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SPECIAL ISSUE DEDICATED TO THE DEFENCE STAFF ANNIVERSARY

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Romanian Military Thinking
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"Army Corps General
Ioan Sichitiu"
Award

"Lieutenant Colonel
Mircea Tomescu"
Award

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The Minister of National Defence Message on the Defence Staff Anniversary

12 November 2017

I am extremely honoured to convey my and the Ministry command team greetings to you, the professionals who work for the Romanian Armed Forces management and command superior body, the Defence Staff.

Established as the military training command structure by Ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza, through the High Order of the Day no. 83 on 12 November 1859, having the main role in ensuring the uniformity of the armies of the two Romanian Principalities following their unification, the Defence Staff, irrespective of its formal appellation, has been one of the pillars on which the current modern armed forces have been built.

Those who have worked for this armed forces elite structure have commanded our troops military actions in wartime and have reformed and equipped the military body. Even at this very moment, more than 900 troops are executing combat missions in various theatres of operations. It is a great achievement for you, who, twenty-four seven, manage, coordinate, monitor and support the activity of these troops so that they can irreproachably accomplish the assigned missions. I express my gratitude to you for this fact.

2017 is first and foremost the year when the Romanian Armed Forces have modernised. The transformation of the General Staff into the Defence Staff, which plays an essential role in planning and conducting operations, the launch of essential procurement programmes, and the equipment of the troops with new combat uniforms are some of the most telling examples of actions meant to rejuvenate the military body.

Moreover, the summer of 2017 was hot in terms of military exercises. In this regard I can mention Saber Guardian 2017, the largest exercise in the history of Romania, involving more than 25,000 service members from 22 ally and partner nations, and Noble Jump 17, the biggest NATO exercise this year, in which more than 4,000 allied troops participated, as the illustration of the intensity and complexity of your work. More than 100 multinational and 400 national exercises can be added to the previously mentioned ones. This process entailed great efforts in terms of planning and conducting, and you, those who coordinated it, deserve our appreciation.

All the mentioned activities, besides the role they played in training, showed the ally and partner countries reaction and deterrence capability in a collective defence scenario, as well as the forces high level of interoperability.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The Romanian Armed Forces start an ample procurement process meant to equip all the services with modern armament systems, being a modern structure tailored to meet the current challenges, a guarantor of the country sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Romania committed, within the Alliance, to spending two percent of its GDP on defence starting in 2017, for minimum ten years. The Romanian Armed Forces procurement plan for the period 2017-2026 includes eight essential programmes, and it has been developed in accordance with the allocated funds.

This year, we will start the Romanian Armed Forces modernisation programme, purchasing the first Patriot system and the first lot

of 8X8 armoured carriers. Moreover, the procurement of transport helicopters from IAR Ghimbav, in partnership with Airbus, as well as of transport and attack helicopters from Bell Helicopters, also in cooperation with IAR Ghimbav, is in different stages of preparation.

It is a huge financial effort and I require all those involved to be meticulous in complying with the legislation and the acquisition procedures. Unfortunately, we live in a volatile security environment, which directly influences the military body domains, especially the optimisation of defence management resources and the wise application of the modern principles of education and training to meet the new challenges.

The Romanian Armed Forces represent now a new and modern construction, compatible with the armed forces of the other NATO and European Union member states. There are more things to do in the future to be efficient in case of crises and of participating in military operations, and I am convinced that now, when the necessary resources are ensured, the Armed Forces transformation process will successfully continue in all the sectors.

On the occasion of the Defence Staff anniversary, I congratulate you on the tenacity and abnegation you demonstrate in accomplishing the assigned missions and I wish you success in all the actions you perform to enhance the prestige of the elite corps you belong to.

Many Happy Returns!

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

Le message
du ministre de la Défense nationale à l'occasion de la Journée d'Etat-major de la Défense

12 novembre 2017

Je suis très honoré de vous envoyer mes salutations et de mon équipe de la direction du ministère, Vous, les professionnels qui font partie de l'organisme supérieur de conception et de commandement de l'Armée Roumaine, l'Etat-major de la Défense.

Conçu comme une structure de diriger l'instruction militaire par le souverain Alexandru Ioan Cuza, à travers de l'Ordre Supérieur du Jour no. 83 du 12 novembre 1859, avec le rôle principal d'harmoniser les armées des deux Principautés roumaines après leur unification, c'est l'Etat-major de la défense, quel que soit son appellation, qui a était l'un des piliers sur lequel a été construite l'armée moderne de nos jours.

Ceux qui faisaient partie de cette structure d'élite de l'armée ont conduit les actions de nos militaires pendant la guerre et ont réformé et doté l'organisme militaire. Même à ce moment-là, plus de 900 militaires effectuent des missions de combat dans différents théâtres d'opérations. C'est une grande réussite pour vous, qui, 24 heures sur 24, sept jours par semaine, conduisez, coordonnez, surveillez et soutenez le travail de ces militaires pour remplir leurs missions impeccablement et je vous suis reconnaissant pour cela.

L'année 2017 est, tout d'abord, l'année de la modernisation des forces armées roumaines. La transformation de l'Etat-major général en l'Etat-major de la défense, avec un rôle essentiel dans la planification et la gestion

des opérations, le démarrage des programmes essentiels de logistique et d'équiper les militaires avec une nouvelle uniforme combat sont les plus révélateurs exemples de ce processus de renouvellement l'organisme militaire.

Dans le même temps, l'été 2017 a été brûlant du point de vue d'exercices militaires. Si je me souviens seulement *Saber Guardian 2017*, le plus grand exercice de l'histoire de la Roumanie, avec une participation plus de 25 000 soldats de 22 pays alliés et partenaires, et *Noble Jump 17*, le plus grand exercice de l'OTAN de cette année, avec une participation de plus de 4 000 troupes alliées, ils nous montre l'intensité et la complexité de votre travail. Ceux-ci sont ajoutés à plus de 100 exercices multinationaux et 400 nationaux. Il était un effort supérieur sur la ligne de planification et de commande, et vous, ceux qui ont coordonné tout ce processus, vous méritez nos appréciations.

Toutes ces activités, en plus du rôle d'instruction, ont montré la capacité de réaction et découragement des pays alliés et partenaires dans un scénario de la défense collective et le haut degré d'interopérabilité des forces.

Mesdames et messieurs,

L'Armée Roumaine commence un ample processus d'acquisition avec des systèmes modernes d'armement pour toutes les catégories de forces et elle se présente comme une structure moderne et adaptée aux défis du moment, comme une garantie de la souveraineté, l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale du pays.

La Roumanie s'est engagée, au sein de l'Alliance, à attribuer deux pour cent du PIB pour la défense depuis 2017, pour une période depuis au moins dix ans. Le plan pour la dotation des forces armées roumaines pour la période 2017-2026 comprend huit programmes essentiels et il a été développé par rapport aux fonds alloués.

Nous allons commencer, depuis cette année, le programme de modernisation de l'Armée Roumaine, en acquérant le premier système *Patriot* et le premier lot de convoyeurs blindés *8X8*. Ainsi, il y a en différentes étapes de préparer l'acquisition d'hélicoptères de transport de l'IAR Ghimbav,

en partenariat avec Airbus, et des hélicoptères de transport et d'attaque de Bell Helicopters, en collaboration aussi avec IAR Ghimbav. C'est un effort financier énorme et je demande à toutes les personnes impliquées de la méticulosité pour respecter la législation et les procédures applicables à tous les achats publics. Malheureusement, nous vivons dans un environnement de sécurité volatile, qui a une influence directe sur les domaines de l'organisme militaire, avec un accent particulier sur l'optimisation de la gestion des ressources pour la défense et l'application avec plus de sagesse des principes modernes de formation et d'éducation pour faire face aux nouveaux défis.

L'Armée Roumaine représente maintenant une construction nouvelle et moderne, compatible avec les armées des autres pays de l'OTAN et de l'Union européenne.

Il y a beaucoup à faire pour être efficace devant les crises et les opérations militaires auxquelles nous participerons, et je suis convaincu que maintenant, lorsque les ressources nécessaires sont fournies, le processus de transformer l'Armée continuera avec succès dans tous ses secteurs.

À l'occasion de la Journée de l'Etat-major de la défense, je vous félicite pour votre attitude persévèrente et votre abnégation avec lesquelles vous agissez pour accomplir les missions confiées et je vous souhaite du succès dans tout ce que vous faites pour agrandir le prestige du ce corps d'élite auquel vous appartenez.

Joyeux anniversaire!

Version française par
✐ *Alina PAPOI*

The Chief of the Defence Staff Message

12 November 2017

The Defence Staff Day anniversary is an event of major significance not only for us, those who work for this structure, but also, at national level, for the history of Romania itself.

If, at the outset, the General Staff Corps core competencies were related to organisation and management, nowadays, the Defence Staff has to ensure the national territory defence as well as to meet the commitments to NATO, the EU, and other international organisations and coalitions to which Romania is party.

2017 is an extremely dynamic and important year for the Romanian Armed Forces, the focus being both on certain changes in the approach to domestic policies and on the need to adapt to the new challenges relating to Euro-Atlantic security. The transformation of the General Staff into the Defence Staff entails new areas of responsibility, such as cyberspace, which has been acknowledged as a new domain of operations. Therefore, the Defence Staff takes on all the responsibilities that are specific to cyber defence in the military field as well as increased tasks relating to enhancing national resilience and other defence-related fields.

Besides the operational level, the Defence Staff, as the Romanian Armed Forces leading structure that manages the majority of the armed

forces personnel, has to equally focus attention on people, on our comrades at all hierarchical levels. We have the moral duty to promote certain socio-medical and administrative-related actions and programmes so that the force structures can focus on the substance of military actions, the fighters can acknowledge that their status is congruent with their risk exposure, and the psycho-moral climate can be based on trust, loyalty and mutual respect.

I trust, dear comrades, that together we will manage to better define the profile of the Defence Staff as the exponent of powerful and respected armed forces, ready to successfully accomplish the mission with which the country entrusted them.

On this festive day, I express my gratitude for your work, I congratulate you, and I wish you were healthy, capable of hard work, as well as you and your beloved ones can enjoy professional and personal achievements.

Many Happy Returns of the Day!

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

Le message
du chef d'Etat-major de la Défense

12 novembre 2017

L'anniversaire de la Journée d'Etat-major de la Défense représente un événement avec des significations majeures tant pour nous, ceux qui nous développons notre activité dans cette structure, mais aussi au niveau national, pour l'histoire-même de la Roumanie.

Si, à son début, les tâches principales du Corps d'Etat-major général se sont consacrées plus de l'organisation et de gestion de l'armée, maintenant, l'Etat-major de la Défense doit assurer à la fois la défense du territoire national et l'accomplissement des engagements assumés envers l'OTAN, UE et d'autres organisations internationales ou coalitions auxquelles la Roumanie est partie.

L'année 2017 est une année extrêmement dynamique et importante pour l'Armée Roumaine, dominée par quelques changements d'approche en termes de politiques internes, mais aussi par la nécessité de s'adapter aux nouveaux défis sur la sécurité euro-atlantique. Transformer l'Etat-major général dans l'Etat-major de la Défense c'est une action qui implique de nouveaux domaines de responsabilité, comme il est celui cybernétique, qui a été reconnu comme un nouvel environnement de confrontation. En ce sens, tous les éléments de responsabilité spécifiques à la défense cybernétique dans le domaine militaire sont en charge de l'Etat-major de la Défense, en plus, nous avons des tâches multiples également pour renforcer la résilience nationale ou d'autres domaines de la défense.

Au-delà du côté opérationnel, l'Etat-major de la Défense, comme la structure primordiale de l'Armée Roumaine, qui gère la plupart du personnel de l'armée, doit tourner son attention également aux gens,

à nos camarades à tous les niveaux hiérarchiques. Nous avons le devoir moral d'être les promoteurs de certaines actions et programmes d'accompagnement socio-médical et administratif, pour que les structures de forces puissent se concentrer sur le fond des actions militaires, les combattants en croyant qu'ils ont un statut correspondant à leurs sacrifices et leur exposition au risque, et le climat psycho-moral soit basé sur la confiance, fidélité et respect mutuel.

J'ai confiance, chers camarades, que nous pourrons, ensemble, faire bien connaître le profil de l'Etat-major de la Défense comme l'exposant d'une armée forte et respectée, prête à remplir avec succès sa mission vers le pays.

En ce jour de la fête, je vous remercie pour votre travail, je vous félicite et je vous souhaite beaucoup de santé, force pour votre travail et réalisations professionnelles et personnelles pour vous et pour vos proches.

Joyeux anniversaire!

Version française par
✎ *Alina PAPOI*

THE DEFENCE STAFF
– the Romanian Armed Forces Elite Structure –

Lieutenant General Dr Adrian TONEA,
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff

12 November is the date that has been embedded in the military body consciousness as the Defence Staff Day. It is, as well as 25 October, an anniversary date for the Romanian Armed Forces, on which we express our gratitude for the past, for our forefathers and their significant deeds, to whom we owe our very existence and institutional role. It is, at the same time, an occasion to celebrate the present and to reaffirm our commitment to the new missions that derive from our membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the current complex and unpredictable security environment.

The Defence Staff history is entangled with the history of modern Romanian Armed Forces. A century and a half ago, the act of Unification on the 24 January 1859 sealed the fulfilment of the Romanians long-held dream of getting unified. Through the High Order of the Day no. 83[1], signed by Ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza (Alexandru Ioan I), it was established, on 12/24 November 1859, the General Staff Corps of the United Principalities Army. In its eight articles, the High Order of the Day presented the military superior management and command body structure as well as

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[1] In *Monitorul Oastei*, no. 21 on 3 June 1860, pp. 322-325, cited in *Statul Major General. 1859-2004. Istorie şi transformare*, coordinator Major General Dr Mihail Orzeaţă, p. 22.

its main responsibilities: from the topographic and geodetic works resulting in the materialisation of the United Principalities cadastral map to be used in tactical-strategic operations, the *"manoeuvre combination and conduct"*[2], through fortifications, up to the *"personnel contribution to the establishment of military committees"*[3] having responsibilities in the field of military education.

Throughout its existence, a 158 year period, the Defence Staff, the Romanian Armed Forces symbol institution, has got different appellations depending on the political and historical contexts: the General Staff Corps, the Great General Staff, the General Staff and, starting on 14 October 2017, the current appellation[4].

The new name this military body bears is not only a change in its appellation but it also entails a substantial transformation of the commitments made by the Defence Staff. Thus we currently consider new areas of responsibility, new challenges the military institution has to meet in an as realistic as possible and foreword-looking manner, at a level of performance equal to that of our allies.

If, in 1994, when the Great General Staff became the General Staff, the main goal was to transform the Romanian Armed Forces into a modern structure, properly trained and equipped to meet the security areal exigencies in that period, today, through the new appellation, the elite structure of the Romanian Armed Forces has to meet increasingly unpredictable and rapid challenges. In addition to its main responsibilities[5], to plan and command operations at strategic level, to train commands and forces, to manage the human resource in the armed forces, to guarantee troops optimally tailored to military operations, to ensure the national territory defence, and to meet the commitments made to NATO and the EU, the Defence Staff has now new responsibilities. Cyber defence and increasing national resilience are two of the missions that are top

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[2] *Statul Major General. 1859-2004. Istorie şi transformare*, op. cit., p. 22.

[3] *Ibidem.*

[4] In compliance with Law no. 167/2017 to amend and supplement Law no. 346/2006 on the Ministry of National Defence Organisation and Functioning.

[5] Stipulated in the mentioned Law, Art. 12.

of the institution agenda. We should start from the reality that, first and foremost, we are responsible for ensuring defence here, at home, demonstrating devotion and professionalism, alongside the other elements of the national defence system. We have a duty to meet the increasingly comprehensive asymmetrical, unconventional challenges. Moreover, we have to align with the spectrum of protection measures against hybrid actions. All these aspects are mentioned in the new Defence Staff *"job description"*.

Our country is an extremely important member state of the North Atlantic Alliance, having a well-defined role in the field of regional and allied security, in consolidating NATO south-eastern flank defence. The fact that we are members of this powerful political-military alliance provides us with the guarantee of collective security but, as in each and every credible and consolidated partnership, it requires us to participate in and contribute troops to joint missions in allied context. Currently, there are about 600 Romanian Armed Forces troops, trained and ready for action, in Afghanistan, both in Kandahar and Kabul areas. There are also about 100 service members ready to fulfil their duty in the Western Balkans. Moreover, we effectively participate in the UN peacekeeping missions in countries in Africa.

The new Defence Staff status, in terms of both appellation and responsibilities, is an important part of the armed forces transformation process meant to tailor the institution to meet the new challenges. All the actions the Defence Staff will perform in the process of institutional transformation and development are intended to consolidate its profile of exponent of the Romanian Armed Forces – powerful and respected armed forces both in the country and in the international environment.

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

L'ETAT-MAJOR DE LA DÉFENSE
– la structure fondamentale
de l'Armée Roumaine –

Lieutenant-général dr. Adrian TONEA,
Chef adjoint de l'Etat-major de la Défense

Le jour du 12 novembre est entré dans la conscience de l'institution militaire comme une célébration de l'Etat-major de la Défense. C'est, à côté de 25 octobre, une fête de l'Armée Roumaine, dans laquelle nous exprimons notre gratitude pour le passé, pour nos ancêtres et leurs actes remarquables, à qui nous devons notre existence et notre mission institutionnelle. C'est, en même temps, un moment de célébrer le présent et d'assumer de nouvelles missions résultant de notre statut de membre de l'Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord, dans l'actuel environnement de sécurité, complexe et imprévisible.

L'histoire de l'Etat-major de la Défense est liée par l'histoire de l'Armée Roumaine moderne. Il y a un siècle et demi, l'acte de l'Union de 24 janvier 1859 consolidait l'accomplissement du desideratum de l'unité des Roumains. Par à l'Ordre Supérieur du Jour no. 83[1], signé par le prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza (Alexandru Ioan I), était né, à 12/24 novembre 1859, le Corps d'Etat-major général de l'Armée des Principautés Unies. Dans ses huit articles, l'Ordre Supérieur du Jour présentait la structure et les attributions principales de cet organisme supérieure de conception et commandement de l'armée: des travaux topographiques, géodésiques et la matérialisation de la carte cadastrale des Principautés Unies vers aux opérations tactiques-stratégiques, *„à combiner et diriger*

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[1] Dans le *Monitorul Oastei*, no. 21, 3 juin 1860, pp. 322-325, dans *Statul Major General. 1859-2004. Istorie şi transformare*, coordonateur: major-général dr. Mihail Orzeață, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 22.

les manœuvres"[2], travaux de fortifications jusqu'à *„contribuer avec du personnel à la formation des comités militaires"*[3] avec de responsabilité dans le domaine de l'éducation militaire.

Au cours des 158 années, l'Etat-major de la Défense, une institution symbolique de l'Armée Roumaine, avait d'autres appellations, en fonction des contextes politiques et historiques que l'armée a subies: le Corps de l'Etat-major général, Le Grand-état général, l'Etat-major général et, à partir du 14 octobre 2017, cet organisme détient le titre actuel[4].

Le changement de ce corps militaire ne concerne pas seulement un changement de titre, mais il est une transformation fondamentale des engagements qui l'Etat-major de la Défense s'assume. Aujourd'hui, on parle de nouveaux domaines de responsabilité, de nouveaux défis auxquels l'institution militaire doit y répondre dans une manière réaliste, prospective, à un niveau de performance égal à celui de nos alliés.

Si, en 1994, alors quand le Grand-état major se transformait en l'Etat-major général, son objectif principal était le changement de l'Armée Roumaine dans une structure moderne, instruite et équipée adéquat pour les exigences de la région de la sécurité de cette période-là, aujourd'hui, par son nouveau nom, la structure fondamentale de l'armée doit répondre à de certains défis de plus en plus imprévisibles et rapides. Outre ses principales attributions[5], de la planification et de commande des opérations de niveau stratégique, de former les commandements et les forces, de gérer les ressources humaines dans l'armée, de garantir une optimum favorable pour nos militaires dans les actions militaires, d'assurer la défense du territoire nationale et d'accomplir les engagements assumés envers l'OTAN et l'UE, l'Etat-major de la Défense a maintenant de nouveaux domaines de responsabilité.

La défense cybernétique et le renforcement de la résilience nationale sont deux missions les plus actuelles que cette institution met à son agenda

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[2] *Statul Major General. 1859-2004. Istorie şi transformare, loc. cit.*

[3] *Ib.*

[4] Par Legea nr. 167/2017 pentru modificarea şi completarea Legii nr. 346/2006 privind organizarea şi funcţionarea Ministerului Apărării Naţionale (La Loi 167/2017 de modifier et compléter la Loi 346/2006 d'organiser et fonctionner le Ministère de la Défense).

[5] Prévues dans la loi mentionnée, Art. 12.

de parcours. Nous devons aller de la réalité que, tout d'abord, nous sommes responsables d'assurer notre défense ici, chez nous, avec dévotion et professionnalisme, à côté des autres éléments du système national de défense. Nous sommes obligés de répondre aux défis asymétriques, non conventionnels, de plus en plus complètements. C'est aussi important de nous alignons au spectre des mesures de protection envers des actions hybrides. Toutes ces actions se trouvent dans la nouvelle *„fiche du poste"* de l'Etat-major de la Défense.

Notre pays est, au sein de l'Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord, un membre très important, avec un rôle bien défini en matière de sécurité régionale et alliée, pour renforcer la défense du flanc du sud-est de l'OTAN. Le fait que nous soyons membres de cette puissante alliance politico-militaire nous offre la garantie d'une sécurité collective, mais, comme dans tout partenariat crédible et renforcé, aussi nous exige de participer et de contribuer avec des effectifs dans des missions conjointes, au contexte allié. L'Armée Roumaine a aujourd'hui, en Afghanistan, à Kandahar et dans la région de Kaboul, environ 600 militaires entraînés et formés pour agir. En même temps, presque 100 militaires sont prêts à prendre leur service dans les Balkans occidentaux. Aussi, nous agissons effectivement dans les missions de maintien de la paix sous le mandat ONU dans les pays du continent africain.

La nouvelle posture de l'Etat-major de la Défense, à la fois comme titre, ainsi que ses attributions, est une partie importante du processus de transformation de l'armée, de l'adaptation institutionnelle conformément aux nouveaux défis. À travers tout ce qu'il va réaliser, dans ce processus de la transformation et de son devenir institutionnel, l'Etat-major de la Défense renforcera son profil d'exposant de l'Armée Roumaine – une armée forte et respectée dans le pays, ainsi que dans l'environnement international.

Version française par
✎ *Alina PAPOI*

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE
IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA
IN THE CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL, STRATEGIC,
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT (IV)

Brigadier General Dr Virgil-Ovidiu POP

The experience gained from the main international treaties having provisions in the field of defence has imposed collective defence as a complex, extremely diversified and adapted to concrete historical reality form. Briefly, its essence could be defined as *"…an arrangement, usually formalised in a treaty or organisation, between participant states that get involved in supporting the defence of a member state, in the event it is attacked by another state that is not a member of the particular organisation"*[41].

Moreover, according to Article 1 of the UN Charter, it is emphasised the idea that *"collective defence"* entails the mutual support of political-military alliance member states when one or more than one of them are the object of aggression. In this context, each state tailors its participation in missions in terms of troops, combat assets and financial resources according to its economic development and the commitments made as an Alliance member state.

Brigadier General Dr Virgil-Ovidiu Pop – Commandant, the 4th Infantry Division *"Gemina"*, Cluj-Napoca.

[41] Constantin Moștoflei, Petre Duțu, Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Apărare națională și apărare colectivă. Studii de securitate și apărare*, vol. 2, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2005, p. 91.

The new NATO strategic concept adopted in Lisbon mentions the Alliance determination to make all military and/or political efforts to ensure security for all member states in compliance with the UN Charter provisions. This principle emphasises, on the one hand, NATO position towards the main mission of the organisation – collective defence, and, on the other hand, demonstrates the ability to support the promotion of liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights, thus promoting political guidelines to follow in the process of adopting military decisions[42].

Moreover, the concept contains a political message that highlights the importance of strengthening the transatlantic link as a decisive factor generating cohesion and security guarantees. The assertion of this aspect as the basic principle of the new strategic concept is relevant for the military domain as far as decision-making is concerned at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical).

"Collective defence" is another option available to states to preserve national fundamental interests. If states cannot meet such an aspiration, depending on different reasons, they opt for the form of partnership (as a preparatory element for possible membership of a political-military organisation) or for bilateral treaties as a temporary solution.

Therefore, *"common defence"* differs from collective defence through content and the way the participant states are involved. In fact, in this case, defence is achieved by establishing, due to the sustained contribution and effort of involved countries, permanent joint armed forces, under the command of a supranational force, having the mission to defend and promote their interests just as national armed forces would do.

Thus, *"common defence"* entails establishing certain adequate (civilian and military) structures by many states or a union of states, their staffing with qualified personnel for the possibly assigned tasks, providing instruments adequate to the set goal (from computers to armament), normative acts that regulate specific activity,

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[42] Brigadier General (r.) Professor Dr Viorel Buța, *Evoluția conceptului strategic al NATO – Continuitatea și flexibilitatea unei alianțe în mediul internațional de securitate*, in *Revista de Științe Militare*, published by the Military Science Section of the Scientists Academy in Romania, 2011, p. 2.

all through the human, material and financial efforts made by all the members of the particular organisation. Moreover, such a structure would be led by the interstate organisation that established it. In other words, *"common defence"* includes the establishment (with the participation and will of all the involved states) of the instruments (human, material, financial and information resources, institutions, treaties/agreements having a juridical aspect) meant to protect their fundamental interests, defend their territory, independence and sovereignty.

Specific to common defence is also the fact that the military structure established for this purpose is under the command of the union bodies and not under those of each member state. Moreover, the structure destined for common defence is permanent, being always ready to fulfil the role for which it was established. An example in this regard can be the European Union, which intends to establish its own military structure to be employed when it is necessary to consistently and systematically involve in activities such as[43]:

- defend its territory, independence and fundamental interests;
- manage some crises in the areas of strategic interests;
- resolve conflicts on the European continent and beyond.

No matter the option of a state for a certain type of defence, it should meet the necessities to preserve the sovereignty, independence, territorial unity and integrity of the particular state. In this context, defence has to flexibly and adequately respond to the current challenges, namely to the risks and threats irrespective of their nature or source.

"Collective actions" can be defined as those *"military actions conducted with the employment of armed forces belonging to two or more states, within an alliance or coalition, under the aegis of an international authority (UN, OSCE, NATO, EU), for the purpose of collective/common defence (Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty or ESDP) or for the purpose of preventing, limiting or ending a crisis/conflict (non-art.5 CRO). To the same category belong the activities conducted within joint military exercises, in which structures*

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[43] *** *L'Union Européenne et la prévention des conflits*, see http://www.grip.org, retrieved on 19 February 2016.

belonging to two or more countries participate, based on pre-established plans, aimed at training/assessing structural, actional, procedural and equipment interoperability"[44].

"Military alliance" represents *"the agreement sanctioned by a treaty through which the signatory states mutually commit to conducting actions, with all or only a part of their armed forces, against a common adversary"*[45]. The commitment to conducting actions and the contribution of each party represent the *alliance clause*. The international norms in force admit only those military alliances that have a defensive character, established for the purpose of the states collective self-defence against a possible armed attack, and that comply with the UN goals and principles.

The *alliance* operations are, technically, joint operations. However, in common language, the term *joint* is often synonym with multinational operations in which participate only the member states.

"Coalition" is defined as an ad-hoc arrangement between two or more nations to conduct a joint action. The multinational action within the coalition is conducted outside the alliance arrangements, usually for unique situations or for an enduring cooperation, in a specific, strictly determined, domain. However, in principle, a *"coalition is temporary, established for a limited period of time or a common goal"*[46].

Throughout history, alliances have been traditional specific mechanisms through which states have coordinated the employment and deployment of military forces. As a pragmatic modality to coordinate the defence policies and national security, they establish the conditions and ways in which states can employ the military force. Thus, alliances represent one of the instruments to regulate the use of the state military power at national level, at the same time becoming a process that depends on the military security globalisation.

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[44] Professor Dr Teodor Frunzeti, *Consideraţii asupra participării Armatei României la acţiuni colective*, within the International Seminar *"Participarea Armatei României la apărarea colectivă sub conducerea NATO şi a PESA"*, 25 May 2006, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Bucureşti, p. 75.

[45] *Lexicon militar*, 2nd edition, revised, Editura Saka, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 19.

[46] Major General Professor Dr Teodor Frunzeti, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

The most relevant aspects, because of their military implications, are represented by the main missions: collective defence, crisis management and cooperation in the field of security. These missions should be seen as a compact set of measures, and collective defence represents the necessary binder to consolidate and integrate the political, financial, economic and military efforts of all the Alliance members, being considered a key chapter in generating the necessity for concrete measures to implement the strategic concept provisions.

The strategic concept requires not only for strengthening links within NATO but also for permanently adapting the entire alliance philosophy to the new conditions because:

a) allies share the same values and interests;

b) collective defence represents not only a binder but also a safe space for member states, partners, and other countries or political and geopolitical entities;

c) collective defence exercises a dissuasive function for current and future potential promoters of violence in international relations;

d) collective defence is a credible support for European, Euro-Atlantic and global security;

e) collective security, through the Alliance effective capabilities, has a strong preventative function in optimising the international security environment (European, Euro-Atlantic and global);

f) collective defence, through its updated content, provides flexibility, adequate response capability to crises/conflicts and an extended area of strategic safety and security[47].

The national defence organisation is the responsibility of the Romanian state, but it no longer can be considered separate from collective defence. The status of a NATO member country, the obligations assumed towards the other allies as well as those of the allies towards the Romanian state make the statement obvious[48].

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[47] *F.T.-1, Doctrina operaţiilor Forţelor Terestre*, Editura Statului Major al Forţelor Terestre, 2006, p. 27.

[48] Dr Constantin Moştoflei, Dr Petre Duţu, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

We thus have the confirmation of the fact that *"collective defence"* is no substitute for *"national defence"*. It does not diminish and dilute the rule of law responsibilities but, on the contrary, it enhances, amplifies, extends them to acquire an international dimension. The contemporary military phenomenon has evolved so that today individual self-defence is rather an exceptional situation to resort to when all the other instruments have failed. It is a situation no state currently desires.

The UN Charter supports and encourages the *"inherent right to self or collective defence in the event of an armed attack against a UN member state"*. In fact, through this provision, the UN Charter states the right to national defence as well as to association for the purpose of achieving it.

Romania's security, as a European member state, can be defined and promoted only within NATO and the EU, depending on the national interests harmonised with the specific policies of the two organisations.

"National defence" can also be part of *"collective defence"*, when there are common goals as in the case of the first moments following the aggression is launched up to the deployment of the main task force of the alliance (coalition) in the conflict area and its engagement in combat. That is why national defence within alliance (coalition) is conceived and planned in an integrated manner, based on the principles stipulated in the normative acts developed on the basis of mutual agreement between the participating states[49].

NATO essential goal is to ensure all its member states liberty and security through political and military means, in compliance with the North Atlantic Treaty provisions and the United Nations Charter principles. The new strategic concept adopted in Lisbon in 2010 provides the guidelines for the Alliance evolution in the current decade to meet this desideratum and reaffirms NATO commitment to safeguard all its member states liberty and security by employing political means, and when they prove ineffective, the available military means.

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[49] General (r.) Professor Dr Mircea Mureşan, *Misiunile Armatei României în cadrul apărării colective şi coaliţiilor*, within the International Seminar *Participarea Armatei României la apărarea colectivă sub conducerea NATO şi a PESA*, 25 May 2006, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Bucureşti, p. 20.

