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
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Abreast of NATO Evolution

In a continually changing security environment, having implications not only for the entire organisation in the aggregate but also for each of its 28 member states, NATO seeks to provide carefully developed and adapted responses to the different types of threats it is confronted with at its borders.

The Alliance determination and ability to strengthen the defence of its member states against the challenges and increasing instability in its vicinity are backed by the measures adopted last year, at the NATO Wales Summit, when, considering the Ukraine crisis, it was decided on the establishment, in the six countries on the eastern flank – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania –, of *NATO Force Integration Units/NFIUs* and two *Multinational Divisions/MNDs* in Poland and Romania. Initially, the Multinational Division Southeast in Bucureşti will subordinate only the two force integration units (NFIUs) in Romania and Bulgaria, and the one in Warsaw will coordinate the units in Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Part of a larger project aimed at equal security of all Allies, NATO's six centres constitute key drivers of increasing the Alliance operational capacity. These structures will support collective defence planning, will ensure the coordination and preparation of special rapid intervention teams, and will facilitate the deployment and active conduct of allied response forces whenever necessary, while being an element to assist the continuation of military training and exercises.

Along with the NFIU activation in Bucureşti, on 3 September 2015, the NATO command units in the other five countries in the eastern flank of the Alliance were also activated. By the next summit of the North Atlantic Organisation in July 2016, in Warsaw, all the six new centres will be fully operational. Thus, through a total concept, revitalised for all NATO response forces, the rapid intervention forces, consisting of land, air and maritime capabilities, will be able to deploy at short notice, wherever a crisis occurs, in any region of the Alliance.

The recent joint exercises of some member states airborne forces – the most important exercises of the military bloc in Europe since the end of the *Cold War* up to the present time – support this assertion.

Romania is particularly interested in the developments in the Wider Black Sea Region and, as stated by former Minister of Defence, Mircea Duşa, the NFIU establishment in Bucureşti has a special significance, being *a historic event*. For the first time since the establishment of NATO, in 1949, two of its command elements operate on the territory of Romania. We can appreciate, in this new institutional architecture, in which the security context of each country is taken into account, not only the Alliance interest in reassuring and strengthening its eastern flank but also its support for Romania. It is further evidence that NATO respects its commitments and none of its allies are and will be alone.

In turn, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Nicolae Ciucă, underlines that, starting from the premise that *defence begins at home*, security is essential not only for each member state individually but also for all the other members, regardless of the manifestation of threats.

Given that the Romanian state has increased its potential and made available to NATO important capabilities that will be part of this rapid reaction sector, the two commands under the flag of the Alliance will strongly connect national forces to those of allied states, and therefore Romania's role in defending the SE flank of the North Atlantic Organisation will increase significantly.

NATO has been evolving, addressing any challenges encountered along the way. Hybrid warfare is just one of these challenges and the Alliance is permanently concerned with improving its ability to respond effectively and decisively to any hostile action taken against a member state. We can thus see that NATO's core values have not changed. It is the way to protect them that has been changed, and Romania is part of this mechanism.

On 1 September 2015, the Battle Flag of the 1st Infantry Division "*Dacica*" was handed over to the command of the Multinational Division Southeast. It is a symbolic gesture having great significance as well as a piece of evidence of the pragmatism that is necessary while analysing and addressing present and future challenges.

✍ Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

En même temps avec l'évolution de l'OTAN

Dans un environnement de sécurité en permanente transformation, avec des implications non seulement pour l'organisation dans son ensemble, mais pour chacun de ses 28 membres, en partie, l'OTAN cherche de répondre soigneusement en s'adaptant aux différents types de menaces avec qui se confronte à ses frontières.

La détermination de l'Alliance et sa capacité de renforcer la défense des États membres aux défis et de l'instabilité croissante dans son voisinage sont pris en charge par les mesures adoptées l'an dernier, lors du sommet de l'OTAN, au Pays de Galles, quand, à partir de la crise en Ukraine, il a été décidé que, dans le six pays sur le flanc oriental – la Bulgarie, l'Estonie, la Lettonie, la Lituanie, la Pologne et la Roumanie – faire fonctionner des unités chargées de l'intégration des forces de l'OTAN (*NATO Force Integration Units/NFIU*) et deux commandements de la Division multinationale (*Multi-National Division/MND*) en Pologne et en Roumanie. Tout d'abord, le commandement de la Division multinationale du Sud-Est, à Bucarest, aura dans son responsabilité seulement deux unités intégration des forces (*NFIU*) de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie, et celui de Varsovie coordonnera ceux de Pologne, Estonie, Lettonie et Lituanie.

Part d'un projet plus vaste, visant l'égalité de la sécurité de tous les Alliés, les six centres de l'OTAN constituent les principaux facteurs d'action pour l'augmentation de la capacité opérationnelle de l'Alliance. Ces structures vont soutenir la planification de défense collective, vont assurer la coordination et la préparation des équipes spéciaux d'interventions rapide, vont faciliter le déploiement et la conduite active des forces de réponse alliés chaque fois qu'il est nécessaire, représentant en même temps un élément de soutien pour continuer des instructions et des exercices militaires.

Simultanément avec l'activation de NFIU à Bucarest, le 3 Septembre 2015 ont été activées les unités de commande de l'OTAN dans les autres cinq pays du flanc oriental de l'Alliance. Jusqu'au prochain sommet de l'Organisation de l'Atlantique Nord, en Juillet 2016, à Varsovie, tous les six nouveaux centres seront pleinement opérationnels. Ainsi, par un concept globale, revitalisé pour toutes les forces de réponse de l'OTAN, les forces d'intervention rapide, comprenant

des capacités terrestres, aériennes et maritimes, seront capables de se déployer dans un court délai de réception de la commande n'importe où est une crise, n'importe la région de l'Alliance. Les récents exercices conjoints des forces aéroportées de certains d'Etats membres – les plus importants exercices du bloc militaire en Europe depuis la fin de *la guerre froide* jusqu'au présent – appuient cette affirmation.

Pour la Roumanie, l'évolution de la situation de la région élargie de la Mer Noire a un intérêt particulier et, comme a indiqué Mircea Duşa, le ministre de la Défense de cette période-là, l'établissement de NFIU à Bucarest connaît une signification particulière et représente *un événement historique*.

Pour la première fois depuis la création de l'OTAN, en 1949, deux de ses commandements fonctionnent sur le territoire de la Roumanie. Nous pouvons apprécier, dans cette nouvelle architecture institutionnelle, où le contexte de sécurité de chaque pays est prise en compte, non seulement l'intérêt de l'Alliance pour la réassurance et le renforcement de son flanc oriental, mais son soutien pour la Roumanie. Une preuve supplémentaire que l'OTAN respecte ses engagements et aucun de ses alliés n'est pas et ne sera pas seul.

À son tour, le chef d'Etat-major général, le lieutenant-général Nicolae Ciucă, a souligné que, à partir de la prémisse que *la défense commence à la maison*, la sécurité est essentielle pour chaque Etat membre individuellement, mais aussi pour tous les autres membres, indépendamment de la direction de la manifestation des menaces.

Étant donné que l'État roumain a augmenté sa disponibilité et a mis d'importantes capacités à la disposition de l'OTAN qui feront partie de ce secteur de réaction rapide, les deux commandements sous la bannière de l'Alliance vont connecter plus forte les forces nationales à ceux de ses alliés. Le rôle de la Roumanie sur la carte de défense au flanc S-E de l'Organisation de l'Atlantique Nord accroîtra dans une manière significative.

OTAN évolue et continuera d'évoluer et d'aborder tous les défis rencontrés le long du chemin. La guerre hybride est juste un de ces défis, mais l'Alliance se préoccupe en permanence d'améliorer sa capacité à répondre concrètement et de façon décisive à toute action hostile contre un État membre. Nous pouvons percevoir que les valeurs fondamentales de l'OTAN n'ont pas changé, mais la façon dont ils seront protégés. Et la Roumanie fait partie de cet ensemble.

Le 1^{er} Septembre 2015, le drapeau de bataille de la 1^{ère} Division d'infanterie „*Dacica*” a été remis au commandement de la Division multinationale de Sud-Est. C'est un geste symbolique, plein de significations profondes, mais aussi une preuve de pragmatisme que nous devons regarder et de répondre au présent et à l'avenir.

Version française par
Alina PAPOI

PERSPECTIVES ON THE EVOLUTION AND INFLUENCE OF THE *HYBRID WARFARE* CONCEPT

Brigadier General (r.) Dr Viorel BUȚA
Colonel Valentin VASILE

The aim of this article is to summarise the main features of the concept of hybrid warfare, its evolution and influence on national and allied military doctrines, as they are described by several military theorists from the United States, the United Kingdom and Sweden. The authors note that the hybridity of contemporary conflicts confirms the ever-changing nature of war, a constant presence in the human history, which continuously adapts not only to the social, economical and legal circumstances, but also to the level of technological development. The authors conclude that studying the evolution of contemporary conflicts may be particularly useful to the proper understanding of the concept of hybrid warfare in order to assess its potential impact on the planning and conduct of military operations.

Keywords: *NATO Summit; Wales; hybrid war; hybrid threats; countering hybrid war*

“Der Krieg ist also ein wahres Chamäleon, weil er in jedem konkreten Falle seine Natur etwas ändert”.
Carl von Clausewitz

Introduction

The efforts made in the attempt of theorising the hybridity of contemporary conflicts confirm the multiform and everlasting changing nature of the war, a constant presence in the history of humanity, which permanently adapts itself to the degree of technological development and the social, economic, legal context, through new forms of manifestation.

The frequency of reference to the *hybrid warfare* in the public discourse, in specialised analysis and in press conferences has significantly increased in the latest years, mainly immediately after the Russian Federation annexed Crimea unleashing the secessionist conflict in eastern Ukraine. The possibility of adding the latter on the list of the frozen conflicts from the ex-Soviet

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Colonel Valentin Vasile – Deputy Chief of the Information and Public Relations Directorate, the Ministry of National Defence.

¹ “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case”, Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976/1984, p.89; p.101, in Knopf’s “*Everyman’s Library*” edition.

territory, the dynamic of the combat actions, the dissimulation of the military support provided to the self-proclaimed popular republics of Donetsk and Lugansk, the overlap of political pressure, diplomatic approach and influence campaign, the application of economic sanctions and the adoption of retaliation measures, in response to the Western economic sanctions, fully justify the interests and doubts of the public, the media and last but not least the political and military leaders regarding the evolution of the conflict in Ukraine. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the former Secretary General of NATO, defined hybrid warfare as “*a sophisticated combination of traditional conventional warfare mixed up with information and primarily disinformation operations*”², drawing attention upon the fact that only the military responses to counteract hybrid threats are insufficient and inappropriate. Moreover, Rasmussen asserted that “*it will take more than NATO to counter such hybrid warfare effectively*”³.

A similar opinion was shared by Josh Earnest, the White House spokesperson, who considered necessary the analysis of NATO member states security needs at the summit in Wales, “*including what we can do to deal with hybrid warfare and other asymmetric threats*”⁴.

The inclusion of the *hybrid warfare* on the agenda of the summit in Wales was also sustained by Robert G. Bell, the American Secretary of Defence representative in Europe and the United States of America Mission to NATO advisor. The American official motivated his proposal by displaying the conclusions of the analysis upon the conflict in Ukraine, “*what is being labelled asymmetric, unattributed aggression, which is a combination of political pressure, economic pressure, cyber, propaganda, special forces, surrogates, infiltrators, equipment provision*”⁵.

The declaration adopted on 5 September 2015 by the Heads of State and Government attending the NATO Wales Summit reflects the commitment of the member states to act in such a way that the Alliance “*is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed*”

² Ian Traynor, *Ukraine Crisis: NATO Plans East European Bases to Counter Russia*. NATO Chief Announces Move in Response to Ukraine Crisis and Says Alliance Is Dealing with a New Russian Military Approach, in *The Guardian*, 27 August 2014, see <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/nato-east-european-bases-counter-russian-threat>

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Josh Earnest, *Press Briefing by the White House Press Secretary*, 2 September 2014, see <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/02/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-922014>

⁵ Ewen MacAskill, *US Presses NATO Members to Increase Defence Spending*, *The Guardian*, 23 June 2014, see <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/us-nato-members-increase-defence-spending>

*in a highly integrated design. It is essential that the Alliance possesses the necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces*⁶.

The NATO Wales Summit Declaration presents the essential features of the *hybrid warfare* – the coordination, synchronisation and superior integration of military operations with the actions of the paramilitary forces and with the actions of support carried out by civil institutions and agencies at political, diplomatic, economic and information level, before, during, and after ceasing the armed conflict. The declaration emphasised the imperative of increasing NATO response capability as well as the necessity of providing it with the most adequate instruments in order to prevent and counteract hybrid threats, simultaneously with implementing the *Readiness Action Plan*. On this matter, the leaders of the member states agreed on improving the exchange of information, enhancing the processes of political consultation and internal coordination to strengthen the cooperation between NATO and other organisations, in order to obtain a better strategic communication and to develop the scenarios for NATO exercises based on the specific features of the *hybrid warfare*.

