



4 October  
December  
2016

# Romanian Military Thinking

Military Theory and Science Journal  
Published by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff



Founded in 1864 under the name "România Militară"  
- English edition, 12<sup>th</sup> year -

# Romanian Military Thinking

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*Romanian Military Thinking Journal*  
is issued in March, June, September, December.

ISSN 1841-4451 ~ Print  
ISSN 1842-824X ~ Online

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HIGH ROYAL DECREE NO. 3663  
THROUGH WHICH "MILITARY ROMANIA"  
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F Category – "Promotion of Culture"  
(Presidential Decree no. 483 on 30.06.2014)

4 October  
December  
2016

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
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# Our Romania

*"I was born here and since then I have been tied to this place. It is like a life sentence. Organically, homeland exists in me and I cannot abandon it. I miss it otherwise".*

Academician Dan Berindei

I passed through Alba Iulia on a cold November Saturday and I felt like spending a few hours into the Citadel. I had visited it before but many images were already faded. I found out that many efforts had been made to restore this Pantheon of the Romanian nation according to its well-deserved historical importance.

However, I left it intrigued after, tempted into a dialogue with a *well-intentioned* volunteer guide, I heard another story of the Citadel, the Unification, the Reunification, Transylvania, Romania. A story – or another kind of history, as the *respectable* person called it, convinced that I would be open-mouthed in astonishment hearing for the first time the *truths* that he told me *disinterestedly*. In fact, it was a story like many others I have heard or read here and there, told or written by other occasional historians, one better *informed* than the other. I would have remained indifferent that time too if the person had not insistently presented himself a true-born Romanian and, of course, an undeniable patriot. Unfortunately, there are many like him.

No, mister *patriot*, the integrity and independence of Romania are not discussed and negotiated over the counter, they are affirmed and defended. Anywhere and at any price! And Romania is the whole our country, with its positive and less positive aspects, but, I repeat, the whole country, not just what suits us at a particular moment in time. For the country independence and freedom not only those from its richest regions but also those from the regions less favoured by history or by God made the supreme sacrifice.

In Alba Iulia, in December 1918, in one of the great – but unfortunately few – auspicious moments in our history, Transylvania got united with the Country. And so it shall remain for ever. The Romanian homeland is only one, and any federation or regional autonomy chimera will only result in our national being dissipation and dissolution in the slipstream of foreign interests and, inevitably, in the mists of history.

Patriotism was the binder that contributed to the building of the country. The country we have the duty to keep whole and place where it should be, namely among the respected nations. It will not be easy for us to preserve this place, but we are obliged to do it, otherwise we cannot face history.

We are also Europeans and we must cherish continental values. Without letting ourselves intoxicated by the promise of globalisation, we must present ourselves to the world having the sense of equality of opportunity. On a planet that gets increasingly hot, almost burning, prospects being uncertain, we need, more than ever, national and international solidarity, we are obliged to get our energies united to resolve the great problems of humanity, not get them exhausted in ridiculous disputes and divergences.

Patriotism is the engine that gets the country ahead, that backs the determining historical deeds. Yet can we currently talk about patriotism as a certainty, as an undeniable mindset? Can we talk about patriotism when millions of Romanians leave the country in search of a better life? Can we talk about patriotism when, unfortunately, it is no longer found in any curriculum? Can we talk about patriotism when this process of mental and behavioural disintegration seems unstoppable, when love of country seems an antiquated concept that no longer finds its place among our core values? Can we talk about patriotism when the appeal to history is but a way to stain our past?

The moment patriotism disappears the country is in danger of dissolution. Compromised by its invocation up to paroxysm during communism and thrown away together with it, patriotism needs to be urgently reinstated.


We need the school to return to the core values and preserve, through teachers and books, our identity and love of country, to thoroughly prepare the new generations to assume the responsibility for the national being preservation. The values exodus will undoubtedly result in the country regressing. Every ounce of intelligence that leaves the country means a minus in the country material and cultural patrimony; it means loss of the nation power.

On the other hand, we need elites to affirm the real image of the country in the world, as there are many who denigrate it.

Of course, we need a serious and responsible political class for the future of the country, a political class having political not only material ambitions, able to generate and maintain a genuine national attitude in line with our real interests.

We need to love our country! Let us all love our Romania!

*Long live My Country!*

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*  
**English version by**  
*Diana Cristiana LUPU*



# Notre Roumanie

„Je suis né ici et je suis lié d'alors de ce terre.  
Il est une sorte d'une condamnation à la vie. Organiquement,  
la patrie existe en moi et je ne le peux pas abandonner.  
Elle me manque sinon elle ne me plus appartient”.

Académicien Dan Berindei

**J**e suis allé, un samedi froid de Novembre, par Alba Iulia et je voulais attarder quelques heures dans la Cité. Je l'avais vue, il a y plusieurs ans, mais beaucoup d'images sont déjà détériorées. Maintenant, j'ai vu et j'ai ressenti qu'ici on eu même beaucoup fait pour replacer ce Panthéon du peuple roumain à son bien méritoire altitude historique.

Mais j'étais parti contrarié, après que, tenté d'un dialogue avec un bénévole guide *bien intentionné*, j'ai entendu une autre histoire de la Cité, de l'Union, de la Réunification, de la Transylvanie, de la Roumanie. Une histoire – ou d'une autre sorte d'histoire, comme l'appelait *le respectable homme*, convaincu que je reste étonné entendant *ces vérités* pour la première fois et dont il me fournissait *désintéressé* – comme beaucoup d'autres que j'ai les entendu ou lis ici et là, parlés ou écrits par d'autres historiens de circonstance plus ou moins *documentés*. Et je restais, aussi cette fois-ci, indifférent si la personne respective n'était pas recommandée – avec insistance – comme un Roumain véritable et, bien sûr, un patriote incontestable. Et, malheureusement, il y a beaucoup comme lui.

Non, monsieur *patriote*, l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Roumanie ne se discutent pas et ne se négocient aux étals du marché, mais elles s'affirment et elles se défendent. Partout et à tout prix! Et la Roumanie est notre pays entière, avec ses bons et ses moins bon, mais, je répète, tout pays, pas seulement ce qui nous convient dans un moment ou en autre. Pour son indépendance et la liberté du pays ont versé leur sang non seulement ceux qui habitent aux régions les plus riches, mais aussi ceux de régions plus méprisés par l'histoire ou par Dieu.

Chez Alba Iulia, en Décembre 1918, dans une de plus grands – et, malheureusement, quelques uns – moments favorables de notre histoire, la Transylvanie était unie avec le Pays. Et il doit rester comme ça pour toujours. La patrie roumaine est qu'une seule et toute chimère de fédéralisation ou d'autonomie régionale va signifier une sorte de perdre, d'effilochage de notre Etre nationale dans le sillage des intérêts étrangers et, inévitablement, dans le sombre de l'histoire.

Le patriotisme était le liant par lequel a été construit un pays. Un pays que nous devons le garder entier et nous le placer la où il appartient, parmi les nations dignes. Il ne sera pas facile de le garder cet endroit, mais nous sommes obligés de le faire, sinon nous ne pouvons pas regarder œil pour œil avec l'histoire.

Nous sommes en même temps Européens et nous devons souscrire aux valeurs continentales. Sans de laisser griser par la promesse de la mondialisation, nous devons présenter devant le monde avec des sentiments d'égalité. Sur une planète de plus en plus chaude, presque brûlante, avec des perspectives incertaines, nous avons besoin, plus que jamais, de la solidarité nationale et internationale. Nous sommes obligés d'unir nos énergies pour résoudre de grands problèmes de l'humanité et de ne pas les épuiser dans des conflits et des différends insignifiants.

Le patriotisme c'est le moteur qui conduit un pays en avant, qui soutient les faits historiques déterminants. Mais, est-ce qu'on peut parler aujourd'hui du patriotisme comme une certitude, comme un état d'esprit indéniable? Peut-on parler de patriotisme alors que des millions de Roumains partent à l'étrangère à la recherche d'une vie meilleure? Peut-on parler de patriotisme alors quand, par malheur, aujourd'hui il n'y a plus des programmes écoliers? Peut-on parler de patriotisme alors que ce processus de désintégration mentale et comportementale semble impossible à arrêter, quand l'amour de pays apparaît comme un concept dépassé qui ne trouve pas sa place parmi nos valeurs essentielles? Peut-on parler de patriotisme alors quand l'appel à l'histoire a resté qu'une manière d'encrasser notre histoire?

Alors quand le patriotisme disparaît, le pays est au danger de sa dispersion. Un compromis par invoquer jusqu'au paroxysme dans le communisme et jeté avec lui, il a besoin de le rétablir d'urgence à sa fonction naturelle.

Nous avons besoin d'une école pour revenir aux valeurs fondamentales et à maintenir, par des enseignants et des livres, notre identité et l'amour du pays, pour préparer vivement les nouvelles générations pour assumer la responsabilité de préserver l'entité nationale. L'exode des valeurs conduise, indubitablement, au régrès du pays. Chaque morceau d'intelligence allé à l'étranger signifie un moins dans le trésor matériel et culturel du pays, il signifie la perte de la puissance du pays.

D'autre part, nous avons besoin d'élites qui représentent dans le monde l'imaginaire réelle du notre pays. Ne vous inquiétez pas, il y a beaucoup d'autres qui jettent y de la boue.

Nous avons besoin, bien sûr, d'une classe politique sérieuse et responsable pour le futur du pays, avec d'ambitions politiques et non seulement matérielles, pour générer et maintenir une attitude nationale authentique, d'aller en avant et d'en accomplir, en consensus de nos intérêts réels.

Nous avons besoin d'aimer notre pays.

*Aimons tous notre Roumanie!*

***Version française par  
Alina PAPOI***

# ARE VIOLENT CRISES AND CONFLICTS INEVITABLE?

*Professor Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ*

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*Many famous people, among them Roman playwright Plautus, philosopher Thomas Hobbes and public intellectual Gore Vidal, believe that conflict among humans is permanent or “natural” as Hendrik W. van der Merwe, a pioneer of conflict resolution, has recently written.*

*It is right that human beings confront each other for almost everything within different kinds of competition. Unfortunately, competitions transform into violent confrontations given the human nature, especially the one of community leaders.*

*Despite many pessimistic prognoses regarding international relations, reconciliation is still possible but it takes time, being necessary negotiations and willingness to understand and accept that we, human beings, are different in race, religion and culture.*

**Keywords:** *violence; conflict; crisis; confrontation; human nature; reconciliation*

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## 1. Introduction

Human ingenuity when it comes to create means of mass destruction and influence to impose certain decisions seems to be greater than when it comes to spur progress and harmonious development of relations between individuals and communities.

Currently, the world is no longer in a position to draw a clear line between civilian and military, between war and peace, between normal and tense relations, because of the states competition for power, influence and resources. What was considered beneficial or at least inoffensive for people health and security some decades ago is now not recommended or even dangerous to be used. Thus dual technology emerged. Examples in this regard: chemical fertilizers based on nitrogen can be used to increase the agricultural production, as well as to develop improvised explosive devices; satellites can be used to communicate, to study meteorological developments, to guide ships

and any other types of vehicles, but also to guide missiles to hit targets; nuclear energy can be used to produce electricity, to help curing different diseases, as well as to produce highly destructive bombs and missiles etc. The word is intended to improve communication and relations between people but it can also be used

as an “*weapon that does not kill*”, influencing the course of events for the better or for the worse. Naturally, caricature is meant to satirise manners and to help those whose behaviour violates moral or legal norms. However, lately, caricature has become a true “*casus belli*”, not recognised as such by the UN Charter and international laws. It is notorious in this respect the violent reaction of some extremist Muslims who killed part of the members of the editorial team of the Parisian magazine *Charlie Hebdo* because they published some Prophet Muhammad cartoons<sup>1</sup>. On similar grounds, the embassies and consulates of the states in which the Islam Prophet cartoons were published were attacked and partially destroyed in Libya, in Egypt and in other Muslim states.

## 2. Causes of Crises and Violent Confrontations

It is known that interests and emotions have been at the origin of most problems in the relations between individuals and communities since Ancient times. Jerome D. Frank and Andrei Y. Melville consider that “*In the past, major causes of wars were efforts of rival tribes or nations to gain control over tangible resources such as territories, national resources or labour force*”<sup>2</sup>. Herbert C. Helman adds to the above-mentioned causes mistrust, suspicion and fear of losing reputation<sup>3</sup> manifested by personalities, parties, communities and even the institutions in the states in tense situations, which should make the decision to negotiate, to identify peaceful solutions to the problems disputed by the confronting parties.

There are studies that place among the causes of violent confrontations and crises ethnic diversity<sup>4</sup>, poverty – that generates the confrontation between the poor and the rich –, income inequity, social changes, social mobility (immigration<sup>5</sup> that generates conflicts between natives and immigrants), discrimination

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<sup>1</sup> Samir Khalil Samir, *The Film and Muhammad Cartoons: Is Time for Healthy Secularism in the West and Islam*, AsiaNews.it, 26.09.2012, see <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/The-film-and-Muhammad-cartoons:-its-time-for-a-healthy-secularism-in-the-West-and-Islam-25918.html>, retrieved on 04.10.2014.

<sup>2</sup> Jerome D. Frank and Andrei Y. Melville, *The Image of the Enemy and the Process of Change*, John Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, see <https://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/frank.html>, retrieved on 09.02.2017.

<sup>3</sup> Herbert C. Helman, *Building Trust among Enemies: The Central Challenge for International Conflict Resolution*, Harvard University, 10 July 2005, p. 640, see [https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hckelman/files/Building\\_trust\\_among\\_enemies\\_IJIR.pdf](https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hckelman/files/Building_trust_among_enemies_IJIR.pdf), retrieved on 01.02.2017.

<sup>4</sup> *Does Ethnic Diversity Cause Conflict?*, Debating Europe, 19.01.2015, see <http://www.dwbatingeurope.eu/2015/01/19/does-ethnic-diversity-cause-conflict.html>, retrieved on 20.02.1017.

<sup>5</sup> Charles Recknagel, *Why Don't Rich Arab Gulf States Welcome Syrian Refugees*, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 4 September 2015.

based on religion<sup>6</sup>, gender<sup>7</sup> and race<sup>8</sup>, fear<sup>9</sup> – generated, usually, by arms race, lack of knowledge or misinterpretation of nonverbal communication (actions in the field of security, especially those related to its military component)<sup>10</sup> etc.

The struggle for power – political, economic, financial – and influence was and continues to be a constant in the relations between individuals and communities. When competition became a real fight like “*who wins who loses*” tensions and violent confrontations between individuals, social groups and communities appeared. Some political and religious leaders got drunk with power and they involved the communities they led in confrontations in order to take control over other peoples, claiming the insufficiency of “*vital space*”, the need to defend and expand religion, democracy – through “*democracy export*”<sup>11</sup>, liberty – through “*revolution export*”<sup>12</sup> etc. Power drunk<sup>13</sup> and megalomania made some leaders lose touch with reality, initiating the cult of personality, calling themselves or accepting to be called “*king of the world*”<sup>14</sup>, “*whip of God*”, “*primus inter pares*”, “*king of kings*”<sup>15</sup>, „*el lider*

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<sup>6</sup> Rachel Woodlock, Antony Loewenstein, Jane Caro, Simon Smart, *Doesn't Religion Cause Most of the Conflict in the World?*, in *The Guardian*, 02.07.2013, see <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/02/religion-wars-conflict>, retrieved on 05.10.2014.

<sup>7</sup> Aaron David Miller, *A Great Power Caught between Allies and Adversaries*, Real Clear World, 5 February 2016, see [http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2016/02/usa\\_iran\\_israel\\_allies\\_adversaries\\_111692.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2016/02/usa_iran_israel_allies_adversaries_111692.html), retrieved on 01.02.2017.

<sup>8</sup> *A Video History of UN Outbursts*, The Daily Beast Video, 22.09.2009, see <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2009/09/22/a-video-history-of-un-outbursts.html>, retrieved on 13.09.2016 (During the UN General Assembly meeting in 1975 it was adopted Resolution 3370 condemning Israel Zionist policy, considered “*a form of racism and racial discrimination*”).

<sup>9</sup> Douglas E. Noll, *The Need to Face Your Adversary*, April 2002, see <http://www.nollassociates.com/Columns/Peace38.html>, retrieved on 02.02.2017.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Scheer, *The Insanity of a New Cold War: A Top Russian Scholar Sounds the Alarm*, in *The Huffington Post*, 14 January 2017, see [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-scheer/the-insanity-of-a-new-col\\_b\\_14168704.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-scheer/the-insanity-of-a-new-col_b_14168704.html), retrieved on 03.03.2017.

<sup>11</sup> Danielle Archibugi, *Democracy for Export: Principles, Practices, Lessons*, openDemocracy, 5 March 2008, see <https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy-for-export-principles-practices-lessons>, retrieved on 02.10.2014.

<sup>12</sup> Eric Hobsbawn, *The Dangers of Exporting Democracy*, in *The Guardian*, 22.01.2005, see <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jan/22/usa.comment>, retrieved on 02.10.2014.

<sup>13</sup> Dan Victor Balaesh, *Proiectul European este astăzi... pe coji de nucă*, in *Săptămâna financiară*, 1 August 2016, see <http://www.sfn.ro/politica-si-finante/proiectul-european-este-astazi-pe-coji-de-nuca/>, retrieved on 09.09.2016, see also Pitagora, *39 de legi ale moralei si ale politicii*, Dimline, 11.04.2014, <http://dimline.blogspot.ro/2014/04/pitagora-39-de-legi-ale-moralei-si-ale.html> (Pythagoras considered power drunk could be prevented only by allowing “*statesmen the time to get accustomed with power and honours*”), retrieved on 09.09.2016.

<sup>14</sup> Joshua J. Mark, *Ashurnasirpal II*, *Ancient Encyclopedia*, 09.07.2014, see [http://www.ancient.eu/Ashurnasirpal\\_II/](http://www.ancient.eu/Ashurnasirpal_II/), retrieved on 28.11.2015.

<sup>15</sup> Peter Beaumont, *Muammar Gaddafi, the 'King of Kings' Dies in His Hometown*, in *The Guardian*, 20 October 2011, see <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/20/muammar-gaddafi-dies-city-birth>, retrieved on 09.10.2016.

*maximo*”, “father of peoples”<sup>16</sup>, “great helmsman”, “providential man”<sup>17</sup> etc. showing discretionary behaviour towards those he led even to conducting aggressive actions against other communities.

It seems that most of the important personalities in recent history have not learned or have neglected the lessons of history; otherwise it is difficult to understand or accept another explanation for the behaviour exhibited by some leaders of states and communities who, although claiming to support democracy and human rights, have made decisions promoting discrimination, racism, xenophobia and club law. It is possible for these attitudes to be considered “natural”, namely deriving from the people “natural” tendency towards conflict (some experts, including Hendrik W. van der Merwe, considers conflict as being natural and even constructive if properly managed<sup>18</sup>).

Poor communication between human communities<sup>19</sup>, the “lack of communication” (actually, communication breakdown) and, in general, the way in which states and communities communicate represent, according to Paul Dobrescu, “a weapon, maybe the most powerful one, meant to human being conditioning and mystification”<sup>20</sup>, double standard in international relations (regarding minorities rights, treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism etc.), globalisation negative (perverse) side effects<sup>21</sup> also being important causes of crises and confrontation between states and groups of states.

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<sup>16</sup> Aleksandr Soljenitiņin, *Arhipelagul Gulag*, vol. 1, Editura Univers, București, 1997, p. 318.

<sup>17</sup> Gilbert Mercier, *Magical Thinking and the Myth of Providential Men*, News Junkie Post, 30 August 2014, see <http://newsjunkiepost.com/2014/08/30/magical-thinking-and-the-myth-of-providential-men/>, retrieved on 10.10.2016.

<sup>18</sup> Hendrik W. van der Merwe et al., *Principles of Communication between Adversaries in South Africa*, in *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, eds. John Burton and Frank Dukes (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990) 216-40. This article summary written by: Tanya Glaser, *Conflict Research Consortium*, retrieved on 01.02.2017.

<sup>19</sup> Solomon Marcus, *Comunicarea internațională ca sursă de conflicte noi*, in *Despre pace și război în era nucleară*, Editura Politică, București, 1985, p. 137.

<sup>20</sup> Paul Dobrescu, *Un despot modern – opinia publică*, in *Revista română de comunicare și relații publice*, no. 2-3/2000, p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> *Sept pièces du puzzle néolibéral: la quatrième guerre mondiale a commencé*, in *Le monde diplomatique*, August 1997, pp. 4-5, apud Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalizarea și efectele ei sociale*, p. 72, see also Dani Rodrick, *Sense and Nonsense of the Globalization Debate*, in *Foreign Policy*, no. 107, 1997, p. 19, see also David Korten, *Corporațiile conduc lumea*, pp.290-291 (“Developing states had to hire foreign advisers enjoying exorbitant salaries and luxurious advantages in key positions..., multinational corporations exploited their resources and penetrated their markets ..., during each progress stage, their social structure got weaker and their dependence on foreign economy got higher...”).

### 3. The Violent World We Live In

History has recorded the existence of psychopaths that enjoyed pulling out the eyes of their opponents<sup>22</sup>, of mass killers that built “*skull pyramids*” and “*death plains*”<sup>23</sup>, or “*corpse pyramids*”<sup>24</sup>. Nowadays, there are also atrocities in Ukraine and the Middle East, seeming to confirm the opinions of notorious people from ancient times up to present who consider conflict in the relations between people as normal<sup>25</sup>. Currently, some journalists, who violate the Code of Ethics, state that the world we live in is ugly and it has to be presented as such<sup>26</sup>. Stephen J. Ball, in his study *The Necessity and Violence of Theory*, describes the world as being “*complicated, confusing and uncertain*”<sup>27</sup>, because, inter alia, of the fact that human violence is influenced by genetics and environment. Erwin Staub incriminates the “*cultural and societal conditions that prevent the community members from meeting their basic psychological needs, situation that makes violence more probable than in the case of ensuring a proper environment for peaceful development*”<sup>28</sup>.

We, human beings, are proud of being the only beings on Planet Earth endowed with reason. Unfortunately, the actions conducted by a large number of fellow beings cannot be subsumed under rational ones. I refer to rationality guided by moral and legal norms that should be known, accepted and observed by all of us. Unfortunately, some moral laws and norms are questioned

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<sup>22</sup> Johanna and Nicolae Șarambei, *99 personalități ale lumii antice*, Editura Semne, București, 1997, pp. 457-458.