The framework for NATO defence planning process is established following the basic principles of collective security in the aggregate:

- political solidarity between member states;
- promotion of collaboration and close links between countries in all the fields related to their common and individual interests;
- assignment of roles and responsibilities;
- acknowledgement of commitments;
- reunited effort to maintain the military forces that are necessary to support the Alliance strategy and policy.

The status of Romania as a NATO member state entails not only the guarantee of the country security and stability but also new responsibilities and missions deriving from it. Our country actively participates in NATO and EU missions outside the national territory as the national defence functions significantly extend in the global and globalised area of crisis and conflict management.

To take part in these actions as well as in combating terrorism, in mitigating the effects of catastrophes and disasters, indisputably means to take part in preventing war, in controlling conflicts and in ensuring regional and global stability, thus creating the security environment able to guarantee borders inviolability, economic and social development, progress and enhancement of the country power and of the effective factors related to national defence. In the new geopolitical context, there is not and there cannot be national defence outside this collective commitment, outside these international responsibilities.

Romania, through its armed forces, assumes an active and effective role in promoting the Alliance values and goals, participating with a significant number of troops in NATO-led joint and multinational operations, in interaction with the member states of the coalition it agreed to join.

One of the most important missions of the Romanian Armed Forces, as well as of any other country national armed forces, is to respond to an armed aggression. We can consider it has been the fundamental mission of the Romanian Armed Forces throughout time and it will remain so, with the mention that, in any situation, our armed forces will not be alone, relying on the allies support.

However, we should not understand that our national responsibilities related to the country defence are diminished or transferred to the Alliance, but that we will be completely supported by the Alliance with regard to own defence. This aspect has two main coordinates:

- national defence benefits from collective defence;
- projection of national defence integration in collective defence has a great dissuasive component, as any military action against Romania will be considered an attack on the Alliance, which will trigger an adequate reaction.

With regard to the response to an armed aggression on the national territory, if it is a surprise attack, in the beginning, the Romanian Armed Forces will employ own forces (both NATO earmarked forces and the generation/regeneration ones) to stop and repel the enemy and, subsequently, they will participate, together with the allied task force, in definitively repelling and/or destroying the enemy.

In the second scenario, the Romanian Armed Forces will get engaged in military actions, on the territory of a NATO or EU member state, to respond to an armed aggression against a member state/group of states, or even against one of the two organisations in the aggregate.

In a classification of the collective actions the Romanian Armed Forces can take part in, the following can be included[50]: collective defence actions, within NATO, to *"repel an aggression against Romania and its Allies"*, in compliance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; crisis response operations (CRO), which can be non-article 5 ones, within NATO or *"within ad-hoc coalitions... to support the allies and partners in the fight against terrorism and to ensure international stability"*, under UN or OSCE mandate; common defence operations within the EU, based on ESDP and CSDP concepts, as well as multinational exercises.

English version by
✍ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

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[50] Professor Dr Teodor Frunzeti, *Consideraţii asupra participării Armatei României la acţiuni colective*, within the International Seminar *Participarea Armatei României la apărarea colectivă sub conducerea NATO şi a PESA*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

RETHINKING AND REDEFINING THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY
– From the Peace of Westphalia to the Early Cold War –

Mircea STAN

Introduction

The Peace of Westphalia triggered a redefinition of the concept of *state*, which has been the core concept within international relations since then. The rise of the principles of sovereignty and equality has not reduced the magnitude of conflicts but has increased the degree of insecurity. The security architecture, outlined by the balance of power theory, the relation between *state* and *power*, the emergence of the concept of *nation-state* have highlighted a cycle in the way security gets manifest as follows: a phase in which the focus is on ensuring the state security (sovereignty, independence, borders) and a phase in which the focus is on the citizen and everyday life security.

Security in the View of the European States following the Peace of Westphalia

A retrospective look at the concept of *security* and its evolution has implicitly made us have a look back in time for four centuries. From that moment on, there have been many phases in which security has focused on either the state or its citizens. It is a cycle that currently continues. I thus consider a periodization of events necessary in the context of accurately defining the significance of security.

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The *first period* is rather related to universal modern history, and if we consider the fact that the term *modern* referred to Europe, we can say that it is the attribute of modern Europe. Even if it could seem long ago (a period of 500 years), in the 16th century Europe was a territory dominated by Italian Renaissance states and Spanish monarchy. The security architecture of Europe was to change against the background of the outbreak of religious wars within the Holy Roman Empire. The Westphalian treaties ended the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), legitimising a *"commonwealth of sovereign states"*[1].

The issue of sovereignty is, paradoxically, as simple as complex. Its simplicity resides in the right of each state to make decisions related to internal problems and at the same time develop relations with other political state actors on equal footing. Its complexity derives from the fact that states belong to an international system based on the rule of law, in which political actors are not perfect entities in terms of independence, being thus interdependent. Interdependence generates conditions, the liberty of one state ending where the liberty of another state begins, thus the picture being completed by synergistic or divergent interactions. The existing theories related to sovereignty, tributary to determinism, are marked by dynamism in keeping with reality. The *Peace of Westphalia* in 1648 placed the state at the core of international relations. The state became an entity that required respect in relation to its borders, the principle of equality between sovereign states being instituted. The *Westphalian* model demonstrated that sovereignty and the principle of equality between states were not sufficient to reduce or even eliminate conflicts, but, on the contrary, they amplified uncertainties at international level. The *Westphalian* model presented the following world view:

- Terra is divided between sovereign states that do not recognise any other form of superior leadership;
- enactment and dispute settlement are exclusive attributes of individual states;

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[1] Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 186.

- the development of the relations between states is a goal, provided the goals of involved parties are met;
- dissensions, crises, conflicts or any other illegal act outside the national borders are strictly the concern of the particular states;
- all states are equal before the law, excepting the asymmetries regarding power, when, practically, the standard of power generates justice;
- disputes are settled, more often than not, by force, thus becoming dominant the principle of the defensive and offensive capabilities of an international political actor[2].

In other words, the *Peace of Westphalia* provides a framework in which each state is a sovereign system, capable of undertaking autonomous and independent actions, without other entities that define their courses of action, states not belonging or acknowledging a global system, thus often having conflictual relations, because of their divergent interests.

The Security Architecture of Europe following the Peace of Westphalia

Following 1648, the relations between states are marked by uncertainty and converge on mitigating it. The *Westphalian* logic embraces the model of independent state that is the beneficiary of sovereignty only to the extent to which it is capable of having and defending it. The security architecture of Europe was based on a balance system formed by France, Sweden and the Ottoman Empire, which surrounded the imperial system in Central Europe. **The states and not the citizens were those whose security had to be ensured**, the Westphalian treaties being the basis for negotiation in the majority of treaties up to 1779.

Relevant for the present research is the emergence of the syntagm **collective security**, introduced in 1629 by Armand-Jean du Plessis de Richelieu (known in historiography as Bishop Richelieu) and partially adopted

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[2] David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 76.

in the text of the Westphalian peace treaties[3]. The moment Westphalia marked the beginning of the institution of resident ambassador and of diplomatic dialogue[4] in order to preserve the balance of power.

The *second period* (1648-1814) is dominated by perfecting and maintaining the balance of power. To understand the balance of power, a distinction should be made between *"state"* and *"power"*, even if Emer de Vattel argued that *"Nations are naturally equal and naturally have the same obligations and rights. Strength and weakness make no difference in this respect. A small republic is a sovereign state as well as the most powerful kingdom"*[5]. The 18th century brought a change between *"state"* and *"power"*, in the sense that the state remained cramped in internal issues and the concept of *"power"* became an attribute of regional or even international policies. The principle of equality between states started to erode.

The balance of power theory is systemically reduced to the fact that a single state should not have so much power that all the other states, in coalition, cannot oppose it[6]. The balance of power theory meant that security was guaranteed by the agreement between great European monarchies, but it could not withstand power interests, interests that started to be defined by the land and maritime military power as well as by resources. **Security** continues to be defined as the **state and not the citizens security**.

The term *"Great Power"* referred to the ability to mobilise human and material resources gradually, depending on the geopolitical and geostrategic fluctuations. The status of *"Great Power"* can be considered,

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[3] Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe 1640-1990*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 40-43.

[4] Adam Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 202, 205.

[5] Emer de Vattel, *The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and the Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns*, vol. III, translation of the edition in 1758 by Charles G. Fenwick, foreword by Albert de Lapradelle, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washington DC, 1916, p. 7.

[6] David Hume, *Political Essays*, in *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*, Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 154-161; David Hume, *Eseuri politice*, translated from English by Adina Avramescu and Cătălin Avramescu, Editura Humanitas, București, 2005, pp. 171-180.

in time, between the moment Silesia was invaded by Prussia (1740) and the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). To the amalgam of geographical changes in the 18th century Europe it was added an *"iron curtain"* between the East and the West, two diplomatic systems coexisting.

The *third period* is marked by the Congress of Vienna, held between 1814 and 1815, up to the outbreak of the First World War. Moreover, the French Revolution in 1789-1799 should be mentioned in this context as it introduced the concept of **nation** in the system of international relations. The sovereign state thus became the expression of the national will, therefore the emergence of the **nation – state**[7]. The French Revolution was a disruptive phenomenon that tested the resilience of the balance of power and resulted in convening the Congress of Vienna[8].

In the period between 1648 and 1789, known in historiography as the Old Regime[9], there were no significant transformations in terms of security compared to the subsequent periods. What happened in fact was the replacement of some state actors with others to ensure the balance so that, at the 1814 Vienna moment, Sweden, the Republic of the United Provinces and Spain were replaced with two other new powers: Russia and Prussia. Having as main actors the Austrian Foreign Minister, Klemens Lathor Wenzel von Metternich, Tsar Alexander I of Russia, accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Karl Vasilievici Nesselrode, the British Foreign Minister, Robert Castlereagh, the French Foreign Minister, Charles-Maurice, Prince of Talleyrand-Périgord (succeeded by Duke of Richelieu), and the Prince Chancellor of Prussia, Klaus August von Hardenberg, the Congress of Vienna was aimed at preventing a hegemonic power from ascending to power in Europe. The main themes of the Congress were:

a) the principle of the balance of power;

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[7] Bertrand Badie, *Un monde sans souveraineté. Les Etats entre ruse et responsabilité*, Fayard, Paris, 1999, p. 93.

[8] Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics. 1763-1848*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 575-582.

[9] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution*, Jon Elster (ed.), translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011.

b) the principle of legitimacy (the reinstatement of monarchies where they were deprived of their attributes following the French Revolution and, subsequently, the French Empire 1804-1814);

c) a certain international code of conduct.

The guarantors of the new European construction were the following treaties and alliances:

a) the Treaty of Chaumont (9 March 1814) concluded between Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria, an alliance having a defensive character against Napoleonic France;

b) the First Peace Treaty with France, signed in Paris (30 May 1814);

c) the Final Act of Vienna (9 June 1815);

d) the Holy Alliance (26 September 1815) perfected between Russia, Austria, Prussia, as the future basis for a security instrument having a collective character;

e) the Second Peace Treaty with France (20 November 1815);

f) the Quadruple Alliance (20 November 1815) between Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia against France, seen as a revitalisation of the Treaty of Chaumont.

The Quadruple Alliance is considered the incipient phase of the **concerted system**, a veritable guarantor of security, based on rotational directorate[10].

Europe entered the *"congress era"* or the *"European concert"* system, which was perturbed by the *Restauration* (the period between the end of the Napoleonic era and the beginning of the revolutions that took place in Europe between 1830-1831), the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), which was certainly not as macabre as the First World War period. **Security remained the guarantor of the safety of the state, as a political actor, and not of its citizens**.

The interwar period was only a period of armed peace. It became clear for all the great actors involved in the Second World War, especially for the winners, that security did not have the same valences following the end of the war. Mention should be made that the League of Nations, an organisation established after the end of the First World War at the initiative

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[10] For further details, see Paul W. Schroeder, *op. cit.*

of the President of the USA, Woodrow Wilson, was a failure. Collective security did not work during the interwar period, many states violating international agreements.

The Concept of Security at the Beginning of the Cold War

Post-war security was dominated by two different visions: the British and Americans seeing security as being constructed through cooperation, development of relations between allies, right of peoples to self-determination, political-economic integration, and the Soviets seeing it only through the prism of protecting the Soviet citizens and interests, by signing international agreements encouraging the dissensions between capitalist states, culminating with the outbreak of some fratricide conflicts in terms of ideology. What is called *"security dilemma"* or *"modern security dilemma"* was a concern then as it is also now. Propagated by many international actors embracing political realism, security dilemma is generated by the lack of trust between states in terms of ensuring security, which increases the gap between them[11]. The relations between the Great Powers were shaken by the possession of the atomic bomb, which generated insecurity among the Soviets. It is the reason why each *Cold War* crisis fuelled the following, and overcoming crises resulted in increasingly fierce arms race. None of the winners could foresee the evolution of international security from the moment Germany and its allies capitulated. Own interests governed the relations between them since the beginning of the *Cold War*.

The synoptic crises that emerged following the Second World War resulted in rethinking and redefining the concept of security at the beginning of the *Cold War*. A viable variant for redefining security can be found in the functioning of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as the five big powers agreed to exercise the right of veto. Thus, unanimity became a *sine qua non* condition for the UN functioning.

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[11] Constantin Onișor, Veronica Mihalache, *Introducere în problematica securității*, university course support, Editura A.N.I. *"Mihai Viteazul"*, București, 2011, p. 24.

The paradox is that in the event two or more out of five permanent members are in conflict the UN becomes inefficient in resolving the case[12]. The first two years in the UN existence highlighted the defective way in which decisions were made and that in which the great powers respected the organisation functioning mechanisms. The two opposing blocs transformed the UN in a body within which attrition fights were conducted to extend the influence globally. The USSR and the USA transformed in the mouthpieces of the countries in which they had troops stationed and interests to counter the other ones. Found incapable of managing the security crises because of the veto, the UNSC was deprived of problem-solving by transferring its attributions outside it. The matter brought to the UNSC attention by Iran, on 19 January 1946, through which the Anglo-Americans contested the unjustified presence of the Soviet troops on the territory of Iran was countered by the British military presence in Greece and Jordan[13].

Besides the territorial concessions it had already obtained in Eastern Europe and Northern Asia, the security belt being ensured from two sides to keep capitalism as far as possible from Moscow, the Kremlin administration had another concern, namely the southern part of the large USSR. In this regard there were three important elements: Iran, Turkey and the Mediterranean. *Ab initio,* the mentioned territories were strategic areas for both the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets. Thus, the two geographical hemispheres became a chess board on which the Soviets and the Americans started to make strategic moves. As in many other cases, the first who made a move was Stalin. He refused to withdraw the Soviet troops from the north of Iran, which were stationed there following the Anglo-Soviet negotiations as a stability factor to prevent Germany from having access to the existing oil reserves, and claimed Turkish territories and the control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, as well as naval bases in the Mediterranean. Anglo-Americans refused the claims and responded by strengthening the military capabilities

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[12] Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Istoria relaţiilor internaţionale (1919-1947)*, vol. I, translated by Anca Airinei, Editura Ştiinţelor Sociale şi Politice, Bucureşti, 2006, pp. 311, 315-316.

[13] *Ibidem*, p. 317.

in the Mediterranean. Moscow was aware of the fact that it went too far, but it did not hesitate to expose its views[14]. Stalin claims and the Soviet Foreign Ministry diplomatic offensive forced the USA to find new solutions to contain communism. It became evident that the Soviets were to export the own regime wherever they reached. It was a difficult situation considering that the USA had to avoid, regardless of the provided solution, its debate in the UNSC.

The USSR required *"compensation"* in territorial currency for the human and material sacrifices made. The USA could not remain prisoners of the partnership policy, the reason why it started to act diplomatically, with another voice, during the Truman's mandate. The USA intended all the measures that had a global impact to be compliant with the UN Charter. The difference between the USA and the USSR was that the Americans acted to unite and not to subject the allies during the *Cold War*, as it was the case of Moscow. A simple analysis of the political evolution of Germany, Italy and Japan shows that those countries inclined towards the USA and not towards the USSR. The US foreign policy as well as the influence over international security, in general, was dominated by the analysis conducted by George Frost Kennan and presented in the *"Long Telegram"*[15].

Kennan's observations, correct, pertinent and courageous for a young diplomat, proved true in time. The new approach was implemented in practical documents by the diplomat Harrison Freeman Matthews. He introduced two observations in the interpretation of Kennan's telegram:

   a) the first was related to military aspects and confirmed a practical reality, namely that the USSR had the land military power while the USA controlled the seas and the air, therefore the Soviet military power could be *"defensively countered by the naval and air power and by the USA and its allies capability to land"*[16];

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[14] Fernande Scheid Raine, *"The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the Origins of the Cold War"*, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Davis S. Painter (editors), *Origins of Cold War. An International History*, 2nd edition, Routledge, New York, 2005, pp. 93-111.

[15] George F. Kennan, *"Long Telegram"*, Moscow, 22 February 1946, in *F.R.U.S.*, vol. 6, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, pp. 666-709.

[16] H. Freeman Matthews, *"Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with Military Studies"*, 1 April 1946, in *F.R.U.S.*, vol. 1, Washington DC, 1946, p. 1169.

b) the second was aimed at the USA future diplomatic actions related to the USSR effective expansion being debated in the UN[17]. The greatest concern was that, geographically, the areas that represented risks and vulnerabilities were those where the USA could not capitalise on its naval and air superiority: *"Finland, Scandinavia, Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Sinkiang and Manchuria"*[18]. In this context, it is relevant the statement made by the advisor to the President, Clark Clifford, through which the USA assumed an international security mission for *"all the democratic states that were threatened or menaced by the USSR"*[19]. This way the paths to the *Marshall Plan"* and *"Truman Doctrine"* were opened.

Against the background of the talks between George Marshall (Secretary of State between 1947-1949) and the British and French Foreign Ministers in Moscow, in 1947, one the one hand, and of the announcement made by Great Britain that it could not credit Greece and Turkey, on the other hand, the USA launched the *"European Reconstruction Programme"* subsequently known as *"Marshall Plan"*. In its initial form, *Marshall Plan* was intended for all the countries regardless of spheres of influence. The way the *Marshall Plan* was developed resembles an American *"maskirovka"*[20], the Soviets falling in the type of trap invented by them. In other words, the Americans expected that the refusal

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[17] *Ibidem*, p. 1170.

[18] *Ibidem*, p. 1168.

[19] Clark Clifford, *"American Relations with the Soviet Union: A Report of the President by the Special Counsel to the President"*, in Thomas H. Etzhold and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1978, p. 66.

[20] Soviet traditional term used in military operations. *Maskirovka* refers to a *"blend"* of deception, covert actions, simulation, misinformation, camouflage to mislead the enemy with the goal of developing plans /prognoses/conclusions that do not correspond to reality. For further details, see Bruce R. Pirnie, *Soviet Deception Operations in World War II*, US Army Center of Military History, Washington DC, 1985, pp. 1-22; Kenneth C. Keating, *Maskirovka: The Soviet System of Camouflage*, US Army Russian Institute, Garmisch, Germany, 1981, pp. 1-20.

of the *Marshall Plan* by the USSR and its allies could result in tension within the communist bloc. The American strategy proved successful not only economically but also geopolitically and geostrategically, Stalin being the one who brought down the curtain on Europe. Europe became a geopolitical *nexus*, in which Truman and Stalin moved *quid pro quo* to achieve the balance of power. Stalin, *"a master practitioner in Realpolitik"*[21], responded to the *Marshall Plan* by establishing *Kominform*, on 22 September 1947, based in Belgrade. *Kominform* had to ensure the links, at European level, between the communist and workers party. Conceived as an *"Intelligence Bureau of the Communist and Workers Parties"*, *Kominform* stored information about who, how, when the *"popular democracies"* in Eastern Europe were established. In the speech delivered on the occasion of the *Kominform* establishment, Andrei Alexandrovici Jdanov [the ideologist of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party in the USSR] recognised that the world was divided in two camps: imperialist and capitalist, led by the USA, and anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist, led by the USSR[22].

The establishment of *Kominform* generated the first major problems for communism. Josip Broz Tito did not agree with the practices of the new organisation that stored important information related to the way the countries in Eastern Europe became communist, which resulted in the rupture between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Tito could adopt an independent attitude in relation to the USSR as he courageously fought against the Nazis and, with the help of national military forces, made the Germans withdraw. Moreover, Tito benefited from an American aid, becoming a possible US *"ally"* in the Balkans. As a response to the *Marshall Plan*, besides the establishment of the *Kominform*, Stalin made another move that proved unsuccessful at international level. Knowing the way in which Berlin was divided, as well as the fact that the allied sectors, resulted from the *"division"*

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[21] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomaţia*, second edition, translated by Mircea Ştefancu and Radu Paraschivescu, Editura ALL, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 376.

[22] Andrei Jdanov, *"The International Situation"*, in US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism*, doc. no. 619, Washington DC, 1948, pp. 211-215.

of Germany following the Potsdam Conference, made Berlin an enclave situated in the area of Soviet influence, Stalin intended to *"discipline"* the West, imposing a road and railway embargo in supplying Western Berlin by the Allies. It was a totally uninspired movement, the Allies providing airlift as the solution to the international humanitarian crisis. The Allies, and especially the Americans, won a double victory: on the one hand, they gained the public support due to mediatisation, and, on the other hand, they gained the respect and gratitude of the citizens. Tito's heresy, remained unpunished, *"Berlin Blockade"*, ended in 1949, the decision of the West to establish a defensive military organisation, namely NATO, the proclamation of the Federal Republic of Germany were many security problems that Stalin did not want but created through own actions. To them, it can be added the fact that there were no disagreements between *"capitalists"*.

The *Cold War* was dominated by the classical concept of *national security*, namely defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal stability by exercising the often coercive power of the state.

Going further, the end of the *Cold War* marked a change in the concept of *national security*, which had three phases. Thus, since the fall of the Berlin Wall up to the events on 11 September 2001, we can speak about a *"security detente"*, in which the focus was more on ensuring the security of the citizen and of the everyday life. Practically, it was a transfer of security from the state to the citizen.

In the second phase, from 11 September 2001 up to the end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (1 May 2003), security was characterised by the capacity of the state to anticipate and the reduction of the potential security risks, strategic analysis and scenario playing an important part. In this phase, military operations to eliminate emergent threats were dominant.

The third phase, 1 May 2003 – present, refers to security resilience. Security resilience is given, in my opinion, by the state capability to ensure and maintain an acceptable degree of security, following the emergence and manifestation of threats, dangers or risks, so that it could function properly. The state should have available the necessary means to restore a proper level of security, namely to resume its functions.

Security resilience means, in fact, the awareness that threats, dangers and risks cannot be eliminated by offensive or defensive means, the focus being on the nation-state and not on the individual.

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3. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Istoria relațiilor internaționale (1919-1947)*, vol. I, translated by Anca Airinei, Editura Științelor Sociale și Politice, București, 2006.

4. David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995.

5. David Hume, *Eseuri politice*, translated from English by Adina Avramescu and Cătălin Avramescu, Editura Humanitas, București, 2005.

6. *Idem*, *"Political Essays"*, in *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*, Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1994.

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English version by
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INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS
– Between Compassion and Hostility –

Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ

Migration is a complex process because of its spread (in terms of space, time and number of people involved) and the implications for the world states (of origin, transit and destination/adoption) at political, diplomatic, economic, financial, social, cultural, psychological, ecological and military level. Migration process is controversial not only in conceptual terms (international and national regulations that are not harmonised, different opinions of the international governmental organisations representatives and of the national and nongovernmental organisations representatives), but also in operational/administrative terms (attitudes and actions of international governmental organisations, of nongovernmental organisations, of nations etc.).

In conceptual terms, international governmental organisations, nongovernmental ones, and nations cannot agree on the definitions of migration, the types of migration and migrants. Therefore, nations attitudes are compliant with internal regulations, meant to reflect national interests, especially sovereignty and independence, while international organisations and human rights militants support *ad litteram* compliance with the provisions of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948*, the *Geneva Convention in 1951*, relating to the *Status of Refugees*, the *Additional Protocol in 1967* to this Convention and with the stipulations in international regulations relating to asylum seekers, deported persons,

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exiled persons, immigrants and other categories of migrants. Nations, in turn, rightly claim that certain provisions of international legislation violate their sovereignty. The most eloquent example is article 14 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948*, according to which *"everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution"*[1]. Understood to the letter, this provision entails that states are obliged to automatically grant asylum to any asylum seeker without checking his/her creditworthiness.

In operational and administrative terms, human rights militants declare their dissatisfaction with the state authorities imposing restrictions that, in their opinion, violate migrants' rights through legislative and border protection measures. In our opinion, the particular migrants selectively observe the provisions of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, as they neglect or omit – for reasons known only to them – to mention the fact that some migrants do not observe women rights as well as ethnic, religious or other minorities rights. In addition, some migrants act in bad faith in relation to the adoptive states, materialised in terrorist attacks and other hostile actions, perpetrated by some of those welcomed with open arms by states.

Main Current Migration Aspects

According to the report of the *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre of the Norwegian Refugee Council (IDMC)* in 2016, *"the world is confronted with the most severe humanitarian crisis since 1945"*[2]. Expressed in figures, humanitarian crisis means the existence of about 65 million migrants, forced to leave their houses and countries of origin[3], to which should be added, according to the declaration

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[1] Guy S. Goodwin-Will, *Declaration on Territorial Asylum*, All Souls College, Oxford, New York, 14 December 1967, see http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dta/dta.html, retrieved on 22.05.2017.

[2] Rebecca Ratcliffe, *Outnumbering Refugees Two to One: How the World Ignores War's Greatest Scandal*, in *The Guardian*, 22 May 2017, see https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/may/22/one-person-a-second-uprooted-by-war-disaster-in-2016-study-finds-norwegian-refugee-council, retrieved on 23.06.2017.

[3] *'Unprecedented' 65 Million People Displaced by War and Persecution in 2015*, UN, 20 June 2016, see http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/%E2%80%98unprecedented%E2%80%99-65-million-people-displaced-war-and-persecution-2015-%E2%80%93-un, retrieved on 24.06.2017.

of the Director General of the *International Migration Organisation*, William Lacy Swing, 244 million international migrants and more than 750 million migrants relocated in their countries of origin[4].

In the same year, 2016, in Europe there were 4.7 million people (51% more compared to the same period in 2015) – having the status of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, who changed their residence of own free will or forced by external factors[5]. In general, the average age of the migrants who have got to EU member states is 27.5 compared to the one in the EU-28 – 42.6[6]. Legally, in 2015, 1,011,700 migrants got to the European Union by sea and 34,900 by land. According to Frontex, to the number of legal migrants the number of illegal ones should be added, totalling over 1.8 million[7].

The report of the *International Migration Organisation*, published by *Amnesty International*, shows that, in 2016, at least 3,500 migrants lost their lives while crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe[8].

The most important causes of migration in the 21st century are armed confrontations, natural and man-made disasters, and poverty.

The Uppsala Conflict Database estimated that, in 2015, there were 49 wars between different states, more than 500% compared to the post-war period and double the number of wars existing 20 years ago[9].

Many of the people who decide to leave their houses and places of birth are economic migrants, namely people who go to other places in the world because of poverty.

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[4] Pamela Falk, *How the United Nations' New Agreement on the Global Migrant and Refugee Crisis Might Work*, *Newsweek*, 26 September 2016, see http://www.newsweek.com/2016/10/07/global-refugee-migrant-crisis-502912.html, retrieved on 23.05.2017.

[5] Ashley Kirk, *Mapped: Which Country Has the Most Immigrants?*, in *The Telegraph*, 21 January 2016, see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/12111108/Mapped-Which-country-has-the-most-immigrants.html, retrieved on 05.05.2017.

[6] *Ibidem*.

[7] *Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts*, BBC NEWS, 4 March 2016, see http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911, retrieved on 05.05.2017.

[8] *Tackling the Global Refugee Crisis: From Shirking to Sharing Responsibility*, Amnesty International, 30 September 2016, see https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/tackling-the-global-refugee-crisis-from-shirking-to-sharing-responsibility/, retrieved on 14.08.2017.

[9] *Uppsala Conflict Database (UCDP)*, see http://ucdp.uu.se/#/year/2015, retrieved on 12.08.2017.

Of the about one billion people displaced from their areas of origin, at global level, approximately 24.2 million persons were forced to leave because of natural or man-made disasters – floods, storms and fires. In some areas, such as South Sudan, Nigeria and Somalia, the effects of violent confrontations and natural disasters were combined, amplifying human suffering and implicitly the size and intensity of the migration flow[10].

Measures Taken by States to Prevent Potential Threats Associated with Migration Process

The perception of migrants as threat to the communities that adopted them was relatively spread in the past two centuries and it was followed by some states population attitudes and normative acts aimed at limiting or even denying the access of some categories of migrants on their territory. The best-known of the mentioned decisions were:

➢ *Chinese Exclusion Act*, law adopted by the US Congress in 1882, which prohibited the Chinese immigration in the USA on the grounds that Chinese workers contributed to the decrease in the minimum salary as they accepted any type of work and any salary, and to the change in the cultural, racial and moral level of the American society; Initially, the President in office, Hayes, rejected the law as it contradicted the *Burlingame-Seward Treaty* in 1868, between the USA and China, which established the limited number of Chinese immigrants in America, but he was forced to promulgate it; the law was valid for 10 years, but its provisions were amended by the *Scott Act*, in 1888, a law that prevented the Chinese residents in the USA from coming back to the USA after visiting China; in 1892, the US Congress extended the validity of the *Chinese Exclusion Act* for more 10 years, through the *Gerry Act*; even if the provisions of the *Chinese Exclusion Act* became permanent in 1902, it was abolished in 1943[11];

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[10] Rebecca Ratcliffe, *Outnumbering Refugees Two to One: How the World Ignores War's Greatest Scandal*, op. cit.

[11] *Chinese Immigration and the Chinese Exclusion Acts*, US Department of State, Office of the Historian, see https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/chinese-immigration, retrieved on 22.07.2017.

➣ the *Immigration Restriction League*, established in Boston, determined the US Congress to adopt the *"literate test"*, in 1896, law that prohibited illiterate people immigration[12];

➣ after the assassination of President William McKinley, in 1901, by anarchist Leon Czolgosz, a descendent of immigrant parents[13], the US Congress added to the list of undesirable immigrants *"anarchists, mentally weak people, people who suffer from different diseases and imbeciles"*[14];

➣ in 1921, by the adoption of *The US Immigration Act* or *Quota Law*, revised in 1924, the US Congress established the quota of immigrants for each and every country of the world[15];

➣ following the Japanese attack on the military fleet of Washington, deployed in Pearl Harbour, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued Order 9066 in February 1942, through which all Japanese ethnics were confined in camps in order to be prevented from committing hostile acts against the American state[16];

➣ through the *Internal Security Act* on 23 September 1950, the US Congress denied communists the right to asylum and interdicted their immigration[17];

➣ in the USA, it was also adopted *The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996*, law through which the border patrols were increased, the benefits for immigrants were reduced,

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[12] *Literacy Test Bill*, The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, see https://gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/immigration-and-migration/timeline-terms/literacy-test-bill, retrieved on 19.07.2017.

[13] *The Assassination of President William McKinley*, 6 September 2016, History, see http://www.history.com/news/the-assassination-of-president-william-mckinley, retrieved on 22.07.2017.

[14] Hasia Diner, *Immigration and Migration*, The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, see https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/essays/immigration-and-migration, retrieved on 07.05.2017.

