



3 July
September
2016

Romanian Military Thinking

Military Theory and Science Journal
Published by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff



**Founded in 1864 under the name "România Militară"
- English edition, 12th year -**

Romanian Military Thinking

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<http://www.smg.mapn.ro/gmr>

Romanian Military Thinking Journal
is issued in March, June, September, December.

ISSN 1841-4451 ~ Print
ISSN 1842-824X ~ Online

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HIGH ROYAL DECREE NO. 3663
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
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Romanian Military Thinking Journal
is included in the Journal Master List
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and EBSCO’s International Security & Counter-Terrorism
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Let Us Be Worthy of Our Heroes!

Our Europe is still seeking the way to a target that seems to be declared met too soon, and national egos and vested interests prove stronger than the Community belief. The balance of forces is ominously tottering, generating chills of disquiet not only among those who are sceptical about the solidarity of this economic and political construct, but also among those who are more optimistic about it and who, under the changing conditions, feel compelled to temper enthusiasm, to consider the pragmatic and sustainable redefinition of the European project and, in particular, to restore the balance in military terms.

Any sovereign state typically promotes own interests through political and diplomatic actions but, when it fails to deal with threats and counter them, it resorts to armed force. Moreover, as a country security is directly proportional to the resources invested for this purpose, the armed forces must be prepared, equipped and, most importantly, respected not only for what they did but also for what they are required to do for the country.

War, in all its forms, more or less understood and accepted, often remains, unfortunately, the only solution for resolving disputes, some of them far from those sent to *clarify* them using the armed force interests and understanding. Those who ignite conflicts have never fought in the front line. That is why there are armed forces. More or less equipped. That is why there are soldiers. More or less ready, more or less motivated. However, they ought to give their lives for the cause of the country if required. And there were many – perhaps too many – who really gave their lives, regardless of equipment, training and motivation, when they were required to do so for the cause of the country.

For Romania, the entry into the First World War was motivated by the country unification, for which it paid a huge death toll. Buried, some of them, with military honours, but most of them anonymously, unknown, and often swallowed by the earth and oblivion, the soldiers did their duty to the country. After the wave of gratitude that animated the Romanian political class immediately after the conclusion of hostilities, transposed into monuments of heroes, some of them grandiose projects – mausoleums, cathedrals, cemeteries and commemorative crosses –, the enthusiasm

for such gratitude decreased proportionally to the remoteness in time and generational change. It was only during the Second World War, the greater bane of mankind, causing millions of dead and missing in action, that people remembered heroes. Again, cemeteries, monuments – though less impressive – and, again, the decrease, over time, in the gestures of gratitude, often shadowed by hypocrisy and formalism, far from being sincerely connected to the supreme sacrifice made by those evoked.

This year it has also been 75 years since Romania entered the Second World War, when the Romanian Armed Forces were thrown into battle to restore the country's territorial integrity, which was affected in the summer of 1940. It is well known how that epic ended – professional military or ordinary soldiers called to do their duty – paid the death toll, in the East and the West, or sacrificed their freedom, those who had the *misfortune* to come back home after the hostilities ended.


This year it has also been 100 years since Romania entered the First World War. Let us believe that we could rise to the occasion and especially to the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of heroes who died for the fulfilment of the national ideal!

The Heroes' Cross, built on Caraiman Peak in the Bucegi Mountains in the first decade of Greater Romania, will be rehabilitated by the Ministry of Defence and will light again – a lamp lit in the sky – the way of these martyrs towards eternity. The Romanian Armed Forces thus honour, as they have always done, a part of the national debt of gratitude to those who sealed with blood the reunification of the country.

The Flag Day was celebrated this year too with the same emotion and patriotic vibration in the Tricolour Square in Bucharest and in all major garrisons of the country, as well as at the Allied military base in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where the Romanian contingents assign their mission for Romania as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The national flag is always hoisted skyward, before the eyes of the military and in the chords of the national anthem, as a prayer for all the comrades, martyrs, who fell on the battlefields, bearing the tricolour in the soul. Many of them were repatriated wrapped in the tricolour silk, but how many still have eternal sleep, known by anyone, in foreign ground, we will never know.

This year and in those significant years for the history of the country to come, each and every gesture of appreciation will not be superfluous to try to gratify, over time, those who have made the supreme sacrifice for Romania. A respectable nation among respectable nations ought to be worthy of its heroes and the sacrifice made by them all.

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*
English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

Soyons dignes de nos héros!

Notre Europe encore cherche son chemin vers une cible qui semble un peu trop vite déclarée atteinte, et les ego nationaux et les propres intérêts se prouvent plus forts que la croyance communautaire.

La balance de forces est instable face aux menaces et elle génère des frissons non seulement ceux qui sont plus sceptiques à l'égard de la solidité de cet édifice politico-économique, mais aussi ceux qui en sont plus optimistes que, voici, dans ce retournement de situation, ils se sentent obligés de tempérer leur enthousiasme, de réfléchir à la redéfinition pragmatique et durable de ce projet européen et, surtout, à une nouvelle situation existentielle sur les axes d'un équilibre militaire.

Tout Etat souverain encourage, généralement, ses propres intérêts par des actions politiques et diplomatiques, mais, quand'il ne réussit pas de résister aux menaces et de les contrecarrer, il recourt à la force armée. Et, puisque la sécurité d'un pays est directement proportionnelle aux ressources investies dans ce but, c'est la force armée qui doit être préparée, dotée et, une chose fondamentale, doit être respectée. Aussi pour tout ce qu'elle a fait, mais aussi pour tout ce qui est nécessaire d'en faire pour son pays.

La guerre, avec toutes ses formes, plus ou moins comprises et acceptées, reste souvent, malheureusement, la seule solution de résoudre des différends, certains d'entre eux loin des intérêts et de la compréhension de ceux qui sont responsables de les *clarifier* par la force des armes. Mais ceux qui ont allumé le feu n'ont jamais combattu à la première ligne du front. C'est pourquoi il y a les armées. Plus ou moins équipées. Pour cela il y a les soldats. Plus ou moins instruits, plus ou moins motivés. Mais, ils doivent donner leur vie, s'il est nécessaire, pour leur pays. Et beaucoup d'eux, peut être trop d'eux – même voire ils ont donné leurs vies, quel que soit la logistique, l'instruction et la motivation, pour la cause de leur pays.

Pour la Roumanie, l'entrée dans la Première Guerre mondiale avait comme objectif la réunification du pays, pour laquelle elle a payé un énorme prix de vies humaines. Enterrés, certains d'entre eux, avec les honneurs militaires, mais les plus dans un totale anonymat, inconnus et, souvent, avalés de la terre et de la manque de mémoire, les soldats ont fait leur devoirs envers le pays. Après le geste spectaculaire de gratitude qui a animé la classe politique et la société roumaine immédiatement que les hostilités s'étaient fermées, transposée dans les monuments des héros, certains d'entre eux de grandioses projets – des mausolées, des cathédrales, des cimetières et des croix commémoratives –, l'élan de cette gratitude a été diminué proportionnellement avec l'éloignement

en temps et le changement des générations. Et il était venu la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, avec la colère plus grande qu'elle l'a abattue sur l'humanité, avec les millions de morts et de disparus, pour que nous nous rappelions nos héros. Au nouveau, des cimetières, des monuments – moins des cathédrales ! – et au nouveau le sentiment de l'oublié, en temps, des gestes de reconnaissance, ombragés, souvent, par l'hypocrisie et le formalisme, loin de se contacter sincèrement à l'esprit et à la grandeur du sacrifice de ces qui sont évoqués.

Cette année nous avons célébré 75 ans depuis la Roumanie est entrée dans la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, lorsque l'armée roumaine a été jetée dans la bataille pour rétablir le corps mutilé du pays, pendant l'été de 1944. C'est bien connu la manière dont cette épopée est finie, où les héros – des soldats de carrière ou simples soldats appelés à faire leur devoir pour le pays – ont payé avec leurs vies sur le champ de bataille, à l'Est et l'Ouest, mais aussi avec leur liberté, ceux qui ont avaiient *le malheur* de rentrer chez eux après la fin des hostilités.

On célèbre aussi, cette année, 100 ans de l'entrée à la Première Guerre mondiale. Il faut croire qu'on pourra être en même de bien répondre à l'importance de ce moment-là et, surtout, à la hauteur des sacrifices des centaines de milliers de héros morts pour l'accomplissement de l'idéal national!

La Croix des Héros du pays, élevée au sommet du Caraiman, dans les Montagnes de Bucegi, dans la première décennie de la Grande Roumanie, sera réhabilitée par le Ministère de la Défense Nationale et elle va éclairer à nouveau – un éclat allumé sur le ciel – le chemin sur l'éternité de ces martyrs. L'Armée roumaine honore ainsi, comment fait-elle toujours, une partie de la dette nationale à ceux qui ont écrit avec leur sang la réunification du pays.

La Journée du drapeau national a été célébrée, aussi cette année, avec la même émotion et vibration patriotique dans la Place du Drapeau à Bucarest et aussi dans les toutes grandes garnisons du pays, mais aussi dans la base militaire alliée de Kandahar, en Afghanistan, où les contingents roumains accomplissent leur mission pour la Roumanie, en tant que membre de l'OTAN.

Les plissures du drapeau national, accompagnés des regards des soldats et des accords de l'Hymne national de la Roumanie, se montent au ciel chaque fois comme une prière pour tous les camarades tombés sur les champs de bataille, ces martyrs du notre peuple, qui sont morts avec le drapeau dans leurs âmes. Beaucoup d'entre eux ont été rapatriés enveloppés dans la soie du drapeau. Mais nous ne saurons jamais combien d'entre eux dorment encore leur sommeil de l'éternité dans une obscurité éternelle, dans une poussière étrangère.

Dans cette année et aussi les prochaines, avec plusieurs achèvements dans l'histoire du pays, aucun geste de la gratitude ne sera pas inutile d'essayer de gratifier, au fil de temps, ceux qui se sont sacrifiés pour la Roumanie. Une nation digne parmi les nations dignes doit mériter ses héros et leur sacrifice!

Version française par
Alina PAPOI

ACTIVE DEFENCE IN CHINESE MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS (II)

Brigadier General (r.) Dr Viorel BUȚA
Colonel Valentin VASILE

The authors discuss the Chinese military concept of three warfares, involving the integration of different techniques, which are specific to psychological, media and legal operations, in the context of active defence.

To better illustrate the non-military ways of promoting national interests, some aspects related to the political, economic and financial operations, carried out recently with China's major involvement, an expression of China's frequent discontent with its own position in the international and regional financial institutions, are mentioned, being shown that China is interested in developing a comprehensive strategy that, in addition to the military dimension, gives priority to non-military means of action.

Keywords: Chinese Military Strategy; three warfares; unrestricted warfare; strategic communication

The Three Warfares

In 2003, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party endorsed the concept of the peaceful development of China and launched a vast programme of investments abroad. The same year, PLA organised its first cyber war units and developed the military strategic concept of *three warfares* (San Zhong Zhanfa), inspired by the theory of unrestricted warfare.

The adoption of the *three warfares* concept reconfirms the thesis of unacceptable risks that arise from reliance on nuclear weapons, due to guaranteed mutual destruction, and resumes the opinions advanced by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in their book *Unrestricted Warfare* about the futility of atomic arsenal in the current security context.

The *three warfares* concept involves the integration of different techniques, which are specific to psychological, media and legal operations in the context of *active defence*, suggesting common ground with the US and NATO definitions

Brigadier General (r.) Professor Dr Viorel Buța – “Carol I” National Defence University, București.
Colonel Valentin Vasile – Deputy Chief of the Information and Public Relations Directorate, the Ministry of National Defence.

of sub-domains contributing to information operations. These aspects are highlighted by **Stefan Halper** in a report prepared in 2013 for the US Department of Defense, which presents the definitions of the warfares – psychological, media and legal – included in the Chinese integrated concept of *three warfares*, as well as the interrelationships, cooperation needs, mutual support modalities and their particular contribution to the achievement of China’s strategic objectives.

According to the Chinese understanding, psychological warfare “*seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralising enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations*”²¹.

Therefore, the objectives of psychological warfare are intended to affect the enemy’s decision making processes by emphasising the uncertainty, contestation and revolt against political and military leaders, to undermine the credibility of the enemy’s leadership, public authorities, institutions and organisations, as well as to reduce or nullify the fighting spirit of the enemy troops. Their fulfilment can be achieved by putting pressure through the use of political, diplomatic, military, economic and media levers in order to assert own legitimacy, to affirm own interests, existing grievances and ways to solve them, as well to convey to the enemy, its allies or neutral states different messages, promises or threats.

Subsumed under the same integrated concept, media warfare “*is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build support for China’s military actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests*”²².

Media warfare is essential to achieve the information superiority through media operations and information activities carried out continuously to influence the perceptions and attitudes of the population, thus facilitating the objectives set for psychological and legal warfare. A large diversity of printed, electronic and digital publications, the news of press agencies, radio and television programmes, video spots and movies, social media, all these channels are favoured by the web expansion and accessibility. And all of them ensure the dissemination of a variety of messages, which contribute to the fulfilment of media warfare objectives: obtaining, maintaining and strengthening the public support in the country and abroad, as well as the morale of the troops, while affecting the enemy’s ability to properly assess the strategic and operational situation, demoralising enemy troops and reducing their will to fight.

²¹ Stefan Halper, *China: The Three Warfares*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., May 2013, p. 28, see http://images.smh.com.au/file/2014/04/11/5343124/China_%2520The%2520three%2520warfares.pdf?rand=1397212645609

²² *Ibidem*.

Expression of the Chinese comprehensive strategy, the *three warfares* concept grants a prominent role to legal warfare, which “*uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests. It can be used to thwart an opponent’s operational freedom and shape the operational space. It is also used to build international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military operations*”²³.

Using arguments drawn from the international law, legal warfare defends and supports China’s national interests and objectives, justifies the decisions taken by Chinese authorities and the subsequent actions in their pursuance, providing documentary evidence, themes and messages that can be used to add value to the specific campaigns of psychological and media warfare. Legal warfare is aimed at challenging the legitimacy and legality of the adversaries’ actions, at the same time affirming the legitimacy and legality of the actions taken by the own forces in diplomatic circles and within the international and regional security organisations responsible for maintaining peace and stability in the world, as well as through the national and international media channels. Legal warfare exploits the international law and requires the strict compliance with multilateral treaties and agreements, considering related legal instruments to ensure the stability of the security architecture at regional and global levels.

According to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the necessity of preventing and discouraging the abuse of treaties and agreements guaranteeing peace, territorial integrity and independence of the signatory countries, even by resorting to international sanctions and military intervention under UN Security Council mandate, is strongly affirmed.

Legal warfare proves the legitimacy of its planners and demonstrates the enemy’s illegitimacy, generates sympathy and condemnation, strengthens certainties and amplifies doubt among the authorities, the military and the population in the own country, as well as in the allied, neutral and enemy countries. Thus, it contributes to attracting and strengthening the support of neutral and allied countries, as well as to gaining widespread acceptance and support of the domestic and international public opinion in favour of China’s strategic objectives. Furthermore, legal warfare undermines the credibility of the enemy, contributes to its delegitimation and leads to its isolation by the neutral countries, reducing the support it receives from the allied countries, media and public opinion.

²³ *Ibidem.*

To this end, there are taken into consideration and used appropriately in specific situations all necessary legal arguments for affirming the legitimacy of their own policy and actions, including military operations, and demonstrating the illegitimacy of the enemy's policy and actions.

In an analysis on the ways of applying the concepts of unconventional warfare, **Tony Corn** remarked the Chinese military theorists' preoccupation with the integration of military operations with the non-military support actions taken in political, diplomatic, economic, informational areas, which in some circumstances may prevail over the use of armed force. After observing that, for ten years, China has pursued consistently and with variable intensity the lines of operations described by senior colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in their book *Unrestricted Warfare* – increasing its capacity of power projection (e.g. development of the submarine fleet carrying nuclear missiles, construction and operationalisation of aircraft carriers, acquisition of new fighter aircraft) and combining military operations with non-military support actions, Tony Corn concluded that China's "*grand strategy appears to be making full use of an ever-widening range of non-kinetic means*"²⁴.

A similar observation belongs to **Timothy Walton**, who noted that: "*Over the past two decades, the PLA's organisational structure, training, and equipment have dramatically improved. Less visible but equally important improvements in coordinated force enabling concepts seek to maximise the effectiveness of the PLA's threat or use of force. Notable among these concepts is **Three Warfares***"²⁵.

Timothy Walton believes that the application of the *three warfares* concept is aimed at influencing the enemy and affecting his decision-making capacity by maximising the deterrent effects of the threat with the use of armed force or the effective use of armed force.

Walton also observes that "*information warfare has assumed a central role in Chinese military writings over the past decade. Achieving information superiority is seen as the precondition for achieving and maintaining battlefield supremacy*"²⁶.

Improving the procedures of psychological, media, legal, economic and cyber warfare, as well as analysing the ability of political and military planners to combine different forms, means and actions specific to the above mentioned types of warfare makes increasingly visible the convergences of Western and Chinese definitions

²⁴ Tony Corn, *Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics*, in *Small Wars Journal*, 5 June 2010, p. 4.

²⁵ Timothy A. Walton, *China's Three Warfares*, Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis, 18 January 2012, p. 4, see http://www.delex.com/sol_CSA_SR.aspx.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

on *comprehensive approach* and *active defence*, psychological, media, legal and information operations, *hybrid warfare*, *unrestricted warfare* and *three warfares*.

Economic Aspects of the Integrative Strategy

To better illustrate the non-military ways of promoting national interests, we encapsulated in the article some aspects of the political, economic and financial operations carried out recently with China's major involvement.

They are an expression of China's frequent discontent with its own position in the international and regional financial institutions – World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank, which is regarded as being inadequate when compared to the strength of the Chinese economy.

In economic terms, China has acted consistently to increase the use of Chinese national currency as an exchange currency in Asia but also in the frame of worldwide economic relations, including partners from the European Union²⁷.

As a result of this economic policy, in recent years the proportion of exports and imports made in yuan has increased more than six times, as well as the outward yuan foreign direct investment and the number of the financial institutions that are using the Chinese currency for payments. This state of affairs is "*implying that international acceptance of the currency has already started to extend from trade settlement to investment*"²⁸.

China's foreign exchange reserves as well as the fact that it is one of the largest creditors to the USA led the Chinese leaders to regularly challenge the hegemonic status of the dollar as the world reserve currency at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, contributing significantly to the formation of the BRICS Group, along with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa.

Moreover, in 2014, the *BRICS* five members initiated the signing of regional agreements that led to the establishment of two new financial institutions intending to offer advantageous loans to developing countries. The launch of these two financial projects can be put in a causal relationship with the sanctions imposed gradually against Russia since March 2014, mainly by the EU, USA, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Australia and the international organisations,

²⁷ Capital.ro – *Prima bancă de clearing în yuani înființată oficial în zona euro / The first yuan clearing bank formally established in eurozone*, 19 June 2014, see <http://www.capital.ro>

²⁸ Moran Zhang, *Will the Chinese Yuan Replace the US Dollar as the Global Reserve Currency?*, in *International Business Time*, 14 March 2013, see <http://www.ibtimes.com/will-chinese-yuan-replace-us-dollar-global-reserve-currency-1125803>

as a result of the Russian intervention in Crimea, followed by the annexation of the peninsula under an internationally unrecognised referendum and a unilateral declaration of independence, and because of the support given to separatist movements from Donetsk and Lugansk regions of eastern Ukraine.

The first agreement, concerning the establishment of the *New Development Bank (NDB)* and of a foreign exchange reserve fund, was signed by the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa on the occasion of the *BRICS* sixth meeting, held in the Brazilian city of Fortaleza, in July 2014.

The *NDB*'s official launch ceremony was held on 21 July 2015, in Shanghai, where the headquarters are located. This new multilateral banking initiative aims to encourage the financial cooperation and "*mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development*"²⁹, ensuring the funding of major infrastructure projects, strengthening emerging markets and managing the crises generated by capital migration, complementary to the efforts of the other regional and international financial institutions concerned with economic growth. The declared strengths of the states participating in the *NDB* are their population (over three billion/42 percent of the world population), their territorial extent (over a quarter of the total land area of the world) on three continents, and their economic capacity (annually, over 25 percent of gross world product). In terms of their decision-making process, unlike the World Bank, where the number of votes allocated to a member state is proportional to its participation in the share capital of the bank, each state participating in the *NDB* holds a single vote and none has veto power.

In October 2014, in Beijing, 21 Asian countries laid the foundation for the establishment of a new regional investment bank – *Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)*, Indonesia associating with this initiative in November 2014. In early 2015 there were several rounds of negotiations (Mumbai/January, Alma-Ata/March, Beijing/April, Singapore/May) to finalise the Articles of Agreement between the participating states, followed by the adoption of the Code of Conduct, rules of procedure and operational policies governing the *AIIB* activity. As an initiative open to all countries of the world, aiming to "*promote interconnectivity and economic integration in the region and cooperate with existing multilateral development banks*"³⁰, to support sustainable economic development through investments in infrastructure

²⁹ *Agreement on the New Development Bank*, 15 July 2014, Fortaleza/Brazilia, see <http://ndbbriics.org/agreement.html>

³⁰ *What Is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank?*, see <http://www.aiib.org/html/aboutus/AIIB/>

and productive sectors, this economic and financial project generated interest in 57 countries, which joined and attended the signing ceremony of the *AIIB Articles of Agreement*³¹ on 29 June 2015, in Beijing.

Effective starting on 25 December 2015, the *AIIB Articles of Agreement* provided the time frame for conducting the first banking operations in 2016, according to the budget and business plans and policies in the areas of compensation and benefits, financing and pricing, acquisitions and public information, which were set out during the inaugural meeting of the *AIIB* Board of Directors, in Beijing, on 17 January 2016.

Without aiming to compete with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, these two new financial institutions (with major parts of the capital provided by China) can evolve as an alternative formula to them, intending to provide developing countries with new opportunities for obtaining loans on favourable terms. The operationalisation of these banks could be the start of a reorganisation of the current global financial system, analyst Leonid Bershidsky saying that “*the BRICS nations’ rebellion against the Western-run pillars of the global financial system is more than just a political gesture: It is a threat and a bargaining tool*”³².

