Romanian Military Thinking

HIGH ROYAL DECREE NO. 3663 THROUGH WHICH "MILITARY ROMANIA" BECOMES THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL STAFF

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Through the agency of this journal all officers, belonging to all branches, who are in service, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces".

Carol - King of Romania
Issued in Bucharest on 8 December 1897

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Romanian Military Thinking

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Undeserved Oblivion

When we occasionally read history books, we seem to browse many of their pages too quickly and heedlessly. Would it be only the so often invoked lack of time?

We read fast, forget fast, and forget a lot. We forget, unfairly fast, those who should be painted on icons and worshipped. We forget those who, by their sacrifice, have built the Romanian national edifice.

70 years have passed since the great tragedy of the Romanian Army in Stalingrad occurred and, besides some departmental or commercial publications that also mention a few pieces of historical information, not much has been said this year about this dramatic episode for the Romanian army and the people implicitly. The media was engaged *ad integrum* in the electoral competition so nothing else concerning other subjects was featured.

Used to celebrate – sometimes too triumphantly – only the auspicious moments of history, those having visible benefits for the evolution of the nation, imposed by evidence or only chosen conventionally, I consider necessary to turn our attention to the less fortunate moments of the past. Silently, without fanfare, but simply with gratitude and reverence for those who sacrificed their lives for the Country.

In Cotul Donului and in the Kalmuck Steppe, the Romanian Army, engaged in a war that was just but beyond its strength – we do not refer to the Romanian soldier training and determination to fight, but to the weapons, technology and equipment absolutely necessary in such large-scale confrontation, promised but… not honoured – got about 160 000 soldiers killed, injured and missing. The lives of the less fortunate ones, who hit losing numbers in the history roulette, were cut short by the strikes of a numerically far superior enemy as well as by the terrible Russian winter or wasted in the prison camps in Siberia. The crosses of those who could be buried and for whom comrades could light a candle were then buried by the Soviet tank tracks in their unrestrained flow to the heart of Europe. Those at home, whose sons, brothers, husbands or fathers never came back, cried for them and, when their eyes got dry, they bore the sorrow in their souls and, when the time came, they took it with them to their graves.

The others, who had the chance to come back home, lived to see another day, struggling with poverty and with the permanent fear that they would be arrested

and convicted simply because they were part of the contingents that had been sent to fight for the country in the East. Medals, decorations and everything they really deserved could become *corpus delicti*, could *tell on* their heroism in front of the enemy, so they were destroyed or hidden, and many of them got lost for good. The heroes of the country suddenly became enemies of the people. Silent and forgotten, they bore their cross with dignity and many of them died in communist prisons. There remained only their incredible stories about the hell they had experienced, told in whispers, for fear they should be heard by someone who should not have to. Those who had the courage to write, on the front line or later, in secret, away from the *vigilant* eyes, left thrilling testimonies to posterity.

Stalingrad – in figures and letters – represented a great failure of the Romanian army and, certainly, the beginning of the Romanian nation disaster for approximately the next 50 years, but the Romanian soldier could not be blamed for it as, far too often, he pulled chestnuts out of the fire set by others, following logic and interests that were not familiar to him. He, the Romanian soldier, fully did the duty for the country and the people. Those who laid down their lives then, who died on duty, thousands of kilometres far from their homeland, believing that they could save it from the clutches of Bolshevism and that they could join its parts together again, that they could enjoy the peace of their homes and the crops of the land they worked – bitter illusion! –, whose heroes are they today?

Who lights a candle for them and who puts a flower on the graves of those who had the misfortune to fall facing the enemy in times which, with undue embarrassment, we do not want to remember? Should we believe that only those who come from battles wearing laurels around the forehead are entitled to fully deserve glory and praise by heirs?

Today, those for whom the dead in wars are simple figures, as they are too preoccupied with their wealth and the ways to increase it, remember, from time to time, that the interest in their image requires to lay, visibly *grief-stricken*, a wreath at the memorials to those who fell for the country. A country they invoke whenever they have something to receive from it and then forget it far too quickly.

Closer to the present, in December 1989, the Romanian army responded to the call made by those destined – or designated?! – to topple the political regime in Romania. Today, after only 23 years, the role of the army in opening the path to liberty gets diluted in a more and more confused environment, touched here and there by fanciful theories and scenarios, *source-documented*, devoured by thrill and political occultism seekers. However, invariably, in mid-December, the tubes for television broadcasting start to heat up again related to the topic of Revolution, and the *revolutionaries'* – more and more dissatisfied from year to year! –

right to be paid *unjustly* unpaid, and, certainly, the blame laid on those who, uninitiated in the mysteries of the scenario, believed in and lost their lives for the victory of the people against the totalitarian regime. The heroes then acclaimed – *the Army is with us!* – are now found guilty, taken to courts, stigmatised by a sustained vengeful campaign, whose consequences are easy to intuit.

Those who got killed by bullets, many of them without even knowing who their enemy was –will we ever find? –, are less and less spoken about. As if we were afraid of not harming them again.

I would like to believe that those who have died or got injured in recent years in the theatres of operations where the Armed Forces of Romania, a North Atlantic Alliance member country, has been engaged in the fight against terrorism are today rewarded proportionally to their sacrifice and they will not be forgotten tomorrow by the generations that, maybe, will not share our ideals.

Let us then assume victories with pride and failures with dignity! Let us praise our heroes as they deserve and not amplify, by undeserved oblivion, their martyrdom!

In the eve and the spirit of Winter Holidays, a thought of sincere gratitude to all the heroes and martyrs of the Romanian nation and appreciation for those who serve with dedication and devotion the interests of the country!

Happy New Year!

✎ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

Un oubli immérité

Alors quand, parfois, nous feuilletons le livre d'histoire, il semble que trop rapidement et trop facilement on passe sur la plupart de ses pages. Est-ce qu'il est seulement le manque de temps ce qui on souvent invoque?

Nous lisons plus rapidement, nous oublions rapidement et davantage. Nous oublions, dans une rapidité non méritée, à ceux qui nous devrons les représenter sur les icônes et leur en prierons. Nous oublions lesquels qui, par leur sacrifice, ils ont construit l'édifice national du peuple roumain.

Soixante-dix ans ont passé depuis la grande tragédie de l'armée roumaine à Stalingrad et, sauf quelques publications, départementales ou commerciales, qu'elles offrent aussi des informations historiques, cet épisode troublant pour l'armée et, implicitement, pour le peuple roumain n'a pas beaucoup été appelé cette année. Dans l'espace médiatique, approprié *ad integrum* à la compétition électorale, rien d'autre n'a plus existé.

Par habitude de célébrer – parfois presque trop triomphaliste – justement les moments glorieux de l'histoire, ceux qui donnent des bénéfices concrets dans le développement de la nation, évidemment imposés ou seulement conventionnellement sélectionnés, je pense que nous devons concentrer notre attention aussi aux moments malheureux du passé. Silencieusement, sans faste, mais simplement avec gratitude et respect pour ceux qui se sont sacrifiés pour le pays.

Dans le Coude du Don (Ukraine) et dans la Steppe de la Kalmoukie, l'armée roumaine, engagée dans une guerre juste, mais au-delà de ses possibilités – nous ne référons pas à sa préparation et détermination à lutter pour le soldat roumain, mais à son équipement avec des armes et de la technologie, absolument nécessaires dans une confrontation de telle envergure, promisses mais… non honorées –, elle avait près de 160 000 soldats morts, blessés et disparus. Ceux qui étaient des malheureux par son destin, qui tiraient, à la roulette de l'histoire, de nombres non gagnants, ils ont perdu brusquement leurs vie par les frappés d'un ennemi numériquement bien supérieure, et aussi par le terrible hiver russe, oú elles, leurs vies, ont été dispersées à travers de la Sibérie en leur captivité. Les croix de ceux qui ont pu être enterrés et qui ont également eu la possibilité de recevoir la lumière d'un cierge de la part de leurs camarades ont été puis recelées

sous les chenilles des chars soviétiques dans leur élan effréné vers le cœur de l'Europe. A leur maison, ceux qui ont perdu ses fils, frères, maris ou pères et ceux-ci ne s'y étaient jamais retournés, ils les pleurent et, alors quand les larmes étaient définitivement tout secs, ils portaient la douleur dans leurs âmes et, dans leur temps, ils sont en allés à leurs tombes.

D'autres, qui ont eu la chance de rentrer chez eux, ils ont pris la vie dans leur poitrine, se sont battus contre la pauvreté et la peur constante d'être arrêtés et condamnés simplement parce qu'ils appartenaient à des contingents qui ont été envoyés au combat, au nom du pays, à l'Est. Les médailles, les décorations et tout ce qu'ils bien méritaient peuvent ainsi devenir *un corps délit*, ils peuvent *démasquer* leur héroïsme face à l'ennemi, alors ils sont été détruits ou cachés et beaucoup d'entre eux sont perdus à jamais. Les héros du pays sont devenus, tout d'un coup, les ennemis du peuple. Ils ont portés leur croix à la dignité, en silence et bien oubliés, et beaucoup d'entre eux sont morts dans les prisons communistes. Il n'y a que leurs histoires incroyables sur l'enfer qu'ils ont vécu, dit à voix basse et dans la peur que certaines personnes puissent les entendre. Ceux qui ont eu le courage d'écrire, sur la ligne de front ou plus tard, en secret, loin de l'œil *vigilant*, ont laissé à la postérité des témoignages émouvants.

Le Stalingrad – en chiffres et en lettres – a marqué un grand échec de l'armée roumaine et, bien sûr, le début de la catastrophe de la nation roumaine pour près les prochaines de 50 ans, mais pour ça il ne peut être culpabilisé le soldat roumain, celui qui, trop souvent, a tiré les marrons du feu déclenché par d'autres, depuis une logique et des intérêts étrangers par lui. Celui, le soldat roumain, a fait abondamment son devoir envers le pays et au peuple aussi. Ceux qui ont donné leur vie alors, ceux qui sont morts en service, au milliers de kilomètres de leur endroit natale, en estimant que le sauvera des griffes du bolchevisme et son corps sera réuni, qu'il réjouissent de la paix de leurs familles et du fruit travaillé des champs – quelle amère illusion! –, dont les héros sont-ils aujourd'hui?

Qui les allume un cierge et les met une fleur sur leurs tombes, pour ceux qui ont eu le malheur de tomber et d'être tué par l'ennemi en tels moments quand, voilà, avec d'un embarras injustifié, nous ne voulons pas rappeler? A croire, peut-être, que seuls ceux qui reviennent du champ de bataille avec de la victoire ont le droit de bien mériter la gloire et la gratitude des héritiers?

Aujourd'hui, ceux pour qui les morts des guerres du pays ne sont que des chiffres, occupés totalement de leur bien-être et des moyens de l'augmenter, ils se rappellent, de temps en temps, que l'intérêt de son propre image les exige de déposer, visiblement *affligés*, une gerbe de fleurs aux monuments des ceux qui sont morts pour le pays. Un pays qu'ils la réclament avec véhémence quand ils ont quelque chose d'en obtenir et qu'ils oublient, ensuite, tout aussi rapidement.

Plus près de nos jours, en Décembre 1989 (c'était la Révolution roumaine, quand Ceauşescu a été tué), l'armée roumaine a répondu à l'appel du ceux destinés – ou désignés?! – de changer le régime politique en Roumanie. Aujourd'hui, après seulement 23 ans, le rôle de l'armée dans l'ouverture de la voie de la liberté est dilué dans un contexte de plus en plus confus, touché seulement ici et là avec des théories et des scénarios des plus fantaisistes, mais *documentés par des sources*, avidement avalés par les amateurs de sensationnel et d'occultisme politique. Toutefois, invariablement, au milieu du chaque décembre commencent s'engager à nouveau les tubes d'émission des télévisions sur le sujet de la Révolution (roumaine), pour les droits *injustement* non payés aux *révolutionnaires* – chaque année de plus en plus nombreux et insatisfaits! –, et, bien sûr, la culpabilisation de ceux qui, non-initiés dans les mystères du scénario, ont cru et ils sont tombés pour la victoire du peuple contre le régime totalitaire. Les héros acclamés alors – *L'Armée est avec nous!* – ils sont aujourd'hui considérés coupables, ils ont des actions entameés en justice, ils sont stigmatisés à travers d'une campagne soutenue vindicative, dont les conséquences peuvent être facilement prévisibles.

A propos de ceux qui tombèrent tués par balles, beaucoup d'entre eux ne sachant même pas qu'ils étaient leur ennemi – est-ce que nous le trouverons jamais? –, on parle de moins en moins. Comme nous avons peur d'eux produire en plus des effets néfastes.

J'aime à penser que ceux qui sont morts ou blessés ces dernières années dans les théâtres d'opérations où l'armée roumaine, Etat membre de l'OTAN, est engagée dans la lutte contre le terrorisme sont récompensés aujourd'hui à l'hauteur de leur sacrifice et ils ne seront pas oubliés par les générations de demain qui, peut-être, ne sériant pas dans nos idéaux.

Alors, prenons-nous sur nous, avec fierté, les victoires et, avec la dignité, les échecs aussi! Apprécions-nous correctement nos héros et non pas amplifier, par un oubli immérité, leur martyre!

A la veille et dans l'esprit des fêtes d'hiver, envoyions-nous une pensée de sincère gratitude à tous les héros et les martyrs du peuple roumain et de l'appréciation pour ceux qui servent avec dévouement les intérêts du pays!

Bonne Année!

Version française par
Alina PAPOI

CONTINUOUS WARFARE
All against All (X)

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAŢĂ

Looking at the future through the past

Let us look together at the future through the past. Namely, to analyse the most important events and lessons of the history of the humankind and identify the elements of commonality and the ones of discontinuity.

The result of my analysis is rather pessimistic and worrisome: the world is dominated by conflict. To put it more concretely, we, people, have particular interests, often different from those of our fellows, reason for which we feel compelled to support these interests by the means that are most familiar to us. Some use the force of the argument, others use the argument of the force in order to prevail. The methods and means obviously depend on the part we use to compete or confront, namely the cultural nearness or differentiation. Basically, from individual level to community level, we, people, are in a permanent confrontation, which takes non-violent or violent forms, depending on the case.

Humankind has been and most probably will continue to be caught in an all against all-type confrontation.

From individual to community level, human nature is the main cause of permanent confrontation.

Focusing on differences like race, ethnic origin, religion, sex, age, education level and so on, people, communities and the humankind as a whole will manage to stimulate permanent confrontations.

In order to reduce the number and intensity of confrontations, people have to focus on common values and interests.

The future of humankind will be the one we build and deserve.

Keywords: history's lessons; permanent confrontation; human nature; religion; double standard; betrayal

We are engaged in a permanent confrontation of the *"all against all"* type, summarised by our ancestors in the dictum *"With friends like these, who needs enemies?"*. A similar conclusion was drawn by other thinkers, anonymous or famous ones, among which Thomas Hobbes is the most prominent. The statistics regarding regional and world security – for periods for which there are enough and credible

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General (r.) Dr Mihail Orzeaţă – Adjunct Professor, *"Carol I"* National Defence University, Bucureşti, former Deputy Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff.

data – confirm the truth of the conclusion. Thus, Robert McNamara, in *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office*, states that *"The planet is becoming a more dangerous place to live on, not merely because of a potential nuclear holocaust but also because of the large number of de facto conflicts and because the trend of such conflicts is growing rather than diminishing"*[1]. Moreover, the International Conflicts Research Institute in Heidelberg, in an analysis of the armed confrontations of the past 75 years, draws the conclusion according to which their number grew from 83 in 1945 to 363 in 2010[2].

What leads us to permanent confrontation?

The causes of inter-human confrontation, of any kind, are multiple, but the essence of all these causes must be searched in the human nature. The uniqueness of each human being to which we appeal so proudly works both to our advantage and to our disadvantage. The awareness of this quality determines many of our fellows to preserve their status and focus their energy on the psychical-physical differences between humans, reflected by race, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, level of culture etc. and not to accept to live in multiracial, multiethnic and multicultural communities.

Religion, together with race and ethnicity, has been a barrier very difficult to cross in the relations between people, Even if many of us are aware of, but do not agree to, the stands of certain religious extremist that are protagonists of recent terrorist attacks, I believe it could be helpful for us to expand a little the area of knowing the people who turned their religion into a battle flag for imposing political will and not for inter-confessional reconciliation. Probably few people remember the political credo of former Bosnian Muslim leader Alia Izetbegovic, named the *"Islamic Declaration"*, published in 1970, in whose content one can find the following statement: *"There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic political and social institutions"*[3]. Could this credo be one of the causes for the desire of secession of Bosnian Muslims from the mostly Christian Yugoslavia? Perhaps it could be.

Even if it may seem surprising, in the last part of the 20th century there still existed political persons, leaders of certain states, who stated that *"we are the only Balkan*

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[1] Robert McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office*, Harper and Row, New York, 1968, p. 145.

[2] Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, *Conflict Barometer 2010*, http://www. ConflictBarometer2010, retrieved on 27.07.2011.

[3] Florian Gârz, *Iugoslavia în flăcări*, Casa Editorială Odeon, București, 1993, p. 66.

country not to have minorities"[4], despite evidence to the contrary. It was an expression of the desire to assimilate minorities or at least to deny their rights.

The examples above point out to a not encouraging truth: the goal of peaceful coexistence is rather utopian that realistic.

Some authors believe it is useful to *"write books to harm in order to do good"*[5]. From this perspective, it looks that some people have been endowed with the gift of speech in order to hide their thoughts. Others believe that, through words, people try to influence their fellows and impose on them or influence their will. Both conclusions are definitely true, otherwise, we would not witness so many difficult to explain attitudes. In the category of those who *"harm in order to do good"*, one may include Emil Cioran, Mircea Bălan, Dumitru Drăghicescu and even C. Rădulescu-Motru. As far as Drăghicescu and Rădulescu-Motru are concerned, Mircea Malița believes they are very similar in *"pointing out certain negative features* [of the Romanian people, A/N], *incorporating into their writings certain political resentments and discontent towards the states that dominated the society of their time, the same remarkable number of contradictions from one paragraph to another"*[6].

Emil Cioran wrote *The Transfiguration of Romania* in 1933, animated, as he himself wrote in the foreword of the book, by passion and ego, fostered by discontent. He believed that *"A people without a mission not only does not deserve to live, but has absolutely no meaning... If Romania cannot find a sense of domination in the world and not even in the Balkans..., than it would be better for us to fade away in the long-lasting agony in which we indulge ourselves"*[7].

If we read the writings of Mircea Bălan, we would find out that *"The Dacians committed treason at all levels in their tumultuous history"*[8]. As a consequence, the Romanians, descendants of the Dacians and the Romans, a people *"orphan ever since birth... [consists of individuals whose, N/A] character [is, N/A] unappeased by a cultural and enriched mind, will be more violent, their perfidy will be more striking; the cunningness, in its unskilfulness, will be much brutal"*[9]. Referring to D. Drăghicescu

[4] Leonard Doyle, *Nationalist Greece Muzzle Dissidents*, article published in *The Independent*, 16 August 1993, quoted by Tom Gallagher in *Balcanii în noul mileniu*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2005, p. 26.
[5] Horia-Roman Patapievici, *Politice*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2008, p. 5.
[6] Mircea Malița, *Cumințenia pământului. Strategii de supraviețuire în istoria poporului român*, Editura Corint, București, 2010.
[7] Emil Cioran, *Schimbarea la față a României*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1993, pp. 48, 57.
[8] Mircea Bălan, *Istoria trădării la români*, vol. 1, Editura Eurostampa, Timișoara, 2001, p. 19.
[9] Dumitru Drăghicescu, *Din psihologia poporului român*, Editura Albatros, București, 1996, quoted by Mircea Bălan in *Istoria trădării la români, vol. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

and his opinions, Mircea Malița believes that the frequency with which he depicts the negative features of Romanians is unjustified. Drăghicescu's attitude, as M. Malița reckons, is determined by his inability to correctly figure out the Romanian history[10]. This conclusion is backed up by Caragiale[*]'s opinion, expressed in a letter to Vlahuță[**], in which he considered that *"Here, there is neither more nor less damage than in other parts of the world ... Human qualities and flaws are everywhere the same; people are people everywhere ... There is no better or worse nation, nor more intelligent or more stupid ... they are all the same. Call them people and let them be!"*[11].

The fairness in the conclusion of Caragiale is demonstrated by the opinions of other authors regarding other peoples. Emile Fouillée wrote that the Slavs were *"prone to anarchy, did not recognise authority and did not agree to discipline and hierarchy"*[12], and D. Drăghicescu thought they were inconstant, which made them go from one extreme to another. Moreover, as the same author believed, the Slavs had a questionable morality, they lacked honesty and were business scammers[13].

As far as the Byzantines are concerned, authors such as Ch. Diehl considered that *"the Byzantine is a nervous, easily influenced, pious, superstitious and passionate ... unmerciful and ruthless..., he has the taste of intrigues (required in order to make his way in life), flattery, denigration and corruption..., inconstant up to amorality"*[14].

Japan, as Lawrence Grinter wrote, *"is a violent country. It is crossed by storms and typhoons. The earth is shaken by earthquakes, and there are a lot of active volcanoes underground. The Japanese were the most ferocious warriors in Eastern Asia... For them, war, conflict and violence were daily routines"*[15].

The character flaws have not been only features of Easterners. Machiavelli said that *"princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word"*[16].

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[10] Mircea Malița, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189.

[*] Ion Luca Caragiale (1852-1912) – famous Romanian playwright, short story writer, poet, theatre manager, political commentator and journalist.

[**] Alexandru Vlahuță (1858-1919) – famous Romanian writer and editor.

[11] *Ibid*, p. 179.

[12] *Ibid*, p. 20.

[13] Dumitru Drăghicescu, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[14] Mircea Bălan, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[15] Lawrence E. Grinter, *Cultural and Historical Influences on Conflict in Sinic Asia: China, Japan and Vietnam*, essay published in *Conflict, Culture and History. Regional Dimensions*, authors Stephen J. Blank, Lawrence E. Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Lewis B. Ware, Bynum E. Weathers, study published by Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, 1993, p. 149.

[16] Nicolo Machiavelli, quoted by Mircea Bălan, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

According to Bynum E. Weathers, third world countries considered the war a normal and legitimate activity, compared with the Western concept of avoiding war through negotiation[17]. In contrast with the views of the American author, N. Iorga condemned warlike attitudes of western political leaders of his time, writing: *"No one puts an end to the plans of mechanical and selfish recovery of Europe, which everyone wants to transform as it suits them best, without even caring that this means to first deny and, if possible, then to ride roughshod over, if not to abolish forever the nations, first of all killing, by prisons, their culture, their soul itself"*[18].

These few illustrations of multiple facets of human nature confirm the assumption of one of the authors, who considers the man as a *"fallen, cultural, sexed and mortal being"*[19], who is impossible to be holy because of his moral flaws, pride, voluntarism and desires[20].

Double standard in international politics

States practice double standard in international relations, usually secretly, because appearances must be kept up. Precaution, stemming from knowing the lessons of history, determines wise people to take safety measures for the situations in which friends and allies change their options and become neutral or even enemies. Therefore, John Mearsheimer's view on diplomacy, which he considered *"a ruthless and dangerous business and is likely to remain that way"*[21], reflects the truth, which can be disturbing, if said aloud and supported by evidence. The WikiLeaks disclosures are quite enlightening in this respect.

The relatively recent history of the 20th century provides us with several double standard examples in the international politics. During the Second World War, the US and the UK signed the Quebec Agreement, on 19 August 1943, regarding the cooperation with a view to building the nuclear weapon. The agreement stipulated that the two states would build together an atomic bomb that they would never use against each other or against any other state without a mutual agreement. Moreover, the agreement mentions that the parties would never disclose any information on the document to a third party without the consent of both signatory

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[17] Bynum E. Weathers, *Culture and Conflict in Latin America: Myth or Reality?*, essay published by *Conflict, Culture and History. Regional Dimensions*, p. 209.

[18] Nicolae Iorga, *Peste dreptul naţional!*, article published in *Neamul Românesc*, year XXXV, no. 1 on 1 January 1940, p. 1.

[19] Horia-Roman Patapievici, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

[20] *Ibid*, p. 230.

[21] John Mearsheimer, *Tragedia politicii de forţă. Realismul ofensiv şi lupta pentru putere*, Editura Antet, 2003, pp. 31-32.

parties[22]. This agreement did not include among signatory parties the USSR, the allied of the two initiating states, because of the lack of trust. In its turn, the USSR carried out massive actions of espionage against its allies using own agents and collaborators recruited from the US, the UK and Canada[23].

During the Yugoslavian crisis between 1991 and 1992, the UN imposed an embargo on the import of weapons to the former Yugoslavian republics. Nevertheless, *"Western media sources show that most of the weapons that entered Yugoslavia, legally, were purchased and brought to the country by companies registered in Germany, with the help of certain neighbour states such as Hungary, Austria, Italy. Other states, such as France, the UK, Turkey, Iran, Libya, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, the Czech Republic, brought weapons in this Balkan area during the war"*[24]. Referring to the Yugoslavian crisis between 1991 and 1999, Tom Gallagher states that Greece[25] and Cyprus[26] broke the sanctions imposed on the Milosevic regime by the UN and the EU, even though Greece was an EU member state and Cyprus wanted to become a EU member itself.

During the Kosovo crisis, when NATO member states debated the opportunity of the military intervention in order to put an end to ethnic cleansing and the influx of refugees in the neighbour states, especially the Western ones, Günther Verheugen – a key politician in Berlin – stated that, legally, the intervention contravened the Charter of the United Nations, but, morally, the intervention is legitimate. During the same crisis, the leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army – Hashim Thaçi – order the attacking of the Serbs in Kosovo in order to trigger the reaction of the forces of the Serbian Ministry of Interior. He later stated that these actions were deliberate and were aimed at forcing the military intervention of NATO[27].

The launching of NATO's military operation on military targets in Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro on 24 March 1999 fuelled the disputes among the international public opinion regarding the legitimacy of the intervention. Some of those who opposed the intervention accused the Alliance's double standard, as NATO did not take the same actions to help the Kurdish people in Turkey or the Chechens or the Northern Irish population. Timothy Garton Ash answered these accusations: *"Well, of course there are double standards – multiple standards in fact. Yet, it's also*

[22] Chapman Pincher, *Trădare. Șase decenii de spionaj sovietic în SUA și Marea Britanie*, Editura Litera, București, 2010, pp. 11-12.
[23] *Ibid*, pp. 16-27.
[24] Florian Gârz, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
[25] Tom Gallagher, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
[26] Kerin Hope, Stefan Waystyl, *Defiant Cyprus Banks that Helped Fund Wars*, article published in *Financial Times*, 24 July 2002, quoted by Tom Gallagher in *op. cit.*, p. 34.
[27] Kola Paulin, *The Search for Greater Albania*, Editura Hurst, London, 2003, p. 341.

true that we can't intervene everywhere. Because I don't prevent a murder in Brooklyn, it doesn't mean I shouldn't try to stop one in Camden. Duties are related to distance: strongest to those nearest"[28].

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People generally may be divided into three big categories in terms of relating to a goal (idea, project, plan, programme etc.): supporters, opponents and a third category that I like to call *"mass of manoeuvre"*. The *"mass of manoeuvre"* is heterogeneous and it is the most numerous one. In principle, this third category consists of people who are afraid of getting involved in any human enterprise that requires assuming responsibility, the undecided, the opportunists, the independents and the indifferent. Their supporters and opponents challenge each other at all levels – political-diplomatic, economic-financial, cultural, information, psychological and military –, and the opportunists wait to see the result of the confrontation in order to render their services to the winner. The indifferent, the undecided and the fearful get carried away, a part of the independents maintain their status and the others join one side or the other. The confrontation does not end, it diminishes in intensity and adapts its form of manifestation to the newly created conditions, respectively the defeated give up – deliberately or forced by the winners – the direct and violent fight and take on the subversive confrontation, carried out on the invisible front of the collection and processing of information, of the psychological manipulation and of the backstage manoeuvres at the political-diplomatic level. When enough material, human, financial etc. resources are gathered, the defeated will restart the battle, hoping to win the new round of confrontation. On the whole, this is the scenario of the Thirty Years' War and the Hundred Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are only a few examples of illustrative confrontation, which reconfirm the continuous nature of the inter-human confrontations. A brief historical retrospective will show that in the present there are conflicts that have been going on for many years: the confrontations between the Chechens and the Russians, since the 18th century and counting; the India-Pakistan confrontation, since 1947, continuing especially at political, psychological and information level; the conflict in the Korean Peninsula, started in 1950, the hostilities ended by the truce in 1953, but, legally and de facto, the two states are still in conflict, especially at political, information and psychological level; the Arabic-Israeli conflicts, which started in 1948; Africa is the *"powder keg"* of the world, starting at the end of the Second World War, with the national

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[28] Timothy-Garton Ash, *No, We're Right to Fight this War*, article published in *The Independent*, 20 April 1999.

liberation wars, continuing even nowadays, with the fights for democratisation in the North African states and the Middle East, considered by George Friedman humanitarian wars[29]; Europe is the theatre of frozen conflicts from Northern Ireland to Caucasus and Cyprus; the two American continents are theatres of terrorist actions etc. One may notice that Clausewitz's assessment, regarding this aspect of inter-human conflict, according to which *"Peace seldom reigns over all Europe, and never in all quarters of the world"*[30] was true then and it still is today.

Even though the closeness between sports and the continuous confrontation in the political, economic and military domains may seem rather inadequate, I believe that the slogan, which became an Olympic dictum – *"If you win, continue! If you lose, continue!"*, expresses, most probably without the author's intention, a feature of the human nature that permanently asks for confrontation (competition, conflict etc.). In the tradition of modern Olympics one may also found the dictum *"Glory to the winners, honour to the losers!"*, but I believe that all of us want to be winners! Who needs losers? Nobody! That is why the confrontation never ends, that is why the Sicilian vendetta and the Albanese Kanun appeared, that is why the members of some African tribes or from other geographical areas are considered adults and useful for the community only after they take part in military confrontations in order to revenge the dead, to capture the cattle of other communities, to impose their right to gain access to water sources[31], that is why the Thirty Years' War and the Hundred Years' War took place and the open conflicts *"smoulder"* after the peace is signed, in order to reburst more violently when the conditions are established for restarting armed hostilities.

It would be a utopia to say that we can end inter-human confrontations. It is natural, however, to believe that the violence, intensity and number of confrontations can be diminished, and in some generations, today's utopia will be more and more a dream come true. The future will be the one that we build and deserve!

English version by
✒ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

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[29] George Friedman, *The Wars of Humanitarianism*, article published on 5 April 2011, at www.stratfor. org, retrieved on 7 April 2011.
[30] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, quoted by Ada Bozeman in *War and the Clash of Ideas*, p. XXXIII.
[31] Dr. Karl Magyar, *Culture and Conflict in Africa's History: The Transition to the Modern Era*, essay published in *Conflict, Culture and History. Regional Dimensions*, pp. 235-236.

BOLOGNA PROCESS ASSESSMENT
– Procedures for the Implementation and Development of Higher Education Systems in Europe –

Colonel Olivian STĂNICĂ

All European armed forces have been undergoing a process of transformation for several years. They have reduced their military power as a result of the changing threats and the emergence of new missions.

In our strategic planning, of the conventions and processes, we must take into account the challenges the military (officer, NCO, warrant officer, professional soldier) must face individually. Therefore, in the author's opinion, the modern military education system is inevitably forced, as complexity and undoubted uncertainties, to permanently consider the features of the war.

Keywords: *Bologna Process; curricular reform; reforms and policies; goals implementation*

European Union member and associated states, noticing that the European higher education is much less competitive as compared with the US one, have established a common purpose, consisting of radical transformation in order to achieve the objectives of the *Bologna Declaration* adopted in 1999, including in Romania.

The *Bologna Process*, launched with the *Bologna Declaration*, signed in the Italian city with the same name on 19 June 1999 by the Ministers of Education of 29 European countries, is one of the most important education reforms, leading to major changes at world level and succeeding, over the 13 years of implementation, in changing the face of Europe in terms of education policies promoted and principles undertaken by signatory states for the purpose of creating and sustaining the *European Higher Education Area (EHEA)*.

Today, the *Bologna Process* unites 47 countries (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium-Flemish Community, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Greece, Germany, Georgia,

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Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Moldova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, Vatican, without Belarus, Monaco, San Marino and Kosovo), which are also part of the European Cultural Convention and are committed to the same goals of the EHEA. An important feature of the *Bologna Process* is that it involves: the European Commission, the Council of Europe, UNESCO-CEPES, along with representatives of higher education institutions (EUA), students (ESU), employees and quality assurance agencies (ENQA).

The *Bologna Process* Declaration, the *Lisbon Strategy* and the *Copenhagen Process Declaration* essentially provide: qualifications, common skills and their recognition in all EU countries; the establishment and acknowledgement of an European Credit Transfer System for university studies; adoption of a single diploma system; the promotion of the mobility of students/teachers based on EU-funded programmes; cooperation to promote a common quality assurance system for higher education; compulsory assurance of 3 cycles (Bachelor's degree – 3 years, Master's degree – 2 years and Doctoral degree – 3 years) for higher education; provision of an additional degree in a European language (especially English); improvement of transparency and recognition of methods in the vocational area of training and education etc.

For the first time in a decade, the European Commission, in cooperation with the *Bologna Follow-Up Group (BFUG)*, commissioned a study on the *Bologna Process Independent Assessment*, in order to get an independent perspective on the progress made by the 47 signatory states of the *Bologna Declaration*.

The aims of the assessment study[1] were:
- to assess the extent to which the operational objectives of the *Bologna Declaration* and subsequent communiqués were achieved particularly in the areas of curriculum reform, studies recognition, quality assurance and mobility of students/teachers;
- to evaluate the extent to which the operational objectives led to the achievement of the strategic objectives of the *Bologna Declaration*, namely to establish the European Area of Higher Education and to promote the European System of Higher Education worldwide.

The ultimate aim of the assessment was:
- to identify the situation (caveats) 13 years ago, before the *Bologna Process*;
- to evaluate the progress made in the last 13 years in terms of the objectives of the *Bologna Process*;

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[1] http://www.esu-online.org/news/article/6001/Bologna-Follow-Up-Group-debates-future-of-Bologna-Proces retrieved on 10.08.2012.

- to identify the actions, reforms and policies that proved to be successful;
- to identify the actions, reforms and policies that proved to be less successful.

Assessing education levels and curriculum reform

All higher education systems of EHEA currently have a structure consisting of two cycles (Bachelor's level – 3 years and Master's level – 2 years);

- the broadest group of countries (21) has a range of combinations when it comes to I and II cycles length, such as: 3+2 – the most common model at national level (17 countries), while some countries opted for 4+1 (2 countries) or 4+2 (5 countries);
- in most higher education systems in Europe, some areas of study are exempted from the *Bologna-type* structure with two cycles (for example, the following fields: medical – medical practice, dentistry, veterinary medicine, pharmacy, engineering and architecture);
- in the vast majority of systems, most students study in *Bologna-type* structures (in 8 Bologna member states, less than 50% of the students study in *Bologna-type* systems, for instance: Germany, Russia);
- 41 countries use the *European Credit Transfer System – ECTS*;
- 4 countries use *ECTS*-compatible systems (among them, only Iceland did not initiate the transition to *ECTS*);
- the shift from a *teacher-focused* concept to a *student-focused* one in the curriculum design is widely accepted at the European level as a necessity (student workload, learning-skills objectives).

Successful identified actions, policies, strategies:
- the 3+2 model stood out as a main European model for the structure of the study cycles, while allowing sufficient flexibility to also enable variations of this structure, depending on the needs;
- there are common terminologies related to skills, curricular areas according with domains and specialisations of higher education, either technical-engineering, economic, administrative law, economic or agricultural ones etc.;
- there is a common area for a European discourse on curriculum reform, focus on the student, flexibility and transparency;
- *ECTS* (compatible systems) and modularisation have been almost universally accepted as the preferred mode of organisation of course units in the curriculum with the local profound implications that affect all students, not just mobile students;

• the *Bologna Process* has turned Europe into a major world region, in which there are generated ideas and tools for curriculum reform, in order to meet the requirements of today's knowledge society.

Remarks about the implementation of Bologna Process objectives:
• the *Bologna Process* has provided increased cooperation in quality assurance, to ensure compatibility and similarity of education levels available to all *EHEA*;
• as an operational goal, the introduction of quality assurance at national level was approved in 2005, including accreditation, certification or comparable procedures;
• in all countries except Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, schemes of internal and external quality assurance are already in place;
• to further ensure compatibility between quality assurance systems, there were developed European standards and guidelines for quality assurance in the *EHEA*;
• other quality assurance measures required for external quality assessment agencies were that they are accredited and assessed regularly;
• the strongest impact on quality assurance came, however, from the stipulation in the introduction of *ECTS*, which was made even more explicit in the qualifications *(QF – Qualification Framework)* for *EHEA*, mentioning the need to achieve the curriculum design through a *student-focused approach*.

Successful actions, policies and strategies at European level:
• in 2008, the *European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education (EQAR)* was established;
• in 2009 – 17 agencies of quality assessment applied for evaluation with a view to determining the agreement with the *ESG (European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the Higher Education Area)* provisions, with registration into *EQAR*;
• 44 national quality assessment agencies were accepted as full members of *ENQA – European National Quality Assurance*;
• quality assurance systems, partly due to *EHEA* standards, often include now *international members in the assessment teams*;
• the establishment of *QF-EHEA* (Qualifications Framework-European Higher Education Area) is a major achievement. Qualifications framework is the intersection between study programmes (including short-term ones), quality assurance, recognition and social dimension (flexible learning paths, recognition of previous studies);

- there is a satisfaction at the level of stakeholders regarding correlation of the aspects of *QF-EHEA* and *EQF-LL (European Qualification Framework – Lifelong Learning)* of the EU;
- the National Qualification Framework implementation remains on the agenda of Bologna ministers (all countries must do so by 2012 and 6 countries completed the process in 2009).

Assessment of recognition policies

The main legal framework for academic recognition is the *Lisbon Recognition Convention*:

- it was ratified by all countries, except for Greece and Italy;
- in most countries, national legislation is in line with the one set out in the *Convention*, except for Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova and Ukraine;
- in most countries, the *Diploma Supplement* is now issued automatically and free of charge in most higher education institutions;
- other measures relating to recognition, outside *ECTS*, were not adopted in the Bologna framework and therefore they have legal effect only in the 27 EU countries (sometimes in *EEA* countries);
- the most important are the directives on professional recognition of qualifications.

Assessment of policies for flexibility and widened participation:

- 39 of the 47 systems reported an underrepresentation of certain groups among their students (people who come from lower socio-economic backgrounds with low-income and low education parents);
- people coming to higher education through non-traditional educational routes;
- although overall participation is fairly proportional, women are underrepresented: in science and technology programmes, in the second or third cycles of studies in almost all countries;
- 12 systems provide pathways through recognition of prior non-traditional studies (1% in Lithuania, 15% in the United Kingdom-England, Wales and Northern Ireland);
- almost 1/3 of the countries provide flexible learning modes;
- 27 Bologna higher education systems provide reduced study cycles from 2% to 26% of the students;
- in most higher education systems there are guidance and counselling departments for students with different levels of quality and availability;

- in terms of financial resources for social purposes, a small group of countries (Denmark, Finland, Scotland and Sweden) are characterised by: a high direct financial aid for learners (corrected depending on the financial situation), low student payments to higher education institutions, high percentages of GDP invested in higher education.

Assessment of mobility

The main change between 1999 and 2007 was the shift from short-term credit mobility to degree mobility. Mobility has increased continuously since the *Bologna Declaration* (*European Higher Education Area* has succeeded in attracting learners from outside the EHEA: there was an increase of 116% in absolute terms between 1999-2007, and internal mobility showed more modest growth: 38% in absolute terms between 1999 and 2007). However, one can detect a clear mobility pattern from east to west.

The global dimension of the *Bologna Process*, the attractiveness and competitiveness of EHEA:

- there is an attractiveness of the European higher education for the rest of the world, as reflected by worldwide student mobility;
- it has been the source of inspiration for many developments in higher education cooperation policies around the world: *USA* – student mobility from Europe to US post-graduate studies;
- the *Tuning project*[2] provides for *China* student mobility to Europe, research cooperation, degree structures etc.

Bologna Process Management Assessment:

- there have been created a common higher education language and functional structures that promote communication between countries about higher education;
- the *Bologna Process* structure is characterised as very different and more effective compared with the way of coordination and decision-making in the European Union and Council of Europe;
- stakeholders (representatives of higher education institutions, learners, employers and employees) are more often consulted in decision-making

[2] *Tuning Educational Structures in Europe* started in 2000 as a project to link the political objectives of the *Bologna Process* and, at a later stage, the *Lisbon Strategy* for the higher education sector. Over time, *Tuning* has developed into a process, an approach to (re-)design, develop, implement, evaluate and enhance quality first, second and third cycle degree programmes. The name *Tuning* is chosen to prove/reflect the idea of the *Bologna Process*: universities do not and should not look for uniformity in their degree programmes or any sort of unified, prescriptive or definitive European curricula but simply look for points of reference, convergence and common understanding.

on higher education compared with similar processes at the European or national level.