[15] *Immigration Policy in the United States*, Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, February 2006, see https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress- 2005-2006/reports/02-28-immigration.pdf, retrieved on 27.07.2017.

[16] *Records Relating to World War II Era Refugees*, National Archives, see https://www. archives.gov/research/military/ww2/refugees.html, retrieved on 23.06.2017.

[17] *History of US Immigration Laws*, Federation for American Migration Reform, updated in January 2008, see http://www.fairus.org/facts/us_laws, retrieved on 25.07.2017.

and it was introduced the responsibility for social workers to verify the immigrants eligibility to be employed and to receive social aid[18];

➢ President Donald Trump has issued many orders to deny the citizens from certain Muslim states immigration, and one of his latest intention is to reduce migration in the USA by half[19];

➢ in 1901, the Parliament of Australia issued the *Immigration Restriction Act*, known as the *White Australia Policy*, through which people from Asia were denied immigration for a period of 50 years; during the same year, it was also adopted the *Pacific Islands Labours Act*, which prevented the workers from the Pacific Islands from working in Australia, and those who were already employed were deported[20];

➢ when the First World War broke out, the citizens of the Entente enemy states – Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, were denied immigration in Australia, and approximately 7,000 citizens, who were already in the country, were confined in camps[21]; Australian authorities made a similar decision at the beginning of the Second World War for the immigrants from Italy, Germany, Japan and Hungary, declared *"enemy aliens"* and confined in camps[22];

➢ in 2012, the Parliament of the UK adopted a law that obliged the immigrants outside the EU, who worked for at least 5 years

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[18] *Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts*, GAO-05-813, Government Accountability Office (August 2005), *apud Immigration Policy in the United States*, Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, February 2006, see https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/02-28-immigration.pdf, retrieved on 27.07.2017.

[19] Sara Murray and Dan Merica, *Trump Backs Plan that Would Curb Legal Immigration*, CNN, updated 3 August 2017, see http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/02/politics/trump-skills-immigration-plan-cotton-perdue/index.html, retrieved on 10.08.2017.

[20] *Australia's Immigration History*, National Maritime Museum, see http://waves.anmm.gov.au/Immigration-Stories/Immigration-history.aspx, retrieved on 28.07.2017.

[21] *Australia's Migration History*, Migration Heritage Center, see http://www.migrationheritage.nsw.gov.au/belongings-home/about-belongings/australias-migration-history/index.html, retrieved on 28.07.2017.

[22] *Wartime Internment Camps in Australia*, National Archives of Australia, see http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/snapshots/internment-camps/index.aspx, retrieved on 29.08.2017.

in the kingdom, to earn 35,000 pounds annually, otherwise being deported; the law applies starting in April 2017[23];

➤ at the present time, 65 states in the world have built fences or walls to stop illegal immigration, a measure that, according to Simon Tomlinson, provides the sense of security but does not ensure the security of the particular states[24]: Israel built the *"wall of discrimination"*[25], which separates the territory of Israel from the West Bank, belonging to the Palestinian Authority; Greece built a 6.9 mile/8.3 km wall at the border with Turkey[26], Hungary built a 109 mile/170 km fence at the border with Serbia; Bulgaria is building a 100 km fence at the border with Turkey; Turkey intends to separate its territory from that of Syria by a 900 km fence; Great Britain enclosed the access to the Calais-Dover tunnel by a fence; India is building a 2,500 mile/4,000 km fence at the border with Bangladesh; Ukraine intends to build a 1,200 mile/1,920 km fence at the border with Russia[27], the United States of America enforced the border with Mexico building a fence that could be replaced with a wall, in compliance with President Trump decision[28] etc.

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[23] James Walsh, *New UK Immigration Rules: Will You Be Affected?*, in *The Guardian*, 7 May 2017, see https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/24/new-uk-immigration-rules-will-you-be-affected, retrieved on 18.07.2017.

[24] Simon Tomlinson, *World of Walls: How 65 Countries Have Erected Fences on Their Borders – Four Times as Many as When the Berlin Wall Was Toppled – As Governments Try to Hold Back the Tide of Migrants*, MailOnline, 22 August 2015, see http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3205724/How-65-countries-erected-security-walls-borders.html, retrieved on 15.07.2017.

[25] *Ibidem*.

[26] Erin Banco, *Some EU Countries Are Building Fences, Walls to Keep Migrants Out*, International Business Times, 23.06.2015, see http://www.ibtimes.com/some-eu-countries-are-building-fences-walls-keep-migrants-out-1978765, retrieved on 30.07.2017.

[27] Adam Taylor, *Migrant Crisis: The Walls Europe Is Building to Keep People Out*, Independent, 29 august 2015, see http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/migrant-crisis-the-walls-europe-is-building-to-keep-people-out-10477233.html, retrieved on 22.07.2017.

[28] Julie Hirschfeld Davis, David Sanger and Maggie Haberman, *Trump to Order Mexican Border Wall and Curtail Immigration*, in *The New York Times*, 24 January 2017, see https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/wall-border-trump.html, retrieved on 10.02.2017.

Migrants: Threat to National Security of States

The attitude of people from many states and the decision of the authorities in some states to impose certain restrictions on migrants were labelled by the Secretary-General of the UN as discriminatory and anti-migration[29], and the President of the United Nations General Assembly, Mogens Lykketoft, considers it xenophobic and even racist[30].

The daughter of some Vietnamese immigrants in the USA, Thanh Tan, appreciates that the Vietnam War has not ended for those who suffered trauma and emigrated to the USA, as they are subjected to *"modern McChartism"*[31].

The anti-immigration attitude in the European Union member states is stimulated and preserved by far-right politicians as Marine le Pen in France[32], Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom[33], Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, the North League Party in Italy, Golden Dawn in Greece[34] etc.

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[29] *'Unprecedented' 65 Million People Displaced by War and Persecution in 2015 – UN*, 20 June 2016, see http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/%E2%80%98unprecedented%E2%80%99-65-million-people-displaced-war-and-persecution-2015-%E2%80%93-un, retrieved on 24.06.2017.

[30] *Afghanistan 10 Years after Soviet Pull-out*, UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, 12 February 1999, see http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3ae6b81cf0&query=Return%20to%20Afghanistan, retrieved on 24.06.2017.

[31] Thanh Tan, *40 Years after the Vietnam War, Move Past Name-calling*, in *The Seattle Times*, 1 May 2015, see http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/for-refugees-resettling-after-the-vietnam-war-words-became-weapons/, retrieved on 25.06.2017.

[32] Adam Nossiter, *Marine Le Pen Leads Far-Right Fight to Make France 'More French'*, 29 April 2017, see https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/europe/france-election-marine-le-pen.html?_r=0, retrieved on 02.06.2017.

[33] Rowena Mason, *Nigel Farage: British Muslim 'Fifth Column' Fuels Fear of Immigration*, in *The Guardian*, 12 March 2015, see https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/mar/12/nigel-farage-british-muslim-fifth-column-fuels-immigration-fear-ukip, retrieved on 30.08.2017.

[34] *Cultural Effects of Migration, The European Immigration Debate*, Globalization 101, SUNY LEVIN Institute, see http://www.globalization101.org/cultural-effects-of-migration/, retrieved on 25.05.2017.

Migrants are perceived as a threat by the majority of European states and the USA, because:

- among migrant groups there are criminals, terrorists[35], extremists and members of organised crime groups[36]; they destroy their identity documents and pretend to have been forced to leave without taking any document with them;
- they have built tunnels under the fence that separates Mexico and the USA[37] and under the border that separates Egypt from Israel[38] and cross over and through the fences at the borders of target states to meet their goals;
- they take advantage of the lapse of attention and caution of some workers and sneak into cargo ships, cargo airplanes, trains, trucks etc. or use the services of human traffickers to get to target states[39];
- in many situations, migrants established a real *"fifth column"* in the states of adoption: Hitler used the German minority in the Sudetenland to disband Czechoslovakia, in 1938[40]; in 1970,

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[35] Leo Hohmann, *ISIS Smuggler: 'We Will Use Refugee Crisis to Infiltrate West' 4,000 Covert Terrorists Already in Place 'Awaiting' Orders*, WorldNetDaily, 09.04.2015, see http://www.wnd.com/2015/09/isis-smuggler-we-will-use-refugee-crisis-to-infiltrate-west/, retrieved on 30.08.2017.

[36] Jennifer Newton, *ISIS Terrorists Are Arriving in Europe Hidden Among Migrants Crossing the Mediterranean on Boats, Warns EU's Top Prosecutor*, Mail Online, 8 July 2015, see http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3151326/ISIS-terrorists-arriving-Europe-hidden-migrants-crossing-Mediterranean-boats-warns-EU-s-prosecutor.html, retrieved on 21.07.2017.

[37] Richard Marosi, *Tunnels Act as Highways for Migrants*, LATimes, November 2006, see http://www.banderasnews.com/0611/nw-tunnelhiways.htm, retrieved on 15.07.2017.

[38] Sophie Mogridge, *Egypt Floods People-smuggling Tunnels Leading From Sinai to the Gaza Strip in a Renewed Effort to Stamp Out Terror Activity*, Mailonline, 20 September 2015, see http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3241477/Egypt-floods-people-smuggling-tunnels-leading-Sinai-Gaza-Strip-renewed-effort-stamp-terror-activity.html, retrieved on 17.07.2017.

[39] *Trafficking in Persons and Migrant Smuggling*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, see https://www.unodc.org/lpo-brazil/en/trafico-de-pessoas/index.html, retrieved on 13.07.2017.

[40] Henrik Eberle, Matthias Uhl, *Dosarul Hitler*, Editura Meditaţii, Bucureşti, 2007, pp. 37, 72, see also Joe J. Heydecker and Johannes Leeb, *Procesul de la Nürnberg*, p. 235, see also Pierre Milza and Serge Berstein, *Istoria secolului XX*, volume 1, Editura BIC All, Bucureşti, 1998, pp. 354-355.

the members of Al Fattah – the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine army – started a rebellion in Jordan, known as the *Black September*, aimed at ousting King Hussein from power[41]; Professor Idean Saleyhan from the Political Science Department of the University of North Texas, writes that refugees are not only *"unhappy products of war but also catalysts for conflicts, including those between states"*; he supports his statements, mentioning the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, in June 1982, in order to destroy the refugee camps and to drive away the rebels that were potential threats to Israel security; a similar situation was in 1996, when Rwanda invaded Zaire[42]; the descendants of Albanian immigrants in the Serbian Province of Kosovo, settled in this region following the 14th century, revolted against the leadership in Belgrade, claiming independence; the interethnic confrontations in Kosovo triggered NATO military intervention in 1999[43], the province being placed under the UN mandate and declaring independence in 2008; similar actions were generated, in 1990, by the descendants of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian migrants against the leadership in Tbilisi; their goal of being independent was supported by Russia and met after the war in 2008[44].

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[41] *The Conflict of 1970*, Jordanian Government, see http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods5.html, retrieved 04.07.2017, see also *Gen. Zia-ul-Haq: The Butcher of Palestinians During Black September 1970*, Defence Forum India, 18 June 2010, see http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/threads/gen-zia-ul-haq-the-butcher-of-palestinians-during-black-september-1970.11673/, retrieved on 04.07.2017, see also Rashid Khalidi, *Behind the Fatah Rebellion*, Middle East Research and Information Project, MER 119, October 1983, see http://www.merip.org/mer/mer119/behind-fatah-rebellion, retrieved on 03.07.2017.

[42] Idean Salehyan, *The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict*, Department of Political Science, University of North Texas, Presented at the conference on *"Migration, International Relations, and the Evolution of World Politics"*, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 16-17 March 2007.

[43] Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *Triumph of Principle, Patience and Persistence*, *NATO Review – Historic Change in the Balkans*, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, Belgium, 2004, p. 6.

[44] Pavel Felgengauer, *Această opțiune a fost planificată de mult timp*, in *"Le Figaro"*, 13 August 2008, article published in *"Revista 22"*, 27 August 2008.

The above-mentioned aspects demonstrate, in my opinion, the existence of risks, threats and potential dangers associated with migrants. These situations should be considered true lessons of history that should not be ignored by political decision-makers and the population in the states of the world.

Conclusions

Migration is a complex and controversial process because of its spread and effects not only on the migrant states of origin but also on the states of transit and those of destination.

The effects of migration are both positive and negative, being manifest in all the fields of social life in the states of the world.

The great number and the increasing frequency of terrorist attacks, carried out by some migrants in the states of adoption, have contributed to the revival and development of extremist parties, terrorism, cross-border crime, as well as to the increasing anti-migration attitude in the majority of the European Union member states and the USA.

Perceiving migration as a threat to national security, many states in the world have adopted legislative and administrative measures to put an end to illegal immigration, repudiated by the human rights militants who focus on the ethical aspects of the migration process, to the detriment of national legislation.

English version by
✎ Diana Cristiana LUPU

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
– Conceptual and Evolutionary Landmarks – (II)

Colonel Valentin VASILE

Motto: *"We need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate".*

Admiral Michael G. Mullen

◆ United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, although the information is not found in the panoply of national power tools[17], it is approached distinctly from the standpoint of its possibilities to highlight the features of the three instruments of national power – diplomacy, military and economic, in order to facilitate their use and to maximise the results obtained.

In the United Kingdom, *Joint Doctrine Note 1/12 – Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution*, promulgated in 2012, highlights the importance of StratCom in achieving the national goals and the need to understand that its effectiveness depends on the cooperation

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Colonel Valentin Vasile – Deputy Chief of Information and Public Relations Directorate, the Ministry of National Defence.

[17] The British model of national power operates with three instruments – diplomacy, military and economic, as opposed to other models that include the information in the category of national power tools.

of all ministries and state agencies that are required to synchronise their actions with messages disseminated in the public space.

The Ministry of Defence, which has a major contribution to the StratCom implementation, supports the achievement of both the specific communication objectives and the general national and allied ones by all the available means – Public Diplomacy (PD), Public Affairs (PA), Psychological Operations (PsyOps) and Information Operations (InfoOps), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP), Key Leaders Engagement (KLE), *show of flag* and *show of force* demonstrations, exercises and missions in theatres of operations. At the same time, based on lessons learned from operations in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan, it is recognised that military HQs *"cannot afford to think about influence and information as separate lines of operation"*[18].

The StratCom definition used by the Ministry of Defence is as concise as it is explicit: *"Advancing national interests by using all Defence means of communication to influence the attitudes and behaviours of people"*[19].

This definition is consistent with the StratCom approach at the level of the National Security Council. It is also an expression of the common institutional understanding in the UK with regard to StratCom: *"The systematic and co-ordinated use of all means of communication to deliver UK national security objectives by influencing the attitudes and behaviours of individuals, groups and states"*[20]. According to the British understanding, strategic communication means far more than words and images. Their value is multiplied by ceremonial activities, *show of flag*, *show of force*, military exercises and operations to which the Ministry of Defence has a significant contribution.

StratCom facilitates the coordination and synergy of activities with impact on the information environment carried out by several specialised components and functions of the ministries and governmental agencies, military and civilian, in a planned and coordinated manner, involving

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[18] *Joint Doctrine Note 1/12 – Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution*, DCDC/MoD, January 2012, p. v.

[19] *Ibid*, p. 1-1.

[20] *Ibid*, p. 1-2.

"public information, information operations, defence diplomacy, soft power activities and diplomatic campaigning"[21].

This is why British apologists of StratCom believe that it *"should be at the heart of the development and implementation of national policy. It is an all-government activity; it cannot be owned by a single department or directorate and should not be seen as a mere adjunct of media and communication. To be effective, there must be clear direction from the highest levels and a pan-government coordination mechanism. In the UK, the National Security Council provides this facility. Although the strategic communication relies on clearly directed policy, decentralised and empowered execution is vital"*[22].

It follows that the development and implementation of national security and defence strategies as well as of sectorial strategies (economic, educational, technical-scientific) must be consistently supported by the state's highest decision-making levels through coherent communication, the substance of which is provided by the actions of ministries, public institutions and government agencies. StratCom is therefore the result of coordination and synchronisation of communication activities with the actions undertaken by the state representative institutions in the political, diplomatic, economic, military and cultural fields in support of the achievement of the national strategic objectives.

Beyond the obvious similarities between the UK definitions of strategic communication and the standard definitions of psychological operations (whose mission is to influence the opinions, attitudes and behaviours of selected audiences), the British model reveals the interinstitutional approach to communication, integrated at government level and circumscribed to a comprehensive multidimensional approach for ensuring the national security.

◆ North-Atlantic Alliance

The North-Atlantic Alliance recognises both the value and the power of the extensive public information for asserting the legitimacy of its own actions and for countering the information-based threats.

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[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid*, p. 3-3.

Starting with the Bucureşti Summit (2008), continuing with the next summits held in Kehl-Strasbourg (2009), Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016), NATO's declarations included the need for adapting to the emerging threats to the security environment and the strategic communications among the top-priority matters, seen *"as an integral part of our efforts to achieve the Alliance's political and military objectives"*[23]. In a similar vein, the importance of setting up the *NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence* in Latvia was highlighted in the Wales Summit Declaration, in which strategic communications represented as one of the key tools for tackling hybrid threats.

In a first definition agreed by the Alliance's members, StratCom was equated with *"the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations, as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims"*[24].

This NATO StratCom definition highlights the importance of coordinating the communication activities with allied actions or operations that may have an impact on the information environment and on the audiences. At the same time, this NATO StratCom definition maintains a level of generality high enough to avoid possible doctrinal disputes caused by the difficulty (impossibility) to separate clearly the activities of informing audiences from those of influencing them, as well as to delimit actions which are simultaneously specific to PD, KLE, CIMIC or PPP.

The Allied Command Operations Directive – ACO (AD) 95-2 *Strategic Communications*, adopted on 21 May 2012, reconfirmed the definition and described the StratCom specific roles, responsibilities and processes. The document highlights that StratCom is *"political-military in nature"*[25], playing *"a central role throughout all phases of operations, from planning*

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[23] *Strasbourg – Kehl NATO Summit Declaration*, 4 April 2009, paragraph 16.
[24] *NATO Strategic Communications Policy*, PO (2009) 0141 & MCM-0164-2009, 29 September 2009, p. 2.
[25] *NATO ACO Directive (AD) 95-2 Strategic Communications*, 21 May 2012, p. 4.

to execution"[26]*,* which requires close *"co-ordination between all elements of the information community"*[27].

At the NATO Summit in Wales, the allies expressed their determination to decisively increase NATO defence capacity, ensuring that the Alliance *"possesses the necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces"*[28]. In order to achieve this goal, new measures have been planned to make StratCom more effective and to develop NATO capacity to counter hybrid threats by improving information exchange, policy consultation processes and internal coordination as well as by strengthening Alliance cooperation with the EU and other organisations.

The Wales NATO Summit Declaration emphasised the StratCom role in countering hybrid threats, its importance being well-understood by NATO planners who appreciated that *"it's not a shooting war, it's an information war"*[29]. The Wales Declaration underlined the need to enhance the effectiveness of communication activities in support of NATO's policies and operations, their understanding and acceptance by public opinion being a crucial condition for achieving the allied objectives and strengthening the NATO's legitimacy.

Highlighted in the Wales Summit Declaration, the establishment of the *NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence* in Latvia is a recognition of the StratCom importance, which was included in the panoply of key instruments for countering hybrid threats. Operational from January 2014, the *NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence* meets the requirements of doctrinal analysis and improvement of PD, PA, PsyOps and InfoOps, which are interacting to materialise allied and national StratCom, to improve NATO's public perception and to counter hostile propaganda.

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[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Wales NATO Summit Declaration*, 5 September 2009, paragraph 13.

[29] Ian Traynor, *Ukraine Crisis: NATO Plans East European Bases to Counter Russia*, in *The Guardian*, 27 August 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/nato-east-european-bases-counter-russian-threat

The Warsaw NATO Summit Communiqué also contains references to the relevant roles of StratCom among the most important tools to be used for increasing the Alliance's foresight and response capacities and its efficiency. The Warsaw Communiqué states that NATO-EU relations will continue to grow on the basis of *"enhanced consultations at all levels and practical cooperation in operations and capability development..."*[30], including StratCom.

Thus, the NATO StratCom assumes doctrinally the coordination of the themes and messages disseminated by the political and military leaders from the allied states. At the same time, the NATO StratCom recommends and requires the synchronisation of actions appropriate to PD, PA, PsyOps and InfoOps.

Publicly expressed at the allied summits, the requirements for improving the performance of StratCom mechanisms are based on the lessons identified during missions and operations, as well as the conclusions of the analyses carried out on the evolutions in the security environment. They highlight both the necessity and urgency of equipping the Alliance with the most appropriate tools to counter information threats, including various types of propaganda, misinformation and manipulation of public opinion, cyber attacks etc.

Enhancing NATO information threats response capacity is closely tied with the implementation of StratCom, which is required to take on new functions at the level of NATO HQs, in addition to classical guidance and counselling ones. By virtue of the authority delegated by the commander, StratCom is required to ensure the integration and capitalisation of all relevant military activities to add content, meaning and relevance to the actual military communication in all its manifestations – PA, PsyOps, InfoOps, PPP, KLE etc. This requirement for a better capitalisation of NATO's StratCom potential is explicitly outlined in the latest edition of the MC 0628 – *NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications*, endorsed by the North Atlantic Council on 19 July 2017.

The document outlines the principled theoretical framework needed to reorganise the structures and to establish the new roles and responsibilities

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[30] *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*, 9 July 2016, paragraph 121.

with a view to the unitary management of the complex activities underlying the strategic communications at the level of the allied HQs and in the NATO-led operations.

Unlike the previous definition, which explicitly mentions the functional areas placed under the StratCom *"umbrella"*, the recent MC 0628 – *NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications* states that *"in the context of the NATO military, is the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the Information Environment (IE), in support of NATO aims and objectives"*[31].

According to this definition, the role shared by the communication capabilities and by the information function of the Allied HQs is to manage unitary, to harmonise and synchronise the communication activities with the military activities (actions/operations) which are relevant from the communication point of view, to plan and to carry out information activities in the general framework of communication processes, with the aim to achieve certain effects on the audiences and in the information environment.

Most of the definitions given to the information environment have in common its description as a multidimensional space – physical, informational and cognitive, which includes all communication activities and processes that take place between sources and audiences, transmission, encoding, reception, decoding, interpretation and feedback on received messages. At the same time, the information environment includes the information itself, as well as the individuals, the organisations and the information systems involved in, or operating on the basis of processing information – transmitting, receiving, interpreting etc.

The impact of both communication activities and military activities (actions/operations) relevant from the communication point of view must be carefully considered during operational planning processes as well as during NATO-led operations.

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[31] *MC 0628 – NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications*, North Atlantic Council, 19 July 2017, p. 4.

Thus, in order to increase the coherence of both the planning and the execution of activities that may have an impact on the information environment, StratCom is defined more recently as *"a command responsibility that spans all levels"*[32].

At the same time, NATO HQs are required to revise their way of exercising the information function and StratCom capabilities and staff functions – PA, PsyOps and InfoOps – by grouping them into a single optimised structure – the *Communications Division* or the *Communications and Engagement Division* under the authority of a Head of Strategic Communications or Director of Communication. His/her primary role is to coordinate and integrate the activities underlying StratCom in the operational planning processes and to capitalise on all other relevant activities carried out by NATO HQs. To this end, he/she can fully assume the responsibilities of the structures and staff functions that contribute to StratCom and, in some cases, additional responsibilities which belong to double-hatted structures, associated with their particular contribution to achieving the StratCom objectives.

In the structural context of allied HQs, characterised by the integration of StratCom capabilities and staff functions according to the last edition of MC 0628 – *NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications*, we note that the head of PA structure, respectively the spokesperson, still retains direct access to the commander for advising him on PA issues, as well as for managing media relations.

The document facilitates the NATO HQs StratCom implementation based on a common approach and general overarching principles, applied *"equally for activities and actions, both kinetic and non-kinetic, which have an effect within the IE. They have particular importance to the communication capabilities of Military Public Affairs (Mil PA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and the staff function of Information Operations (Info Ops)"*[33].

The unity of effort and the identity of goals are essential requirements for the successful StratCom implementation, subject to the following

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[32] *Ibid*, p. 5.
[33] *Ibid*, p. 4

general principles outlined by the MC 0628 – *NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications*:

a. All activity is founded on NATO's values.

b. Activity is driven by objectives derived from Narrative, Policy and Strategy issued within a framework of political-military direction.

c. Credibility and trust are vital attributes and must be protected.

d. Words and actions must be aligned.

e. The IE must be understood.

f. Communication is a collective and integrated effort.

g. Focus is on achieving (a) desired effect(s) and outcome(s).

h. Communication is empowered at all levels.

As the implementation of NATO's StratCom heavily relies on structures and resources made available by allied states, MC 0628 – *NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications* underlines the need to consider permanently the IE evolutionary nature, and to respect the national differences and caveats in terms of perceptions, specific approaches, capabilities and restrictions on their use during NATO's operations.

Considering the dominant position of the MC 0628 – *NATO Strategic Communication Policy* in relation to allied policies and doctrines of the areas and staff functions underlying StratCom, in the coming period it is the predictable that processes of revising the NATO policies and doctrines on PA, PsyOps, InfoOps will be initiated, most likely with reverberations on similar national documents.

European Union

The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) demonstrate the member states will and concern for harmonising their efforts to develop common capacities dedicated to strategic communications, *"an important tool in furthering the EU's overall policy objectives"*[34], as outlined in the *Action Plan on Strategic Communication* adopted in June 2015.

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[34] *Action Plan on Strategic Communication*, European Council, Brussels, Ref. Ares (2015)2608242 – 22/06/2015, p. 1.

Strategic communication is considered to be a valuable tool for increasing the EU's resilience and responsiveness to hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns. Thus, strategic communication is called upon to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the EU's external, security and defence common policies, being mentioned successively in the most important documents which are setting the CFSP & CSDP – *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – A European Union Response* (6 April 2016), *The Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* (28 June 2016), *EU Operational Protocol for Countering Hybrid Threats* (7 July 2016) and *The Implementation Plan on Security and Defence* (14 November 2016).

Regarding the strategic partnership with NATO, based on the 2002 *EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy*, its importance was reconfirmed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw with a new *EU-NATO Joint Declaration*, adopted on 8 July 2016. The document stressed the need to urgently adopt procedures agreed by both organisations in order to *"boost our ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response"*[35].

Strategic communication has become an integral part of the activities of the European External Action Service, being currently used to promote EU's core values, principles and objectives among the international and European audiences, as well as to increase public awareness of how *fake news* and disinformation actions can be countered. In accordance with the objectives of EU's policies, different communication strategies, support plans, themes and messages are prepared and delivered to be implemented by EU's bodies and member states and a wide range of multimedia products are disseminated through all the media channels – traditional, new and social ones.

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[35] *Joint Declaration* by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Warsaw, 8 July 2016.

The Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats specifies the role played by strategic communications for implementing the operational actions aimed at improving awareness, building resilience, preventing, responding to crisis and recovering. The contribution of strategic communications plays an essential role in countering hybrid threats, which can be sustained by disinformation campaigns through all forms of traditional, electronic and digital media – newspapers, radio, television, brochures, books, online publications, blogs, *YouTube* and social networking websites – *Facebook*, *Twitter*, *LinkedIn*, *Instagram*, *Snapchat* e.g.

From the perspective of the European External Action Service, it is necessary to develop, at the level of both EU and member states, the mechanisms that can contribute to effective strategic communications as a condition for increasing the public awareness and strengthening the resilience of society in case of exposure to hybrid threats. In order to ensure a steady flow of accurate information on European institutions and to increase the speed of response in the event of disinformation, the strategic communications *"should make full use of social media tools, as well as the traditional visual, audio and web-based media"*[36].

European Union's strategic communications are the best way to promote the European Dream by *"investing in and joining up public diplomacy across different fields, in order to connect EU foreign policy with citizens and better communicate it to our partners"*[37]. The EU *Global Strategy* has highlighted the priorities of strategic communications that are intended to increase the consistency and the speed of transmitting messages on common principles, values and policies, to quickly counter disinformation actions by providing truthful information, and to promote the transparency and accessibility of public information within and outside the EU.

The *Report on Common Foreign and Security Policy – Our Priorities in 2016*, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 17 October 2016, included an assessment of the implementation of the 22 operational actions established in the *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats*.

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[36] *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – European Union Response*, European Commission, Brussels, 6 April 2016, p. 5.

[37] *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, European Council, Brussels, June 2016, p. 23.

Regarding NATO-EU relations, the *Report* mentioned the strategic communications among the key areas of cooperation between the two organisations, along with intelligence exchange, cyber security, crisis prevention and development of response capabilities.

The Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, presented to the Council of the European Union on 14 November 2016 by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, details how to apply the provisions of the *Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*. The strategic communications are mentioned among the priorities and proposals for defining actions for the new level of ambition of the EU in the field of security and defence.

In order to implement the EU's strategic communications, the Strategic Communications Division was established within the European External Action Service. It has the role of catalysing efforts to promote the public dimension of EU's diplomacy and the relevance of its external actions, while synchronising and coordinating communication activities on common foreign, security and defence policies. By coordinating with other European institutions, the Strategic Communications Division is acting *"to project and promote key EU policies and core values – respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights – globally as well as to audiences at home"*[38].

The *"Made in the EU"* strategic communications aim at improving the content of messages and increasing the speed of their dissemination, adding value to the interaction with audiences, strengthening the independence and professional deontology of the media, bolstering the capacity to counteract anti-EU propaganda by third parties.

Applying Strategic Communications – National Tendencies

In the context of a tense international security environment, NATO members are required to shape their own communication activities to best reflect NATO StratCom themes and messages. To this end, allied

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[38] *European Union External Action Service – Strategic Communications*, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/100/Strategic%20Communications.

HQs and the *NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence* provide allied and partner states with expertise, thematic analyses and evaluations, specific training, access to lessons learned and exchange of best practices.

At national level, even in the absence of a definition agreed by all civilian and military institutions involved in implementing StratCom, the resources, tools and means of public communication are strategically used in all cases when it is necessary to express the official position of the state in relation to events, crisis situations, interventions and military operations, independently or within an allied context. Therefore, the lack of a national StratCom definition is not equivalent to the lack of strategic communications. The more so when the national strategic communications are in line with the NATO StratCom definition. The absence of such a definition does not exclude the coordination and synchronisation of public communication activities, as well as of all the other communication-relevant activities carried out by different institutions on the basis of cooperation procedures and coordination instructions specific to the operational plans and orders, in accordance with NATO StratCom definition.

At national level, as well as at NATO level, StratCom requires careful coordination and appropriate use of all communication activities, events, actions and capabilities that can effectively support the implementation of planned activities, thus facilitating the achievement of national general objectives in various fields, political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and military.

The representative state institutions, ministries and government agencies, including the armed forces and their specialised structures, contribute to the achievement of national StratCom objectives by coordinating and synchronising the activities specific to PD, PA, and – during missions in theatres of operations – KLE, PPP, CIMIC, PsyOps and InfoOps.

The capacity of allied states to contribute to achieving NATO StratCom objectives is assessed from the perspective of the normative basis (national legislation, internal regulations, communication strategies, common procedures for interinstitutional coordination), structures and resources, and last but not least, the qualified staff. All these are needed to materialise national strategic communications also by integrating NATO StratCom themes and messages into own messages and products.

Implementing StratCom – Legal Aspects

StratCom implementation is facilitated by the adoption of national policies, doctrines, manuals and framework concepts for strategic communications and its contributors – PD, PA, PsyOps and InfoOps -, compatible with NATO similar documents and in full compliance with the international standards of respect of the citizens' fundamental right to information.