In this article, our intention is to underline the fact that, prior to being taken over and made it official by NATO, even by including it in the text of the *NATO Wales Summit Declaration*, the concept of *hybrid warfare* represented the object of numerous studies, debates, even controversies, especially in the USA. This is the reason why we consider that studying the evolution of the theory regarding the hybridity of conflicts in the American military thinking as well as in the military doctrines of some allied states (Great Britain) and partners (Sweden) can be extremely useful to fully understand the concept of *hybrid warfare* and to evaluate its potential impact upon the planning and conduct of military operations.

Pros and Cons of the Hybrid Warfare: the American Perspective

The first use of the syntagm *hybrid warfare* is assigned, in the USA, to **Robert G. Walker**, the author of a bachelor degree thesis written at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, in December 1998, having as topic the “*US Marine Corps and Special Operations*”, in which he describes

⁶ *NATO Wales Summit Declaration*, 5 September 2014, para. 13, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease

the expeditionary capability of the Marine Corps as being “*a hybrid force for a hybrid war*”⁷.

In 2002, in a paper presented at the Naval Postgraduate School, **William J. Nemeth** tried to anticipate the future of the war and altogether the necessity of adapting it to the armed forces in terms of equipment, personnel training and operational procedures. Building his argumentation in the form of a case study applied to Chechnya, the term Nemeth used for the future war was that of *hybrid warfare*. The author stated that “*the strengths of hybrid warfare lend itself to the use of guerrilla tactics, which technologically advanced and highly bureaucratic forces have a difficult time countering*”⁸. Another dominant characteristic lies in the very strong motivation of the fighters, for whom *hybrid warfare* is a total war, a fight which ensures the survival of the society they belong to. The fight for existence justifies, in their view, the “*use of all tactics at disposal including kidnapping, control of the enemy’s food or water supply, massacres, and blurring the distinction between combatants and non-combatants*”⁹. It is worth mentioning that using extreme tactics (kidnappings, assassinations, hostage mutilation, massacres, bombing and mining some objectives) exceeds the framework of guerrilla fights and resembles, according to the international classification, terrorist acts. Having as a starting point the analysis of the characteristics of the Chechen society, the influence of religion, traditions and modernism upon population, the institutional structure and organisation, the economic potential, the organisation, equipment, manning, tactics, and experience of the combat formations, as well as their ability to use current technology, Nemeth concluded that *hybrid warfare*, having as a role model the Chechen insurgents, would spread more and more.

In Nemeth’s opinion, modern armies, when confronted with the *hybrid warfare*, will be asked to give up their rigid doctrines and adapt their own operational procedures in order to identify and exploit the critical vulnerabilities of enemies as to be able to permanently strike the centres of gravity of their forces, thus minimising their freedom of movement, capacity and will to fight.

Given the fact that the *hybrid warfare* may involve both military forces pertaining to states and fighting formations pertaining to some non-state actors (terrorist organisations, combatant groups, extremist factions, political parties), it is necessary

⁷ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia, December 2007, p. 9.

⁸ William J. Nemeth, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case For Hybrid Warfare*, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2002, p. 74.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

to understand their motivations and strategic resorts in order to adapt their engagement rules, focusing on the conventional means of striking (e.g. artillery and missiles, aerial bombing etc.) or the non-lethal means of engaging the targets, through political, economic, legal, socio-cultural and informational means.

In the US *National Defence Strategy – NDS*, approved in 2005, there can be noticed preoccupations with identifying and understanding the characteristics of the new types of threats that the American society and its armed forces have confronted with in the theatres of operations, and not only. Without losing sight of the possible dangers coming from the armed forces of other states, the *Strategy* highlighted the US vulnerabilities if confronted with state and non-state adversaries (paramilitary formations, terrorist organisations), which would mainly resort to destabilising actions, organised crime and extended terrorist attacks. The above-mentioned document requires the responsible American authorities to undertake all the necessary measures to counteract the different varieties of threats directed to the United States of America – *traditional* (conventional armed forces of other states), *irregular* (political, religious and ethnic extremism, insurgency and terrorism), *catastrophic* (acquisition, possession, use of weapons of mass destruction) and *destructive* (development of advanced technology in order to obtain supremacy in key fields like – biotechnology, cyber, laser, spatial weapons). The national defence strategy identifies the risks of simultaneous exposure of the American state to various types of threats because “*in the future, the most capable opponents may seek to combine truly disruptive capacity with traditional, irregular or catastrophic forms of warfare*”¹⁰.

It can be asserted that the merit of having noticed the tendency of integration, overlapping, coordination and synchronisation of the various categories of threats, traditional, irregular, catastrophic and destructive, goes directly to the authors of the 2005 edition of the US *National Defence Strategy*, thus undoubtedly contributing to the conceptualisation of *hybrid warfare*.

Nathan Freier believes that the challenges mentioned in the US *National Defence Strategy*, 2005, “*are archetypes. None of the four – traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive – exist now or will exist in the future in pure form. Thus, <hybrid challenges> will remain the norm*”¹¹.

⁷ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia, December 2007, p. 9.

⁸ William J. Nemeth, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case For Hybrid Warfare*, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2002, p. 74.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2005, p. 2.

¹¹ Nathan Freier, *Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, Traditional, and Hybrid Threats in Context*, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, p. 46, see <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub782.pdf>

The analysis of the conflict in Lebanon, in the summer of 2006, in which a state actor, Israel, militarily engaged against a non-state actor, Hezbollah, allowed drawing some conclusions, which were exploited by the USA in the analysis of the hybrid threats and the theory of the *hybrid warfare*.

The popularity of the concept of *hybrid warfare* has as a reference point an article published by Lieutenant General **James N. Mattis** and Lieutenant Colonel **Frank G. Hoffman**, in 2005, in *Proceedings Magazine*, edited by the US Naval Institute. The two authors draw attention to the fact that the US conventional and technological military superiority can be challenged by other states and even by non-state actors by the combined use of some less advanced technologies, and the irregular procedures and tactics that represent an advantage for them – terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla fights carried out by paramilitary formations made up on ethnic grounds, organised crime, cyber attacks against military targets and financial institutions, destruction of some essential infrastructure as well as of communications and transport elements etc. As the analysis of the development of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan shows, the direct confrontation shall be avoided, because what really matters is obtaining some tactical advantages whose popularity might limit the capacity of action of the US armed forces. Based on these considerations, Mattis and Hoffman state that, in the future, the US armed forces will deal with experienced opponents, able to “*select a combination of techniques or tactics appealing to them..., as the combination of novel approaches, a merger of different modes and means of war. This unprecedented synthesis is what we call Hybrid Warfare*”¹².

Frank G. Hoffman, one of the most fervent proponents of the *hybrid warfare* theory, considers that the distinction between traditional and *hybrid warfare* is made because the latter manifests itself by overlapping more threats and forms of conflict, at the same time with the classical military operations, in which the armed forces of the enemy states confront.

Hoffman mentioned that “*hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder*”¹³.

¹² James N. Mattis, Frank G. Hoffman, *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, US Naval Institute, *Proceedings Magazine*, November 2005, vol. 132/11, p. 19, see <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/archive/2005>

¹³ Frank G. Hoffman, *Hybrid Warfare and Challenges*, in *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 52 (1st Quarter 2009), p. 36.

Hoffman's advocacy draws attention to the changing nature of war, in which the opponents that are inferior seek, and often find, new alternatives, forms and ways of combat, through which they try to maximise their chances of survival and to obtain the victory in confronting themselves with forces that are superior in number and technology. Hoffman asserts that *hybrid warfare*, without representing a novelty in the history of mankind, manifests itself differently because there is a juxtaposition of more types of threats, forces, capabilities, equipments and advanced systems (encrypted communications, portable air-ground launchers), insurgent procedures (ambush, improvised explosive devices) and terrorist (destruction of some objectives of public importance, suicide attackers, coercive kidnappings and assassinations), military and non-military actions integrated at an operational and tactical level with the purpose of gaining victory on the battlefield.

Hoffman pays special attention to the study of the conflict in Lebanon, in 2006, in which, a non-state actor, Hezbollah, managed to resist, for 34 days, the organised Israeli armed forces that were highly superior in terms of strength, training, weaponry and equipment. This confrontation represents, in Hoffman's view, a model of *hybrid warfare*. Hezbollah exploited the advantages of a modular structure, composed of cells prepared and authorised to act in a decentralised manner, in populated areas, using weapons and ammunition from pre-positioned warehouses. Hezbollah fighters combined guerrilla tactics with the use of some systems of weaponry that had a great destruction power, launching, between 12 July and 13 August 2006, over 4,100 missiles that hit the objectives positioned in depth of the Israeli territory, with a record of 250 missiles in the last day of the war. Moreover, Hezbollah fighters used guided anti-tank missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, unmanned air vehicles (capable of carrying explosive loading), surveillance systems that monitored the actions and communications of the Israeli forces, night vision systems. The analysis of the *modus operandi* employed by Hezbollah showed the inadequacy and the limitations of the operational spectrum of conventional armed forces in case of a threat of hybrid type.

In 2007, in the work entitled *Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing States*, **Margaret S. Bond** militated for developing a distinct strategic concept to describe the ways in which the American armed forces could be used in hostile operational environments, specific to failing states. She had in mind the necessity of increasing the efficiency of applying military forces in supporting actions, carried out at political, diplomatic, economic and information level, thus facilitating meeting the pursued political-military objectives. Margaret S. Bond considered that *"the war of the next century will comprise a kind of hybrid war, projecting all elements of national power along a continuum of activities from stability,*

security, and reconstruction operations, to armed combat¹⁴. Military and information activities, training and allocating the human, material and financial resources, stabilisation, reconstruction and development programmes are correlated in order to maximise the effects of non-violent and persuasive use of the political and economic influence to initiate the evolutions that are to lead to reforming the hostile governments in failing states, characterised by the instability of the political, social and economic conditions. In this context, although non-lethal military activities are preferred, *hybrid warfare* might also mean applying lethal force if direct threats appear from conventional military units, paramilitary formations, insurgent groups, terrorist organisations.

Brian P. Fleming, the author of the monograph *The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art*, analyses the conclusions of the theoretical debates and the proposed definitions for the concept of hybrid threat, as well as their impact upon the doctrines and the military operational planning in the US. For Brian P. Fleming, hybrid threats began to reveal themselves in a new modern form after the end of the Gulf War, in 1991, as “*a sophisticated amalgam of unrestricted threat activities that have resisted codification and generated a labyrinth of contradictory explanation*”¹⁵, which had in common the translation of the strategic intention into a set of operations unrestrictedly distributed in the entire operational spectrum. In his study, Fleming asserted that, in the near future, the number of hybrid threats would increase, at the same time with the diversification of the ways and means of using them, so that different state actors (China, Iran) and non-state ones (Hezbollah) could meet their objectives. That is why the need for the US armed forces to anticipate the impact of hybrid threats upon the operational environment and, consequently, to revise the general strategy, the doctrines and the planning procedures, units’ combat training, personnel training and resource allocation prioritisation. Just as Frank G. Hoffman does, Fleming considers that the concepts of hybrid threat and *hybrid warfare* have been increasingly used after the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, out of the need to describe the complexity and sinuosity of the operational environment. It is characterised by the coordination of the actions carried out by the military units of regular military forces with the actions of the irregular formations in order to obtain the desired strategic effects.

¹⁴ Margaret S. Bond, *Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing States*, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2007, p. 4.

¹⁵ Brian P. Fleming, *The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art*, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2011, p. ii.

In his paper, Brian P. Fleming emphasised the significant contribution that the historian **Thomas M. Huber** had to the theory of the *hybrid warfare* to whom we owe the paternity of the concept *compound warfare*, introduced in the literature in 1996. The compound warfare, according to Huber's definition, is "the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against an enemy"¹⁶. The simultaneous use of regular and irregular forces represents a main feature in the definitions given for the *hybrid warfare*, which supports the assertion that *compound warfare* is part of *hybrid warfare*.

For **John J. McCuen** "hybrid wars are a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously – and more decisively – attempt to achieve control of the combat zone's indigenous populations by securing and stabilising them (stability operations)"¹⁷. McCuen considers that *hybrid warfare* addresses the entire spectrum of conflict, simultaneously pursuing to disable the enemy, by combat actions and non-lethal means, to take control over the population in the operation area, to get its support, as well as to enjoy the sympathy of the public opinion and the international community. Thus, in McCuen's opinion, achieving the strategic objectives of the *hybrid warfare* is conditioned by achieving success on all these battlefields, conventional and asymmetric – theatre of operations itself, local population, public opinion and international community.