Successful actions, policies and strategies:
- *BFUG* plays an important role in the strategic decisions about higher education in the *EHEA*;
- the high level of political commitment towards the *Bologna Process* goals has remained stable over the past 10 years; the involvement of stakeholders at the European level, as well as nationally has proved crucial for the dissemination of information about the *Bologna Process*;
- the multitude of activities within BFUG has been made possible due to the financial support of the European Commission;
- the establishment of the Bologna Secretariat located in the host country helped the administration of the process at the European level and contributed to the continuity of the discussions;
- the policies in higher education have gained a more important position on the national and European political agenda as a result of the attractive ideas of the *Bologna Process*;
- most of the *Bologna Process* member countries have adopted new higher education legislation to introduce and regulate elements of the *Bologna Process*; many countries have allocated additional funds for the implementation of new Bologna policies;
- the extent to which the key objectives of compatibility, comparability and competitiveness (*Bologna Process* desired outcomes) will be achieved is still an open question;
- the establishment of a fully transparent *European Higher Education Area* requires further efforts in the areas of recognition of studies and student support. Mobility within the EHEA has not increased substantially;
- the increase in staff mobility both within and outside the *EHEA* further requires supporting policies, especially regarding pension funds and work permits;
- the monitoring of national achievements and those of the EHEA as a whole requires better data. The focus should be on the development of comparable and relevant indicators that give insight into goal achievement.

Romanian[3] higher education reform has focused in particular on the implementation of the objectives set out in the *Bologna Declaration*

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[3] See the Romanian National Report on the Implementation of the *Bologna Process*, 2008.

on the *European Higher Education Area* and the implementation of the *Lisbon Convention* (put forward jointly by UNESCO and the Council of Europe in 2000) regarding the European recognition of qualifications.

By the implementation of the *Bologna Declaration*, the higher education system in Romania has undergone major changes since the 2005-2006 academic year. These changes were enacted by *Law no. 288/2004* on the organisation of university studies and *Government Decision no. 88/2005* on the organisation of Bachelor's degree courses of study. The overall European construction and development of the *European Knowledge Area* involve mobility, recognition of qualifications, access to labour market, without limiting the existing cultural and educational diversity.

Currently, the first cycle is implemented from the academic year 2005-2006, prior to the first cycle programmes (long-term and short-term Bachelor's degree), which were gradually replaced by Bachelor's programmes, so that, since 2008, all programmes have been Bachelor's ones. The new structure of the higher education in Romania provides full access for students in the first cycle (Bachelor's degree) to the second one (Master's degree) and from the second to the third one (Doctoral degree).

The structure of the Romanian higher education on three main cycles is based on the reorganisation of curricula content, by identifying and defining general knowledge, competences and specific professional skills in order to meet labour market requirements (or beneficiaries, in the case of education institutions from the National Defence, Public Order and National Security System). Universities are in the process of reforming their curricula in order to ensure a student-centred education.

Influences for the military education system under Bologna Process, Lisbon strategy and Copenhagen Process

The main question that can be asked in this context is: *Is it possible to exclude the military higher education system from the process of the changes occurring in the civilian system of higher education?*

All European armed forces have been undergoing a process of transformation for several years. They have reduced their military power as a result of the changing threats and the emergence of new missions. In our strategic planning, of the conventions and processes, we must take into account the challenges the military (officer, NCO, warrant officer, professional soldier) must face individually. Therefore, in the author's opinion, the modern military education system is inevitably forced, as complexity and undoubted uncertainties, to permanently consider the features of the war.

The countries that have taken into account the concepts of the *Lisbon Strategy* for recognising the rights of soldiers to have access to the best education and research, through the complete fusion of the military education system with the national one, have the experience of achieving positive results in professional terms related to value compared with the civilian system, benefit from employment assistance etc.

Many different influences determine the implementation in each country. New methods, techniques and procedures of military education must be implemented and become mandatory or at least necessary for the organisation of education and training of students, professional soldiers, similar to the one of civilian learners.

It is not only a national interest of comparing national military education systems, but also an international one. When there is transparency and the study programmes are recognised, as well as the qualifications frameworks, it will be much easier for the exchange of officers, NCOs and civilians to take place in order to study or work in different countries. This will lead to reduced costs and increased interoperability. This system requires the implementation of a quality assurance system, which will eventually support cooperation within communities or work in international environment.

In conclusion:
- the 3 cycles – Bachelor's, Master's and Doctoral programmes – rely on a single system *(ECTS)* that can be implemented at different stages in the higher military education systems of the member countries of the European Union;
- the regulatory framework for quality assurance in higher military education should be linked with the national regulations of each country;
- the officers – graduates from each cycle – receive a *diploma supplement* in a foreign language (especially English), required for the recognition of the professional qualifications both at home and abroad;
- in the future, one must analyse the possibility of the exchange of teachers/ trainers/learners between different military institutions of higher education.

After the launch of the *European Higher Education Area*, during the Ministerial Conference in March 2010 in Budapest-Vienna, the priorities of the *Bologna Process* were renewed. In this respect, the *Leuven/Louvain-la-Neuve Communiqué*[4] clearly specifies the directions on which the *Bologna Process* will be focused between 2010-2020, as follows:
- the social dimension of education – improving the conditions of study of a student and ensuring equal access to education for all social groups of students;

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[4] http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/thematic_reports/

- lifelong learning;
- employability – increasing employability rate of graduates by involving private sector representatives/employers in reforming curricula so that they meet the current needs of the labour market;
- student-centred education – engaging students as competent partners with equal rights in decision-making at all levels and in quality assurance;
- education, research and innovation;
- mobility – in terms of identifying and overcoming the remaining barriers in order to increase the percentage of students involved in such actions;
- creating permanent tools for collecting, reporting and analysing data;
- multidimensional transparency tools in education;
- increase in higher education funding, in terms of identifying additional opportunities for funding in order to ensure its functionality and increase education quality.

European Commission's strategy[5] for modernising higher education

European Commission presented a new strategy for modernising higher education aiming at identifying priority areas in which, on the one hand, the EU countries should make more effort to achieve common goals of education and, on the other hand, at determining the way in which the European Union can support the modernisation policies of these states.

One of the priority areas where reform is needed is *higher education funding*. In this respect, the EU multiannual budget (2014-2020) is intended to be substantially increased for education, training and research. Moreover, according to reports, in Europe, the rate of investment in higher education is 1,3% of GDP, very small compared to the US one – 2,7%.

To strengthen long-term impact and complementarity of EU funds of financing, two programmes are put forward, as follows:

➢ *Horizon 2020*: Framework-Programme for research and innovation, which wants to make EU funding more attractive by funding innovation/research and easier to access (80 billion Euros for three main objectives: research, innovation and 6 key topics: health-demography-welfare, food security-agriculture-bio-economy, environment-friendly energy sources, smart transport means, combating climate change-efficient use of resources and raw materials);

➢ *Education for Europe*: unique programme of education and training for youth introducing innovative teaching methods and recognition of knowledge acquired during mobility.

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[5] http://ec.europa.eu/education/news/news3049_en.htm retrieved on 12.08.2012.

Another area concerns *increasing the number of students*, so as to achieve one of the objectives of the *Europe 2020* strategy regarding the fact that at least 40% of EU youth aged 30-34 years must graduate from higher education institutions. Today, in Europe, there are 19 million students and 4 000 universities and other higher education institutions, these numbers increasing substantially in recent years.

Also, another area targeted for reform is *mobility*. It is sought to promote mobility by improving the recognition of studies abroad by strengthening the *ECTS* and supporting student mobility taking into account the decisions of the European Court of Justice and the standards of education quality assurance.

Bologna Process Stage in higher military education system

Since the 2005-2006 academic year, all 5 military institutions of higher education (except for the Military Medical Institute) have begun to implement the requirements under the *Bologna Process* by organising the education process on three cycles (Bachelor's degree – three years at the Land Forces Academy, Air Forces Academy the *"Carol I"* National Defence University; Bachelor's degree – 4 years at the Naval Academy and Technical Military Academy; Master's degree – 1 year, 1,5 years and 2 years at the *"Carol I"* National Defence University, Land Forces Academy, Air Forces Academy, Naval Academy and Technical Military Academy, Doctoral degree – 3 years at *"Carol I"* National Defence University, Technical Military Academy), releasing, since 2008, the Diploma Supplement (in English), provide the equivalence of studies based on transferable credits, institutional and study programmes assessment by ARACIS (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education), introducing and developing quality assurance systems in education and ensuring student mobility (the military *Erasmus programme*, starting with 2009).

Currently, there are 6 military institutions of higher education, such as: *"Carol I"* National Defence University – București/Department for Defence Policy and Planning, *"Nicolae Bălcescu"* Land Forces Academy – Sibiu/Land Forces Staff, *"Henri Coandă"* Air Force Academy – Brașov/Air Force Staff; *"Mircea cel Bătrân"* Naval Academy – Constanța/Naval Forces Staff, Military Technical Academy – București/Armaments Department; Military Medical Institute – București/Medical Directorate and a military institution of postgraduate education – the National Defence College/Department of Parliamentary Liaison, Public Information and Personnel Welfare.

Education levels: *military higher education* (Bachelor's degree; Master's degree and Doctoral studies) and *military postgraduate education*.

The main way to become an officer are *directly* – by going through all the stages of training in military education institutions and *indirectly* – by attending in the military institutions only certain military and/or specialised training modules.

Education finalities:

- *command and staff officers*, leaders of military organisations;
- *specialised officers, expert officers and expert structure leaders* (engineers officers, military doctors and pharmacists).

The education offer of military higher education institutions includes:

- *38 programmes of full-time higher education studies* (32 accredited and 6 authorised to function temporarily) in 16 Bachelor's degree study areas, the duration of studies: 3 years (180 credits) and 4 years (240-credits);
- *22 programmes of nationally accredited Master's studies*, 1 year (60 credits), 1,5 years (90 credits), 2 years (120 credits);
- *Doctoral study programmes in 10 majors* in three key areas: *"Military Science and Intelligence"*, *"national security"* and *"Engineering sciences"*, the duration being 3 years, with the possibility to extend it by 1-2 years as provided by law;
- *Career and level postgraduate courses*, duration: up to 6 months.

Currently, all *6 military higher education institutions* are accredited by the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education, have schooling capabilities beyond the needs of the ministry and other internal/external users and provide the training, improvement and specialisation of the training for a total of approximately 11 500 officers/year for the Romanian Armed Forces needs.

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DIMENSIONS OF SMART ORGANISATIONS

Captain (N) BEng Ciprian LUNGU

By increasing communication, social connections and access to highly valuable information and knowledge, enhancing collaboration inside and outside the boundaries, any organisation could create a solid platform for transformation into a smart organisation able to dramatically amplify individual and organisational performance.

Defined by knowledge dimension, information and communication technology (ICT) dimension and organisational dimension, a smart organisation promotes collaborative partnerships, reacts positively and adequately to change and uncertainty and identifies and exploits new opportunities by involving knowledge, relationships, and innovative and collaborative intelligence.

Knowledge is a critical resource of a smart organisation which makes it able to achieve its purpose, understand the environment and mobilise resources, in other words to be smart.

***Keywords**: smart; organisation; knowledge; management*

The term *"smart organisation"* is used for organisations that are knowledge-driven, internetworked, dynamically adaptive to new organisational forms and practices, learning as well as agile in their ability to create and exploit the opportunities offered by the new economy[1].

A smart organisation integrates collaboration into business processes to ensure access to the right content when required both within and outside the organisation. It comprises the implementation of social technologies to facilitate collaboration and information exchange between people[2].

Such an organisation promotes collaborative partnerships, reacts positively and adequately to change and uncertainty and identifies and exploits new opportunities by leveraging the power of *"smart"* resources, i.e. information, knowledge, relationships, brands, and innovative and collaborative intelligence.

David Matheson and James E. Matheson defined nine principles of a smart organisation which makes it able to achieve its purpose, understand the environment and mobilise resources[3]: *culture to create value, continual learning, creating*

alternatives, *embracing uncertainty*, *outside-in strategic perspective*, *systems thinking*, *disciplined decision-making*, *alignment and empowerment*, and *open information flow*.

Three dimensions concur to define a smart organisation: *knowledge dimension, information and communication technology (ICT) dimension and organisational dimension*[4].

Figure 1: Dimensions of a smart organisation

Knowledge dimension

Knowledge is a critical resource of a smart organisation which makes it able to achieve its purpose, understand the environment and mobilise resources, in other words to be smart. Knowledge derives from information and combines various pieces of information with an interpretation and meaning.

Karl Wiig defined the different forms of knowledge as factual (which is found in books and data), conceptual (found in perspectives and concepts), expectational (knowledge to make judgments and hypothesis) and methodological (knowledge from reasoning and strategies)[5].

In organisations, data can simply be found in records, and information in messages, while knowledge is embedded in documents or databases, in organisational processes, routines and norms and is obtained from individuals, groups, or organisational routines either through structured media or through person-to-person contact.

Knowledge management includes a complex combination of organisational processes, information technologies and creative human capacities and plays a key role in organisational adaptation and transformation in response to environmental and operational changes.

In military organisations, knowledge management is designed to support specific strategic, operational, or tactical decision-making processes, inter-organisational communications, cooperation and interaction.

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[4] E. Filos, *Smart Organizations in the Digital Age*, in E. M. Jennex, *Knowledge Management: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications*, Information Science Reference, London, 2008, pp. 48-72.
[5] Karl M. Wiig, *Knowledge Management Foundations: Thinking About Thinking: How People and Organizations Create, Represent and Use Knowledge,* Schema Press, Arlington, 1993, p. 153.

Knowledge management can be seen as a set of techniques and practices that facilitates the flow of knowledge into and within the firm (Birkinshaw, 2001) or as a capability to aggregate, analyse, and use data to make informed decisions that lead to action and generate real business value (Davenport, 2001).

Knowledge management has a major impact and contributes to value-adding command-and-control (C2) processes, battlefield interaction and synchronisation, increased operational tempo, accuracy, lethality and survivability, synchronised tactical offensive and on situational awareness to ensure a proper understanding of operational and security environment and prompt implementation of command intent.

According to Maule, Schacher, and Gallup (2002), knowledge management is often used in the broadest sense to include such variables as the management of numerical values obtained from automated collection systems, qualitative data from human subjective opinions, synthetic results from both human and machine simulation, and systems output or result sets tailored to address specific long-range plans or objectives[6].

Broadly, knowledge management in military organisations integrates technologies, disciplines, initiatives and mechanism addressing:

- *Knowledge transfer:*
  - ➥ techniques to capture common-sense knowledge in a context-sensitive manner and extract expert-level specifics (Storey and Day, 2002);
  - ➥ data and information consolidation and integration into knowledge, understanding of strategic options and cause-effect relationships (Primix Solutions, 2000).
- *Knowledge utilisation:*
  - ➥ context to help document knowledge flows;
  - ➥ knowledge expertise building.

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Dimension

Smart organisations facilitate control of information overload, offering ubiquity and hyper-connectivity to enable new services and increase the effectiveness of collaboration between clients, partners and suppliers to generate real value[7].

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[6] R. William Maule, *Military Knowledge Management*, in David G. Schwartz, *Encyclopedia of Knowledge Management*, Idea Group Reference, London, 2006, p. 629.
[7] http://atos.net/NR/rdonlyres/4AE86E1A-C78A-4E3C-BD6F-474066A92912/0/Positioning_Paper.pdf, 18.12.2012.

Information technologies, techniques and methods in smart organisations include[8]:
- computer and communications technology, cognitive science and artificial intelligence (AI), and human-computer and human-systems integration;
- information synthesis or fusion, with XML (extensible mark-up language) as a categorisation schema and ontology structure in support of semantic understanding;
- cognitive understanding and research to encode process, procedural, and expert knowledge into software.

Collaborative tools play a significant role because they can integrate valuable resources to enhance situational awareness and understanding and to provide guidance for actions.

Chat, instant messaging, online meetings and shared application technologies are core instruments of current knowledge-management projects and initiatives.

Despite of increasing complexity, military staffs are encouraged to integrate traditional knowledge technologies with collaborative capabilities, to use collaborative planning tools in developing military strategies, concepts of operation and operational orders, and to assist execution with knowledge-based communications.

Portals are key elements in knowledge dissemination and, because of openness and flexibility in combining a variety of tools and services, they can be customised to create a rich knowledge-sharing environment. The main purpose of a portal is to collect content and offer access, often on a need-to-know basis, to information and knowledge repositories consisting of aggregating Web services, information sites, collaboration tools and decision-support applications.

The key characteristic of all portal products is the aggregation of content from many different sources, resulting in a virtual collection supported through communities of practice and subject-matter experts to ensure an updated and relevant context, available through a single point of access.

ICT is a key enabler for knowledge flow defined as a process of knowledge passing between people or knowledge processing mechanisms[9].

Movement of knowledge from a person, group or storage medium to another person, group or storage medium sustain the ability of individuals to create, transfer and apply knowledge on identification and execution of new tasks, providing logistic support in real time and creation of new logistic concepts and capabilities.

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[8] R. William Maule, *op. cit.*, p. 629.
[9] Hai Zhunge, *A Knowledge Flow Model for Peer-to-Peer Team Knowledge Sharing and Management*, Expert Systems with Applications, 23, 2003, pp. 23-30.

Direction, *content* and *carrier* are essential attributes that characterise a knowledge flow and determine the sender and the receiver, the sharable knowledge content and the media that can pass the content.

According to Wiig (1995), a flow of knowledge has four basic functions:

- *building of knowledge* by knowledge transfer from external sources and creating new knowledge by research and development;
- *storage of knowledge* by preserving current knowledge in artefacts;
- *distribution of knowledge* by sharing and transfer;
- *application of knowledge* by integration in organisational processes, products and services.

Different types of knowledge flow derive from a combination of possible connections between sources of knowledge, respectively human and artefacts. Knowledge artefacts are seen as artefacts (objects made by a human being) which represent an encoding of knowledge.

➢ *Human – human knowledge flow*: transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge between individuals, groups and organisations.

Transfer mechanisms include socialisations, general or tailored training, formal and informal learning, mentorship. This type of knowledge flow is specific to a strategy of knowledge management, namely personalisation strategy, focused on knowledge as an object of exchange through person-to-person contacts.

➢ *Human – artefacts knowledge flow*: transfer and storage of explicit knowledge in physical media.

Human-artefacts knowledge flows are part of a strategy of knowledge management named codification strategy that is based on the idea that maximising the use of technology the knowledge can be extracted from individuals, codified, stored and reused.

➢ *Artefact – human knowledge flow*: distribution of preserved explicit knowledge from physical media to users by sharing and direct transfer.

Literature offers two primary mechanisms of knowledge utilisation – direction and routine. Direction involves codifying tacit knowledge into explicit rules and instructions that can be communicated throughout the organisation. Routine assumes the development of predetermined response alternatives to environmental and operational changes.

➢ *Artefact – artefact knowledge flow*: automatic transfer of knowledge between physical media based on dedicated software.

In this context, *Network Enabled Capability (NEC)* is a key enabler for knowledge management in military organisations. The general purpose

of the *NEC* is to facilitate a dynamic, distributed decision-making process at all levels of military command by involving multiple diverse sensors in the process of generation and maintenance of a common perception of the situation, allowing shared awareness across the battlefield[10].

NEC Components	Functions
Technical network *(Physical infrastructure)*	Acquisition, generation, distribution, manipulation and utilisation of knowledge.
Social network *(Group of interacting people)*	Transfer, manipulation, integration, sharing of knowledge.
Knowledge network *(Minds of the people)*	Perception, awareness, understanding, expertise, beliefs and values, decisions.

Table 1: Relationship between NEC components and functions

Developed initially by the UK, based on previous research on Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) (1998), NEC internationally evolved to NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) defined as *"the Alliance's cognitive and technical ability to federate the various components of the operational environment, from the strategic level down to the tactical levels, through a networking and information infrastructure"*[11].

NEC provides support for knowledge modelling, discovery and creation, integration and sharing by excellent and intuitive ways:

• advanced techniques and architectures for more effective sharing of information and knowledge across the enterprise's distributed and heterogeneous information systems (high-performance information grid, integrated sensor grids (satellite imagery, manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, ground sensors), high-speed automated assignment of resources, access to all appropriate information sources, weapons, interactive network, data-sharing technologies);
• visualisation and geospatial systems for enhanced understanding of spatial- and time-related knowledge in complex environments.

In the field of logistics, another key enabler for knowledge utilisation is *Logistic Information Management* that couples available information technology with logistic processes and practices to meet the NATO Commander's and nation's logistic information requirements.

NATO logistic systems need to be interoperable with both existing and emerging national and NATO systems. Interfaces with industrial systems should also be considered where practical and cost effective[12].

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[10] *Understanding Network Enabled Capability*, Newsdesk Communications Ltd, London, 2009.
[11] *NATO Network Enabled Capability*, http://nnec.act.nato.int/default.aspx.
[12] *NATO Logistics Handbook*, NATO HQ, Brussels, 2007, 6.

Users from NATO and national command and force structures require executive, managerial and operational logistic information and knowledge. To be effective, logistic information systems must facilitate the delivery of the right information and knowledge to the right people at the right time with the right security protection.

Organisation dimension

For a smart organisation, cooperation is essential in order to achieve key strategic goals as[13]:

- resource optimisation (sharing investment with regard to infrastructure, research and development, market knowledge and the sharing of risks, while maintaining the focus on one's own core competences);
- creation of synergies, e.g. by bundling complementary competences and by offering customers a solution rather than a mere product or a service;
- attaining critical mass in terms of capital investment, shared markets and customers;
- achieving increased benefits in terms of shorter time-to-market, higher quality, with less investment.

A military organisation defined as *"a unit or element with various functions enabled by a structure through which individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish a common mission and directly provide or support war fighting capabilities"*[14] could be transformed into a smart organisation by accelerating organisational processes that sustain the ability of individuals to create, transfer and apply knowledge and analysis on identification and execution of new tasks, creation of new concepts and capabilities.

In military organisations, organisational culture is an important part of the organisational dimension concerning learning, communications – internal and external –, coordination, and memory which supported by various tools like[15]:

- military-specific initiatives such as command and control, military intelligence, and sensors;
- meta-cognitive attributes to help define relationships between user cognitive needs and knowledge metadata.

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[13] Y.L. Doz, G. Hamel, *Alliance Advantage. The Art of Creating Value through Partnering*, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1998.

[14] *NNEC Best Practices Handbook*, Command and Control Centre of Excellence, 2009.

[15] R. William Maule, *op. cit.*, p. 629.

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By increasing communication, social connections and access to highly valuable information and knowledge, enhancing collaboration inside and outside the boundaries, any organisation could create a solid platform for transformation into a smart organisation able to dramatically amplify individual and organisational performance.

Collaborative partnerships, ability to react positively and adequately to change and uncertainty and to identify and exploit new opportunities by involving knowledge, relationships, and innovative and collaborative intelligence are key characteristics of smart organisations.

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AIRPOWER IN THE ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICT
Case Study: Afghanistan (I)

Major General (AF) Dr Victor STRÎMBEANU

Intra-theatre air transport of special forces or ground troops, from the camping areas to the points of contact with the enemy, can be done, in the author's opinion, only by helicopters or other aircraft able to take off and, especially, to land vertically or on short distances, on land improvised or ad hoc areas. This requires, on the one hand, that significant special forces detachments or ground forces are permanent, on a rotation basis, at a high alert level and, on the other hand, that air forces and assets are permanently prepared to take off in the shortest time, with destinations which often are communicated or changed during flight, by virtue of the principle of dynamic allocation of targets.

Keywords: *close air support; intervention time; air surveillance; peacekeeping*

The asymmetrical conflict is characterised preponderantly by the confrontation with an atypical enemy, dissimulated in the local population, sometimes even assimilated by it, with combat methods and procedures unspecific to the armed forces and classic troops. Consequently, in the asymmetrical conflict, at first glance, the role of airpower is not important compared with the one in the classic armed conflict. First of all, because in an asymmetrical conflict there is no visible enemy, there is no demarcation line of own troops in relation with the enemy ones, there is no *"depth of the enemy territory"*, the second echelon, the reserves, the classic concentration areas, that are subject to air interdiction, for instance. Secondly, even though chronologically it is before the above-mentioned aspect, there is no enemy aviation that must be eliminated from the fight for ensuring air supremacy and freedom of movement for own troops. In its turn, air supremacy, the first condition for success in the classic, symmetrical conflict, belongs to own forces ever since

Major General (AF) Dr Victor Strîmbeanu – Chief of Training and Doctrine, the Romanian Air Force Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

the beginning of the asymmetrical conflict, but the *"asymmetrical enemy"* is not interested nor significantly affected by the absence of air supremacy. Because the enemy does not fight in the classic style. It has neither infrastructure nor visible troops, established in clearly delimited dispositions, that can be attacked by the aviation that has air supremacy. The enemy is completely hidden and assimilated to the population itself, with which it is confounded, most of the time, or which protects it openly or indirectly, voluntarily or forced, for various reasons.

In these circumstances, classic air power, at first glance, has no decisive role in determining the result of the armed conflict. More precisely, capitalising on the air power in a classic way is no longer possible but to a small extent. Therefore, airpower must adapt to the particularities of the asymmetrical warfare, partially mentioned above and which will be mentioned again depending on their importance.

The absence of a veritable air enemy makes even the term of *"air supremacy"* lose its significance, because *"air supremacy"* is an intrinsic comparison, it has a meaning only in relation with something to be compared with, more precisely with the airpower implicitly weaker or more diminished of the enemy. In the case of the asymmetrical conflict, the comparison is missing by definition or is insignificant and it can be ignored.

The absence of a control of airspace and of the forces and means that should support such a control is another essential particularity of the asymmetrical conflict. Therefore, there is not radar to take out of service, no command post, no apparent communications system.

Airfield infrastructure, ground-based air defence, concentration areas, logistic elements, ammunition depots, fuel-lubricants warehouses are just a few classic examples of absent targets of air strikes, and the list could continue. Not even traditional economic objectives, weapons factories, communications lines and nodes, urban agglomerations are no longer subject to air strikes, because they either do not exist or do not serve the strategic or political interests, such as the case of the urban centres of localities (placed at the fourth level of importance, in the Warden doctrine, for example), because the population is not hostile, at least not entirely, to the peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces. On the contrary, there is a broad political and strategic campaign of gaining public support, without which the chances of success against the enemy in the asymmetrical conflict are low up to impossible in terms of meeting the policy objectives and, ultimately, victory. Not even this (victory) has the same meaning and content as in the traditional armed conflict. Most of the times, *"victory"* in an asymmetrical conflict is a political compromise that brought to power or helped to get to power democratic forces or, at least, political regimes favourable to maintaining national and regional security, cooperative

and strong enough to remain in power after the withdrawal of the peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces.

Apparently paradoxically, the absence of these classic, traditional objectives and targets does not reduce in any way the importance of airpower in the asymmetrical conflict. Quite the contrary, it establishes the premises for evolutions of real magnitude, creates significant pressure on airpower for rapid transformation and adaptation to the features of the new field of confrontation. The hidden enemy or even the one assimilated by the local population must be identified rapidly, certainly, then isolated and neutralised. This already means continuous, punctual, omnipresent air surveillance and air strikes of surgical precision. The absence of the classic contact line, doubled by the omnipresence of the enemy infiltrated in the quasi-totality of the territory, from border villages to the centre of the capital of the respective state makes the contact of land troops with the enemy possible anytime, anywhere, in the most unexpected time or place. This means, again, that air support should be delivered rapidly, accurately and efficiently, wherever needed. However, at the same time, keeping aircraft in the air, to reduce response time, remains as costly, uneconomic, inefficient and insufficient as always. This aspect has led to essential conceptual and procedural changes, such as the concept of *"dynamic targeting"*. Essentially, this is the ability to rapidly reschedule forces and air assets, *which are already in the process of carrying out a mission*, to other targets appeared *ad hoc* and which exceed in importance and emergency the originally planned ones. This reduces the time of intervention dramatically, avoiding the consumption of resources in the areas of service in the air, but requires versatility, flexibility both in the means of striking, mandatory multirole, and especially at the level of command and control systems.

Close Air Support

Returning to *Close Air Support – CAS*, it has already surpassed the limits of the classic definition both as spatial dimension, now excelling more in the depth of the enemy or enemy-controlled territory, and as precision, sometimes being necessary that the enemies are hit at the level of the individual placed in the proximity of own forces or of other locals, neutral or even sympathisers of allied troops. Which means, again, continuous, timely, omnipresent aerial surveillance, qualitative information, high striking precision, strong but strictly limited effect, to avoid collateral damage and effects. A child or a neutral local, killed accidentally, produces today, under the circumstance of the asymmetrical conflict, collateral effects with strategic impact. It is already questionable if they can be classified

as *"collateral"*. The timeliness and accuracy of the strike have progressed so much also because of computers and computerisation, of special software, replicated both in ground equipment and on board the aircraft, enabling *JTAC (Joint Terminal Air Controller)* operators to indicate the target with precision without the classic descriptions used in the past, in keeping with well-known, standardised algorithms, specific to the *CAS* in medium or low threat. After the space dimension and the dimension of the strike precision, the time dimension of Close Air Support in the asymmetrical conflict is essential. The *"TIC"* events [*"troops in contact"* (with the enemy)] are short, sporadic, sometimes coordinated, simultaneous, close or far away from each other, but most of the times, unpredictable or unexpected and short. Providing timely, effective Close Air Support, in these circumstances, becomes extremely difficult, but it does not reduce the status of *sine qua non* condition for the protection of own troops, destruction or neutralisation of enemy troops at the same time with limiting own losses.

However, Close Air Support remains controversial for *complex attacks* carried out usually on points of entry into coalition military objectives and in Afghan military and governmental political objectives. First, because of their unpredictability and rapidity. A *complex attack* in the context of asymmetrical warfare consists of a combination of attacks with cars loaded with explosives, suicide attackers wearing explosives and classic fighters who use grenades and small weapons to penetrate the gap created in the force protection system by the suicide, motorised or individual elements. These forms of attack take place rapidly and end in two to three minutes, either by the security forces rejecting the attack or by insurgents entering the objective, where the use of Close Air Support is difficult. Basically, in many cases, a complex attack ends before the intervention of air forces. Secondly, the controversial nature of using air support in complex attacks, of the type described above, lies in the proximity of own and enemy forces, which again makes it difficult to deliver air support without the risk of fratricide. In turn, it has proved very effective in urban combat, in attacks on allied or Afghan government forces carried out from tall buildings, such as the September 2011 attack on ISAF headquarters or the attack in July 2011 on the *"Continental"* hotel in Kabul, when, under pressure from protection forces, suicide attackers sought refuge on the hotel's roof, exposing themselves as easy and safe targets for coalition helicopters that were already *in holding* for the attack.

At the same time, the difficult prediction of the next target, of the next attack on the allied troops or the neutral population, requires the fast intervention of land troops or special forces, and this can be ensured only by air, primarily due to speed of aircraft and, secondly, because of their relative independence from terrestrial

obstacles, especially in the conditions of a terrain that is very inaccessible *("high, hot and locked")*, such as in this case (Afghanistan). *Intra-theatre air transport* of special forces or land troops, from the camping areas to the points of contact with the enemy, can be done only by helicopters or other aircraft able to take off and, especially, to land vertically or on very short distances, on improvised or *ad hoc* chosen lands. This requires, on the one hand, that significant special forces detachments or land forces are permanently, on a rotation basis, at a high alert level and, on the other hand, the air forces and means are always ready to take off as soon as possible, with destinations which often are transmitted in the air or changed during flight, by virtue of the principle of dynamic targeting. This type of air missions, in turn, are not simple transport mission. It is required that they are ensured during flight with aircraft or helicopters able to counter any surface-to-air attacks on the trajectory towards the objective. As a matter of fact, in Afghanistan and in any other asymmetrical conflict in which the area of combat actions is the whole territory, any intra-theatre air transport is permanently escorted, because one can never know when there will be an attack on these means. Not even fighters and combat helicopters fly alone. They are always flying at least in a formation of two in order to support each other in case of attack or cover from the air for the forced landing of one of them. A forced landing on the territory of a state which is subject to an asymmetrical conflict exposes own forces to an attack of the insurgent forces anytime and anywhere, shortly after the forced landing. After escorting on the trajectory, the improvised or *ad hoc* chosen landing field must be secured from the air and from the ground to avoid falling into ambushes. A true *"tactical dialogue"* takes place permanently. Enemy forces adapt at least as fast as own forces. Fake *TIC* events were frequently carried out to actually attract in ambushes important land and air forces and means. The US forces lost 30 special forces fighters because the insurgents shoot down, in August 2011, a CH-47 helicopter caught in ambush in Wardak province, southwest of Kabul, by simulating an engagement of the international coalition patrols. This is a quite eloquent example in this respect.

To avoid such events, followed by losses in forces and means that sensitise strongly the public opinion at home, transformed, in turn, into a significant instrument of pressure on political and military decision-makers, today, one puts more and more emphasis on the *Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – UAVs*. They have already passed from the stage of UAV, used mainly in research and aerial surveillance missions in the state of *UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle)* and are usually used in Close Air Support missions. *"Unmanned"* does not mean unpiloted. In the already established meaning, it only means without a human pilot on board. In other words,

these robotised means of combat are in fact controlled by air operators, human pilots, from the ground, through satellites, through operations centres located thousands of kilometres away, virtually on the other side of the planet. From such a distance and with the limitations imposed by the means of identification and visualisation of targets, Close Air Support has become more complex, eliminated the risk of potential losses of pilots, but could not completely eliminate, at this stage of technological progress, the risk of fratricide, the risk of an attack on own forces, especially when they are engaged in fighting insurgents. The case of the accidental attack of drones on own forces, executed following the request for air support of the *"Alcatraz"* base commander (in southern Afghanistan), carried out from *Creech AFB (Air Force Base),* USA, coordinated (at *intell* level) from the *ANG (Air National Guard)* base in *Terre Haute*, Indiana, USA, on 5 April 2011, which resulted in two fatalities from own forces, is not the only one of this kind.

Superior, from this point of view, remains the Close Air Support provided by human crews on board, both with fighters (most often A-10, F-16, Mirage 2000) and with combat helicopters (AH-64, Tigre etc). Reduced intervention time, vital for the success in the case of *TIC*s, is better provided by aircraft due to their superior speed and dynamic targeting. Basically, they rarely work *"on call"*, from the position of *"on duty at the airfield"* or from *"air service areas"*. The response time, specific to these methods of action, is not enough for the features of the combat actions in the asymmetrical conflict. Dynamic targeting, or the *"detour"* of air means that are the closest to where the *TIC* occurred has proved to be the most effective method, the aircraft reaching the battle place within minutes, sometimes even two to three minutes, to the complete surprise of the insurgents who thus do not have enough time to retreat or disappear among locals.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

Even though unmanned aircraft are used more and more in combat missions, their main mission is preponderantly in the area of *Intelligence, Surveillance, Recconnaisance – ISR*. All the missions of air forces, as, in fact, the entire range of military actions, are essentially based on information. This requires the gathering, timely processing and transformation of the information in useful intelligence for decision-makers and executors. Under the circumstances of the asymmetrical war, the most affected by its features is the data collection process, because in the asymmetrical conflict there are no classic objectives, signs and traditional symptoms that, once identified, can assist the specialists in figuring out the enemy plans, intentions, movements, places of future attacks (as we cannot speak of probable directions of attack, in their well-known meaning). The absence

of these symptoms, indicators and data requires that the coalition forces preponderantly limit their action to a reactive rather than proactive role, even though there are enough situations in which one can act, proactively or preventively. For mitigating the consequences of this particularity of the asymmetrical conflict, the *ISR* system had once more to adapt both in terms of means and in terms of procedures and methods of collecting data. Thus, classic air reconnaissance, though important, had to make room for permanent optoelectronic surveillance carried out from captive balloons, unmanned air vehicles and satellites. Paradoxically, at first glance, *Permanent Tracking and Display System – PTDS*, even though they are big, static, visible from long distance, including at night, and implicitly easier to shoot down, are NOT shot down by insurgents.

At a closer look though, the paradoxical feature of the absence of reaction of insurgents in relation to such systems makes sense and can be explained through the fact that an attack on them immediately discloses the position of the insurgents through the very surveillance means put on the balloon and launches a rapid counter-attack of the coalition forces. By the same logic, shooting down a captive balloon is not enough spectacular to justify the losses of the insurgents. Not even the insurgency has unlimited resources, which determines it to choose carefully the targets and objectives to be attacked, in order to get a maximum effect and a great impact on the media and the public opinion in the coalition countries, this being effects on which the insurgent leaders put great stress. To conclude, these surveillance balloons are very efficient, easy to maintain, provide clear pictures in the visible and infrared spectrum, on a range of 10-15 kilometres. They are extremely efficient for the surveillance of airports, urban agglomerations, communications lines, military and political objectives and access routes to them, movements of masses of people and suspect vehicles. Special stress is laid on the surveillance of small groups of people who activate on lines of communications, near military and political objectives and on the access routes to them, for setting *Improvised Explosive Devices – IED*. Such a balloons network easily covers with minimum consumption of resources hundreds or thousands of square kilometres in the areas of interest. Their only vulnerabilities are those due to reduced visibility because of smoke or dust storms and the wind that is quite frequent and has a speed these aerostations cannot handle.

Battlefield picture is completed by means of unmanned reconnaissance, more difficult to exploit than aerostations, but much less resource-consuming as compared to manned aerial means. Unmanned reconnaissance vehicles are small, difficult to detect by insurgents, difficult to shoot down, rapid, easily deployable and operable and have the decisive advantage of mobility as compared with balloons.

They can be sent anywhere, at short notice. Basically, in Afghanistan, any action of special forces or ground forces is assisted from the air by unmanned aircraft that provide commanders up to sub-tactical level, in real-time, with critical pieces of information in order to command their forces with maximum efficiency.

Satellite surveillance is obviously more complex and more expensive, but it is absolutely necessary especially outside the territory controlled by coalition forces, for the surveillance of insurgent camps and movements on the territory of adjacent states, favourable to insurgency and which do not allow the access of coalition forces on their territory or in their airspace.

Last but not least, classic air reconnaissance from manned air vehicles remains a valuable means for data collection. Basically, every flight, regardless of its nature or main mission, has as secondary mission the air reconnaissance as well as the reporting, in real time or after landing, of the elements of interest from the tactical situation observed.

All these components of the *ISR* lead to building a consistent, solid, robust, timely information background based on which operational commanders at all levels can make the most relevant decisions in full awareness of the situation. The diversification of the means and the implicit abundance of information have enabled the decentralisation of decision-making, command and control, by lowering information access up to sub-tactical levels, platoon or group leaders. The classic information pyramid, at strategic or operational level, now consists of a multitude of sub-tactical and tactical information elements, without affecting the operational and strategic decisions effectiveness, but offering instead, by decentralising the access to information and the decision-making process, maximum efficiency of battlefield forces.

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In the second part of the article, the author will write about certain significant aspects of the role of robotisation, from the strategic to the micro-tactical level.

English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON FUNDAMENTAL STATE INSTITUTIONALISATIONS

Colonel Dr Georgel RUSU

To fulfil the roles undertaken in front of its own nation/population, as well as international actors, the state uses instruments of power. Their subordination/coordination and control are established by law and they benefit from public management and must cooperate and collaborate with other institutions. Historically speaking, as the author mentions, the instruments of power of a state appeared with the state itself (the fundamental ones), and in the modern age they increased as the standards regarding the state recognition/qualification evolved (the instruments: information, peace enforcement ones and especially emergency situations management are newer notions, which are related to the assurance of good governance).

Keywords: *international norms; emergency situations; state of peace; social contract*

For any part of the world, regardless of the economic and social path taken, the state is the geographical and social entity with historical becoming gained by political and organisational will and often by long violence, resulting in human or other losses. Throughout history, the state has seen multiple evolutions. Notional, theoretical and practical approaches, just as the relations between masses and leaders, as well as the ones between states or foreign entities have known, in recent decades, major changes and transformations. The modern age imposed a new approach and a new understanding of the notion of state as a large collective project. The separation/division of powers in the state as a feature of un-totalitarian political regimes is at least claimed, if not actually working in more and more countries and the mutual control between the legislative power, the executive power and the judicial power ensures the balance and normality of the state.

The idea of separation of powers has its origins in the 17th and 18th centuries. In 1690, John Locke described the policy requirement in *"Two Treatises*

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on Government" and in 1748 C. de Montesquieu ruled in the same respect in *"De l'esprit des lois"*. The three components-powers represent the *"minimal state"*, which provides the possibility of governance by mutual continuous balance *(figure 1)*.

Separation of powers in the state

"Minimal", democratic, modern state

LEGISLATIVE POWER

JUDICIAL POWER

EXECUTIVE POWER

Figure 1: Democratic functionality of states

Together, the three components make the *public power*. Between the three powers, there are no relations of subordination, only of complementarity, cooperation and mutual control. This control is exercised through instruments specific to each power. As regards the affiliation of the President to one of the state powers, political doctrines locate this institution both within the executive power (the President appoints, is responsible for security and defence, adopts macro-systemic management tools/see the activity of the Supreme Council of National Defence/CSAŢ etc.). and the legislative one (the President signs/decrees laws).