In Romania, any public communication activities (strategic, external, internal) are carried out under the conditions of ensuring the citizens' unhindered access to public information enshrined in the *Romanian Constitution* (Article 31 – Right to information), in the *EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights* (Article 11 – Freedom of expression and information) and in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 September 1948 (Article 19 – Freedom of opinion and expression, which includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any means and regardless of frontiers). These provisions are also reaffirmed by the *Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe* signed on 1 August 1975, namely the Principle VII of the *Helsinki Declaration* (known also as *"The Decalogue"*) on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as in the Chapter II of the subsequent document concerning the cooperation in humanitarian and other fields, on improvement of the circulation of, access to, and exchange of information between the institutions and citizens of the signatory states.

The Constitution of Romania guarantees the citizens' right to information in full compliance with European and international standards, Article 31 stating that *"a person's right of access to any information of public interest shall not be restricted"*[39] and that *"the public authorities, according to their competence, shall be bound to provide correct information to the citizens about the issues of public and personal interest"*[40]. It also specifies that ensuring the citizens' right to information *"shall not be prejudicial to the measures of protection of young people or national security"*[41] and that *"the public*

[39] *Constitution of Romania*, 8 December 1991, art. 31 alin. 1.
[40] *Ibid*, Art. 31, para 2.
[41] *Ibid*, Art. 31, para 3.

and private media shall be bound to provide correct information to the public opinion"[42]. Moreover, it guarantees the autonomy of public radio and television services, specifying their obligation to ensure the right to broadcasting time to social and political groups, as well as that the parliamentary control over their activity is regulated by an organic law.

The responsibilities of the public authorities regarding the organisation of public communication and the access of citizens and mass-media to public information are regulated by the *Law No. 544/2001 on the free and unhindered access to the information of public interest*, followed by the *Government Decision no. 123/2002 – Methodological Norms for the Enforcement of the Law 544/2001*. Regarding the relation with the media, both normative acts specify that the state authorities are obliged to organise their own activity of public information by establishing specialised structures or posts, publishing the information of public interest, disseminating press releases and holding press conferences. These responsibilities are also described by the laws, regulations and internal orders regarding the organisation and functioning of the ministries and agencies that form the National Security System (NSS), whose architecture[43] is specified in the *Guide of Romanian National Defence Strategy 2015-2019 (figure 1)*.

In the context of national StratCom, a certain communication value is added by the adoption of the extensive national security concept. According to the *Romanian National Defence Strategy 2015-2019, A Strong Romania within Europe and the World*, the implementation of the extensive national security concept requires increased efforts to coordinate and synchronise the activities of the ministries and agencies with responsibilities regarding defence, public order, intelligence, counterintelligence and security, economy and energy, diplomacy, crisis management, education, healthcare and demography. The implementation of this concept is supported by the *National Political Agreement on Increasing Defence Spending* and the *Programme on the Transformation, Development, and Procurement*

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[42] *Ibid*, Art. 31, para 4.
[43] *The Guide of National Defence Strategy 2015-2019*, approved by Supreme Council for National Defence, Decision no. 128, 10 December 2015, The Presidential Administration, Bucureşti, Romania, 2015, p. 15.

Figure 1: Architecture of the National Security System

of the Romanian Armed Forces to 2027 and Beyond, the national activities being correlated with NATO's measures for long-term strategic adaptation to the international security situation.

Increasing the interoperability of the NSS components implies the improvement of common procedures to optimally exploit the potential of each component, but also the development of structural complementarity so that they act *"together in a coherent and effective way to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives, by accepting common doctrines and procedures, sharing use of infrastructure elements and delivering efficient communication"*[44].

Coordination and synchronisation of activities which are contributing to the realisation of strategic communications stems from the *Romanian National Defence Strategy*, that specifies the need to integrate the measures taken by the ministries and agencies with responsibilities regarding the national

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[44] *Ibid*, p. 9.

defence, public order and national security domains for developing *"the capacities required to respond in case of asymmetric and hybrid threats"*[45].

The principles and lines of action set out in the *Romanian National Defence Strategy 2015-2019* and in the *Defence White Paper*, drawn up in accordance with the provisions of *Law no. 203/2015 on defence planning*, are reflected in the *Military Strategy of Romania – Modern Armed Forces for a Powerful Romania within Europe and Around the World*, approved by the Government on 28 September 2016, and they are supporting the complex, multidimensional and interinstitutional approach to ensuring national security.

The contributions to the national StratCom provided by the NSS components, other ministries, public services, institutes and agencies in their subordination are possible under the conditions set out by the laws and regulations regarding their organisation and functional operating models. For example, by limiting ourselves to several exponential institutions of national public diplomacy, we mention the laws governing the organisation and functioning of: the Romanian National News Agency *Agerpres* – Law no. 19/2003, the Romanian Broadcast Society and Romanian Television Society and – Law no. 41/1994, the Romanian Academy – Law no. 752/2001, and the Romanian Cultural Institute – Law no. 356/2003.

The autonomous functioning of these institutions, under conditions of respect for decision-making, editorial independence and political equidistance, and without any outside interference by public authorities or by social, political, trade union, economic, interest and pressure groups, provides the national StratCom with credibility and relevance in supporting the achievement of national and allied objectives.

The Romanian national legislation specifies the responsibilities of all public institutions to carry out public information activities, while military regulations for operational planning describe the requirements for coordinating instructions, including all the types of activities circumscribed to StratCom.

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[45] *National Defence Strategy 2015-2019, A Strong Romania within Europe and the World*, The Presidential Administration, București, Romania, 2015, art. 73, p. 18.

The analysis of the implementation of StratCom by the allied states reveals conceptual and structural uniformity tendencies, corresponding to the NATO StratCom documents, while maintaining specific national approaches due to their own legislation and historical experience, conditioned by the availability of the necessary resources for the contributing domains.

Implementing StratCom – Practical Aspects

The national armed forces and their specialised structures can make the difference with a major contribution to achieving national and NATO StratCom objectives. For this purpose, military structures can carry out activities in support of PD and PA, as well as in theatres of operations – KLE, CIMIC, PPP, PsyOps and InfoOps. Bringing all the above-mentioned concepts under the StratCom umbrella facilitates their correct application by avoiding confusion and develops the interoperability with the allied and partner armed forces. Achieving a common StratCom understanding at national level requires the development of strategies, policies, doctrines, manuals and framework concepts for the contributing areas – PD, PA, PsyOps and InfoOps -, which must be compatible with NATO similar documents in terms of principles, concepts and terminology.

Specifically, during peacetime the national StratCom is centred mainly on the coordination and synchronisation of public communication activities of high internal and external relevance that support the achievement of national strategic objectives. Thus, national *StratCom* overlaps much of the public communication associated with *special events* (e.g. summits and conferences, National Day), *external missions* (e.g. contribution to NATO *ISAF*, *Resolute Support*, to NATO and EU maritime operations *Unified Protector* and *Atalanta* with *Regele Ferdinand* frigate of the Romanian Naval Forces, and with the flagship of the Romanian Coast Guard, the patrol vessel *Ştefan cel Mare*, to the Joint Maritime Operation *Triton* organised by the EU FRONTEX Agency for countering illegal migration), *crisis management* (e.g. the evacuation of Romanian citizens from Libya in 2011, humanitarian interventions), and *major procurement programmes* (e.g. the purchase of F-16 *Fighting Falcon* multi-role fighter aircraft).

Depending on the international context and the scale of allied responses, the national *StratCom* integrates themes and messages of NATO *StratCom* framework concepts. As an example of using NATO *StratCom* themes and messages, they were exemplarily integrated in the Romanian public communication products during NATO operation *Unified Protector*, to which Romanian Armed Forces were represented by *Regele Ferdinand* frigate between 22 April and 21 July 2011. Aboard *Regele Ferdinand* frigate was also a *Combat Camera* team, generated by the Ministry of National Defence (MoND) Media Trust. Based on NATO *Unified Protector Strategic Communications Framework Concept*, this *Combat Camera* team delivered various multimedia products, regularly sent correspondence for military radio-TV broadcasts, for weekly newspaper *Observatorul Militar* and for civilian national and international media, including TV channels. After this mission, the integration of themes and messages provided by NATO *StratCom* framework concepts for different operations has become a common practice for Romanian military PA system.

Multimedia products aim at informing domestic, national and international audiences about Romania's contribution to NATO operations in Afghanistan *(ISAF, Resolute Support)*, the evolving crises in Ukraine and Syria, the NATO adaptation measures on the territory of Eastern European allies consisting of *enhanced Forward Presence* (eFP) and *tailored Forward Presence* (tFP).

The topics related to the strengthening of NATO presence in the allied countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the NATO joint exercises, missions in theatres of operations where Romanian troops are also deployed, the NATO officials' visits and the summits are enjoying a great interest from the Romanian media, fully justified by the tense security environment at regional level. Extensive media coverage was generated by the operationalisation of NATO structures in Romania, circumscribed to NATO's *tailored Forward Presence* (tFP) in South-Eastern Europe – *Multinational Division South-East* (HQ MND-SE), *NATO Force Integration Unit Romania*, and *NATO Multinational Brigade* from Craiova.

NATO StratCom themes and messages are included in the *Communication Strategy of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence 2017-2020*, as well as in the annual communication plans

or in the plans drafted for special events of high visibility. Presently, it is a current practice that NATO StratCom messages are transmitted by Romanian MoD officials together with their own messages when attending public activities or press conferences, through interviews, press statements or press releases. NATO StratCom messages are constantly found in public interventions of military communicators, in the information flow of public interest transmitted regularly to media (press releases, press files), on the MoND internet sites, as well as on the social media pages of military education and culture institutions. NATO StratCom messages also benefit from a broad insertion in the multimedia products developed by the MoND Military Media Trust and by the territorial editorial offices of the Armed Forces. The MoND Military Media Trust produces a wide range of public information products in different formats, printed, electronic, radio and television, disseminated at national level both by its own means and through public radio and television channels, on the basis of agreements with the Romanian Radio Broadcasting Company and with the Romanian Television Society.

The national StratCom becomes particularly evident during the course of some large-scale allied exercises in Romania, when the Romanian military contingents are newly introduced or rotated in theatres of operations, during the implementation of major military procurement programmes of the Armed Forces, as well as when confronted with various crisis situations. For example, we would like to mention the Bucureşti-Tripoli airbridge mission, the first of this type since World War II, which was successfully accomplished by the Romanian Air Forces from 24 February to 4 March 2011. As a result, over 350 Romanian and foreign citizens (52 – British, American, Canadian, German, Danish, Cypriot, Bulgarian, Bosnian, Ukrainian, Russian) as well as the staff of the diplomatic mission of Romania in Tripoli were safely evacuated from Libya, when the internal, security and humanitarian crisis was underway. In this case, as well as during the medical evacuation mission carried out by the Romanian Air Force on 25 June 2013, to bring back the victims of a severe road accident from Podgorica/Montenegro to Romania, *Combat Camera* teams acted aboard the military aircrafts, providing photo & video footage to the military and civilian media during their respective missions.

At national level, interinstitutional exercise *Histria – 15* aimed to check the capacity of the Romanian Armed Forces to synchronise and coordinate their specific activities with other ministries, institutions and state agencies, including those with an impact on the information environment and are contributing to StratCom. The public information on the exercise was permanently coordinated with the representatives of the NSS components and reflected themes and messages from *ACO Strategic Communications Framework 2015-2016*, contributing to media coverage of all the training activities carried out simultaneously or successively in the nine locations of the exercise.

In 2016 and 2017, large-scale allied exercises such as *Trident Joust*, *Noble Jump*, *Anakonda* or *Saber Guardian* (led by the US Army Command – EUCOM), attended also by Romanian military contingents, are themselves NATO StratCom messages. Having a well-defined dissuasive character, they benefited from an extensive media coverage provided by civilian and military media, as well as by social media.

The extensive media coverage of these topics has helped to strengthen the constant position of the Romanian Armed Forces at the top of public confidence, confirmed by polls conducted in recent years. These results are mainly due to the *very active* public information policy adopted by the MoND and the intensity of the communication activities carried out by the military structures. At the same time, it confirms the proactive MoND engagement in the relation with the media and the validity of organising the public communication at the level of the military institution. In this way, the MoND responds to the constitutional and legal obligations to inform the public opinion, to ensure the transparency of decision-making and to provide the citizens' access to public information, at the same time reflecting the NATO *StratCom* themes and messages. They are constantly integrated into MoND public information activities, being adapted and included in the military communication strategies, in the annual PA plans of military structures and in the military media products.

A valuable contribution to the fulfilment of the MoND communication objectives, as well as to the promotion of the image of the Romanian Armed Forces belongs to the activities carried out in support of the public

diplomacy. This category includes special events, conferences and exhibitions organised by the MoND specialised cultural institutions and sports associations (e.g. National Military Circle, National Military Museum, Armed Forces Sports Club *Steaua*) in partnership with the Romanian Cultural Institute and the Romanian Academy, both in the country and abroad, with the support of the defence attaché offices and Romanian embassies. The national and military public diplomacy are also supported by the missions performed by the military ships of the Romanian Naval Forces, a special mention deserving the training voyages of the famous School Ship *Mircea*, whose presence overseas and in the ports of the world has a significant potential for the external representation of the Romanian Armed Forces.

In Romania, the existence of a robust PA system with extensions to all the NSS components, as well as the validity of the procedures for coordinating the public communication between them (tested in crisis situations, as an example, during the air evacuation of the Romanian citizens from Libya in 2011) mitigates the lack of a national StratCom definition. The lack of such a definition, which is to be accepted by all ministries and state agencies contributing to strategic communications, is not at all equivalent to the lack of national strategic communications. However, doctrinally, organisationally and functionally, the military PA system, as well as other structures and functions contributing to StratCom (PsyOps, InfoOps, CIMIC) operate on the basis of NATO's policies, principles and definitions, which are reflected in the national policies, doctrines and manuals corresponding to the respective military specialties.

The MoND has proved to be the main vector of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Romania, accumulating an important experience in the field of structural transformation and disseminating it in the society. This is also true with regard to the adoption of the legal and normative framework, the establishment or adaptation of structures that contribute to what we call StratCom today.

However, at MoND level there are also concerns, successes, as well as areas where there is still plenty of room for improvement in broadly reflecting the NATO StratCom themes and messages

within its own public communication activities. The positive developments in transforming the Romanian Armed Forces have been favoured by the intense interaction with the allies through the participation of Romanian troops in NATO exercises and operations, from which the communication component has never been exempted. The experience gained and the lessons learned from these occasions have substantiated the steps taken to identify the possibilities for action, clarified the roles and established the contributions of the structures whose concerted efforts have to materialise the national StratCom. Based on the above observations, it can be said that interoperability in the field of StratCom with the allied armed forces has been successfully tested during certification exercises and proved during joint large scale NATO exercises and, especially, during the missions in the theatres of operations in the Western Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Conclusions

StratCom is the result of synchronised and coordinated contributions of several ministries, state agencies, civilian and military organisations whose activities cover the areas of PD, PA, PsyOps, InfoOps, CIMIC, to name a few. The diversity of the actors involved and their specific planning procedures raise the importance of interinstitutional coordination for analysing the information environment, formulating priorities and objectives, planning, running and evaluating the activities carried out under the umbrella of strategic communication.

During peacetime, due to the legal restrictions and limitations on the use of psychological and information operations, we must underline that the public communication activities are predominant in the overall StratCom effort. The strategic dimension of communication is given by the planned and synchronised feature of all the communication and communication-relevant activities, which are conducted by several governmental institutions in support of the fulfilment of national and allied objectives. We also note that the relevance, credibility and effectiveness of StratCom depend largely on associating public communication activities with major decisions, with strong impact on audiences directly interested in special events, evolving crises and the management of their effects,

military missions and operations initiated to meet the national and allied objectives.

Taking into account the different contribution of civilian and military organisations to StratCom, the improvement of interinstitutional cooperation based on common procedures, information exchange, synchronisation of actions and reactions, in accordance with legal provisions, proves to be extremely important for its effectiveness.

In the StratCom implementation, actions, especially those of high public visibility, are the most powerful messages and their credibility cannot be questioned. From the communication standpoint, the value of the actions is appreciated by taking into account their impact on the information environment, which must be capitalised to achieve the desired effects in support of the national and allied objectives. Therefore, it is advisable to plan the StratCom taking into consideration the dissuasive potential of informing audiences about large scale military exercises, bilateral and multilateral cooperation results, CIMIC, KLE and PPP activities, such as *show of presence* and *show of force* demonstrations or force-projection operations.

The MoND contribution to the national StratCom is in line with NATO's definition and principles, requiring the involvement of several ministries and state agencies, coordinating messages and synchronising high visibility actions. As a consequence, the MoND promotes NATO's understanding of StratCom at the level of the Romanian National Security System: process and support function in fulfilling the national and allied political and military objectives by coordinating and synchronising all the activities impacting the information environment carried out through PD, PA, PsyOps, InfoOps, and by integrating the NATO StratCom themes and messages for crisis management or operations into national communication.

It should be noted that in peacetime, with the exception of allied missions in theatres of operations, legal and doctrinal restrictions do not allow the use of all *StratCom* tools. Thus, it is forbidden to use the influence and deception actions associated doctrinally to PsyOps and InfoOps, directed at own or allied and partner states audiences and population. From this perspective, the reasons why in peacetime

all the functions of StratCom cannot be applied at national and allied levels become obvious, its content mainly consisting of PD and PA activities. This finding is confirmed by the analysis of NATO *StratCom* framework concepts, in most cases dominated by themes and messages specific to PA, as well as by PD activities.

The efforts made to theorise and institutionalise NATO StratCom, materialised into the new edition of MC 0628 – *NATO Policy on Strategic Communication*, will lead to a better understanding of the concept and its associated activities, followed by its unitary application within NATO's HQs and during the allied operations.

However, the coherent understanding and application of the StratCom definition and principles are more than a doctrinal imperative. It is the acquisition of a set of essential communication skills necessary to all political and military leaders to be able to capitalise the communication-relevant potential of events, actions, missions and operations in support of achieving the national and allied strategic objectives. The acquisition of these skills by political and military leaders proves to be even more important in crisis situations and given the information environment characterised by attempts to model the public perception through influence and deception operations.

One should notice the tangible trends at the level of NATO HQs in favour of merging PA, PsyOps and InfoOps in a single department, the Communication Division (or Communication and Engagement Division), for reasons related to achieving the unity of command and unity of effort during the management of processes underlying StratCom.

At the same time, we must not fail to notice the significant evolutions and differences at the level of allied states in the variable geometry of StratCom national approaches. These are largely due to the national legislation, institutional traditions, specific organisational culture, and effective capacity to allocate human, technical, material, financial resources to maintain and develop efficient structures capable of planning and conducting actions, missions, campaigns and operations in the information environment or having an impact on it.

At the level of allied states, the StratCom implementation goes beyond the mission, legal competences and responsibilities that are specific

to the Ministries of Defence, calling for the involvement of civilian components, ministries and government agencies, academic forums and cultural institutes, through Public Diplomacy activities, national and international information campaigns.

Understanding and accepting the essential but limited role played by the military structures in the StratCom equation could explain the process of phasing out the strategic communication's specific terminology from the latest editions of the US Joint Publications (JP) for Public Affairs, Joint Operations, Joint Planning etc.

For example, we bring up JP 3-61 Public Affairs, the edition of 25 August 2010, which included numerous references to the strategic communication (definition, principles, relationships, models of support plans), compared with the last edition of the same document, adopted on 19 August 2016, from which all the aforementioned references to the strategic communication were removed. This is mentioned only once in the context of describing the Public Affairs Roles, noting that PA staffs *"must also work with information operations (IO) and strategic communication planners to coordinate and deconflict communication activities"*[45].

The same finding results from the comparison of successive editions of JP 3-0 Joint Operations and JP 5-0 Joint Planning in the last seven years. Thus, while the JP 3-0 Joint Operations, edition of 11 August 2011, contained several references to strategic communication *("an important component of strategic guidance"*[46], *"applies to USG-level department and agency activities"*[48], being implemented *"in the context or their theater strategies and during specific joint operations"*[49]), the current edition of this joint doctrine, adopted on 17 January 2017, does not include a single reference to strategic communication, not even in the glossary of terms.

The 11 August 2011 edition of JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning also included numerous references to strategic communication (definition,

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[46] Joint Publication 3-61 *Public Affairs*, Edition 17 November 2015, Incorporating Change 1/19 August 2016, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. I-4.

[47] Joint Publication 3-0 *Joint Operations*, Edition 11 August 2011, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. I-6.

[48] *Ibid*, p. III-15.

[49] *Ibid*.

objectives, relationships), while the latest edition of the same joint doctrine, endorsed on 5 June 2017, clearly states that the Department of State *"has primary responsibility for communication synchronization oversight"*[50] within the United States Government, ministries and agencies. This is in line with the *US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*, the main document designed to set out United States Government-level *"guidance, intent, strategic imperatives, and core messages under which DOD can nest its themes, messages, images, and activities"*[51].

The latest edition of JP 5-0 Joint Planning highlights the importance of the **support role** played by the US Armed Forces across the strategic communication activities, *"primarily through commander's communication synchronization, public affairs, and defense support to public diplomacy. Communication synchronization considerations should be included in all joint planning for military operations from routine, recurring military activities in peacetime through major operations"*[52]. The document also states that all Joint Force Commands have *"the responsibility to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize communications to support planning and execution of a coherent national effort"*[53].

The communication at the level of the US Armed Forces Joint HQs is coordinated as usual during the operational planning processes, and its requirements are described in the coordinating instructions which are part of the operation plans and orders.

The pragmatic approach to the United States Government-level communication underlines the importance of maintaining the functional delimitation and the identity of the structures, areas, capabilities and staff functions that contribute to the materialisation of strategic communication under the responsibility of the Department of State.

From this perspective, the excessive use of strategic communication terminology in the military doctrines and field manuals becomes useless.

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[50] Joint Publication 5-0 *Joint Planning*, Edition 16 June 2017, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. II-10.
[51] *Ibid,* p. II-11.
[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*

This is probably the reason why the latest edition of JP 5-0 Joint Planning, from 16 June 2017, does not even include the definition of strategic communication in the glossary of terms, instead noting that there is an approval for its *"removal from"*[54] the Department and Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

In Romania, the understanding of the risks associated with disinformation campaigns through the media and social networks led to the establishment, in April 2017, of the first *Laboratory of Information Warfare and Strategic Communication Analysis* (LARICS), which operates under the aegis of the Romanian Academy within the Institute of Political Science and International Relations *Ion I.C. Brătianu*. The lab provides policymakers, researchers, journalists and public opinion with analyses and assessments on the media coverage of internal and external events that have immediate implications for Romania. To this end, as well as to warn public opinion, LARICS inaugurated a portal (www.larics.ro) through which various articles on the techniques of manipulation and public communication are disseminated. Thus, LARICS aims to become an early warning source in case of disinformation campaigns against Romania. At the same time, LARICS intends to carry out public awareness campaigns and training sessions for journalists in order to identify and highlight the specific actions of propaganda, disinformation and manipulation, as well as to develop analytical capabilities, tools and methods to counter them.

Such initiatives support the achievement of national and NATO StratCom objectives, increase the resilience of the allies and develop mechanisms to counteract the various types of hostile propaganda, which are defining the behaviour of states that deliberately violate the rules of international law and the fundamental treaties on the global security architecture and endanger peace at regional and global level.

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QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN EDUCATION SYSTEMS
Could It Be a Solution for Military Education Institutions?

Colonel Dr Olivian STĂNICĂ

Following the historical analysis of the events in the field of education quality standards I have found out that standards and comparative quality indicators were approached in the 10th decade of the 20th century and in the first decade of the 21st century, while total quality management was approached between 1990-2000, and quality paradigm offensive starting in 2000.

a. Brief History of the *"Education Quality"* Evolution

Part of these topics have been debated during the meetings in: Sorbonne (1998 – Europe of knowledge, use of credits, two-cycle common system, student and teacher mobility), Bologna (1999 – Declaration on the new dimensions of higher education, ECTS – European Credit Transfer System, easily readable and comparable degrees, student mobility, European cooperation to ensure quality), Lisbon (2000), Prague (2001 – cooperation between the experts in ensuring quality and those in recognition of academic diplomas, Life Long Learning/LLL, ECTS, diploma supplement, correct recognition of diplomas), Barcelona (2002), Berlin (2003 – quality assurance at institutional,

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national and European levels, inclusion of doctoral degree in the third cycle of academic studies, connection between higher education and research fields), Copenhagen (2004), Bergen (2005 – adoption of European standards and guidelines to ensure quality, adoption of Framework for Qualifications – European Higher Education Area/FQ-EHEA, flexible study routes in higher education), Brussels (2005 – the moment when national quality assurance systems had to include: accountable bodies definition; curricula or institutions evaluation, results publication; accreditation, certification systems or comparable procedures; participation and cooperation in international networks), Berlin (2006), London (2007 – establishment of European Quality Assurance Register, National Qualification Frameworks up to 2010, establishment of the role of higher education within LLL), Paris (2008 – Europenisation of officers education and training – *Military Erasmus* project was launched), Leuven (2009 – Quality as EHEA fundamental goal, target of 20% up to 2020 in terms of student mobility, National Qualification Frameworks to be adopted up to 2012, permanent enhancement of Bologna instruments), Vienna (2010 – European Higher Education Area definition), Bucharest (2012 – Global mobility of students – incentives, barriers, as well as global and regional approaches to ensuring higher education quality – essential for the long-lasting development of the states in the world) and Brussels (2017 – School development and the excellent quality of teaching for a good start in life. High-quality education for everyone will help Europe to meet economic and social goals).

b. Delineation of *Quality*-related Concepts

In order to investigate the **quality** of an education institution and of the generated education services, it is necessary to define the associated concepts and notions.

Quality is a concept that, throughout time, has been analysed from different perspectives (technical, economic, social, educational) by different experts according to their field of activity. Thus, the first definitions of **quality** referred to something that could be incorporated

into a product and subsequently detected by inspecting. According to J. Juran[1], the quality of a product or service entails its *"ability to be used"*, and P.B. Crosby[2] defines quality as *"compliance with requirements"*.

However, the *International Standards Organisation (ISO)* defines **quality**[3] as the *"the aggregate of the characteristics of an entity (product, activity, process) that provide it with the ability to meet the express or implicit needs"*. Therefore, quality is, in essence, an attribute of any material or immaterial object that reflects its compliance with the beneficiary specified or implicit requirements.

Standard ISO 9000:2000[4] outlined a new vision of the concept, defining **quality** as *"the degree to which an ensemble of implicit characteristics meet certain requirements, especially the declared need or expectation, implicit or compulsory"*, the characteristic being *"a distinctive measurable trait having physical, sensorial, behavioural or functional nature"*.

However, the quality of an education institution is determined by the quality of the processes and the provided educational services (*figure 1*).

The educational services provided by an education institution depend to a great extent on their quality, being significantly determined by the management team at the level of department/college/school/academy/university.

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[1] J.M. Juran (1904-2008) – American Professor born in Romania, known for the *7-Point Programme*, meant to improve quality, the *Spiral of Progress* – conceptual model representing the trajectory of a product from project to sale or the *Quality Trilogy* – which expresses three categories of independent processes – planning, control and quality enhancement.

[2] P. B. Crosby (1926-2001) – US expert who introduced 4 basic principles in TQM (Total Quality Management): ensuring standard compliance; ensuring quality by preventing defects and errors during production; concept of *"zero defects"* – everything should be well executed from the beginning; *"quality does not cost, it pays"*.

[3] Source: http://www12.tuiasi.ro/users/112/D.Gheorghiu-ICPM.pdf, retrieved on 14.06.2017.

[4] Dan Potolea et alii, *Pregătirea psihopedagogică. Manual pentru definitivat şi gradul didactic II*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2008 p. 52.

Figure 1: Educational organisation, processes and services in an education institution[5] *(adapted diagram – according to the source)*

Educational services **quality standards**[6] ensure mainly the following functions:

    b.1.1 Written standards serve as objectives towards which the education institution directs its efforts. They provide the education institution with a clear direction.

    b.1.2 They represent a way to make expectations known. In this manner, the education institution can clearly communicate the way the expectations should be met by the didactic, auxiliary and administrative staff so that the entire personnel will be within the same parameters and management procedures, assessment and decisions will not surprise anyone.

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    [5] Panaite Nica, *Calitatea şi managementul calităţii în instituţiile de învăţământ, Asigurarea calităţii în educaţie/Ministerul Educaţiei şi Cercetării*, Editura Şcoala gălăţeană, Galaţi, 2005, p. 49.

    [6] *Ibidem*, p. 55.

b.1.3 Standards allow for the creation of some effective management instruments. Once a coherent set of standards is developed, they have to be used to determine the new employees profile, the performance assessment, the job descriptions, and the training process.

Standards have to be the foundation of the system of assessing the behaviour of all the university personnel towards clients. By establishing clear, concise, observable and realist standards, the image we intend for the education services provided by the education institution is defined. This is the starting point for the education services quality for the client.

Standards comprise the two dimensions of quality for the client: procedures and the personnel behaviour in the relations with the clients.

Procedure standards refer to the system of providing education services, the procedures related to developing activities, and those related to meeting the clients needs. Their concrete content is aimed at the following aspects: the level of competencies that are to be developed; the flexibility of procedures; the anticipation of clients requirements; communication; the clients feedback; the organisation and supervision of activities.

Personal standards are related to the behaviour and attitude of the didactic, auxiliary and administrative staff. The concrete content of these standards is aimed at the following aspects: the organisational climate; the attitude in interpersonal relations; the attention paid to the clients; the tact; the support for the didactic and auxiliary staff; the provision of solutions to the incidents in an as agreeable as possible manner and the resolution of conflicts.

The quality products (competent graduates) and the failures depend on the relationships between leaders as well as on the way they manage the educational activities/services/processes within education institutions.

A model for the relationship between the mentioned components is presented in *figure 2*.

Another concept is *education quality*. It represents the aggregate of the characteristics of an education programme as well as of its provider

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL
(RECTORS, DEANS, PRINCIPALS)
COMPETENCE

1. Didactic staff competence and motivation
2. Students/pupils quality
3. Curriculum quality
4. Programme quality (adequacy to the market requirements)
5. Didactic methods and procedures quality
6. Material resources quality
7. Financial resources quality and decision autonomy as far as their use is concerned
8. Facilities (libraries, social services, accommodation spaces) quality
9. Didactic and non-didactic facilities

DIDACTIC PROCESS QUALITY

EDUCATIONAL/ SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ACTIVITY QUALITY

OTHER SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE EDUCATION INSTITUTION QUALITY

1. Personnel quality
2. Personnel motivation and availability
3. Beneficiaries/sponsors trust
4. Available material resources quality
5. Financial resources availability

FACTORS EXTERNAL
TO THE EDUCATION INSTITUTION

Figure 2: Education institution services quality[7]
(diagram adapted by the author – a version)

meant to meet not only the expectations of the beneficiaries but also the quality standards.

In general, the term **quality**[8] denotes: *"trait, specific value, characteristic, performance, position, situation, title, condition, rank etc."*. In classical dictionaries, the term originates in Latin *qualitias*, meaning, as already mentioned – *"attribute"*, *"characteristic"*, *"property"*.

Ensuring quality education refers to the capability of the education institution to provide education programmes in compliance with the set standards, entailing an ensemble of actions meant to develop the institution capacity and the study programmes, so that beneficiaries can trust that the education provider organisation meets the *quality standards*.