<sup>23</sup> *Genocidul din Cambodgia. Pol Pot și câmpiile morții*, article posted on 06.03.2010 on <http://www.conflictelelumii.blogspot.com/2010/03/genocidul-din-cambodgia-pol-pot-si-cimpiile-mortii.html>, retrieved on 2.03.2012.

<sup>24</sup> Michael Worth Davison, editor-in-chief, *Când, unde, cum și de ce s-a întâmplat. Cele mai dramatice evenimente... și cum au schimbat ele lumea*, p. 90 (Mongol hordes took prisoners very rarely, instead leaving corpses, skeletons and human skulls arranged in pyramids).

<sup>25</sup> Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1955, p. 57, apud Dr Lewis B. Ware, *An Islamic Concept of Conflict in Its Historical Context*, Stephen J. Blank, Lawrence E. Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Bynum E. Wheaters, *Conflict, Culture and History*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, 1993, p. 67 (“*human nature makes war a norm and not an exception*”).

<sup>26</sup> Sue O'Brien, Mary Ann Shake, Mark Nolan, *A Picture of Controversy*, Journalism Ethics Cases Online, Indiana University, School of Journalism.

<sup>27</sup> Stephen J. Ball, *The Necessity and Violence of Theory*, Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 2006, 27 (1), pp. 3-10.

<sup>28</sup> Erwin Staub, *Notes on Cultures of Violence, Cultures of Basic Human Needs*, International Society of Caring and Peace and the Fulfilment of Political Psychology, Blackwell Publishing Inc., MA, USA, 2003, p. 1.

on religious<sup>29</sup>, economic, financial and cultural grounds. The Dalai Lama said that we, human beings, are equal, regardless of race, religion and gender. In fact, we are equal only in relation to legal norms, as each and every of us has got different development depending on education, convictions (religious, political etc.), personal and group interests, cultural customs etc., aspects that impose proper norms of conduct.

Some religious denominations norms seem to be insurmountable because the numerous attempts to harmonise them have resulted in promises, delays or diplomatic<sup>30</sup> or bellicose refusals to accept different points of view.

#### 4. Possible Solutions

Following the First World War, the international community initiated measures meant to resolve the violent crises and conflicts between states using negotiations, by establishing the League of Nations and then, following the Second World War, the United Nations Organisation. Therefore, when states and communities are confronted with tense situations, the UN initiates measures to settle disputes through mediation, peace enforcement and peace keeping missions. Nevertheless, they have not been always successful, and violent confrontations persist because of some unresolved issues among the states in the world.

Under such circumstances, I consider it is necessary:

- to thoroughly learn the lessons of history so that the errors and consequent suffering related to violent events cannot be repeated;
- to educate the young generations so that they can be more tolerant and compassionate and to correctly perceive social justice and the moral norms that govern the society;
- for states and communities to make sustained efforts to reconcile with history<sup>31</sup>.

#### 5. Conclusions

Throughout the history of states and communities there have been abnormal behaviour described by authors like Herodotus (*Istoriei*, volume 1 – Clio, Editura Teora, București, 1998), Alexandr Solzhenitsyn (*Arhipelagul Gulag*,

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<sup>29</sup> Small Keith, *Mutual Misconception. Christian Misconceptions about Islam and Muslim Misconceptions about Christianity*, Debate.org.uk, 18.02.1997, see <http://www.debate.org.uk/debate-topics/theological/small/>, retrieved on 30.09.2014.

<sup>30</sup> John Bowker, *Credințe care au schimbat lumea*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 2007.

<sup>31</sup> Corneliu Vlad, *Reconcilierea*, Editura Institutului Revoluției Române din Decembrie 1989, București, 2009, pp. 20-29.



Editura Univers, volumes 1-3, București, 1997), Ivan Stadniuk (*Războiul*, volumes 1-3, Editura Militară, București, 1986), Thomas Ambrose (*Despoți și dictatori*, Editura Litera, București, 2008), Johana and Nicolaie Șarambei (*99 personalități ale lumii antice*, Editura Semne, București, 1997), Guido Knopp (*Războinicii lui Hitler*, Editura Litera, București, 2010), Paul Johnson (*O istorie a lumii moderne 1920-2000*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2003), Pierre Accoce, Dr Pierre Rentchwick (*Acești bolnavi care ne guvernează*, Editura Tribuna, Craiova), Michael Lee Lanning (*100 de personalități militare ale lumii*, Editura Orizonturi, Editura de Științe Sociale și Politice, București, 2005), Lawrence Rees (*Auschwitz. Naziștii și soluția finală*, Editura Rao, București, 2007), Adrian MacLiman (*Haosul care vine, război fără nume, inamic fără chip*, Editura Mașina de scris, București, 2004), Jeremy Black – coordinator (*Șaptezeci de bătălii ale tuturor timpurilor*, Oradea, Editura Aquila '93, 2006), Ian V. Hogg (*Dicționarul marilor bătălii*, Editura Artemis, București, 2000), Dr Karl Magyar (*Culture and Conflict in Africa's History: The Transition to the Modern Era*, essay published in *Conflict, Culture and History. Regional Dimensions*), Paul Donnelley (*Asasini și asasinate care au schimbat istoria lumii*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2009), Steve Făinaru (*Legea celor puternici*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2009) etc. Knowing all these aspects, I consider it is natural for us to make sustained efforts to avoid repeating the traumas individuals and communities have experienced. Unfortunately, it is evident that the history of confrontation, especially the atrocities committed in different periods of history by some peoples forefathers, have mentally and almost irremediably marked their descendants. This truth is especially revealed in crisis situations when the hatchet is too easily dug up.

Even under these circumstances, maintaining crises and conflicts at the level of “*nonviolent competition*” or debate would be possible if all the people or at least their majority were more tolerant towards their fellows belonging to other races, ethnic groups and religions.

Reconciliation is possible but it requires time (Corneliu Vlad considers that “*reconciliation is a long if not permanent process*”<sup>32</sup>), as well as sustained efforts and negotiations between the parties involved in confrontations for different reasons.

**English version by**  
 **Diana Cristiana LUPU**

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 24.

# ROMANIA

## – A Country in the Middle of a “Perfect Storm” –

Major General Dr Petrică-Lucian FOCA  
Colonel Dr Vasile CERBU

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*The Wider Black Sea Region is geostrategically and geoeconomically important due to some key positions such as the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits, the Peninsula of Crimea, the Danube and the Sulina Branch, the Serpents' Island, and the Georgian littoral. The authors consider that this part of Europe is defined using criteria that are rather political and economic than geographic, including the littoral states: Greece, FRY Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan. The WBSR was one of the themes on the agenda of the 2016 Warsaw NATO Summit. During the summit were adopted some measures of maximum importance for our country that is, as the authors put it, in the middle of a “perfect storm”: Turkey in the South, the Caucasus in the East, Crimea and Donbas in the North, and migration in the West.*

**Keywords:** *air capabilities; regional powers; Wider Black Sea Region*

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he Black Sea became a security complex in the late '90s, following the post-war relations developments<sup>1</sup>.

The *Black Sea Region* is disputed between three major security complexes represented by the Euro-Atlantic bloc, the Middle East and the former Soviet space. The fault lines that divide the three major complexes intersect and form a virtual strategic triangle (which corresponds to the Black Sea). The geopolitics of this region is strongly influenced by the internal actions and external aspirations of the great regional powers, such as the Russian Federation and Turkey, as well as of the smaller states such as Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, all desiring to ensure their security within not only specific regional mechanisms but also the European and NATO ones. The other small countries (Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) are not integrated in security complexes and fearfully watch the evolution of the geopolitical relationships.

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<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.facebook.com/notes/iulian/chifu-istoriaunuiconcept-de-securitate-regiunea-extinsă-a-mării-negre/>, retrieved on 15 February 2016.

In recent years, the Black Sea Region has gained consistency, reflected in the attention it is given by the EU and the USA. Scrutiny is motivated by several factors. One is the fact that the Black Sea is the point of departure/entry in the New Middle East, access being impossible without the cooperation of the neighbouring states. It is also held that he who controls the Black Sea will control the most important areas in the New Middle East. The *Black Sea Region (BSR)* is also the place crossed by the “*new Silk Road*” through which are carried the energy resources (oil and gas) the EU is dependent on.

The *BSR* can become a part of Europe, given that all the riparian states, excepting the Russian Federation, want to become EU members<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore, the *WBSR* is also a source of risks, given the “*frozen*” conflicts in the former Soviet countries, to which is added the most dangerous conflict ongoing in eastern Ukraine – with implications yet imprecisely defined, and the first act meant to modify the borders of a state by force, which was the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation<sup>3</sup>.

The *WBSR* started to draw attention due to the fact that, recently, it has resumed its destabilising geopolitical potential with possible global implications. In recent years, a new concept has appeared – *the Wider Black Sea Region* – which defines a region not according to geographic criteria, but rather, to politico-economic ones, including riparian states – Greece, FYR Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan<sup>4</sup>.

The *Wider Black Sea Region (WBSR)* is positioned at the border between Europe and Asia, between the Russian Federation and the New Middle East, connecting Southeast Europe to Western Europe via the Danube River, and being the intersection of two axes: the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, Central Asia and Western Europe, respectively<sup>5</sup>.

There are several key positions in the *WBSR* that help increase its strategic and geo-economic importance, such as the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, allowing access to the Planetary Ocean, controlled by one single state: Turkey; the Crimean Peninsula, an advanced stronghold, a real “*aircraft carrier*” well anchored in the ground, with major air, naval and land facilities; the Danube flows into the sea and ships sail on the Sulina branch to Brăila; the Snake Island,

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<sup>2</sup> See <http://www.euronaval.ro/53-zona-extinsă-a-mării-negre-zonă-de-importanță-strategică-pentru-România/>, retrieved on 17 June 2016.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>4</sup> See [www.academia.edu/67672/crimeea-geostrategic-base-between-the-Balkans-and-the-Caucasus/](http://www.academia.edu/67672/crimeea-geostrategic-base-between-the-Balkans-and-the-Caucasus/), retrieved on 29 May 2016.

<sup>5</sup> See [www.hotnews.ro/știri-opinii-16697667-crimeea-problemă-internațională/](http://www.hotnews.ro/știri-opinii-16697667-crimeea-problemă-internațională/), retrieved on 21 March 2016.

whose importance has grown in recent years, both economically (for the delineation of the Exclusive Economic Zone) and militarily (situated close to Crimea); the Georgian coast – access point for the pipelines from Central Asia<sup>6</sup>.

The events in the *WBSR* are largely influenced by Turkey but even more acutely by the Russian Federation, especially since Vladimir Putin began his third presidential mandate, basing his authority on the nationalism and religiosity of the Orthodox Russian people, thus having a strong impact on the Russian minorities living on the territory of former Soviet republics. Strategically speaking, some former Soviet republics have fluctuated between entering the Russian sphere of influence, which presents the project of the Eurasian Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia etc.), while others are not involved at all (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan etc.) and yet another part of them are still hesitant about joining the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia).

The Russian Federation exploits every opportunity to discourage the expressions of independence of former Soviet republics, being interested in creating a sanitary cordon/security cordon between the Euro-Atlantic space and its own area of influence. The Russian diplomacy also calls this area by the name “*close vicinity*”. The accession of the Eastern Europe countries to Euro-Atlantic institutions has been appreciated by the Russian Federation as a US policy of containment and the actions derived from the development of the missile shield as a provocative act and a threat to its security. In line with this logic, the Russian Federation opposes the integration of former Soviet republics (particularly Moldova and Georgia) in the Euro-Atlantic economic and security mechanisms. Under these circumstances, Ukraine refused to enter the security arrangements initiated by the Russian Federation on the grounds that an international neutrality policy should be preferred.

The crisis deepened when, in November 2013, amid the intensification of internal and external contradictions, Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign the Association Agreement and Free Trade with the EU in Vilnius, which meant giving up its European path; instead, he signed a similar agreement with the Russian Federation for the association to the Eurasian project initiated by President Vladimir Putin. The reason for this act was Russia’s more generous offer consisting in \$15 billion funds and economic concessions.

In the case of Ukraine, a country of transit for the oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia and Siberia to Europe, the Russian Federation has used over time the economic blackmail to raise obstacles to the European course of Kiev<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> See [www.academia.edu/67672/crimeea-geostrategic-base-between-theBalkans-and-the-Caucasus/](http://www.academia.edu/67672/crimeea-geostrategic-base-between-theBalkans-and-the-Caucasus/), retrieved on 29 May 2016.

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.estica.eu/article/noua-ucraină-contextul-geopolitic-internațional>, retrieved on 16 June 2016.

At the same time, Ukraine, with a population of over 45 million inhabitants, has the vulnerability of a people struggling with a national identity crisis, insufficiently elucidated, volatile and lacking homogeneity. Also, Ukraine is an artificial state, coagulated through territorial concessions and donations, internally biased between the East and the West throughout history – an ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic and economic cleavage. This historical split has created a rift between pro-Russians and pro-Europeans, each side having almost 50% representation in the Parliament<sup>8</sup>.

Following the Vilnius act, street protests were organised and resulted in the expulsion of President Viktor Yanukovich (who fled to the Russian Federation). It is estimated that over 1 million people were involved in street demonstrations, which spread especially in the Western regions and that both parties used firearms with lethal ammunition, thus over 100 dead and great property damage being recorded. To their honour, the Ukrainian armed forces refused to engage in violence against demonstrators. After Viktor Yanukovich fled from the country, in order to avoid the intensification of the violent actions and their transformation into civil war, the Parliament dissolved itself and a new legislative package was issued for the impeachment and indictment of President Viktor Yanukovich, for the formation of a provisional government, the announcement of early elections, the amnesty of political detainees, financial compensations to the victims of the revolution, and some other measures with an anti-Russian tinge like the prohibition of the use of Russian language in schools and administration. After the President left the country, in southern and eastern regions clashes emerged between the supporters of the new government and the opposition. The attempts of the camps to negotiate did not lead to any solution.

We note that, historically, Muscovite Russia originated in Kievan Russia and, consequently, the Russian Federation acted quickly and resolutely by applying the Kosovo pattern exactly as in the case of Serbia by withdrawing the envoy engaged in the talks in Kiev, annexing Crimea, not recognising the elected government, considering it a coup, and annulling its offer of financial support for Ukraine. In Crimea, the annexation occurred without violence and with the use of unmarked military contingents, just the way the US had acted in Iraq, eluding international regulations. Vladimir Putin began to apply the book of Russian ethnics and of “voluntary” military contingents, with tactics to conquer power specific to Bolshevism: the infiltration of propagandists and influence agitators, transit tourists etc.

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<sup>8</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Geopolitics of Ukraine's Schism*, in *Agence Global*, 15 May 2016.

Later, referendums were held that legalised through vote the Crimean independence and the demand for union with the Russian Federation, thus the annexation becoming *de facto*. They ordered measures for the reorganisation and administration of the province, as well as for the organisation of a very strong military disposition, consisting of more than 40,000 soldiers, dozens of helicopters, warships and submarines, hundreds of tanks, artillery, and over 100 planes with different destinations. The measures were taken quickly because there was the risk that the naval military bases in Sevastopol and Balaklava, the airports and land posts could have been transferred to NATO, if Ukraine had joined the Alliance.

Following these actions of the Russian Federation, the West responded with economic sanctions, whose effects are easy to be seen since public entities and state-run companies and private companies are targeted<sup>9</sup>. These effects are manifest in all fields.

In other provinces located in south-eastern Ukraine (which belonged to it only for short periods of time), inhabited mainly by Russophiles, unmarked military structures appeared quickly, declaring themselves counterrevolutionary, with Russian ethnics occupying the premises of a number of state institutions and causing clashes between the representatives of the two camps, often ending with casualties.

In order to resolve the situation, the interim government decided to employ armed forces, aiming at regaining control of the provinces in the southeast, where security forces failed to manage the situation. The insurgent forces used individual weapons and major military equipment (tanks, APCs, IFVs, missile launchers, artillery of all calibre etc.) that had been provided, allegedly, by the Russian armed forces, managing to shoot down helicopters and aircraft with different destinations, to destroy armoured vehicles and tanks of the governmental forces and to produce considerable casualties among them. The conflict escalated, the number of the troops and means employed growing considerably, at the same time becoming even stronger and more diversified, so that the number of victims exceeded the figure of 6,000, according to analysts.

The Russian Federation as well as Ukraine conducted actions specific to psychological and information warfare, declared that they did not support the insurgents – euphemistically called “*self-defence forces*” – with either troops or military equipment, blaming Kiev for war escalation, war crimes, disproportionate use of force, use of force against civilians, as well as for the fact that volunteer units consisted of “*volunteers*” from western Ukraine, some having even fascist orientation.

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<sup>9</sup> See <http://www.estica.ru/article/noua-ucraină-contextul-geopolitic-internațional/>, retrieved on 16 June 2016.

We appreciate that Russia counts on the revitalisation of pan-Slavism, on the growing expansion of the Russian Federation, creating new frozen conflicts to consolidate a line of delineation of its area of influence from NATO's one, which departs from Kaliningrad and passes through Transnistria and the territorial annexations from Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), line including Ukraine that needs to be disciplined. This alignment includes the way out to the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, which allows it to communicate with the world's oceans.

The West fears that the crisis could expand resulting in war with an impact at regional or even global levels. A strengthening of the eastern alignment of the Alliance is desired, on the axis of the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

We have briefly described the development of the events. In what follows, we will try to present the objectives and effects of these actions, as well as the possible scenarios/denouements.

Thus, we consider that the imperatives that shaped the action in Ukraine can be formulated as follows: the Russian Federation – a nuclear superpower; the Russian Federation – a world great power; the Russian Federation – a political, cultural, diplomatic and military power in the former Soviet space. What is new are not the objectives, but the ways they are implemented and achieved. The actions, nevertheless, have generated a negative effect on the elements of this geostrategic triad for the Russian Federation isolated itself, destabilised economically and caused the change of the relations between the EU and Ukraine. However, the majority of the population voted for the independence of Crimea from Ukraine and its unification with the Russian Federation.

In early 2014, the situation in Ukraine was disastrous. Treasury was empty, corruption was generalised (it ranked 144 out of 177 countries, according to *“Transparency International Index”*), the condition of the armed forces and other state structures/elements was critical, and poverty was a widespread phenomenon<sup>10</sup>.

## **The Events in Ukraine and the Economic Implications**

The GDP of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk represents about 30% of the GDP of Ukraine, the national currency of the Russian Federation and Ukraine (the ruble and the hryvnia) experience a sharp depreciation; a number of projects related to investment in the economy of the two countries are cancelled; large amounts

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<sup>10</sup> See Alexandru Bara, *Ucraina – un butoi cu pulbere (un punct de vedere geopolitic)*, Editura Semănătorul – online, 21 June 2016, pp. 34-35.

of currency are withdrawn, so that states are forced to intervene; external financial support is needed, especially for Ukraine (over \$27 billion).

It is worth mentioning that the imposition of sanctions against the Russian Federation also considered the implications for Western economies, starting with the West dependence on Russian energy resources and the selling of their products on the Russian market. But Russia, too, needs technology and financial resources from the West. We emphasise that not all business ties were suspended, but only those aimed at the military industrial complex and the administrative-economic personalities who participated in the decision to annex Crimea and to support the Donbas actions. Certain contracts were affected – those with Rosoboronexport, those of helicopters meant for Afghanistan, “Mistral”-type ship supply by France, B.P., Chevron, Exxon-Mobile actions in the Russian Federation and especially in the Arctic area.

The events in Ukraine have also generated a new paradigm of collective defence, adopted at the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014. Please note that the military budgets of various countries were revised, the plans to modernise the military structures and operational concepts were amended, conforming to the idea that *“to maintain peace, one must prepare for war”*.

The events of 2014 in the Black Sea area produced changes in the geopolitics of the Wider Black Sea Region, the most important being the following:

- a new paradigm of NATO defence, with effects in the Black Sea as well, was adopted;
- the Russian Federation decided to increase the defence budget, although the budget of other ministries was reduced, in order to comply with the multiannual programme for restructuring and modernising the Russian forces;
- the military capacity of the *Strategic Operational Command “South”*, which includes the Black Sea region and the Caucasus, was strengthened;
- the Russian Federation threatens with deployment of nuclear forces in Crimea;
- the Black Sea Fleet became a priority;
- the Russian Federation developed a new type of conflict, the hybrid one, for which it proves to be well prepared;
- the Russian Federation adopted a new military strategy, which stresses that NATO is a threat and the use of nuclear weapons is not excluded, given that the Alliance developed conventional weapon systems with similar nuclear destruction capacity;



- the Russian Federation focused and acted on controlling the Black Sea and its energy resources: it deployed air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles systems in Crimea; it redeployed the strategic bomber and multirole aviation; it deployed a large numbers of troops and military equipment (40,000 soldiers, hundreds of tanks, artillery and armoured systems, electronic warfare systems, special operations troops, over a hundred surface combat ships, strengthening the Black Sea fleet with 6 *Krivak* class corvettes and 6 *Kilo* class submarines, upgraded); Rosneft acquisition of a 49% stake in the oil terminal port of Poti – a terminal of strategic importance as it ensures control of the entire southern energy corridor (the Caucasus); the Russian Federation also deployed in Crimea capabilities that enable the collection of information from across the entire Wider Black Sea Region, as well as the possibility of striking any point in the hostile areas included in that space;
- it generated a readjustment of orientation in the Turkish foreign policy: Turkey signed an acquisition programme for defence missile systems produced in China, which are worth over \$4 billion and are assets with excellent performance (assessed by some experts as even superior to the US *Patriot*, the Russian *S-400* and the European *FD-2000* ones), even if they are not interoperable with NATO systems; also, it exhibits an increasingly pronounced orientation towards the Eurasian Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (which may require even waiving joining the European Union); in this way, China enters the security mechanisms of the Black Sea and joins the club of major suppliers of high-performance military equipment;
- the Russian Federation withdrew from the advisory group that monitors the *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces*, saying that it is not respected by the Western countries, but initiated negotiations for a new treaty which takes into account its own realities and interests;
- we consider that the Russian Federation seeks the federalisation of Ukraine – an objective more advantageous than the occupation because federalisation may enable it to control the political decisions at central level through Russophile and Donbas representatives, and to support the effort of Donbas reconstruction made by the central government of Ukraine, whereas the occupation and incorporation of Ukraine mean a burden for the Kremlin, particularly regarding the endeavour to reconstruct the provinces devastated by war.