Conclusions

The main documents of the *Chinese Military Strategy* are simultaneously not only statements of intent and articulated messages of strategic communication but also themes of international dialogue about the need of achieving the right balance between “*war preparation and war prevention, rights protection and stability maintenance, deterrence and warfighting, and operations in wartime and employment of military forces in peacetime*”³³. For China, the desideratum of *active defence* is conditioned by the development of the capacities for anticipating risks and for long-term planning, so that the *PLA* could react optimally by adopting the appropriate defensive posture and ensuring the own freedom of action in crisis

³¹ *The AIIB Agreement* was signed in Beijing on 29 June 2015 by 50 participating countries (Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uzbekistan and Vietnam), and by other seven participating countries (Denmark, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa and Thailand) by the end of 2015. On 31 January 2016 the agreement was ratified by 29 participating states, and the other signatories will deposit the instruments of ratification by the end of 2016.

³² Leonid Bershidsky, *The End of the World Bank?*, in *Bloomberg View, Economics*, 15 July 2014, see <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-07-15/the-end-of-the-world-bank>

³³ Anthony H. Cordesman, Steven Colley, Michael Wang, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

management, deterring and rejecting any aggression and, ultimately, winning the war.

The strategy of *active defence*, the theory of *unrestricted warfare* and the concept of *three warfares* reveal a lot of commonalities with the Western theories on *comprehensive approach*, *information operations* and *hybrid warfare*.

The hybridity of war is a result of its ability to adapt to the new social, economic, technological and legal circumstances, its polymorphic nature being brilliantly described by Sun Tzu. He says that war is like water, which “*shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions*”³⁴. Based on this observation, Sun Tzu concludes that the one who is able to modify his tactics in relation to the enemy’s operations will have the best chance of winning the war. Even for this single observation, without taking into account the other principles of *The Art of War*, which have remained in history until today keeping unaltered their axiomatic value, Sun Tzu can be considered one of the forerunners of the theory on *hybrid warfare*, very fashionable nowadays.

Consistent in respecting the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, China stresses the defensive nature of its military doctrine, recognises the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons, while stressing that Beijing will only use them in retaliation for such an attack. At the same time, China declares its commitment not to use and not to threaten with the use of nuclear weapons countries that do not possess such weapons, permanently emphasising, in international forums, the need for measures aimed at preventing proliferation and leading to the complete prohibition and destruction of the nuclear arsenal.

The intense pace of economic development, the similarity of social processes, and the synchronicity of ideas, debates, innovations, theories and concepts, including the military, to those in the Western world have a simple explanation: China’s opening to the outside world to take models, to adapt and to produce new technologies, using its influence and power to assert itself as a formidable global competitor, in order to strengthen its position on the great chessboard.

How the Chinese military leaders understand the complexity of modern warfare gets also manifest through the reticence and criticism expressed by them related to the strategies based solely on military force that have had many unfortunate consequences contrary to those intended, which have led to the extension and intensification of crises, turning them into veritable undeclared

³⁴ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Collins Classics, Harper Collins Publishers, London, 2013, p. 25.

wars without a predictable ending, and impossible to be won. Therefore, China is interested in developing a comprehensive strategy that, in addition to the military dimension, gives priority to non-military means of action – political, diplomatic, economic, legal and informational. In the long term, this comprehensive strategy aims to determine successive changes in the security environment so that the recourse to the use of military force is no longer necessary. One can easily observe here the reflection of a principle formulated by Sun Tzu 2500 years ago, in *The Art of War*: “Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not the supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”³⁵.

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³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

CLAUSEWITZIANISM AND POSTCLAUSEWITZIANISM

About the Need for a Paradigm Shift within the Romanian Military Thinking (II)

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Adrian LESENCIUC

The paper aims at analysing the role of General Clausewitz's theory within the strategic and doctrinaire projection of the past two centuries, and focuses on the Romanian military thinking in the final part of the study. In essence, the nature of war has remained the same, even if substantial changes have occurred in terms of the means of warfare. Given this reality, theorists who joined the Clausewitzian paradigm tried to expand the horizons beyond its limits; consequently, different Clausewitzian perspectives of his followers are more or less dissonant with the current security context. For an accurate argumentation of an appropriate positioning of the Romanian military thinking, we proposed an episodic structuring of the entire issue, covering Clausewitz's work, the emergence of his ideas, the anti-Clausewitzian positioning, and the benchmarks of the Romanian military thinking related to Clausewitzian values.

Keywords: *Clausewitzian paradigm; peace; war; policy; Romanian military thinking*

2. Clausewitzianism

2.1. The emergence of Clausewitzian ideas.

The ideas of Carl von Clausewitz did not spread outside Prussia until 1871. The unification of Germany (1864-1871) permitted the dissemination of these ideas beyond the old boundaries of Prussia. The decisive role in putting them into debate was played by General Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891), who implemented the Clausewitzian concepts and ideas into war.

On War raised important issues in understanding it firstly because of the language used. Moreover, there are some inaccuracies within the text and some unfinished ideas in writing the work. In addition, the author's intention to approach, one way or another, the conception of Immanuel Kant (for example, by contradicting the possibility of existence of the concept of "eternal peace" – in *realia*, with the instrumentation of the military sciences –, proposed by the German philosopher from the perspective of the critical philosophy,

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see Kant, 2008) or of G.W.F. Hegel (1998)²², trying to implement the dialectical method based on the trinity thesis-antithesis-synthesis in the analysis of belligerence through the trinity defensive-offensive-defensive/offensive, made a big part of the work useless in the doctrinaire implementation of Clausewitz's ideas. However, after the implementation of Clausewitz's teachings through the military operations led by General von Moltke, *On War* became very visible and was translated into many European languages. The first translations were not the most appropriate, therefore, the Clausewitzian ideas were deformed, on the one hand, due to the ambiguity (and to the inability of the translators and the users of the text to operate with concepts that exceeded the limits of understanding the philosophy of war) and, on the other hand, due to the inability of translators to operate both with terms that concern the practice of arms and with philosophical concepts. The complexity of the work, despite the inconsistencies caused, probably, by the lack of finishing, led to disseminating the deflected content of the Clausewitzian text and to inadequately summarising it. Clausewitz's work was perceived rather as a textual framework that can be summarised to the necessity of use the extreme violence than as a philosophical work. There were many theorists who described this phenomenon of spreading Clausewitzianism as distorted meanings of the Prussian General ideas. We considered the explanation of Larry H. Addington relevant: *"In other armies, and down to the eve of the First World War, Clausewitz's book was usually read in translation and often with an incomplete understanding of its admittedly difficult and sometimes metaphysical language. For the most part, and whether Clausewitz ever intended to have such an effect or not, such reading of Vom Kriege promoted a faith that in war moderation was imbecility and maximum violence was the surest road to victory"*²³.

The generalisation of the Prussian General's work, by simplifying it, involved an ideological character that reflected and served the interests and aspirations of a new school of military thinking or, rather, of particular military organisations that needed to justify their actions. The main vectors of the Clausewitzian thinking were the leftist ideologists Friedrich Engels and, especially, Vladimir I. Lenin. The latter one used, in the benefit of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Clausewitzian relationship between policy and war. He considered the Prussian General *"one of the most important military authors"*. The use of Lenin as a vector in promoting the Clausewitzian conception at the social and historical levels was also remarked

²² Clausewitz approach to Hegel, from the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, means also the assumed Hegelian perspective on war. Hegel believed the war was a necessary evil, helping the State to be revitalised, while peace was associated with the lack of progress.

²³ Larry H. Addington, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

by General Beaufre, who even considered that General Clausewitz was imposed by Lenin²⁴.

The well-known influence of the Clausewitzian work, through the produced strategic effects, was on Adolf Hitler's work entitled *Mein Kampf* (1941) and on the entire projection of the Third Reich. The Nazi leader admired the Prussian General and called him "*the great Clausewitz*"²⁵. Hitler designed his campaigns based on the Clausewitzian conception of absolute war and quoted him twice in his work. But the Clausewitzian conception did not take roots only where totalitarianism manifested itself. Even known fighters against totalitarian ideas, such as the French philosopher Raymond Aron, denouncer of both totalitarian manifestations of the 20th century, Nazism and Communism, joined Clausewitz's ideas.

Aron considered the Prussian General a *magister*, in relation to whom he has aligned the ideas of, probably, the most ambitious project, *Peace & War. A Theory of International Relations* (1966). Aron considered that war characterises all periods and civilisations, and diplomacy can be the alternative to strategy, built on the fundamentals of competition. Basically, these ideas – even if outside the limits of the projected violence – are rooted in Clausewitzian thinking, which is seen by Aron as being philosophical, neutral and coherent: "*As a theoretician of rational action, he [Clausewitz – A.N.] reminds leaders of war and peace of the principle both must respect: the primacy of policy, war being merely an instrument in the service of politically determined goals, a moment or an aspect of relations among states, each of which is obliged to submit to the political realm, i.e., the perception of the collectivity's lasting interests. Let us agree to call strategy the conduct of military operations as a whole, and diplomacy the conduct of relations with other political units. Strategy and diplomacy will both be subordinate to politics, that is, to the conception on the part of the collectivity or its leaders of the <national interest>. In peacetime, politics makes use of diplomatic means, not excluding resource and arms, at least when threatened. In wartime, politics does not exclude diplomacy, since the latter conducts relations with allies and neutrals, and continues to deal tacitly with the enemy, threatening defeat, or offering a possibility of peace. Here we are considering the <political unit> as an actor, enlightened by intelligence and prompted by will. Every state has relations with other states: as long as the states remain in peace,*

²⁴ André Beaufre, *Introducere în strategie. Strategia acțiunii*, Editura Militară, București, 1974, p. 3.

²⁵ Within the political testament addressed to Admiral Dönitz before his suicide, Hitler advised him to continue the fight in accordance with the "*ideals of the great Clausewitz*" in P.M. Baldwin, *Clausewitz in Nazi Germany*, in *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1981, p. 10, *apud* Jablonsky, *Churchill and Hitler: Essays on the Political-military Direction of Total War*, Ilford, Essex&Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1994, p. 188.

*they must somehow manage to live together. Unless they resort to violence, they attempt to convince each other. The day they fight, they attempt to constrain each other. In this sense, diplomacy might be called the art of convincing without using force (convaincre), and strategy the art of vanquishing at the least cost (vaincre). But constraint, too, is a means of convincing*²⁶.

Raymond Aron is not unique in his positioning. He believed that Clausewitzian theory was still applicable and relevant to the period of nuclear weapons development. Although, naturally, Clausewitz's theory should have ceased to be applicable with the abandonment of a certain type of strategy, of action, with the end of a certain period of Western societies development, the modern one (within which it was designed). The new paradigmatic horizon would have allowed new support for the theory of the Prussian General. For example, the strategy of nuclear deterrence is seen by Aron only as a test of will and as an expression of policy primacy in relation to the military component. The French philosopher even launched an alternative to the strategy of deterrence, called "*saving the war*"²⁷. It was designed as the extension of the flexible retaliation conception of General Maxwell Taylor²⁸ and, of course, at the forefront of a Clausewitzian reinterpretation that would give rise to a current called "*Neoclausewitzianism*" in military sciences, and "*political realism*" in political sciences. Neoclausewitzianism universalises the binomial war-policy, but shifts the emphasis from the "*absolute war*" of the modernity of the 19th century (within which it was created by Carl von Clausewitz) to the "*limited war*", therefore politically "*modelled*".

Generally speaking, Neoclausewitzian thinkers bring the interpretation of the nature of war into the area of immutable. War loses its absolute character, but earns in continuity instead. From this Neoclausewitzian position, war is understood as being continuous, while peace is seen as a period of preparation for a new conflict.

²⁶ Raymond Aron, *Peace&War. A Theory of International Relations*, new foreword by Daniel J. Mahoney and Brian Anderson, 2003, p. 24.

²⁷ Apud Joël Mouric, *Citizen Clausewitz: Aron's Clausewitz in Defence of Political Freedom*, in José Colen and Elisabeth Dutarstre-Michaut (eds.), *The Companion to Raymond Aron*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2015, p. 80.

²⁸ In Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1960. The American General Maxwell D. Taylor (1901-1987) graduated the Military Academy in West Point. He was the commander of various structures in operations during the Second World War, including the 101st Airborne Division in Normandy, and the 9th US Army during Korean War. He is the author of a work that radically changed the US strategy and, subsequently, NATO one (*The Uncertain Trumpet*). Retired in 1959, General Taylor imposed his perspectives in relation with the Kennedy Administration soon after its installation. He also held important positions in the US apparatus during Lyndon B. Johnson's Administration, being a fervent supporter of the campaign in Vietnam.

2.2. Neoclausewitzianism. The Neoclausewitzianists could not deny the end of the classical war. In fact, the end of this type of war did not mean the end of strategy or of conditionings between the security environment and policy. During the *Cold War*, theorists spotted the changes of the unstable global environment's form (not the content) and redesigned the military thinking on different coordinates. First, they identified a risk society, based on bipolarity, engaged in a warfare of threats, in a race of nuclear weapons, that reached its point of maximum intensity in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Then, they started to discuss about the one pole society, unmotivated by divergent economic, politic or symbolic interests. These were the mutations that led to redesigning, in the context of the overall dynamics, the phenomenon – the war – as a source of power. These mutations were observed at the level of each state and taken into account in each case within the state's security policy.

The ideal of freedom and democracy, in line with the optimistic vision of Francis Fukuyama (1992), who foreshadowed an *end of history*, i.e. the supremacy of liberal democracy within the contemporary states, or the ultimate form of governance from the perspective of the society evolution, appears not to be in accordance with the major changes in a society of unpredictability, of risks. This society was totally different interpreted by the Neoclausewitzians. They inserted the *fuzzy logics* in the classical dichotomous peace-war pair: *“Though <peace> and <war> are usually regarded as opposites, there is a sense in which both are aspects of the conflict that is endemic in all social life. War is simply a special kind of conflict that differs from peace only by its violent nature. The fact that peace is not a panacea explains why, when confronted with the stark choice of peace and war, leaders sometimes choose war. Some kinds of peace – under dictatorship, for example – may be worse than some kinds of war. In other words, although everyone wants peace, almost no one (apart from strict pacifists) wants only peace or peace at any price”*²⁹.

In these circumstances, a change of perspective in the military thinking of the years '60s-'70s was required. As a response to peace based on nuclear deterrence – a necessary peace that was considered fragile and morally questionable – this change reversed the Clausewitzian formula: *war – instrument of policy* became *policy – instrument of war*. This radical change, but necessary in the context of a fierce nuclear weapons race due to the influence of political realism/the Neoclausewitzian current in strategy, whose main exponents were John Garnett, Hans Morgenthau, Gordon Harland, Robert E. Osgood

²⁹ John Garnett, *The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace*, in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Collin S. Gray and Eliot Cohen, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 39.

and Henry Kissinger, led to a different vision regarding the dichotomous relationship peace/war: *“The new trend essentially consists in conceiving international policy as a tough confrontation, in which force may be used not for war, but to lead to success a policy of peace and security”*³⁰.

The states' guidance towards the policy of alliances and the intention of coherent building of peace (recognising the limits of morality and rationality in politics) are explained from the previously mentioned perspective. In other words, starting with the *Cold War* period and continuing with the nowadays one-pole society, war is justified by peace, and policy, seen as an instrument of war, is conducted in various forms. To highlight the spirit of competition and even of belligerence, the Neoclausewitzians associated the term *“warfare”* with economic, psychological, media, informational etc. According to the Neoclausewitzian perspective, the future war will be not an instrument of policy, but the policy an instrument of war – the only open way towards controlled change, the possibility of intervention for peace, the promotion of security and the support for the status quo. On the contrary, war can be viewed as a policy instrument as long as it achieves the purposes for which it has been launched, which has not happened in the last more than 200 local confrontations from the Second World War until now. Used as a guarantee for change, the peace intervention is *ultima ratio*. This is the direction of study in the case of the Neoclausewitzianist John Garnett: *“Weapons control is the theory that considers peace and security can be achieved through the skilful management of weapons. Limited war is the theory that considers peace and security can be achieved by controlling and limiting armed forces used in a conflict. Crisis control is the theory that considers peace and security can be promoted through techniques for keeping control of international crises”*³¹.

The Clausewitzian influence continues in the post-*Cold War* one-pole world, even at a low level. In fact, the Clausewitzian orientation of some military theorists cannot produce a reinterpretation of the theory designed within the work *On War* just to align it to the current context of security. Clausewitz's influence on the classical strategic thinking and on the nature of war is still visible nowadays, although it has become marginal and related to other contextual foundations. However, there are theorists who still adhere to the Clausewitzian way of thinking. Moreover, as long as (excepting the first part of the work *On War*) Clausewitz's work does not respond to the pure academic interest, but to the pragmatic one, a series of field manuals contains clear references either to the ideas, or to the language

³⁰ Corneliu Soare, *Recitindu-l pe Clausewitz, op. cit.*, p. 188.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 189.

used by Clausewitz. The Clausewitzian theorist David J. Lonsdale uses as example the United States Marine Corps *Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 'Warfighting' (FMFM-1)* in 1989³², and Stuart Kinross, other Clausewitzian theorist, well-known for the works *Clausewitz and Low-intensity Conflicts* (2004) and *Clausewitz and America. Strategic Thought and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq*, and for the quotation “*there are only wars*”³³ uses as example the manual *FM 100-5 Operations* (1993)³⁴.

2.3. Clausewitzian paradigm and the limits of its horizon. Clausewitzian paradigm is a way of thinking about war in accordance with the concept of modern warfare, i.e. warfare specific to modernity and industrialism. The military thinking within this paradigm exceeds the period of modernism, considering however some human finalities of the war: 1. a limitation of violence against civilians and social order and 2. a design of ways to solve disputes between states³⁵. The Clausewitzian paradigm is specific, therefore, to a reality of military confrontation based on the quantitative dimension. It is a paradigmatic projection of the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz, consisting of discussions on the use of extreme violence and of operationalisation of the abstract concept “*absolute war*”. The projection is also related to a necessary change of the old perspectives on war and relationships between policy and war. Eventually, Clausewitz’s projection did not refer to the extreme military operation. The followers of Clausewitz’s ideas were exaggerated, producing extreme effects, such as those under the umbrella of the Second World War.

The Clausewitzian pillars are uncertainty, violence and policy. In the exact terms of the Prussian General, these pillars are the native violence, based on hatred and enmity (“*to be considered as a blind natural instinct*”), “*the game of probabilities and chance*” and the nature of war “*subordinate to a political instrument*”³⁶. The Clausewitzian uncertainty (“*the game of probabilities and chance*”)

³² In David J. Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, Frank Cass, London and New York, 2004, p. 21.

³³ Stuart Kinross, *Clausewitz and Low-intensity Conflict*, in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2004, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 54.

³⁴ *Idem*, *Clausewitz and America. Strategic Thought and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq*, Routledge, London and New York, 2008, p. 182. Kinross offers the argument of maintaining three Clausewitzian concepts: *friction* – “*accumulation of chance errors, unexpected difficulties, and confusion of battle that impede[s] both sides*” (FM 100-5, 1993:2-7); *centre of gravity* – “*the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends*” (FM 100-5, 1993:6-7), respectively *culmination* – “*in the offence, the culminating point is the point in time and location when the attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender*” (FM 100-5, 1993:6-8).

³⁵ Hugh Smith, *On Clausewitz. A Study of Military and Political Ideas*, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire and New York, 2004, p. 261.

³⁶ Clausewitz, *Despre război, op. cit.*, p. 69.

changes the previous paradigm, named Sun Tzu paradigm. If in Sun Tzu's perspective knowledge plays a key role, in the current conditions of an indisputable "transparency" of the battlefield, where uncertainty has decreased dramatically in the information age, the Clausewitzian fundamentals of the "mist" and "chance" are no longer relevant. The use of uncertainty still remains valid within the Clausewitzian warfare, and the uncertainty is the very instrument used by the "military genius" that also uses his intuitive skills for doubling knowledge and experience. In the current type of wars, uncertainty on the battlefield is maintained at increasingly smaller levels. The limited value of the information role (of its collection and analysis) within Clausewitz's thinking transforms the Clausewitzian paradigm in a modernist one, without the possibility of extending the paradigmatic horizon in the information age. This paradigm is built on the pedestal of the Prussian General distrust in the calculation of the effects of human interaction and of moral force in combat. Clausewitz considers it is impossible to calculate or approximate it. The theory design and the extension of the horizons of the Clausewitzian paradigm are based on the value named "uncertainty", on its virtues and on its use within the battlefield. "Information", as opposed to "uncertainty", belongs to a different paradigm, where we should operate for adequacy and consistency of the design of our analysis.

The Clausewitzian warfare is understood as being based on "primordial violence" and "chance" (probability) and it is adjusted by means of a lever called "policy". The followers of Clausewitz's ideas, especially those that put them into practice, starting with von Moltke and ending with Hitler, marched only on the role of the first two resistance elements in shaping the new concept of war: violence and chance. "Violence" is, therefore, another foundation of Clausewitz's theory, and subsequently of the Clausewitzian paradigm, which separates itself both from the previous paradigm, Sun Tzu's one, and the later one, post-Clausewitzian. At the other end, the Prussian General admits that victory is possible without destroying the enemy, but this assertion is the exception. In the universe of Clausewitzian war, victory without fighting can refer to what Michael Handel (1991) identifies in Clausewitz' work as being the manoeuvre and, especially, the war by algebra, where the calculation of the balance of forces and effects leads to a precise prediction of the result of confrontation, and, thus, to the defeat of a combatant group. This feature is rather one with purely theoretical significance: "Clausewitz does concede that there is a possibility of winning without having to engage in combat, but he considers it too remote that it is best confined to the realm of theory"³⁷.

³⁷ Michael I. Handel, *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared*, foreword by Major General Paul G. Cerjan, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Strategic Studies Institute/US Army War College, 1991, p. 29.

It is the first one that discriminates between the paradigms in military sciences, namely between Sun Tzu's and Clausewitz's ones, more precisely for the fact that victory without fighting is ideal in the first case and exception in the second one: *"The difference between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu on the issue of winning without fighting is considerable. While Sun Tzu elevates it to an ideal, Clausewitz considers it to be the exception. Indeed, in almost every instance where Clausewitz mentions the possibility of <winning by algebra>, he immediately adds the caveat that there is normally no substitute for combat"*³⁸.

Obviously, Handel's comparative analysis could not be agreed by Clausewitzianists³⁹, even if the reality of the new security context has determined them to recognise the possibility of victory without fight. Victory on *soft* powers level (political, economic, and cultural) is a reality of the information age, and the outcome of the *Cold War* is the best example. Therefore, it is enough to take into account the exception to the Clausewitzian norm as being a norm of adapting to the current political, economic, social, and cultural reality. Moreover, this reality makes the supporters of the Clausewitzian ideas expand the horizon of understanding within a new paradigmatic area: *"The notion of victory through information dominance reads like the theory of war by algebra, which Clausewitz largely dismissed"*⁴⁰.