To fulfil the roles assumed in front of its own nation/people, as well as international actors, the state uses the *instruments of power*. These instruments have their subordination/coordination and control established by law (in relation to the public power[1]), benefit from public management and have the obligation of inter-institutional cooperation and collaboration. Historically, the instruments of power of the state appeared at the same time with the state (the core ones), and in the modern era, they multiplied as the recognition/qualification standards of the state evolved (the information and law enforcement instruments and especially the emergency situations management are newer notions[2], which are related to ensuring good governance).

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[1] Georgel Rusu, *Elemente ale raportului dintre puterea publică şi autoritatea militară*, Editura Axa, 2002.
[2] European regional seminar *"Transnational Threats and Homeland Defence"*, Bratislava, Slovakia, 6-10 June 2011.

The eight *instruments of power* (diplomatic, information – through education, training, civic/national consciousness, access to information; military; economic; financial; security intelligence; law enforcement and creation of the culture of *"national value accumulations"* and emergency situations management) are not the same with state powers. Some of them are well known (the military instrument of power, the diplomatic instrument, the economic instrument, the financial instrument etc.). Others, being newly defined, need notional clarifications *(figure 2)*. Thus, the information instrument takes into account education, training, civic/national consciousness and, above all, access to information as a fundamental constitutional right of the citizen.

Instruments of power

Figure 2: Instruments of the national/state power

However, all have a specific management at state/national level, and some are meant to individualise and define/differentiate the citizens of one state from those of another state (the instrument of law enforcement and of the creation of a culture of *"national values accumulation"*). There are several state institutions that contribute in various forms to achieving these desiderata, and the guarantee is made by law (of education, of access to information etc.). Without going into further details regarding the analysed instrument, we noted some of the expected results of the action specific to it. First, one must mention that education is *"a set of measures applied systematically in order to form and develop the intellectual, moral and physical skills"*[3], while training is *"a set of knowledge, skills and abilities, taught or acquired by someone, that seeks to acquire a general knowledge, a professional specialisation, education; the preparation of soldiers to acquire military theory and practice; criminal cases research activity"*[4]. Therefore, we notice the fact that,

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[3] *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române*, Editura Academiei, 2010.
[4] *Ibid.*

being activities of acquiring knowledge and skills, education includes training; training allows the carrying out of operations learned, therefore reproduction; education allows higher processing, capitalisation, adoption of critical attitudes, valorisation, educationally based initiatives, further transmission of education and training. They are important for the state entity in order to obtain the expected social behaviour of an individual for the functional *"reproduction"* of institutions, as well as to ensure the understanding of the phenomenon of state and of the proper reaction to the endangering of *"rei publicae"*.

Given such considerations, any state is based on the convention adopted between the citizen and the state in which the former gives *his right to violence* to the latter. By virtue of this aspect of the social contract that founds the state, the civilian commits to performing only non-violent activities, and the state commits to using violence only legally and only through specialised institutions. These specialised institutions in using violence – the military, the military structures of the Ministry of Interior (Gendarmerie), the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Protection and Guard Service, the Special Transmission Service, the National Prison Administration of the Ministry of Justice – are, together, the *military instrument of power*. By virtue of this fact, unlike the civil citizen, who has the obligation of non-violence, including in the workplace, the military personnel from the institutions that form the military instrument of power have the violence as a job obligation. The violence is exerted in keeping with the law and its limits. The military personnel has the right and obligation to exercise the *"legal violence"* of the state as an element of coercion against those who, in one way or another, attack the elements that jeopardise statehood and constitutional values.

Such job obligations bring about serious risks, including the one of supporting violence or even be killed, which is not found at the civilian employee. If, for the civilian employee, work is rated by the quantity or quality of operations, products and services and is calculated per hour or per day of work of 8 hours or less, for the military men, the intervention and action must occur anytime, under any circumstances and wherever violence is used, including only by intimidating through his presence. This feature requires a different way of remuneration, which is reflected in the pay given for the monthly specific activity. The violence is *limited only by law*. In order to ensure the legal aspects, the state adheres to international standards/ adopts provisions of International Humanitarian Law, sets specific rules etc. At the structural level, there is the institution of the officer with special criminal investigation, honour councils and trial councils, and at the inter-institutional level of the components of the military instrument of power – the Military Prosecutor's Offices. The military action is one of the prerogatives of the state. The military instrument

of power is designed to exert violence (the possibility of violence). Only the state can exert violence in order to achieve the goal of institutional existence, the great national project, in accordance with international law. As a consequence, *any military action indicates the attitude of the state*. To guarantee *the compliant and responsible behaviour in using violence*, the military personnel is selected by physical, medical, psychological, moral, intellectual, cultural etc. standards. that place them at the highest level on the labour market. In addition to the guarantees, by law, the members of the military instrument of power are applied interdictions that ensure equidistance from the political factors, non-involvement in social subjectivisms etc.

The specificity of the violence of the action as a normality of the existence of the institution and the military personnel has led to the appearance of the institution of the officer in charge of specific investigation. He is the one who, based on corroborating the data regarding the investigated facts with the institutional regulations and rules of national and/or international law, prepares the case file regarding the actions of the military man, comparing facts with military regulations.

In order to carry out constitutional tasks, the instrument of military power benefits from resources from the other instruments of state power to match the decision established by norms by state powers. (Legislative power – what and how much?, Executive power – from where and how?, Judicial power – ensures/verifies the legality of the *"transfer"* of resources!).

At the same time, a civil, democratic control, specific to each of the three powers, is exerted on the military instrument of power.

The domain of the attributions of the military instrument of power is the one of leaving the normality of social existence, of jeopardising the state of peace and is classified in the Romanian legislation through the *state of emergency*, *state of siedge*, *state of mobilisation* and *state of war*. *Emergency situations* may overlap with any of them, including on the state of peace *(figure 3)*. For these situations, the specialised literature has inscribed between the instruments of state power the one of emergency situations management[5].

Most of them are addressed with the military instrument of power. They are described in the legislation in the field of defence and their gradualness is based on the distribution of specific resources according to the requirements imposed by the evolution of the situation. The gradualness allows even for the passing

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[5] European regional seminar *"Transnational Threats and Homeland Defence"*, *op. cit.*

STATE OF WAR

STATE OF MOBILISATION

STATE OF SIEGE

STATE OF EMERGENCY

PEACE

EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

Figure 3: The states of the Romanian society
and the attributions of the military instrument of power

under the responsibility of the military authorities of the adoption of regulations enabling the unhindered accomplishment of missions (military orders). Mention should be made that *emergency situations* can occur during any of the states of the society (during a state of peace, of war or of mobilisation there may be floods, earthquakes etc.). Resource allocation can be made without the authoritarian intervention of the military in the case of *emergency situations*. The specific authoritarian activity of the military instrument of power is manifested when needed for mobilisation, requisition, requiring people to render services in the public interest etc., and this brings the citizen in front of the military jurisdiction.

If we were to observe the *seniority* and *merits* of instruments of power, two of them are fundamental for the state. *The military and the currency define the state*. Alvin Toffler argues that their mission/position of this kind is ended for the countries that have *"joined the third wave"*[6]. We will contradict him based on realities. The most economically advanced Western countries, which can be included in *the third wave*, have retained their national military, some of them even the currency (see the United Kingdom), and even though one country has joined the Euro, its national symbols are still present on that currency.

Being aware of the fundamental importance for the state existence of the two elements mentioned, the military and the currency, has always made

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[6] Alvin Toffler, *Război şi antirăzboi*, Editura Antet, Bucureşti, 1995.

it possible for every country to establish the most severe penal actions against those who, in one way or another, attack these values. Counterfeiting the currency or damaging defence capabilities are thus considered direct attacks on statehood, on the roles only the state has, in the manifestation of its sovereignty. The two statehood foundation elements have a common feature. Just as the currency must include in its quantitative dimensions the goods and services of the state, so must the military cover the country's defence through capabilities and numerical sizing. This is basically a statement regarding the economy of the great collective project that is the state. The fact that economic development can be enhanced by foreign capital injections would speed up economic development, but this does not change the relations established by economics between the currency and its coverage in goods and services. Likewise, alliances can be enhanced by security guarantees, but cannot replace a defence of the real dimension of the state.

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English version by
✍ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

THE NEED FOR INTEGRATING CIVIL AND MILITARY AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN PEACETIME, CRISIS OR CONFLICT SITUATIONS (II)

Colonel (AF) Relu PANAIT

In the second part of the article, the author points out NATO's main objectives regarding airspace management, which are focused on: supporting Alliance missions, operations and exercises by providing services required by air traffic management; ensuring NATO requirements on the use of airspace; drawing up policies and doctrines common to all of the Alliance space of interest; harmonising and standardising air traffic management regarding the use of unmanned air means; maintaining close connections with regional and international civil aviation organisations; promoting cooperation, partnership and dialogue in air traffic management.

Keywords: NATINEADS; control and prevention; air police; aircraft; emergency situations

Airspace Control

❖ **NATO Initiatives regarding Airspace Control**

On 19 December 2007, the NATO Air Traffic Management Committee – NATMC approved the *NATO Air Traffic Management Policy*[10].

In accordance with the principles set out in this document, the purpose of this policy is to *"enable aircraft operators to meet their planned times of departure and arrival, to the extent possible, and adhere to their preferred flight profiles with minimum constraints and no compromise to safety"*. For that purpose, all the functions and elements necessary for aircraft movements on the ground and in the air must fall within an integrated system that is based on standards and requirements available to all airspace users.

Airspace is continuous, multidimensional, yet limited and it is used by both civilians and the military, for which we need a common commitment of all – military and civilian authorities, international and regional organisations relevant for aviation – to achieve the expected level of cooperation and security.

Colonel (AF) Relu Panait – the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.
[10] *NATO ATM Policy*, at http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/

To achieve a safer and better system of air traffic management in order to meet the requirements of a market in which competition is fierce, civilian airspace users permanently try to make the most economical flight profiles for each type of aircraft used, maintaining a high level of security and safety of flights. To do this, aside from the improvements made to the aircraft and their engines, we have been witnessing an ongoing process to improve navigation, communication and surveillance equipment that meet the needs of air traffic management *(ATM)* for civil aviation, which, unfortunately, *"raise the requirements"* for the military aviation.

As one of the major users of this area, NATO must consider all these developments and adapt, maintaining its essential functions and being prepared to project its forces as soon as possible where there are potential threats. In this context, it should consider the standards of the other airspace users and ensure a high degree of interoperability between own systems and those used by them.

Considering that NATO operations will take place in a mixed, civil-military environment, the *ATM* rules in the controlled airspace are the same for all. The services are rendered similarly for the civilians and for the military in a civilian airport in which there is host nation support, and if this support does not exist, these services can be provided by NATO to all users.

The military's need for joint cooperation and coordination of efforts with all structures representing civil aviation remains an important objective for NATO, not only in order to improve interoperability, but especially to create a robust and reliable *ATM*.

In this context, NATO's goals in airspace management are:
- NATO missions, operations and exercises support by providing services needed for air traffic management;
- assurance of Alliance requirements regarding the airspace use;
- development of common *ATM* policies and doctrines for the whole NATO area of interest;
- *ATM* harmonisation and standardisation regarding the use of unmanned aerial vehicles;
- close connection with civil aviation regional and international organisations;
- harmonisation between concepts regarding achieving the means and supplying the services of *ATM/CNS* (communication, navigation, surveillance) and civilian ones;
- promotion of cooperation, partnership and dialogue within *ATM*[11].

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[11] *Effective Airspace Management*, at http://www.smi.online.co.uk/event_media/

All these goals are in the competence and responsibility of *NATMC*, which advises *NAC* on the use of airspace. The above-mentioned goals are pursued both in the North Atlantic Organisation, between member states, as well as beyond, through agreements, understandings and cooperation in the fields of reference, with relevant international and regional organisations – such as *ICAO, EUROCONTROL*, organisations responsible for regulating the use of airspace, air navigation, air traffic management, collaboration and cooperation among member countries, with global responsibilities in these domains.

❖ **Priority Situations for NATO**

To perform basic tasks and remain a credible alliance, NATO must maintain its ability to meet the full range of missions, starting from collective defence to crisis response, stabilisation, support etc. operations. These tasks may appear in a short while and at long distance from Alliance borders. The new *NATO Response Force* – NRF, in particular, can provide response forces and means which are already in a state of alert, capable of being deployed where needed, in the shortest time possible (5-30 days).

NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence System – NATINEADS is the backbone of NATO's collective defence. Unique system in NATO, it also includes surveillance and air police functions. While the air surveillance system is passive, ensuring airspace surveillance and detection of friend or foe aircraft and missiles movements, air police is an active system, designed to intercept and/or interrogate any air vehicle and possibly to impose the required necessary corrective measures.

NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control – NAEW & C aircraft and the air police ones are essential to control airspace. These aircraft missions require rapid response, airspace sufficient for execution, priority over any other aircraft, precision and safety. This objective and the limited time of response confirm the need for continuous preparation, training and exercises of military aircraft that meet these missions, but also explain the priorities or unrestricted access in relation to the civil aviation and the other airspace users.

For training purposes, NATO commands carry out a series of joint multinational exercises. One of the objectives of these exercises is to prepare and evaluate the capability of commands, large units and units to work together and the ability to perform Alliance missions. Just as these exercises improve the quality of interoperability and the efficiency of NATO forces, so they will contribute to civil-military interoperability through compliance with the requirements imposed by each of the parties[12].

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[12] *Guidance, Procedures and Timetable for Civil/Military Coordination of Air Exercises* [ref. (e)], at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics/

NATO military forces training and exercises are a national responsibility and are conducted in accordance with the policy of each nation, except for the common means of the Alliance and the NATO large-proportions exercises. We know that preparation and training requirements vary among allies, the types of aircraft, the pieces of equipment and weapon systems used still being different. Therefore, airspace use requirements are difficult to harmonise when the means of Alliance members work simultaneously. If the attempt to harmonise the requirements of aviation from different countries seems difficult, then imagine what happens when armies and navies work at the same time with the aviation to reach common goals.

In my opinion, I think a training programme needs to be conducted during which all kinds of forces and means (on types of missions) should take part and each NATO member nation should be able to prepare its own forces in the interests of the Alliance as a whole and to achieve the desired level of interoperability.

In this respect, *Military Harmonisation Group – MILHAG*[13] has identified the requirements of the military aviation regarding the needs of airspace management, issuing, in this sense, a compendium of requirements for member countries: *"Compendium of the Airspace Requirements for Training and Exercise of Ground, Sea and Air Forces of NATO Member Nations"*[14].

The emergency situations identified concern, in principle, the application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the crisis situations that may arise (ranging from real combat operations to support or stabilisation ones).

Although we do not expect massive aggressions on Alliance members, there are sufficient concerns that conditions could arise at the borders of this area that require the rapid presence of NATO forces and their equipment with the necessary logistics for carrying out the assigned operations.

One of the capabilities needed to timely respond to threats is force projection and ensuring support for this force, for which the aviation's contribution is essential. In the situations in which actions are taken under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the establishment of any airspace restrictions will fall under the commander of the NATO air component, in which case the civil aviation will have to harmonise (subordinate) its goals with those of the military.

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[13] It was created by the Civil-Military Interface Standing Committee – CMISC as a military support group, in General-locotenent dr. Ion-Aurel Stanciu, comandor dr. Emil Cimpoca, comandor dr. Marius-Adrian Nicoară, căpitan Daniel Stan (coord.) *Sărbătoarea aripilor româneşti. O sută de ani de zbor în Armata României (17 iunie 1910 – 17 iunie 2010)*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 269.

[14] At http://www.nato.int/milhag/cps/reqs/

For the cases where a non-Article 5 crisis emerges, as a consequence of the situation that we expect to be very sensitive in all respects, the main requirement is cooperation at all levels between all airspace users. Crisis response operations include rapid projection of forces and means, air lift missions, air refuelling, flights with VIPs – Very Important Persons, land and naval forces support, repatriation etc. Although normal measures of air traffic management will be applied, it is still possible that some military aviation flights could become very important and have priority over other airspace users, regardless of the *ATM* resources available.

Restrictive measures, segregated areas, their airspace activation and deactivation, the airspace design in general will take into account the civil aviation flights, everything being designed so that the impact on the system of air routes could be as small as possible.

Just as in the case of applying Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the *Airspace Control Authority – ACA* will delimitate the area of operations in the airspace and will implement the restrictions that are imposed on it. Sometimes, it can spread to the borders of the whole country or even in areas close to them, including portions of airspace of neighbouring countries. These restrictions may be in the form of *Temporary Segregated Areas – TSA*, *Temporary Restricted Areas – TRA*, *Air Safety Zones – ASZ* and/or *buffer zones*, areas reserved for specific military aviation operations, such as air refuelling and patrolling, where civil aviation flights are prohibited. *ACA* will coordinate their activation and deactivation with the authorities (countries) concerned in order to reduce, as far as possible, the impact on the *GAT* network of civilian air corridors. During crisis response operations or during crises, in the absence of the technology necessary to operate unrestrictedly in the airspace, NATO will use *GAT* flight corridors and, in this respect, will sign agreements with the countries affected for their use and/or prioritisation. In this way, the necessary separation between civil and military aviation will be achieved and civil air traffic will be affected to a lesser extent.

In this context, as a last resort to prevent, stop or mitigate the effects of such situations, the military intervention is necessary and, by using transport, air reconnaissance or combat aircraft, air traffic management will be a priority in all affected countries.

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The membership in several international organisations does not only provide a place at the negotiating table, but it also requires increased responsibility, accountability for obligations and providing own capabilities in order to diminish threats and provide security of all nations represented at that table, as well as

the contribution at conceptual and operational level to the common effort for peace and progress.

Regional agreements in Europe are good examples for the other actors of the international arena, just as in NATO there were formed and developed structures dealing with civil-military cooperation in this field. The institutional framework formed this way deals with policies, laws and regulations, operational plans and working relationships that all contribute to providing transparency, increasing credibility and exchanging information.

Besides Europe and the US, which face very heavy air traffic, the perception of the changes needed to achieve the technical and procedural compatibility between civilian and military in the field of *ATM* is seen with relative suspicion[15], due to the high costs involved. But most of the people are looking forward to all these initiatives and have begun to participate in the establishment of a strategic *"itinerary"* in this regard, also perhaps because it is the first time the air forces seek to align themselves to the requirements of a highly complex air traffic, in which flight safety and security come first. In any case, I think it is useful to carefully analyse the costs involved, the time necessary to complete the proposed desiderata and, finally, the advantages of the technological upgrading of state aircraft in order to meet the new requirements. Depending on the results, the civil-military cooperation in this area can become an example for the other countries that do not yet participate in these initiatives. Here we must clarify one aspect that often escapes attention: the main beneficiaries of these technological and procedural changes are airlines and the related services, the air forces contributing to it. It may sound mean, but, contrary to the civil aviation sector, the cost-benefit analysis loses its relevance for the military, because the military aircraft suffer most of the changes (sometimes at the expense of decreased combat capabilities of aircraft) in order to adapt to the requirements of cooperation with the civilian sector, and they become irrelevant to the combat missions that must be performed in any circumstance, in all weather conditions, timely and at the optimal parameters of the aircraft and its weapons. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, the military cannot quantify the success of the mission by economic requirements, larger or smaller benefits in terms of financial gaining, comfort and flight routes/levels with lowest fuel consumption. If we draw a parallel between military and civilian requirements, we can see that we all want the highest possible level of safety and security of the flight, yet, the military are the ones who have to bear additional, sometimes

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[15] Brigadier General Wolfgang Baltes, Chairman of the Civil/Military Interface Standing Committee – CMIC, EUROCONTROL, presentation at http://www.faa.gov/news/speeches/news_story.cfm?newsId=10836

unjustified expenses, in order to improve air traffic management. Moreover, in most cases, the military perform evasive manoeuvre to the detriment of the economy, have to take into account that civil companies aircraft are heavy, have great inertia, and any change in flight parameters translates into a decrease in flight autonomy, disturbance in time and space planning, terminal congestion and ultimately discomfort to passengers and financial losses of airlines. If a civilian company can make a calculation, at the end of the year, and see the expenditure versus the revenue, the benefits the military bring by settling defence or national sovereignty issues are difficult to measure in money. We also need to take into account some special interest among these airspace users. Each of them directs funds to services they cannot give up in order to achieve their goals, such as, for example, the fact that the military have their own air traffic management services, unlike civilian airlines, which are not too much involved in providing these services. Coordinating the interests of these two parties deserves more attention. If we think of how many commercial interests support and lie at the basis of the requirements and management needs of civilian airspace, it would be fair to also think to the national, regional or international interests based on which the military requirements and needs regarding efficiency and effectiveness are analysed.

Therefore, to continuously promote the interests of the Alliance, in the dialogue with the other airspace users, I think we should talk in any occasion about the military requirements for the use of airspace, to be able to meet the full range of combat and/or security missions without diminishing the contribution to strengthening cooperation and to creating conditions to increase aviation safety and security.

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

WHY IT IS WORTH PERMANENTLY AND CAREFULLY REREADING SERGEY G. GORSHKOV

Dr Florin DIACONU

The study explores the perennial character of some of the ideas present in the works of Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, who was, for many years, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. In order to accomplish such an academic goal, the author briefly lists and comments some of the ideas of the Soviet Admiral, and later on analyses the main events and trends of the evolution of the naval forces of the Russian Federation in the past (2007-2012). The final conclusion is that Gorshkov's main aim, that of eroding US global hegemony by actively boosting the presence of the Russian Navy almost anywhere in the World Ocean, is nowadays an increasingly important priority for the leaders in the Kremlin.

***Keywords**: Navy; Russia; USA; World Ocean; sea power of the state; balance of power; strategic parity; strategic arms race*

Reading the most important work of Soviet Admiral Sergey G. Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*[1], is a major intellectual exercise; and this because he wrote in a manner devoid of any inhibitions about *clearly perennial topics* (in the full sense of the word) in the political and strategic thinking of the state with the centre of gravity in Moscow, regardless of the ideological regime in power.

And this is why we believe this. Gorshkov wrote, among others, that *"the navy, as a branch of the armed forces and in its quality of essential component of sea power, must often act as one of the most important instrument of the policy of states in various historical conditions"*. The capital importance of sea power – as a huge force of pressure a naval force can exert – is visible, according to the Soviet Admiral, in the relations between the great Western powers (which he calls, using the term politically correct, from the perspective of the official ideology of Moscow at the time, *"imperialist states"*)

[1] S.G. Gorshkov (Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy), *The Sea Power of the State*, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, Malabar, Florida, 1983.

and *"weaker states"*. And, as Gorshkov pointed out, *"many attempts have been made to put to work this way of using the sea power against the Soviet Union as well"*. Transferring today the writings of Gorshkov from the '70s, *the central idea is that of an almost irreconcilable opposition between Moscow and the West*, an opposition fully manifested in the naval power as well, an area of action in which Moscow's military fleet can and should act as a *"factor to stabilise the situation in various regions of the world"*[2]. Behind this last statement, there are *two very* strong political ideas. First, the fact that Moscow's (and, with maximum likelihood, Gorshkov did not talk only about the communist Moscow of his time, but also about the *perennial* dimension of Russia's power) central goal of its foreign policy, as well as its military strategy could and should be achieving and maintaining a certain *balance of power* in relation to the West. Of the nine possible meanings, according to Martin Wight, of the syntagm *balance of power*, we will use presently the meaning that refers to the *"even distribution"* (or at least as balanced as possible) of power[3]. In other words, we can understand Gorshkov statement as follows: *the national interest, as formulated by (or understood in) Moscow, demanded that Russia should prevent the West from holding hegemonic positions at global level*. To achieve such a goal, Moscow can act to achieve and maintain functional balances of power at zonal and regional levels, as long as it is clear that the global distribution of power is nothing more than a sum (almost arithmetical, according to some, rather vector-like, in the opinion of others) of local, regional, continental and hemispherical balances. Yet, the statement used by Gorshkov probably relatively vague intentionally, can also mean something else: namely, that *Russia can and must be capable of acting, if necessary, anywhere in the world* in order to thus *"stabilise the situation in various regions"* of the global scene. Here we can easily understand the main reason that made Gorshkov have such a consistent success in promoting his ideas, even in circumstances in which he demanded that naval forces were allocated a *very* important share of the severely limited vital resources and productive force available to USSR. It is a *geographical* one, with a *strong geopolitical and geostrategic significance*: the fact that our planet's surface consists of only three tenths of land (continents and islands), as well as seven tenths of water[4] (which means, beyond a few large lakes of the world, that the world's surface is made up, for more than two-thirds, of seas and oceans, which together make up the world Ocean, in such conditions, *in order to be capable of intervening anywhere in the world,*

[2] For the short fragments quoted in this paragraph, see S.G. Gorshkov, *op. cit.*, p. 277.
[3] For the nine possible meanings of the concept of *Balance of Power*, as well as for the meaning we have used here, see Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, *Dicţionar de relaţii internaţionale englez-român*, Editura Universal Dalsi, Bucureşti, 2001, pp. 51-52.
[4] See Gérard Chaliand, Jean-Pierre Rageau, *Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1985, p. 51.

in order to maintain or re-establish an as balanced as possible distribution of power at global level, so that the West is prevented from having a stable hegemonic status at planetary level, Moscow should have available an as consistent as possible naval power. In practical terms, this means naval military forces capable of calling in question the West capacity of controlling the entire World Ocean (and, equally, capable of projecting, when necessary, Russia's power anywhere in the world). This meaning of Gorshkov's statement was true in the Soviet Union of some decades ago, and continues to remain true, with no major changes, in the Russian Federation of today.

On 23 February 1968, namely 44 years ago, the influential *Time* magazine published an article regarding the naval power of the USSR, which began by quoting an extremely ambitious statement (and a clearly threatening one, for the *vital* strategic interests of the Western world – and especially of the USA) from a writing signed by Gorshkov. The statement read: *"The flag of the Soviet navy now proudly flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the US will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas"*[5]. The central idea comprised in the above-quoted fragment – namely that the *Russian fleet must acquire and maintain the capacity to act in all the areas of the World Ocean, in order to erode in this way, even in the absence of a direct conflict, the US global hegemony* – is mostly valid *also* for the strategic planners from the Russian Federation of today. In order to support such a stand, we will further briefly present *some* of the main elements that describe *the dynamics and major goals of the Russian naval military policy, as core elements of the dynamics of the Russian Federation's naval power between 2007 and 2012.*

For *2007*, the first significant episode to be considered is that moment in mid-April when Russia launched *"its first brand new generation of nuclear submarines since the collapse of the Soviet Union"*. It was the atomic submarine *Yuri Dolgoruky*, the first from the *Borei* class. More commentators underlined the special *strategic* relevance of the launch of the new warship. One of them wrote: *"Russia wants to show that it remains a nuclear power and – as the Putin Administration says – still a great power and for them the greatness of that power is measured by its weapons"*. Another specialist in strategic studies wrote that *"Russia's attack submarines carry out the role of denying the US the freedom of action on the world seas"*. *Reuters* remembered the fact that Russia had already announced that it intended to build 8 such ships by 2018. The entire submarine class was to be provided with ballistic missiles with a range of action of approximately 9 000 kilometres[6].

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[5] *"Russia: Power Play on the Oceans"*, in *Time*, 23 February 1968, at www.time.com./time/magazine/article/0,9171,837933,00.html

[6] Guy Faulconbridge, *"Russia Launches New Generation Nuclear Submarine"*, *Reuters*, 15 April 2007, at www.reuters.com

In August 2007, the Commander of the Russian navy, Admiral Vladimir Masorin, stated that *"the Mediterranean is an important theatre of operations for the Russian Black Sea fleet"* and recommended that *"We must restore a permanent presence of the Russian Navy in this region"*[7]. In only a few days, the Russian strategic bombers coming from North got near the Guam Island and the American battleships located in the area of this important US base in Central Pacific. American aircraft were immediately sent in an interception mission, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian long-range aviation declared that the Russian and American were so near that *"they exchanged smiles"*[8]. In another four days, *Reuters* published a rather long article that quoted even some statements of certain commanders of *NORAD*, the military command whose mission is to protect the North American airspace. They stated that, in the last three-four months, Russian members flew their bomber force maybe a little bit more than in the past towards potential *maritime* and land objectives located farther than usual from their takeoff bases[9]. On 19 August 2007, the Russian state television aired a documentary regarding the fact that the only still operational Russian aircraft carrier began, after two years, to send aircraft in training flights. Western observers highlighted that the action expressed *"Russia's ambitions of expanding its global intervention capacity"*. On 5 December 2007, the Russian Defence Minister stated that 11 warships would be sent in a large-scale naval exercise in the Mediterranean, *"the purpose of such actions being to ensure a naval presence in important regions of the World Ocean"*. Moscow announces that a big Russian naval exercise would soon take place in the Atlantic *as well*. On 17 December 2007, a Russian atomic submarine, submerged in the Barents Sea, launched a new-type intercontinental ballistic missile called *Sineva.* The Commander-in-Chief of Russia's strategic ballistic forces said that the exercise, as well as other military actions, was part of the way in which Russia responded to the American initiative of launching an antiballistic defensive system in Europe.

In *2008*, on 22 January, Russian strategic bombers carried out combat exercises above the Biscaya Gulf. The episode took place at the same time with a huge Russian naval exercise carried out in the Biscaya Gulf as well, relatively close to the territorial waters of France and Spain[10], NATO member states (as well as *very* far from the Russian borders or territorial waters). On 9 February 2008,

[7] *"Russia Seeks Navy Presence in Mediterranean"*, *Reuters*, 3 August 2007.
[8] Kristin Roberts, *"Pentagon Denies Russian Bombers Flew over Guam"*, *Reuters*, 10 August 2007.
[9] *Idem*, *"Russia Said Flying More Missions near US Territory"*, *Reuters*, 14 August 2007.
[10] Guy Faulconbridge, *"Russia Bombers to Test-Fire Missiles in Atlantic"*, *Reuters*, 22 January 2008.

Russian bombers flew near Southern Japan, where one of them even flew over the American aircraft carrier *Nimitz*[11]. On 12 February 2008, US Navy chief of naval operations said that several recent episodes proved that *"the Russian navy desires to emerge as a global navy"*. Other US officials were concerned about *"what might indicate a return"* of Moscow *"to a Cold War mind-set"*[12]. On 5 March 2008, a Russian bomber got five miles near the aircraft carrier *Nimitz*, which was sailing near Korea. In late March 2008, Russian strategic bombers flew for 15 hours over areas of the Arctic and the Pacific Ocean near Alaska. On 27 March 2008, Russia *officially* announced that it would send warships to protect the trawlers fishing in the Arctic Ocean. On 10 August 2008, in the context of the Russian-Georgian war, Russian Black Sea fleet ships sank in battle a Georgian missile boat[13]. On 25 August 2008, the Russian cruiser *Moskva*, the flagship of the Russian fleet based in Sevastopol, in response to the entry of several warships of NATO member states in the Black Sea in order to carry aids to Georgia, began to conduct exercises to launch anti-ship missiles[14]. That action was most likely meant to send a clear *political-strategic* message to the West: that, for Moscow, the Black Sea was an area of *great* strategic interest and that the growing presence of NATO in the area would not remain unanswered. On 8 September 2008, Moscow announced it would send nuclear-powered cruiser *Peter the Great* in Venezuela, to participate in a great naval exercise. The decision was interpreted by some commentators as a reminiscent of the policy of force of the USSR in the Latin America area[15]. On 11 October 2008, Russian atomic submarine *Tula* launched a ballistic missile in the Barents Sea towards an imaginary target located in the *equatorial* region of the Pacific, located more than 11 500 km (or 7 200 miles) away. The same day, President Medvedev announced that his country would soon start the construction of a new generation of heavy aircraft carriers. In November 2008, a Russian military squadron visited Venezuela, and Washington commentators argued that this action would show America that, if the US intervened in the Black Sea in support of Georgia, Russia *could* do the same in Latin America, *fully* using the naval component of its military power[16].

In *2009*, in January, a Russian frigate in a patrol mission in the Gulf of Aden

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[11] Kristin Roberts, Dmitri Solovyov, *"Russia Surprised by US Reaction to Bomber Flights"*, *Reuters*, 12 February 2008.

[12] Richard Cowan, *"US Military Weighing if Russia in Cold War Pose"*, *Reuters*, 12 February 2008.

[13] Ron Popeski, *"Russian Navy Sinks Georgian Boat: Defence Ministry"*, *Reuters*, 10 August 2008.

[14] Conor Sweeney, *"Russia Cruiser to Test Weapons in Crowded Black Sea"*, *Reuters*, 25 August 2008.

[15] Dmitri Solovyov, *"FACTBOX: Russian Navy Plans Evoke Soviet Presence in Caribbean"*.

[16] Frank Jack Daniel, *"Russia President, Warships to Venezuela to Counter US"*, *Reuters*, 23 November 2008.

contributed to putting off Somali pirates who attacked a Dutch merchant ship. The episode shows Russia's interest to use segments of its naval power in regions far away from its national borders, but in the proximity of waterway routes that are vital for global trade. In late January 2009, Russian media reported that Moscow would begin construction of a new *naval* base in Ochamchire, on the coast of Abkhazia[17], a separatist region of Georgia whose secession was supported and recognised by Russia. In early March, the Georgian media gave to publicity news on Russian warships stationed near the Abkhazian port Ochamchire. On 5 August 2009, US officials admitted that two Russian attack submarines of the *Akula* class patrolled off the American coasts, approaching shore to less than 200 miles. *"It is the first time in roughly a decade that we've seen this kind of behaviour"*, American officials said[18].

In the first month of *2010*, Moscow officials said Russia intended to massively strengthen its military Baltic fleet in response to the US decision to install anti-ballistic shield elements in Poland. On 22 February 2010, President Medvedev announced a massive program of re-equipping Russian land *and naval* forces with *new* weapons. Medvedev said that *"Our strategic goal is the formation of an effective army and navy that are adequate to the level of modern threats, are able to stand up to any level of aggression and to be a real factor in providing international stability"*[19]. Once more, *the naval forces were presented to be a major factor among the instruments that could enable Russia to achieve its strategic goals in the global arena*. In late February 2010, President Medvedev asked French President Sarkozy to sell *Mistral*-class warships to Rusia. International media highlighted on that occasion that Moscow's request *"alarmed Washington and NATO countries in Eastern Europe"*. Analysts then remembered that, in September 2009, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy stated that, with a *Mistral*, he could have reached its military goal in only 40 minutes instead of 26 hours, during the war with Georgia in 2008[20]. On 6 May 2010, a Russian warship attacked a group of pirates who captured a Russian oil tanker sailing off Yemen, killing one pirate and capturing another 10.

On 10 and 11 September 2010, Russian combat planes and helicopters repeatedly flew over US military ship *USS Taylor*, on the march in the Barents Sea. International media described the episode as *"a Cold War-style incident"*. On 4 October 2010, Russian Navy Chief announced that his country would increase

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[17] Christian Lowe, *"Russia Plans Base in Georgia Rebel Region: Report"*, *Reuters*, 28 January 2009.

[18] Adam Entous, *"Russian Subs Patrol off US East Coast: Officials"*, *Reuters*, 5 August 2009.

[19] Steve Gutterman, *"Medvedev: Russia Must Stop 'Patching Up' Old Arms"*, *Reuters*, 22 February 2010.

[20] Denis Dyomkin, Conor Sweeney, *"Arms and Energy on Agenda for Medvedev in Paris"*, *Reuters*, 28 February 2010.

patrols missions of warships in the Arctic Ocean to thus defend Russia's interests in the region[21]. On 25 October 2010, Moscow officials stated that, in the next 10 years, 18 new warships would be added to the Russian Black Sea Navy.

In *2011*, on 26 May, *Reuters* reported that France and Russia reached an agreement on *Mistral* class ships. French President Sarkozy said the agreement was a *"definitive"* one, and that France would build two such ships for Russia, and other two would be built in Russia[22]. On 7 July 2011, Moscow announced its plans to ask the UN, in 2012, to reshape the political map of the Arctic, so that Russia could receive *"a greater part"*. The statement was made just one week after Russia announced it would send more troops and *ships* in the Arctic to protect Russian interests in the region, where there were, under the sea, around 90 billion barrels of oil and about 30% of the natural gas reserves in the world. In November 2011, Russia announced it intended to start construction of a new class of strategic submarines – *Yasen*. For the five new submarines there had already been allocated around 9 billion US dollars. On the same occasion, *Reuters* also referred to the statements of senior Russian officials, who said that, by 2020, Russia would spend around 653 billion dollars to modernise the armed forces, indicating that *one quarter of this amount was assigned to upgrading the navy*[23]. We are talking about a massive allocation of resources that will enable a *dramatic increase in the global capacity of action of the Russian Navy*.

In *2012*, before the presidential elections, Vladimir Putin promised, for the next decade, military expenditure higher than those announced in 2011. Putin stressed that *"in order to rearm the army and the navy, we need to involve not only the defence industry, but the potential of the whole Russian economy"*[24]. On 4 June 2012, a statement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian naval forces announced that the first *Borei*-class submarine, which became operational, would become part of the Northern Fleet. On 6 June 2012, Putin, who returned to the Kremlin for a new presidential term, announced that his country would continue military cooperation with China, citing recently ended joint *naval* manoeuvres in the China Sea and stating that he agreed with Beijing that those major naval exercises *"were only the first"* in a whole series of actions. The *special* emphasis laid by Putin on *naval* cooperation with China would take place just days after Leon Panetta, US Secretary of Defense, said that, by the end of this decade,

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[21] Guy Faulconbridge, *"Russian Navy Boss Warns of China's Race for Arctic"*, *Reuters*, 4 October 2010.
[22] John Irish, *"France, Russia Agree Helicopter Carrier Deal"*, *Reuters*, 26 May 2011.
[23] Gleb Bryanski, *"Russia Orders Five Yasen Class Nuclear Subs"*, *Reuters*, 9 November 2011.
[24] *Idem*, *"UPDATE 1-Putin, Before Poll, Says Russia Needs Stronger Army"*, *Reuters*, 20 February 2012.
[25] Gleb Bryanski, Ben Blanchard, *"Putin Says to Push Military Ties with China"*, *Reuters*, 6 June 2012, at www.reuters.com

about 60% of the large ships of the US Navy would operate *in the Pacific*[25]. On 30 July 2012, President Putin, visiting the Severodvinsk shipyard in Northern Russia, said: *"We believe our country should maintain its status of one of the leading naval powers"* of the world. Putin also said that *"first of all we are talking about the development of the naval part of our strategic nuclear forces, about the navy's role in maintaining the strategic nuclear parity"* with the West. The Russian President also emphasised that *"obviously the navy is an instrument to protect national economic interests, including in such regions as Arctic"*[26]. The latest news about the role of sea power in Moscow's geostrategic plans is linked to an espionage scandal. On 13 November 2012, a British soldier arrested in March the same year admitted in court that he had met with people he considered to be Russian agents, who were interested to buy military secrets, including data on the exact moment of the launch of British nuclear submarines[27].

Taking into account all these elements (as well as many others of the same type that, because of the severely limited amount of text, could not be presented and analysed in detail), it is quite plausible that, whenever in the foreseeable future, we can read, fascinated, but also *legitimately concerned*, many pages written by Gorshkov decades ago. And this is because his central idea, that *Moscow must be massively present in the World Ocean*, is one that has *re-emerged intensely in recent years* in Kremlin.

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[26] Gleb Bryanski, *"Russia to Get Stronger Nuclear Navy, Putin Says"*, *Reuters*, 30 July 2012.
[27] Peter Schwartzstein, *"UK Submariner Tried to Pass Secrets to Russia: Court"*, Reuters, 13 November 2012, at www.reuters.com.

WAYS OF MANIFESTATION OF ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE USE OF ARMED FORCE

Lieutenant Colonel Viorel ȘTEFANCU

Economic calculation lies at the basis of the actions of both individuals and states. Through more or less visible, subtle and insidious actions, avoiding the risks of military actions, but more effective than these, the decrease in the resources of a state through economic confrontation has the potential to generate in the target state, in addition to minimising military power, instability, resurgence of nationalism and violence.

It is desirable, in the author's opinion, to maintain the confrontation only at the economic level, by preventing the conflict escalation and avoiding reaching in a situation whose only solution could be resorting to violent actions, as an effect of the deterrence achieved by the actions specific to this type of confrontation.

Keywords: state actors; demand and supply; conflict; enemies

In the current stage of the evolution of the war phenomenon, the role played by its various components in carrying out its fundamental goals is reshaping. It is more and more obvious that we are witnessing a *"demilitarisation of warfare"*[1], a decrease in the importance the military factor had in the 20th century. The world conflagrations in which the great powers take part seem unlikely now, because of the discouragement effect given by the possibility of using nuclear weapons. However, from the geophysical component to the economic one, going through the space, psychological and cultural one, one can notice new defining elements, which seem to claim primacy in settling disputes and whose ultimate goal is the same: destroying or neutralising the elements that determine the enemy combat capacity.