We appreciate that the key to resolving the crisis in Ukraine could only be negotiated, regardless of the format of the adopted system, no compromise being too big, given the destruction that a military solution can generate. A negotiated and adopted solution requires transformational reforms that should underpin the future of Ukraine, reforms to ensure decentralisation, economic security and the adoption of a statute of non-member state (non-aligned, neutral). Furthermore, we appreciate the efforts to join NATO to be irrational and certainly having one single result – the aggravation of the situation. Ukraine should not be a reason for dispute, but a bridge between the East and the West. Nevertheless, this peaceful, negotiated, solution must be accepted internally by all political forces and by all ethnic communities whose interests must be recognised and promoted.

At the same time, we reckon that a change is needed in the manner the problems in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq are addressed by the US Administration, with Turkey and Romania as the main pillars. This is a strategy entailing an integrated approach to the area and providing guarantees by the US to its allies in the area. The problem in the *WBSR* and in the Middle East must be considered holistically, a theatre of operations – the Black Sea, with two separate issues.

The EU and NATO member states have, in turn, tools that enable them to act against Russia, among which:

- continuing and strengthening the sanctions imposed on Russia;
- supporting and strengthening the defence capacity of Ukraine;
- promoting energy security for all EU members;
- diversifying energy resources in the Black Sea;
- reducing energy dependence and assuring security of exploitation and transport in the *WBSR*;
- developing military capabilities and defence of the *WBSR* states (creating a joint military Black Sea Fleet, including non-riparian states vessels, too, by rotation);
- joint cyber defence and air defence capabilities etc.

The situation in the *Wider Black Sea Region* was also on the agenda of the Warsaw Summit held from 8 to 9 July 2016. There were adopted certain measures of utmost importance for Romania, whose application will be materialised during the defence ministers meeting of NATO member states this fall. Thus, we mention the following:

- reinforcing NATO presence in the Black Sea and increasing the capability of this presence with a naval and air group (provided, in particular, by the countries of the region);

- establishing a multinational brigade (affiliated to the Multinational Division Southeast Command) by converting a Romanian mechanised brigade, with a definite contribution of a Bulgarian battalion and a Polish company and with the prospect of other nations' participation;
- transferring the command and control of the missile defence system from southern and eastern Europe to NATO (the US vessels based in Spain, the radar in Turkey and the interceptors at Deveselu);
- developing cooperation with partners in the interoperability platform;
- a robust component of the intensified training initiative.

The Black Sea is considered as being of strategic importance (although not the highest), explicitly highlighted in the final documents of the summit, which means it is subject to analysis, having also operational potential at the Alliance level.

Without claiming to have addressed all the important issues concerning recent developments in the Russian Federation, we estimate that it is moving more and more towards the status of an empire, that the imperial nostalgia is still alive and plays an important role in the decisions made by the elites in the Kremlin.

Signs of a new *Cold War* are becoming more visible. The collapse of the national currency, amid oil price decline, the rising price of imported products and the massive withdrawals of capital are alarming signals for the Russian economy. Furthermore, the reduction in the price of oil and natural gas has led to a drop in the Russian GDP, given that they are responsible for 50% of the GDP. Even so, the Russian Federation will not give up its objectives in Ukraine and will turn to the east, to Asia, with Eurasian projects gaining more weight.

In his annual state-of-the-nation speech on 4 December 2014, President Vladimir Putin stated: *"It is useless to talk to Russia from a position of strength, even when faced with internal difficulties ... We should not forget the lessons of the past. As Hitler failed in his misanthropic ideas, he failed to destroy Russia ... We will not be drawn into an arms trap, but nobody will be able to obtain military advantage over Russia"*<sup>11</sup>.

The strategic dilemma the Russian Federation is confronted with is that it has a huge area and, therefore, many fronts to defend against potential external rivals and internal risk factors. Internally, the solution is to channel the energies of the population towards a revengeful attitude, promising the country's return on the international arena as a great power, as it used to be for hundreds of years.

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<sup>11</sup> See [www.money.ro/putin-nici-hitler-nu-a-reușit-să-ne-distrugă](http://www.money.ro/putin-nici-hitler-nu-a-reușit-să-ne-distrugă), retrieved on 7 June 2016.

The idea instilled in the consciousness of the masses, the return to the glorious past, enabled directing the population discontent towards external factors. In order not to fight on several fronts, Russia has secured only two. Thus, it negotiated with Japan, hinting that it was willing to consider the question of Kuril Islands and even that it would be willing to cede them. It engaged in actions of cooperation reinforcement with China and Central Asian states in various forms of economic and security collaboration. When the two fronts were secured, it started action in the west, with outstanding results. We consider that the demarches are just at the beginning and far from their end.

An important player in the *WBSR*, with major influence in the region, is Turkey, also a significant military power in NATO. This situation must be taken into account by both allies and competitors, alike. Turkey has the second NATO force (about 610,000 active soldiers and 380,000 military reservists), with a military strategy aiming at: deterrence, collective security, advanced defence, active military participation in crisis management in the area<sup>12</sup>. It has a multiannual programme to modernise the armed forces that is worth \$150 billion by 2025. It has also developed a defence industry capable of producing major military equipment with high degree of complexity.

Regarding the conflict in Syria, Turkey has a position of support for the moderate Syrian opposition, a decision with two important components that influence Turkey's policy and interests in the region: one related to principles referring to Bashar al-Assad's regime failure to observe the norms of international law and human rights, and the other related to the opportunity to obtain a privileged position in the oriental strategic architecture<sup>13</sup>. Turkey strives for a Western military intervention, which, in our opinion, will not take place, as it is aware that any prolongation of the Syrian crisis affects its own interests more and more severely.

On the other hand, Turkey's stance towards the Syrian conflict is inconsistent with the position of Russia and Iran, states that support Bashar al-Assad regime and act against this conflict escalation. The contradictions with Iran are even more significant as Turkey's interest in becoming a leader of the Muslim world are opposed by those of Iran that wishes to be a regional leader.

We appreciate that Turkey's geopolitical and geo-economic importance has increased, based on the following considerations: conjugation of the global energy crisis with the beginning of the process of capitalisation on the fabulous

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<sup>12</sup> See [www.ionpetrescu.ro/trg/fortele-armate-turce](http://www.ionpetrescu.ro/trg/fortele-armate-turce), retrieved on 15 March 2016.

<sup>13</sup> See [voxeurop.eu/ro/un-proiect-pentru-istanbul](http://voxeurop.eu/ro/un-proiect-pentru-istanbul), retrieved on 15 March 2016.

potential of hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian Sea; the Islamic space holds about 3/4 of the global hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian Sea and the Middle East; the Turkish territory can provide a safe transport zone for these resources, from the exploitation areas (Caspian region, Siberia, the Persian Gulf) to beneficiaries (Europe, Asia, Far East and the USA); Turkey wants to have the same say in NATO as that of Great Britain, France or Germany; it wants to accede to the EU only as a first rank member; it is in the proximity of a conflict zone – Syria and Iraq.

Turkey has imperial ambitions, which are also reflected in its pharaonic projects, made public by the current President Tayyip Erdogan. He wants to build a 48-kilometer long channel, with a 150-metre width and a 25-metre depth, linking the Black Sea to the Marmara Sea, which would have the effect of reducing traffic on the Bosphorus Strait. This “*crazy project*”, which could be completed in 2023, when the Republic of Turkey celebrates its centenary, would transform a part of Istanbul into an island and would take over the traffic of oil tankers and trans-container vessels that crowd the strait and are a real danger to the public (the risk of collision between vessels is very high, while the yearly amount of oil throughput is over 140 million tons and the gas production of about 4 million tons in 2014, and is increasing).

Another project is the construction of the third suspended bridge, which is a controversial project, estimated to attract a larger number of vehicles, which would result in the paralysis of the urban traffic in Istanbul.

The construction of a new airport in Istanbul, with a capacity of 150 million passengers a year, planned to be completed in 2023, would increase the economic importance of the metropolis, predicted to be flooded by a sea of tourists, pilgrims and businessmen.

The project of building a new huge mosque to rival those of Mecca, Cairo and Jerusalem, is another “*big crazy*” idea by Tayyip Erdogan, a president who wants to remain in the memory of the Turkish people as the “*new sultan*” of Great Turkey, the new Soliman, given that it is not by chance that all his projects are long term ones, to be completed before 2023. The mosque will have an area of 15,000 square meters and will be built on the hill of Camhca to be seen from any point of Istanbul.

The materialisation of these projects would transform Istanbul into the heart of Eurasia, would put Turkey in the top ten economies of the world around the year 2023 and would increase its geopolitical role. Improving its geostrategic and geo-economic position could transform Turkey in the next 20 years

into a referee between the USA, the EU and the Russian Federation<sup>14</sup>, a leader of the Islamic world, the key to controlling the Islamic world, unable to unite voluntarily, but being able to perform union with Turkey as their leader. In case the oil reserves of the region decrease, Turkey could become an opportunity for the Arab world development, which, beyond the economic and strategic advantages, has the leverage of historical legitimacy since the Ottoman Empire once ruled the Middle East region.

But all these projects appear to be negatively affected by an event with significant consequences that are still difficult to assess. Thus, on July 15 this year, a coup was attempted in Turkey, which involved important factions of the armed forces, of the Internal affairs, Justice and other entities of the Turkish society. But a combination of factors caused the failure of this try – the elected president Tayyip Erdogan withstanding power, backed by the population in large cities, Istanbul and Ankara, who took to the streets.

Immediately after the suppression of the coup, the president took tough measures. He arrested many military personnel (about 7,000) with very high ranks (it is estimated that more than 100 generals and admirals), over 3,000 judges and prosecutors, as well as businessmen, staff from the Ministry of Interior etc. Cleric Fethullah Gulen, who is the main opponent of the president and in self-imposed exile in the USA, was accused of inspiring the coup.

Moreover, restrictions have been imposed in respect of the activities on the Turkish air base at Incirlik, used by the USA in the anti-ISIL campaign.

The coup took place in a moment considered by specialists as inappropriate because Turkey was more and more involved in the fight against its own internal insurgency represented by the Kurds affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in their fight against ISIL and in the conflict in Syria as well. It is possible that these actions might worsen the situation, also as a result of the weakening of the military since a substantial part of its leadership was arrested. In addition, military morale will be low and the logistic structures and the command and control processes will be affected. Naturally, the state of operational readiness of the Turkish armed forces will be affected, too, as several major exercises will be re-planned or even cancelled, and the decisions of the last NATO summits will be implemented with delay.

Summarising, we can say the following:

- the Turkish armed forces will no longer be able to be used as the main instrument for promoting Turkish regional policy;

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<sup>14</sup> See [http://gandeste.org/general/turcia\\_redevine\\_imperiu/](http://gandeste.org/general/turcia_redevine_imperiu/), retrieved on 14 March 2016.

- the Russian Federation is the main winner, while the US position in the region is undermined, and the prospects of strengthening the position of NATO in the region are threatened;
- Turkey has morphed from a pivot of stability into a volatile area, with hardly predictable developments in the medium and long term, whose role will decline both economically, diplomatically and militarily;
- the measures taken by the Turkish president against the suspects of the coup are likely to be appreciated as deeply undemocratic by Western leaders, affecting Turkey's relations with the EU and the USA.

In this geopolitical context, with many variables in its evolution, we can say that Romania is in the middle of a *"perfect storm"*: in the south – Turkey with a volatile situation, and the conflicts in Iraq and Syria; in the east – the Caucasus, with its *"frozen"* conflicts; in the north – Crimea and Donbas; and in the west – migration flows that currently have a low intensity. There are many questions whose answers will *"roll over"* in the not too distant future.

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# COLLECTIVE DEFENCE IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA IN THE CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL, STRATEGIC, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT (II)

*Brigadier General Dr Virgil-Ovidiu POP*

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*The author continues the analysis of the security scenarios concerning the main actors in the Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA) as well as of the nature of the relations between them, starting from Russian interests and policy in the region.*

*Thus, for Russia, the energy geopolitics is closely related, in its relations with the EU, NATO, and especially the states in the WBSA, to the pursuit of some goals associated with its affirmation and confirmation as a great power. One of the scenarios mentioned by the author is that related to the Russians taking control over the entire southern coast of Ukraine to connect the Russian Federation and its security forces in the area of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria with Crimea.*

**Keywords:** *defensive force; economic growth; Gazprom; Black Sea Synergy*

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## 2. Geopolitical, Economic and Military Aspects in Southeastern Europe

The *Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA)* is a very complex space because of many reasons as follows: different types of states in terms of power level and government system; considerable resources; transit area having a major impact on the European states energy security as well as on the exporting states, especially Russia, economic security; multiple cooperation initiatives whose impact is relatively low; crossroads of many regions having different characteristics; the Middle East proximity; the US and NATO influence through partnerships and/or some littoral states membership etc. All the mentioned aspects influence the way the main actors develop their vision of the security environment in this space, the way they promote and defend their interests related to the WBSA, as well their relations.

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We thus consider necessary the analysis of the main actors in the *WBSA* security visions as well as of the relations between them to eventually assess security in the *WBSA*<sup>12</sup>.

The *WBSA* security dynamics depends, to a large extent, not only on the course of frozen conflicts in the Caucasus but also on the interests and policy of Russia towards the actors in this space, because it is defined as one of the most influential factors with regard to the *WBSA* security environment. Moreover, the relation between Russia and Ukraine is as important as the other mentioned aspects in this context. Ukraine is crossed by the gas pipelines that supply Europe from Russia, about 80% of the energy resources that are necessary in Europe transiting Ukraine<sup>13</sup>. In addition, 75-80% of the necessary natural gas and 85-90% of the necessary oil for Ukraine come from Russia. Therefore, its critical energy infrastructure is important for the EU energy security as well as for Russia economic security. The direct access to the Black Sea makes Ukraine an actor having interests in hydrocarbon transport routes in the Black Sea. Moreover, according to some studies, it is possible for gas and oil deposits to exist in Ukraine continental plateau.

Thus, Russia creates room for economic manoeuvre and an open market in the states in its near vicinity, on the one hand, and ensures a central position in the future international relations between the West and the East, on the other hand. By maintaining political and economic relations in Russia's terms, based on clear and stable influence in the space in its near proximity, Russia lays the foundation for its affirmation and confirmation as a regional and world power.

Even if the US strategic interests move from the Middle East, the *de facto* scene of the "war on terror", to the Asia-Pacific region, the *WBSA* influence continues to be an important point in the relations between Russia and the USA, through NATO. Most of Moscow negative reactions have been generated by the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO and the EU, as well as by Georgia closeness to the two structures. The movement of the US strategic interest to Asia-Pacific could be considered a reason for Russia détente with regard to the Black Sea area of convergence.

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<sup>12</sup> In the present study we will mainly analyse the major actors in the *WBSA*– the Russian Federation, Turkey, the European Union and NATO. However, smaller actors – Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova will be also considered. Their interests and problems are approached within the relations they have with the actors analysed by and large as well as within their membership of the EU and NATO.

<sup>13</sup> Geir Flikke (ed.), Einar Wigen, Helge Blakkisrud, Pal Kolste, *The Shifting Geopolitics of the Black Sea Region. Actors, Drivers and Challenges*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Report, Oslo, 2011, pp. 25-26.

There is still one problem left – the US missile defence system, which has generated a security dilemma in the *WBSA*.

The official declarations made following the decision to place elements of the US missile defence system in Romania and Poland are eloquent not only for the nature of the relations between the USA /NATO and Russia, but also for Russia's long-term objectives. At declarative level, the US missile defence system is intended to defend the USA and its allies against nuclear powers such as Iran, which refuses to comply with international standards in the field.

The Kremlin, on the other hand, considers the US presence in the immediate vicinity of its borders as a threat to national security. That is why the declarations in which it is evident the escalation of tensions related to this matter. An example in this regard is the discourse of the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Nikolai Makarov, six years ago, stating that Russia will not hesitate to employ pre-emptive attacks if the development of NATO missile defence system reaches its third phase. All these aspects can be seen as a security dilemma – the efforts made by NATO member states to enhance their security are perceived as threats by other states<sup>14</sup>.

Moreover, this attitude is supported even in the Russian Federation official documents. Thus in the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept (2008) it is stated that “*Russia maintains its negative attitude towards NATO enlargement, especially towards the plans to include Ukraine and Georgia in the Alliance, as well as towards the presence of NATO military infrastructure near Russian borders*”<sup>15</sup>.

This aspect is also reiterated in the Russian Federation Military Doctrine (2010), which lists as main military threat the intention to increase NATO force potential through global functions performed violating the international law norms and through placing NATO member states military infrastructure near Russian borders<sup>16</sup>. The idea is backed by the content of another identified military threat – the development and deployment of missile defence strategic systems that undermine the global balance of power and the correlation of forces in the field of nuclear missiles. The official declarations as well as certain actions conducted by Russia (double the number of troops at the borders with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) represent materialisations of this concept.

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<sup>14</sup> Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Dileme de securitate: abordări subiective și obiective ale problematicii scutului antirachetă*, in *Impact Strategic*, no. 3[40]/2011, pp. 39-44.

<sup>15</sup> *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, 12 July 2008, see <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>, retrieved on 7 March 2016.

<sup>16</sup> *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, 5 February 2010, see [http://www.sras.org/military\\_doctrine\\_russian\\_federation\\_2010](http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010), retrieved on 7 March 2016.

Moscow's reaction can be explained by the implications of the fact that Russia and the USA together own 95% of the world nuclear arsenal. The maintenance of the balance in this respect also entails the existence of mutual vulnerabilities between the two actors. Thus, even if having a defensive character, the US missile defence system can be seen as a threat as it reduces the USA and its allies vulnerability compared to Russia, while the Kremlin does not enjoy such an advantage. Moreover, it should be considered the importance of placing these elements in Eastern Europe under the previously mentioned circumstances of the sustained efforts made by Russia to consolidate its influence in this space. The missile defence system can be easily used as a foreign policy instrument, as a way to operationalise the military and diplomatic instrument meant to promote national interests. Thus, according to the USA, the missile defence system could convey the message to the Europeans that the USA will continue to be committed to providing security in the context of increasing risks and threats (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, organised crime); meanwhile, the missile defence system can be seen as a means to transmit an easily understandable message to the international actors that exhibit a less responsible behaviour in the international arena.

On the other hand, for Russia, the aggressive rhetoric regarding the missile defence system as well as the concrete measures (concentration of troops at the borders with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia)<sup>17</sup> can be also meant to decrease the European states, especially those that used to be under the Soviet umbrella, confidence in the USA and NATO capability to guarantee their security – which is contrary to the USA intentions; moreover, this type of rhetoric can be also oriented towards the confirmation of Moscow interest in maintaining its influence in former Soviet states as well as its status of emergent power.

Russia prefers to regionally address the *WBSA* security to maintain the role of a leader, of a main regional power. Therefore, in compliance with the documents on foreign policy and security, Moscow supports bilateral and multilateral cooperation within international security organisations; on the other hand, it opposes NATO and EU enlargement and involvement in this space.

### ***2.1. Geopolitical aspects and scenarios***

The Black Sea area has been a geopolitically and geostratgically important areal since the time of Peter the Great. That is why many analysts consider it the “*key*” to maintain a considerable influence over Europe, influence that can be

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<sup>17</sup> “*Rusia își schimbă instalațiile de securitate de la graniță*”, 28 May 2012, see <http://www.ziare.com/articole/drone+rusia>, retrieved on 9 March 2016.

preserved as long as Russia remains the most important if not the only energy supplier for Europe. Harold Mackinder clearly summarised, at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Black Sea geopolitical and geostrategic importance: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World”<sup>18</sup>. Moreover, the area adjacent to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea is also used as a transit area for the Russian hydrocarbons to Europe, being at the same time the main battlefield in the current “energy war”<sup>19</sup>, conducted with “energy weapons”<sup>20</sup>.

Russia is one of the emergent powers that could be identified at international level, fact that is visible in the economic growth mainly based on the hydrocarbon production and export, confirmed by the rhetoric towards the USA, NATO and the EU. As far as the *WBSA* is concerned, the Russian Federation considers three great areas of interest. Firstly, it is the *WBSA* value in terms of energy as both a transit and a rich in resources area. Secondly, it is in the near vicinity of Russia that traditionally considers the states in this space as being in its sphere of influence. Thirdly, it is the dynamics of the relations with the EU, NATO, and the USA, characterised by Moscow reticence with regard to the enlargement of the two mentioned organisations towards Russia’s borders, as well as by the true security dilemma in its relations with the USA, because of the development of the US missile defence system.

For Russia, energy geopolitics is closely linked, in its relations with the EU and NATO, and especially with the states in the *WBSA*, with pursuing its interests related to the affirmation and confirmation of its great power status. In this regard, it is useful to establish the connection between using hydrocarbons as an instrument to promote Moscow interests and its relations with the states in its near vicinity.

Analysing the official documents, we can clearly deduce that Russia’s foreign policy is based on two major components. The first of them is its role in the world and the second one is represented by the relations established in its near vicinity. The analysed official documents make clear the aspiration of Russia, an uncontested regional actor, to become acknowledged as a global power. The current international context, marked by the transition from the unipolar configuration to a multipolar one, in which the emphasis is laid on cooperation, on multilateral approach

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<sup>18</sup> Apud Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Marea tablă de șah. Geopolitica lumilor secolului XXI*, Editura Univers enciclopedic, București, 2002, p. 51.

<sup>19</sup> Marius Cristian Neacșu, Silviu Neguț, “Gas Pipelines War”, in *Romanian Review on Political Geography*, year XII, no. 1, 2010, p. 31.

<sup>20</sup> Cristian Băhnăreanu, “Arma energetică” în contextul relațiilor internaționale la începutul secolului al XXI-lea, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2007, p. 25.

within existing international and/or regional bodies, is often considered a favourable one<sup>21</sup>. In this context, the relations with the states in the near vicinity play a key role, Russia trying to maintain its influence over them, which has been visible especially following NATO and EU attempts to integrate the state entities in this space in their own institutional dynamics.

