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**Founded in 1864 under the name "Military Romania"  
- English edition, 7<sup>th</sup> year -**

# Romanian Military Thinking



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*Through the agency of this journal all officers, belonging to all branches, who are in service, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces".*

*Carol - King of Romania*

*Issued in Bucharest on 8 December 1897*

## Romanian Military Thinking

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
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# The Triumph of National Dignity

**O**n 1 December, **Romania's National Day**, following a wonderful tradition, the Romanian Armed Forces passed under the Arch of Triumph in Bucharest once again. It was a wonderful opportunity to renew the sense of national pride, to confirm the strong connection between the people and its army, to reinforce the Armed Forces oath of allegiance to the Country as well as to testify to the trust the people put in the military.

The Romanian Armed Forces passed proudly under this Gate of Honour of the Nation and, as usual, the show was grandiose and impressive. The flowers and admiration flowed over the troops on parade, in a gesture of sincere appreciation for their oath to serve the country and to make the supreme sacrifice.

*“Romanian battalions, cross the Carpathians!”*, the march that inspired the Romanian Army during the First World War, made the hearts of those who came to the Great Holiday of the Country throb and their eyes shed tears.

75 years ago, on 1 December 1936, the Arch of Triumph was inaugurated in its current form. It was initially built in 1922 to honour King Ferdinand I and Queen Maria entering the Capital city, after being crowned as sovereigns of Great Romania in Alba Iulia. Rebuilt with the contribution of numerous associations of former combatants that responded to the subscription launched by the Ministry of National Defence, symbol of Romania's victory in the War for National Reunification, the Arch of Triumph thus became, like the Mausoleum of Mărășești, the Heroes Cross on Mount Caraiman, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the Coronation Cathedral in Alba Iulia, as well as like the roadside memorials and crosses, known and unknown ones, for those fallen on the battlefield, an altar of the dignity and gratitude of the country for its heroes.

*“Glory to those who prepared the national unity by the light of their mind and the power of their soul!”* and *“Glory to those who achieved national unity with their bravery and sacrifice!”* are the words engraved on the stone of this temple, on its two sides, the southern and the northern ones, to express the everlasting gratitude for those who sacrificed themselves for the fulfilment of the national being of the Romanian people and the consolidation of its missions related to the state.

Certainly, the Great Unification in 1918, a legitimate historical act, expected for centuries by the Romanian people and prepared politically and diplomatically by its most enlightened minds, was achieved under favourable political-military circumstances – which have not been quite numerous in the history of this people – at the end of the First World War. However, we should always remember that the Romanian soldiers sacrifice was the supreme argument, and its strength, at a time when great armies lost vigour – was the guarantee of its persistence.

The sacrifice of those who fought for national unity obliges us, the people of today, to be united for the national cause. In a world confused in the fog of globalisation, desperately seeking to make the way forward clearer, gathering around the perennial symbols of the nation is, for certain, the only chance for our identity to survive. However, only the pride to be the descendants of these heroes is not enough and, indisputably, we will have to live up to their sacrifice through our present and future deeds.

The Romanian Armed Forces battle flags proudly flew in front of the troops and on the combat vehicles that passed under the Arch, and the tricolour cockades on the wings of the aircraft and helicopters cleared the sky above.


The soles of the boots of the military men who fought under the Romanian tricolour in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan as well as of those who are ready to respond to the call of the Country at any moment hit the granite of the square in the brass band cadence, and their sound was amplified by the everlasting echo of the cannons in Mărăști and Oituz and of the battle cries in Mărășești.

At the Arch of Triumph, the vault that has sustained all our history, the Romanian Armed Forces presented arms and they were given the evidence of the trust the people put in their power and mission.

On **Romania's National Day** the dignity of this people triumphed again. It was a chance to have confidence in its power of regeneration, to gather and mobilise its creative energies, hoping that we will succeed in fighting today and tomorrow hardships and whatever the increasingly unpredictable future might have in store for us.

A nice December thought, at the end and the beginning of a year, to all those who serve the country under the flag as well as to those who value and respect the Romanian Armed Forces!

***Happy New Year!***

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*  
*English version by*  
*Diana Cristiana LUPU*

# Le triomphe de la dignité nationale

**A**u 1<sup>er</sup> Décembre, *la Journée nationale de la Roumanie*, dans une belle tradition, l'Armée Roumaine passait à nouveau sous l'Arc de Triomphe de Bucarest. Il était une possibilité d'une fierté nationale renouvelée, ce qui confirme le lien entre le peuple et son Armée, qui renforce le serment de l'Armée pour son Pays et, en même temps, qui reçoit la confiance du peuple dans ses soldats.

C'est l'Armée Roumaine qui fièrement passait sous cette Porte d'Honneur de la Nation et, comme toujours, le spectacle était extraordinaire et émouvant. Les fleurs et l'admiration sont renversés sur les soldats rangés qui défilaient, dans un geste de sincère gratitude pour l'engagement de servir leur Pays jusqu'au sacrifice suprême.

„*Traversez les Carpates, bataillons roumaines!*“, le marche qui a enthousiasmé l'Armée Roumaine dans la Première Guerre mondiale, augmentait le pouls des gens et mouillait les yeux de ceux qui sont venus à la Grande Fête du Pays.

Il y a 75 ans, le 1<sup>er</sup> Décembre 1936, a été inaugurée la configuration actuelle de l'Arc de Triomphe, élevé dans la forme originale en Octobre 1922 à l'honneur de l'entrée du roi Ferdinand I<sup>er</sup> et de la reine Marie dans notre Capitale, couronnés à Alba Iulia en tant que souverains de la Grande Roumanie. Restauré par la contribution de nombreuses associations d'anciens combattants qui ont répondu aux doléances lancées par le Ministère de la Défense nationale, le symbole de la victoire de la Roumanie pendant la Guerre de la Réunification Nationale, c'est aussi l'Arc de Triomphe qui est devenu, auprès du Mausolée de Mărășești, de la Croix des Héros du Peuple sur le Mont Caraiman, Le Tombe du Soldat inconnu, la Cathédrale du Couronnement à Alba Iulia, et que tous les croix votives, connues et inconnues, de ceux qui sont morts sur le champ de bataille, un autel de la dignité et de la gratitude du Pays pour ses héros.

„*Gloire à ceux qui, par la puissance lumineuse de l'esprit et l'âme, ont préparé l'unité nationale !*“ et „*Gloire à ceux qui, par leur bravoure et leur sacrifice du sang, ont réalisé l'unité nationale !*“ sont gravés en lettres de pierre sur ce temple, sur les deux côtés de son édifice, au sud et au nord, à l'éternelle reconnaissance

pour ceux qui se sont sacrifiés pour l'achèvement de l'être national du peuple roumain et pour l'institution de ses raisons d'Etat.

Bien sûr, la Grande Union de 1918, un document historique légitime, attendu par de siècles du peuple roumain et préparé politiquement et diplomatiquement par ses esprits les plus éclairés, a été accompli dans des circonstances favorables politiques et militaires – et ce peuple a eu seulement tels moments de son existence – de la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale. Mais, n'oublions pas que le sacrifice de ses soldats roumains était l'argument, et son force, dans une époque où de grandes armées ont dispersées leur vigueur – était le garant de sa persévérance.

Le sacrifice de ceux qui ont lutté pour l'unité nationale nous oblige à tous, les gens d'aujourd'hui, à la solidarité pour la cause nationale. Dans un monde confus par le brouillard de la mondialisation, qui cherche désespérément à éclairer la voie à suivre, la cueillette des gens autour de symboles pérennes de la nation est certainement la seule chance de survie de notre identité. Toutefois, seulement la fierté d'être les descendants de ces héros n'est pas suffisante et, sans doute, il sera nécessaire de faire un effort immense de nous atteindrons à l'hauteur de leur sacrifice, par nos actions d'aujourd'hui et de demain.

Les drapeaux de bataille de l'Armée Roumaine fièrement ondulaient au front des troupes et sur les véhicules de combat qui passaient sous l'Arc, aussi que les cocardes tricolores sur les ailes des avions et des hélicoptères éclaircissaient le ciel au-dessus.

Les semelles des bottes des soldats qui ont combattu sous le drapeau roumain dans les Balkans, en Iraq et en Afghanistan, et de ceux qui sont prêts à tout moment pour répondre à l'appel de la Patrie frappaient dans le rythme des laitons de la fanfare sur le granit de la marché, et de leur écho était amplifié par le signal jamais étouffé du canons de Mărăști et Oituz et aussi d'appel de départ pour l'attaque au Mărășești.

A l'Arc de Triomphe, ce voute sur lequel toute notre histoire se fonde, l'Armée Roumaine saluait et recevait le témoignage de confiance de gens dans sa pouvoir et sa mission.

***De la Journée nationale de la Roumanie*** triomphait, à nouveau, la dignité de cette nation. C'était un moment de la confiance dans sa possibilité de se régénérer, de recueillir les gens et de mobiliser ses énergies créatives, en espérant que nous allons réussir dans le combat contre les difficultés d'aujourd'hui, de demain et tout ce que l'avenir nous réserve, même si il est le plus imprévisible.

Voici une magnifique pensée de Décembre, de début et de fin de l'année pour tous ceux qui servent le Pays sous le drapeau et à tous ceux qui chérissent et respectent l'Armée Roumaine!

***Bonne Année!***

*Version française par  
Alina PAPOI*

# **CONTINUOUS WARFARE**

## **Cultural Confrontation (VI)**

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ

### **Does a cultural confrontation exist?**

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*Culture and civilisation used to be considered synonymous notions by most philosophers, sociologists and other scientists.*

*Cultural confrontation is not necessarily violent, but it has been and will most probably continue to be part of the humankind history as long as the world exists.*

*Religion is one of the most active battlefields in the cultural confrontation domain.*

*Political leaders used and will perhaps continue to use arts for promoting their personal interests.*

*Culture can be compared with a double-edged sword because it can both serve noble purposes and instigate people to take actions with very bad consequences for other human beings.*

**Keywords:** *culture; conflicts; religion; politics; arts; leaders*

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Some authors consider that a cultural confrontation “*is nonsense*”<sup>1</sup> because values are not conflicting but perennial, while interests are variable and they are the aim of actions. Interests also initiate destructive actions in order to replace the existing values. Paradoxically, the same authors, within the same book, express an opposite opinion according to which “*cultural war*” could be generated by the political involvement into culture and the effects of these actions could be seen in libraries, bookshops, cinemas, on TV and markets<sup>2</sup>. This radical change is not singular and it could be included into the category of the so-called “*undulations*” (something similar to the labours of Sisyphus – everything built is ruined in a very short time and the individual has to start the same work from the very beginning again and again), a concept launched by the Romanian philosopher Lucian Blaga.

Reading many different authors’ opinions about culture, I was tempted to think that some people discovered cultural confrontation only after Samuel Huntington published his famous article *The Clash of Civilizations*. If it is true, then all those people

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<sup>1</sup> Teodor Frunzeti, Mircea Mureșan, Gheorghe Văduva, *Război și haos*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2009, p. 264.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 266-267.

should know that confrontation in this domain has existed since human beings decided to organise themselves into different groups. Everyone who wants to find proof of this truth has to study religious writings.

More than 200 years ago, the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche made public his opinion according to which any creator had to destroy values first<sup>3</sup>, meaning to question all the values previously created, and to replace them with the new ones. In order to do that, Nietzsche points out that every means is good but war is the best one, which he considers to be a great wisdom of all the spirits that have become too inward, too profound<sup>4</sup>.

Analysing conflict in general, Max Weber estimates that it will be impossible to eliminate fight between individuals because they try to impose their will over other fellow men using different means, especially the ones that stimulate contradictions<sup>5</sup>. T. Parsons also believes that conflict is spread all over the industrial modern society because the equality of chances is impossible and there is a great risk of appearing “*conflicting cultures*”<sup>6</sup>, generated by the most powerful to exploit the poorest and weakest.

The Romanian philosopher Emil Cioran sustains cultural confrontation from the inside of what he calls “*minor cultures*”<sup>7</sup>, like those from the Balkans that, being aware of their destiny, must defeat it<sup>8</sup>. It means that all those cultures have to fight against themselves in order to eliminate a presumable inferiority complex consisting of the need for justifying and proving their values, in opposition to “*major cultures*” that impose on others through themselves.

The same subject of conflict is approached by the sociologist Lockwood who considers culture a true infrastructure<sup>9</sup> that reduces the amplitude of conflicts, although they will continue to appear inside human communities. Another sociologist – Coleman – estimates that fights for sustaining interests at local level, within urban as well as rural communities, regarding taxation, education systems, the role

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<sup>3</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein Buch für alle und keinen*, in vol. *Das Hauptwerk*, Band 3, Nymphenburger Verlag, München, 1995, p. 158, cited by Nicolae Rambu in *Tirania valorilor. Studii de filosofie culturală și axiologie*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică R.A., București, 2006, p. 101.

<sup>4</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Amurgul idolilor*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2007, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Max Weber cited by Raymond Boudon, in *Tratat de sociologie*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1992, p. 267.

<sup>6</sup> T. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, New York, The Free Press, 1937, London McGraw Hill, 1964, cited by Raymond Boudon, in *Tratat de sociologie, op. cit.*, p. 271.

<sup>7</sup> Emil Cioran, *România subterană*, în *Singurătate și destin*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1991, p. 302.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>9</sup> D. Lockwood, *Quelque remarques a propos de “The Social System”*, cited by Raymond Boudon, in *Tratat de sociologie, op. cit.*, p. 272.

of the church and so on could be very sharp because they reflect the power and prestige of each personality and community<sup>10</sup>.

Anyone who will try to identify the way of defining culture will take part in a true confrontation of ideas because there are hundreds of definitions which constitute a real labyrinth of significations<sup>11</sup>.

Even in antiquity, the concept of culture was perceived as an action of cultivating, initially the land and then the human spirit. Sigmund Freud states that, through culture, people renounce their natural drives such as the death, destruction and narcissism ones. Unfortunately, the result is not the goodness, the beauty and the sacred but the feelings of uncertainty and guilt<sup>12</sup>. Jean Jacques Rousseau thinks that man is essentially good by nature but he is perverted and corrupted by his experiences in society. That is why he calls for a return to nature by eliminating all civilisation barriers which are not good for people. In keeping with Rousseau's opinion, the German writer Friedrich Schiller says that civilisation transforms man into a miscreant<sup>13</sup>. Sigmund Freud is categorical on this subject saying that the suppression of civilisation is a short-sightedness<sup>14</sup>. He forecasts that the elimination of all the civilisation barriers will free the beast's instincts which are inherited by any human being and the result will be a society governed by the laws of the jungle.

E. B. Taylor is among the first ones who consider culture identical to civilisation because both of them include knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society<sup>15</sup>. In turn, Huntington considers civilisation a "*cultural entity*"<sup>16</sup>, meaning that culture includes civilisation.

On the other hand, most of the German philosophers and sociologists make a distinction between culture and civilisation. In their opinion, culture is spirit – that is to say something that comes from the inside of humans – whilst civilisation is power, meaning something that comes from the outside of people. Immanuel Kant in his *Critique of Judgment* defines culture as a regulation of mutual relations among people, consisting of the opposition between legal powers,

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<sup>10</sup> J. Coleman, *Community Conflict*, Free Press, New York, 1957, cited by Raymond Boudon, in *Tratat de sociologie, op. cit.*, p. 279.

<sup>11</sup> Nicolae Rambu, *Tirania valorilor. Studii de filosofia culturii și axiologie, op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

<sup>12</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Angoasă și civilizație*, in *Opere* vol. I, Editura Științifică, București, 1991, pp. 353-364.

<sup>13</sup> Friedrich Schiller, *Scrieri estetice*, Editura Univers, București, 1981, p. 262.

<sup>14</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Viitorul unei iluzii*, in *Opere* vol. I, Editura Științifică, București, 1991, p. 375.

<sup>15</sup> Edward B. Taylor, *Primitive Culture. Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Language, Art and Custom*, Gordon Press, New York, 1974, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations?* in *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, p. 23.

born from the civil society, and the prejudice that people could produce to each other as a result of their conflicting liberties<sup>17</sup>. Thomas Mann was a supporter of the distinction between culture and civilisation before the World Congress of Writers, held in the USA, in 1939. Right after it, he stated that he and the German people as well were wrong considering culture different from civilisation.

Most definitions of culture are similar to the one formulated by T. S. Eliot and deal with its both spiritual and material dimensions: arts, manners, traditions, ideas and religious representations of a community<sup>18</sup>. As a matter of fact, culture is the glue that transforms a sum of individuals into a human society. Surprisingly, it seems that Eliot contradicts himself, in the same book, saying that it is possible to exist some epochs about one can say that do not have any culture<sup>19</sup>. In other words, Blaga's "undulations" are related to not only the so-called "minor cultures" but also to the ones considered major.

The great diversity of opinions concerning the meaning of culture and especially the fact that so many are opposite make T. Eagleton state that it is impossible to rigorously define the notion of culture<sup>20</sup> and E. H. Gombrich say that nobody really knows what the notion of culture means.

In my opinion, cultural confrontation is a continuous fight between people who sustain different ideas, which generates artistic works and scientific creations that facilitate a better cognition of the Universe, continuing progress for the benefit of the whole mankind. Unfortunately, cultural products are dual, if we take into account their utility and final destination. I do mean that some products such as explosive, aircraft, ships, laser beams, radio waves and so on could be used for building houses and industrial plants, for communications, for medical purposes etc. but they could also cause the destruction of buildings and other facilities as well as kill or influence people to do something against their will etc.

Cultural confrontation does not stimulate violence but its feature of being dual is reflected in a very impressive scale of meanings such as opinions and attitudes ranging from positive appreciations, sympathies to carelessness, rejection and even destruction of some cultural productions or the physical elimination of some value creators. Burning books and heretics in front of a large audience was quite common during the Middle Ages. Over the years, this practice was re-enacted by dictatorial regimes such as Nazism and communism.

<sup>17</sup> Dominique Colas, *Genealogia fanatismului și a societății civile*, Editura Nemira, București, 1998, p. 276.

<sup>18</sup> T. S. Eliot, *Contribuții la conceptul de cultură (Zum Begriff der Kultur; Notes Towards the Definition of Culture)*, Hamburg, 1961, p. 136, cited by Nicolae Râmbu in *Tirania valorilor, op. cit.*, p. 42.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>20</sup> Terry Eagleton, *Was ist Kultur. Eine Einführung?*, C. H. Beck, Munchen, 2001.



Carelessness and rejection of certain cultural products are quite common forms of nowadays cultural confrontation in democratic states. These attitudes are more likely to emerge among individuals belonging to different generations. Analysing clashes between people, as far as culture is concerned, Alvin Toffler concludes that people could be divided in classical music supporters, contemporary painting supporters, modern theatre supporters and so on and they dislike to change their opinions or to mix their preferences<sup>21</sup>. The result of this situation is a permanent conflict between humans and between human nature and culture as well. This permanent conflict is caused by the human spirit that desires to be free of all social barriers whilst culture aims to diminish the intensity of conflict by building some “*safety valves*”<sup>22</sup>, consisting in institutions in charge of controlling all types of conflicts within society, and to direct individuals’ energies towards non-destructive activities.

I assume that cultural confrontation existed and will continue to accompany human societies because any type of confrontation is based on the human feelings of “*hate, envy, need and desire*”<sup>23</sup>. This combination of feelings leads people to try to impose their will on other fellow men utilising a large variety of methods and means that substantiate the dimensions of confrontation. For instance, in the name of civilisation and with the aim of promoting cultural values wars have been waged, territories have been occupied and their inhabitants have been obliged to live in accordance with the new rules imposed by the most powerful<sup>24</sup>.

Science (anthropology, philosophy, ethics, sociology, history etc.), art (literature, music, painting, sculpture, theatre and cinema) and religion are the most important “*battlefields*” of the cultural confrontation. It is waged at individual level especially through competitions and polemics and at group level as well having as “*warriors*” think tanks, schools, interest groups, institutions, organisations – international governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations – and communities (states, group of states, ethnic and religious minorities) etc.

### ***Religion as the cultural confrontation battlefield***

Religion was and most probably will continue to be a very active field of confrontation. According to S. Huntington, religion discriminates sharply than ethnicity because a person cannot be, for instance, half Muslim and half Catholic<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> Alvin Toffler, *Consumatorii de cultură*, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

<sup>22</sup> L. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, The Free Press of Glencoe, cited by Raymond Boudon in *Tratat de sociologie*, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

<sup>23</sup> Raymond Boudon, *Tratat de sociologie*, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

<sup>24</sup> Emil Cioran, *Istorie și utopie*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2002, pp. 37-38.

<sup>25</sup> Samuel Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

As most people know, culture is the most important element that defines a human community. It can help us come along but it can also stimulate discrimination and deep cleavages among people and communities. Unfortunately, over the last decades, it has been a growing trend towards mutual rejection among people belonging to different generations, ethnic communities and religions. The idea of unity in diversity is a generous one but it seems to be more like a utopia because too many people focus on what differentiates us instead of what unifies humans. The worst situation occurs in the religious domain because of fanatics. These people described by Dominique Colas as iconoclasts, evildoers, anarchists, rebels, inflexible and even zealous assassins<sup>26</sup> represent a real threat to our hopes. Unfortunately, religious leaders had and most probably will continue to have a prominent role within religious confrontation. The majority of them do not accept to harmonise religious precepts or to accept peaceful coexistence fearing to diminish or even to lose their important positions within the society and clergy. In this respect, I can recall the attempts made by the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, the most important components of Christendom, which failed because everyone pretended to keep its beliefs and rituals and the other one to join and adjust all the practices accordingly<sup>27</sup>.

Throughout the history of mankind, religion has been an ally and an opponent of policy as well. Almost always religious leaders have been involved in politics and some political leaders have held important religious positions into clergy hierarchy, including the one of the major religious leader. Caesar, for instance, was the Priest of Jupiter when he was young and the Great Priest after he became a consul, in the year 63 BC<sup>28</sup>. His example is not a singular one. The Great Dacian Priest Deceneu was, according to Jordanes, first councillor and even Vice King of the Dacian Kingdom led by Burebista. After the assassination of Burebista, the Great Priest Deceneu became King of the Dacians, as the historian Jordanes tells us.

In Ancient Egypt, priests had a great influence over the pharaohs and, many times, priests even subordinated them. When pharaohs wanted to reduce the influence of the priests, they were subject to rebellions instigated by priests. The situation in Egypt occurred in almost the entire ancient world. For instance, priests of the God Marduk facilitated the action of Cyrus II the Great of Persia to conquer Babylon, betraying their King Nabonid, because of the lack of consideration for them<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> Dominique Colas, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>27</sup> John Bowker, *Credințe care au schimbat lumea*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 2007, p. 65.

<sup>28</sup> Iohanna and Nicolae Șarambei, *99 personalități ale lumii antice*, Editura Semne, București, 1997, p. 67.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 129.

The appetite for power – both political and religious – led some religious leaders to be promoted in political positions of ministers, like the French cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin<sup>30</sup>, and even of prime ministers, like the Romanian Patriarch Miron Cristea, in the interwar period, or chiefs of states like the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini. In order to justify his political position, Khomeini used to declare that “*Islam is politics or it is nothing*”<sup>31</sup>.

Charles the Great of the Franks (Charlemagne), who reigned between 742 and 814, used religion as a pretext for conquering new territories<sup>32</sup>. He wanted and managed to impose the Christian religion by force, despite the fact that this religion promotes peace and love for the other fellow men. As a matter fact, he left no choice for the opponents but to convert to Christianity or to die<sup>33</sup>.

It is relatively easy to influence people using religion, because many religious books encompass dual behavioural norms. Some of the precepts urge to moderation and respect for other fellow men, no matter they belong to the same religion or to a different one. The other precepts promote confrontation and even extermination for people belonging to other religions. Globally, the result is a mix of confrontation and cooperation, depending on the clergy decision.

Christianity – the religion of most people in the world – initiated some crusades to free Jerusalem from the Muslim occupation in the Middle Ages. Right now, Christians, especially those from the Occident, are suspected to wage a hidden war against Muslims, using the pretext of the war against terrorism<sup>34</sup>.

Another religion, the Islamic one, promotes mixed precepts for its adepts. Some recommend cooperation and peaceful coexistence with people belonging to other religions but other precepts urge for converting them, otherwise they have to be subject to killing. On the other hand, any Muslim that converts to another religion, makes peace with “*the pagans*” or criticises the Islam will be sentenced to death<sup>35</sup>. Some of the most famous cases refer to the assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, in 1981<sup>36</sup>, because he signed a peace treaty with Israel, and the condemnation to death of the writer Salman Rushdie, because of his book *Satanic Verses*<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> Ilie Grămadă, *Franța lui Richelieu și Mazarin*, Editura Junimea, Iași, 1971, pp. 6-24.

<sup>31</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Random House Trade Paperback, New York, 2003, p.8.

<sup>32</sup> Michael Lee Lanning, *100 personalități militare ale lumii*, Editura Orizonturi, Editura Științelor Sociale și Politice, București, 2005, p.45.

<sup>33</sup> \*\*\*, *Unde, când, cum și de ce s-a întâmplat*, Reader's Digest Ltd. Press, București, 2005, p. 81.

<sup>34</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *America la răscruce*, Editura Antet, Filipeștii de Târg, Prahova, 2006, p. 62.

<sup>35</sup> Bernard Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>36</sup> Paul Johnson, *O istorie a lumii moderne: 1920-2000*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2003, p. 687.

<sup>37</sup> Shahrugh Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period*, New York, 1980, cited by Paul Johnson in *O istorie a lumii moderne: 1920-2000, op. cit.*, p. 693.

Judaism promotes, in some precepts, the exclusion from community of the people belonging to other religious cults by prohibiting the marriage between Jews and non-Jews as this event involves two individuals that belong to the same religion<sup>38</sup>.

The association between policy and extremism based on religion gave birth to the most dangerous social phenomenon – terrorism – which has contaminated people in the entire world, especially the descendants of the emigrants from Africa and Asia in the Occident. Francis Fukuyama points out that most fighters for jihad were born and educated in Western Europe. Their membership to the extremist organisations is caused by the desire for revenge against the countries they live in<sup>39</sup> because of their different views about life, society and religious beliefs. All those cultural differences have made impossible their integration into western societies.

### ***Standardisation versus arts***

There is an internal confrontation between different domains of culture. It encompasses professional disputes such as polemics and harsh debates between different personalities aiming to impose their vision and style of creating values on the other creators of art. Many times the disputes have a hidden aspect consisting in influencing people to acknowledge the merits of artists and to give them the appropriate incentives such as social position, fame as well as material stimulants.

Another dimension of confrontation is represented by the “clashes” between different groups of creators forming art schools, universities, think tanks and so on. Everyone seeks large recognition and, at the same time, tries to put the other similar groups of creators into shade.

Although there is enough room for everybody in this world, art creators, as well as most human beings, aim to occupy the best place in society, meaning the one that provides recognition, fame, money and good social position.

Scientists, engineers and economists have made standardisation and rapid economic growth possible by convincing people to focus on commonalities rather than on differences and uniqueness in industrial production. The unprecedented development of sciences and the information explosion facilitate new ways of producing goods and services using planning, programming and standardisation. It has generated a great economic efficiency and expansion of knowledge in all the domains of human activities. The result is dual, as most products of humanity are.

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<sup>38</sup> Josy Eisenberg, *Judaismul*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1995, p. 128.

<sup>39</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

One facilitates communication among individuals and communities, blowing up many myths and reducing the importance of some artistic products and of their creators as well. Photos, cinematography, television and the Internet have contributed enormously to forcing artists to descend from their “*ivory tower*”. This is the second result of the economic and scientific progress – the growing opposition between artists and scientists along with engineers. Some artists blame science because it seems to standardise people’s lives. According to Max Lerner, the majority of hospitals, schools, industrial plants, houses are standardised. Also, education, workplaces, work itself and even life are dominated by daily routine and uniformity<sup>40</sup>. That is why the American psychologist Rudolf Arnheim believes that standardisation is in deep opposition with art. Whilst standardisation is more or less conformism, arts help people regain their unique feeling of being alive and express their emotions. Moreover, he recommends arts as a cure against losing people’s roots<sup>41</sup>.

### ***Art and policy***

Political leaders with totalitarian views about governing society and extremist religious leaders have tried to erect different barriers to stop or at least to reduce communication between their followers and the people from democratic countries fearing of the “*contamination*” with democratic views about human relations into society. It is the case of the authoritarian regimes from Central Asia which established a strict control over the military cooperation with the USA<sup>42</sup>. Also, in some cases, presidents themselves approve professional connections between indigenous cadets and commissioned officers and the occidental ones, trying to prevent the democratic influence of the latter over the ones they relate to<sup>43</sup>. It is amazing and sad as well that these attitudes still exist. I assume that those leaders do not know or if they know it they neglect the truth that administrative and physical barriers are more permissive compared to the psychological ones, built with patience and dedication through education. Any leader and educator has to know that more interdictions stimulate curiosity, attraction for the prohibited action, thing etc. and contribute to the growth of the germs of rejection among generations, ethnic and religious communities.

Interest divides people in all the domains. The interests of artists and their sponsors as well have been expressed in different ways. Some of the ways are very subtle

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<sup>40</sup> Max Lerner, *America as a Civilization*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1957, pp. 260-261.

<sup>41</sup> Alvin Toffler, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

<sup>42</sup> Michael J. McCarthy, *The Limits of Friendship*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, 2007, pp. 114 -115, <http://www.aupress.maxwell.af.mil>.

<sup>43</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, Penguin Books, New York, 2003, pp. 74-83, cited by Michael J. McCarthy, *The Limits of Friendship*, pp. 114-115.

and insidious like subliminal messages and pleas for the independence of art. The other ways – the brutal ones – have been usually imposed by the political and religious leaders with the help of some artists and scientists eager to receive social positions and material incentives as soon as possible. The prohibition of certain artistic products – books, films, paintings, and theatre shows –, the destruction of some sculptures and buildings, especially the ones related to religious practices; the ignition of some books, the closure of some theatres; the banishment, imprisonment or even murder of some artists – such as the Soviet art creators jailed in Siberian gulags or the murder of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of La Prensa journal in Managua<sup>44</sup> etc. are among the most used forms of political dictators involvement in the artistic domain.

Narrow-mindedness and bigotry were and most probably will continue to be some of the most dangerous enemies of culture. One may understand an attitude like the one of the English authorities in the middle of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, which did not make distinction between robbers, beggars, vagrants and theatre artists. I do mean this attitude could be related to the level of science development that determined the Puritans to consider work as sacred, idleness as evil and art at best the waste of God's precious time<sup>45</sup>. On the other hand, nowadays, some political and religious leaders as well practise censorship, burn books<sup>46</sup>, condemn to death artists who promote and deliver artistic products that support opposing ideas or criticise some religious practices.

Art creators, scientists and politicians have been involved in lasting debates and polemics related to the role of art in society. There have been two most important directions identified: *“art for art's sake”* and *“art of engagement”*<sup>47</sup>.

In my opinion, the objective of *“art for art's sake”* has never been achieved. People with talent and imagination have expressed their ideas and emotions and made them available for the public opinion in order to initiate or to foster the fulfilment of some objectives or to suggest/impose some political guidelines. In other words, I suspect that those who have promoted and supported the *“art for art's sake”* slogan are more interested in sustaining their prestige that distinct them from the mass of ordinary people than in following the aim

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<sup>44</sup> Saul Landau, *The Guerrilla Wars of Central America: Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993, p. 30.

<sup>45</sup> Louis B. Wright, *The Cultural Life of the American Colonies 1607-1763*, New York, Harper and Row, 1962, cited by Alvin Toffler in *Consumatorii de cultură, op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>46</sup> Salman Rushdie's book *Satanic Verses* was burned publicly in the city of Bradford in UK, on 14 January 1989, according to *The Times* and *Daily Telegraph* journals on 15 February 1989.

<sup>47</sup> Virgil Matei, *Dicționar de maxime, reflecții, expresii latine commentate*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 2007, p. 25.

of obtaining independence for arts. Most probably, they would like to seize the status of elite for all the art creators. That is why they blame musicals, art galleries in supermarkets, art courses for amateurs, pretending that these actions lower art performance standards<sup>48</sup>. Elitists pretend that they do not defend their positions but the arts' quality that need to be protected from vulgarity, which extends because of democracy that facilitates the access to the arts for masses of ignorant people<sup>49</sup>.

Another way of sustaining “*art for art's sake*” trend is the indirect one, promoted by many artists and other intellectuals such as Russell Lynes. They militate for sharp separation between arts and politics, otherwise arts will be certain victim of politicians seeking to accumulate more political capital<sup>50</sup>.

The so-called art with tendencies or art of engagement has been a permanent presence in the cultural life of all historical periods. It is meant to serve the powerful people – politicians and religious leaders as well – to subjugate their fellow men and to make them more dependent or enthusiastic in order to support the ideas and objectives promoted by the most powerful or the richest people.

Many artists are sponsored by rich people or crowned heads, becoming “*official poets (painters, composers etc.)*”. Thus, they are not independent to express their ideas and emotions. All their works are subordinated to the interests (desires, commands) of their patrons and they have to create the desired effects over the mass of ordinary people. The impressiveness of buildings, through their style, dimensions and chosen place for being erected, has been designated to inspire fear, subjugation, and trust into the power of certain symbols as well as to show the wealth, magnificence and glory of the owners or the institutions. Egyptian pyramids, for instance, have to symbolise the divine origin of the pharaohs and to suggest their spiritual immortality by what is left for posterity.

Paintings have had a very important role in delivering the messages of the popes, cardinals, emperors, kings, princes, dictators, political parties' chairmen and, more recently, businessmen. Many times artists have decided to serve political causes and created works that have become famous, such as *Liberty Leading the People* of the French painter Eugene Delacroix, during the French Revolution or Picasso's *Guernica* showing the destruction of a locality during the Spanish Civil War.

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<sup>48</sup> Bush-Brown, cited by Alvin Toffler in *Consumatorii de cultură, op. cit.*, p. 180.

<sup>49</sup> Dwight MacDonald, *Masscult & Midcult*, in *Against the American Grain*, Random House, New York, 1962, cited by Alvin Toffler in *Consumatorii de cultură, op. cit.*, pp. 181-182.

<sup>50</sup> *The New York Times* on 23 September 1963, cited by Alvin Toffler in *Consumatorii de cultură, op. cit.*, pp. 163-164.

Written and spoken words were and will continue to be one of the ways that mostly influence people. That is why poets, writers and playwrights have been among the most involved artists into glorifying or criticising political leaders through their pamphlets, novels, drama and sagas. When dictators impose censorship artists use allegories and encoded writings in order to transmit their messages to the public opinion.

Art is like a double-edged sword. It could be used both for noble purposes and for promoting racial hate, religious intolerance, xenophobia and any type of discrimination as well. The American writer Harriet Beecher Stowe promotes slavery abolition and racial discrimination elimination in her novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin* but the Italian poet Gabriele D'Annunzio promotes fascism and racial discrimination. The Soviet regime is described as unjust and harsh by the Russian writer Alexandr Solzhenitsyn in his book *Archipelago Gulag* while Vladimir Mayakovski and some other Soviet writers and poets glorify the same regime.

### ***The sleep of reason gives birth to monsters***

According to Plutarch, the concept of civilised people is the opposite of the one of barbarian or savage and uneducated. In reality, the usage of the notion of barbarian was meant to make a distinction between the Greeks and the Romans on the one side and any other people. Education helps people to acquire spiritual and material culture and to eliminate the beast's impulses inherited in the human nature. Also, education is the basis for knowledge and its implementation into real life.

The desire for power by all means has led people, leaders or ordinary men, to use betrayal, crime, corruption, deception and force to impose personal will on other people. The worst atrocities in the entire history such as killing brothers and parents, mass murder of the opponents – both religious and political ones – have resulted from an exaggerate desire for power that possesses some people's minds.

Monsters of human appearance have lived throughout history inside human societies. In ancient times, there was quite common for the heirs of rulers at any level to fight and kill each other to gain power. The attitude of the leaders translated to their followers and, guided by the Latin dictum "*when weapons speak the law falls silent*"<sup>51</sup>, the soldiers used to kill, rape and plunder, thinking – like Juvenal's hero<sup>52</sup> – that their will could replace reason.

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<sup>51</sup> Cicero, *Pro Milone (IV, 10)*, cited by I. Berg in *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, Editura Vestala, București, 2004, p. 312.

<sup>52</sup> Juvenal, *Satire VI (223)*, cited by I. Berg in *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre, op. cit.*, p. 314.



Almost all the autocratic leaders played the role of God on Earth, saying and thinking like Louis XIV that “*L’Etat c’est moi (I am the state)*”<sup>53</sup> or like Mao Tse Tung: “*Power grows out of the barrel of a gun*”<sup>54</sup>. Most of them thought that they had divine origin and so they were above human rules. As a consequence, they disobeyed rules and used personal will as supreme law. It is said that Alexander the Great of Macedonia forced his destiny all the time, as he did when he cut the Gordian knot. He thought he was equal to the Gods, especially after his coronation as Pharaoh of Egypt when the priests declared him son of God Amon. Many times he was seized by a violent fury and used to cruelly repress all people that opposed his ideas, no matter if they were relatives or friends. After battles his behaviour was inconstant – sometimes killed all the prisoners but in some cases he tried to attract people from the conquered territories adopting their habits and Gods<sup>55</sup>.

Caesar, the Roman Emperor, was well educated at the best schools in the empire. He was a good orator, a brilliant writer and he had vast knowledge. Despite all these qualities, some historians portray him as dishonest, dominated by the desire for power, a cruel person living a dirty life. During battles he used to forgive those opponents that decided to join him and to cruelly punish those that fought against him till the end of battle. It is said that he ordered to kill 40 000 Gauls in 53 BC, following their rebellion<sup>56</sup>.

There are some stories about Herod – King of the Jews between 37 BC and 4 AD – who killed many of his numerous children, one of his wives and many other relatives who pretended to succeed him to the throne after his death in order to smooth the way to the throne for his favourite children only. Also, he ordered the murder of all boys in and around Bethlehem who were two years old and under, when he heard the story of the birth of Jesus, to whom the Kingdom of the Jews was promised by God<sup>57</sup>.

From legendary David (1013-973 BC), who cruelly killed all his opponents<sup>58</sup>, to Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Khomeini, Saddam Hussein, and Ratko Mladici, there have been a lot of leaders led by the desire for power who committed genocide and mass murder.

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<sup>53</sup> I. Berg, *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre, op. cit.*, p. 198.

<sup>54</sup> Victor Duță, *Religie și putere*, Editura Ștefan, București, 2008, p. 19.

<sup>55</sup> Iohanna and Nicolae Șarambei, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-23.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 64-78.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 209-210.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 137-139.

# A POSSIBLE NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR EXTREME RISK MANAGEMENT

*Brigadier General (r.) Dr Gheorghe VĂDUVA*

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*Each institution involved in emergency and extreme risk management draws up a series of intervention plans that are harmonised through collaboration and cooperation protocols. However, intervention in emergency situations is subsumed under the intervention in extreme risk circumstances. That is why, as a consequence of the proliferation of new challenges, dangers and threats, as well as of the new vulnerabilities to them, that rise the risk level to its maximum, extreme limit, a national integrated system for extreme risk management is more and more needed.*

*This is what the author writes about, suggesting two versions to achieve the national system for extreme risk management, as follows: as a system of systems and as a group of systems.*

**Keywords:** *vulnerabilities; plans; emergencies; extreme risk; intervention means*

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- to monitor normality, abnormality, events that are likely to generate disasters, critical situations and crisis in all extreme risk or/and pre-risk events;

**E**mergency plans are instruments used to identify the dangers, threats and vulnerabilities to them

and the risks involved and assumed in the case of the occurrence of extreme risk situations, such as: earthquakes, catastrophes, natural disasters, epidemics, pandemics and other emergency situations.

Firstly, the emergency plan supposes a rigorous method to phase the activities of identifying, analysing, assessing, predicting possible emergency situations and of settling the amount and type of forces, means and resources and of organising all the actions in order to provide maximum possible security to persons, properties, communities, public and private institutions and environment.

The essence of the emergency plan is *forecast*, but this is not possible without a very good understanding of the situation. It requires:

- to know and understand the phenomenon that generates the extreme risk;
- to gather experience;

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- to identify, assess and forecast, on the basis of thorough knowledge and rigorous analysis, namely of understanding the precedents, the gathered experience and existent and updated databases, the challenges, dangers, threats occurring in possible emergency situations, for every type of event (earthquake, torrential rains, overflows, floods, fires, drought, waves of frost, heatwaves, avalanches, meteorite falls, other meteorological, geophysical, or cosmic events, technologic, nuclear, ecological accident, explosion induced at some ammunition depots remained from after the war or accidental ones, biological accidents, epidemics, pandemics etc.) and the vulnerabilities to them;
- to analyse, assess and forecast all possible events and situations that could generate disasters, on groups of events and predictable evolutions, areas, localities, sites, enterprises, institutions etc.;
- to calculate the risk level for every type of possible event, area, community, institution, on a chart ranging from *absence of risk* to *extreme risk*;
- to draw up policies and strategies to prevent the surprise in case of great risk events, to allow timely intervention to limit effects, to protect population, assets, infrastructures, properties etc.;
- to draw up concrete intervention plans in areas, localities, sites, enterprises, institutions, situations etc.;
- to draw up measures of evacuation, sanitary assistance, social protection and reconstruction, particularly for the critical infrastructures;
- to draw up policies to organise the emergency management system and, on this basis, to train personnel for these structures;
- to draw up policies and strategies to identify, multiply, capitalise on and recover resources, including financial ones, needed for interventions in emergency situations;
- to draw up policies and strategies to provide intervention means (special vehicles, equipment, individual and collective systems and means for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) protection; high-tech devices etc.);
- to draw up policies and strategies to alert, search, save-rescue persons and goods, to protect the population, property, institution, communities and infrastructures;
- to design and develop, based on the previous elements, a coherent and efficient emergency management system;
- to correct errors and re-assess differences.

These are just a few main elements of emergency management considered by all factors responsible for citizen, institution, community or nation's security in case of events of extreme risk other than war and armed conflicts or including them, because they are huge forms of manifestation of extreme risk.

Our living environment is, at the same time, dynamic and complex, adverse and, in many aspects, challenging and even dangerous. Most of the dangerous situations are created by the human being. Yet, a great part of them (earthquakes, floods, fires started as result of excessive heat, avalanches etc.) does not depend in almost any situation on the human being.

The scope, responsibilities and dynamic of risk management can be represented as in *table 1*.

We consider that the *National Extreme Risk Management System (NERMS)* should become a unitary management system for all situations involving extreme risk, including as concerns the national security and national defence, as well as common security and common defence, under NATO and EU systems. This system should regroup the three great systems, without damaging their consistency and autonomy, but, on the contrary, for consolidating them due to the synergic effect created through connection and interoperability.

NERMS should comprise:

- the National Defence System (national security and defence system);
- the National Emergency System;
- the National Public Order and Security System.

These systems are or can become coherent and perfectly interoperable, with a minimum effort of adaptability. They are parts of the same whole and cannot be conceived and developed but together. In fact, their reason is to provide the country's defence against any dangers and threats from outside and inside, including military ones, to guarantee the protection and security for citizens, properties, communities, institutions and law and, obviously, to protect population, community, property, public institution and private entity, territory and infrastructures against calamities and disasters, crises, conflicts and wars, to eliminate their consequences and to reconstruct after damages. In fact, the three systems already function together, though the law ruling them, meaning the policies generating this law, need to be rethought into a wider (regional, European and Euro-Atlantic) framework.