Being an expert in counterinsurgency and the advisor to General David Petraeus, the Australian author **David Kilcullen** approaches in his book *The Accidental Guerrilla* the development of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, proposing, considering the conclusions of the operational analysis, a model for the *hybrid warfare*, based on the theoretical elements frequently conveyed in the American literature in the field. In his opinion, "concepts such as hybrid warfare and unrestricted warfare make a lot more sense than traditional state-on-state, force-on-force concepts of conventional war"¹⁸. According to Kilcullen, *hybrid warfare* is conducted beyond the limits of conventional warfare, to which are added irregular warfare, civil war, insurgency and terrorism, exploitation of ethnic and religious factions of the population in the area of operations.

¹⁶ Thomas M. Huber, *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot*, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002, p. 1.

¹⁷ John J. McCuen, *Hybrid Wars*, in *Military Review*, March-April 2008, p. 108.

¹⁸ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla. Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 263.

One of the most famous critics of the theory of *hybrid warfare*, **Russel W. Glenn**, asserts that, “*From a purely doctrinal perspective, hybrid threats and the methods they employ seem at best a subset of irregular warfare*”¹⁹. Glenn’s conservative attitude is justified by his preference for the acknowledged definitions in the approved official publications of the US armed forces. Among them it is the definition of irregular warfare – “*a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)*”²⁰, which promotes indirect and asymmetric approaches and uses a complete range of military means and other capabilities to minimise the opponent’s strength, influence and will. To Glenn, the defining elements of *hybrid warfare* – the simultaneous and adaptive use of a mix of conventional, irregular military actions, terrorism, organised crime and civil activities, carried out by states and non-state actors – are included in the definition of the irregular warfare.

The elements of *hybrid warfare* are also present in the definition of the unconventional warfare, understood as “*activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area*”²¹, which is under the control of the enemy or hostile forces, where own and allied forces cannot operate successfully due to some operational limitations. As a result, unconventional warfare includes – without limiting to – guerrilla warfare, subversion and sabotage, information activities, recovery and support provided by special forces, which entails the development of a wide spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, usually through local forces, organised, trained, equipped, supported and, to a certain extent, led by an external actor. Though he agrees with the fact that the theory of *hybrid warfare* may contribute to better understanding the aspects of modern warfare, Glenn is very strict when he asserts that *hybrid warfare* “*should not attain status as part of formal doctrine*”²², because its component elements are already better described by other concepts, accepted, validated, clearer and easier to be understood by the practitioners of the military art.

The concepts of hybrid threat and *hybrid warfare* still remain a constant presence in the speciality literature and the media, especially as they have been used in the documents written by the Air Force and the Special Forces to describe

¹⁹ Russell W. Glenn, *Thoughts on “Hybrid” Conflict*, in *Small Wars Journal*, 2 March 2009, p. 7.

²⁰ JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010 (as amended on 15 November 2014), p. 130.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 259.

²² Russell W. Glenn, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

the complexity of the contemporary operational environment, as well as in the public interventions of some political leaders and military commanders. Nevertheless, the Department of Defence of the United States of America does not use an official definition, which is equivalent to recognising the concepts of hybrid threat and *hybrid warfare*, because they do not represent a new type of warfare, the forms and means of manifestations that are assigned to them being included in the definition of irregular warfare.

The position of the Department of Defence is based on the conclusions of the report that refers to *hybrid warfare*, *GAO-10-1036R Hybrid Warfare*, published on 10 September 2010, by the *US Government Accountability Office*²³. This report, submitted to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities of the Armed Forces Committee in the Representative Chamber, intended to identify the differences between *hybrid warfare* and other forms of warfare, and also the impact of using the new concept upon the general strategy, doctrines and operational planning.

Emphasising the need for the US armed forces to continually improve their capacity of adapting and responding to the new types of threats, the report highlighted the different perceptions of the representatives of the armed forces services regarding the classification of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and of the one between Russia and Georgia, in 2008, into the patterns of conventional, irregular and hybrid warfare. When comparing the doctrine characteristics, it is obvious that the accepted definitions of the conventional and irregular warfare also include the attributes of the *hybrid warfare* (*figure 1*), resulting in making the effort to theorise it redundant.

The report mentions the agreement of the majority of the representatives in the Department of Defence regarding the fact that, although the concept of *hybrid warfare* describes the more and more complex nature of warfare, which includes all the elements that manifest along the entire spectrum of the conflict, “*DOD does not consider it a new form of warfare*”²⁴.

²³ GAO is a non-affiliated political and ideological agency, independent and objective, that works for the US Congress. Also named “*the guardian dog of the Congress*”, GAO carries out numerous audit activities to assess the ways of using public funds, the functioning of the public institutions, and investigates the way governmental programmes and policies are implemented.

²⁴ US Government Accountability Office – *Hybrid Warfare: Briefing to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities*, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-10-1036R, Washington, 10 September 2010, p. 11, see <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1036R>.




Figure 1: The concept of hybrid warfare²⁵

Obviously, the concept of *hybrid warfare* has the advantage of the novelty of interpretation. However, there is also a great disadvantage, namely that it has most recently arrived in the brilliant company of its numerous congeners – guerrilla, compound, special, unconventional, asymmetric, irregular, non-linear warfare. This might be the reason why the 15 November 2014 revised edition of the *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, published by the US Department of Defence, mentions neither hybrid threats nor *hybrid warfare*.

The British Perspective on Hybrid Warfare

The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre in the Ministry of Defence estimated, in its study *Future Character of Conflict*, published in 2010, the evolutions of the characteristics of warfare up to 2029, as well as their possible consequences. The regional instability generated by failing states, the increasing interethnic and interdenominational disputes, the actions of extremist groups, terrorism, the intensification of competition for resources, and the modification of the power balance at international level are the reasons that might lead to the emergence of conflicts.

Although the typology of future conflicts cannot be precisely anticipated, in the future, wars can be conducted in broader areas of operation, meaning that the armed forces will be simultaneously faced with more types of threats

²⁵ Source: GAO-10-1036 Report on Hybrid Warfare, US Government Accountability Office, Washington.

and different opponents, with conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, insurgent movements, extremist groups, terrorist organisations. The study mentioned that *“future conflict will be increasingly hybrid in character..., it is about a change in the mindset of our adversaries, who are aiming to exploit our weaknesses using a wide variety of high-end and low-end asymmetric techniques. These forms of conflict are transcending our conventional understanding of what equates to irregular and regular military activity; the <conflict paradigm> has shifted and we must adapt our approaches if we are to succeed”*²⁶.

In spite of the numerous studies and analysis dedicated to the concepts of hybrid threats and *hybrid warfare*, the British conservatism and pragmatism do not contradict themselves, and a critic analysis has been made by **Paul Latawski**, a Professor at the Department of Defence and International Affairs, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

In the article *The Inherent Tensions in Military Doctrine*, Latawski considered that *“Fashionable <big ideas> may be nothing new in the history of war and neither is their impact so profound as to change its nature or character. History provides the critical reality test that separates empty jargon from revolutionary change. Doctrine must be a living intellectual body of thought that draws on the past, lives in the present, evolves, develops and, if necessary, gives way to anew thinking relevant to the present or anticipated future operational conditions and changing weapons technology”*²⁷.

In the mentioned article, published in 2011, Latawski asserted that: *“there is really nothing particularly new about the hybrid nature of war and, in fact, the problem of hybridity has long been the subject of study and analysis. Indeed, all wars are hybrid and it is only the characteristics of hybridity that change over time”*²⁸.

Latawski drew the attention to the imbalances caused by overdependence on the US models, which may affect the correct understanding of the past, present and future conflicts. The abundance of works published in the US on *hybrid warfare* determined Latawski to complete the opinions expressed by James N. Mattis and Frank G. Hoffman, the American pioneers of the *hybrid warfare* theory. Closely analysing the definitions proposed by the American authors, Latawski questioned the elements that the mentioned authors considered as absolute novelty, even revolutionary in shaping the hybrid physiognomy of war.

²⁶ Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) – *Strategic Trends Programme. Future Character of Conflict*, Ministry of Defence, February 2010, p. 1, see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33685/FCOCReadactedFinalWeb.pdf

²⁷ Paul Latawski, *The Inherent Tensions in Military Doctrine*, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Occasional Papers, no. 5, 2011, p. 3.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

Moreover, Latawski mentioned that the term *hybrid warfare* was used for the first time by **Thomas R. Mockaitis**, in his paper *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, published in 1995, which was not reviewed by the American authors who claimed the paternity of the concept. This aspect is relevant not only for the transatlantic circulation of ideas but also for the evolution of the concept of *hybrid warfare* in the military theory.

On describing the complex, multiform nature of warfare, Mockaitis asserted that the confrontations that took place in the '60s in Indonesia were equal to "*a hybrid war, combining low-intensity conventional engagements with insurgency*"²⁹. Mockaitis also noticed that "*hybrid war demonstrates the extreme fluidity of categories such as <low>, <mid> and <high> intensity when applied to modern war. The conflict spectrum operates within individual wars as well as separating them from each other*"³⁰.

Two fundamental documents for the defence concept of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty* – *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty*, adopted in October 2010, contain numerous references to the vulnerabilities of open and interdependent societies to the risks and threats that affect the current security environment. The documents highlight new types of risks, the multiplication and the diversity of a range of threats to peace and security of states, and the increasing instability and uncertainty that are to be felt in the world. In this respect, there was felt the need of revising the *National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain*, which "*is of little value without the tools to implement it*"³¹.

The report on security and strategic defence specifies the ways of action and the preset terms for implementing the stipulations of the *National Security Strategy*, as well as the necessity for the armed forces to be reviewed, reorganised, trained, equipped and modernised. The operational and deterrence capacity should meet the demands of protecting the United Kingdom, ensure the defence of the country and successfully deal with different kinds of threats to national security.

The diminution of the risks of producing conventional attacks does not mean an increase in the level of security, affected by the multiplication of unconventional threats. Among them there are terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the use of chemical and biological weapons, cyber attacks, the dependence on some types of fuel and energy sources, climate changes and their impact upon the economy,

²⁹ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, Manchester University Press, 1995, p. 16.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

³¹ *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, the National Security Strategy*, HM Government, October 2010, p. 3.

food and water resources, serious accidents and natural catastrophes. These types of threats can be generated by state and non-state actors, terrorist organisations, insurgent movements and criminal groups.

The *National Security Strategy* and the *Report on Security and Strategic Defence* do not mention hybrid threats or *hybrid warfare*. However, it can be noticed that the types of threats taken into consideration are to be found as hybrid threats in the definitions of an American origin, and the entities that might employ them identify with the actors of the *hybrid warfare*. Moreover, the British documents specify the advantages of a comprehensive approach, at national and international level, in order to identify, prevent and eliminate the threats before they have serious consequences, affecting the security and interests of the United Kingdom. This is the emerging point of the wish to maintain a wide spectrum of defence capabilities, multilateral and adaptable, necessary to discourage, prevent and, if necessary, to act against imminent threats, as well as of the need to consolidate the cooperation with essential allies and partners. These requirements are subsumed under the comprehensive approach to ensuring national security, which entails “*coordinating and integrating the approach across government, achieving greater effect by combining defence, development, diplomatic, intelligence and other capabilities*”³².

The *UK Defence Doctrine*, adopted in November 2014, makes the distinction between *external threats* (invasion, attack or blockade), *internal threats* (terrorism, subversion, civil turbulence, caused by the exacerbation of the political, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious tensions, corruption, poverty, injustice, crime, insurgency, sabotage, espionage) and *other threats* (instability caused by financial crisis, climate changes, pandemics, cyber attacks or other types of attack upon some essential national infrastructure). Although it broadly analyses the typology of threats in the present security environment and proposes their management through a comprehensive approach, by the “*coordinated use of the three instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic and military. The three instruments of power are underpinned by information*”³³, the *UK Defence Doctrine*, the November 2014 edition, does not refer to hybrid threats and *hybrid warfare*.

The Swedish Perspective on Hybrid Warfare

Renouncing conscription in 2010 and adopting a system based on volunteering, cutting down military expenses and recognising the deficiencies in defending the country, the reform of the armed forces and the revision of their incumbent

³² *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, HM Government, October 2010, p. 10.

³³ *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine (5th Edition)*, November 2014, p. 12.

missions, redefining the role and status of the armed forces in society made necessary the development of a new strategic military doctrine in Sweden, which was adopted in 2011.

The doctrine considers necessary the training of some flexible units, with a high operational capacity, interoperable and able to be part in rapid reaction joint forces, to participate in the operations of rapid reaction multinational forces, to contribute and ensure an increased presence in both short-term operations and long-term operations. The concern to increase interoperability, the expeditionary approach and the participation in multinational missions show Sweden's interest in enhancing regional partnerships, within NATO and the UE, in amending its strict defensive position, of neutrality and non-alignment, which is meant to use the armed forces and the units for territorial defence to counter a conventional attack.

The strategic military doctrine of Sweden reveals understanding the fact that, to be able to properly respond to the challenges generated by the complexity of the international security environment, it is necessary to identify, practise and apply new multifunctional methods to ensure the coordination of the military and civil efforts within a comprehensive approach.