Now, we are practically outside the universe of the Clausewitzian wars. Why do we need to be within the limits of his paradigm's horizons? Why is a Clausewitzian interpretation for facts that exceed his theory's limits of application necessary? These questions can be answered as long as we are outside the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the horizons of a warfare seen as a game, which cannot be a zero-sum game.

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³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 30.

³⁹ For example, David J. Lonsdale puts Handel's work under uncertainty, without arguing his position: *"Handel's identification of this distinction in On War between war by algebra and victory through manoeuvre is questionable"* (Lonsdale, *op. cit.*, p. 32).

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

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ARE WE PREPARED FOR THE WAR OF THE FUTURE?

General (ret.) Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ

We all need to know how the future war looks like in order to better prepare ourselves for fighting in and winning it.

There is no consensus among experts from all over the world about future war definition and characteristics.

In my view, most of the concepts that describe the future war are, in fact, part of the same continuous, total, unrestricted and chameleonic war.

Political leaders and national public opinion as well need to understand the concept of future war in order to sustain the appropriate budget for national defence.

Keywords: *future war; armed confrontation; national defence; defence budget; defence resources; war victory*

To answer the question in the title, it is necessary to know what the war of the future looks like and, on this basis, to develop the strategy and tactics so that they could be viable in the event of a confrontation of this kind.

Having a strategy and appropriate tactics, we can conceive plans and programmes for staff training, procurement and modernisation of technology and combat assets in the Armed Forces inventory. The next step is to allocate the necessary resources – human, material, financial, technological or otherwise, for the strategy, tactics, plans and programmes to be met.

1. Do We Know What the War of the Future Looks Like?

At international level, there are different opinions regarding the war of the future. Most of the viewpoints related to this theme are included in concepts such as: “preventive war”¹, “the fourth world war”², “the fourth generation warfare”³, a new

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¹ Francis Fukuyama, *America la răscruce. Democrația, puterea și moștenirea neoconservatoare*, Editura Antet XX, Filipeștii de Târg, Prahova, Romania, 2006, p. 85.

² Norman Podhoretz, *World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win*, Commentary 118, no. 2, 2004, pp. 17-54; see also Charles Krauthammer, *In Defense of Democratic Realism, National Interest*, no. 77, Washington, 2004.

³ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating*, Berkley Books, New York, 2006, p. 8; see also William Lind, *FMFM I-A – Fourth Generation War*, at http://www.military.com/ContentFiles/4gw_manual.doc, retrieved on 14.10.2016.

cold war, but with different protagonists⁴, “continuous war”⁵, “unrestricted warfare”⁶, counterinsurgency⁷ and “perpetual war”⁸. There are also experts that call this type of confrontation “hybrid war”⁹ or even “mosaic war”, considering the ongoing events in Ukraine and Syria as reference elements. Most of the listed concepts “dethrone” the military force ranked first among those that participate in the confrontation to obtain victory. There are even opinions estimating that, in the future, “most wars will be civilian”¹⁰.

A while ago, I estimated that we could really know what the war of the future would be like only by fighting in such a war. Over time, several elements have emerged leading me to believe that there are sufficient data that enable us to estimate, with a probability higher than 0.5, the main features of the war in the foreseeable future. Therefore, based on the lessons learned from the wars waged in the past few decades and from the ongoing ones, I consider that the future armed confrontations will have the characteristics of **total, unrestricted** (without rules), **continuous and chameleonic war**. In other words, what experts call the *fourth generation warfare, unrestricted war, hybrid war, mosaic war* etc. are, in my opinion, facets or, better to say, components of the same type of violent confrontation.

⁴ Edward Lucas, *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, New York, USA, see <http://www.amazon.com/the-new-cold-war-putins/dp/02302614345#reader-0230614345>, retrieved on 20.08.2014; see also Steve Horn, *US-Russia “New Cold War”: The Battle for Pipelines and Natural Gas*, Global Research, 20 August 2013, at <http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-russia-new-cold-war-the-battle-for-pipelines-and-natural-gas/5346344>, retrieved on 20.02.2014; see also Ann Applebaum, *China and Russia Bring Back Cold War Tactics*, *The Washington Post*.com, 26 December 2013, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ann-applebaum-china-and-russia-bring-back-cold-war-tactics/2013/12/25>, retrieved on 20.08.2014.

⁵ General Mircea Mureșan and Brigadier General (r.) Gheorghe Văduva, *Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului*, National Defence University, București, 2004, p. 14.

⁶ Tony Corn, *Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics*, in *Small Wars Journal*, at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/449-corn.pdf>, retrieved on 10.06.2015.

⁷ Robert M. Gates, *A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age*, in *Foreign Affairs*, no. 1, January-February 2009, see <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2009-01-01/balanced-strategy>, retrieved on 10.06.2015.

⁸ Jack Shafer, *War without End: The US May Still Be Fighting in Syria in 2024, 2034, 2044 ...*, Reuters, 24 September 2014, see <http://blogs.reuters.com/jackshafer/2014/09/24/war-without-end-the-u-s-may-still-be-fighting-in-syria-in-2024-2034-2044/>, retrieved on 17.10.2016.

⁹ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia, December 2007, p. 8, see http://www.potomac institute.org/publications/Potomac_HybridWar_0108.pdf, retrieved on 10.06.2015.

¹⁰ Paul Hirst, *Război și putere în secolul XXI. Statul, conflictul militar și sistemul internațional*, Editura Antet XX, Filipeștii de Târg, Prahova, Romania, 2006, p. 69.

Why **total war**? Because this confrontation will employ all the resources, be they political, diplomatic, economic, financial, informational, technological, cultural and military, of the parties involved in the conflict.

Why **unrestricted war**? Because each party in the confrontation wants victory and, to that end, will employ both legal and illegal (unrestricted violence, atrocities, mass murder etc.) resources and means, having one goal: to achieve the synergy between the physical and psychological dimensions of war in order to demoralise and defeat the opponent¹¹. Both parties in conflict know that the “*reason of the strongest is the best*”¹² and that, ultimately, “*woe to the vanquished*”¹³. Paraphrasing Stanley Bing, losers “*pay the bill* [namely pay reparations, A.N.], *while winners go to the next trendy club* [namely participate in international activities without having remorse, A.N.]”¹⁴.

Why **continuous war**? Because “*Wars no longer begin or end, they are assumed to be the natural continuous state of things*”¹⁵. In other words, want it or not, wars are in full swing, especially considering their non-military and apparently non-violent components. Mihnea Gheorghiu states that there has been no real peace in the world¹⁶. His opinion is supported, among others, by the results of certain studies conducted Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, showing that the number of armed confrontations has increased from 83 in 1945 to 363 in 2010¹⁷.

The continuous character of warfare is given by the entire range of permanent competition between both individuals and communities, be they governmental (state, alliances, organisations) or non-governmental (religious, ethnic, professional etc.), to promote and even impose own interests in all the fields of social life. An important part of such competition is included in the concept of “*free market*”, where there cannot be only winners. That is why, those who know

¹¹ Frank G. Hoffman, *ibidem*.

¹² I. Berg, *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, Editura Vestala, București, 2004, p. 191 (*La raison de plus forte est toujours la meilleure*, French, in original).

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 341 (*Vae victis*, Latin, in original).

¹⁴ Stanley Bing, *Sun Tzu era un biet mototol. Subjugă-ți adversarii, ține-ți aproape prietenii și stăpânește adevărata artă a războiului*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2009, p. 14.

¹⁵ Tom Toles, *Friday Rant: Perpetual War Edition*, in *The Washington Post*, 26 September 2014, see <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2014/09/26/friday-rant-perpetual-war-edition/>, retrieved on 17.10.2014.

¹⁶ Mihnea Gheorghiu, *Flori de tutun*, Editura Eminescu, București, 1984, p. 15.

¹⁷ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, *Conflict Barometer 2010*, see <http://www.ConflictBarometer2010>, retrieved on 20.05.2016.

the “*rules of the game*”¹⁸ employ subversive¹⁹, politico-diplomatic²⁰, economic, informational and psychological methods. When some of the actors in the international arena fail to meet their goals, they can decide to use the armed forces. Such decision is, according to Michael Mandelbaum’s opinion, tantamount to political judgement error²¹, as non-violent methods have not met the expected success and especially because the armed confrontation has destructive effects materialised in casualties, suffering, damages and chaos.

I must admit that not everyone can accept the idea of living in an ongoing war. In spite of possible contrary opinions, I believe that we must adapt to the current reality. The terrorist attacks in many states, the regular threats made by various extremist and terrorist leaders, followed by violent actions, are just some of the arguments that support my view and that have led Uri Friedman to wonder whether there is peace or war in America²².

Why chameleonic war? Because it often and rapidly changes its development depending on the operational situation. Each party in the confrontation intends to surprise its opponent by using new or less known strategies, tactics and methods, which have to ensure success in fights and operations. Practically, we can estimate that, in the future war, the battlefield would be characterised by permanent change, disorder and high hostility, thus the chaotic and fluid character²³. In this context, it is likely that in the same area of operations classical and unconventional, terrorist included, confrontation can coexist, having different scope, time and intensity, depending on the evolution of the operational situation. This type of confrontation is one in which “*state and non-state actors use, simultaneously and in the same area of operations, a mixture of conventional weapons, unconventional warfare tactics, terrorism and criminal actions, to destabilise the existing order*”²⁴.

¹⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Seventeenth printing, 1999, USA, pp. 3-21.

¹⁹ Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Războiul tăcut*, Editura Polirom, 2008, p. 129 (“*The aim of covert actions is to influence the actions of some foreign governments [...]. These actions may be aimed at the government of a particular country, the population in general or a certain segment of the population*”).

²⁰ *Ibidem* („*Influencing the strategies, events or circumstances in other countries is the essence of the foreign policy [...]*”).

²¹ Michael Mandelbaum, *From the Archives: The Failure of Intervention*, in *Foreign Policy*, September-October 1999, see <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/55396/michael-mandelbaum/from-the-archives-the-failure-of-intervention>, retrieved on 24.06.2014.

²² Uri Friedman, *Is Peacetime or Wartime in America?*, in *The Atlantic*, 11 September 2014, see <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/obamas-losing-battle-with-perpetual-war/380060/>, retrieved on 19.10.2014 (“*Obama is losing his battle with perpetual war*”).

²³ ***, *Concept for Future Joint Operations*, see <http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/jv2010/concepts-jv-2010.pdf>, retrieved on 01.06.2016.

²⁴ *Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40: Security and Stability: The Military Contribution*, Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrines Centre, London, November 2009, see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49948/jdp3_40a4.pdf, retrieved on 10.06.2015.

With regard to the war of the future, Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, highlighted the progressive disappearance of the distinction between war and peace, between the military belonging to certain institutionalised structures and the personnel engaged in undercover operations, as well as the beginning of the armed confrontation without any declaration of war. The Russian official also mentioned the simultaneous coexistence and correlation of military and non-military actions. Among the non-military actions are included those conducted by the local population as the “5th column”²⁵), all contributing to the spectacular increase in the actions intensity and effectiveness at the fastest pace so far.

Victorious in the war of the future will not necessarily be the one that will eliminate most enemies from the fight (killed, wounded or taken prisoners) or will occupy a larger area of the opponent territory. We have recent examples in the war in Afghanistan and the Second Gulf War, and the First World War is also illustrative in this respect. The territory of Afghanistan and Iraq was entirely occupied by the coalitions that deployed military forces against the Taliban or against the military regime in Baghdad. The international coalitions proclaimed victory, but subsequent developments were to insurgency, guerrilla, sabotage and terrorism. Unlike the mentioned wars, during the First World War, the German armed forces were on the territories of some adverse states; however, the leaders in Berlin agreed the truce, and later Germany was declared defeated by the Peace Treaty of Paris in 1919.

Therefore, in the war of the future victory will mainly consist in destroying the credibility within the international community, in the economic and financial losses caused to opponents by destroying databases, stealing important data, creating insecurity for investors, withdrawing from business or avoiding to invest in the economy of the target state etc. Actions of this kind will be continuous, and they can be produced by isolated individuals, groups of individuals belonging to transnational organised crime, as well as by terrorist networks having different orientations and even states²⁶. Regarding the economic losses caused to states

²⁵ Sam Jones, *Ukraine: Russia's New Art of War*, in *Financial Times*, 28.08.2014, at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html>, retrieved on 09.06.2015; see also Paul Goble, *Putin's Actions in Ukraine, Interpreter*, 20.06.2014, see <http://www.interpretermag.com/putins-actions-in-ukraine-following-script-by-russian-general-staff-a-year-ago>, retrieved on 09.06.2015.

²⁶ Jason Rivera, *A Theory of Cyberwarfare: Political and Military Objectives, Lines of Communication, and Targets*, *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, 10.06.2014, see <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/06/10/a-theory-of-cyberwarfare-political-and-military-objectives-lines-of-communication-and-targets/>, retrieved on 09.06.2015.

and companies, some estimates in 2015 indicated losses of over 445 billion USD, annually, at global level, because of hackers!²⁷.

2. How Should We Prepare for the War of the Future?

2.1. Human resource training

Fighters should be very well-trained in any confrontation dimension so that they can withstand the constraints on the battlefield and win victory in the physical and especially mental and virtual confrontation. In turn, national public opinion should be prepared to resist the “*psychological bombardment*” launched by the adversary using many channels and employing methods that are increasingly difficult to identify and counter.

The morale of the armed forces and the nation is the element of power that makes the difference between victory and defeat. For the time being, the morale cannot be accurately quantified although there are many who try to achieve it. Fighters can be dominated by fear or, on the contrary, they can be very self-confident. Problems arise when they over- or under-value their adversary. People are, as a pope used to say, like wine, as when they get old they can become either vinegar or champagne! Therefore, we should be able to choose the best solution. How? By permanently operating selection at all hierarchical levels and in all the activities. Getting to know the personnel requires time and patience. Time is said to resolve everything. It is probably true, but solutions do not always come at the right time and, moreover, they do not come out of nothing but of the initiative and involvement of increasingly more people in putting the wheels stuck in bureaucracy in motion and in breaking the psychological barriers raised by some of our peers who cannot see beyond the length of their nose. Collin Powell used to say that people win victories and when they are incapable or when morale and discipline are low, no plan and no strategy will be successful²⁸.

When a country is strong enough internally, it should not be afraid of potential enemies, but it should face them with wisdom and determination to sustain national interests. A fearful attitude will be promptly exploited by the opponent, and a bellicose one will most likely result in an escalation of tensions and even armed confrontation. Openness to dialogue, accompanied by the decision clearly declared and firmly supported by the political class and domestic public opinion to defend national interests, will have a strong psychological effect of restraint on any opponent.

²⁷ Ian Bremmer, *These 5 Facts Explain the Threat of Cyber Warfare*, in *Time*, 19.06.2015, see <http://time.com/3928086/these-5-facts-explain-the-threat-of-cyber-warfare/>, retrieved on 21.06.2015.

²⁸ Oren Harari, *Secretele lui Colin Powell*, Editura Tritonic, București, 2006, pp. 114-116.

Throughout time, there have been many situations when great nations considered strong, but faced with internal tensions, had to yield to some modest opponents having greater internal cohesion and higher morale.

2.2. Ensuring the material, financial and technological resources necessary for the Armed Forces to accomplish their missions

The political leadership of the country establishes the Armed Forces goals and general missions through the *National Defence Strategy* and the *Military Strategy*. These goals and missions can be motivating, but it is economy that can support them or not. The quality and quantity of the resources allocated for national defence should be consistent with the strategic goals set by the country; otherwise, the plans and programmes developed to achieve the goals will, to a large extent, remain only intentions. In this situation, new vulnerabilities emerge or the already existing ones get amplified, thus the credibility of defence and the image of the country in the relations with allies and partners being eroded.

Unfortunately, Romania's defence budget has been underfunded in the past decades, which has reflected in the Armed Forces lower than intended combat capacity. This situation is generated by the lower performance of some of the obsolete equipment still in the inventory of the military structural entities. The defence budget in the previous years could also be a consequence of the fact that some politicians consider that "*NATO protects us*" and that the armed defence is not a priority. The Alliance will back us in the event of an armed aggression, but we will have to be able to defend ourselves until the allied forces join our forces. The situation appears to be changing because of the armed confrontations in the proximity of the national borders.

In general, an economy that proves competitive internationally can provide the material and financial resources necessary for the citizens of the country to live a decent life, as well as for the plans and programmes in health, education, science, culture, research, social services, armed forces etc. to be fulfilled.

In turn, economy can become competitive by the contribution of **policy** (through continually assessing the internal and international situation, followed by setting certain realistic and sustainable objectives for the country), **diplomacy** (through consistently supporting with viable arguments the country interests in the relations with the other actors in the international arena – states and international governmental organisations), **finance** (through capitalising on the country assets and effectively investing the public money, in the framework of certain realistic economic and social policies), **education** (through preparing valuable graduates and correlating curricula with current and future labour market requirements),

health (through employing adequate measures to maintain the citizens health and, implicitly, diminishing the number of absences from the workplace), **scientific research and culture** (through capitalising on the citizens creative potential and promoting their inventions and innovations in other sectors of internal social life and in relation with the other communities in the world).

3. Conclusions

The armed clashes of the future are more likely to be complex and total. They could simultaneously have elements of conventional, unconventional warfare, and even terrorism.

The world can be equated to an arena where international actors, be they governmental (states and groups of states) and nongovernmental (organisations and all types of associations), are in dispute over influence, resources, profit and territories.

We live in a world that is over-informed²⁹, supersaturated or better to say bombarded³⁰ by mass-media, by the information provided by millions of publications, dozens or even hundreds of thousands of television or radio stations, tens of millions of blogs, internet sites³¹ and other types of official and unofficial sources. In this context, it is increasingly difficult to separate information from unnecessary³² and, many times, harmful³³ (manipulating and misinforming people) data.

²⁹ Greg Laden, *Subjective Filtering of Internet Content*, Greg Laden's blog, 12.12.2008, see <http://scienceblogs.com/gregladen/2008/12/12/subjective-filtering-internet/>, retrieved on 05.02.2015. (The digital revolution progress can be expressed in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Cyber space is "crowded" each and every moment, and the information quantity grows exponentially).

³⁰ *Information Age*, Flat World Business, see <http://flatworldbusiness.wordpress.com/flat-education/previously/web-1-0-vs-web-3-0-a-bird-eye-on-the-definition/information-age/>, retrieved on 04.02.2014 (Cyber attacks are enabled by the fact that the Internet has practically an infinite dimension. To assess the dimension of the cyber space we should analyse the statistical data related to the volume of data and the dynamics of activities: to see all posts on the Internet in one second, we need 5 years, there are twice the world population more cyber devices, at least 204 million emails are posted daily, 20 million photographs are seen, music is listened to for more than 61,141 hours, 47,000 documents are downloaded etc.).

³¹ *The Rise of the Digital Information Age*, in *The Washington Post*, 11 February 2011, see <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2011/02/11/GR2011021100614.html>, retrieved on 03.02.2014.

³² Ilinca Bernea, *Era informațională și dictatura eului*, 22.10.2011, see <http://ilincabernea.wordpress.com/2011/10/22/era-informationala-si-dictatura-eului>, retrieved on 03.02.2016 (Ilinca Bernea considers the Internet is an extremely powerful collective drug, where bloggers, driven by "mental exhibitionism" and fond of chatting show off to release own tension, inducing a social attitude characterised by passivity and lamentation. The author states that information expansion is a form of anarchy where the ego feels free to express and individual liberty declines any form of responsibility).

³³ Bob Hughes, *The Information Age and Its Victims, Beneath the Cover*, 14.01.2013, see <http://www.beneaththecover.cover/2013/01/14/the-information-age-and-its-victims/>, retrieved on 03.02.2016. [The easiness to get in contact with unknown people and the difficulty to identify those that have false

Up until some previous decades, war phenomenon was associated with employing brute and destructive force. Such an understanding of war is no longer supported by the conclusions resulted from the armed confrontations taken place in the late 20th century and in the 21st century as well as from the undesired events that make the world bleed.

The armed forces depend on all the other elements of the society through the goals set by the political and military decision-makers, through the value of the fighters largely achieved through the education system, through the funds allocated for procurement, modernisation and investments, through the economy capability of ensuring competitive combat technology and assets etc.

National defence components are interdependent and their value depends on the responsible involvement of each citizen of the country. For citizens to get involved in supporting national defence it is necessary to correctly and continually inform them, thus contributing to each of us awareness and assumption of responsibilities.

We will always find convenient excuses for failures, forgetting that he who excuses accuses himself. To be worthy heirs of those who have made certain accomplishments for our country, we should face the convenience, narrow-mindedness, distrust and of course hostility of people – in the country and abroad –, manifested, first and foremost, psychologically. In other words, **we will have the future we are building now!**

English version by
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

identities, competencies, abilities, responsibilities are only a few of the conditions that enable individuals, groups and criminal organisations to conduct illegal activities. There is a broad range of such activities including deception, swindling, stealing data and identities, harassment, extortion, electronic correspondence violation, “infection” of computer networks with harmful computer products (viruses and worms), posting messages, photos and movies with irreverent or illegal content].

FROM THE ARAB SPRING TO THE ISLAMIC STATE – Responsibility to Protect and Combating Terrorism – New Conceptual Dimensions of the “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine (II)

*Iuliana-Simona ȚUȚUIANU
Nelu BÎRLĂ*

The current study is a plea for the right of states to assist oppressed and innocent civilians who are fighting for democracy and human rights. It is a plea for the right to humanitarian intervention, which has its roots in Grotius and Vattel’s “just war” theories.

The authors seek to explain how this mindset has become part of global consciousness and how a true doctrine of international community based on active involvement in intrastate conflicts and eradication of genocide as a threat to international security and stability has been shaped. The paper also addresses the issue of legitimacy, of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine and the convergence dilemma between the efforts to prevent mass atrocities and those related to combating terrorism.

Keywords: *terrorist threats; Millennium Summit; sovereignty; humanitarian actions*

“Responsibility to Protect” and National Sovereignty

The late '90s saw the conceptual leap from sovereignty perceived as a right to sovereignty perceived in terms of responsibility. Westphalian sovereignty was virtually reinvented, as this pivotal norm of the international relations system moved towards a model of post-Westphalian sovereignty, which essentially promotes an ethical exercise of sovereignty. Thus, states and their leaders are not only the beneficiaries of privileges, rights and immunities guaranteed by sovereignty but also have moral responsibilities attached to sovereignty.