It is obvious that not all three systems contain extreme risk units and institutions, but, in principle, these systems involve a major risk containing many elements of extreme risk. The armed forces, for example, represent an extreme risk institution because war and military actions of crisis and armed conflicts management

Table 1

NC	Activity	Responsibilities	Effects
1	Knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon generating the extreme risk.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Central and local authorities</li> <li>- National Emergency Management System (NEMS)</li> <li>- Specialised institutions</li> <li>- Continuous professional training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Manuals</li> <li>- Specialised works</li> <li>- Databases</li> </ul>
2	Experience gathering.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Central and local authorities</li> <li>- Specialised institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Systems of values</li> <li>- Databases</li> </ul>
3	Normality, abnormality, critical situation and crisis monitoring in all extreme risk and pre-risk events.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Central and local authorities</li> <li>- Specialised institutions</li> <li>- Supreme Council of National Defence (SCND)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Multivalent network</li> <li>- Actuality</li> </ul>
4	Identification, assessment and prognosis, based on thorough knowledge, namely understanding precedents, gathering experience and existent and updated databases, of the challenges, dangers, threats during possible emergency situations, for every type of event (earthquakes, torrential rains, overflows, floods, fires, drought, waves of frost or heat, other meteorological, geophysical or cosmic events, technological, nuclear, ecological hazards, explosion burst of ammunitions from former wars or accidental explosions, biological hazards, epidemics, pandemics etc.) and the vulnerabilities to them.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- (NEMS)</li> <li>- Inspectorate for Emergency Situations (IES)</li> <li>- Firefighters</li> <li>- Meteorological and Hydrological System (MHS)</li> <li>- Specialised structures of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Administration and Interior (MAI)</li> <li>- Local specialised structures</li> <li>- Other structures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Databases that permanently need to be updated</li> <li>- Dynamic inventories, for fields and events, of challenges, dangers and threats</li> <li>- Maps, graphics, assessments, prognoses</li> <li>- Guides</li> <li>- Awareness-alert systems</li> </ul>
5	Analysis, assessment and prognosis of all possible events and situations, for groups of events and predictable evolutions, areas, localities, objectives, enterprises, institutions etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Structures of analysis from specialised institutions</li> <li>- Central and local authorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assessments</li> <li>- Prognoses</li> <li>- Standards</li> <li>- Graphics</li> <li>- Guides</li> </ul>

NC	Activity	Responsibilities	Effects
6	Calculating risk level for every type of possible event, area, community, institution, on a chart raging from <i>absence of risk</i> to <i>extreme risk</i> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- (NEMS)</li> <li>- Specialised structures</li> <li>- Local authorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Charts with risk levels</li> <li>- Standards, graphics etc.</li> </ul>
7	Drawing up policies and strategies to prevent the surprise coming from these great risk events, to timely intervene to limit their effects, to protect population, assets, infrastructures, properties etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Central and local authorities</li> <li>- SCND</li> <li>- NEMS and especially IES</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Laws, emergency ordinance, decisions</li> <li>- Strategies for extreme risk situations</li> <li>- Tactics, procedures, standards</li> </ul>
8	Drawing up concrete plans of intervention on areas, localities, enterprises, institutions, situations etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NEMS and, especially, IES</li> <li>- Specialised structures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Concrete plans of intervention</li> <li>- Missions and tasks</li> </ul>
9	Drawing up measures for evacuation, sanitary assistance and reconstruction, particularly for critical infrastructures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NEMS</li> <li>- Central and local authorities</li> <li>- Specialised structures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Plans</li> <li>- Documentations</li> <li>- Methodologies</li> <li>- Projects</li> </ul>
10	Drawing up policies to structure the emergency management system and, against this background, to train the personnel who will act in these structures and to prepare the population for an adequate reaction in emergency situations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Central authorities (Government, Parliament)</li> <li>- SCND</li> <li>- MAI and MoD</li> <li>- IES</li> <li>- Educational institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Laws, Government decisions (GD)</li> <li>- NEMS Doctrine</li> <li>- Forces and population preparation strategies</li> <li>- Educational programmes, courses, systems for lifelong professional training (LPT) for specialists from emergency situation interventions' field</li> </ul>

NC	Activity	Responsibilities	Effects
11	Drawing up policies and strategies to identify, multiply, value and recover resources, financial ones inclusive, needed for emergency situations interventions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local and central authorities</li> <li>- SCND</li> <li>- NEMS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Laws, GDs regarding the policies and strategies for resources management needed in emergency intervention</li> <li>- Resources strategies</li> <li>- Methodologies to identify, assess, use and recover</li> </ul>
12	Drawing up policies and strategies to provide means of intervention (special vehicles, machines, individual and collective systems and means of CBRN protection, high-tech equipment etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Central and local authorities</li> <li>- SCND</li> <li>- NEMS</li> <li>- Industry</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Laws, GDs</li> <li>- Means strategies</li> <li>- Standards</li> </ul>
13	Drawing up policies and strategies for alerting, searching, saving-evacuating persons and goods, for limiting the effects of disasters and other extreme risk events, for protecting population, properties, institutions, communities and infrastructures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Central and local authorities</li> <li>- SCND</li> <li>- NEMS</li> <li>- MAI</li> <li>- MoD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Laws, GDs</li> <li>- Operational strategies for emergency situations</li> <li>- Tactics, procedures, standards</li> </ul>
14	Enhancing, based on the above elements, the NEMS and its connection with other systems of monitoring and reacting to crisis situations and creating a National Extreme Risk Management System (NERMS).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Central and local authorities</li> <li>- SCND</li> <li>- NEMS</li> <li>- MAI</li> <li>- MoD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Laws, GDs</li> <li>- Collaboration agreements with other crisis structures</li> <li>- NERMS Strategy</li> </ul>
15	Correcting errors and re-assessing differences in order to connect all the action systems for crises and emergencies and, finally, accomplishing a unique system for extreme risk situations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Central and local authorities</li> <li>- SCND</li> <li>- NEMS</li> <li>- MAI</li> <li>- MoD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Policies, strategies, doctrines, tactics, standards, procedures</li> </ul>

are extreme risk actions. Yet, institutions of major and even extreme risk are also those that work to defuse ammunition remained from wartime, to protect population and goods whenever calamities and disasters occur, to intervene in catastrophes (fires and floods), antiterrorist and counterterrorist actions, to combat traffickers and crime, to provide, maintain and even impose public order etc.

NSMERS could look like in figure 1.




Figure 1: The National Extreme Risk Management System

NERMS could be seen in two variants:

- as a system of systems;
- as a group of systems.

As a *system of systems*, NERMS involves the above mentioned systems – the National Defence System, the Public Order and Security System, the Emergency Situations Management System –, and also has meta-system competencies, namely functions resulting from the integration of the three systems into a unitary system in order to assure the integrated leadership and coordination, by the Supreme Council for National Defence or by another structure settled by law, of the unitary intervention of all the components from all the systems.

Of course, there is the modular variant, because every system creates, in concordance with the other systems, a series of modules for different types of interventions, so that, whenever necessary, they could assemble from the movement, on the coordinates settled by planning, of mixed structures that act unitarily in relation to their specialty.

The advantage of the system of systems is that it assures a good integration of intervention for extreme risk situations so that overlaps, misunderstandings, waste of time and efficiency decrease could be avoided.



As a *group of systems*, *NERMS* does not regard integrated actions, namely the integration of actions, but only their *complementarity*. This requires the existence of coordination plans, regarded or agreed upon by the SCND, through which the interventions should be very well coordinated. In this situation, as in other countries, integrated multidisciplinary advisory structures (teams) could function, with specialists from different structures (meteorology and hydrology, earthquakes, environment, national defence, public security and order, firefighters, engineers, chemists, specialists in different emergency fields etc.) which, together, should provide specialised assistance and guidance to local and central intervention teams.

The current system – itself under construction – provides a good intervention in extreme risk conditions but it is not sufficient as long as it does not have the well-equipped and well-trained proper structures in every locality and every enterprise. The crisis or emergency situations cells (for calamities, disasters, snowdrifts, torrential rains, floods, serious technological accidents etc.), created by the government or different structures, provide a certain coordination of actions but do not succeed in preventing, limiting or solving the situations occurred in the most effective way. The people from these cells are not part of a system and, generally, they do not have the competencies necessary for extreme risk management, which belong and must be part of strategic leadership structures. An integrated system or a group of systems for intervention under extreme conditions could be the best solution.

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*NERMS* can manage all risk levels or only those from the extreme risk category. Under these circumstances, the system can be more reduced, lighter and better trained in order to identify and assess risk thresholds, gradually alerting the intervention structures.

The classification of challenges, defiance, dangers and threats as well as of the vulnerabilities to them, generating emergency situations, is not made for ever. It must be permanently adapted to the new conditions created by the evolution of the global, regional and national cosmic, geophysical, climate, economic, infrastructural, informational, social and military environment, so that efficient emergency management could be constantly provided. Such management is possible only under the conditions in which there is a good assessment of risk and, especially, of extreme risk. Its limits, the transition thresholds

from a category of risk to another, from a level of risk to another determine a special approach to the extreme risk issues and to the creation of some proper structures and functions or the optimisation of the already existent ones.

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# MODELLING & SIMULATION TECHNOLOGY AND ITS MILITARY APPLICATIONS

*Lieutenant Colonel BEng Ionel VLĂSIE*

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*The potential of M&S for the military domain was officially recognised in 1998 with the release of NATO M&S Master Plan. This is the capstone implementation guide for M&S within the Alliance that identifies the application areas and establishes the main lines of effort for the M&S community in order to make the best use of the technology in the military field.*

*The Master Plan was endorsed by the North Atlantic Council and signed by the Secretary General – Lord Robertson, its provisions being mandatory for NATO organisations and recommendable for member states. In order to address the new operational requirements and the emerging technological landscape, the document was thoroughly reviewed in 2010 then ratified by all 28 NATO countries.*

**Keywords:** *defence planning; perception; constructive simulation; technological development*

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Nevertheless, M&S entered a new era of development with the invention of computer. First, with the analogue then with the digital computing, the M&S community has been able to calculate increasingly larger models and create more complex scenarios.

**A**

lthough perceived as relatively new, the technology of *modelling and simulation (M&S)* has in reality a century-old history, with many different individuals and organisations contributing to its development. For example, no earlier than 2 500 years ago, ancient civilisations used rudimentary models made of carved stone and clay figures to represent battle formations or to assess and select the courses of action.

Most likely, the “*Terracotta Army*” (clay figures of warriors, chariots and horses) depicting the armies of Qui Shi Huang, the first Emperor of China (200 BC), might have served such a purpose. Later on, during the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Leonardo da Vinci used wooden models to visualise and develop concepts that proved to be revolutionary for the aeronautic domain. As a matter of fact, the acceptance, implementation and continual refinement of many of these concepts and principles have enabled M&S technology to become prevalent and pervasive in today’s society.

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Nowadays, the *M&S* applications are commonly used in almost all areas of human activity, from neurosurgery, car building, weapon systems testing and evaluation to human behaviour representation, thousands and thousands of people using them for training, to increase the efficiency of their work, or to explore beyond the abstract limits.



### ***M&S Fundamentals. Definitions & Taxonomy***

From a *M&S* perspective, *observability* and *controllability* are two essential properties a system needs to exhibit. In the sense that, somehow, we can influence its behaviour through the *inputs*<sup>1</sup> and measure the *outputs*<sup>2</sup>.

Assuming that an object can be assimilated into a system we want to study or experiment with, then a model may be defined as a simplified representation of a system, at some particular point in time or space, intended to promote understanding of the real system. Consequently, a model can be used to answer questions about that system without doing experiments on the real system.


Based on their nature, systems can be: mental, verbal, physical, mathematical etc. – the last category defining models that are primarily developed by computer and frequently used in *M&S* applications (e.g. to describe a system when the relationships between its variables are expressed by mathematical formulas; to represent measurable variables, such as: temperature, pressure, density, unemployment rate, data traffic).

<sup>1</sup> *Inputs* – variables of the environment that influence the behaviour of the system.

<sup>2</sup> *Outputs* – variables that are determined by the system and may influence the surrounding environment.

Models are important mostly because they:

- enable people to comprehend more complex concepts and processes by simplifying them into understandable and manageable representations (e.g. it is much easier for a scientist to look at a graph and understand the implications of those data than to read the actual numerical information);
- provide a way to test our perception and understanding of systems or processes (e.g. car manufactures create computer models of engine components in order to be examined before making the commitment to build them);
- represent the foundation for the development of dynamic simulations providing the physical characteristics and performance boundaries within simulations operate; in other words, models provide the rules and the data that allow simulations to function in a specific way for a specific purpose.



People often confuse *models* with *simulations* and use the two terms interchangeably. Therefore, the terms are not always used accurately. Considering the experiment as the process of extracting information from a system by exercising its inputs, simulation is the experiment conducted with a model to understand the behaviour of the real system. Thus, if a model is used dynamically over time to reflect change, it becomes a simulation. In layman's terms, if a plastic soldier is the "*model*", when several of these "*models*" are used in a mock battlefield to express organisation or strategy, they become a simulation.

There are three types of simulation that make our case in terms of relevance and suitability for military domains. Depending on system representation, technical support used to execute the iterations and means to feed-in the inputs and collect/process the outputs, they are:

- *live simulations* – involve real people operating real systems with simulated weapon effects; a good example of live simulation developed for military



training is the *Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Simulation – MILES* (well known in the civilian world as “laser tag”);

- *virtual simulations* – involve real people operating simulated systems; examples of virtual simulations include flight simulators, driving simulators, and other simulators using computer-generated visualisations;
- *constructive simulations* – involve simulated people operating simulated systems; a constructive simulation may include combinations of computer programmes, computer-mediated war games, and role-playing simulations (e.g. *JCATS – Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation*, *JTLS – Joint Theatre Level Simulation*).

Some general conclusions with regard to *M&S* fundamentals are worth being considered:

- the ability to produce the correct model is dependent on the method used to connect the system, operational and environmental domains;
- the basis of a simulation project is a clear, concise, and complete problem definition; incorrect problem definitions and requirements result in incorrect outcomes;
- to talk about models or modelling in the absence of the intended simulation goal is meaningless; moreover, to discuss simulation without defining the nature of the phenomena/system/event to be captured and modelled is fundamentally impossible and worthless;
- model validation is against the problem definition and not the expected results;
- a model should be evaluated according to its usefulness; from an absolute perspective, a model is neither good or bad nor neutral; the model’s fit to the desired outcome determines its worth;
- the purpose of *M&S* is to gain knowledge of a system or phenomena, not to gain models.

## **Military Applications of M&S**

Even if the *M&S* technology started to be acknowledged and exploited by countries like USA, UK, Germany and France in the '60s, its potential for military domains was officially recognised in 1998 with the release of *NATO M&S Master Plan*. This is the capstone implementation guide for *M&S* within the Alliance that identifies the application areas and establishes the main lines of effort for the *M&S* community in order to make the best use of technology.

The Master Plan was endorsed by *NAC – North Atlantic Council* and signed by the Secretary General at that time – Lord Robertson, its provisions being mandatory for NATO organisations and recommendable for member states. In order to address the new operational requirements and the emerging technological landscape, the document was thoroughly reviewed in 2010 then ratified by all 28 NATO member countries.

The Master Plan defines *M&S* as essential tools in providing a “*readily available, flexible and cost-effective means to enhance NATO operations*” in various application areas, such as: *defence planning, education, training, exercise, support to operations, research and technology, concept development and experimentation*.

Based on the Master Plan provisions, Romania developed its own strategy regarding *M&S* implementation within the military domain. The document was drafted by the *M&S Training Centre SMEs (Subject Matter Experts)*. Located in the same compound with the National Defence University, the centre is subordinated to the General Staff and acts as the “*central hub*” for connectivity and collaboration with similar structures from the North-Atlantic Alliance.

Each and every application area mentioned above may benefit from *M&S* advantages, especially in the field of costs and risks reduction.


### **M&S support to defence planning:**

- enables planners to better assess the effectiveness of the available forces taking into account their readiness and core capabilities;
- assists planners in formulating the best plan (at low cost and rapid iterative powers) with the available assets in the least amount of time;

- supports planners to evaluate the impact of new systems and technologies without actually absorbing the cost of employing them in the field.

### **M&S support to education, training and exercise:**

- provides “*safe*” virtual environment for learning valuable lessons by enhancing information and experience exchange;





- delivers realistic and efficient simulation tools for staff training in a rapid-paced decision-making environment by decreasing the decision cycle time, providing distributed simulation to train staffs in their normal operational environment;
- enables appropriate immersive training environment to prepare reserve staff augmentees and non-NATO staffs (PfP, NGO/PVO) for participation in NATO exercises and operations;
- allows cost savings – the use of simulation in HQ exercises (CAXs – Computer Assisted Exercise) compared to LIVEXs (Live Exercise) of the same complexity;

• increases flexibility and safety avoiding many of the LIVEX's constraints, such as the ability to eliminate weather as a factor or to use realistic situations and locations that are not available for actual live exercises (desert area operations, C-IED – Countering Improvised Explosive Device operations);

- enhances LIVEXs at low cost by representing additional simulated forces.

**M&S support to operations:**

• develops a better understanding of the complex C2/decision-making relationships that exist between the operational command HQs, NATO HQs and the political military leadership of individual nations;

• enhances decision-making and shortens the decision cycle;

• provides ability to forecast the outcome for different courses of action when making decisions and employing forces during a real operation when the cost of delay or error is unacceptable.



**M&S support to research & technology development:**

• reduces acquisition time, resources and risks; future technology evaluation, comparison of possible scenarios;





- improves decision cycle times and improves product quality; prototyping, proofs of concept and demonstrations;
- reduces life-cycle costs and enhances commonality.

#### **M&S support to concept development & experimentation:**



- supports requirements definition, concept exploration, experimentation;
- enables military operators to interact and involves in decision-making at all stages in the life-cycle process;
- improves decision cycle times and quality leveraging of diverse resources through computer-networking (common tools, databases, methodology).

### **Examples of Modelling & Simulation Systems in NATO**

Currently, within NATO there are used two major types of M&S:

- *military* – including models & simulation specifically developed for military domains;
- *COTS (commercial off the shelves)* – modelling and simulation systems that with appropriate adjustments may also serve military purposes.

Military simulation systems: *JTLS; JCATS; J-SAF (Joint Semi-Automated Forces)*.

Military models: *LAMBDA (Land-Air-Maritime Battle Determination Algorithms); GAMMA (Global Aggregation Model for Military Assessment); ADAMS (Allied Deployment and Movement System); TOPFAS (Tools for Operational Planning, Force Generation and Simulation)*.

*COTS models: MindManager; Visio; Powerpoint; SmartDraw.*

*COTS simulation systems: @ Risk Suite; VBS2 NATO; Stat – Fit.*

### **Examples of M&S Applications in the Military**

M&S versatility and benefits to military application areas are illustrated by the ongoing *ACT – Allied Command Transformation* initiatives and projects aiming to provide a persistent M&S capability to the Alliance. Some of them are briefly presented below:

➤ *SNOWLEOPARD*



*SNOWLEOPARD Programme*, also known as *NETN – NATO Education & Training Network* was initiated in 2006 by *ACT* and aims to provide to the Alliance and Partners



a persistent and distributed training and education capability for HQs and NATO forces, spanning from strategic down to tactical level, across the full spectrum of operations, by leveraging the existing *M&S* experience, expertise and capabilities.

All NATO and national training centres will be integrated into the *NETN* using a common network *CFBLNet* (*Combined Federated Battle Lab Network*). This will enable NATO standardised training and exercises

to be distributed wherever and whenever needed to meet the current operational requirements. *Snow Leopard Initial Operational Capability (IOC)* was validated in 2008 during the *Steadfast Joiner Exercise*, and the phase 1 of *Final Operational*



*Capability (FOC)* was demonstrated during the *NETN 2010 Experiment* when 12 NATO and national simulation systems and models were integrated through *CFBLNet* into a single federation and played the same scenario (including 5 training vignettes: a ground attack, an air and a maritime strike on a terrorist camp, a MedEvac operation and an UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reconnaissance).

Some of the benefits envisioned for *NETN* are as follows: *increased interoperability through standardisation (SOPs, TTPs); realistic and safe training environments for troops and staffs; maintenance of a higher level of readiness for a longer time; cost savings and enhanced training by avoiding duplications.*

Quoting the Danish Major General K.O. Skare – the Assistant Chief of Staff at SACT HQ and the Programme Executive, “*Snow Leopard will transform militarily and culturally the way NATO trains its commands and forces*”.

➤ *VBS2 NATO*

*VBS2 NATO (Virtual Battle Space 2)* is the military version of *VBS2 VTK (Virtual Tool Kit)* – a fully interactive, COTS, three dimensional (3D) simulation training system developed by *BOHEMIA Interactive Ltd.*

The system consists of: *Visitor 4* – a lightweight GIS application for terrain representation (terrain features and textures); *Oxygen 2* – a 3D modelling tool for buildings, weapon systems and platforms, vehicles and AI – *Artificial Intelligence* (avatar) entities representation and *Mission Editor* – an offline graphical mission & scenario editor that facilitates accurate and realistic representations of tactical situation.



*VBS2 VTK* offers data logging and *after-action-review* – *AAR* functionality and is *HLA* (*High Level Architecture*) and *DIS* (*Distributed Interactive Simulation*) compliant.

The system enables human behaviour representation in an intuitive graphic representation, users being able to move, interact and operate weaponry and vehicles.

Following a suitability and feasibility technical report drafted in 2008, NATO purchased three licenses of *VBS2 NATO Server* version and installed them on servers located at *JWC* (*Joint Warfare Centre, Stavanger – Norway*), *JFTC* (*Joint Force Training Centre, Bydgoszcz – Poland*) and ACT, including additional 900 licenses of *VBS2 NATO Client* version – deployable on *WAN* (*Wide Area Network*, e.g. the Internet) or compact discs.

Some of the prospective application areas studied by NATO SMEs include, but are not limited to:

- *Collective training: Joint Urban Operations – JUO*; infantry tactics, techniques and procedures – TTPs (C-IED, recce/logistic convoy).
- *Individual training*: gunnery, observer, navigator, shooter.
- *Operational analysis and experimentation*: SOPs and TTPs testing and evaluation, AARs.
- *3D Terrain visualisation* – for battlefield familiarisation.

As of today, VBS2 NATO has been already validated as the technical solution for delivery of C-IED standardised training and 5 of the ACT training courses, respectively: *TACOPS (Tactical Operations in an IED Environment)*, *T3 (Train the Trainer)*, *SOAC (Staff Officers Awareness Course)*, *WIT (Weapons Intelligence Team)* and *BSC (Battle Staff Course)* are to be distributed over the Internet or CFBLNet to all NATO and PfP training centres.

CISM already owns a licence for VBS2 NATO Client and the Regional C-IED Training Centre (an US-Romanian initiative expected to be materialised in the near future; the centre is to be located within the same compound with the Engineer, EOD and CBRN Defence Training Centre “Panait Donici”) to be established in Râmnicu-Vâlcea could become a potential beneficiary of the system.

> *TLTS*

*TLTS – Tactical Language Training System*. At the moment, the programme is budgeted only by the US Marine Corps, NATO’s contribution being limited to operational requirements definition and assessment. Once finalised, it is expected to become part of the VBS2 VTK/VBS2 NATO Development Suite.



*ALTS (Automatic Language Training System)* developed by *ALELO* creates highly accurate and operationally valid 3D immersive training environments for enhanced tactical language skills. Basically, the technical solution aims to integrate both systems – VBS2 and *ALTS*, thus scenarios edited in VBS2 would be populated with *ALELO* avatars.

The unique characteristic exhibited by *ALELO* avatars is that they can use spoken language to communicate and display an appropriate behaviour. Moreover, they can engage in conversation with the trainees during specifically tailored scenarios.

By using *TLTS* features, the training audience would be able to exercise their tactical language skills and familiarise



with elements of *cultural sensitivity* and *cultural awareness*. Hence, once entering in the theatre of operations they could establish and gain locals' confidence that may prove crucial to collect valuable information for mission accomplishing.

So far, there have been developed only training scenarios for Iraqi, Afghan and Northern Africa, including Pashto & Dari and French dialects.

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Despite the benefits and examples already mentioned, any decision to use *M&S* for military applications should be properly documented and made after all the advantages and technology limitations have been thoroughly reviewed and assessed. In this respect, a list of *PROs* and *CONs* may include, but not be limited to:

➤ *PROs*:

- Efficiency increase due to enhanced information sharing (computer networks, federating interoperable models and simulation systems).
- Generally more available as the actual equipment/environment may not always be available or reproducible.
- Faster than real life (can easily add and remove players or reproduce/repeat events, practically in the same conditions).
- Risks and costs reduction (in human life during training; in money during acquisition).
- Measurement of effectiveness and performance through data collection/mining.
- Standardised experimental design techniques (supporting methods & ancillary tools).
- Data visualisation (situational awareness & behavioural representations).
- Demonstration (aids explanations or issues; quantifies capabilities we plan to test or evaluate).

➤ *CONs*:

- Unjustified costs when the problem can be solved using commonsense analysis or the system is available for direct experiments.
- Severe time constraints – to prepare a model or validate a simulation are time-consuming activities.
- Models and simulations cannot be properly verified, validated and accredited against a baseline.
- The cost of simulation exceeds possible savings.
- System complexity is the issue (data about systems are not available to ensure the necessary level of realism and validity for study and analysis).

As concerns the national approach, ever since it was established (2002), CISM has managed to bring together the Romanian community of interest promoting the technology and using *M&S* applications for staff and command training and exercises at operational and tactical level or for operational/exploratory research.

However, to ensure an optimal exploitation and maximise the benefits of technology to military domains and not only, we believe some additional measures and lines of effort should be considered in the medium and long term:

1. To efficiently exploit the existing national and NATO capabilities, expertise and experience, such as: CISM, JWC/JFTC; NC3A<sup>3</sup>.

2. To increase the visibility among NATO and international communities of interest through an active participation within NATO working groups (e.g. MSG 068<sup>4</sup>, MSG 074<sup>5</sup>) *M&S* seminars and conferences, as well as by developing cooperation with academia and industry for collaborative research and information exchange (cooperation and coordination mechanisms similar to OCAI<sup>6</sup>, CRADA<sup>7</sup>).

3. To promote the technology and train the users by increasing the decision-makers awareness over the *M&S* benefits, preparing and training a designated pool of military SMEs.

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<sup>3</sup> NC3A – *NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency*, The Hague, Netherlands; the agency is NATO's main provider for *M&S* solutions and applications; upon request, these are releasable to all NATO member nations.

<sup>4</sup> This *Modelling and Simulation Group* was initiated to support the *SNOW LEOPARD Programme*.

<sup>5</sup> This *Modelling and Simulation Group* was established to study *COTS* suitability for military application areas.

<sup>6</sup> *Office for Collaboration with Academy and Industry* (Allied Command Transformation).

<sup>7</sup> *CRADA – Collaboration, Research and Development Agency* (US Department of Defence).

# FUTURE WARFARE GOAL AND CONFRONTATION FIELDS

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Dorin-Marinel EPARU

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*The confrontations at the beginning of the third millennium between states, groups of states and political-military alliances will be determined, in the author's opinion, by their goals and interests at local, regional and global level, as they represent factors of movement for states, groups or alliances. From certain points of view, the interests can be: national, specific, global, regional, security, economic, political, ideological. From the same perspective, the goals in international relations can be: national, economic, political, territorial or strategic; vital and secondary; stable, variable, general and specific; common, complementary or conflictual goals.*

**Keywords:** *military actions; belligerent; group interest; persuasion; international relations*

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**A**nalysing war as a continuation of politics by military means implies that its purpose has a deeply political character. Some specialists consider that, *“especially lately, and certainly in the future, the general political-military goal of the military conflict has and it will continue to have an increasingly political importance, because of the options of this type and the political directives at the highest level”<sup>1</sup>.*

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the world is confronted with a multitude of problems, some of them transformed into permanent challenges, and others into real military conflicts. Irrespective of the political goals of a state, groups of states or political-military coalition, the recourse to military force represents a way to settle a “*crisis*” situation, by imposing their own interests.

Depending on the interests of one or other of the belligerents, the political component of war is defence; pursuit or regaining, by all possible means, of the fundamental national, group or coalition interests, by thwarting, rejecting or defeating the enemy efforts. This particularly materialises

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<sup>1</sup> Mircea Mureşan, *Reflecții despre fenomenul militar*, Editura U.N.Ap., București, 2004, p. 37.

in: choosing the objectives of military actions; establishing the participating forces and means; ensuring the military actions politically, economically, psychologically etc., as well as correlating them with other strategic actions.

The political side of the goal has mainly in view the success of any kind of military action, the occupation (or liberation) of any parts of the territory conquered (occupied) by the enemy, preventing the opponent from imposing the “*accomplished fact*” policy, the re-establishment by armed forces of fundamental interests and the defence of the constitutional order.

Regarding the strategic component of the overall political goal of the military conflict, we believe that it is represented by the *destruction* (annihilation) of the multiple enemy confrontation systems, which act directly or indirectly on the adversary, the *discouragement of developing* (continuing) strategic actions and the *reduction*, as much as possible, of the war potential.

The military goal consists in: *preventing and limiting the effects* of any type of military action; *carrying out the initial strategic offensive* (riposte) and then *seizing or destroying* defence (invasion) groups which act internally; *obtaining* (imposing) peace conditions.

To prevent the effects of military conflicts is a mandatory goal of military intervention (confrontation), often crucial for avoiding the escalation of the armed conflict. It can be achieved through: *information* (to ensure surprise in the development of the main combat actions); *concession* (to timely ensure a situation with a high degree of strategic complexity to prepare and conduct effective action); *deterrence* (to make the opponent aware of the risks assumed by pursuing certain actions); *persuasion* (the firmness of the armed response to make the opponents change the initial attitude or give up continuing military actions).

The ultimate strategic goal is the destruction of military, economic and infrastructure objectives of the adversary and thereby the collapse of its strategic systems. As a result “*military actions can be transferred to the enemy territory while the established objectives and tasks could be performed independently or in cooperation with allied forces*”.

The paths to achieve the overall political-strategic goal of military conflict are and will remain mainly military, plus a range of political and diplomatic, economic, psychological, and information actions. In this context, we appreciate that, in the future, there will be a close interdependence between the aspects of the political-military goal. Wars at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century highlight an issue worthy of attention, namely: either a severe

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<sup>2</sup> Constantin Onișor, *Teoria strategiei militare (vol. 2). Strategia militară în războiul modern*, Editura AISM, București, 1998, p. 14.



discrepancy between the real and declared goals of a military confrontation or the insufficient training of the armed forces in relation to planned strategic and political-military purposes.

If, initially, the strategic goal is defined using the criteria of humanitarian intervention, then, it acquires geostrategic elements and, finally, it gains regional geopolitical connotations (border revision, state reorganisation, reorientation of development, ideological clarification, positive attitude to integration etc.).

In this context, the political content may be highlighted by human rights protection and saving from the genocide/ethnic cleansing of nations, the withdrawal of certain national forces from a specific area, the unconditional acceptance of peace agreements proposed by the opponent and of the presence of an international military force on the national territory.

Likewise, the military content is given by the deterioration of the entire enemy military capacity, initially, and of some of its systems, subsequently, to prevent it from opposing the international regulations regarding the new status of the area and the internal/external military activities; the annihilation, up to certain limits, of military systems in different areas; the destruction of war infrastructure and the reduction of national military logistics; the major influence on the morale of the enemy combat and paramilitary structures.

Therefore, future warfare will be different from the ones conducted at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with regard not only to its goal, always adapted to state, regional and global security policies but also to the causes that generate it and its physiognomy that has undergone most spectacular changes as a result of the development of new technology of all kinds.

Confrontation at the beginning of the third millennium between states, groups of states and political-military alliances will be determined by their goals and interests both locally as well as regionally and globally, so that they become driving forces for states, groups of states or alliances.

From certain points of view, *interests* may be: *national, specific, global, regional*, as well as *security, economic, political, ideological ones*. From the same perspective, the goals in international relations may be: *national, economic, political, territorial and strategic; vital and secondary; stable and variable; general and specific; common, complementary or conflicting*.

It is important to note that, sometimes, the interests of the actors in the scene of power can coincide in the short term while, in the long term, they may become divergent.

Although confrontation areas take distinct forms, such as political, ideological, economic, civilisational, territorial, military etc., the fact that, in a possible confrontation,

they represent as many types of action call for an approach to the problem in its wholeness and not by parts (which would inevitably lead to misunderstandings and misperceptions of the fundamental problems or phenomena).

The interdependencies between the above-mentioned fields enable the existence of the state, the creation of groups of states or political-military alliances. Territory has always been the ground on which actors have disputed their interests. During the current period, *space* is given major importance when it comes to be used as the last argument, force in its military form, large-scale military confrontations, since the control over space, both horizontally and vertically, provides the actors with undisputed superiority. Territoriality manifests itself in the political arena by *sovereignty over a territory*, limited by state borders, and by the *political control exercised over the area* in which an actor imposes its political will. We underline that the actors that assert their sovereignty and establish their control over a political space are also competitors in the economic arena and put their mark over the spiritual space. When the art of compromise is helpless and interests are irreconcilable, actors resort to war in the geostrategic environment.

The political control area takes the form of the spheres of influence and represents the way the relationships between the dominating and the dominated in the system of international relations get manifest. If, after the Second World War, bipolarism led to a new balance of power in various regions, including Europe, today we are witnessing the proliferation of influence and control areas, defined and characterised by:

- the emergence of buffer zones (*grey areas*) with special status;
- vital interests related to controlling the economic environment;
- the existence of areas of global interest;
- transition of the world from a policy focused on international, interstate interests to a world of businesses that ignore the current borders;
- increase in economic rivalry.

From this perspective, the world map presents “*points and regions of maximum and minimum political interest*”<sup>3</sup>, as follows: maximum interest – regions of intense political life, minimum interest – regions where the political pace is slow.

The economic space is by far the most actual field for confrontation between the great actors of the world, the struggle for access and control in some areas leading to tension or even to the serious deterioration of the balance of the system of international relations. Resources also constitute a strategic objective in conflicts and an instrument of warfare. Vital raw materials are also means of pressure

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<sup>3</sup>T. Frunzeti, M. Mureşan, Gh. Văduva, *Război și haos*, Editura CTEA, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 59.

in the hands of some actors over other actors: the embargo on countries of the Persian Gulf or the one on Yugoslavia are undisputed examples. It is well known that, by the facilities made in the basin of the river Euphrates (Ataturk Dam), Turkey has affected Syria and Iran, thus appearing a series of situations through which water supplies can be drastically diminished.

Today, friction or convergence zones have coagulated around large basins of energy resources and strategic points; in this context, the Persian Gulf with its energy resources and the dispute for the control over the Caspian Sea area are viable examples. “*States virtually occupy the entire world political map but only a fraction of the total economic space*”<sup>4</sup>, on the one hand, because of the economic activities of non-state actors or transnational corporations and, on the other hand, due to the changing relationships between states and non-state actors, taking different forms, from peaceful coexistence to conflicts generating embargoes, import or export restrictions, taxes etc. Also, transnational companies, the economic and financial giants evade state regulations, and sometimes their interests become incompatible with the national interests of states, leading to even harsher confrontations.

Precisely for this reason, institutions and organisations that, in one way or another, are involved in managing international relations take into account classical actors – states – rather than transnational and multinational organisations, non-state powers that evolve mostly independently from the world in which states and interstate relations operate.

As an engine of economic development, technological space is a highly disputed area of confrontation. Technology, education system and economic growth are the main elements of power. The place and role of an actor in the equation of power are given by its power potential. Alvin Toffler emphasises that “*power involves the use of violence, wealth and knowledge, to make people act in a given direction*”<sup>5</sup>. The actors that will understand the importance of quality in the power potential, an element given by knowledge, economic growth, stability and national cohesion, will have a significant strategic advantage in the power ratio. Technology will soon allow the annihilation of key elements of a military objective without killing soldiers or completely destroying the target. Technology, through mind control techniques and methods, will make the opponent become an ally and will form the basis of information production, dissemination to target and effect assessment.

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<sup>4</sup>T. Frunzeti, V. Zodian (coord.), *Lumea 2009. Enciclopedie politică și militară*, Editura CTEA, București, 2009, p. 76.

<sup>5</sup> Alvin Toffler, *Război și antirăzboi. Supraviețuirea în zorii secolului XXI*, Editura Antet, București, 1996, p. 24.

Combat technology and assets for fighting under and on water, land, in air and space, smart weapons and their users, the 21<sup>st</sup> century fighters, will ensure supremacy in all areas of confrontation.

At the beginning of the millennium, civilisation witnesses the most spectacular transformations due to both population growth and political regimes of the states to which they belong. To these are added the effects produced throughout time: either the arbitrary delimitation of space of sovereignty or the uncontrolled migration from one state to another, for various reasons and, last but not least, the development of the states' own culture. The clash of civilisations is more topical now, as non-state powers and powerful states are trying to impose their own views on the evolution of civilisation and on the international relations to be established in the future.

The emergence of the transatlantic civilisations and of Western Europe opened a new stage in the confrontation between civilisations. The West is trying by all means, whether diplomatic, economic, military and others, using secret means, propaganda, even constraints, and appealing to third countries, to get support in the process of democratisation and observance of human rights, while the results of this massive effort are less visible. The Asian countries, whose economic strength is constantly growing, act as if they were immune to Western pressure. The Islam also resists the Western initiative. Provocative actions generated in some parts of the world have troubled waters even more, the conflict situations seeming more dynamic than ever.

The Western will, supported by a series of actions of some ethnic, religious or other groups, has carried the germs of conflicts between civilisations at different levels:

- *local*, such as micro-conflict between neighbouring states belonging to different civilisations; between groups belonging to different civilisations within the same state; between groups trying to create new states;
- *fault line conflicts*, widespread especially between Muslims and non-Muslims;
- *global*, conflicts between core states, which occur between states of different civilisations.

The military field is the space of confrontation between states and alliances when all arguments have been exhausted. Balances and imbalances of power determine the state of international relations systems. If balance is associated with peace and security, imbalance, depending on its intensity, can lead to crisis situations, conflicts of all kinds – diplomatic, environmental, ideological –, and ultimately to war. War is more than a military confrontation.

Analysing the growth and decline of great powers, A. Beaufre concluded: “There is no doubt that in a prolonged war for hegemony between great powers, victory will always be on the side of the one who owns the most flourishing production means”<sup>6</sup>.

The development of non-lethal weapons, a *revolution in military affairs*, will fail to have the same impact as the production or possession of nuclear weapons. The fact that the world still has not gone through the experience of nuclear war, Japan being just a tragic experiment, maintains in the strategic thinking of the great powers the idea of using nuclear weapons, which continues to play an important role in the power potential of one or another of the world states.

A characteristic of modern warfare is the ever decreasing importance of a state population and the number of military combatants. Quite conclusive is the experience of American forces in the Persian Gulf where a number of twenty thousand American combatants were opposed over a million Iraqi fighters, the results being widely known.

Without claiming that we have exhausted all the areas of confrontation at the beginning of the millennium, we believe that if at the level of small countries problems are not unanimously accepted and resolved without conflicts or misunderstandings, this is more so worldwide, where the range of subjects, interests and goals is much more comprehensive, therefore the areas of confrontation could become as many causes of war in the future. If we add the risks and threats to peace, stability and security, the picture of the causes of armed conflicts becomes more comprehensive. From a certain perspective, we can make a classification of causes of war as follows:

- *internal causes*, proper to states, which can be identified in: proliferation of territorial disputes and separatist tendencies, against an ethnic-religious background or for historical reasons; concerted actions of the forces that are hostile to a political regime in order to change it; concerted actions of some religious sects and trends to change the faith of the population; poverty and hunger; actions of terrorist groups, organised, trained and paid in order to destabilise the state and create the favourable conditions to foreign intervention;
- *regional causes*: the fight for supremacy in the area of one or other constituent states; territorial claims; the fight of the states that have emerged from the tutelage of a union or federation to assert and preserve their identity, sovereignty and independence; historical or provoked rivalries;

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<sup>6</sup> A. Beaufre, *Strategie pentru viitor*, Editura Militară, București, 1991, p. 17.

- *international causes*: violation of international agreements and treaties; the fight for democratisation, for maintaining the interest and influence areas; violation of human rights; historical rivalry; the tendency to multipolarity that needs a control space for any new emergent power; organised crime; the battle for markets and raw materials; conflicts between civilisations etc.

Of course, this classification is an attempt to identify the origin, more precisely the causes underlying the open military conflict, the war finally.

From another perspective, however, we can say that wars can be triggered off by other causes, depending on the goals they pursue, a fact confirmed, even not fully, by history, namely:

- experimentation of new technologies and sophisticated weapons;
- testing the reaction of population and local, regional and international institutions;
- show of force to impose the rule of power etc.

In conclusion, we can appreciate that, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the fields of confrontation in the world arena and the causes generating armed conflicts span over a quite wide range, which demonstrates that war will be present for a long time in the state, regional and global policy. But its physiognomy will be very different and will reflect both the level of development reached by mankind at the beginning of the third millennium and the geopolitical and geostrategic changes.

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# NATIONAL SUPPORT ELEMENT – Missions and Responsibilities –

Colonel Cozmin MARINESCU

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*The Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine defines the national support element as a primarily logistic unit, temporarily established, to support national forces acting in a NATO multinational operation. According to this doctrine, the mission of the national support element is to ensure the necessary conditions for receiving, deploying to the area of operations and returning to the country the national forces and their coordination with the host country and the NATO commander of the respective operation. The organisation and responsibilities of the national support element are assigned to the country that participates with forces in the multinational operation. Even if the new approaches to the logistic processes of modern armed forces attach more and more importance to multinational logistic solutions, the current evolutions and estimates still provide the national support element with a significant role in the medium term in the theatre of operations.*

**Keywords:** terrorism; conflict; temporary missions; logistic support; NATO

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**G**lobalisation and the current economic-financial crisis have become, slowly but surely, two of the most persistent topics of the moment. Today, the concept of “globalisation” can be found in almost any domain and to define or characterise almost any phenomenon, especially economic or social in nature.

As a consequence of the changes occurred in the political and military domains, within the main security organisations that operate at world level, a series of ways and means through which steps would be taken for stability and peace enhancement in the world have been put forward lately. Especially, for each of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, the status of member requires the broadening of the range of objectives and projects, focusing on the ones meant for preparing the forces participating in collective defence and accomplishing the capabilities needed for the entire range of operations, from crisis management to multinational ones, for combating terrorism.

Even though the number of intra- and interstate conflicts has relatively decreased in the latest years, regional conflicts are still a feature of the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century,

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their nature being mostly religious. Therefore, contrary to the standpoint of many analysts, globalisation does not necessarily bring about integration and stability. In fact, in the short and medium term, globalisation seems to contribute to the generation of simultaneous processes that create tensions.

The new approaches of the North Atlantic Alliance in the field of security currently trigger significant changes in the field of the modern logistic support provided to troops located in theatres of operations and the increase in the share of military expeditionary operations also requires a resizing of the logistic support planning and projection process.

The logistic support for military actions in international missions is a vital field, a national responsibility that is achieved through own forces and missions, through a series of arrangements with partners, in a combined manner, as well as with the host nation support, depending on the existing possibilities and conditions in each theatre of operations. From this perspective, the coherence and quality of the logistic support for combat forces plays an essential part.

As a member of three important organisations – the UN, the EU and NATO –, the involvement of our country in providing regional security and stability requires an active participation in implementing the cooperation and security assistance policies. The need for adapting to the realities of the contemporary world, to the continuous changes in it, as well as the imperative to develop indispensable capabilities to face risks and threats also entail a transformation of the traditional military system.