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[1] Gheorghe Arăvădoaice, Valentin Stancu, *Războaiele de azi și de mine. Agresiuni neconvenționale*, Editura Militară, București, 1999, p. 13.

In the UN report – *"A more secure world: our shared responsibility"*[2], economic threats are one of the main dangers to the humankind, while the *European Security Strategy* states that, because none of the current threats is military, they cannot be addressed by military means alone. It follows that, in order to counter these types of aggressions, one needs an integrated response, a comprehensive, civil-military approach to actions at all levels.

The statement that the phase we are in, that of globalisation, is marked by an increasing role of information and economy is a truism. For economic reasons, armed forces are resized, European, African or American alliances and unions are reshaped – the so-called *"coalitions of interests"* –, wars are launched or ended. The action of the military factor is increasingly limited by the economic factor, because, on the one hand, resources are increasingly scarce, and, on the other hand, the current economic relations bring about strong relations of interdependence within whom military conflicts become more and more unlikely. At the same time, the role of economic power in providing access to military and technological capabilities that can make the difference between winners and losers on the battlefield is increasing.

The economic expansion of some states justifies the opinions according to which we are undergoing a new colonial era, a neo-colonialism, whose spearhead is represented by multinational companies and international financial bodies. Thus, it is sought obtaining commercial hegemony, conquering new economic areas, aggressively promoting own interests, in the context in which some authors[3] consider the capacity of a nation to sell its products worldwide as a measure of its power.

Economic competition as well as economic confrontation have become the watchword for the new realities. The concept of *economic confrontation*, from the point of view of the space of manifestation and the object of the action, seems to be more and more a tool through which decisions can be influenced and objectives can be reached. The object of economic confrontation is represented by resources, and the subject is multiple – state and non-state actors, nations, ethnic groups, organisations, armies. As far as the space of manifestation of economic confrontation is concerned, in peacetime it is the market, as a meeting point of demand and supply, and at war, the theatre of military actions.

Economic confrontation will anticipate, precede and accompany the wars of the 21st century, will determine their type, duration and intensity, will contribute to the mitigation or escalation of a conflict. Unlike the military means, the economic

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[2] At http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf, retrieved on 11.04.2012.
[3] Sophie Bessie, *Occidentul şi ceilalţi. Istoria unei supremaţii*, Editura Runa Bucureşti, 2004, p. 154.

means can be used by almost any state or non-state actor, at different levels – national or supranational, local or regional – and the interdependency relations established between them have the potential of transforming apparently isolated processes and events into an international crisis or conflict.

For avoiding some ambiguities that persist in the specialised literature, I have deemed it necessary to use the syntagm of economic confrontation instead of the one of economic warfare, especially because I do not agree with the definition given to it by certain sources – *"the use of, or threat to use, economic means against a country in order to weaken its economy, and thereby reduce its political and military power"*[4].

The definition of military confrontation, the one that we support and suggest, is the following: *the whole actions of political, economic, military and diplomatic nature carried out in peacetime, in crisis situations and at war in order to control, diminish or destroy the resources of a potential or declared enemy.* The essential difference between the two definitions consists in the type of instruments that can be used in military confrontation. While the former believes that only economic means participate in it, the definition proposed by us marks an obvious reality: in the economic confrontation take part all the means available through which one can influence the availability, quantity and quality of resources of an enemy.

From the analysis of the already ended or ongoing conflicts, it follows that this type of confrontation has a series of distinct features, among which one can mention:

- it is continuous, but with different intensities, correlated with the stages of the conflicts;
- it can take place under the form of peaceful as well as aggressive actions;
- as the phenomenon becomes more critical, the object of the military confrontation becomes more concrete, better defined;
- it is not entirely controlled by the state; especially in peacetime, the state has sometimes only the role of ensuring the conditions favourable to its development, without intervening directly;
- in peacetime, belligerents are difficult to identify;
- it involves actions of both non-state actors (crime and terrorist organisations), as well as supra-state ones (economic blocs or regions);
- its effects are not immediately manifest, but only after a while since the enforcement of specific measures.

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[4] At http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/178545/economic-warfare, retrieved on 12.06.2012.

In peacetime, economic confrontation takes place especially under the form of economic competition, but a guided competition, in which Keynes's *"invisible hand"* is replaced by geopolitical calculations. In this phase, the strategic goals of the state are: to support its companies in order to obtain increased competitiveness at the international level, to ensure combat and mobilisation stocks, to sign agreements and treaties with states that have important energy resources, to maintain macroeconomic stability, to break the economic mechanisms of a potential enemy, to gain markets by buying foreign companies, to develop key sectors, such as information technology. This last aspect is extremely important, considering that, even if the phenomenon of the war industrialisation still persists, there can be seen a gradual shift from massive engagement to smart engagement, stimulated by the development of IT, being still difficult to foresee the extent to which the development will reach.

The most frequent actions used in obtaining economic advantages and undermining the enemy position in the world economic competition through economic-financial instruments have been:

- to impose taxes for imports (protectionism);
- to subsidise local producers;
- to have a monopoly on strategic domains;
- to except certain producers from paying taxes (disguised subsidisation);
- to practice dumping prices;
- to buy companies in order to gain their markets;
- to deny imports of products with means belonging to another state;
- to demand high costs for repairs and war compensations;
- to carry out speculative attacks on other national currencies;
- to apply measures of sanitary protection of local producers from cheap food imports (one of the oldest actions: in 1806, Austro-Hungary rejected swine importations from Serbia due to *"veterinary reasons"*[5]);
- to transfer currency and gold reserves from banks from the target states to friend states, as a means of pressure; a relatively recent example is the statement of the Venezuelan President, according to whom the gold reserves of his country will be transferred from Europe and America to Russia, China and Brazil[6].

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[5] Stevan Pavlowitch, *Istoria Balcanilor 1804-1945*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2002, p. 169.

[6] *Chavez Wants to Keep Venezuela's Foreign Currency Reserves in Russia*, published on 11.08.2011. Available at http://www.eurasiareview.com/chavez-wants-to-keep-venezuelas-foreign-currency-reserves-in-russia-18082011, retrieved on 15.05.2012.

During the *Cold War*, the arming race represented a particular form of economic confrontation, whose result was the decline and, eventually, the collapse of the USSR. The US economy growth rates surpass the USSR ones, despite the benefits the latter had by subordinating the economies of the satellite countries in Eastern Europe. State measures such as imposing a certain specialisation on COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) members and carrying out giant projects, such as the *"Myr"* energy transport network and the *"Drujba"* hydrocarbons transport network, did not lead to reaching the expected results. In order to counter the danger of the Communist rise, the USA sought to support the economic development of certain areas in Europe, a development seen as *"the best remedy against poverty a means to prevent revolutions"*[7].

After the end of the *Cold War,* the reorientation of the policies of purchasing military assets from internal sources to import sources put the weapon industries to a hard test, especially that they were affected by the reorganisation of the military body. Their specific demand was reduced, arming programmes were ended, resource-consuming high proportions exercises were cancelled. Moreover, the disbandment or redimensioning of military units, the elimination of the compulsory military service influenced negatively the economy of cities or areas that provided products and services for them.

Economic confrontation cannot decide on its own the result of *"hot"* wars, however, through complex actions carried out at strategic, operational or tactical level, combined with the military, psychological and information ones, it is capable of generating a synergetic effect, which can trigger the ultimate paralysation of the enemy actions. The disorganisation of destruction of the productive capacities of a state, meant for ensuring the material resources necessary for waging wars, will lead to delays in mobilising the economy for defence[8] or even to the impossibility of making this achievable and will diminish the forces combat capacity. However, it is desired that the confrontation should be maintained only at economic level, by preventing the escalation of the conflict and avoiding reaching a situation whose only way out is resorting to violent actions, as an effect of the discouragement obtained through the actions specific to this kind of confrontation.

The continuous presence of the economic factor in any human action, the military confrontation included, makes it almost impossible to ignore, and when this really happens, its consequences are some of the worst. For instance, even if, during the War in the Falkland Islands, Argentina could have turned

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[7] Sophie Bessie, *op. cit.*, p. 122.
[8] Gheorghe Arăvădoaice, Valentin Stancu, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-219.

the outcome of the war in its favour by using the economic dimension, by refusing to pay its external debt, for jeopardising the economy of the UK[9], this did not happen.

Unlike military dominance, in certain circumstances, economic dominance and control exerted through certain of its instruments, such as economic or financial assistance, are accepted by the target state, because it settles, for the moment, an unfavourable internal situation, such as unemployment, famine and economic underdevelopment.

The main effects of economic confrontation can be found in:
- reducing the capacity of the enemy to wage a long war through diminishing its economic potential, especially of the productive capacities from the weapon industry;
- increasing vulnerabilities by losing control on strategic resources, their areas of exploitation included;
- limiting or interrupting the flows of supply with vitally important products, which includes preventing the enemy in different ways from purchasing a certain product it is dependent upon for the development of certain weapon components, IT programmes or certain types of materials;
- increasing social tension caused by inflation, rising prices, scarcity of products of strict necessity;
- limiting the enemy military potential by denying its access to high technology;
- economically subordinating certain states which are in the impossibility of reimbursing their credits.

Economic confrontation diminishes the capacity of a nation to oppose to an external or internal force through its potential to limit the dimensions of the military body or to diminish the resources necessary for carrying out military actions at a level at which their success practically becomes unlikely. The actions assimilated to the economic confrontation isolate the enemy, prevent him from generating and regenerating forces and, at the same time, play an important part in applying the principle of sustainability, which regards the assurance of the resources necessary for waging a long war. In operational design, military planners must take into consideration, beside the classical dimensions of operations, the economic dimension as well, which we consider to be one of the essential ways through which the enemy centre of gravity can be destroyed, because *"the wars of tomorrow will appeal to enslaving national economies"*[10].

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[9] Mircea Gologan, *Războiul din Falkland. Ce au făcut bine şi unde au greşit beligeranţii?*, Editura U.N.Ap., Bucureşti, 2007, p. 166.
[10] Gheorghe Arăvădoaice, Valentin Stancu, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

The so-called new world order has sparked reactions of rejection by different organisations and movements. One of them, the Zapatist Movement, is considered to be, with *"weapons in hands, the first riposte of the South against economic globalisation and neoliberalism"*[11].

The economic crisis has restored the state as the main actor through its capacity of intervening in regulating the economic mechanisms that got out of control and in redressing certain financial institutions whose collapse could have had dramatic consequences. Another feature of crisis situations seems to be the fuelling of aggressive tendencies of certain militarist or dictatorial regimes and the increase in the prerogatives and power of the armies that support them, while the armies of the democratic states are currently confronted with underfunding and restructurings derived from the need for allocating resources for economic reconstruction.

The fierce economic competition has forced the actors to form coalitions, most of the time, based on geographical criteria, as well as mutual interests, in order to strike the balance of economic power. Even if they are not excluded, the actions specific to economic confrontation inside these regions/alliances have reduced proportions.

Certain leader states frequently resort, with the purpose of expanding their economic influences, to drawing new economic partners and signing cooperation agreements. Because the relations within such agreements are asymmetrical because of the difference of economic power of the members, the benefits of the membership of such a partnership will also by asymmetrical, favouring the strong ones. However, the effects of these treaties and agreements are not entirely negative through the contribution they can have to improving bilateral relations, stabilising certain areas and even modernising and developing them.

Certain poles of economic power, such as the EU, have available a force of attraction, the so-called *"soft power"*, given, first of all, by the prosperity and mirage of the welfare of being its member. One must however mention that the desire of economic development, by gaining membership in an economic union, is capable of imposing, under popular pressure, changes of regimes and systems, political and economic reforms, including the transition towards democracy and market economy, or it can lie at the basis of making decisions with strategic impact.

We may conclude that, through ways of action specific to economic confrontation, strategic goals can be reached, which are difficult to obtain through other means and whose benefits can be immediate: to establish trade relations that would not be possible in the case of a dictatorial regime, to open markets, to provide access

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[11] Ignacio Ramonet, *Geopolitica haosului*, Editura Doina, București, 1998, p. 120.

to certain resources. The access to foreign markets is extremely important, as it enables the possibility of obtaining the foreign money for purchasing resources that are scarce at home.

A top position in confrontation belongs to financial resources. The level of resources available at a given moment will be a deciding argument in making the decision whether to respond or not to the request of international bodies regarding interventions to settle certain crises that do not threaten own interests – humanitarian actions, peacekeeping, conflict prevention, crisis management, while the costs of maintaining a peace force can contribute to increasing pressures for settling conflicts. Giving material rewards for diminishing the enemy combat capacity or influencing its action is not something new. Money has always been used to pay traitors, gain information, encourage desertions. During the war in Korea, North-Korean pilots were promised rewards in exchange for deserting and surrendering the piloted aircraft to the enemy side[12], and more recently, in the theatres of operations in which the war on terror takes place, money was presumably[13] given to insurgents for not carrying out terrorist attacks in certain provinces. Accepting to use as an official way of payment the currency of another state practically enlarges the area in which its decisions regarding the monetary policy will be applied and brings about a series of disadvantages, among which one may mention the exposure to external shocks.

Putting into practice certain specific measures of economic confrontation must be part of a well defined and coherent strategy, because the costs and risks involved are big. The failure of applying them can lead to increasing tensions and escalation of crisis, deterioration of regional political situation, economic instability.

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[12] Gheorghe Arăvădoaice, Valentin Stancu, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
[13] Alexandru Toreanik, *Italia a cumpărat de la talibani siguranţa trupelor ei*, published on 15.10.2009. Available at http://www.ziare.com/international/afganistan/italia-a-cumparat-de-la-talibani-siguranta-trupelor-ei-919928, retrieved on 18.03.2012.

THE STATES' STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM GEOPOLITICS

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Against the background of the contemporary geopolitical and geostrategic conditions and the struggle for power between nations, the author analyses the evolution of the geopolitical concepts of power, power struggle and power balance, at the beginning of the 21st century. Power is one of the most circulated concepts of geopolitics, and the struggle for power is one of the mechanisms leading to the evolution of human civilisation.

The general notion of a state's power includes the potential power and the actual power. The potential power is limited to items such as: population, weapons, infrastructure and national wealth, while real power includes many more factors, many of which are not quantifiable.

Keywords: power; international relations; interest; hard power; soft power

Power is one of the most circulated concepts of geopolitics and the fight for power has been one of the mechanisms leading to the evolution of human civilisation. *"Power. Nothing exerts a greater attraction on human beings than the magic word. Nothing arouses more powerful passions and stronger links"*, said Brazilian José Nivaldo Jr., in one of his studies on power.

Power, without being shown aggressively, is an international coercion factor, often used in different ways, from soft forms to hard forms. Freud wrote in his study – *"Civilisation, War and Death"*: *"As long as there are nations and empires prepared, each, to cruelly exterminate the rival, all alike must be prepared for war"*[1]: Freudian idea is strongly repeated, in various forms, by the great realist thinkers of international relations such as EH Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth N. Waltz and John Mearsheimer.

The concept of power is at the base of the international system and the notions of: local, regional, great power, superpower or hegemony are part of the daily language of the politician of yesterday and today.

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[1] Sigmund Freud, *Actuelles sur la guerre et la mort* (XIII), PUF Publishing, Paris, 1993, p. 151.

Geopolitics and geostrategy
at the beginning of the third millennium

If a decade ago, geopolitical and geostrategic theories were the preserve of a small intellectual elite, today, thanks to interconnections that are established between the political, military, economic, social, geographical or financial domains, the two concepts are more present, affecting all areas of our lives. George Friedman, analysing geopolitical usefulness, referred primarily to its predictive functions: *"Geopolitics is not just a fancy term for international relations. It is a way of thinking about the world and of predicting what will happen over time"*[2].

Power, along with other basic notions of geopolitics: *actors, balance of power, interest and perception*, is analysed carefully by politicians, because the behaviour of states and the international system dynamics are based on the structure and distribution of world power. *"Power is the only effective way known to human society able to assure the perpetuation and survival. In the past six millennia competitive society, power is the culmination of two great human aspirations: wealth and prestige. Wealth, prestige and power cross time together. Where it is one of them, there will be inevitably the other two"*[3].

For the realistic conception, power is the cornerstone of international relations. All realist theories emphasise the importance of related concepts: power, balance of power, power dynamics, which represent the vector of international business development, power being the main instrument, if not the only one, to fulfil national interests. In this respect, realist theories are based on the idea that states are in a constant power struggle.

War, another basic concept of international relations is one of the oldest human occupations in which they have invested and continue to invest considerable resources in order to change the balance of power. It is deeply rooted in millennia warlike nature of man and, unfortunately, there are unlikely ways to change mankind behaviour. Some states attach greater importance, while others less to the state power level.

We can determine the importance a state attaches to ensuring national security and implicitly to military power by studying budget allocations for national defence. The study of these percentages is not conclusive in all cases, but it can highlight, in time of sudden changes, a desire to change the balance of power and the regional balance of power, which may take bellicose forms.

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[2] George Friedman, *Următorii 100 de ani: previziuni pentru secolul 21*, Editura Litera, București, 2009, p. 18.

[3] José Nivaldo Jr., *Machiavelli, Puterea. Istorie şi Marketing*, Editura Economica, București, 2001, p. 24.

The general notion of state power includes potential power and real power. There is always a distinction between the potential power and the actual military power of a state. Potential power is limited to elements such as: population, weapons, infrastructure and national wealth, while real power includes many more factors, among which many are non-quantifiable. Therefore, a hierarchy of states power is relative, as the position of nations can easily slide within 3 to 5 places from the real position, even in the case of a detailed study. In the analysis of power, in order to get palpable results, the terminology of relative power is used. We relate the power of a state or an alliance to the one of the other state or alliance. There are no two sensibly equal powers. There will always be factors that cannot be measured at the beginning of a conflict or that are not taken into account and that can change the balance of power.

The actors on the modern international political stage use two ways of expressing power in their relations with the others, in order to get the desired results:

- *"hard power"*: by using direct power to impose the change in the behaviour of the other state or group of states. This is mainly achieved by the use of military and economic force by a *"player"* so that it could impose its will over the adversary;
- *"soft power"*: by indirectly using power, using the cultural, economic and institutional attraction force of an actor/player over the others in order to change the behaviour of the latter. It must be based on the fact that the target nation believes in the values of the cultural patterns generator.

The concept of *soft power*, in the terminology already established by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., also means the ability to attract and attraction often means a tacit acceptance.

In the geopolitics of the *Cold War* and that of the beginning of the 21st century, the results generated by *soft power* are firstly due to the awareness of values that an organisation or country expresses through its own culture, through the results of the application of concepts in the life of the particular country or organisation, through the positive example that can be implemented in other countries and cultures.

Under these conditions, current geopolitics is characterised by strong theoretical and structural settlements in the post-*Cold War* period.

We find that there is no serious opponent to have divergent views on liberal democracy. If, in the past, democracy was considered inferior to theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, communism or other forms of human leadership, today there is a decreasing opposition against this form of government in the Western world. On a spiral of history, after two millennia and a half, democracy resumes its top place in the state leadership systems, on the same vertical as Athenian democracy.

Democratic changes in Eastern Europe were conducted at a relatively high speed because of the similarities related to civilisation, so that the values of Western culture were absorbed very quickly by the former communist countries, favouring *soft power*, without great conflict. Under the current conditions, *"geopolitical realities ... are the result of a balance between hard and soft power, between the concept of nation in the realistic sense and some postmodern security developments"*[4].

Twenty years after the start in democratising the states in Central and Eastern Europe, liberal democratic values and hopes in a better future have managed to create strong tensions in the Islamic states located in the immediate vicinity of the Western world. The result of these tensions led to serious cracks in the impenetrable systems of Arab countries monarchies and leadership. Under these circumstances, the effect of the concept of *soft power* has been also felt in the Islamic countries in North Africa, an area directly influenced by European culture.

The cumulative effects of these *soft* pressures have resulted indirectly in the revolutions that engulfed much of the Islamic world in the vicinity of Western world – by vicinity understanding not only the geographical proximity but also the economic, political and military aspects in Arab states related to the West.

At this point *"there is an issue of modernity in the Arab-Islamic area, a subject that is questioned, as well as a constant concern with the identification of the ways to follow in order to achieve a balance between the Islamic historical values and the universal values of humanity"*[5], given that Western values could be considered universal values.

The World of Islam, after two centuries of *"fighting"* against European modernity, is currently confronted with a real earthquake on three levels:
- Arab/Islamic nationalism;
- democracy;
- freedom and secularism.

In recent years, the striking effects of the pressure exercised by the culture of Western world on the Islamic ones have become more obvious, and the phenomenon has already got a name *"Islamic Spring"*.

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[4] George Cristian Maior, *Noul aliat. Regândirea politicii de apărare a României la început de secol XXI*, Editura RAO International Publising Company, București, 2009, p. 13.

[5] Laura Sitaru, *Gândirea politică arabă. Concepte-cheie între tradiţie şi inovaţie*, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2009, p. 33.

International conflicts
– a characteristic of the history of mankind

The conviction that man is the source of all evils, implicitly of the evil called war, can be found, in different forms, in the theories of all those who studied the war phenomena, from theologians, philosophers and historians to politicians. We start with Spinoza, St. Augustine, Luther, Malthus, Jonathan Swift, Inge, Reinhold Niebuhr and continue with countless scholars of modern academia. War is a huge domain that has been written about, without being able to change anything in human behaviour.

Plato and Rousseau say that man is a product of society, so if the society is bad, man cannot possibly be otherwise. The reverse would be: good state – good people and, consequently, war disappearance. It is a theory developed by Plato, Kant, the 19th century liberals, the revisionist socialists, as well as by the Marxists, who were trying to discover the conditions that had to be met for states to be good. All these studies have remained without practical purpose up to these days.

In parallel with the studies about war disappearance, Kant says that *"it is the desire of any state or leader to reach a condition of eternal peace by conquering the world, if it were possible"*[6]. It is a theory leading to the conclusion that, under the circumstances of a global hegemony existence, war would disappear and the international system could transform from an anarchical system into a hierarchical one. The existence of a single global hegemony is unlikely in the foreseeable future, but the existence of a regional hegemony is a reality that, in time, can lead to the disappearance of war in the controlled region. However, this does not exclude conflicts on the periphery of the region or the emergence of tensions and conflicts between regional hegemonic actors to delimit or change the areas of influence.

Rousseau identifies the main causes of war not as people or countries but the systems of states, the international systems. He starts from the fact that no man can behave peacefully until he is not sure that others cannot harm him. We see the same idea, raised at the level of global affairs, by Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*: *"every state is a possible aggressor and no state can know the intentions of others"*. The arguments used to justify the use of force are different from one ideological trend to another.

Hans Morgenthau, the founder of Classical Realism, believes that states have a *"boundless lust for power"*, because they are run by human beings who desire power since their birth and therefore are constantly looking for opportunities to take the offensive and to impose domination over other states.

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[6] John J. Mearsheimer, *Tragedia politicii de forţă*, Editura Antet XX Press, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 29.

Taking into account the importance of the subject – war –, many theories have circulated regarding its possible causes. The whole spectrum of possibilities have been considered, from human nature as the root of conflicts, individual leaders, internal policies, political ideologies, systems of government and economic systems, to the structure of the international system. Other theories, closer to the topic of the present study, have mentioned the distribution of power as a cause of international conflict. Under these circumstances, Kenneth N. Waltz argues bipolarity as a stability factor and Morgenthau points out that the emergence of a dominant power would increase the likelihood of conflict, arguing thus the multipolarity theory closer to international stability requirements. Meanwhile, Karl Deutsch[7] and David Singer say that only a global hegemonic power would reduce the potential for conflict, through the pressure that it would be able to exert on other states.

If, in Morgenthau's view, human nature represents the cause of the competition for power, according to the founder of defensive realism, Kenneth N. Waltz, anarchy has the same role. Kenneth Waltz points out, in *The Theory of International Politics*, the fact that although states seek survival, being tempted to behave defensively to maintain the balance of power, they capitalise on every opportunity offered by the international system to increase the power factor. Both concepts are based on the three common ideas:

- between sovereign states there is anarchy specific to international relations, as they are not under an arbitrator of a global hegemony;
- each state shall provide its own security (self help) under the circumstances of dangerous interaction between states;
- there is a natural tendency of escalating tensions based on the famous *"security dilemma"*, which in turn is based on the lack of certainty regarding the intentions of adversaries, leading to the interpretation of defensive arming actions as signs of aggression preparation, which feeds the spiral of arming and increases the risk of an accidental war.

John Mearsheimer's offensive realism is based on a similar idea, showing, in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, that certain elements of the international system force great powers to enter a blind competition for power. Offensive realism

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[7] Karl Wolfgang Deutsch (1912-1992) focused his studies on war and peace, nationalism, cooperation and communication. He studied law in Prague, and received his first doctoral degree in Political Science, in 1938, at *Charles University* and the second, in the same field, at Harvard University in 1951. He taught the theory of social and political relations at MIT, between 1943 and 1956, at Yale University up to 1967 and at *Harvard University* up to 1982. He introduced the use of cyber models and the simulation of social, political and economic processes.

considers that the fundamental purpose of a state is to become hegemonic in the international system.

The watchword of military interventions in recent years has been *"humanitarian intervention"*, which has often had unclear goals, based on mixed motives. Mary Kaldor[8] states that the attempt to impose peace in Bosnia was a mistake. According to the British Professor, the parties did not have the same level of political legitimacy and the war was not a genuine conflict between nationalities, but rather an unequal competition between those who supported the values of civility and those who relied on a policy of enforcing hate and exclusion. All these conflicts fall into the category of actions arising from the struggle for power, carried out at different levels.

In recent years we have seen a crystallisation of ideas related to studying conflicts, considering the ways to approach wars. The terms *"old wars"* and *"new wars"* have emerged as a result of the differences found between them.

When the *"old war is the war waged between the armed forces of states in which the armed confrontation was the armed fight"*[9], *"old wars"* could be considered the conflicts developed in Europe in the period after the Peace of Westphalia to the mid-20th century, which were actually state-building mechanisms. Charles Tilly said: *"the war used to build states and vice versa"*[10], when national coagulation phenomenon was analysed.

During the *Cold War* period and after, other forms of war emerged, called *"new wars"*, which occurred along with the old ones. This type of conflict occurs in the context of states dissolution, under domestic nationalist pressure and often following the external intervention of certain *"benevolent"* powerful states pursuing their own interests in the area.

"New wars" are conducted *"by networks belonging to state and non-state actors, often without wearing uniforms, but wearing distinctive signs such as the cross or Ray-Ban sunglasses, as in the case of Croat forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina"*[11].

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[8] Mary Kaldor (b. 16 March 1946) is acknowledged as a personality of the British academic world. Professor at London School of Economics, where she teaches Global Governance. She is also the Director of the Global Studies Centre, where she has developed cosmopolitan democracy. She has written numerous studies on: globalisation; international relations; humanitarian interventions; global civil society and global governance. She has also studied future wars physiognomy. In Romania, the following papers have been published: *Securitatea umană* and *Războaiele noi şi vechi: violenţa organizată în era globală*, Editura CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010.

[9] Mary Kaldor, *Securitatea umană: reflexii asupra globalizării şi intervenţiei*, Editura CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, p. 12.

[10] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1900*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p. 67.

[11] Mary Kaldor, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

A feature of these conflicts is the rarity of open fights and the existence of extreme violence against the civilians, on both sides. This type of warfare is aimed at terrorising the population, ethnic cleansing and winning territories by the population exodus outside the area for which the war is conducted. It is a type of war that takes some of the pre-Westphalian warfare methods, when local rulers waged war to occupy new areas. In these cases, funding is through robbing occupied territories, distinctive insignia of combatants miss and the difference between combatant and non-combatant is minimal. In many cases, war is fuelled by cross-border criminal networks.

These intrastate wars have been often classified as inter-state to justify foreign intervention, while they are conducted by fractions or nationalities of a state or federation of states.

International conflicts, despite considering war illegal, have continued at different scales, which is a characteristic of the successive civilisations on earth.

Multipolarity, bipolarity and unipolarity

Throughout history, there have been several types of polarisation of power, which have been labelled as multipolarity, bipolarity or unipolarity.

How can we analyse the polarity of the world and world powers? What is the threshold between superpowers, great powers and regional powers? These are questions we will try to answer below.

The difficulty in building a hierarchy of powers has arisen not because of the issues related to assessing their capabilities, but because of the confusion related to the way polarities should be defined.

The world has generally been multipolar and, for short periods of time, unipolar or bipolar. The last period of bipolarism based on the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation lasted for 50 years – a relatively short period, if related to history; however, by the analysis of distinguished Professor Neagu Djuvara, it was only a transition period from Western powers multipolarism to the American hegemony unipolarism.

Multipolarism, as a form of global politics, consists of an anarchical system of relatively connected states that do not have a superior govern. If monarchy is a system led by a single ruler, anarchy means the absence of any ruler. Thomas Hobbes[12], reviewing continuous wars that devastated Europe in the 17th century,

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[12] Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) systematised the materialistic theories of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), developing a consistent materialist-monist ontology. In his view, *"man is a wolf to man"* and this is the reason why the *"natural state"* (previous to the state) is the *"war of all against all"*. He rejects democracy, being in favour of a despotic power in the form of monarchy.

when everyone fought against everyone, said about life in such a world that it tended to be hard, brutal and short.

It is a specificity of a multipolar system in which there are no great powers – arbitrators, which would have played a role in correcting aggressive behaviour deviations. There are no international courts to enforce the law, nobody having the monopoly for the legitimate use of force.

In multipolar systems, *"some states are stronger than others, and there is always the danger that they can resort to force. When force cannot be excluded, the result is mistrust and suspicion"*[13], which automatically leads to escalating arms race.

Empire was one of the basic forms of power polarisation. Imperial government controls most of the world it comes into contact with, this being a form of classic unipolarism. The Roman Empire was the most powerful example of unipolarism in the Western world.

Ancient World Empires – Sumerian, Persian and Chinese – can be classified as marginal or regional empires because, even if they were contemporary, they were not aware of the existence of the other. They considered themselves unique world leaders, because of the isolationism they lived in and the huge distance separating them. The Chinese Empire existed in the same period with the Roman one, but without knowing of each other, each being the expression of unipolarism for the continents it covered.

In the 14th century, Spain and Portugal, maritime states, tried to create overseas empires, based on the sea power they held, but failed to reach the performance of the Roman Empire, which represented the classic form of continental state.

At the end of the 18th century, France started from a mainly continental concept in trying to create a continental empire in the middle of the Eurasian *heartland* but failed in a short period of time.

The British Empire expanded its territories overseas, controlled vast areas and continental-sized countries – Australia and India – for more than three centuries. It used as a imposition instruments pressure and maritime power control as well as very well organised administration. It sought both the exploitation and modernisation of colonies, as far as they could absorb, through a *soft power* policy, mixed with a *hard power* policy, as stated later by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

We can say that empires were precursors of the great powers at the end of the second millennium and the beginning of the third millennium, having common basic characteristics, such as: superior organisation; capacity to promptly mobilise for military purposes; large technological capabilities; huge resources; large population.

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[13] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Descifrarea conflictelor internaţionale*, Editura Antet, Bucureşti, 2005, p.13.

The First World War opens a new era in global geopolitical relocation. The Great War marks, as stated by Professor Neagu Djuvara, the beginning of a series of successive conflicts with common characteristics (the First World War and the Second World War, followed by the *Cold War*), conducted with the same combatants, distributed differently on the same chessboard[14]. This series of conflicts ran for 77 years (1914-1991) and marked the transition from Western countries multipluralism to the bipolarism of the two Pacts or Alliances, and ultimately resulted in the unipolar world led by a global hegemonic power, complemented by a host of small regional powers.

After the Second World War, the world has moved from a multipolarism supported by seven-eight major powers to bipolarism. *"Bipolarity has resulted in a loss of flexibility and enormously increasing insecurity. One of the new alliances has developed around a land-based authoritarian power, the other – a democratic power having expanded trade and culture and having naval supremacy"*[15], fact predicted at the beginning of the century by Mackinder[16].

The Soviet Union exerted immense pressure to advance the communist system in Europe, regardless of the treaties concluded after the war. The stability of the European region was obtained with huge efforts by the US part. This threw in battle the whole available diplomacy, supported by a huge military and economic power, so that Europe could not fall prey to the Soviets, and the balance of power could be overthrown.

The balance period of the two elements of power equation was but a transition to a different type of polarity. Confrontation *"brought into arena the main maritime power dominating two oceans, the Pacific and the Atlantic, against the main land power in the world, holding the supremacy of the Eurasian heartland"*[17] reasserting, after a century, Mackinder's concept related to the *"pivot area of world politics"*.

Walter Lippman[18], based on his analysis of international politics, wrote, in the early '50s of the last century that bipolar world would enter a process

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[14] Neagu Djuvara, *Războiul de şaptezeci şi şapte de ani (1914-1991) şi premisele hegemoniei americane*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2010, p. 6.

[15] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[16] Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) was the Dean of the famous Faculty of Economic and Political Science in London and Vice-President of the Royal Geographical Society. His ideas on geopolitics were first expressed in *"The Geographical Pivot of History"*, paper presented within the *Royal Geographical Society* in 1904. The central idea of the paper is that universal history and global policy were strongly influenced by the huge space within Eurasia, and the domination over this area represented the foundation of any attempt to dominate the world.

[17] Zbigniew Brezinski, *Marea tablă de şah – Supremaţia americană şi imperativele sale geostrategice*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 16.

[18] Walter Lippmann (23 September 1889 - 14 December 1974) is a well-known writer, reporter and political analyst who introduced the concept of *Cold War*. Lippmann was the recipient of Pulitzer Prize

of dissolution, without being given credit by anyone. Half a century marked by structural changes regarding states and international relations between them had to pass so that history could vindicate him.

We are at the beginning of the third millennium, in a period of rapid transition from the bipolar system to another system, and many theories circulate, out of which three are closer to reality:

➢ US unipolarism hegemony theory, stabilising and generating relative peace, excluding, by omission or forgetfulness, unions of states such as the European Union, whose only economic power is acknowledged, and China, which is less vocal in the American interest area, being only a producer of technology;

➢ Multipolarity theory, which provides a specific bipolarism balance, on the one hand, the North American supremacy and, on the other hand, a sum of weak poles: Europe, Russia, China and Japan, with divergent interests, whose might cannot be summed up;

➢ Regional hegemony theory, which mentions, on the one hand, the Western world – the United States and the European Union – an old alliance and, on the other hand, young hegemonic powers: the Empire of the East – China –, which extends its area of influence in the Pacific, Africa and the Arab region, India, Russia and the Arab-Islamic world, which could coalesce around the neo-Ottomanism in Turkey or Iran, if they are allowed by America, which is rather unlikely.

Following the analysis of the three theories, we note the constant existence of American hegemony supplemented by various regional powers. Everywhere a division of the world into two parts can be seen: a global hegemonic power and two unrecognised poles; a global hegemonic power and several weak poles; two regional hegemonic powers that polarise neighbouring regions.

The current international order is the result of the great powers selfish policies and not of the humanitarian policies to promote peace, carried by them. The new international system is moving, contradictorily, to the fragmentation of nations and globalisation of the world. The states freed from the inherent limitations related to belonging to a block, specific to the *Cold War* period, rather head to another level Westphalian-type organisation, where blood ties are above national ones. Under these conditions, the new world order will contain five to six major powers: the United States of America, European Union, Japan, Russia, China and perhaps India, and some mid-level (regional) powers and small (local) ones.

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two times (1958 and 1962) for his articles in *Today and Tomorrow*. During the First World War, he was the advisor to President Woodrow Wilson, being the author of the draft of Wilson 12-point declaration, which made him famous in the world history.

The reality of the new millennium is represented by a world that tends to only apparently become multipolar again, with state actors having regional powers and a global hegemonic power: the USA. Currently, half a century after the dissolution of the Soviet Union – the strong piece of one of the poles of power –, void remained in one of the *"balance scales"*, which is intended to be covered by regional powers and local powers with claims of *"regional power-packed"*.

Given the current unipolarism, many states expect the international management responsibility to be assumed by the United States, proclaimed the universal hegemonic power. However, the effort the USA is required to make exceeds its capability and political will so that the US have acted effectively in their historical area of interest, without interfering in the areas of interest of the former great powers to maintain global balance.

The greatest danger is the excesses of dominant strata and interest groups, which can cause America to act *"pre-emptively"* in some states to impose democracy by force or to introduce some concepts, lifestyles or false freedoms, which are not common to the particular civilisation. The American people is one of the peoples that have perfect confidence in democratic values but, often, its rulers have exploited some moments of world history by taking decisions that were contrary to the traditional principles of the United States. The American security doctrine *"is built on two pillars: the United States will do everything in their power to maintain military supremacy unshaken, and the United States arrogates the right to preventive actions"*[19], principles that will be imposed by American leadership whenever needed.

Collective security plans have been always doomed to failure because, in case of conflict, each state acted in front of the opponent and just the threat of extinction led the nation to make allies until the end of the war in question. We do not too often meet in history states acting like allies forever. Great Britain allied either with France or with Prussia, depending on their interest at that time. France, Great Britain and Russia were allied against Germany in the First World War. Russia and Germany got allied against Poland at the beginning of the Second World War. Fear has always been the best advisor in international politics.

When two states establish a cooperation pact to change the absolute regional ratio of powers, they also analyse the changing of the relative power relations between them, in the medium and long run.

Global equilibrium is constantly changing due to the enormous pressures exercised by great powers in their continuing struggle to achieve global or regional hegemony. World architecture undergoes continuous change and the completion

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[19] *** , *US National Security Doctrine*, September, 2002.

of major processes is far from the original purpose. Zbigniew Brezinski reviews some major changes that have lately occurred in the global system[20], which have been complemented with the changes in the last decade, hastening the transition from a stable bipolar system to a relatively stable unipolar one.

The changes that have had a major effect on geopolitics in the third millennium, in the last half of the century have been as follows:

- the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist system in Eastern Europe as a result of concerted efforts, spanning four decades, of Western governments, in conjunction with the pressure of Pope John Paul II, the Polish leader Lech Walensa, and supplemented by the destructive influence of some factors within the Soviet system;
- the US and allied forces victory in Iraq in the first Gulf War that, without achieving peace in the Middle East, has raised awareness related to the capability of the US hegemonic power;
- the exacerbation of Islamic hostility to the Western world in general and to the USA in particular;
- the enlargement of NATO and the European Union in Eastern Europe;
- the institutionalisation of globalisation by the World Trade Organisation, which has led to *"breaking"* the economic borders between states;
- the resurgence of authoritarianism and nationalism in Russia, followed by rebuilding military power, backed by Russian energy dominance over Europe;
- the resumption of efforts by India and Pakistan to enter the family of nuclear powers, encouraged by the lack of firmness of nuclear powers in this respect;
- the change in the US priorities following 11 September 2001, which represents a turning point in the US and world politics.

To these the following can be added:

- Asian financial crisis, which has been a coagulator for Asian countries, around China and Japan, leading to an unprecedented expansion of China to the position of *"global economic player"*;
- the degradation of Russia's superpower status to the one of great power;
- the European economic penetration by Russian mafia network;
- the global financial and economic crisis started in 2008, which has blocked much of the global economy and messed Russia estimates to arm based on the sale of oil and gas gains;

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[20] Zbigniew Brezinski, *A doua şansă – Trei preşedinţi şi criza superputerii americane*, Editura Antet, Bucureşti, 2007, pp 14-15.

- the maintenance of European governments inability to develop a common energy policy to counter Russia as the main energy provider;
- China's expanding influence area over the Pacific Ocean, Africa and its resources;
- closing the gap between domestic issues (on which only the sovereign state decided) and external issues (pertaining to international organisations prerogative), and supranational organisations continuous interference in internal affairs have become everyday normality.

These are phenomena that have left their mark on all aspects of national and international life and led to major changes in terms of power structure in a very short period after the collapse of the Soviet system until today.

Global hegemony has been a dream of many heads of state, and the means for achieving it have been different. In the majority of cases in the past, hegemony was achieved through military power. However, in recent decades, the effects of using the economic and financial power in imposing the will of states, at regional level, have occurred more and more often.

The first half of the 20th century stands out through the bloodiest conflagration conducted to obtain a priority position by force of arms.

The second half of the century is characterised by a refinement of the method, carried through by means of economic warfare. Following this confrontation, the United States of America has become the only superpower *"able to intervene whenever and wherever it wishes, when its interests are affected"*[21], reaching to possess technological superiority that no other nation hopes to achieve in the near future.

America began its long journey of development during the years marked by conflict in the old continent, where *"no European country was able to pose a real threat, as long as it was preoccupied with confronting rivals"*[22]. In those years, through actions of force, it expanded its borders to the disadvantage of Canada and Florida in 1794, bought Louisiana from France in 1803, and then Florida and Texas from Spain. All these actions were the first steps to build a great power. James Monroe[23] said, referring to the territorial scope of a state, that it shall

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[21] Ion Coșcodaru, Vasile Paul, *Centrele de putere ale lumii*, Editura Științelor Social-Politice, București, 2003, p. 28.