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[7] *Ibidem*.
[8] Dan Potolea et alii, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

At the level of an education institution, the **standard** represents the description of the requirements in terms of *rules or results* or the *minimum compulsory* level of performance related to an educational activity. Standards represent benchmarks that allow the comparison between results and formulated expectations.

Quality standard[9] can also have another significance, namely a *"document established following documentation, agreements or consensus, comprising specifications and descriptions of the requirements formulated in terms of criteria, rules, guidelines, characteristics or results, which define the minimum compulsory level to which a formative activity should be performed in a set educational context"*.

Depending on the school development phase, the following types of standards will be used: authorisation for temporary functioning; accreditation and quality (reference).

For example: the structure of a standard to assess the quality in education, according to the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ARACIP), is as follows: domain (n=3), criteria (n=15), subdomains (23), performance indicators (n=43), descriptors (93/197/118).

Moreover, we mention that there are many categories of standards having either compulsory or facultative character related to: product, services, being in fact acceptance criteria, nature of the employed method or the type of guidelines, terminological restrictions etc.

Quality assurance in education is mainly focused on *results*[10]. Results are expressed in knowledge, competencies, values and attitudes, which are acquired by attending or graduating a study programme.

Education quality enhancement entails the continuous assessment, analysis and corrective action on the part of the military education institution, based on observance and adoption of the most appropriate procedures as well as the choice and implementation of the reference standards.

Quality management focuses on those strategies, structures, techniques and procedures through which the education institution

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[9] *Ibidem*, p. 53.

[10] Art. 7, para. 1 of OUG no. 75 in 2005 regarding education quality assurance.

demonstrates that it assesses its performance in ensuring and enhancing education quality and it has the necessary feedback mechanisms in the education and research process that testify to the results in education and research/applicative research.

Education quality control that is specific to/performed in education institutions is another term to be defined. Synthetically, this concept refers to the *"set/system of the activities and technologies having an operational character, systematically applied by an assessment/inspection authority appointed to verify the pre-established standards"*[11]. The science that deals with the quality control and measurement is called **qualimetrics**.

Accreditation. A component of quality assurance, accreditation *represents a modality through which an authorised institution/body certifies the observance of standards in the activity of an education provider and its study programmes.*

Efficiency represents the relation between the added value and the consumed resources (profitability and productivity), while **efficacy** represents the relation between the real effect and the ideal effect. In reality, a service **quality** is differently perceived by the provider and the client, as they consider different reference elements. The provider considers the specifications in the service documentation (standards, norms, task books, regulations etc.) and the client appreciates the service quality in relation to his/her needs/requirements. Any product/service is obtained based on a process, which is a transformation that adds **value**, entailing persons and resources. Usually, the **added value** in Romania is lower than in the EU member countries. The initiation/maintenance of control related to any process seeks maximising efficiency and efficacy.

Another definition of **efficacy**[12] is the relation between effort and effect, which is mathematically represented as follows:

Ef = Effect/Maximum Effort → or Ef = Effort/Minimum Effect →.

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[11] Ioan Neacșu, *Calitatea în educație și învățământ. Manual pentru definitivat și grad didactic II*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2008, p. 53.

[12] Ovidiu Nicolescu, *Sisteme, metode și tehnici manageriale ale organizației*, Editura Economică, București, 2000.

All the presented notions and concepts will allow all the actors involved in the educational process to address and ensure effective and productive management in education institutions, developing a quality culture.

c. Designing a Quality Management System – ISO and EFQM Principles

According to the most recent European documents, *education efficiency and quality* are the fundamental premises for social cohesion, active citizenship, economic growth and human development meant to ensure transition to the knowledge society.

For example, the *two major reform processes* initiated by the Ministry of National Education in the field of pre-university education, *decentralisation and quality management*, are perfectly compliant and convergent with the European guidelines for the reform of education and training systems, in order to meet the fundamental objectives of *"Lisbon Process"*.

The Ministry of National Education intends to develop a unitary system meant to ensure education quality, applicable for all the levels and forms of education.

The construction of the education quality management has to be based, according to the ARACIP Declaration of Principles, on a series of *guidelines* that substantiate specific criteria, standards, indicators and procedures:

➢ Quality education is based on innovation and diversification.

➢ Quality education is provided by responsible institutions.

➢ Quality education is promoted by educational leaders.

➢ Quality education observes individual autonomy and is based on institutional autonomy.

➢ Quality education is result-oriented.

➢ Quality education is achieved in dialogue and through partnership.

➢ Quality education is focused on the educational services clients and beneficiaries.

➢ Quality education ensures the participation of educational actors and the capitalisation of human resources.

These conceptual and methodological benchmarks represent the basis for the *Medium-term Strategy for the Implementation of the Quality Management System in Pre-University Education.*

The main benchmarks, according to the ARACIP strategy, regarding the education quality in Romania are as follows:

c.1. Establishment of a coherent and unitary national quality management

The implications reside in projecting a *National Quality Management System (NQMS)* including two fundamental elements: c.1.1. – the education institutions functioning assurance and c.1.2. – the quality management at the education institution and the system level assurance.

c.1.1. – the education institutions functioning assurance

Each newly established education institution will undergo an evaluation process in two phases – *provisional authorisation* and *accreditation*. *Provisional authorisation* certifies the fact that there are all the premises for the particular education institution offer to be compliant with the legal requirements. *Accreditation* certifies that in the education institution, besides premises existence and update, the educational processes, especially teaching and learning, comply with the legal regulations, and the results meet the expectations, being within the limits considered acceptable at national level.

Accredited institutions are periodically evaluated, every 5 years: the aim of periodical evaluation is to verify whether the education institution continues to meet the national accreditation standards. Therefore, *periodical evaluation is equivalent to reaccreditation.* Periodical evaluation is not aimed at disbanding education institutions but at identifying those domains or areas where intervention is necessary so that the education institution can function at the level established by law. The intervention is performed by the legally responsible institution or institutions.

A comparative analysis between the traditional education institution and the quality-oriented education institution is presented in *table 1.*

Table 1

QUALITY-ORIENTED INSTITUTION	TRADITIONAL INSTITUTION
Client-oriented	Internal needs – oriented
Problem prevention-oriented	Problem detection-oriented
Investment in personnel	Not systematic in personnel development
Has got a quality strategy	Has not got a quality strategy
Treats complaints as opportunities to learn	Treats complaints with irritation
Has defined the quality characteristics for all the organisation domains	Shows vagueness in relation to standards
Has got a quality policy and plan	Has not got a quality plan
The personnel encourages quality: creativity is promoted	Procedures and rules are important
Rules and responsibilities are clear	Rules and responsibilities are vague
Has got clear evaluation strategies	Has not got a systematic evaluation strategy
Regards quality as a means to meet client satisfaction	Regards quality as a means to reduce costs
Long-term plans	Short-term plans
Quality is seen as a part of organisational culture	Quality is seen as an initiative that triggers problems
Colleagues are treated as if they were clients	There is a hierarchical structure

Comparative analysis between traditional institutions and quality-oriented ones *(scheme adapted by the author)*

Following the analysis, we note major differences related to the evolution towards modernisation of quality-oriented institutions compared to traditional ones, which do not wish it or have not identified this aspect. *Quality* is essential to the development of the institution in the long term, promoting the personnel quality, contributing to meeting the clients/beneficiaries needs and ensuring business success.

c.1.2. – quality management

Education quality is produced, generated, assured at the level of the fundamental educational relation, that between **teacher and student**, and defined and assessed at the level of education beneficiaries. We can talk about quality *assurance* only at the school level, because only the school *can generate the trust of the participants in the education process, and the obtained results will be valuable for them.* In the current situation: we can talk about the *inexistence of a common quality culture.*

The progressive implementation of the *National System of Indicators, Standards and Procedures related to Education Quality Assurance and Evaluation (SNISPAECE)* will also ensure the development of a quality culture in education at the level of the involved factors in schools/universities. The *SNISPAECE* implementation will also depend on the public debate and the educational actors agreement, especially on the part of direct and indirect beneficiaries. Subsequently, the elements of the national quality management system will be enacted only after a significant number of education institutions meet the agreed criteria and standards and are able to follow the particular procedures. Quality standards will be defined on three levels: *minimal, reference* and *excellence*. Finally, all the educational actors that are essential in quality management and assurance will be involved.

c.2. Quality management focus
on *added value* and *on progress*

The education quality evaluation is performed on the basis of *added value*, namely depending on what school, education, adds to the *"heritage"* related to the already existing knowledge, skills, attitudes, general competencies at the level of individuals, groups and communities. Schools differ in terms of premises and resources. Therefore, for equal efforts the obtained results will be different. Thus, quality can be also obtained in the schools that function in difficult conditions, so the effort made and the results obtained should be acknowledged and recompensed. The use of the *"added value"* concept is necessary to: *discern the real influence of education* on the obtained results and to *motivate the schools* that obtain notable results in terms of added value. In order to measure the added value, it is necessary to correctly estimate the input, expressed in *risk factors* (for example, benchmarking to find out: the percentage of students that benefit from social scholarship, the percentage of families that benefit from different forms of social aid, the percentage of families in which at least one parent is unemployed, the percentage of single parent families, the percentage of migrant students, the educational background of parents, the percentage of unqualified didactic personnel, the fluctuation in didactic personnel etc.). Based on benchmarking, the education

institutions will be ranked in terms of risk, depending on the functioning conditions, and the *assessment of the results obtained by an education institution will be performed only by comparing it to the average reference for that category*.

c.3. Foundation of quality management on self-evaluation and on institutional development

Quality assessment is first and foremost performed by the school itself. Self-evaluation should firstly ensure the achievement of the main functions of evaluation, namely: *the enhancement of current activity, the provision of feedback for significant stakeholders, the revision and optimisation of educational policies and strategies. We evaluate to develop*, to grow, to learn and *not to sanction*, to praise, to say *"it is impossible"* or to acknowledge that things are satisfactory. The self-evaluation process, managed by the commission for quality assessment and assurance, will be included in the process of *institutional development planning*. In all the phases of the self-evaluation process, significant stakeholders in the community will be involved. The procedures meant to assure quality will not be separate from the normal procedures meant for institutional development. *The education institution development cycle should be considered a quality cycle*. An essential role will be played by the *Commission for Quality Assessment and Assurance* in the education institution. The quality management system will promote the *practicability principle*, ensuring that the system does not become one that is bureaucratic and difficult to coordinate, *applying the principle of trust and that of "presumption of truthfulness" for the declarations related to education quality*.

c.4. Transparency of the national management and quality assurance system

All the documents related to the institutional evaluation in order to be authorised and accredited, as well as related to quality evaluation will be *public*. All the initiatives in the field of management and quality assurance, programmatic and operational documents included, *will be subject to public debate*.

c.5. Continuous quality improvement – fundamental goal of the national quality management system

The entire activity of ARACIP and the other institutions and institutional components involved in quality management and assurance is aimed at *continually improving education quality* in pre-university education. The education quality evaluation is based on three fundamental processes, defined by law – *internal quality assurance, quality control* and *external quality assessment.*

Moreover, the essential *instruments* of quality management can be defined, in turn, depending on three characteristics, which are also stipulated by law: *components, procedures and domains of application.* Quality improvement is the *effect of carrying out specific processes, in the defined domains, and using the established components*, and will lead, through the qualifications offered by education providers, to tailoring education services to meet the expressed and implicit needs as well as to increasing direct and indirect beneficiaries satisfaction with provided educational services. *ARACIP will cooperate* with all the components and levels of the education system, as well as with all the institutions coordinated or subordinated by the Ministry of Education. Quality indicators will be related to *hard* domains, namely quantitative and statistical data, such as: **success rate, abandonment rate, key skills and competencies acquired, qualifications obtained at different levels, participation and progress in the learning process**, as well as to *soft* domains, such as: **the degree of trainees satisfaction in relation to the offer, the degree of social partners involvement in the system and, last but not least, the public view of the system.**

c.6. Flexibility and evolutionary character of the national quality management system

ARACIP will develop and implement an *own activity quality assurance system*. Thus, procedures *to periodically analyse the needs of education beneficiaries*, to *consult* educational actors, *to measure the degree of satisfaction* related to the educational services offered by education institutions will be initiated. There could exist, besides national quality standards, *standards and indicators specific* to different categories and types of education

institutions, even to individual schools. Education institutions will be encouraged to develop personalised quality systems and to implement the already acknowledged quality management systems (ISO, EFQM, CQAF-VET etc.). The quality management system flexibility and evolution are also ensured by the *quality standard structure*: domains and criteria stipulated by law, including subdomains, indicators and descriptors – quantitative and qualitative ones –, so that the fact that requirements are met can be objectively demonstrated.

The existence of three levels of quality – minimal, optimal and excellent – results in the fact that, once education quality evolves, minimal requirements are introduced in accreditation standards, and the superior levels are periodically redefined.

According to the quality principles of the International Standardisation Organisation and the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM), quality education[13]:

a) is focused on the educational services clients and beneficiaries;
b) is provided by responsible education institutions;
c) is oriented towards results, performance, added and created values;
d) respects individual autonomy and is based on the institutional autonomy in making decisions and in providing quality services;
e) is promoted by educational leaders in terms of unity, continuity, development directions and creation of stimulating learning environments;
f) ensures the participation/involvement of all educational actors, the valorisation and development of the potential and the competencies of the human resources in education;
g) is achieved through dialogue, partnership with all the educational community, all the interested educational actors;
h) is based on innovation, diversification, creativity, research, new information and communication theories;
i) addresses the educational process as a unitary, global, credible, and transparent one;

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[13] Dan Potolea et alii, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

j) is aimed at continuing education, individually, in group and in institutions, and at continually improving the results/ performance; is based on independence between the education actors, providers and beneficiaries, to serve the students and ensure reciprocal advantages.

The European Commission[14] highlighted, in the latest report to the European Parliament, the importance of improving the quality of the teaching-learning act in schools/universities. For example: the environments that favour collaboration and digital technologies can improve learning among the didactic personnel. Through the programme *Erasmus+*, the EU supports the professional development of the didactic staff. There are grants for the students who prepare to be didactic personnel, for the didactic staff and school directors who want to participate in training courses, pedagogical practical activities and learning activities through observation in another country. By *eTwinning*[15], the EU supports volunteer cooperation and reciprocal learning among didactic personnel through *online* courses and joint training events.

Conclusions

Educational services quality should express the level of the outcome of the efforts made by the management team, the didactic personnel, and administrative structures to achieve the final product, namely the graduates having competencies and skills acknowledged and appreciated by beneficiaries.

Education quality assurance should express the ability of education institutions, the military ones included, to provide educational programmes

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[14] *School development and excellent teaching for a great start in life*, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions, COM (2017), Brussels, 30.05.2017.

[15] *eTwinning* is the largest online community for schools in Europe. More than 46,000 didactic staff and 4 out of 10 schools in Europe have already taken part in the platform. Providing a safe online environment for transnational projects in education, eTwinning makes available to schools easily accessible instruments so that they can enhance their digital learning offer and support intercultural and transnational contacts between didactic staff and students. Its utilisation in all the schools in Europe can contribute to improving digital competencies. See https://eTwinning.net/ro/pub/index.htm, retrieved on 14.07.2017.

in compliance with established standards, and to meet the goals through a set of actions meant to enhance institutional capability, as well as to develop, plan and implement study programmes so that the beneficiaries can trust that the education provider organisation meets the quality standards.

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MILITARY LEADERSHIP
– Synergistic Complementarity of Defence Capability? –

Brigadier General (r.) Petru TOADER

Motto:
"Leadership is a matter of intelligence, trustworthiness, humaneness, courage, and discipline ... Reliance on intelligence alone results in rebelliousness. Exercise of humaneness alone results in weakness. Fixation on trust results in folly. Dependence on the strength of courage results in violence. Excessive discipline and sternness in command result in cruelty. When one has all five virtues together, each appropriate to its function, then one can be a leader".

Sun Tzu

Leadership plays a key role in enabling an army to survive, resist and meet challenges. There is a direct relationship between leadership and the ability to influence people's behaviour, as it represents the power to motivate and determine people to act, action not being conditioned by the superior hierarchical position someone in a command post enjoys. In other words, the mere fact that a person holds a command (authority) post does not mean that the particular person is a leader. Thus, under *"friction, uncertainty, fluctuation and disorder"* circumstances, which influence the condition and survival of not only the leader but also the subordinates, transactional motivation sources (i.e. payment, rewards, threat of punishment) become insufficient. The ability to influence subordinates behaviour should be found in ways to inspire rather than impose obligations.

Brigadier General (r.) Petru Toader – Reserve Officers Association in Romania.

When subordinates trust a charismatic leader they are transformed in individuals willing to get along with the commander without considering this option as a conscientious obligation to serve. In what follows I will present some of the characteristics of this type of command within the military organisation.

Leadership refers to emotional intelligence, to the human element, to the moral component of combat power (ability to make people act and fight). The concept can be defined as the art to motivate individuals to meet objectives or goals, beyond what they believe to be their limits, an art based on the capacity to stimulate people to do things they do not normally do.

Leadership represents the projection of the leader personality and character, the combination of personal example, persuasion and constraint to determine people to do what you ask them to do, ensuring the power to put people together and orient them towards a common goal, based on the character of the leader who inspires trust. Moreover, it refers to exercising the influence of an authority that seeks to inspire people (individuals or groups) behaviour based on the dynamics existing in a team, being distributed among different members of a team, depending on their aptitudes, motivations and actions; it is the ability to set standards, to build and manage a climate in which people can motivate themselves to meet long-term goals, in a participative environment that is compliant with their personal values.

A leader should embody the qualities and characteristics that are specific to the people and the structure he/she subordinates, as the subordinates are not only a simple collection of educated individuals. Subordinates should see that the leader is like them and also different in some essential aspects: self-confidence and enthusiasm, ability to make decisions and initiative, courage to accept responsibility, determination, calm in crisis moments, sense of duty, loyalty, sense of justice, personal example, physical form, human element – courage before defeat, inspiration in moments of apathy, clarity of the mind in moments of confusion.

In such moments, a leader should show the subordinates that he/she does not consider himself/herself superior, and he/she does not expect the subordinates to do things he/she does not do.

Military leaders should consider themselves top representatives in their profession. *Leadership* is not a job, but it is a *way of being*. It does not mean positions and popularity, but first and foremost responsibility.

Leadership starts from the top of the hierarchy, as both good and less good examples propagate downwards: we can mention here the experience of Norman Schwarzkopf, who later became a General, when he arrived at the headquarters of the US Division in Chu Lai, in Vietnam, where he was to become a battalion commander: *"The place was almost worthy of a Club Med – a spacious building with screened porches and low tropical eaves, nestled on a hilltop with a gorgeous view of the South China Sea. We were seated at a long, U-shaped table, with white tablecloth, china and wineglasses: Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey, his deputy commanders, his staff, and me – as soldiers waited on us. At the end of the meal came what I was told was the nightly ritual: a staff officer stood and recited a poem he had written about the day's events at headquarters. Everybody laughed and applauded. Then another officer stood and with a lot of joking asides announced the movie for the evening. I was heartsick. We had men – about eighteen thousand men – out in the mud and the jungle, maybe fighting the enemy, maybe dying at that moment, while their senior officers ate off fine china and recited cutesy little poems"*[1].

Leadership power does not mean symbolic egalitarianism. It means encouraging the interactions between subordinates filling different positions in the organisational chart: people need liberty and an intellectual environment, a participative atmosphere.

The greatest difference between commanders (command given the legal authority or management competencies) and leaders is the way

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[1] General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, Autobiography, Bantam Book, New York, 1992, p. 173.

they motivate subordinates: it is not enough to tell subordinates what they have to do so that they can achieve their tasks. *Leadership* means transformational command – such leaders mainly employ the *psychological contract* to build *affective commitment*, which influences competencies, personality traits, motivations. Thus, the team will be capable of following the leader no matter the risk associated with achieving the assigned tasks. Leaders are team players, contributing to building the team identity and the team spirit, which is the result of a certain dynamics existing within the team, distributed among different members of a team, depending on their aptitudes, motivations and actions. Emotions approach and management as well as the team management should not alter the distinction between the chief and subordinates, which is the essence of leadership.

Those who are appointed to command military organisations are confronted with the situation of doing the job of both the commander and the leader, which entails:

- creating a necessity and a vision relating to the desired result, which requires a higher level of performance than the normal one (the leader job);
- developing a strategy based on the vision (the commander job);
- conveying the vision to the members of the organisation, by forming some qualified teams to guide the process, based on the leader's ability to assess individuals and risks, as well as the alignment of adequate persons in the substrate of the strategy, guiding the activity, without performing it in their place (the leader job);
- creating an environment in which subordinates can be all that they are – the achievement of objective organisational integrity depends on the achievement of subjective organisational unity; unity cannot be achieved by simple imposition but by the moral and intellectual character of command. In this regard, the commander should motivate sufficiently uniform group of people so that they could act harmoniously;

thus, if some people are too enthusiastic while other people are cynical and recalcitrant, the group energy cannot be adequately concentrated (the leader job);

- assigning tasks and focusing on them (the leader job);
- developing a team considering the following aspects: vision determines the organisation direction; structure determines the organisation dimension; individuals (subordinates) determine the organisation potential; inter-human relations determine the organisation morale; leadership determines the success (the leader job);
- developing a *"team of teams"*, based on *"shared consciousness"*, allowing members to act having *"intelligent autonomy"* based on the unity created by the trust in the common goal of the organisation (the team is based on: character, loyalty, professional value, team spirit, solidarity and compassion). High-performance teams are composed of individuals who have learned to rely on one another, have discovered their strengths and weaknesses, being able to *"read"* each other's intentions and movement (the leader job);
- transmitting the possible effects of his/her decisions to the team so that its members can assume in turn the success/failure (the leader job);
- exercising authority in order to decide upon a certain course of events, to guide the subordinates to implement it, as well as planning, organising, coordinating, commanding and controlling, continually re-evaluating the situation (the commander job);
- implementing decisions employing not only command levers, through a well-structured hierarchical structure (the commander job), but also inspiration: the best way to communicate with people and motivate them is own behaviour. When hierarchical relations are based on empathy and care, and not on arrogance and pride related to superior ego, good things start to happen.

This is a communication principle that often leads to changing fury into respect, and doubt into trust (the leader job);
- delegating authority so that the members of the organisation can act by virtue of the vision (the commander job) – they capitalise on the short-term results to provide their vision with credibility and to create the necessary motivation to overcome the obstacles related to change (the leader job);
- achieving the ability to *"read"* problems, to dramatise and solve them, knowing how to transpose in the emotions of the others to understand them, to respond and to better guide them (the leader job);
- creating a situation in which the style is variable depending on the context, discerning the moments when he/she should be permissive or, on the contrary, authoritative, in case he/she perceives threats or disturbances that should be immediately eliminated (the leader job);
- alternating listening, tolerance and authority, without compromising, combining participation, consensus and authoritative decisions in relation to important problems (the leader job);
- communicating the plans as openly and directly as possible, keeping promises, being sure that the task is well understood, on track, and achieved: subordinates should understand what is expected from them, what the leader wants, what the standards are, when and how goals should be met (the leader job);
- the military leader does not command using charisma but by imposing some standards; that is why, whenever necessary, leaders have to implement measures that are specific to the armed forces discipline, which requires moral courage, and subordinate leaders have to support the senior leader decisions, as reversing the sanctions can lead to the lack of trust in the command chain and the rejection of decisions in the future;

- one of the main missions of the leader is to assign individuals to different positions; if the selection is based only on the gained popularity and not on the human quality, the promotion of valuable individuals becomes a formality. When standards are not rigorously maintained, and lack of performance is permitted at the leader level, the effect is that of using only a part of the organisation potential as well as of weakening the command capacities, resulting in the elimination of successful leaders by inefficient ones, and the rapid institutionalisation of mediocrity.

Leadership exists at three main levels: *strategic, operational* and *team*. The successful functioning of any organisation is determined by the existence of effective leaders at all three *leadership* levels. None of the levels is more important than other, the difference between them being a in terms of responsibility while they are the same in terms of value. Therefore, a person can become a strategic leader after being a team leader and then an operational leader – the role of a strategic leader is not to control but to be an *"emphatic artisan"* of organisational culture. The mission of the strategic leader is to develop *leadership* at all subordinate levels.

The strategic leader and the operational leader should remain in contact with real, palpable life: those who work in the field are closest to the problem and that is why the true wisdom is there: one cannot lead people about whom one knows nothing, and one cannot solve problems of which one does not know.

The exchanges and interactions between leaders and subordinates, as levels of leadership change, get materialised in the fact that as the leader advances above the tactical level, the number of people for whom he/she is responsible increases, and the interaction with *"troops"* becomes less and less direct. *Leadership* at battalion level is not similar to *leadership* at general level.

The leader at tactical level is first and foremost a technician, a practitioner, who really takes part in the operation: the interaction between the leader and subordinates is direct, verbal and informal in an operational environment.

The organisation strategic vision requires that a senior leader should deal with problems that are more complex, in conceptual and abstract terms, than the tactical preoccupations of a unit commander. In this context, command is a *more* intellectual activity. Because the large number of people who work for the leaders above the tactical level, these leaders will have less direct contact with the majority of subordinates, therefore direct contact will be more difficult if not impossible. Consequently, a significant responsibility of a senior leader is to create the proper operational and ethical atmosphere so that people could know what is expected.

A senior leader has to firmly stay in contact with the mission being thus more than a generalist who leaves the operation details in the hands of those more familiarised with daily operations: instead of micromanagement, the senior leader should become an expert in what can be called *"climate control"*[2] – the leader controls the climate in the organisation ensuring that his/her vision, values and vitality enter the organisation. It is achieved by defining the leader's vision for the organisation, by presenting it so that everybody can understand it and then repeatedly transmit the message using a variety of means.

The increasingly reduced identification with the organisation objectives may question the leaders ability to make subordinates respect their decisions. Thus, a transition occurs from hierarchical, rigid, structures to network structures, which means another way to see authority. It does not mean that power is abandoned, as the pyramidal structure remains, but the pyramid is lateralised, becoming more levelled, as intermediary links are eliminated. We witness a decentralisation process that entails the transfer of decision-making power to one or more subordinates, the leader being responsible for their decisions. The role of the leader in the command and control process continues to be essential, but the way in which he/she exercises authority should be adapted

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[2] The concept of *"climate control"* includes work delegation and subordinates empowerment so that the mission can be accomplished (A.N.).

to the current reality in which combat actions (especially those related to crisis management) are based on activities that are specific to tactical level more than to operational or strategic ones. It is not about diluting command and control or renouncing the leader's basic responsibilities but about distributing them correctly depending on hierarchical levels. Therefore, a change in the *leadership* mentality is required, from that based on coercive and authoritarian principles to the decentralised one: at strategic level – clear objectives, at tactical level – more freedom of action. The people who act in the field are closer to the problem and, that is why, there is the true wisdom. Last but not least, the delegation of authority to the lowest level encourages responsibility, initiative, creativity and action. An organisation in which vision, policy and orientation are, to a large extent, preponderantly imposed and accordingly executed rather than created and shared by the majority of its members is ineffectively established to meet this century challenges that become increasingly real.

English version by
✑ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

NEGOTIATION, COMMUNICATION AND DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS RESOLUTION

Captain (AF) BEng Stelian TEODORESCU

Security and Insecurity in the Context of Globalisation and Transnationalism

Globalisation, which became a famous concept at the end of the 20th century, continues to dominate the political, economic, social discourse, and most of all the one regarding the field of *security*.

The realities and challenges that have influenced the latest decades through an evolution characterised by an accentuated dynamic and a high level of unpredictability have generated intense international debates on this phenomenon that has divided the world in followers and enemies of globalisation.

The current security environment, starting from the level of each state up to the regional and world one, is under a strong and permanent interaction, many times characterised by profound and often surprising (through their consequences) changes. The world has become more and more complex, witnessing the progressive increase in the level of interdependency between states in terms of security management, which leads to the impossibility of any international actor to manage the evolution of risks and threats on their own.

Captain (AF) BEng Stelian Teodorescu – the Ministry of National Defence.

It seems that our current situation imposes certain limits on politics and, implicitly, on state and its power *(disappearance, resurgence or transformation)*, this becoming an issue that needs to be rigorously and thoroughly analysed if an effective way is to be pursued in the field contemporary international relations. In fact, it has become very clear that risks, threats go beyond national borders, the interests of states being dominated and even sometimes questioned by *transnational* ones.

Currently, ethnic or religious extremism, international organised crime, terrorism, illegal arms trafficking, illegal migration, massive refugee flows from conflict zones and environmental disasters pose a potential threat to the national security of any state, and it is important to underline that risks and threats go beyond national borders, turning into *transnational risks and threats*.

International security comprises all these factors that have a direct influence on the structure of a national system. In this context, *one witnesses more and more the increase in the influence of international security on national security as a result of the growing role of the global community in managing crises of any kind and anywhere in the world.*

An eloquent example in this respect is the *terrorist threat*, which has become a systematic concern for most of the world's states. Another example is insecurity generated by instability in various regions of the world, such as the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, North Africa and, more recently, Crimea, which are marked by armed conflicts that have prompted the world community to intervene in solving them, to prevent the risk that they expand by involving the states in the vicinity of these conflicts.

As we can see, we can fully point out that globalisation and, implicitly, transnationalism, both as phenomena and as processes, have a significant impact on security policies adopted by one state or another at national level, as well as at regional and international level.

Conflict Resolution in the Context of their New Typology and the Concept of Collective Security

The typology of the conflicts that marked the period after 1990 points out a greater complexity of the notion of conflict. Thus, the notion

of *conflict* proposed by L. Coser[1], widely spread in Western states, is a struggle for values and for claiming a certain status, for power and resources, in which the purpose of one of the parties involved is neutralising, damaging or eliminating the opponent.

In the studies regarding contemporary conflict research in the Western states, we can identify a direction for studying conflicts and another direction, aimed at studying the ways/solutions for solving conflicts in case of military escalation, in this context the conflicts being classified in several categories, as follows:

- *open and latent;*
- *constructive and destructive;*
- *short- and long-term;*
- *real and unreal;*
- *local, regional and international etc.*

Without making a distinction between the international conflict and the interstate conflict, K. Wright provides a broad definition for the international conflict as being *"those relations between states that can exist at all levels and in different proportions"*[2], in such a context being identified four stages in the evolution of the conflict:

1) recognition of incompatibility;
2) increase in the level of tension;
3) increasing pressure, without the use of the military force;
4) the war.

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[1] Lewis Coser (born in Berlin, on 27 November 1913, died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 8 July 2003) was a German-American sociologist, who served as the 66th President of the American Sociological Association, in 1975. Coser was the first sociologist who tried to reunite structural functionalism and conflict theory. His work focused on finding the functions of social conflict. Together with Georg Simmel, Coser argued that conflict might serve to solidify a loosely structured group. In a society that seems to be disintegrating, conflict with another society, inter-group conflict, may restore the integrative core. For example, the cohesiveness of Israeli Jews might be attributed to the long-standing conflict with the Arabs. Conflict with one group may also serve to produce cohesion by leading to a series of alliances with other groups.

[2] Radj Cărbune, politolog, *Esenţa şi dinamica conflictelor internaţionale*, https://radjcarbune. wordpress.com/2011/03/15/esenta-si-dinamica-conflictelor-internationale/.

Analysed through a much more limited approach, it can be appreciated that an international conflict can be defined as the situation in which states set up action plans against each other.

The object of the conflict can be any element of the material world and of the social reality, being necessary that this element could be located at the crossroads of the interests that are connected with various problems of social interest, i.e. individuals, professional groups or other groups classified according to criteria related to nation, age or religion or any other groups, either collective ones or associations, including interstate unions built on economic, political or military criteria.