Thus, there came the need for the creation of a strong logistic support structure for Romanian military contingents deployed in temporary missions in multinational operations in theatres of operations. In this context, through the support of the General Staff and of the Joint Logistics Command, starting October 2008, the *support and transit module (STM)*, through which the Joint Logistics Command provided efficient logistic support to Romanian Troops in the Zabul province, was deployed in the Aerial Point of Debarkation in Kandahar. During the next rotation of contingencies, *STM* transformed into the *national support element (NSE)*, “*independent operational structure, component of the theatre of operations outside the national territory, that materialises the third line of logistic support for the Romanian forces deployed in the theatre (...) and that needs to use all the opportunities and resources that exist in the theatre of operations and on national territory in order to integrally provide own forces with all that is necessary*”<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> *Concepția și procedurile generale privind organizarea, constituirea și funcționarea elementelor de sprijin național (ROU-NSEs) al forțelor românești dislocate în teatre de operații situate în afara teritoriului național, al reprezentanțelor României la comandamentele militare internaționale și al personalului Ministerului Apărării Naționale care încadrează funcții în aceste comandamente, București, 2004.*



The Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine (AJP-4.4) defines *NSE* as a primordial logistic unit, established temporarily, in support of national forces that act in a NATO multinational operation. According to this doctrine, the mission of the *national support element* is to provide all the conditions necessary for receiving, deploying in the area of operations and returning to the country the national forces, as well as for coordinating them with the host nation and the NATO commander of that respective operation. The organisation and responsibilities of the *national support element* represent the task of the country that participates with forces in the multinational operation. Even if the new approaches to the logistic processes of modern armed forces attach more and more importance to multinational logistic solutions, the current evolutions and estimations provide however the *national support element* with a significant role in the medium run, at the level of the theatre of operations.

During joint multinational operations, the logistic support is a collective responsibility of the commander of the multinational force and of the nations that contribute to the force generation. The commander of the national force that participates in such operations is responsible for providing the logistic resources necessary for accomplishing missions, and the authorities of the international body represented by the commander of the respective echelon have authority over these resources, for using them efficiently, under the same status of the command as the units they serve.

Each nation can have its own logistic support standards, but it is essential for NATO commands and their subordinate forces to use common standards in operations, which contribute to meeting the requirements of the logistic support for forces.

When entering the theatre, the assets and materials necessary for carrying out the operation are transported, as much as possible, by the *NSE*. These elements are usually located in forward logistic bases in the area of the theatre of operations. At operational level, the logistic support is provided in the area of immediate support of forces by the *national support element* located in the same area. Each situation requires the coordination between the nations involved and the multinational headquarters in the theatre of operations.

The *national support element* basically comprises two modules: the *command* one and the *execution* one. Previous to deploying the forces in the location of permanent deployment (the country of origin) in the theatre of operations, it is earmarked a module of *logistic management*, which monitors the operativeness of providing logistic resources. Moreover, "*NSE provides support for the structures and/or military staff personnel of the country that activate within the international*

*military headquarters. It plays an essential role during the deployment, strategic evacuation, development of the (preponderantly logistic) operation of receiving, temporarily quartering and deploying to operational locations and integrating in the structure in the theatre, in keeping with operation planning*<sup>2</sup>.

The main reason for creating the *national support element* is the achievement of the logistic functions at the level of the third line of support in theatres of operations. The *third line* of logistic support refers to those logistic elements that are deployed behind the combat area. Here there is transferred, in vehicles, all that comes from ports (airports) of disembarkation and are stored a wide range of materials and equipment. At the level of this line, there are located field hospitals, workshops for repairing equipment etc.<sup>3</sup>. The third line of logistic support is provided, depending on the type of the security organisation that leads the multinational operation (NATO or EU), by the following logistic support structures: logistic bases/positions located behind the combat area, the mobile maintenance and evacuation sections, the field hospital. In this respect, *NSE* must use all existing opportunities and resources at the level of the theatre to integrally provide the logistic support of own forces, in order to accomplish its main missions:

- *“to support deployment, development and strategic evacuation of forces in and out the theatre of operations;*
- *to materialise the third line of logistic support at the level of the theatre of operations through the provision of the management of logistic flows and associated domains, that are outside the area of responsibility of the logistic structures belonging to the deployed forces;*
- *to coordinate logistic and specific activities at the level of the theatre of operations, local authorities (in case they exist), international organisation, non-governmental organisations and private organisations, on voluntary basis;*
- *to sign mutual logistic support agreements with the other national or multinational logistic structures in the theatre;*
- *to provide specialised assistance in the logistic domain and access to the database of the Multinational Joint Logistic Centre, NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency respectively;*

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<sup>2</sup> Benone Andronic, Bixi-Pompiliu Mocanu, *Opinii privind organizarea elementului de sprijin național*, in Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare, no. 4/2004, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Locotenent-colonel Ion Pirgulescu, colonel (r.) prof. univ. dr. Lucian Stăncilă, *Sprijinul logistic al acțiunilor militare specifice stării postconflict*, Universitatea Națională de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2009.

- to manage the involvement of multinational integrated logistic units available to the NATO force commander in support of national forces;
- to use local logistic service providers: handling the goods in ports, airports, railway terminals, storing and providing public utilities (water, gas, electric power, sewerage, garbage evacuation);
- to permanently monitor specific logistic supports agreements and contracts, signed by the logistic staff of the national support element<sup>4</sup>.

As we have mentioned before, designing a flexible structure of the *national support element* can be accomplished by using a modular approach. This method is focused on creating standardised functional modules, capable of carrying out all specific functions. Subsequently, during the planning process, the functional modules can be selected, adapted and/or eliminated, according to operational requirements. During carrying out its missions in the theatre of operations, the structures of the *national support element* apply and promote the general principles of logistic activity in the multinational and NATO operations.

Special attention in designing the *national support element* is paid to the vital support, mainly meant for providing the morale of the personnel. That is why, one of the basic functions specific to these structures consists in meeting the current requirements of the personnel of national contingents deployed in theatres of operations located outside national territory, such as:

- psychological and religious assistance;
- postal services;
- phone, internet and even (real time) video connections with the families of the soldiers;
- leisure centres and/or opening stores for the deployed personnel.

Benefiting from an exceptional structural and functional diversity, the *NSE* complexity increases directly proportional to the level of the supported echelon. Thus, the structural dimension and complexity of the *national support element* are influenced by a series of factors, among which:

- the type of the military operations (military operation per se, peace support operation, peacekeeping operation, peace enforcement operation etc.);
- the existence or inexistence of a potential host nation, the existence and degree of aggressiveness of the sides in conflict;

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<sup>4</sup> Cătălin Zisu, Liviu Scrieciu, Bixi-Pompiliu Mocanu, *Logistica grupărilor de forțe la început de secol și mileniu*, Editura CTEA, București, 2004, p. 3.

- the dimension of the joint multinational force;
- the political and economic features of the geographical area;
- the related geo-climatic features;
- the level of the supported echelon;
- the type of supported combat units;
- the nature of military actions;
- the maturity level of the theatre of operations.

Based on these considerations, the current circumstances of the conflict in Afghanistan have required the creation of a *national command element* – *NCE*, which provides the continuity and redistribution of the logistic effort from one region to another (from RC SOUTH to RC EAST and the other way around) and of two *national support elements* – *ENS1*, currently located in the airbase in Kandahar (APOD KAF) and *ENS2*, as a forward detachment in the area of Kabul International Airport (KAIA), being a logistic support structure accomplishing *ANA TRAINING*-type operations. *SNE* thus manages to promptly and effectively provide the logistic support capabilities needed by the Romanian forces structures deployed in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan. In this respect, the main objectives of the *SNE* are aimed to:


- provide a high operativity coefficient for the armoured technique used in specific combat missions, whose frequency has increased from one structure to another;
- rhythmically supply spare parts and materials, in accordance with the requirements of national detachments;
- improve the food of Romanian troops for all structures deployed in theatres of operations.

While accomplishing their missions in the theatre of operations, the structures of the *national support element* apply and promote the main principles of the logistic support activity in multinational operations under UN, NATO or EU command, being a modular and flexible structure that can carry out the assigned missions as a main force of logistic support for Romanian troops contingents that participate in multinational operations. As far as the logistic support of the military operation conducted by a contingent of the Romanian Armed Forces is concerned, this must be designed and materialised considering the distinct phases of the operation. Thus, just as any multinational operation is included among modern military actions, with a series of relevant and unequivocal features, so does the logistics associated to them require numerous prospects, studies and documentation in order to find out the qualitative changes in the field and to tailor more rapidly

and efficiently to meet the requirements of the theatres of multinational operations. In my opinion, it is only in this way that national contingents will be able to accomplish in due time and in optimal conditions the missions assigned. In fact, the success of a multinational operation “*is closely connected to the actual way to provide logistic support to combat troops, and this aspects can be demonstrated only through the efficiency of the capabilities made available for the logistic structures, materialised through the provision of modern assets and pieces of equipment, of self-sustainment materials stocks, as well as through the efficiency of bi- or multilateral support agreements signed with various partners in the theatre of operations*”<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> General-maior dr. Cătălin Zisu, *Comandamentul Logistic Întrunit – modalități concrete de asigurare a sprijinului logistic*, in *Gândirea militară românească Journal*, no. 3/2010, p. 32.

**PROJECTS AND INITIATIVES IN THE FIELD  
OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION  
FOR THE USE OF AIRSPACE**  
– *Their Effects on Civil and Military Air Traffic Management  
in Peacetime, during Crisis Situations and at War  
and Perspectives for Global Expansion – (I)*

*Colonel (AF) Relu PANAIT*

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*Civilians and the military must develop together an integrated command system that is capable of functioning in peacetime and is based on ongoing and future initiatives and projects.*

*In the author's opinion, this system will have at its top a body/committee for airspace and air traffic management composed of both military men and civilians, who will represent the authority in the respective country or area of operations. Depending on the situations that may occur – in peacetime, during crises and at war – their responsibilities and ways of transfer from civilians to the military and vice versa will be defined, which will make it possible for air traffic management to be assured continuously.*

**Keywords:** *armed forces; ICAO; environment protection; operational concept; communications*

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**I**n the past 20-30 years, the requirements regarding the use of airspace, by both civilians and the military, have risen dramatically, not only in Europe, but also at global level. However, the existing airspace structures are complex and separate, especially in Europe, with differences between civilians and the military, within the same country, on the one hand, and between countries, on the other hand. Moreover, airspace users, either military or civilian, have different “cultures”, with requirements that must be equally met.

### ***The Vicious Circle***

Civilians take into account the separation between aircraft, the military – the nearness or the flight on interception courses. In order to be efficient, civilians consider flights with as less fuel as possible, the military – the fastest possible flights;

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civilians must think of the physical comfort of passengers and their satisfaction, the military must provide the moral comfort of the population by ensuring a climate of peace, in which each person should carry out their regular activities. The military take into consideration pilots training, air police missions, aircraft and ground or air weapon systems testing, in order to be capable of meeting the specific airspace defence objectives etc., while, for civilians, airspace is important from the economic point of view. This ultimately reflects on the incomes to the national budget and, therefore, on the GDP percentage meant for people defence and wellbeing.

That is why, the requests of civilians to use the shortest route possible to save fuel, both to become competitive and to protect the environment, are perfectly justified. At the same time, the armed forces' main goals are defending and securing airspace, as well as ensuring its sovereignty. Thus, the permanent training of military pilots is very important to ensure the sovereignty and security of each country. We can say that there is a certain *"vicious circle"*: progress, in general, relies on peace and peace is provided by armed forces, that is why, without assuring the security of a nation, one cannot develop the economy and, therefore, there can be no progress.

### ***The Need for Cooperation***

The interest is obvious not only at national, regional or continental level, but also at world level. Thus, it has been created the institutional framework for the development of certain initiatives meant to create that kind of airspace in which each user can carry out their activities without any problems, through own concepts, in agreement with the international ones, through bilateral and/or multilateral agreements and treaties between nations, organisations, continents, through studies conducted by research institutes, common projects, forums, conferences etc.

These activities are carried out through platforms made available by ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation), Eurocontrol (The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation), FAA (Federal Aviation Administration/USA), the European Commission, NATO, state treaties, each nation – through the related ministries etc., by overcoming cultural, institutional barriers, by harmonising the legislation, establishing common standards, implementing new regulations, assuring their control, coordination and continuous update, depending on the requirements of the international community.

None of the above mentioned goals can be achieved in Europe or worldwide without the creation of a certain interoperability necessary between ministries,

countries, organisations and systems, without a precise cooperation and coordination between them. Without these characteristics, airspace cannot be used efficiently and the safety and security necessary for flights cannot be provided.

### *Projects and Predictions*

We are currently witnessing a real dilemma in the air transportation sector. Technology has advanced incredibly in the field of the materials used in the aeronautic industry, the computerised design of the production of aircraft and their engines, information technology, automation and communications, avionics and many other fields of aeronautics revolutionising the aircraft in general. Yet, paradoxically, the systems needed for their efficient and safe support and operation have reached the limits of their possibilities. As an example, in Europe, only through the inefficient use of the airways, the annual loss is of 2,4 billion Euros and a higher loss is estimated in the *TMA (Terminal Manoeuvring Area)*, due to cancellations and delays, the annual costs being more than 8 billion Euros.

More precisely, the *ATM (Air Traffic Management)*, developed after 1944, following the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, has reached a deadlock, which can be broken only through an extended cooperation, at global level.

The *ATM* system comprises an impressive spectrum of regulations, operating procedures, services and infrastructures that form the so-called *operational concept*; in layman's terms, it establishes in what way air transportation operations are carried out, considering the resources, roles and responsibilities of the parties involved. This system has evolved continuously since 1944, improving the procedures and regulations in keeping with the technological advance, managing to reach safety and security levels that are coveted by any other transportation system.

Yet, as civilisation evolves, other parameters occur that must be considered in the equation: efficiency, environment protection, system capacity, flexibility to allow other users to use airspace, and increase in the safety of flights, such as personal aircraft, *UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles)*, surface-to-air missiles for weather protection etc.

In this context, we can expect the following question: *Where can the ATM system be improved?* There are still enough elements that can help: elimination of excessive safety spaces, remodelling and maintenance of an increased flexibility of airspace, review of the space structure of airways, of the constraints caused by speed or altitude, improvement of trajectories, either ascendant or descendant, of the so-called *holding areas*, efficient use of airspace at high altitudes, accomplishment of an improved



communication system and many others, which form the *operational concept*. Mention should be made that most of these elements are attributes of traffic controllers and other specialists who contribute to the modernisation of the system, therefore, they depend a lot on the human element.

The acknowledgment of these problems, both on the part of the political sphere and the industry, by the ICAO and the institutions of the kind from Europe and the USA, has led to launching two great initiatives or projects: *SESAR* and *NextGen*. Although released independently of each other, both projects follow the same objective: increasing air traffic safety, modernising the *ATM* system, at the same time with making savings from all points of view, reducing the environmental impact etc. There is also the initiative to replace the current operational concept, which focuses on the airspace volumes management by the human factor with control functions over certain processes, with a concept called *TBO (Trajectory Based Operations)*, where the aircraft trajectory is the fundamental resource for airspace management and the role of the human element consists in monitoring the automated equipment providing optimal solutions and in making decisions on these solutions. This is basically a collaborative trajectory management system, facilitated at the strategic level by an architecture of a central system coordinated by service providers, to which airspace users have access.

If *TBO* is a controversial concept, for which many research and investments are still necessary, the first two initiatives – *SESAR* and *NextGen* – are feasible and must surpass that institutional framework regulated by various national or regional economic, political, cultural, technological and geographical aspects.

### ***The Impact of ATM Modernisation on the Military***

In November 2002, the NATO Summit in Prague took place, an event during which another seven states were invited to join the Alliance. On the same occasion, US President Bill Clinton provided an alternative for the modernisation of air traffic and airspace management for Central and Eastern Europe. This was called *RAI (Regional Airspace Initiative)* and had as purpose the improvement of regional cooperation and, specifically, it provided American assistance in designing the regional architecture for military and civilian air traffic management, in order to meet the requirements of both entities – military and civilian – with regard to civil traffic defence and safety.

The basic concept was modernising the *ATC (Air Traffic Control)* capabilities of these countries at a minimal cost, to make the transition easier towards similar systems from the advanced countries from this point of view. The objectives of this modernisation were: the accomplishment of an efficient regional cooperation

and harmonisation of air traffic with Eurocontrol and European requirements, as well as the integration of the airspace of these countries in the European one.

Moreover, there were sought the improvement of the efficiency of the civil-military cooperation, the increase in operational efficiency, the promotion of regional cooperation and the facilitation of the integration into NATO and allied members systems.

Initially, these studies were started in 1994, when it was predicted that the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia would join the Alliance in the first wave of the accession. *RAI* comprised three main courses of action as far as air traffic management was concerned: civil air traffic, military air traffic and air sovereignty. Moreover, *RAI* consisted in providing neighbour countries radiolocation data, as a means to improve radar coverage and to promote regional cooperation.

This study, together with other similar projects and initiatives undergoing various stages of development in Western European countries, regarding airspace management, represent platforms leading to the establishment of regional conferences in which participating countries could exchange information and express concern regarding the future of airspace and air traffic management.

*RAI* and other consequent programmes, inspired by it, were designed to improve the following elements: airspace management, command and control, civil-military cooperation in the respective country and, by extension, cooperation in the entire region and not only.

Subsequent to an initial analysis, it followed that countries should modernise their civil-military airspace management based on common concepts. For instance, due to the fact that it was not possible to display a common air picture, at Western European standards, for both civilians and the military, it was concluded that *ASOC – Air Sovereignty Operation Centre* should be created.

Therefore, combining the elements provided by air defence radars with those provided by civil air traffic management, an integrated air picture of the entire country and the surrounding areas was created. In addition, *ASOC* was designed to be interoperable with the format of similar Western European data, the beneficiary countries being thus encouraged to cooperate, on the one hand, at national level, between civilians and the military and, on the other hand, at international level.

Another project that was initiated at that time was the one regarding the use of military radars. These radars provided primary radar data incompatible with the civil ones and, not to be forced to buy 3D-type radars, which were very expensive back then, the *RADIUS* programme was initiated, in order to modernise them.

In the same way *RAI* led to the development of *ASOC*, the research and analyses regarding *CAI* (*command, control, communications, computers and information*) began, generating the necessity for a *Military Command Centre*, at national level. *However, what can you do with the integrated image as long as you do not have the command levers to counter a possible crisis at national level?* In our opinion, this concept should integrate not only the air picture, but also the land one, together with the maritime one, as long as the technology for this exists.

At the same time, the *NAVAIDS* project was launched, meant to modernise the navigation means used by the former communist countries in keeping with the International Civil Aviation Organisation standards. The military and civilian communications, navigation, surveillance and air traffic management systems (*CNS/ATM*), for terminal services as well as for routes, needed to be modernised. In most cases, civilians changed the infrastructure faster than the military. The progress of the military was slowed by budget constraints, possible alternatives to existing techniques and their impact on the aircraft avionics.

This led to incompatibility issues that still exist between civilians and the military in the field of *CNS/ATM*, among them being the restriction of military air operations and the negative impact on the Air Force training.

Following *RAI* studies and related projects – *ASOC*, *NAVAIDS* and *RADIUS* –, which proved to be fruitful in terms of civil-military cooperation at national and regional level, it was decided that the project should be extend.

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*In the second part of the article, the author will approach some aspects regarding the civil-military cooperation in the field of air traffic management, a process that has had beneficial effects on both national economy and compliance with operational requirements of air forces.*

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# UN EFFORTS TO REFORM THE SECURITY SECTOR AS PART OF POST-CONFLICT STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION – A Contemporary History –

Colonel (N) Dr Gheorghe-Cristian BOGDAN

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*The article draws the reader's attention to the challenges the UN has to face to install peace in some of the most troubled regions in the world.*

*Firstly, it is mentioned the UN Secretary-General's Report regarding the role of the organisation in providing support for the Security Sector Reform – SSR, highlighting that the global development in the long term requires a level of security that is sufficient to ensure poverty reduction and economic growth.*

*Secondly, SSR is defined as being the process of assessment, review and implementation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the state and its people with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.*

*To conclude, it is shown that the existence of efficient and accountable security institutions is essential for peace and stability.*

**Keywords:** *the UN; Security sector reform; peacekeeping operations*

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As an international servant at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations – DPKO within the United Nations Secretariat, I witnessed the most effervescent period of research, search, definition and clarification related to the *Security Sector Reform – SSR*<sup>1</sup>, a problem the UN was confronted with in almost all peace operations it was conducting, and it did not succeed in conceptualising and transforming, up to 2008, into a coherent policy for the entire system of the Organisation.

The purpose of this article is to draw the reader's attention to the multiple challenges the UN has to face to install peace in some of the most troubled countries in the world. I do not attempt to provide solutions but to raise awareness regarding the complexity of the issues discussed, for those who will further wish to explore the domain.

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*Editor's Note:* Between Mars and October 2004, Colonel (N) Dr Gheorghe-Cristian Bogdan monitored the military and political-military evolutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a liaison officer of the UN Forces Commander in MONUC Mission and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Congo. Subsequently, he attended the pilot course on information related to SSR, organised

UN peace operations are acquiring more polyvalent characteristics and, before we go further into details, we should discuss the so-called “*multidimensional*” operations, as there is an evident connection between modern peace operations and SSR.

The transformation of the international political environment has given birth to a new generation of peace operations defined as “*multidimensional*” by the UN. These operations are typically conducted in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. In this broad context, the main functions of such an operation are:

- Create a stable and secure environment while strengthening the host country ability to provide security for its citizens with full respect for the law and human rights.
- Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of state legitimate and effective institutions.
- Provide a framework for ensuring that the United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the national level in the host country in a coherent and coordinated manner.

If the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation may help to stop violence in the short term, it is unlikely to result in sustainable peace unless it is accompanied by programmes designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Of course, every situation is a particular one. However, the UN experience demonstrates that, in order to achieve stable peace, significant progress is required in at least four domains: restoring the state ability to provide security and maintain public order; strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; supporting the establishment of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes; promoting economic and social recovery, including the peaceful return and resettlement of refugees.

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations generally lack the necessary funding and expertise to effectively implement peacebuilding programmes. Nevertheless, the missions that are declared multidimensional, integrated,

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by DPKO in 2008, and between March 2008 and August 2009 he monitored the military and political-military evolutions in East Timor (Timor-Leste) as a liaison officer of the DPKO Military Affairs Office and Operations Office.

<sup>1</sup> The Romanian legislation refers to the discussed issues using the phrase “*security and defence domain*”, while the UN approach includes defence in security. Therefore, *security* and *security forces* in this article include the internal security forces (police, gendarmerie etc.) and the external ones (the armed forces).

are often mandated by the Security Council (SC) to play a catalytic role in activities that belong to peacebuilding such as:

- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants;
- mine clearance actions;
- protection and promotion of human rights;
- electoral assistance;
- support to restoration and extension of state authority;
- actions related to the rule of law and the security sector reform, which is the theme of this article.

As it is described in the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines*, drawn up in March 2008<sup>2</sup>, SSR is an essential component of the efforts meant to restore and strengthen the rule of law. Achieving progress in the field of SSR proves to be very important for the success of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation and helps to define its “*exit strategy*”, a strategy closely connected to the ability of the national actors in the security domain and of the responsible institutions to function normally and efficiently. Depending on the mandate, a multidimensional peacekeeping operation may be called upon to assist in the restructuring, reform and training of the national police and/or armed forces.

### A look at the beginning of the concept of SSR

The security sector reform is not new for the UN. The germs of the SSR appeared in 1989, when the Organisation started to assist Namibia to reform the armed forces and to establish its new national army. Since then, the UN has acquired expertise in the field and a series of states have been supported to develop SSR or SSR-related activities. Despite experience, the support was mainly *ad-hoc*. A number of 29 UN missions provided, at the beginning of the '90s, under one form or another, assistance for revision and planning in the security sector, counselling and training for police, prosecutors, judges and those working in the correctional field, limited support for the defence system reform, support for the administrative and supervisory structures.

The first UN missions that had explicitly mentioned in the mandate to conduct SSR were *MONUC – United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo)* through the Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1493 and *UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia* through SCR 1509 in 2003. Since then, the number of peacekeeping missions having mandates incorporating SSR has grown significantly.

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<sup>2</sup> *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines*, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, 2008.

Until recently, the UN has got neither a common framework nor a general strategy. Even currently, the Organisation has limited institutional and structural capabilities not only in the headquarters but also in the missions deployed to guide SSR. Lately, UN practitioners have approached SSR in a coherent and more comprehensive manner, following the requirements formulated by the member states through the General Assembly and the SC. Significant progress has been made in resolving some shortcomings, progress to which not only member states but also regional organisations have contributed.

The research we conducted showed that the first official mention of the preoccupations of the Organisation, namely the UN SC, to conceptualise and generalise the SSR domain appeared in a statement by the President of the Security Council on the occasion of the 5225<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Council on 12 July 2005. Referring to the multiple premises regarding the success of reconstruction in the societies in post-conflict stage, he stated, among others: *“The Security Council emphasises that **security sector reform** is an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-conflict environments, underlines that it is inextricably linked with promotion of the rule of law, transitional justice, DDR and the protection of civilians...”*<sup>3</sup>.

The SC generic formulations regarding the efforts aimed at SSR acquired a more concrete form with the statement by the President of the Security Council on the occasion of the 5632<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the Council on 21 February 2007, in which the UN Secretary-General was asked to prepare a report containing *“concrete recommendations on the identification, prioritisation and sequencing of United Nations support to nationally-owned security sector reform, with particular emphasis on post-conflict environments... recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness and co-ordination of all UN system entities that support security sector reform”*<sup>4</sup>.

In 2007, within DPKO, the *Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI)* was created, meant to provide an integrated and long-term approach to the post-conflict assistance the UN should provide to host countries in establishing the rule of law and the proper functioning of security institutions. OROLSI brings together, besides the Police Division, the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Section, the UN Mine Action Service, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service, the *Security Sector Reform Unit*. This Office focuses its efforts on implementing certain principles, concepts and strategies able to lead

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<sup>3</sup> *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, 12 July 2005, registered as S/PRST/2005/30, retrieved from [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_pres\\_statements05.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_pres_statements05.htm) (29.01.2011).

<sup>4</sup> *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, 21 February 2007, registered as S/PRST/2007/3, retrieved from [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_pres\\_statements07.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_pres_statements07.htm) (29.01.2011).

to the achievement of a permanent, effective and responsible security sector to operate in a country in post-conflict phase, on the strict basis of law and human rights observance. To that end, the Office brings together an appropriate number of experts in multidisciplinary areas, it thus being a reference point as well as a strategic resource for DPKO and the peacekeeping operations it coordinates, for other actors in the great UN family, for national and international partners engaged in providing support in the SSR domain. When it is requested, the Office, in cooperation with other DPKO entities, provides support for SSR processes, especially at the strategic-political level and the general sector one through: facilitating post-conflict national dialogue on SSR issues; facilitating the processes related to the reform of the national security policies, strategies, plans and architecture; articulating legislative issues regarding SSR; consolidating the management and internal control capabilities, as well as SSR coordinating structures; ensuring coherence regarding the mobilisation of the UN human and financial resources for SSR; monitoring and evaluating SSR projects and programmes. In close cooperation with Inter-agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTF), the Office prepares technical guidelines based on the UN lessons learned and best practices, also administrating the United Nations SSR Community of Practice.

To provide the whole UN system with coordination and coherence, the Secretary-General established, in 2007, an inter-agency action group known as Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTF), led by DPKO. The group had 11 members, and its secretariat was ensured by SSR Office within DPKO. IASSRTF *raison d'être* is to provide a comprehensive approach to SSR, which was, in fact, required by the UN member countries. IASSRTF also prepared the SG Report on SSR, and it currently continues to develop a common vision on SSR for all those that take part in the process, affirming as a forum for discussion and debate to provide coordinated solutions to the requirements formulated by the UN Missions deployed in different countries.

Almost a year after the SC meeting in February 2007, the long-awaited report of the SG<sup>5</sup> regarding the UN role in providing support to SSR was presented on 23 January 2008 and it was the foundation of the conceptual developments, scheduling practices in SSR and subsequent evolutions. The reference points in this report will be presented in the next paragraph.

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<sup>5</sup> *Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform, Report of the Secretary-General*, 23 January 2008, registered as A/62/659-S/2008/39, retrieved from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm> (29.01.2011).



To end this journey in history, I would like to mention that, currently, there are more than ten peacekeeping missions and special political missions counselled by the UN in the field of SSR, these missions including *BINUB – the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (Bureau intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi)*, *MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti)*, *MONUC*, *UNIOGBIS (established in January 2010)*, *UNIPSIL – United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone*, *UNMIL*, *UNMIS (United Nations Mission in Sudan)*, *UNMIT – United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste*, *ONUCI – United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire)* and *UNPOS (United Nations Political Office for Somalia)*. BINUB, MONUC, UNMIL and UNMIT have larger or smaller SSR support structures.

### About the SSR concept in the UN vision and the structures that may contribute to its implementation

Let us have a more detailed look at the Report of the SG regarding the role of the UN in supporting SSR in January 2008. From the beginning, it is highlighted that long-term development demands a sufficient degree of security to facilitate poverty reduction and economic growth. A World Bank study, *Voices of the Poor*<sup>6</sup>, notes that physical insecurity is the main concern of the poor populations around the world. Security forces that are untrained, ill-equipped, mismanaged and irregularly paid are often part of the problem, and commit serious violations of human rights.

What is essential for permanent peace and stability is the existence of some security institutions that should have two characteristics: *effectiveness* and *accountability*. The rule of law thus becomes a solid principle of good governance in a country. All individuals, institutions and different entities, the state included, are accountable to the law. The law is publicly promulgated, equally enforced and consistent with international human rights norms and standards.

The mentioned report states, among others, that the UN does not have a unique approach to SSR and, therefore, defines in general terms what the UN considers to be the security sector:

*Security.* The UN has a broad approach, considering that there are two sides of security: *human security* – and here the desideratum stated by the President of the USA, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1941, is referred to. According to this,

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<sup>6</sup> Deepa Narayan, Robert Chambers, Meera K. Shah and Patti Petesch, *Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, as it is cited in para 11 of the Report.

all persons should be free from fear and free from want<sup>7</sup>. The second one is the *state security*. Both of them are closely connected and they cannot exist without each other.

*Security sector*. It is a broadly used term to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. Here are included defence, law enforcement, correction, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies, justice, monitor and audit structures, civil society and others<sup>8</sup>. Societies define security in conformity with their own context, traditions, culture and needs. Even if there is no unique model, all security sectors have some elements in common as follows:

- a legal and constitutional framework for the legitimate and accountable use of force;
- mechanisms for the direction, monitor and audit regarding law application;
- capacities to provide effective security (structures, personnel, equipment and financial resources);
- mechanisms for interaction among the actors in the security sector (transparent modalities for coordination and cooperation, based on roles and responsibilities);
- organisational culture (promoting unity, integrity, discipline, impartiality and respect for the law and human rights, as well as enhancing the manner in which all those who work in this sector carry out their duty).

*Security sector reform*. It describes a process of assessment, review and implementation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the state and its people, without discrimination and with full respect for the rule of law and human rights<sup>9</sup>. For the UN, the importance of SSR resides in the fact that it demonstrates that security goes beyond traditional military elements and involves a much wider range of national and international institutions. Effectiveness, accountability and democratic governance are three mutually reinforcing elements of security, allowing for the implementation of a shared vision of security by national actors, the UN and international partners.

Experience so far demonstrates the SSR character of a long-term effort. In most cases, only after acceptable stability has been achieved, also including the completion of the disarmament and demobilisation process, can we speak

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<sup>7</sup> "Four Freedoms", Franklin D. Roosevelt, speech in the American Congress, 6 January 1941, retrieved from <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm> (05.02.2011).

<sup>8</sup> As it is stated in para 14 of the Report.

<sup>9</sup> Para 17 of the Report.

about the return of refugees and the completion of emergency humanitarian operations. Many times it is necessary that the election process leading to the formation of a national government should be completed, too, before directing the attention and resources of a country towards the SSR domain. The lessons learned show that:

- a) security is an essential precondition for sustainable peace, development and human rights;
- b) the transformation of the security sector is inherently linked to national goals and relationships between different institutions. That is why SSR is a highly political process that must be placed in a national and regional context;
- c) integration of women rights in SSR is inherent to a socially responsive approach to post-conflict transformation;
- d) as a national process, SSR cannot be isolated from other national strategies or priorities;
- e) SSR must proceed from a deep, clear and realistic consideration of what is financially, operationally and logistically feasible and viable;
- f) issues of infrastructure, training and equipment need to be addressed as part of SSR;
- g) the existence of effective governance and permanent civil oversight are essential for the success of SSR. Unfortunately, these aspects are often neglected.

However, despite the good intentions that animated them, some UN missions, especially peacekeeping ones, put in motion SSR processes without previous strategic analysis and assessment. The result was a disparate and underfunded activity, without substance and with lamentable outcomes.

Let us consider, in the last part of this paragraph, some of the structures that may contribute to the implementation of the SSR process. We will only list them, specifying the nature of their contribution. A series of departments, offices, funds and programmes have provided a wide range of support activities at the request of the nations in question or at the request of the SC. They have included: *Department of Political Affairs – DPA, DPKO, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights – OHCHR, Peacebuilding Support Office – PBSO, United Nations Development Fund – UNDP, United Nations Development Fund for Women – UNIFEM, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – UNODC* and many others<sup>10</sup>.

During the activities, the different components of the UN system have perfected their expertise and capabilities. DPA has concentrated on SSR in the process

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<sup>10</sup> Para 19 of the Report.

of peacebuilding and in the context of political missions while DPKO has focused on supporting defence, police, correction, legal, judicial institutions in the context of peacekeeping missions. OHCHR has approached the reform of the institutions that defend human rights and the capabilities necessary to the security sector, and UNDP has specialised in supporting institutional development in the field of justice and security, as well as in the legal field and in the one of monitoring government institutions by the civil society. UNODC has proved its utility in supporting the enhancement of the capabilities meant to prevent crime, and UNIFEM has used its knowledge and expertise in addressing the issue of women's rights in SSR. Many times, these bodies have enjoyed the support of some international partners<sup>11</sup>. The process of coordinating the activities of these bodies at the level of host countries and even the UN Command is still in its infancy.

Regional and sub-regional organisations have also contributed to the understanding of critical local problems that may influence SSR. The African Union – AU continues to develop the normative standards for SSR, especially with regard to reconstruction and post-conflict development. The Economic Community of West African States – ECOWAS has outlined the guidelines for SSR and closely cooperates with the national authorities and international partners in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The European Union provides operative support for the partners outside the EU based on very well established principles. The Development Assistance Committee – DAC, belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD, conceived a Handbook on the implementation framework for security system reform and governance. The World Bank revised public expenses in the security sector in Afghanistan and the Central African Republic, at the request of national authorities, in order to identify and manage sustainable financing for investment in SSR. Such reviews are under way for other countries too. Last but not least, NATO provides advice and assistance for partner states to reform their own security sectors<sup>12</sup>.

The previous paragraphs have highlighted the fact that the goal of the UN in the field of *Security Sector Reform – SSR* is to support states and societies in developing an efficient and accountable security sector. In post-conflict societies, SSR processes have to be based on a national decision and/or UN mandate. Maintaining a steady rate of SSR depends on the will of the state in which it develops as well as on the national ownership of the process. The UN approach to security sector reform must be flexible and tailored to the specific environment in which reform takes place, necessarily taking into consideration women's rights,

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<sup>11</sup> Para 20 of the Report.

<sup>12</sup> Para 33 of the Report.

in any stage of the process. The development of the appropriate framework and the launch of the SSR should take place at the onset of a peace process, as part of the early recovery strategy, clear and well defined, taking into account the post-conflict context. The effectiveness of international support in SSR is strongly determined by the integrity of motive, the level of accountability and the resources and capabilities. Last but not least, national and international efforts have to be well coordinated, constantly monitored, and the regular evaluation should track progress.

In what follows we will mention SSR achievements in some UN Missions, without claiming to exhaust the subject or to comment the results, as it is premature. I would like to mention that the segment strictly dedicated to defence sector reform will be treated in another article, so it is not part of the following presentation.

### SSR on the right way

#### ❖ Burundi

*United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)*<sup>13</sup> organised a series of training sessions aimed at enhancing the security forces professionalisation. Police and military training sessions currently focus on crowd control, the national military code of conduct, military justice and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence. In collaboration with the Government of Germany, *BINUB* assisted in the establishment of a national women's police network to promote the more active participation of female police officers in the execution of police tasks. *Peacebuilding Fund* financed the establishment of a community police force, and the *United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)* collaborated to provide 5 000 uniforms to the national police. To enhance national security, offices were built, different types of communication equipment were provided, and communication centres in police stations were established.

With regard to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of dissident combatants, under the World Bank-supported *Emergency Demobilisation and Transitional Reintegration Project*, the Government of Burundi completed, in May 2010, the payment of the final instalment of demobilisation and reintegration assistance to 6 504 people. Under the community recovery programme, co-funded by the *Peacebuilding Fund* and *UNDP*, 3 781 "adults associated with the action of combatants" were employed in infrastructure projects in different provinces of the country. In June 2010, the National Commission on civilian disarmament and combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons launched a four-month-long campaign to destroy these types of arms and weapons. The campaign was a continuation

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<sup>13</sup> *Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi*, 30 November 2010, no. S/2010/608, retrieved from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep10.htm> (24.02.2011).

of the one meant to the civilian disarmament in October 2009, which led to the mass collection of firearms, grenades, weapons and ammunition. *BINUB* supported the Commission throughout the entire process. By the end of September 2010, a joint police and armed forces team contributed to the registration and marking of 7 500 police weapons in Bujumbura Mairie, Bubanza and Cibitoke provinces. The Programme was funded by the Peacebuilding Fund and, additional resources permitting, it will be extended to the remaining 14 provinces and will also include weapons belonging to the armed forces<sup>14</sup>.

❖ **Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Between 15 March and 15 June 2010, 34 bills were considered and 15 laws were adopted, including legislation on public procurement, the agricultural code, and the statute of magistrates, as well as the law criminalising torture.

The *United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – MONUSCO*<sup>15</sup> continued its efforts related to the mandate supporting reform harmonisation. The Mission convened an ambassadors' forum and working group meetings on SSR, with the participation of officials of the Democratic Republic of the Congo representing the Ministries of Defence and Interior as well as the Office of the National Security Adviser to the President. The Mission also continued to encourage the Government to develop a viable national SSR strategy and provided the national authorities with the necessary tools to facilitate information sharing among security sector stakeholders.

*MONUSCO* worked with local authorities on a project to develop national training capacity and a training programme that should provide six months of intensive training on police functions for 1 500 police personnel. Moreover, *MONUSCO* supported the Executive Secretariat of the Steering Committee for police reform, in cooperation with the *European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL)*, and the reform of the General Inspectorate for the Police nationale congolaise was continued.

*MONUSCO*, *UNDP* and the *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – UNODC*, in close cooperation with the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, initiated the development of a multi-year (2010-2012) joint United Nations justice support programme focused on developing the criminal justice chain, the police, the judiciary and correctional structures (prisons network) in conflict-affected areas. Moreover, strategic planning at the central level in Kinshasa was supported.

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<sup>14</sup> Synthesis of para 33-37 of the above-mentioned Report.

<sup>15</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 08 October 2010, no. S/2010/512, retrieved from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep10.htm> (24.02.2011).

*MONUSCO* continued to provide support to civilian and military prosecutors in the process of investigating and obtaining redress for human rights violations and combating impunity. The reconstruction of the Ndolo military prison in Kinshasa and the plans to make it operational were completed. At the Goma Central prison, the construction of a structure designed to separate juveniles and women neared completion<sup>16</sup>.

#### ❖ **Liberia**

The process to implement the national security strategy developed in 2008 as well as an appropriate architecture continues in this country too. The framework to reform the Liberian security sector is under way<sup>17</sup> in the field of establishing and training the key security structures. After significant delays, the Government in Liberia forwarded the draft of Liberia Security Reform and Intelligence Bill to the legislature, which was an important step towards the institutionalisation of the new security architecture.

Thus, progress has been made in developing the Liberia National Police and in implementing its strategic plan. Over 120 projects are under way. Following a joint working session, with the participation of police and donors, support offers were consolidated and investment priorities for police were established. However, even under these conditions, the Liberia National Police face massive budget constraints, having in view the increase in operational demands.

The Liberia National Police have embarked on institutional development in a number of areas such as the introduction of a professional performance appraisal system that will be used nationwide, and the development of basic systems for inventory accounting and management of the elements in the police ownership. The mobile unit, having a forensic lab, may develop the comparative analysis of bullets and different ammunition. The Ministry of Justice signed the act called “*Professional Standards Division Policy and Procedure*”, and with the support of the police component of the *United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)* a database was established, allowing the cases of police misconduct to be tracked.

Increasing public confidence in the police remains a key objective and therefore efforts are made to establish a police public information office. With the support of the Peacebuilding Fund a series of community policing programmes are under way in order to enhance police-community relations.

So far, five classes of the armed Emergency Response Unit have graduated, contributing over 300 officers, including 4 women, to its strength. These officers

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<sup>16</sup> Synthesis of para 25, 54, 57-61 in the mentioned Report.

<sup>17</sup> *Twenty-first Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, 11 August 2010, no. S/2010/429, retrieved from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep10.htm> (24.02.2011).

continued to gain experience, participating in anti-robbery operations in Monrovia, and reinforcing unarmed police officers in difficult situations. With the support of external donors, by the end of 2011, the Unit will increase the strength to 600 officers.

The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation is undergoing a restructuring process. It is provided with elements of communication, infrastructure and mobility. The Ghana Immigration Service develops a programme to train, by the end of 2011, a number of 200 Liberian immigration officers.

Following a national conference regarding the access to justice, which sought to harmonise the formal and customary justice system, important steps have been made to develop coherent policies in the field. The Ministry of Justice has enhanced its efforts to eliminate the remains of the old system, focusing on improving the preventive detention system procedures through identifying and correcting errors and enhancing collaboration between prosecutors and the police. Moreover, the Judicial Institute started a 12-month intensive training programme for magistrates. There are 64 magistrates in the programme.

In the correctional sector, efforts have been made to initiate procedures regarding probation and remaining under supervision, as well as to enhance the legislative framework. Detention units have been built in areas where they have not existed so far, and 50 officers in the correctional field completed the training process and they were employed in units<sup>18</sup>.

#### ❖ **Timor-Leste**

We could state that the most important transformations in the field of SSR are present in Timor-Leste<sup>19</sup>. Progress has been made in registration, screening and certification of almost 3 000 police officers, out of whom 565 women by a national evaluation panel. At the end of the mandate, the tasks of the evaluation panel may be transferred to the Office of the General Inspectorate of the Secretary of State for Security to embed this process in the Timorese legislative system and to increase national ownership of the process.

The national police have resumed policing responsibilities in eight districts, and other two districts will resume primary policing responsibilities later, when the police units meet the minimum standard.

Efforts are made to ensure the transfer of authority from the police component of the *United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste UNMIT* to the local police forces

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<sup>18</sup> Synthesis of para 22, 23, 26-34 in the mentioned Report.

<sup>19</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 21 January to 20 September 2010)*, 13 October 2010, no. S/2010/522, retrieved from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep10.htm> (24.02.2011)



in the capital of the country, Dili. The measures taken include the enhancement of logistic capabilities, the development of skills such as investigation, community policing and fight against human trafficking, as well as administrative ones.

In the districts where the national police have already resumed primary policing responsibilities, *UNMIT* continued to monitor progress and remained available to advise and provide operational support, if required. *UNMIT* capacity to assume executive responsibilities in extremis was preserved. In the situations in which human rights violations were reported, the national police initiated disciplinary action.

In March 2010, the Government announced the first promotions of police officers since the establishment of the national police. These promotions expanded the number of available ranks from 4 to 12. In July, the General Commander of the national police formally promoted 73 police officers, including a woman, to the position of district commander in Liquiça District. The entire process was conducted by the Government of Timor with the support of a Committee that included five international experts (from Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Portugal and Singapore) and the technical support provided by the *UNMIT* police. Concerted efforts were made to remove unsuitable officers who were guilty of breach of discipline or were convicted following the investigation of their deeds. The written tests for promotion highlighted the fact that the police officers of the Border Patrol Unit, Special Police Unit and Maritime Unit had the lowest score, which is a matter of concern. However, they were promoted, so the confidence of the national police in the promotion process was somehow undermined. In June, the Police Training Centre issued a training manual on the investigation of gender-based violence. The manual was sponsored by *UNMIT* and the *United Nations Population Fund – UNFPA* with bilateral assistance from Australia. Subsequently, the centre initiated a course on investigations of gender-based violence, course attended so far by 40 police officers, among whom 30 women. The same Training Centre conducted seven three-day courses on human rights, the role and place of women in society, gender-based violence, including domestic violence, and law and order enforcement. These courses were supported by *UNMIT*, *UNIFEM (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women)*, *UNFPA* and *International Organisation for Migration – IOM*. 179 police officers in Timor, among whom 59 women have been trained so far.