In order to define the possible missions of the armed forces, the Swedish military doctrine takes into consideration a wide range of military operations and activities in the spectrum of the conflict, from high-intensity to low-intensity ones, conducted against both conventional and irregular forces. An important role is played by special operations forces, being mentioned their participation in multinational stabilisation missions, counterinsurgency-specific operations, irregular and *hybrid warfare*.

The Swedish military doctrine shows the transition towards a new concept of national defence and underlines the necessity of training the armed forces in order to be able to carry out new types of missions that meet the new types of threats. Among them, the Swedish military doctrine explicitly mentions hybrid threats and *hybrid warfare*. However, the document specifies neither the armed forces action possibilities to counter hybrid threats nor the military response options in case of a *hybrid war* against Sweden.

The new Swedish doctrine assumes the concept of *hybrid warfare* because of the increased frequency of simultaneously use of conventional, irregular, paramilitary forces by different state and non-state actors in recent conflicts. According to the Swedish doctrine, "*Hybrid Warfare is explained as a mean of warfare which combines different strategies, tactics and combat techniques within the same conflict (area) with an emphasis on the influence and communication activities at global scale, on the importance of leadership and support to a various extent with the increased availability of advanced weapon systems. Hybrid Warfare*

can be seen as a development of *irregular warfare* with the increased use of modern technology. It requires the ability to handle regular, irregular and unconventional warfare”³⁴.

Although conflicts differentiate in terms of circumstances, actors and their motivations, engaged forces and assets, the Swedish military doctrine considers useful the classification and description of the character of the conflict based on clear criteria that are meant to easily structuring and better understanding a crisis situation, its causes and the type of war. In case of a crisis, defined by threatening some fundamental values, there is an immediate need for intervention as the available time is limited. That is why the necessity of managing and coordinating the actions of the forces and assets in highly unstable conditions, establishing the character of the type of war, has a pragmatic importance, reflected in configuring the structure of the intervention forces and the assets they use.

The Swedish, two-dimensional, version of the conflict spectrum situates the *hybrid warfare* between the regular and irregular warfare, in the category of high-intensity conflicts (figure 2).




Figure 2: The spectrum of conflict³⁵

³⁴ *Militärstrategisk doktrin med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12)*, Försvarsmakten, Grafisk produktion, Stockholm, 2011, p. 29.

³⁵ Source: *The Swedish strategic military doctrine, op. cit.*, p. 38.

A comprehensive analysis of the numerous pros and cons that conceptualise hybrid threats and hybrid warfare is provided by a Swedish officer, **Thomas Bjerregaard**, the author of the work *Hybrid Warfare: A Military Revolution or Revolution in Military Affairs?*, presented in 2012 at the US Army Command and General Staff College.

The advocates of the concept claim that *hybrid warfare* represents a new type of warfare, resulted from combining regular warfare with the irregular one. Its contestants claim that *hybrid warfare* only seems to be a new form of warfare but nothing makes it different from other conflicts in history, when adversaries used techniques and components of the regular and irregular warfare at the same time.

Trying to perceive beyond the disputes emerged over the theory of *hybrid warfare*, Bjerregaard notices the fact that, although the Swedish strategic military doctrine does not have recommendations regarding counteracting hybrid threats and training the armed forces to face a hybrid war, *“If the Swedish Army is to prepare for hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, it is prudent to define and describe hybrid warfare. As these concepts are new to the Swedish defence discourse, it is fitting to try to define them. Only by understanding a threat, is it possible to prepare a suitable response”*³⁶.

Conclusions

The influence of the American military concepts, exerted directly or through the North Atlantic Alliance, has inspired numerous analysis, debates and conferences, fuelling different opinion currents and sanctioning crucial decisions regarding the military doctrines, the organisation and use of the armed forces of the allied and partner states, without limiting to those. Following the American models has undoubtedly contributed to the development of interoperability between the armed forces of NATO member states, an essential condition for success in case of accomplishing real missions by transforming multinationality in a genuine resource of legitimacy and strength.

Without constituting an exception, the translation of the concept of *hybrid warfare* from the American doctrine debates to the content of the operational concepts of NATO member and partner states and not only confirms, once again, the attraction force of the American military theories. The mention of the concept of *hybrid warfare* in the *Wales Summit Declaration* demonstrates the unchallenged influence of the American military thinking over doctrinal debates at the allied headquarters

³⁶ Thomas Bjerregaard, *Hybrid Warfare: A Military Revolution or Revolution in Military Affairs?*, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2012, p. 5.

level, the transatlantic circulation of ideas, terms, definitions, their transition from scientific research to experiment and application, as well as in NATO exercises and operations.

In fact, the features of the American concepts regarding hybrid threats and *hybrid warfare* are present in NATO documents before the *Wales Summit Declaration*. In this context, it is relevant the activity of NATO working group for strategic planning and concepts that, in February 2010, defined hybrid threat as being “*one posed by any current or potential adversary, including state, non-state and terrorists, with the ability, whether demonstrated or likely, to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively, in pursuit of their objectives*”³⁷.

The influence of the American concepts regarding the hybridity of contemporary conflicts is also evident in *Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(D)* – promulgated on 21 December 2010 by the NATO Standardisation Agency. According to this document, the analysis of the current security environment confirms that “*there is likely to be a further blurring of the boundaries between state and non-state actors (such as insurgents, terrorists and criminals) and NATO may subsequently confront an adversary using both conventional and non-conventional means. This could be a compound threat of coincidental or uncoordinated actors, or hybrid when used by a determined adversary in a simultaneous and coordinated manner*”³⁸. *AJP-01(D)* takes into consideration the possible exploitation of NATO vulnerabilities by opponents who are likely to resort to hybrid threats difficult to anticipate, without respecting any legal or western ethical norms, in order to achieve long-term strategies, centred not necessarily on winning victory but on avoiding defeat.

The American perspective regarding *hybrid warfare* also appears in the Alliance officials’ articles and messages according to whom “*hybrid threat is an umbrella term encompassing a wide variety of existing adverse circumstances and actions, such as terrorism, migration, piracy, corruption, ethnic conflict, and so forth*”³⁹.

³⁷ US Government Accountability Office, *Hybrid Warfare: Briefing to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities*, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-10-1036R, Washington, 10 September 2010, p. 15, see <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1036R>.

³⁸ *Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(D)*, December 2010, pp. 2-6.

³⁹ Michael Aaronson, Sverre Diessen, Yves de Kermabon, Mary Beth Long, Michael Miklaucic, *NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat*, PRISM, A Journal of the Centre for Complex Operations, vol. 2, no. 4, 09/2011, p. 115, see <http://cco.dodlive.mil/prism-volume-2-issue-4/>

State as well as asymmetric non-state actors may generate hybrid threats dissimulating their hostile intentions by resorting to covert operations, conducted by intermediaries, unidentified forces assuming false identity, able to function for a long time under a detrimental balance of forces. Complementary to the classical employment of the armed forces, *hybrid warfare* resorts to a wide variety of non-military instruments, used in a coordinated manner, before, during and after ceasing military operations as such. Their efficiency can be enhanced by the actions of the local paramilitary formations, by provoking internal turbulences, by exploiting the population, ethnic and religious groups dissatisfaction, stimulated by the effects of the economic sanctions and propaganda. Thus, there are created the premises of emerging civil conflicts or secession movements on the territory of the abused state, with the obvious or discrete implication of the special forces of the aggressor state.

The increased interest of political-military analysts as well as of the media to conceptualise *hybrid warfare* is due to overlapping its theoretical features with the crisis physiognomy in Ukraine, as follows: combining military actions with non-military ones (political and diplomatic pressure, economic-financial sanctions, banning the access to resources or to public markets); simultaneously using armed forces and paramilitary formations as well as some unidentifiable or having a false identity forces; concentrating military units, exercises, firing sessions, intimidating flights with bombers and hunting aircraft, shows of force in the proximity of the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine; propaganda and subversive actions to channel the dissatisfaction of the population and ethnic and religious minorities into contesting the legitimacy and the authority of the Ukrainian leaders and institutions; creating and supporting some secession movements, whose actions have led to *de facto* affecting the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine, by annexing Crimea to the Russian Federation and by constituting the self-proclaimed popular republics of Donetsk and Lugansk.

The deterioration of the security situation at regional level as a consequence of the crisis in Ukraine and the blockage of the collective security mechanisms, on the ground of non-respecting the agreements, engagements, principles and international law norms, have generated legitimate concerns regarding the capacity of NATO member states of reacting adequately, timely and efficiently in case they were exposed to the specific threats of *hybrid warfare*. The Alliance response materialised in assurance measures for the member states, upgrading the contingency plans, intensifying military exercises, revising the procedures

for the establishment and deployment of command and control centres/allied headquarters, developing rapid reaction forces and NATO deterrent capabilities, pre-positioning equipment, ammunition and military assets meant for collective defence.

Nevertheless, as the former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated, the Alliance does not possess the most appropriate instruments to be able to respond to the *hybrid warfare* challenges. Counteracting *hybrid warfare* exceeds the sphere of competence of the military commands, mainly trained to use manoeuvre and striking capabilities in order to destroy the enemy, and not to respond to the threats that manifest in the economic field (banning the access to resources and advanced technologies, manipulating currency and prices, closing markets) and in the information field (propaganda and cyber attacks, undermining the credibility, legitimacy and authority of political and military leaders, affecting and blocking the public institutions functioning).

The multiple dimensions and facets of *hybrid warfare* determine the North Atlantic Alliance to undertake efforts to ensure the member states security. The flexibility of the command and control structures, the reconfiguration of operative units, the increase in the expeditionary, force projection and rapid reaction capabilities, the equipment, ammunition and military assets pre-positioning are all necessary but not sufficient measures. In addition to these measures, there have to be developed, practised and applied integrated strategies at both NATO and member states level to allow substituting or minimising the use of the armed forces or, if the case, multiplying the effects of its application due to the coordination of the activities carried out by the allies on different levels: political, diplomatic, economic, informational, cultural and humanitarian. This crucial need for developing integrated strategies is, therefore, a common responsibility of the Alliance and member states commands.

At the level of the Defence, Public Order and National Security System and, implicitly, of the Romanian Armed Forces, it is necessary to further develop and practise, in national and multinational exercises, the comprehensive, interdepartmental approach in order to capitalise on the potential of all national power resources through the coordination of the activities of the ministries, government agencies and institutions, military or civil, that can really contribute to counteracting *hybrid warfare* specific threats. As a result, it is mandatory to impose the augmentation of the synergy effects as a doctrine principle and pragmatic necessity in operational planning to integrate and coordinate military

and non-military actions, lethal and non-lethal, at the same time with allotting and judiciously using the available resources, depending on the specific features of hybrid threats.

Regardless of the challenges and the risks in the regional and global environment, of the classical or hybrid valences of the potential threats to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the North Atlantic Alliance states, the quality of a member state represents a fundamental security guarantee itself and brings about the application of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, expression of the right to collective defence of the states, stipulated in the United Nations Charter.

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THE CHANGE IN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN ARMED CONFLICTS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY

Rear Admiral (LH) Dr Constantin CIOROBEA

In the modern era a wide range of threats affect the security environment. Under these conditions, it is important to adapt all power structures so that they can respond appropriately to these challenges, especially asymmetrical ones, as it is the case of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. War and peace have become increasingly mixed, as the conflict entails widely using political, economic, informational, social, media, humanitarian and other non-military measures, supplemented by the instigation of local population and the use of unmarked soldiers.

Given that the hybrid war ultimate success, determined by successively meeting the objectives set for each stage and initiating the next stage, depends on the achievement of favourable conditions, it is our primary responsibility to act to prevent enabling conditions.

Keywords: *hybrid warfare; reflexive control; information operation; new generation warfare; comprehensive approach*

The security environment has grown more complex lately in terms of interdependencies at international and regional level, complicated and simultaneous crises, diverse asymmetric actions, demographic and environment changes as well as increasing number of failed states. In this context, the security environment is affected by various threats such as terrorism, piracy, nuclear threats, cyber attacks, immigration, mafia-like networks, religious fundamentalism, irredentism, secessionism, extremism and ecological ones.

The interdependence of international relations and the interconnection of risks and threats make the role of the state and its links with the international organisations become increasingly important. In this context, NATO, which is in a continuous process of transformation, must continue to adapt, and the military structures, in turn, must transform in order to respond appropriately to these challenges, especially asymmetrical ones, similar to the destabilisation actions of Russia against Ukraine,

Rear Admiral (LH) Dr Constantin Ciorobea – Deputy Chief of the Romanian Naval Forces Staff.

or terrorist actions. We find out that in these actions the battlefield and the front line cannot be clearly defined, it is not a line of separation between peace and war, between governments and citizens, between the military and civilians, and all these aspects require changes in the ways of conducting war, as well as in the way the Alliance should plan the response.