As a result, the following stages can be highlighted in the dynamics of these conflicts: *latent conflict, manifest conflict (which includes the incident, the conflict escalation, the balancing of contradictions), conflict resolution, conflict aftermath.*

In essence, a conflict is incompatibility, clash of interests, disagreement *(antagonistic interests, dispute or violent discussion)*, the model of development and settlement involving five distinct stages:

1. identification and recognition of disagreement;

2. confrontation;

3. escalation;

4. de-escalation;

5. settlement.

In such a complex typology of conflicts that can occur in different fields or on different levels – political, ethnic, territorial, interfaith, interstate etc., the *methods* or *tactics of conflict de-escalation* are as complex and diversified as conflict situations. However, we can try to reduce their classification to four types:

1) the conflict avoidance tactics;

2) the use of force tactics or the violent method;

3) the unilateral or adaptation concessions method;

4) the compromise or collaboration tactics.

Therefore, conflict resolution/settlement in a rapidly evolving security environment is therefore a multidisciplinary issue, the solution of which requires the identification of answers to a large number

of questions, most of them being newly emerging questions concerning international relations.

As a consequence, it is important to point out that, once problems start to be global, their settlement must also become *"global"*. A clarifying example is the concept of *"global governance"*, which could mean applying a common policy at global level and an adapted response.

History has shown after 1990 that conflict resolution largely depends on their recognition, and in such a context, *"global governance"* can fill the gap regarding the lack of regulation and cooperation between states at international level – the state preserving its own regulatory functions – and foster the emergence of new political forms by strengthening international organisations and increasing their involvement.

The diversity and complexity of the notions that can be used in defining and classifying conflicts, as well as in identifying the optimal methods, techniques and tactics to solve them pro-actively or reactively have led to various approaches in the research of this phenomenon. Otherwise, efforts are made to extract the essence of the conflict from the *"human nature"*, a major interest being shown in analysing the emotional, psycho-physiological status of the participants during all stages of conflict evolution, as well as in identifying, explaining and understanding their actions, which is an essential element in choosing solutions for conflict resolution.

Raymond Claude Ferdinand Aron[3] and Kenneth Ewart Boulding[4], two leading personalities, believe that the essence of the conflict is directly related to the consciousness of the participants in the conflict. Aron points out that two entities are in conflict when they tend to possess the same goods or achieve incompatible goals. In this context, the great scientist emphasises that *invasion wars are becoming less advantageous and too risky,*

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[3] Raymond Claude Ferdinand Aron (1905-1983) was a famous French philosopher, sociologist, journalist and political researcher. He is known for his 1955 book *The Opium of the Intellectuals*.

[4] Kenneth Ewart Boulding (1910-1993) was an American economist educator, peace activist, poet, systems scientist and interdisciplinary philosopher. He was known for his participation in numerous research projects in economics and social sciences.

but this does not bring about a radical change in a basic feature of international relations, which is the legitimacy of the use of force by international actors. In the same context, Aron stresses that *"peace is impossible, war is improbable"*[5], according to him, conflict being a normal state for international relations.

Boulding writes that *"conflict may be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions, and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other"*[6].

Considering the more-and-more-difficult-to-predict evolutions of the security environment (starting from the national one to the regional and international one, which are levels that are also in a permanent interaction), which have generated deep and often surprising changes, we can identify both the positive and the negative functions of conflicts, their features being largely dependent upon the social structure of the actors involved.

In open and democratic societies, *conflict* is perceived as a *perfectly natural phenomenon, and, certainly, there are ways, procedures, techniques or tactics to solve conflict situations.* Conflict is seen as a phenomenon that contributes to simulating the dynamics of evolution of society, therefore generating social progress. In closed and totalitarian societies, *conflict is not recognised, and the only way to settle it is the use of force.*

In this context, the following are promoted at international level: security dialogue, joint crisis management, creation of cooperation systems based on reciprocal limitations or joint action capacities, use of common standards when dealing with challenges, including terrorism and, of late, illegal migration.

As a consequence, one can firmly state that an essential element when dealing with conflict settlement is the level reached in the process of communication/compatibility/incompatibility between states, this level

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[5] Radj Cărbune, *op. cit.*
[6] *Ibid.*

being dependent upon the frequency, speed, consistency, importance and level of trust of contacts/interaction, all these indicators being on a scale from zero to an ideal situation *(multiple and consistent interaction)*.

Communication in the Negotiation Process

Communication lies at the heart of social organisation, mediating between the horizontal and vertical relationships between people, as well as engaging their aspirations in an upward movement towards the higher levels of the existence of societies.

Communication can be understood as a set of physical and psychological processes by which connection is established with one or more people with the view to achieving certain goals.

The communication process is based on four fundamental components: *the transmitter, the channel, the information and the receiver*, the essence of the process consisting in the transfer of the information from the transmitter to the receiver. This elementary model needs to be expanded, because communication is a two-way process that never ends with simply receiving information. One should definitely not overlook the *feedback*, because communication takes place only in order to obtain a response and establish the following actions accordingly. In interpersonal relationships, the feedback enables the adjustment of the transmitter's behaviour depending on the verbal or nonverbal response from the interlocutor, this adjustment being made immediately after receiving the response or after a certain period of time. The *message, as the basic unit of communication*, is in fact located at the crossroads of communication and representation of reality and may consist of written or spoken words, visual images, music, sounds, signs, symbols, colours, gestures etc.

The theory of human communication has been used in negotiations ever since its appearance. At international level, although the negotiation process is completed by written communications, verbal communication plays a fundamental role in terms of both the space it occupies *(the selection phase, the actual negotiations, the period of drafting the clauses of the agreements,*

post-negotiation activity etc.) and the content *(the essential elements that are the subject of the negotiations are established through direct dialogue)*.

In this context, it is important to point out that negotiation can be defined *as a main form of communication*, a complex of processes, activities, consisting of contacts, meetings, consultations, negotiations between two or more partners in order to reach an understanding.

Through communication, the modern human beings analyse both themselves and the dialogue partners with which they interact and, ultimately, can identify their own way of investigating and analysing the surrounding environment.

The negotiation process bears the distinctive mark of human behaviour and refers to a situation in which two or more entities interact with a view to reaching an acceptable solution in the context of several disagreements. While one must not ignore the social context in which the negotiations are placed, the basic notions *(the strategy adopted, techniques and tactics)* used in the negotiation process should not be omitted also.

Negotiations usually take place on a face-to-face basis at the negotiating table. A series of processes are achieved through verbal communication, such as: *obtaining and transmitting information, drafting proposals, expressing opinions, determining the disagreement and the level of compatibility/incompatibility, with its effects of blocking or postponing negotiations etc.*

Negotiation starts from the fact that each party has direct and indirect needs and interests that must be met, but each time the partners have tacitly considered their mutual desires, the negotiation has ended successfully, following the win-win principle and subsequent contacts have been able to continue under favourable auspices. Yet, when the interests/needs of a party have been ignored and the negotiation has been just a game, with a *winner* and a *loser*, its results seem to be transactions whose conditions have not been set at the beginning of the negotiations.

Specialists in the field point out systematically the fact that a successful negotiation is based on the following principles:

> 1. *to recognise the value of the relation between the people engaged in negotiation;*

2. to have the mutual desire to maintain this relation;

3. to be actively involved in the negotiating process;

4. to show respect for the values, needs and purposes of the partner;

5. to search a solution capable of satisfying both parties involved in negotiation.

A successful negotiation is all the more important since it is part of the category of non-jurisdictional (diplomatic) peaceful means of conflict resolution, alongside other means, such as good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation.

Negotiation is a simple diplomatic means and one of the oldest and most used ones in the peaceful settlement of disputes between states and it does not involve the intervention of a third party. Basically, it implies talks that take place between the parties in dispute/conflict and are meant to reach a settlement to settle the dispute/resolve the conflict. The essential role currently played by negotiations in diplomatic practice, as compared to other methods, derives from the fact that, given their direct nature and the immediate contact between the parties involved, negotiations provide additional possibilities to identify converging points of view, making it possible for all obstacles or hardships to be overcome with patience, tact and understanding, as well as for solutions acceptable to all parties involved to be found.

A very important aspect of the science of negotiations is *to know when to stop*. In all negotiations, there is a so-called *"critical point"*, after which relations can become uncontrollable and destructive. During the cooperative process, a good negotiator will know when the critical point is near and will know to stop before it is reached.

Diplomacy vs. Force Policy in conflict resolution

Among the many definitions of diplomacy, considered by some art and by some science, we will refer to the one according to which *diplomacy* is *the science of relations and interests between states* or *the art of reconciling the peoples' interests with each other*, therefore, in a simpler way, it is the *science or the art of negotiation*. Strictly speaking, diplomacy is not a science, like mathematics, for instance, just as one cannot determine how close it is to art.

From a scientific perspective, the object of diplomacy is to study the political or legal relations between various states, as well as the interests they generate.

As an art, the object of diplomacy is the management of international affairs, which implies the ability to arrange and conduct political negotiations.

Today, we can talk not only about state diplomacy, but also about the diplomacy of coalitions, groups or international associations. Therefore, diplomacy is expanding its range of action, taking on a new, modern sense, totally different from old diplomacy.

Negotiations and diplomacy have evolved from simple practical solutions to the sophisticated epistemological classification of today. The common observation that needs to be pointed out is that negotiation, related to diplomacy *(theoretically and practically)*, has taught and imposed on people *"the exercise of patience"* or *"the tactics of winning with the weapons of the adversary"*. In fact, both of them *(diplomacy and negotiation)* require tactics and strategies that can influence not only the international political field, but, through foreign policy *(with broad basic negotiations)*, they can also generate crucial changes for the whole of humanity.

In the 20th century, in 1956 approximately, in a political dictionary, Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjold coined the term *"preventive diplomacy"*, probably thinking (after the end of the Second World War) that it was about time that states and nations prevented conflicts and did not wait for misunderstandings, even minor ones, to occur in order to wage wars. Perhaps, nowadays, when some socio-political changes can influence peaceful decisions and negotiations, psychologists and sociologists can change and influence positively conducts, individual attitudes, decisions etc.

It could be said that, for many international actors, the concept of *"preventive diplomacy"* has remained a simple term in a dictionary, since many conflicts have been generated and made worse among different nations, which has contributed to the regional and international security situation unbalance.

We can include in this context those conflicts that are inefficiently managed and degenerate into wars in many cases and are caused by the superficial understanding of religions and cultures that create transcultural internal identities. As a result, Herbert Marshall McLuhan's[7] famous *"global village"* vision seems contradicted by the development of strong *(local)* religious and ethnic areas in many regions around the globe, which have significant potential for generating conflicts difficult to predict and manage.

Thus, regional and global security has become the responsibility of the leaders of all the states in the world equally, with more and more varied specialists being involved. That is why, a set of relevant concepts, methods and possible ways to follow for proactive conflict resolution have been proposed and established so that a general disaster does not strike:

- capitalising on early warnings and implementing the most efficient and effective actions to prevent conflict escalation;
- acquiring and improving conflict communication, negotiation and mediation skills in order to avoid security imbalances anywhere in the world;
- facilitating reconciliations through diplomatic negotiations and actions to resolve conflicts;
- building a prevention culture through negotiation within the framework of diplomacy.

As a result, we can undeniably point out that it has become very clear that collective security is based on the premise that threats can arise both from the inside and from the outside, and the pro-active conflict resolution process and the avoidance of danger could be less critical than preparing the response to the threats caused by a certain incompatibility with own military capabilities. In this context, regional or world security, which is basically a summation of the security of economic, ethnic, state and other entities, is built through the involvement of states on the basis

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[7] Herbert Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980) was a Canadian professor and philosopher, known for coining the expression *"the medium is the message"* and the term *"global village"*.

of the concept of *"common regional or global issues – solutions through cooperation at regional or global level"* in countering current risks and threats.

Conclusions

The disappearance of certain subjects of international law and the appearance of new ones, as well as the new international security context point out the need for permanently adapting to the efficient and effective approach to the newest and most important issues of the current security international environment.

Through the transformations carried out, it is necessary for a response to be given to the current international reality, which requires both to proactively know and understand the causes, evolution, unpredictability and dimensions of the effects generated by the new types of conflicts, and to permanently update the national and international legal system to meet the new political, economic, military and security realities of today.

One essential element could be that the relationships between state and non-state actors, as well as the connections between the strategies, techniques, tactics and mechanisms of each entity are channelled coherently, efficiently and effectively in order to prevent and settle various conflicts and crisis.

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(III)

IMPROVING CAPABILITIES

NATO's modern defence posture is based on an effective combination of cutting-edge weapons systems and platforms and forces trained to work together seamlessly. As important as it is that Allies invest in defence, it is also critical that those funds are invested in the right capabilities. NATO plays an important role in assessing what capabilities the Alliance needs, setting targets for national or collective development of capabilities,

and facilitating national, multinational and collective capability development and innovation.

The NATO Defence Planning Process continues to be the primary means to identify and prioritise required capabilities and to promote their development and acquisition. At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies agreed to further enhance their ability to meet their commitments and introduced a range of measures to respond to the evolving security environment. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, Allied leaders confirmed their commitment to delivering heavier and more high-end forces and capabilities as well as more forces at higher readiness.

Exercises

Exercises help the Alliance to test its thinking, procedures, systems and tactics. They help prepare NATO to respond to security challenges, to adapt to new security environments, and to ensure the readiness of the Alliance to defend and protect all its members. Exercises are also an important element of deterrence, not only helping NATO to develop capabilities but also demonstrating its credibility.

NATO seeks at all times to be transparent and predictable, in accordance with international obligations. Exercise schedules are published months in advance on NATO's website[1]. NATO members

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[1] www.shape.nato.int/exercises

strictly abide by their commitments on arms control and confidence and security measures, and they regularly go further, for example, by offering observation opportunities for international organisations or non-member countries. They also often announce in advance small-scale exercises that fall below the notification threshold set by the Vienna Document on military transparency.

In 2016, NATO conducted 107 exercises and was associated with 139 national exercises. These exercises varied in scope, duration and form, ranging from live exercises involving thousands of troops and heavy equipment to computer-assisted exercises that took place in classrooms. As in 2015, about one third of the exercises were part of the assurance measures associated with the Readiness Action Plan.

Military exercises are also essential for testing how the military elements, units, command posts and equipment from NATO and partner nations work together in the air, on the ground, and at sea. In this way, exercises are an essential tool for increasing interoperability. Seventeen high-level exercises were open to partners in 2016. International organisations, including the European Union, were also invited to observe NATO exercises.

Crisis Management Exercise 2016

Crisis management is one of NATO's three core tasks. The objective of the annual Crisis Management Exercise is to help prepare the Alliance to respond quickly and effectively to possible crises by rehearsing different scenarios and testing internal processes and protocols. In line with the Readiness Action Plan, the Crisis Management Exercise 2016 tested a recently introduced method for enhanced consultation and quicker decision-making in the NATO Crisis Management Process. No forces were deployed during this table-top exercise. It was based on a fictitious but realistic crisis scenario on collective defence and included challenges posed by hybrid warfare tactics. Finland and Sweden participated as partners in the exercise, while European Union staff participated as observers.

Key NATO and Allied multinational exercises in 2016

INFORMATION	DATE	LOCATION
DYNAMIC MANTA NATO exercise testing anti-submarine warfare capabilities. More than 5,000 sailors from eight NATO nations participated, including France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.	22 February – 4 March	Ionian Sea
COLD RESPONSE Multinational exercise showcasing Allies' ability to conduct operations in extreme weather conditions. This exercise included land, maritime and air assets, with more than 15,000 troops from 12 NATO nations as well as partners Finland and Sweden.	17 – 28 March	Norway
BRILLIANT JUMP ALERT 16 The first in a series of four exercises testing the core elements of the NATO Response Force. It tested the activation process of NATO's Spearhead Force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The exercise involved numerous military headquarters and units in Albania, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom.	1 – 10 April	Albania, Poland, Spain, UK
RAMSTEIN ALLOY This multinational air exercise focused on enhancing interoperability among Allies and with partners, as well as exercising Baltic Air Policing aircraft. It involved air assets from Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as partners Finland and Sweden.	19 – 20 April	Estonia

INFORMATION	DATE	LOCATION
STEADFAST ALLIANCE The exercise trained the Alliance's Ballistic Missile Defence structure, including planning and decision-making processes at all levels. Seven NATO nations participated: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom.	18 – 29 April	Multiple locations
FLAMING SWORD A multinational exercise testing Special Operations Forces from NATO nations and partners, including Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.	1 – 20 May	Latvia, Lithuania
BRILLIANT JUMP DEPLOY 16 This exercise trained NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) to quickly deploy where needed. It tested the deployment of the VJTF's land elements, from their home location in Spain to the Zagan Military Training Area in Poland. Around 2,500 troops participated.	17 – 26 May	Poland
SWIFT RESPONSE This US-led land and air exercise focused on crisis response training and interoperability. Around 9,000 troops from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States participated.	27 May – 26 June	Germany, Poland
BALTOPS 16 This US-led multinational exercise focused on interoperability with regional partner nations in the maritime, air and land domains. Around 5,800 troops participated, including from Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway,	3 – 26 June	Baltic Sea

INFORMATION	DATE	LOCATION
Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as partners Finland and Sweden.		
IRON WOLF This Lithuanian-led land training exercise involved NATO Allies Denmark, France, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and the United States. Around 5,000 troops participated.	6 – 19 June	Lithuania
SABER STRIKE This US-led land exercise focused on interoperability and involved around 9,000 troops. Participating NATO nations included Canada, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States.	2 – 14 June	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
ANAKONDA This was the largest Allied exercise in 2016, involving around 31,000 troops, including air and land forces. The Polish-led exercise tested the readiness and interoperability of Polish Armed Forces with 18 participating Allies and five partners. This long-planned defensive exercise was one in a series which occurs every two years.	7 – 17 June	Poland
DYNAMIC MONGOOSE This was an annual NATO-led anti-submarine warfare exercise. It involved naval and air forces from Canada, France, Germany, Poland, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as host nation Norway. Nine surface ships, four submarines and four maritime patrol aircraft participated.	20 June – 1 July	North Sea

INFORMATION	DATE	LOCATION
FLAMING THUNDER 2016 This annual Lithuanian-led live-fire exercise focused on artillery and mortar fire training. It involved troops from Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and the United States.	1 – 12 August	Lithuania
TOBRUK LEGACY This multinational exercise focused on integrating Allied air and missile defence systems. NATO Allies the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and the United States participated.	19 – 30 September	Slovakia
JOINT WARRIOR 16 This UK-led multinational exercise involved warships, aircraft, marines and troops. Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 and Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group 1 participated.	6 – 16 October	Scotland
NOBLE ARROW This multinational air exercise focused on enhancing the interoperability of NATO forces in air operations and increasing the readiness of the NATO Response Force air components.	8 – 12 October	United Kingdom (West Coast of Scotland, North Atlantic, North Sea)
TRIDENT JUNCTURE 16 This multinational exercise aimed to train the troops of the NATO Response Force and other Allied forces to increase their readiness to respond to a wide range of challenges. The exercise also tested the VJTF.	24 October – 3 November	Italy

Capability Delivery

Many of the capabilities required to address today's challenges can be very expensive when pursued by individual countries. Multinational approaches to capability delivery not only distribute the costs

but can also benefit from economies of scale. For NATO, multinational cooperation remains an important means of delivering the capabilities that Allies need. NATO actively supports Allies in the identification, launch and implementation of such cooperation.

Highlights of these efforts in 2016 include:

- Under the Smart Defence umbrella – an initiative launched in 2012 to facilitate multinational capability delivery – Allies completed four projects in 2016, bringing the total number of projects completed to 12.

- Through the complementary Evolved Approach to Multinational Cooperation, NATO is pursuing a political, top-down approach to fast-track new capability cooperation efforts. This work yielded important results in 2016:

- Eight Allies signed a Memorandum of Understanding in February 2016 to acquire air-to-ground Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM), with a ninth Ally joining in October. The participating Allies have already launched the first round of multinational procurement for delivery in 2017-2019 and a second round is expected in 2017.

- In the area of Special Operations Aviation, four Allies built on a broader cooperation initiative launched in 2015 by adopting a common approach to related training. The Chiefs of Defence of Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia signed an arrangement for the creation of a multinational solution for training Special Operations Aviation forces.

- At the Warsaw Summit, Poland and Turkey signed a Letter of Intent on multinational cooperation in the area of airborne escort jamming capabilities, the purpose of which is to increase cooperation to help protect Allied air assets through jamming of enemy radars and missile systems during Alliance missions.

Given the high costs of developing this capability as well as the prospect for modular solutions, multinational cooperation is a compelling option in this area. It is anticipated that more Allies will join this effort in due course.

The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) – the senior NATO committee responsible for the promotion of armaments cooperation – celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2016. The CNAD focuses on enhancing interoperability, facilitating multinational cooperation and overseeing major NATO programmes – including the Ballistic Missile Defence programme and the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance initiative – in order to ensure the delivery of vital capabilities.

Integrated Air and Missile Defence

NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NIAMD) is an essential, continuous mission in peacetime, crisis and conflict. It safeguards and protects Alliance territory, populations and forces against any air or missile threat, and makes an important contribution to the Alliance's deterrence and defence.

In 2016, the Alliance established a conceptual basis for integrating its air and missile defence systems. The new system provides the means for NATO's two IAMD peacetime missions: Air Policing and Ballistic Missile Defence. The implementation of the new Air Command and Control System and the further development of NATO's Ballistic Missile Defence have been important milestones in achieving this.

NATO declared that its Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) had achieved Initial Operational Capability at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, meaning that the Alliance is better able to defend its populations, territory and forces against the increasing threat posed by ballistic missiles from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. A significant portion of the strengthened missile defence capability is represented by the Aegis Ashore site in Romania, which is now capable of 24/7 operations. This asset is complemented by other US BMD elements deployed in Europe, as well as by additional voluntary national contributions offered by European Allies.

The NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) has moved from the procurement and testing phase to the delivery phase. The validation

period involving four countries is expected to be completed in 2017, and the delivery of ACCS to another 11 countries has already begun. The NATO Command Structure is also on course to declare Initial Operational Capability for ACCS in 2017, with a small number of command and control centres already using the system for operations.

Aviation

NATO is consistently adapting its approaches and structures to meet the demands of an evolving security environment. In order to develop a broader and more holistic approach to aviation, incorporating all technical, organisational, procedural and human factors, the North Atlantic Council established the Aviation Committee in January 2016. The Aviation Committee replaces the former Air Traffic Management Committee and is part of a total system approach towards aviation policy. This will contribute to the effectiveness of Allied air missions and to the mitigation of hazards and risks to safety and security in the air.

AWACS Operations in 2016

- NATO E-3A and E-3D components delivered nearly 6,000 hours of battle management/command and control.

- NATO AWACS conducted 448 assurance measures flights and an additional 31 flights as part of the tailored assurance measures for Turkey.

- NATO AWACS provided 290 hours of support for high visibility events including support for the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland in July.

- The first modernised E-3A with glass cockpit was delivered to Geilenkirchen in November.

> - The first E-3A mission in support of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL was flown in October; a total of 22 of these missions were flown in 2016.

In 2016, efforts to implement NATO's airworthiness policy continued, ensuring that all aircraft operating for the Alliance are certified by a recognised airworthiness authority. Another focus area has been the assessment of how civil aviation projects such as the Single European Sky in Europe and the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in the United States could affect the Alliance's missions and capabilities.

NATO has begun work to promote a coherent and consistent approach to unmanned aircraft systems across the Alliance. A new policy is being developed to ensure that NATO has the right organisational structures and cooperation mechanisms among its members, as well as with partners and international organisations.

Airborne Warning and Control System

As NATO's *"eyes in the sky"*, the NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) fleet is a crucial asset for the Alliance – highly mobile and able to respond quickly and effectively to different types of crises all over the world. AWACS support activities include airborne early warning, command and control, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and maritime situational awareness. By offering a full picture of the sky over a vast area, the E-3A capability has played an important role in numerous operations including in the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as in Libya and Afghanistan.

The NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control capability includes 16 NATO E-3A AWACS aircraft, and 16 NATO members currently support the programme.

In response to Russia's aggressive posture on NATO's eastern flank, the AWACS fleet is involved in reassurance measures in and close to the territory of NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe.

These defensive measures are designed to reassure Allied populations and deter potential aggression. On 5 October 2016, NATO AWACS aircraft flew their 1000th patrol mission over Eastern Europe.

In October, AWACS surveillance aircraft were deployed to Turkey to provide support to the Global Coalition forces in their fight against ISIL. The first NATO AWACS flight in support of the Coalition fighting ISIL took place on 20 October 2016. AWACS aircraft also supported Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's maritime counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean.

General characteristics of the Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft:

- Primary function: High-altitude, long-endurance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
- Power plant: Rolls-Royce North America AE 3007H turbofan
- Thrust: 7,600 lbs.
- Wingspan: 130.9 ft. / 39.8 m
- Length: 47.6 ft. / 14.5 m
- Height: 15.3 ft. / 4.7 m
- Weight: 14,950 lbs. / 6,781 kg
- Maximum take-off weight: 32,250 lbs. / 14,628 kg
- Fuel capacity: 17,300 lbs. / 7,847 kg
- Payload: 3,000 lbs. / 1,360 kg
- Speed: 310 knots / 357 mph / 575 kph
- Range: 8,700 nautical miles / 10,112 miles / 16,113 km
- Ceiling: 60,000 ft. / 18,288 m

In Warsaw, NATO leaders agreed that AWACS will continue to be modernised and extended in service until 2035. The modernisation of NATO's AWACS fleet is vital to ensuring the security of all Allies, and will strengthen the Alliance's awareness and capacity for strategic anticipation. NATO is currently working on a successor programme to replace the NATO AWACS fleet in 2035: the Alliance Future Surveillance and Control system.

Alliance Ground Surveillance

NATO's political and military commanders need access to accurate and reliable information. In 2016, NATO made tangible progress on Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), which will be the first NATO-owned and operated Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance system. AGS will perform persistent surveillance over wide areas from remotely piloted aircraft operating at considerable *"stand-off"* distances and in any weather or light conditions. Using advanced radar sensors, the system will be able to continuously detect and track moving objects and provide radar imagery of areas of interest on the ground and at sea. As such, AGS will complement NATO AWACS, which already monitors Alliance airspace.

The AGS programme represents an excellent example of transatlantic cooperation, thanks to the multinational industrial cooperation on which the programme has been founded. The AGS Core capability is being acquired by 15 Allies: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States.

The AGS Core will be an integrated system consisting of air, ground and support segments. The air segment includes five Global Hawk aircraft. The first NATO Global Hawk took off for its maiden flight in Palmdale, California in December 2015, followed by further test flights in June, July, and December 2016. The first NATO Global Hawk is expected to fly from the US to its new home in Sigonella in Italy in 2017.

## *Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance*

The Alliance has long recognised the fundamental importance of Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) to its strategic preparedness and the success of its operations and missions. However, lessons drawn from recent operations have highlighted NATO's limitations when it comes to building and sharing a common picture based on data collected by a wide variety of JISR assets.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) plays a vital role in all military operations. Information and intelligence gained from surveillance and reconnaissance missions help decision-makers to make informed, timely and accurate judgments. While surveillance and reconnaissance can help to answer the questions *"what"*, *"when"* and *"where"*, the combined elements of various ISR sources and disciplines provide the answers to *"how"* and *"why"*. Joint ISR is the combination of all these elements.

2016 was an important year for NATO's JISR capability. In February 2016, Allied Defence Ministers declared Initial Operational Capability for JISR. Initial Operational Capability is organised along three pillars: enhancing interconnectivity across NATO systems, improving training and expertise among NATO personnel, and implementing procedures for information handling and sharing. This milestone represents a significant achievement. By improving proficiency in collecting, processing and exchanging intelligence, the system can provide enhanced situational awareness for the NATO Response Force.

The JISR trial Unified Vision 2016 in June built upon these achievements and further evaluated and demonstrated the breadth of JISR missions. The trial involved over 400 participants from 17 countries and took place at ten different locations, including live and simulated JISR assets.

In October, Luxembourg announced that it will provide resources for the acquisition of servers to support the automated sharing of JISR information in a coalition environment. These servers will be fully owned and operated by NATO.

Unified Vision 2016

17 countries, 400 people, 380 workstations, 30 exploitation systems, 15 collection sensor systems, 10 dissemination & storage systems, 2 command & control systems

Locations: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. The command post was hosted by the United States Air Forces in Europe Warrior Preparation Center in Germany. Technical and subject-matter expertise was provided by the NATO Communications and Information Agency.

Live assets included the US Global Hawk, the Romanian Hirrus, and the Belgian B-Hunter remotely piloted air systems. A Danish Combat Support Ship also took part in the trial.

Facilitating National Capability Development

The overwhelming majority of military capabilities available for NATO operations are provided by NATO members. While national capability development is a sovereign responsibility, NATO plays an important supporting role in facilitating national capability development and delivery.

In 2016, thousands of national experts gathered to exchange information, develop NATO standards, engage in cooperative trials and demonstrations, identify opportunities for multinational approaches and advance existing multinational efforts. This takes place primarily within the committee structure under the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and the Military Committee and includes work undertaken within the Science and Technology Organization. These communities maintain and regularly update a portfolio of over 570 standards that provide NATO forces with the interoperability they need to work together efficiently and effectively.

> **Notable progress in 2016:**
>
> - In the land domain, progress was made in the areas of soldier-to-soldier situational awareness, jammers against radio-controlled improvised explosive devices, improving the ability of NATO forces to operate in degraded visual environments, and augmented reality for armoured vehicle survivability.
>
> - In the maritime domain, NATO developed standards that will enable the first digital underwater communications network, which among other things will provide vastly improved support to autonomous and unmanned maritime capabilities. NATO also promoted multiple efforts to reduce shipbuilding costs while increasing operational flexibility and interoperability through modular ship design initiatives.
>
> - In the air domain, the Alliance continued to improve aircraft survivability through trials on countering infra-red and radar-guided threats; efforts related to air-to-air refuelling; work on the development of the NATO Suppression of Enemy Air Defence capability; further development of ISR interoperability through the Unified Vision trial; and improvements to an Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) capability through continued development of NATO standards and a NATO UAS Policy.

Anti-Submarine Warfare

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) is a key capability area in which NATO is pursuing quantitative and qualitative improvements in order to keep pace with the evolving threat environment. In 2016, NATO initiated an effort to develop a more consistent, structured and coordinated approach to enhance the understanding across NATO of all ongoing and planned efforts related to ASW, as well as their interdependence. This effort highlighted the need for a concept that would help define a common *"direction of travel"* to better align NATO and national initiatives.

Other NATO ASW-related efforts in 2016 included:

- support to seven multinational cooperation projects
- experimentation and testing of innovative ASW solutions (for instance next-generation sonar and underwater gliders)
- development and maintenance of more than ten standards and doctrinal products
- sponsorship of over 20 science & technology and industry research projects
- conduct of seven large-scale NATO and multinational ASW exercises

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In the fourth part of the report, Mr. Stoltenberg writes about the need for projecting stability, pointing out NATO's support for Iraq, the fight against ISIL, the work in Afghanistan, the security at sea, the capacity-building efforts in Kosovo and the moral imperative of protecting civilians from the effects of armed conflict.

10 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT NATO

1. Collective defence: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is group of 29 countries from Europe and North America. NATO exists to protect the people and territory of its members. If one NATO ally is attacked, then all NATO allies are attacked. This is called *"collective defence"*, and is the foundation of our Alliance. When terrorists attacked the United States on 9/11 2001, all NATO allies stood with America as though they too had been attacked. Since 2014, NATO has implemented the biggest increase in its collective defence since the Cold War. For instance, we have now deployed four multinational battlegroups to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. We do this not to provoke a conflict, but to prevent a conflict.