The *International Organisation for Migration* continued to support the development of the migration service of the national police through an extensive capacity-building programme. Thus, the immigration and asylum laws were revised and a border management system was implemented. The *Millennium Development Goal Achievement*

*Fund Joint Programme* continued to fund the fight against any form of illegal trafficking. *IOM* facilitated the return and social reintegration of 16 trafficked persons.

As far as the review of the security sector as a whole is concerned, notable progress has been made in the overarching legislative and policy framework. The President promulgated, in April 2010, the *National Security Law* and the *National Defence and Internal Security Law*. To provide the general framework for cooperation and coordination of security issues at the national level, the Council of Ministers debate the national security policy. With the support of *UNMIT*, the Presidency together with important national actors analyse the content of a new project to revise the security sector, and the law regarding civil protection is under development. The *UNMIT* and *UNDP* joint efforts are focused on enhancing the legislative framework for the civilian control over the state institutions that play a part in the security sector. It was funded a survey on the public perception of the security sector and the way private security companies are seen by the population. Simultaneously, other projects were developed, aimed at assessing the capacity of the Government to respond to complex emergencies; providing the early warning mechanisms that are to be established by the Secretary of State for Security; a series of presentations regarding the security sector reform, under the auspices of the Presidency; training key personnel in security sector; assessing the operational capacity of national fire service equipment; training on the rehabilitation of radio communication; placing national and international advisers in key state institutions<sup>20</sup>.

The presented elements demonstrate the wish of all SSR stakeholders to invest in order and security forces, correctional structures, justice and the rule of law. In a future article, we will see that, although some things “move” in the field of defence in post-conflict societies, the participants in the process do not show the same enthusiasm and dedication when it comes to military men and the armed forces. We will also see why. The few exceptions merely prove the rule that there is reserve and caution regarding defence reform.

### On the future of SSR

To speak about real and credible future of SSR, we consider that the United Nations, each member and each regional organisation should focus on:

➤ *Ensuring national ownership of the SSR process*. SSR process must be owned by the country in which it is developed so that SSR implementing strategies can take into consideration the opportunities and challenges specific to a post-conflict society. Far too often, SSR models are imposed by external actors, especially

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<sup>20</sup> Synthesis of para 21-26, 28-30 in the mentioned Report.

in the situations in which there are not enough national capacities to project a SSR programme. These models do not take into account the political, social and cultural reality of the context in which reform develops. That is why it is necessary that, on the one hand, the points of view of many stakeholders should be considered and, on the other hand, the country that undergoes these transformations should develop those capacities that allow it to support the SSR process in the long run.

➤ *The role played by external actors in supporting SSR.* Besides ensuring national ownership of the SSR process, external support is also vital. However, external support is often uncoordinated, which proves not only the conceptual difference between those who work for “*development*” and those engaged in “*security*”, belonging to multilateral organisations and bilateral donors, but also the incoherence between the political and planning priorities of the bilateral donors engaged in the SSR process in post-conflict context.

➤ *The engagement of non-state actors.* While the UN role in SSR is limited, for the time being, to the involvement of state actors, recent experience indicates that the state is not always the only security provider. The state-centric model of SSR is not sufficient in the situations in which elements of the population consider non-state actors as legitimate security providers. It means that, although the state remains the main actor in this game, there is a series of unofficial security providers without which SSR cannot be viable and sustained. Paradoxically, these non-states actors are regarded with suspicion by national authorities in certain circumstances. Thus, a dilemma arises: having relations with non-state actors, the UN and other stakeholders risk compromising the relations with their national counterparts participating in SSR. The UN therefore faces a permanent challenge, that of reconciling the state-centric approach and the reality of non-state actors prominence during the SSR process. There is a need for the UN to learn from the experience of other regional organisations and member states to better interpret the participation of non-state actors in SSR<sup>21</sup>.

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The UN makes concerted efforts to live up to its responsibility and role of coordinator of international efforts to support SSR. However, there is still much to be done.

The security sector in a country develops as a response to the permanent changes determined by new necessities and conditions. In certain national contexts,

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<sup>21</sup> Communication entitled *Why Is SSR Important? A United Nations Perspective*, delivered by Adedeji Ebo, Kristiana Powell, co-authors, at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) e-Conference on “*The Future of Security Sector Reform*”, editor Mark Sedra, pp. 54-56, retrieved from [www.ssrfuture.org](http://www.ssrfuture.org) (24.02.2011).

this is a continuous process conducted in accordance with the practice in the field and the schedule set for a permanent revision. In other situations, change, sometimes radical change, occurs under the impulse of a conflict or crisis that threatens public safety and highlights existing structural weaknesses.

Despite the efforts made so far, the UN capabilities are still modest as far as some key aspects are concerned, as follows:

- there is not a coherent and complete approach, in the entire UN system, to the policies regarding the effort a country should make in the field of SSR;
- the guidelines provided by decision-makers for the missions carried out to support the host country authorities in assessing security needs and planning to meet them are all limited;
- the capabilities to implement SSR mandates, including the ones related to the human resource are reduced;
- there are not enough partnership relations with the UN member countries and with the regional or international organisations that may contribute to the process.

The concept of *security sector reform* describes a process of quantitative analysis, revision and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by the authorities of a country. The goal of the process is the enhancement of effective and accountable security institutions for the state and its people with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. As one of the Presidents of the Security Council states, SSR “*should be a nationally-owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question*”<sup>22</sup>.

*English version by*  
✍️ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

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<sup>22</sup> *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, 21 February 2007, no. S/PRST/2007/3, retrieved from [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_pres\\_statements07.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_pres_statements07.htm) (29.01.2011).

# **ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION**

## **- A Priority of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century -**

*Lieutenant Colonel Dr Filofteia REPEZ*

Motto:

*"We cannot change other people,  
but if we can change ourselves,  
Earth can stop changing its appearance ..."*

Melody Beattie

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*In his desire to master the environment and the living earth, man has also made mistakes, which have caused not only material damage but also losses.*

*The individual, communities and global security is threatened by both natural disasters and those caused by the action of man. Currently, the environmental dimension of security takes precedence and one must admit that due to carelessness in the use of technology an unprecedented potential to affect our world may occur.*

*Starting from a relatively new and interesting bibliography, using own observations and those of specialists, using various statistics and analysis, the author tries, in an interdisciplinary way, to emphasise an important aspect for the safety of all: We need to take care of the environment.*

**Keywords:** *security; environmental dimension; man-made threats; natural disasters; vulnerabilities*

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**S**ecurity is a state characterised by the existence of a set of social, economic, political, ecological, cultural etc. conditions that are necessary for a normal life and activity of peoples, human communities, states, of the world, in general. State and non-state actors must act in concert to ensure a safe and stable climate and to adequately control disturbances that are specific to the security environment. Threats or vulnerabilities to security, regardless of backgrounds (military, environmental etc.), are required to be known and controlled in order to prevent or reduce their negative effects.

The interaction between humans and the environment has existed since ancient times. As well as the concern for environmental protection. For example: according to ancient sources, in 242 BC, in India, King Asoka orders that fish, land animals and forests should be protected

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by law, creating relatively large territories of nature reservations, called “*abhaya-rana*”; in 1273, Edward I of England gives several ordinances relating to the smoke coming from coal; in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, Charles IV bans in Paris “*disgusting and foul-smelling fumes*”<sup>1</sup>. With the industrial revolution, the environmental protection measures increase. A series of measures against pollution of industrial origin, designed to protect health and ensure safety, are established in England (1863) and Italy (1865, 1888). The first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are dominated by concerns and regulations on nature protection and preservation. On 19 March 1902, it is signed in Paris the *Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture*, followed, in 1911, by the *Treaty for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals*, and in 1933, the *London Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State*. At national level, Finland adopts the first law on nature protection in 1923, Romania in 1930, Lichtenstein in 1931, Denmark in 1937. A particular boost to the legal regulations and institutionalisation of environmental action through global expansion of environmental concerns is given by the first *UN Conference on the Human Environment* (June 1972, Stockholm), followed, in 1992, by the summit in Rio de Janeiro and, in 2002, the one in Johannesburg.

The relationship between environment and security has been the subject of numerous studies (the most telling example being brought by the Copenhagen School), which have taken into account broadening the dimensions of the concept of security, by adding the political, social, economic and ecological dimensions to the military one.

The decisive role of international debate, especially of the *United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*, in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, is to make known on the international scene the environmental issues of the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries and to identify and promote the *sustainable development* concept in unison, according to which economic, social and environmental problems form a whole and cannot be treated separately. The United Nations Development Programme considers that “*environmental threats countries are facing are a combination of the degradation of local ecosystems and that of the global system*”<sup>2</sup>.

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and the third millennium, all countries have a more or less rich legislation regarding the environment. The recognition of the quality of subject of law and the preservation of environment elements, independent of any human interest, are considered a legal progress. The three basic

<sup>1</sup> Mircea Duțu, *Dreptul mediului*, university course, Editura C. H. Beck, București, 2007, pp. 5-9.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel dr. Florea Surdu, *Dimensiunea ecologică a acțiunilor militare*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2004, p. 39.

elements – equity among all people living today regarding the distribution of environmental benefits; equity between generations in terms of preservation and transmission of a healthy quality environment; equity between species, especially between humans and other species – stress the intra- and inter-generational solidarity and the perception of humanity as a species among species, as an inseparable part of Nature<sup>3</sup>.

The environmental dimension of international security does not have a purely internal character, but also an external one, in which all states must participate at whatever level of development. Environmental security is important for each of the forms of security (individual, national, regional or international). The role of the environment, in times of peace, at war or in general, in increasing the insecurity of individuals is different from one situation to another, but it is obvious that any armed conflict has relevant effects on the environment. Among them: contamination (damage) of land and infrastructure; burning of vegetation and forest; destruction of fauna and flora; contamination of surface and deep waters; production of large amounts of hazardous, toxic, domestic waste; noise and chemical pollution of air; effects of the action of electromagnetic field generated by the operation of combat equipment, as well as telecommunications and radar. The armed forces of all countries need to apply and respect the content of principle 25 of the Rio Declaration, which states that “*peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible*”<sup>4</sup>.

Studies<sup>5</sup> have revealed three categories of threats that should be considered in the presentation and analysis of the environmental dimension of security:

1. Threats from the environment to human civilisation, which are not the result of human actions: earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, meteor falls, natural cycle of return to ice age.
2. Threats caused by human actions on natural systems or structures of the planet, when the changes made seem to be existential threats against a part or the entire civilisation; an obvious example is pollution, which has among the effects ozone depletion.
3. Threats caused by human actions on natural systems or structures of the planet, when the changes do not seem to be existential threats against a part or the whole civilisation, but, in the long term, there can be perverse effects: for example, exploitation of mineral resources.

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<sup>3</sup> Mircea Duțu, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel dr. Florea Surdu, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>5</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Waver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., USA, Colorado, 1998 in Ion Roceanu, coord., *Dezastrele naturale și efectele asupra populației*, Editura Universitară, București, 2008, pp. 86-87.

The variety of problems brought by these threats (e.g. destruction of ecosystems, energy issues, demographic, food, economic problems, social conflicts) is not exclusively environmental; these intersect with the other dimensions of security, being seen in terms of their impact on the environment.

The attitude of human beings and their activity towards the environment can be positive or negative, can lead to good or bad, depending on the quality of conscious reflection and knowledge based on which action is taken. Human action, whatever its nature, must take into account the influence that can be exerted on the environment. The lack of a strategic product from the nature<sup>6</sup> creates security risks or threats.

One such product is *water*, “*extremely important element in the equation of national security*”. To stress the importance of this aspect, I will list some statistical arguments, from which the indissoluble link between water, security and the individual emerges, as follows:

- for a decent living, an individual needs around 100 litres of drinking water annually (36,5 m<sup>3</sup> per year);
- the lack of water occurred in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century has increased continuously, considering that this will be one of the main causes of the outbreak of conflicts in the future;
- in many cases, the crisis that arises from the lack of water causes many internal problems, the national security being endangered, which may lead to the fall of governments (e.g. Jordan in 1996, Pakistan in 1997);
- the potential conflict of streams is increased by the fact that the hydrographical basin extends in several countries, for example: Danube – 17, Nile – 10, Amazon – 8, Congo and Niger – 11 each, Rhine and Zambezi – 9 each<sup>8</sup>.

The tons of solid waste people dump daily into rivers and oceans pollute marine life, spreading diseases that annually kill 1,8 million children under the age of five, more precisely, according to experts, every 20 seconds, in the world, a preschool child dies from illnesses associated with poor quality water. The large amount of dirty water makes more people die currently because of contaminated water and polluted environment rather than because all forms of violence, including wars<sup>9</sup>. Diarrhea, caused mainly by dirty water, kills

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<sup>6</sup>The strategic product is a material or immaterial good that meets three criteria: *necessity*, *uniqueness* and *perception*. About these criteria, see dr. Ion Costache, *Protecția mediului și conflictele armate*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2006, pp. 80-82.

<sup>7</sup>Dr. Ion Costache, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 83-85.



about 2,2 million people every year and over half of the hospital beds in the world are occupied by people with sufferings related to contaminated water, says the UNEP report<sup>10</sup>.

As of 1992, every year, on 22 March, *World Water Day* is celebrated, an appeal to the world, which draws attention to the critical situation of communities with inadequate access to drinking water and sanitation.

The human being cannot boast about owning the environment. Such “*vain boasting*”<sup>11</sup> has a kernel of untruth: man-caused disasters are more severe. Let us remember the atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (6 August 1945, 9 August 1945 respectively), the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (26 April 1986) or the Fukushima one (11 March 2011), following which there were released into the atmosphere significant amounts of radioactive materials with long-term negative effects on human health and the environment.

The responsibility for the threats and risks to the environment, in relation to the assumed objectives and managed areas, fall under the following actors: international organisations, national civil governmental organisations, national and international military structures, national intelligence agencies/services, corporations, the private sector, NGOs, education, with its establishments and structures, individuals, organisations etc.

American security specialists have conducted a classification of the responsibilities for these threats and risks, as follows:

- within the country, out of ignorance and/or lack of appropriate environmental management;
- within the country, intentionally;
- within the country, as a result of natural and/or human actions;
- cross-border, out of ignorance and/or lack of appropriate environmental management;
- cross-border, intentionally;
- cross-border, as a result of natural and/or human actions<sup>12</sup>.

The threats and risks to the environment remain a major problem for humanity, even if the international community’s efforts in this respect are commendable. It is also worth noting that the international scientific community and the international

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<sup>10</sup> At <http://www.postamedicala.ro/raport-onu-apa-murdara-omoara-pesto-un-milion-de-copii-anual.html>, retrieved on 23 November 2011.

<sup>11</sup> Stephen J. Spignesi, *100 Greatest Disasters of All Time*, Editura Lider, București, 2005, p. 11.

<sup>12</sup> Colonel dr. Florea Surdu, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

technological community have developed together a series of initiatives designed to monitor and analyse the risks associated with weather phenomena in order to reduce property damage and save lives. Among these initiatives, one can mention: *International Charter for Major Disasters*, *Global Monitoring for Environment and Security – GMES*, *International Committee on Earth Observation Satellites – CEOS*, *Working Group on Earth Observation – GEO*, *Global Earth Observation System of Systems – GEOSS*, *UN Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response – SPIDER* etc.<sup>13</sup>.

NATO considers that environmental problems can be solved only through international cooperation both within the organisation, as well as in cooperation with partner countries in the PfP program. At the organisation's level, environmental issues are addressed through: Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, Environmental Training Working Group, Environmental Protection Working Group, Working Group of the NATO Committee for Standardisation.

Over the years, the EU has developed various standards of environmental protection to resolve a multitude of issues. Currently, environmental priorities take different aspects: climate change, biodiversity conservation, reduction of health problems caused by pollution and a more responsible use of natural resources. The EU must take the lead at the UN Summit in Durban (South Africa) in December 2011 on climate change and support “*publicly and unequivocally*” the extension of the Kyoto Protocol (international agreement that commits industrialised countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases) after 2012<sup>14</sup>.

In Romania, the protection of the environment, natural resources, quality of environmental factors at the level of international standards was first included among the national security interests in 2001, in the *National Security Strategy* – The guarantee of democratic and fundamental liberties, sustainable and enduring economic and social development, NATO accession and EU integration. It was also included a specific objective, namely *Assurance of Environmental Security*, so that the accomplishment cumulated, correlated and consistent with the other goals could lead to the development and affirmation of the fundamental interests of the country.

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<sup>13</sup> Ion Roceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>14</sup> At <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ro/headlines/content/20111107FCS30711/10/html/Summit-ul-privind-schimb%C4%83rile-climatice-UE-trebuie-s%C4%83-sus%C8%9Bin%C4%83-prelungirea-Protocolului-de-la-Kyoto>, retrieved on 24 November 2011.

*Romania's National Security Strategy*, adopted by the Supreme Council of National Defence through Decision no. 62 on 17 April 2006, stipulates that national security can be jeopardised by a number of serious events, of geophysical, weather-climate or related nature, coming from the environment or reflecting its degradation, including as a result of dangerous, harmful or irresponsible human activities. Among these serious phenomena, we can include: natural disasters and other geophysical or severe weather-climate phenomena (floods, storms, severe drought conditions or other extreme events caused by global warming; other sudden and radical changes in the living conditions; landslides; earthquakes); the trend of depletion of vital resources; industrial or environmental disasters resulting in huge loss of human lives, substantial disruption of economic and social life and serious environmental pollution in their territory or in adjacent regions; increasing likelihood of pandemics.

Environmental protection is a priority in the security policy of other states. For example, in Canada, at government level, entered into force, in December 1995, the concept of “*Greening Government Departments*” calling all ministries and departments to prepare sustainable development strategies and action plans to present them to the parliament for approval every 3 years; in China<sup>15</sup>, environmental protection and energy efficiency has become a key policy; in this respect, a series of measures have been applied to combat pollution, increase forest areas, improve air quality (of the 559 cities monitored in 2006 by China State Environmental Protection Administration, 62,4% have improved air quality).

Environmental protection enjoys worldwide attention. The legal rules designed to protect the environment and to ensure human and other creatures health are a testimony in this respect. Thus, we mention: 1976 *New York Convention* on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques; *World Charter for Nature*, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1982; *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, adopted in 1982; *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 etc.

Environmental protection remains a priority of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. For this reason, analysts in the field warn that “*environmental protection can be achieved only through a sector approach, effectiveness in this area involves a concerted action at global level of all factors that depend on environmental protection*”<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> At <http://www.ecomagazin.ro/china-creste-investitiile-in-protectia-mediului/>, retrieved on 24 November 2011.

<sup>16</sup> Prof. univ. dr. Dumitru Mazilu, *Dreptul comunitar al mediului*, Editura Lumina Lex, București, 2005, p. 13.

A suitable means of preventing and mitigating the negative effects of threats and risks to the environment is the political will and cooperation between different actors for the awareness of the need for environmental protection. Environmental education acquired early in school plays an important role in knowing environmental problems and becoming aware of the responsibility that each one of us has to maintain environmental quality. Peter Scott, a founder of *World Wide Fund for Nature* (formerly known as the *World Wildlife Fund*), a non-governmental organisation for nature preservation and ecological restoration of the natural environment, believes that: “*The most important task, if we are to save the world, is to educate*”<sup>17</sup>.

A clean and healthy environment depends on each person’s behaviour and consciousness, it is the result of our action. For my security, for your security and for all people’s security, we must take care and protect the environment!



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<sup>17</sup> At <http://www.ecoweb.anpm.ro/page/5-Sugestii-pentru-profesori>, retrieved on 26 November 2011.

# INTELLECTUAL POTENTIAL, THE MOST EFFICIENT WEAPON OF TERRORISM IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

Cristian-Dan ȘTEFAN

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*The article starts from the premise that contemporary terrorism is based on a limitless resource that can be used at any given moment and make the most of any other terrorism resources – intellectual potential. That is why this article analyses a series of moments in which intellectual potential makes its presence felt during planning and developing the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (New York), 11 March 2004 (Madrid) and 7 July 2005 (London). The purpose is to expose the military-strategic thought elements necessary to shape under a viable conceptual form the “terrorist intellectual potential” in order to anticipate and put an end to the new terrorist attacks.*

**Keywords:** *intellectual potential; terrorism; intellectual terrorism; terrorist attacks; opportunity cost theory; rush-hour attack*

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*“Started by individuals belonging to fanatic groups, organisations or even states, terrorism, as a destructive phenomenon, is spread all over the world, which makes the fight against it more difficult, being the responsibility of neither a single state nor a group of states and, in any way, of a single army”<sup>1</sup>. This task is even more difficult because “terrorists are more likely to break the international law system than states are, because, unlike states, they have no interest in the system”<sup>2</sup>.*

In this situation, this article tries to expose the most important part of the terrorist arsenal, the *intellectual potential*. There is no doubt about the fact that these organisations have resources that can be used to promote terror in the world. However, the only way for those resources to be capitalised on is the one that includes the use of intellectual potential. In this regard, a conceptualisation of this phenomenon could create the premises for better understanding and better solving the new threat of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, *intellectual terrorism*.

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<sup>1</sup> Silviu Negruț, *Geopolitica: universul puterii*, Editura Meteor Press, București, 2008, p. 250.

<sup>2</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, Jon G. Pevehouse, *Relații internaționale*, Editura Polirom, București, 2008, p. 277.

Terrorism refers to “political violence deliberately and non-discriminatory focused against civilians”<sup>3</sup>, being considered “the weapon of the weak”. Up until the 9/11 terrorist attack, nobody had in mind the idea that such a weapon could actually strike at the heart of democracy, represented by the United States of America.

Although the terrorist phenomenon existed long before 9/11, it was not considered an actual threat to the liberal world and that is why it was understood rather as a social phenomenon, as Brzezinski said, “terrorism emerges from social discontent, even if it is strengthened by ideology”<sup>4</sup>, than as a military one, as we can say that: “terrorism is not actually new. It is in fact just another step along the way of violence”<sup>5</sup>. Nevertheless, even if the threat actually existed, the Western developed countries’ public opinion ignored it, based on the fact that such small groups could never develop a serious attack plan against any Western country.

There is no doubt that the intellectual potential of terrorist groups was underestimated or there is a possibility that this kind of resource was not taken into account, this being one of the facts that served as a starting point for this article.

Not only was the terrorist attack of 9/11 successful, but it was “efficient”, if we consider the opportunity costs for the terrorist group and the impact on the world that made terrorism the “centre of debates in Security Studies”<sup>6</sup>.

It was “efficient” because, with a few plane tickets and some flying lessons, a few people managed to destroy one of the most impressive buildings in the United States, the World Trade Centre complex and damage the Pentagon building but it was the psychological impact of this action that was more important.

The fundamental effect of terrorism is the psychological one. Partially, terrorism receives attention because of the dramatic nature of attacks, mostly because of the manner used by the media to show this phenomenon to the world<sup>7</sup>.

Still, why did they choose the United States, and not any other Western state? The analysts’ answers are multiple and invoke political, historical, strategic, psychological reasons. Nevertheless, the right answer lies in the United States “capacity of broadcasting terrorist acts live worldwide”<sup>8</sup>, this being without doubt the best way to promote fear and uncertainty.

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 275.

<sup>4</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Marea dilemă: a domina sau a conduce*, Editura Scripta, București, 2005, p. 29.

<sup>5</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, Jon G. Pevehouse, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

<sup>6</sup> Andrei Miroiu, Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, *Manual de relații internaționale*, Editura Polirom, București, 2006, p. 54.

<sup>7</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, Jon G. Pevehouse, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

<sup>8</sup> Jacques Portes, *Statele Unite ale Americii, hiperputere?*, Editura Enciclopedia Rao, București, 2003, p. 109.

This being said, we can see that the 9/11 attack against the United States was in fact based on the efficiency principle as well as on terror at the same time. In this regard, we can say that this act of terrorism showed the new face of terrorism, a kind of terrorism based not on material resources but mostly on intellectual resources.

At the same time, we may say that “9/11 raises terrorism to a new level of unconventional and asymmetrical warfare. In order to «legitimate» even more this phenomenon, the terrorist attacks in Madrid (11 March 2004) and London (7 July 2005) followed”<sup>9</sup>.

On 11 March 2004, “nearly simultaneous blasts hit Atocha station in the centre of the Spanish capital and two smaller stations”<sup>10</sup>. This will be the second terrorist attack that will be analysed in this article in order to extract the intellectual component.

First of all, we should look at the time of the attack, “morning rush hour”<sup>11</sup> and the places, *rail stations*. There is no doubt about the purpose of the effectiveness of the attack. This idea is strengthened by the *multiple explosions* and by *planting the bombs inside* as well as *outside the rail stations*.

This terrorist act was actually a *multiple synchronised attack* that left no reaction time for anyone. Still, a part of the plan did not work because some other bombs were found and defused, bombs that were meant to explode when the paramedics would have arrived<sup>12</sup>. This shows the use of *anticipating and adapting practice in terrorism*.

Nevertheless, the most important part of any terrorist attack, *fear and psychological impact*, is represented by the creation of an *insecure environment* for the people, increased by *an apparent inefficiency of the state* in finding the ones responsible, because, at the beginning, this attack *was not claimed by any terrorist group*.

In keeping with the arguments presented, we can say that the *intellectual component* of this terrorist act consists in *adaptability* and *anticipation* and, judging by the *multiple attack* practice, we can say that the terrorist act is aimed at maximising the *chances of success*, even on a small scale.

On 7 July 2007, four suicide bombers struck in central London. The coordinated attacks hit the transportation system at the morning rush hour, when three bombs went off in underground trains in the Liverpool Street and Edgware Road stations,

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<sup>9</sup> Silviu Negruț, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

<sup>10</sup> *Scores Die in Madrid Bomb Carnage*, 11 March 2004, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3500452.stm> retrieved on 16.10.2010.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

and another one between King's Cross and Russell Square stations, the final explosion being around an hour later in a double-decker in Tavistock Square, not far from King's Cross<sup>13</sup>.

In this case, we can notice that the rush hour rule applies, the time of the attack being, as in the other two cases, during the morning. We can again observe the simultaneous attack against several different targets. Therefore, it is clear that *efficiency has an important place in every terrorist action*. We should not forget about the actual targets of the attacks, a few underground trains and a double-decker bus, which, same as in the case of the other two attacks, were means of public transportation.

Here, the intellectual component appears under the form of applying the *back up strategy*, meaning the use of the second target (the double-decker) that could guarantee at least a partial success even if the main plan failed. This thing is shown by the period between the attacks on the underground train and the one on the double-decker, of almost an hour.

*"Terrorism became a transnational phenomenon, having special implications for security, stability and state political order, as well as for international order and peace"*<sup>14</sup>. The terrorist attacks analysed in this article outline a picture of how dangerous terrorism has become in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, by becoming more efficient, better organised, using strategic thinking and military methods, having, without any doubt, clearly defined *"strategies that comprise ends, ways and means"*<sup>15</sup>.

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Regarding the three attacks, we can notice some resemblances:

The *first* refers to the targeting process, by using multiple targets simultaneously, which contributes essentially to the success of a terrorist action, by maximising the chances to carry out the terrorist plan.

The *second* refers to the means and ways of action. The terrorists use airplanes, trains, underground trains and buses, all of them being crowded means of transportation. This shows the capabilities to adapt, because they did not attack the same means of transportation twice, considering the security measures that are required after a terrorist attack.

The *third* considers the time of the attacks that, in this three cases, was chosen for increasing the efficiency of terrorist actions. If we focus on terrorism efficiency,

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<sup>13</sup> At [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london\\_blasts/what\\_happened/html/](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/) retrieved on 16.10.2010.

<sup>14</sup> Silviu Negruț, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

<sup>15</sup> James Jaz Carfano, Paul Rosenzweig, *Winning the Long War*, Ed. Heritage Books, 2005, p. 161.



we may say that it has evolved, considering the fact that during the last terrorist attack analysed in this article, terrorists did not miss any of the targets nor lose any of the explosive devices, which actually represents a success for terrorist groups.

Based on the fact that nowadays terrorists use the opportunity cost theory, concept of effectiveness, backup strategies and, last but not least, military tactics, we can say that these parts of a terrorist strategy can only be developed by the 21<sup>st</sup> century terrorism, intellectual terrorism.

Under these circumstances, *“the evolution of terrorist actions, from an isolated phenomenon to planned operations, organised by military rules, lead humankind and nonetheless international environment to a fragile security”*<sup>16</sup>.

In the recent years, several other Western countries were threatened, for instance, *“in 2009, France found itself grappling with an Islamist threat that reflected the nation’s changing demographics. Several public announcements by al-Qaeda (AQ) and other groups reiterated that French interests remained key targets of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In response to President Sarkozy’s June comments calling for the banning of the burka in France, AQIM spelled out their intentions to attack France stating: «we will do everything in our power to avenge our sisters’ and our daughters’ honor, by striking France and its interests, wherever they may be»*<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> Silviu Negruț, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

<sup>17</sup> US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, August 2010, at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf> retrieved on 18.10.2010, p. 76.



***“It was necessary to develop a manual in accordance with the provisions of the similar NATO document, to include specific guidelines for the initiation, development, coordination, approval, execution, review and revision of operations”***

*Interview with Lieutenant General Dr Valeriu NICUȚ,  
Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations and Training*

***Operations Planning Handbook**, initiated in 2009 by the General Staff's Representation to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium, is a document of paramount importance for the Romanian Armed Forces. Subsequently, during 2010 and 2011, the Strategic Planning Directorate within the General Staff was assigned the main task of coordinating and editing the handbook approved as to form by the Commission on Specific Normative Acts, Doctrines and Military Manuals within the General Staff. All the structures in the Ministry of National Defence made their valuable contribution to the manual. It is applicable to all the types of operations planning activities at strategic, operational and tactical level. The manual describes the planning process, at all the levels of military art, in terms of comprehensive approach. It should be understood and applied in a flexible, realistic and creative manner, depending on the specific characteristics of the military action. It also provides the necessary guidelines to harmonise the operations planning process in the Romanian Armed Forces with the one in NATO. In this regard, we have addressed some questions to **Lieutenant General Dr Valeriu NICUȚ**, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations and Training.*

***Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE: General, you have been directly involved in developing, sustaining, and promoting this manual. What determined you to initiate this process?***

***Lieutenant General Dr Valeriu NICUȚ:*** When I initiated this process I was the General Staff's Representative to the Supreme Headquarters Allied

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He was born on 17 November 1955, Domnești, Argeș County.

He graduated from “*Dimitrie Cantemir*” Military High School (1974), “*Nicolae Bălcescu*” Active-duty Officer Military School (1977), Academy for Advanced Military Studies, Combined Arms Faculty (1993) and the Security and National Defence Post-academic Course – National Defence College (2005).

He filled command and staff positions (1993-1998); Chief of Romanian Specialists Office/Joint Course – Joint Services, PfP Regional Training Centre (1998-2000); Acting Commander of the Romanian-British PfP Regional Training Centre (2000), and then Commander of this Centre; Chief of Partnership Section, Cooperation and Regional Security Division, International Military Staff, NATO HQs, Brussels, Belgium (2001-2004); Chief of Strategic Planning Directorate, the General Staff (2004-2005); Advisor to the Chief of the General Staff (2005-2006); Romanian National Military Representative to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium (2006-2009); Deputy Director for Operational Command, the General Staff (2009).

As of 30 March 2009 he is the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations and Training.

He attended the International Orientation Course for Staff Officers, the Netherlands (1998); the Joint Course – Command and Staff College Bracknell, Great Britain (1999); the Staff and Command Procedures, Joint and Multinational Operations

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Powers Europe. I noticed that the global and regional security situation compelled this institution and all member states equally to permanently adapt and transform the operations planning process. Moreover, to achieve the desired interoperability in this field too, it was necessary to achieve a common language. The revision of NATO Guidelines for Operational Planning provided us with the opportunity to do it at home as well.

Choosing the Strategic Planning Directorate to coordinate this project was not accidental. I could say it was natural. It is the directorate that is responsible, in cooperation with the other structures in the General Staff, for the planning process at strategic level. To this argument a subjective one can be added – the experience gained by the personnel of this structure following the fact they have filled some international positions or they have actually taken part in operations planning activities at national and international level. The first opportunity to test the manual project was *Exercise DACIA 2010*. On that occasion we drew conclusions that were extremely useful for the enhancement of the content of the manual. I think it is appropriate here to once more express my thanks to all those who contributed personal expertise or the one of the structures they were part of to the completion of this difficult project!

***Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE:***  
***As you have spoken about intended users, who is the manual designed for?***

***Lieutenant General Dr Valeriu NICUȚ:***  
We firstly consider commanders and staff officers/military planners at all echelons, as well as

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Further Development Course (1999); PRIME (Partnership Real-Time Management and Exchange System) Course, Belgium (2003); NATO European Cooperation Course in Security, Germany (2002); “*Armed forces during democracy*” Course, Germany (2005).

In 2008 he received his doctorate in military sciences.

Throughout his career, he has been given numerous distinctions and awards: “*Virtutea Militară*” Order, in the rank of Knight; “*Pentru Merit*” National Order, in the rank of Knight; “*Pentru Merit*” National Order, in the rank of Officer; “*Onoarea Armatei României*” Emblem, with the war mark; General Staff’s Emblem of Honour; Land Force’s Emblem of Honour; Air Force’s Emblem of Honour; Naval Force’s Emblem of Honour; Logistics’ Emblem of Honour; “*Știința Militară*” Emblem of Merit, 1st class; “*În Serviciul Patriei*” Commendation for 25 years of service.

He speaks English and French.

He is married and he has two children.

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the military educational institutions where the future planners should get familiar with the existing procedures in this field in NATO. To make the collaborative planning process – an imperative affirmed by the current manual – work effectively, it is necessary for all the planners, at all echelons, to have a common understanding of the specific situation in the area of operations and to apply common procedures to accomplish the missions.

**Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE:**  
*Can we ask if there were any other arguments to pay a special attention to it and to recommend it as a necessary normative act?*

**Lieutenant General Dr Valeriu NICUȚ:**

As far as I am concerned, besides my responsibilities for directly coordinating the operations planning in the Romanian Armed Forces, there is an additional argument in favour of it – the experience gained by me and my predecessors as the General Staff’s Representative to SHAPE. It is no less true that there was a need for revival in this domain

to anchor it in the current realities. It was necessary to develop a manual in accordance with the provisions of the similar NATO document, to include specific guidelines for the initiation, development, coordination, approval, execution, review and revision of operations. Moreover, there was the need for approaching some aspects such as civil-military interaction, the development and use of knowledge bases, the assessment of operations, the planning process at strategic level, information and timely decision-making by political-military decision factors, all not thoroughly covered by the previous manuals/normative acts. Last but not least, another reason was that of including all valuable aspects in the Romanian military thinking related to operations planning.

As I have already mentioned, from the very beginning, we had in mind the necessity to align the operations planning process in the Romanian Armed Forces with the provisions of the *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive*,

document developed by SHAPE, which is intended to guide the Alliance involvement in the international community efforts to comprehensively approach, under all aspects, military and civilian, the issues related to stabilisation and reconstruction in the theatres of operations. In essence, it is about NATO member nations assuming not only the military role but also the relationship with other partners and international actors, civil-military instruments for crisis management and support for stabilisation and reconstruction operations.

***Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE: The continuous adaptation, as you have already said, of the operations planning process in the Alliance and, implicitly, in the Romanian Armed Forces. The duty of the Armed Forces to understand and anticipate the needs and objectives of other participants in the operation and to coordinate own effort with those of other institutions, authorities, international organisations and nations is also mentioned in the manual. How are we supposed to understand the fact that the responsibilities of the military body have apparently gone beyond the ones we have got used to so far?***

***Lieutenant General Dr Valeriu NICUȚ:*** In many cases, experience demonstrates this fact. NATO-led operations cannot be successful using only military means. In consequence, the Romanian Armed Forces have to be prepared to use, not only in the context of the alliance but also in the national one, a wide range of instruments, and to cooperate with other actors to achieve their objectives in accordance with *NATO Strategic Concept*. Romania has to be able, if needed, to deploy and manage resources and capabilities, other than the military ones, and, depending on the situation, it will decide to make them available to international organisations or not. Experience teaches us that planning in such a multidimensional, complex environment is not only extremely difficult but also very important. It is only through the coordination and collaboration of all the military and civilian actors in a comprehensive manner that the necessary effects can be created to achieve the desired end state.

***Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE: Exercise BICAZ-2011 was completed recently. We are of the opinion that it was a good opportunity to practise the operations planning procedures recommended by this manual. To what extent does it respond to the desideratum that generated it?***

***Lieutenant General Dr Valeriu NICUȚ:*** Of course, one of the main training objectives of this exercise was for all the commands involved to practise the specific procedures included in the manual. Currently, post-action reports have been centralised

and allow us to draw some conclusions. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the manual *has achieved the standardisation of the specific procedures used by the participants during the planning and conduct of operations at operational and tactical level.* The experience acquired during the exercise *BICAZ-2011* has determined the enhancement of the efficiency of staff activities, decision-making cycle, and information flows, in full agreement with the procedures established in the manual. Moreover, it has led to the definite conclusion that, in the future, it is necessary to equally develop the tactical level.

***Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE: Taking into account the speed at which the current strategic environment moves and, implicitly, the evolution of modern conflict theory, how long do you think the validity period of this normative act can be?***

***Lieutenant General Dr Valeriu NICUȚ:*** I think it is clear for everybody that such a manual is permanently perfectible! Our duty is to continue, to permanently persevere. I have always told those I have been working directly with that a manual with limitations, but existent, is far better than a perfect one, but permanently inexistent. The security environment is constantly changing. Any time new necessities and, implicitly, new ways to resolve conflict situations may occur. Obviously, they will require new operating procedures. Therefore, it is very difficult to predict the period such a document, as this manual, remains valid. In our situation, I like to think that it will be at least as long as the “*validity period*” of the *Strategic Concept* adopted in 2010 at the Lisbon Summit. However, it is clear that this manual revision process should be continuous and synchronised with that of the normative acts adopted by NATO. We take into consideration here the revision of *SHAPE Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive – COPD*, as well as of other NATO documents such as: *BiSC Knowledge Development Handbook*, *BiSC Operations Assessment Handbook*, *Revised Allied Joint Doctrine* or *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning*. This revision, which is usually necessary every five years, will certainly keep pace with the revision of the Romanian doctrines relevant in the field: the *Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine* and the *Operations Planning Doctrine in the Romanian Armed Forces*. Currently, it is very important that we already have the reference elements and experts in the field to be permanently connected to the operational environment and that we will be able to use, without difficulties as far as actions are concerned, the same operational language.

***Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE: Thank you, Lieutenant General!***

*2 December 2011*

***English version by***  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

# FROM INFORMATION SECURITY TO CYBER DEFENCE

*Brigadier General BEng Ovidiu Ionel TĂRPESCU  
Colonel BEng Florian TOMIȚĂ*

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*The advanced information communication networks are particularly important for the military, creating global and national information infrastructure, the military and the defence information infrastructure. These interconnected systems enable the rapid exchange of information throughout the world. Yet, these technological advances seem to be a lethal two-edge sword for the military system. On the one hand, a user may employ offensive information operations to attack the command and control elements of an adversary, while, on the other hand, the adversary may attack first or have highly developed defensive measures. To succeed in defence missions, the modern military must develop technology and systems for increasing the lethality of the information technology advances in offensive information operations, striving to diminish the lethality of potential adversaries through protective defensive information operations.*

**Keywords:** *information operations; communication and information networks; technological progress; cyber defence*

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**T**he current context in which the military system evolves is that of a dynamic transformation and globalisation process. This context has strong implications for the operational environment in which the armed forces carry out their missions.

As far as the communications and information structures in the Romanian Armed Forces are concerned, their current missions are equally influenced by the requirement for interoperability with the similar military structures of NATO partners and by the rapid technological progress.

The accelerated technological advance brings about, for communications and information structures, both the challenge of developing new technical and operational capabilities and the one of keeping these capabilities ready under the conditions of operating in a global and complex environment that is hostile to carrying out missions.

Today, military communications and information systems are not hierarchically organised as they used to be during the years of the *Cold War*,

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Brigadier General BEng Ovidiu Ionel Tărpescu, Colonel BEng Florian Tomiță – Communications and Information Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

they do not operate independently of the civilian communication systems and they are not isolated at national level. The current military communications and information systems are connected to networks whose extensions may operate wherever in the world, *are capable* of connecting using heterogeneous transmission media, collect pieces of information from own or allied sensors simultaneously, process them instantaneously and provide commanders with summary information that allows them to make decisions at tactical, operational and strategic levels.

Most of military communications and information systems operate having a common infrastructure with the civilian ones. This fact makes the advantages brought to information operations by technological progress be accompanied by major threats to military communications and information systems and the information conveyed or processed, which, implicitly, become direct threats to the accomplishment of the armed forces missions.


It is well known that superiority in battle is dependent on the success in the information operation. As we have shown above, information operation is conducted in a global, virtual and hostile environment.

In this context, naturally, the concern for the security of the information conveyed and processed in the military communications and information systems is addressed in the most serious manner, as success in battle depends on it.

### Approach to information security in the military communications and information systems

*Information Assurance – IA* domain extends the classical model of information security, presented in *figure 1*, known as *CIA Triad* (*Confidentiality – Integrity – Availability*), including two new objectives: *authentication* and *non-repudiation*.

Although controversial among some experts because of the two stated objectives that do not represent attributes of information, the information security assurance model, presented in *figure 2*, includes, however, a series of measures meant to ensure the restoration of information systems through protection, detection and reaction capabilities. All these mentioned capabilities have led to the emergence



**Figure 1: Classical information security model**






Figure 2: Components of information security assurance

and procedures meant to assure a minimum state of security necessary to effectively carry out the management, command and control processes at all levels.

Because of the new threats and vulnerabilities, increasingly diverse and complex, in the context of command and control systems extension and their interconnection in the digital battlefield as well as of the concept of network centric warfare implementation, the current security model is outdated without the implementation of cyber defence capabilities.

The conduct of network centric warfare presupposes the use of integrated computer and communications network for the command and control of military actions in the larger context of C4I systems (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence). From this standpoint, the domain of information security assurance continues the efforts to secure the military organisations C4I systems in the context of the current role of information as an instrument of power in the development of military actions.

In the context of network centric warfare, information security (INFOSEC) represents the protection of information and information systems against unauthorised access, modification of information, whether in storage, processing or transit and the access to information for authorised users. INFOSEC includes those measures necessary to detect, document and counter these types of actions.

INFOSEC components are: *COMPUSEC* – *Computer Security* and *COMSEC* – *Communications Security*. In turn, *COMSEC* comprises: *TRANSEC* – *Transmission Security* and *EMSEC* – *Emission Security*.

*COMPUSEC* consists of measures and control elements that ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information stored, processed

of the cyber defence domain, with important implications for the structures designed to assure information security and, especially, to staff them with highly qualified personnel, able to understand and exploit the new security technologies.

The initial model, based on information security, also implemented in the Romanian Armed Forces, known as *INFOSEC*, includes standards, practices

and transmitted by computers. These measures include hardware and software procedures and instruments necessary to protect the information systems and the information stored by them.

*COMSEC* comprises measures meant to deny the unauthorised access to the information that can be obtained from the communications systems as well as to ensure the authentication of correspondents. It uses cryptographic techniques to transform information in encrypted messages, unintelligible to the unauthorised personnel that intercept communication.

*TRANSEC* uses a series of techniques to prevent the signal detection or jamming during transmission. These techniques include either the channel “*concealment*” or its transformation into a constantly moving target.