Russia has conducted a real undeclared war against Ukraine, a modern one, at the limit of international laws, which has allowed the opponent being struck simultaneously in various areas throughout its territory, the actions being covert, engaging, simultaneously and jointly, special forces, conventional forces, protesters and internal opposition. This mode of action is presented and developed in the Russian Federation military doctrine approved by President Vladimir Putin in December 2014. This doctrine characterises modern military conflicts as *“the comprehensive use of military force as well as political, economic, informational, and other non-military means, together with the extensive use of the population’s potential for protest and special operations forces”*¹.

This concept, which assumes that, currently, war is not carried out only by the military, allows adapting the ways of engagement to act with maximum efficiency in areas where the opponent is weak, simultaneously in political, economic, informational and humanitarian areas. Conventional military forces are employed only at a certain stage, in particular as a factor of threat or to ensure the final victory. This model of engagement was used in all of its complexity in Ukraine, where direct military actions (conducted covertly and vehemently denied by the Russian Federation), actions of paramilitary groups sponsored from abroad, and continuous support with information were combined with disinformation campaign, influence actions at political level, influence campaign using the mass media, and economic pressure.

Analysing how the actions were conducted by Russia in Ukraine and even in Georgia in 2008, the application of a new military strategy having three interrelated levels is obvious. Firstly, promoting and imposing a unilateral doctrine or the idea that the successful use of force determines the legitimacy of the action, and the less firm response of the USA and the EU show that the adopted strategy proved successful.

Secondly, strongly supporting the legal nature of the conducted actions, justified at the limit of law, based on historical issues or on the will of the people from one region, but without respecting treaties and agreements signed at international level. In this regard, to promote regional interests and to justify

¹ Dr Mark Galeotti, *The Belligerent Bear, Russia Updates Its Military Doctrine*, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 11 February 2015, p. 30.

its actions, Russia carried out a campaign at national and international level in which it was stressed that Crimea accommodated its fleet in the Black Sea for more than 250 years, that Crimea was always part of Russia, and that it was a mistake when Crimea became part of Ukraine in 1954.

Thirdly, Russia firmly rejects any reference to the military occupation of Crimea, claiming that the forces operating in the region belong to local self-defence structures, expressing the will of local population.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine as well as the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 had an important phase in the field of information and communication at strategic level. During those two conflicts Russia acted mainly in the field of information operations to discredit opponents and justify to the public and the world leaders the actions carried out. The main theme presented by all stakeholders in the information operations initially consisted of supporting the relation “*aggressor – victim*” favourable to Russia; gradually the theme was changed in the intervention in Georgia into “*it is necessary to save the population of Ossetia from the Georgians barbaric actions*”.

A common element is represented by the fact that the mass media in Russia continuously supported the actions of Russian forces and we can consider that the media was part of the operation plan and had its course of action clearly defined, with own objectives, intended to help the achievement of the operation end state.

Another course of action used in the operations in Georgia and resumed with excellent efficiency in the actions in Ukraine was represented by influencing leaders and local population to act against the national representatives in the region situated along the main direction of action. In support of influencing international leaders in the case of actions in Georgia the theme was to present the Georgian government as a “*criminal regime*”, aspect highlighted even by communicators at strategic level, Vladimir Putin declaring that “*Tbilisi had effectively lost its moral right to govern the two breakaway regions*”². Russia also acted to influence the local leaders and population in South Ossetia to oppose the authorities and to force the Georgians to leave the region.

During the actions in Ukraine the same messages were resumed but in a different form – “*fascist seizure of power*” or “*Ukrainian fascists*”, messages conveyed by different leaders using the public media in Russia. With regard to the strategic support of actions at tactical level, it is worth mentioning the interview given by Sergey Ivanov, Russian Deputy Prime Minister, to *New York*

² Richard Weitz, *Moscow's Motives in Its Georgian War*, World Politics Review Exclusive, August 2008, see <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2553>

Times: “I think the American public believes that Russia attacked Georgia. The big Russian bear attacked the small and peaceful Georgia. The real situation is vice versa, a large country such as Georgia attacked the small autonomous region South Ossetia”³. Such actions were mainly aimed at delaying the governments and international organisations reactions against the Russian Federation attacks, reactions that occurred much later, in the case of Georgia, when the Russian forces engagement was obvious and they were already in Georgia.

In Crimea, the influential action launched through the media was followed by the “*little green men*” infiltration in the region and, when the situation was under their control, the conventional structures of power were presented as being able to act in order to avoid the escalation of conflict, confirming in this way the annexation. The adversary discrediting actions, those meant to justify the actions to the public and the world leaders, the strategic communication and the total destruction of the armed forces system of command and control were greatly successful. The success of those actions was highlighted by the fact that, in three weeks and without firing a single bullet, the Ukrainian military morale was destroyed and all approximately 190 bases from Crimea were surrounded by local self-defence forces. The action was executed by less than 10,000 people who, without tanks and artillery, succeeded in removing 16,000 Ukrainian forces from the peninsula!

After blocking Ukrainian forces in their location, Russia moved to the next phase, namely psychological actions, intimidation, bribery and propaganda using the Internet/mass media in order to undermine resilience. The actions were successful and in this way again Russia did not use force to meet the set objectives. The success in action was facilitated by the good coordination between the actions performed at political, psychological, informational, military and economic level. Finally, Russia supported without hesitation the referendum promoted by the pro-Russian political forces in Crimea desiring to legitimise the annexation of the region and presented the referendum as a case of self-determination similar to the events in Kosovo.

In the actions in eastern Ukraine, Russia encouraged defections among Ukrainian army and police, also acting to recruit volunteers and to provide the self-defence forces with weapons. All these actions were supported by an aggressive, continuous war conducted in the informational domain and in the media in order to delegitimise the new government in Kiev, as well as by cyber attacks against Ukrainian banks and official websites of the ministries.

³ *Transcript of the Interview of the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Sergey Ivanov to CNN on 11 August 2008*, Russian Mission to the UN, 11.08.2008, see <http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/warfare/statement110808en.htm>, retrieved on 23. 08. 2008.

All the actions, in different environments, had as main objective the preservation of the tense situation and the production of crises in society, and in these circumstances, Russia, under the pretext of the responsibility to protect civilians, could intervene aggressively by starting a humanitarian intervention or a peacekeeping operation using the model of Transnistria. All the actions were prepared long before by funding the nongovernmental organisations and parties that contributed to meeting the objective, namely to destabilise the country and discredit the political class. Another development was the support of the citizens having the same nationality, by encouraging them to conduct destabilising actions, and of the unemployed people, disappointed by the government system, as well as the training and preparation of some detachments for destabilisation actions in the so-called “*patriotic education camps*”.

The Russian Federation planned and financed aggressive influence actions including by using the social media. Social media⁴ is a set of tools (web sites and software) that work with an Internet-connected device (computer, laptop, tablet, mobile phone etc.) built to facilitate the communication of Internet users and the creation, distribution, exchange of content (text, photo, video, audio, multimedia presentations etc.) among the members of a social group (friends, colleagues, family etc.) formed on trust basis, each member seeking to assert identity, belonging, creativity and freedom of expression. Thus, in February 2012, *The Guardian* reported: “*A pro-Kremlin group uses a network with the intention of obtaining flattering effects regarding Vladimir Putin and simultaneously acts to discredit the opposition and the media*”. Since then a permanent disinformation campaign has infested numerous sites in Western Europe. These actions intensified during the Crimean crisis when were posted numerous comments supporting the Russian Federation actions, denigrating the opponents. Sometimes the comments were designated to prepare official positions presented by governmental news agencies. Thus, in May 2014 a blog presented that the West supported Kiev junta actions in the fight against own citizens. Immediately after the post, on the website of RIA Novosti (ria.ru) broke a story regarding the US financial support to Ukraine. In forums/blogs it was conducted, throughout the conflict, a real campaign to support Russia’s actions and denigrate the actions of Ukraine and democratic countries.

Thus we can easily see that the involvement of Russia in Ukraine began long before the crisis in Crimea. Ukrainian computer networks were the target of an attack in 2010, attack that affected diplomatic and governmental systems. Russia used, starting in 2008, the gas pipelines as a means meant to influence

⁴ See http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_de_socializare

the Ukrainian government. Following the independence of Ukraine after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in Kiev nobody considered any hostile intention of the Russian Federation, but some Moscow pressure activities were permanently performed as not only masked actions designated to prepare the population of Crimea but also quite visible actions. In this respect, I would mention the fact that the flag of the Russian Federation permanently waved on several buildings in Sevastopol since Ukraine became independent. The Russian citizens in Ukraine were encouraged to watch only the TV programmes from the Russian Federation and read only the Russian press, allowing for their isolation from the Ukrainian state and understanding of the state activities including those in their interest, given that information was filtered according to Russia's interests.

Analysing how Russia acted in Georgia and Ukraine we can conclude that modern warfare is based on the fact that the main modern battle space consists of the perception and representation of reality, domain necessary for decision-making. In these circumstances, actions are executed in the informational and psychological environment, to obtain superiority in controlling forces by demoralising and psychologically influencing decision-makers, the armed forces and the population. The actions are aimed at reducing the need to engage in combat military equipment with high fire power and determining the civilian population of the region of interest and even some state structures to support the aggressor actions against their own government and country.

The main feature of this new concept of conducting military actions consists in the fact that war is no longer waged in a limited time but it is permanent, becoming part of the usual society conditions, with the synchronised and direct involvement, with different intensities, of all elements from the political, economic, informational, technological, cybernetic, ecological environment. This new concept of conducting actions was defined by most specialists as *hybrid warfare*. However, this definition should not mislead us because these actions are designated to achieve goals that violate the country's constitution and their end state is the independence or autonomy of regions. The analysis of modern conflicts concludes that in the actions of the hybrid war can be employed unmarked military structures that assume non-state identities, members of extremist organisations that have limited military capabilities or state and non-state actors working together to achieve common objectives.

We can see that *hybrid warfare* can assure the growth of confusion in the international environment, complicating the decision-making system and slowing down the process of providing an appropriate response, the aggressor thus deriving great advantage.

The Wales Summit Declaration adopted by Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Alliance in Wales, 4 to 5 September 2014,

defined hybrid warfare as the employment of a wide range of overt or covert military, paramilitary and civilian measures in a highly integrated design.

On the other hand, Russian military planners have their own description of this concept, made in February 2013 by Valery Gherasimov, Chief of the General Staff, concept presented in an article published in the *Russian Defence Journal – VPK*, in remarks that now seem prophetic. *“War and peace are becoming increasingly mixed. The methods of conflict have changed and now involve the wide use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures. All these actions can be supplemented by the instigation of local population and the use of unmarked soldiers/little green men”*⁵.

On the blog of the Canadian specialist in strategic analysis, Walter Derzko⁶, under the title *“How Russia Captured Crimea so Quickly and Why Ukraine and NATO Are Paralysed”* the phases of this new type of war conducted by Russia are presented schematically. According to Tchekinov & Bogdanov⁷, they are as follows:

➤ In the first phase are conducted asymmetric non-military actions, including strategic communication engagement and informational, ideological, diplomatic and economic actions as part of the operation plan, intended to establish a favourable situation in the political, economic and military environment.

➤ The second phase involves the execution of special activities designed to mislead and deceive political and military leaders through coordinated actions using diplomatic channels, media and communication at strategic level through top government representatives, by *“leaking”* false information, data, orders, directives and instructions.

➤ The third phase involves direct actions against persons holding important positions in government, state structures, and officers through intimidation, deception, bribery to influence the fulfilment of their service duties.

➤ In the fourth phase starts the propaganda actions designed to destabilise the country and to increase discontent among the population, amplified by actions executed by militant groups infiltrated in that country supporting the escalation of destabilising or subversive acts.

➤ The fifth phase involves extensive use of private military structures pretending to be civilians on leave, volunteers, citizens visiting relatives, all of them highly trained military professionals, acting in cooperation with local structures to initiate armed

⁵ Ana Stan, *Infografie: “Războiul hibrid” al lui Putin a început cu mult timp în urmă. Rusia a ridicat stacheta și a dus războiul la rang de artă*, 2 September 2014, see http://adevarul.ro/international/rusia/razboiul-hibrid-putin-inceput-timp-urma-rusia-ridicat-stacheta-dus-razboiul-rang-art-a-1_5405b3c30d133766a8cb23aa/index.html

⁶ See http://smarteconomy.typepad.com/smart_economy/2014/04

⁷ Tchekinov & Bogdanov, 2013, pp. 15-22.

opposition actions by various means to enforce international isolation of the country and to assure the control of land, sea and air communications.

➤ In the sixth phase starts the preparation of military actions through large scale subversive and reconnaissance missions that employ all forces and means the society has available, including special operations forces, military structures, forces acting in the electromagnetic environment, diplomacy, economy, and secret services.

➤ In the seventh phase starts the combined action using electronic warfare, information operations, aerospace and harassment operations using air assets combined with the use of precision weapons on different platforms.