Many of the *WBSA* states are still characterised by instability, a precarious security environment, so-called “*frozen conflicts*” as those in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, it is a transit area for the energy resources from Russia, being in turn rich in such resources. Therefore, stability in this area has become increasingly important to NATO and the EU.

On the other hand, Russia has perceived the two organisations enlargement efforts as a direct threat to its security, an invasion in its own sphere of influence, aspect visible in capitalising on the status of hydrocarbon exporter as well as in its policy towards the former Soviet bloc states. The war in Georgia, in 2008, can be considered an eloquent example in this respect as well as the support provided by Russia for the separatist republics Transdnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Vladimir Putin initiative in 2011 to establish a Euro-Asian Union, similar in terms of function, significance and organisation to the European Union is subsumed under the same topic.

We can appreciate that, by developing such projects, Russia attempts to create an alternative to the “*attraction*” exercised by the integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic economic, political and security structures to the states in the post-Soviet states. Thus, the Euro-Asian Union, defined as a future part of Wider Europe, a bridge between the European Union and the Asia-Pacific region<sup>22</sup>, comprises the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Tajikistan, but other states are expected to become members and Ukraine is one of them. Moreover, the definition given by Putin to the Euro-Asian Union<sup>23</sup> clearly reveals the two dimensions of the Russian foreign policy. Taking into consideration the fact that in contrast to the EU, where there are terms of comparison between member

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<sup>21</sup> See <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>, <http://wikidot.com/russia-national-securitystrategy-to-2020>, retrieved on 6 March 2016.

<sup>22</sup> Xenia Solyanskaya, *A New Integration Project for Eurasia – The Future in the Making*, in *Current Concerns*, 16 December 2012, see <http://www.currentconcerns.ch/index.php?id=1426>, retrieved on 12 March 2016.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*.

states regarding the level of power, although we can identify the organisation economic and/or political engines, in the Euro-Asian Union Russia's level of power is clearly different from the other member states, the Euro-Asian integration organisation being evidently under Russia's political influence.

In addition, part of Russia's regional policy is its humanitarian dimension, often considered its "*soft instrument*" to promote Russian national interests in its near vicinity. "*International humanitarian cooperation*" is specified in the Russian Federation foreign policy concept, being based on observing fundamental rights and liberties, protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the Russian citizens and of the Russians who live abroad, as well as on promoting the Russian culture<sup>24</sup>. Thus, if we take into consideration that there are many states in the WBSA where Russian ethnics live (i.e. Ukraine – 17.3%, Moldova – 5.8%, Georgia – 1.5% etc.<sup>25</sup>), then the humanitarian dimension of the foreign policy becomes a veritable instrument meant to promote Russian national interests and culture<sup>26</sup>.

Turkey is another actor that has major influence over the stability and predictability of the security environment in the Black Sea. It is also an emergent power. Turkey is a NATO member state since 1952 and an EU partner state, candidate to the status of member state. In addition, another aspect that particularises Turkey as a Black Sea actor is the fact that it is the only Muslim, although laic, littoral state. Moreover, Turkey is a considerable military power, quality that is consolidated and supported by its membership of NATO; from this perspective, Turkey represents NATO outpost in the Black Sea, the South Caucasus<sup>27</sup> and the Middle East.

Turkey has always enjoyed an important geostrategic position, by its location south of the Black Sea, in the near vicinity of Russia and the Middle East. Thus, if during the *Cold War* the membership of NATO ensured its close relations with Washington, being united by the common Soviet threat, subsequently, its geostrategic importance was identified in relation to its proximity to the Middle East, in the context of the "*war on terror*" conducted by the Euro-Atlantic community in this region.

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<sup>24</sup> *The Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation (2008)*, see <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>, retrieved on 12 March 2016.

<sup>25</sup> According to the data provided by CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov>, retrieved on 12 March 2016.

<sup>26</sup> Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, Oleksandr Sushko, *Percepția Rusiei în România, Republica Moldova și Ucraina*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2010, pp. 65-68.

<sup>27</sup> Maria Postevka, Vladimir Zodian, *Zona Lărgită a Mării Negre*, in *Lumea 2011. Enciclopedie politică și militară (Studii strategice și de securitate)*, coordinators Teodor Frunzeti, Vladimir Zodian, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2011, pp. 162-246.

Moreover, the international developments as well as the states behaviour have made Turkey important in the context of the energy security in Europe and of the use of this resource in foreign policy (see the case of Russia).

### **2.2. Economic aspects and scenarios**

Often proving to be the only ally of Romania in its neighbourhood, the Black Sea has played a major role in developing foreign and security policy. Romania's strategic position reunites a series of different dimensions, and the direct access to the Black Sea is a trump card in the Romanian security policy.

Historically, the Black Sea is a strategic and commercial route that unites Europe and Central Asia and the Near East. In the Middle Ages the great empires conducted economic activities in the Black Sea area. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, due to technological progress, trade was developed on different bases. Besides the mentioned advantages, the Black Sea is at the crossroads of many cultures and civilisations as well as of geostrategic opportunities.

The Romanian Principalities and later on the Romanian state encountered difficulties in having direct access to the Black Sea to benefit from trade and other opportunities provided by such position.

In 1878, following the Congress of Berlin, Romania obtained Dobrogea and succeeded in developing commercial activities in the Black Sea, acquiring a privileged position in geostrategic terms. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the fact that Romania had direct access to the Black Sea proved to be much more important, especially during the two world wars.

Besides trade opportunities, the Black Sea is an area rich in resources, especially natural gas and oil, which resulted in building the infrastructure to exploit them. Lately, new hydrocarbon reserves have been discovered and, following the decision of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Romania has been in possession of a part of the continental platform rich in such resources.

Thus the Black Sea has become an essential point in the field of energy resources, in the context of the desiderata related to energy independence or at least import diminution.

Geopolitically, the Black Sea region is very important, which has led to confrontations between the great powers interests throughout history. After the end of the *Cold War* a regional organisation was developed here, playing a major part in the Black Sea littoral states cooperation. Thus the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was established with the real support of Russia, which led to consolidating political-economic cooperation. Once the BSEC was established, the Black Sea changed the status of frontier with the one of bridge

between the West and the East, which emphasised new risks and threats related especially to the frozen conflicts in the Middle East.

Once Romania became a NATO member state, the Black Sea more evidently became an area where different interests clashed. Moreover, states like Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, due to their closeness to NATO security system, perceive the strategic importance of the Black Sea differently from Russia. Thus, there have been different attempts to cooperation, including the establishment of a dialogue platform called the *Black Sea Synergy*.

The *Black Sea Synergy* was an EU programme developed on the *good neighbourhood policy* principles, which attempted to enhance the dialogue with the states in the region. The goals were transport and energy programmes, consolidation of the dialogue between the BSEC and the EU, also considering the frozen conflicts in Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In this framework, Romania has made considerable efforts for the enhancement of cooperation in the region. The major challenges for the states involved in cooperation activities in the Black Sea region are mainly related to providing solutions to the frozen conflicts and capitalising on the economic potential. Despite the fact that the Black Sea was considered a Russian lake for a long period of time, not only in historiography but also in international relations, once Turkey emerged as a regional power and the EU and NATO involved in the region, it ceased to be considered as such. Analytically, all the actors involved in the Black Sea region have major interests, a fact that has challenged the academic and government institutions to develop a proactive diplomacy and a strategy meant to avoid potential crises and to enhance mutually advantageous cooperation.

The Black Sea region strategic importance is increasingly topical not only in Romania but also in littoral states and even at international level, as great powers like the USA and the EU develop plans for cooperation in the region. For Romania, the Black Sea vicinity may represent an important benefit in energy policy, not only by extracting resources from the continental platform but also by participating in interconnected energy projects. Moreover, besides the economic character, the Romanian state will benefit from the thorough cooperation at regional level, thus ensuring the stability of both own and the Euro-Atlantic eastern border.

The geopolitical conflict at the Black Sea would not be so “*charming*” if there were not the economic dimension, able to sustain the intense commercial and diplomatic competition. The Black Sea region has proved an important commercial node lately because of the fact that it is in the proximity of the Caspian basin, which is highly rich in energy resources. Therefore, in order to maintain



energy security, the Russian Federation, the USA and the states in the region have launched an ample commercial and diplomatic competition to establish the hydrocarbon routes. The Russian Federation, in its quality of important oil and natural gas producer and exporter in the region (and in the world), and the main natural gas supplier for the EU member states, is directly interested in the energy game in the Black Sea basin. For Moscow, the “energy weapon” is the only means to keep Europe under pressure, and it could not afford losing it.

The EU, on the other hand, is concerned with ensuring its energy security and makes efforts in this respect, especially considering that Russia has often proved its lack of transparency, as in the disputes with its neighbours (Ukraine and Belarus), and it has resorted to extreme measures like stopping the gas supply. A new reason requires for Europe to diversify its access to energy resources, and the Caspian basin proves a viable solution in this regard. In its effort it is supported by the USA that, after succeeding in ensuring Israel energy security, by the *Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan* pipeline, now supports the project of gas pipeline *Nabucco*, to reduce the Russian potential threat to the EU. The project is currently menaced by a Russian offer, *South Stream*, aiming at transporting gas directly from the Russian Federation through the Black Sea to Bulgaria, having ramifications to Italy and Austria (*figure 1*).

- Existing      - - - Nabucco West      - - - Trans Anatolian      — South Caucasus Expansion
- - - Under construction      - - - Trans Adriatic      — Blue Stream      - - - Southern Corridor



**Figure 1: Natural gas pipelines in the Wider Black Sea Area<sup>28</sup>**

<sup>28</sup> See [www.businessinsider.com/russias-aggression-in-ukraine-is-part-of-a-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation-with-the-west.html](http://www.businessinsider.com/russias-aggression-in-ukraine-is-part-of-a-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation-with-the-west.html), retrieved on 7 March 2016.

In this energy interests conflict that has profound diplomatic and political connotations, in which the Russian Federation cannot conceive to lose supremacy, the EU, backed by the often hesitating USA, intends to be less dependent on the Russian gas; Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria consider themselves important regional actors, Georgia and Azerbaijan intend to somehow pay off Russia, and Ukraine hopes to be part of the EU and NATO. One aspect is though sure, namely that, despite all private interests, all the actors involved in the region should play as partners and not as rivals, as it used to happen.

The energy security from the perspective of the relations between the Russian Federation and the European states is a focal point in the Black Sea security environment. Russia used to enjoy the status of great power up to the collapse of the USSR, in 1991; Moreover, Russia is famous for emphasising the *hard* dimension of power, as it often used to ensure its security resorting to weapons and its numerous troops. The unipolarity period was one in which the Russian Federation seemed to distance from the mentioned status. However, gradually, with the end of unipolarity and the beginning of multipolarity, it has increasingly become a revisionist state that seeks to gain considerable influence in the world but especially in the region. The instrument of power is one of *hard* type too, not the military but the economic one – energy.

Thus, on the one hand, Russia seeks, as we have mentioned, to maintain its status of single energy provider for Europe, preserving its main instrument to promote its interests in this area. It was fully demonstrated during the crises in 2006, 2008 and 2009, when, for various reasons, Russia stopped the gas supply for Ukraine and, implicitly, for the entire European space; on the other hand, the EU has developed pipeline projects able to guarantee its independence or at least to reduce its dependence on the great provider in the East. In other words, acknowledging the implications of the energy dependence on Russia, the European states decided to establish an alternative route to import hydrocarbons from the Central-Asian region, project known as *Nabucco*. Subsequently, Russia developed its own alternative project – *South Stream*, through which energy resources are transported to Central Europe through the Black Sea to Bulgaria, Serbia, Germany. In parallel, the close relations between the Russian Federation and Germany, doubled by those between Putin and German Chancellors Gerhard Schroeder and Angela Merkel, favoured the construction of a pipeline that directly connects Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea – *North Stream*. The projects were seen by many experts as a real “*natural gas war*”, and Russia’s reaction as “*a pre-emptive attack*”<sup>29</sup> at the level of energy geopolitics.

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<sup>29</sup> Marius Cristian Neacșu et al., *op. cit.*, p. 39.

Considering the energy geopolitics, Turkey plays an increasingly important role for Europe energy security as its territory is used for the transit of hydrocarbons coming from the Caspian Sea and the Middle East. Thus, Turkey is becoming another key actor for the energy security in the region and in Europe. However, from this perspective, Turkey seems to clearly reveal the existence of a realist logic in terms of international relations theories at the Black Sea. It is because Turkey is situated in the area where almost 70 percent of the hydrocarbon deposits identified so far are located, being also an important transit area, but depending on energy imports. Moreover, it is an actor that has fully capitalised on its geostrategic position. Thus, in 2009, Turkey signed the Inter-Government Agreement for the project *Nabucco*, meant to reduce Europe dependence on the energy imports from Russia, and, in 2010, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement to build a nuclear complex in Mersin (Turkey), followed by the agreement between the two states to cooperate regarding the oil pipeline *Samsun-Ceyhan*. Subsequently, in November 2011, Turkey signed an agreement with Azerbaijan for the trans-Anatolian pipeline, meant to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe.

After a month, Turkey agreed with Russia to build *South Stream*. In other words, Turkey is involved in not only European projects, meant to reduce the dependence on hydrocarbons from Russia, but also in Russian projects, meant to maintain the monopoly over hydrocarbons supplies for Europe. The importance of Turkey in Europe energy security and in Russia foreign policy is practically given by the fact that Ankara is a not only valuable but also indispensable partner for the mentioned states. Moreover, the multitude of projects initiated in this field reveal the fact that Turkey is able to fully capitalise on its position, a state that ensures the energy transit and the diplomatic liaison between the East and the West, between the Euro-Atlantic community and Eurasia.

Thus, Turkey plays a key role in the EU energy security equation. However, the EU cannot have all the necessary guarantees in terms of Turkey engagement in its favour in the Black Sea energy geopolitics, especially considering the little progress made regarding Turkey accession to the EU since 2005 when negotiations started. Moreover, the fact that Turkey is a pivot in the Black Sea region is evident in terms of energy geopolitics and geostrategy as this actor plays an important part in maintaining stability and security in the area by controlling the two straits that connect the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea as well as by being the only state with a Muslim, secular, population majority highly anchored in the Euro-Atlantic institutional architecture. The relations established by Turkey with the states in its vicinity are reflected in the characteristics of the security environment in the Black Sea region. Thus, Turkey and Russia are two key regional powers that influence the security environment in the area.

The foreign policy of Turkey is centred on the principle “*zero problems with neighbours*”<sup>30</sup>, concept that has lain at the basis of cooperation in terms of economy, security and institutional structures development in the Black Sea region, as well as of settling the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus etc. Nevertheless, the reality demonstrates that Ankara sometimes finds difficult to implement this principle.

The best example in this regard is the conflict in Syria, in which Turkey got actively involved, Ankara supporting Syrian opposition and the necessity to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The Turkish-Syrian conflict has major implications for the security environment in the *WBSA*, given the complex implications for many actors in this space.

The conflict is ongoing, following the popular revolts in North Africa and the Middle East that, in many states, led to toppling the political regimes that ruled them for many years. In Syria, the civil war between the regime forces and the rebellious groups continues because of Russia’s and China’s veto in the UN Security Council regarding the international community intervention. Moreover, Russia supports the regime of Bashar al-Assad, Syria being one of the trade partners of Russia as far as arms trade is concerned, as well as the host of a Russian military base in the Mediterranean (Tartus). In addition, in order for the increasingly expressed aspiration of Russia to become a great power in an international system that tends to be multipolar get materialised, it has to maintain its influence in the near vicinity, and Syria is one of the relevant partners in the Middle East.

However, for Turkey, the course of events in Syria has made Russia have an opposite attitude, which has led to increasingly tense relations between the two relevant actors in the Black Sea region. According to the data provided by the mass media, Turkey hosts about 100,000 Syrian refugees and supports the Free Syrian Army rebels. Besides the fact that the civil war in Syria generates security problems for Turkey, because of the large number of refugees, there is also the Kurdish problem. Turkey has a separatist Kurdish minority representing 18% of its total population<sup>31</sup>.

In the context in which a similar ethnic group also exists near the Syrian border, it could capitalise on the conditions created by the civil war to establish an autonomous Kurdish entity in Syria. Under these circumstances, the Kurdish community in Turkey may be tempted to do the same. Therefore, Turkey is expected to get involved in preventing such scenarios from becoming reality. Moreover,

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<sup>30</sup> Turkey Foreign Ministry, *Policy of Zero Problems with Our Neighbors*, see <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa>, retrieved on 15 March 2016.

<sup>31</sup> According to the data provided by CIA World Factbook, see <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>, retrieved on 10 February 2016.

Turkey membership of NATO has led to the situation in which Turkey has received aid in this respect, namely *Patriot* missiles to consolidate Turkey air defence<sup>32</sup>.

The fact that Ankara and Moscow have different positions regarding the mentioned conflict seems to put an end to a favourable period in the development of the relations between the two countries, when cooperation in economy and energy was remarkable. Both have enjoyed a relatively constant economic growth<sup>33</sup>, even in the context of the economic and financial crisis. Moreover, both countries had similar views regarding the security environment in the Black Sea region, opposing the project of the Black Sea “*internationalisation*”, project that entailed ensuring stability and security in the Black Sea by involving the international community, especially NATO and the EU.

Moreover, Turkey seems to distance from the Western “*anchors*”. The process of accession to the EU stagnates, the relation with Washington has been tense following the different positions adopted regarding Iran as well as the divergence between Turkey and Israel, the main US ally in the Middle East, which made both Russia and Turkey perceive themselves as belonging to the “*axis of the excluded*”<sup>34</sup>. However, the status of Ankara is different from the one of Moscow as far as the relation with the USA is concerned. Turkey will have elements of the US missile defence system on its territory, which is seen as a negative aspect by Moscow. Moreover, the closeness between the two countries have proved to be only temporary, their divergent interests in the region being fully demonstrated considering the current events in Syria that have repercussions over the cooperation in the Black Sea region too.

### ***2.3. Military aspects and scenarios***

Militarily, Romania has capitalised on its direct access to the Black Sea developing a military fleet that executes missions under NATO aegis. The Black Sea has also been used as a transit route for the troops deployed in the conflict areas in the Middle East.

The current military position of the Russian Federation in Ukraine is very exposed entailing major costs compared to the limited political gains. The strategic bastion represented by Crimea can be defended as an island, but it may be subject

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<sup>32</sup> *NATO Spokesperson's Statement on the Deployment of Patriot Missiles to Turkey*, 21 December 2012, see [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-9BA52668-6E053407/natolive/news\\_93430.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-9BA52668-6E053407/natolive/news_93430.htm), retrieved on 10 February 2016.

<sup>33</sup> About 4.3% (2010 and 2011) for Russia and 9.2 % (2010), 8.5 % (2011) for Turkey, according to CIA World Factbook, see <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>, retrieved on 10 February 2016.

<sup>34</sup> Yigal Schleifer, *Turkey: Syria Crisis Causes Russian Relations to Suffer*, 19 July 2012, see <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65684>, retrieved on 15 February 2016.

to isolation. The Ukrainian separatists and their Russian supporters position in eastern Ukraine is actually a great advantage that will need major military investment to ensure its security. However, it cannot necessarily help the Russian Federation to meet its greater goal, namely the establishment of some borders that can be easily secured. Thus the question arises whether Russia will conduct other military actions to ensure its interests in Ukraine.

Therefore, in my opinion, there are some basic military scenarios that can be considered by Russia to manage its concerns related to the security in Ukraine, from small-scale harassment actions to total occupation of eastern Ukraine up to the Dnieper. The moment and the necessary forces to conduct such operations have been assessed to determine the general effort, the related costs and the ability of the Russian armed forces to execute each operation. In the analysis of these scenarios it was considered that the only opponent could be the Ukrainian armed forces already involved in the conflict<sup>35</sup>.

1. One of the most discussed options is the Russian forces advance along the southern coast of Ukraine to establish a connection between Crimea and the separatist positions in eastern Ukraine. This scenario is based on the premise that strategists can extend the front enough to ensure the water supply for Crimea from the Dnieper, and the defensive lines will be anchored in the river, the only position in the region that can be defended.

Thus a terrestrial bridge will be created to ensure the security of supply lines for Crimea and to prevent future isolation of the peninsula. The Russian forces will have to cover more than 400 km in the depth of an area of about 46,620 km<sup>2</sup>, establishing more than 450 km of new defensive lines, and to control about 2 million citizens.

Taking control over this territory, despite the current opposition in Ukraine, would entail a strength of about 24,000-36,000 troops, in 6-14 days. For defensive reasons, Russian strategists should consider the risk that NATO can support Kiev. If it were so, Russia should expand its defensive force up to 40,000-55,000 troops to control the territory.

Strategists should also consider the necessary force to face possible insurgent actions conducted by the population that becomes less pro-Russian outside Donbass. The size of the counter-insurgency forces is generally related to the size of the population and the expected resistance level. It naturally leads to various estimates. According to this scenario, to control the population a strength of about 4,200 troops would be necessary, while extreme insurgency could result in the increase up to 42,000 troops.

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<sup>35</sup> Military experts describe three scenarios related to Russia's options in Ukraine, 19.01.2016, see <http://www.timpul.md/articol/%28harta%29-expertii-militari-descriu-trei-scenarii-despre-optiunile-rusiei-in-ucraina-86412.html>, retrieved on 07 March 2016.

In this case extreme insurgency is not expected, but it would be expected in cities like Dnepropetrovsk, Harkov or Kiev. The defensive force could overlap with the counter-insurgency force to a certain extent if there were no external threats. In case external threats existed, forces should be separate, being possible for the number of the troops necessary to ensure the security of the territory to double.

2. A similar scenario that has been considered is related to taking control over the entire southern coast of Ukraine to connect the Russian Federation and its security forces in the Self-Proclaimed Autonomous Region Transnistria with Crimea. It would undermine Kiev position by interrupting the direct access to the Black Sea, ensuring Russia's interests in the region in a continuous arch.

As for the necessary effort, the Russian forces would double the option of a terrestrial bridge. 40,000-60,000 troops would be necessary to attack, advancing about 645 km to take control over some territories covering an area of 103,600 km<sup>2</sup>, for 23-28 days. The necessary defensive force would be 80,000-112,000 troops. It would introduce in the equation a complicated and dangerous operation to build a bridge over a large river. Moreover, there are about 6 million people in the region, thus a counter-insurgency force of about 13,200-120,000 being necessary.