The post-*Cold War* era has brought developments in overcoming the Westphalian model, reflected

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in practices that are multiplied by UN peacekeeping operations and in regional cooperation processes that have standardised the strengthening of the nation state flexibility. The post-Westphalian modernity processes or those related to post-*Cold War* post-modernism are not new. The “*Concert of Power*” installed in 1815 (liberalism 1.0 articulated by Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919-1920)¹ or the post-war United Nations based on liberalism 2.0 promoted by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt through the “*four policemen*”² concept were actually attempts to overcome Westphalian constraints in both the exercise of sovereignty and the manifestation of the harmful inflexibility of systemic hegemony in the race for supremacy among powerful actors.

The Westphalian model can be overcome in the context of systemic democratisation through integration and not in the context of unquestionable hegemony of an actor, whether extremely powerful or benign. John S. Mearsheimer considers that in recent decades the United States has pursued a policy of applying military force to lead a unipolar world, establishing the rules of world order and being prepared at all times to implement them³. This assumption is contradicted today by the deep process of installing a cooperative security, which rejects both the concept of balance of power and MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction), refining the concept established by Article 16 of the League of Nations and resumed by the UN Charter. This process is accompanied by another, which is more devastating for the Westphalian paradigm, namely *de facto* overcoming the nation state in favour of an international community homogeneously governed by stringent rules and regimes for the good of all and eliminating any chance of war generating systemic anarchy.

In the academic world, there is still a deep scepticism towards the installation of a post-Westphalian paradigm, and the generalisation of respecting human rights globally after the end of the *Cold War* – despite the historical progress registered

¹ G. John Ikenberry, “*Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order*”, *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 7, no. 1, March 2009, pp. 71-87, see <http://www.princeton.edu/~gji3/LiberalInternationalism.pdf> (retrieved on 1 July 2016).

² The Four Policemen refers to a post-war council consisting of the Big Four that US President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed as a guarantor of world peace. The members of the Big Four, called the Four Powers during World War II, were the four major Allies of World War II: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the Republic of China. The Four Policemen would be responsible for keeping order within their spheres of influence. See on this matter: Townsend Hoopes, Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the United Nations*, Yale University Press, 2000; Alan Brinkley, *Franklin Delano Roosevelt*, Oxford University Press, 2010; Beverly Bandler, “*Why FDR Matters Now More Than Ever*”, 30 January 2015, see <https://consortiumnews.com/2015/01/30/why-fdr-matters-now-more-than-ever/> (retrieved on 15 July 2016).

³ John S. Mearsheimer, “*Imperial by Design*”, *The National Interest*, 16 December 2010, see <http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show> (retrieved on 1 July 2016).

in recent centuries, including and especially from an institutional perspective – is perceived as the “*last utopia*”⁴. In this context, debates on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the new political strategic and humanitarian concept, namely the “*responsibility to protect*” (*R2P*) are to be noted. This is a concept that boldly captures the compatibility between national sovereignty principles and those of international legality, allowing the intervention of the international community to exercise jurisdiction over the most serious crimes against humanity. But how did this concept emerge, under which conditions and what is in fact its content?

On the occasion of the *2000 Millennium Summit*, which brought together heads of state and government from 191 countries, the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan raised a controversial question on humanitarian intervention (seen often as an unacceptable assault against sovereignty) and its realistic impact in situations such as those in Rwanda or Srebrenica, where human rights were systematically violated. In response, Canada announced the creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which founded the new “*responsibility to protect*” (*R2P*) concept in its first report on the subject, which appeared in 2001. Five years later, at the 2005 summit, the participants unanimously favoured the adoption of the concept, even though this political statement should have been normatively implemented so as to produce legal effects. The UN General Assembly was therefore required to take the necessary steps to develop a strategy whereby the responsibility to protect could be sanctioned and finally implemented. The United Nations Security Council revealed its position a year later, when its Resolution 1674 entitled “*Protection of civilians in armed conflicts*” reaffirmed the provisions contained in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 summit’s final document⁵. And thus the responsibility to protect opened a new universe of political options, representing one of the most controversial and least understood ideas of our time.

There are three key aspects that are often invoked and likely to undermine the moral force of *R2P* and its preventive and/or punitive function: its selective application, the lack of a clear operational concept, and ignorance of its preventive

⁴ Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 2012; see also the book review by John Grey in *The National Interest*, January 2011; <http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/>; <https://westphalianpost.wordpress.com/machtropolitik/droit-de-%E2%80%99hommisme/what-rawls-hath-wrought/> (retrieved on 1 July 2016).

⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution no. 1674, 28 April 2006, see <http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/un-security-council-resolution-1674-civilians-armed-conflict/p23454> (retrieved on 12 July 2016); United Nations General Assembly Resolution no. 60/1 on 2005 World Summit Outcome, see <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf> (retrieved on 15 July 2016).

dimension. Anne Marie Slaughter, one of the prominent defenders of the concept said that the idea of responsibility to prevent is advanced as a corollary of the responsibility to protect, entailing endeavours to avoid conditions that encourage inter- and intra-state violence. Without proposing a new politically correct *R2P* vocabulary, Slaughter tried to explain how “*intervention assumes that sovereignty is a closed sphere, when in fact it is an increasingly, and legitimately, permeable one*”⁶.

Fred Kaplan, columnist at *Slate* magazine, believes that the responsibility to protect is just a “*sanitised*”⁷ version of humanitarian intervention. This approach is questionable now, when international law fully recognises human rights and the immutable protection relationship between national governments and their citizens. *R2P* has had an important impact on political discourse and has gradually become a useful tool for international decision-makers in their efforts to prevent humanitarian crises and obstruct genocide and other serious violations of human rights. Through this tool, the great powers might overcome their divergences and recognise undeniable human rights in restructuring the international relations system. The perception that we are witnessing a diminution of national sovereignty (conceived in its traditional context) in the context of *R2P* ascension seems inconsistent, regardless of the arguments invoking humanitarian interventions carried out in the past by Western states to promote their interests. The world changes, new threats and dangers appear every day and even if *R2P* is not yet admitted as a new theory of international relations, it could be perceived as a continuation and consolidation of previous theories dedicated to morality and humanity.

The right to sovereignty is sounded by both autocratic and democratic governments, most of them tending to condemn foreign intervention on their territory due to nationalistic reasons. Respect for sovereignty is recognised in a large number of laws and international institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and, especially, the United Nations Charter. For example, the preamble and Articles 17 and 53 of the Rome Statute establish the Court’s competence as complementary to the member states’ jurisdictions⁸.

⁶ Anne Marie Slaughter, “*Intervention, Libya, and the Future of Sovereignty*”, *The Atlantic*, 4 September 2011, see <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/intervention-libya-and-the-future-of-sovereignty/244537/> (retrieved on 15 July 2016).

⁷ Fred Kaplan, “*It’s Not What We Ought To Do, But What We Can Do*”, *Slate*, 19 August 2011; see http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2011/08/its_not_what_we_ought_to_do_but_what_we_can_do.single.html (retrieved on 14 July 2016).

⁸ For further details, see the first part of the study.

The Westphalian sovereignty paradigm has always been criticised. The French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain claimed that sovereignty is “*a concept intrinsically wrong*”, which brings insurmountable complications in international law, and Stephen Krasner described sovereignty as “*organised hypocrisy*”⁹ as it is widely violated, although universally recognised. Most interesting is the approach by Bertrand de Jouvenel, who argued that while people often perceive the sovereign will as absolute authority, they however accept that it is subject to moral constraints¹¹. In other words, sovereignty is founded on a moral framework that serves to justify the paradigm, but at the same time can justify deviations and exceptions to it.

Before the *R2P* advent, the UN had not developed any general case of restricted sovereignty. The Security Council authorised external interventions rarely and on an ad-hoc basis, for example in Somalia and Haiti. *R2P* has codified a set of criteria that justifies the violation of a state’s sovereignty, marking in this way a decisive decline of the Westphalian norm. After the unanimous approval of the concept in 2006, numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions have referred to it, and the concept has become extremely important in international debates where it has been invoked by a wide range of state and non-state actors. *R2P* has also suffered failures, especially in the context of its invocation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, both episodes shaking severely the concept’s popularity¹².

Amitai Etzioni, in his recent article entitled “*Defining Down Sovereignty*”, addresses the normative thesis that sovereignty must not provide for any state absolute protection against armed intervention by other states, where that state uses particular politico-military standards that endanger international security. The analyst advances some possible actions to be made by international community to limit the immunities that have been wrongly associated with sovereignty: setting a clear threshold to justify armed intervention and the decision-makers to lay its foundations, as well as the adjacent responsibilities, namely “*the responsibility to prevent international terrorism*”¹³.

⁹ Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State*, University of Chicago Press, 1951.

¹⁰ Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 85-86, 108, 163-75, 180-82, 202-17.

¹¹ Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good*, Cambridge University Press, 1957.

¹² Bruce Ackerman, “*Obama’s Unconstitutional War*”, *Foreign Policy*, 24 March 2011; Richard Norton-Taylor, “*Libya Campaign ‘Has Made UN Missions to Protect Civilians Less Likely*”, *Guardian*, 19 March 2012, see www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/19/libya-un-missions-civilians (retrieved on 16 July 2016).

¹³ Amitai Etzioni, “*Defining Down Sovereignty: The Rights and Responsibilities of Nations*”, *Ethics & International Affairs*, 10 March 2016, see <https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2016/defining-sovereignty-rights-responsibilities-nations/> (retrieved on 16 July 2016).

Undoubtedly, when foreign terrorists attack one country's citizens, the armed and security forces of the attacked state are entitled to use force to crush the terrorist acts. However, the use of drones and special forces to eliminate international terrorists is often criticised by those who invoke in their arguments the massive violation of state sovereignty (it is the case of "violating"¹⁴ national sovereignty of Pakistan when US special forces killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad). Still, when the US used the drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, they previously notified the governments of those countries (who even collaborated in the implementation of the decisions to intervene¹⁵) or stressed that they had their "tacit consent"¹⁶ just out of respect for the norm of state sovereignty.

Mary Ellen O'Connell claims that "international law has a definition of war and it refers to places where intense, protracted, organised inter-group fighting occurs. It does not refer to places merely where terrorist suspects are found"¹⁷. In the context of theatres very narrowly defined in war declarations of the states involved, the legal framework associated with the "law of peace" should be expanded so as to regulate also the counterterrorism efforts. In short, if states cannot assume this responsibility to curb the terrorist phenomenon on their national territory, they do nothing but give up, inevitably, relevant portions of the claims related to their sovereignty. Therefore, the attacked states and the entire international community act legitimately when responding with force against terrorist threats, regardless of national frontiers.

The normative concern related to the prevention of mass atrocities is universal, and the rise of powers associated to the pluralistic notions of state sovereignty and non-intervention has not led to a decline in protection rules. On the contrary, since 2005, the Security Council has adopted several resolutions regarding robust peace operations and coalition of the willing to protect innocent civilians as a central part of the assumed mandate. These have not disrupted in any way the concerned regulatory trends but have demonstrated the vulnerability of key

¹⁴ Chris Woods, "CIA Drone Strikes Violate Pakistan's Sovereignty, Says Senior Diplomat", *Guardian*, 3 August 2012, see www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/03/cia-drone-strikes-violate-pakistan (retrieved on 20 July 2016).

¹⁵ Akbar Nasir Khan, "Legality of Targeted Killings by Drone Attacks in Pakistan", *Pak Institute for Peace Studies*, February 2011.

¹⁶ Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Lawful Use of Combat Drones", see fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/042810oconnell.pdf (retrieved on 18 July 2016); Dana Priest, "Foreign Network at Front of CIA's Terror Fight", *Washington Post*, 18 November 2005, see www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/17/AR2005111702070_3.html (retrieved on 18 July 2016).

¹⁷ Mary Ellen O'Connell, "When Is a War Not a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror", *ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2005, p. 5.

principles, such as *R2P*¹⁸. The most relevant protection practices are not necessarily the result of the *R2P* related activism or the political impact of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. Rather, both the political action to protect vulnerable populations (imposed by the harsh realities of the contemporary security environment) and the normative *R2P* construction as a political tool have fuelled the development of global protection rules, which focus on genocide and other mass atrocities and gradually reach expanded approaches associated with: peacekeeping under the UN aegis; international criminal justice; humanitarian intervention and promotion of human rights.

Doctrine in Action

The revolutionary movements in the Middle East and North Africa have demonstrated both the potential and the limits of the “*responsibility to protect*” (*R2P*) doctrine, when it is applied in countries with authoritarian regimes that cannot meet the popular demands for human rights. The most important development of the *R2P* was made by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 (referral of the situation in Libya to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court) and Resolution 1973 that authorised NATO to use “*all necessary means*” to protect Libyan civilians, within the framework of an insurrection in which this goal could only be achieved by overthrowing the political regime. *R2P* is intended to support the national sovereignty of states – by clearly stating the obligation to protect the civilian population – so that the foreign intervention on the territory of a state could only be justified in the light of that protection, the change of political regime not being expressly stipulated as such in the doctrine’s regulatory frameworks. However, in Libya, both goals were envisaged – the achievement of one entailing automatically the fulfilment of the other. An increased reluctance in implementing *R2P* has persisted, however, in the case of Syria, where the crackdown of the protests against the Assad regime has led to civil war. The *Arab Spring* had its obstacles and critics, but the novelties and openings induced in the societal dynamics by the extended protection opportunities of human rights and universal values (set out in national constitutions and the accessions to the ICC and to international treaties on human rights) have resulted in synchronising the evolutions of states in the region with those of the security environment and international relations system, as well as in priming

¹⁸ Gerrit Kurtz, Philipp Rotmann, “*The Evolution of Norms of Protection: Major Powers Debate the Responsibility to Protect*”, *Global Society*, vol. 30, no. 1/2016 (special issue *Contesting and Shaping the Norms of Protection: The Evolution of a Responsibility to Protect*), pp. 3-20.

the restructuring and redefinition process of national sovereignty on post-Westphalian coordinates.

With the coming of 1990 and the dissolution of *Cold War* state structures, shocking situations have occurred repeatedly, especially in the former Yugoslavia and Africa. In most cases where the international community responded through the UN, the result was counterproductive, for example in Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995). Then, after the beginning of the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, the option of a so-called *coalition of the willing* acting outside the authority of the UN Security Council has raised several questions about the integrity of the international security environment. The same thing happened four years later, with the invasion of Iraq.

The emergence and consolidation of a new norm – *the responsibility to protect* – cannot guarantee in itself that mass atrocities come to an end, but offers a better chance of achieving this goal. The responsibility to protect makes political power more reliable and democratises humanitarian intervention in a way that reconceptualises national sovereignty as responsibility. This approach has great potential for legitimacy, in terms of both the legal commitment to protect human beings and the cosmopolitan deconstruction of jurisdiction immunity. Moreover, *R2P* allows indigenous democratic movements only insofar as they serve the purpose of management of internal conflicts, in collaboration with external support. Even if *R2P* doctrine does not lead to the abolition of war, it rejects wars stemming from selfish national pride or power in favour of military actions for safeguarding and promoting human rights principles.

However, realities on the ground make the *R2P* doctrine difficult to apply consistently and coherently. How can be justified, for instance, to protect a Libyan citizen's life, while other lives are doomed by the lack of similar actions approved at the UN? It sounds like a selective humanitarian logic that masks a moral dishonesty and raises suspicions of applying a double standard, humanitarian actions being considered to have other motives, including facilitation of access to oil reserves (the case of Syria is eloquent in this respect). Whether it is about religious, ethnic, economic conflicts, or those motivated by dictatorial regimes and failed states, the international community has a duty not only to help and protect people exposed to violence, death, disease or famine, but also the obligation to prevent the conditions allowing these causes and their related human suffering.

Through its moral, preventive and punitive force, the responsibility to protect has an evolutionary potential in the thinking and practice of international relations in the 21st century. An intelligent foreign policy to cope with the challenges, expectations and ambitions of a multipolar world must combine in perfect balance

the need to protect human lives and associated values with the need to protect the state interests; the responsibility to protect with the responsibility to prevent; *soft* means with *hard* means; and a unilateralist approach with a multilateral one. Idealism and realism should not be condemned to remain always on opposite sides. Their synthesis is the answer to all the uncertainties of the 21st century, manifested in an enlightening kind of realism that makes states and their citizens more responsible.

In 2006, the United Nations Security Council made for the first time an official reference to the responsibility to protect, in a resolution that commits states to action to protect civilians in armed conflict. Resolution 1674, adopted on 28 April, reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome on the responsibility to protect civilian populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Four months later, Resolution 1706 was issued, which expressly authorised a UN force to use "*all necessary means*" to protect Sudanese civilians in the region of Darfur. The latter is a precedent-resolution operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in which the responsibility to protect is fully assumed and implicitly encoded.

In January 2008, the severity of the political crisis in Kenya determined the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Bernard Kouchner to make an appeal to the UN Security Council to react on behalf of the responsibility to protect, before this country ends up in a large-scale ethnic conflict. The Kenyan government and the opposition parties agreed that former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan should mediate the political crisis and his mediation efforts were subsequently successful through the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, concluded on 28 February 2008. This rapid and coordinated reaction of the international community was perceived as "*a viable model of diplomatic action under R2P*"¹⁹.

In 2011, the R2P doctrine reached its maturity, being associated with results indicating tens of thousands of saved lives and renewed hope for long oppressed peoples. In Libya, Ivory Coast, South Sudan, Yemen and Syria, it is shown that "*human protection is a defining purpose of the United Nations in the twenty-first century*"²⁰.

Resolution 1973 of 2011 on the situation in Libya is considered historic. It created jurisprudence that generated confidence among the Arab peoples.

¹⁹ "*Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance*", *Human Rights Watch*, vol. 20, no. 1 (A), 17 March 2008, p. 67.

²⁰ UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's address to the Stanley Foundation Conference on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), in New York on 18 January 2012, see <http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sgsm14068.doc.htm> (retrieved on 17 February 2016).

NATO's actions in Libya were assessed as "*model intervention*"²¹ and a validation of the *R2P* principle. Lives of tens of thousands of people were saved in this country, without sacrificing any military lives of the Alliance and with a cost of several million dollars (a reasonable cost compared to other modern interventions). Although there were some abstentions in promoting the resolution, NATO received military assistance from the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Jordan and especially Qatar. And although the USA bore half of the cost of military intervention, France and Britain mainly acted, so that international public opinion has not perceived the operation as an American one. However, there was misunderstanding of the legal consequences of Resolution 1973, due to the non-assimilation of the lesson of Iraq, i.e. that interventionist forces must have a well prepared action plan for the future. This became obvious in 2012, as Libya was increasingly torn by internal conflicts, brutal treatment of war prisoners and chaos at its borders. Although NATO is a military alliance that has no competency over post-conflict reconstruction, this does not absolve the UNSC of responsibility. A humanitarian intervention whether possible by the Security Council's validation or through "*coalitions of the willing*" should always have a post-intervention action plan. The planning difficulties in Iraq deterred any military intervention in Syria, where operations were limited to a supervision mission, without much success.

Nevertheless, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the intervention was possible and relatively easy. It was a new intervention of the French forces in coordination with the UN mission in Ivory Coast to end the conflict in this African country where tough fighting had taken place between the forces of the UN-recognised President Alassane Ouattara and supporters of Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to give up power after he lost the elections in 2010. The purpose of intervention authorised by Resolution 1975 of 30 March 2011 was to prevent bloodshed. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, stated that the attacks were not a declaration of war against Gbagbo, but were designed to protect the civilian population of Ivory Coast.

On 8 July 2011, the Security Council laid the foundation of the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), by Resolution 1996 to provide, among other aspects, assistance and counselling to the Sudanese government in fulfilling its responsibility to protect its population. South Sudan officially became an independent state on 9 July 2011, the culmination of a lengthy process that began in 2005 with a peace agreement ending a long civil war.

²¹ Ivo H. Daalder, James G. Stavridis, "*NATO's Victory in Libya*", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2012, p. 2.


Finally, the last reference to the primary responsibility to protect civilians in a 2011 UN Security Council resolution appeared in Resolution 2014 of 21 October, which condemns the widespread violations of human rights by the authorities of Yemen and encourages an inclusive political process of power transition, including presidential elections.

In 2012, the responsibility to protect becomes the common UN syntagm for the situation in Syria, although no UN Security Council resolution has been passed to condemn the humanitarian crisis in this country and authorise the necessary counter-measures. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on regional policy-makers and the international community, especially the United Nations Security Council, to urgently identify a political solution to end the crisis which had resulted in more than 100,000 deaths at that point. The UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council condemned the massive and systematic violation of human rights, calling the Syrian government to immediately end the violence and protect its civilian population. Moreover, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recommended the referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court and asked the UN Security Council to assume responsibility to protect the Syrian population.

On 10 October 2013, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2121 underscored the primary responsibility of the Central African authorities to protect the population, as well as to ensure the security and unity in its territory, and stressed their obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law. In April 2014, due to the deterioration of the security situation in the country, the UN Security Council Resolution 2149 authorised MINUSCA peacekeeping operation to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian access in the Central African Republic.

The responsibility to protect is perhaps the most noticeable and dramatic normative development of our times. Removing the tensions in the UN Charter between national sovereignty and human rights seem superfluous now, in the context of the highly fluid and unpredictable current security environment, where sovereignty does not involve anymore the license to kill. We have tried to capture succinctly in this section of the study the triggering factors of the *R2P* doctrine after its official adoption in 2005, noting that a number of challenges²² remain to be considered ahead in the norm's transition towards a solid and viable model of political action.

²² See more on the challenges of *R2P*: Ramesh Thakur, Thomas G. Weiss, "*R2P: From Idea to Norm – and Action?*", *Global Responsibility to Protect 1(1)*, February 2009, pp. 22-53, see https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233638957_R2P_From_Idea_to_Norm-and_Action (retrieved on 18 July 2016).



Relevant moments in the evolution of “responsibility to protect”²³

New Challenges and the Need to Reconceptualise the Doctrine

The rationale of the US invasion of Iraq is still confusing. Still, there is a quasi-general consensus that humanitarian motives, if there were any, have faded due to the lack of evidence of weapons of mass destruction and credible links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden or the events of 11 September 2001.

In the UK, we are witnessing a wave of controversy on the historical report released by the Chilcot inquiry commission on the war in Iraq, which brings into question the responsibility of former Prime Minister Tony Blair and the role of American-British disinformation that led to atrocities and chaos in Iraq and (not least) the emergence of ISIS. The report, which contains 2.6 million words – four times longer than Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy’s novel “*War and Peace*” – might be used in court against Blair and the British government, although there are voices among international jurists who argue that this approach is “*a fantasy*”²⁴ in the absence of a court with proper jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. It is known that the ICC may have jurisdiction to punish those guilty of committing the crime of aggression only in 2017. However, and despite the fact that “*international*

²³ The developments recorded in 2015 are addressed in the next section of the study.