## Cyber warfare

*Cyber warfare* is strictly linked to the information warfare and represents a concrete/particular form of it, presupposing the execution of a complex system of offensive and defensive actions on information and communications systems. Even if, to conduct these actions, some means and methods specific to hackers are used, given that the goal of cyber warfare is to gain information dominance, it should not be confused with the actions of hackers. The actions carried out within cyber warfare are more complex and varied, they are not individual actions, being organised and planned by governmental and non-governmental structures, as well as by ideological entities or groups.

This form of warfare may involve diverse technologies, especially the ones used not only in command and control systems, to collect the classified information processed and distributed in tactical communication, position determination, friend-foe identification systems, but also in the “*intelligent*” armament systems. Offensive actions are aimed at disturbing, by all means, the enemy information and communications systems, misinforming and intoxicating the enemy with information or “*blinding*” it, while defensive actions consist of a complex of actions and measures meant to protect own information and communications systems.

The concepts specific to different dimensions of warfare sometimes overlap, which has led to the intensification of the scientific research effort to delineate, define and establish the interfaces between information warfare, network centric warfare and cyber warfare. Therefore, bold approaches regarding the dimensions of the future conflict have emerged, defining cyberspace as the fifth dimension of confrontation (*figure 3*):

1. land;
2. sea;

3. air;
4. outer space;
5. cyberspace.

Cyber warfare also determines the development of new strategies and doctrines to organise and carry out actions: what types of forces are necessary, where and how they should develop, how the enemy should hit, where and when information




Figure 3: The five dimensions of military confrontations

and communications systems are positioned, what type of computers, sensors, networks and databases are used. As an innovation in warfare, cyber warfare has become, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, what the “lightning war” (Blitzkrieg) was in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Simplifying to the minimum, cyber warfare represents an important extension of the importance attached, in the past, to the actions meant to get information in war: gaining superiority with the help of command and control systems and achieving surprise by discovering, localising and deceiving the enemy.

If we admit that cyberspace is an environment in which a complex confrontation may take place, with important state and non-state actors, as in the case of international terrorism or cross-border crime, then the conflict in cyberspace or *cyber warfare* is a phenomenon placed at the confluence of many forms of confrontation between these actors, as it is presented in figure 4.



Figure 4: Interaction between cyber warfare and the other forms of information warfare

Thus, in the virtual environment, within information warfare, we may define, depending on the states of peace, crisis or war, two phases of cyber confrontation:

- internet warfare, in peacetime and pre-crisis period;
- cyber warfare, during crisis, war and post-conflict.

The difference between the two phases of confrontation in cyberspace resides in the accentuation or preponderance, during cyber warfare, of the military components of conflicts.

The common feature of the two phases is the continuous antagonistic relation established between the threats that get manifest in cyberspace – *terrorism, espionage, sabotage, subversion and organised crime* and information security.

### **Cyberspace threats**

However, is there a cyber warfare or is it only a figment of theorists or of some military bodies in their attempt to attract new financial resources for procurement? NATO says that cyber warfare poses as great a threat as a missile attack. This concern is widespread after “*Titan Rain*” hacker attacks and especially after it has been ascertained that the “*online*” attacks provoked by some organisations that seem to be supported by states are increasing. Thus, at a conference in London, it has been said that espionage and “*online*” terrorism currently represent some of the most serious threats to global security, and NATO treats the cyberwar threat as seriously as a missile attack risk. According to the same source, Suleyman Anil, who is in charge of protecting NATO against cyber attacks, said: “*Cyber defence is now mentioned at the highest level along with missile defence and energy security. We have seen more of these attacks and we do not think that this problem will disappear soon. Unless globally supported measures are taken, it can become a global problem*”. Anil, who is the Head of NATO Computer Incident Response Capability, declared that the cost of “*high-tech*” strikes on government communications was falling, while the amount of damage they could inflict was growing.

Among the main threats is *cyber terrorism*, in which attackers try to shut down “*online*” communication networks or use the internet to attack government institutions. Although some have warned of this fact since the '90s, it is only in recent years that this issue has come under the attention of the leadership of some countries. Anil also warns of some nations that could sponsor internet-based attacks on NATO member countries: “*There are nations that are not just working on defence capabilities, but that have attack capabilities*”.

The prospect of an “*online warfare*” has come to the fore after a series of high-profile international attacks. In 2007, it was discovered that a gang

of hackers, believed to be from China, infiltrated computer systems at the Pentagon and launched attacks on the government networks in Great Britain, Germany, India and Australia. United States officials, who named the group *Titan Rain*, accused them of operating with the support of some officials in Beijing. Another attack that has taken place in Estonia, a country that has one of the most “high-tech” governments in the world, has been blamed on some hackers backed by the Russian authorities. However, only an Estonian teenager has been arrested in relation to this incident so far.

In *figure 5* we have tried a complex representation of the structural, conceptual and temporal relations between *TESSO* (*Terrorism, Espionage, Sabotage, Subversion, Organised Crime*) threats in cyberspace and information security.




Figure 5: Information security in the context of cyber warfare

*Organised Crime*) threats in cyberspace and information security. *Information security* consists of a complex set of forces, means, policies, regulations, measures and operations conducted to identify, monitor, counter and prevent *TESSO* threats in cyberspace.

## Cyber defence

The use of computers in almost all daily activities, such as business, finance, education, in government institutions and national security system, also involves the reconsideration of assuring information and communications systems security. Many articles published in international mass-media present the real concerns of the bodies responsible for preserving the state of security in developed countries regarding the possibility of a cyber attack whose source may be a state, as well as a transnational organisation or an individual, with minor or very serious consequences.

In this context, the defence “*reaction*” against computer aggressions appears as a necessity at all levels – individual, organisation, state or alliance. Each entity

participates, directly or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily, not only in formulating new defence strategies against the new types of risks and threats, but also in adapting the reactions to them through applying certain individual or collective measures.

With the emergence of cyber warfare, experts have tried to define new solutions for cyber defence, as a response to computer aggressions, materialised in a complex set of offensive and defensive actions.

All organisations recognise the need to provide a strategic response to the new forms of threats in the cyber domain, where there have been major leaps regarding the development of the technologies used, not only to protect own data and systems but also to instrument this new environment to gain competitive advantage. From this standpoint, one of the key objectives in the field of information security in IT and communications systems – INFOSEC is to provide a viable solution to counter *cyber warfare* activities. As a form of reaction, *cyber defence* consists of a complex set of defensive measures and actions designed to prevent offensive actions and to provide the efficient and prompt response to cyber attacks.

In formulating cyber defence strategies, the following aspects should be considered:

- multidisciplinary information security: personnel physical security, document security, computer and industrial security;
- reaction capability able to respond to the most diverse and unpredictable forms of cyber aggression.

Cyber defence also represents a complementary form of cooperation between people, organisations, alliances and states to counter *cybercrime*, *electronic fraud*.

If offensive actions belong more to the military domain, it is recognised that defensive measures are the result of an efficient collaboration between civil society and military organisations or the ones belonging to the national security system. Therefore, currently, it may be stated that defensive actions in response to IT security incidents have been best developed and implemented for both civil society and the military. These actions are carried out by specialised structures, known as *Computer Emergency Response Team – CERT*.

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Certainly, the inherently negative effects are added to the benefits of technological progress, at least in the field of communications and information, one for which we are more concerned and responsible.

Real life shows that the best choice is to adapt to reality. The reality is that responsible armed forces train seriously to fight in cyberspace as well as in the confrontation in the tactical field. Victory in the field is practically impossible if information operation is not won.

Alongside other specialised structures, one of the key actors in information security in the Romanian Armed Forces is the Communications and Information Directorate in the General Staff, a military structure that has among its responsibilities the one of implementing the technical measures meant to assure the security of the information transmitted and processed by the military communications and information systems.

Currently, in agreement with the legislation adopted at national level, the structures of the Ministry of National Defence that have responsibilities in the field of information security have achieved a series of results in defining, regulating and implementing INFOSEC policies. The great challenge for the structures and bodies with responsibilities in the field is, based on own experience, to take part in developing the national legislation regarding cyber defence/cyber warfare and to continue to implement CERT structures in the Romanian Armed Forces. This course of action will not guarantee the success of the mission to defend the country or of the missions within NATO but, it is certain that, without it, no future mission can be accomplished.

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**English version by**  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

# POSSIBLE EVOLUTIONS OF MARITIME TERRORISM

Colonel (N) Aurel PUICHILIȚĂ

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*Piracy resurgence resides in the failure of regional and global organisations to manage the evolution of specific phenomena of globalisation, including the widening disparities between rich and poor countries, religious intolerance and governance failure.*

*In these circumstances, piracy has suffered mutations related to the association with terrorism and organised crime, boosting each other, in an unusual formula. One of the main causes that has led to the association of piracy with terrorism is the war started against terrorist organisations, aimed at reducing the funding of these organisations. The International Maritime Community has demonstrated the capability to counter terrorism and maritime piracy.*

**Keywords:** *terrorism; piracy; naval terrorism; maritime terrorism*

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Until the end of the twentieth century, piracy was believed to be a historical phenomenon, transposed into reality only by novelists and filmmakers. For hundreds of years, it was associated with a job, a source of income, just like other illegal occupations such as dealing drugs and weapons, or even human trafficking. However, some developed maritime countries in the Middle Ages considered piracy an honourable profession.

Various opinions support the idea that the link between piracy and terrorism is based on circumstances. Evidence suggests that terrorist organisations and pirates behave alike, by perceiving the maritime space as a great opportunity for a rapid and relatively secure income. The economic growth and easy access to technology, but most of all, the war launched against terrorism, based on its financial component, drove organisations to a financial collapse by diminishing their funds. They were forced to go in different directions in order to regain their economic stability, and that included piracy, even if most of them were not initially prepared to take action at sea. This might have been one of the causes for the return of maritime piracy, as well as naval terrorism. In other words, the war against terrorism led to the migration of terrorism to the marine environment,

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Colonel (N) Aurel Puichiliță – Diving Centre, Constanța.



due to the need to access new forms of funding by exploiting the various opportunities encountered in shipping.

### ***From piracy to terrorism***

Piracy is motivated by quick financial gain, while terrorism is driven by political goals beyond the immediate opportunities created by the attack itself. For this reason, pirate activities conducted by terrorist organisations create a so-called *grey border* between piracy and terrorism; the way of acting is typical to piracy, but the outcome is evaluated as a terrorist action.

The pursuit of financial resources has also led to the obvious association between terrorist organisations and organised crime, with devastating consequences. These organisations reinforce each other, although they do not share the same ideologies. While terrorists fulfil their tasks as visibly as possible, carefully observing the impact in the media, organised crime embraces anonymity by tackling various issues silently and safely.

The majority of naval attacks take place in ports or in the docking points outside them. Usually, these attacks are of small scale and can be passed on to the local port authority. Most of the attacks on marching ships have been mainly recorded on small tonnage commercial ones, used in regional trade, which are more sensitive to such incidents. Container ships and large oil tankers crossing the Malacca and Singapore Straits between Europe or Middle East and East Asia have not reported any attacks, at least if they do not slow, stop, or anchor<sup>1</sup>. It is true that these ships are monitored by officials, being provided with security assistance while transiting the straits.

According to various experts in naval terrorism<sup>2</sup>, the potential for cooperation between pirates and terrorists has been overestimated, especially when it comes to the Asian territory. As proven before, piracy and naval terrorism exhibit a common way of operating shown by attackers, but they are different when it comes to motivation and finale; piracy has a material motivation, while terrorism is founded on political grounds.

When it comes to evaluating the dangers of naval terrorism, we are tempted to believe that terrorists might be interested in the skills and expertise of pirates at sea. In reality, it is much simpler than that. The coastal area abounds in experienced ex-navigators, fishermen and shipping workers, easy to be exploited

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<sup>1</sup> Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond, Joshua Ho, *Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits – An Agenda for Action*, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2006, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Adam Young, Mark J. Valencia, *Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 25, no. 2, August 2003, pp. 269-283.

by terrorists. However, there has to be drawn a line between terrorists that use piracy and armed robbery in order to gain some profits and those who directly attack a ship or a port facility in a terrorist act<sup>3</sup>.

Article 101 from the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* defines piracy as belonging to the following acts:

*a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state;*

*b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;*

*c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).*

### **Naval or maritime terrorism?**

The international literature regarding the field mainly uses the term “*maritime terrorism*” (easily found in over 97 000 items on *Google* search engine), while “*naval terrorism*” (found in 686 items) is highly present in articles and various papers in Europe.

Maritime terrorism is especially used by American literature and that of the states that show massive interest in the Planetary Ocean, focusing on the security of oceanic and maritime transportation. These particular states, by their military and maritime doctrine, consider defending their interests, homeland and citizen security as far away from their physical borders as possible. The scenario of a terrorist attack on board of a ship that navigates on the Mississippi river was probably unimaginable, similar to the unthinkable events of 9/11. The states that are dependent on maritime transportation on rivers and interior waters are mostly European and they address both terms (naval and maritime terrorism). In my opinion, naval terrorism is more appropriate, covering not only the maritime environment but also rivers and interior waters.

### **Modern characteristics of naval terrorism**

Naval terrorism has been perceived differently, from state to state, depending on where the government stood over the phenomenon and the interest level of freely and safely using the seas and oceans.

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<sup>3</sup> Sam Bateman, *Assessing the Threat of Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region*, accessed at <http://books.google.ro/books>, retrieved on 15.01.2011.

In India's perspective<sup>4</sup>, the following actions are regarded as acts of naval terrorism:

- use of the sea or a river to knowingly facilitate acts of terrorism on land; examples are use of sea-going and river-worthy ships and fishing craft for the transport of men and for the clandestine smuggling of weapons, ammunition and explosives and possibly WMD material in the future for committing an act of terrorism on the ground; at least one transnational mafia group, namely the one led by Dawood Ibrahim, which is based in Pakistan and helps jihadist terrorist organisations, has this capability;
- use of small boats and fishing vessels for acts of terrorism mounted against coast-based or port-based targets such as port installations, foreign ships visiting ports, off-shore oil installations, oil refineries, nuclear and missile installations etc. Many of India's oil refineries and nuclear and space/missile establishments are based on the coast and are hence vulnerable to such attacks from the sea;
- use of trainer, microlite and other aircraft for acts of suicide terrorism directed against water-based targets such as off-shore oil installations, ships carrying human beings, commercial merchandise and POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricant) products, naval ships of perceived adversaries of the terrorists either on the high sea or while anchored etc. In 1992, a Pakistan-trained Sikh terrorist belonging to the Babbar Khalsa, arrested by the Indian Police, stated during his interrogation that during his training in Pakistan, his Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) suggested to him that he should join the Mumbai flying club and, during a solo flight, crash his trainer aircraft on the Mumbai off-shore oil platform;
- ship hijacking;
- causing timed or remotely detonated explosions on board ships while they are moving through sensitive channels in order to cause disruption of maritime traffic.

One of India's greatest concerns related to terrorism is the international community's failure in taking the lead against the transnational mafia led by Dawood Ibrahim, sheltered in Pakistan, which has had a proven nexus with transnational terrorist and nuclear proliferation groups. It played a role in facilitating the nuclear proliferation activities of A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist and masterminded the terrorist strikes in Mumbai (Bombay) in March 1993.

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<sup>4</sup> B. Raman, *Maritime Terrorism: An Indian Perspective*, accessed at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers12/paper1154.html>, retrieved on 12.02.2011.

Because of the huge funds at its disposal, it has been able to and is still in a position to mobilise maritime capabilities, either of its own or of others, to facilitate acts of maritime terrorism<sup>5</sup>.

### **Trends and possible developments of naval terrorism**

There has been a tendency to develop a false feeling of security based on the certainty that the inevitable difficulties terrorists encounter in organising and carrying out activities at sea will generate only sporadic incidents. I personally believe that it would be much more cautious to also take into account the high adaptability of al-Qaeda, the ingenuity, tenacity and boldness that have already been proven. Maritime tactics, techniques and procedures have already been tested in the terrorist community.

The war of national liberation successfully launched years ago by the maritime component of the *Liberation Tamil Tigers of Elam (LTTE)* represents for al-Qaeda a source of inspiration and a model of organisation and success. Before the 2002 ceasefire, the maritime component of the LTTE had no less than 3 000 employees and 100-200 ships involved in a campaign against other ships, belonging to Sri Lanka. Moreover, LTTE perpetuated their experience in the maritime academy and school, ensuring a formal volume of knowledge that could easily be applied in naval terrorism<sup>6</sup>.

The greatest terrorist threat in South-Eastern Asia came from al-Qaeda and their associated group, particularly Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). They own training ranges in the Philippines, where they train together and share their experience<sup>7</sup>. The members of these organisations make regular trips between Sabah, Borneo (Indonesia) and training camps, using fast boats and the ferry. The Philippines' ASG has already shown the ability of attacking ships, taking responsibility for the "Superferry 14" attack, on 27 February 2004, with a death toll of 116.

For South-Eastern Asia, the following scenarios of the possible terrorist attacks against maritime targets can be pictured. These are grouped in less plausible and more plausible scenarios. They focus on the threats on ships and port infrastructure. The reasoning behind it all is based on the skills of known terrorist organisations, the level of difficulty in launching a particular attack and its probability of success.

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Captain James Pelkofski, *Al-Qaeda's Maritime Campaign*, 2005, accessed at <http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,83909,00.html>, retrieved on 15.02.2011.

<sup>7</sup> Rommel Banlaoi, *Romulo: RP Won't Be Frontline of Terror Attack*, in *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 13 August 2005, p. A1.

The less plausible scenarios are:

- sinking a ship in order to block the Malacca or Singapore Straits; this is a highly popular scenario in the academic environment, as well as the media, but in reality it is not quite credible, even if not impossible<sup>8</sup>. There are a few reasons to support this affirmation. The first one is related to the width of the strait. Even if the narrowest spot of traffic separation measures approximately 1 000 meters in width, a greater number of ships should be sunk in some particular spots. Even in this case, the problem can be easily solved by temporarily diverting the traffic of ships with significant draft in the separation zone, and those with a lower draft outside it. Another reason is represented by the difficulty in attacking large tonnage ships and sinking them in precise locations in order to reach their goal. This is extremely difficult to achieve, even for navigators who operate assisted by tugs. However, an associated scenario regarding the attack of an oil tanker in the separation area of the traffic that would start a fire and various explosions on board is almost plausible<sup>9</sup>;
- the use of ships that carry toxic or dangerous load as “floating bombs” is another popular scenario for commentators, but considered highly implausible as well; the ships included in this category are large oil tankers, liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers or tankers that carry chemicals or volatile cargoes (for example ammonium nitrate). In this case, the problem of hijacking such ships and operating them in the exact way that would lead to catastrophic outcomes by generating an on board explosion is seen as extremely difficult. Even the most trained terrorists in the field are confident that this type of scenario would never succeed. The missile attacks on oil tankers during the “tanker war” in the ’80s showed how difficult it was to fire up an oil tanker<sup>10</sup>. A similar opinion is shared by the experts, regarding the difficulty in firing up large LNG or chemical carriers. An oil tanker that carries LNG or volatile chemical products with reduced displacement could represent a much more plausible target for terrorists, even if the effects of the explosion of such a ship would be more diminished than in the case of larger carriers. To hijack a small ship, with limited

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<sup>8</sup> Catherine Zara Raymond, *Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Potential Scenarios*, in *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 14, issue 7, 6 April 2006, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Neela Bannerjee, Keith Bradsher, *A Vulnerable Time to be Moving Oil by Sea*, in *The New York Times* online, 19 October 2002.

<sup>10</sup> Nicholas Tracy, *Attack on Maritime Trade*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991, pp. 224-230.

staff, is much easier and the fact that the ship is sabotaged and is being led by terrorists can be overseen by port authorities;

- the underwater attack on ships or port facilities, involving divers. There are various reports on the interests of al-Qaeda and ASG in training divers for developing the skills required for an attack on ships and port facilities<sup>11</sup>. However, by generating these capabilities, a number of additional skills and sophisticated techniques are needed. This makes this scenario less plausible for terrorists. Even so, military ships located in relatively unsafe ports are vulnerable to this kind of attack.

The relatively plausible scenarios are:

- a bomb attack on a cruise ship or a ferry. Although experts in maximum security state that passenger ships do not usually make a terrorist target due to congestion and the previous control on boarding, they are vulnerable to a bomb attack. This has been proven before in a few incidents reported in the Philippines and Indonesian archipelagos, including the “*Superferry 14*”. The greatest problem of these ships was not the bomb itself, but the fire and panic installed unwillingly. The horrendous death toll was not caused by the explosion itself, but by the faulty procedures of coping with the situation and evacuating the staff;
- blocking choke points with marine mines. This scenario could cause tremendous economic prejudices, without directly creating damage. The explosion of a ship caused by a mine, discovering a mine or even a simple statement that mines have been launched in the Malacca or Singapore straits could lead to diverting the majority of the maritime traffic away from these spots. During the “*tankers war*” of the ’80s, mine launching was a huge success in interrupting naval traffic, in comparison to the use of anti-ship missiles<sup>12</sup>. Compared to other scenarios presented in this article, this can be a low budget option for a terrorist organisation. Strait waters are relatively shallow, facilitating not only the use of anchored mines, but also the bottom ones. Most certainly, a response to this kind of attack would be a multinational one;
- suicide attacks with the help of faster, smaller boats. These are used as an alternative<sup>13</sup> to car bombs, successfully used in the case of attacks

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<sup>11</sup> *Terrorists Train for Seaborne Attacks*, JoyoNews, 18 March 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Sam Bateman, *Assessing the Threat of Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region*, p. 87 accessed at <http://books.google.ro/books> retrieved on 15.01.2011.

<sup>13</sup> Captain James Pelkofski USN, *Before the Storm: Al-Qaeda’s Coming Maritime Campaign*, US Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 131, no. 12, December 2005, p. 22.

on the *Limburg* tanker and the *USS Cole* and less successfully in a few attempts over some other military ships, belonging to the US. The fast motor boats are another reliable alternative, offering an easier handling and low radar mark. They can easily execute attacks in multiple directions, hiding in the traffic or between fishing ships, launching various actions of diversion and deception, so that they would launch the lethal attack by using multiple weapons and loads. Both attacks on *Limburg* tanker and the *USS Cole* took place in potentially hostile waters, knowingly activated by terrorist forces. These attacks are less probable in “friendly” waters in which terrorists might not find a base for launching the attack.

### **Evolution of tactics and means to counter naval terrorism**

One of the prerequisites for successfully countering any terrorist action is the possibility to obtain timely and accurate information about planned terrorist activities, terrorist groups involved and their objectives. In terms of terrorist attack basis, there are two possibilities of striking maritime targets of a state: the planning and execution of attacks within that state or from foreign territories. While the ability to prevent action in the first case depends largely on the efficiency of own intelligence, in the second case, the centre of gravity moves to the intelligence of the state in which the attack is planned. This is the main reason for international cooperation in terms of intelligence capabilities.

Building intelligence capability at regional and global level is not much a goal but a necessity in the sense of database upgrade and mutual support to cover some gaps, reduce the level of uncertainty and define the priorities for antiterrorist and counterterrorist action. In this context, a joint operational planning and execution is needed in order to determine the weaknesses of each partners and the way to address these problems. Practices, such as the joint use of means and methods of gathering information, recruitment of new sources through mutual support, joint interrogations of suspects, will be adopted more and more often. Domestic intelligence agencies tend to resist such collaboration, even at state level, not to mention the joint planning and execution with foreign intelligence agencies, for reasons of operational security. However, if we want better results in the fight against naval terrorism, maybe it is time to overcome these impediments.

Another important aspect in fighting against terrorism is physical security. Physical security involves two aspects. First, a thorough check of the character and record of new staff for aviation and maritime companies and their continuous verification of the performance of the service, to prevent infiltration of terrorists

or sympathisers among the staff of companies, particularly in aircraft and ship crews. The idea of introducing “*inhibited*” terrorist cells in the aircraft and ships crews is not something new, especially when terrorist organisations are based on the ideology of jihad. A second aspect regarding physical security is the access control on ships and aircraft, where important progress has been made in recent years.

Concerning merchant ships, the character and background check of new staff and staff activity is an extremely difficult task, given that they are recruited from several ports and from different nationalities. The question is whether it is appropriate to establish a common procedure in this respect and which is the possibility of its implementation at national, regional or global level<sup>14</sup>.

Solving the problem of global maritime security encompasses a number of measures already adopted, such as operational cooperation at sea, monitoring of the position of vessels at sea, container and cargo integrity, and uniformity and securitisation of seafarers’ identity documents. These rules are set by IMO (International Maritime Organisation), in particular the introduction of the ISPS Code (International Ship and Port Facility Security Code), other amendments to the Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS), including the obligation of ships with a displacement larger than 500 tons to be equipped with an automatic identification system (AIS – Automatic Identification Systems) and planned amendments to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (USA) and protocols, covering offshore facilities.

The ISPS Code<sup>15</sup> was a great success. Benefits exceeded the scope of the code requirements proposed by the very security of ships and ports. These benefits include greater awareness of security needs across the maritime industry and reduce specific forms of crime, including tax evasion and theft of goods. Putting an officer in charge of ship security helped to make the crew more responsible and to reduce the vulnerability of the whole ship.

Notwithstanding the benefits, there are some residual issues on the effectiveness of this code. It applies only to vessels subject to SOLAS, those merchant ships with a displacement of over 500 dwt in international voyages. Unless the rule is extended nationally, fishing vessels with a displacement of less than 500 dwt and operating between domestic ports are exempted. The number of vessels that are exempted from the provisions of the ISPS Code is relatively high, especially in Asia-Pacific, where there are numerous fishing fleets, many commercial vessels with small displacements, but large commercial ships that operate in domestic trade

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<sup>14</sup> B. Raman, *Maritime Terrorism: An Indian Perspective*, accessed at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers12/paper1154.html>, retrieved on 12.02.2011.

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.coess.org/pdf/COESS-ISPSmanual.pdf>, retrieved on 02.03.2011.



(belonging to China, Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines)<sup>16</sup>. Implementation of the ISPS Code provisions entails significant additional costs for ship owners, including the need to supplement staff crews in some cases. OECD (*Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development*) estimated the initial effort of the owners at a value of about 1 279 billion dollars, subsequently reduced to 730 million dollars annually, representing mainly expenditures for staff and special equipment<sup>17</sup>. This expenditure is justified, since they are designed to prevent a crisis in global transport, being easily absorbed by the huge volume of world maritime trade.

Ongoing monitoring of vessel position at sea is one of the current goals, seeking to achieve a global system similar to that for aircraft, where they are transferred from a traffic controller to another. The initiative belongs to the US and it is considered by the IMO. The system that will result is called “*Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of Vessels*”. The system can be developed from a certain level of the vessel displacement, resorting to the AIS system facilities.

The US plans to develop a system that will integrate current and future resources for surveillance and monitoring of the 121 000 commercial vessels with a displacement greater than 300 dwt<sup>18</sup>.

However, many other ships sailing the oceans of the world will remain outside the goal. The failure to monitor the movement of fishing vessels, cruising yachts and other private boats remains an important gap in international regulation of maritime security. Even the current plans of the LRIT system have some unresolved issues. For example, it seems pointless for a state to identify and monitor the movement of ships that exercise the right of freedom of navigation in the exclusive economic zone or the high seas and do not intend to enter a port or anchor in the national waters<sup>19</sup>. At the same time, monitoring maritime traffic would require a standard system for reporting arrival and departure of ships, which generates sensitivities in terms of safety and trade, being obstacles in the configuration and implementation of the system. For example, the ISPS Code requires ships to be equipped with AIS transponders, which can be switched off when desired, simulating their failure.

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<sup>16</sup> James Brewer, *Small Vessels, Big Security Risk*, Lloyd's List, 7 June 2005.

<sup>17</sup> Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact*, Paris, July 2003, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> David Munns, *121 000 Tracks*, Seapower, July 2005, pp. 10-13.

<sup>19</sup> Hartmut Hesse, Nicolaos L. Charalambous, *New Security Measures for the International Shipping Community*, in *WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs*, 2004, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 138.

# **PAN-ARABISM AND THE “ARAB SPRING” - Ambiguity of the Arab Unity Issues -**

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*The Arab nationalism has grown since the last part of the Ottoman Empire. However, in the second half of the last century, in the Arab world we could talk about an explosion of pan-Arabism events. The Arab leaders, as Nasser and Muammar Gaddafi, promoting pan-Arab ideology, made Arab states unions, demonstrating that pan-Arab nationalism was more than just ideology. Although the “Arab Spring” has not failed to revitalise pan-Arab movement, we believe that, in the future, when it will be more democracy in Arab countries, there will be Arab leaders who will update pan-Arab ideology and try to achieve unity of Arab peoples, using the EU model.*

**Keywords:** *nationalism; Arab peoples; pan-Arabism; unity of Arab peoples; Arab Spring; Arab states; Arab world*

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**M**ovements for political unity have been a reality of the Arab world, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, when it can be said that nationalism was expressed with force among many Arab nations. In order not to leave room for misinterpretation, we want to mention, from the very beginning, that it is within this theoretical framework that we intend to tackle transnational Arab nationalism, i.e. the nationalism that is known in the literature as the *pan-Arab nationalism* or *pan-Arabism*. This is the “*type*” of Arab nationalism that can be found in many Arab nations and that has constituted the ferment of the union movements in the territories inhabited by Arabs, while attempting to achieve some unions of Arab states in the second half of the twentieth century. In other words, we shall consider some important aspects of the evolution/involution of pan-Arab ideology and nationalist movements and, to a lesser extent, (territorial) “*local nationalisms*” in the Arab

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world, such as Egyptian, Syrian, Tunisian, Iraqi nationalism etc. In addition, by comparison, we shall refer to other ideological trends promoting transnational union ideas in the Arab world, including those of fundamentalist orientation. Moreover, in order to reflect the pan-Arab ideology and movement as close to the truth as possible, we shall refer, in particular, to the pan-Islamist ideology and the religious Islamic fundamentalism, represented by Islamist organisations.

### **Highlights of the movement for unity in the Arab world**

Although there can be found common points between Arab and European nationalism, out of which it has drawn its inspiration, however, referring strictly to the periods in which nationalist trends have occurred in the European and Arab world, things are obviously different. As Nadia Anghelescu stated, opinion that we find in other authors as well, *“it cannot be talked about Arab nationalism before the First World War, because the idea of the separation from the Ottoman Empire had not gained place in the minds of Arabs under Ottoman rule”*<sup>1</sup>. In contrast to Arab nations, as it is well-known, nationalist trends on the European continent came to force in early nineteenth century, while the Arabs were at that time under Ottoman rule and Arab nationalist trends were in an early stage. *“In the second half of the nineteenth century, Stewart Ross, a specialist in Middle Eastern history emphasises, nationalism exploded along and across Europe. Thus, German and Italian nations were forged; it shook the British in Ireland and helped to create a set of small states characterised by patriotism in the Balkans. All these affected the Middle East as well, where, since 1860 onwards, the Arab intellectuals themselves began to talk about their own nation”*<sup>2</sup>.

Though the nationalist movements in the Arab space have occurred with some delay as compared with those on the European continent, they have a unique specificity due to political, cultural and religious features, but mostly due to the fact that they promote the idea of unity of the Arabs as a necessity of breaking free from the colonial rule. However, *“Arabs are more alike than Europeans, Margaret K. Nydell, a specialist in the Arab-world problems, said, because they share the same language and, most importantly, I think they are a cultural unit, one Arab nation. Arab nationalism has a broad appeal, despite shifting political alliances”*.

Because the Arabs were part of the Ottoman Empire for several centuries, the process of reconstruction of their identity consciousness took place with plenty

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<sup>1</sup> Nadia Anghelescu, *Identitatea arabă. Istorie, limbă și cultură*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2009, p. 262.

<sup>2</sup> Stewart Ross, *Orientalul Mijlociu în flăcări*, Editura Niculescu, București, 2011, p. 12.

of difficulties. By reference to the idea of Arab identity in the last part of the existence of the Ottoman Empire, the way in which the consciousness of the affiliation of the Arab peoples to a great nation, the Arab one, developed in the Middle East and North Africa, we consider that, although the Ottoman rule constituted a strong impulse in the development of pan-Arab nationalism, however, later, the colonial policies of the European states would be more “*stimulating*” for the Arab nations in terms of pan-Arab nationalism. One aspect is obvious, in both cases: the Ottoman Empire, as well as, later, the European states and the US, which would exert their influence in the region, were concerned about the fact that the peoples in the geographical area called today “*the Arab world*” became too aware of the fact that they belonged to a common world – the world of the Arab peoples. Thus, according to the information of the time, some Western countries, especially France and England, spurred the Arab nationalisms (the territorial ones) to develop in order to speed up the erosion of and facilitate the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. Arguably, if during a first stage the European powers sought to stimulate the development of some nationalist trends in the territories inhabited by Arabs to facilitate the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, which continued to maintain its influence, then, after the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, the same European countries tried to obstruct the promoters of pan-Arabism in their attempt to achieve unity, hindering the assertion of the pan-Arab nationalist trend. In this historical context, it should be noted that the inevitable replacement of the exercised Ottoman domination by a new form of expansion, the Western one, was not at all regarded with understanding by a majority of the Arabs. Under these conditions, a number of Arab intellectuals, supporters of the unity of all Arabs, understood very well that the replacement of the Ottoman rule by the Western one did not open at all an optimistic perspective for the Arab peoples. Although the idea of the accomplishment of the Arab unity began to take shape in the last period of existence of the Ottoman Empire, the tribal and multi-confessional diversity of the Arab area would always represent a problem in the way of achieving this goal. Although they had significant resources that could stimulate nationalist movements, the Arabs were divided on religious criteria in several categories, which was not an advantage for the manifestation of the pan-Arab nationalist trend: “*the Arabs were also divided into three different, if not contradictory, orientations: a Muslim Arab, modernised nationalism, a multi-confessional nationalism and a regenerated Islamism by the Arabs*”. Thus, one can say with certainty from the beginning, the idea of an Arab state that should include all speakers of Arabic, regardless of religion, was not embraced with optimism by all the nations existing in the Arab area. For example, for Berbers,

Arabisation (the achievement of unity) was regarded as “*a process directed against their identity*”, while for some Shiite Muslims, Arab nationalism was considered “*a conspiracy of the Sunni majority, who wanted to impose in this way as well*”.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, one can speak, as previously noted, only of an “*embryonic*” development of nationalism in the Arab space, but the diversity of opinions of Arab thinkers gradually led to the shaping of the two main orientations subsumed under transnational nationalism that led to the crystallisation of two competing ideologies. The first orientation, represented in the coming decades by the pan-Islamist ideology, implied the need for an Islamic union that would include all Islamic believers and was promoted by those Arab nationalists who supported mandatory loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Arab unity could not be seen in a mega-state of the Arabs, an independent one, but only within the Ottoman Empire, an entity that provided conditions for the “*Arab provincial rebirth by the democratic decentralisation of the Ottoman power system, an Arab identity guaranteed by the existence of a religious unit and within it*”<sup>3</sup>. In this context, it is highly suggestive the Egyptian Gamal Eddine al-Afghani’s statement, one of the leading promoters of the concept of *umma islamiyya* (the Islamic nation), who imagined the Islamic unity as an entity composed of “*several leading governments that should rule in accordance with the Koran’s rules and should be united by the community of religion*”<sup>4</sup>. Within the same theoretical framework is included the Egyptian Muhammad Abdu’s view, a disciple of al-Afghani, who claimed that Turkish foreign domination was a symbol of the Muslim unity and represented the only solution against colonisation by Europeans. In addition, the Egyptian Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, a follower of the “*reconstruction*” of the Islamic caliphate, criticising the attempts of some Arab thinkers to impose the European concept of nation on the Islamic society, said that “*the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire was the end of the unity of the Muslim world*”<sup>5</sup>.

The second orientation, which we shall present more extensively, refers to the pan-Arab nationalism that has built its theoretical foundation starting from the European concepts specific to nationalist doctrines. Unlike Islamic nationalism, which places the religious factor in the centre, the transnational Arab nationalism, i.e. pan-Arabism, has proposed as a fundamental objective

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<sup>3</sup> Laura Sitaru, *Gândirea politică arabă. Concepte-cheie între tradiție și inovație*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2009, p. 115.

<sup>4</sup> Tariq Ramadan, *Aux sources du renouveau musulman. D’al-Afghani à Hassan al-Banna, un siècle de reformisme islamique*, Edition Tawhid, Lyon, 2002, p. 87.

<sup>5</sup> Laura Sitaru, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

the creation of an *umma arabiyya* (an Arab nation), based primarily on linguistic and cultural unity, rejecting solidarity based on religious or confessional affiliation. In this way, considering the religious factor as being situated in the background, pan-Arab ideology differs fundamentally from Pan-Islamism, proposing a peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups and religions within the same state of all peoples speaking Arabic.

As compared with the past decades after the end of the “*Ottoman period*” of the Arab world, we can say that pan-Arab nationalism and local nationalisms began to show their greatest strength in the years that followed 1945, when the Arab nations became more and more aware of the need to eliminate foreign interference in the Middle East and North Africa. After the end of the Second World War, the fierce competition that started between the great powers, and particularly between the oil companies belonging to these states, determined pan-Arab nationalism to manifest with greater force in response to the powerful states policy in the richest region of the world in terms of oil resources.

In order to better capture the way in which the idea of unity of all Arabs was born and evolved, it is necessary a brief look at pan-Arab ideology, one that sums up, from a theoretical standpoint, the essential arguments regarding the need for carrying out the unity of Arab peoples. A number of authors who have studied nationalism in the Arab area believe that pan-Arab ideology promotes the idea of uniting the peoples of the Arab world starting from the assumption that Arabs constitute one single nation. According to Hillel Frisch, a specialist in the problems of the Arab and Islamic world, Pan-Arabism is the belief that the Arab-speakers of the Middle East would be best served if they were combined into one nation-state, rather than divided into the 21 states that make up the Arab League today. The aim of pan-Arabism is therefore the union of Arabic speakers in one state and, on the ideas conveyed by this ideology, the Arab states should cooperate more to achieve this goal, taking the example of the European Union countries.

The theoretical debates within pan-Arabism highlighted, on the one hand, the idea of the Arab unity by using the argument of the linguistic unity of Arabic-speaking peoples and, on the other hand, they noted the need for theoretical clarification of the influence of the religious factor on Arab unity. In this respect, it should be noted that pan-Arabism proclaims the linguistic and cultural unity as the primary sources of the political unity of the Arab peoples within the same state. While it may seem unnatural, given the role of religion

in Islamic societies, an important part of Arab nationalists rejects, within theoretical approaches, the idea of achieving unity of Arab peoples placing in the centre stage the religious affiliation, although they all agree that there should be a solidarity based on confessional or religious affiliation. *“At its inception, Arab nationalism, said Laura Sitaru, a researcher of the complex problems of the Arab world, is manifested by invoking the argument of classical language unity (...) Arab nationalism aims to create an umma arabiyya, whose unity derives from the linguistic unity”.*

Pan-Arabism was strongly promoted by a number of leading Arab scholars who had a superior understanding of the social processes that had taken place in Europe, particularly in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, in terms of the positive role of the European nationalist trends in achieving the national unity of the states of the old continent. It is worth mentioning two of these pan-Arab nationalism theorists, due to the influence of their work on shaping a positive attitude towards the Arab unity process in several Arab countries. The first of them is Sâti al-Husri, who worked creatively in both Syria and Iraq, being considered the most important theorist of modern Arab nationalism. By developing an essentially secular concept of pan-Arabism, based on the common language and history of Arab peoples, Sâti al-Husri promoted the idea of unity of all Arab peoples, saying that *“the Egyptians, Iraqis, Maghrebians are only branches of a single umma, which is the Arabic umma”*<sup>6</sup>. It is an approach that clearly reflects the fact that al-Husri imagined the Arab nations united in a single state, because of the common identity elements inherited over time.

The second important ideologist belonging to pan-Arabism is the Syrian Michael Aflaq, considered the main theorist of Baasism in Syria and Iraq, a theorist whose work is often cited when making reference to the evolution of the nationalist trends in the Arab world. Considering Arab unity as a sacred duty for every Arab, Michael Aflaq stated, in 1947, at the first congress of the Baas Party: *“Our objective is clear and does not stand any ambiguity: one single Arab nation from the Atlantic to the Gulf. Arabs form one nation, with the imprescriptible right to live in a free state”*<sup>7</sup>. As it can be seen, this statement of Michael Aflaq, although does not make any specific references to the powerful states that held important positions in the Arab world, expresses the need for unity of Arabs in response to the expansionist policies of the great European powers during the period that followed after the First World War. It can be said, without fear of mistake, that, if at first the nationalist movements for Arab unity were generated as a feedback to the policies of the Ottoman Empire,

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<sup>6</sup> Pierre-Jean Luizard, *Modernizarea țărilor islamice*, Editura Artemis, București, 2008, p. 78.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 83.

then, once the empire disappeared, Arab nationalism was reactivated in response to the domination policies pursued by the Europeans in the Arab world. By analysing the objectives proposed by pan-Arab ideology, we believe that the idea of Arab unity animated the political circles in the Arab world rather than manifested as a mass phenomenon, and *“this idea was the expression of the mobilisation against an internal or external threat more than the real desire for political unity”*<sup>8</sup>.

There were important moments throughout Arabs history when it appeared that in the Arab world a sense of unity existed and even worked. A number of Arab leaders animated by the ideals of pan-Arabism, after the end of the Second World War, initiated the achievement of some unions of Arab states, as a form of response to an imminent or potential danger. Thus, there were more Arab nations than in the second half of the twentieth century that were engaged in various concrete unionist projects, as a real form of manifestation of pan-Arab nationalism. The attempt to achieve some unions of Arab states, and the temporary success in this respect, as a prior stage of the construction of the *“state of all Arabs”*, on the one hand, expressed the appetite for the pan-Arab ideology of some Arab political figures and, on the other hand, reflected the position of various Arab states in relation to the most influential powers of the *Cold War* period. Meanwhile, Arab unity as a political project was often presented by its advocates as a way of progress for the people belonging to the great common core of Arabs, invoking the need to return to the origins of the Arab development, when the Arab populations were united in the first caliphates. Listing some of the unions of states that emerged in the Arab world, in the second half of the last century is certainly relevant for reflecting the fact that Arab unity was not just a theoretical goal of pan-Arab ideology promoters.

The signal for the *“awakening”* of the Arab nation, so to speak, was given in the clearest way possible as a result of the unifying actions initiated by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the imperialist powers feeling it at first once with the Suez crisis. *“This recovery of the Arab nation, the French historian Marc Ferro asserts, began to manifest ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century, but it was only with Nasser that the anti-imperialist struggle turned into a restoration project of Arab unity, in which the nationalist temptation encountered and conflicted with others, being soon shared by other Islamic countries”*<sup>9</sup>. Later, in 1958, at the initiative of President Nasser, the Egyptian-Syrian union was achieved under the name of the United Arab Republic (UAR), and later, by Yemen’s joining, the association

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<sup>8</sup> Maurice Flaury, Robert Mantran, *Les régimes politiques des pays arabes*, PUF, Paris, 1968, p. 163.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 121.



of United Arab States (UAS) was founded. Due to internal political rivalries and to some social problems, the pan-Arab structure could not resist and, after nearly three and a half years of existence, both UAR and UAS ceased to exist. Despite this failure, in an attempt to take a first step towards the fulfilment of Arab unity, Egyptian President Nasser continued to be a visionary, hoping that *“the Arab world will finally unite and become one of the new great powers in the international politics”*<sup>10</sup>.

Another attempt for union was made in the spring of 1963, when Egypt had an initiative to *“get closer”* to Syria and Iraq, because of the Baas Party leaderships of both countries, in favour of the idea of unity. Although, in April 1963, an agreement between the three countries was signed with a view to achieving union, soon the unionist project became practically outdated due to the opposition of Iraqi and Syrian party. After only four years, according to the information provided by some authors who studied the realities of the Arab world of the last century, Egyptian President Nasser changed his attitude towards the goal of Arab unity: *“The year 1967 ended the regional aspirations of unity under the leadership of Egypt, and Gamal Abdel Nasser seemed no longer willing to coordinate such projects”*<sup>11</sup>.