These two scenarios are based on a wrong premise as they entail extremely exposed positions covering a relatively flat territory – crossed by a river in one of the scenarios – which are difficult to maintain if they can be defended in the case of a concerted attack executed by a modern military force. The supply lines will be also very long across the entire area and, in the scenario that extends beyond the Dnieper, they are based on establishing bridgeheads over a large river.

3. The third scenario would entail taking control by the Russian Federation over the entire eastern Ukraine up to the Dnieper, using the river as a defensive front line. This scenario is more justified considering the problem of defending the captured territory. The Dnieper is a large river that has few crossing points and few areas that allow for tactical operations to establish bridgeheads, meaning that the defensive forces can concentrate on narrow passages. This is the most logical option for Russia if it intends to conduct military actions to ensure a defensive position anchored in a solid terrain.

However, this operation would entail a massive military effort. The necessary force to take control over this area – 222,740 km<sup>2</sup> – and to beat the opposition in the area would be 91,000-135,000 troops, advancing 402 km in the depth. Taking into consideration that the river would increase the defensive capabilities, the defensive force would be equal to the attack force to a large extent. However, considering the population in the area, 13 million people, supplementary counter-insurgency forces could be necessary, varying from 28,000 to 260,000 troops.

The Russian Federation has about 280,000 troops in the land forces, meaning that the initial operation would involve a substantial part of the Russian armed forces, and a major insurgency could menace Russia's ability to occupy the area even if all the land forces were deployed in Ukraine.

Another positive aspect would be that such an operation could be executed in 11-14 days, even if it entailed taking control over a large area, as the Russian forces could advance using different routes. On the other hand, the operation would entail a great mobilisation effort and a change in the Russian security forces missions, meaning that Moscow's intention would become evident and would be an alarm signal for Europe and the USA even in its incipient phase.

4. Another option would be for Russia to launch small-scale operations, using few resources, to meet similar security objectives. For example, it could be considered the possibility for the Russian forces to occupy only the southern part of eastern Ukraine, in an effort to use a reduced combat force. However, in this case, the Russians would have a flank exposed and they would lose security at the Dnieper.

5. The extension of the separatist lines to the north would incorporate the rest of the regions Donetsk and Lugansk, making this territory easily self-sustain. However, even though such operations were less difficult to execute the results would not be significant.

6. The last scenario considered entails Russia executing temporary small incursions along the entire border with Ukraine, as part of an effort to threaten key installations in the area and thus dissipate the Ukrainian combatant forces. The measure would be efficient and effective in terms of the necessary effort for the Russian forces. It could lead to achieving small political and security objectives such as to distance the Ukrainian forces from the current line of contact, distracting Kiev or increasing the sense of urgency, thus making the Ukrainians believe that Russia will launch a generalised invasion if Kiev does not respond to Moscow requests.

For all the analysed scenarios the findings are consistent: all of them are technically possible for the Russian armed forces but they incur major problems. None of the mentioned options can lead to achieving political and security objectives by using limited or reasonable resources. This conclusion does not mean that the Russian decision-makers would not get any of the scenarios materialised, but highlights an extended cost-benefit analysis that should be considered by leaders when they plan future actions. No theoretical model can exactly estimate the denouement of a war but it can provide leaders with ideas regarding the type of actions that should be conducted or not, as well as the urgency of taking certain measures.

*English version by*  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*



# ROMANIA'S POSTURE REGARDING COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND SECURITY WITHIN THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANISATION

*Mircea STAN*

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*The article presents some aspects of Romania's evolution within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), focusing on the divergences between our country and the other Warsaw Pact member states related mainly to defence and collective security. Thus some distinct positions Romania adopted within the WTO, especially after 1964, are mentioned. The author shows that the flagrant contradictions between Romania and the other member states irritated Moscow that responded adopting a coordinated active measures programme through which Romania's actions were reinterpreted and distortedly presented in the West, the analysis of the material available to research showing that, more often than not, the coordinated active measures met their goals.*

**Keywords:** *Cold War; Warsaw Treaty Organisation; European security; socialist bloc; intelligence*

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## Introduction

Romania's evolution within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) experienced both relaxation and tension periods. If up to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 the political factor in Bucharest acted according to the USSR directives, after the event things changed radically. The gap created between Dej and Khrushchev was determined by Dej's opposition to Moscow's decision to build the Berlin Wall (1961) and to the Cuban missile crisis. With regard to Cuban episode, the communist leader of Romania went so far that he informed John F. Kennedy about the fact that the Romanian state did not support the deployment of nuclear weapons in Cuba, and that the WTO had responsibilities in defence matters referring only to the European continent<sup>1</sup>. Dej did not want to be involved in conflicts he did not know about, showing that he trusted the strategic vision of the USA and NATO more than the one of the USSR and WTO.

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<sup>1</sup> This aspect was remarkably sensitive, and it was not transmitted using the diplomatic or information channels. Corneliu Mănescu requested a meeting with the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, during the opening of the UN General Assembly in October 1963 in New York. On 4 October 1963,

Following the “*Cuban crisis*”, the decision to remain or not within the WTO was a constant concern of the Romanian communists up to the late '70s. Between 1962 and 1966, the Romanians tried to reform the WTO so that the USSR could not have the total control over the organisation. When they did not succeed in doing it, they sought to develop intra-bloc alliances. There were clear signals that, following the *1964 Declaration*, “*in case Romania had achieved its goals, it would not have been part of any pact, the Warsaw one included, and it would have been concerned with defending its own borders only*”<sup>2</sup>. In 1968, there were enough reasons for Romania to leave the WTO, but eventually it considered it was better for it to remain within it<sup>3</sup>.

The special relations with Beijing and Washington, the Sino-American, American-Vietnamese, Egyptian-Israeli mediations, the collective security initiatives and the always distinct positions within the WTO resulted in Romania’s criticism from other members, so that each of them wanted to “*give a lesson*” to Bucharest. The Kremlin changed its tactics to counteract the actions of Romania, seeking to intoxicate and misinform the West related to the Romanian state intentions. After 1964, the USSR constantly sought to exploit Romania’s vulnerabilities, inside and outside the borders, to act accordingly. These is the framework within which Romania evolved as a WTO member state throughout the *Cold War*.

The refusal to sign the “*Statute of the United Armed Forces in Wartime*”, the effervescent support for the non-intervention employing the WTO armed forces in Poland, in 1981, the delay in the talks regarding the renewal of the WTO, in 1985, and the Romanian proposals for reform to “*democratise*” the Pact resulted in certain disadvantages for Romania, which culminated, through the active measures programme coordinated by the Soviets, with the events in December 1989.

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Mănescu conveyed to Rusk that Romania did not agree with Khrushchev’s intentions to transform the WTO from a defensive alliance into an offensive one. Moreover, Mănescu had a mandate from Dej to offer the USA “*the opportunity to use any means and methods to test if there are nuclear facilities in Romania*”. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, *When and Why Romania Distanced Itself from the Warsaw Pact*, in *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 5, 1995, p. 111.

<sup>2</sup> Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, doc. no. 145, Washington, 1996.

<sup>3</sup> Mircea Munteanu (ed.), *Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1969-1989*, vol. II, *Memorandum of Conversation between Emil Bodnăraş and Ambassador Harry G. Barnes*, in *CWIHP Document Reader*, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 168.

## **The International Security Environment prior to the Establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation**

Declared a defeated nation following the Second World War, Romania entered the Soviet sphere of influence for over four decades. Having suffered numerous casualties and material damages, and having a territory occupied by the Red Army, the Romanian state signed, on 10 February 1947, the Treaty of Peace with the Allied and Associated Powers, treaty that was considered necessary for the daily life in Romania to be resumed within approximately normal parameters<sup>4</sup>. The political opposition was completely disbanded, the monarchy was abolished, and the Romanian Armed Forces leadership was highly politicised following the Soviet model. The Romanian Armed Forces communisation was achieved through: a) the establishment, on 5 October 1948, of the Armed Forces Political Superior Directorate (AFPSD), highly infiltrated and controlled by the Soviet counsellors who belonged to the Soviet military intelligence service or the Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU – Glavnoe Razvedivatelnoe Upravlenie) and the Soviet State Intelligence Service (Narodnii Komissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti – NKGB/MGB, 1943-1946/1946-1953); b) the appointment, on strictly political bases, of some persons who had not received any military education and training at the AFPSD command, up to its transformation into the Armed Forces Political Superior Council (AFPSC); c) the treasons against the state committed by some politicians within the AFPSD/AFPSC, employing proletarian internationalism as a determining factor; d) the destruction of the military elite that survived the Second World War<sup>5</sup>.

Although, by signing the Peace Treaty in 1947, Romania was forbidden from developing or possessing certain types of armament<sup>6</sup>, this aspect was to change a year after signing the treaty, following Petru Groza's initiative<sup>7</sup>. At the beginning of 1951, as a result of the orders issued in Moscow, it was decided the “*organisational, doctrinal and logistical uniformisation*” of all the armed forces of the countries in the Soviet sphere of influence, which was one of the first important steps taken in relation to violation of the clauses of the Peace Treaty with the Allied and Associated Powers<sup>8</sup>. At the Conference of the representatives of the Soviet

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<sup>4</sup> Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, *România și organizarea postbelică a lumii (1945-1947)*, Editura Academiei R.S.R., București, 1988, p. 189.

<sup>5</sup> Gavriil Preda, Petre Opreș, *România în Organizația Tratatului de la Varșovia (1954-1968)*, documente, Academia Română, I.N.S.T., 2008, pp. 22-23.

<sup>6</sup> Constantin Toderășcu (coord.), *Documente privind istoria militară a poporului român. 13 mai 1945 – 31 decembrie 1947*, C.S.C.T.I.M., Editura Militară, București, 1988, p. 359.

<sup>7</sup> National Central Historical Archives (ANIC), PCM Collection – Stenograme, File no. 13/1950, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Gavriil Preda, Petre Opreș, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe held in Moscow on 9-12 January 1951, it was established a “*Coordination Committee*”, whose role was to implement the Soviet model in all the armed forces of the partner countries on the Soviet orbit. The committee was led by the Defence Minister of the USSR, including two representatives of the socialist partner countries, one on behalf of the government and the other on behalf of the armed forces<sup>9</sup>. The “*Coordination Committee*” established following the Soviet proposal was practically the precursor of the WTO.

Briefly, that was the situation of the military in Romania and in the Communist Bloc up to early 1951. The Soviet control had to be enhanced so that the circles of power in the Kremlin could stay in peace.

Externally, a series of events determined Stalin to implement the “*Coordination Committee*”, through which the socialist camp could modernise itself in terms of the military and the armament. Through more or less visible actions, the Kremlin came to the conclusion that the socialist camp had to be armed to face the emergent challenges to the communist system survival. Episodes such as: the establishment of the Western Union (WU), on 17 March 1948, the first post-war defence organisation; the Berlin Blockade – 1948-1949; the establishment of NATO, on 4 April 1949; the recalibration of the US foreign and security policy, following the directive of President Harry Truman, and the well-known Directive 68 of the National Security Council (NSC)<sup>10</sup>, through which *containment* policy was extended; the Korean War and the involvement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in favour of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), a movement against which General Douglas MacArthur suggested using the atomic bomb, suggestion rejected by President Truman – are but a few of the geopolitical and geostrategic developments known in detail by the decision-makers in Moscow.

An important aspect, which helps us understand some of the USSR actions in that period, belongs to the field of *intelligence*. The Soviet espionage penetrated the first American and British political echelons so deep that Stalin was in the possession of the top secret documents that were the object of the discussions between Harry Truman and Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, between 3 and 8 December 1950. Through Donald Duart Maclean, a member of the “*Cambridge five spy ring*”, the Soviet espionage was the “*beneficiary*”

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 27.

<sup>10</sup> See also: NSC, *A Report to the National Security Council – NSC 68*, Washington, 12 April 1950, President’s Secretary’s File, pp. 1-66.

of sensitive information going so far that the Soviets knew the Americans would not use the atomic bomb in the Korean War, Maclean undermining, at the MGB order, the American-British efforts to cease the Korean War<sup>11</sup>. Maclean was the diplomat who, throughout his activity as a spy for the USSR, generated important material and, by ricochet, human losses at international level. *HUMINT (Human Intelligence)* means of collecting the information used by the Soviet espionage resulted in considerably bridging the technological gap existing in many areas of activity between the USSR and the USA.

The establishment of the WU and of NATO was considered by Stalin, *in illo tempore*, a reason for the fear of the imminent danger of attacking the USSR. The reality was in fact different. Moscow was confronted with other problems, which were more severe, having a security nature. In Western Europe there were two great ideas related to ensuring security – the European idea and the Transatlantic one. With regard to the European idea of security, it was the attempt to establish the European Defence Community (EDC)/the European Defensive Community (EDC), known in the literature as the *Pleven Plan*. The plan was conceived to counter the US request to re-arm the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), in flagrant contradiction with the Postdam Agreement in 1945, and the country accession to NATO. Therefore, on 26 May 1952, Great Britain, the USA, France and the FRG signed the “*Bonn Conventions*” or the “*Convention on the Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany*”, also known as the “*Common Treaty*”. One day after it, on 27 May 1952, it was signed the *Treaty of Paris* by the governments of France, Belgium, the FRG, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands, by which the EDC was established<sup>12</sup>. Mention should be made that the USA and Great Britain had distinct positions related to the EDC, as they did not ratify the treaty but engaged to maintain military forces in Europe and especially in the FRG to help with the EDC integration<sup>13</sup>. Although conceived by the French, the *Pleven Plan* ended on 30 August 1954, when the French communists together with the Gaullists opposed to introducing the document regarding the establishment of the EDC, the project being thus ended. Concomitantly with the political-military-diplomatic actions, the USA supported the establishment of *ANZUS* (The Australia, New Zealand,

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<sup>11</sup> Samuel J. Hamrick, *Deceiving the Deceivers: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2004, p. 107.

<sup>12</sup> Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1980, p. 147; Kevin Ruane, *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community. Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950-1955*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 2000, p. 34.

<sup>13</sup> Kevin Ruane, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

United States Security Treaty), in September 1951, organisation included in the *Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO)* since 1954<sup>14</sup>. The establishment of *ANZUS* was a strategic movement whose role was to prevent and contain communism from reaching the geographical South.

The information in Stalin's possession, obtained via the "five spy ring" determined him to build scenarios regarding the stationing of some Western and US forces on the Asian continent during the Korean War. In the Soviet leader's view, the attrition war between the two Koreas was beneficial for Moscow, as the Westerners focused on providing aids for the South Korea in its fight with the future DPRK supported by the PRC. The role of *intelligence* in such situations is essential for making the best decisions. Today, we know that the information obtained by the "five spy ring" for *NKGB/MGB/KGB* was crucially important for the consolidation of Moscow's authority over the socialist countries.

The rejection of the *Pleven Plan* by the united French opposition in the Parliament generated an intense political-diplomatic campaign of the USA to integrate the FRG in the WU and in NATO. The immediate effect of the *Pleven Plan* rejection was the organisation of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USA, the FRG, the UK, Canada, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Belgium in London, between 28 September and 3 October 1954, to discuss about the future FRG. It was followed by the Conference of Paris, between 19 and 23 October, attended by the same participants as the Conference of London. Through the Conference of Paris, it was established, among others, that the FRG should be recognised as a sovereign entity. Moreover, it was established that US, British and French troops should station on the FRG territory. The WU transformed into the WEU by including Italy and the FRG. It was also decided for the FRG to join NATO, limiting the types of armament the FRG could produce or own<sup>15</sup>. Moscow showed its discontent with the Paris Agreements on 19-23 October 1954 and reacted by renewing the suggestions made on 31 March 1954 regarding the so-called "*European Security Treaty*"<sup>16</sup>. Moscow continued its actions and, on 13 November 1954, issued a document through which 23 European states and the USA were invited to participate, on 29 November 1954, in the USSR, in discussions regarding a new European collective security architecture. The Soviet invitation was accepted by only the states in its sphere of influence and the PRC as an observer.

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<sup>14</sup> Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza (coord.), *Istoria secolului XX*, vol. 2, *Lumea între război și pace (1945-1973)*, translated by Marius Ioan, Editura Bic All, București, 1998, p. 156.

<sup>15</sup> Edward Fursdon, *op. cit.*, pp. 328-331.

<sup>16</sup> Geoffrey Roberts, *A Chance for Peace? The Soviet Campaign to End the Cold War, 1953-1955*, in *CWHP*, Working Paper 57, December 2008, p. 32.

Following the talks held between 29 November and 2 December 1954, it was signed a “*Joint Statement*” on the Eastern European states engagement to build a European collective security system able to “*keep peace in Europe*”<sup>17</sup>. The Soviet fear regarding the FRG re-armament and its WEU and NATO membership got endemic for the decision-makers in the Kremlin.

Up to that moment, we can admit that the situation of the European security was increasingly escalating, which was a negative aspect. On the one hand, there was the establishment of NATO and the WEU, the FRG remilitarisation and its joining in Western European and North Atlantic security systems and, on the other hand, by the order of Stalin, the USSR made a start on re-arming socialist countries.

The Soviet diplomacy tried to mitigate the signing of the “*Paris Agreements*” on 19-23 October 1954, but it did not succeed in doing it. The USSR response was the preparation of the documents for the establishment of the WTO. Between 15 December 1954 and 14 May 1955, there were many actions of the Soviet political and diplomatic factors that concerned Romania. During the visit made in Moscow between 15 and 20 January 1955, Romania concluded an agreement regarding the enhancement of the national territory defence, followed by the signing, in February 1955, of another military agreement. The second agreement stipulated that, up to 31 May 1955, the Armed Forces Ministry (AFM) of the People’s Republic of Romania (PRR) should send to the Soviet Armed Forces Great General Staff the plan for the Romanian territory operational preparation. As far as the military was concerned, on 13 March 1955, a Soviet-Romanian commission decided the conclusion of another military agreement that stipulated the establishment of a part of the USSR Black Sea Fleet on the Romanian littoral<sup>18</sup>. It is possible for such agreements to have been concluded between the USSR and the other states in the socialist bloc.

The Soviet diplomacy took action to stop the US “*offensive*” in Europe. In this regard, the negotiations with Japan for the normalisation of the relations between Moscow and Tokyo were resumed. Then, the Soviet Foreign Ministry focused its attention on Central Europe, by resetting the relations with a view to concluding the “*State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria*”. Between 12 and 15 April 1955, Soviet-Austrian negotiations took place in Moscow. The Soviet delegation was led by Viaceslav Molotov (Foreign Minister) and Anastas Ivanovici Mikoyan (Prime Vice-President of the Council of Ministers). The Austrian delegation was led by Iulius Raab

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 37.

<sup>18</sup> Gavriil Preda, Petre Opreș, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

(Chancellor), Adolf Schaerf (Vice-Chancellor), Leopold Figl (Foreign Minister), Bruno Screisky (Secretary of State). In “*Moscow Memorandum*”, signed on 15 April 1955, Chancellor Raab accepted the Soviet proposal to transform Austria in a permanently neutral state, following the Swiss model. Neutrality excluded the possibility for Austria to join NATO in exchange of withdrawing all the Soviet forces from the territory of Austria up to 31 December 1955<sup>19</sup>. The final document was signed on 15 May 1955, a day after the agreements for the establishment of the WTO were signed. The fact that the “*Austrian problem*” was resolved represented another step taken by the Kremlin leadership towards the establishment of a military alliance in Europe.

Prior to the establishment of the WTO, in Romania, the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP) held a series of consultations on topics related to the national territory defence. There were three meetings of the Political Bureau (PB) of the RWP, on 1, 13 and 23 April 1955 to discuss inclusively the composition of the delegation that was to go to Warsaw<sup>20</sup>. The last meeting at the highest level in Romania, before the delegation went to the capital of Poland, was on 7 May 1955, when the Government gathered to discuss about the composition of the Romanian delegation as some changes were made, and about the fact that Romania would actually attend a Conference of the European States to Ensure European Security<sup>21</sup>, similar to the one held in Moscow between 29 November and 2 December 1954. During the meeting on 7 May 1955, Dej did not provide too many details regarding the topics for discussion in Warsaw between 11 and 14 May 1955.

### Distinct Positions of Romania within the WTO

The “*Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance*”, generically called the *WTO*, was signed by 8 European states: the People’s Republic of Albania (PRA), the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSR), the Democratic Republic of Germany (DRG), the People’s Republic of Poland (PRP), the People’s Republic of Romania (PRR), the People’s Republic of Hungary (PRH) and the USSR, and entered into force on 4 June 1955, after its ratification by the PRA<sup>22</sup>. There were many similarities between the *WTO* and the founding document of NATO, and it was projected for a 20-year period,

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<sup>19</sup> Andrew E. Harrod, *Austrian Neutrality: The Early Years, 1955-1958*, in *Austrian History Yearbook*, vol. 43 (2012), Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota, pp. 165-188.

<sup>20</sup> Gavriil Preda, Petre Opreș, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-56.

<sup>21</sup> ANIC, Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri Collection, File no. 2/1955, p. 5.

<sup>22</sup> *Idem*, *Tratatul de la Varșovia*, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 3/1955, p. 9. Romania ratified the Treaty on 3 June 1955.



namely up to 4 June 1975<sup>23</sup>. In article (art.) 11, paragraph (para.) 1 it was a clause through which the Treaty was automatically extended for a 10-year period if it was not denounced by any country a year prior to its termination, and art. 11, para. 2 stipulated that the Treaty would become null when a “*European General Collective Security Treaty*” was concluded at European level.

Within the *WTO*, it was stipulated the establishment of a Unified Command of the United Armed Forces/UAF (art. 5) as well as the establishment of a Political Consultative Committee (PCC) (art. 6). The Unified Command of the UAF was a command structure in the *WTO*. As for its organisation, it was stipulated the position of Supreme Commander of the UAF having the following responsibilities: to meet the PCC resolutions; to monitor and to operationally prepare the UAF joint exercises; to comprehensively know the situation of the troops and fleets under the UAF command and to take all the necessary measures, in cooperation with the governments and the defence ministers of the particular countries, to ensure the armed forces permanent combat training; to develop and present the PCC proposals regarding the continuous enhancement of the quality and quantity of the available personnel. The UAF Supreme Commander subordinated the UAF General Staff having responsibilities in monitoring the activity of the personnel subordinated to the UAF Supreme Commander. The UAF General Staff consisted of: the permanent representatives of the defence ministries in the *WTO* member states; special bodies responsible for strategic, tactical and organisational aspects; armed forces inspectors in different UAF services.