²⁴ Geoffrey Robertson, “*Putting Tony Blair in the Dock is a Fantasy*”, *Guardian*, July 2016, see <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/05/tony-blair-in-the-dock-fantasy-wars-aggression> (retrieved on 16 July 2016).

*criminal law is still in its infancy*²⁵, the Chilcot report (called after its chairman Sir John Chilcot)²⁶, published on 6 July 2016, may represent an impetus for the necessary legal changes to ensure that future leaders who wage wars of aggression can be brought to account. Until then, we will most likely witness to symbolic trials handled by courts which do not have authority to arrest the indictees or carry out their verdicts²⁷.

The recourse to *R2P* in Iraq has damaged the international community's ability to implement any kind of legitimate intervention. Thereafter, *R2P* architects have repeatedly warned about the highly diversion danger of the doctrine's goals. A worrying example is the innovative perspective of the Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the Russian Federation's responsibility to protect all Russian citizens in Ukraine. In this case, the abusive instrumentalisation of the doctrine was an attack on the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state, and against the legitimacy of *R2P* principle as such.

The struggle for the doctrine's legitimacy will haunt the international community as it tries to stem the violence perpetrated by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 10 years after the endorsement of the responsibility to protect by member states of the United Nations, the convergence dilemma between the efforts to prevent mass atrocities and those related to combating terrorism is debated. Even if terrorist acts and mass atrocities are easily comparable and sometimes they overlap, the human rights practitioners have shown restraint in recognition that *R2P* is more than a humanitarian concept, with major implications for national and international security. In recent years, the atrocities committed by non-state actors in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and West Africa, such as the Islamic State, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, were most often condemned as terrorist acts and not as crimes against humanity.

The fourth section of the UN Secretary-General's report on the *R2P* implementation, dated 13 July 2015, shows how the new contemporary conflictual dynamics leads to two major challenges to an effective *R2P* implementation, namely "*responding to non-state armed groups that engage in atrocity crimes and adjusting*

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ Detailed information available on the website of the Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot Inquiry): see <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/> (retrieved on 18 July 2016).

²⁷ On 23 November 2011, the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal (Malaysia) convicted the former US President George W. Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who were found guilty of genocide and crimes against peace after an investigation that lasted nearly three years. The court convicted them in absentia for violating international law in March 2003, when they decided unilaterally to invade Iraq.

to the impact of new technologies”²⁸. The approach that the ISIS phenomenon entails rather the fight against terrorism than the *R2P* does not consider sufficiently the nature of violence caused by the terrorist organisation and the reality that terrorism – understood as violence directed intentionally against civilians – is often in itself a crime against humanity. Thus, in most cases, countering terrorism and *R2P* are simply different approaches to the same problem: violent attacks on the civilian population. The fact that a particular crisis can be described in terms of fighting terrorism does not mean that it does not pose also a challenge to the responsibility to protect.

The air strikes by the US-led coalition in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State are the latest military intervention justified under the Responsibility to Protect. Alex Bellamy, Director of *Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect* encourages the military campaign based on this rationale²⁹. Also, Gareth Evans, the academic lawyer and ex-foreign minister of Australia who played a key role in developing the concept of *R2P* and building support for the doctrine, has written two articles in which he endorses such course of action: in the first, he enthusiastically supports the campaign in Iraq, and in the second, he advocates the bombing of ISIS bases in both Iraq and Syria (while expressing some reservations)³⁰.

On the other hand, Gregory Shupak believes that Bellamy and Evans’ affirmed support for the *R2P* implementation in Iraq and Syria are grounded in extremely weak political analyses that demonstrate serious naiveté about American foreign policy. In his view, both analysts “do not give sufficient consideration to the ways the USA and its allies have exacerbated the suffering Syrians have endured in their civil war, the US strategy being geared toward dominating the region, this goal being pursued with extreme violence”³¹. Another who challenges the exclusively humanitarian *R2P* instrumentalisation in Syria and Iraq is Adam Hanieh, Professor at the University of London. He describes how US policy is “driven by the recurring theme of its decade-long history in the Middle East: the attempt to deny the people

²⁸ “A vital and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect”, Report of the UN Secretary-General on R2P, 13 July 2015, pp. 14-15, see http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/500 (retrieved on 13 February 2016).

²⁹ Alex Bellamy, “The Islamic State and the Case for Responsibility to Protect: Do not let feelings toward past invasions in the Middle East deter us from protecting Syrians and Iraqis”, *Canadian International Council*, 20 April 2015, see <https://www.opencanada.org/features/the-islamic-state-and-the-case-for-responsibility-to-protect/> (retrieved on 12 February 2016).

³⁰ Gareth Evans, “A Legitimate, Human Mission in Iraq to Halt Islamic State Extremism”, *The Australian*, 2 September 2014; “The Limits to Fighting the Islamic State”, *Project Syndicate*, 23 September 2014.

³¹ Gregory Shupak, “Iraq and Syria: When Humanitarians Attack”, *MIDDLE EAST EYE*, 23 July 2015, see <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/iraq-and-syria-when-humanitarians-attack-2099011895> (retrieved on 13 February 2016).

of the Middle East direct control of the region's resources"³². Also, David Vine, Associate Professor at *College of Arts and Sciences* of the American University in Washington DC, points out that since the 1980s "the US military has gradually garrisoned the Greater Middle East in order to control oil supplies"³³. Shortly, what these opinions suggest is that the US's current campaign in Iraq and Syria is providing the US ruling class with an opportunity to deepen its long-term presence in the Middle East and to have launching points for future attacks, which will result in devastating humanitarian consequences for the people of the region.

Beyond this pessimistic view on the *R2P* capacity to annihilate ISIS, the human rights community, national governments and the United Nations have a duty to decipher the coordinates of the convergence between preventing mass atrocities and combating terrorism. Since the initial report on *R2P*, issued in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, does not contain too many practical recommendations on protecting civilians from non-state actors, the right time for the doctrine's conceptual development has come. The UN Security Council Resolution no. 2249 of 20 November 2015 requires coordinated action by the international community against the Islamic State. Proposed by France and adopted unanimously, seven days after the terrorist attacks in Paris, this resolution calls for taking all necessary measures to combat ISIS on the territory controlled by terrorists in Syria and Iraq, in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. The document opens a new chapter in the fight against terrorism in general and against ISIS in particular, as the expression of an ample legal development that began in 2001, by offering greater consistency to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, especially as regards Article 51: the power to use force against terrorists is now consolidated within the framework of the right to self-defence.

The message sent by the NATO Summit held in Warsaw between 8 to 9 July 2016 also puts an emphasis on realistic and credible collective efforts so that the North Atlantic Alliance can be perceived as a Cerberus of the responsibility to protect and defend the territory and population of the Euro-Atlantic

³² Adam Hanieh, "A 'Single War': The Political Economy of Intervention in the Middle East and Central Asia", in: Jerome Klassen, Greg Albo (eds.), *Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan*, University of Toronto Press, 2013, Part I (3).

³³ David Vine, "The Bases of War in the Middle East: Congress is spending billions of dollars on bases in the Middle East, but what role do they really serve?", *The Nation*, 13 November 2014.

community: “The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty”³⁴. The leaders of NATO member states decided that the Alliance would provide surveillance aircraft and military trainers to support the international coalition against the jihadist organisation Islamic State.

Until recently, there have been fears that a wider transnational use of force in the fight against international terrorism would transform the Grotian international society into a Hobbesian order, dominated by the obsession for security and some rules of prudence, in which agreements can be broken³⁵.

The UN Security Council Resolution no. 2249 and the NATO Warsaw Summit’s declaration indicate that such a development is not inevitable. Major challenges to security, such as international terrorism, may lead to a state order in which international rules on the use of force are reformulated in order to allow a more effective crackdown on the new threats, in line with international standards mutually agreed under the supervision of the United Nations. Contemporary international terrorism is a threat that could not be anticipated in 1945 and, accordingly, Chapter VII of the UN Charter does not deal openly with this problem. Designed to prevent and mediate interstate crises, the United Nations Security Council must now adapt its old traditions to cope with new types of global conflicts caused by non-state actors such as ISIS or Boko Haram³⁶. A new interpretation of the basis and norms attached to Chapter VII, which extends the *jus ad bellum* rules to the fight against terrorism, “will not lead to a more anarchical international society but rather to a society that effectively repels the threat of such anarchy”³⁷.

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³⁵ Federico Sperotto, “The Use of Force against Terrorists: A Reply to Christian J. Tams”, *The European Journal of International Law*, vol. 20 no. 4, 2010, p. 24.

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COLLECTIVE DEFENCE IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA IN THE CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL, STRATEGIC, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT (I)

Brigadier General Dr Virgil-Ovidiu POP

The author presents the main characteristics of the current security environment against the background of the role played by Romania, in general, and by the Land Forces, in particular, in collective defence. The concept of security environment has undergone important changes throughout time and so has the attitude of the European Union member states towards the way in which security environment elements are implemented. In the past, the political, strategic and military concepts were based on the use of force, considering that each state security depends on its military arsenal, economic power and the power of alliances, namely on the balance of power, in general. The security concept evolution has been aimed at implementing some new relations, based on the observance of international law and agreements.

Keywords: *different opinions; USA; negotiation; multipolarity; terrorism*

Motto:

“A nation cannot exist without a homeland, and homeland is just a word without a nation”.

Nicolae Iorga

Introduction

At first sight, the issue of the security environment in the *Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA)* seems to have faded into obscurity lately because its importance as a distinct space in the geopolitical, geostrategic, international relations and security studies analyses seems to have been obscured by other phenomena and events that occur in adjacent regions or even in the international security environment.

The Wider Black Sea Area continues to be extremely important for its component states, and there are at least two reasons for the decreasing concern with its study. The first one would be the difficulty in integrating this space in the general definitions of the concept of *region*, as it is profoundly heterogeneous. The second reason is generated

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by the fact that the phenomena that individualise it are approached separately in different contexts. Moreover, the importance of the Black Sea is considered in the equation of the energy security in Europe and of the relations between Europe and the Russian Federation. The Black Sea also plays a substantial part in the definition of the littoral actors interests. In addition, it does not seem to lack in importance in relation to the role NATO plays in the Black Sea region.

All these are clear indications of the existence of certain heterogeneity that marks the interactions between the entities in the *WBSA* as well as its security environment in general. Large and small states, democracies and authoritarian regimes, NATO and EU member and partner states make up the complex *WBSA* map. Moreover, the security environment in this area is also notably subject to the influence of the tensions between NATO, the USA, and Russia. The frozen conflicts marking the destiny of this area cannot be ignored in this context. The Black Sea quality as a transit area adds to all the above-mentioned aspects, making it extremely important with regard to energy security, international terrorism, organised crime, migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The premise from which we start is that the *Wider Black Sea Area* is a complex space with many variables, many factors contributing to its security. Accordingly, any analysis of this space security is a challenge. This present study aims to identify the main features that characterise the *WBSA* security environment and intends to signal its possible developments in the medium and long term.

National security and defence represent the fundamental elements that lie at the basis of a society normal functioning. Thus, the citizens of a country enjoy the necessary and as far as possible sufficient conditions to live and conduct their activities without fear of dangers, risks, and especially imminent security threats. To a certain extent, security and national defence may be considered public goods from which all the citizens should benefit. That is why, each state must be constantly concerned with ensuring the normal conditions so that its citizens can live and conduct their activities.

The *Wider Black Sea Area* is confronted, a quarter of a century after the Iron Curtain fell, with a precarious security situation, the main problems being as follows: interethnic conflicts, the slow transition of the states in the Eastern European bloc to competitive economy, and the increase in the number of immigrants and refugees. These states should capitalise on the lessons learned and rapidly reach the state of anticipation. Strategic knowledge is key to defining interests and establishing priorities. The most important resource in order to acknowledge problems and provide rapid solutions is *strategic knowledge*¹.

¹ George Cristian Maior, Serghei Konoplyov, *Cunoaștere strategică în Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre*, Editura Rao, București, 2011, p. 11.

Currently, national security and defence is continually facing the pressure exercised by the risks and threats generated and/or nourished by globalisation, demography, climate change, conflicts caused by the state and non-state actors competition for resources. The risks and threats national security and defence must face every day are diverse in nature, manifestation, dimensions and characteristics. Thus, we can speak about general security and defence risks and threats, which are known and against which efficient measures to prevent and/or limit effects area taken. Moreover, there are the so-called *asymmetrical* and *hybrid risks*.

The idea that national security cannot be achieved autonomously but as a result of cooperation between states is quite recent. During the last century the collective security organisations multiplied. Following the establishment of the United Nations organisation (UN) other organisations specialised in collective defence emerged such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Subsequently, the idea of establishing a common security framework became manifest among the political-economic organisations, the European Union being a good example in this respect.

1. Current Security Environment

We have included in this first chapter the necessary elements to describe the main features of the current security environment and to support the definition of the general framework of the present study on the role played by Romania, in general, and by the Land Forces, in particular, in collective defence.

Firstly, we would like to bring to the fore the general problems related to the current security environment, appealing to the sociological and military literature in this important area of life, literature from the country and abroad.

Then, in order to show that this concept is not independent, the study will present a series of descriptive elements to capture the features of the current international security environment. In parallel, arguments that support both the manifesting trends and the vulnerabilities in this knowledge area will be provided.

1.1. General problems related to the current security environment

The concept of security environment, its components as well as the attitude of the European Union member countries to their implementation have undergone changes over time. In the past, the political, strategic and military concepts were based on the use of force, considering that each state security depended on the military arsenal, the economic power and the power of alliances, on the balance of power in general. The evolution of such concept of security has been aimed

at implementing new relations, based on the observance of international law and international agreements. Thus it has been intended not to resort to force to resolve the divergences between states, using instead dialogue and negotiations.

Currently, crises do not get manifest between states only. The interstate problems are resolved, to a lesser or greater extent, by the international organisations within the acknowledged frameworks. The current international security environment is mainly characterised by fluidity, which results in its continuous changing. The survival of states entails the establishment of a system based on alliances and mutual help. Old rivalries and their recollection have led to armed conflicts, which may happen in the future as well.

Although proper to distant past, the disbandment of the “*Warsaw Treaty*” and the “*collapse*” of the Soviet Union, important factors in the *Cold War*, contribute to the uncertainty in the international environment stability and security. Currently, it is witnessed a reconfiguration of power relations diagram. If, in the past, it was a bipolar global system, where the USSR and the USA had the status of superpowers, today, through dialogue and diplomatic relations, each country pursues its own economic interests.

Thus, there are two fundamental models, multipolarity and bipolarity. The first is defined by the presence of at least four main actors that have compatible and interconnected capabilities. Four actors because, according to Waltz, a system that is composed of only three great powers quickly turns into a bipolar one, by eliminating one of them. Although theorist Randall Schweller tried to prove the existence of a distinct three polar system, his initiative was not successful because of the evident conceptual and methodological difficulties.

We know from the past that, in the first situation of power relations reconfiguration in the international security environment, the USA was considered the only superpower, able and compelled to respond to the challenges proper to the beginning of the millennium, defiance and sometimes opposition of the regional powers that are currently rising.

A hegemon emergence and existence usually tend to be countered by the other actors. Unipolarity may indicate only tendencies, the concrete results being in close connection to the actors interactions. As it is very rare, the above-mentioned system is the most complicated and difficult to define, mainly because the potential hegemon should be compared not only to each actor independently but also to all the other actors in the aggregate. Starting from the same figures, the existence of both unipolarity and multipolarity can be demonstrated.

Another trend in the evolution of the international security environment is represented by the development of some regional actors interests, including state and non-state actors especially from Europe, America and Asia.

In the current concept, multipolarity generates certain trends in international relations. Depending on the states interests, alliances are flexible and many times they do not last long. However, coalitions are essential to ensure security.

Considering the above-mentioned factors, it is difficult to decide which of them is more stable, unipolarity in comparison with bipolarity and multipolarity. The involvement of a superpower in regional conflicts or disputes may result in their escalation. In the long term, world order can change, but the dominant power intends to contain and preventively weakens potential rivals. Otherwise, if this strategy is not successful, a short-term coalition having well defined terms is possible.

Throughout time the ratio of power between the USA and the other regional and world powers has got manifested in two ways: the USA – a concurrent state, and the USA – a partner for joint actions to solve stringent problems.

This situation is due to the fact that the superpowers interests do not converge to form alliances that equal the USA power, considering that the USA does not create the perception of a threat to the other powers, which may accelerate the establishment of alliances in order to balance the threats.

In the analysis of the evolution of international relations another important aspect is the way foreign policy is perceived by internal public. The public perceptions on the trends and evolution in national security, especially in democratic states, play a key part in establishing the particular state foreign policy. For a great part of the state public opinion, the US superpower is considered imperialist.

Not only NATO but also the EU member states have undergone positive transformations in all sectors (political, economic, financial, social and military), resulting in détente and international cooperation, these being essential objectives in the construction of the new security architecture.

The states that are still in transition to democracy are the actors that display fragility as far as the political and economic life are concerned and that are likely to become sources of instability in the defined international security environment.

The new geostrategic situation brings to the fore of the international security environment a series of regional actors. Among them the most important are considered to be the European Union, the USA, Russia, China, Japan, Iran, Pakistan, India and Israel. Regaining national identity by the states in Central and Southeastern Europe made them become dialogue and alliance partners. The new reality of the security environment included the emergence of conflicts, some of them becoming armed conflicts having dramatic outcomes.

The current distribution of power in the global security environment has resulted in less likely large-scale armed conflicts. However, the threats and challenges that may generate new tensions and crises should not be neglected.

The United States of America is in a dominant position in this international system. It enjoys significant advantages, especially at military and economic level. Advance technology, air and naval forces and nuclear arsenal are still the factors that provide power in the military field.

To return to the fore, the Russian Federation has massively invested in the armed forces development and modernisation, especially in terms of conventional forces and means. China and India have developed economically, affording to modernise the military technique and equipment, following conducting certain procurement contracts. The European Union, because of some emergent political-economic interests, has not yet succeeded in achieving the necessary unity to play a major part in international relations. Although it is an often claimed objective, it is practically not accompanied by significant actions.

The European environment, in comparison with the other regions in the world, is different in the international security environment. Its uniqueness resides in the fact that it can ensure and demonstrate the achievement of political and economic integration in the short and medium term. However, it is an accomplishment that requires commitment to common ideals and values.

The warning signal to the global security environment comes from the regions considered the “*third world*”. There are incidents here that become problems for the international community, being considered as major risks such as demographic explosion, civil war, terrorism, poverty, famine.

The following components are necessary so that security can be achieved in the international security environment:

- acknowledging direct risks and threats to the international security environment;
- ability of the international system to manage the consequences, the nature of the institutional reaction and its quality;
- taking action under the circumstances of crisis and confrontation;
- perceiving direct risks and threats generated by the cultural and technological standards and ideologies of the society.

As Zbigniew Brzezinski asserts, the essence in achieving a viable security architecture is the establishment of relations between Eurasia (where China and Japan are included, besides Europe and Russia) and the USA. Thus, experts in the field of security have identified two Eurasian power triangles:

- a) *Europe, Russia, the USA*
- b) *the USA, China, Japan.*

In the two Eurasian power triangles one of the powers (Europe, respectively Japan) considers the idea of stability and security in international arena essential. On the other hand, Russia and China are interested and prepared for the possible geopolitical mutations.

The new approaches to preserving national, regional and global security indicate that there is a close link between globalisation and security. Romania's actions regionally and globally intended to acknowledging own security interests require assuming the fact that global security is closely linked with national security.

A recent analysis reveals that about 30% of the world population is part of the democratic community, and this community owns 70% of wealth. This fact stimulates regional liberty, prosperity, stability and security.

On the other hand, analysts have identified the existence of a quite vast instability area. It stretches from the Middle East to the Asian littoral. There are severe problems here (extremist Islamic fundamentalism, poverty, high rate of unemployment) that represent risks to security. Terrorism, interethnic tensions, corrupt governments, geopolitical rivalries, scarce resources, drug trafficking, armament trafficking, organised crime are other threats to global security environment, which have found the proper ground to develop here.

The substantial transformations that characterise the international security environment in the 21st century require the permanent adaptation of the criteria employed for security analysis. There are still traditional hotbeds of tension, and their violent addressing has led to emerging unconventional cross-border risks, terrorism being the most common of them. In order to prevent and combat terrorism new assessment methods as well as appropriate modes of action are required. Because of the globalisation of the terrorist phenomenon a general consensus and joint action to combat it are necessary. The political decisions taken during different summits having security as main theme (March 2012 – Seoul, March 2014 – the Hague, April 2016 – Washington), as well as the actions taken by democratic states to achieve the current security architecture have contributed to the consolidation of this environment. The democratic world becomes increasingly exclusivist, which entails resizing fundamental national values such as independence and sovereignty. They will have to be promoted in an environment that tends to deny them.

From the politico-economic standpoint, most developed countries are in post-industrial stage of development, while other groups of states are in transition to modernity in terms of policy and economy. Among them there are more and more "*failing societies*" thus the incapacity to control their activities on the national territory.

The developments in the international system are closely related to the inter-state relations. The most important states in the global economic environment are those that dictate the future developments on the market, the majority of states being consumer societies, aspect that influences, to a large extent, the context of the global security environment.

Globalisation may be defined as trans-national integration, which can be demonstrated by the enlargement processes conducted in 2004 (NATO) and in 2007 (EU). Under these circumstances, the national state gets less relevant as an actor in the international arena. However, in terms of national autonomy and independence, the state position is enhanced internationally. The globalisation perspective and the Russian Federation concern with having a say in international issues are reference points that characterise the current security environment and its evolution. To the above-mentioned aspects there can be added the economic development of the Asian states as well as their increasing importance in international political life, the divergences in the Balkans, and the increasingly violent actions in the Middle East. Moreover, an important aspect is the control over the resources in the Black Sea region, an area of strategic interest, where there are many latent conflicts. In addition, there should be mentioned the effects of natural phenomena (floods, climate change, earthquakes, depletion of resources), which permanently influence global stability and security.

The emergence of terrorist groups stimulates the Islamic radicalisation in Europe, highlighting the risks posed by the return in the community area of the European jihadists involved in terrorist fights or training programmes in other countries where terrorism is active. Increasing migration from either areas of conflict or from areas confronted with economic problems and poverty has generated challenges to the ability of member states to manage the flows of illegal immigrants and to integrate them in local communities.