[22] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomația*, Editura ALL, București, 2008, p. 26.

[23] James Monroe (28 April 1758 - 4 July 1831) was the last US founding fathers, signatory of the Declaration of Independence; as the fifth president of the USA (1817-1825), Monroe is famous for his proclamation on 2 December 1823, known under the name of *"Monroe Doctrine"*, in which he stipulated that European powers would not colonise and interfere in the domestic affairs of Americas, and the United States of America was to proclaim neuter in the wars between European powers and their colonies.

"confer a nation many of its features. It marks its resource size, population, its physical strength. It marks, in short, the difference between a great power and a small one"[24].

Currently, the United States of America enjoys *"a dominant position that cannot be contested by a state or a combination of states in the foreseeable future"*[25].

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Given the disappearance of bipolarity, caused by the implosion of one of the superpowers, there have been more and more discussions regarding the necessity of the emergence of a universal gendarme, to correct some states deviations from the universal norms, to ensure an overall balance. This gendarme can be a state or an alliance. The universal gendarme is supposed to be America, which has not reached the stage of maturity as far as the state is concerned, growing continuously since the end of the First World War. Currently, America is the only world power that has access to two oceans, which it is able to control. It has replaced Europe, which, for half a millennium – from the discovery of America by Columbus in 1492 until the collapse of the Soviet Union – has held world power, being called, in some circles, the Empire of the Atlantic Europe, starting from Mackinder's premise that who controls the seas controls the world.

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

[24] William A Williams, *The Shaping of American Diplomacy*, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1956, p. 122.
[25] George Soros, *Supremația americană: un balon de săpun,* Editura Antet, București, 2004, p. 3.

THE PRIORITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Filofteia REPEZ

At the beginning of the 21st century, the security environment too is affected by modifications, transformations or other phenomena. Among these, one may mention the Russian Federation attempts to be recognised as a great power. The Russian Federation's will to actively participate on the international scene as a significant actor in all the aspects was remarked by all worlds' states.

The present article intends to emphasise a part of the directions towards which the current efforts and preoccupations of the Russian Federation are oriented – the economic development, the relation with the European Union and the vision over the Black Sea Wider Area – in order to maintain national security, promote national interests and be recognised as a main actor on the international political scene.

***Keywords**: security strategy; security; energy resources; national interests; neighbourhood; economy*

"Politics – from yesterday or today – is not enough to explain a people. If, for some, Russia is an iceberg and the politics is its peak, the profound Russia is much more. Therefore, it remains to be known and understood. Russia is the Kremlin, the military parades from the Red Square and Gazprom. But it is also Dostoyevsky, and Chekhov, and Tchaikovsky, and the couples of skating champions, the Kazachok, Matryoshka and the beautiful blue-eyed women. Russia is a huge and always revealing, always surprising, always inciting reality.

In this respect, for many people, Russia is riddle, mystery and enigma at the same time".

Corneliu Vlad, *Russia, after USSR*[1]

Economic Development – A Factor in Preserving National Security

Despite its largeness (its surface of 17 million square kilometres makes it the largest country in the world, almost twice times larger than the country on the second place, Canada) and its population of 142 million inhabitants (the eighth country in terms of number of inhabitants), the Russian Federation went through many periods of economic development after the USSR collapse.

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[1] Corneliu Vlad, *Rusia, după URSS*, Editura Top Form, București, 2011.

Boris Yeltsin's period is considered (at least until 1997) *"catastrophic, when the population was almost ruined and the oligarchic, almost Mafia-like redistribution of national resources began"*[2]. The establishment of an oligarchy and of a sometimes Mafia-like state administration system questioned the social-political stability. Concomitantly, the armed conflict in Chechnya started and the fundamentalist Islamism began to rise[3]. 1997 remained the year when an incipient market economy flourished in Russia.

Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, between 2000 and 2008, there were initiated the reorganisation of the administration, the strengthening of the state, the stimulation of state companies etc., in an attempt to regain Russia's *"dignity"* and political force at the international level.

In order to re-establish the Russian Federation's statute of regional and global power, the *"close vicinity"* policy (defined as *"own sphere of influence"*) was activated, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation was developed, the structures of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation were improved. The relations with China and India were intended to materialise in an *"anti-hegemonic bloc"* and, concomitantly, the *"energy diplomacy"* strategy was activated regarding the supply of cheap energy to *"allied"* states and expensive energy to *"adversaries"*[4].

Comparatively, the economy of the Russian Federation during Yeltsin and Putin can be seen in the scheme below *(figure 1)*.

Figure 1: Russian Federation Economy since the USSR collapse until 2008[5]

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[2] Source: *BRIC, BRICS (4) – O analiză: Rusia*, article available at http://politeiaeuropa.wordpress.com/2012/04/10/bric-brics-4-o-analiza-rusia-prima-parte/, retrieved on 22 August 2012.

[3] Dr. Teodor Frunzeti, dr. Vladimir Zodian (coord.), *Lumea 2011. Enciclopedie politică şi militară (studii strategice şi de securitate)*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 162.

[4] J. Bugajsji, *Pacea rece*, Editura Casa Radio, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 2667 and following, apud dr. Teodor Frunzeti, dr. Vladimir Zodian, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

[5] Source: *BRIC, BRICS (4) – O analiză: Rusia, art. cit.*

The economic revival of Russia was owed to oil prize growth, structural reforms, as well as to the increase in investors and businesspersons' trust in the Russian economic environment.

The period between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 was characterised by the first recession after 10 years of economic growth. The stable growth was resumed at the end of 2009 and continued in 2010. As compared with the majority of the European states, the Russian economy was not very damaged by the global financial crisis, greatly because of hydro-carbonates selling. 2011 was not a difficult year in economic terms because the gross domestic product of Russia grew by with 4,2%, the greatest ratio of growth of all the developed economies of the world. For 2012, the Russian government forecasted an economic growth of 3,7%[6].

The economic crisis ensures the national security of the Russian Federation by developing the national system of innovation, increasing the labour productivity, assimilating new sources of resources, modernising the main sectors of the national economy, enhancing the banking system, the financial sector of services and the inter-budgetary relations in the country.

Concerning the aforementioned strategy, the Russian Federation has enough potential to accomplish, in the medium term, the conditions to strengthen its position among the leader-states of the global economy on the ground of the efficient participation to the global division of labour, the enhancement of the global competition capacity of the national economy, of the defence potential and the level of state and social security.

The long-term economic risks and threats to national security are considered to be, according to the *National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020*, the following: ↝ maintaining the export models of raw materials in the development of the national economy; ↝ diminishing the competitiveness capacity and the high dependence of its most important spheres by extern conjunctures, losing control over national resources; ↝ worsening the situation of raw materials for industry and energy field; ↝ the unequal development of regions and the decreasing labour force; ↝ the reduced stability and protection capacity of the national financial system; ↝ preserving the favourable conditions for corruption and criminality in the economic-financial relations; ↝ illegal emigration; ↝ the deficit of fuel and energy, water and biological resources; ↝ taking discriminatory measures and amplifying incorrect competitiveness in relation to Russia; ↝ the crisis phenomena in the world financial-banking system.

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[6] *Ibid.*

With a view to diminishing and preventing such economic risks and threats in order to provide national security on the basis of the Russian Federation economic growth, the main efforts will be focused on the development of science, technology and education, enhancement of national investment and financial institutions to reach the needed level of security in the military, defence industry and international spheres.

The state of the national security of the Russian Federation, as stipulated in the *National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020*, directly depends on the economic potential of the country and the efficiency of the system of providing national security.

The Russian Federation and European Union Vision of Vicinity and Energy

By the enlargement of the European Union and the North-Atlantic Alliance, it was certainly emphasised that the Russian Federation's area of influence was considerably reduced.

After the end of the *Cold War*, from the geostrategic perspective, the Russian Federation and the European Union, *"a collection of different national or regional versions of capitalist economic and social order… an unique version in itself"*[7], became direct neighbours in time, respectively, they became two *"colossi"*, each with its own strategy for direct neighbourhoods: the European Union with the *European Neighbourhood Policy*, released in 2003-2004, with the main goal of attenuating an eventual *"Iron Curtain"* between the community bloc and the countries situated at its geographic periphery; the Russian Federation with the *Russian doctrine of close vicinity*, in order to maintain and strengthen its power and restrict the presence of other powers.

The disagreements between the Russian and the European leaders (for example: in January 2006, at the EU-Russia summit, held in Helsinki, the European leaders requested explanations from the Russian government regarding the respect for human rights, independence of justice and freedom of the press; in the commercial field, Russian leaders aimed to pressure the member states of the Union into signing bilateral agreements, but they encountered the steady solidarity of the EU member states which rejected this action; Poland was against the negotiation to renew the EU-Russia agreement in the commercial and

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[7] Mirela Atanasiu, *România – între Est şi Vest. Influenţe geopolitice*, article published in *Spaţiul sud-est european în contextul globalizări,* Scientific communications session with international participation, *Strategii XXI/2007*, 12-13 April 2007, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare *"Carol I"*, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 114.

energy fields and also against Russia joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO);
recently, the same hostility against Russia accession to WTO is also manifested
by Georgia after it demanded that Russia cancelled the measures taken regarding
Abkhazia and South Ossetia) has consequences for the way in which the European
Union develops international relations and for the points of view with the Russian
authorities. Therefore, the European Union wishes the development of the rule
of law, the enforcement of a system of pertinent (commercial, economic, energy,
political, environmental etc.) norms and shows a neighbourhood policy applicable
to the countries from the Southern and Eastern shore of the Mediterranean (countries
of the Barcelona Process from 1995) as well as to Russia, Ukraine, the Republic
of Moldova and the republics from Caucasus. On the other side, the Russian
authorities do not appreciate the way the Russian Federation was placed
on the same level with the other states in the framework of this politics and, moreover,
they interpret the European Union neighbourhood policy *"as a competition, an
immixture or even a threat"*[8].

Energy has become a strategic factor in the international policy and in the relations
between states and main component of economic development and social progress.
The energy problem could not miss from the Russian Federation-European Union
relation, being an important aspect of this relation and, at the same time, being placed
on the list of disagreements between the two parts.

The Russian Federation is very well situated in terms of energy resources;
for example, according to the report drawn up, in 2008, by *BP Statistical Review
of World Energy*, Russia was the state with the biggest proved reserves of natural
gas worldwide, with a quantity of 44,65 trillions cubic meters for 2007.
On the other hand, the European Union is dependent on the supplies from exterior,
especially Russian ones; almost four fifths (79,1%) of the natural gas imports
in EU-27, in 2009, came from Russia, Norway or Algeria; 57,3% of the crude oil imports
in UE-27 came from Russia, Norway and Libya, while 77,5% of the superior coal
imports came from Russia, Columbia, South Africa and the United States[9].

The energy relation between the European Union and the Russian Federation
can be a collaboration one, a *"win-win"*[10] one, on condition that the two parties
make sustained efforts in this regard. Still, there were times when the energy
relation was used as a means of pressure on the Union's states. For example,
in January 2006, the export of gas from the Russian Federation to Ukraine was stopped
for 48 hours, on the grounds that Ukrainian leaders refused the five times higher

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[8] Sylvain Kahn, *Geopolitica Uniunii Europene*, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2008, p. 165.
[9] Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_
and_imports/roâ Informa.C8.9Bii_suplimentare_Eurostat, retrieved on 21 August 2012.
[10] Sylvain Kahn, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

price requested by Gazprom; also, Russia caused anxiety in some European states by the political and economic pressures put on some small countries as Bulgaria, Serbia, Azerbaijan or Ukraine in order to buy their energy infrastructures or to have the monopoly on their modernisation.

A major challenge for the European Union is the way in which it can provide energy security with competitive and clean energy, considering the limitation of climate changes, the escalation of global energy demand and the uncertain future of the access to energy resources. In order to address such challenges, the *European Energy Strategy* from 2006 emphasises the diversification of supply sources and the capitalisation on alternative energy resources and considers that the Russian Federation, the main oil, natural gas and coals supplier is an essential and equal partner. Another solution to this challenge is the strategy called *"Energy 2020: A Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy"*, adopted by the European Council in June 2010, in which a series of ambitious objectives are stipulated: the 20% greenhouse gas emissions reduction, the 20% of renewable energy increase and 20% of energy efficiency increase[11].

The *energy strategy* of the Russian Federation for 2010-2030, approved in November 2009, stipulates that energy exports will remain the major factor for the country's development. Among the main problems related to Russia's energy resources, mentioned in the *Strategy*, there are: decreasing demand and prices for energy resources owed to the global economic crisis; insufficiently diversifying markets for Russia's energy resources and raw materials exports' structure; politicising energy relations between Russia and exterior; low level of energy companies activities from Russia on external markets.

In order to reach the objective of external energy policy, the *Strategy* stipulates that the following requirements should be accomplished: the recognition of Russia's national interests in the development of the functioning system of global energy markets, which aims at their predictable and stable development; the diversification of export markets and the structure of merchandise export; the provision of stable conditions on energy markets, including guaranteed demand and safe prices for the major energy resources exported; the consolidation of some positions in the exterior for major Russian energy companies; the provision of an efficient international cooperation in the implementation of some risky and complex projects in Russia; the active participation in international negotiation processes on energy issues; the provision of a balance between the interests of energy resources importers, exporters and transit countries, in international treaties and international organisations; the development of cooperation in the energy field with countries from Commonwealth of Independent States, Eurasian Economic Union,

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[11] Source: http://www.dae.gov.ro/articol/1416/comisia-european-a-adoptat-strategia-ldquo-energie-2020-o-strategie-pentru-energie-competitiv-sustenabil-i-sigur-rdquo, retrieved on 21 August 2012.

North-Eastern Asia, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the European Union, as well with other countries and international organisations; the coordination of activity on oil and gas global markets with the members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and Gas Exporting Countries Forum; assistance in the development of the Russia-Europe-Asia united energy area; assistance in attracting foreign investments[12].

The collaboration between the Russian Federation and the European Union is mutually advantageous: the European Union's markets are very attractive for the Russian business, and Russia is an important market for European products and services and one of the major energy suppliers of the Union. The EU-Russian Federation strategic partnership is extremely important for the consolidation of political, economic, social security and stability at regional and global level. In order to remain a constant energy supplier to the West, Russia must attract investments in the energy infrastructure and have access to modern technologies. Moreover, neither side should see energy as a political instrument of pressure or blackmail.

Presently, there are two main projects to supply the European Union: *South Stream,* initiated by the Russian Federation, and *Nabucco,* which benefits from the support of the European Union and the United States of America *(figure 2)*.

Figure 2: The Projects to Supply EU: **South Stream and Nabucco**[13]

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[12] Source: http://www.bursa.ro/exporturile-de-energie-factorul-major-de-dezvoltare-a-rusiei-161093&s=companii_afaceri&articol=161093.html, retrieved on 21 August 2012.

[13] Source: site-ul http://www.geopolitics.ro/spatiul-ex-sovietic/marea-caspica/3089.html, retrieved on 21 August 2012.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin considers that, at the end of 2012, the real construction of *South Stream* gas pipeline can be started, which will unite Russia and Europe, on the bottom of the Black Sea (therefore, the Russian and European gas transport system will be united), and *"gas buyers from Europe cannot doubt Russia's safety as supplier"*[14].

According to some analysts, through the *South Stream* pipeline from Russia to Greece and Italia via Turkey, some EU member countries (for instance, Bulgaria, Greece and Italia) will become key elements of the Russian European energy market control strategy[15]. Moreover, the main Russian gas company and world gas sale leader (25% from the global total), Gazprom, is interested in the *Nabucco* project (initiative of the European Commission, launched in November 2002), therefore, it manifested the intention to bilaterally negotiate with Austria and to transform Baumgartner in a major Eurasian energy terminal.

The energy issue represents an important aspect of European Union-Russian Federation summits; eventually, the economic resources should become neither burden nor blessing for a party or another, but it must simply be the engine of economic development and common progress.

The Vision of the Russian Federation over the Black Sea Wider Area

The Black Sea was one of the *Cold War* frontiers, carrying on a legacy of imperial rivalry between Russia and the Ottoman Empire along five centuries, with a short break in the interwar period, before the bipolar world, at the beginning of 1940. After 1989, the Black Sea region was placed in the Eastern part of the area, between post-Soviet Russia and the victorious Western Alliance.

The Black Sea basin has permanently drawn the attention of the Russian Federation, ever since the 18th century, when Russia hoped to transform the Black Sea in *"its own lake"*. For the Russian Federation, the Black Sea region has been *"a crucial component of the national security and, therefore, the protection of Russia's sphere of influence is considered a national interest"*[16].

The interests the Russian Federation has in the region are multiple. Firstly, Russia wishes to maintain its position of important actor in region,

[14] Source: http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2012_03_24/69481738/, retrieved on 21 August 2012.
[15] Șerban Filip Cioculescu, *Terra incognita? Repere pentru "cartografierea" haosului din relațiile internaționale contemporane*, Editura Militară, București, 2010, p.109.
[16] Gheorghe Calopăreanu, *Complexul de securitate "Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre"*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare *"Carol I"*, București, 2012, p. 103.

then, Moscow officials try to prevent the emergence of some actors or projects regarding energy that are outside Russia's control, to prevent the appearance of some military coalitions able to lead to the dissolution of the Federation as well as to prevent the countries in the region from seeking to become NATO members; moreover, Russian authorities wish to develop cooperation in the military field with states from the former soviet bloc as well as to limit the hegemonic trend in this region etc.

For the Russian Federation, the Black Sea has been an area of strategic, political, military and economic interest for centuries. Perhaps this is why, in the relations with the Black Sea riparian states, the Russian Federation seeks to enforce a status that is equal to the North-Atlantic Alliance one.

The means through which this Russian point of view is materialised are diverse: the active participation in regional initiatives (OBSEC and BLACKSEAFOR), the involvement in activities meant to influence the riparian states policies, the military presence in some strategic areas riparian to the Black Sea (Georgia-Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Adjara, Moldova-Transnistria, Ukraine).

The Russian Federation maintains the monopoly over the energy transport infrastructures and seeks to face the competition from European and Euro-Atlantic projects (Baku, Tbilisi, Ceyhan pipeline – BTC – crosses Turkey, the itinerary of the Nabucco pipeline is intended to bypass Russia etc.).

The Black Sea Wider Area remains a scene of confrontation of divergent interests between diverse actors. The Russian Federation aims to re-establish the sphere of influence in the space of the Commonwealth of Independent States, to block the NATO enlargement towards its frontiers and to limit the Western access to the Caspian energy resources through Southern Caucasus.

Furthermore, Russia will try to assert itself as the main power in the region by its huge military force, *"energy diplomacy"*, navy, support of *"secessionist republics"* Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, attempt to counteract USA, NATO and EU influence, minimisation of *GUAM* (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) and to combat *"orange revolutions"* in Ukraine and Georgia.

For a while, the Russian Federation tried to use the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation as an instrument of regional economic cooperation under its aegis or to create a *"trilateral"* with Ukraine and Turkey.

NATO and EU enlargement through the accession of Romania and Bulgaria changed the facts: the perspective is that the Black Sea issue becomes international, no matter the temporary Russian obstacles[17].

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[17] Cf. dr. Teodor Frunzeti, dr. Vladimir Zodian, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

Owed to the position and its special potential, the Black Sea Wider Area has played an important role in the European system. The maintenance of the region's security or the resolution settlement of different problems cannot be the attribute of a single state or non-state actor. The cooperation policy can be the solution to strengthen security, stability and development in the region, so that each actor interested in the region can be able to make a statement and, consequently, not feel threatened.

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Geographically placed both in Europe and in Asia, the Russian Federation remains a *"known unknown … which has always aspired to a key position in the world"*[18]. At the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian Federation wishes to maintain and strengthen its national security and, in this respect, its main priorities are: national defence, state security and social security. To those it is added the concentration of own efforts and resources to fulfil some priorities of enduring development: raising the quality of life of Russian citizens, economic growth, ecology of living systems and reasonable use of nature, energy stability and strategic partnership.

As far as the relation with the European Union is concerned, the Russian Federation aims to increase the Union's states dependence on the Russian deliveries of hydro carbonates, to exploit the divergences between the EU and the USA and between the New and Old Europe. The relations of Russia with Western Europe are cordial relations, unlike the relations with the former *"brothers of the Soviet camp"*, which became members with full rights in the EU and whose behaviour worried Moscow.

Same as many other states, the Russian Federation cooperates with USA and the West to combat international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism threat.

From the standpoint of the Russian decision-makers, the Middle East is not a worrying issue, even if the region encounters many turbulences[19].

The Russian officials give special attention to the relation with the People's Republic of China as well as to new relations with Japan, South Korea, India, *ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)*, Latin America, especially in the economic field.

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[18] Octavian Sergentu, *Rusia: între dilema identitară şi busola geopolitică,* at http://www.epen.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4466:studiu-octavian-sergentu-rusia-intre-dilema-identitar-i-busol-geopolitic&catid=42:analize-interviuri-category&Itemid=61, retrieved on 21 August 2012.

[19] *Politica externă a FR – vectori, principii, instrumente* at http://www.geopolitics.ro/analize/3205.html retrieved on 20 September 2012.

Externally, the Russian Federation's position regarding a multi-polar world has become well-known and the Eurasia concept holds a more and more important place in defining the Russian identity and its national interest. The considerable energy resources and other states dependence upon its resources are the strong points used by the Russian Federation to meet its priorities and to regain the statute of great power.

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LEGITIMACY OF PURPOSE AND LEGALITY OF MEANS IN CURRENT MILITARY CONFLICTS (IV)

Colonel (r.) Dr Ionel HORNEA

In 2006, the International Committee of the Red Cross drew up A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare*, which was prepared in consultation with nearly thirty military and international law experts, including governmental experts, from ten countries. The guide advises on substantive and procedural questions that are to be considered in related actions.*

In this case, the new state, party to the Ottawa Convention, would be required to revise its mine arsenal in order to make sure that neither one "is designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person"*, as anti-personnel mines are defined by Article 2 (1) of the Convention.*

In the author's opinion, a new weapon – which is a proposal for a new means of warfare – cannot be examined without considering the way it will be used, therefore, without taking into account the method of warfare associated with it.

Keywords: methods of warfare; ICRC; combatant; weapon control

New military aspects related to the international use of force in the current world order

A great instability has left its mark on the recent years and the coming decades are very likely to be the same as the key drivers of unrest have generally remained the same. Specifically, the unstable global mixture of political, economic, social, technological and military circumstances will continue to create great tensions in the international order. It is considered therefore that it is highly unlikely in the next 10-20 years to appear circumstantial conditions or a power to somehow exceed these sources of instability and provide a stable world order. During this period, there is little possible for the United States to face a military adversary as the Soviet Union, although there is still a number of threats, and it is possible for others to appear over time. An estimate of the future strategy at global level could be that the objectives would be to achieve peace and security in the world while observing human rights, minority rights, democratic values, and under the circumstances

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of legitimate good governance[89]. In terms of doctrine, while modern countries or those with potential in the field still will not give up the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, underdeveloped countries or at least some of them will continue to threaten with total war, guerrilla and even terrorist war. All this entails a new vision regarding the rules of employing forces in international relations[90], taking into account that, with changing rules on the use of armed force, the rules of engagement will change too, varying in relation to the concrete situation, depending on the country using military force, the threats to national security, but also on the profile of experts.

The current and objective necessity of the existence and functionality of the law applicable in armed conflicts under the circumstances of the new threats to security

According to some strategy theorists, the legal process is dialectic of intelligences in a conflict environment, claiming that *"legal war"* is the conflict par excellence[91], some people having a clear awareness of the analogy between warfare and the legal conflict. The Germans had a bellicose and treacherous law, the violations of the laws of war in the Second Reich and the abuse of retaliation during the Third Reich being well known examples. The law is specific to organised societies to ensure civil liberties, community living and community protection against antisocial risks and threats instead of employing military force to adjust them (which is grounded in committing illegal acts). *Legal dispute* is resolved by recourse to a *third party* (judge) and by applying the *general rule*s according to some previously set procedures. This principle also applies to international relations between states, the appeal to peaceful means of conflict resolution, whether judicial, diplomatic or mixed, becoming a substitute for traditional legal system, where the right to make war *(jus de bello)* was not abolished. Thus, *war loses its legitimacy* as its effects become more devastating and universal, process that is due to many factors, among which the main are ideological and technical, an impediment to widespread violence of war being just international law applicable in international armed conflicts[92]. Therefore, today it is widely accepted that the military phenomenon has known a legal perspective that creates an edifice of legal rules relating to building

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[89] Cf. M. Ciocan, *Tendinţele strategiei în secolul XXI*, in vol. *Fenomenul militar contemporan*, Editura Ars Docendi, 2003, p. 48.

[90] Cf. M. Mureşan, Gh. Toma, *Provocările începutului de mileniu*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2003, p. 214.

[91] Cf. H. Coutau-Bégarie, *Traité de stratégie*, 3rd edition, Economica, Paris, 2001, p. 89.

[92] M. Mureşan, Gh. Toma, *Provocările începutului de mileniu, op. cit.*, p. 214.

military rules, only this way being possible to speak about a real and substantial regulation of the military phenomenon[93].

The risks, threats and vulnerabilities to security are differently interpreted by human communities. In this regard, the UN reform project developed in 2005 identified the following threats to world peace and security in the post-*Cold War* period[94]: (a) economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation, (b) interstate conflict; (c) conflicts within states, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; (d) weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological ones; (e) terrorism; (f) transnational organised crime[95].

Types of future wars

Apparently, all wars are the same. In fact, no war is like any other. Each is, in its way, unique and unrepeatable. Furthermore, although the war is governed essentially by the same laws and the same principles, belligerents rarely learn the needed lessons. And they rarely conform to the established rules and principles, namely the rules and customs of war. With few exceptions, the war is, as it is well known, a continuation of politics by other means (political, economic, cultural, informational, diplomatic, moral, technical, scientific and military) and has at least three dimensions: continuity, asymmetry and violence.

Continuous confrontation (continuous warfare) is, in fact, the ultimate expression of competitive phase – irreconcilable phase – in all areas and by all means (economic, political, informational, social, military and so on). Such a phase is not accidental, voluntary or not voluntary, but part of the whole, of the system.

War is not a military confrontation, a military struggle; it is a complex engagement, a complex confrontation, throughout history, every war having its own *"laws"* and *"principles"*. However, it can be said that[96]:

- *there was always an attacker and a defender* (strategic initiative belonged to one of the belligerents);
- *strategic supremacy* (in the First World War, oscillated; in the Second one, it clearly belonged to the Germans during the first half, and to the allies,

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[93] Cf. I. Armaș, C. Purcărea, P.D. Duță, *Acțiunea militară la granița dintre milenii*, Editura Militară, București, 2001, p. 42.
[94] *European Security Strategy* in 2003, developed within CESP, concluded that the community is likely to be confronted with global challenges. The *National Security Strategy of Romania*, disseminated in the fall of 2007, identified threats such as the ones to the EU.
[95] See http://www.iss-eu.org.
[96] Gheorghe Văduva, *Principii ale războiului și luptei armate – realități și tendințe*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2003, pp. 4-5.

during the second one; in regional wars it usually belonged to those who started the attack);

- almost all wars have had *uncertain development* (rarely the political objective of the war was fully achieved);
- they caused *great losses* in human lives as well as material ones (their effect should not be considered only as negative; sometimes, especially when the war was the last form of a crisis, spectacular economic, social, political and others leap followed);
- they had *earthquake-like effects* (in terms of onset and negative energy consumption);
- they were never *accidental* (people have always expected violent confrontations, wars);
- although *their prevention and the removal* of violent confrontation from the human society have always been desired, it *has never been achieved* and, in all likelihood, it will *neither be achieved*;

The goal of the war was to destroy enemy forces and force the enemy to return to the negotiating table, obviously, to impose conditions that, before the confrontation, were considered unacceptable. The goal of the war – the destruction of enemy forces – led automatically to achieve the political goal – to impose own will on the enemy – i.e. to obtain those benefits (territorial, economic, demographic etc.) which the political power desired. If we go beyond feelings and appeal to the law of peace and war, it is difficult to determine – in general – who is and who is not guilty of breaking out a war.

In fact, there can be no fault, since there is a law of peace and war, and war is seen as a possible solution, regulated and accepted, to settle the dispute, when the strategic situation is blocked and can be unlocked only by the force of arms. Frederick II believed that the war meant to attack.

After the Second World War, the principle of the law of war as a way to unlock a strategic situation was not available anymore, and the war was condemned in its entirety. Its declaration and breaking out were deemed illegal. Liddell Hart said that victory *in war was not automatically the achievement of the political goal of war*. In fact, *war has always been a means and not an end*, and the complete destruction of enemy forces – Clausewitzian concept of war – which can be its objective, but not its political goal, does not automatically mean the achievement of the political objective. *"What is important in the war (which is only a means and never an end) – says Francois Caron – is not to destroy the opponent, but to deprive it of its freedom of action, to induce him to surrender"*.

In the physiognomy of war, a crucial role is played by *forces* and *means*, which are *products of strategy*, namely of the genetic or generative strategy, which in turn is a product, namely, a method of implementing a policy, a political decision. The relationship is not one-way, but two-way, meaning that the forces and means condition, in turn, the *political decision*, the evolution of the forces and means used in wars entailing carefully relating to the political, economic, social, ethnic, cultural, religious and so on components of the relations between human communities as far as the commonalities and the differences are concerned[97].

Principles of just war[98]

• *A war can be waged as a last resort*. All non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified.

• *A war is just only if it is waged by a legitimate authority*. Even righteous causes cannot be served by actions taken by individuals or groups that do not represent an authority and they are sanctioned within the society and outside it, even if they are considered legitimate.

• *A war can only be waged to repair the injustice suffered*. For example, self-defence against an armed attack is always considered to be a right cause. Moreover, a just war can be waged only with "good" intentions: the only acceptable objective of a just war is to remedy an injury.

• *A war can only be just if it is waged with reasonable chances of success*. Deaths and injury incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable.

• *The ultimate goal of a war is to restore peace*. More specifically, the peace established after the war must be preferred to the peace that would have prevailed if the war had not been waged.

• *Violence used in the war must be proportionate to the damage suffered*. States are banned to use force that is not necessary to achieve the limited objective of addressing the injury suffered.

• *The weapons used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants*. Civilians are not allowed targets of war and every effort should be made to avoid killing civilians. Death of civilians is justified only if they are, inevitably, victims of a deliberate attack on a military target.

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[97] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Omul, statul şi războiul. O analiză teoretică*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
[98] See http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/justwar.htm

Review of the legality of some weapons, means and methods employed in warfare

In an armed conflict, the parties are limited in the choice of weapons, means and methods of warfare, as well as by the rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)[99] that regulate the conduct of hostilities. Relevant rules include a ban on the use of the war means and methods that are unable to discriminate between civilian and military or civilian objects and military objectives, which are the *"cardinal rules"* of international humanitarian law applicable to arms. In addition, special treaties and customary rules impose specific prohibitions or limitations on the use of certain weapons, such as antipersonnel mines and blinding laser weapons.

For a state that is party to Additional Protocol I of 1977, establishing the legality of new weapons is an obligation imposed by the Treaty in accordance with Article 36 of the Protocol, which stipulates that each state must determine whether the use of *"a weapon, some means or methods of armed fight"* that are studied, developed, acquired or adopted should be *"in some or all circumstances"* banned by the international law applicable to all states. It also has a good political sense for all states, whether or not party to the Protocol, checking, again, new weapons in legal terms. Indeed, it is in the interest of each state to assess the legality of its new weapons to ensure that it is able to comply with international legal obligations during armed conflicts and other situations of violence. In its advisory opinion regarding the legality of the threat or the use of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice mentions the basic rules of International Humanitarian Law as *"essential"* principles[100].

The establishment of national mechanisms to assess the legality of new weapons is highly relevant and urgent, given the development of new technologies such as direct energy weapons, incapacitant weapons[101], behaviour change agents, acoustics and nanotechnology, to mention only a few of them[102]. The mechanisms to assess

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[99] Kathleen Lawand's point of view, legal advisor within the Red Cross International Committee up to January 2007; currently, legal advisor to ICRC in Afghanistan.

[100] See, for example, J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (coord.), *Customary International Humanitarian Law*, ICRC/Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, Regulation 70 and 71, no. 88, vol. 864, December, 2006, p. 257.

[101] *Incapacitant (nonlethal)* substances are chemical substances that cause temporary physical or psychical incapacity. Those having psychical effect include substances that stimulate or block the central nervous system. Those with physical effect include irritants (lachrymatory, smoke), cholinergics with Parkinson-like effects (oxotremorine), hypertensive ones (guanetidine), paralysing (decamethonium) and emetic (apomorphine); *paralysing grenades; incapacitant grenades*.

[102] See, for example, D.P. Fidler, *"The Meaning of Moscow: Non-lethal Weapons and the International Law in the Early 21st Century"*, Red Cross International Review, vol. 87, no. 859, 2005, p. 525; Robin Coupland and Dominique Joye, *"Legal and Health Aspects: International Humanitarian Law and Mortality or Non-lethal Weapons"'*, in M. Dando (ed.), *Non-lethal Weapons: Technology and Operational Perspectives*, Jane's Information Group, London, 2000, pp. 60-61.

weapons would be also relevant in reassessing the existing weapons, stored in a state arsenal, in light of the new rules of international law or of the ones under development, such as when a state becomes a party to a treaty banning or restricting the use of certain weapons (e.g. Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty).

Both the 27th Conference of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Red Crescent in 1999 and the 28th Conference of 2003 called on states to establish mechanisms and procedures to determine compliance with the international law of arms. In particular, the 28th Conference said that *"in view of the rapid development of weapons technology in order to protect civilians from indiscriminate effects of weapons and combatants from unnecessary suffering and prohibited weapons, all new weapons, means and methods of warfare have been subject to rigorous and multidisciplinary review "*[103].

The emphasis of this requirement is due to the fact that few states are known to have adopted procedures for review of arms. In 2006, the ICRC developed a *Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare*, which was prepared in consultation with nearly thirty military experts in international law, including governmental experts from ten countries. The Guide advises on substantive and procedural questions to be considered in such actions.

In this case, the new state, party to the Ottawa Convention, should revise its arsenal to ensure that none *"is designed to explode by the presence, proximity or contact of a person"* in relation to the definition of antipersonnel landmines defined by Article 2 Paragraph (1) of the Convention.

The guide is not intended to be a definitive statement regarding the legal review of new weapons. Rather, it reflects the ICRC interpretation of the subject, based on several sources at hand: Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, the ICRC Commentary to the additional protocols (it was largely based on the preparatory work of protocols – for example, their negotiation history), declarations of international conferences and the practice of six states reflected in instruments that establish review procedures[104].

As regards state practice, the Guide is based solely on primary sources – which are formal procedures that have been already written in the public domain or have been made available to the ICRC by the state. They do not take into account secondary sources – which are statements or publications of officials or school

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[103] See the Final Goal 2.5 in *Agenda for Humanitarian Action*, adopted at the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Committee 2003.

[104] See footnote 8 in Annex A of the *Guide to Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare*.

descriptions of the procedures in which the ICRC has no access or are applied only to the public domain. In this respect, both the 27th and the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Committee encouraged states to share information about review mechanisms and procedures, involving ICRC to facilitate such exchange and also inviting states to cooperate with the Committee in this regard[105].

Moreover, the Guide states that a state party to Additional Protocol I should share its review procedure with other states, under Article 84, under which the high contracting parties shall communicate to each other *"laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application of the Protocol"*.

The obligation to review the legality of new weapons entails at least two things. Firstly, a state should have implemented some forms of permanent procedure in this regard, i.e. a permanent mechanism *(Standing Mechanism)*, which can be automatically activated whenever the state develops or purchases new weapons. Secondly, for the authority responsible for the development or acquisition of new weapons, such a procedure should become mandatory by law or administrative directive.

In addition to these minimum procedure requirements, each state can decide the specific form of its review mechanism. As outlined in the Guide, a new weapon – which is a proposal for a new means of war – cannot be examined in isolation of the way it will be used, without taking into account the associated method of war. This fact raises three questions. The first is whether the review authority should take into account the proposed or intended use of weapons or other predictable effects, resulting from a combination of its design and the way it is used.

Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I seems to support a broader approach, because it requires a state to determine whether the use of new weapons would be *"banned in some or all circumstances"*. Commentary on Additional Protocols interprets this as meaning that a state should determine whether *"normal or intended use"* of the weapon could be prohibited, but this is not required to provide or to consider all the possible misuse of weapons. This would imply that the review authority should not take into account the possible uses and effects of weapons that can be reasonably expected. Let us take, for example, serrated-edged bayonet blade, whose antipersonnel use is considered by some countries as causing unnecessary suffering and therefore is prohibited by international humanitarian law. Although these states may choose to equip their troops with jagged-edged bayonets as tools for digging, cutting and other non-antipersonnel military use in some armed forces it is entirely predictable that soldiers can use them in the battle as antipersonnel weapons.

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[105] See, for example, Action 2.5.3 in the Final Goal 2.5 in *Agenda for Humanitarian Action*, adopted at the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Committee 2003.

This leads to the second question arising from the relationship between the means and methods of warfare: *What should the review authority do if the methods proposed to use the weapon by some, but not all, are found to be illegal?* State-based practice, the Guide suggests that, in such cases, the review authority should establish restrictions on the use of weapons. Taking the same serrated-edged bayonet blade example, the review authority would allow them to be used by soldiers, provided that their antipersonnel use is banned. It is essential to include any terms of use for the firearm in the operating procedures or the user manual so as to ensure that all commanders and fighters who use weapons are fully aware of its operational restrictions.

The third question arises from the intrinsic connection between the fighting means and methods that entail the type of *conduct rules of International Humanitarian Law in conducting hostilities*, which are to be considered by the review authority. The guide suggests that, in addition to the *"cardinal rules"* of international humanitarian law applicable to weapons, the review authority could also consider other rules of international humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities, for example, those that require action proportionality and precautions in attack. While these rules are intended primarily to be applied in the military battlefield by commanders on a case by case basis, they will still be relevant in the analysis phase of a new weapon, to the extent to which the type of weapon, its characteristics and foreseeable effects allow the review authority to determine whether its final use is or not in accordance with them. It should be noted that International Humanitarian Law is not the only body of law relevant to arms control. Article 36 of Additional Protocol I refers to the law applicable in the *"Protocol or any other rules of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party"*.

However, in controlling the legality of new weapons, states can and should also consider international law on human rights, applicable to the use of force in situations that are not armed conflicts. This is particularly important, given the increased involvement of the military in peace support operations, where troops are more likely to be involved in law enforcement than in war.

Finally, if the review of weapons is carried by a person or a body consisting of many people or departments, they should be capable of a multidisciplinary approach based on relevant military, legal, medical and environmental expertise. Such an approach is outlined in the Guide and it was specifically requested by the 28th Conference of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent[106].

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[106] See *Agenda for Humanitarian Actions, op. cit.*

Multidisciplinary expertise is important, given a wide range of factors that should be taken into account during the review, particularly by the review authority, which requires a technical understanding of the reliability and precision of weapons in light of the prohibition of indiscriminate use of the weapons able to result in injury or undue suffering. Medical expertise is important when dealing with technologies that have effects other than those with which surgeons are generally familiar, especially effects other than those of explosive force, such as changes in the body chemistry, electromagnetic energy and so on.

Ensuring the legality of new weapons is crucial if development, proliferation and use of direct and indiscriminate weapons are to be prevented and if humanity, to quote the words of Henry Dunant, must be protected from *"new and terrifying weapons of destruction"*[107].

Antipersonnel mines in conformity with Ottawa Convention

Since 1999, 40 million mines have been destroyed, cleaning thus an area of 1 002 km^2, including the territories of most affected states, such as Afghanistan or Albania. 144 states parties have stocks of antipersonnel landmines[108]. States parties have supported these actions with one billion dollars, and the states that are not party to the Convention have also contributed, with a total of one billion dollars. In addition, the Convention has changed the policies of states not parties, some of which impose a moratorium on the use of landmines, while others prohibit the transfer of mines (China, Russia, Ukraine, Singapore, South Korea and the United States of America).

Many challenges are still to overcome. Indeed, it is not a universally ratified Convention, and the main users and producers of mines remain outside the regulatory framework and, therefore Caroline Millar[109] said, during the ICRC Colloquium in Bruges (18-19 October 2007): *"we should thus promote the ratification of the Convention, particularly in areas where it can have a real impact on security, peace and development (Middle East, for example)"*. In addition, states are faced with the deadline set by the Convention related to cleaning mined areas and destroying stock. For some, the implementation of these commitments will be difficult.

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[107] Henry Dunant, *O amintire de la Solferino*, ICRC, Geneva, 1986, p. 128.

[108] State parties were imposed deadlines to clean their territory of their mines. In conformity with article 5, this fact has to be completed in 10 years since the Convention entered into force for a state. A number of state parties confronted with deadlines in 2009, including Chad, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique, Jordan and Sudan. Many states – especially the most affected ones – predict that they will not comply with the deadlines, in *Current Perspectives on Regulating Means of Warfare*, 18-19 October 2007, Collegium, no. 37, Summer, 2008, p. 33.