Besides the responsibilities of the UAF General Staff, which were not negligible at all, we mention that the communications system used by both the Supreme Commander and the Chief of the UAF Staff was the diplomatic post as well as other means of communication provided by the *WTO* member states in their liaisons with their *WTO* representatives<sup>24</sup>. The first Supreme Commander of the UAF was Ivan Stepanovici Konev, and the first Chief of the UAF General Staff was Alexandr Inochentevici Antonov.

It is interesting the testimony of Lieutenant General Ion Tutoveanu, who was a direct participant in the discussions on the establishment of the *WTO*, thus contemporary with the events, according to which both the UAF Supreme

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<sup>23</sup> US Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Document*, vol. 1, Department of State Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117, Washington DC, in *CWIHP*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> KC PZPR 2661/16-19, Archiwum Akt Nowych, *Statutul Comandamentului Unificat al statelor membre ale Tratatului de la Varşovia*, 7 September 1955, document translated into English by Lena Sirota, in *CWIHP*; document also published by Vojtech Masntý, Christian Nuenlist, Ana Locher, *Prevederi generale ale Comandamentului Unificat al Forşelor Armate Unite ale Tratatului de la Varşovia*, Records of the Political Consultative Committee, 1955-1991, January 2003, in *PHP*.

Commander and the Chief of the UAF General Staff were “in the leadership of the 10<sup>th</sup> Directorate within the Red Armed Forces General Staff”<sup>25</sup>.

Besides the military aspects, by the establishment of the WTO, the USSR became the beneficiary of a huge volume of information collected by the military intelligence services of the WTO member states.

The scientific materials related to the establishment, functioning and activity of the WTO mention the hypothesis of establishing the military organisation to counter the establishment of NATO and the WEU, to ensure collective security in Eastern Europe. At the Geneva Conference on 18-23 July 1955, attended by the USSR, the UK, France and the USA, the Soviets proposed a project to conclude a “General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe”<sup>26</sup>. For its conclusion, they were ready to renounce the WTO on condition the Western countries would renounce the WEU and NATO.

By simply reading the text of the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance”<sup>27</sup> we find out that the political structure within it was considered more important than the military structure. It is interesting that the establishment of the PCC was not announced on the 4 June 1955, when the WTO entered into force through its ratification by the PRA. This aspect was made public only on 20 January 1956, when a communique was issued regarding the establishment of the PCC and the organisation of its first session in Prague, on 27 January 1956. During the meeting in Prague, following the adoption of the United Armed Forces Command (UAFC) statute and the WTO member states approval of the establishment of the DRG national armed forces and its fully-fledged and equally membership of the Treaty, two more structures subordinate to the PCC were established, based in Moscow: a Permanent Commission, responsible for issuing the recommendations regarding foreign policy matters, and a Joint Secretariat, consisting of representatives of all WTO signatory states. On 28 January 1956, the PCC subordinated three structures: a) the UAFC, which subordinated the UAF and the UAF General Staff; b) the Joint Secretariat;

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<sup>25</sup> Ion Tutoveanu, *În 1954, am fost martor la e explozie atomică sovietică*, in *Dosarele Istoriei*, year VIII, no. 10(74)/2002, p. 34.

<sup>26</sup> Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, vol. V, Documents of the Conference (251-257), doc. no. 251, 252, pp. 517-519.

<sup>27</sup> Not to be mistaken for the “Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” concluded between the PRR and PRB, PRH, CSR, URSS, PRP, in 1948. For a comparison between the “Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” concluded by the PRR with the socialist states in Europe and the WTO, see also: ANIC, *Tratatul de la Varşovia*, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 24/1966, pp. 37-43.

c) the Permanent Commission<sup>28</sup>. The structure remained in force, at least theoretically, until the WTO reorganisation in Budapest, in 1969<sup>29</sup>.

The first meeting of the WTO member states foreign ministers was held on 27-28 April 1959 in Warsaw, which was not acknowledged by the Organisation officials. The WTO socialist member states foreign ministers and their deputies met regularly starting in 1966.

During the meeting in Budapest on 17 March 1969 there were made some structural reforms regarding the WTO. Thus, the PCC subordinated the following structures: a) the Defence Ministers Committee (of the WTO member states); b) the UAFC, which subordinated: the UAF, the UAF General Staff, the Military Council<sup>30</sup> and the Technical Commission; c) the Joint Secretariat; d) the Permanent Commission (mentioning that the members of the Joint Secretariat and of the Permanent Commission would not be appointed to any public office until the next reorganisation of the WTO). It is noted the establishment of two more bodies subordinate to the UAFC, namely: the Technical Committee and the Military Council<sup>31</sup>. The next structural reform of the WTO was adopted following the PCC consultations in Bucharest, in November 1976. In the new structure, the Permanent Commission would be replaced with the Foreign Ministers Committee (FMC), and the Joint Secretariat would have the same statute as in 1956<sup>32</sup>.

For the period under research, 1964-1989, Romania had already been in contradiction to the other WTO member states related to some security aspects. To the letter of the CC of the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany (SUPEG), submitted, on 10 November 1964, to the CC of the RWP with a view to convening a session of the PCC of the WTO to examine the common position of the socialist states regarding the intention to establish the NATO Multilateral Nuclear Forces (MNF), the RWP agreed with convening the session but in January 1965, motivating that the NATO Security Council (SC) was to be held on 16 December 1964, divergences already existing between the Alliance members<sup>33</sup>. The analysis

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<sup>28</sup> ANIC, *Tratatul de la Varşovia*, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 16/1965, p. 73.

<sup>29</sup> Neil Fodor, *The Warsaw Treaty Organization. A Political and Organizational Analysis*, USA, Palgrave Macmillan, 1990, pp. 33-34.

<sup>30</sup> The Unified Command Military Council consisted of the Supreme Commander, as Chairman, and its deputies (from each country – A.N.) and Chief of the UAF General Staff, as members. See also ANIC, *Tratatul de la Varşovia*, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 23/1966, p. 33.

<sup>31</sup> Neil Fodor, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 37.

<sup>33</sup> ANIC, *Tratatul de la Varşovia*, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 14/1964, pp. 1-3.

of the proposal made by Romania proved it to have a logical basis, namely to convene the WTO PCC after the conclusion of the discussions within the NATO SC, but the attitude of Bucharest irritated Moscow. Romania was not the only voice in this respect, but it was because the short period of time up to convening the PCC. The CSR did not agree with convening the PCC of the WTO on 27-28 December 1964, invoking the short time for the thorough preparation with a view to discussing the problems, and the PRH agreed with the meeting of the foreign ministers deputies in the WTO member states before the PCC meeting<sup>34</sup>.

The PCC of the WTO convened in January 1965 in Warsaw. Relevant for Romania was the expertise provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The last point of the expertise mentioned the issue of the WTO member states negative manifestations towards Romania in relation to the *“Declaration in April 1964”*<sup>35</sup>. It is a good example as, after April 1964, Romania applied its own foreign policy, which was not consistent with the one of Moscow. The positions expressed by Romania within the WTO PCC meeting in January 1965 were described by Western mass-media as *“a compromise between Ulbricht – Gomulka position and the one of comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej”*<sup>36</sup>. In 1965, Romania had already traded with the FRG and sought for tempering the rigid attitudes of the PRH and DRG towards the FRG. As far as the WTO structure and functioning were concerned, it is worth mentioning the fact that it was a point on the agenda stipulating regular meetings of the WTO member states foreign ministers or their deputies *“at regular intervals – but at least twice a year”*<sup>37</sup>, idea initially rejected by Romania, which motivated, in this respect, the violation of each state right to decide in matters of own foreign policy<sup>38</sup>.

Romania played a unique role in the WTO, through its efforts to hamper the USSR plans to subordinate the national armed forces of the member states to the UAF. Romanian political leaders expressed the idea during different summits, an example in this regard being the meeting in 1965 with Chinese communist leaders<sup>39</sup>. Romania was the only WTO member country that vehemently opposed

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<sup>34</sup> *Idem*, Tratatul de la Varşovia, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 16/1965, p. 3, 14.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 60.

<sup>36</sup> *Idem*, Tratatul de la Varşovia, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 18/1965, p. 3.

<sup>37</sup> *Idem*, Tratatul de la Varşovia, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 19/1965, vol. 1, p. 108.

<sup>38</sup> *Idem*, Tratatul de la Varşovia, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 23/1966, p. 19.

<sup>39</sup> *Idem*, CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, File no. 105/1965, pp. 2-15.

to all Moscow's decisions regarding "military integration" throughout the *Cold War* period. Starting in 1965, Romania was excluded from the Pact first strategic echelon because of its different vision put in practice by Bucharest in matters of own foreign policy. 1966 was the year when Ceaușescu declared *expressis verbis* that major changes should be made in the WTO decision-making so that command belonged, on a rotational basis, to all the member states and not only to the Soviets. The same Ceaușescu militated that the member states should participate in the process of developing the Soviet strategy regarding nuclear armament, simultaneously with strengthening the national legislation on the state control over the Armed Forces<sup>40</sup>.

The haste in which the text of the Warsaw Treaty was written became, in time, a burden for the USSR, even if the country had the status of *primus inter paris* within the Alliance. The fact that the WTO was an association between equal countries on voluntary basis determined the Kremlin to focus its efforts on annexing a "War Statute" to the initial document, which would have led to making decisions on behalf of all allies, aspect strongly rejected by Romania. The Soviet decision-makers reacted to Romania's opposition by concluding bilateral treaties with the other member states of the Organisation, but without achieving the expected results. The inexistence of a document having an integratory character, valid for all the WTO members, could not have effects over some possible strategic movements against Bucharest. Moreover, Romania relied on the need for unanimity to make decisions within the Pact.

It followed a period when Romania was not invited to attend some important meetings of heads of state or government in the WTO countries. Thus, after the PCC meeting in Sofia on 6-7 March, there were other meetings in Dresden (23 March 1968), Moscow (8 May 1968), Warsaw (14-15 July 1968), Bratislava (3 August 1968), Romania was not invited to attend<sup>41</sup>.

In 1970, Romania was requested, at embassy level, to provide information and answers following the news in the Soviet mass media informing the international public opinion that, at the end of January, following the USSR order, the WTO

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<sup>40</sup> Buletinul Oficial al RSR no. 7 on 23 January 1967, Decree no. 1017/1966.

<sup>41</sup> ANIC, *Tratatul de la Varșovia*, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 41/1969, vol. 3, p. 28. Document also published in Mioara Anton, *România și Tratatul de la Varșovia. Conferințele miniștrilor Afacerilor Externe și ale adjuncților lor (1966-1991)*, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Institutul Diplomatic Român, Editura Alpha MDN, București, 2009, IV, "Întâlnirea adjuncților Miniștrilor Afacerilor Externe ale țărilor participante la Tratatul de la Varșovia, consacrată Tratatului de nediseminare a armelor nucleare. 26-28 februarie 1968, Berlin", doc. no. 4 "[...] august 1968, București, Sinteză a MAE referitoare la principiile politicii externe ale RS România ca membru al CAER și al Tratatului de la Varșovia", pp. 172-173.

“multinational forces” were to be established<sup>42</sup>. The news was rapidly made available for the information channels worldwide, and the Romanian state, through its diplomatic representatives, had to clarify to what extent the country would participate in those forces. The Western diplomats and military attaches were convinced that Romania’s position was consistent following the speech delivered by Nicolae Ceaușescu in front of the superior cadres in the Ministry of National Defence in the first half of the ’70s. Romania participated in the WTO military manoeuvres organised on the territory of the DRG in 1970, by sending “a group of Romanian officers, at staff and division level”, which was surprising up to that moment, considering the policy of Bucharest with regard to the orders given to the Romanian Armed Forces<sup>43</sup>. Mention should be made that Romania consolidated, up to that moment, the point of view according to which the WTO troops “cannot be deployed from the territory of one state to the territory of another state without the latter agreement”<sup>44</sup>. Romania accepted, after 1968, to organise exercises only on the map, without troops, considering what happened in Czechoslovakia. The military exercises conducted on the national territories of the WTO member states represented an opportunity for GRU – KGB to collect first-hand information from the particular countries. The authorities in Bucharest tried, employing all available means, to avoid this type of joint military exercises throughout the *Cold War* period.

In 1972, Ion Gheorghe Maurer sent a letter to his Soviet and Bulgarian counterparts, Alexei Kosîghin, and Stanko Todorov respectively, “related to the proposal to conclude bilateral conventions to regulate the passage of the Soviet troops into the territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and of the Romanian troops into the territory of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, in order to provide military support for the People’s Republic of Bulgaria”. Maurer invoked art. 4 in the Treaty and intended that, for its applicability, bilateral conventions should be concluded between Romania, on the one hand, and the USSR and the PRB, on the other hand, to regulate the legal conditions related to providing military support in compliance with the UN Charter. Maurer mentions, in the letters addressed to his two counterparts, that letters had been exchanged at defence minister level between Romania, the USSR and Bulgaria, the latter two countries rejecting Romania’s request on the grounds that the particular provisions were stipulated in both the treaty and the “operational plan”<sup>45</sup>. Romania felt the need for a solid political-juridical

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<sup>42</sup> ANIC, Tratatul de la Varșovia, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 51/1970, p. 2.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 25-35.

<sup>44</sup> See also ANIC, CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe Collection, File no. 72/1969, pp. 4-30.

<sup>45</sup> ANIC, Tratatul de la Varșovia, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 59/1972, pp. 6-21.

foundation to regulate the passing of the Soviet troops into the national territory so that a scenario similar to the one in the CSR could not be possible.

An aspect related to the military domain was that on 24 April 1973, when it was signed in Moscow the “*Convention regarding the juridical capacity, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the General Staff and other command bodies within the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation member states*”. The Convention regulated not only the issues related to the General Staff juridical capacity but also those related to the immunity and privileges enjoyed by the members of the UAF General Staff structures<sup>46</sup>.

Romania’s strategies, both defensive and offensive ones, regarding the WTO and the way to tackle some issues related to European and international security, nuclear disarmament and other aspects, were subsumed under the ideas of the small countries equality and independence as well as of weakening the Soviet control over the allies. Under the auspices of such vision, Romania tried to build relations with the other WTO member states, which failed because of the opposition of some countries that considered foreign and security policy could be consolidated only within alliances. The distinct positions expressed by Romania during each PCC or CMAE meeting were countered by clandestine measures directed from the USSR. The revitalisation of some bilateral relations between Romania and other WTO member states, up to the CSR invasion, met the firm opposition of Iosip Broz Tito and Alexander Dubček. It followed the initiative, undermined by the USSR, to establish an alliance system between Romania, Bulgaria<sup>47</sup>, Greece and Turkey, a “*Balkan Pact*”, based on the Soviet idea of establishing some nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Balkan Peninsula and Northern Europe.

The next major confrontation within the WTO between Romania and the other member states was related to the adoption of the UAF Statute in wartime. Following a series of consultations with the Defence Ministers Committee (Budapest, 29 November 1977), PCC (Warsaw, 22-23 November 1978), and with the Military Council (Bucharest, 31 October 1979), Romania refused to sign the UAF Statute in wartime, through which national armed forces could be subordinated to the Soviet Armed Forces and, consequently, to Brezhnev, motivating that the international situation was not escalating, and the international security environment did not indicate an imminent attack on the part of the adversary<sup>48</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> For further details regarding the integral text of the Convention, see also ANIC, *Tratatul de la Varşovia*, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 66/1974, pp. 36-42.

<sup>47</sup> Bulgaria had a double standard, publicly supporting the establishment of a Balkan Pact and at the same time undermining it through KDS. See also, the Central State Archive in Sofia, “*Minuta convorbirii dintre Todor Jivkov – Leonid Ilci Brejnev, reşedinţa Voden [Bulgaria]*”, 20 September 1973, 378-B Collection, File no. 360, in *CWIHP*.

<sup>48</sup> Constantin Olteanu, Alesandru Duţu, *România: 36 de ani în Tratatul de la Varşovia*, Editura Niculescu, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 324-329.

It was one of the numerous moments when Romania was in marked contrast to the Soviet proposals regarding the reform of some of the Treaty structures. Moreover, the signing of the UAF Statute in wartime meant an increase in the military expenditures, principle that was in contrast to the ideas supported by Ceaușescu in all bi- and multilateral meetings. Moscow responded through encouraging the animosities between Romania and Poland, facilitated by the visceral hatred Wojciech Witold Jaruzelski had towards Ceaușescu. In fact, Jaruzelski was also the Defence Minister in Poland, who became the Secretary General of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), one of the fervent supporters of signing the UAF Statute in wartime and concomitantly a fierce critic of Romania with regard to the topic, under the circumstances of Romania's firm opposition to a possible military intervention against the population in Poland<sup>49</sup>.

A distinct role within the Pact was played by the disputes between Romania and the USSR over nuclear disarmament. Not mentioning the flagrant contradictions between the proposals made by the two countries, we emphasise the suggestion made by Ceaușescu in his speech held during the PCC meeting in Prague, in 1983, regarding *"the establishment of a special commission of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation socialist member states to militate for slowing the arms race and to develop measures regarding disarmament – first and foremost nuclear disarmament –, which would have a high political significance and would be in agreement with the peoples in Europe and in the entire world"*<sup>50</sup>. It is evident that the Kremlin did not agree that a country with no nuclear arsenal could discuss the establishment of a *"Special Commission"* to implement conventional and nuclear disarmament.

The fact that 1985 was near and the deficiencies in reaching consensus with regard to extending the WTO resulted in big problems within the socialist bloc, because of Romania's opposition. After the failure in the Soviet-Romanian talks regarding extending the Pact validity in December 1984, in Moscow, the PCC meeting, scheduled in January 1985, in Sofia, was delayed less than 24 hours before its beginning. Romania sought for the WTO to be restructured so that the military alliance could become a voluntary coalition in which all the states should be equal.

During the last decade of the communist regime, Romania sought to limit the Soviet power and control within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. At the end of 1988, the Soviets made a new proposal for the signing of a concept-document

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 147-152.

<sup>50</sup> Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, Douglas Selvage (eds.), *Records of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee*, Prague, 4-5 January 1983, *"Discurs al Secretarului General al PCR (Nicolae Ceaușescu)"*, translated from German by Ursula Froese, p. 5, in *PHP*.



on “*the UAF Statute in wartime*”, but, as the document did not succeed in resolving the fundamental issues, Romania refused again to ratify it. The proposal to reform the WTO, made by Bucharest on 1 July 1988, following the discussions during the meeting of the RCP Executive Political Committee (CPEX), on 17 June 1988, was aimed at radically restructuring the WTO. There were bilateral meetings between Romania and the USSR on this issue, between 7-8 July 1988, in Moscow, and between September-October 1988, in Bucharest<sup>51</sup>, during which the Soviet party tried to isolate the other members of the Pact and to provide them with directives to prevent the information leakage on the topic in the mass media.

The election of Mikhail Sergheevici Gorbachev as the leader of the SUCP, on 11 March 1985, meant a decline in the relations between the USSR and the USA, on the one hand, and between the USSR and the Western European countries, on the other hand. In spite of the gaps in the scientific materials developed on the topic of Mikhail Gorbachev coming to power, it is known that he started the socialist system economic recovery programme through the reforms known as *uskorenie* (acceleration), and then, starting in 1986, *glasnosti* (transparency) and *perestroika* (reconstruction).

Besides the internal problems, Gorbachev inherited *ad initio* a foreign policy, security and defence agenda dominated by the archaic thought of the old leaders. The thorough analysis shows the flagrant similitudes between the actions chosen by the Secretary General of the SUCP to implement the decisions and the proposals promoted by Romania up to that time. In the USSR foreign policy, the dominants were: the exclusion of the ideological principles in the relations between states; the normalisation of the relations with the USA, China, Israel, the Middle East, and, with regard to security issues, the main aspects were: the WTO transformation process, the arms race cessation, the Soviet forces withdrawal from Afghanistan. The political environment in which Romania had developed its foreign and security policy within the Warsaw Pact changed when Gorbachev took over the decision-making authority with regard to security agenda from the Soviet force structures, especially from the armed forces. It was the moment when Romania did no longer play the role of international mediator in certain security issues, and the strategies and visions promoted by Bucharest on disarmament were directly assumed by Gorbachev.

The last two years of the *Cold War* were also the years when Romania intended to totally transform the WTO, failing in its attempt.

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<sup>51</sup> About the Romanian-Soviet consultations in Bucharest, see also ANIC, *Tratatul de la Varşovia*, Ministerul de Externe (1954-1991, 1993) Collection, File no. 155/1988, pp. 1-69.

## Conclusions

The end of the Second World War marked a new beginning in the security system and international relations. Entering a period of silence and suffering, Europa was divided in two antagonistic political-ideological blocs that were to include the military dimension too. The establishment of NATO, in 1949, and of the WTO, in 1955, were to radicalise the relations between the East and the West in such a way that what is known in the literature as the *Cold War* could be defined by periods of crisis and *détente*, which eventually led to the dissolution of the communist regimes.

The distinct position adopted by Romania within the WTO, especially after 1964, resulted in numerous impediments to the Alliance “governed” by the Kremlin. The flagrant contradictions between Romania and the other member states irritated Moscow several times. The “*unruly*” attitude of Bucharest triggered the title of the rebel of the communist bloc, a situation that could not remain without a response from Moscow. The Kremlin countermeasures found their practical finality in the coordinated active measures programme through which Romania’s actions were reinterpreted and distortedly presented in the West. The disinformation, intoxication, and propaganda were among the widely used methods to substantiate the USSR responses to Romania. The analysis of the material available to research shows that, in most of the situations, the coordinated active measures met their goals. It is one of the possible answers to the reaction of many Western states towards Romania, especially in the last years of the *Cold War*.