1.2. Characteristics, trends and vulnerabilities

The evolution of the security environment is currently characterised by the intention of globalisation, by the desire of some states to integrate into the European Union and NATO, by the migration phenomenon that results in differences of opinions within the European Union, by the desire and preoccupation of the Russian Federation to play an important part in the decision-making process related to international issues, and by the violent actions of terrorist movements.

To all the above-mentioned aspects are added the effects of natural phenomena (floods, earthquakes, climate change, demography, resource depletion etc.), organised crime, poverty and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which continue

to influence global stability and security. Thus, it can be asserted that the current world order is built following new principles that mark the characteristics of the current international security environment.

The first characteristic is the dissolution of unipolarity, entering thus a new stage in which the United States of America, the only state that used to have available a multitude of assets and means (that allowed it for involving in and managing the major global issues effectively), is now “confronted” at different levels. Examples that can confirm this aspect are the assertion of the European Union as a factor of stability and progress, the nuclear threats posed by North Korea, the fast economic and military development of China, the diplomatic offensive of Russia (that is not any more in “standby” regarding the major global issues while it develops and militarily involves in regional conflicts), all these aspects suggesting that, in the long run, the new international security architecture will be articulated in a multipolar system.

The second characteristic is that the international security environment is extremely dynamic, continually changing, and the emergence and manifestation of non-state actors have a determinant role. Their main feature is that they are guided by principles and ideas other than the national ones. Such actors do not belong to a geographical area and they are led by specific norms and rules. Moreover, they tend to control and manage the areas and sectors pertaining to cutting edge technology, economy, finance, energy resources.

Last but not least, world economy preponderantly relies on the development and safety of the economy system of the United States of America, Japan, China, and the European Union.

To all these aspects a special feature is added, namely the functioning and development of political, economic, military and security institutions and organisations. There are new trends in their functioning as follows:

- transition from collective defence to collective security. This change requires not only new concepts but also appropriate structures. NATO has transformed developing and perfecting the strategy not only for cooperation and integration but also for the consultation with the Russian Federation (which is currently in temporary impasse). This transformation is undergone concomitantly with assuming commitments beyond its traditional area of responsibility by initiating and actively involving in crisis management, in regional context, as well as in combating terrorism;
- UN and OSCE encourage the mandates for coalitions or regional organisations to settle international crises; therefore, it is necessary to establish forces capable of conducting such missions;

- some states have regionalisation tendencies, in the above-mentioned context;
- international and regional political institutions tailored to meet the new geopolitical challenges;
- strengthening the democratic states intentions not to initiate or develop cooperation relations and negotiations with dictatorial or terrorist regimes or political movements;
- ensuring decision-making processes transparency and effectiveness in international institutions;
- amplification of the competition for the control over energy resources, high technology and especially nuclear arsenal;
- intensification of efforts in the field of international cooperation to manage the terrorist phenomenon;
- definition of the fight against terrorism in a document that should establish the priorities and the political, economic and military instruments that are necessary to limit and combat this phenomenon;
- provision of solutions for the states external problems in an international framework and identification of the differences between their internal and external problems;
- redefinition of the political and military role of NATO so that duplications and contradictions with other international institutions could be eliminated;
- substantiation of international relations policy based on the acknowledged multilateralism principle;
- relaunch of international political institutions credibility and authority;
- increasing dependency on the resources, information and technology from other countries results in reducing the level of national sovereignty. The financial dependence on partnerships and external cooperation sometimes prevents governments from making decisions in accordance with the national interest, which may have negative repercussions on sectors other than the economic one, such as cultural identity, control over cross-border criminal and mafia elements and groups etc.;
- periods of the current international system deconstruction and reconstruction may result in the emergence of crises; it is possible that, under the impact of globalisation effects and especially disputes for an as advantageous as possible place in the global power hierarchy, the current system can alter and acquire a different physiognomy, which may generate disputes and crises having an economic, ethnic, religious or national nature; some state entities that are insufficiently structured, unstable and economically uncompetitive risk failing in the great global competition;

- mobilisation of economic and financial resources to support the states in disadvantaged regions.

The brief analysis of the characteristics of the international security environment helps us detect the vulnerabilities of the current international system, which, in our opinion, may be generated by:

- political instability of some states, groups of states and even regions, caused by political struggles, antidemocratic measures and frequent violations of human rights;
- terrorism, under a multitude of forms – terrorist attacks, adepts recruitment, information or money collection, logistic support for such activities, influence over important people, parties or even political regions;
- economic instability caused by the effects of globalisation, transition, and external debts;
- penetration of information and banking systems, disinformation, and manipulation of information;
- internal and international corruption, and organised crime;
- amplification of the existing disparities in terms of development, restriction of the access to the “*global market*”, and the developing countries increasing financial, economic and political dependence on developed countries;
- expansion of clandestine immigration and mass exodus, the problems related to environment, epidemics, natural or industrial disasters, which may involve vast areas and regions;
- development of weapons of mass destruction, cutting edge dual technology, ballistic missiles, other lethal technology;
- rationalisation of natural resources and avoidance of their chaotic exploitation;
- absence of an appropriate juridical framework able to provide the conducted actions with legitimacy.

The analysis of the situations that may generate risks and threats to international and national security, as well as of the lessons learned from the conflicts in the last decades allows for drawing the following conclusions:

- the great majority of risks have a social character, with complex effects on the individual and society;
- the innovative and asymmetrical character of risks, and their multiplication and diversification result in the existence of strategies to counter them, concomitantly with the identification of the necessary forces;
- the risks and threats to security have become regional or even global, being thus difficult for states to counter them;
- the society may be victim and risk generator at the same time.

To conclude, the global security environment gets consolidated following the political-military decisions as well as the enhanced efforts of democratic countries to establish the new security architecture, favouring the achievement of global political-economic stability.

1.3. Wider Black Sea Area

The area subject to analysis in the present study is a topic for debate starting from the states that are included in it. In general, the *Wider Black Sea Area* can be understood as the area subsumed under the territory of the Black Sea littoral states – Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine. In the *Wider Black Sea Area* there have been many armed conflicts to conquer key points and territories. Frontiers represent defining elements in the collective mindset of the people on the Black Sea coast, which would have blocked peace and established real artificial barriers between people². Following the brief analysis of the above-mentioned states, it is clear that they are diverse, they belong to different regional systems, they are distinct from the cultural, political and economic standpoint, favouring the perception according to which the *WBSA* is an area “*crushed*” between the EU and the Euro-Atlantic area, situated in the proximity of the Middle East, a “*black hole*” or a “*grey area*” between the EU, Eurasia and the Euro-Atlantic area³.

Consequently, any analysis of the interactions between them should also consider that all these states are characterised by distinct mechanisms and phenomena, proper to adjacent regions. For example, Romania and Bulgaria are NATO and EU member countries, Turkey is a possible EU candidate, having a history marked by many difficulties and contradictions, as well a NATO member state. Moreover, following Romania and Bulgaria NATO membership, the *WBSA* has acquired a key role in the “*global war against terror*”, war that has been preponderantly waged in the states in the Middle East, thus also becoming the frontier of the Alliance in this war led by the USA.

Russia is evidently a considerable regional power, its relations with the EU and NATO being many times marked by tensions (eloquent examples in this regard being the elements of the missile defence shield on the territory of Eastern European

² Marius Roșu, *Geopolitica frontierelor în Regiunea Extinsă a Mării Negre în perioada post-război rece, Strategii XXI* International Scientific Conference, vol. 1, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, 2015.

³ Tedo Japaridze, *The Black Sea – A Key Strategic Corridor. Is the Region a Black Hole or a Grey Zone within the EU, Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic Space?*, in *Black Sea Security. International Cooperation and Counter-Trafficking in the Black Sea Region*, IOS Press BV, Amsterdam, 2010, p. 17.

countries or energy security). Ukraine and Georgia are state entities that are visibly under the influence of Moscow, being concomitantly parties in different EU cooperation programmes.

Moreover, the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea proximity cannot be ignored. Chechnia, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria bring to the fore the conflict potential in the *WBSA*, although not all of them are littoral states. In addition, if we analyse the role played by the Black Sea in the EU security equation, as a transit area that connects European importers and resources in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, then the area is marked by a real competition for resources, materialised in the Russian Federation attempts to maintain the monopoly as exporter of hydrocarbons and in the European states attempts to identify alternative resources. The most recent projects related to alternative routes, such as *Nabucco* or *South Stream*, also transit the Black Sea thus creating links with even states in the Western Balkans. Therefore, the Black Sea is also considered an area rich in natural resources and extremely important for supplying energy to the entire European continent.

In this regard, it should be highlighted that the Black Sea plays an important part in the energy geopolitics, not only because it is indubitably a transit area for the oil and natural gas from Russia and the Middle East to Europe but also because it has considerable energy resources. For example, in 2009, within the Atlantic Council *Black Sea Energy & Economic Forum*, Mehmet Uysal, Chair and President of *Turkish Petroleum*, stated that, in the next decades, the Black Sea could replace Russia as the main energy source⁴. The same theory may be employed in the implications of the dispute between Romania and Ukraine related to the delineation of the Exclusive Economic Zone in the Black Sea.

If we consider the components of the regional organisations established at the Black Sea, then the *WBSA* includes other actors too. For instance, the *Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)* comprises the six littoral states to which Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Moldova and Serbia are added. The *Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership (BSF)* includes the littoral states except for Russia and Turkey (the latter having an observer within the organisation, as well as Serbia), comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova. In addition, there is an EU initiative meant to develop regional cooperation at the Black Sea, known as the *Black Sea Synergy*, seeking to foster cooperation in terms of promoting democratic principles, addressing issues related to environment, resources, security, frozen conflicts etc.

⁴ Alexandras Petersen, *Black Sea to Supply Europe's Energy?*, 20 October 2009, *New Atlanticist Policy and Analysis Blog*, see http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/black-sea-supply-europe%E2%80%99s-energy, retrieved on 15 February 2016.

Thus, the *WBSA* designates an economic and political area that is comprised of littoral states and not only, being defined as “the sum of some security complexes reuniting the states whose security problems cannot be solved without the cooperation and support of the other states”⁵. The definition provides a clear image not only of the implicit complexity of the area but also of its quality as an area of convergence of some regions having distinct features. The *WBSA* is a frontier area, often marked by tensions, by difficulties in cooperation, as well as by the awareness of the fact that the efforts in this regard are necessary and beneficial for all the regions that converge here.

Therefore, in the present study, when we speak about the *Wider Black Sea Area*, we refer not only to the six littoral states but also to states in their near proximity – the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan.

The Black Sea adjacent area is often studied in correlation with the concept of “*region*”, one of the frequently mentioned notions in the security analyses or international relations. However, the significance of the term is not clearly defined, theoretical approaches having thus a heterogeneous character depending on the school of thought that conducts the analyses as well as on the factors that are considered. Moreover, the extremely diverse lexical field related to the term “*regionalisation*” reflects the variety of meanings and approaches. These lead to the fact that the articulation of a clearly defined vision relating to it can be very difficult. Thus, despite the existence of varied literature in the field trying to explain, understand, predict the emergency, dynamics and development of regions⁶, there is no theory that encompasses pertinent explanations for the variety and specificity of all the regions.

Therefore, as far as any regional security analysis is concerned, we consider useful to start from the premise that each region has its specificity, certain characteristics that recommend it as a region, meaning that the related mechanisms and processes are similar to those of other regions. In this context, the *WBSA* analysis could be conducted from the perspective of one of the best-developed and widest-known regional security analysis theories.

One of the most important contributions to the regional dimension of security studies belongs to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever⁷, exponents of the Copenhagen School. They developed the *Regional Security Complex Theory*, considering

⁵ Gheorghe Calopăreanu, *Complexul de securitate Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2012, pp. 28-29.

⁶ Bjorn Hettne, Fredrik Soderbaum, *Theorising the Rise of Regionness*, in *New Political Economy*, vol. 5, no. 3, 2000, pp. 457-472.

⁷ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.

that it would be an useful instrument to explain international relations and to identify the development possibilities in the international security environment and in the relations between states. The authors compare two perspectives on the world order following the *Cold War* – the neorealist and the globalist ones. The former analyses the power resources distribution in the international system, state territoriality and sovereignty being key-concepts for this type of approach to international relations and security. However, they can explain neither the cooperation initiatives in this regard nor the existence of an organisation as the EU. The globalist perspective tends to ignore the state and its territorial characteristics, focusing instead on culture, trans-national aspects and international political economy. Both visions can provide explanations regarding the evolution of the international security environment.

The third perspective, which better brings to the fore the issues in the present study, is presented by the same Buzan and Waever in *Regional Security Complex Theory*. It reunites elements of the two above-mentioned visions but focuses on a smaller analysis level.

Buzan and Waever define the *Regional Security Complex (RSC)* as a long-lasting but not permanent substructure of the international system, which has an important geographical component given by the interdependent patterns of security in time. Practically, *the states in a RSC are geographically close and their security is so interdependent that they can be easily distinguished from the neighbouring security regions*. The interdependence relies on a series of historical patterns such as friend-foe, cooperation-confrontation, which characterise the relations established between states. *In other words, a regional security complex can be defined as a “group of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interconnected that their international security problems cannot be analysed or resolved independently”*⁸. Consequently, we can speak about regional security complexes where the pattern is that of cooperation relations (e.g. Northern America) as well as about regional security complexes where the pattern is that of confrontation (e.g. the Middle East).

From this perspective, the *WBSA* is only partially included in the definition of the concept of *regional security complex* to the extent to which there is a relation of interdependency between the states in its composition, but we cannot speak of a unique historical pattern characterising the relations between states. Therefore, if the current trend is to consolidate and develop the cooperation patterns between the states in the *WBSA*, we can notice conflict relations between them both in the contemporary period and throughout history. Thus, if we consider

⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea. Un nou cadru de analiză*, Editura CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2011, p. 27.

only the changes occurred in geopolitics since the end of the *Cold War*, during which the area was divided between the two blocs, the fluctuation in the relation patterns is obvious.

Therefore, the *WBSA* is not a *RSC*, as defined by Buzan and Waever, because it cannot be completely integrated in the model proposed by them. However, the *WBSA* analysis from the standpoint of this theory clearly reveals that this area is a specific one, its characteristics determining specific security environment developments.

One of the most recent examples in this regard is the war between Russia and Georgia (2008) or Russia's decision to stop the natural gas supply for Ukraine in 2005 and 2007, and for the Republic of Moldova in 2006⁹, although, traditionally, the two states are considered to be under the influence of Moscow. Similarly, it can be analysed the dissention between Romania and Ukraine regarding the delineation of the exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, dissention that was ultimately addressed by the International Court of Justice. Concomitantly, the entire Black Sea adjacent area is the object of the EU and NATO efforts to consolidate cooperation, the initiative known as the Black Sea Synergy being an eloquent example in this respect.

Moreover, Romania and Bulgaria are EU member states, Turkey is a candidate state, and Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova have developed cooperation relations with the EU based on the European Neighbourhood Policy and on the Eastern Partnership. Therefore, the question arises whether the *WBSA* can be considered a changing regional security complex or a specific area that has own characteristics which makes it impossible to be defined as presented before. According to some researchers, a regional security complex that undergoes change may have the following repercussions¹⁰:

- a) *status quo maintenance* (entails the maintenance of the complex essential structure – power distribution and hostility pattern);
- b) *internal transformation* (the essential structure of the complex changes in the context of its external frontier, which can be the result of political integration, of the decisive modification of power distribution or of the major alternation in the friend/foe pattern);
- c) *external transformation* (the essential structure of the complex is changed through the expansion or contraction of external frontiers);

⁹ Cristian Bahnăreanu, *“Arma energetică” în contextul relațiilor internaționale ale începutului de secol XXI*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2007, pp. 39-44.

¹⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

- d) *coverage* (entails the action of one or more external powers in the regional security complex, resulting in the suppression of the indigenous security dynamics).

In the *WBSA* it can be noticed a sum of the mentioned repercussions, which may be the causes for the difficulty in including this area in the category of regions from the perspective of international relations analyses. Therefore, on the one hand, we can speak about the maintenance of the power distribution in the *WBSA*, considering the fact that the Russian Federation and Turkey have been the main actors in the *WBSA* throughout time. The two states reunite the most important power resources thus having the greatest influence in this area.

On the other hand, we cannot omit the fact that there are clear indications of transformation, both internally and externally. Moreover, it is relevant the fact that the external frontier of the *WBSA* is not clearly established so that it could be unanimously accepted at academic and political level. In addition, the states in the southwestern part of the Black Sea have been included in regional organisations having an economic (the EU) and/or military (NATO) specific. The Russian Federation has become an emergent power that challenges the USA and NATO influence in the region, having an aggressive rhetoric towards this influence, which has recently been illustrated by the debate on the installation of some elements of the US defence missile system in the Black Sea adjacent area. Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia are states that are considered under the influence of Moscow. To all the mentioned aspects it is added the evident action of another power that clearly influences the security dynamics in this area – the USA, present not only through NATO but also through the actions in the *WBSA* proximity, in the Middle East.

In fact, the *WBSA* started to be treated as such following NATO and EU enlargement process, which clearly defines the existence of a regional security complex that intersects with the *WBSA* on the territory of Turkey, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. On the other hand, we can speak about another complex, under the clear influence of Russia, including Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia. Therefore, we can refer to the *WBSA* as a developing regional security complex, still under the influence of changing forces. It is more so considering that the entire international system undergoes such a process, mainly characterised by the polarity reconfiguration at global level, process in which the USA, Russia, Turkey as well as the EU play important parts. The *WBSA* is, preponderantly, a contact area, a crossroad of many regions, because, besides the initiatives meant to consolidate the relations between the Black Sea adjacent states, there can be identified distinct approaches to this space, such as the Near Neighbourhood Policy (Russia) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (EU).

In conclusion, the *WBSA* cannot be approached as a regional security complex, according to its definition, but the existence of a distinct geographical area in this space is easily perceived. It is a transit area, a contact area between different actors in the international arena, actors having different and sometimes antagonistic interests but common problems to solve. The foundation, in cultural, civilisation, historical, political, economic, social and religious terms, makes it difficult to perceive the *WBSA* as a coagulated, unitary region. The *WBSA* profoundly heterogeneous nature can be also explained by the fact that its institutional dimension, regular cooperation within certain regional institutions, is a relatively recent reality that dates back in 1992, when the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation was established.

The term “*region*” sends to the geographical proximity and to the existence of interdependency in terms of security, interdependency that, in the context of globalisation, is present to a certain extent between all international actors, especially between those that are geographically neighbours. On the other hand, the concept of “*region*” may entail the existence of certain cooperation relations, of some institutions able to provide the framework for cooperation, but it cannot exclude the fight for power or the possibility for a security dilemma. The relations between the above-mentioned actors in the region – Russia, the USA through NATO, Turkey – reveal tensions, geostrategic games, different interests that once more highlight the frontier character of this area.

Moreover, it is this characteristic of the *WBSA*, a frontier space, that makes it attractive for these powers, the majority of them trying to expand their influence over the entire region, because of reasons pertaining not only to natural resources but also to security, mainly the energy security. In addition, geostrategy and security are considered (the case of the EU, which, through the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, attempts to create a group of stable states, predictable from the standpoint of security, in the near neighbourhood).

Therefore, as far as the *WBSA* is concerned, we can state that it is a region, due to geographical proximity, which has made it possible and necessary the interaction between littoral states (although their nature is different depending on the states considered), as well as because of the common risks and threats, and of the recent efforts to jointly address the security issues in this area. Thus, as long as it is a vision that can be identified at the level of all the actors involved in this area, in our opinion, we can speak about a region, as a distinct space subject to security analysis. It may be true, despite the fact that littoral states have the tendency to associate, at perceptive level, with diverse regions, the Black Sea being only the convergence area, which results in the *WBSA* being defined at the crossroad

of the concepts of “*region*” and “*security*”, security risks and threats (having a military, political, economic, ecological, energy nature) being the main “*regional coagulant*”¹¹. Practically, in keeping with this vision, the existence of common problems has made this area to be considered a region and treated accordingly.

The advantages have played an important part in the emergence of a region such as the *WBSA*. Its natural resources and its importance as a transit area to supply Europe with oil and natural gas have also contributed to including the *WBSA* in the category of regions and to accordingly addressing it and the strategies of the actors in the area.

Heterogeneity and paradox seem to be the main characteristics of the security environment in the *WBSA*, which is both an independent and confluence space, an area of cooperation, competition and confrontation, of risks and threats, of opportunities, as well as of economic disparities between littoral states.

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In the second part of the paper, the author will treat the issues existing in the Wider Black Sea Area from the geopolitical, economic and military perspective.

English version by
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*



¹¹ Felix Ciută, “*Region? Why Region? Security, Hermeneutics, and the Making of Black Sea Region*”, in *Geopolitics*, no. 1, vol. 13, 2008, p. 129.

THE ROLE PLAYED BY “DEFENCE REVIEW” IN AVOIDING STRATEGIC SURPRISE

General Dr Ștefan DĂNILĂ

The early 2014 events reshaped the international relations system and altered the fragile balance of power. Moreover, the follow-ups, particularly the Russian Federation's involvement in Syria, generated a turn of events in the entire post-Cold War security architecture. In this context, the author considers that defence analyses and analyses reviews have called for fresh approaches. Thus Strategic Defence Review has become necessary, being a process that will result in using resources more efficiently, and capitalising on predictability and deterrence. Moreover, credibility will be enhanced, thus contributing to greater relevance in international relations, more trust in investment, and a climate favourable to economic development and enhanced living standard.

Keywords: *state of security; political leadership; operational structures; strategic surprise*

National security is the main responsibility of the political leadership of a state, particularly if elected democratically. To ensure national security, it is essential to be aware of the specific national goals or interests within the fluid balance of international relations, potential threats, and their corresponding countermeasures, by employing customary analysis and planning tools.

No matter the size, economic power, demographic profile or national awareness, each and every nation asserts its own interests and goals in the relationships with other nations, as more or less challenging, adjustable to the more or less favourable changes in the balance of power.

More often than not, security is not a result of the absence of threats, for this ideal situation is hardly attainable, and when it happens to be the case, it does not last long. Security can more precisely be described by the capacity to counter

threats, which firstly entails their identification and correct assessment. The review process is intricate. It is built not only on a sufficient knowledge-based expertise (the field and level of knowledge being often hard to settle), but also on an operational background that enables elaborated and exhaustive approaches. Secondly, *capabilities* must be developed to counter threats. This concept refers not only to assets, personnel, other necessary resources, but also to procedures, techniques and strategies, including personnel training for the most efficient and effective asset operation.