[109] Ambassador of Australia to the Permanent Mission of the United Nations Organisation and Disarmament Conference, Geneva

Explosive remnants of war: legal and operational perspectives

Article 2 of Protocol V of the 1980 Convention on certain conventional weapons mentions two categories of *Explosive Remnants of War – ERW*: unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines, traps or other devices as defined in Protocol II, are not included. Explosive remnants of war represent a long-term threat to the civilians and limit the freedom of manoeuvre of troops. Several causes determine incidents: poor quality control, degradation due to certain components damage, environmental effects, human errors etc. *"To stop this phenomenon, cooperation and assistance from NATO are highly valued and are achieved by developing best practices in designing, assuring quality and manufacturing these systems in member states, as well as developing quality assurance standards and better monitoring and exchange of technical information. Within the Ammunition Safety Group, it will be also sought to develop consistent agreements, which will then be implemented in all member states of the Alliance. Finally, some states, such as France, took the initiative to organise conferences on explosive remnants of war"*[110].

Operationally, NATO forces have been faced with explosive remnants of war in Bosnia or Kosovo, where their presence has restricted, especially, the ability to protect and rebuild civil society. Cleaning the conflict areas has become a priority. Afghanistan is more complicated for NATO. Explosive remnants of both past wars (the war against the Soviet Union and the civil war) as well as of the current conflict represent a threat to NATO forces and the civilian population, especially in the south. To address this threat, the exchange of information on the type of explosive remnants and their location is essential. ISAF participates in the removal and destruction of explosive remnants and supports education programmes on the risks posed by unexploded remnants provided by NGOs for civilians. The current security situation, however, is a major challenge to allow the continuation of this work, cooperation and assistance measures being concrete applications of Protocol V and its technical annexes and providing NATO with a unique role in this regard.

Proportionate use
and weapon discrimination: challenges to the military commander

The principle of proportionate and discriminate use of weapons is codified in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I and recognised as a principle of customary international humanitarian law. The United States of America is not party to the AP, but recognise this as a rule of customary law. US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq

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[110] Lieutenant Colonel Darren M. Stewart OBE (GBR Army), Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, *Legal and Operational Perspectives Associated With the Issue Of Explosive Remnants of War*, Collegium, *op. cit.*, 2008.

were facing new challenges in the implementation of this principle. Both conflicts illustrate the phenomenon that the enemy, because of technological advantage (weapons quality, endurance level of command and control, communication systems, high performance) had a disadvantage in adopting asymmetric means and methods, which required looking for their advantages but also endangering the application of prescriptive standards.

Opponents of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have eluded American superiority, using less effective artillery in the fight against a technologically efficient fighter but very useful in urban guerrilla operations, using also improvised explosive devices, built with mobile phones cars, copper wire, fertilisers, fuels or explosive remnants of war.

The party disadvantaged in asymmetric conflicts by adopting illegal fighting means, such as people killed or injured in breach of the rules of customary international law is codified in Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is important for commanders to develop countermeasure systems. At the operational level, it would be possible to detonate improvised explosive devices, before being used in attacks. But the lack of knowledge, such as placing the bomb, however complicates the calculation of proportionality. Many items used by the disadvantaged party aimed at dual use, both military and civilian. It is therefore difficult for combat forces to distinguish between weapons, their components and other military objects used by their civilian counterparts. Where asymmetric technology generates perception of unequal forces, commanders will worry about their perception that even legal actions could be considered unfair or illegal.

Forces in theatres of operations are also concerned about the methods used by technologically disadvantaged opponents. The weakest parts tend to move into populated civilian areas, making it difficult to locate, identify and hit mainly due to the fact that they are *a priori* not uniform. This makes it difficult for soldiers to distinguish between combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities. Forces may, therefore, adopt rules of engagement for self-defence, stating that a person must execute a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent before a combatant. Opponents also use vulnerable groups for military purposes, using human shields (voluntary and involuntary), so finding a civilian traitor if conducting surprise attacks and operating in the premises which enjoy special protection under IHL. These methods, which are equal tactical responses to technological asymmetry, are violations of customary international humanitarian law and the PA I for those who are parties. Opponent forces have adopted a strategy of attack with legal

arguments *(lawfare)* as a method of warfare to offset US advantages. Thus, one party shows that the other acts illegally in order to withdraw the national and international support as well as the support of own military power and the public. This tactic is often used in non-infringement of community rights.

Another way is to ensure that traditional media have access to cruel scenes involving the death and suffering of civilians. Moreover, in some cases, the adversary of military forces attack individuals or groups who have been described as civilians under international humanitarian law (police, NGOs, ICRC and UN politicians ...). By moving the centre of gravity of the Army on the civilians, insurgents try discourage cooperation with the occupation regime and create instability.

Finally, the forces should take into account cultural sensitivities, while applying the principle of distinction. Sometimes, for example, insurgents use a mosque to store weapons and military forces are reluctant to enter these places. Similarly, they systematically check women at checkpoints, fact that is known and used by opponents.

The breach of the discrimination principle and of other standards of International Humanitarian Law by opponents has clearly affected the attitude of the soldiers on the ground. According to a 2006 study, conducted in Iraq by US military experts in mental health, only 47% of the Land Forces and 38% of the Marines respondents believe that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect! Indeed, when one party violates the law, it becomes difficult for the commanders of the other party to enforce law among their troops.

Use of new types of weapons by the armed forces during peacekeeping or peace-imposing operations

In peace operations taking place in international contexts generating armed conflicts, International Humanitarian Law applies only where *there are specific considerations regarding weapons, means and methods to conduct warfare*. When applying International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (IHRL), in each case the way in which the rules of the two systems interact is defined. However, some problems, such as *extraterritorial applicability of human rights* and *the responsibility of states* participating in peace operations may occur.

Given IHRL, the use of force, especially the lethal one, is more limited than under International Humanitarian Law, although in the case of joint applications, International Humanitarian Law may be *lex specialis*, especially in international armed conflicts. The right to life shall be protected by the ECHR and ICCPR. Therefore, weapons, means and methods of retaining, whose use automatically violates this rule, should not be used.

It is also banned to use weapons that cannot be directed to specific targets or recourse to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. This identifies a human rights requirement to equip police and other forces when carrying out actions against the crowd or riot, using non-lethal weapons. European Court of Human Rights considers that a balance between the aim and the means used to achieve this fact should be struck. This philosophy is reflected in the United Nations basic principles on the use of force and firearms, for law enforcement.

Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions obliges state parties to adopt internal procedures to ensure that all weapons, means or methods of warfare, introduced by their armed forces, to a legal review of their obligations under international law for their use (IHL or IHRL). In analysing the legality or illegality of the use of special weapons, the review authority examines not only the weapon model, but also the method of use (for example, the Belgian authorities reviewed lachrymal gas grenades and pepper spray, considered illegal). In International Humanitarian Law, *peace operations* differ slightly from other military operations in terms of military means and methods of warfare. Applicability of human rights in peace operations, either with or without the application of IHL, may trigger distinct rules, among the most restrictive ones, especially related to intentional lethal force and equipment and weapons necessary for a better proportion. Under these circumstances, it becomes difficult to know, at this stage, for the forces in the field, when certain weapons can be used, especially in cases where human rights requires them, but also in the situations where IHL bans them as fighting means.

The notion of *"peace operations"* is used as a general term that includes *peacekeeping operations*, from the consensual acceptance in a permissive environment to the imposition of peace in a hostile environment. In these situations, for the development, acquisition or adoption of new weapons, new means and methods of warfare, any state party to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 shall, in accordance with the agreement, establish whether the means would, in some or all circumstances, be banned by this Protocol or by any other rules of international law applicable in that state party (Article 36 of this Protocol). This broad formulation can be seen as referring to the introduction of new weapons (this expression refers also to new methods), regardless of the type of operations that will be employed, including peace operations.

Before a state decides to equip its military personnel with some new weapons, it should ensure that, therefore, the use (normal or expected) of these weapons is not banned or restricted. Where such use would go against the national law

of that state or its obligations under international law, it should not equip its staff with these weapons or it should impose restrictions, nationally and/or internationally, as required by law.

International law applicability

The use of weapons, means or methods of warfare may be banned or restricted by rules of international law, in particular by International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (HRL). The legal framework for peace operations is complex and varies from case to case, including with regard to the applicability and interaction between International Humanitarian Law and HRL. Clearly, if International Humanitarian Law is applied, the legal regime is quite different, and a consensual post-conflict peacekeeping operation does not meet the requirements of participating in an armed conflict where IHL does not apply. A specific example can be mentioned in the rules for the agents designated to riot combat and crowd control[111].

International law and human rights applicability

Addressing the concrete way these laws are implemented means providing an answer to the question: *"To what extent are military forces operating in foreign countries in peace operations subject to international human rights obligations?"*[112]. This question was and remains debated. Moreover, besides the relationship with the requirements of International Humanitarian Law, briefly discussed above, the debate concerns primarily the extraterritorial applicability of human rights. In addition, within peace operations conducted by international organisations, the problem of responsibility attribution reappears: *Are the participating states and/or the organisation responsible?*

There are a few key reflections on this issue. Firstly, on *extraterritoriality*, despite opposition from several countries (e.g. USA), there seems to be growing recognition, particularly in international law, that human rights apply in cases of global extraterritorial control on territory or persons. The situation related to the forms of control is far less clear nowadays. However, it is stated the view that it is better, in such cases, to progressively implement these human rights, affected by a more limited exercise of jurisdiction; it would be also appropriate,

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[111] ICC Decision in Tadici case, related to banned fighting means and methods, mentions that *"what is inhuman and therefore forbidden in international wars cannot be but inhuman and inconceivable in civil conflicts"* (2 October 1995, §119); it is also observed that CCW extension to non-international armed conflicts, but it is also observed the lack of provisions for war crimes outside international conflicts in ICC Statute.

[112] Alfons Vanheusden & Frederik Naert, the Ministry of Defence, Belgium.

despite its rejection by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in Bankovic case[113]. Instead, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has accepted such a gradual approach[114].

Secondly, the application should also take into account the particular circumstances of peace operations, including any effect of a UNSC mandate, the relationship with IHL, and any exemption. Regarding the latter aspect, it is shown that, despite the contrary opinion of many researchers, exemptions may be claimed extraterritorially related to threats to the existence of the host nation. As the European Commission of Human Rights declared that the Turkish armed forces in Cyprus have introduced any other persons or forces there "in jurisdiction" of Turkey, under Article 1 ..., *"to the extent that they exercise control over the forces or the properties"*... it results that, equally, Turkey was [...] *competent ratione loci*[115] to any measures of derogation under Article 15[116].

Thirdly, there may be a warning to regional human rights instruments, which could – to some extent – contain elements that are not universally shared (e.g. difficulty of applying the European Convention on Human Rights/ECHR in Afghanistan). However, the situation could be also considered in a phased approach, as in the case of extraterritorial rights applicability.

Fourthly, on the issue of liability, there seems to be differing opinions between HRC, which requires states to send to the court of first instance, and ECHR, which adopted a decision in Behrami & Saramati cases by largely exempting participating states. The latter decision has led to a series of comments. Weapons, coercion means or methods, the use of which automatically violates this obligation, are, therefore, not used. In addition, it is prohibited to use weapons, means or methods of constraint that cannot be directed to specific targets[117] and to use torture and cruel, degrading or inhuman treatments, therefore the weapons or methods whose use necessarily entail such treatment are also outlawed. Thus, restrictions on weapons in accordance with human rights law are partly similar to those under international humanitarian law, and, in part, also stricter.

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[113] Vlastimir Bankovic and Borka Bankovic et al, The European Court of Human Rights on 12 December 2001, in Bankovic et al vs Belgium et al.

[114] Ibrahim Gueyeetal, the cause of France, no. 196/1985, 6 April 1989, §9.4: *"authors are not, in general, under the French jurisdiction, excepting the fact that it is based on the French legislation regarding their pensions"*.

[115] ECHR competencies *a) ratione temporis; b) ratione personae; c) ratione materiae; d) ratione loci.* (*"Acts occurred on territories that are not controlled by a state cannot engage its responsibility"*).

[116] Apud *Collegium*, *loc. cit.*, p. 127.

[117] Isayeva, the cause of Russia, 24 February 2005, §191: *"the massive use of weapons without discrimination … cannot be considered compatible with the standard of care, prerequisite to such an operation that entails the use of lethal force by state agencies"*.

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Since 11 September 2001, there has not been any considerable turbulence among those who study the law governing armed conflicts. Much of the controversy involved the treatment of individuals, groups and nations that could, in one way or another, relate to mass murder at the World Trade Centre in New York. As time passed, there has been no argument to support the fact that the rule of law has come to the fore again, or at least that its usefulness has become apparent to those in power. Among the topics under discussion currently are the following:

- US position that they can resort to military action in the doctrine of *"pre-emption"* even if the threat against it does not meet traditional standards to justify an armed attack under international law before September 11;
- position, supported by several other nations, that international peace and security continues to seek UN Security Council approval, before responding to armed aggression, if there is no imminent threat;
- treatment of people caught in conflicts incurred by the United States fall outside traditional concepts and justifications for the protection of prisoners of war, which even requires the revision and jurisdiction of federal courts;
- illegal means of interrogation of persons caught in conflicts and potential liability of persons involved or for whom such query is required;
- rules governing belligerent occupation on the territory of an attacked state, in accordance with the doctrine of pre-emption and, undoubtedly, without the Security Council approval;
- United Nations role in resolving and concluding belligerent occupation.

In addition, the definition and military actions against international terrorism and, no doubt, the prosecution of persons accused of terrorism should involve aspects of the law of war, including, *inter alia*, the definition of *war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.*

From the perspective of international humanitarian law, *peace operations* differ slightly from other *military operations,* in terms of fighting means and methods. In contrast, the applicability of Human Rights in peace operations, whether or not concomitantly with International Humanitarian Law may entail a number of distinct rules. It seems that they are reflected in most restrictions, relying strongly on *lethal force*, especially with the intent and requirements of equipment and weapons that allow a proportionate response, in some cases even when such equipment or weapons would be contrary to International Humanitarian Law, such as in the case of riot control agencies.

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION AND ITS MANAGEMENT

Cristina CHIRIAC

The 21st century is influenced by major reforms that have a great impact over the security context in all its dimensions.

In these conditions, the reform of the intelligence field represents a permanent concern for both the specialists and the citizens interested in the rising risks and threats the national and international security is faced with.

In the past years, we have witnessed intensified efforts made by states in order to more efficiently organise the activity and management of the intelligence organisation – IO.

The IOs have as main goal searching and providing data, and analysing and obtaining the intelligence necessary for the political, economic and military decision-making process.

Keywords: security context; intelligence; intelligence analysis; organisations management; intelligence process

We are living in a dynamic world, in which the pace, the objectives and the complexity of change are increasing. The continuous evolution of globalisation, the increasing number of independent actors and the advanced technology have strengthened global connections, interdependence and complexity, bringing about more and more uncertainty, a developed risk and a less predictable future. These changes have decreased the warning times and compressed the decision cycles. Even if this interconnected world gives many opportunities for technological innovation and economic growth, it also triggers unique challenges and threats. In this environment, the secret to achieving long-lasting strategic advantage is the ability to rapidly anticipate and adapt to complex challenges.

The experience gathered at the beginning of the 21st century has pointed out that the success of any *intelligence* organisation is determined, in most cases, by the anticipative capacity of its top

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management regarding the changes to occur in the organisation security environment, as well as by the capacity of adequate response to the challenges/changes determined by the vulnerabilities, risks and threats posed to the organisation.

Organisations are the basis of a collective activity with a certain purpose. Some specialists maintain that the term organisation can refer to *any complex system of human interaction, no matter if there are collective purposes involved or not.*

Organisations, as complex social systems, consist of elements that must act in a focused manner to gain efficiency by making long-term planned changes that aim at the entire organisation and, most of all, at human resources.

The efficiency, performances and flexibility of an organisation are key desiderata for its optimisation and can even be goals within certain programmes and strategies of the society. This requires that the organisations are analysed from the perspective of the capacities to integrate the organisation variables with human factors, as well as from the perspective of adequately responding to the influence of the external environment.

Reinventing the Intelligence Organisation

Managing the continuous flow of changes determines intelligence organisations to be flexible and adaptable, and this adaptation to change involves: strategic vision and permanent innovation; to decentralise decisions and inform component structures; capacity to spontaneously use multidisciplinary teams; a modular and easy to reconfigure organisation structure; a strong organisational culture that is adequate to the purpose of the organisation; a managerial policy that encourages innovation, non-linear thinking and assimilation of new technologies; human resource policies capable of identifying, developing and promoting competences within the organisation.

At the core of an intelligence organisation are the people, that is why one of its biggest challenges is the ability to attract, train, and retain a highly skilled, creative and adaptive workforce. The human capital must be more distributed, virtual, and flexible than any time in the past. Any intelligence organisation needs professionals with excellent linguistic skills, deep understanding of the cultural environment and good mastery of the human nature. The human capital must be focused on the customer that can combine functional knowledge and expertise with collaboration and networking skills. Strict limitations, such as the distinction between advisers and analysts, must become permeable delimitations, which highlight different roles that our intelligence professionals play during a career in intelligence, and not exclusive memberships.

Intelligence organisations must be efficient, namely successful: for this, they should permanently think of reinventing themselves in order to face the challenges of globalisation and of the rapid and often unpredictable developments at world level. According to James A. Champas, Chairman of the *Perot Systems* advisory group, for the organisation to reach its objectives, we need to project the work flow starting from zero, and in order to deal with the challenges of the future, more stress can be laid on redesigning the processes of the company and on re-inventorying the company. Any redesign must start from a strategic vision that should be embraced by all those who embark together on the path of an important structural change, that should influence/change reality and not just replace a structure with another structure. The management of the intelligence organisation can be assimilated, at all hierarchical levels, with a series of operations, of programmed elements, which take place in a certain order and provide the respective process with a cyclic character and support the manager or the managerial team in addressing all leadership issues. This managerial process has a cyclic character, which is triggered when objectives are set, continues with the operational activity for meeting these objectives and is completed when the results are evaluated. The development of this cycle entails the existence of certain functions of management, such as *planning, organisation, conduct, coordination, control-evaluation* and *information of the factors in charge.*

Providing an integrated decision-making system requires that the intelligence organisations assume responsibility for changing the organisation and the processes with a view to improving the intelligence products and their distribution channels for the consumer within the organisation's decision-making system.

The Manager of the Intelligence Organisation

The Manager is a specialist in the field of leading the intelligence organisation, invested with authority and power of decision for using, combining and coordinating human, financial, material and intelligence resources and, implicitly, for managing the information system, based on management principles and techniques, with the purpose of reaching the desired (sought) outcomes. The manager is assisted by his collaborators, a component of the managerial team, advisors, consultants and leadership specialists, as well as by an important number of partners (services providers, consumers, beneficiaries, intermediaries etc.).

Each manager is unique, and being invested with authority provides him with a *capacity* to organise, conduct, coordinate and control the way in which

there are established and managed the resources necessary for the functioning of the system led. In this respect, he is compelled to know the goals of the activity of the intelligence organisation he is in charge of, its features, interest, necessities and possibilities for relating with the external environment and the fundamental elements related to the profession or the tasks of the manager.

A modern, professional and effective manager must make changes in the organisation, obtain participation, build the *"chameleonic"* and/or *"camouflaged"* organisation, create a place in which people belonging to different departments and hierarchical levels can unite spontaneously in order to settle inter-department issues.

A manager's defining feature is his *professional (conception) capacity*, manifested in regard to both its own work and its collaborators work. This consists in the general and specialised knowledge that enables him to make stable and valued decisions, foresee new solutions, imagine and think constructively. It presupposes knowledge in the field of managerial sciences, especially at the level of the organisation, as well as a complex of attitudes and aptitudes for efficiently fulfilling certain activities such as: precisely setting goals, planning and thoughtfully distributing the tasks to those who must accomplish them, depending on necessities, possibilities and interests.

The *competence* of the manager is defined through the attested professional capacity, obtained following the process of socialisation through school and enriched during the managerial, organisation, leadership and decision-making process with a view to obtaining and managing information resources.

In the field of organisational intelligence, a manager must have enough knowledge to use methods/processes and procedures in the specific activity (*technical* skills), he also must have the ability to collaborate with the other people involved in the information process (*human* skills) and the capacity to design and offer solutions, for different domains and issues, to organise and reorganise the specific activity depending on necessities (*conceptual* skills).

At the same time, a manager must have:

- *personal qualities: professional knowledge, general knowledge, sense of observation, ability, initiative, precaution, analysis and synthesis capacity;*
- *elements generated by the ones above: capacity to communicate; ability to lead and organise resources (management), thorough knowledge of the social domain and systemic vision;*
- *skills: strong character and personality, intellectual adaptability and flexibility, tact and discretion, ability in communication and public relations, managerial skills.*

The leadership ability helps the manager put into practice his leadership knowledge, capitalise on it in the most concrete way possible, using his abilities to observe, select useful information, set priorities, analyse managerial phenomena, communicate with the personnel, think economically and technologically and participate in making decisions.

The manager is in a strong *information field* and operates with:

➥ *status information* – defined as situations or conditions for acquiring information resources whose processing results in other alternatives of action or attitude;

➥ *decision-making information* – based on which the decision is made.

Thus, the manager must have *double professionalisation*, which derives, on the one hand, from his professional development, and on the other hand, from the exigencies of the function that requires thorough knowledge in the field of management. Therefore, the personality of the manager consists in the range of his features, characteristics, capacities and skills that are accomplished in the practical behaviour and are capitalised on in the managerial process.

The manager has a *decision-making competence*, achieved by obtaining, accomplishing and using information resources, skilfully using the information, contacts and formal and informal relations with the view to capitalising on resources, settling certain conflict situations and initiating optimal solutions to the issues he must address.

The complexity of the managerial activity in the field requires *"team leadership"* – the managerial team, in which the manager has a determining role in:

- *establishing a viable managerial structure, based on the set objectives and purposes and providing specialists at the level of obtaining information resources (execution) as well as at the level of their analytical processing, to make an "informal" and operational sub-entity from the managerial team;*
- *planning the specific actions and measures necessary for integrating the managerial team in the ensemble of the information system, of protecting the managerial act and ensuring the internal order within the system;*
- *maintaining permanent communication, organised in accordance with the attributions and responsibilities that fall under the personnel depending on attributions and competences.*

His role is provided through authority and competence, which entail the right to command, the power to obey, to act, to implement a decision. While the authority is determined by the legislative system, the participative

character in making and adopting decisions (can be hierarchical, functional, institutional authentic, personnel), the competence of a manager must be understood through the interdependence between his specialist quality and his psycho-pedagogical skills. In the managerial process, each team manager achieves desired results only if he ensures the functionality of the team through his collaborators, through the subordinates he is in charge of. That is why there are required, on the one hand, optimal working relations between the manager and his collaborators and, on the other hand, a behaviour that is permanently oriented towards obtaining concrete results at the level of the set plans and programmes. Full understanding between the members of the managerial team determines better results in the managerial process.

The correlative of authority is *responsibility;* there can be no authority without responsibility and vice versa. Responsibility is a derivative of the freedom of choice between legal and illegal, moral and immoral. Responsibility means assuming consciously, deliberately and from own initiative the accountability for the managerial activity with its ups and downs. A good manager does not act alone, he is compelled to proceed to the *delegation of competences* – which involves sending (temporary or permanent) authority and responsibility from top to down to a functional department of the structure he manages in order to reach a certain goal for which attributions, scope and limits of the operational autonomy are established.

In the information-management process, the *management team* has the *"executive"* function, because it is a *"formal"*-type structure, which coordinates in an organised (planned) manner the interpersonal/institutional relations in order to meet the goals set consciously and deliberately. A viable *management team* must work in an informal-formal regime to be able to provide:

- *the organisation and functioning in an integrated manner of the components of the managed information system;*
- *distribution of tasks and responsibilities set by a manager during the information process;*
- *rational use of information resources, as well as efficient and timely implementation of decisions.*

The *"informal"* organisation is determined by the need for prompt information and for self-protection, and is achieved through the interpersonal collaboration at the level of the managerial team, while the *"formal"*-type organisation is required by the need for establishing the hierarchy of functions within the managerial

team – in order to ensure communication needs within the systems and subsystems for accomplishing national safety.

The new managers must go beyond the traditional orientation focused on the intelligence organisation and embrace a style based on the cooperation with other organisations of the same kind and on interdisciplinary experience. Moreover, the new managers will adopt a new role, more focused on the professional development and on the assessment of the quality of the work and less concentrated on the supervision and analysis of the product. The new managers must get involved in creating leadership development programmes, performance assessment systems and establishment of a structure of incentives that must be the same for the entire intelligence organisation.

The Analyst – The Essential Element of the Intelligence Organisation

The managerial team consists of *specialists* (analysts and advisors) – people with thorough knowledge in their domain of competence, which provide the manager with arguments, evaluations, propositions and solutions regarding the substantiation of decisions. Among them, an important role belongs to the analyst. Today, at the international level, all intelligence organisations need different kinds of analysts: traditional analyst, intelligence analyst, information resources analyst or the analyst that manages the relations with the information beneficiaries.

From our point of view, we are interested in the intelligence organisation analyst. He is the key element of the organisation, because he is placed within the organisation structure between the information resource and the manager – the information user, the specialist who has authority and competence regarding the ways of capitalising on the pieces of information.

He is the specialist who determines the need for information, receives the data and information from the information flows established, analyses them from the perspective of their relevance to the intelligence organisation, selects them depending on importance and priorities, makes the necessary connections with a view to gaining the pieces of information, processes the information and gives his conclusions to the manager so that the latter can make the decision to use them. Therefore, the analyst must be capable of:

- *going into the issues assigned to the managerial team he is part of, as well as into the elements that are specific to the domains of activity of the intelligence organisation;*

- *examining every piece of information, as well as the possibility that this can be found on the adequate carriers in the information flow established;*
- *mastering the flow of classified or unclassified pieces of information obtained from all the categories of sources;*
- *detecting the dysfunctions, vulnerabilities, risks and threat pointed out by the information he processes.*

The role of the analyst in the intelligence organisation is first of all noticed in the *quality of processing the information* obtained by the departments and structures of the organisation, *in producing timely and valuable information products*, as well as in the operative achievement of the specific connection between resources and managers.

If we consider the multitude of traits, qualities and skills that a good analyst should prove, it is clear that recruitment, training and education processes in the intelligence organisations are difficult. Therefore, the training process of a good intelligence analyst is a long one, which requires constant effort from both the instructors/trainers/tutors and the analyst, trying also to solve some of the problems generated by the dysfunctions, vulnerabilities and risks faced by intelligence analysts.

Therefore, in an intelligence organisation, the analyst is the key element to inventorying the information products as a basis for obtaining integrated information products.

The *advisor* has a well-defined place in the management team and in the organisational structure, being nominated through specific function and attributions. He is a specialist in a well-defined field, being able, through training and experience in the field, to support the decision-maker through specialised consultations, useful in decision-making. At the same time, he must be permanently in contact with the other specialists within the management team, especially with the analyst, but also with the specialists from the domains related to national safety in order to obtain additional information for substantiating decisions. In some cases, the advisor may be invested with managerial responsibilities and authority in his domain of specialty.

The advisor can perform the following specific tasks:
- ☞ he makes suggestions regarding the strategies and work programmes regarding the management of information resources, as well as their reorientations for ensuring the functionality of the information system;

⮞ he analyses pieces of information and information products, viability of flows information circuits established;

⮞ he makes estimates regarding the information resources needed and proposes ways of capitalising on the pieces of information and information products, as well as of improving the activity;

⮞ he examines draft of regulations, instructions, methodologies, procedures and technical standards and other documents regarding the activities carried out by the information-organisational structure and proposes them for approval to the manager (decision-maker);

⮞ he analyses the way in which cooperation is achieved with other structures that contribute directly or indirectly to accomplishing the assigned tasks;

⮞ he makes propositions regarding adopting internal security measures in accordance with the law.

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Studies show that the intelligence organisation of the future will undergo profound changes that will affect the leadership, the functionality and the integration in its whole. Thus, organisations will become temporary systems, capable of adapting and constantly changing, depending on the environment developments and individual needs, and the issues will be solved by groups of people with different qualifications. The role of the manager will be very important, as a significant link capable of understanding the scientific language, but without the pretension of knowing and directing the whole conduct of the activity. Another special role will be the one of the *groups of specialists* established depending on the issues occurred, and the leadership will belong to those who are the most capable of solving the problems and not necessarily those who have a certain rank, essentially, the specialists will differ in terms of skills and professional training, not by rank or roles. The aspects regarding knowledge will gain a crucial role in asserting the identity of the organisation, in ensuring its integrity and coherence in terms of structure, strategy and actions.

To ensure the volume and quality of intelligence-specific information resources, the issues and profiles of achieving intelligence products, as well as their effective management, it is necessary to create a reconfigurable organisation and to use multidisciplinary teams. This change, which has become permanent, is part of the natural order of things, leadership being now equivalent to change management.

In conclusion, according to specialists, the optimisation of the performances of the intelligence organisation of the future will depend more and more on this anticipatory capacity of response to changes, which must be attributed to the increasing professionalisation of both the manager and the management of intelligence organisations.

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English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

ENERGY SECURITY AND NATO: A VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

Dan MILSTEIN

What you see depends on where you are standing…and the view of energy security from here on the banks of the Potomac River is surely quite different from that on the banks of the Seine, the Thames, the Vistula, or of Faxafloi Bay.

In 1973, the United States were so traumatised by an oil embargo by members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that we still use a proper noun to describe the *"1973 Oil Crisis"*. Though we soon stopped burning oil to generate electricity and made gradual progress improving the fuel efficiency of our vehicle fleet – such that our nation's oil demand peaked in 2005 – the near-monopoly oil still has in fueling our transport sector is our acute energy

security vulnerability. Given that monopoly, and transport's literal circulatory role in all commerce, oil remains the lifeblood of our economy.

The United States has a relatively secure supply of oil. With rising domestic oil production, we are once again importing less than half of our oil demand and we have a diverse, reliable set of foreign oil suppliers – Canada supplies the most with 24% of our imports. Yet, *"energy security"* implies not only secure access to supplies, but also at affordable prices. Irrespective of the provenance of the oil we combust, we are not insulated from the economically disruptive oil price spikes that can be the consequence of a supply disruption anywhere in the world.

The 1973 Oil Crisis inspired the creation of the *International Energy Agency (IEA)* in 1974, precisely to organise collective action by large oil importers to cope with oil supply disruptions and price manipulations by OPEC. The *IEA* has largely done the job it was created to do within the limited range of action its members have to address global supply disruptions. It was only a year ago that *IEA* members executed a coordinated release from their strategic oil reserves in order to try to mitigate the spike in global oil prices caused, in part, by the disruption to Libya's oil exports to Europe during its civil war and NATO's campaign.

The 2011 Libya experience came just one year after the adoption of NATO's new *Strategic Concept* at the Lisbon Summit, which speaks directly to a new NATO role in addressing energy security. The *Strategic Concept* demands that NATO *"develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning…".* The violence in Libya directly threatened the energy security of NATO members by disrupting the flow of its light, sweet crude to European oil refineries and the flow of natural gas through pipelines to Italy. NATO took pains not to destroy Libya's oil infrastructure during the course of the campaign, but this hardly constitutes a demonstration of a new capacity.

This recent experience begs the question: *What else, if anything, should NATO have done to address the energy security threat posed to the NATO members by the conflict in Libya?*

From here in Washington, the answer seems to be: nothing. *IEA*'s role to address the energy security threat the Libyan conflict posed to its members was relatively straightforward. Though the membership of the *IEA* and NATO are not identical, the overlap is considerable, with 19 of 28 Alliance members in the *IEA*, leaving out only small oil consumers.

If one agrees that NATO should not attempt to adopt a competing and redundant role for addressing oil supply disruptions – still the top energy security challenge here in the United States – what useful role should it play?

It bears reminding that the Alliance's recent attention to energy security was, to a large extent, focused by the natural gas supply disruptions many of its European members experienced as Russia became perceived as an unreliable supplier when Gazprom turned off the flow of gas in the winters of 2006 and 2009 in the course of contract disputes with Ukraine, a key transit state. With soft echoes of *Cold War* rhetoric about the malevolent and capricious Russian bear, much ink and breath has since been used to expound upon the necessity for and mechanisms by which those countries most dependent on Russian gas could and should diversify their suppliers and supply routes.

Without rehashing those arguments and ideas, let us ponder: what role, if any, would NATO play in what many have this asserted is the chief energy security vulnerability on the East side of the Atlantic. Would NATO finance the construction of gas interconnectors, LNG receiving terminals, pipelines to Caspian-region suppliers, or other critical infrastructure? No. Would NATO enforce the unbundling terms of the European Union's Third Energy Package that Gazprom so despises? No. Would NATO require its members to meet certain energy efficiency targets in its gas-heated buildings and key industries? No.

These are all activities best left to European national governments and the EU itself. And though the EU membership and NATO membership are not identical, akin to *IEA* membership, the membership overlap between NATO and the EU is considerable, with 21 of 25 European members of NATO also members of the EU, with only Albania, Croatia, Iceland and Norway outside of the EU fold. In the event of an Article 5 attack on a member, NATO would strive to protect endangered critical energy infrastructure, but this has always been the case.

It would seem that NATO faces a conundrum of sorts: Its new *Strategic Concept* puts energy security squarely in its mission, but the two energy security matters its members are most fixated upon – the reliability of oil and natural gas supplies and stable energy markets – are being addressed by other institutions that are better suited to deal with these issues. However, just because NATO has no primary role to play in the foremost energy security challenges of its members does not mean that it has no role to play at all.

NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. NATO plays a critical energy security role by protecting critical energy infrastructure and transit – a role explicitly embraced in the new NATO *Strategic Concept*. Presently, for example, it is playing this role by protecting the ships and sea lanes into and out of the Persian Gulf from a potential Iranian threat.

NATO can develop *"the capacity to contribute to energy security"* in valuable novel ways as well. At the *2012 NATO Summit*, held in Chicago this past May, our leaders officially endorsed the creation of a new *NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence*. There are three emerging energy security challenges to which the new *NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence* should endeavor to bring attention across the Alliance to these challenges and their potential solutions:

1) Operational energy

It is plainly obvious that the national militaries that make up the Alliance have a strategic weakness in their energy supply chains and energy usage. It is a tragedy that NATO convoys regularly come under lethal attack in Afghanistan while delivering fuel to operate inefficient vehicles and inefficient diesel generators used to power inefficient devices. The fully-burdened cost of fuel – not the price paid to the wholesaler, but the true price of getting that fuel to the frontlines of the battlefield – is an excess that no military expecting combat can easily afford as national budgets across the Alliance tighten. NATO should catalyse cooperation throughout the Alliance to identify and implement the means by which our militaries can be made stronger by becoming more energy efficient and less reliant on lengthy fuel supply chains.

2) Cyber-security of the energy sector

One of the most serious energy security threats NATO allies face today was not a threat at all until fairly recently: the threat of cyber attacks disabling the energy sector critical infrastructure from afar. Kinetic attacks on critical energy infrastructure – such as a power plant or electrical grid – is less likely to occur within the Alliance than a successful cyber attack. Our systems are vulnerable and the cascading effects of a sustained failure in the power sector could be terrible, affecting essential basic services such as water purification.

NATO should be applauded for having the foresight to include both energy security and cyber security in the domain of its relatively new *Emerging Security Challenges Division*. Similarly NATO's newly established *Energy Security Centre*

of Excellence and the new *NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence* should work very closely together on the area of cyber attacks on the energy sector and disseminate the expertise and best practices from Alliance members.

3) Extreme space weather

NATO has a long and proud history defending against and doing contingency planning for low probability, catastrophic events. Severe space weather – and its impact on energy infrastructure in particular – is one of those types of events against which NATO allies should collectively work to defend themselves. Though space weather would at first seem to be an esoteric subject of discussion between nations' space agencies, extreme space weather events observed in the not-too-distant past would have dire consequences if repeated in today's electronics-dependent world. According to NASA, a repeat of the 1859 super solar flare (known as the *"Carrington event"*) could produce year-long blackouts over enormous territories. In 1989, a less severe geomagnetic storm disrupted power transmission in Canada knocking out power in Quebec for 6 million people and melting power transformers.

Clearly the expertise on solar weather resides with our space agencies and astronomers, but our militaries must consider the potential security consequences and take preventive measures and do contingency planning for low frequency, high impact extreme space weather events.

In summary, the greatest energy security challenges confronting NATO members are the same potentially disruptive critical energy supply interruptions that have threatened our economies for years: namely, oil and gas imports from non-NATO members. In the United States, the threat of oil supply disruptions and oil market instability is still our paramount energy security threat. That said, the *IEA* was created in the wake of the *1973 Oil Crisis* precisely to address this concern and there does not appear to be a useful new role for NATO in this space. From this side of the Atlantic, we recognise that new European

anxieties over the reliability of some Alliance members' natural gas imports from Russia provided the motivation for including energy security so prominently in the *NATO Strategic Concept* that was adopted in 2010. However, there is little NATO can do to address those anxieties, as NATO is incapable of making the necessary infrastructure investments and market reforms necessary to mitigate those continental vulnerabilities.

However, NATO already plays a critical energy security role by protecting critical energy infrastructure and transit and can play a valuable role in spreading expertise throughout the Alliance about emerging and overlooked energy security challenges. Specifically, NATO's new *Energy Security Centre for Excellence* should pay close attention to the issues of: operational energy, cyber-security for the energy sector, and extreme space weather. This is not to say that there are no other emerging or overlooked energy security threats that NATO ought to pay attention, but it would constitute a very fine start to the Alliance's newly assumed responsibilities.

INDIA'S NEXUS BETWEEN RESOURCES, CLIMATE CHANGE AND STABILITY

Michael KUGELMAN

Few regions are more environmentally insecure than South Asia. The region faces rising sea levels and regularly experiences coastal flooding – of particular concern in a region with heavily populated and arable-land-rich coastal areas. Additionally, it is highly vulnerable to glacial melt. The Western Himalayas, which provide water supplies to much of South Asia, have experienced some of the most rapid melt in the world.

Natural resource deficiencies are stark as well.

South Asia houses nearly a quarter of the world's population, yet contains less than 5 percent of its annual renewable water resources. Water availability has plummeted from over 21 000 cubic meters per capita in the 1960s to about 8 000 in 2005.

According to recent estimates, some of the region could face water scarcity (per capita water availability under 1 000 cubic meters) by 2025. In South Asia, water shortage imperils food security and health, but also livelihoods – because farming and fishing are dominant sectors.

Meanwhile, energy is similarly lacking in South Asia. The World Bank has ranked its electricity grid as one of the world's worst. Millions of South Asians do not have electricity – including 400 million in India alone.

Running dry on resources

India, in fact, is a microcosm of the region's environmental insecurity. A recent *Center for Global Development* study projects that nearly 40 million people in India – more than in any other country – are at risk of dying from rising sea

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levels by 2050. It also estimates that because of rising temperatures, India's agricultural productivity could fall by 35 to 40 percent by 2080.

India boasts over 20 percent of the world's population – yet only 4 percent of its water. About 25 percent of Indians – 250 million people – lack access to clean water. So extensive is India's water consumption that users are raiding groundwater supplies with abandon. According to the World Bank, India is the world's most voracious consumer of groundwater. A US study in 2009 found that groundwater levels fell by four centimetres per year between 2002 and 2008 in three northwestern states – including Punjab, the nation's chief breadbasket.

A similar story prevails with energy. India's economic growth has sent demand skyrocketing, and estimates peg India as the world's third-largest energy consumer by 2030. However, the nation, as dramatically demonstrated by the 2012 summer's monster power outages, struggles to meet demand.

Links to stability and security

While climate vulnerability and resource constraints have received heightened attention in recent years, their ties to stability and national security often go unaddressed. In India, these links are particularly sharp.

❖ *Internal contexts*

These connections play out in both internal and external settings. Regarding the former, a chief example is the Maoist anti-government insurgency. This rebellion is low-grade yet widespread; it extends to more than two thirds of India's states, and is often referred to by the New Delhi establishment as the country's gravest internal security threat.

The insurgency's bastions lie in India's eastern and central reaches – which happen to be the locations of the country's chief reserves of coal, India's most heavily consumed energy source. Given the country's energy imperatives, New Delhi

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has a strong incentive to crush these insurgents – which it has done with heavy-handed shows of force that trigger civilian casualties and spark further recruitment to the rebellion.

Additionally, the basic drivers of the insurgency are tied to natural resource constraints. The fruits of heavy resource extraction – mainly coal – often fail to reach local communities, fueling grievances among poor villagers that the Maoists exploit to spark recruitment. Intensive coal mining in these areas also displaces locals and creates toxic living conditions for those who stay – further strengthening the insurgency.