Even though Pan-Arabism, as a way of expression, is strongly linked to Egyptian President Nasser’s personality, it is important to remember that the Arab world saw other unionist projects to which various Arab states adhered. Some unions were born as antagonistic structures to other unionist Arab projects, showing that, in the Arab world, rivalries between groups of states were born and maintained, this being an obvious obstacle in the way of the major objective of the supporters of pan-Arab ideology, that of achieving a great state of all Arabs. In order to understand the complexity of the Arab world, the difficulties the advocates of pan-Arabism encountered in their efforts to achieve the objective of unity, we should mention some other unionist projects that were initiated in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, considering the United Arab Republic a danger from the political and regional security viewpoint, in February 1958, Iraq and Jordan formed the Arab Union that, following the coup in Iraq, existed for only one month and a half. Also, against the project in 1963, which sought the recovery of UAR (Egypt, Syria and Iraq), the King of Saudi Arabia, Faysal II, made the proposal to achieve an Islamic Pact in 1966, which was to bring together Arab states willing to combat foreign ideologies in the Arab territories. The two Arab states, the Saudi and Jordanian ones, pledged *“to defend Islam*

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<sup>10</sup> Marc Ferro, *Șocul islamului. Secolele XVIII-XXI*, Editura Orizonturi, București, 2006, p. 140.

<sup>11</sup> Laura Sitaru, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

and Arab nationalism against atheism and ideologies derived from it<sup>12</sup>. The options of the Arab states to support or oppose the pact showed very convincingly that the Islamic Arab world was divided, and the prospect did not seem optimistic at all in terms of the central objective of pan-Arab ideology.

Arab unity was for the former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi an extremely important goal, starting from the admiration he had for the personality and the pan-Arab nationalist ideas of Gamal Abdel Nasser. In this respect, Laura Sitaru, adopting one of the ideas of Bleuchot Hervé and Monastiri Taoukik, said about Arab unity that it represented *“a fundamental objective of the Libyan revolution and its leader, Muammar Gaddafi, for whom the creation of an independent Arab nation, socialist and united so as to end the existence of Israel and American imperialism, is a goal above all others”*<sup>13</sup>. From this perspective, Muammar Gaddafi proposed and tried several formulas to achieve a first *“step”* towards Arab unity: in 1969, the Tripoli Charter (Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Syria); in 1971, the Federation of Arab Republics (Egypt, Libya and Syria); in 1972, Gaddafi proposed a union between Libya and Egypt; in 1978, he proposed the creation of a federation to include Tunisia, Algeria and Libya. Even if all these projects failed, we should realise that Muammar Gaddafi never gave up his unionist ideas, his anti-Western speeches in the '70s and '80s often reiterating the idea of the need for creating a *“common front”* of the Arab states.

Even though there were plenty of attempts to achieve Arab unity in the second half of the last century, the conflicts that took place in the Arab area after the end of the Second World War demonstrated very clearly that the Arab world was a state structure in which the unity objective promoted by the pan-Arab ideology was very difficult to achieve. Therefore, there were a series of conflicts between various Arab states, which did not add value to the idea of Arab unity, such as the conflict between monarchists and republicans in Yemen, the one between Iraq and Kuwait, after the latter proclaimed its independence, in 1961, the conflict between Morocco and Tunisia around the issue of Mauritania, the civil war in Algeria, the Algerian-Moroccan conflict etc. In addition, the Arab world proved to be quite broken into pieces following the First Gulf War (1991), once with the US military intervention in Iraq (2003) and, recently, following the conflict in Libya. There are three conflicts that show the fact that, considering the way each Arab state positioned itself, the Arab world is very far from finding a common view on important regional issues and the ideal of pan-Arabism followers for achieving a state or a union of states seems very difficult

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 167.

to reach. Thus, at the beginning of the First Gulf War, 12 Arab League member states agreed to send military contingents<sup>14</sup> in Saudi Arabia in order to participate in the Coalition of States against Iraq, aiming to free Kuwait. Moreover, the conflict in Libya, conducted over several months, in 2011, was another opportunity for Arabs to show that Arab states were far from achieving the unity objective, as pan-Arabism advocates had in mind. Thus, even from the beginning of the international military intervention in Libya, in order to stop the atrocities of the regime against its own people, based on the UN mandate, both Qatar and United Arab Emirates were part of the military intervention force. Later, during NATO military intervention to protect non-combatant Libyan population, some other Arab states demonstrated hostility towards Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's regime, while other countries manifested as neutral or expressed their reserves about NATO's intervention against "*an independent state*". The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, lasting for over sixty years, about which we do not intend to discuss in this article, is another major cause of the dissension and division of Arab states, which has had a negative impact on pan-Arab unionist ideas. The early collapse of the old order in the Arab world (of the autocratic regimes) once with the "*Arab Spring*", with countries like Egypt being signatories to peace agreements with the Jewish state, is, according to specialists in the Arab world geopolitics, the beginning of a new historical period, during which, as a result of future political changes in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya etc., Arab states may regroup, in relation to the "*likes*" / "*dislikes*" towards Israel. Under these circumstances, we believe that the Palestinian problem, still unsolved, will have a crucial influence on geopolitical developments in the Middle East and North Africa, including the future of pan-Arabism.

### ***Riots in the Arab world - an opportunity for the affirmation of the Arab unity?***

Now, after a prolonged "*Arab Spring*", when one could notice how Arabs react in the context of the popular revolts carried out in 2011, we can wonder: *Does pan-Arab ideology have a future?* Considering the events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria etc., we would be rather tempted to say that Pan-Arabism has no longer the power of manifestation from the "*Nasserist era*", thus taking the risk of contradicting a number of Arab authors who continue to firmly believe in the Arab unity project.

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<sup>14</sup> Ion Safta, Gheorghe Arădăvoaice, Ilie Tănase (coord.), *Războiul din Golf*, Editura Militară, București, 1991, p. 34.

Addressing the issues of contemporary nationalisms, Mary Kaldor, a specialist in the problem of contemporary conflicts, concluded that today in the world we are dealing with a “*new nationalism*”, which is more restrictive, being closer, in terms of expression, to religious fundamentalism. This can be inferred from the fact that some nations are defined in religious terms: Muslim Bosnians, Muslim Egyptians, Christian Egyptians, Orthodox Serbs, Sudanese Christians etc. Nevertheless, what is worth mentioning, in particular, is that with today’s globalisation processes that are constantly expanding, “*new nationalisms tend to be transnational*”<sup>15</sup>. An important role in this development of nationalism towards transnationalism belongs, on the one hand, to the much easier circulation of ideas and people in the most remote places in the world and, on the other hand, to the strong development of means of communication, especially the Internet. As in the case of the unrests in the Arab world, we believe that the social networks in the virtual space play a very important role in the process of “*evolution*” of some local nationalisms towards a type of transnational nationalism. Although, in Europe, we can say that Mary Kaldor’s opinion regarding the trend of some local nationalisms to spread into wider geographical areas, to become a transnational movement has some factual coverage in the last two decades (Albanian nationalism, Hungarian nationalism, Serbian nationalism etc.), in the Arab area, however, as it was noted on the occasion of the “*Arab Spring*”, we cannot speak of an Arab nationalism wearing a transnational “*garment*” and leading to a huge popular movement for Arab unity. On the contrary, even if there were sympathetic reactions throughout the Arab world towards the Arab peoples who took to the streets against autocratic regimes, at no time there was the impression that one can develop a strong pan-Arab movement that would lead to the unification of the Arab states.

As it is known, conducting popular revolts in a number of Arab states starting with the first month of 2011 surprised many experts in the problems of the Arab and Islamic world. The victory of the “*Jasmine Revolution*” in Tunisia, followed by the victory of the popular revolt in Egypt, the state considered the centre of the Arab world, represented an important impetus for the popular movements in other Arab states that were animated by the desire to put an end to autocratic regimes. The political and social context that was created in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA<sup>16</sup>) after the removal from power of Tunisian

<sup>15</sup> Mary Kaldor, *Securitatea umană*, Editura CA Publishing 2010, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, p. 138.

<sup>16</sup> MENA (Middle East and North Africa) is an acronym often used in academic, military planning and business writing and covers an extensive region, extending from Morocco to Iran, including the majority of both the Middle Eastern and Maghreb countries. It also contains Israel, but, within this approach, we are considering only Arab states, without the Jewish state. Moreover, according to some authors, MENA includes Pakistan and Afghanistan, but we do not share this belief; at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MENA>.

President Ben Ali and of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's political leader, led to the outbreak of some popular revolts of a greater or lesser extent, in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya etc. In Libya, the popular revolt to remove the leader Muammar Gaddafi from power turned into a civil war between the forces loyal to the Libyan leader and the rebel forces, which demanded political and social reforms and a new political leadership in Tripoli. In accordance with UN Resolution no. 1973, in order to protect the Libyan civilian population against the attacks of "pro Gaddafi" government forces, the North Atlantic Organisation launched a military operation in Libya for humanitarian purposes, with an air and naval component. After seven months of clashes between Colonel Gaddafi's government forces and the rebels supported by NATO forces, within the UN Resolution, the Libyan civil war ended in victory for the rebels and removed from power the Libyan leader.

The popular uprisings in the Arab world started as peaceful movements aimed at the elimination, through "street pressure", of the autocratic political leaderships of those countries, but later, in Egypt, Libya and Syria, the riots degenerated into confrontations with the forces of state repression, resulting in numerous victims. If, in Egypt, according to the statistics spread by international human rights organisations, the number of victims exceeded 900, and in Syria there were mentioned almost 3 000 dead since the outbreak of the rebellion, in March, in Libya, however, due to the civil war and NATO's intervention, the number of victims among the population is controversial, since there are thousands of people that lost their lives. These figures, reflecting the toughest side of the riots in the Arab world, demonstrate, at the same time, that the Arab nations eagerly wanted to overthrow the autocratic regimes and start on the path of modernisation, at the cost of enormous human sacrifices.

It has often been spoken of the domino effect of the way these popular uprising propagated, but almost a year after their initiation, we can say that the wave of riots failed to revive the ideas of pan-Arabism. We can say that these mass movements can be considered, from the perspective of pan-Arabism, a "barometer" of the way the idea of Arab unity is still pulsating within Arab peoples. As we stated in the first part, noting the unionist activities during the '50s and '60s, Arab unity was mostly a promoted goal of some political leaders in the Arab world rather than a mass phenomenon that should have spread and produced a contagious effect throughout the geographical area inhabited by Arabs.

The idea that pan-Arabism, as ideology and transnational political movement, is definitely related to the personality and political ideals of some Arab leaders, was unfortunately confirmed, through these revolts, for those who want Arab unity.

After about eleven months of riots in several Arab countries, it can be noted that, although the popular uprisings carried out simultaneously in several countries could have supported the revival of pan-Arab movement, still, pan-Arabism gave no sign that it could return as a force to be reckoned in North Africa and the Middle East. We believe that the Arab Spring, through the novelty of the situation created by the very ample street movements, could have been a good opportunity for the reactivation of pan-Arab nationalist trends, but the events of recent months have shown that it is unlikely to revive Nasser's spirit in the Arab communities in MENA states. However, we ask ourselves, why wasn't it possible to record the revitalisation of pan-Arab nationalism? One possible answer would be that, as suggested earlier, pan-Arabism in its evolution was promoted only by some Arab leaders, not representing a strong trend among the Arab peoples that were to achieve a contagion of the Arab-speaking populations for the materialisation of the idea of Arab unity. And, as we have noted in the conduct of popular revolts, the Arab world today does not have strong and charismatic leaders, such as Egyptian President Nasser, to revive the mobilising ideas of pan-Arab ideology.

It is obvious to all those who have closely watched the tumultuous events taking place in the Middle East and North Africa since the early months of 2011 that the idea of achieving Arab unity in the spirit of pan-Arab ideology was absent from the list of the claims of the large demonstrations held on the occasion of popular revolts. If the claims of millions of demonstrators in Cairo, Tunis, Benghazi, Damascus etc. primarily focused on issues of political, social aspects, civil rights etc., nowhere in the Arab world can be said that the idea of Arab unity revived, as an opportunity generated by the development of the events in the Middle East and North Africa. The historical experience of recent decades shows some examples in which some "*revolutionary situation*" created by a major event rapidly led to the realisation of a unionist ideal. The case of German reunification after the fall of the "*Berlin Wall*" in 1989, although it is an example that comes from a fundamentally different socio-cultural environment, is a proof that the idea of unity can be successfully materialised when the historical conditions favour it. Nevertheless, the fact that, in none of the states where popular revolts took place, the pan-Arab ideas were not stated shows that at present pan-Arabism cannot be revived.

Although pan-Arabism was absent in the context of the "*Arab Spring*", some Islamic leaders of fundamentalist movements made use of the opportunity of revolts to promote again the renowned ideas on the unity of all Muslims. These pan-Islamist ideas were launched, according to experts, in an attempt to "*seize*" the ideals of revolutionary Arabs and to guide the force of millions of demonstrators

against Western countries. The pan-Arab nationalist movements failure has always been speculated in the last decades by the Islamist fundamentalist movements – supporters of the pan-Islamist ideas, pleading for Arab unity within a “*global state*” of Muslims, based on the primacy of the religious factor in achieving this goal.

In the last decade, during an obvious rebound of pan-Arab unionist trends, we can say that one of the most active and influential promoters of Arab unity, seen as part of a Muslim mega-state, under the restoration of the old Caliphate in the Middle East, was Osama bin Laden, former leader of al-Qaeda terrorist network. Bin Laden’s messages for Muslim unity aimed at the outbreak of jihad, the “*holy war*” against the unbelievers, i.e. the Western countries considered guilty for the suffering of Muslims and the low level of development of most of the Muslim world. “*Bin Laden’s hero, Mary Kaldor points out, was Saladin, the Kurdish commander who joined the Islamic groups against the Crusaders in the twelfth century. Bin Laden’s goal was to emulate Saladin and to unite these disparate groups in a global struggle*”<sup>17</sup>. The former leader of the most feared terrorist network, al-Qaeda, used the occasion of popular revolts in the early months of the year 2011 to ask the Arabs to be united in their fight against the corrupt leaders and achieve, together, a state of all Muslims in which there should be introduced the Islamic law *Sharia*. Also, some local leaders of al-Qaeda terrorist organisation tried to arouse feelings of belonging to the Dar el Arab, but in a great state of all Muslims. Thus, due to the popular uprising victory in Tunisia, the al-Qaeda terrorist movement branch in Yemen addressed Muslims in the Arab states asking them to rebel<sup>18</sup> against the corrupt Arab leaders and to grant the power to governments to lead based on the Islamic law *Sharia*. The Yemeni organisation placed such a message on Islamist websites in the last decade of February 2011 that also contained harsh criticism addressed to Saudi Arabia, which offered “*luxury accommodation*” to former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who found refuge in this Arab country. Beyond its bellicose content, the message is a call for unity in addressing both the peoples in the Arab states and those non-Arab of Islamic religion, attempting a revival of both pan-Arab and pan-Islamic sentiments. In fact, the idea of Arab unity and of the Muslim world, in general, of initiating the jihad against the Western countries is one of the established themes of the fundamentalist Islamist movements, often circulated in the messages transmitted by the terrorist network al-Qaeda leaders. Given the often expressed dislike of the al-Qaeda leaders towards some Arab leaders, considered to be subservient to the West, riots in the Arab world

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<sup>17</sup> Mary Kaldor, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

<sup>18</sup> At <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-8342264-qaيدا-cheama-revolte-impotriva-conducatorilor-arabi.htm>

were an important opportunity for the terrorist organisation to call for the change of regimes in the Arab states close to the Western world and for achieving the unity of Arabs in order to face the West more easily.

The conflict in Libya is another example of which conclusions can be drawn about how the Arabs related to the idea of unity, given that this conflict is considered to be the largest that took place in the region after the US military intervention in Iraq, in 2003. Thus, the participation of some Arab states in the Coalition against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, starting 19 March 2011, is an element that shows that within the Arab world, as it happened in the last century, there are “*fault lines*” that separate the Arab states depending on the historical affinity, on a particular tradition in the relations between regional states, but especially on the belonging to a certain sphere of influence promoted by the main actors of the international scene. Thus, the fact that the anti-Gaddafi Coalition of Western countries was joined by Arab states like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, countries that have multiplied the military effort of Western states against the Libyan regime, is a clear proof that the popular uprising in Libya, and the subsequent civil war, were unable to determine the Arab states to act on the same side of the barricade. Although the American military intervention in Iraq in 2003, followed by the presence of a large number of US troops in the Middle East, was perceived by the majority of Arab citizens as a new colonisation of the region, however, as it resulted from the analysis of the Libyan conflict as well, the states of the Arab world have different affinities and strategies in relation to states of the Western world. This explains the fact that, even under the circumstances in which a convinced Nasserist would have urged the Arab states to achieve unity in order to oppose the Coalition of Western countries against the regime in Tripoli, the Arab states adopted different positions, demonstrating once again that pan-Arabism, as a nationalist ideology, is to be found more in the speech of some Arab political leaders rather than as a means of expression at the level of the masses. Under these circumstances, we can ask: *Why did Pan-Arabism not use the extremely favourable opportunity of the popular uprisings in the Arab world in order to manifest its power of contagion? When could the pan-Arab movement really manifest? Will pan-Arabism be able to achieve Arab unity in the future, or is this trend irreversibly in decline?*

The removal from power of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the last of Arab leaders who tried several times in the last century to actually make the idea of unity in the Arab world real, we believe that it means, beyond the immediate political and social effects for the Libyan people, the end of an era. This is the era of some Arab leaders, since Gamal Nasser on, who fervently believed in the idea



of unity of Arabs within the borders of a great state able to cope with the strong expansion of the Western states. Certainly Mubarak, Ben Ali or Gaddafi will be followed by other Arab leaders who will try, in the opinion of specialists in the Arab world, to build Arab societies that will differ from the old Arab autocratic regimes. However, we ask again: *Will this new generation of Arab leaders following the popular revolts, forget for good the idea of unity of Arab peoples, or on the contrary, will pan-Arabism demonstrate in the coming years that it has resources to regenerate?*

As the popular uprisings in the Arab world have not experienced any significant event in terms of pan-Arabism, we believe that, in the short term, it is difficult to believe that in the MENA region there could be a revival of pan-Arabism that should create a more specific situation in terms of the political future of the region. The new authorities in Cairo, Tunis or Tripoli will have, firstly, the difficult task of the political reconstruction of the society in which the reflexes of the autocracy instituted several decades ago will be removed and the political and social changes will have to convince, shortly, that the popular revolts were not in vain. According to the views expressed by leading analysts of the Arab world problems, the period that will follow will be a difficult test for the new authorities that will lead Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, after the removal of the autocratic regimes. We believe that people's expectations will be difficult to meet because of the difficult economic situation inherited from the previous regimes, especially in Egypt after Mubarak and Libya, ravaged by the civil war that caused damages difficult to assess.

If the new authorities that will lead the Arab states where autocratic regimes were removed do not demonstrate a political and social management neatly different from the previous period, if there is not noticed an improvement in the living conditions of citizens, there will be a risk that the political-social situation of these countries should depreciate and social instability should increase. Against this background, there is the possibility of the increase in the popularity of the Islamist movements that might occur as an alternative to ensure a safer future for the populations dissatisfied with the implementation of the social and political reforms. We also believe that in a context in which a failure regarding the political and social reforms in these Arab states occurs, there is the probability of the reactivation of the Arab nationalism, especially pan-Arabism, which could be understood as a way forward for the masses of the discontented who have lost the confidence in the authorities of the state to which they belong. The resuscitation of pan-Arabism, according to the historical tradition, could be the *"work"* of Arab political figures able to redirect the state of discontent of millions

of Arab citizens, trying to restore “*the work*” of the goal of achieving Arab unity, by skilfully using the mechanisms of psychologically influencing the masses, as Nasser and Gaddafi did.

Some Arab authors consider that the death of Sâti al-Husri, in 1967, one of the pioneers of pan-Arab nationalism, also meant the decline of that ideology in the Arab area. “*In al-Husri’s view, Nadia Anghelescu appreciates, Arab unity was also linked to the idea of modernising the Arab area*”<sup>19</sup>. Nevertheless, as we have seen in 2011, the riots in the Arab world meant both the removal of the autocratic regimes and the timid beginning of the processes of political and social modernisation of the respective states. If we accept that Al-Husri’s forecasts are correct, that the idea of achieving unity of the Arab peoples is related to the stage of modernising the Arab states, the reasoning can go further and we could state that the beginning of the processes of modernisation in the Arab states that have toppled autocratic regimes in 2011 opens an optimistic prospect from the perspective of pan-Arabism, as compared with the previous decades. So, in the spirit of al-Husri’s vision, the modernisation of the Arab states in the coming years would prepare the “*ground*” for the unification of Arab peoples, therefore, for the revival of pan-Arabism. Even if, for some researchers of the social realities of the Arab world, such reasoning might seem utopian, we think that it would be wrong to believe that the causal link between the concept of social and political modernisation and the unity of Arab peoples should be excluded. If we consider the content of the complex process of the European unification, the successive enlargements of the EU over the last twenty years, we can see that each state that was to get integrated in the Union was imposed some “*quality standards*”, i.e. an appropriate level of political, economic and social modernisation that should facilitate integration. Therefore, in the European community, a certain level of modernisation of candidate countries allowed the integration into the European Union, hence the connection al-Husri makes between modernisation and the unity the Arab peoples (in a state, in a confederation etc.) may be correct and so feasible in the future. At the same time, it should be noted that, as opposed to this perspective, there is the view that it is almost impossible to imagine in the Arab world a time horizon within which the idea of unity will materialise, even in the form of a confederation, due to the large differences in the “*political vision*” of the Arab states.

We, therefore, believe that although pan-Arabism, as a political movement, was not present during popular uprisings in the Arab world, it will not disappear

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<sup>19</sup> Nadia Anghelescu, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

in the future because naturally, there will be Arab leaders who, knowing the force of attraction of this ideology, will try to restore the trend when there is a favourable moment. As pan-Slavism, pan-Turkism or pan-Hungarianism did not exert their penetration force on populations of certain geographic areas, we think that Pan-Arabism cannot be considered a failure in history, even if it was more unsuccessful than successful. Thus, the idea of the unity of peoples in the Arab world will continue to occur despite an apparent recurrence in the past decades.

We do not believe in a unionist project that incorporates all Arab states, but the possibility of some “*regional initiatives*” that propose unions of 2-3 Arab states should not be excluded. The development of federal structures in which states that like the idea of unity should preserve their identity remains a variable that might occur in the future. In opposition to this plausible option, we believe that pan-Arab projects to build an Arab mega-state whose borders would disappear cannot be supported with well-founded arguments. By comparison with the European Union, which is a great confederation of member states, a number of Arab intellectuals concluded that integrating future developments are possible in the area of the Arab world. Therefore, the unity of the peoples of the Arab world, even if it is not at the forefront of the debate of ideas, at this point is still an ideal that has an attractive force in the Arab world, despite the passing of time, able to embrace different forms of “*expression*” as compared with the Nasserist pan-Arabism age.



# **WESTERN BALKANS**

## **- Between Economic Crisis and European Perspective -**

*Cristina GĂLUȘCĂ*

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*This article takes an approach to certain aspects of the current financial crisis through the perspective of the economic situation of some countries such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia.*

*Before pointing out the economic characteristics of each of these countries, the author reviews a set of proposals meant to redress the world economy, which were issued by the Central European Bank: to introduce new fiscal rules in national legislations, to punish the countries that break the rules continuously; to monitor and enforce more dynamically the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact; to improve correction mechanisms; to make a set of propositions to enhance European economy etc.*

**Keywords:** *fiscal policies; recession; political perspective; financial stability; economic boom; European Commission*

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fter the initial chaos created by the economic crisis, in 2007 and 2008, the European Union took the matter seriously by designing a new regime of economic governance. During debates, multiple centres of power occurred, each advocating a set of proposals. These centres are the European Commission, the European Council, the Central European Bank and, of course, the most important member states – Germany and France, but there were also made interventions by some states, such as Poland and the UK. The proposals were pushed forward in the spring of 2010, after it became clear that Greece’s problem was no exception and it could be followed by numerous other member states. The European Commission was the first to draw up a set of proposals, in May-June 2010. The European Council created a special working group, led by its President, Herman Van Rompuy, consisting in the finance ministers of the member states. Several work sessions took place and, in general, the proposals made were similar to those of the Commission.

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In June 2010, the Central European Bank designed its first set of proposals, the most radical ones so far. The measures were introduced at the beginning of 2011. The main proposals regarding economic governance are aimed at<sup>1</sup>:

- More dynamic monitoring and enforcement of the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, namely it must be respected the threshold of 3% for the budgetary deficit and of 60% limit for the public debt.
- Monitoring and review of planned budgets by member states.
- Monitoring, by the EU, which will improve correction mechanisms. There will be a semiautomatic mechanism of launching penal procedures. Institutions may begin procedures in the absence of a political decision.
- A not very substantial change in thinking about behaviour in risk situations. So far, the stress has been laid on the 3% limit of the budgetary deficit, and the governmental debt has been considered a secondary indicator. Now, exceeding the debt limit is as serious as exceeding the deficit limit. Practically, there is a proposition that excessive deficit procedures are initiated against countries that have a debt level higher than 60%, even in the case in which the budgetary deficit is lower than 3% of the GDP.
- The existence of a proposition to introduce these fiscal rules in national legislations, constitutions included.
- The existence of a proposition meant to punish the countries that break the rules continuously. These sanctions include the obligation of financial guarantees (deposits), which will be interrupted until sufficient progress is made. There is also another proposition to temporarily freeze or cancel the structural cohesion with the EU or with the funds of the common agricultural policy (CAP) for the countries in discussion. The most radical step will be to limit or cancel the voting right of the respective country (this is the case of the Eurogroup).
- The existence of a wider set of propositions to enhance European economy, prepared by the EU, in the so-called *Europe 2020 Strategy* – the successor of the *Lisbon Strategy*.

Many of these propositions are supported and they will definitely be introduced soon. However, there are also arguments against, such as the argument of democracy, which says that the one entitled to revise and approve the budget is the national parliament, not the governments of other countries or institutions in Brussels. The suggestion to cancel or freeze EU funds has also caused controversy

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<sup>1</sup> According to final COM (2010) 250, 12 May 2010. COM(2010) 367/2. CE 11646/10, 7 July 2010. CE 12076/10, 13 July 2010. PCE 161/10, 12 July 2010. PCE 105/10, 25 May 2010. PCE 102/10, 21 May 2010. ECB, 10 June 2010.

and Poland has reacted on behalf of the new members, who, in fact, really need these funds in order to rebuild their societies and economies. It is counterproductive to punish financially one country that already has financial issues. The suggestion to introduce legal guarantees against fiscal actions – the Constitution included, will probably be fought against on political grounds. The propositions for the energetic implementation of EU norms will inevitably affect candidate countries – either directly or indirectly. There will be high expectations in regard to prudent fiscal policies and a budgetary discipline on the part of candidate countries. The best course of action for candidates will be that each will have to personally study and introduce the most efficient propositions for their economic governance, no matter if they are mandatory or not. Thus, they will have not only guarantees for financial stability but also protection measures against domestic populist temptations (for instance, when these norms are enshrined in the Constitution).

As compared to its neighbours and regional peers, which, in the '90s and especially in the last decade, made considerable progress in the process of European integration, **Albania's** results were poor. Nevertheless, after joining NATO in 2009, the country is irreversibly oriented towards the Euro-Atlantic integration. Despite certain domestic political oscillations in Albania, the relations have a positive perspective.

Just as **Bosnia-Herzegovina** (BiH) passes from the Dayton era to the road to Brussels, the EU itself assumes a leading position in BiH's international commitment, not through excluding other partners, but through a relation that evolves naturally, based on the aspiration of the Federation to make possible the accession to the EU. Bosnia and Herzegovina capitalised on the EU's autonomous trade measures from 2000. As a consequence of the entry into force of the Interim Agreement on 1 July 2008, the access of BiH products in the EU has expanded, and the EU exports in the country have received commercial preferences. In 2007, both exports and imports from the EU rose with 6,3%, 8,8% respectively. The exports represented approximately 15% of the GDP, and the imports 31%. The main source of export incomes is represented by fabricated goods – textiles, vehicles and transport equipment, as well as raw material. The EU is the main trade partner of the country. This means 63% of its total imports and 73% of its total exports.

BiH has made a lot of efforts to reach the objectives of the integration into the EU. BiH Directorate for European Integration has proved its capacity of trustworthy national authority in the difficult process of harmonising the legal segment and meeting various criteria. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has not yet submitted an application for candidate status, is a more difficult case.

It remains trapped in a succession of political and constitutional crises. This would give politicians an incentive to overcome the deadlock and work to establish a functioning administration. The liberalisation of EU visas has shown that the leverage effect is most effective when Bosnia is subject to the same non-negotiable conditions as its neighbours rather than treated as a special case. The country should create functional administrative systems and the centralisation of functions should be made at state level or with working agreements on the inter-entity borderline. For instance, it will need a coherent statistical system for the entire country. It is more likely that these processes will transform the cumbersome constitutional structures from BiH in a federal working system more effective than any attempt to renegotiate the constitution. After the Office of the High Representative (OHR) is closed, Bosnia and Herzegovina could formally apply for EU membership (expected this year), with already prepared responses to its questionnaire. This would enable the Commission to prepare this year, at the same time with Serbia, its opinion on Bosnia<sup>2</sup>.

**Croatia** is the most advanced nation in Western Balkans on the path towards EU accession. The accession is under negotiation. As mentioned above, in July last year, it completed 22 of the 33 negotiation chapters and currently there are under negotiation the remaining and most difficult chapters, including the ones regarding the reform of the legal system and fundamental rights.

The European Union has reiterated the fact that **Kosovo** as well has the same European perspective as all the states in the Western Balkans area. The Union is the main economic partner of Kosovo and the main investor in the region. The exports from the region towards the EU are of 11%, and imports of 52%.

On 14 October 2009, democratically and liberally, Europe convincingly rejected the chauvinism in the Balkans with the argument that **FYROM** is “*only a historically ephemeral phenomenon, which existed, but will disappear*”. At that time, the European Commission suggested to open the accession negotiations between the EU and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. FYROM has changed from a country that was many times on the verge of interethnic wars into a country firmly committed to the path of EU integration, ready to begin accession talks. The same year, after 20 years, Europe eliminated the compulsoriness of visas for citizens from former Yugoslavia. From 19 December 2009, the visa-free

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<sup>2</sup> Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus & Daniel Korski, *Beyond Wait-and-See. The Way Forward for EU Balkan Policy*, May 2010, p. 3. *The European Council on Foreign Relations* at [http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/beyond\\_wait-and-see\\_the\\_way\\_forward\\_for\\_eu\\_balkan\\_policy](http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/beyond_wait-and-see_the_way_forward_for_eu_balkan_policy)

journey to Europe has become a reality once more for Macedonian citizens. Throughout history, the relations between FYROM and the EU have had their ups and downs, but with a positive perspective.

**Montenegro** committed individually to join the EU immediately after gaining independence, in 2006, and was recognised by the EU member states. Montenegro made some progress before, as part of the state union with Serbia, but the progress has been more rapid since 2006. Once with the victory of a broad coalition of Serbian democratic forces in the 2000 federal elections, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia joined the European integration process defined in the Zagreb Summit, in November 2000. That year, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was restructured in the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. After Montenegro opted for independence, in a referendum in 2006, Serbia, as the successor state of the state union, continued its relations with the EU.

❖ **Albania**

Because the communist regime lasted the longest in Albania, this was the last country in the Western Balkans to reach democracy and freedom and one of the most backward countries in Southeastern Europe from the economic and social points of view. But this is not the greatest pain of Albanian society. The biggest problem is the political sphere, where the authoritarian inclinations and actions of the political class, as a whole, have led to a very poor dialogue between major political parties. Like all other candidate and potential candidate countries to the EU, in this process, through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and the previous CARDS, Albania benefits from financial assistance from the European Communities. Albania's European perspective was confirmed by the conclusions of the European Council in April 1997 and June 1999, as well as by the final documents of the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb (November 2000) and Thessaloniki (June 2003). The same rules apply to Albania as well as to the other Western Balkan countries whose assistance depends on the progress in meeting the Copenhagen criteria and the actual priorities within the European partnership. The progress is observed through monitoring mechanisms, among which the most important are the annual progress reports of the European Commission.

Corruption is widespread. In 2009, the following cases were documented<sup>3</sup>:

- Countries whose citizens were arrested in Italy for trafficking cocaine: Morocco: 1 532 – 11%; Albania: 1 137 – 9%.
- Distributors of heroin in Italy in 2000-2008: Albanians: 32%.

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<sup>3</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Crime and its Impact on the Balkans and Affected Countries*, pp. 32-48.



- Countries whose citizens were arrested in Germany in 2008 for sale of cocaine: Turkey: 450 – 10%; Italy: 142 – 3%; Lebanon: 113 – 3%; Morocco: 76 – 2%; Sierra Leone: 76 – 2%; Albania: 74 – 2%.
- Countries of “*cocaine importers*” in Germany in 2008: the Netherlands: 48 – 8%; Turkey: 37 – 6%; Nigeria: 30 – 5%; Italy: 26 – 4%; Jamaica: 11 – 2%; Morocco: 12 – 2%; Poland: 11 – 2%; Albania: 10 – 2%<sup>4</sup>.

Centuries without statehood, decades of isolation and totalitarianism, political and social instability – all these factors have contributed to Albania’s economic backwardness. The technological underdevelopment and general inefficiency, so characteristic of all former communist economies, seem to be the full expression of Albania’s economy. However, Albania has managed to overcome the obstacles inherited from the isolation period and has slowly achieved some progress. From 2004 to 2008, the Albanian economy grew with an annual average of 6%, with a low and stable inflation. However, the world economic crisis affected Albania, too, and the GDP decreased by around 4% in 2009.

But the economy continued to grow, even in crisis, based on credit expansion and high level of consumption. In the past two years, the main factors in the economy were agriculture, services, mining, construction and trade.

The Albanian economy is based on five fundamental pillars. The first source of financing is the diaspora through remittances. Like in the case of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, in the 1990s, a relatively large emigration level was recorded, especially in Italy, Greece, Switzerland, Germany and the United States. At present, it is estimated that 25% of Albanians live abroad. Thus, Albania’s national economy has been strongly supported by remittances. These funds represent 15% of Albania’s GDP per year.

The second pillar is the investment in construction. Albania has a very attractive sight – the Mediterranean coast, with beaches on both seas, Adriatic and Ionian. During the isolation period, under communism, this shoreline remained intact, while now it has turned into a construction site for tourism facilities and infrastructure. Moreover, due to the favourable geographic and strategic location, Albanian ports have become more and more attractive for investments. The Durres port lies literally at the entrance of the Adriatic Sea.

The third and most important pillar for the Albanian economy is tourism. The Ministry of Tourism has registered several millions of tourist who come to Albania every summer season. The fourth source is represented by the EU pre-accession programmes. And the fifth – Albania’s natural resources and agriculture. Nevertheless, due to the lack of modern equipment and inadequate infrastructure, the last two pillars do not contribute effectively to the global economic growth.

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<sup>4</sup> Idem, *The Globalisation of Crime. A Transnational Organised Crime Threat Assessment*, pp. 100-123.

The world economic crisis maybe hit most seriously exactly these sectors. Albania's more valuable resources include oil, natural gas, coal, iron ore, bauxite, chromium, copper and nickel. It also has rich salt deposits. On the other hand, Albania suffers from insufficient power resources, which hinders economic development (it has insufficient production capacities, and most of its transmission lines are still under construction). Albania is still an agrarian country and is included in the category of the poorest in Europe. The GDP per capita is only 25% of Europe's average<sup>5</sup>.

Therefore, Albania is prevented from continuing on its path towards the EU and, thus, the memory of being a permanently unstable country is relaunched. The Commission stated that the elimination of visa compulsoriness for Albanian citizens will depend on the settlement of the internal political crisis.

#### ❖ **Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is one of the successor states of former Yugoslavia which suffered the most severe and painful process of disintegration of the Federation, marked by war, devastation and population displacement. The global economic crisis has affected the reform agenda. In Bosnia, the process of recovery from recession is slow, mainly because of exports of metals and energy, whose prices aligned to the level of the global market. The pre-crisis growth was based on international financing, which fuelled an expansion of the credit, being used mainly for local consumption of products based on import. Investments in infrastructure and energy and the sale of some state companies are seen as a future growth engine, but the main obstacle to economic reform is political instability – and, thus, the country remains ethnically divided.

The political situation started to grow worse in 2006, before the general elections in October. This led to the blockage of central state institutions and of implementation of certain important reforms required by the EU<sup>6</sup>.

In the most recent report regarding the progress of BiH, the European Commission clearly stipulates: Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential candidate for EU membership. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU was signed in June 2008. The Interim Agreement, which focuses on the trade-related areas of the SAA, has been in force since July 2008. EU-related reforms have seen limited progress. A shared vision on the direction of the country remains necessary for the smooth operation of institutions, for creating more functional and efficient state structures

<sup>5</sup> European Commission – Albania 2009 Progress Report.

<sup>6</sup> Ștefan Ralchev, *Status Quo as the More Likely Alternative for Bosnia and Herzegovina*, June 2009, Institute for Regional and International Studies, at <http://www.iris-bg.org/files/iris-analysisbosnia%202009.pdf>

and for speaking with one voice on EU and international matters<sup>7</sup>. The European Union has been greatly involved in BiH in the reconstruction efforts after the 1992-95 war and in supporting reform and democratisation.

According to *Transparency International*, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), BiH is the country with the highest corruption levels in the Western Balkans. From 2009, the score is 3,0 (on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is total corruption and 10 is lack of corruption), and ranks 99<sup>th</sup>, among 180 nations, next to countries such as Zambia, Tonga and the Dominican Republic<sup>8</sup>. For comparison, the ranks of its neighbours are: Croatia (4,1, 66<sup>th</sup>); Montenegro (3,9, 69<sup>th</sup>); Macedonia (3,8, 71<sup>st</sup>); Serbia (3,5, 83<sup>rd</sup>); Albania (3,2, 95<sup>th</sup>). The world financial and economic crisis hit the Balkans later than Western Europe, however, its impact was even more damaging on the fragile market economies. Before the crisis hit, Bosnia was one of the most stable economies in the Balkans, at least financially. The currency, the convertible mark (KM), was pegged to the Euro in keeping with an agreement of the monetary board. The GDP was rising at approximately 6% every year. Exports and imports decreased by 21%, 26% respectively (compared to 2009) and the trade deficit was reduced by 30% in the same period. Once with the reduction of trade deficit, the relatively stable remittances and other entries from the current account were reduced and the current account deficit (CAD) was halved. This led to a reduction in the Central Bank reserves from 6,9 billion in October 2009 to around 5,8 billion by July 2010. Nevertheless, the reduction of reserves was reversed following the conclusion of the Stand By Agreement (SBA) with the IMF and the afflux of foreign funding. The future of Bosnia Herzegovina is clearly as a full member of the EU, as shown in the high-level reunions in Zagreb (2000), Thessaloniki (2003) and Sarajevo (2010).

#### ❖ Croatia

Croatia is the most advanced country in the Western Balkans from the economic point of view and the closest one to the European Union accession. Like Serbia, Croatia began its transition process later than the rest of Central and Eastern Europe countries. In the 2010 report regarding Nations in Transit, *Freedom House* rated Croatia with a general democracy score of 3,71 (on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the highest level of democratic development and 7 is the lowest), unchanged from 2009 and improved from 4,46 in 1999-2000. Compared to the other Western Balkan countries, Croatia ranks among the first (together with its neighbour – Serbia – its score being also 3,71). It needs to reduce corruption and accelerate

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<sup>7</sup> European Commission, *Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report*, 14 October 2009, pp. 4-5, at [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2009/ba\\_rapport\\_2009\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/ba_rapport_2009_en.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2009*, at [www.ti-bih.org](http://www.ti-bih.org)

the judicial system reform. Divided into elements, the country remained at the same level from the following points of view: national democratic governance (3,50), electoral process (3,25), civil society (2,75), independent media (4,00), local democratic governance (3,75), judicial framework (4,25) and corruption (4,50)<sup>9</sup>.

Just as in the case of Serbia, Croatia's institutional infrastructure is one of the most stable in the Balkans, in part due to the legacy from former Yugoslavia. Another reason is that Croatia, as well as Serbia, is relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnic composition. Just as in all Balkan countries, judicial reform remains the main challenge for Croatia. Corruption has been one of the main points of dissatisfaction for the European Union regarding candidate and potential candidate countries in the Balkans, and even recently accepted members – Bulgaria and Romania. As far as Croatia is concerned, progress has been made lately in this respect. The legal framework for fighting corruption must be further improved, including as far as confiscating assets is concerned.

Croatia was seriously hit by the world financial and economic crisis, as well as by the austerity measures that the government (especially Kosor's cabinet, after July 2009) adopted and that produced negative social reactions from farmers, war veterans and trade unions. However, it is estimated that the economy will get back on its feet in the last part of 2011. The crisis did not succeed in shaking Croatia's institutions as it did in its neighbouring country, Bosnia, for example, due to the institutional tradition and the government. In June 2010, an analysis of the International Monetary Fund noted: the world economic and financial crisis significantly affected the Croatian economy. With reduced capital inflows, subject to export demand and following tight credit conditions on the domestic front, the real GDP decreased by 5,8 % in 2009, and unemployment rose to 17%. While exports decreased, an even bigger contraction of imports resulted in a reduction of almost a half of the current account deficit to 5% of the GDP. The economy remained in the middle of a severe recession in the first part of 2010, and positive growth did not occur in the second half of the year either, only a zero growth in 2010. The authorities' response to the crisis has been rapid. The Croatian National Bank (CNB) properly addressed liquidity shortages in the banking sector, in 2009, through the relaxation of regulatory requirements and simplification of norms for banks in the process of accessing the CNB's emergency liquidity assistance. In 2010, the real GDP growth was 0,0%, but, according to the IMF, the economy will grow by 2,0% this year. Unemployment

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<sup>9</sup>Freedom House, *Nations in Transit 2010: Croatia*, pp. 158-60, at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2010/NIT2010Croatiafinalfinal.pdf>

will oscillate around 9,0% and inflation will stay at the healthy levels of approximately 2,0%. The budget deficit will remain below 4% of the GDP<sup>10</sup>. Although Croatia has started successfully the actions meant to alleviate the effects of the crisis, the crisis caused the decrease in the growth and led to direct actions of farmers and trade unions.

Croatia hopes to join the EU in 2012, and some specialists believe it will rather be 2013. What is clear is that the country will be the next one to join the accession bloc. Croatia's accession will give a strong signal, will show explicitly to the Western Balkan countries that Europe is and will be a whole, despite sporadic ideas caused by Euroscepticism and economic problems. Croatia's economic growth in the latest decade of approximately 5% per year was due to tourism in the Adriatic Sea, as well as to domestic consumption and state investments, stimulated by foreign loans. Now, economists say that the country needs growth based on industry and exports, and they must be accompanied by structural reforms and fiscal consolidation. The government programme, focused on recovery, has identified the key issues and the necessary reforms – a better investment climate, a more efficient administration.

#### ❖ **Kosovo**

The case of Kosovo has been a subject of discussions and polemics in the contemporary European diplomacy for more than a century. Kosovo became an important theme at the centre of international politics during the disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia. In fact, the Kosovo case was one of several problems that led to the break-up of the federation. Moreover, in its general development, Kosovo has pulled back Serbia, taking advantage of its leading position in the region. Despite the national struggle that lasted a decade, the extraordinary political efforts, the diplomatic confrontation, the military action and the open war made Serbia lose Kosovo. After the declaration of independence, Kosovo was recognised by more than 60 states, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank included. Yet, Serbia refuses to recognise Kosovo.