➤ In the eighth phase begin the attacks against remaining resistance points and the destruction of surviving forces by employing special forces who will communicate the position of opposing forces for their destruction using attacks with rockets and heavy artillery, airborne operations to isolate points of resistance and finally engaging the ground forces to clean the territory.

Analysing the aspects presented we can notice a change in the conception of the Russian Federation on the mode of action in order to achieve regional supremacy or in areas of interest. The old approach characterised by direct confrontation decreases in importance and it is replaced by a comprehensive approach using combined engagement of various instruments of power contained in the so-called *hybrid warfare*. Another characteristic is represented by the actions taken to emphasise the “*spontaneous*” character, given that these actions are planned in advance, to the smallest detail, in order to establish very exact the manner and timing of employment of each instrument of power depending on existing conditions at a certain moment of the crisis, acting through economic coercion, preferential relations, intimidation and various information activities, using perception management propaganda, manipulation, misinformation, intoxication, deception etc. The mentioned actions are backed by promoting their legitimacy in order to obtain nongovernmental organisations, international public opinion and local population support, and to avoid international diplomatic and economic sanctions.

This concept has as basic element the fact that Russia has put the idea of influence in central planning process and during the actions are used all means to achieve this objective, such as deception, psychological operations, skilfully using the means of mass communication and ensuring well coordinated actions in the international environment. The key factor for the success of the operation in Ukraine was represented by a very good knowledge of the target audience and especially of their expected behaviour as a result of the sent messages. Russia sent selective messages depending on the planned target audience designated for engagement such as the Russian speaking majority in Crimea, the Ukrainian government, international community, particularly NATO and the EU. This way of planning and conducting an operation

shows that Russia knows what results are expected to be obtained from the actions performed, demonstrating the existence and viability of the concept of reflexive control/control of the will.

Control of the will/manipulation, "*Reflexive control*", is defined by Timothy L. Thomas as "*a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action*"⁸. In this case, influence actions are at the base of the planning process, and all means are used to achieve the ultimate objective.

One of the Russian pioneers in developing the concept of reflexive control, Vladimir Lefebvre, stressed that "*the model could be used to influence an adversary into making decisions that were favourable to the Soviet Union. In making his decisions, the adversary uses information about the area of conflict, about his troops and ours, about their ability to fight. We can influence his channels of information and send messages that shift the flow of information in a way favourable to us*"⁹.

Essentially, Lefebvre suggests that once the Soviet Union understands in detail the opponent decision-making process, it can interfere in this process by transmitting the adversary the information that can lead to a predetermined decision. Such an approach influences the character of the conflict, which is no longer seen and prepared as an interaction between two military forces; the conflict can be seen as a confrontation between the two opponents decision-making processes at strategic level.

This Soviet period theory was taken up and developed in the modern era and, in a document from 2001, Russian theorist S.A. Komov developed theoretical models¹⁰ on the implementation of the concept of reflexive control. This theory is based on the concept that the information environment can be a real battlefield while the vast majority of citizens have unprecedented access to information, which provides them and the decision-makers with a variety of options simultaneously. Given that many people look for an ideology or a set of principles universally valid, perhaps even a purpose for existence, the media, especially television and the Internet can play a more important role than ever before in influencing people and decision-makers.

On the other hand, financial incentive, corruption, badger game, intimidation and blackmail are other important elements of the reflexive control, aspect very well highlighted by former officer in the secret services, Donnelly, who worked

⁸ Timothy L. Thomas, *Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and the Military*, 2004, p. 237, see http://www.rit.edu/~w-cmmc/literature/Thomas_2004.pdf

⁹ *Crimea : Russian Reflexive Control?*, see <http://behavioural-conflict.tumblr.com/post/80898348308/crimea-russian-reflexive-control>

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

for 10 years leading the Soviet Studies Research Centre from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and served for 13 years as special adviser to the Secretary General of NATO. Donnelly summarises the complexity of the actions executed by the Russian Federation today: *“Covert forms of power exercised by Russia are not only military. First is money. It buys members of parliament as advisers, buys companies, buys London, buys individuals: bankers who receive jobs in Moscow and are then compromised, blackmailed, when returning to the West. Second is corruption. Many governments around the world do not like the fact that international economic assistance comes with conditions, but Russia is happy to bribe and use organised crime”*¹¹.

To the reflexive control activities were added disinformation, deception and even paralysing actions from Russian territory in the form of large-scale military exercises, including in Kaliningrad region, to increase the Baltic countries and Poland insecurity and popularise the military activities, including those during the preparation and deployment near the borders of Ukraine, aimed at intimidating and demoralising the enemy.

This concept of preparation and implementation of the measures, according to the concept of reflexive control, is addressed to all actors who can influence the further course of actions in different and sometimes difficult to predict forms. They must be seen in the overall context determined by the interest of Russia to support any act of autonomy, ethnical regionalisation or proclamation of independence. This approach may affect the future stability of the EU and Romania directly in terms of the situation in Moldova and through possible interventions supporting any form of regionalisation, autonomy or secession of some regions in our country.

Concluding, we can identify key trends through which the Russian Federation develops new capabilities, enabling the transition from direct military actions characterised by destroying the enemy’s capabilities to directly influence its actions, decision-makers as well as to its degradation from inside. Such actions require reducing the importance of conventional forces in the initial phase of war, and increasing the role of special forces prepared for such actions and even unconventional military structures standing or infiltrated into the enemy territory. In this context, it is very important to understand the strategic significance of this concept as long as this way of action represents a new form of warfare that cannot be characterised as a military campaign in the well-known and widely accepted sense.

Implications for Defence Policy

At international level it is present an increasing trend, adopted by the Russian Federation and other countries and organisations, which consists in promoting and seeking to impose their own interests in neighbouring regions. This trend

¹¹ Ana Stan, *op. cit.*

is accompanied by a diminution of the role of states and international organisations in preventing and managing crises and, in this context, it is likely that some countries in the proximity of Romania continue to challenge the current regulations established at international level, related to international law and crisis management. The cornerstone of such an approach is to present these regions as part of their sphere of influence given the religious, ethnic or “*wrongs of history*” aspects.

To ensure an adequate response to these challenges, Romania must develop and especially implement consistently a long term and comprehensive national security strategy that would eliminate some existing trends in the structures outside the national defence system, which consider Romania’s defence as the exclusive NATO responsibility. It is partly true, but it applies only under certain conditions, in the case of direct attack, and after all NATO countries have achieved consensus on granting support. This is a long process that, given the speed at which actions were conducted in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014, puts the Alliance in a position to respond to the aggressor’s initiative and act for the liberation of territories not for their defence.

We should also keep in mind that the civil society in Western countries has never accepted war as a solution and, in these circumstances, it is expected to strongly oppose the war, especially if it is not a war of defence against an invader but it can be appreciated as self determination or request regarding federalisation. This approach must be carefully analysed, especially considering that the parliaments and governments of NATO member countries should take into consideration the pressure of the civil society, as they will be sanctioned by vote. In these conditions, they will postpone as long as possible the implementation of sanctions or the engagement of their citizens in combat.

The mode of action used in Georgia and Ukraine, based on deception and cheating, has been used in warfare over time, but the form of employment (and here I would underline the case of “*little green men*”), even if it violates international laws in force, cannot guarantee NATO response actions. The actions conducted by Russia, under the concepts of hybrid warfare and reflexive control, have demonstrated that the nature of war has changed and we cannot speak of a conflict between states in its widely accepted meaning and in these conditions it is difficult to demonstrate that an armed attack is conducted. If we analyse the phases included in the concept of *hybrid warfare*, we find out that, by successively implementing the initial phases, the set objectives can be met, as it happened in Crimea, without the need for direct engagement of the armed forces to execute strikes against another state territory and without the formal declaration of war with all the consequences in the international environment.

Russia's actions in the initial phases of this new type of conflict entailed issuing passports to citizens from the countries in the region of interest, supporting movements to promote human and minority rights, supporting the actions meant to organise a referendum or to amend the constitution of some states in order to establish Russian as the second official language in Ukraine and other countries, polling and influencing public opinion on the availability of supporting destabilising actions, control of citizens through the Russian language media etc. In line with these actions, it can be mentioned the subtle and successful way in which Russia acted to influence the internal policy of the states in the region through ethnic political parties that covertly supported the Russian policy.

Such actions, carried out in the initial phases of *hybrid warfare* on whose success depends the development of actions in the next phases, cannot be counteracted by the direct action of the armed forces, given that these structures do not have a clear mandate to intervene. In order to effectively prevent and counter destabilising actions coming from outside, specific to phases one and two of hybrid warfare, all state institutions and nongovernmental organisations should act in a coordinated manner.

I will present some aspects that could be considered in planning actions to counter *hybrid warfare*, using the results of the study undertaken by Latvian defence researchers at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research of the National Defence Academy and brought to knowledge of allied states in the document "*Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defence Policy*"¹².

Firstly, I will briefly analyse the content of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It states: "*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area*". The article makes it clear that only an armed attack can guarantee NATO intervention using "*such action as it deems necessary*". But the annexation of Crimea can be also interpreted as a free expression of the citizens' vote regarding their destiny. The armed attack, as defined in Article 5, runs in the seventh stage, only if necessary, given the fact that, for instance, in Crimea, objectives were met at the end of the fifth phase. The final phase of actions

¹² Janis Berzins, *Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defence Policy*, in *Policy Paper* no. 2, Centre for Security and Strategic Research/National Defence Academy of Latvia, April 2014.

included propaganda actions aimed at destabilising the country and increasing the discontent among the population, followed by the execution of direct actions of intimidation against persons holding important positions in government, state structures, and officers, concomitantly with the extensive use of private military structures under various covers (civilians on leave, volunteers, citizens visiting relatives) in cooperation with the opposition, organised in local armed structures that had the mission to organise the so-called referendum. This less traditional mode of action certainly proved effective and the question arises whether NATO has the legal framework and tools to respond in such situations.

Unless NATO prepares the necessary tools to respond to similar situations, we can meet the attitude of some countries that, to justify the postponement of military actions, appeal to the fact that there is no armed conflict, or even the situation in which the aggressor will appeal internationally to respect the democratic rights to self-determination/autonomy like in Kosovo or Crimea. To prevent such a situation, Romania, along with other states that may be affected similarly, must act diplomatically so that the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty can be adapted to prevent the actions related to the concept of *hybrid warfare* and, in this way, eliminate any possibility of interpretation. It can also act to include in the treaty the fact that any direct or indirect action meant to change the existing boundaries or to regionalisation should be seen as a threat to the Alliance. All the diplomatic proposals can be supplemented by actions at the level of international structures to make those involved in destabilising actions against Romania responsible and reduce their influence as well as the influence of extremist religious leaders, so that they have no effect on population.

Given that an important element of the *hybrid warfare* is represented by actions in the information operations domain, designed to influence and disrupt the command and control process, at national level, the proper coordination of all the structures involved is required to ensure the flexibility of response in the information domain and coherent action should be taken to influence and/or shape the real or potential opponents decision-making process.

Moreover, the state power structures should act to protect the political leaders and important personalities of the country both physically and against the attempts of blackmail, bribery, racketeering or coercion. This reduces the aggressor possibility to gain influence or control over decision-making personalities in the political, financial, administrative, economic or military field.

The mobilisation and proper training of reservists is another essential element for ensuring an appropriate response in the event of aggression, the necessary legal framework being provided by Law no. 270 in 2015. I consider that all young people in Romania should undergo a stage of military general training for up to 6 months,

during which the future basis of selection for enlisted personnel and volunteer reservists can be formed.

To ensure an adequate response in the initial stages of *hybrid warfare* Romania should be able to quickly counter any armed revolt attempt, if riots or “*popular movements*” are executed by armed men, masked and without insignia on their uniform, occupying or attempting to occupy government buildings. In these circumstances, efficient preventive actions can be performed by governmental and nongovernmental organisations that should act firmly against all military training activities in the so-called “*patriotic education camps*” whose activity is not approved and coordinated by one of the structures of the National Defence, Public Order and National Security System (SNAOPSN). A model is the Lithuanian Prosecutor General’s Office that initiated an investigation regarding a military training camp attended by Russian students, and the Ministry of Education called on parents not to let their children take part in such activities. In Moldova, the Information and Security Service detained and prosecuted several young people in the Gagauz Autonomous Republic, who were recruited and trained in such special camps¹³.

Given the direct involvement in the *hybrid warfare* of factors from the political, economic, informational, technological, cybernetic, ecological domains, it is necessary to engage in the response actions the structures from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which must be able to respond appropriately in the first five phases. The effective action of these structures can be ensured through equipment, training and clear procedures, but it should be considered a special aspect that stood out in the actions in Ukraine when subversive elements among the forces in mission acted to sabotage from the inside the actions, discrediting these structures and their missions to the population and thereby facilitating the enemy mission accomplishment.

Another important element is the need to develop the operational capabilities of all the structures of the Ministry of National Defence by providing a budget as required. It is obvious that the most effective way to prevent an opponent’s aggressive intentions is deterrence and, in this context, equipping, training and the system of alliances are elements of particular importance.