❖ *External contexts*

The external manifestations of links between India's resource woes and security are discernible in ties with Pakistan. With energy demand rising, India has increased its construction of hydropower projects on the Indus Basin's western rivers. These waters are allocated to Pakistan by the Indus Waters Treaty – though India is allowed to use them to develop dams and other hydropower projects that do not store any water. However, some Pakistanis take a different perspective, contending that India is *"stealing"* Pakistan's water. Such accusations become a security matter when they emanate from the likes of the Laskhar-e-Taiba (LeT), an anti-India militant group. The LeT has threatened to attack India in response to India's alleged water theft.

Another external example of India's resource-security links is its relationship with China. Since India lacks energy supplies at home to fulfill its immense demand, it is taking its search for energy abroad. This can bring it into fierce competition

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with China, whose growing regional and global presence is driven, to a great extent, by its own search for natural resources.

Some security analysts have depicted the Bay of Bengal as a future potential source of Sino-India conflict. This is an area off India's eastern shoreline where China is investing in energy assets (not long ago, India discovered significant deposits of natural gas in this area). China has secured a major natural gas deal with Burma – and may conclude one with Sri Lanka. These are deals India has sought unsuccessfully. The fact that China received them has stoked the perceptions of some Indians that China is *"encircling"* India.

Water, meanwhile, is a key factor in border tensions between India and China. These tensions centre around one of the region's rare water-rich areas, particularly Arunachal Pradesh (AP) state. China, like India, suffers from water insecurity. The North China Plain, one of China's core breadbaskets, is acutely water-scarce, with per capita availability of only 225 cubic metres per year. The strategic significance of water-rich AP state, therefore, goes beyond the issue of territory. Finally, India is deeply alarmed by Chinese dam building on Tibetan Plateau rivers, including the Brahmaputra, which flow downstream into lower-riparian India.

The destabilising impact of climate change

The resource-stability nexus – and the implications for India's national security – grows more troubling when considering the long-term consequences of climate change. Assigning causation between climate change and insecurity is risky,

but several speculative conclusions can be made. One is that climate change will intensify existing internal conflicts. Climate change could aggravate a range of problems: displacement, food insecurity, water losses, and economic distress.

These problems will manifest most acutely in India's least developed and poorest regions – and it is in these regions where most of India's internal conflicts are based. These include central and eastern India, where the Maoists are strong, and in northeast India, home to festering separatist insurgencies. Existing resource-driven conflicts, such as state-rooted water-sharing disagreements, will be exacerbated as well.

Climate change could also aggravate India's external security concerns. Existing water-related tensions with Pakistan and with China would likely worsen. However, perhaps the most serious threat would emerge from Bangladesh, a country with which India has bickered over the years due to transboundary water-sharing disagreements. Bangladesh's extreme vulnerability to climate change will likely cause major flooding and agricultural losses in the coming decades. Millions of environmental refugees may stream across the border into northeastern India – a tense region with separatist tendencies, not to mention violence. In fact, arguably some of the violence in that region – including the state of Assam, which witnessed its most recent flare-up of strife this past summer – is driven by local resentment of Bangladeshis who have already migrated in recent years.

The way forward

How can India ease the threat that its resource constraints pose to stability? To a certain extent, its hands are tied (climate change, after all, is irreversible). However, two actionable policies come to mind.

One is better integrating resource considerations into security policy and planning. India's navy, whose modernisation is driven in part by the need to protect far-flung energy assets abroad, is on the right track.

The other measure is for India to improve its resource governance, and to develop demand-side, conservation-based policies that better manage resources that are precious, but not yet scarce. Examples include:

- better maintaining water infrastructure (40 percent of water in most Indian cities is lost to pipe leaks);
- more equitable resource allocations; and
- stronger incentives for using resource-efficient technologies and policies.

These actions would not eliminate India's security concerns. But they would certainly make them more manageable.

ARAB SPRING
– And Now the Morning After –

Barak BARFI

The hopes of real democracy sweeping through the Arab world have not materialised. Having travelled through the region, I saw different interpretations of what freedom means, frustrations having simply changed targets, and new problems replacing old ones. The regimes may have gone. But the societies, structures and problems they created over decades have not.

When hundreds of thousands of Arabs poured into the streets at the end of 2010, many Westerners believed that they were witnessing a democratic revolution. One that would finally free the Middle East from the shackles of authoritarianism and introduce a reign of universal principles of freedom stretching from Chile to South Korea.

The good times: during the revolutions, few were concerned about the shape of the future – as long as it was different from the past

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Twenty three months later, these hopes have been shattered. The Arab world has shown that its view of political liberalisation differs greatly from that of Jean Jacques Rousseau.

In Egypt, Islamists are pushing for a constitutional clause that would make it a crime to speak ill of the Prophet Mohammad and the first four caliphs. Liberals fear that it will muzzle the creative spirit of critical religious analysis. And days after the death of Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, the president of the interim government declared that an edict banning polygamy would be annulled – because it contradicts Islamic law.

As new Arab leaders focus on remaking society, they appear to be neglecting the political reforms at the heart of a democratic transition. These omissions largely stem from the foundations of the revolutions which were never about democracy itself, but rather ending corrupt, authoritarian regimes and their myriad hurdles to social and economic advancement.

These regimes saw their social bases erode and societal frustrations mount as people increasingly realised they could not win in a rigged game.

Cairo's Tahrir Square – arguably the Arab Spring's "Ground Zero"
© Reuters

Today, many Egyptians are frustrated with the revolution's pace of progress. The youth that fuelled the uprising seem no closer to finding steady employment than when President Husni Mubarak ruled.

Their vexation should come as no surprise. A government that could not respond to their needs cannot be reformed overnight. A revolution that topples the elites but leaves behind a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy will not implement the changes necessary to modernise the country to compete with the Asian Tigers. Among them is the need to remove subsidies that gobble up 28% of the national budget.

The most significant changes thus far have been the almost complete breakdown of security and an Islamist government focused more, I believe, on modifying societal mores than reforming a decrepit economy. Some Egyptians can no longer leave their homes at night without fear of being robbed. Thugs rough up patients in hospitals. And the perpetual demonstrations in downtown Cairo cripple the capital's economy, leaving residents angry.

Rather than address these concerns, the Muslim Brotherhood that rules Egypt has been encouraging piety in the workplace. Veiled women who were banned from being anchors on state television channels under Mubarak now sport chic headscarves on air. Bureaucrats who feared growing beards associated with religious devotion now confidently display their whiskers in ministerial hallways.

And now the questions begin… is the best way to protect freedom with unchallenged powers?
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"We are finally free to be good Muslims", Nabil S. told me last summer, outside a mosque in one of Cairo's numerous slums. *"We don't have to be afraid the security services will arrest us if we pray five times a day"*. But Nabil and like-minded Egyptians view freedom as an opportunity to impose their ideas on others. They want Egypt to embrace the Islamic values and suppress the rights of secularists.

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood's focus on societal change, President Mohammad Morsi has tried to institute some economic and bureaucratic reforms. He increased government workers' salaries by 15%. He promised to address shortages in basic staples and fuel. And he pledged to improve security and reduce the traffic jams that clog Cairo streets. But of the 64 goals he laid out during his campaign, only nine have been met.

The Brotherhood's failure to improve Egyptians' lot as their security deteriorates has created nostalgia for the *ancien régime*. In part, this reflects Egyptians' disappointment with the democratic values they have only selectively embraced. They want government to redistribute wealth and create jobs, without questioning what its true role is.

***Unemployment, particularly of the young and males,
is perhaps one of the Arab countries biggest challenges***
© Reuters

These dilemmas reflect Egyptians' frustrations. They are more concerned with rectifying their socio-economic problems rather than establishing their political rights. *"We want our leaders to listen to us, to solve our problems"*, Ahman F. told me in the Cairo suburb of Giza. But when I asked him and his friends what type of government they wanted, they were puzzled by the question. They were more interested in ranting about micro problems than articulating theoretical views of government.

Some liberals have tried to define what government's role should be. But they are largely discredited for their relationship with Western countries and their advocacy of principles like freedom of expression and religion. Instead, a more Islamic model of government has prevailed, which emphasises social justice rather than political liberty; collective duties rather than individual freedoms.

In Libya, the revolution has taken a different course. But the frustrations are the same. After 42 years of Qadhafi's idiosyncratic policies, people merely want some normality in their lives. The perpetual revolution against internal and external enemies that obliterated state institutions has left them utterly exhausted with politics.

Since Qadhafi's fall, the state has receded. The new government has little authority beyond a handful of coastal towns. In the hinterland, ethnic groups clash over smuggling routes, with the central government seemingly powerless to stop them. At times Libyans are exasperated with the disappearance of the state. But at others, they are indifferent. *"We want to be left alone"*, Muhammad al-B. told me during a March visit to Benghazi's gold market.

Nevertheless, many Libyans yearn for the security stripped from them by the revolution. The militias that sprang up to topple Qadhafi are the country's

New faces for new challenges in Libya
© Reuters

real power brokers. City states in Misrata and Zintan declare war on neighbouring towns. Theft and revenge killings are common. As in Egypt, some Libyans pine for a return to the previous era. Then, political freedoms may have been non-existent, but safety was abundant.

Much like in Egypt, the Western focus on individual rights is lost on many Libyans. Revolutions often lead to the removal and marginalisation of the factions that supported the former regime. But mass expulsion of these groups rarely accompanies a transition to democracy. Yet in Libya, militias from Misrata expelled the 30 000 residents of neighbouring Tawargha because they fought for the loyalists. Today they are scattered around the country.

Last December I visited *Tripoli's Naval Academy*, where about 2 300 Tawarghans reside with frequent blackouts and no heat. *"What does freedom mean if we can't go home?"* asked Sabri Muhammad Milad. *"Where is the government that is supposed to protect us?"*

"What were we fighting for again?"...
A rebel from Misrata takes a break
© Reuters

Many Libyans complain it is the government itself that is the problem. The *National Transitional Council (NTC)*, the interim government that took power when Qadhafi was overthrown, stumbled out of the gate. In a country ruled by only handful of men, who rose to power with Qadhafi in 1969 or joined him in the 1970s, few have any political experience. But the *NTC* failed to clear even Libyans' low bar for success.

Its secretive nature frustrated a people already exasperated with Qadhafi's regime, termed *"opaque"* by American diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks. *"There is no transparency in the council's decisions"*, a former *NTC* member told me in February. *"We agree on things and then other decrees are announced"*.

With political reform stalled and security deteriorating by the day, many Libyans have soured on a revolution they never viewed primarily through the prism of establishing democracy. Many Libyans see no tangible gains from embracing it. Elections have not brought to power leaders who can transcend the country's fractious fissures. Iraqi-style bickering has prevented the establishment of a government three months after national polls.

Not over yet

Egyptians and Libyans' initial encounter with democracy has left them disappointed. New economic, political and security crises emerge daily. In part, their frustrations stem from the instability that accompanies transitioning to democracy.

But the populations themselves also bear some of the blame. Some of them believe democracy is a buffet-style political system, from which they can select certain principles – but not others. They have fervently embraced the right to protest but largely rejected individual rights that are a hallmark of democratic states.

If they want their revolutions to succeed, the people of the Middle East need to remake their societies by discarding traditional ideas – and embracing modern ones. Otherwise, their flirtation with democracy will end in failure just as an earlier experiment with pluralistic politics did.

In the 1940s and '50s, weak parties led by urban and rural notables with no social base proffered political programmes that contained nothing beyond preserving their interests. If today's democratically elected leaders wish to avoid their fate, they will also have to avoid their mistakes. But none of their policies have so far demonstrated a grasp of the past that is so crucial for their future.

BUILDING INTEGRITY (BI) PROGRAMME

The *Building Integrity (BI) Programme* is part of NATO's commitment to strengthening good governance in the defence and security sector. It was established by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in November 2007 in the framework of the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB). The BI programme seeks to raise awareness, promote good practice and provide practical tools to help nations enhance integrity and reduce risks of corruption in the security sector by strengthening transparency and accountability.

At the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, Allied leaders welcomed the Status Report on Building Integrity and the progress achieved by NATO's Building Integrity Programme, which has made important contributions to promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity in the defence sector of interested nations.

BI is focused in particular on the management of financial and human resources. In taking this work forward, Allies agree that priority should be given to developing a BI contribution to support the Afghan National Security Forces. This is in addition to ongoing efforts to develop a tailored BI programme to support nations in South Eastern Europe.

The BI Status Report also highlighted the importance of education and training in building capacity and sustaining change. The North Atlantic Council agree that NATO Military Authorities led by Allied Command Transformation are to develop a BI Education and Training Plan. This will provide the necessary framework for supporting NATO civilian and military efforts to promote good governance

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Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68368.htm

in the defence and security sector as well as addressing requirements for NATO led operations.

The BI programme is supported by voluntary contributions to the BI Trust Fund led by Belgium, Norway, Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Making effective use of resources in the defence and security sector is a challenge faced by all nations. The BI programme of activities and tools are open to all Allies and NATO's partners in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, as well as other partners across the globe, including Afghanistan.

Implementation

Participation in the BI Programme is on a voluntary basis.

The NATO International Staff serves as the executing agent and project manager for the BI Programme and works closely with nations and other international organisations as well as representatives of civil society to develop a multi-year programme to promote awareness and understanding of corruption and its impact on military operations and peace and security as well as practical tools and mechanism – the BI Tool Kit. Where possible the BI programme is being integrated and aligned with national processes as well as NATO partnership mechanisms.

BI is also supported by a network of implementing partners – drawn from NATO countries, partner nations and civil society. They include the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Transparency International (UK Defence Team), the Swedish National Defence College, the Bulgarian and Norwegian ministries of defence, and Partnership for Peace Education and Training Centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. These institutions support implementation of BI by provide expertise advice on training and education and by hosting BI activities.

Building Integrity Tool Kit

The Building Integrity Tool Kit includes a BI Self Assessment Survey (available on the NATO website in English, French, Arabic, Dari and Russian) and a Peer Review Process, BI courses certified by Allied Command Transformation, resource material, a Pool of BI Subject Matter Experts and a network of institutions.

Nations use the BI Self Assessment Survey to map current practices and procedures in defence and security establishments. The Peer Review is based on an analysis of the completed survey and provides a framework for identifying and promoting good practice as well as developing national action plans and benchmarks. Nations completing the BI Self Assessment may request a Peer Review and expert support to develop a tailored action plan. To date, BI Peer Reviews have been completed for – Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Norway, and Ukraine. Peer Reviews for Hungary, Latvia and Serbia are ongoing.

BI courses have been conducted in the EAPC area as well as Afghanistan for more than 550 civil and defence and security personnel. In 2012, BI courses are being conducted at the PfP Centre in Ankara, Turkey, and the NATO School Oberammergau, Germany.

The BI Tool Kit also includes resources – *"Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: A Compendium of Best Practices"* (available in English, Arabic, Russian and Ukrainian; see links in right-hand margin). This Compendium provides a strategic approach to reducing corruption risks. It focuses on the practicalities of designing and implementing integrity-building programmes in defence, while taking into account the cultural specifics of defence organisations.

BI is supported by a pool of subject matter experts, drawn from national civilian and defence ministries, international organizations and civil society. These experts provide advice and take an active role in the development and implementation of all aspects of the BI programme such as the BI Peer Reviews and pre-deployment activities for ISAF.

Building Integrity Programme

Strengthening transparency, accountability and integrity and reducing the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector 2012-2014

Aim

1. The aim of this document is to highlight the further progress made in the implementation of the Building Integrity (BI) work programme agreed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and noted by the Heads of State and Government at the Chicago Summit.

Background

2. The BI Programme was launched in the EAPC in November 2007 to raise awareness and develop institutional capabilities in key areas elaborated in the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB), agreed at the Istanbul Summit. From the outset, the BI programme has focused on developing practical tools to help nations build integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector. This ongoing programme promotes good practice and provides nations with systems and mechanisms to make defence and security institutions more effective and smarter.

3. The BI programme includes a set of activities open to NATO, EAPC, MD, ICI and Global Partners. Participation is on a voluntary basis. While the overall approach presented to nations in March 2010 remains unchanged, a number of significant steps have been taken to embed BI into NATO systems and procedures and to make it more operational. This includes contributing to NATO civil-military efforts focused on corruption and its impact on operations.

4. The BI calendar of activities and practical tools will continue to be updated and adjusted to meet the needs of nations. The NATO IS and the BI programme is supported by a network of institutions as well as subject matter experts (SME) drawn from other international organisations, national administrations as well as civil society.

Current Status

5. Taking account of the BI Status Report noted at the Chicago Summit, the NATO IS has focused efforts on:
- The development of a Tailored BI Programme for SEE prepared in close cooperation with Bulgaria as a lead nation within the South Eastern Defence

Ministers (SEDM) Process and Norway. The Tailored BI programme will be formally launched at NATO HQ 13-14 December 2012 (see Annex 1).

- The development of a Tailored BI Programme for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) prepared in close cooperation with the United States and stakeholders in theatre; this BI contribution is developed in the framework of the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership and reflects commitments made by the GIRoA at the Tokyo Conference on 8 July 2012 (see Annex 2).

6. The tailored programmes for SEE and GIRoA have been developed in close cooperation with nations and key stakeholders to meet the specific needs of the nations concerned. In preparing the tailored programmes, the NATO IS has drawn on the BI Self Assessment/Peer Review Process and other NATO reporting mechanisms as well as additional gap analyses undertaken with the support of nations. This ongoing analysis will be used to further tailor activities aimed at strengthening national and regional capacity and to identify benchmarks to help nations monitor change. The tailored programmes for SEE and GIRoA recognise that education and training are fundamental to making and sustaining change and developing capabilities.

7. The impact of the tailored programmes depends on political leadership and sustained support of national authorities to implement change in their defence and security institutions. The impact expected will be specific to the situation of individual nations, it may include review and adjustment of legislation and procedures, professional development of staff to promote good practice and review of education and training including those focused on stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. Specific objectives for the ANSF have been reflected in the BI Tailored Programme. Benchmarks to assess change are being developed as part of the tailored programme for SEE.

8. Education and training are key to building capacity and transforming institutions. As tasked by the NAC, work has focused on developing a structured and sustainable approach to education and training. The BI Education and Training Plan, developed in cooperation with NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) and agreed by the NAC, addresses NATO's current and future operations and supports ongoing NATO civilian and military efforts to contribute to good governance in the defence and security sector. Further implementation of this plan is being taken forward by the NATO IS and NMAs in close collaboration with stakeholders including the Centre for Building Integrity in the Defence Sector, established on 1 September 2012 in Oslo, Norway.

9. The implementation of the tailored programmes highlighted in this report are supported by a range of BI tools and activities. These include the BI Self-Assessment/Peer Review Process, the Pool of BI Subject Matter Experts (SME) and education and training activities. The NATO IS will continue to take account of UNSCR 1325 in the further development of BI tools and activities.

10. The BI Self-Assessment/Peer Review Process is designed to help nations to map current practice and procedures, and assess the overall integrity of the defence and security sector. As of 1 December 2012, this process has been completed by 4 Allies and 4 Partners. The results of this process are used to identify good practice as well as areas for follow up.

11. The BI Pool of Subject Matter Experts (SME) is used to support the BI Peer Review, implementation of tailored programmes as well as the development of education and training activities. At the request of nations, SME also provide assistance in the development and implementation of national tailored action plans to enhance institutional capacity and to promote good practice. Experts are drawn from national administrations, international organisations and civil society.

12. To support Education and Training, the _Compendium of Best Practices: Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption Defence_ was produced by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in cooperation with NATO and other international experts. It provides a strategic approach to reducing corruption risks and focuses on concepts and tools which can ensure good practices in defence management. The text is available in English, Arabic, Russian, and Ukrainian[1]. Additional resource material focused on reducing the risk of corruption in the Ukrainian defence establishment has been developed by the Ukrainian Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies (CADS)[2].

13. The NATO Defence Leadership in Building Integrity Course, conducted since 2008, is focused on promoting best practices, strengthening transparency and accountability in the defence and security sector. This year a total of 67 civil and military personnel have taken part in the BI course conducted at the PfP Training Center (Ankara, Turkey) and the NATO School (Oberammergau, Germany). This is in addition to a BI train the trainer workshop to be conducted in Ankara, Turkey 16-19 December 2012.

14. By the end 2012, more than 600 civilian and military personnel will have taken part in education activities developed and implemented by the BI Programme.

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[1] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/search.htm.
[2] _Building Integrity in Defence Establishments: A Ukrainian Case Study_, ed. V. Badrak, Kyiv 2012. Available in English and Ukrainian.

In addition to these activities, BI modules have been incorporated into existing national and NATO activities including pre-deployment education and training.

15. The bi-annual Building Integrity Conference provides an opportunity for civilian and military authorities to raise and address further challenges to BI at a strategic level. Discussions at previous conferences provided the basis for further enhancement of the BI Programme. The upcoming BI Conference, to be conducted in Monterey (USA) 25-28 February 2013, is expected to further shape the BI tailored programmes for SEE and GIRoA, identify priority areas to strengthen civil-military cooperation, in particular with regards to NATO operations.

Support for BI

16. The estimated total budget of €5,5 million will be used to support BI activities for NATO, EAPC, MD, ICI and Global Partners for 2012-2014.

17. Nations have also made substantial in-kind contributions to support BI. In addition to hosting events and designating national institutions to support the design and implementation of the BI programme this includes:
- Funding of the needs analysis for the Tailored Programme for SEE by Norway;
- Establishing a Centre for Building Integrity in the Defence Sector, Oslo, Norway;
- Providing project management within the SEDM Process and hosting of SEE experts' meetings by Bulgaria;
- Providing Voluntary National Contribution (VNC) to NATO HQ and the Office of the Senior Civilian Representative, Kabul, Afghanistan;
- Nominating experts to the BI Pool of Subject Matter Experts; and
- Providing expertise and financial contributions to support the development of tailored BI programmes.

Recommendation

18. Nations are invited:
- to note the progress made in the design and implementation of the BI programme including the development of tailored programmes for SEE and GIRoA;
- to continue supporting civilian and military efforts to promote good governance in the defence and security sector, in particular, through the BI Education and Training Plan; and
- to consider how to further support the BI programme through financial or in-kind contributions.

BI Tailored Programme
for South Eastern Europe (SEE)

Aim

1. The aim of the NATO BI Tailored Programme for SEE is to contribute towards reducing the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector of the participating nations by promoting good practices, strengthening transparency, accountability and integrity.

2. This NATO led effort is complementary to the ongoing efforts carried out by nations and other international institutions such as UNODC. The tailored programme for SEE is being developed over a five-year period (2012-2016) and is focused on nations taking part in the South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) Process. This text addresses the period 2012-2014.

Background

3. The BI programme was launched in the EAPC in November 2007. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, nations agreed to develop a BI tailored programme to meet the needs of nations in South Eastern Europe. This includes embedding BI into existing NATO and national procedures and processes such as IPAP and developing a tailored approach to build capacity of nations. The BI report, noted by the Head of State and Government at the Chicago Summit in 2012, highlighted the importance of strengthening transparency, accountability and integrity in the defence and security sector; and emphasized that priority should be given to developing a tailored BI programme to support the nations in SEE.

4. This Tailored BI Programme is being developed in close cooperation with Bulgaria, as a lead nation within the SEDM Process and Norway. It aims to make maximum use of existing BI resources avoiding duplication and competition for resources.

5. This political initiative was endorsed by the SEDM Ministers of Defence at their meeting in Sarajevo on 3 October 2012. The SEDM Process has proven to be a successful model for mutual cooperation among states of the region. It provides a framework for a more structured and comprehensive approach to further developing effective regional cooperation between nations and with civil society as well as establishing links facilitating integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions in order to enhance stability and security in SEE.

6. SEDM Participating States in this tailored programme are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia. This Tailored Programme is open to other SEDM nations as well as observers.

7. Supporting institutional change requires a sustained effort. For the period 2012-2014 the BI Tailored programme is focused on re-aligning three existing BI elements to better meet the needs of the nations in SEE. This includes:

- Raising awareness to better understand the importance of developing defence and security institutions that are trusted and offer value for money;
- Completing the BI Self-Assessment/Peer Review Process to have a snapshot of current practices and policies; and
- Supporting the development and implementation of national BI Action Plans that promote good practice and strengthen transparency, accountability and integrity in the defence and security sector.

Developing a tailored approach for SEE

8. The aim of the tailored programme for SEE is to contribute towards reducing the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector of the participating nations by promoting good practices, strengthening transparency, accountability and integrity.

9. Acknowledging the importance of having programmes developed on the best possible understanding of the problems and challenges, this tailored programme draws on existing NATO and partnership tools and mechanisms such as IPAP, ANP, PARP and the BI Self-Assessment/Peer Review Process.

10. Work is ongoing to identify needs to ensure the tailored programme is focused and sequenced to meet the needs of the nations. The purpose of this need analysis led by Norway is to:

- Identify factors that can build integrity and reduce the risks of corruption in the defence and security sector; and
- Inform the design of future activities to better support nations.

11. The analysis will identify:

- Normative standards/guidelines/benchmarks regarding transparency and accountability in the defence sector – reflecting internationally recognized concepts and standards. These will serve as a benchmark for assessing the current situation;
- The extent to which these standards etc. are institutionalized in the participating countries. This includes reviewing the extent that the standards are reflected in domestic legislation (legal framework),

their influence on organisational arrangements and the perception within the defence sector; and
- Gaps between the normative standards and their actual extent of institutionalisation and potential measures to address them.

12. The BI Self Assessment/Peer Review Process represents an important starting point and nations are encouraged to make use of this tool. In addition to research and interviews with national authorities, the needs analysis also draws on existing NATO and partnership tools and mechanisms such as IPAP, ANP, and PARP as well as open source material.

13. The research and analysis phase will be completed by 2013. The comprehensive picture of requirements resulting from this process will be used to inform the design and conduct of capacity building activities for SEE in 2014. Professional development activities will include workshops and courses to be conducted on a regular basis, primarily in SEE, and will be enhanced through ongoing contact with the national BI points of contact.

14. The tailored programme for SEE will officially be launched at NATO HQ 13-14 December 2012 and bring together the BI points of contact from nations wishing to participate and to acquaint them with the overall outline and specific activities developed with the assistance of Bulgaria and Norway.

15. Education and training are key to building capacity and transforming institutions. The tailored programme for SEE will build on the results of the assessment work and draw on the NATO BI Education and Training Plan, developed in cooperation with Allied Command Transformation (ACT). This includes making use of resources of BI Implementing Partners such as the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (Sarajevo) and the PfP Training Center (Ankara).

16. Participation in the tailored programme for SEE is on a voluntary basis and is open to all members and observers of SEDM. Participating nations are invited to nominate a military and a civilian point of contact (at OF-5 or equivalent level). These POCs will serve as national focal point and facilitate exchanges with the NATO IS. To further deepen their knowledge, a series of activities will be developed to serve the dual purpose of sharing knowledge and developing a SEE network.

17. The programme of BI activities for SEE is expected to focus on key areas to include:
- Parliamentary oversight;
- Anti-corruption and integrity policies;
- Specialised Anti-Corruption bodies;

- Conflict of interest;
- Freedom of access to information;
- Internal and external audits;
- Ombudsman institutions;
- Public procurement including acquisition and asset disposal; and
- Human resources management.

18. BI is an ongoing programme. The capacity building activities planned and 2013-2014 will be kept under review and adjusted to take account of the results of this research and analysis and experiences on the ground. The benchmarks identified through this effort will be used in the further development of the BI Tool Kit.

19. An initial set of tailored activities are being developed in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. Information regarding these activities will be circulated through the EAPC. As part of an overall approach to promote good practice and sharing of knowledge participating nations are invited to consider offering to host one of the BI tailored activities planned for 2013-2014.

20. An ad hoc team composed of Norway, Bulgaria and NATO IS will carry out the research and analysis. The ad hoc team will also make recommendations for further activities to be developed for 2015-2016. The Tailored BI Programme for SEE will be kept under ongoing review and adjusted to meet the changing circumstances and capabilities of the nations taking part. A formal review and stocktaking will be conducted on an annual basis with key stakeholders and presented to nations.

Expected outcome

21. The Tailored BI Programme for SEE is expected to:
- Improve nations understanding of the risks of corruption in the defence and security sector;
  - Identify priorities and formulate a road ahead for common action;
  - Provide advice on the application of institutional practices and procedures aimed at strengthening transparency, accountability and integrity in the defence and security sector;
  - Develop benchmarks so that nations can monitor change;
  - Provide education and training to promote good practice and build capacity; and

Promote wider use of existing BI NATO tools and mechanisms and how they can be used to strengthen transparency, accountability and integrity in the defence and security sector.

Building Integrity (BI)
tailored programme for Afghanistan

Aim

1. The Tailored Programme to Build Integrity and Reduce the Risk of Corruption in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is focused on promoting good practices and developing capacity of the civilian and armed forces in Afghan Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Interior (MOI) to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in its efforts to build integrity and reduce the risk of corruption. The Tailored Programme is to be implemented over 2011-2021 and this text addresses implementation during transition ending 2014.

2. Supporting institutional change requires a sustained and aligned effort by the international community. This programme is part of the NATO Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan and is complementary to the ongoing efforts carried out by other international organisations.

Background

3. In October 2011, the Afghan MOD and MOI of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) agreed to the recommendations of the BI Self Assessment and Peer Review Process. These recommendations include the development and the implementation of an action plan to build integrity, increase transparency and improve accountability in the ANSF through the development of processes and procedures.

4. Leadership and specialized areas of the management of financial resources (budgeting, procurement, contracting) and human resources (including recruitment and merit-based promotion) have been identified by the GIRoA, NATO and other stakeholders as priorities within the defence and security sector to reduce the risk of corruption and sustain the ANSF. Accordingly, this implementation plan has been designed to meeting gaps in these two key areas.

5. Cognisant that education and training are key to building capacity and transforming institutions, the Tailored Programme is focused on strengthening ANSF capacity and includes:
- Establishing and sustaining a Pilot BI Center in Kabul; and
- Designing and delivering tailored BI education and training.

The BI team assigned to the BI Centre will focus on the integrity, transparency and accountability of the MOD and MOI process to include planning, programming, formulation, adoption, execution and control of the financial (budget and procurement) and human resources.

6. The focus on institutional and individual capabilities provides a framework for the longer term effort to develop systems and procedures to support the ANSF. The establishment of civilian led security ministries and institutions to direct, oversee, manage and resource the ANSF is part of successful transition. MOD and MOI need to have institutional capabilities (procedures and staff) to provide effective management and to support the development of forces that the Afghan people will respect and trust. These actions are streamlined to further ensure a national accountable leadership and an early involvement in the gradual management of financial and human resources scheduled for post-2014.

7. In developing this plan, the NATO International Staff (IS) has taken into account the outcome of recent high level meetings in particular Bonn II and the Chicago Summit. This also includes the mutual accountability provisions agreed at the Tokyo Conference which have resulted in the Afghan Presidential Decree on Fighting Corruption.

8. These efforts will complement and reinforce bi-lateral efforts such as those supported by the US. To the extent possible, activities will be conducted in Afghanistan. Implementation will be supported by dedicated BI staff based in Kabul and be supported by a network of BI Implementing Partners and a pool of subject matter experts drawn from government and civil society providing greater flexibility.

9. The NATO IS will continue to be responsible for the design, implementation and monitoring of the tailored BI Programme for the ANSF. The NATO Support Agency (NSPA) will provide reinforced support in Afghanistan.

10. NATO IS continues to work closely with key stakeholders engaged in developing ANSF institutional capabilities - in particular the US Office of Secretary of Defence programmes – Defence Institutional Reform Initiative and Ministry of Defence Advisors as well as NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan and the Anti-corruption Synchronization Working Group.

11. The approach and planned activities include a mix of short and long term measures with an emphasis on the development and promotion of good practice and practical measures. The Tailored Programme will be adjusted as appropriate taking into account experiences gained and changing conditions.

Development of a tailored programme

12. The BI contribution to NATO led efforts will focus on enhancing ANSF capabilities including transfer of knowledge, sharing good practice and development of skills aimed at:

- Strengthening transparency and accountability to support the design of financial and human resources management systems; and
- Enhancing education and training capabilities, laying the ground work for the development of a BI Centre in Kabul to become a centre of knowledge within the Afghan National Security University.

13. The BI programme has been developed taking into account priorities identified for transition including gradual evolution towards on-budget support and will build capacity of MOI and MOD in programming, implementation and managing budgeting in accordance with laws established with the Ministry of Finances and other international stakeholders such as the World Bank and the UN.

14. Enhancing education and training capacity is a key element in sustaining change in the ANSF. The implementation plan focuses on further enhancing ANSF knowledge of the impact of corruption in the defence and security sector, their operations and the consequences for the people of Afghanistan and will promote best practices.

15. The 2012-2014 Tailored Programme also encourages the integration of gender issues in the curriculum and ensure women serving in the ANSF have access to BI courses and resources.

Expected outcome

16. The 2012-2014 Tailored Programme for Afghanistan is expected to:

- Improve knowledge and understanding of the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector at all level and its impact on MOD and MOI;
- Develop capabilities of a BI Afghan core team as a start-up team of the BI Center to be able, post-2014, to run the BI Center at the ANSU. This team should also be able to map current education and training activities as well as procedures in accordance with the key identified areas of potential niches of corruption – management of financial and human resources;
- Provide specialized education and training, including train-the-trainer programmes to promote good practices, embed integrity, transparency and accountability in planning, budgeting, contracting and managing human resources in the defence and security sector; and
- Continuing to embed and assess BI into ANSF curriculum.

"SMART DEFENCE" – Harmonisation between National and NATO Priorities –

Lieutenant General Dr Teodor FRUNZETI
Colonel Dr Ion ROCEANU
Cristina BOGZEANU

On 31 October 2012, in the Auditorium of the *"Carol I"* Central University Library in București, a seminar was held on **"Smart Defence and Defence Investment"** organised by *"Carol I"* National Defence University, the Academy of Romanian Scientists, the Military Science Department and the Centre for Analysis and Security Studies. Through this event, the organisers intended to provide a favourable framework for discussions not only for harmonising theoretical approaches, but also for opening some prospects for cooperation for materialising the policies for the implementation of the concept of *smart defence* in Romania. Gathering at the round table discussions all those who were part in the creation of this strategic vision, Romanian public authorities whose responsibility is the implementation of this vision, as well as representatives of the business environment, undoubtedly a part of the solution proposed through *smart defence*, the event was meant to contribute to a responsible, informed, coherent involvement of Romania in implementing smart defence.

The concept of *smart defence* was officially launched at the Chicago summit in May 2012, representing the North Atlantic Alliance's response to the need

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to use most effectively the limited resources in the context of the economic and financial crisis without undermining NATO's strategic objective. *Smart defence* presupposes the harmonisation of national priorities with those of the Alliance in terms of defence planning, specialisation of member states on the production and development of military capabilities where there is a higher level of expertise and cooperation.

The starting point for the discussions was the novelty of the initiative known as *smart defence*, determining the context created by the economic and financial crisis and characterising the international security environment as becoming increasingly complex. *Smart defence* thus appears as a viable solution for NATO to be able to maintain the ability to perform the previously undertaken missions. Moreover, the speeches of the guests highlighted the challenges for the implementation of the concept of *smart defence* at NATO level, as well as in the member states, possible solutions being proposed in this regard.

Regarding *NATO*, the defence budget cuts made in an uncoordinated manner, only according to national criteria, caused the defence planning at Alliance level to become an activity carried out in emergency conditions, in a context in which many factors are unexpected. Therefore, it became necessary for the Alliance to go through a reformation process, focused on increasing flexibility, coordination and coherence, which can be achieved only through multinational solutions. However, *smart defence* can equate with a serious warning that the time has come for the period of complacency and self-assurance after the expansion to end. In the context of the need for the financial contribution of the European countries

to be a balanced one as compared with the US one, a series of old (programmes and activities conducted in multinational context) and new (efficiency, realism, sustainability) courses of actions were proposed. These new directions do not involve austerity policies, but the increase in flexibility, interoperability, setting priorities and common goals.

Moreover, it is important to note the primary role of member states, *smart defence* being a process accomplished by nations, for them and through them, as well as the re-substantiation of the relation between NATO and the EU.

Therefore, transparency, multinational capabilities engagement, involvement of partner countries in multinational projects, the relation with the EU and the development of financing arrangements are essential parts of *smart defence*. At the same time, *smart defence* has a function of catalyst of the approached initiative, involving the need to harmonise requests, especially technical ones, to develop the business and project management dimension, as well as to become really involved in the defence industry.

All these show the importance of engagement at national level in this context, because, although *smart defence* has a profound multinational nature, the main responsibility lies with the member states. In this respect, it is necessary to overcome the ways of thinking that are strictly confined within the national borders and to implement *smart defence* in order to obtain an optimal balance between prioritisation, specialisation and cooperation.

As far as *Romania's involvement in the process of implementation of smart defence* at the level of the Euro-Atlantic community is concerned, it is useful to note that there is already certain experience gained in developing and implementing initiatives in the field of multilateral cooperation.

Smart defence has an impact on interoperability, research and development, defence and procurement industry, all these being areas in which, in the context of the implementation of the new NATO concept, opportunities may emerge for each member state with regard to obtaining capabilities that it could not afford on its own. All four areas can be tackled by Romania, but only after some adjustments at the governmental, military-operational, scientific level, as well as especially in the industrial environment. For the successful implementation of the concept, both at Alliance and national level, it is essential that this process is properly prepared. The national effort must be correlated with the commercial model or models adopted at Alliance level to jointly produce the needed capabilities. Developing operational requirements must be a coordinated process, in relation to the missions assumed within the Alliance.

It is also necessary the correlation with interoperability standards and financial possibilities, defined by the budget perspective in the field of defence. The analysis of transposing operational requirements in technical requirements and, further, in products for military purposes must be based on innovative, proven and tested solutions, which are technically mature. This requires adequate technological capabilities.

For the process of implementation of *smart defence* to be successful, it is necessary to take into account the following aspects: a) the industrial environment must continue to strengthen the technological base, simultaneously with consolidating own development plans; b) the role of scientific research in defining technical solutions must be increased; c) the relation with own defence industries must be transparent, as a guarantee for the access to the process of optimisation of different capabilities development solutions; d) strategies at the level of defence industries from the Alliance member states must be developed to strengthen relations of industrial cooperation and exchange of technical and technological information.

Among the possible ways to implement *smart defence*, we can mention: a) to streamline the framework for information sharing, directly at the level of industries and for the connection to the specialised bodies of the Alliance; b) government support to strengthen the technical and technological base; c) to strengthen economic efficiency, to increase technological efficiency, to return to the specific level of performance of an industry generating added value in the 21st century. It is also essential that the industry conducts a realistic assessment of its capacities and the need to change is accepted in order to adapt to the new requirements of the concept.

Romania also seeks to meet the standards of the NATO member states armed forces and to support the reform with adequate financial resources, according to the financial framework of austerity. In this regard, it is imperative to develop and maintain a defence and security industry sector able to meet the national and Euro-Atlantic requirements so far, but especially the ones in the long term. Increased transparency and greater openness towards markets are important milestones in the implementation of *smart defence*.

Mention should be made that, for NATO, as well as for all its member states, Romania included, defence underfunding means actually a false economy because it requires increasing the level and the number of vulnerabilities, pushing states into a vicious circle, and this is why *smart defence*, as an instrument to spend more efficiently, rationally and realistically, is a high utility initiative in the current context.

In addition, it is necessary to approach the defence planning in the long term, namely to use multiannual planning and to establish multiannual budgets, which requires finding new solutions also at the level of public institutions. Among the proposed solutions, there are: multinational cooperation, rational priority setting, better coordinated planning among allies, development of the next generation of capabilities, establishment of a performance indicator that shows how money is spent on defence. Moreover, the relation with the defence industry plays an important part, being necessary to harmonise and simplify the relationship between NATO – member states – defence industry, as well as to increase their transparency. Moreover, the defence industry should embrace the operational lessons learned from NATO to be able to improve its level of efficiency and effectiveness.

One of the most developed military resources identifiable in Romania is the human one. Romania should maximise and exploit the strengths in this regard – discipline, resistance and intellectual capacity. Moreover, given that Article 5 is the main guarantee for Romania's security, and that, in order to apply it, a minimum of infrastructure and exercises is necessary at command level to allow the deployment of forces, Romania should consider bilateral and multilateral exchange bases for the military, especially for those in areas in which our country's capacity is limited. This will help improve the relations of command, which are subordinated to the relations between commanders and will facilitate the establishment of contact between the Romanian military personnel and their counterparts from other countries, thus also contributing to the increase in the level of familiarity and interoperability within NATO troops. Consequently,

lifelong learning and knowledge enhancement are part of the *smart defence* solution, whose implementation could mean a *"brains-based approach"*.

Difficulties and challenges were identified at *the level of the defence industry*, both at national and regional level. Among the difficulties with which the defence industry is faced currently, there is the decrease in military budgets, the increase in the level of ambition, the different qualification and assessment processes in procurement projects, the lack of standardisation in NATO in terms of procurement (in this respect, it was proposed the adoption of the OCCAR procurement model), the lack of balance in defence investment between the US and the European states, the unpredictable nature of conflicts.