However, the two aspects previously mentioned are not sufficient. Once threats have been identified, and corresponding countermeasures or countering capabilities implemented, relaxation is not the viable option. The threat can alter or reshape, it may or may not strike, and the reaction must be well-timed. This means not only a timely response but also one that is able to counter or cancel out the aftermath of the threat. Hence, the *readiness* of the forces capable of accomplishing the task must allow for just-in-time action. The resources required to keep large forces highly ready are vast and hard to account for. A gradual action or reaction, depending on the enemy's moves or the manner in which the threat has been posed, mainly defined by *risk level*, helps capitalise on reaction. We must add to this an early warning system, designed to track and prevent any changes in the threat status, so that reaction can meet expectations.

All these measures are needed to play the special part assumed by any political leadership in the security equation, namely to avoid strategic surprise. Making the best decision to act is an outcome of a valuable multiple-parameter update, namely a worthy and detailed situation awareness, a good early, tailored and flexible planning, reaction tools in place, as well as of the understanding and view of the decision-maker and his command team, particularly strategic-level military commanders.

Whereas tactical surprise is about actual, unforeseeable actions in the field, and operational surprise may be inflicted by erroneous or defective planning, strategic surprise is mostly triggered by lack of decision or wrong political decision. Strategic surprise may seldom have immediate causes. More often than not, it is caused by failures, lack of action or inadequate actions in time, even for a long time.

I will present just a few cases of strategic surprise recorded throughout history. In the Second World War, the invasion of Poland as well as the close envelopment and invasion of France by Germany can be seen as strategic surprises. Likewise, at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War, Israel was strategically surprised by Egypt and Syria, although there was a warning signalled by the conspicuous

previous actions of the Arab coalition. The strategic concept called for a pre-emptive attack, yet there was much hesitation before making the decision. If we also considered here both moments when Romania entered the two world wars, quite highly motivated ideologically and based on well-established objectives, but catastrophically implemented at the military level, we would look at an interesting picture. All these instances could be taken for “*inspired visions*” by conspiracists, since each one of them had unexpected consequences, in favour of those who had set off on the wrong foot. Hazard has had a part in it, but I do not believe that we can turn over the reasoning for the first part, and maintain that a wrong decision is necessarily conducive to a positive follow-up, even more desirable than a right decision. Random turns of events should not be included in the toolkit of a political decision-maker or military commander.

Can we profess that the 2008 summer events in Georgia, following the demanding Bucharest Summit of April 2008, were surprising to NATO? We are definitely talking about strategic surprise. Some voices believed the Russian Armed Forces’ potential and determination were underrated, others did not expect such a forcible reaction by President Putin, while some others from the Alliance put the blame primarily on Georgian President Saakashvili, too self-confident after the Summit Declaration. Did anything miss from the NATO strategists’ review? It was possible. Georgia, in its present shape and size, remains a valuable partner of the Alliance, which does not applaud a revanchist stance. Furthermore, in late 2008 and early 2009, the United States and the Russian Federation agreed that the problem could be overcome, for the mutual benefit of both nations, with no other actors involved. For that matter, the *Russian Federation Security Strategy* confirms the “*Russian-US relations reset*”, in a gesture of goodwill and reconciliation on the Russian part! The Russian position was quite evident, especially following the analysis of the other key idea in the paper, namely the commencement of a complex reform of the Russian Armed Forces. There were only few analysts who really noticed the steps taken by the Russian troops, from the uniform change, military pay raises and fixity (following the times when bets had been put on receipt vs. non-receipt of payment), the brand new strategic operations centre, to the ever more complex and larger exercises, when the Armed Forces were even alerted by the President himself. Exercise “*Zapad-2013*” was one of the events in which NATO strategic commanders and officials were invited to participate. The foe was actually NATO, with no disguise whatsoever. The special invitees were NATO members too. Some of them concluded: a major event, which strengthened the NATO-Russia bond. General Gerasimov was congratulated by the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee himself,

at the first MC meeting in the NATO-Russia Council format. He got even thanked for the protocol!

Could the invasion of Crimea still be viewed as a strategic surprise? If so, for whom? For Ukraine, which has been struggling between two trends similarly sized and represented, where the big victory of the Orange Revolution translated into a pro-Russian comeback at the following elections, based on a quite volatile majority? For the political leadership established after a new Euromaidan Revolution, which was yet to identify the risks of such an insurgency, supported by a highly uncertain majority? For the military commanders represented by Ukrainian generals and admirals, most of them trained in former Soviet Union schools, with close ties to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, of which almost all of them were in awe?

Or maybe for NATO and the EU, whose leadership appeared really surprised by the event as well as totally unprepared. The guarantee provided by three nuclear powers, members of the UN Security Council, for a country to give up its nuclear arsenal became volatile in a few hours, time that was enough for the Russian special forces to seize the communication lines and the main installations in the Crimean Peninsula!

The early 2014 events reshaped the international relations system and altered the fragile balance of power. Moreover, the follow-ups, particularly the Russian Federation's involvement in Syria, gave quite a turn to the entire post-*Cold War* security architecture.

In this context, the analyses and analyses' reviews on defence have called for fresh approaches. The most important one is to identify the relevance and the need for a defence review against a more complex and unfriendly environment.

Why is it necessary a Strategic Defence Review – SDR for the countries that have already performed an initial review?

Firstly, since the dimension and risk level of a major threat have changed, the distance to it has changed too. Depending on the emerging situation, response capabilities and their size must be justified for an effective and timely reaction. The current structure of the armed forces must be accounted for in reasonable, consistent and legal terms, not only as far as their size and organisation are concerned (strength, type, unit number and size, location), but also in terms of earmarked resources (why 2% of GDP, and – very important – the intended purposes for which these funds are to be used).

Mobilisation is necessary for establishing the operational structures of almost all military units. This process must be reviewed in order to avoid obstruction

of all units' activity, to properly distribute the needed equipment, and to train the personnel. Defence industry must be able to maintain the hardware, and support the war effort. Where this is not feasible, palpable solutions must be implemented.

Therefore, What Are the *SDR* Expected Outcomes?

The Armed Forces' structure is the first evident outcome. It should be established according to the missions assigned, in compliance with the commitments of the Romanian state regarding participation in missions abroad and national defence missions against foreseeable, potential, more or less identified threats. At the same time, it should also take into account the financial support capacity, meaning the best proportion between the structure and expenditures. It is important to consider the minimum necessary operational capability, and the generation/regeneration capability to ensure rotation (continued presence).

Another outcome of the review is the force structure arrangement depending on mission, necessary and current infrastructure, demographic profile, and local social structure.

The equipment needed for building the intended capabilities will be purchased according to the specific force structure, the equipment already in place, its life span, and by all means within financial resources at hand.

Immediately prior to starting the review, a prerequisite can be added, so that any acquisition should also include the establishment of maintenance, and potential consumable items production facilities in Romania. The foreign policy component will certainly matter! Any prospective capability should be built in a multinational environment, employing NATO or EU mechanisms and tools. If not the case, government-to-government agreements will be concluded, considering the existing strategic partnerships, and related economic development opportunities, provided that competitive hardware is purchased, and closely assessed by our experts.

The United States' involvement in the Black Sea security, along with certain initiatives, like the one regarding the relevance of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, could be of assistance, if used properly.

Who Is to Perform *SDR*?

A board nominated/endorsed by the Supreme Council for National Defence, which should include representatives of the parliamentary parties having administrative, economic and financial expertise, ideally MPs, businessmen

conversant with national defence issues and high performance in their current line of work, Defence and/or National Security Advisors from the Government and the Presidential Administration, State Secretaries from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Finance, screenwriters, military experts with strategic planning background and a good understanding of the process. Foreign support should not be ruled out, given that this process is to be developed for the first time. American experts have recently performed *SDR* for Georgia.

A first analysis could be made with the support of US experts, approved by the US Department of Defense, or even exclusively by such experts, considering that the US Military Strategy 2015 provides support for the partners on their *defence capacity building*.

This is a minimum six-month process, according to other nations' experience.

Strategic Defence Review is a must, a long lasting process designed to help streamline resources, provide predictability, and – why not – deterrence. Higher credibility will not only contribute to higher relevance in international relations, but also to higher investor confidence, an auspicious environment for economic growth and higher living standard. We can also prove to be a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Alliance, our assessments and actions having contributed to building a robust common defence capability that is able to deter any enemy.

The external audit has nothing to do with blaming or reproaching others for foregone actions. It shows the actual way to build a modern military power.



“LESSONS LEARNED” FROM THE NATIONAL REUNIFICATION WAR FOR THE ATTENTION OF ROMANIAN MILITARY THEORISTS

Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE

*The focus of the article is on the need to address the lessons learned from the First World War campaigns and to promote the ideas related to national defence and the armed forces organisation, education and training in the future, in the media, which led the armed forces superior command echelons to order, in 1921, the resumption of *România Militară* journal publication, under the leadership of the Great General Staff. It is therefore noticed the Romanian military theorists preoccupation with capitalising on the war experience as well as with modernising the Romanian armed forces. Continuing the work of their famous predecessors, they in turn became the predecessors of the Romanian military thinking in the interwar period, when the cognitive and development process continued and increased in intensity.*

Keywords: *First World War; România newspaper; România Militară journal; lessons learned*

Between 1916 and 1920, after Romania entered the First World War, military journals were suspended. However, articles related to the military continued to appear in the newspaper ***România***, published by the Great General Headquarters in Iași, having Mihail Sadoveanu as director and Octavian Goga as first editor.

After the war ended, the need to address the lessons learned from the conducted campaigns and to promote the ideas related to national defence and the armed forces organisation, education and training in the future, in the media, made the armed forces superior command echelons order the resumption of ***România Militară*** journal publication, under the leadership of the Great General Staff.

Therefore, starting in January 1921, the journal was again the leader of the military press, a position that allowed it to encourage the interest in military theory, addressing issues related to the national

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defence system conception and orientation, especially in terms of the national military body modernisation, the population preparation for defence, the country military, demographic and material potential mobilisation. Moreover, it was resumed the publication of the journals belonging to the military branches and services, and new publications emerged, thus the general military aspects being detailed for the system components.

The First World War generated important mutations as far as both military structures and military thinking were concerned. The war outcomes and the lessons learned following it generated extensive debate. Therefore, numerous authors, belonging or not to the military, analysed the mistakes made during the war and tried to identify the new directions of the military body evolution.

The orientation of the debate towards the armed forces immediate needs was evident. However, military publications proved to really promote the military theory and science progress, special attention being paid to the debate over the war and the armed forces general problems related to military doctrines, strategy and tactics, the role of different branches, the armed forces organisation, as well as the troops training. Relevant results were recorded in the field of military historiography, as, besides historical research, it was advocated the development of military history as a special knowledge area of military sciences.

The title of the first issue of the journal in January 1921 is very simple: *1916-1920*. The editorial strategy of the journal is briefly presented, being shown that ***România Militară*** resumed its publication after 4 years. *In this short but important period of time, as it fundamentally changed the world history, Romania entered the war alongside its great allies to break the chains of slavery our brothers over the mountains had been in for centuries, as well as to contribute to the common goal pursued by the allies, namely to destroy the German imperialism that threatened to dominate the world by force. [...] România Militară fills a gap in our armed forces that need a journal in whose pages the lessons learned from the war can be presented and the new ideas related to the armed forces organisation in the future can be discussed. [...] Following a war as the one we were engaged in, which is still present in the collective mindset, there are a lot of aspects to discuss and, of course, many things to learn – the journal being open to all those who, due to their experience and expertise, intend, and they must do it, to contribute to meeting the set goal: GREATER AND POWERFUL ROMANIA THROUGH STRONG, WELL ORGANISED AND WELL TRAINED ARMED FORCES, as we have many enemies and we know their hidden intentions*¹.

¹ ***, 1916-19120, in *România Militară*, no. 1, January 1921, p. 13.

In an article suggestively called, “*Armatele viitorului*”/“*The Armed Forces of the Future*”, Colonel Alexandru Rizeanu² discusses a series of aspects that were extremely important for all the states that were either victorious or vanquished in the recently ended war. Thus, he shows that the most important problem is the economic recovery in close connection with the reorganisation of the armed forces, considering that all the states – be they victorious or vanquished – were exhausted following the war; that is why it was sought a solution to downsize the armed forces so that many workers could be available for the reconstruction of the country and the pressure over the budget of the country could be minimum, which was a very difficult task.

Taking into consideration, the author says, that the survival instinct forces the victorious countries to preserve the fruit of victory, and the vanquished ones to wreck vengeance, the need to address threats employing own forces remains topical. However, concluding regarding the future of the armed forces, all opinions gravitate towards reducing the conscription period/the term in service and the volunteer armed forces. The solutions, some of them already imposed on the vanquished states – the system on voluntary basis and the military strength downsizing – others as own options – the conscription period reduction or the possible resumption of the principle of military service on voluntary basis. Moreover, it was hoped for the League of Nations to be able to replace the states armed forces with an international gendarmerie to keep peace in the world. However, the question was who could guarantee such understanding, considering that the future intentions of Germany and Russia were not known and neither were the US future policies (*Monroe Doctrine* or their influence in Europe).

As for the **physiognomy of the future armed forces**, Colonel Rizeanu quotes the inquiry/survey carried out by the French Lieutenant Colonel Emil Mayer in the French journal *L’Action Nationale*, requesting the opinions of prestigious military men regarding the place held by the armed forces within the nation, the role of permanent and mobilised armed forces, the term of military service, conscription, the role of education and training for officers and non-commissioned officers, the mindset in the future armed forces, combat assets, materiel, military jurisdiction, the employment of civilians and women in the armed forces, the demilitarisation of certain personnel (doctors, engineers).

Among the answers provided, we mention the following, considered relevant:

➤ **General Lanrezac**: materiel will be very important in the future; important savings will be made if few people are maintained in the service; however, a large number of reserve officers will be necessary.

² Colonel Al. Rizeanu, *Armatele viitorului*, in *România Militară*, no. 1, January 1921, p. 15.

➤ **General Sarail:** the importance of materiel, the connection between branches, the importance of new combat assets (aircraft, automobiles etc); for each breakthrough in the field of ideas the armed forces should be adapted, the final goal being disarmament.

➤ **General Le Gros:** the recently ended war highlighted aspects related to the fronts of fortifications resistance power as well as to the French adaptation to the new characteristics of war, which was very good; the reduction of the term of service will be possible only by developing the young generation military moral and material preparation; well-equipped support armed forces permanently disposed in vulnerable areas; defensive infrastructure completed in peacetime; always complete military strength, officers and troops; the role of the armed forces is to ensure the border inviolability up to the arrival of the mobilised elements; downsized cavalry; well-developed artillery and aviation; discipline should not be diminished because of the reduction of the term of service, considering the young generation is well-trained, morally, in schools.

➤ **General Maud'huy:** two types of armed forces: permanent armed forces for colonial expeditions (French military and foreign volunteers) and popular armed forces for the defence of the French territory; the law should oblige all the young people to learn the military job; soldiers should be *artists* in their job: *“Only those who are capable of defending freedom can enjoy it.”*³; the necessity and development of the War School and the disavowal of the importance of the Centre for Higher Military Studies (Marshal School): *“My concern is that this School will convince many graduates they have aptitudes that cannot be proved in reality”*⁴; the officer should be a source of energy; the armed forces performance depends on their value; that is why it is necessary to provide them with the necessary material resources. *“Living in a society – that, unfortunately, is too concerned with making money – the officer should be able to live a decent life to enjoy the necessary respect.”*⁵.

➤ **General Ruffey:** as for artillery, the tractor should replace the horse, especially considering the 2-year term of service, a short period for the artillerist to learn to ride a horse.

➤ **General Rouquerol:** aviation will play an important role in the war of the future; the air force will be the quintessence of deployment and offensive; commanders having professional talent and troops having military value

³ *Ibidem*, p. 22.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 26.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 25.

will be necessary; all states are concerned with economic recovery and therefore with tailoring the armed forces to meet this goal; the winners maintained the compulsory military service, reducing it to ensure the whole nation training, while the losers were forced, by the concluded peace treaties, to reduce the military power to the minimum; on 21 August 1920, the Reichstag voted (was forced to vote!?) giving up conscription. *“However, Germany is not expected to give up military preparation. The way the 22 brigades belonging to the Reichswehr are organised shows that they contain the necessary elements to be the basis, if necessary, for the organisation of at least 22 army corps; in turn, the Hungarians strive to organise powerful armed forces by pretending to organise the gendarmerie.”*⁶. *“We should also recognise that the last war was a materiel one, the human element, the most precious and expensive one, not being protected accordingly.”*⁷. Regarding the **character of the future military actions**, the opinion according to which they will be preponderantly offensive, having a shock army to penetrate Germany up to its heart, is rejected on the grounds that the supporters of such hypothesis are not able to see that in the future, over 20-30 years, France will not have the border on the Rhine but the older border, and Germany will be strengthened, having reorganised armed forces and defensive system, and will wreak revenge⁸.

In conclusion, seeking to provide reasonable solutions for the future of the Romanian armed forces, and convinced that *“each officer will have contributed something to strengthening the future military, and România Militară journal will have met its objectives”*⁹, Colonel Alexandru Rizeanu highlights the important issues that should be addressed in this respect: recruitment (exemption, dispensation, delay) and its social consequences (social justice), general recruitment system (regional, national or mixed); problems related to maintaining cavalry and artillery troops in the future; different (2, 3 or 4 years) or equal term of service?; mobilisation; materiel, taking into account the lessons learned; modern conception of each branch organisation and employment, equipment, proportionality between the branches in the future, providing the example of the artillery and aviation development compared to the other branches, the future of the navy. As far as the preparation for war is concerned, the author discusses the education of officers and the education of troops for the future armed forces, the organisation of large-scale exercises (manoeuvres with large units), the necessity of an exam for the rank of major, the requirement to establish a higher military studies school

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 149.

⁷ *România Militară*, no. 2, February 1921, p. 141.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 152.

like the one in France in the Romanian armed forces, as well as the reorganisation of the Ministry of War.

One of the important questions that arouse at the end of the war and that was debated in the pages of *România Militară* was that related to the **character of the future war: the war of position or the war of manoeuvre**, as well as to the employment of different types of branches in modern warfare: infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer troops, aeronautics, navy, tanks, asphyxiating gases, intelligence, medical service, liaison etc., and the troops education and training.

Initially, the **war of position** was believed to remain the main type of armed confrontation, the provided example being the confrontation between the French and German armed forces on the Western Front, the **war of manoeuvre** being considered only a form of military action to capitalise on the already achieved success, but soon the ratio between the two mentioned forms of war started to change in favour of the latter, the author stressing that the military operation on the Eastern front placed the **war of manoeuvre** in a favourable position. Therefore, Colonel Alexandru Rizescu considers that *in modern battle, the one who will better exploit the terrain, the fortification and the fire will be able to achieve the economy of force needed for the decision-making process, without thinking of continuous lines. However, manoeuvre and offensive will always enable decision-making, regardless of the form of the war*¹⁰. Without intending to provide only one solution to the way war should be conducted in the future, the author recommends to use the lessons learned from the recently ended war, taking into consideration the theatre of operations and each country resources, communications and military strength. Moreover, it is highlighted that the armed forces organisation and training will continually evolve in keeping with the armament and technical progress, tailored to the type of war each country is probable and possible to carry, in the case of our country considering the nature and length of the border, the resources, communications and possible adversaries.

Taking into account the precarious economic situation at the end of the war and its consequences for the armed forces, Colonel Ioan Teodorescu, concerned about the unfriendly attitude of some of our neighbours following the new borders imposed by the peace treaties, suggests a compromise related to the defence of the country borders, considering the necessity of not only savings but also powerful and well-trained armed forces. Thus, his opinion is that these desiderata can be met by establishing some coverage divisions having garrisons close to the threatened borders and troops to be mobilised,

¹⁰ ***, *Război de poziție sau război de mișcare*, in *România Militară*, no. 2, February 1921, p. 138.

while the other large units, downsized, having garrisons inside the country and being capable of mobilising if necessary. In his opinion, 4 infantry divisions and a cavalry division would be necessary for Bessarabia and Bucovina, an infantry division and an independent cavalry division for Dobrogea and 4 infantry divisions and a cavalry division for Transylvania. To them 2-3 hunter divisions should be added, disposed in the area of the Carpathians and able to be mobilised within 48 hours and intervene on the border if attacked. There should be 15 interior divisions to complete at least 8 army corps¹¹.

With regard to the importance of **intelligence** in military actions, Major Ioan Nicolaid convincingly states that the intelligence services within the belligerent countries commands proved to be a necessity that cannot be denied. As for our country, the intelligence service was enhanced, especially after the arrival of the French Mission that brought with it important knowledge in the field, comparable to that of the similar bodies in the allied armed forces¹². Following the end of the war, when the international political situation is uncertain, given the *importance of the existing problems, all the states, both the victorious and the vanquished ones, tenaciously preserve such services, seeking to enhance and organise them to yield as real as possible results*¹³.

In this context, the **intelligence** bureau within a command should be considered an active operational body that is integral part of the command operations structure, and their (operations and intelligence) command should be ensured by really valuable officers, having solid general and military knowledge, great discernment capacity, officers able to ponder over a strategic or tactical situation and timely draw logical and just conclusions. The *value and activity of an intelligence bureau*, states the author, *do not limit to the collection, writing and transmission of information. It is the most banal part of the job and I consider I am right saying that anyone can do it, even if not trained in the field*¹⁴.

It is also highlighted the importance of organising a complete intelligence service since peacetime and the need for the supreme command intelligence service to have investigation elements in all the fields of activity of the state (military, financial, industrial, agricultural, social etc.), which should form an *intelligence central service*. As for the probable theatres of operations, the author promotes

¹¹ Colonel Ioan Teodorescu, *Necesitatea unor trupe de acoperire puternice*, in *România Militară*, no. 6, June 1921, p. 682.

¹² Major Ioan Nicolaid, *Serviciul de informații la comandamente*, in *România Militară*, no. 10-11-12, October-November-December 1922, p. 718.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 518.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 719.

the idea of establishing forward intelligence sub-centres directly subordinated to the Great General Staff, to form the intelligence centre in the particular theatre of operations (the author thus suggests three sub-centres; in the east, west and south).

In an article about the **infantry combat procedures**, Colonel Radu R. Rosetti emphasises the main role held by infantry in the future war. That is why *it should develop its offensive ability and all its actions should be dominated by only one idea: ahead and ahead, no matter the price*¹⁵. However, considering that on the battlefield the infantry will be exposed to the attacks of aviation – the new branch that demonstrated its importance in the war – and that the artillery enhanced its fire power, the author lists the essential requirements as far as the infantry combat procedures are concerned:

1. *to ensure freedom of action considering the enemy aviation;*
2. *to change the notion of fighting by replacing the notion of tiraeuller chain with that of machine gun chain;*
3. *to change the way infantry is divided into different echelons to better dispose troops in the depth*¹⁶.