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**English version by**  
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# MODERNISATION OF THE MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM

Colonel Dr Daniel BĂNICĂ

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*Education and training are two essential components of individual life in a knowledge-based society. According to the author, the reform of the military education system should be based on quality and excellence.*

*Thus the reform of the military education system starts from the social values and entails institutional and individual responsibility, being generated by the relationship between teacher and student/trainer and trainee. The results are strongly influenced by the quality of the teaching staff/training staff. In this context, the author analyses the main courses of action in the field of military education, as planned by the General Staff, in stages: 2017-2020 and 2021-2026.*

**Keywords:** *initial education and training; professional development; graduate model; military colleges*

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and military fields. Romania also represents the second consumer market in the Central and Eastern Europe and benefits from its strategic geographical position thus becoming one of the most attractive territories.

## Current References

Romania is the largest country in the South-East Europe and the seventh member state of the European Union regarding its population. In this context, Romania benefits from a series of important advantages that should be accordingly managed in all fields, not only at the strategic level but also at the operational one.

In 2004, Romania joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and since then it has participated in collective defence along with its allies and partners; in 2011, the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century between Romania and the United States of America was adopted and thus our country enjoyed a privileged status in the field of defence.

Since 2007 Romania has been an EU member state and adopted important EU regulations in the legal, political, administrative, commercial

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In the military context, Romania is the forward point in the south-eastern flank of NATO, having the second largest well-equipped army after Poland and an important geo-strategic position in the equation of the Wider Black Sea Region.

Currently, Romania is experiencing a significant economic growth with advantages in all fields, also including the military system which has been suffering from a low budget over the past years.

Within the military organisation, military education represents a priority and participates, as an integrated part of the national education system, along with the entire Romanian society, in the profound, structural and principled transformation of the country in order to build a European democratic future of Romania, considered to be an open window to a major perspective of our European and Euro-Atlantic modernisation.

The military education system in Romania is open and responsive to European and Euro-Atlantic changes, while the military education units and institutions face the challenge of playing a significant role in developing education within the European area, along with the other civilian educational institutions.



The educational process, the scientific research activity, the professional training of the teaching and non-teaching auxiliary staff within the military educational units and institutions are organised and performed according to the national legal framework stipulations and the special regulations related to the educational system within the Ministry of National Defence.

The main objective of the military education system is the initial training and professional development of the officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers in order to assume responsibilities for accomplishing the Romanian Armed Forces constitutional missions, in compliance with the operational training standards in NATO and EU member states, as well as with the national and universal values and principles.

The mission and objectives of the educational process are reflected in the operational objectives, the specific and transversal competences, as well as in the functions for which graduates are trained.

The European legal framework that underlies the national legislation was implemented and adapted to the particularities of the military education, while the harmonisation of the legislation represents a continuous concern of the designated structures. Furthermore, the accomplishment of a total

compatibility with the training and professional development institutions in NATO professional armed forces is still one of the primary aspects of the modernisation process.

### **Overview of the Education System**

The military education system forms an integral part of the national education system and functions according to the National Education Law of 2011, including subsequent amendments and additions, and in accordance with the specific regulatory framework: Government resolutions, ordinances of the Defence Minister, as well as regulations issued by the Chief of the Human Resources Management Directorate and by the Chief of the General Staff.

Some documents of great importance can be mentioned when it is about assigning new purposes to the military education, such as: *the Defence White Paper, the National Defence Strategy (2015-2019), the Professional Development Strategy in Romania (2014-2020), the National Qualification Authority Strategy – 2015, and prospectively forward to 2020, and the National Lifelong Learning Strategy (2015-2020)*; hence results the necessity of developing the military education aiming to achieve an integrated, productive and competitive system, as well as efficient and always adapted to the operational requirements of the armed forces, and also to increase the compatibility standards along with the professional development of the entire military personnel within NATO armed forces.

All Higher Education Military Institutions are accredited by the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ARACIS) that conducted external quality evaluations between 2010 and 2015, visits which resulted in a positive verdict – *“high degree of confidence”* thus classifying these institutions into the second category – higher education and academic scientific research, having sufficient school capacities. At the same time, starting in 2013, the Higher Education Military Institutions are integrated within the European Higher Education Area.

The National Military Colleges, authentic European schools, represent symbols of the national education due to the excellent Bacalaureate results as well as those obtained in the national and international competitions and Olympiads. The three military post high-school education institutes were accredited by the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance on Pre-University Education (ARACIP). They are unique on the labour market and ranked among the first third of the Romanian educational institutions.

The continuing vocational training institutions generally have appropriate teaching staff and material resources in order to accomplish all missions and objectives.

The modernisation process is aimed at the reorganisation and improvement of the entire military education system by providing qualitative initial and further vocational training programmes in relation to the existing requirements in the Romanian Armed Forces, established through the forthcoming “career guidance” and human resource management policies.

In the evolutionary context of the society and security, including the military organisation as well, *the vision for the military education results in a logical consequence: the development of the military education from a conceptual, procedural and architectural perspective, able to provide the armed forces with highly qualified human resource, innovative and capable of changing the educational assets not only into knowingsness but also into competitive advantages, flexible, able to fulfil a wide range of missions so that all military structures can meet efficiently any challenges that may arise.*

*The mission of the military education that emerges from the vision, is to form officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, having professional and transversal competencies as well as leadership skills, in accordance with the requirements and needs of the armed forces, appropriate qualifications for the specific job requirements, potentially becoming creative and innovative personalities, really determined to obtain performance, to generate quality and to take responsibility for their military career.*

## **Modernisation of Education**

### **> Upper secondary education (high school)**

The military high school provides the youth with the opportunity to explore the social reality for developing a balanced personality, teamwork skills, qualifications and aptitudes in order to plan a military career and to quickly integrate into an open and dynamic society, ensuring personal security. Within the four military high schools, the entire training-educational process is intended to provide the graduate with solid transferable skills, in a healthy environment, equipped with all the necessary facilities to educate the youth according to the democratic citizenship, by means of teaching staff that are competitive, empathetic and open to change.

In April 2016, based on the provisions of the Ministerial Order no. M.S. 53/2016, the procedures regarding the authorisation to operate a new military high school were initiated by re-establishing the former “Tudor Vladimirescu” Military High School in Craiova, in place of “Fratii Buzesti” Communications and IT Training Battalion. Thus, in June 2016, the newly-established institution, called “Tudor Vladimirescu” Military National College, received an evaluation visit conducted by the Romanian

Agency for Quality Assurance on Pre-University Education (ARACIP), which resulted in a temporary functioning authorisation by the Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research (MNESR) Order no. 4988/23.08.2016.



The legislation in force has allowed education to develop in keeping with the new school curriculum. The development and diversification of core competencies (Math and IT specialisation) and vocational ones (military specialisation) were achieved due to the high quality of educational services, and at the same time to primary military socialisation of the human resource who would join a military academy or a post-secondary military education institution in the Romanian Armed Forces able to provide professional military education and training.

The main objective is to provide students with scientific and art knowledge in accordance with the curriculum in order to achieve good results at the baccalaureate and the university or post-secondary military institutions entrance exams.

Taking into consideration the curriculum, a major aim is to develop the education process through increasing performance and constantly promoting that type of management education based on the practical techniques and strategies, using modern methods that have the student in the centre.

We could clearly observe the good results of the students from the military high schools through this type of education. Thus, the military high schools are in the top 10 high schools from the country due to their results in the national exams.

Moreover, the national and international achievements could sum up the value of the military schools. An example is the student Sabina Calisevici from “Ștefan cel Mare” Military College in Câmpulung-Moldovenesc who, in August 2016, got the golden medal at the international Geography Olympiad held in Beijing, China.

➤ **Post-secondary education**

The NCO military schools within the armed forces services staff provide basic training, life-long learning and professional training for warrant officers, NCOs, privates and enlisted personnel as experts in weapon and equipment exploitation, repairing and maintenance as well as for NCOs as fighters, leaders, trainers and citizens with a post-secondary training in order to fill superior positions in their military career.

The post-secondary education of the warrant officers and NCOs in military schools is divided in post-secondary studies lasting 1-2 years, being therefore commissioned/authorised programmes, part-time learning for those NCOs training programmes, through specialisation/continuing learning courses and English language courses, to achieve core and specific technical competencies.



Educational aims fulfil the schools' mission to train military experts in all the branches belonging to the land, air or naval forces, as well as in logistics or IT structures. They are able to highly adapt to the technological, structural and doctrinal changes, to develop linguistic skills, to use the information technology, to gain physical abilities to meet the already established standards, to achieve professional abilities equal to those of the graduates from technical post-secondary education at national level, based on the curricula adopted by the Ministry of National Education and approved by the Chief of the General Staff.

The educational curriculum (the study programme) was designed based on the Graduate Model, the Fighter Model and the set of competencies in military and civilian specialties, in accordance with the syllabus for the professional qualification. The curriculum is updated by implementing, in the syllabi



and the curricular areas, the specific elements and knowledge related to the new assets in the inventory of operational forces, the newly adopted standards, and the specific regulations.

Among the primary goals during the last year there can be mentioned the trainers performance enhancement, the didactical base development to train warrant officers and NCOs in compliance with the standards for the professional qualifications and the Graduate Model for each branch and military specialty in accordance with the transformation of the Romanian armed forces, so that they can have the necessary skills to operate and maintain the new military assets in the inventory of the Romanian Armed Forces.

➤ **Military higher education**

The military higher education provides officers with basic and lifelong training through independent or university consortiums study programmes – bachelor, master, doctoral and post-university studies. The mission of the armed forces services higher education institutions is to generate and share information through basic and lifelong learning, to train experts of other branches, to conduct scientific research and even to develop, innovate and transfer technological knowledge.

Basic and lifelong learning in university and post-university studies could be attended not only by officers from all military branches or services but also by engineering experts or IT personnel, as well as by all the beneficiaries in the intelligence, public order, defence and security institutions. Moreover, the military doctors' basic training could be performed in the Universities of Medicine and Pharmacy from Bucharest and Târgu Mureş, under the coordination of the Medical-Military Institute.



The military higher education institutions are responsible for: the quality of the educational and research activities, the university freedom, the compliance with the current national and European legislation and policies in the education field, the decision-making process transparency, the respect for university ethical laws and the effective resource management.

Currently, the basic and professional officers' training as well as their future development have the following path:

a. *basic training*: through 3 or 4-year bachelor studies with 180-240 transferable credits, which are followed by a 6 to 11-month basic course (less for the engineers 'course). Therefore, an officer should attend university studies in order to be in charge of a platoon, followed by a 6 to 11-month course, getting level 6 according to *EQF (European Quality Framework)* after completion;

b. *further training*: could be accomplished by graduating two career courses within the training schools in order to fill company commander or staff positions;



c. *professional training for the position of regiment commander or higher*: could be accomplished through university studies as follows:

c.1. command master studies at the National Defence University "*Carol I*", professional master studies at the Military Technical Academy, and professional training for battalion commanders at the armed forces services higher education institutions, as well as for post-university studies graduating with level 7 qualification according to *EQF*;

c.2. post-university command or specialised courses at the National Defence University "*Carol I*" where officers are trained to fill regiment or brigade commander positions, post-university courses for engineers at the Military Technical Academy, as well as courses for the specialisation

in the functional domains at the armed forces services higher education institutions.

d. doctoral studies in Military Science, Intelligence and National Security and Engineering Science at the National Defence University “*Carol I*” or the Military Technical Academy in order to achieve a doctor diploma and level 8 according to *EQF*.

The academic management focuses on augmenting the quality of the educational and scientific research process based on a good educational activity organisation and planning, meeting the quality standards in developing the study programmes. Progress has been made in permanently harmonising the normative acts and the novelties in the field of education, scientific research, and recognition of the military institutions in the national and international university environment.

#### ➤ **Non-university continuing education**

The training process organised and held in the institutions of continuous development is aimed towards the stated purposes, starting from the practice of the responsibilities exercise within all military units of the Ministry of National Defence.

The practical-applicative character of the training process, the standardisation of the students activities and assessment, the increasing responsibilities for their personal training, as well as the assignment of tasks for the students in their entire training process have contributed to the acquirement and thoroughness of knowledge, the development of the skills necessary for the accomplishment of the duty tasks for which they have been trained, an issue that may be seen in the good and very good results in the course graduation.

In order to improve the quality of the training process, the development and update of the training logistics is a must in such a manner as to provide the necessary basis for the skills’ development in the duties for which the students are trained. Moreover, it is necessary to adapt the logistics to the competency- focused model.

The educational objectives are established and defined in relation to the competencies, skills, capabilities that are necessary for the graduates according to the duty tasks for which they are trained.

In order to improve the training process quality, when the syllabus and the tactical exercises are developed, there must be taken into account the lessons learned and the good practices (findings, comments, identified lessons) not only those experienced but also those received from the superior echelon.

At the level of the General Staff, it was suggested a training pilot programme – *Long Range Reconnaissance and Ranger*, starting in 2016-2017. The proposed course duration was endorsed and approved by the Chief of the Land Forces Staff through the plan of the training development for the military staff through courses, other than career courses, held within the military education units/institutions subordinate to the Land Forces Staff as follows: two weeks in April 2017, for the *Long Range Reconnaissance* course, (training pilot programme) and nine weeks (three phases with seven modules) in May-July 2017 for the *Ranger* course (training pilot programme).



The main aim of the *Ranger* course is the selection, within the limit of the approved vacancies, of the officers, graduates of the basic course, and also of the non-commissioned officers, graduates of the post-secondary studies of one year, of the last four series in infantry branch, who have the physical, psychological, moral and behavioural qualities that are vital for the combatants that act in hostile environment implying extreme risk, and who have been declared “*Admitted*” following the completion of the training pilot programme in the *Long Range Reconnaissance* course.

### ***Educational Priorities and Opportunities***

The educational priorities aim to accomplish a proficient learning process in order to provide interoperability in the field with NATO and EU member states armed forces, to guarantee the effective transfer into the curriculum of the requirements established in the Graduate Model, the Military Career Guide, and also the realistic needs for training in the branch for each specialisation programme, the acknowledgement of the learning assessment at the national level, within formal, non-formal, informal contexts specific to the military field,

the augmentation of the educational logistics that is necessary for the conduct of the educational process in excellent conditions, as well as for the improvement of the trainers' psycho-pedagogical knowledge.

The process of professional development of the military staff must be planned and carried out starting from the aims, according to the new national educational curriculum and the requirements to adjust the military learning system in the Romanian Armed Forces, in accordance with the competency grids, the curriculum and the syllabus authorised for each learning programme, taking into account the following requirements:

- a) the unitary planning for the entire period of training depending on the specialisation;*
- b) the strong practical-applicative and standardised character;*
- c) continuity, evolution (knowledge, aptitudes and skills should be acquired logically and from simple to complex);*
- d) the process should be conducted, every time the situation requires it, considering the curriculum units for teaching, learning, research, practical exercises and assessment, the aims established for each training phase, customised/specific for each learning year, on areas, military specialisations and specialties, professional qualifications;*
- e) flexibility in the way the objectives and/or activities are tailored to meet the transformations within the content of the qualifications provided by the learning programmes;*
- f) pupils/students/trainees motivation regarding the necessity to study all subjects;*
- g) permanent awareness of the real situation and interference in order to address any deficiency through the assessment system;*
- h) correlation between training and the functional duties of the combatants and specialists from all fields, as well as with the operative needs of the armed forces;*
- i) development of skills and capabilities for all pupils, students and trainees, in order to plan, organise and carry out the activities as well as to operate and maintain the systems and assets that are under exploitation within the military units;*
- j) organisation and development of some integratory activities in cooperation with the other military educational institutions.*

The main **strategic objectives** for the update of the military educational system are as follows:

- a) identify the necessary skills for the graduates in order to meet, at the established standards, the responsibilities for the positions they will fill;

- b) acknowledge, at the level of national legislation, the jobs and qualifications specific for officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, whose development is ensured through university studies for license and post-secondary studies, as they emerge from the Job Classification within the Ministry of National Defence;
- c) plan the new basic/initial training programmes/syllabus for officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers;
- d) plan, in accordance with the Human Resource management, the continuous training programmes/syllabus for officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, their approval and authorisation, on a case by case basis;
- e) fully correlate the objectives of the military high school education system and the requirements of the initial/basic training for officers by changing the specialisation in the national military high schools from Mathematics-Informatics into Mathematics-Informatics with intensive teaching in English;
- f) enhance the education and training process for officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers by reorganising the system of military training institutions and units and managing the military education system in an integrated and unitary manner.

The revitalisation and modernisation of the military education system are required by the continuation of the adjustment process of the system to the national learning system and the EU and NATO member countries evolution trend, by the lack of an integratory policy, and by the necessity for improvement in terms of the learning system and the scientific research quality. The education system modernisation is aimed at providing efficient graduates, capable to put into practice the procedures, standards, training and assessment techniques in the Romanian Armed Forces, the EU and NATO.

The readjustment and update of the learning system represent an endless process and aims the intercourse issues, educational syllabus, assessment and authority system and methods, as well as the process of teachers' training and development.

The social, military, economic and technological modernisation and transformation process may contribute to the effectiveness of the military education system through developing projects funded by grants and capitalising on the experience gained by the military personnel in the theatre of operations.

The structural and functional transformation of the military educational institutions should be conducted taking into account the personnel dynamics,

the lack of attractiveness of the teaching positions, the occupational standards and the professional qualifications specific to the military field, the National Register of Qualifications, as well as the extended possibilities of cooperation and collaboration with foreign partners, following Romania's membership of NATO and the EU.

The impact elements for the inter-institutional development are represented by the involvement of the professors in universities in the innovation-development-research programmes financed from European funds, the financial resources availability in the capital and cost budget necessary for co-financing in order to participate in project competitions and their development, as well as in mobility programmes within *Erasmus+* and *Military Erasmus*.

### ***Courses of Action and Prospects***

The General Staff considers that the modernisation of the military education system will be viable if it is a staged process as follows:

a. *the first stage – 2017-2020* will include the formulation of the legal background for a single structure that provides integrated educational management, the completion of the project “*The Modernisation Strategy of the Military Education System until 2026*”, the establishment of committees and their assigned responsibilities as to identify military occupations and qualifications, the development of the occupational and professional standards and their embeddedness, with the help of the National Authority for Qualifications, in the Classification of Occupations from Romania, the National Register of Qualifications for university graduates and the National Register of Qualifications, and finally the first structural modernisation;

b. *the second stage – 2021-2026* will include the completion of the modernisation process at all military education levels, the outcome being an integrated education system characterised by a high level of performance, flexibility and competitiveness, a system that guarantees highly qualitative educational products and the development of valuable military related professional competences.

For the immediate future the intention is to promote a series of initiatives that are aimed at creating and adding value so that the military education system could timely and efficiently meet the current and future challenges as follows:

1. The settlement of a *Summer Camp for Educational and Professional Guidance* for the students in the 11th grade within the four military high schools in the country in different locations belonging to the four Romanian Armed Forces services and commands in order to make the junction between theoretical knowledge and practical skills as well as to provide students with educational and professional guidance.

2. The organisation of the *Summer School of Excellence* for the students in military high schools and universities that have best accomplishments.

3. The enhancement of the participation of both students and trainers in the *ERASMUS+* mobility programme.

4. The inception of the pilot courses specific to the *Long Range Reconnaissance and Rangers* in the first semester of the year 2017 and depending on their results the insertion of these type of courses in the military education system starting in the academic year 2018-2019.

5. The informatisation of the education system by providing digital course books and learning materials.

6. The modernisation of the equipment and material resources used in the training process as to ensure an augmentation in the quality of the educational process.

7. The rewriting and validation, starting in 2018-2019, of the new basic training course books for military colleges.


8. The preservation and augmentation of the qualitative value of educational products for military colleges by striving to reach 100% pass at the baccalaureate and 90% pass at the academy entry exams for the military college graduates.

9. The continuous professional development for the trainers at all educational levels accompanied by initiatives that make instructor positions appealing to highly proficient officers who have experience in theatres of operations.

10. The structural and architectural modernisation for all the military institutions that provide education so that they could face the unpredictable challenges of the future.

The reformation of the military education system should have as its core values quality and excellence. Therefore, having as a starting point the definition of the *quality of education* seen as the cluster of characteristics of an educational programme and its provider, characteristics which meet the beneficiaries expectations and the quality standards, and taking into consideration that it has two dimensions, an objective one – meeting the standards, and a subjective one – meeting or even exceeding the beneficiaries expectations, we firmly assert that the military education system reform starts from social values, entails individual and organisational accountability, is generated by the relation between trainers and trainees, its outcomes being mainly influenced by the quality of the teaching/training staff and less by the funding.

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# THE IDENTITY OF NATO

*Lieutenant General Michel YAKOVLEFF*

As events seem to accelerate inside and outside of NATO, the focus has been: “*What is NATO doing?*” or: “*Where is NATO heading?*”. Yet I venture to say there is a more fundamental question: “*What is NATO?*” *Who we are* is more revealing and enduring than what we are doing, preparing for, thinking about, talking about.



*The founding treaty of the North Atlantic Alliance was signed in Washington in 1949, in the aftermath of the Second World War. The purpose of the Alliance was to secure peace in Europe, to promote cooperation among its members and to guard their freedom – all of this in the context of countering the threat posed at the time by the Soviet Union.*

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Let us think a little about this question of the *identity of NATO*.

First of all, when NATO was created, it was created to counter and deter an explicit, visible, existing threat. During the Cold War, NATO conducted massive

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The article was originally featured in *NATO Review*, April 2017, see <http://www.nato.int/docu/review//2017/Also-in-2017/the-identity-of-nato/EN/index.htm>

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planning and exercises and developed a strong body of doctrine and interoperability. These activities are heavily manpower-dependent, indeed, it was an aim in and of itself: get these people busy, together. The NATO Command Structure became the school of NATO, the body through which thousands of officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and civilians rotated and graduated with a new, multinational perspective, “*the NATO way*”.

When that threat disappeared, as the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and the Soviet Union, and then Russia, entered into a more constructive relationship with NATO, the Alliance remained. To the surprise of many and the dismay of some, the Alliance decided to stay together, for no other reason than a feeling of family. Having started as an Alliance *against*, NATO became an Alliance *for*. We do not need a threat to want to stay together, just like families do not need other reasons to persist and prosper.



*In the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the Alliance extended a hand of friendship to non-member countries – including former Cold War adversaries Russia and the countries of the former “Eastern Bloc”. Today, NATO works with over 40 partner countries. © NATO*

The driving idea of the time was Partnership for Peace, the endeavour to befriend our former foes. It was successful to the point that 12 of today’s 28 members (and soon 13 with the accession of Montenegro) started their journey as partners. Today, there is no operation that NATO would consider in the absence of partners, for reasons political and ethical much more than operational.