However, the lessons learned from previous multinational projects suggest that the critical success factors for the acquisition of multinationals include: a) harmonising military requirements, schedule and specifications for equipment procurement to the greatest extent possible, in accordance with the national requirements regarding capability, increase in the mutual aspect, by minimising the variety and reducing costs; buying *"off the shelf"* when possible and at a low price, taking into account the possible effects on research and development in doing so; b) opening towards the requirements of being enhanced by alternative solutions (for instance, stating the result, not only the requirement); c) optimising research and development to help overcome the negative expenditure tendencies (better coordination and cooperation in research and development provide a means to offer more for less); d) having, at the same time, its own industrial base, being fully open to competitive bidding (in accordance with legal requirements), as well as to the benefits this brings, such as minimising costs and improving quality; harmonising legislative requirements in different countries and successfully managing the impact of any differences.

In the vision of the companies in the defence industry, *smart defence* falls within the current features of the world we live in, being necessary that the defence is addressed in an intelligent way. This involves, in general, having control over information, focusing the businesses on the customer's needs, connecting and empowering people, a proactive attitude regarding risks, capitalising on *"cloud"*-type calculations *(cloud computing)* – a consumption and delivery model inspired by internet services for consumers that involves virtualisation, automation and standardisation – and creating expertise in central systems.

However, for this, it is necessary to overcome certain barriers, such as: a) the need for member states to accept the existence of industrial interdependences; b) the fact that the industry is sceptical and worried that there will be fewer and smaller contracts; c) governments will have to provide guiding lines in terms of long-term defence planning; d) industry should be more proactive in providing

proposals. In the case of Romania, another type of difficulty can be that the defence market in Central and Eastern Europe has an unconsolidated and fragmented industrial base that makes it operate inefficiently, but also that its size and fragmentation makes individual markets become uninteresting. The solution to this state of affairs was identified in a process related to *smart defence*: a) pooling; b) investments in areas of excellence and giving up capabilities in other areas (sharing); c) development of common development projects; d) strong focus on its bottom-up construction based on top-down budgetary planning. However, this requires political decision and coordination, as well as transforming the industry into a key partner of the government. An example of such a project is the partnership UTI (Romania) – Bumar (Poland), an industrial partnership for the development and implementation of Defence, Homeland Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection Programmes.

At the same time, substantial difficulties, which can have serious repercussions on the role of Romania in the context of the implementation of *smart defence*, were identified at the level of economic operators with state capital in the defence industry. Thus, between 1997 and 2012, the technical and economic-financial situation of state-owned operators in the defence industry experienced a continuous depreciation and, after 2000, a series of production capacities of economic operators in the defence industry, mainly branches of CN *"Romarm"* SA, underwent reorganisation and restructuring programmes by separating civil and military capacities, establishing joint companies and industrial parks, facilitating assets recovery through lease or sale.

The decline of the defence industry could not be stopped, a fact that is visible through a series of aspects: budgetary allocations meant for investments were aimed at civilian production and less at modernising the military production flows and achieving new products, the activities from the promoted programmes were not sufficiently supported financially, most operators have huge debt, with significant penalties, the privatisation actions failed in the absence of an internal market, foreign strategic investors are reluctant to invest in outdated production and technological capacities and with difficult financial-economic and social problems, new NATO-type products made and approved with own resources by some economic operators do not have the contract guarantee by the national defence forces. All these reflect the chronicity of the not only economic but also military vulnerabilities, which will increase the challenge posed by implementing *smart defence*.

During the seminar, there were proposed a number of recovery measures, as follows: reorganising the Defence Industry and Special Issues Department and framing it with specialised personnel or with personnel from structures responsible for equipping the forces in the National Defence, Public Order and National Safety System; completing, endorsing and approving, by the Supreme Council of National Defence, the *National Defence Industry Strategy*; drawing up normative acts drafts for approval of the reorganisation and restructuring programmes of economic operators from the defence industry, the branches of CN *"Romarm"* SA and those who are under the authority of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Business Environment (MECMA); presenting in the Romanian Parliament, for approval, the draft of the *Law on defence industry*, a document drawn up and being in the process of internal endorsement; providing funds for the protection of personnel employed in the defence industry not covered by military contracts and orders; continuing the actions for identifying, together with the MECMA and Ministry of Finance specialised structures, the funds necessary to ensure investment programmes; developing, endorsing and approving normative acts drafts on some measures for debt cancellation and reduction of budgetary arrears; continuing delaboration/dismantling operations by the defence industry operators with obligations regarding the application of the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 38/2010 and modifying this normative act for the purpose of higher capitalisation on certain components resulted, a document which was drawn up and is currently in the process of internal endorsement.

On the whole, the discussions during the seminar started from the context created by the world financial and economic crisis, namely its impact on military budgets. The solutions were built around the ideas of interdependence, inter-state and inter-sector harmonisation, increase in the level of transparency,

innovation. Reciprocal cooperation and support between NATO members and between the governmental sector and the private sector is the guiding line of the visions on the successful implementation of the new concept. Moreover, as far as NATO as a whole is concerned, beyond the challenges of implementing *smart defence*, with all its three components – prioritisation, specialisation and cooperation – another difficulty that was clearly outlined in the context of the seminar was the lack of standardisation in the field of Alliance procurement, making difficult the cooperation between the governmental field and the business environment.

As far as Romania is concerned, the challenges are double. This is because, in order to achieve its effective involvement in the process of implementation of *smart defence*, as well as to benefit at maximum from the opportunities offered by it at all levels involved – military domain, public institutions, business environment – it is necessary to overcome certain already chronic vulnerabilities, which imperatively require to be mitigated. Solutions were proposed, on the one hand, for the domestic difficulties and, on the other hand, for Romania's contribution to the efforts made within the Alliance, all contributing to increasing the level of security, both by reducing vulnerabilities and obtaining the necessary means for addressing security risks and threats.

English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

LESSONS LEARNED AT NATO'S HIGHEST LEVEL

Colonel Dănuţ VACARIU

The coat of arms of lessons learned*

Motto:
"He will respond to the prayer of the destitute
He will not despise their plea;
Let this be written for a future generation,
That a people not yet created may praise the Lord"[1].

Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre – JALLC was established on 2 September 2002, an event that not only gave an anniversary character to the NATO Lessons Learned Conference that took place this October in Portugal, in Lisbon, not far from Europe's Westernmost point, Cabo Da Roca, but it also was the occasion to review the 10 years of activity of the Centre. And we really had a lot to learn from this activity! The messages were sent by key representatives from the Alliance, such as the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, **Ambassador Alexander VERSHBOV**, **Admiral Tony Johnsone-Burt**, *who recently completed an operational tour in Afghanistan as a COMISAF's Director of Counter Narcotics and International Organised Crime,* **Major General Stough**, *who was appointed Vice-Director US Joint Staff J7 in April 2012,* **Major General Weighill**, *who was in charge of the planning of NATO operation in Libya –* Unified Protector *and was also selected*

Colonel Dănuţ Vacariu – Head of the Office of Lessons Learned, the Training and Doctrine Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

The report was entirely taken from the website of the *NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre*, available online at http://www.jallc.nato.int/newsmedia/docs/NLLC2012Report.pdf

[1] *New Testament with Psalms (The Orthodox Bible)*, Psalm 101:18-19, *A Prayer of the Afflicted*, p. 49 and Psalm 102:17-19 from the *Catholic Bible*. This is the motto of the field of activity of the *lessons learned* in the Romanian Armed Forces.

* The heraldic elements of the coat of arms of the *lessons learned* are: *the symbolic badge of the lessons learned* and the *descriptive blazon*, connected through a ring. The symbolism of the two mentioned heraldic elements suggests the *lessons learned* generated by after-action review. The descriptive blazon, created on a heraldic shield, called in Latin *scuta rhombata*, has a single partition that comprises the next

as Operations Director; he was promoted to Major General in July 2012 and remained at the Joint Force Command as Deputy Chief of Staff Plans; **Major General Peter C. Bayer, Jr.,** *armour officer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy, Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation NATO, Vice-Admiral* **Bob Davidson***, who joined the Canadian Forces in 1977. His first command was the submarine HMCS OJIBWA. In his last sea tour of duty, Vice-Admiral Davidson deployed with HMC ships IROQUOIS, CALGARY and PROTECTEUR to participate in Operation ALTAIR, Canada's maritime contribution to Operation* Enduring Freedom; *he is the Canadian Military Representative to NATO;* **Mr Ferrier***, former Lieutenant Colonel in the British Royal Marines. In 1995, he was appointed as a civilian in the International Staff at the NATO Headquarters. He is Head of Crisis Exercising and Management Systems, Planning Directorate Operations Division of International Staff of NATO. This section, in cooperation with the International Military Staff and the Strategic Commands, supports the functioning of the North Atlantic Council, including the Council Operations and Exercises Committee.*

Last but not least, our distinguished host, **Brigadier General Sonneby***, who joined the Danish Air Force in 1975. He served in the Surface-to-Air Missile Squadron 541 and assumed command of SAM Squadron 531. From 1992 to 1995, he served on the staff of the HQ Chief of Defence Denmark. In 1998, General Sonneby was assigned to HQ Allied Forces Central Europe (now Joint Force Command Brunssum) and as the Executive Officer for Staff Operations in the Command Group. In 2001, he was appointed Chief of Personnel Policy in HQ Chief of Defence Command Denmark and then Chief of Pay and Administration at the Danish Defence Personnel Organisation. In 2006, General Sonneby was assigned to SHAPE for duty as the Deputy Director of Staff and in January 2010 he received orders to assume command of JALLC.*

The participation in this activity gave us the possibility of studying thoroughly on the spot the way the NATO Lessons Learned was applied, starting from the tactical level and to the political-military level, during the presentations and the discussions that followed them. Moreover, the fact that the name of our country, Romania, was mentioned in one of the presentations during the conference gave us a feedback that the observations sent by us regarding the lessons learned were useful for the Alliance and that, according to the speech of Brigadier General Sonneby, Commander JALLC, **"We, the LL Practitioners, have done our work, we have identified the lessons. But, as General**

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elements: in the upper part, a red heraldic flower, in the central part, two medieval mounted knights, a white and a black one, having their tournament laces crossed, and in the lower part, the white silhouette of *"the Hamangia thinker"*. The white silhouette of the *"Thinker"* represents the after-action review from which the *lessons learned* are generated. The white colour of the thinker symbolises the fair play of the person who works in the field of *lessons learned*. The silhouette of the *"Thinker"* is designed after the clay statue from the Hamangia civilisation (5000 BC – 3000/2000 BC). The statue is a masterpiece – with worldwide value – of the Neolithic Anthropomorphic Art. The mounted knights with their tournament laces crossed symbolise the fight. They also symbolise the two opposite chess horses, the white and the black ones, and their routes on the chessboard.

The red colour of the heraldic flower symbolises the *"reward of the battle"*, flower given by the princess of the tournament at the end, the *"price of the battle"* the blood spilt by the fighters and finally the *"lesson learned"* from the battle. The symbolic badge reproduces the symbols from the describing blazon, having as a central piece the *"Thinker"*, framed by the two *"L"* letters, from the English words *Lessons Learned*, symbolised by the chess horse routes. The inclination of the letters symbolises the end of the battle. The red colour of the heraldic flower is transferred to the letters *lessons learned* from the symbolic badge (fragment from the datasheet of the heraldic sign).

**Stough said during his presentation, learning only happens when we change
our behaviour as a result of experience".**

*We would like to take this present opportunity, of publishing in the pages of the official journal
of the Romanian General Staff, to confirm to General Sonneby, Commander JALLC, that this conference
was "the best yet", and its theme* **"Learning from the Past – Preparing for the Future"** *strengthens
the fact that the "Lessons Learned mindset has begun to truly take hold throughout NATO".*

*We are sure that a review of the most important moments of the activity described in the Conference
Report will strengthen all the above-mentioned facts and opinions.*

Here are the most important documents from the Lisbon Conference.

The 2012 NATO Lessons Learned
Conference Report

From the Commander...

The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre hosted the *NATO Lessons Learned
Conference* in Lisbon, Portugal from 23 to 25 October 2012. The conference theme
was: *"Learning from the Past – Preparing for the Future"*.

I think most attendees will agree with me that this year's conference
was the best yet. The theme allowed us to look beyond development of the NATO
LL Capability, beyond even the capture and implementation of specific lessons
from NATO's recent activities – although the difficulties in making the LL Capability
actually lead to improvements in the way we operate were evident throughout
our discussions this week.

Instead, we were given an opportunity to examine from a broad perspective
NATO's activities of the past decade and consider how we can apply what we found
to our future activities. We did this by answering three key questions:

"What have we learned?", "How did we learn it?" and *"How do we apply
it to future challenges?"*

The answers to these questions were fascinating. We heard a wide array
of ideas on what we have learned over the last decade including perspectives
from both NATO and Nations. For me several cross-cutting lessons emerged:

- Those of us working in or with NATO do not sufficiently understand
  how the Alliance works at all levels and this reduces our overall organizational
  effectiveness.
- Dealing with the modern information sphere continues to be a challenge,
  whether info and intel sharing, getting our message to others or simply
  managing the inundation of information, including LL related information.

- We do not yet know how we can better understand the future battlespace, and, closely related to that –
- We're still not comfortable in planning to deal with the unexpected, that is, on the one hand improving our ability to predict future challenges and, on the other, creating the balance in Alliance and national structures and between preparation and adaptation.
- Incorporating partners continues to be a challenge.
- The LL Mindset has begun to truly take hold throughout NATO.

For me, these are the lessons from that last decade. We, the LL Practitioners, have done our work, we have identified the lessons. But, as General Stough said during his presentation, learning only happens when we change our behaviour as a result of experience.

What will change as a result of identifying these lessons? I cannot say. But I am most encouraged by things I heard this week. Many of this year's speakers are exactly those leaders who can change the behaviour of our national and alliance organizations. I was encouraged to hear that they too are aware of the lessons that emerged during our decade of conflict and that they are working hard to learn them as we move into the future.

How can we, the LL practitioners help? For my part, I will continue to commit JALLC to providing high quality and intellectually honest analysis products to steer leaders' understanding of the problems we face. I will also continue to provide and to improve the tools for learning and sharing, such as our portals, handbooks and training course that help you provide a similar product for your leaders.

More specifically, and in support of the theme of this conference, JALLC will in the coming months publish two studies which we presented at the conference: the study presented by Mr Redmayne on a *Decade of Conflict*, and the project on *Redeployment from Operations* presented by Major Hamers.

Finally, I and my staff will continue to champion the specific lessons that we personally think are important.

What do I ask of you as an outcome of your participation? As in past years, I would ask you to champion learning in your organisation and push sharing with others. I also asked each one of you to provide input to support two JALLC studies *(figure 1)*.

This brings us to the most important takeaway from this conference – a reinforcement of your own understanding of your role and your responsibilities for contributing to learning within your organisation. After all, every single one of us, regardless of specialty or branch, is a member of the LL Community. The LL Capability cannot function without all of us knowing our roles and executing tasks

that lead to organisational learning. Each of you must have a keen personal sense of what you must do to make learning lessons a reality. This is the overriding message of this conference!

Peter Sonneby
Brigadier General, Danish Air Force
Commander JALLC

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Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR
A Lessons Learned Framework

Admiral Davidson provided a high level but personal perspective of the *OUP – Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR* LL process. He acknowledged the challenges in moving forward with completing overall lessons from *OUP*. These include the stovepipe structure within NATO HQ and various political challenges that come into play when reporting military issues. He concluded by identifying the need to implement LL from the onset, follow the process, be honest, and understand the goal, and stated that we are very good at learning tactical lessons but need more focus at the strategic-political level. His final comment was that it is as important to look behind us as it is to look ahead.

Colonel Andrews led off with an overview of 21st century security challenges – Missile Defence, Cyber and other emerging threats have entered the fray and how the CCOMC was developed as a way to tackle these challenges and drive cultural change towards a comprehensive approach. He gave an overview of CCOMC capabilities, guiding principles, process, engagement and governance. The salient lessons in regard to the CCOMC include: this is an opportunity to succeed and do more with less, embrace technology, and the mind-set to change culture comes from the top.

General Weighill gave an overview of *OUP* from an *"Operator's Perspective"*, beginning with the political environment, the conduct of the campaign, and some of the overall planning challenges that were encountered. High level observations included a challenging C2 transition from *Odyssey Dawn* to OUP, constructive ambiguity on end states, guidance, strategic communications, Intel collection and fusion, and OPSEC. He highlighted the importance of agility and keeping accurate and detailed records. He concluded by cautioning that although there are many lessons to be learned from *OUP*, we should not focus on these lessons exclusively.

Mr. Ridgway provided an overview of *OUP* reports and products that are currently available and presented a listing of major themes for lessons. He also described the report endorsement process through NATO HQ and ACO.

He concluded with some personal observations concerning the *OUP* LL process and also concerning the operation itself. Regarding lessons from the LL Process he advanced the notion that while ACO commands have demonstrated an ability to capture basic observations, only JALLC seems able to investigate issues, tie threads of evidence together and discover root causes. With respect to lessons from *OUP*, he highlighted the flexibility and uniqueness of the NATO Command Structure and proposed that some lessons, such as Intel Sharing and Logistics Reporting, which have surfaced in all NATO operations, may simply not be solvable.

The panel kicked off with a question concerning information sharing and the hurdles posed by national classifications, caveats, and other political concerns. The panel acknowledged that this is always a concern and many times a problem. *Admiral Davison* commented that many times we need to be practical and Nations need to write reports in a manner that will allow wider distribution. *Brigadier General Sonneby* added that individuals and commands tend to take the safe solution to over-classify and that this requires a change in mind-set and focus.

There were a couple of questions asked related to political ambiguity in goals and objectives and is there a way to get around it. *Admiral Davidson* acknowledged that it is a problem but certain factors such as political transitions which impact decisions associated with the sharing of lessons learned. The ambiguity can be constructive at times by giving military commanders some leeway in the decision and operations planning processes.

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Lessons from a Decade of Conflict

The Lessons from a *Decade of Conflict* Panel was led off by key speaker, *General Stough*, who as the Vice Director of the US Joint Staff J7, incorporated his version of lessons learned over the past decade, stressing that the J7 recently took on an expanded role of learning lessons of the past and using them to provide a framework for the future. General Stough continued to elaborate that what the US and NATO prepared to do, they did very well, but cautioned that we must continue to understand the environment in which we are fighting, recognise the conventional warfare paradigm, and win the battle of the narrative. He stressed that as we move forward, the lessons that we have learned need to be embodied in the leaders of the future.

Mr. Redmayne provided a JALLC perspective of NATO's lessons learned over the past decade, which came from over 130 JALLC analysis reports. He highlighted that we must learn from the past to manage future challenges, not to fight the last war. Mr. Redmayne mentioned that there is a common perception

that NATO does not change, but disputed this by citing profound structural change coming from the three key summits of the last decade, and noted that NATO has evolved more rapidly in the last ten years than it has since its inception. The central element of the presentation was the identification of six cross cutting themes that together support the central thesis that emerged from the *Decade of Conflict* study. The thesis is: Like many organisations, NATO's comfort zone is managing a steady-state system in a stable environment; but when major evolutionary changes and unexpected impulses occur in the environment to challenge the system, NATO labours – and delivers when it counts.

Lieutenant Colonel Ben Ahmed provided a National perspective of lessons learned over the last decade and *Lieutenant Colonel Zettermark* contributed a non-NATO, Partner Nation point of view, emphasizing that documentation is extremely important for capturing lessons. There were many similarities among these national perspectives.

The Panel Discussion provided some significant insight, with the main theme being adaptability/flexibility. A somewhat controversial topic arose regarding NATO individuals (some at high levels) not being comprehensively educated on NATO and its many processes, sometimes resulting in a lack of productivity. It was remarked that if you do not understand the process, you are incapable of improving.

The key panel takeaways were that NATO Nations and Partners need to default to sharing more information in order to better disseminate the lessons that have been learned and that they must remain adaptable.

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ISAF Transition Challenges

Admiral Johnstone-Burt began by highlighting that we are in Afghanistan in a security capacity, not a political or economic one. The ISAF transition does not mean the NATO mission is over in 2014 but will involve a change from a combat role to a training and advisory role. Lessons from the Balkans, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the recent coalition transition from Iraq are being applied to the ISAF transition. The admiral noted that the three major challenges to the ISAF transition are security, redeployment, and building the ASF. The challenge is to ensure NATO is ready for future support in the region. Admiral Johnstone-Burt concluded with emphasising that our responsibility is to identify, collect, and process Lessons Identified, which requires a transformational mind set.

Colonel Schad gave the HQ ISAF perspective on transition, stating that transition is on track and achieving success, and presented some supporting metrics.

Transition, he said, is not just geographic, but involves transfer of functional tasks to Afghan entities. Lessons from Iraq have been particularly helpful in planning transfer of such tasks. Colonel Schad then described some of the positive momentum of the ANSF. The Security Force Assistant Model (train/advise/assist) has achieved some fundamental milestones towards Afghanistan taking the lead and setting the conditions for overall security.

Lieutenant Colonel Kingsbury stated that transition is not an event, it is always happening and therefore command friction can occur. This can be the result of ambiguous communication at the strategic level. He highlighted the success of applying lessons learned at the lower level (tactical) stage. This requires framing the campaign and filtering out constructive ambiguity. He discussed lessons from the current transition such as areas of command priorities, risk, time, messaging, and the situation.

Major Hamers presented the ongoing JALLC Study on *Redeployment from Operations*. He reviewed the background, scope, requirements, challenges, and methodology used in the study. He discussed the overall current status and briefly summarized the preliminary findings. This gave the audience insight into the steps involved and the need for inputs/reports/support from the NATO nations to ensure comprehensive lessons are captured in order to support the ISAF transition. The panel discussion began on the challenge of strategic communication. *Lieutenant Colonel Kingsbury* pointed out that if the agenda is not set at the strategic level, the pressure is on the theatre commander in the interpretation. *Admiral Johnstone-Burt* countered that there has to be a balance with not interfering too much, thus requiring a high level of trust and communication. With 50 partner nations, this can be extremely difficult, adding the risk of competing commands/nations constructive ambiguity issues.

A question was asked if an innovation or adaptation has a more immediate impact and thus can be more quickly and easily learned as a lesson if it is more technical/tactical. The consensus was that innovation and learning at Strategic level is harder to see, much less implement. The strategic level at times may not be agile enough for a quick turn around on strategic lessons. The question was asked at what point do we say there is a failure of objectives (if that occurs). *Colonel Shad* replied that the security part can be measured, but the political and economical piece is difficult to judge – *"What is the measurement of a good government?"*. *General Bayer* emphasised that we need to remember who we serve. Our job is to give the most accurate and complete military advice to the political leaders who make the ultimate decision.

During the conclusion of the panel discussion the question was asked of how many of the lessons are repeats of previous lessons. The answer falls back onto the leadership – does a LL Capability exist to mitigate a commander's lack of interest in Lessons Learned or because he truly wants to lead an agile and adaptable organisation that avoids repeating avoidable problems. The effectiveness and participation in the lessons learned process is directly related to the engagement level of leadership

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Moving into the Future

Applying what we've learned to coming challenges

The subject for the final day of the 2012 Lessons Learned Conference was *"Moving into the Future"* with presentations linked to key themes taken from the Chicago Summit. No panel discussion was held.

Although the topic of moving into the future was held on the final day, it was actually broached on Day 1 with a presentation by *Major General Peter Bayer* from *HQ SACT* on *"Maintaining a Ready Alliance in the Future Operating Environment"*. He described the planning timeline based on the situation expected in 2012, 2020, and 2030. 2030 is our emerging future and must be used in planning to maintain readiness and overall military capabilities. There is a need to identify future requirements. There needs to be guidance and objectives for the alliance to operate successfully.

General Bayer explained that we need to examine the future security environment through a strategic foresight analysis. The challenges of the future will be very different from what we experience today. He emphasised that the Lessons Learned Community contributions must be engaged in all steps of future operations planning. This can include participation in working groups and conferences. As planners identify a gap during the *DOTMLPF* process the lessons learned that are applied can help planners focus on the best courses of action.

Mr. Andrew Budd from the IS spoke about *NATO Forces 2020* – modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised, and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment. With a global shift in focus from Europe to Asia, the US expects Europe to take on an increased share of Alliance (as well as its own) defence. In simple terms, NATO Forces 2020 provides a goal to aim at in achieving the capabilities needed to ensure we can undertake the three essential core tasks agreed in the Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

Smart Defence and the *Connected Forces Initiative* are at the heart of the new approach but implementation will be demanding. NATO Nations must embrace the commitment to maintain interoperability and readiness as we continue to drawdown from Afghanistan. His final point was that it is up to the Allies to seize these opportunities, and that NATO itself can play merely a facilitating role. NATO's greatest strength is its unity. Through 2020 and beyond, stimulated by the requirement to use defence resources more efficiently, NATO will deepen that unity to maintain and upgrade its military strength.

The final speaker was the Director of the European Union Military Staff, *Brigadier General Pascal Roux* FRA F, who gave a detailed description of the function of the EU military staff gave an overview of NATO-EU Cooperation, noting that both organisations take a comprehensive approach to preventing conflicts and building peaceful and stable society. He pointed out that although NATO and the EU are both complex organizations, they are able to work together, citing an example of the EU delivering an approved C-IED concept based on NATO's model and highlighting the cooperation with NATO and many other bodies in Counter-Piracy operations.

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Keynote Speaker

Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Deputy Secretary General of NATO

JALLC was honoured to welcome as the Keynote Speaker for the 2012 NATO Lessons Learned Conference Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO. Ambassador Vershbow delivered his remarks on the final morning of the conference within the context of *"Moving into the Future"*.

The Deputy Secretary General began by noting that he has a great personal and professional interest in lessons learned. According to the NATO Lessons Learned Policy, he is the lead for political lessons of the Alliance. This means ensuring that lessons from operations and previous experience are properly taken into account as NATO develops its future policies and procedures. He stressed that as the Alliance looks to cope with today's rapidly changing security environment, it is more important than ever to quickly identify and implement improvements.

Ambassador Vershbow referenced the Chicago Summit, giving a detailed outline of the demanding agenda ahead for NATO. At this year's Chicago summit, national representatives agreed to some challenging goals including an enduring commitment to Afghanistan throughout the transition from conflict to capacity building, a commitment to developing NATO's capabilities in the face of tight

Figure 1: Examples of lessons learned and badges from different countries

economic constraints and shrinking defence budgets, and a commitment to furthering NATO partnerships both to foster support to operations and through political consultation.

Each of these goals raises questions that lessons could answer such as: *What does our experience in Afghanistan teach us about how to cement relationships with organizations we need to work with as part of a comprehensive approach? What can we learn from our historically ad-hoc approach to multinational capability development to make Smart Defence and Connected Forces Initiatives deliver real efficiencies? And what have we learned during Afghanistan and OUP about building and sustaining coalitions of Allies and partners? Policymakers armed with the answers to these questions and more may be able to reach good solutions faster, leaving them more time to focus on emerging security challenges such as cyber defence.*

He closed by stressing that if we complete the whole lessons learned process, and incorporate lessons into our policies, then we can ensure that the Alliance's record of success will continue well into the future. During the questions that followed his speech, he noted that learning political lessons is not always easy. At the political level, experienced diplomats can be rigid and inclined to think they know it all already, plus the problems they are trying to solve frequently have no clear solution. Therefore, the lessons learned process must not pull any punches but offer solutions; even if they are workarounds for problems that cannot be completely solved. When NATO's LL Capability is able to do this, he will have fulfilled his role, and the lessons learned process will be doing its job to ensure the Alliance is prepared to cope with the wide range of emerging security challenges in the future.

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Acknowledgements

JALLC wishes to thank the following organisations and individuals for their support and assistance with this conference:

- The Portuguese Army Military Academy for allowing us to use the facilities, and for their support in IT, catering, and admin during the conference itself.

- The US Navy Reserve, which every year provides personnel who play a major role in the successful execution of the conference.

- All the speakers and presenters – especially Ambassador Vershbow – without whom there could be no conference.

- Captain Hilaire Ducellier, Lieutenants Gord Gushue, Ana Hajdic and Fernando Duarte, and Major Ștefan Olaru from JALLC Production branch, the lead conference planners for this year's conference, and the rest of my staff from Admin, CIS Management and BUDFIN branches who assisted in its execution.

- Finally, all the attendees for your engagement and enthusiasm in helping to make NATO into a successful learning organisation.

THE 2011
GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ
JOURNAL AWARDS
THE 14ᵀᴴ EDITION – 9 November 2012

Now at its 14th edition, the ceremony of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal Awards took place once more under the aegis of the events dedicated to the Day of the General Staff (12 November). To this end, the mission of the *Journal Awards Selection, Evaluation and Nomination Commission*, chaired by Lieutenant General Dr Sorin Ioan, Chief of the Land Forces General Staff, was to choose the winners from the 35 works entered in the competition. Its mission was exciting, but rather difficult, considering the multitude and style of the domains approached.

The guest of honour of the ceremony was Academician Dan Berindei, Vice President of the Romanian Academy, member of the Journal's Editorial Board, who pointed out the contribution and, especially, the interest of the military men in *"achieving competitive works that join the outstanding works that are being developed in this country"*.

The awards, for five different categories, were given by the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Dr Ștefan Dănilă.

Here are the laureates of the *Journal Awards* for this year:

• *The Award Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu*,
for the *Geopolitics and Geostrategy* domain,
was given to **Iuliana-Simona Ţuţuianu**,
for *"Apusul Westphaliei – Statul naţional
în sistemul relaţiilor internaţionale
în anii post-război rece"/"The Sunset of Westphalia
– The National State in the System of International
Relations in the Post-Cold War Years"*.

• *The Award Division General Ştefan Fălcoianu*,
for the *Military Policy, Security and Collective
and National Defence* domain,
was given to **Cristian Petre**
for *"Cadrul operaţional contemporan
şi transformarea militară"/"Contemporary
Operational Framework and Military
Transformation"*.

• *The Award Marshal Alexandru Averescu*,
for the *Military Art* domain,
was given to **General (r.) Dr Mihail Orzeaţă**
for *"Războiul continuu"/"Continuous Warfare"*.

• *The Award Brigadier General Radu R. Rosetti,*
for the Military History domain,
was given to **Dr Petre Otu**
and **Dr Maria Georgescu**
for "Radiografia unei trădări:
cazul colonelului Alexandru D. Sturdza"/
"The X-Ray of a Treason.
*The Case of Colonel Alexandru D. Sturdza".*

• *The Award*
Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu,
for Troops Organisation, Preparation,
Command and Logistics domain,
was given
to **Major General (r.) Dr Gheorghe Arădăvoaice**
for "Liderul militar. Realităţi şi deziderate"/
"The Military Leader. Realities and Desiderata".

Other nominees
for the Gândirea militară românească
Journal Awards were:

TEODOR FRUNZETI

DIPLOMAŢIA APĂRĂRII

EDITURA UNIVERSITĂŢII NAŢIONALE DE APĂRARE „CAROL I"
BUCUREŞTI, 2011

GHEORGHE CALOPĂREANU

**REGIONALIZAREA SECURITĂŢII
ÎN EUROPA CENTRALĂ**

EDITURA UNIVERSITĂŢII NAŢIONALE DE APĂRARE „CAROL I"
BUCUREŞTI, 2011

The Award Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu:
"Diplomaţia apărării"/"Defence Diplomacy",
author **Lieutenant General Dr Teodor Frunzeti**,
and *"Regionalizarea securităţii în Europa Centrală"/*
"The Regionalisation of Security in Central Europe",
author **Colonel Dr Gheorghe Calopăreanu**.

**ARGUMENTUL NUCLEAR
ÎN POLITICA EXTERNĂ A STATELOR**

Rodica Dinulescu

TEODOR FRUNZETI   DOREL BUŞE

RELAŢII INTERNAŢIONALE

EDITURA UNIVERSITĂŢII NAŢIONALE DE APĂRARE „CAROL I"
BUCUREŞTI, 2011

The Award Division General Ştefan Fălcoianu:
"Argumentul nuclear în politica externă a statelor"/
"The Nuclear Argument in the Foreign Policy of States",
author **Dr Rodica Dinulescu**,
and *"Relaţii internaţionale"/"International Relations"*,
authors **Lieutenant General Dr Teodor Frunzeti**
and **Major Dr Dorel Buşe**.

The Award Marshal Alexandru Averescu:
"Afganistan – zece ani de război contra terorii"/
"Afghanistan – Ten Years of War on Terror",
author **Major General (r.) Dr Visarion Neagoe**,
and *"Aeronautica română în anii celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial*
(22 iunie 1941-12 mai 1945)"/"Romanian Aeronautics in the Years
of the Second World War (22 June 1941-12 May 1945)",
authors **Aurel Pentelescu** and **Marius-Adrian Nicoară**.

The Award Brigadier General Radu R. Rosetti:
"Prizonierii români din armata austro-ungară internați în Rusia"/
"The Romanian Prisoners from the Austro-Hungarian Army Interned in Russia",
author **Cornel Țucă**,
and *"Acțiunea ‹Recuperarea›. Securitatea și emigrarea germanilor*
din România (1962-1989)"/"Action ‹Recovery›. The Securitate and the Migration
of Germans from Romania (1962-1989)",
the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives,
editors **Florica Dobre, Luminița Banu, Florian Banu** and **Laura Stancu**.

The Award Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu:
"Tratat de criză teroristă"/"Treatise on Terrorist Crisis",
authors **General (r.) Dr Eugen Bădălan,**
Lieutenant General Dr BEng Gheorghe Savu,
Major General Dr Ilie Botoş and **Colonel Dr Vasile Bogdan,**
and *"Tentaţia migraţiei. Necesitate şi oportunitate într-o lume globalizată"/*
"The Temptation of Migration. Necessity and Opportunity in a Globalised World",
author **Ionel Stoica.**

There were also given two *Certificates of Excelence*:
- to **Lieutenant General Dr Teodor Frunzeti** and **Dr Vladimir Zodian** for coordinating *"Lumea 2011. Enciclopedie politică şi militară"/"World 2011. Political and Military Encyclopaedia"*;

- to **Editura Militară/The Military Publishing House** for its outstanding contribution to the enrichment of the heritage of military science.

GMR
English version by
✑ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

MEDAL
FOR *LESSONS LEARNED*
IN PICTURES
– Award for military filmmakers –

The film *"După 90 de ani/After 90 Years"*, a production of the Armed Forces Film Studio, received the *"Occasional Medal Funded by the Society for Defence Learning"*, for the *documentary* category, at the *International Historical and Military Films Festival* in Warsaw, between 17 and 20 October 2012.

38 films, from seven states, were part of the competition the Ministry of National Defence participating with three films made by the Armed Forces Film Studio. The documentary *"After 90 Years"*, the result of the effort of a crew consisting in *Captain Constantin Mireanu* – Director, *Cătălin Suzeanu* – editing and soundtrack;

George Motoacă and *Daniel Domenico* – photography, shows the history of tanks in the Romanian Armed Forces from 1916 until our days.

The prolific collaboration between the Information and Public Relations Directorate of the Ministry of National Defence and the General Staff is well-known, and this distinction given by the *Society for Defence Learning* confirms once again that *"a picture is worth a thousand words"* when it comes to capitalising on the experience of an organisation and using these *lessons learned* in the future in order not to repeat undesirable situations as well as to make future actions more efficient.

The Training and Doctrine Directorate of the General Staff, the training and doctrine structure of the Land Forces Staff, the National Military Museum *"Ferdinand I"*, the School of Application for Combat Units *"Mihai Viteazul"*, the M-100 TV Studio, the editorial staff of the weekly newspaper *"Observatorul militar"*, the *Pro Patria* editorial staff, the Agency for Information Systems and Services, the Arts Studio, the Commission of Heraldry and Honorary Names of the Ministry of National Defence and, last but not least, the troopers, who have done their best in order for the *branch of tanks* to have a coat of arms ... after 90 years, all contributed, through their representatives, organised in a big crew, to receiving

Anniversary Coat of Arms
*"TANKS – 90 YEARS"**

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* The heraldic elements of the anniversary coat of arms *"TANKS – 90 YEARS"* are: the *symbolic badge of the branch of tanks* and the *descriptive blazon*, connected through a ring. The symbolism of the two heraldic elements suggests the anniversary of the 90 years since the establishment of the first tank unit, the connections between the branch of cavalry and the branch of tanks and the place where the event took place – the city of Pitești, *"the city of tulips"*. The descriptive blazon, created on a heraldic shield, named in Latin *scuta rhombata* has a single partition that comprises the next elements:

- in the upper part, the anniversary number *90;*

- in the central part, a tank and a medieval knight on a horse, symbolising the cavalry, which was replaced by tanks in the battlefield. The most important combat weapons of tanks and of cavalry – the cannon, the spear respectively, are crossed; Below them there are inscribed the date of *1 August*, when the first tanks units was established in the Romanian Armed Forces and the years 1919-2009;

- in the lower part, a blue heraldic tulip, honouring the city of Pitești, reminds us that on the military maps the actions of the military tanks is represented with blue conventional signs, after Romania became NATO member.

the above-mentioned medal and we want to assure them of our respect and, why not, to challenge them to undertake new projects in the field of film, education and *lessons learned*.

The *"venerable"*, not to say old, Colonel Gheorghe Cojocaru, the mentor, wore this coat of arms on the lapel of his white coat of knight of military honour. In our film, we see him sharing his *lessons learned* to the benefit of those to come!

The film *"After 90 Years"* can be watched on the Internet, either on the website of the Ministry of National Defence, or google-ing *După 90 de ani* or on http://www.youtube.com/user/mapnromania. You can still comment on the Internet about this film!

✎ *Colonel Dănuț VACARIU*
Head of the Office of Lessons Learned
The Training and Doctrine Directorate
The General Staff

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

———— ◦•●•◦ ————

The symbolic badge of the branch of tanks comprises, in the upper part, the silhouette of a golden tank under the Tricolour, and in the lower part, there are inscribed in golden letters the words *"THE BRANCH OF TANKS"*, with a black background, specific to the branch of tanks. The two partitions are separated by a golden line (Fragment from the heraldic object datasheet).

2012 / 2013

Thank you, dear collaborators, for the word materialised in the pages of the journal of the General Staff!

Thank you for the fact that, together, we have written a page in the history of the Romanian Military Thinking!

Therefore, it is to each of You we express our gratitude and appreciation:

1. Lieutenant Colonel
      Dr Ioan-Doru APAFAIAN
2. Dr Bogdan AURESCU
3. Colonel Adrian BĂLĂLĂU
4. Barak BARAFI
5. Cristina BOGZEANU
6. Colonel Dr Daniel BRĂTULESCU
7. Constantin-Dumitru BROȘU
8. Colonel (AF) Dr Vasile BUCINSCHI
9. Colonel Liviu BUMBĂCEA
10. Jason BURKE
11. Colonel Dr Mihai BURLACU
12. Major Dr Dorel BUȘE
13. Captain (N) Vicențiu CĂTĂNEANU
14. Brigadier General Ion CERĂCEANU
15. Colonel Dr Dorin CHIRCA
16. Cristina CHIRIAC
17. Colonel Dr Ionel CIOBANU
18. Brigadier General Dr Ion COȘCODARU
19. Lieutenant General Dr Ștefan DĂNILĂ
20. Colonel Paolo D'ONOFRIO
21. Valentin-Bogdan DĂNILĂ
22. Dr Florin DIACONU
23. Lieutenant Colonel
      Marcel-Iulian DOGARU
24. Mirela Claudia DRACINSCHI
25. Colonel Dr Daniel DUMITRU

26. Dr Cristea DUMITRU
27. Sorin FILDAN
28. Captain (N) Adrian FILIP
29. Lieutenant General Dr Teodor FRUNZETI
30. Colonel (r.) Dr Ion GIURCĂ
31. Colonel Florin HELMAN
32. Colonel Codrin-Leonard HERȚANU
33. Colonel (r.) Dr Ionel HORNEA
34. Lieutenant Colonel Avram-Florian IANCU
35. Lieutenant General Dr Sorin IOAN
36. Colonel Dr Crăișor-Constantin IONIȚĂ
37. Michael KUGELMAN
38. Dr Ioan Codruț LUCINESCU
39. Captain (N) BEng Ciprian LUNGU
40. Colonel (AF) Liviu-Marilen LUNGULESCU
41. Lieutenant Colonel BEng Nelu LUȚAN
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Manuscripts submitted to the editorial staff should be sent by mail or email, edited in *Microsoft Word*, *Times New Roman*, *size 14*, *justify*, and they should have no more than *8 pages*. The **graphic illustration** – schemes, figures, tables should be designed using *CorelDraw*, and maps and images – in *JPEG* format.

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The Editorial Staff

The editorial and layout process was completed on 21 December 2012.

We thank you all – the collaborators and readers

of our journal alike, and we wish you happy holidays.

May you be healthy and loved!

Happy New Year!

Cover 1: *Military troops and technology at the National Day Parade – 1 December 2012.*
Photo: Petrică MIHALACHE
Cover 4: *Monument to the Romanian Military Heroes Fallen in the Line of Duty*
– Romania's National Day, 1 December 2012. Photo: Petrică MIHALACHE

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