To respond adequately to the *hybrid warfare* challenges, the armed forces structure should also have in its composition structures that are small, highly mobile, specially prepared for hybrid actions, that can be rapidly deployed and can execute missions in extended spaces, properly equipped to be able to execute independent and isolated actions for a relatively long period of time, and all these actions must be presented in the media as required by specially prepared liaison structures.

¹³ See <https://ro.stiri.yahoo.com/omule%C5%A3ii-verzi-ai-lui-putin-antrena%C5%A3i-mici-154248774.html>

Another important element is the possibility of commanders to make decisions and act independently based on a concept of operation and rules of engagement approved in peacetime, which reduces the response time and ensures more flexibility in the execution of actions. This way of planning and conducting actions is essential considering the fluid modern battlefield and the possibility of blocking the communications system.

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Modern conflicts having *hybrid warfare* as a model increase ambiguity, complicate decision-making, and reduce the reaction time and coordination efficiency, aspects that create special advantages for the aggressor. Worldwide experts estimate that such conflicts are also expected in the future with more serious consequences than those caused by non-state independent actors.

In these circumstances, given that security arrangements existing at regional level, which justified their viability for more than 15 years, have been violated, and in the context caused by the crisis in Ukraine, Romania, a NATO and EU member state, must act to strengthen national and regional security. Our country should give special priority to increasing the capacity for conflict prevention through enhanced operational and immediate reaction capabilities.

A course of action is represented by the encouragement and support of increasing presence of NATO and EU forces in the region and Romania, as a reliable partner both for NATO and within the regional dialogue on the normalisation of crisis, shifts the main effort on conducting exercises and activities to promote security in the region together with the Allies.

Given that against our country are executed actions planned from outside, from several directions, which are at different stages of employment, following the model shown in the material, and the presence of allied forces may not fully achieve national security, Romania must be able to respond adequately to *hybrid warfare* by planning response preventive actions since peacetime, in many areas and on varied levels, as well as by directly and coordinatedly engaging all power factors in a comprehensive defence and response at national level. Given that, in the concept of *hybrid warfare*, the ultimate success is determined by successively achieving objectives for each stage and the initiation of the next stage depends on ensuring the favourable conditions in the previous stage, I consider that it is our responsibility to act to prevent enabling conditions in the intermediate stages in order to avoid encouraging the enemy to escalate own actions and to act in increasingly aggressive ways, specific to higher stages. Moreover, considering the responsibility for national security, exclusively and sometimes exaggeratedly,

as the Alliance assignment, under the current provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, can be a fatal risk to the integrity, if not the existence of the state.

Considering the regional context, national commitments, and Romania's importance in the region, it is necessary, in the future, to work towards building a force structure capable of responding to the risks and threats specific to the new security environment in the Black Sea region, which has to be also interoperable with the military structures of NATO and the EU. When defining the future force structure it should be considered that Romania's NATO and EU membership does not exclude the need to have a well trained force package that allows an immediate and appropriate response against any aggression on the national territory. The Romanian Armed Forces must become a credible instrument of national and allied defence policy at regional level and contribute, along with the Allies, to achieving security in areas of interest, providing an adequate response to all unpredictable requests and being always ready to achieve success.

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INTEROPERABILITY

– The Key to Success in Achieving NATO’s Goals –

Colonel Dr Olivian STĂNICĂ

NATO has been striving to allow its forces to work together since its establishment in 1949. The Alliance nations have been exercising together since 1951. Throughout this period our understanding of interoperability and its importance to the future of NATO has increased in direct proportion to the growth of the Alliance and in particular to NATO’s commitment to out-of-area operations since the early 1990s.

Though routinely used as a term to describe an aspirational utopia across the military spectrum, the specifics of interoperability are complex and hard to define. They are highly situation-dependent, and often associated with terms such as standardisation, integration, interchangeability, cooperation and synergy. In military terms, interoperability is commonly considered at strategic, operational, tactical and technological level. In its broadest sense interoperability is the degree to which organisations, individuals, or systems are able to operate together to achieve a common goal.

Keywords: *interoperability; education; training; military cooperation; standardisation; capabilities*

Throughout its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been striving for the ability of its member states’ forces to work smoothly together in order to pursue collective goals that have changed, especially since the end of the *Cold War*. The key concept in this endeavour – “**interoperability**” – has been defined by NATO as “*the ability for Allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives*”¹. It encompasses a **technical** dimension (including hardware, equipment, armaments and systems), an **operational** dimension (including doctrines and procedures) and a **human** dimension (including terminology and training); it is complemented by information as a critical transversal element.

Advancing interoperability has never been easy for a variety of reasons linked to national sovereignty, economic and industrial interests. However, there are also remarkable successes, many of them determined by the lessons learned

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¹ Source: AAP-6 (2007) / *Glossary of NATO terms and definitions*.

in joint operations. NATO's drawdown in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and its decision to terminate the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), its biggest operation ever, by the end of 2014, have opened the prospect of an era in the Alliance history with small-scale land and air operations. Moreover, most NATO states are going through a period of economic crisis, which puts their defence budgets under heavy strain.

Against this background, NATO perceived not only a new need but also a window of opportunity for *interoperability* and, as a result, in 2011, it launched the initiative of *Smart Defence* and the *Connected Forces Initiative (CFI)*, meaning to use joint military capabilities in a more efficient/smart manner. Both initiatives are portrayed as drivers to maintain the Alliance cohesion and as instruments to optimise the military support for political decisions. At the Chicago NATO Summit (20-21 May 2012) the heads of state and government approved a concrete package of multinational projects with the aim of developing a coherent set of deployable, interoperable and sustainable forces, equipped, trained, exercised and commanded to meet "NATO Forces 2020" headline goals. In parallel, intensive debates continue inside NATO on all aspects of "connectivity", the fashionable new synonym for *interoperability*.

Over the last months of 2014, NATO portrayed ISAF as the shining example of the Alliance interoperability. According to some military experts, there have been some gains resulting from ISAF interoperability, particularly with regard to command and staff procedures at strategic and operational level, and less at tactical level, which has not been improved in the past decade.

Interoperability remains a challenge for NATO due to the complex involvement of its 28 member nations having diverging political and economic interests.

Nations try to support some of the ideas developed by the Alliance on the increase in "connectivity" but it seems that not all of them will have the same promising support.

To be achieved, interoperability needs time to mature and it should be executed bottom-up and top-down, namely by national governments and NATO command structures.

NATO working language is English and a good knowledge of it is a basic condition for working efficiently and effectively in the organisation. We are aware that NATO has two official languages, but we note that for the performance of operations/international missions the use of English is basic. It is the *conditio sine qua non* for *interoperability*. However, many military experts consider that speaking English is not always a sufficient level of knowledge for military operations.

In order to improve military knowledge, especially in the English language, NATO uses existing diversified technology, such as: e-learning, social networking, file sharing, blogs etc., which enables military and civilian personnel to improve the level of language (when, where and how they prefer). There is also a recommendation for NATO countries to produce and publish their own doctrines in English as well as in their national language. The use of English in national education and training systems, particularly in areas related to military operations, should be encouraged to establish the necessary level of understanding and joint competency. Moreover, military experts in Human Resources recommend that the *Standardised Language Profile (SLP)* that is currently necessary only for positions in NATO command structures should be extended nationally to include all key positions in command and staff structures, thereby allowing the officers who fill such positions to relate and interact with similar structures in the international environment.

It is also important for NATO to encourage *interoperability* so as to reduce costs for member states. In the context of the current economic crisis, which will probably last for several years, nations cannot afford very high defence spending. NATO should conduct research and publish the results of research on the additional areas where *interoperability* can help nations save money. This aspect would provide a real incentive for *interoperability* between nations.

The hypothesis we start from is that *education, training, exercises, standardisation and technical support* are basic “pillars” of NATO interoperability.




Figure 1: The basic pillars of interoperability in NATO²

² Source: *Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces*, see www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84112htm?

In accordance with the working hypothesis these “pillars” of interoperability (education, training, exercises, standardisation and technical support) are of equal importance and should be addressed as such by NATO.

a. Education and training (basic pillars)

Historically, NATO education has been focused on ensuring that military forces from member countries can work together effectively in operations and humanitarian assistance missions, construction and post-conflict reconstruction missions. Today, NATO education functions have expanded significantly. NATO has a network of schools and institutions, conducts regular exercises and runs training missions as far away as Afghanistan. The main purpose is to enhance the *interoperability* and effectiveness of NATO-led multinational forces. Military experts have repeatedly stressed the absolute importance of education and training considering *interoperability* as a mindset that needs to be acquired as soon as possible in an educational training programme for military personnel or in the guide of their military career development.

According to the statement of the representative of Poland at the Steering Group NATO Training Group Conference in Washington DC, in July 2014, “*training leads to efficiency, bringing about the development of operational capabilities*”. SHAPE generated the task to develop a framework for *measuring how training can contribute to progress in increasing NATO interoperability*.

In this regard, SHAPE prepared a study on the topic “*Measuring how training contributes to gains in interoperability*”³. The document reviews the definition and content of **interoperability** at strategic, operational and tactical level. Moreover, it shows how it can be achieved in the most efficient manner in order to identify opportunities for measuring the level of full interoperability achievement.

The structures responsible for NATO standardisation as well as the developments with effects in the field of interoperability in recent years are also mentioned in the document.

Processes to consider:

- the armed forces of NATO member states have achieved a high level of interoperability as a result of decades of joint training and exercises, enhanced by the participation in allied missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Currently, the “*Connected Forces Initiative*” undertakes the development of interoperability given the reduction in the scale of allied operations;

³The study was presented at the Steering Group NATO Training Group Conference, in June 2015, in Warsaw, Poland.

- training and exercises generate “*best practices*”, which really work, and “*lessons learned*”, which require correction; exercises allow to test and validate concepts, procedures, systems and tactics; NATO exercises may play an important role in defence reform, and NATO member countries can test, through exercise, the implementation of national reforms.

To identify methods for measuring interoperability it is regarded as necessary to identify assessment methods. In this regard, three *courses of action (COA)* have been proposed:

- COA no. 1: identify interoperability components, elements that can be measured, and implementation methods in NATO activities;
- COA no. 2: use the current ACO Evaluation and Certification Programme;
- COA no. 3: maximise the benefits of *SAVE (Standards Assessment and Validation in Exercise)* concept to promote standardisation as a key to interoperability.

Within NATO training and education we insist on: **global education programming, military schools/educational institutions, e-Learning, centres of excellence and partnerships.**

a.1. Global education programming

Global education programming is used to describe the *Allied Command Transformation (ACT)* initiative to knit together the education and training provided by NATO, nations and other organisations in order to make best use of the scarce resources to meet critical requirements. This section describes the contribution by schools/institutions (NATO and national), e-learning, Centres of Excellence (COEs) and the implications for partner countries. The contribution to be delivered by national schools is dependent on the willingness of nations to make them available for other nations and partners. According to NATO planning, an essential element to allow education to be *interoperable* at the Alliance level is the capability to transfer the acquired knowledge and qualification, be it from another national school or a NATO school or COE, to a so far nationally controlled system of education. This requires the “*transferability*” of courses throughout NATO. To achieve this transferability the courses must meet required standards. This transferability does not need to lead to a loss of sovereignty. It requires trust in NATO and other national education standards.

Imposing verifiable standards and commonly agreed curriculum on different educational institutions will induce the required level of trust for nations to give up national courses and send people to educational institutions run by other nations or to NATO schools/educational institutions.

a.2. Schools/Educational institutions

Current situation of NATO schools: The Alliance possesses a variety of educational institutions and schools that create an international environment fostering interoperability. Some examples are: the NATO Defence College (NDC) in Rome, NATO School Oberammergau (NSO), NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS), Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC).

Since all NATO schools and training centres have a standardised curriculum, they have already contributed to interoperability through the participation of NATO and partner nations for training and education. In addition, the Alliance is working to improve the connectivity of NATO as well as national schools to allow them to interoperate more effectively.

Current situation of national schools: NATO nations' schools are typically administered by national military authorities or civil organisations and are open to participation by personnel from NATO member and partner countries, according to their particular national policy. However, their contribution to interoperability is questionable because of the lack of a common standard or curriculum.

Partial conclusions: education and training should be improved by developing and widely using distributed education and training (e-learning, chat rooms, blogs, video conferencing), not only within NATO schools but also between NATO and national schools (e.g. National War Colleges). Distributed education packages should be developed by the JFTC. In the long term, nations should not only rely on national schools and training, but they should also allow NATO or other member nations' schools and training as equivalent substitutes.