Allied forces training during NATO Exercise Trident Juncture 2015

Source: Fact Sheet, June 2017, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_06/20170628_1706-10things-eng.pdf

2. Managing crises around the world: Promoting stability in our neighbourhood and protecting our people at home sometimes means taking action further afield. In the 1990s, NATO stopped further bloodshed in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Since 2003, NATO has helped to ensure that Afghanistan is no longer a safe haven for international terrorists. NATO has helped to prevent piracy off the Horn of Africa and, since 2016, has helped to address the refugee and migrant crisis in Europe.

3. Fighting Terrorism: NATO plays an important role in fighting terrorism. More than 13,000 NATO troops are training local forces in Afghanistan. NATO is now a full member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and our AWACS surveillance aircraft support the Coalition. NATO is training Iraqi forces to better fight ISIS. NATO's new Intelligence Division helps us to anticipate and respond to threats. NATO is also setting up a *"Hub for the South"* in Naples to help allies tackle the threat of terrorism.

4. Working with our partners: Threats like terrorism, piracy and cyber warfare know no borders. That is why NATO works with over 40 partner countries around the world, as well as organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union, to spread stability and security.

5. Troops and Equipment: Whenever NATO decides to carry out a mission, allies commit troops and equipment to be placed under NATO command. They become known as *"NATO forces"*. The only military equipment that NATO owns is a fleet of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control) surveillance aircraft. NATO is also developing a capability for Global Hawk surveillance drones.

6. NATO's Command Structure: With so many countries working together, having a clear chain of command is vital. Military and civilian personnel from all member states work together every day within NATO's *"Command Structure"*. This includes two top-level Strategic

NATO troops train and advise the Afghan National Army

Commands: Allied Command Operations based in Mons in Belgium; and Allied Command Transformation, based in Norfolk in United States.

7. NATO funding: Every NATO country contributes to the costs of running the Alliance. By far the biggest contribution comes from allies' taking part in NATO-led missions and operations. For example, one country might provide fighter jets, while another provides ships or troops. NATO allies also pay directly to NATO to cover the costs of NATO staff and buildings, its Command Structure, and its jointly-owned equipment, like its AWACS aircraft.

8. Defence Spending: At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO allies pledged to invest more and better in defence – to stop the cuts; move towards spending 2% of GDP on defence by 2024; and to spend 20% of that on major equipment. We are making progress. In 2015, we saw a real increase in national defence spending across European Allies and Canada. In 2016, this continued and, in 2017, we foresee an even greater annual real increase of 4.3%. This means, over the last three years,

***Image from Locked Shields 2017,
the world's largest cyber defence exercise, in Estonia.***

European allies and Canada have spent almost 46 billion US dollars more on defence.

9. The *"Open Door"*: Any country in the Euro-Atlantic area is free to join NATO if it is prepared to meet the standards and obligations of membership, and to contribute to the security of the Alliance. Since 1949, NATO's membership has grown from 12 to 29 countries. This year, we welcomed Montenegro as our 29th member of the NATO Alliance.

10. Cyber Defence: Cyber-attacks are becoming more common, sophisticated and damaging. Cyber defence is now a top priority for NATO. NATO now recognises cyberspace as an "operational domain" – just like land, sea and air. NATO helps allies to boost their cyber defences by sharing information about threats, investing in education and training, and through exercises. NATO also has cyber defence experts that can be sent to help allies under attack.

THE POST-BREXIT EUROPEAN UNION
What Are Our Geopolitical Perspectives? (I)

Dr Pierre VERLUISE

1957-2017. The European Union – assessment and geopolitical perspectives. As the month of March 2017 was marked by the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, Pierre Verluise asks: has the time of "European deconstruction" and disappearance of the European Union come? He responds in an argumentative way, by considering the major parameters: territory, population, economy and strategy. His study integrates the effects of "Brexit", which can have an accelerating effect.

Has the time of *"European deconstruction"* and disappearance of the European Union come?

After six decades of European construction and seven successive enlargements, the consultative referendum of 23 June 2016 concerning the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union sees a breaking point. How does this event fit into the profound forces already at work in favour of the relative disappearance of the European Union, the effects of which could still be considerably accentuated by a *"Brexit"* that has already become effective?

For those who are concerned about the influence – namely, the power – of the European Union in the world, it is necessary to distinguish

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between appearances and dynamics. The seven successive enlargements of the European Community have resulted in a significant territorial expansion. Started in 1957 with six countries with a total area of 1.3 million sq km, the European Economic Community (EEC) expands to nine countries in 1973, reaching 1.7 million sq km. The second, third and fourth enlargements of 1981, 1986 and 1995 increase the area of what becomes the European Union in 1992 to 1.8 then 2.3 and 3.2 million sq km. Finally, the fifth, sixth and seventh enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013 lead these successive configurations to 3.9, then 4.3 and 4.5 million sq km[1]. This territorial expansion could be understood as a sign of a rising power.

These numbers fully demonstrate the attractiveness of the European Union since this expansion has taken place peacefully, with the agreement of the integrated populations... although it has often lacked public debate and referendum consultations among its member states. In the aftermath of the integration of ten new countries in 2004, the movement has generated an *"enlargement fatigue"*, in particular. In fact, for a long time already, the political underpinning of the European integration has been eroding. In a way, the European Community has been built in reverse, starting with the technical-administrative domain, circumventing the political one, which comes back as a boomerang.

This is reflected in the increasing non-participation in the elections for the European Parliament. From 1979 to 2009, without exception, the seven ballots for the European Parliament are characterised by an increase in absenteeism, gradually, from 38.01% in 1979 to 56.92% in 2009. However, within three decades, the European Parliament has moved from a purely consultative body to being an important co-legislative institution. In addition, the number of voting countries has increased,

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[1] Yves Doutriaux and Christian Lequesne, *Les institutions de l'Union européenne après la crise de l'euro*, coll. Réflexe Europe, Paris, La Documentation française, Paris, 2013, p. 44.

but the downward trend in participation persists, weakening the political footing of the project. The elections for the European Parliament in May 2014 put an end to the decline in the participation, which stands at 43.09%, placing the abstention at 56.91%. In other words, the European Parliament elected in 2014 is the fourth to be elected consecutively, since 1999, by less than 50% of the people who registered to vote, but the first since 1979 to stop the rise in abstention.

Yet, this vote results in the breakthrough of Eurosceptic, even Europhobic parties, especially in the United Kingdom, Denmark, France and Italy. Since 2008, with the economic and financial crisis adding to previous doubts, the support of public opinion for the European project is gradually fading in some countries, as witnessed by the rise of anti-European parties in the 2014 European elections. What the *"Brexit"* demonstrates is that the populations are less and less interested in this project. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Maastricht Treaty passed narrowly. In 2005, France and the Netherlands put a stop, with their *"no"*, to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for the EU – which was bypassed by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. In 2016, the voters from the UK – and more particularly from England and Wales – voted to leave the EU. This is part of a broader movement of negative referendums in 2015 and 2016 on the European Union, held in Greece, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The EU is fading, the disenchantment is growing. France is no exception. It is part of a general logic of distrust. Citizens are won by a sense of loss of control of the process.

In addition, the territorial extension of the EU must be relativised. At 4.5 million sq km, the EU's 28 member states (EU-28) is still far behind Russia, Canada, China, the United States, Brazil and Australia. The European Union is currently 3.8 times smaller than Russia and half the size of the United States. On the other hand, it is territorially – and politically – much more divided than these two countries with federal organisation.

What would be the territorial effect of *"Brexit"*? If Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty is actually activated by London and the *"Brexit"* reaches its term, the EU will lose 6.66% of its area. It would therefore remain with 93.34%. In other words, the EU's area would decrease from 4.5 million sq km to 4.2 million sq km. The EU would be a little

further away from the countries already mentioned. Beyond these figures, one must certainly emphasise that the United Kingdom is a developed territory, connected to the Commonwealth countries and more broadly to the World system, notably through its financial centre, the City. Its standard of living, measured through the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) is above the EU average by 10 percentage points.

Now let us consider why would the *"Brexit"* highlight the deep forces that already weigh in favour of the break-up of the European Union?

We will answer by successively studying three fundamentals of power: *the population (I), the economy (II)* and *the strategic dimension (III)*.

I. A relative demographic decline

It is necessary to distinguish between the absolute figures and the relative figures (A) and to take into account the possible effects of *"Brexit"* (B) to understand that, despite the migratory contribution, the EU is engaged in a dynamic of relative demographic decline (C).

A. It is necessary to distinguish between the absolute numbers and the relative numbers ...

Through these seven enlargements, the number of inhabitants of the EU has increased mechanically. In 1957, the six founding countries initially had 163 million inhabitants. The first enlargement brought the Community to 240 million, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th enlargements to 260, 310 and 360 million, then the 5th and 6th enlargements to 450 and 485 million inhabitants[2]. After the 7th and last enlargement, taking into account the natural growth of the population in all the member countries, the Union now has 510 million inhabitants. That is more than half a billion, a number that is striking for its importance, but which should not hide two important limitations.

First of all, the European Union remains much less populated than the major Asian emerging countries, China (1.37 billion) and India (1.31) in 2015. The population increase in absolute figures hides a decrease in the relative weight of the Union compared to the rest of the world.

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[2] *Ibid*, p. 44.

Indeed, its total growth rate is very low compared to the world average, which is mainly determined by the population growth in Asia, Latin America and especially Africa. As a result, the relative demographic weight of the European Union is steadily decreasing. This is also true for the United States, but to a lesser extent. When the relative demographic weight of the EU-28[3] area decreases by 85% from 1960 to 2010, that of the United States falls by 38%[4]. The relative collapse in the EU-28 area thus takes place more than twice faster than in the United States.

While the EU-28 area accounts for 13.3% of the world's population in 1960, the EU-28 accounts for only 6.9% of the world's population in 2015. What would be the effects of *"Brexit"*?

B. ... and take into account the possible effects of *"Brexit"*...

The United Kingdom's exit would result in a decrease of its population. It would diminish from 510 million to 443 million, meaning from 6.9% of the world's population to 5.9%[5]. In other words, the EU without the United Kingdom would be less populated than the EU-25 on 1 May 2004 (450 million inhabitants). With an increased excess of deaths over births and a lower rate of migration, the EU would probably suffer more from the *"demographic winter"*. Gérard-François Dumont defines by this expression *"the situation of a country where fertility is clearly and permanently below the threshold for the replacement of generations"*. By 2050, the EU in its present configuration but without the United Kingdom would represent between 4 and 4.5% of the world's population. This demographic dynamic, marked by aging and depopulation, cannot remain without effects on the active population and the burden of the inactive, not to mention innovation and competitiveness.

It goes without saying that Turkey's accession would change the situation, but not only from the demographic point of view.

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[3] The term *"EU-28"* refers to the Union's territory at the last enlargement (28 members) before the states actually join the EU-28 – *"Brexit"* not included. This makes it possible for the study to cover a longer time in order to distinguish the dynamics.

[4] The UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.*

[5] Gérard-François Dumont, *"Brexit: quelles conséquences démographiques?"*, in *Population & Avenir*, September – October 2016, no. 729, p. 3.

This is another subject. In addition, its recent political evolution leads to greatest caution regarding the prospects of its accession.

Several factors are behind this situation. While the world population has more than doubled since 1960, the European countries as a whole have, since the mid-1970s, had fertility rates well below the replacement level for generations. In 2015, the total fertility rate in the EU-28 was only 1.6 children per woman, whereas it should be above 2.1 to reach the replacement level. Not only has this situation of *"demographic winter"* produced cumulative effects for four decades, but far from compensating for this lack, the enlargements since the beginning of the twenty-first century have only reinforced the trend. Admittedly, five of the 13 countries that joined the EU in 2004, 2007 or 2013 are approaching the EU average (1.6) in 2016, but the two most numerous countries are far below[6]. Poland (38.4 million) has a fertility indicator of 1.3; and Romania (19.8 million inhabitants) stands at 1.2. In 2016, the EU-28 population has more elderly people than young people, with only 16% under 15 compared to 19% of people aged 65 and over – and 21% of older people in Germany.

What about the migratory contribution?

C. … in order to notice that, despite the contribution of migration, the EU is experiencing a relative demographic decline

Since the beginning of the 1990s, migration has been the driving force behind the total increase in the population of the European area. Especially since immigrants are young and favour the birth rate.

However, the crisis of 2008 points out something often ignored by the public debate. Since 2009, the migration in the EU-28 area has decreased from 1 141 471 to 851 335[7]. This balance is 925 223 in 2010, 872 332 in 2011 and 653 100 in 2013[8]. In other words, without any real

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[6] *"La géographie mondiale des populations en 2016"*, in *Population & Avenir*, no. 730, November-December 2016, pp. 18-23.

[7] The accuracy of the numbers published by Eurostat should not be misleading. These are actually estimates and therefore the order of magnitude must be considered and not the figure.

change in migration policies, the economic crisis has greatly reduced the overall migratory attractiveness of the community as a whole. This is particularly the consequence of the migratory evolution in southern countries, such as Portugal and Spain, whose economic weakening has led to a complete migration reversal, turning them from countries of strong immigration to emigration countries. This symbolic change under the threshold of one million per year should therefore weigh on the demographic prospects of the European Union and, consequently, on its relative weight in the world. By halving the regime of its main *"engine"* and as natural growth is unable to take over, the economic crisis has further reinforced the EU's demographic slowdown.

The second rupture – the year 2015. Indeed, in 2015, the EU faces a migratory flow of more than one million people, including people fleeing war zones – including Afghanistan and Syria – and economic migrants leaving areas marked by poor governance, particularly following the Arab changes from 2010-2011. This sudden increase in migration has been unsuccessfully anticipated by the EU. It has resulted in a major political crisis, with part of the public opinion and governments being worried about this inflow. Several governments have rejected the EU's proposed refugee relocation policy, starting with Hungary, a country that is particularly vulnerable, given its geographical location near the *"Balkan route"*. In October 2016, Prime Minister Orban organises a referendum on this issue. The 40% participation is insufficient for the vote to be valid, but the response of those who voted is negative at more than 96%. A collateral effect of the migration crisis of 2015-2016 is the fact that the Schengen Convention has gone through a difficult time, the member states reinstating controls at the internal borders of the EU, as stipulated by the Convention in case of crisis. For example, France has restored control at the border with Italy, particularly near Ventimiglia. This happens while the control of the external borders of the EU remains very unequal.

In 2015, for the first time, the total of the EU's increase comes from migratory growth, since natural increase is negative, with more deaths

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[8] *"Premières estimations démographiques"*, press communiqué, 108/2014, Eurostat, 10 July 2014.

than births. In fact, the EU-28 population is of 510.1 million on 1 January 2016. For the first time, the EU experiences a negative natural balance in 2015, with deaths (5.226 million) exceeding births by 135 200 units. The natural balance is negative for 13 countries, 8 of which are in Eastern Europe. The largest losses are recorded in Bulgaria (-0.62%), Croatia and Hungary (-0.40%). France stands out, showing a natural increase of 0.30%.

In 2015, the total growth of the EU is therefore entirely due to net migration (1 898 million). That is a first. The fastest growing countries are Luxembourg (+2.33%), Austria (+1.44%) and Germany (+1.18%). In France, the growth was of +0.37%. In contrast, Lithuania (-1.13%), Latvia (-0.87%) and Croatia (-0.82%) record the largest decreases. The Eastern European countries that have been members since 2004 represent 7 of the 11 EU countries to have fallen, the other 4 being part of southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain).

In other words, in 2015, the EU is entirely dependent on its migration for its total increase.

In the short and medium term, the European Union will remain the region with the largest population in the world (excluding Japan), which will inevitably lead to problems of financing pensions, *depopulation* (in French, *Ed.*) and *dépeuplement* (in French, *Ed.*) phenomena[9] in large areas, tensions between immigration and integration, particularly because of the issue of diasporas[10].

Is the economy better?

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In the second part of the article, the author will point out a few economic and military issues regarding the European Union member states, starting from the review made in March 2017 against the background of the Brexit consequences.

English version by
✍ Iulia SINGER

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[9] *Depopulation* is the excess of deaths over births in a territory, *dépeuplement* means the total population decline.

[10] Gérard-François Dumont, *Démographie politique. Les lois de la géopolitique des populations*, Paris, Ellipses, 2007.

ADAPTING NATO INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF *"ONE NATO"*

Arndt Freytag von LORINGHOVEN

Early this year, NATO stood up its new *Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD)*. This is the most significant reform in the history of allied intelligence. In response to the challenging threat environment posed by an assertive Russia and the rise of terrorism and instability in the south, the allies are fundamentally adapting how NATO organises and analyses intelligence.

In today's globalised, hyper-connected, multipolar world, NATO must simultaneously monitor and assess a multitude of different threats: conventional military, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, hybrid warfare, cyber attacks and international terrorism to name but a few of the most difficult. Geographically, NATO has begun to look more broadly, from central Africa to North Korea and from the Arctic to the Middle East. The provision of relevant intelligence must match the frantic pace of change.

Moreover, the lines between civilian and military, between war and peace are increasingly blurred. This also makes it necessary to better integrate civilian and military intelligence at NATO in a single

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***A more assertive Russia and aggravated hybrid threats
part of a wide range of factors in today's challenging threat environment,
which must be matched by the provision of relevant intelligence.***

efficient structure, which can provide a coherent intelligence picture to the North Atlantic Council and NATO's Military Committee.

These considerations led allied leaders to launch a fundamental reform of NATO intelligence at their summit meeting in Warsaw in July 2016. A key element of this reform is the creation of a new division at NATO Headquarters, consisting of two pillars: intelligence (with the merged strands of military and civilian intelligence) and security (the NATO Office of Security).

Building up the New Division

When I assumed the position of Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security in December 2016, my first priority was to make the new division operational as quickly as possible. Reorganising 270 people from different countries and work cultures has not been easy, especially for a newcomer to NATO Headquarters. But I remained optimistic, drawing on my experience of working at the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, the national foreign intelligence service) a decade ago, when it embarked on a similar exercise to fuse civilian

and military intelligence. It was an instant success – professionals from both sides recognised the added value of working with colleagues with different mindsets and quickly developed a team spirit. Other nations have had similar positive experiences. The big question was: could this be repeated in a more complex multilateral environment?

In February, we took a deep dive into the new structure. Thanks to the extraordinary commitment and professionalism of my colleagues, we rapidly overcame most of the growing pains. We quickly brought joint intelligence production up to speed and it is now up by about 25 per cent, compared to last year. This reflects a growing demand for our products – an encouraging sign but also an extra burden for the analysts. The new division is now largely structured as mandated by allied leaders in 2016 – but this is not the end of our adaptation.

NATO's role in countering terrorism is expanding and the Alliance needs deeper situational awareness in the field

Intelligence needs to keep abreast of evolving political and military priorities. NATO's regional focus is widening and the Alliance faces aggravated threats emanating from the hybrid domain, cyber space

and terrorism. Intelligence must focus more on these transnational issues and develop appropriate capabilities to do so. The threat of hybrid warfare is now rated so high that allied defence ministers tasked us to set up a special unit at NATO Headquarters to look systematically into the issue. A new branch for hybrid analysis was established in the JISD in July 2017. Its mandate is to analyse the full spectrum of hybrid actions, drawing from military and civilian, classified and open sources. It is all about connecting the dots, reflecting the growing need to take a holistic approach. Cyber security will play an increasingly important part in this.

Likewise, as NATO's role in countering terrorism is expanding, the Alliance needs deeper situational awareness in this field. To support this, we established a new Terrorism Intelligence Cell, which will focus on delivering strategic intelligence worldwide.

Terrorism is also an essential area of concern of the division's security pillar. The NATO Office of Security continues to assure the security of NATO Headquarters as well as NATO personnel on missions. It is also developing security standards for the protection of classified information and systems, and ensuring the compliance of NATO bodies, NATO member states and partner countries. Making it part of the new division is another opportunity to bring more synergy to our work, especially between intelligence and counter-intelligence.

NATO's Wider Intelligence Enterprise

Looking ahead, we need to widen our focus and look at NATO's intelligence enterprise as a whole. It extends far beyond our new division. Only a fraction of NATO's intelligence professionals work at the JISD itself; the majority are spread throughout NATO's Command Structure. A highly complex network of actors and structures also includes the NATO Intelligence Fusion Cell in Molesworth in the United Kingdom, Centres of Excellence in various fields, and a number of committees (military, civilian, security) representing nations' intelligence services. The present landscape of NATO intelligence has grown *"organically"* over the years without a common master plan. While this legacy is a rich resource, joint planning and coordination across the enterprise is a challenge.

*Created in 2006, the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC)
is a military led, US-sponsored organisation, chartered by NATO's Military
Committee, based on a memorandum of understanding with 26 of 29 NATO
nations and one partner country. The Centre facilitates the sharing
and fusion of intelligence, contributes to filling intelligence gaps,
and supports the planning and execution of current operations.
It is one part of a highly complex network of actors and structures
that makes up NATO intelligence. © DVIDS*

The NATO intelligence enterprise can be made more efficient and coherent in many ways by synchronising efforts, further reducing duplication and fully optimising resources. The Alliance should foster a joint effort to plan strategically for the future and set priorities for the enterprise as a whole. *"One NATO"* will be our guiding principle. As we set out on this path, I hope we can maintain the enthusiasm and positive dynamic that have so greatly helped us in setting up the new division.

ZAPAD 2017
AND EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

Dave JOHNSON

Since 2008, Russia has used its strategic exercises and large-scale snap exercises to hone its military capabilities, undermine regional stability and peace and – twice, first in Georgia and then Ukraine – to mask impending aggression. Exercise ZAPAD 2017 was the latest iteration of such exercises.

The Russian Armed Forces revived the practice of regular, annual strategic exercises with Exercise KAVKAZ 2008 in Russia's North Caucasus region on its border with Georgia. According to official announcements, Exercise KAVKAZ was conducted with the participation of 8,000 troops. However, General Yuri Netkachev said in an interview[1] with *Independent Gazette* at the time that the figures were *"officially underestimated"* to avoid inviting international observers. Russian troops remained on the Georgian border after Exercise KAVKAZ ended on 2 August 2008 and a force estimated at approximately forty thousand troops started operations on Georgian territory on 7 August, halting under international pressure five days later on the outskirts of Tbilisi.

Exercise ZAPAD 2017, officially conducted on NATO's eastern borders in Russia's Western Military District and on the territory of Belarus

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[1] http://www.ng.ru/regions/2008-07-18/1_peacemakers.html

*Russian President Vladimir Putin uses a pair of binoculars
while watching part of exercise Zapad 2017
with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (L) and Chief
of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov (2ⁿᵈ R)
at a military training ground in the Leningrad region,
Russia 18 September 2017. © REUTERS*

from 14 to 20 September, was the latest iteration of the exercise series thus linked to *"Europe's first war of the 21ˢᵗ Century"*[2].

Exercising Lessons Learned

The Russian Armed Forces learned some hard lessons in Georgia. Low manning and readiness levels forced the Russians to attack with a scratch force. Shortfalls in C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) were sorely felt, as was the limited ability

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[2] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1333553

of the land and air forces to operate together, and the lack of precision weapons. The ultimate outcome was never in doubt, but the Georgia campaign highlighted a long list of essential military reforms.

Since the conflict in Georgia, Russia has used the nine subsequent annual exercises, including the three most recent ZAPAD exercises (see box) to put things right. The annual combined-arms exercises are conducted on an alternating basis in each of the Military Districts. (The Military Districts are also designated as Joint Strategic Commands. The Northern Fleet Military District/Joint Strategic Command was created in December 2014 but as of 2017 had not been integrated into the rotation of the annual strategic exercises on its own but has participated in snap exercises and exercised concurrently with the Western Military District ZAPAD 2017 exercise).

The annual exercises are capstone training events culminating the annual training cycle with a three-fold test of:
- the selected Military District to operate in its assigned strategic direction;
- all other military districts to mobilise and operate in support;
- the General Staff and other command and control elements to direct strategic operations.

Following President Vladimir Putin's 2013 decree to increase military readiness, the annual strategic exercises have been augmented by no-notice *"snap"* exercises comparable in size and scope or even larger than most annual strategic exercises. These snap exercises are conducted without warning to the units involved, thus avoiding the requirements for prior notification set out in paragraph 41 and 41.1 of the Vienna Document[3] (an agreement between OSCE participating states intended to implement confidence and security building measures).

In a recent meeting of senior military leaders, Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov reported that 24 snap exercises of this size had been conducted by November 2017, along with many more smaller snap exercises. These snap combined-arms exercises have involved tens of thousands of troops;

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[3] http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597

some conducted in the Western and Eastern Military Districts have reportedly[4] involved approximately 150,000 troops.

Russia's Annual Strategic Exercises 2008-2018

Year	Exercise	Military District	Participating Troops (announced by Russian Ministry of Defence)	Estimated Participating Troops
2008	KAVKAZ	North Caucasus (now Southern)	8,000	40,000
2009	ZAPAD	Western	11,900	13,000
2010	VOSTOK	Eastern	20,000	-
2011	TSENTR	Central	12,000	12,000
2012	KAVKAZ	Southern	8,000	-
2013	ZAPAD	Western	11,920	90,000
2014	VOSTOK	Eastern	100,000	155,000
2015	TSENTR	Central	95,000	100,000 − 160,000
2016	KAVKAZ	Southern	12,500	120,000
2017	ZAPAD	Western	12,700	60,000 − 70,000
2018	VOSTOK	Eastern	-	-

The Wider Context

NATO's response has been measured. The Alliance recognises the sovereign right of nations to exercise their armed forces but it is important that this be done in accordance with well established guidelines and agreements and international obligations. NATO leaders also perceive the destabilising[5] way in which Russia has conducted its military exercises during the last ten years, evading its long-standing commitments to transparency and predictability contained in the Vienna Document, and leveraging exercises for intimidation purposes and to mask impending aggression.

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[4] https://www.foi.se/reportsummary?reportNo=FOI-R--4128--SE

[5] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-zapad-drills-france-germany-denounce/28722103.html

These perceptions are reinforced by the context of eroding stability and security[6] that Russia has created by suspending its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) in 2007, as well as its aggression against Georgia in 2008 and against Ukraine in 2014. Allies gradually perceived during this period that Russia's approach to warfare and conflict short of war combines all elements of state power, including military force, in a seamless continuum that culminates with overarching nuclear messaging. This is the lens through which Russia's strategic combined-arms manoeuvre warfare exercises near NATO's borders are – or at least should be – viewed.

Fudging the Numbers

The conduct of ZAPAD 2017 was consistent with this track record. The Russian Ministry of Defence announced[7] that a total of 12,700 Russian and Belorussian troops would participate in ZAPAD, with 10,200 troops in Belarus (including 2,000 Russian troops) and 2,500 troops exercising in Russia. It also announced that it would involve approximately 70 aircraft, 680 pieces of military equipment, including 250 tanks, and 200 rocket and artillery systems. The numbers in Belarus fell just shy of limits requiring mandatory invitation of foreign observers under the Vienna Document (13,000 troops is the threshold) and Russia declined to notify the exercise because they claimed that only 2,000 troops would exercise on its territory as part of ZAPAD. No Russian general said explicitly that the ZAPAD numbers were *"officially underestimated"* for this purpose, but General Salyukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, said in an interview[8] with TASS after the conclusion of ZAPAD that Russia *"displayed only part of the exercise, actually these exercises deployed on many ranges. These were vast exercises, very interesting"*.

A look at the table of exercises conducted since 2008 highlights how Russia adapts its *reporting* of their size based on whether they fall

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[6] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578016/EXPO_IDA%282017%29578016_EN.pdf

[7] http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12142199@egNews

[8] http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4606896

***Armoured vehicles and helicopters take part in exercise Zapad 2017
at a range near the town of Borisov, Belarus – 20 September 2017.
© REUTERS***

within the Vienna Document's zone of application or not. The numbers of troops reported by Russia as participating in exercises in the Central and Eastern Military Districts – which are not covered by the Vienna Document – matches expectations for the force requirements for strategic warfare. In the case of the Western and Southern Military Districts, Russia simply compartmentalises its large-scale exercises into chunks small enough to evade Vienna Document requirements. The Russian Armed Forces do not train only for limited, small-scale war in the Western and Southern Military Districts, they only make it appear that they do. The creation of the Northern Fleet Military District has greatly facilitated this approach by creating an administrative divide between major components of Russia's exercises in the Western strategic direction.

The Russian Ministry of Defence also announced that ZAPAD 2017 was strictly defensive, organised around an anti-terrorist scenario and – though being conducted in part on Belarusian territory – bore no connection to any actual region.

Foreign analysts[9] have said that the actual event was substantially larger than claimed by the Russian Ministry of Defence, with 60,000 to 70,000 troops estimated to have participated – about 12,000 on Belorussian territory and the rest on Russian territory. Day-to-day reporting on the exercise by the Ministry of Defence also contradicted its own official version of ZAPAD's scale and intention.

The *"terrorist"* formations confronting the combined Russian and Belorussian forces were of sufficient size and strength to require three days of operations by combined-arms and armoured land forces with extensive fixed and rotary-wing air support, large-scale aerospace operations and engagement by the Baltic Fleet and coastal defence units.

The Strategic Nature of ZAPAD

The strategic nature of ZAPAD was highlighted by a simulated defence of the Moscow region by S-400 air defence interceptors against a mass cruise missile attack. Dual capable (conventional and nuclear) precision strike capability was also a major element of ZAPAD, including SS-21 SCARAB and SS-26 ISKANDER missile unit activity, with live firing in other regions by ISKANDER units not stationed in the Western Military District. The Ministry of Defence also reported extensive exercise activity by Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defence units, underscoring the Russian Armed Forces' ability to operate in a CBRN-contaminated environment. The exercise activities were conducted in two phases – a first defensive and counter-offensive phase, followed by transition to a second offensive phase.

Varying levels of exercise activity were conducted in all the other Military Districts simultaneously with the officially acknowledged ZAPAD activities in the Western Military District. These other activities involved aerospace defence operations, test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (some of which may not have been linked to ZAPAD but driven by required service life testing), naval battles in Russia's coastal waters in the Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas and the Pacific Ocean, land force

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[9] https://rusi.org/commentary/zapad-2017-why-do-numbers-matter

RUSSIAN FEDERATION MILITARY DISTRICTS

engagements of various sizes, CBRN unit activity, and repair by the Rail Troops of stretches of railway damaged by enemy cruise missile strikes. Exercise activity in the Northern Fleet (Arctic) Military District was particularly intense. It included a simulated intercontinental submarine launched ballistic missile attack by a Northern Fleet ballistic missile submarine against the simulated enemy on Day 3 of ZAPAD and a missile strike by a Northern Fleet strike group against an enemy naval grouping on Day 6.

NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu consequently said that, *"in effect, all these activities together constituted a single strategic exercise... ZAPAD was clearly a large scale state-on-state conflict"*[10]. The character, scale and intensity of Russian military exercise activities during September 2017 is consistent with the system of strategic operations that Russia would conduct in conflict with NATO, focusing on the Western Strategic Direction, with supporting military activity

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[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/us/politics/zapad-russia-military-exercise.html

nationwide in all strategic directions, and potential global operations, in an escalating conflict. If ZAPAD 2017 were actually conducted in line with its official description, it would exercise just a portion of Moscow's strategic plans for potential war with NATO. The exercise activities should instead be viewed in the context of the exercise activities conducted concurrently across Russia during 14-20 September 2017.