Currently, the formal relations between the EU and Kosovo are summarised in the European Parliament resolution on 5 February 2009 regarding Kosovo and the role of the EU: Kosovo manages its own affairs, while being supervised in its implementation of, *inter alia*, measures to protect and promote minority rights. So far, 54 countries, including 22 of the 27 EU member states, have recognised Kosovo's independence. The EU member states sent a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) to Kosovo, Pieter Feith. EULEX is expected to function

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

in accordance with the EU mandate, with a view to promoting the enduring development of Kosovo and guaranteeing the rule of law for all communities in Kosovo. In June 2010, the EU decided to extend the mandate of its mission in Kosovo by another two years, until 8 June 2012. In the *Freedom House* report in 2010, Kosovo was assessed as “*partially free*”, with a score of 5, and 4, respectively, for the categories of political rights and civic liberties (on a scale of 1 to 7, where 7 is the lowest level of democratic development)<sup>11</sup>.

In general, there has been progress as far as the reform of public administration is concerned. Key juridical documents must be adopted. Providing the delivery of public services to all people in Kosovo and establishing a professional, responsible representative of the public sector, free from political interference, are a key priority for the European partnership. This has not been fully guaranteed. The capacity of Kosovo’s public administration remains weak. There are needed substantial efforts to ensure the transparency of public appointments. However, the mechanisms needed to ensure their implementation are not yet in force. These problems are at the basis of the large-scale corruption in Kosovo’s institutions and in the society, in the economy and the state governance, in the regulatory framework and the business environment. Organised crime has always been present in the Balkans and gained significant influence, being internationalised during wars and after the 1990s. The roots of Kosovo’s organised crime are clear and publicly known. In the UN report from 2010, it is highlighted that the Kosovo Liberation Army received weapons looted from the armories of Albania and support from the Albanian diaspora community. However, Kosovo does not have a crime reduction strategy. Kosovo lacks proper resources and an intelligence system in the penal field to address this phenomenon. The lack of cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade, as well as between the central authorities in Kosovo and the structures in the north seriously undermines the efforts made in the fight against organised crime, which is a priority.

Even though Kosovo’s economy has grown at a constant pace in the latest decade due to international donations and remittances, it remains one of the poorest countries in Europe, with an amazing unemployment rate of approximately 50%. Political instability is a major obstacle to the better exploitation of its natural resources, including coal, lead, zinc and nickel, and to the stimulation of exports. The government’s main challenge is to attract more foreign investment, which could thus create jobs. At the height of the world economic crisis, Kosovo was weakly and only indirectly affected by it, most of all due to the country’s

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<sup>11</sup> Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2010, Kosovo*, at [http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc\\_country\\_detail.cfm?year=2010&country=7972&pf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?year=2010&country=7972&pf)

limited participation in the system of international economic relations. However, the influence of the global crisis was also felt in Kosovo's economy. It was unable to rely on a more serious inflow of direct foreign investments and even less on creating new jobs in 2009. Along with Bosnia and Macedonia, Kosovo is one of the European champions in unemployment. According to data of the Commission<sup>12</sup> and the CIA<sup>13</sup>, Kosovo's unemployment is extremely high: 40% in 2009, 50% in 2010, with approximately 75% of the young people being without a job.

Kosovo's economy is founded on three main pillars. The *first* is the European financial pillar, the EU being Kosovo's main economic supporter. In July 2008, the EU organised a donor conference for Kosovo. It raised 1,2 billion Euros for the young, and over 500 million Euros for the community budget aid. The *second pillar* is the fact that a large part of the Kosovo diaspora is in Western Europe and the United States. Over the past few years, Kosovo's economy has achieved significant progress in the transition towards a market system and the retention of macroeconomic stability, but it is still highly dependent on the international community and the diaspora for financial and technical assistance. The remittances from the diaspora – located mainly in Germany and Switzerland – are estimated to be of approximately 14% of GDP, while the activities financed by donors and aids are of approximately 7,5%<sup>14</sup>. The *third pillar* of Kosovo economy is represented by minerals and metals: lignite, lead, zinc, nickel, chromium, aluminium, magnesium etc. This pillar has the smallest contribution due to the obsolete extraction equipment and the insufficient investments in this important segment with sector potential and perspectives. The presence of EULEX in Kosovo provides the necessary legal framework that would provide potential investors with the needed stability and predictability in the region. Strategically, the country necessitates the EU support. Following some assessments of the European Commission, Kosovo faces serious economic challenges. According to the International Monetary Fund, Kosovo's GDP per capita is 1 726 euros, namely 6,9% of the EU-27 average. Kosovo continues to face a significant deficit in the trade with goods and services. Kosovo's global trade deficit is of 43% of GDP in 2010. A democratic Kosovo, with a successfully integrated Serb community and with the elimination of traditional organised crime opens the way towards normal and successful development not only for the country itself but also for the entire Western Balkans region.

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<sup>12</sup> European Commission, *Kosovo: European Perspective*.

<sup>13</sup> CIA, *The World Factbook. Kosovo*, at [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate\\_kv.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate_kv.html)

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

❖ **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as part of former Yugoslavia, inherited, to a great extent, the pro-European and pro-Western orientation of the Federation, keeping them until today. The course of the foreign policy of the country has been established, in this context, consensually endorsed and recognised: the integration into the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. However, these aspirations have been delayed because of Greece, a EU/NATO member with veto right. Until the two countries reach a mutually acceptable agreement regarding the name – Greece does not recognise it, because it is identical with the name of its northern province – the Euro-Atlantic accession will be delayed. In addition, the world economic crisis hit FYROM severely, which slows down the European integration.

The European Commission congratulated FYROM for the steps taken in the following domains:

- the formation of the High Committee for Public Administration Reform, presided by the Prime Minister, with the purpose of guiding the reform process;
- the adopted amendments to the law on public administration and the strengthening of the role of the Agency for Civil Servants, as well as the encouragement of filling jobs based on merit, introduction of the elements of the vertical system for internal promotion;
- the introduction of the new methods of strategic planning through the preparation of a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, as well as the formation of sectors for planning in each ministry;
- the progress achieved in the enforcement of the law on the free access to public information;
- the adoption of the law on internal affairs regulating the management of the police force.

Apart from hurting FYROM's traditionally weak economy, the global economic crisis also spread the economic problems in the social and political sphere. Over the last years, FYROM witnessed an average annual economic growth of approximately 5%, but the crisis caught the political and economic factors in the country unprepared to fight the powerful waves. Thus, the global crisis indirectly contributed to slowing down the implementation of the needed reforms and caused a lot of damage in FYROM' integration into the EU. The recession felt like this: a decrease in industrial production and exports, a decrease in retail trade and services, at the level of turnovers and profits, a decrease in foreign direct investments. All this led to a general decrease in incomes, sometimes



to the lack of them, so that the purchasing power of the population dropped, causing a fall in the consumption.

The smaller economic activity, of both firms and individuals, resulted in much lower tax revenue for the state budget. The global result was: a gross domestic product (GDP) contraction with 0,9% in the last quarter of 2010 and a rise in the already high unemployment levels<sup>15</sup>. The unemployment for the last quarter of 2010 was 33,5%. This unemployment is structural, accumulated in decades, and culminated in the transition period in the 1990s, especially during the privatisation. There is this long spread belief in the Macedonian society according to which the State Statistics Office is politically influenced. FYROM's increase of approximately 6% before the crisis was determined by the great production of metals, textiles and construction industry. The recovery in 2010 was possible due to capital investments and smaller public expenses. Anyway, it is indisputable that, with the record-high unemployment even on a world scale, and the oscillating economic growth, the Macedonian economy is one of the weakest in the region and in Europe<sup>16</sup>. The forecasts of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which showed that foreign direct investments in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYROM, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia would be almost 50% smaller compared to 2007 and 2008, were right. As far as FYROM is concerned, EBRD made an estimation in July of last year that its GDP would grow by 0,5% that year and 2,5% in 2011. The EBRD also intends to intensify its investments, by raising its portfolios in infrastructure development in FYROM and Serbia.

The perspectives of FYROM are optimistic. An intensified reform effort is needed to meet EU requirements, in order to become a fully fledged member. The realisation of this historic goal is in the hands of the Macedonian political elite. At this stage, it is important that national unity could be reached. There are four basic components of the platform, which FYROM's domestic and foreign policy should meet:

- an initiative for a pro-active maintenance of a continual and balanced political dialogue (at home and abroad);
- tolerance and political consensus applied at home and in multilateral relations;
- maintenance of a strategic balance based on good neighbourhood and in the spirit of liberal-democratic values;
- devotion to reform implementation.

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<sup>15</sup> In keeping with the data of the National Statistics Office, at <http://www.stat.gov.mk/statistiki.asp?ss=09.01&rbs=2&izbranPeriod=I+2005>

<sup>16</sup> Michael B. Sauter, Douglas A. McIntyre & Ashley C. Allen, *The Fifteen Nations with the Highest Unemployment in the World*, June 2010, at <http://247wallst.com/2010/06/23/the-fifteen-nations-with-the-highest-unemployment-in-the-world>

Such a consensus policy would also be a guarantee for the progress and good perspectives for FYROM in the EU accession process and in the geopolitics of the Euro-Atlantic area. By joining this area, Macedonia will cement its statehood and secure a stable development, with a political and social perspective.

#### ❖ Montenegro

Montenegro is the smallest country in the Western Balkans. Montenegro is one of the youngest states in Europe and is still facing challenges typical of a state during the building and consolidation stage. Nevertheless, Montenegro is progressing well as compared to its older regional peers, partly due to an inherited tradition. According to the 2010 *Nations in Transit* report, Montenegro's score is of 3,79 (on a 1-7 scale, where 1 is the highest level of democratic development and 7 is the lowest); the result has not changed in the last three years and has improved just a little compared to the years before 2008. In regional perspective, in the Western Balkans, Montenegro ranks the same as FYROM, just behind the leaders Serbia and Croatia (3,71) and before Bosnia (4,25) and Kosovo (5,07). On components, the *Freedom House* reports point out that Montenegro kept its 2009 scores in almost all areas, except for a regress at the level of independence of the media, as well as for a progress regarding the independence of the judiciary framework.

According to *Transparency International*, the 2009 corruption perception index ranks Montenegro the 69<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries, with a score of 3,9 (on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is total corruption and 10 is no corruption), with a tangible improvement from the previous year, when it ranked 85<sup>th</sup>, with a 3,4 score. Compared to its Western Balkan peers, in 2009, Montenegro was behind Croatia (66<sup>th</sup>, score 4,1), but ahead of FYROM (71<sup>st</sup>, score 3,8), Serbia (83<sup>rd</sup>, score 3,5), Albania (95<sup>th</sup>, score 3,2) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (99<sup>th</sup>, score 3,0)<sup>17</sup>. Corruption remained widespread and the government needs to put more efforts into fighting this phenomenon.

The economy in Montenegro experienced robust growth in the years after gaining its independence, as a result of previous reforms, thus increasing the confidence of foreign investors (particularly in real estate) and rising tourist revenue. The World Bank described the situation at the end of 2008, on the brink of the world economic crisis, and warned of some negative signs, as follows:

➤ In 2007, Montenegro was one of the world's rapid economies, with a non-oil increase. After the international recognition of statehood, investors reassessed the country's relative attractiveness, responding positively to:

- the implementation of the privatisation and structural-reform agenda;

<sup>17</sup> Transparency International, *op. cit.*, at [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2009/cpi\\_2009\\_table](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table)

- the provision of a low tax level;
- a clear European perspective.

In response, investments increased. Capital inflows from foreign direct investment (FDI), largely absent, reached a level of 30% of the GDP in 2006 and 40% in 2007, fuelling the domestic demand and stimulating economic growth. The real GDP grew at double-digit rates in 2007, a result that stands in stark contrast to the period of economic anaemia that characterises Montenegro's pre-independence years. In this environment, commercial banks supported the activities in the private sector with very large increases in crediting the economy (with 12-month growth rates exceeding 180% at the end of 2007). These helped to finance higher imports of goods and services, leading to a rapid increase in the current account deficit from 8,5% of the GDP in 2005 to 40% in 2007. The economic dynamism, which exceeded all projections, led to an unexpected abundance of fiscal revenues.

➤ Post-independence, the economic boom has been fueled by unsustainable external capital inflows. Apart from tourism revenues and foreign acquisitions of companies, banks and shares of publicly traded enterprises, more than one third of capital inflows consisted of temporary elements, dissipated mainly in the medium term. Local banks will not be able to lend to the private sector as aggressively as they did during the immediate post-independence period. The credits for the economy reached unprecedented rates. Because of the rapidly increasing level of the external indebtedness of financial institutions degree, *Standard & Poor* rated Montenegro's banking sector as the riskiest in the region.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the real GDP growth slowed down from 10,7% in 2008 to 6,9% in 2009 and to a negative 1,8% in 2010; the budget deficit grew to 7,1%, while government debt further increased to 44,0% of the GDP<sup>18</sup>. So far, Montenegro has been reticent about signing a loan agreement with the IMF. According to this institution, even if the country was hit hard by the crisis, the measures undertaken by the government were timely and helpful. Montenegro advances gradually on its path to European integration. After receiving the title of candidate country to the EU in December 2010, the reform efforts must be more comprehensive, because the EU integration process becomes more exigent and new challenges occur. Montenegro has the opportunity of overcoming the effects of the world economic crisis sooner than its regional peers due to its small dimension.

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<sup>18</sup> International Monetary Fund, *IMF Concludes 2010 Article IV Consultation with Montenegro*, 27 May 2010, at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1067.htm>

❖ **Serbia**

Serbia is the biggest successor state of the former Federation and the biggest factor in the Western Balkans in terms of territory and population. Even if Serbian economy has developed as a result of increasing exports and industrial production, inflation risks remain high and foreign direct investment low. Social tensions are possible, because the government will have to intensify the reform of the pension system and reduce public sector expenditure, as part of a loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

According to the latest *Nations in Transit* report, launched by *Freedom House*, in June 2010, Serbia has slightly improved its overall democracy score to 3,71 from 3,79 in 2009 (on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for highest level of democratic progress and 7 for lowest). Compared to the other countries in the Western Balkans, Serbia shares the best 2010 score with Croatia, followed by Montenegro and FYROM, with 3,79, 4,25 with Bosnia and Kosovo, with 5,07. The report states that there were significant improvements in Serbia in 2009 in the areas of civil society, governance at local, national level and democratic governance.

Serbia stayed at the same level in the categories of the electoral process (3,25), the judicial framework and independence (4,50), and corruption (4,50). It is registered a deterioration in independent media (3,75 to 4,00) due to the adoption of controversial new laws, causing concerns that they could continue to increase self-censorship and economically weaken the media sector and jeopardise its independence in relation to the country's political powers. Indeed, the fulfilment of pre-accession criteria involves the incorporation of approximately 20 000 legal acts in the domestic legislative system of a candidate country. Certainly, all these reforms contribute to the institutional progress and better functioning of democracy. The European Commission praises the country's advancement and, among other things, the public administration reform.

Economic growth in Serbia was robust at the middle of the 2000s. After growing with 5,6% in 2005 and 5,2% in 2006, the Serbian economy expanded by 6,9% in 2007<sup>19</sup>. In 2008, the year the crisis began, economic growth reached 5,5%, despite the weaker fourth quarter. The growth was largely owed to a high inflow of foreign capital – cross-border remittances and interbank credits, support

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<sup>19</sup> Gordana Matkovic, Bosko Mijatovic & Marina Petrovic, *Uticaj krize na trziste radne snage i zivotni standard u Srbiji (Impact of the Financial Crises on the Labour Market and Living Conditions Outcomes in Serbia)*, Belgrade, *Centre for Liberal-Democratic Studies*, January 2010, pp. 11-13, at <http://www.clds.org.rs/newsite/Uticaj%20krize.pdf>

given by international financial institutions, foreign direct and portfolio investments – which stimulated domestic demand and, consequently, the high economic activity. That is why Serbia maintained for years a very high current account deficit, reaching 18% of the GDP in 2008 and became highly dependent on capital inflow. The financial and economic crisis in Serbia took place in the same pattern and simultaneously with other countries in transition. The first signs of crisis showed in the third quarter of 2008, when exports and industrial production started to decrease. However, the economy continued to grow in the fourth quarter, too, but at a lower pace. The Serbian economy managed to stay on its feet. This is a consequence of the mildness of the recession in developed countries and the low export dependence of Serbia, as well as the support of international financial institutions and some smart moves by the central bank. A very important factor in Serbia dealing with the crisis was the signing of a stand-by loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The agreement was approved initially in January 2009 for 15 months, for an amount of approximately 420 million Euros. However, Serbia remains vulnerable to negative financial repercussions in the region. The authorities' strategy of fiscal adjustment continues to focus on medium-term consolidation. As far as the perspectives for Serbia's economy, growth indicators are positive, while goods and industrial production are increasing. The GDP decreased by 3,0% in 2009, but 0,0% in 2010 and a positive effect of 2,2% in 2011<sup>20</sup>.

For Serbia, the European perspectives will remain good if the intense legislative work is continued, more effort is put in reform and the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is maintained.

Serbia's economy grew by about 6% a year before the crisis, due to strong capital inflows and consumption. In the last two years (2009, 2010), its currency, the dinar, lost almost 30% and the government wanted a new export-based growth model that would encourage investments and stimulate employment.

In January 2010, Serbia was offered the EU questionnaire. According to *Southeast European Times* website<sup>21</sup>, Serbia expects the final answer to its application in order to join the EU on 9 December this year. In October, the European Commission recommended that Serbia should be given the candidate status, but the decision on setting a date for accession talks depends substantially

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<sup>20</sup> Goran Saravanja, *Serbia*, June 2010, p. 44, at <http://www.bankaustria.at/en/5295.html>

<sup>21</sup> Important source of news and information in Southeastern Europe, in ten languages: Albanese, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, English, Greek, Macedonian, Romanian, Serbian and Turkish.

on the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina<sup>22</sup>. The EC stated that Serbia obtained candidate status by arresting all individuals wanted by the Hague Tribunal and by the fact that it made real progress with the reforms. Nevertheless, it drew attention that Serbia should continue to implement systemic reforms and fight corruption.

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<sup>22</sup> At <http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/ro/features/setimes/features/2011/11/09/feature-01>

# TERRORIST ACTS FINANCING – Paradoxes Decade –

Daniel PINTILIE

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*Not very large sums of money are necessary to launch terrorist attacks, and the associated transactions are not so complex. For example, the author writes, an examination of the financial connections of the air attacks on 11 September has led to the conclusion that most of the individual transactions included small sums of money, below the limit of reporting cash transactions, and the operations were aimed at Swift transactions only. The beneficiaries were foreign students who received money from their parents or under the form of grants for studies, so the transactions were not identified as requiring further examination by the involved financial institutions.*

**Keywords:** *training; financial support; terrorist funds; money laundering*

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**T**he terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have had a considerable impact not only on the United States of America

but also on the global security context. Therefore, the way international relations are conceived, the security paradigm, the way risks are perceived and the definition of prevention and combat methods have fundamentally changed. Thus, one can speak of a “*post-11 September*” era.

The terrifying events in September did not represent a singular and isolated case but the beginning of a series of large-scale terrorist attacks: Madrid, London, Sharm el Sheikh. Currently, we can say that we are in a “*war against terror*”, more difficult and complex, because it is an irregular one, and the “*decade that separates us from the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 has not changed the world as definitely as it seemed to do during the days or the first years after the attacks. On the contrary, if we consider all the events directly related to 11 September (and their subsequent course), we can say that the last decade was marked by numerous (and spectacular) twists, in which ideas and symbols combined (and transformed) in an almost dialectical manner*”<sup>1</sup>.

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Daniel Pintilie – Ministry of Administration and Interior.

<sup>1</sup> Radu Cucuta, Director of *Journal of East European and Asian Studies*, in *Cum a schimbat 9/11 lumea?*, 12 September 2011, at <http://www.9am.ro/>

*What is terrorism?; Who are terrorist acts funded by?; Which is the flow of the funds used by terrorist groups?* The premise of all these questions we will discuss in what follows is represented by the defining elements of the terrorist phenomenon: it is an act of violence or threat of violence; it has a political-ideological goal or motivation; the targets are members of civil population; it seeks to intimidate the audience, creating terror among its members; it is an alternative to conventional warfare.

The cohesion of a terrorist group is given by the personal motivations unity, gender-based organisation, leaders' behaviour, members' satisfaction, homogeneity, ideological and religious unity and, last but not least, by the members' fanaticism.

In general, terrorist groups should have sufficient financial resources to support at least the following activities:

- recruiting new members;
- training bases (camps);
- current expenditure (housing, food, tickets, rent etc.);
- equipment, explosive, conventional and unconventional weapons;
- fake identities and travel documents;
- sophisticated means of communications.

In this context, terrorism sources of funds include:

- state sponsors of terrorism: financial support by countries and organisations with a large enough infrastructure to collect funds and make them available to terrorist organisation;
- legitimate (legal) sources: charitable organisations, legal businesses used as covering;
- criminal (illicit) sources: businesses that involve drugs, kidnappings, prostitution networks, credit card frauds etc.

Following terrorist attacks in New York, it has been established the necessity to combine the efforts and experience in the war to counter terrorism financing. It mainly allows for observing the mosaic created by financing terrorism and the movement of suspect terrorist funds more clearly.

Terrorist groups are different from other criminal organisations with respect to the real goal that lies behind crime. In fact, unlike organised crime groups, whose main aim is to get money, terrorist groups do not usually have financial purposes. They spread an ideology or, much simpler, create an intimidating atmosphere.

How do terrorist groups achieve the flow of funds? There are at least two ways: *through the formal banking system* and *through non-formal channels*. The use of the banking system is aimed at:

- ⇒ structured deposits or withdrawals from bank accounts;



- ⇒ purchases of different types of monetary instruments (travel checks, bank checks, payment orders);
- ⇒ existence of some debit or credit cards and SWIFT money transfer.

Beyond theory, as experts say, for the terrorist attack in New York on 11 September, about 400 000 – 500 000 \$ was used. Kidnappers were given about 300 000 \$ in their bank accounts in the United States and their supporters used the banks, especially the ones in the Gulf Area, to send the money in the name of al-Qaeda. Moreover, the money was kept in foreign bank accounts and then it was accessed in the USA through transactions and credit cards.

For an overview of the main sources of funds and the ways used to move the capital employed by terrorist organisations to support their networks, it should be highlighted that the people investigated for having committed terrorist acts conducted money transmission operations using the alternative systems spread all over the world. Very often, funds were transferred abroad using the money transfer alternative networks, being collected by foreign citizens having specific nationalities, residents in some countries involved in the fight against terrorism. For such entities, operations via the banking system have led to the development of their activities internationally.

In other cases, individuals have made cash payments in different countries, involving large sums of money that were directed to the same account. The collected funds were subsequently transferred in Asia or in the United States. Currently, a series of banks have a preventive attitude and fill in more and more *suspect transaction reports (STR)* related to what is considered to be a “*suspect activity*” of the clients. For example, only in Great Britain, the annual number of *STRs* has grown from 30 000 in 2005 to about 250 000 in 2010.

The use of non-formal channels is aimed at the transfers using the “*hawala*” system. This system, used in almost all the Middle East, is based on trust as well as on anonymity, because no operation is made on paper. Those who use such system transfer money abroad, but the transfer is not made physically. In fact, the main characteristic of “*hawala*” is “*compensation*”, as the persons involved are assured that the money (or goods in other cases) will be transferred in the particular account, which will be returned through a future reversible transaction.

Thus, we can speak about electronic payment systems (e-cash, smart-cards etc.) and cash smuggling (through couriers or bulk cash). Al-Qaeda is supposed to encourage and train terrorist cells in the training centres in Afghanistan regarding different ways to provide funds by illicit activities. Another example is the Islamic Fighting Group, the author of the terrorist attacks in Madrid, in March 2004. In this case, investigations have shown that the sources of attacks financing

were represented by activities involving drug trafficking. In this context, the following question arises: *Do terrorists need large sums of money to finance their activities?* Surprisingly, following some studies, it has been established that the answer is no!

Not very large sums of money are necessary to launch terrorist attacks, and the associated transactions are not so complex. For example, an examination of the financial connexions of the air attacks on 11 September has led to the conclusion that most of the individual transactions included small sums of money, below the limit of reporting cash transactions, and the operations were aimed at SWIFT transactions only. The individuals who were the beneficiaries were foreign students who received money from their parents or under the form of grants for studies, so the transactions were not identified as requiring further examination by the involved financial institutions.

Subsequent to the attacks in London, on 7 July 2005, the aspects regarding terrorism financing were reconsidered. The four explosions were committed by British citizens, people raised and educated in Great Britain, unlike the ones in Madrid and New York, cases in which terrorists had an Arab origin.

Unlike the attacks in the United States, financed with about 500 000 \$, the cost of explosions in London was 2 000 \$, the major cost being represented by the equipment with explosive and detonators.

We may conclude that, in many cases, the money used for terrorist activities comes from legitimate businesses, non-governmental institutions and charitable actions. Terrorist groups often combine the funds obtained from legal sources and the ones from illicit sources, a series of investigations showing that many attacks are financed with small sums of money.

Terrorism financing is different from the classical money laundering. Thus, in the case of money laundering, the income from illegal activities is translated in assets that make them appear legal, and the goal is usually to gain larger and larger sums of money. By financing terrorism, the source of funds is often “*legal*”, and the goal is not necessarily to gain more money.

Although it seems logical that the funds from legal sources should not be laundered, there is however necessary for terrorist groups to hide or disguise the connexions between the group and the sources of legal funds. Therefore, similarly, terrorist groups have to find some ways to launder these funds so that they could be subsequently used without attracting the attention of authorities. Examining the financial activities related to terrorism, it has been drawn the conclusion that terrorists and the networks that support them use, in general, the same methods for money laundering as criminal groups.

The instruments to combat terrorism financing are similar to the ones used in the case of money laundering, namely the following:

- standard norms to know the client;
- continuous monitoring specific transactions (such as rapid money transfer and SWIFT transfers);
- supervision of the accounts of the clients whose partners are individuals located or coming from countries in which the risk of terrorist activities is high.

### ***FATF recommendations as far as terrorism financing is concerned***

In order to prevent terrorist organisations to get and transfer the funds for their criminal activity, a series of recommendations of the *Financial Action Task Force (FATF)* were adopted. The recommendations represent international standards in the fight against terrorism.

The agreement on special recommendations<sup>2</sup> obliges *FATF* members to take a series of measures as follows:

- ratifying and implementing UN instruments;
- criminalising the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and organisations;
- freezing and confiscating terrorist assets;
- reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism;
- providing the widest possible range of assistance to other countries' law enforcement and regulatory authorities to investigate terrorism financing;
- imposing the requirement to combat money laundering on all the rapid money transfer systems;
- strengthening client identification measures in case of internal and international SWIFT transfers;
- ensuring that entities, in particular non-profit organisations, cannot be misused to finance terrorism;
- last but not least, *FATF* extended the invitation to the whole world to take part in this process in the same conditions as the members of the organisation, highlighting the importance of "*global*" cooperation in this field.

Romania supports the efforts made within international, regional and sub-regional organisations to strengthen international solidarity against terrorism, in accordance

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<sup>2</sup> At the extraordinary Plenary on the Financing of Terrorism held in Washington, 29-30 October 2001, at <http://www.onpcsb.ro/pdf/9%20Rec%20Speciale%20FATF.pdf>

with international law, and cooperates bilaterally to prevent and combat this phenomenon.

In this respect, last year, at the meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defence, it was approved the *National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing*, document that provides a uniform and coherent basis for the sectoral actions to combat and prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. The document also establishes the courses of action for all the institutions that have responsibilities in the field, in conformity with *Romania's National Security Strategy*, according to which “11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against symbols of the American civilisation and power and the subsequent similar strikes in Europe and other areas of the world are to prove that terrorism, as a general phenomenon, and international terrorism structured in cross-border networks, in particular, poses the most serious threat to human lives and freedom, democracy, civilisation, way of life and the other fundamental basic values that make the foundations of the democratic community of the Euro-Atlantic states”<sup>3</sup>.

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*English version by*  
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# TEAMING, TRANSPARENCY AND TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN

*Lieutenant General William B. CALDWELL*

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*NATO's assumption of Afghan military and police training responsibilities in 2009 produced a marked quality improvement. This was noticeable in marksmanship, discipline, and retention. Additional NATO trainers brought key capabilities that were previously absent such as helicopter maintenance, medicine, and civil policing. They also improved the recruiter to trainer ratio.*

*While still developing enabling capabilities such as logistics, counter-IED (improvised explosive devices), and human resources, the Afghan military and police are on track to assume country-wide lead security responsibility from ISAF (the International Security and Assistance Force) by the end of December 2014. As agreed between NATO and Afghanistan in Lisbon during last fall's summit, the train, advise and assist roles will endure through NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.*

**Keywords:** *NTM-A; literacy training; defence purchases; institutional transition; ISAF*

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**W**hen NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was stood up in November 2009, our mission was about teaming with Afghans to build a dynamic future for a secure and stable Afghanistan. With lessons from the Soviet experience and previous international efforts as our guide, NTM-A adopted a new mindset relying on teaming, transparency, and transition.

Initially challenged by trainer numbers, the unified approach under a NATO flag worked. The first 30 trainers grew to over 1 800 in two years; the original two countries were joined by 33 others (Ukraine and El Salvador are the latest). By March 2012, we anticipate an additional 600 trainers, with more to follow.

When combined with additional financial resources from NATO and non-NATO partners such as Japan and the United Arab Emirates, the benefits of a unified NATO command are apparent in a growing and professionalising Afghan Army, Air Force, and Police.

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The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, the *Afghanistan 2011 versus Afghanistan 2001: The Same Country?* issue, 2011, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Afghanistan-2011/Teaming-Transparency-Transition/EN/index.htm>

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell – the United States Army, the first commander of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (served from November 2009 to October 2011).

During the first two years of NTM-A's existence, the Afghan Army grew by 75 000 and the Afghan Police grew by 45 000. The combined force is on schedule to grow an additional 47 000 by November 2012 and Afghan air frames will nearly triple by 2016.

While still developing enabling capabilities such as logistics, counter-IED (improvised explosive devices), and human resources, the Afghan military and police are on track to assume country-wide lead security responsibility from ISAF (the International Security and Assistance Force) by the end of December 2014. As agreed between NATO and Afghanistan in Lisbon during last fall's summit, the train, advise and assist roles will endure through NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.



*Lieutenant General Caldwell, former Commander of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A), addresses a graduating class of Afghan National Police (ANP). © ISAF*



*A US Army trainer from the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) provides mentoring to an Afghan recruit. © ISAF*

The depth of NATO's commitment to training the Afghan army, air force, and police is clear throughout the 70 training sites NTM-A manages. At the *Kabul Military Training Centre*, for example, there are personnel from ten countries training between 8 000 and 12 000 Afghan soldiers in 40 different courses every day. This includes Basic Warrior Training for new recruits, non-commissioned officer training, female and male officer candidate schools, and specialty branch schools such as logistics, law, and communications.

NATO's assumption of Afghan military and police training responsibilities in 2009 produced a marked quality improvement. This was noticeable in marksmanship, discipline, and retention. Additional NATO trainers brought key capabilities that were previously absent such as helicopter maintenance, medicine, and civil policing. They also improved the recruiter to trainer ratio.

Prior to the creation of NTM-A, police were often assigned duties before receiving the appropriate level of training. Moreover, the overall quality of training varied

from region to region. Through an agreement with the Afghan Ministry of Interior, NTM-A, EUPOL (the European Police), and the German Police Project Team, there is now a common training curriculum.

Basic patrol training has been expanded from six to eight weeks. The new programme of instruction now incorporates more human rights and gender training, additional literacy training and new transparency and accountability material. These improvements would not have been possible without a concerted international effort to unify action and make the most of scarce resources.

***The new programme of instruction now incorporates more human rights and gender training, additional literacy training and new transparency and accountability material***

NTM-A has been able to oversee more civil policing. Over the last year, the number of civilian police assigned to NTM-A increased from 168 to 525. Whether they are at the headquarters at Camp Eggers or training sites throughout Afghanistan, civilian police are bringing their unique skill sets and professionalism to the Afghan National Police. As NTM-A enters its third year, several areas require continued focus to enable security lead transition by the end of 2014. Among these are training Afghan trainers, leader development, building literacy and vocational skills, and developing enduring institutions and self-sustaining systems.

The success of NTM-A in the training base created over the past two years is evident in the quality of the fielded Afghan forces we see today. Increasingly, Afghans are assuming the security lead for their country and are gaining the trust of the people. To ensure these gains are enduring, a key priority is training Afghan trainers. Today, there are over 3 200 trained Afghan trainers and they are on track



*A joint-service colour guard detail stand at an NTM-A Command Sergeant Major change of responsibility ceremony at Camp Eggers in Kabul. © ISAF*

to be in the lead for basic-level training by December 2012. While coalition trainers will still be needed to provide oversight of the training base and conduct advanced training, the foundation has been laid to enable institutional transition.

Over the past two years, much progress has been made training and educating Afghan military and police personnel; officers and non-commissioned officers in the police grew from 42 500 to 61 850. Now that the schools are in place, the police leader ranks will grow to 83 400 by mid-2012.

The same is true in their army; over the past two years since 2009, officers and non-commissioned officers grew from 40 900 to 66 800 and will grow to 86 500. Training and education are essential in developing leaders, but experience is irreplaceable and requires time. To close the leader gap, continued emphasis is needed to support initiatives such as the National Military Academy of Afghanistan, the Afghan National Police Academy and new efforts like “*Sandhurst in the Sand*”, which is a United Kingdom-led officer candidate school scheduled to begin in early 2013.

**“Afghans are assuming the security lead for their country and are gaining the trust of the people. To ensure these gains are enduring, a key priority is training Afghan trainers”.**



*Lieutenant General Caldwell takes the time to speak to Afghan recruits during their mandatory literacy training course. © ISAF*

One key lesson of the past two years is the importance of literacy training to develop a capable and professional military and police. After decades of war and a decimated public education system, only 14 percent of military aged men and women are literate.

But in early 2010, NTM-A accepted illiteracy as a challenge and worked closely with international bodies and the Afghan Ministry of Education to educate “*the lost generation*” in the training base. For about \$33 per person, over 125 000 Afghans have been taught to read, write and count through a mandatory literacy programme. By 2012, about 50 percent of the military and police will be functionally literate. Literate soldiers can now verify security passes at entry control points, numerate police can inventory vehicles.

And all can count their monthly salaries, helping to reduce predatory corruption.

Because of these efforts, Afghan recruits can now choose to attend advanced or vocational training to become engineers, artillerymen and logisticians. With the establishment of 12 branch, or vocational, schools over the past year,



NTM-A is beginning to train the skills and units that will enable Afghan forces to perform these critical functions themselves. This is part of a phased development effort that includes advanced training in logistics, finance, communications, human resources, intelligence, artillery, engineering and other important functions. As the fielding of these support units and specialists continues, the ANSF will be carefully balanced with increased ability to support and sustain itself, leading to independent operations.

As we learned from the Soviet experience, without an indigenous training and maintenance base, the system will collapse when international assistance stops. Consequently, it is critical for the international community to provide only equipment and training that are capable, affordable and sustainable for Afghanistan.

A part of this is supporting Afghan economic development through defence purchases under the NATO Afghan First programme, which has produced about 17 000 jobs and reduced costs. For example, the cost of producing boots in Afghanistan is half the cost of producing them in the United States and then shipping to Afghanistan. And the quality is as good because of partnering with US business and academic experts who assisted Afghan companies. Furthermore, supporting boot factories in Afghanistan has given rise to a fledgling Afghan footwear industry.

***“Thirty years ago the United States worked to help Afghans reclaim their country from Soviet invaders. With the departure of Soviet forces, we declared victory and turned away from helping Afghans build a stable country with effective security forces. On 11 September 2001, we discovered the tragic consequences that such inattention can have. That is a lesson we cannot afford to learn again”.***

In 2011, US Senators Carl Levin and Jack Reed wrote: *“Thirty years ago the United States worked to help Afghans reclaim their country from Soviet invaders. With the departure of Soviet forces, we declared victory and turned away from helping Afghans build a stable country with effective security forces. On 11 September 2001, we discovered the tragic consequences that such inattention can have. That is a lesson we cannot afford to learn again”.* Through continued US and NATO support beyond transition, partnering beyond 2014 will be critical to avoid repeating mistakes of the past.

# **NATO TEN YEARS AFTER**

## **- learning the lessons -**

*Michael RÜHLE*

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*The author argues that, in retrospect, instead of heralding NATO's decline, "09/11" became the catalyst for the most fundamental changes in NATO's history. Yet, for the NATO allies, the questions they had to ponder from the outset were as obvious as they were profound. Without agonising debate, NATO moved from a geographical to a functional understanding of security. This shift proved to be more significant in ensuring NATO's future relevance than any other change it has undergone in its history. Today's NATO is far more experienced in conducting complex operations far from home than it was before "9/11" and the subsequent Afghanistan mission. Moreover, the experience that NATO gained in training indigenous security forces may also provide a valuable asset in other contingencies – for example, in post-Qadhafi Libya.*

**Keywords:** 09/11; Article 5; NATO's transformation; ISAF; Comprehensive Approach; Military Concept

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**S**hould the allies invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO's collective defence commitment, thereby giving the strongest political signal of solidarity sovereign nations can give? Or would this just drag the Alliance into what might become a very "personal" campaign of the United States to seek revenge against whoever had committed this heinous crime? Above all, what if Washington simply decided that this was essentially a national issue, thus sidelining NATO and its offers of solidarity?

***The US did not make NATO  
the centrepiece of its response...  
Washington concluded  
that a very different coalition was required***

The immediate weeks that followed "9/11" appeared to confirm the views of those who had been reluctant about making grand gestures.

Although the allies invoked Article 5 only one day after the attacks and certain Alliance mechanisms, such as granting the US blanket overflight rights, were immediately put into effect,

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Michael Rühle – Head of the Energy Security Section in NATO's Emerging Security Challenges Division. He writes here in a personal capacity.

the US did not make NATO the centrepiece of its response. As it became clear that the origins of the attacks lay in Afghanistan, Washington concluded that a very different coalition was required.

For a short while at least, the “*NATO-in-decline*” school of thought appeared to have a field day: after having invoked Article 5 for the first time

in NATO’s history, the response from Washington to the allies seemed to amount to “*don’t-call-us, we’ll-call-you*”.



© ISAF

### ***NATO’s Transformation***

A few months and many NATO obituaries later, things became clearer. The US had not been as dismissive as it had seemed initially. Nor was NATO doomed to being marginalised in the fight against international terrorism.

Secretary General Lord Robertson’s warning that the critics of NATO were making the mistake of succumbing to the “*parochialism of the moment*” proved to be right on the mark. The transatlantic community needed time to fully absorb all of the implications of “9/11”. Eventually, however, the lessons of that fateful day would be reflected in NATO’s political and military agenda.



Indeed, NATO had started to adapt its agenda even before the allies consciously set out to do so. The first example was the invocation of Article 5 on 12 September 2001. By agreeing that an attack by a non-state actor could be categorised as an “*armed attack*” in line with the Washington Treaty, the allies

broadened the understanding of collective self-defence far beyond its traditional meaning of responding to a military invasion.

Moreover, as this first-ever invocation of Article 5 had no anti-Russian context, it effectively demolished long-held myths that collective defence was all about Russia.

Another major change was the deployment of forces from many NATO nations to Afghanistan, complemented by statements in key documents to meet challenges “*whenever and wherever*” they occurred. This marked the de facto end of NATO’s out-of-area debate, which, as the French NATO Ambassador put it cogently, had collapsed with the Twin Towers.

Put simply, without agonising debate, NATO moved from a geographical to a functional understanding of security. This shift proved to be more significant in ensuring NATO's future relevance than any other change it has undergone in its history.

The conceptual dimensions soon followed, however, notably with NATO's Military Concept for the defence against terrorism. With the attacks still fresh in everyone's mind, the Concept was able to break new ground with respect to the early use of force. A little over a year after "9/11", NATO's Prague Summit agreed on the development of new military capabilities that would support its counter-terrorist missions, notably the NATO Response Force and various initiatives on nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapon defence. A Partnership Action Plan for the Defence against terrorism was agreed as well. And several partner countries participated in "Operation Active Endeavour", NATO's Article 5 counter-terrorist naval operation in the Mediterranean.

### ***The Lessons of Afghanistan***

Taking command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003 was another major step towards a NATO role outside Europe.

Predictably, the Afghanistan mission confronted NATO with numerous challenges, ranging from the lack of appropriate military capabilities of many allies to the perennial debate about what constituted a "fair" sharing of risks and burdens. The mission also exposed serious political and military asymmetries within the Alliance, as well as differences among allies regarding the importance of this mission and of the means necessary to succeed. Still, the Afghanistan engagement forced NATO to effect even more changes – changes that would put NATO in a much better position to meeting future challenges.

***Today's NATO is far more experienced in conducting complex operations far from home than it was before "9/11"***

One major change concerned the military capabilities of allies and partners. While many nations suffered considerable losses in Afghanistan, the ISAF mission accelerated the transformation of many nations' *Cold War* legacy forces towards expeditionary missions. For many nations in ISAF, this mission amounted to their first combat experience in decades. Confronted with demanding tasks ranging from stabilisation to counter-insurgency, the forces of many allies and partner countries had to adjust their training and equipment.

As a result, today's NATO is far more experienced in conducting complex operations far from home than it was before "9/11" and the subsequent Afghanistan mission. Moreover, the experience that NATO gained in training indigenous security forces may also provide a valuable asset in other contingencies – for example, in post-Qadhafi Libya.

Another major change concerns partnerships. As the overall objectives of NATO's Afghanistan mission were widely shared by many countries from across the globe, the Alliance became the hub of an unprecedented international coalition, with members ranging from the Asia-Pacific region to Latin America. As a result, NATO's partnerships not only became global in reach, but, like NATO itself, transformed from a regional towards a more functional approach. These changes have made NATO's partnerships a much more effective instrument for tackling future challenges, be they terrorism, proliferation, cyber attacks, or humanitarian disasters.



*The Alliance became the hub of an unprecedented international coalition... and NATO's partnerships became global in reach*

The third major area of change concerned NATO's relations with other institutions.

From the outset, NATO's role in Afghanistan was to provide for the secure environment that would allow civilian actors to play their part in re-building that war-torn country. While the engagement of the civilian side was often seen as lagging behind the military effort, the relationship between ISAF and the civilian organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, developed over time. For example, the relationship between NATO and the United Nations, which during the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s had been difficult, improved markedly.

A true Comprehensive Approach, combining political, economic, and military tools, is still a distant objective, yet NATO today is far better connected to the civilian part of the international community than it was before "9/11" and Afghanistan.

***“A true Comprehensive Approach, combining political, economic, and military tools, is still a distant objective, yet NATO today is far better connected to the civilian part of the international community than it was before “9/11” and Afghanistan”***

The transformation of NATO that was sparked by "9/11" is far from complete, however.



Al-Qaeda has been significantly weakened, but achieving by end 2014 a full transition to Afghan security leadership over all provinces and districts remains a sizeable challenge. Moreover, although NATO is now acting on several continents, the need for allies to foster a “*global*” collective mindset is not yet fully developed.

As a result, NATO often only becomes interested in a region once a crisis has erupted and the deployment of forces has to be contemplated.

Another area that still needs more attention is partnership. In particular, China and India, both countries with a serious stake in Afghanistan’s future, must be brought closer.

Finally, more conceptual work is needed with respect to NATO’s role in combating terrorism, for example by complementing the Military Concept with a political one.

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At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, NATO was confronted with a double dilemma. First, even before “9/11”, it was becoming clear that new threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, were emerging from outside of Europe, drawing the United States’ attention towards Central Asia and the Middle East. However, as long as NATO still considered itself to be solely about managing European security, any US focus away from Europe would have meant a focus away from NATO.

The second dilemma resulted from the fact that the military capabilities of most allies were still optimised for a contingency that was becoming ever less likely: a large-scale war in Europe. Hence, there were worries that US unilateralist impulses would be reinforced and Europe’s influence on Washington weakened.