With regard to the use of **cavalry** in modern warfare, Colonel Constantin Ilasievici advocates the employment of this branch, which is not accidental, considering that this cavalry officer, who became General and Minister of National Defence in 1937, was a cavalry school commander, cavalry inspector, and he taught cavalry tactics at the Superior War School. Although he acknowledges the important role played by the aviation and the tanks in the war, he emphasises that *people win wars*¹⁷ and their morale can be decisive for victory. *Even if the progress in science and industry is about to replace the animal machine in the balance of success, morale will always be decisive*¹⁸. Therefore, he appreciates the importance of cavalry, adapted to the new characteristics of warfare, expressing his disagreement with regard to minimising the role of this weapon in a future war and considering the experience in the war of position on the Western Front.

As for the cavalry combat procedures, Colonel Ilasievici considers that, under the circumstances of the war of position, cavalry had to adopt the procedure *on foot*, although, according to the cavalry spirit, it should have put in practice

¹⁵ Colonel Radu R. Rosetti, *Ceva despre procedurile de luptă ale infanteriei*, in *România Militară*, no. 4, April 1921, p. 355.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 374.

¹⁷ Colonel Ilasievici, *Considerațiuni generale asupra întrebuițării cavaleriei în războiul modern*, in *România Militară*, no. 1, January 1921, p. 27.

¹⁸ Colonel Ilasievici, *Considerațiuni generale asupra întrebuițării cavaleriei în războiul modern*, in *România Militară*, no. 2, February 1921, p. 168.

only the doctrine of direct confrontation, meaning on horseback. The progress made in weaponry forced cavalry to adopt standing combat. However, the author highlights that this procedure should not exclude horseback combat, especially considering its effect for the morale. Moreover, he mentions that *well trained cavalry troops can always combine standing and horseback combat, depending on the situation, and, as long as the presence of this branch is justified, cavalry should remain cavalry*¹⁹. The arguments provided to support this statement are the actions of the Romanian 2nd Cavalry Division in Transylvania in September 1916 and those of the 1st Cavalry Division in the theatre of operations in Oltenia, in November 1916, on the left bank of the Olt and in Robănești, the actions of cavalry on the front in Mărășești, in 1917, in Bessarabia, in 1918, in Transylvania and Hungary, in 1919. There are also provided as examples the actions of the Russian cavalry against the Austrian cavalry on the front in Galicia, and those of the German cavalry on the Romanian front (Urziceni-Buzău), the actions of the French cavalry in the confrontations with the German cavalry, and especially those on the front in Thessaloniki, against the Bulgarian forces, having as result the fall of the Macedonian front, in 1916. *The continually increasing power of armament, the progress made by aviation, the enhancement of automobiles, liaisons, and communications will all contribute to better manoeuvre, increasing the speed of manoeuvre and movement, the only ones that are decisive in operations*²⁰. That is why, the author's opinion is that *cavalry should be considered as a manoeuvre branch, capable of rapidly transporting a mass of action (striking or firing) in one part of the front or of the theatre of operations, where a rapid intervention is necessary. Its manoeuvre is based on its characteristics: mobility and speed. Preserving these qualities, it could execute missions that cannot be accomplished by other branches. [...] For us, considering the available military assets, a war of manoeuvre is preferable, one in which we will seek to destroy the enemy using movement and manoeuvre*²¹.

In the same spirit of *chivalry*, Colonel Iliasievici supports the future of cavalry in the Romanian armed forces, providing objective arguments (no matter how developed the country economy could be, it would be impossible to equip the armed forces with assets and armament similar to those in Western countries, and it would be impossible to cover any of the three borders of the country with troops, disposed in a continuous, stabilised front), as well as moral arguments: if all the countries, our neighbours included, would have cavalry troops in the future, our country should have such troops too. Moreover, the author emphasises that *despite cavalry*

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 169.

²¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 167, 170.

is an expensive branch, difficult to regenerate, and difficult to use, its management being an art, at war cavalry is able to rapidly recover the cost of investment in peacetime²².

With regard to the use of **artillery**, Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrie Haralamb shows that, up to 1917, the branch put in practice the principle of rapidly penetrating in the depth of the disposition, engaging the enemy artillery and preparing the attack by targeting the enemy for a long period of time, and, after 1917, the military art suddenly changed, surprise being considered more successful than the enemy total destruction. Once achieved, it is not necessary, while preparing the attack, to cover the enemy trenches and to totally destroy the artillery and the barbed wire networks. It is enough for the offensive to paralyse the area of attack. However, the infantry will have the most difficult mission, while the other branches support it²³.

The **tank** was expected to have a *spectacular* success, first of all because its mobility and manoeuvre capability, its fire power, as well as the protection it provided for the personnel against not only the weapons but also the asphyxiating gases, whose effect on the battlefield was a major concern for military theorists. In this context, *the tank will become a terrestrial submersible, able to hermetically close once the special devices signal the air is poisoned. Moreover, the tank can be used as a gas tank, as a tank can carry 10 tons of liquefied gas, and 300 tanks can carry a quantity of gas greater than the one used by the British armed forces during the world war*²⁴.

Regarding the **engineer troops**, Lieutenant Colonel St. Căţoiu states that, in spite of the fact that technical assets were widely employed in the recently ended war, all states were surprised in a period when engineer troops underwent transformation and were incompletely organised. One of the causes was the commands aversion to using combat assets that could annihilate the troops offensive spirit. When the war of manoeuvre changed, in September 1914, in a war of position, even the shovel and the pickaxe were considered, depending on the situation, offensive or defensive weapons²⁵. Because of the increasing fire power, it was necessary to establish echelons in the depth of the disposition, which led to the position composed of many lines. As pioneer troops could not execute reinforcement works alone, the other branches were forced to resolve this problem,

²² *Ibidem*, p. 169.

²³ Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrie Haralamb, *Evoluţia ideilor relative la întrebuinţarea artileriei în legătură cu celelalte arme*, in *România Militară*, no. 1, 1921, p. 59.

²⁴ Major Constantin, *Influenţa tancurilor asupra operaţiunilor militare*, in *România Militară*, no. 7-8, July-August 1922, p. 506.

²⁵ Lieutenant Colonel St. Căţoiu, *Trupele de geniu în războiu*, in *România Militară*, no. 1, 1921, p. 62.

pioneers being called only for complex jobs: bridges, command posts, shelters, great obstacles, communications. Because of the echelons in the depth and the movement of commands, it was necessary to transmit the information at great distance, using the telephone, telegraph, signalling, and pigeons. The building and crossing of the bridge over the Danube, in Flămânda, in 1916, was a glorious moment for the pioneer troops.

Railways were important for the troops, being combat assets at the same time, which made Marshal Moltke state: *Do not build strongholds but railways*²⁶. Considered as the *main means of transport on land, able to carry large quantities of resources at great distance in a relative short period of time*²⁷, the railways enjoyed the special attention of the military theorists at the end of the First World War. Major I. C. Orezeanu (later the director of railways during the Ion Antonescu government), emphasises the railway troops contribution to the campaign in 1916-1918 (a railway regiment) as well as following the mobilisation in 1918 (two regiments). He advocates their development, considering that *the conduct of operations in the war of manoeuvre and the maintenance of positions in the war of position are impossible if the ammunition, provisions and troops are not timely transported, railways being also useful for medical and other types of evacuation*²⁸. Providing the example of the important role played by the railways in the military operations in the West, where they were considered a real branch, he shows that the war of the future needs a wide network of railways, well distributed and equipped with all the necessary installations for its exploitation, double railways, crossroads, stations and platforms for long trains (500 m). That is why, in the future war of manoeuvre, characterised by deployment of troops from one front to another, namely numerous strategic transportations in short time and at great distance – *a true railway warfare – the number of troops will have to be rapidly increased. Moreover, they can contribute to the development of communications in the regions recently attached to the body of the country as well as to countering the effects of strikes or sabotage*²⁹.

The need for reconnaissance and transport means required for the increase in the number of **troops and automobiles**, leading to the establishment of the automobile corps, in March 1917, and its transformation into the automobile regiment, in 1919, having over 100 automobiles and 2500 people. Other units are the motor machine gun groups, the assault car battalion, and the antiaircraft

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 65.

²⁷ Major I. C. Orezeanu, *Sporirea trupelor de căi ferate*, in *România Militară* no. 4, April 1921, p. 715.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 729.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 738.

artillery regiment. It is predicted an increasing development of the automobile units, once the appropriate technique is available³⁰.

As for the **navy** contribution to the war effort and the future of the branch, Lieutenant Commander Al. A. Gheorghiu advocates the naval war and the difficult tasks the allied fleets had to achieve, considering the necessity to control the seas in order to win a future war. The maritime power allowed the allies to intervene in Thessaloniki and to strike Bulgaria, signalling the disbandment of the Central Powers coalition. In addition, the control over the sea allowed the United States of America to intervene and decide the fate of the war in Europe. The author considers that *not having control over the sea, the Central Powers, despite their counteroffensive, were condemned to slow death by the allied fleets*³¹.

Related to the concept of *supremacy at sea* or of *control over the sea*, the author specifies that it refers not only to enjoying the advantages of transport by sea, carried out by commercial fleet, but also to denying the enemy doing it, by the navy. The author says that *it is only one naval force, the navy and commercial fleet together, which should be seen as a factor involved in national defence*³². After the outburst of war, the few German vessels were destroyed by the allied navy, which forced the Germans to increase the role played by submarines and launch strong offensive at sea. It was then believed that the large combat vessels would be soon out of the war, being replaced with submarines as the unique and sufficient means to achieve supremacy at sea. However, the Allies managed to find a solution to annihilate this powerful combat asset using small vessels, light and fast, while keeping the large vessels in ports protected against submarine attacks. The author concludes that although the submarine can inflict great damage on the adversary, it cannot ensure supremacy at sea alone³³.

A special attention was given at that time to **military aviation**, as it developed spectacularly during the war, resulting in changing the conception of its use, from a simple service to a branch. At the beginning of the war, observation, combat or bombardment aviation was totally unknown. The captive balloon and the zeppelin were soon abandoned as the aircraft conquered the air space, although it was still fragile and vulnerable. However, it enjoyed the advantage of *horizontal and vertical speed, manageability and flexibility*³⁴. These characteristics were to make it a valuable

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 66.

³¹ Lieutenant Commander Al. A. Gheorghiu, *Marina în Marele Războiu. Evoluția ei. Învățăminte. Marina viitorului*, in *România militară*, no. 1, 1921, p. 69.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 77.

³⁴ A.I.P., *Aeronautica militară. Cum a evoluat de la declararea războiului mondial până la finele lui*, in *România Militară*, no. 1, 1921, p. 82.

combat asset, configured and specialised for all the types of missions assigned: observation and bombardment aircraft – very powerful, a sort of air dreadnought – as well as lighter, faster and well-armed aircraft, able to cover them – a sort of cruiser-dreadnought. These two types of aircraft were intended to achieve and maintain *air supremacy* – a recently emerged concept! – and for the attack on the enemy aviation it was suggested the existence of a very rapid aircraft, *extremely flexible and susceptible to attack the large enemy aircraft by surprise; it will be the mono-seat jet fighter*³⁵.

However, how could aviation be prevented from accomplishing its mission? The answer is provided by Major Emanoil Leoveanu, who writes: *to defend against aircraft the most mobile weapon able to rapidly react following the attackers is the jet fighter, but as it is difficult to find, a ground defence system has been resorted to, in which the cannon and antiaircraft gun machine can stop the aircraft*³⁶. In fact, the autumn of 1916 (19 September) marks the beginning of the antiaircraft artillery in the Romanian armed forces, which continually develops because of the permanent need to respond to an increasingly competitive aviation, on the one hand, and of the evolution of own technical material, on the other hand.

The *novelty* of using **combat gases** by the Germans on the Western Front (Ypres, France, 22 April 1915) and their devastating effects on troops and combat assets resulted in the Romanian military theorists seriously considering this aspect. In this regard, Colonel Bolintineanu presents the main chemical substances used in combat at that time, the way in which they can be used as well as the methods to defend against their effects³⁷.

As for the evolution of the **superior medical service**, Division General MD I. Antoniu and Lieutenant Colonel MD I. Bălănescu state that in the campaigns in 1913, 1916-1918 and 1919-1920, it adapted to the needs on the front benefiting from the knowledge shared by the Western armed forces. First aid and surgery were well managed, but post-surgery care was not so successful because of frequent evacuation that prevented its continuation. It is suggested that the medical service will further transform and develop, highly specialised methods being employed and prophylaxis coming into focus. It is also highlighted the sanitary service functioning dependence on the military action evolution, increasingly influenced by the use of aviation and tanks³⁸.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 84.

³⁶ Major Emanoil Leoveanu, *Organizarea apărării contra aeronavelor prin artilerie și mitraliere*, in *România Militară*, no. 5, May 1921, p. 512.

³⁷ Colonel Bolintineanu, *Efectele gazelor asfixiante*, in *România Militară*, no. 3-4, March-April 1922, pp. 198-211.

³⁸ Division General MD I. Antoniu, Lieutenant Colonel MD I. Bălănescu, *Scurtă privire generală asupra evoluției serviciului sanitar superior*, in *România Militară*, no. 1, 1921, pp. 85-93.

With regard to the ratio between the **political and military power** in winning the war, Major D. Orășanu opines that foreign policy is essential for the nation to achieve the desired results, war being half won politically before it starts, the military power being thus only a complementary force to impose own will. The best and most available examples are from the recently ended conflict, in which the Allies, due to their political superiority, ensured the military superiority over Germany, the latter being unable, despite its initial military superiority, to win the war. In this regard, it is mentioned the fact that Germany could easily attract the enmity of former allies co-opted by Chancellor Bismark, in 1882, immediately after Germany achieved military supremacy compared to its former adversary, France, by conducting a wise policy, as members in the Triple Alliance (Italia, Romania). To those adversaries, the United States of America was added, in 1917, because of the same unwise policy³⁹.

*Considering the military power plays a more important role (over 50%) than the foreign policy means aiming at an exception from the general rule, at an unnatural result, making the war a **goal and not a means**. In such cases, policy is often started by war, war by partial victories, being thus ended in a totally disadvantageous way⁴⁰. That is why, the author concludes, foreign policy should play the most important part in winning or losing the war. *The origin of defeat or failure in a war should not be sought in the eve or in the time of war but far before the outbreak of war when not all the measures were taken to win the predicted war.[...] Foreign policy should consider a long period of time, sometimes many generations. Its planning should take war as a possibility or obligation into account, the armed forces being allocated an important chapter without neglecting the other important chapters such as political alliances, the most important means to meet its goals, consolidation of the state by internal policy and alongside powerful armed forces.[...] Military policy should be, first and foremost, a leverage for the foreign policy action and manoeuvre, and, secondly, an active and fatal means to resolve, employing weapons, an unavoidable, foreseen or arranged conflict to our advantage. Military policy should be, in essence, the last terrible means employed by foreign policy in resolving its problems. It should not be resorted to before all the other means prove unsuccessful, and before we ensure that our sword is superior to that of the adversary, and the one who uses it is well trained to defeat the enemy.**

Thus the foreign policy makers are solely responsible for unwisely resorting to an unsharpened sword used by people unable to do it, solely responsible for all the disastrous effects of a lost war⁴¹.

³⁹ Major D. Orășanu, *Influența puterii politice și puterii militare asupra rezultatului războiului*, in *România Militară*, no. 10-12, October, November, December 1922, p. 623.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 625.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 626.

Regarding the **influence of the supreme command over the result of the battle**, Major V. states that not the armed forces but their commanders are accountable for the victory or defeat, as *the one who conceives and carries out the work and not the instrument employed is responsible for it. The armed forces supreme commander, wearing the shoes of the operator of the machine that is the army is fully accountable for the result*⁴².

Considering the recently ended war, the author highlights the extraordinary qualities of the German, French and allied armed forces, not only at the command but also at the troops level: *However, the most authorised papers written following the war, related to accountability, show the following as most glorious: Joffre, as he succeeded in winning Marna, with less numerous and badly equipped troops; Foch, who, in a genial manner, depleted the adversary reserves, preserving the own ones for the decisive effort; Hindenburg, Lunderdorf that led their troops to victories that remained famous in history, as the ones in Tanenberg and the Mazarian Lakes etc.*

*Related to the increase in strength, the enhancement of armament, the enlargement of battle fronts etc., I think the supreme command is, as it used to be in the past, the brain and the soul of the animated body that is about to fight. Today, more than ever, the armed forces need a soul, more than ever, the armed forces should think, throb, palpitate, live through the thought, heart, pulse and personality of the supreme command. Today, as in the past, I think that the battle can and should be led*⁴³.

As for the **cadres preparation**, as part of the **armed forces training**, Colonel Leon Cerchez, intending to highlight the *different means to maintain the officers general and specialised knowledge*⁴⁴, analyses the Romanian military education system, criticising the lack of a rational programme to harmonise the education and training of officers belonging to all echelons.

With regard to the **military writings and press**, which should have been directly related to the armed forces education and training, the author salutes the resumption of the appearance of all the military journals that existed before the war, as well as the distinguished military men who prove to be very good writers *publishing very interesting papers that are of natural interest not only for our officer corps but also for the civilians*⁴⁵. Highlighting the problems an author who intends to publish a scientific paper encounters, we find out that publishing a book by an officer was a true heroic act. In economic terms, printing was extremely expensive, paper was difficult to find and of poor quality, the necessary money to encourage or enable publishing lacked, and book selling was highly problematic,

⁴² Major V., *Influența ce are comandamentul suprem în câștigarea sau pierderea bătăliei*, in *România Militară*, no. 5-6, May-June 1922, p. 275.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 278.

⁴⁴ Colonel Leon Cerchez, *Instrucția în armată*, in *România Militară*, no. 4, April 1921, p. 696.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 701.

so the author worked for the publisher and typographer, having *only the moral satisfaction that he could publish a book without being in debt*⁴⁶. This is the reason why the author considers that our military literature was very poor, in spite of the fact that *our officer corps was one of the most educated and trained in the world*⁴⁷. To get out of the impasse, he suggests establishing an institute for publishing military writings, subsidised by the Ministry of War, to provide military writers with all the necessary means to publish their works. *Otherwise, we will continue to be dependent, materially and spiritually, on the French or German literature, having no spontaneous literary activity on our own, and preventing the numerous talents within our distinguished officer corps from expressing themselves*⁴⁸.

As for the role of **military circles**, the author emphasises their role in complementing the education of all the officers in a garrison, especially for those who are not in the capital. That is why the military circle should have available a *well-equipped library and an attractive reading room, where all the officers in a garrison should be invited to spend their free time*⁴⁹. Moreover, they should have a conference room and a room for war game and map exercises. The commander of the garrison can also organise compulsory courses for young officers at the military circle, having as trainers or lecturers the experienced officers in the garrison.

The lessons learned from the First World War did not limit to capitalising on the experience gained by own troops. Moreover, they focused on the success and failure of the other belligerents, especially France and Germany, as Romanian military theorists paid special attention to them, firstly because the two armed forces were considered the most advanced in Europe, therefore the need to choose a model for the Romanian armed forces. In this context, *România Militară* published, in the first years after the war, a series of articles such as *O critică a planului de război francez/Analysis of the French War Plan*⁵⁰, *Armata germană în timpul războiului din 1914-1918/The German Armed Forces during the War in 1914-1918*⁵¹, *Contribuțiuni la istoria poporului nostru. Ofensiva germană-austriacă la Nord de Focșani iulie-august 1917 (după lucrările și documentele germane)/Contribution to the History of Our People. The German-Austrian Offensive North of Focșani July-August 1917 (according to German papers and documents)*⁵², *Pregătirea militară germană*

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 703.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 704.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 705.

⁵⁰ P.D., *O critică a planului de război francez* (translation), in *România Militară*, no. 4, April 1921, p. 375.

⁵¹ N.A., *Armata germană în timpul războiului din 1914-1918*, in *România Militară*, no. 4, April 1921, p. 386.

⁵² Colonel Laurențiu Bârzotescu, *Contribuțiuni la istoria poporului nostru. Ofensiva germană-austriacă la Nord de Focșani iulie-august 1917* (according to German papers and documents), in *România Militară*, no. 6, June 1921, p. 762.

*a respectat principiile războiului ?/Was the German Military Preparation Compliant with the War Principles?*⁵³, *Tactica defensive germane în 1918/The Tactics of the German Defensive in 1918*⁵⁴, *Greșelile strategiei germane în 1918/The Failures of the German Strategy in 1918*⁵⁵, as well as a series of reviews from foreign military journals, the constant interest being the connection between the Romanian military thinking and the international military spirit.

We thus notice the Romanian military theorists preoccupation with capitalising on the war experience as well as with modernising the Romanian armed forces. Continuing the work of their famous predecessors, they in turn became the predecessors of the Romanian military thinking in the interwar period, when the cognitive and development process continued and increased in intensity. Among them we can mention Radu R. Rosetti, Florea Țenescu, Radu Dinulescu, Mircea Tomescu, Ion Cernăianu, Ioan Sichitiu, Al. Ioanițiu, C.N. Hârjeu etc., military authors whose name is related to the Romanian military thinking beginning and development. It happened first and foremost because of the need to provide solutions for the national defence and for strengthening the defensive capability of Romania in the new geopolitical and geostrategic context following the First World War. The national reunification resulted in the national borders reconfiguration and enlargement, which implicitly meant more external threats that had to be responded properly, considering the new principles of conducting combat actions and the reality in Romania, in terms of economy, society and the system of alliances Romania joined. In addition, the influence of the universal military thinking, the accelerated technical process and its influence over the military art, the new conceptions of military organisation and of conducting war, the dispute between the war of position and the war of manoeuvre continuing during the entire interwar period as well as the dispute between the French and the German model were other important aspects considered.

The Second World War was to validate or, unfortunately, to amend the mentioned intellectual effort.

English version by
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⁵³ Major Mladge, *Pregătirea militară germană a respectat principiile războiului?*, in *România Militară* no. 6, June 1921, p. 706.

⁵⁴ Colonel N. Negreanu, *Tactica defensivei germane în 1918*, in *România Militară*, no. 6, June 1921, p. 685.

⁵⁵ Colonel Gr. Constandachi, *Greșelile strategiei germane în 1918*, in *România Militară*, no. 3-4, April 1922, p. 174.

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