"Maskirovka" and Info Ops

The March 2015 strategic snap exercise[11] which began as a crisis in the Baltic and Barents Sea regions and quickly escalated to nationwide and then global strategic operations is another good model for where ZAPAD fits in the larger scale of Russia's military planning for strategic operations. Because of the heavy emphasis placed on *maskirovka* (military deception) by the Russian military, estimates of the size of exercises and the official figures provided by Russia for exercise participation should be assessed against likely political, organisational, operational, and technical measures to hide, mask, minimise and otherwise deceive about the size, composition and location of participating forces. Training and testing *maskirovka* is doubtless a major component of Russia's strategic exercises.

Russia endeavoured to maximize the impact of ZAPAD 2017 with months of related information operations. These info ops in Russia's virtual sixth military district – the *"Information Military District"* – had several aims, including to portray Russia's military strength, to project a related sense of risk to neighbours, to undermine existing arms control and confidence building regimes, and to provoke exploitable reactions by NATO and individual nations. Russia's approach was to trumpet the military capabilities on display while ridiculing any expressions of concern as symptomatic of *"anti-Russian hysteria"*[12].

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[11] https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/anatomy-of-a-russian-exercise/

[12] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-kremlin/kremlin-accuses-west-of-whipping-up-hysteria-over-russian-war-games-idUSKCN1BP23S

Dual capable – conventional and nuclear – precision strike capability was a major element of ZAPAD, including SS-21 SCARAB and SS-26 ISKANDER missile unit activity.

In keeping with its asymmetric approach to obscure and confuse through mixed messages, Moscow followed a two-pronged approach to its Vienna Document obligations: violating its spirit and intent, while claiming that Russia's selective release of information and invitation of military attaches to a distinguished visitors day near St. Petersburg under strictly controlled conditions was equivalent to the more demanding requirements set out in Chapter VI Observation of Certain Military Activities.

Then, having forced outside analysts to estimate the true size of ZAPAD 2017, Moscow asserted that subsequent admissions that ZAPAD had been smaller than the largest estimates proved that Western concerns had been wildly exaggerated[13]. By this sleight-of-hand, Russia tried but failed to obscure the fundamental fact that signatories of the Vienna

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[13] https://www.rt.com/news/404123-poland-and-nato-russia-military/

Document should, precisely, not have to estimate the size of other participating states' military exercises in the first place. Russia's next planned strategic exercise is VOSTOK 2018.

Allied Vigilance and Readiness

The response by NATO collectively and allied nations individually was far from the *"hysteria"* of which Moscow accused them and was well described by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg as a policy of *"continue to be vigilant and ready to act if needed"*[14]. NATO will need to stick to this approach as Russia continues its military build-up in the Western Military District and its programme of provocative and destabilising exercise activities. Allies will also need to continue to reject Russian attempts to substitute improvised and selective *"transparency"* in place of its existing international obligations to genuine, verifiable confidence and security building measures.

Meanwhile, NATO has no need to justify its efforts to estimate the size and scope of Russian military exercises, while Russia deliberately abstains from fulfilling the commitments that would make such estimates unnecessary. At the same time, NATO's moderately increased military exercising in response to Russian aggressive actions against Ukraine continues in full transparency and compliance with international commitments.

As the ten-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Georgia approaches, the origins of Russia's revived programme of annual strategic exercises in that aggression should be recalled. This anniversary should also cause reflection on Russia's use of a snap exercise to mask troop movements at the start of the Ukraine crisis, and the way that Russia's strategic exercises enabled power projection into Syria. Russian forces continue to operate in both Ukraine and Syria, proving wrong the many foreign analysts who predicted after the Syrian intervention that Russia would be unable to sustain simultaneous

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[14] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_145109.htm?selectedLocale=en

operations. Russia has not only managed to sustain both operations, but to continue its extensive exercise programme.

The increasing size and complexity of Russia's annual strategic and snap exercises, in particular the Western-oriented ZAPAD series, underscores the need for allies to ensure full and timely implementation of the strengthened deterrence and defence measures agreed at the NATO Summits in Wales[15] (2014) and Warsaw[16] (2016). Such measures, along with allied commitment to meaningful dialogue and engagement with Russia, are the most effective response to Russia's long-term negative trajectory.

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[15] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease
[16] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

EDITORIAL EVENTS

✎ *Alina PAPOI*

The book **"JOINT FORCE-2020. A New Challenge for Officers' Education in the 21st Century"**, written by **Colonel Dr Olivian STĂNICĂ**, has been recently published at the *"Carol I"* National Defence University Publishing House.

The author, head of department within the Training and Doctrine Directorate of the Defence Staff, is a graduate of: *"Ştefan cel Mare"* Military High School from Câmpulung Moldovenesc (1981), Military School of Active Duty Officers – antiaircraft artillery, missiles and radiolocation, Braşov (radiolocation branch, 1984), the Bucharest University of Economic Studies, the Faculty of Economic Cybernetics, Statistics and Informatics (1993), the National Defence College (2014) and various postgraduate specialised training/refresher courses at the *"Carol I"* National Defence University.

The experience gained in the international military environment as a member of the NATO Individual Training and Education Development Task Group since 2006 has definitely enabled the author to include in this book the achievements of the military education and training system for the military personnel of the Romanian Armed Forces and compare them with other military education systems in NATO/partner and EU countries.

As far as choosing the topic is concerned, *General (r.) Dr Florian Răpan*, who signs the *Foreword* of the book, suggests that the author's starting

point is the reality that it is necessary to remodel and make more efficient the military education systems of officers training, *"in the new geopolitical and military context, marked by risks and threats to the security of European states, in order to support the development of new military capabilities, which is a requirement for projecting new JOINT-level force structures, generically called Joint Force 2020"*. This topic is *"not at all easy"*, but very topical, and interesting for the specialists in the field, and addresses performance as a result of the symbiosis between professionalism and the education-training binomial. The current geopolitical and security environment requires that Romania, by virtue of its NATO and European Union membership, should tailor to meet the performance standards adopted by these bodies, while also taking into account the world social, economic, political, and military aspects. In this respect, the author is concerned about strengthening the relations of interdependence between the education and training, and about the quality of the human factor, technology and praxeology: *"Among the Europe 2020 basic goals, one can mention: quality assurance in education, quality of teaching and learning, development of the online learning skills provided by the opportunities in the digital era"*.

The book consists of five chapters, which cover the following topics: the military education and training systems with time horizon 2025; some features of how to apply the Bologna system in order to promote educational policies; the stages of the force planning process in NATO member countries; European education models for initial officer training; comparative analysis of Romanian military education system versus NATO member states military education system; the definition of the concept of military capability – case study: multirole aircraft; benchmarking – *"a future solution to quality assurance in education, military education institutions included"*.

We are more than certain that this book will be a true instrument in dealing with certain problematic situations the Romanian military will face in a volatile and unexpected geostrategic environment, due to its innovative and well-grounded elements. In the same context, *"the analyses, case studies, models, prognoses and proposals will ensure*

the development of training and education structures, while modernising the concepts and doctrines necessary for command/joint task forces planning and projection and military capability development" (General Florian Răpan).

Last but not least, we must notice the detailed and relevant methodological and theoretical-scientific support of the book. The author addresses certain theoretical, methodological and praxeological issues, based on his own knowledge build-up and the results of his experience, and, at the same time, on the future operational and functional effects of the Romanian Armed Forces military capabilities with a view to achieving their missions: *"In addition to the high-quality content of military personnel training and education, the dynamics of the new security environment have required the use information and communications technology for the distribution of real-time knowledge by beneficiaries, wherever needed".*

English version by
✎ *Iulia SINGER*

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✎ **Associate Professor Dr Georgel RUSU**

Published at *Spandugino Publishing House* in the spring of 2016, the book **Civilisation of Illiteracy** is, besides its shocking title, a comprehensive, interesting and challenging analysis of social and not only phenomena occurring in the Western world and especially in the USA in the past decades and tending to globalise. The author, **Mihai Nadin**, is a complex personality, having and educational background and preoccupations that are apparently incompatible. Particularly, the author graduated the faculties of Electronics and Philosophy in Bucharest and where he also got a PhD in Aesthetics. He has worked for prestigious universities in the USA and Germany, thousands of students and more than 500 doctoral students enjoying the benefits of his activity

as a Professor. He has carried out research in many fields, his current concern being, as presented by the editor, one related to the *anticipation systems, especially the design of new computational methods able to integrate the physical substrate and the processes that define life.*

The scope of the book from *Literacy in a Changing World/Progressing towards Illiteracy?* to *Sense of the Future* (Chapter 2/Book V) means more than 900 pages treating very different subjects, each chapter having a title that *speaks for itself!* (*How Many Words in a Look?*, *The University of Doubt* etc.).

The language, a quasi-permanent theme in the book is seen, atomised, ordered, interpreted and projected in its deepest intentions and possibilities, some of them escaping the average decoder, casting light on deeper meanings. It is revealed by the author in the first lines of the book: *"Preoccupation with language is, in fact, preoccupation with ourselves as individuals and as a species"*[1]. I have quoted these words as the idea is present in almost all chapters of the book, the referred language being a *"... storing device..."*[2] and foundation of the civilisation of literacy up to the information is processed as support and involvement in software or artificial intelligence. And if, for the individual, *"the alphabet is a reductionist machine used to see the world from the perspective of own experience"*[3], the *"Logics behind the logic"*[4] can lead to *"Multi-valued logic, fuzzy logic, temporal logic, pertinent to computation, artificial intelligence, memetics and networking ..."*[5], which *"... allow for machines to read thoughts and emotions"*[6].

Moreover, through the *"Logic of Actions"*, the author refers, in Chapter 12, to the *military phenomenon*, where we find that we have already carried out the *"First War of the Civilisation of Illiteracy"*[7], identified in the book with the Gulf War.

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[1] Mihai Nadin, *Civilizația Analfabetismului*, Editura Spandugino, București, 2016, p. 3.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 83.
[3] *Ibidem*, p. 187.
[4] *Ibidem*, p. 188.
[5] *Ibidem*, p.198.
[6] *Ibidem*.
[7] *Ibidem*, p. 694.

We should have briefly (losing meanings) referred to the fact that the illiteracy considered by the author is related to the possibility of reading/understanding the written language in the absence of understanding the meaning and especially of validating answers. If, as the author states, *"... literacy means being able to read and understand the Book and therefore the world"*[8], illiteracy that is referred to is an elliptical one. *"Illiterate"* people are present all levels of the society: *"It is relative illiteracy. I have colleagues in the academic environment that have not read a book in the past 20 years. The way some of them express did not allow me to graduate the second class of the primary school. Nevertheless, they are amazing in their field. Some of them are neurosurgeons. Others work in radio astronomy. Some of them are remarkable personalities in the field of genetics. To acquire knowledge, they use extremely precise specialised language that has reduced expressive power. In their case even reading specialised literature is limited. A cohort of assistants select what they consider appropriate to their specific interests (Politicians are not different: members of the cabinet write for them and polls inform them about ‹the direction of the wind›)"*[9].

We are thus confronted with functional illiteracy. It is the result of an education system. It seems that it is due to production mainly focused on efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, it is promoted the deviation from the well-established humanist values seeking to exponentially increase the human activity and even succeeding in doing so. This fact is stated at the beginning of the book: *"I have analysed the structural characteristics of the society from the perspective of the human activity and in relation to the implacable law of enhancing efficiency"*[10].

The armed forces as an institution is also analysed by Mihai Nadin from the same perspective, especially considering that the advance in military technology has always been a concern for all types of societies.

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[8] *Ibidem*, p. 38.
[9] *Criteriul Naţional* – all Romanains newspaper on the net, 29 March 2016.
[10] Mihai Nadin, *Civilizaţia Analfabetismului, op. cit.*, p. VI.

It is the field where the more effective force has met success, and the proposed analysis is one in relation to the other developments led by efficiency. In this regard, the following except is eloquent: *"High precision electronic eyes placed on orbiting satellites picked up the firing of the rocket and the launch parameters. Data was transmitted to a computer centre for information processing. The computed information, specifying angles, firing time and trajectory, was relayed to antirocket missiles programmed to intercept enemy attack"*[11].

Technically, what the author describes is correct. However, the described *"literacy-based modes of practical experiences pertained to war"* show a military instrument of power different from the classical one. Different from what was postulated as necessary for the political authority substantiation (the theory of social contract: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau) or the rule of law, or even the source of law that legitimates the state violence within the legal framework. Could it be a deviation of the form seeking efficiency and abandoning the initial idea? The fact that *"...a literate soldier can be better indoctrinated, subjected to inherent arguments of literacy, of rules and authorities to be obeyed"*[12] seems to have led to horrors such as genocide but it cannot exclude from the social life the fact that certain armed forces met the major desiderata of independence and state unification or a Europe of nations. Moreover, the observation according to which *"... the pragmatic nature of war has changed: faster action makes reading – of instructions, commands, messages – inappropriate if not even dangerous"*[13] seems to move the military man away from the purpose of the action, to deny him a goal, to transform him in a tool of war. In addition, today, when the greatest risk seems to be generated by the technological progress itself, to the *"post-literate nature of war"*[14] the *"uncontrolled"* military instrument of power can be added.

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[11] *Ibidem*, p. 693.
[12] *Ibidem*, p. 711.
[13] *Ibidem*.
[14] *Confer*, ... p. 693.

Without launching a polemic with Clausewitz regarding specific definition, the author concludes: *"War is the continuation of practical experience of survival in the context of a society trying to control and adjudicate resources. Accordingly, combat follows the lien of other practical experiences"*[15]. The suggested assimilation can be accepted, but the absence of a more elaborate treatment of the new purpose of the military instrument of power could mean the orientation of the armed forces in the social sphere a sort of brigandage more efficient than the one in the Middle Ages? Where is the politics in the equation of war?

To those who have read Alvin Toffler or Jaques Seguela, the surprise could be greater if we notice that we are led by Mihai Nadin beyond the *Future Shock*, the *Third Wave* or the *Future of Future*.

The fact that, according to the author, *"Legislative political work continues a tradition that goes well beyond literacy. Nevertheless, effective legislation became possible only within the pragmatic framework that made literacy necessary. Once literacy itself reached its potential, new means for the political legislative practical experience became necessary. The driving force is the expectation that the legislative process should reflect practical needs emerging in a context of rapid change over shorter patterns of recurrence"*[16], can sound calming from someone belonging to the civilisation of illiteracy. Not for the others! As for the personal qualities of those who perform *"legislative political work"*, the situation becomes increasingly clear, at both national and international level, so that we cannot imagine the political class can have coherent visionary attitudes dedicated to people.

With regard to the military phenomenon, a partial conclusion of the author seems to be that *"If military experiences were to remain literacy-based, this would be equal to maintaining different pragmatic structures and pursuing goals of disparate efficiency"*[17]. Putting it together with the axiomatic statement that *"...science and arts are more accessible*

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[15] *Ibidem*, p. 697.
[16] *Ibidem*, p. 687.
[17] *Ibidem*, p. 716.

to educated people"[18], we cannot ask ourselves whether military art and military science can disappear in the future.

If Mihai Nadin ideas go towards the pace of globalisation exponential development, it means that we are closer than expected to the materialisation of Kant idea related the man – citizen of the world and to the establishment of a federation of free states?! The problem that arises (especially for the literate citizen) is related to the price? And what type of liberty, if we now witness a society that *"… defines its values differently from the past civilisations"*[19]?

Through education, the author of the book certainly belongs to the literate civilisation, even if he has worked for decades within the civilisation of illiteracy. It would be interesting to know if the author considers that the *Civilisation of Illiteracy*, the book, or any other title that analyses the social sphere as profoundly and comprehensively as it does, could have been created by someone belonging to the *"team of illiterates"*.

Far from calming us, the book draws attention to the witticism: *I do not know what arms will be employed in the third world war, but in the fourth world war clubs will be employed!?*

And that is all the more appropriate considering the title of Chapter 12: *"THEIRS NOT TO REASON WHY"*!

Shocking by title, inciting by approach, attractive by style, the book is a must read for anyone who wants to know the major trends in the development of humanity. It contains a multitude of questions and answers, arising, at the same time, a lot of questions. One of them is: Has the scope of security changed so much so that the fundamental goal of the military instrument of power and its relations with the state powers can face dissolution?!

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

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[18] *Ibidem*, p. 30.
[19] *Ibidem*, p. VII.

✎ *Alina PAPOI*

The 40th issue of ***Jandarmeria română/ Romanian Gendarmerie*** was published, from which one can find out about: *The Law regarding the Gendarmerie*, currently under parliamentary debate, *"Putin's imperial ambitions, more topical than ever"*, the *MINUSTAH* operation in Haiti, the participation of the Gendarmerie in the First World War. This issue also presents detailed aspects regarding the use of weapons in the national legislation, as well as the way psychical traits contribute to the development of professional skills of public order and security forces: *"Knowledge of mental states means awareness of military actions ... Psychological training is a set of general and special measures whose basic role is to constantly enhance the connections of the soldier's state of mind with the physical requirements he/she must face during training and at work, thus making he/she capable of getting the best results in difficult work situations"*.

English version by
✎ *Iulia SINGER*

THE 2016
GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ
JOURNAL AWARDS
THE 19ᵀᴴ EDITION – 9 November 2017

On 9 November, the 19th edition of the ceremony of the *Gândirea militară românească Journal Awards* took place in the Hall of Honour of the Ministry of National Defence, under the aegis of the events dedicated to the Day of the Defence Staff. This year, the ceremony was part of the series of actions dedicated to the Centenary of the great battles of Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz.

The photos were taken by Eugen Mihai – the Ministry of National Defence Media Trust.

The *Journal Awards Selection, Evaluation and Nomination Commission* was chaired by Lieutenant General dr. Adrian Tonea, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Journal. Each year, the five awards are given to five representative books in the field of military theory and science, written in the previous year, *"as a well-deserved reward for the work of those who contributed to the enrichment of the theoretical treasury of military science"*, as the Chairman of the Commission mentioned.

The members of the *Journal Awards Selection, Evaluation and Nomination Commission*, Brigadier General Valentin Becheru, Brigadier General Dorin Blaiu, Colonel Mircea Gologan and Colonel (AF) Marius Șerbeszki – had to carry out the extremely difficult, but all the more crucial task of selecting the winners out of the 47 entries in the competition, respecting the criteria set out in the *Award Rules*.

The awards were presented by the Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff, Lieutenant General Dr Adrian Tonea.

Here are the laureates and nominees of the *Journal Awards* for this year:

• The *"Marshal Alexandru Averescu"* **Award**
was presented to
Alesandru DUȚU
for the book *"Armata Română în vremuri de cumpănă. 1945-1965/The Romanian Armed Forces in Treacherous Times. 1945-1965"*.

Other nominees for the *"Marshal Alexandru Averescu"* Award were:

*"Acţiunile detaşamentului înaintat în operaţia ofensivă/The Actions
of the Forward Detachment in Offensive Operations"*,
author Colonel **Valentin DRAGOMIRESCU**,
and *"Puterea aeriană în mişcare. Dimensiunea aeriană
a conflictualităţii contemporane în Regiunea Mării Negre/Airpower
on the Move. The Air Dimension of Contemporary Conflicts
in the Black Sea Area"*, author **Colonel Ion PURICEL**.

• The **"Division General Ştefan Fălcoianu"
Award**
was presented to **Sergiu BALANOVICI**
for the book
**"Generalul Gheorghe Avramescu/
General Gheorghe Avramescu"**.

Other nominees for the *"Division General Ştefan Fălcoianu"* Award:


"Armata în judeţul Buzău – o retrospectivă istorică/The Armed Forces in Buzău County – A Historical Retrospective",
coordinator **Major General (r.) Petrică-Lucian FOCA**,
and *"Generalul Constantin Christescu – seniorul artileriei române moderne/ General Constantin Christescu – The Senior of Modern Romanian Artillery"*, authors **Brigadier General (r.) Adrian STROEA** and **Colonel (r.) Marin GHINOIU**.

• The **"Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu"** Award
was presented to Michael E. BARRETT[*]
for *"Preludiu la Blitzkrieg. Campania austro-germană în România – 1916/Prelude to Blitzkrieg. The 1916 Austro-German Campaign in Romania"*.

General (ret.) Michael E. Barrett is a graduate of the South Carolina Military College – The Citadel. He served in the US Army until 2004. He earned his PhD Degree of History at the University of Massachusetts, graduated from the Army War College and Command General Staff College, and was a professor at The Citadel College of Humanities and Social Science. His award winning book was published by the Military Publishing House (n.red.).

Other nominees for the *"Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu"* Award:

"Război submarin la Marea Neagră/Submarine Warfare
in the Black Sea", author **Captain (N) (r.) Ioan DAMASCHIN**,
and *"Sub semnul lui Marte. Secvenţe de istorie militară românească/*
Under the Sign of Mars. Scenes from Romanian Military History",
author **Colonel (r.) Petre OTU**.

• The ***"Army Corps General***
***Ioan Sichitiu"* Award**
was presented to **Adrian Mihai DIACONU**
for ***"Intervenţii militare***
în secolul al XX-lea. De la Criza Suezului
la cea iugoslavă/Military Interventions
in the 20th Century. From the Suez Crisis
to the Yugoslav Crisis".

Other nominees for the *"Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu"* Award:

„*Drama României. 1916-1918/The Drama of Romania. 1916-1918*",
author **Victor PÉTIN**,
and *"Gladiatorii înălţimilor. Aşii aviaţiei în Primul Război Mondial/
The Gladiators of the Sky. Flying Aces in the First World War"*,
author **Valeriu AVRAM**.

• The ***"Lieutenant Colonel Mircea TOMESCU"***
Award
was given to **Florian BANU**
for ***"De la SSI la SIE. O istorie
a spionajului românesc
în timpul regimului comunist
(1948-1989)/From SSI to SIE. A History
of the Romanian Espionage
during the Communist Regime (1948-1989)"***.

Other nominees for the *"Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu"* Award:

"Managementul riscului în securitatea aeriană/
Risk Management in Air Security",
author **General (r.) Ștefan DĂNILĂ**,
and *"Grupul operativ de acoperire Rucăr-Bran/*
The Rucăr-Bran Covering Task Group",
author **Cornel POPESCU** and **Cornel ȚUCĂ**.

The Special Award

was presented to the following articles published
in ***Gândirea militară românească/***
Romanian Military Thinking Journal in 2016:

➢ *"De la Primăvara Arabă la statul islamic – responsabilitatea de a proteja și combaterea terorismului/From the Arab Spring to the Islamic State – Responsibility to Protect and Combating Terrorism"*, author **Iuliana-Simona ȚUȚUIANU** and **Brigadier General (r.) Nelu BÎRLĂ** (*Gândirea militară românească*, no. 2/2016, pp. 38-58).

➢ *"Frontul de Sud în proiectele strategice românești (1914-1916)/ The Southern Front in the Romanian Strategic Projects"*, author **Colonel (r.) Petre OTU** (*Gândirea militară românească*, no. 1/2016, pp. 239-253).

➢ *"Clausewitzianism and Postclausewitzianism – About the Need for a Paradigm Shift within the Romanian Military Thinking"*,

author **Lieutenant Colonel Adrian LESENCIUC** (*Gândirea militară românească*, no. 2/2016, pp. 21-27).

➢ *"Keystones of Prospective Thinking in Planning Military Actions Carried in Hybrid Type Operational Environment"*, author **Lieutenant Colonel Dan-Lucian PETRESCU** (*Gândirea militară românească*, no. 1/2016, pp. 44-51).

The Gândirea militară românească Journal

Certificate of Excellence

for 2016 was awarded to **Colonel (r.) Mircea TĂNASE**,
for the remarkable professional activity as the Editor-in-Chief
of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal.

The ceremony of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal Awards was held in the presence of State Secretary and Chief of the Armaments Department, Florin Lazar Vlădică, State Secretary and Chief of the Department for Parliament Relations and Personnel Welfare, Nicolae Nasta, many generals, active officers from central structures and reserve officers, as well as collaborators of the journal.

GMR

English version by
✒ *Iulia SINGER*

A B S T R A C T S

Collective Defence in the Wider Black Sea Area in the Current Geopolitical, Strategic, Military and Economic Context (IV)

The status of Romania as a NATO member state not only provides security and stability guarantee but also entails new responsibilities and missions. Our country actively and effectively participates in the Alliance and the EU missions outside the national territory, as the functions and attributions of national defence significantly extend in the global environment of crisis and conflict management.

Taking part in these actions as well as in combating terrorism means, as the author mentions, taking part in war prevention, conflict control, regional and global stability, thus creating the security environment able to allow for progress.

Keywords: collective engagement; responsibilities; collective defence; diplomacy

Rethinking and Redefining the Concept of Security – From the Peace of Westphalia to the Early Cold War

The author discusses the concept of security in relation to that of sovereignty from the Peace of Westphalia up to the early *Cold War* period. In this context, it is shown that the existing theories related to sovereignty, tributary to determinism to a large extent, are also marked by dynamism, in order to meet the challenges specific to different periods in history. As for the beginning of the Cold War, the two different visions of security, which were dominant, are mentioned, namely security through cooperation and political-economic integration, obeying the right of peoples to self-determination, promoted by the Western world, and security through encouraging dissensions between the capitalist states, protecting the interests of the Soviets. Thus, the so-called security dilemma became a major concern, being mainly generated by the lack of trust between states in terms of ensuring security.

Keywords: state; nation-state; power; sovereignty; security; security dilemma

International Migrants
– Between Compassion and Hostility

Migration is a complex and controversial process. It can have a positive and negative impact on both the host country and the sending country.

Some people from Western countries have an anti-immigration attitude because of the negative effects of migration, especially the terrorist attacks carried out by migrants. During history, some of the migrant communities played *"the fifth column"* role against their host countries.

Out of the almost one billion people who migrated from their areas of origin worldwide, the author mentions in his study that almost 24,2 million people ran away from natural or man-made disasters – floods, storms and fires.

Keywords: migration; migration effects; terrorism; extremism; migrant threats

Strategic Communications
– Concept and Evolutionary Landmarks (II)

Strategic Communications (StratCom) are recognised by NATO as a concept that brings to the same denominator all the civilian and military activities carried out to significantly impact on the information environment. NATO StratCom gathers under its umbrella public diplomacy, public affairs, information and psychological operations, assuming support, integration and coordination functions.

The paper analyses the theoretical and practical StratCom approaches applied to facilitate the achievement of national and allied objectives, emphasising the communication policies in support of NATO's objectives, and the procedures developed by the allies to clarify the role of military and civilian agencies.

Keywords: public diplomacy; strategic communications; public affairs; information operations

Quality Management in Education Systems.
Could It Be a Solution for Military Education Institutions?

The quality of education can often influence the young generation development. However, it is difficult to strike the right balance between the education institutions products and the society expectations. Quality assurance in education is connected with the ability of educational institutions, the military ones included, to provide educational programmes in compliance with the established standards. That is why quality management could support

the managers of educational institutions to use the available resources in order to enhance performance to meet the beneficiaries requirements.

Keywords: education; standards; quality management; competitiveness; strategy

Military Leadership – Synergistic Complementarity of Defence Compatibility

Leaders must embody the qualities and attributes typical of the people and the structure they are in charge of. The people they lead are not just a collection of trained people. The subordinates must see that the leader is the same as they are, but also different in terms of the essential aspects: self-confidence (trust) and enthusiasm; initiative and ability to make decisions, courage to accept responsibility, determination, calm in times of crisis, sense of duty, loyalty, sense of justice, personal example, physical form, human element – courage before defeat, inspiration in moments of apathy, clarity of mind in time of confusion.

Keywords: emotional intelligence; self-motivation; strategic leader; operational leader

Negotiation, Communication and Diplomacy in International Conflicts Resolution

The political, military and security environment at national, regional and global level has certain dynamic that sometimes outstrips the effectiveness of communication and the efficiency of diplomacy actions.

In this context, it is important to emphasise that the legitimate entities involved in conflict management, whether state or non-state, political or military, national or multinational, must find a legal, standardised, constitutional, normative, institutional balance between policies, decisions and actions regarding both individual freedom and collective defence, as well as between the communication and negotiation process so that security and stability could be ensured.

Keywords: negotiation; conflict; communication; diplomacy; risk; international relations; strategy

Adapting NATO intelligence in support of "One NATO"

The author, who was Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, approaches the most significant and fundamental reform in the history of allied intelligence, launched at the NATO summit meeting in Warsaw, in July 2016. In response

to the challenging threat environment posed by an assertive Russia and the rise of terrorism and instability in the south, the allies are fundamentally adapting how NATO organises and analyses intelligence, the key element of this reform being the creation of a new division at NATO Headquarters, consisting of two pillars: intelligence (with the merged strands of military and civilian intelligence) and security (the NATO Office of Security). In this respect, he points out the special role played by the Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD), an intelligence structure established last year.

Keywords: intelligence reform; hybrid analyses; Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD); NATO Office of Security; Terrorism Intelligence Cell

ZAPAD 2017 and Euro-Atlantic Security

The author writes about the strategic exercises and large-scale snap exercises conducted by Russia in the last decade, from Exercise KAVKAZ 2008 in Russia's North Caucasus region on its border with Georgia to Exercise ZAPAD 2017, officially conducted on NATO's eastern borders in Russia's Western Military District and on the territory of Belarus from 14 to 20 September.

In his opinion, the character, scale and intensity of Russian military exercise activities during September 2017 is consistent with the system of strategic operations that Russia would conduct in conflict with NATO, focusing on the Western Strategic Direction, with supporting military activity nationwide in all strategic directions, and potential global operations, in an escalating conflict.

Keywords: KAVKAZ 2008; ZAPAD 2017; snap exercises; maskirovka

English version by
✎ *Iulia SINGER*
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

2017 / 2018

Thank you, dear collaborators, for the word materialised in the pages of the journal of the General Staff!

Thank you for the fact that, together, we have written a page in the history of the Romanian Military Thinking!

Therefore, it is to each of You we express our gratitude and appreciation:

1. Tor Arne BERNTSEN
2. Dr Florian BICHIR
3. Brigadier General (r.) Dr Viorel BUȚA
4. Gjert Lage DYNDAL
5. Dirk DUBOIS
6. James GREENE
7. Dave JOHNSON
8. Lieutenant Colonel Dr Adrian LESENCIUC
9. Arndt Freytag von LORINGHOVEN
10. Eugen MIHAI
11. Petrică MIHALACHE
12. Dr BEng Liliana MIRON
13. Prof. Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ
14. Kestutis PAULAUSKAS
15. Brigadier General Dr Virgil-Ovidiu POP
16. Sigrid REDSE-JOHANSEN
17. Colonel (r.) Dr Georgel RUSU
18. Jamie SHEA
19. Mircea STAN
20. Colonel Dr Olivian STĂNICĂ
21. Jens STOLTENBERG
22. Colonel (r.) Dr Mircea TĂNASE
23. Captain (AF) BEng Stelian TEODORESCU
24. Brigadier General (r.) Petru TOADER
25. Colonel Valentin VASILE
26. Dr Pierre VERLUISE
27. Brigadier General (r.) Dr Mircea VLADU

"GMR" Editorial Staff

The editorial and layout process
was completed on 29 January 2018.

1st Cover: *The Arch of Triumph – The Combat Colours of the units participating in the Military Parade. Photo Valentin Ciobîrcă*

3th Cover: *Exercise Northern Challenge 2017 – a multinational Bomb Disposal Exercise taking place at the Icelandic Coast Guard facility in Keflavik, Iceland, 9-11 October 2017.* https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_147833.htm

4th Cover: *SPIKE-LR Portable Anti-tank Guided Missile System testing completed at the "Getica" National Joint Training Center in Cincu, Brașov County (November 2017).* https://www.forter.ro/galeria-foto/29854

http://www.smap.mapn.ro/gmr