***Instead of heralding NATO’s decline, “9/11” became the catalyst for the most fundamental changes in NATO’s history***

In part by design, but in larger part by simply following its sound political instincts, the transatlantic community was able to overcome those dilemmas. Instead of heralding NATO’s decline, “9/11” became the catalyst for the most fundamental changes in NATO’s history, turning the Alliance from an Alliance “*in being*” to an Alliance “*in action*”. It also reinforced NATO’s role as a unique institution that combines military competence with political appeal. The transatlantic community had demonstrated that it is, as one European observer aptly put it, a “*learning community*”.

Although “9/11” had thrown everyone off-balance, it is clear in retrospect that NATO did in fact heed the advice given by Henry Kissinger shortly after the attacks: it had turned tragedy into opportunity.

# FOOD SECURITY: THE SEED OF SOLUTION IS ALREADY HERE

*Bjørn LOMBORG*

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*The author argues that global warming's effects on food scarcity can be addressed – and now. Furthermore, he paints a picture in which less people starve in the world, despite population growth. He writes about several large-scale surveys that have looked at the effect of climate change on agricultural production and the global food trade system, underlining four of the crucial findings they have in common.*

*Moreover, he underlines that the extent of hunger depends less on climate and more on economics, acknowledging that it is utterly unrealistic to think that we could entirely stop either global warming or the economic aspects of hunger. But what we should attempt to do, in the author's opinion, is to find the scenario that gives us the lowest absolute number of hungry people – and this is correlated with making incomes the highest.*

**Keywords:** *food security; climate change; agricultural production; global warming; malnutrition*

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**W**e are often told that global warming is soon going to make it impossible to feed the planet. This dramatic overstatement of the truth leads us to focus on the wrong solutions.

When the Copenhagen Consensus Center convened a panel of Nobel Laureates to identify the best investments that could be made to help the planet, they highlighted incredibly cheap, highly effective ways to fight malnutrition, such as micronutrient supplementation, micronutrient fortification, biofortification and community nutrition programmes.

Sadly, in the developed world we do not hear enough about these solutions – or even about this challenge. When we do focus on hunger, we often see it through the wrong lens.

***The proportion of people starving has steadily declined since 1950 from more than 50% of the world's population to less than 18% today***

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The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, no. 7, 2011, [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Climate-Action/Food\\_Security\\_Solutions/EN/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Climate-Action/Food_Security_Solutions/EN/index.htm)

Bjørn Lomborg – the author of *The Skeptical Environmentalist* and *Cool It*, director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at Copenhagen Business School.

We have long worried about massive levels of future starvation: in 1968, Paul Ehrlich declared that humanity had already lost the battle to feed itself. His prediction of impending widespread starvation was based on the rudimentary idea that greater numbers of people inevitably mean less food for each individual.

In actual fact, the world's population has doubled since 1961, but food production has almost tripled. The developing world's population has slightly more than doubled while food production there has quadrupled.

The result has been rapidly rising calories available, especially in the developing world. The proportion of people starving has steadily declined since 1950 from more than 50% of the world's population to less than 18% today. The longest-term UN scenarios expect this proportion to drop steadily toward 2,9%



in 2050. This will still represent 290 million people undernourished at that time.

Several large-scale surveys that have looked at the effect of climate change on agricultural production and the global food trade system have four crucial findings in common.

First, they envision a large increase in agricultural output – more than a doubling of cereal production over the coming century. In the words of one modelling team: “Globally, land and crop resources, together with technological progress, appear to be sufficient to feed a world population of about 9 billion people in 2080”.

***The most pessimistic models, expecting the most pessimistic climate impacts, expect a total reduction of agricultural production of 1,4% compared to a scenario without any climate change***

Second, the impact of global warming on agricultural production will probably be negative, but in total very modest. The most pessimistic models, expecting the most pessimistic climate impacts, expect a total reduction of agricultural production of 1,4% compared to a scenario without any climate change. The most optimistic model forecasts a net increase in agricultural production from global warming of 1,7%. To put these numbers in perspective, the average growth rate for agriculture over the past 30 years was about 1,7%.

Third, while there will be little change globally, this is not true regionally. In general terms, global warming has a negative impact on developing nations' agriculture but a positive impact on developed nations' agriculture. This cruel reality is because temperature increases are helpful for farmers in high latitudes (bringing longer growth seasons, multiple crops, and higher yields) but mean lower productivity for those in tropical countries.





In worst-case scenarios, this will mean a 7% decrease in yield in the developing world and a 3% increase in the developed world. This is an issue that we must address, but we should also note the bigger picture: total production even in the least developed countries is expected to rise by about 270%.

Over the coming century, developing nations will inevitably become more dependent on food imports from developed countries. This is not primarily a global warming phenomenon: even without global warming, imports for least developed countries would double over the century because of demographics. Global warming causes the import increase to go from about 100% to 110-140%.

We should keep in mind that developing country consumers in 2080 will be considerably better off than they are today. One modelling team points out that future developing nation consumers *“are largely separated from agricultural production processes, dwelling in cities and earning incomes in the non-agricultural sectors. As in today’s developed countries, consumption levels depend largely on food prices and incomes rather than on changes in domestic agricultural production”*.

Fourth, overall, global warming will be responsible for up to 28 million more malnourished people in the most likely scenario. (Other scenarios show lower impacts, ranging down to global warming causing an overall reduction in the number of malnourished people by 28 million).

***The extent of hunger depends less on climate and more on economics***

It is important to put this into context. The world now has about 925 million malnourished. Over the coming century we will add at least 2-3 billion more people, yet it is likely that towards the end of the century, there will be *“only”* about 108 million people starving.

The extent of hunger depends less on climate and more on economics. Even dramatically controlling global warming (imagine that we somehow halted emissions today) would maximally avoid 28 million people from going hungry by the end of the century. By comparison, if we manage to move from one of the UN’s less economically effective scenarios to one of the more effective scenarios, we could avoid 1 065 million hungry people by the end of the century.

Of course, it is utterly unrealistic to think that we could entirely stop either global warming or the economic aspects of hunger. But what we should attempt

to do is to find the scenario that gives us the lowest absolute number of hungry people – and this is correlated with making incomes the highest.

Using climate policy to obtain a small reduction is simply not a sound or ethical strategy. Carbon cuts create a small, far-off change in temperature rises. If the Kyoto Protocol had been fully implemented, this would have reduced malnutrition by just 2 million people in 2080, at an annual cost of \$180 billion.



However, if we really care about helping the hungry, we can do much better.

This is where cheap, effective responses to malnutrition enter the picture. The Nobel Laureate Expert Panel that recommended greater investment in micronutrient supplementation, micronutrient fortification, biofortification, and community nutrition programmes in the Copenhagen Consensus 2008 project did so because even tiny investments in these areas can make a powerful difference.

Through fortifying basic food items (such as with iron), developing more nutritious crops, and ensuring more comprehensive delivery of micronutrient supplements, we can deal much better with the often overlooked problem of undernutrition. Community nutrition programmes can help to deliver sustainable improvements that benefit families and the entire community in the long run (for the research underpinning these recommendations, see: [www.copenhagenconsensus.com](http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com)).

***We must recognise that the extent of hunger depends very little on climate***

Other highly ranked investments by the Nobel Laureate Expert Panel, such as the expansion of vaccination and deworming coverage, improved malaria prevention and treatment, and lowering barriers to girls' schooling, would deliver lasting changes that would make the world's most vulnerable communities stronger and more resilient.

If we care about helping the most people escape from hunger, then we must recognise that the extent of hunger depends very little on climate and much more on economics.



# GENERAL HENRI MATHIAS BERTHELOT – 150 Years from his Birth –



Colonel (r.) Dr Ion GIURCĂ

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*In the first half of 1917, General H.M. Berthelot and the members of the French Military Mission were involved entirely and with remarkable results in the processes of reorganisation of the Romanian Armed Forces.*

*Establishing large units, training cadres and the troops, enabling the arrival of military material, assembling and sending it to units, organising training centres and military schools were several activities in which the French military men had an undisputable place and role.*

*Despite all the difficulties generated by the winter of 1917 and the status of the communications in Moldova, General H.M. Berthelot was present everywhere in order to oversee and guide the specific activities throughout the reorganisation period.*

**Keywords:** military authorities; Ukraine; truce; Central Powers; Basarabia

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**M**odern Romanian history comprises several examples of political and military figures from European countries and not only who played an important part in our internal events, in keeping with the entrusted missions, with the ability to understand Romanian realities and connect with the living and working style in our ethnic area, sometimes having certain personal interests, and last but not least, with the feelings and emotional connections set with the representatives of the host country.

Among them, we can mention **General Henri Mathias Berthelot** (1861-1931), from whose birth we have recently celebrated 150 years and who was one of those who had an indisputable place and role in Romania's Unification War, both when he was the chief of the French Military Mission in Romania (October 1916-March 1919) and when the French Armed Forces were present on the Romanian land, between October 1918 and May 1919, when he acted as Commander of the Danube Army.

Born on 7 December 1861, in Fleurs, Burgundy, into the family of a French gendarme,

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Colonel (r.) Prof. Dr Ion Giurcă – Hyperion University, București.

he dedicates entirely to the military career, graduating, among others, from the famous Saint-Cyr Military Academy, in 1883.

As of 1907, he is assigned to the French General Staff, being promoted deputy of the first second-in-command of the Chief of the Armed Forces Staff and, after the outbreak of the First World War, he is named first-deputy of the Commander of the North and North-East Theatre of Operations.

In November 1916, he is appointed in command, being promoted up to the rank of army corps commander on the French front.

The unfavourable situation on the Romanian front, after the awful defeat in Turtucaia and its aftermath, determines Romania's political and military leadership to demand the presence of a French Military Mission on the Romanian front, which arrives in the country on 16/29 October 1916, led by the General who will become so famous in the Romanian Army through his appearance, behaviour and fondness for the Romanian cause and to Romania, in agreement with the mission assigned by the French Great Headquarters.

According to Constantin Kirişescu, when General H. M. Berthelot arrives in Periş railway station, I.I.C. Brătianu – Romania's Prime Minister – greets him with these words: *“Welcome, General! I salute you, if I may be allowed, as the Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff”*<sup>1</sup>. Naturally, General H. M. Berthelot declines the offer, his mandate entrusted by the French authorities stating clearly that he must support and assist Romanian commands and units in carrying out operations and fights, in employing newly procured means, especially French-made ones, in advising staff officers at the Great Headquarters and army commands.

The arrival of the French Military Mission and of General H.M. Berthelot is received with hope and trust. I.G. Duca, minister in I.I.C. Brătianu government, welcomes from the beginning the outspokenness and diplomacy of the French General: *“all his observations were made with great diplomacy, being obviously concerned not to offend and to respect our legitimate torments. Without hiding the gravity of the situation, he reassured us through his natural optimism and especially through the note of absolute confidence in the result he brought from France. It is undeniable that, through his presence, he made us feel more openly that France was by our side throughout all the challenges, but hid from us what we eventually found out – that, in those moments, it was undergoing, in its turn, great hardships and painful doubts”*<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Constantin Kirişescu, *Istoria Războiului pentru Întregirea României: 1916-1919*, vol. 1, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1989, p. 392.

<sup>2</sup> I.G. Duca, *Memorii*, vol. III, Editura Machiavelli, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 68.

While the King, Prime Minister and members of the government welcome with satisfaction and confidence the French military presence, high ranking officers, General Dumitru Iliescu himself – who is Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff –, show some reservations, especially when it comes to General H.M. Berthelot. General D. Iliescu would have wanted Colonel M. Despres – Frances Military Attaché in Bucharest – in this position, with whom he collaborated very well.

General Alexandru Averescu also shows and expresses his reservations towards the presence of the French Military Mission officers in the command of his army: *“I am not sure whether they will complicate things around here. They are very bright and full of knowledge. But we are bright too, even too much, and we also have the knowledge. Of course, they have the two-year war experience, but I have the feeling they lack the common sense to see that what they apply in France cannot be applied without any adjustments here”*<sup>3</sup>.

Nor are the appreciations to General H.M. Berthelot among the most positive ones: *“We spoke of the situation of our armed forces and I must confess that I was choking when hearing recommendations so-called practical, but totally theoretical, perfectly and absolutely unaware of the local situation”*<sup>4</sup>. In fact, throughout the entire stay of General H.M. Berthelot in Romania, the relation between General Averescu and him is unfriendly, especially after General Prezan is appointed Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, a decision the Chief of the French Military Mission was no stranger to.

At the Romanian Great Headquarters, the presence of French military men is well seen and welcome, as Major Radu R. Rosetti will write later: *“We had the most comradely and loyal collaboration with the Berthelot Mission, as they considered our cause as theirs. Their competence has never made me envious... As a Romanian, I was not flattered by the need for strangers to guide the way things worked. But I figured it out immediately that we could capitalise on their knowledge and experience”*<sup>5</sup>.

Maybe unanticipated by the country’s political and military leadership, the presence of General H.M. Berthelot commanding 1 500 French soldiers in Romania determines the reaction of the Russian Great Headquarters, definitely affecting the Romanian-Russian political and military relations. From the Russians’ point of view, the place and role of the French Military Mission should have belonged to a Russian missions, starting from the idea of the direct cooperation and collaboration between the Romanian and the Tsarist Armed Forces.

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<sup>3</sup> Mareșal Alexandru Avrescu, *Notițe zilnice din Război*, vol. 2, Editura Militară, București, 1992, p. 65.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 69.

<sup>5</sup> General Radu R. Rosetti, *Mărturisiri (1914-1919)*, Editura Modelism, București, 1997, p. 134.

The Russian reaction is instant – a Military Mission commanded by General M.A. Beleaev is sent, whose stated purpose was “*not to help the Romanians, but to prevent the Berthelot Mission from succeeding*”<sup>6</sup>.

Despite all the efforts made, General H.M. Berthelot and his collaborators cannot prevent the Romanian Armed Forces from suffering a painful defeat in the autumn of 1916.

In December 1916, the General and some of his collaborators move to Iași, even though the Great Headquarters and King Ferdinand I remain in Bârlad until March 1917. Although the situation is disadvantageous from the point of view of military collaboration, the presence of General H.M. Berthelot in Iași proves to be beneficial as far as the cooperation with the government and the representatives of allied states is concerned, especially regarding the settlement of the Romanian-Russian dispute related to: exerting the military command of the Romanian front, subordinating the Romanian railways to Russian bodies, evacuating the military forces to the East of the Nistru River with a view to reorganising.

Against the background of some indecisions of the Romanian authorities regarding the requests of the Russian Great Headquarters, General H.M. Berthelot insists and convinces the King, members of the government and General Prezan not to give in to the pressure exerted from Moghilev or Iași, where there are the Tsar’s representatives in Romania.

In January 1917, even though his intention is to go to Petrograd to advocate the Romanian cause, and France’s one indirectly, General H.M. Berthelot only reaches Moghilev, where he has a long talk with General V.I. Gurko, the Chief of the Russian Great Headquarters at the time. Referring to this moment, General V. Pétin will write later: “*the exchanges of views between General Berthelot and General Gurko, who defended the Russian point of view, were intense and pointed to profound divergences. You are more Romanian than Romanians, Gurko told one day to Berthelot. Actually, we were not more Romanian than Romanians, but actively supported the French interests through our action*”<sup>7</sup>.

In the first half of 1917, General H.M. Berthelot and the members of the French Military Mission involve themselves directly and with outstanding results in the processes of the armed forces reorganisation. Establishing large units, training cadres and troops, providing the arrival of military material,

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>7</sup> General Pétin, *Le drame roumain, 1916-1918*, Paris, 1932, pp. 149-150.

assembling it and sending it to units, organising training centres and military schools are some of the activities in which the French military men have an undisputable place and role.

Despite all the difficulties generated by the winter of 1917 and the situation of the communications in Moldova, General H.M. Berthelot is present everywhere to examine and guide the activities specific to the reorganisation period.

General H.M. Berthelot is also involved in the harmonisation of the Romanian and Russian points of view regarding operations planning on the Moldova front, in the summer of 1917, mediating with good results between the Romanian and Russian commanders.

Romanian Armed Forces achieving the combat ready status, in keeping with the adopted campaign plan, determines General H.M. Berthelot to demand C. Prezan that: *“regarding the situation that will soon be created through the activity of operations, the place of the French officers in the mission must change”*<sup>8</sup>. Out of courtesy, General C. Prezan responds in favour of the French request, although he is aware that this will infringe on the unity of troops command principle.

In fact, the decision is not received well at the Great Headquarters, in a report dating 17 July 1917 being shown that: *“In all occasions, the French Mission looks as exerting an absolute tutelage and seems not to understand the needs of the Romanian command in terms of organisation and procurement and, more than that, it seems to impose its plan under a form that apparently must not offend”*<sup>9</sup>. The problems is eventually settled in a manner through which a tense situation is avoided, the French officers keeping their place and position in relation to the other commanders of Romanian large units and units.

In the summer of 1917, General H.M. Berthelot is not involved in commanding the military operations on the Romanian front, but he is a careful observer of the evolution of the situation. He is not directly involved in the replacement of General C. Cristescu from the command of the First Army, but he believes the decision is timely, showing that he *“has not shown enough energy and has not managed to have a good collaboration with Ragoza (the Commander of the Russian Army – A./N.), who would have wanted to already be deployed on the right bank of the Siret River”*<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> *Arhivele Militare Române (AMR), Microfilme*, P III 5.193, c. 700.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, c. 699.

<sup>10</sup> Glenn Torrey, *General Henri Berthelot and Romania. Mémoires et correspondances. 1916-1919*, East European Monographs, Boulder, 1987, p. 97.

The situation created in the autumn of 1917 on the front in Moldova, as a consequence of the hostile attitude of the bolshevised Russian troops towards their commanders and even towards the Romanian authorities requires General H.M. Berthelot to intervene at the Russian commanders to re-establish the order. He discusses with the Romanian side and acts to maintain the country in war, being obvious that the Russian troops are not reliable anymore. The concern of the French Military Mission is to recover the materials in Odessa, in the railway stations and in the storage houses in Basarabia and Ukraine, which must be made available to the Romanian Armed Forces.

General H.M. Berthelot manifests himself directly before the Romanian political and military authorities with a view to avoiding to sign the truce with the Central Power, being in favour of resistance until the *“final extremity”*, but his action fails, with many consequences in the following months for the Western front and Romania as well as at the level of the relations with Entente states. Given his position, H.M. Berthelot participates in talks in which important decisions are taken for the future of Romanian-Russian relations: the disarmament of the Russian troops in Socola (during the night of 8/12 – 9/22 December 1917) and the Romanian military intervention in Basarabia.

The main concern of the French General is to convince whoever and in any way of the needs to organise, in any conditions, a strong resistance in Moldova, to immobilise the French troops. He has failed in that as well.

The beginning of 1918 marks the decrease in the activity of General H.M. Berthelot in the line of the assigned mission, given that Romania signs the truce with the Central Powers in Focșani (24 November/7 December 1917), Russia signs the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers (18 February/3 March 1918), and in Iași is established a government led by General Alexandru Averescu, forced, in his turn, to negotiate peace with the Central Powers.

Under the threat of denouncing the truce and starting the offensive in Moldova, the command of the Central Powers in Romania manages to impose the signing of the Preliminary Treaty of Buftea (20 February/5 March 1918), which stipulates, among others, the withdrawal of the French Military Mission.

The departure of General H.M. Berthelot and the French Military Mission from Romania, on 5/18 March 1918, represents a sad moment for the Romanian Royal family, for the members of the former government led by I.I.C. Brătianu,



but less for General A. Averescu, who makes not even the most elementary gesture of courtesy towards those who militated and acted in keeping with Romania's interests.

The moment I.G. Duca and H.M. Berthelot say goodbye is expressed in sad words by the one who has shown great trust in the French General: *"We all had tears in our eyes. He reassured us, we expressed all our gratitude towards the French Mission and towards himself. All of us kept intact the belief in the final victory of the allies but we could not bear the pathos of the days that lay ahead"*<sup>11</sup>.

The belief in victory augured well, in only a few months, General H. M. Berthelot resuming his collaboration with Romanian authorities.

Being made in charge of the Danube Army in the night of 8/9 October 1918, General H.M. Berthelot sends to the King and to I.I.C. Brătianu the request for Romania to re-entry as soon as possible in the war against Central Powers.

The decision is fundamentally important for the future of the relations between Romania and the Entente states, in the perspective of the peace that will soon be imposed on the defeated states.

The promptness of the action of Romanian authorities results in the fact that Romania is in a state of war with the Central Powers at the time the Compiègne truce is signed. After the Danube is crossed by the troops commanded by General H.M. Berthelot, he establishes his headquarters in Giurgiu, being mainly concerned with: evacuating the Bulgarian troops from Dobrogea, returning the Romanian leadership to București, organising the military cooperation between Romania and Entente states, being mandated in this respect by Georges Clemenceau.

On 13/26 November 1918, in Giurgiu, a meeting takes place between Generals C. Prezan and H.M. Berthelot, during which issues are discussed in regard to the Romanian participation in the Entente projects related to Russia's reestablishment, without Basarabia.

In this context, the issue of re-establishing the Romanian authorities in Dobrogea is discussed, between the borders set in 1913, as well as the movement of Romanian troops in Transilvania to the Mureș River line, the evacuation of Banat by the Serbian army etc.

General H.M. Berthelot is present in București at the ceremony of the return of the Royal family and government members in the capital city and at the manifestations occasioned by the decisions taken by Bucovina

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<sup>11</sup> I.G. Duca, *Memorii, op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 93.

and Transilvania to unite with Romania, refusing any contact with the persons that have manifested in favour of the Central Powers.

A series of rumours launched in București in relation to not respecting the obligations assumed by the allies towards Romania, especially as far as the fate of Basarabia is concerned, are dismissed by H.M. Berthelot on 6/19 December 1918.

Against the backdrop of the anti-Romanian manifestations of the Hungarians from Transilvania and Hungary, H.M. Berthelot, joined by Radu R. Rosetti, makes a 9-day trip to Belgrade, Banat, Crișana and Transilvania, everywhere Romanians giving them a warm reception.

Being convinced of the legitimacy of the union of Romanians into one state and of the need for this state to be acknowledged by the Allied and Associated Powers, General H.M. Berthelot suggests, on 20 January 1919, *“that we ask too much permission for what we intend to do. We should try to make «des faits accomplis»”*<sup>12</sup>.

The General’s firm attitude towards the manifestations of Hungarians from Transilvania is somehow in contradiction to the ideas of General Franchet d’Espèrey, which are considered hostile to Romania, as well as with those of the government in Paris, which believes that *“General Berthelot’s situation is shaken; it is expressed the concern that the one who will replace him would not be as favourable as him”*<sup>13</sup>.

Contrary to the dispositions coming from Paris regarding the advance of Romanian troops in Transilvania, on 19 April 1919, H.M. Berthelot tells Lieutenant Colonel Radu R. Rosetti: *“You must proceed with the action in Hungary until you put Hungarians out of the fight”*<sup>14</sup>. In full offensive towards West, the Romanian troops reach the Tisa River, where they start the defensive on a broad front, with the main forces in depth, the Romanian Great Headquarters proving that they do not intend to cross the river, as the government in Budapest claimed on every occasion.

For various reasons, apparently generated by General Franchet d’Espèrey, General H.M. Berthelot requests to be recalled to France on 20 March 1919. Therefore, on 28 April 1919, General Graziani arrives in București, with a new staff, assuming the position and the attributions established.

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<sup>12</sup> General Radu R. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p. 333.


<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, p. 343.

The imminent departure of the French General is marked by a sumptuous reception at the Cotroceni Palace, during which King Ferdinand I speaks highly of General Berthelot, with admiration and gratitude for everything he has done for Romania.

General H.M. Berthelot leaves București on 6 May 1919, when an impressive number of people show great sympathy towards the one who has identified himself with the Romanians' struggle for unity, the one who has understood, throughout his entire missions, that the victory of Romanians also means the victory of France.

For his merits in Romania's Unification War, General H.M. Berthelot is declared an honorary citizen of Romania, being given a plot of land and a house in Fărcădinu de Jos (today, General Berthelot), Hunedoara County, which will be left through his will to the Romanian Academy. He is awarded the "*Mihai Viteazul*" Order and is elected honorary member of the Romanian Academy.

150 years after the birth of the most famous French General in Romania, we have intended not only to draw attention once more to his place and role in the tragic and great events of the years 1916-1919, but also to point out that Romania's political and military history of this time cannot be written unless we invoke, mention, present and analyse the activity of the one Romanian soldiers used to nickname "*Tata Burtălău*"\*!

***English version by***  
 ***Iulia NĂSTASIE***

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\* Approximate translation: *Papa Potbelly* (translator's note).

# THE EXPEDITION OF THE TEN THOUSAND

Ioan-Sebastian ILIE

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*The expedition of the ten thousand represented an important moment from the ideological point of view: after they defeated the Persian troops at home, but failed in territories outside the Greek area, the entire Hellenic world is now witness to the fact that a small force of disciplined Hoplites defeats the army of the “king of kings” near his capital, crosses huge distances and defeats a series of Asian populations.*

*The author points out that, for the first time, conquering the great Persian Empire becomes an attractive possibility for the Greek world, in permanent need of grain and “storage space” for the demographic surplus, which will eventually be accomplished 70 years later by Alexander the Great, following the project of his father, Phillip II, one of the readers of “Anabasis”.*

**Keywords:** *Thucydides; Greek troops; escort; sea transport; mercenaries*

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the safety of Levantine ports, 70 years before the well-known expedition of Alexander the Great.

**B**etween 401 and 399 BC, approximately ten thousand Greek mercenaries, from all the corners of the Greek world, just coming out of the great Peloponnesian war, take “one of the greatest adventures in humankind history”<sup>1</sup>, as British historian Will Durant called it.

Initially coming in support of the pretender to the Persian throne, Cyrus the Younger, the disunited group of Greek outlaws and adventurers soon finds itself tens of thousands of miles from home. Surrounded on all sides by hostile people, hunted by the army of the one they tried to remove from power and lacking any consistent leadership, despite the impossible situation, even exceeding their expectations, the small Pan-Hellenic army still manages to traverse more than 7 000 kilometres, creating a true “military republic”<sup>2</sup>. They come thus into contact with the large oriental world they met until then only through the campaigns during the Persian wars and the exaggerated stories of traders who do not venture beyond

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<sup>1</sup> Will Durant, *The Life of Greece*, Ed. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1939, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p. 67.

Among the many expatriates of the expedition there is a young, 30-year-old man, named Xenophon (430-354 BC). Born into an aristocratic family with anti-democratic views, pro-Spartan (participating with them in the battle of Coronea), an admirer and friend of Socrates<sup>3</sup>, Xenophon is to be noticed as a skillful general during the expedition and he will capture it in his historical work *"Anabasis"*. This is a story in seven books of the journey that takes its name from the Greek term *"anabasis"* = journey from the coast to the inside, a term describing only partially the endeavour of Xenophon's companions, who make, at the same time, a *"katabasis"* = journey from the inside to the coast<sup>4</sup>. Besides the *"Anabasis"*, Xenophon writes *"Hellenica"*, a continuation of Thucydides' *"History of the Peloponnesian War"*, and many Socratic-style philosophical dialogues and treatises, placing second after Plato in terms of value<sup>5</sup>. In any case, *"Anabasis"* is the main source for the expedition of the ten thousand, a narrative work easy to read, in which influences from the work of Thucydides could be observed (the dramatic speeches delivered by Xenophon and other characters) as well as from the work of Herodotus (legends, historical anecdotes learned by the army during the journey and the otherness used to define *"barbarians"*)<sup>6</sup>. Mention should be made that Xenophon never speaks about him in the first person and, even when directly addressing the reader, he does it referring to himself as a person separated from the author, an innovation both in literary and historiographical terms, attributed by some historians to Xenophon's desire to seem more reliable by dissociating his vision from his real presence<sup>7</sup>.

The gathering of the army as well as the march and its actions in the service of pretender Cyrus are found in the first book of *"Anabasis"*. Following the death of Persian King Darius II, two of his sons – Artaxerxes II and Cyrus the Younger, the leader of satraps in Asia Minor, dispute his throne. Aware of the military skills of Greek Hopliters, Cyrus raises an army of mercenaries from different regions. The diversity of areas to which these soldiers belong is illustrated as follows: 5 000 Hopliters from Arcadia and the Peloponnese region, 1 000 Hopliters from the Greek islands, 1 500 Spartans, Argolians and other Laconians, 1 500 Beotians

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<sup>3</sup> At [ancienthistory.about.com/historians/p/Xenophon](http://ancienthistory.about.com/historians/p/Xenophon), retrieved on 27.12.2010.

<sup>4</sup> Zoe Petre, *Civilizația greacă și originile democrației*, Editura Erasmus, București, 1993, p. 89.

<sup>5</sup> At [ancienthistory.about.com/historians/p/Xenophon](http://ancienthistory.about.com/historians/p/Xenophon), *loc. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> At [www.britannica.com/.../Anabasis-as-discussed-in-Xenophon-Greek-historian](http://www.britannica.com/.../Anabasis-as-discussed-in-Xenophon-Greek-historian), retrieved on 27.12.2010.

<sup>7</sup> J. Rich and G. Shiplez, *War and Society in the Greek World*, Editura Free Press Publishing, New York, 1995, p. 236.

and other 1 000 Greeks from other regions, including 300 from Syracuse (Greece Magna – Sicily), 200 Cretan and Athenian archers, such as Xenophon. About 1 000 Thracians brought by General Clearchus<sup>8</sup> add to them. As far as motivation is concerned, a clear diversity is obvious: some of them, like Menon, former tyrant of Thessaly, joins the expedition in an effort to get Persian help, with which he can regain his power and wealth; others, like Spartan Clearchus, are part of the former generation of combatants from the Peloponnesian war, for whom “*war is a mistress*” they cannot live without; some, such as Proxenus of Beotia, are part of it only for the simple desire of material gain; and some are outcasts of their own cities (it is also Clearchus’ case, who is declared dead “*in absentio*” in Sparta)<sup>9</sup>. As for Xenophon, he justifies his participation following the invitation made by his friend Proxenus, a decision that he has not made before consulting another good friend, philosopher Socrates, who advises him to rely on the advice of the Oracle of Delphi. But he is reprimanded after Xenophon asks the question: “*To which of the gods must I pray and do sacrifices so that I might best accomplish my intended journey?*” – a trick that shows us unequivocally that Xenophon wants to participate<sup>10</sup>. It is unclear if at this date he has already been ostracised or whether this takes place only after the trial of Socrates<sup>11</sup>.

Under the command of the leaders of each group (the most important ones being presented above) and under the general theoretical command of Clearchus, the Greek soldiers, together with the forces of Cyrus, cross Asia Minor, the Anatolian Plateau, the Syrian gates, go down along the Euphrates in Mesopotamia and fight the Battle of Cunaxa with the forces of Artaxerxes<sup>12</sup>. Although the Greek Hoplites manage to chase away the Persian infantry and then the cavalry, Cyrus is killed in combat and mercenaries are thus left without leadership and without targets, near the distant Babylon<sup>13</sup>.

From this follows the desperate withdrawal of Greek forces, in their attempt to reach the Black Sea coast, near the Caucasus, being impossible to return on the road followed to get there – events recounted in books II and III. Clearchus initially manages to negotiate a truce with Artaxerxes, who sends Tissaphernes with a large army with which to escort the Greeks home<sup>14</sup>. However, soon this turns

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<sup>8</sup>Xenophon, *Anabasis*, translated by H.G. Dakyins, Oxford, 1932, at <http://en.wikisource.org>, retrieved on 27.12.2010, I, 2.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid*, I, 3 and II, 6.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid*, III, 1.

<sup>11</sup>At [www.xenophon-mit.org/milhist/greece/xenolife.html](http://www.xenophon-mit.org/milhist/greece/xenolife.html), retrieved on 27.12.2010.

<sup>12</sup>Xenophon, *op. cit.*, II, 9.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid*, I, 10.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid*, II, 2.

out to be nothing else but a Persian trick, Tissaphernes inviting General Clearchus and the other generals at a banquet only to behead them afterwards<sup>15</sup>. With the entire ruling class literally beheaded, a new leadership comes shortly, consisting of second class officers, democratically elected by the soldiers. They include Xenophon, who manages to impose himself in front of the soldiers through speeches and wise strategies, based on visions received from Zeus in a dream, as well as Spartan Chirisophus<sup>16</sup>. The two become leaders of the rear guard, respectively of the vanguard, the latter becoming a kind of substitute for Clearchus as a supreme leader, in fact, a kind of hegemon out of necessity for other generals and leaders, a position quite similar, actually, to the one Sparta had towards the other Greek cities at that time<sup>17</sup>.

Continuously harassed by Persian mounted archers, the Greeks will soon have to adapt their military technique. Composed mainly of heavy infantry troops, the Hoplites being usually lined up in their phalanx formation, the Greek army quickly realises that it needs the support of the cavalry and of some troops able to shoot at long distance. In this respect, they create a force of slingshooters coming mainly from Rhodes and an improvised cavalry, consisting of horses captured along the way. Moreover, the role of Cretan archers and light infantry troops, mostly Thracians, becomes increasingly important in order to force the enemy to fight directly with the body of Hoplites, before which no other infantry troop at that time could resist<sup>18</sup>.

Advancing along the Tigris, the Greeks reject the attacks of Tissaphernes, make their way with difficulty through Zagros Mountains, which are in the possession of the extremely hostile Charduchians (Kurdish) mountain tribes, fight the mercenaries of the satrap of Armenia, cross snowy mountains near Lake Van, enduring extreme cold, snow deposits and a powerful storm, followed by the drought and heat of the rocky deserts in the region. They face, at the same time, a series of hostile tribes, from Taochians to Macronians, each with their own unique way of fighting, from the fortification in some points to the direct fight with double-edged axes. The moment the army finally sees the Black Sea coast is celebrated with a universally known cry: "*Thalassa! Thalassa!*"<sup>19</sup>.

Reaching the Greek colony Trapezos (now Trapzon), the army divides – the wounded, the infirm and the elder find a direct sea transport, while the rest,

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, II, 3.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, III, 1.

<sup>17</sup> J. Rich And G. Shiplez, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

<sup>18</sup> At <http://www.historiamilitar.es/ingles>, retrieved on 27.12.2010.

<sup>19</sup> Xenophon, *op. cit.*, IV, 2, 3 and 4.

after a few plundering expeditions launched against Colchians and other locals, continues the trip along the coast of the Black Sea (now the northern coast of Turkey). At this point, the army amounts to approximately 8 000 people, a record, if we consider the difficulties encountered along the way<sup>20</sup>.

However, the route followed on the coast proves to be just as difficult for the Greeks, who find themselves deprived of food more than they have been throughout the rest of the route being successively attacked by different populations, such as Paphlagonians, who capture any small group separated from the army, and Pontic Thracians, extremely ferocious warriors. This is the part of the journey in which Xenophon becomes the de facto leader of the expedition, after Chirisophus leaves in a boat, hoping to obtain a Spartan fleet<sup>21</sup>, and Xenophon must face many conspiracies from within (because he has toyed with the idea of founding a city on the coast of Asia Minor), also favoured by the mix of various Greek colonies on the coast, more or less willing to help them. For a brief moment, the army even breaks up into three parts – “*Arcadian*”, “*Athenian*” and “*Spartan*” – to reunite after the Arcadian part is almost destroyed by the Thracians. These events are the subject of books V and VI.

Arriving, at last, in Europe, in Byzantium, the army is in a deplorable state, without food and money, betrayed by the Spartans as well, who refuse to help them. Faced with this situation and as the only general of the army (Chirisophus dies of fever, and the others die in combat or desert), Xenophon decides to put himself in the service of Thracian King Seuthes II, deposed at that time by an Odrysian branch from northern Thrace<sup>22</sup>.

This latest Thracian campaign is the subject of the seventh book and ends with Seuthes recovering his throne, but paying very poorly the mercenaries. Being again impoverished, “*the ten thousand*”, which are now slightly above 5 000, choose to put themselves in the Spartans’ service<sup>23</sup>. Determined to return home, Xenophon decides to lead some of his old soldiers in several actions in Asia Minor, where he captures the local satrap, in return to whom he gets an important ransom and then leaves the army for good and settles on an estate in Laconia, granted by the Spartans. His departure also means the end of the ten thousand, most of whom managed more or less to return home<sup>24</sup>.

The expedition of the ten thousand is a milestone from the ideological point of view as well: after defeating the Persian armies on their territory, but failing

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, V, 1.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, V, 2.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, VI, 1.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, VII, 6.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, VII, 8.



in territories outside the Greek world, the entire Greek world is now witness to the fact that a small force of disciplined Hoplites defeats the army of the “*king of kings*” near its capital, crosses vast distances and defeats a number of Asian populations. For the first time, conquering the vast Persian empire becomes an attractive option for the Greek world, in constant need of grain and “*storage space*” for surplus population, which will be realised 70 years later by Alexander the Great, following the project of his father, Philip II, one of the readers of “*Anabasis*”.

On the other hand, the ten thousand represent a model of unity, probably the only one in the Ancient Times, in which almost all ethnic Greek groups are affiliated in a common action and purpose, although the implications of this fact will be void<sup>25</sup>.

Nor should one overlook the reality that this expedition highlights, for the first time, a new professional class in the Greek world – the *mercenarism*, which, after 100 years, will explode in the context of the fights between the Hellenistic kingdoms of Diadochi<sup>26</sup>.

In any case, the existence on such a large scale of mercenaries proves that, following the almost continuous Peloponnesian war, an entire class of citizens from different cities emerges, whose sole source of income is war, citizens who, deprived of it at home, look for opportunities in distant places and discover, thus, the edifice in decline of the Persian empire of Achaemenid nature, which will be soon exploited by the Macedonian kingdom, whose ruler – Alexander – will use, during his campaign, the “*Anabasis*” as a strategic guide with effects that really speak for themselves.

***English version by***  
 ***Iulia NĂSTASIE***

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<sup>25</sup> At [www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient](http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient), retrieved on 27.12.2010.

<sup>26</sup> Zoe Petre, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

**THE 2010**  
**GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ**  
**JOURNAL AWARDS**  
**THE 13<sup>TH</sup> EDITION – 11 November 2011**


The 13<sup>th</sup> edition of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal Awards ceremony took place, just as in the previous years, under the auspices of the events celebrating the Day of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff (12 November). The mission of the *Journal Awards Selection, Evaluation and Nomination Commission*, chaired by Lieutenant General Dr Sorin Ioan, was difficult and challenging at the same time: to choose the winners from almost 50 works selected. The awards were given by Lieutenant General Dr Ștefan Dănilă, Chief of the General Staff.



Here are the laureates of the *Journal Awards* for this year:

- *The First Award*

of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal was given to **Colonel (r.) Dr Petre OTU** for “*Pace și război în spațiul românesc. Secolul al XX-lea*” (“*Peace and War in the Romanian Area. The 20<sup>th</sup> Century*”).



- *The Second Award*


of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal was given to **Lieutenant Colonel Dr Ion CĂLIN** for “*Managementul informațiilor grupării de forțe cu rol operativ în operații întrunite*” (“*Operational Task Force Information Management in Joint Operations*”).

- *The Third Award*

of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal was given to **Lieutenant Colonel Dr Filofteia REPEZ** for “*Aspecte politice ale securității României*” (“*Political Aspects regarding Romania’s Security*”).



**Other nominees  
for the Gândirea militară românească  
Journal Awards were:**





Nominees for the **First Award:**

*“Securitatea energetică. Dimensiuni euroatlantice”  
 (“Energy Security. Euro-Atlantic Dimensions”),*

authors **Admiral (r.) Dr Gheorghe MARIN, Ionel BAIBARAC  
and Rear Admiral (r.) Dr Victor BARBU,**

and *“Războiul din Afghanistan (1979-1989)” (“The War in Afghanistan (1979-1989)”*),  
author **Ion XENOFONTOV.**




Nominees for the **Second Award:**

*“Transformarea militară. Coordonate instructiv-educative și de învățământ”  
 (“Military Transformation. Training and Educational Directions”),*

second volume, authors **Major General Dr Dan GHICA-RADU,  
Brigadier General (r.) Dr Emil Victor CHEȚE and Major Dr Aurelian RAȚIU,**  
and *“Operațiile postconflict” (“Postconflict Operations”),*

authors **Colonel (r.) Dr Lucian STÂNCILĂ,  
Lieutenant Colonel Dr Ion PÎRGULESCU and Eugen CONSTANTIN.**



Nominees for the **Third Award:**  
“*Cedarea și evacuarea Cadrilaterului în anul 1940*”  
 (“*Cession and Evacuation of Cadrilater in 1940*”),  
authors **Brigadier General (r.) Dr Ion CRÎNGUȘ** and **Colonel (r.) Dr Ion GIURCĂ**,  
and “*Misiunea generalului Coandă la Stavka (1916-1917)*”  
 (“*General Coandă’s Mission to Stavka (1916-1917)*”),  
coordinator **Colonel (r.) Vasile POPA**.



There were also given two Certificates of Excellence, as follows:

- to **Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Apărare și Istorie Militară (Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History)** for “*Reforma militară și societatea în România (1878-2008). Relaționări externe și determinări naționale*” (“*Military Reform and Society in Romania (1878-2008). Foreign Relations and National Determinants*”);



- to Direcția Personal și Mobilizare din Statul Major General (Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate within the General Staff), for coordinating the volume: "Psihologie aplicată în mediul militar. Tendințe și orientări actuale ale psihologiei militare românești (PSIHOMIL VII)" ("Psychology Applied in the Military. Current Trends and Orientations in Romanian Military Psychology").



GMR

English version by  
Iulia NĂSTASIE

# 2011 / 2012

*Thank you, dear collaborators, for the word materialised in the pages of the journal of the General Staff !*

*Thank you for the fact that, together, we have written a page in the history of the Romanian Military Thinking !*

*Therefore, it is to each of You we express our gratitude and appreciation:*

1. Dr Ioana Valeria ALEXE
2. Lieutenant Colonel Iulian Vasile ALISTAR
3. Colonel (AF) Mihalachi ANGHEL
4. Colonel Virgil ASAN-MIC
5. Colonel Sorin Silviu BĂLĂŞESCU
6. Lieutenant Colonel BEng Daniel BĂNICĂ
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13. Colonel Nicolaie BUZATU
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52. Dr Mihai POPESCU  
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67. Lieutenant Colonel BEng Dr Ionel STOICA  
68. Colonel (AF) Dr Dan STROESCU  
69. Cristian-Dan ȘTEFAN  
70. Colonel (AF) Dr Mihai ȘTIR  
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    BEng Ovidiu Ionel TĂRPEȘCU  
74. Dr Olaf THEILER  
75. Colonel BEng Florian TOMIȚĂ  
76. Colonel Dr BEng Gheorghe ȚUCUNETE  
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*“RMT” Editorial Staff*

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**Manuscripts** submitted to the editorial staff should be sent by mail or email, edited in *Microsoft Word, Times New Roman, size 14, justify*, and they should have no more than *8 pages*. The **graphic illustration** – schemes, figures, tables should be designed using *CorelDraw*, and maps and images – in *JPEG* format.

Manuscripts should be written in accordance with the academic standards and adopting the norms in the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, available at [www.ldoceonline.com](http://www.ldoceonline.com). Abbreviations and acronyms should be either avoided or explained.

To optimise our collaboration, submissions should be accompanied by the following: name, phone/fax number, email, address of the institution and other relevant information.

*RMT* Editorial Staff reserves the right to make editorial changes regarding the style, grammar and length of the manuscripts. Authors will be consulted, in case the changes could affect the form or the content of the manuscript.

We expect You, with interest and hope, to submit your articles for publication, mentioning that manuscripts and relating materials are not given back to authors. Thank you for your understanding!

**The Editorial Staff**

The editorial and layout process  
was completed on 28 December 2011.



*We thank you all – the collaborators and readers  
of our journal alike, and we wish you happy holidays.  
May you be healthy and loved!*

*Happy New Year!*

*Cover 1: Military parade organised in the Arch of Triumph Square – 1 December 2011, București.  
Photo – Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

*Cover 4: Ceremony organised at the Monument to the Romanian Heroes fallen in the line of duty,  
Tineretului Park – 25 October 2011, București. Photo – Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*



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