NATO is a successful family. Some of its neighbours want to join, others simply want to associate, from time to time, and that is fine. Each partner decides on its own terms. Whatever their closeness to the Alliance, the partners of NATO have become a defining part of the Organisation, for which engaging with partners is much more than a competency: it is a destiny.

What of operations? Well, operations started in 1993, a full 42 years after the creation of the NATO Command Structure. And insofar as no operation is desired to be perennial, there is an aspiration that, one day, some day, NATO will not be conducting operations. And yet no one sees that day as leading to the demise of NATO.



*Thanks to years of joint planning, exercises and deployments, soldiers from different NATO nations work well together when the need arises.*

© NATO

In other words – and though this may seem counter-intuitive in view of the warfighting ethos of the organisation – operations are not part of the DNA of NATO. They are over and above, they are extremely important and indicative of the value and valour of NATO, *but they are not the underlying reason for NATO*. Just as NATO developed and prospered *before*, without operations, so NATO will prosper *after* the age of operations – if ever that day comes, of course.

So the identity of NATO is nested in planning, exercising, conceiving (all the conceptual work behind doctrine, interoperability, capability development) and partnering. Operations are over and above, the standard, the ultimate measure of effectiveness and legitimacy. But they are not part of the fundamental genetic code of the Alliance. Even if we stopped doing operations, chances are our nations would wish to remain together – as an Alliance, ready, forthcoming, friendly, not necessarily fighting!

Even as a more threatening environment is materialising, I hope the Alliance will remain true to its fundamental nature: an Alliance *for*, not *against*.

# SPENDING FOR SUCCESS ON CYBER DEFENCE

*Neil ROBINSON*

NATO leaders have made resourcing cyber defence a top priority. They adopted a Cyber Defence Pledge at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 and underlined their commitment to enhance and strengthen the cyber defences of national infrastructures and networks as a matter of priority.

The Cyber Defence Pledge comes against the background of the evolving complexity and impact of cyber attacks. In the past few years, attacks against critical energy infrastructures, telecommunications companies, government authorities and most recently political parties, demonstrate the societal and economic impact of cyber attacks.



***NATO leaders made resourcing cyber defence a top priority at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016. © NATO***

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The article was originally featured in *NATO Review*, April 2017, see <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/nato-priority-spending-success-cyber-defence/EN/>.

What is published in *NATO Review* does not necessarily represent the official position or policy of member governments, or of NATO.

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Closer to home, the 2016 Secretary General's Annual Report notes that last year NATO's own cyber defenders dealt with 500 incidents per month, a rise of approximately 60% compared to 2015.

Cyber attacks serve to undermine the trust and confidence in cyberspace – a fundamental issue given how much we rely upon interconnected technologies, not only for our communications but also for our future economic growth and social model.

## **How Do We Allocate Resources to Best Effect?**

The Alliance has recognised at the highest levels that to address these challenges, advanced capabilities, education and training need to be resourced.

To achieve this, policy makers in capitals will need to grapple with a number of important questions. These include: how much should we spend? What is a minimal level of investment? What should we spend it on to achieve a basic level of cyber security, particularly given the dynamic nature of the threat landscape?

From publicly available information, we can see that some Allies have already made progress in answering these questions. For example, the French *Pacte Défense Cyber* from 2014 included €1 billion dedicated to cyber defence and, in 2016, the UK announced a £1.9 billion investment to underpin its national cyber security programme.

Spending on defence is a complex area which does not lend itself to a simple cost/benefit analysis. However, it is worthwhile to bear in mind that the costs of cyber (in)security may be significant. For example, a 2015 study by the Atlantic Council and University of Denver suggested that, under a worst case scenario, by 2030 the costs of cyber insecurity have the potential to knock US\$ 90 trillion off global Gross Domestic Product. More worryingly, their study highlights the possibility that in the future, the costs of cyber insecurity could well outweigh the benefits that cyberspace offers. So the spending reported above appears small, when compared against the potential total costs of insecurity.

## **What Can a Cyber Defence Budget Be Spent on?**

Prior to answering this question, a few considerations are worth noting.

Firstly, what nations spend on cyber defence may well be driven in part by their dependency on secure and unfettered access to cyberspace and exposure to cyber risks. Or else, only if a nation does not use communications and information technology there is an argument that there is no need to spend anything. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of the threat landscape and the specificity of exposure to cyber risks in any given situation – what the experts call the “*attack*

surface” – makes for complexity in deciding what to spend. This points to the need for an approach to cyber defence based on assessment and management of risks, so that resources can be prioritised against those threats likely to cause the most damage.

Secondly, from a theoretical perspective, a given amount of a cyber defence budget may well buy more defence relative to the acquisition of other forms of defence capability. Budget spent on a firewall or user awareness helps protect against a range of cyberattacks including those which aim to steal money or disrupt infrastructure. The implication is that for cyber defence spending a little can go a long way.



*In the past few years, attacks against critical energy infrastructures, telecommunications companies, government authorities and most recently political parties, demonstrate the societal and economic impact of cyber attacks.*

Lastly, those budgeting for cyber defence need to appreciate that effective cyber defence stems not only from the right technology, but getting the right people, trained to the right level and through the enforcement of good policies. In general, unlike the acquisition of traditional forms of defence capability that places an emphasis on tangible equipment, effectiveness with cyber defence may be more determined by information sharing, cooperation and coordination. These are all things which are somewhat intangible.

In addition to accounting for the nebulous nature of these types of activities, it becomes very challenging to understand the costs of other parts of the cyber defence puzzle: for example, the additional costs of the time spent by users conducting basic cyber hygiene or the additional development effort needed to implement cyber defences to the software of military hardware.

Finally, the cycle of upgrades may be more frequent in cyber defence than in other forms of defence capability. Anti-virus software is a good illustrative example: the increasing ubiquity of cyberspace means that the lists of the digital

fingerprints of different viruses used by anti-virus software can be updated in real-time. By comparison, major pieces of defence equipment are intended to last years – the Hercules C-130, for example, first flew in 1954 and in its different variants is still going strong.

## **The Tangible and Intangible Costs of Cyber Defence**

With this in mind, cyber defence spending can be spread across a number of different things. These can be both tangible and intangible and may be one-off investments or may recur monthly, annually or irregularly.

People are perhaps the most obvious recipient of spending. This can be either in terms of salaries and other indirect costs such as pensions but also time spent on their training, courses and exercises. Given that recruitment and retention of cyber specialists by government is challenging (due to the attractive salaries that can be offered by the private sector) these costs may be significant: indeed, expert views suggest that they may account for the biggest driver of spending in cyber defence.



*Investing more resources in Security Operations Centres is a priority.*

The cost of labour also needs to be taken into account: this might include time spent on designing, implementing and maintaining cyber defences, including performing upgrades to security systems, decompiling malicious code or performing certification exercises.

A final type of intangible cost driven by the nature of cyber defence is the time and labour spent on coordination, information sharing, establishing cooperation. It is often said that cyber defence is a “*team sport*” and that “*trust is key*”. The importance of these principles is obvious when we come to appreciate the amount of time that goes into creating and establishing a trusted network

and exchanging information. Even in the time of video teleconferencing, there is no replacement for a face-to-face meeting to build trust.

The tangible types of cost are often the most obvious, but relative to the activities above may be a small proportion of the total spent on cyber defence. These costs could go to hardware and software, software licences (which can often run into thousands or even millions of dollars or euros) and the customisation and integration necessary for them to work in their intended environment. Increasingly, recurring costs are associated with services offered by Managed Security Service Providers who offer a form of outsourced cyber defence by for example, conducting threat analysis on behalf of their customers. Other costs that might be also labelled under technology include purchase of as yet undiscovered and software vulnerabilities (known as “zero-days”) as a way to avoid them being bought and used by others.

Finally, spending might go toward stimulating innovation – an increasingly important theme which can take advantage of early stage research and development for improving cyber defence. This might be through grants to industry or research and development activities.

### **The Cost of Doing Nothing**

Understanding the imperceptible budgetary implications of cyber defence can be just as challenging as investigating the seemingly ghostly attacks that come from the virtual world.

Nonetheless, when we look at some estimates regarding the costs of cyber insecurity and the relative importance that many countries have afforded cyber risks, it is obvious that spending on cyber defence may well be good defence value for money. For example, the cyber attack against the Bangladeshi central bank involving the Swift network cost approximately US\$81 million – a significant sum for that country.



*Spending on innovation will be increasingly important and can take advantage of early stage research and development for improving cyber defence.*



In the private sector, following the cyber attack in 2015, UK communications provider TalkTalk reportedly suffered exceptional costs of £40 - £45 million with £15 million damage to their trading revenue, in addition to the loss of over a hundred thousand customers.

### **Spending Priorities**

To avoid incurring these sorts of economic damage it is important to pay attention to what spending goes on, as well as how much.

Spending on human capital – in terms of recruitment, retention, training and education, appears to be key to getting results. Therefore, targeting of spending is necessary – especially now that the global hunt for talent means that the private sector can easily lure away highly skilled and knowledgeable experts. Spending considerations also need to take into account that, like an iceberg, much of cyber defence spending lies “*below the waterline*” with time (and therefore budget) needed for sustainable coordination, cooperation and information exchange to build trust.

### **The Value of the Cyber Defence Pledge**

Within NATO these aspects will need to be resolved in the context of wider political discussions about defence spending among the Allies. The Cyber Defence Pledge can provide a platform to stimulate discussion in the Alliance about cyber defence spending and prioritisation. Through the insights that Allies learn from the reporting on implementation of the Cyber Defence Pledge, it will be possible to share experiences and best practices regarding cyber defence spending, thereby contributing to more effective and efficient cyber defence for the Alliance as a whole.



# THE BELGIAN ODYSSEY: YPRES

## – The First Toxic Gas Attack in History –

Colonel Dr BEng Aurel IACOBESCU

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*The diplomatic illusions of the old Europe were shattered when the troop trains started rolling in August 1914. The military illusions of the general staff had expired in the bloody trenches of Gallipoli and Neuve-Chapelle. The combatants realised that Europe's Great War was a conflict far beyond the confines of any previous experience. The stage was set for the mass battles of 1916, the waging of Total War.*

*The armies of many nations fought in the Salient, but Ypres has become particularly linked with the Commonwealth forces who served here continuously from October 1914 to the end of the First World War. By the time the last shells fell on Ypres in October 1918, the Salient had claimed 185,000 Commonwealth lives. More than 100,000 of these men have no known grave.*

**Keywords:** *First World War; Schlieffen Plan; frontier battles; toxic gas; Menin Gate Memorial*

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*Motto:*

*"I should like us to acquire the whole of the ruins of Ypres... a more sacred place for the British race does not exist in the world".*

Sir Winston Churchill, January 1919

### Argument

The Great War, by its magnitude and consequences, has put a mark on the modern history and the birth of Europe today. This article is dedicated to *the Centenary of the First World War*, presenting some Belgian echoes of **the Battle of Ypres**, divided into three campaigns: 1914, 1915 and 1917. There is evidence that in August 1914 the French used tear gas grenades against German soldiers, a desperate act to stop the invasion of Belgium and Northern France.

The effect of the gas was only irritating, but the fact that such a weapon could be a way to defeat the enemy raised questions. Thus, in October 1914, the German army attacked with projectiles loaded with a chemical substance that caused violent bouts of sneezing at Neuve-Chapelle. Again, the gas was not intended

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Colonel Dr BEng Aurel Iacobescu – Deputy Commander of the Training School for Combat Support Units "*General Eremia Grigorescu*", Sibiu.

to kill soldiers, but to fight them out temporarily. As soon as they started to dig **trenches**, the belligerents sought a way to bring their opponents on the battlefield, under fire, and the answer was the use of toxic gas. The use of the chlorine gas by the German army on 22 April 1915 in Ypres, in order to kill the soldiers of the allied troops, had such severe consequences that shocked and caused a huge panic among the combatants. This was considered an unforgivable barbarity, even in the context of war. However, the precedent was created, and during the war were used more toxic gases as weapons of mass destruction, first by Germany and then by France or Great Britain, starting from the tear gas and mustard gas to other lethal agents, such as phosgene or chlorine gas.

In that context, chemical weapons became a major component of the first global and total war of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and though the armies were equipped with **gas masks**, the balance was tragic: 1.3 million victims of whom 100,000 combatants dead on the battlefield, and hundreds of thousands of people left forever blind with respiratory or burn marks by the end of the Great War.

**Using toxic gases during the First World War was a war crime**, as there were violated two treaties negotiated at **The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907**, the first regulations on the conduct of warfare and war crimes. Accordingly, the projectile to spread asphyxiating gas and the use of *“poison or poisoned weapons”* during the war were forbidden.

### **General Context**

**Ypres** is a town in Flanders, Belgium, having a strategic position during the First World War, because it stood in the way of Germany’s planned sweep across the rest of Belgium and into France, according to the *Schlieffen Plan*. Moreover, the Belgian neutrality was guaranteed by Great Britain and the German invasion of Belgium brought the British Empire into the war. The German armed forces surrounded the city on three sides, bombarding it throughout most of the war. To counterattack, the French, British and allied forces made costly advances by hitting German lines on the surrounding hills.

During the **first battle of Ypres**, 31 October-22 November 1914, the Allies were able to capture the city from the Germans. Between 22 April and 25 May 1915, the **second Battle of Ypres took place**, when the **Germans used toxic gas for the first time in history** on the Western Front and captured much of the high ground in the eastern part of the city. The first toxic gas attack was launched against the Canadian, British and French soldiers. It was used the chlorine gas, the French soldiers reporting that they saw yellow-green clouds drifting slowly toward the Allied trenches. They also felt distinct smell

that they described as a kind of mixture of pineapple and pepper. Initially, it was thought that the Germans would advance behind a curtain of smoke and they were ordered to prepare for an armed attack, but when the toxic gas reached the soldiers of the allied forces they began to complain of pain chest and burning sensation in the throat. The gas destroyed the soldiers' respiratory system, and they had a slow death by asphyxiation.

Ypres was devastated in the **third and final battle**, which took place in this area during the period 31 July-6 November, 1917, which remained in history as the **Battle of Passchendaele**, when the British troops penetrated the German left lines. During this battle a chemical weapon was to be used – the mustard gas or diethyl sulfide dichloroethane/yperite – after the name of the locality, a gas which attacks the respiratory system and causes serious burns and blindness.

### **The First Battle of Ypres**

When the war broke out, the German armed forces executed a modified version of the *Schlieffen Plan*, quickly attacking France through Belgium on 4 August 1914. Luxembourg was occupied without resistance, on 2 August. The first battle in Belgium started with the siege of Liège, which lasted between 5 and 16 August 1914. Liège was heavily fortified, the Belgians surprising the German armed forces led by Marshal Karl von Bülow by their unexpected resistance. After the fall of Liège, most of the Belgian armed forces withdrew to Antwerp and Namur. Although the German armed forces bypassed Antwerp, the Belgians remained a constant threat to the attackers flank. A second siege followed, this time in the city of Namur, which lasted from 20 until 23 August. During the second half of August, the German armed forces advanced into Northern France fighting both French under Marshal Joseph Joffre and the first divisions of the British Expeditionary Force, commanded by General Sir John French. A series of battles followed known as the *battles of the frontiers*. These included the Battle of Charleroi and the Battle of Mons. After the great retreat of the allies, a new series of battles followed: the Battle of Le Chateau, the siege of Maubeuge, and the Battle of Guise.

Thus, the German army was 70 km close to Paris, but during the first Battle of the Marne, between 6 and 12 September 1914, the French



and British troops forced the Germans to retreat, ending their advance in France. The German armed forces withdrew to the north of the river Aisne, where they began to dig trenches. A front line was established, which remained almost the same for the next three years. After that, the conflicting forces tried to outflank each other in the *Race to the Sea*, trenches being dug from the English Channel to the Swiss border.

Apart from the huge number of victims and the almost stationary front line, the Western Front was the witness to the beginning of new military technologies, including poison gas and tanks. Although relatively few territories were conquered throughout the conflict, the battles on them proved to be decisive in the war.

### ***The Second Battle of Ypres***

On 22 April 1915, Germany and France led a fierce battle near Ypres, in the northwest of Belgium, a citadel that the Germans failed to conquer. It was the Second Battle of Ypres, 22 April to 15 May 1915, as the history established. On the night of 22 April, 1915, the Germans decided to throw a terrible weapon in the battle: they released into the atmosphere 180 tons of chlorine liquid over a 6 km front between Steenstraat and Langemarck, which would form a huge yellow cloud, carried by wind in the French positions in a few minutes. There was a distinctive smell in the atmosphere, the same mixture of pineapple and pepper.

The huge tragedy would unfold almost instantaneously: the French soldiers turned red in the face, blinded and choked. About 3,000 of them died in excruciating pain and almost 7,000 survived, but with serious scares for life. At that time the Germans conquered much of the eastern suburbs of the city. Also, the bibliographical sources show that after this tragedy, 5,975 French, British, and Canadian troops belonging to the Canadian Division – unit fighting for the first time on European land – died by asphyxiation. About 1,500 people survived but having sequelae.

Using toxic gases in the First World War was the subject of allegations of war crimes arising from violation of treaties signed at The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. It is true that, up to Ypres, the subject of the treaties was rather preventing poisoning of the wells, soil or the use of poisoned arrows, being too little anticipated the use of projectiles or some sort of asphyxiating procedures.

The liquid chlorine was discovered by the *German chemist Fritz Haber*, who went down in history as the first scientist who put his knowledge at the service of war. Haber discovered the effects of liquid chlorine, a gas quite cheap,

as chemical waste, highly toxic, with properties of concentration at low height above the ground, which irritates mucous membranes, causes difficult breathing, vomiting, choking and not very late death. In this context, the Germans considered the use of liquid chlorine as a success and Fritz Haber was awarded the rank of captain in the German armed forces.

In May 1915, on the Russian front, a mixture of chlorine and phosgene was used killing 6,000 combatants and injuring another 3,000. And in July, at Argonne in France, 100,000 “T” shells with benzyl bromide were used. At the same time, in 1916, in March, during the Battle of Verdun, they used shells with phosgene, a colourless gas, a mixture of carbon monoxide and chlorine with deadly effect, and in July, during the fighting of the Somme hydrogen cyanide shells. In 1917, in March, phosgene was spread in flight, and in September for the first time it was used the Clark gas, arsenic, which caused vomiting and nausea, making the soldiers incapable of fighting.

1918 is the year when they started using chemical shells. In the years that followed, the history showed that at that time the Germans not only had the concern to find potentially damaging chemical weapons, but they were the first to discover and use liquid chlorine, thanks to their developed chemical industry. After those cynical attacks, troops were equipped with rudimentary gas masks filtering the air through cotton swabs soaked in urine. Another consequence was the increase in the resources allocated to the parties in conflict in order to discover potentially lethal chemical weapons.

### ***The Third Battle of Ypres***

The City of Ypres was devastated in the third and final battles – ***the Battle of Passchendaele***, when the British troops penetrated the left flank of the German lines. It was one of the important battles of the Great War, when the Entente troops under British command attacked the German armed forces in a series of operations. The battle aimed to take control over Passchendaele village – today Passendale – located near the city of Ypres in the West of Flanders. The defenders’ objectives were “*wearing out the enemy*”, “*securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier*”. The Canadian participation is commemorated by raising



the *Passchendaele Memorial*, located at the former site of the Crest Farm on the southwest fringe of Passchendaele village.





### Consequences

After the war the town was rebuilt, and in 1927, the *Menin Memorial* was built to commemorate the victims of the battles, bearing the names of 54,415 soldiers from Commonwealth, whose graves are unknown.





Despite all the internationally signed documents, the research on improving chemical weapons continued, it is true, often apparently strictly scientifically, and these types of weapons were used during the later armed conflicts. Today there are expressed intense fears that such substances or weapons could fall into the hands of terrorist organisations.

The *Menin Gate Memorial* commemorates all the victims of the British Commonwealth that died in Ypres Silent, with the exception of New Zealand.



## **Conclusions**

The War on the Western Front led to the surrender of German forces and their allies, regardless of successes on the other fronts. As a result, the terms of peace were actually dictated by France, Britain and the United States, adding some of the requests of other allies during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The result was the *Treaty of Versailles*, signed in June 1919. The initial terms of the treaty would have been practically paralysed Germany in terms of military and economic domains, the military delegation refusing to sign the documents. However, the peace treaty was signed by the new military government delegation.

*The Treaty of Versailles* “restored” the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to France, rich in coal mines, thus putting a limit to the coal provision asked by the German industry. The treaty also limited the German army to no more than 100,000 men, plus forbidding forming Air and Naval Forces. The German naval fleet was given to the Great Britain in Scapa Flow, where they were sabotaged. The Rhineland was to be demilitarised and the Kiel channel was opened for the international traffic. The peace treaty also redesigned the European frontiers dramatically.

The general conditions under which Germany surrendered were very hard: the government was broken, people lived in a state of semi-starvation and the trade collapsed. Allies occupied the cities of the Rhineland, Cologne, Koblenz and Mainz,

and returned them after the payment of war reparations. Among the German population it began to circulate rumours that the German armed forces were not defeated decisively, myth exploited later by Nazi propaganda to justify the overthrow of the Weimar Republic.

France suffered the heaviest losses among the participants in the war. Apart from the great loss of life that seems to me the most significant in such a context, the industrial area in northeast was devastated by war. When he realised that Germany was about to lose the war, Ludendorff ordered the coal mines of France and Belgium to be destroyed. His desire was to destroy the industry of the most important European rivals of Germany. France would build a huge series of fortifications along the frontiers with Germany, the *Maginot line*, hoping that these structures would prevent future attacks from the eastern neighbour.

The war trenches left a generation of mutilated soldiers, war widows and the effects of the First World War had an overwhelming influence on the world, which is felt even today.

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The editorial and layout process  
was completed on 27 April 2017.



**Cover 1: *Military Parade in București, Romania's National Day.***

***Foto: Valentin CIOBÎRCĂ***

***[http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20161201\\_1/9W2A6576](http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20161201_1/9W2A6576)***

**Cover 3: *Justice Eagle 17 Exercise. Source: <http://www.mapn.ro>***

**Cover 4: *Parade on 1 December 2016, București. Foto: Petrică MIHALACHE***

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