Some intermediate steps are required in order to meet the final objective of educational interoperability and transferability:

- establish courses for staff officer ranks from Major to Lieutenant Colonel at a location to be determined (TBD) for NATO and partner countries aimed at the tactical and operational level in their preparation for national or international command and staff functions (currently there is not such course at NSO).
- employ mobile training and education teams from NATO schools to national military academies and schools in order to support their educational systems;
- NATO should foster the development of a cohesive education system incorporating all NATO and national schools. Also, the Alliance should cooperate/coordinate with member/partner nations to create common modules for education in such a way that students can follow their national course part way through the curriculum and then attend

a common core at a central location in another country. A system developed in this way will push nations to ensure that their students are at the required level before attending the common, centrally located module. Thereby, nations are encouraged to increase the level of interoperability of education and training for their students, officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). In concrete terms, this also means that the courses are taught in English.

Nations are encouraged to establish bilateral or regional cooperation in education and training. (e.g.: regional schools for the Scandinavian countries, for the Benelux countries – Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg or the Balkans etc.). There are also **regional trends** to exploit the capabilities of training, including for officers or NCOs into NATO/EU member countries through the initiatives launched in 2000 and later, after 2010, such as: *Smart Defence*, *Pooling and Sharing* and *Connected Forces Initiative*. Such examples of cooperation at European level – between education institutions are set out below:

❖ Germany launched a European project called *European NCO Academy*⁴ (*ENCOA*). The project, launched in 2003, provided training only for NCOs from Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The project was resumed in 2006 to achieve multinational cooperation in training, based on ADL-supported courses, for NCOs of the 3 countries, in German for now. It may be extended to other countries if courses in English are developed. In 2012, it was an international symposium organised by *Multinational ENCOA* and discussions on the website of the Academy have continued.

❖ Besides bilateral exchange projects, other efforts have been made to organise networks of military institutions or cadets. There is an initiative by France to create a network of cadets in military schools and academies within the *Conference of European Military Schools and Academies* (CEEAM – under French acronym). This experimental conference was organised in 2002 in the Military School of Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan and later in Brussels in 2003 and then in Italy in 2004. It was intended to bring together cadets and students of military educational institutions of the EU, Canada, the USA, Russia and Norway to explore the possibility of establishing the bases of a “*European Academy*” (as a forum for discussion and debate). For organisational and financial reasons, related to the participants travel requirements, the experience has not been repeated at such a large scale.

❖ In European educational institutions, in the late '90s, network integration was also implemented. Naval Academies, acting in the initial training of naval officers

⁴ Source:<http://www.encoa.de/>

created a forum called the *Superintendent's Conference*, which reunited the rectors of institutions from 16 member states, as well as from Norway and the USA. Its purpose is to improve cooperation between the participating institutions, for example to make training available to others or to organise cultural or sporting events (such as maritime frigates).

❖ As for officers in the air force education, it was created a forum called *European Union Air Force Academies (EUFAFA)*. It reunited the rectors of educational institutions in 15 member states as well as Switzerland, Norway and Turkey. Its purpose is similar to that of its naval counterparts, and achievements are remarkable, especially because it provides cadets with the opportunity to meet for short sporting events (e.g. athletics).

The question arising at this level is related to the necessity of a European initiative in the field, given that these institutions have already found ways to cooperate before going to the details of the exchange of cadets; however, it can be seen that none of these forums meets in a configuration at “*European*” level, within the CSDP⁵.

A similar initiative exists for the land forces in the 28 EU member states, which have agreed to have a forum for discussions and for higher education institutions, known as the *European Military Academy Commanders Seminar (EMACS)*. Since its creation in 2008, *EMACS* discussions seem to focus mainly on the activities of students/cadets exchanges, as well as their counterparts in the naval and air forces.

a.3. e-Learning

Current situation: **e-learning** is education and training delivered electronically through a computer or similar device. It consists of Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL), computer based training (CBT), immersive learning, mobile learning (M-learning) and collaborative learning. According to the Education and Training Directive (Bi-SC/75-2), e-learning will be embedded in the Electronic Individual Training and Education Programme (e-ITEP). This web-based programme is optimised for use by NATO, nations, partners and education and training facilities, providing the ability to program and manage education and individual training requirements at all levels. The system is internet accessible, allowing near-real time visibility by all users to ensure transparency and improve the communication of training requirements and opportunities.

⁵ CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy.

a.4. Centres of Excellence (CoEs)

Current situation: There are currently 24 centres, including 22 accredited and 2 in the process of accreditation. CoEs are nationally or multi-nationally funded institutions that train and educate new leaders and specialists from NATO member and partner countries, assist in doctrine development, identify lessons learned, improve interoperability and capabilities, and test and validate concepts through experimentation. They offer recognised expertise and experience, which benefit the Alliance and support the transformation of NATO, while avoiding the duplication of assets, resources and capabilities already present within NATO command structure. Coordinated by *ACT*, CoEs are considered to be international military organisations that do not belong to NATO command structure but support NATO command arrangements. CoEs cover a wide variety of areas, each one focusing on a specific field of expertise to enhance NATO capabilities. *ACT* has overall responsibility for CoEs, being in charge of the establishment, accreditation, preparation of candidates for approval, and periodic assessments of the centres.

The primary purpose of CoEs is to assist transformation within the Alliance. They generally specialise in one functional area and act as subject matter experts in their field. CoEs distribute their in-depth knowledge through training, conferences, seminars, concepts, doctrine, lessons learned and papers. In addition, to give leaders and units the opportunity to augment their education and training, CoEs also help the Alliance to expand interoperability, increase capabilities, develop doctrine and standards, conduct analyses, evaluate lessons-learned and experiment in order to test and verify concepts.

Partial conclusions: Before creating or introducing any additional CoE, the full utilisation of the already established CoEs has to be approved by the Alliance and its member states. The products and the individual support offered by each CoE have to be made accessible to NATO's partners as well. The efforts of any CoE to develop and excel at its own output have to be improved according to the actual needs and requirements of the Alliance. CoEs should focus on the improvement of their ability to interoperate.

According to some military experts, *interoperability* is also a fundamental change of mindset. Leaders and their units have to be mentally prepared to work together, to trust in partners' capabilities, and they have to be willing to interoperate. CoEs work plans have to be adjusted and their schedules and mission statements have to reflect this task and appropriate changes have to be introduced accordingly. Given that CoEs are completely nationally funded, nations should be encouraged to make more efforts on increasing the capabilities of the CoEs.

a.5. Partnership

Current situation: Today, NATO engages with 41 countries as partners. Many of them as well as other non-member countries offer substantial capabilities and provide political support for the Alliance missions. Since 2012, all partners have had access to an extensive two-year new partnership cooperation menu, which comprises some 1,600 activities. An individual partnership and cooperation programme is jointly developed and agreed between NATO and each partner country that requests one, being drawn up according to each country's specific interests and needs. All partners that have an individual partnership and cooperation programme or some other programmes entered into with NATO have access to the wide variety of courses, seminars, conferences and other training activities provided by NATO and national educational institutions. An example in this respect is the **Interoperability Platform**⁶ – a product of the new concept regarding the development of interoperability with NATO partners. The concept of interoperability is subsumed under the *Partnership Interoperability Initiative*, adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014. It is based on the individual approach to NATO partners and the use of three tools: *engagement, support and reward*.

Partial conclusions: It is recommended a more extensive use of the existing mechanism of the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies whose main vision is to create a community and network of experts in the fields of defence and security studies in order to share best practices and practical solutions to common issues and problems. It is also required to intensify NATO's cooperation with partners in the Middle East, e.g. the United Arab Emirates. Former officers from NATO member states are training and educating multinational course members at the Air Warfare Centre in Abu Dhabi according to NATO standards. Common training improves the interoperability with regional partners in the Persian Gulf. Examples of training centres are: the Ukrainian International Peacekeeping and Security Centre in Yavoriv, the Education and Research Centre for International Peacekeeping at National Defence Academy in Kiev, as well as the recently established Navy Counter Piracy Training Centre in Sevastopol.

b. Exercises (basic pillar)

Current situation: In the past, NATO gained interoperability through a well-established exercise calendar structured to train the military personnel for the full spectrum of future operations. When NATO became heavily engaged

⁶ Source: NATO Committee for Standardisation final report, 30.04.2015, Brussels/Belgium.

in Afghanistan, the exercise calendar was changed to solely prepare units for their specific missions, excluding training on aspects that were not relevant.

As NATO works towards its exit from ISAF, its challenge will be to maintain the level of interoperability it has gained through its years in Afghanistan (over 12 years). Therefore, NATO plans to maintain a high level of training based on the main lessons learned, which will be implemented in the NATO Response Force (NRF) framework. In response to this challenge, NATO has a specific two-tiered approach to train its forces from now until 2015 and from 2015 onward. The first period focuses entirely on achieving a high readiness level (e.g. NRF and LIVEX⁷ - 15) and the second period 2015-2020 focuses on maintaining this high level and on shortening the readiness period up to several days.

Since 2015, when NATO completed its transition from a campaign to a contingency force, the Allies have been able to commit greater military capabilities in exercises. To practice and bolster *interoperability* and readiness, as the binding effects of reduced operational activities, NATO will put in place a three-year exercise cycle, composed of one LIVEX and three CPXs per year. This cycle considers several requirements like NATO's level of ambition, NATO's inherent means and capabilities, and the conduct of as many exercise permutations as possible. This integrated exercise programme will focus on those headquarters and units preparing for the NRF, and will also be open to Allies and partners. These exercises will cover the entire spectrum of possible NATO-led operations, from the most likely to the most dangerous, and an evaluation and a certification methodology will follow in order to evaluate the performances. A "*smart*" way to meet this objective will be to synchronise NATO exercises with national ones, including those of partners and other organisations, such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), through timing, scenarios, and linked control structures. Such deep cooperation between NATO and national programmes, and also between Allies and partners, would increase interoperability.

Partial conclusions: We agree on NATO post-2015 plans and re-emphasise that exercises will be some of the instruments employed by NATO to maintain interoperability. The NRF will continue to be the venue where the interoperability of the assigned units will be achieved.

⁷ LIVEX – Live Exercises. LIVEX are focused on training both the force structures in order to integrate their actions and the HQ in order to manage subordinate/available forces in different types of operations. (SMG 91/2011 – Order for planning, conduct and analysis of the exercises in the Romanian Armed Forces).

According to the latest reports of ACT, Computer Assisted (CAX) and Simulation Exercises are very cost-effective, avoiding the expensive use of troops, equipment and the impact on the environment. The basic tool that can be used for enhancing the use of CAX and simulation in NATO is the *Modelling and Simulation CoE* in Rome, Italy. This should be linked with various national simulation centres (e.g. the US Warrior Preparation Centre in Germany and the Battle Tanks Simulators Centre in Greece). Currently, CAXs are typically conducted at the Corps level of the NATO Force Structure. All nations should be encouraged to include their lower tactical echelons in this training as one of many tools in their preparation for the culminating LIVEX. Despite its added value, CAX cannot be considered as a substitute for LIVEX.

c. Standardisation and technical support (basic pillars)

c.1. Standardisation

Standardisation is very important and crucial to NATO being also considered a pillar of interoperability. The importance of standardisation is known among NATO members, but its implementation has not been well executed.

In NATO, the structure managing the standardisation process is the *NATO Standardisation Office (NSO)*.

Current situation: The NSO is the central authority for standardisation. Its aim is to initiate, develop and coordinate all activities related to standardisation within NATO under the authority of the Committee for Standardisation (CS), which is directly subordinate to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The development of STANAGs is used to implement standards in order to achieve interoperability among members and it can also be applicable to partners that consent to the STANAGs. However, STANAGs are not sufficiently implemented by members and partners. As a result, interoperability issues often arise when similar capabilities from different nations are used side-by-side. Standardisation is a major challenge for NATO and it is an area that NATO has been struggling with for years. As stated before, *standardisation of equipment* is critical to achieve *interoperability*.

For NATO the training of forces is a very important activity. According to the latest report of the NATO Standardisation Office⁸, it results that the Alliance has only 6 standards in training field, such as: *STANAG 2449 (Training in the Law of Armed Conflict)*; *STANAG 2597 (Rules of Engagement – ROE/ Escalation of Force Training)*, *STANAG 2593 (NATO Urban Operations Training)*, *STANAG 6001*

⁸ Source: NATO Training Group for Individual Training and Education Developments/ Breda/ the Netherlands, March 2015.

(*Language Proficiency Level*); *STANAG 6023 (TEPSO)* and *STANAG 2591 (ADL – Advanced Distributed Learning)*.

Partial conclusions: Interoperability of new systems must be a basic criterion from inception. The development of systems that are interoperable from the factory through their lifespan is more efficient both technically and financially than solving interoperability through modernisation, as an after-thought. There is a recommendation to intensify the dialogue between defence industries and the Alliance to achieve best possible results. New ways of developing and producing goods for defence purposes can be a win-win solution to both, the industry and the Alliance.

In concrete terms, we support the new CS initiative to develop, at the appropriate level, a more efficient implementation process of STANAGs. The recommendation is that national military authorities work more closely with the *NSO* (in charge of promoting new standards within NATO). The process of validation for standardisation works correctly, but it needs to be implemented more quickly.

c.2. Technical support – Future Mission Network⁹

With regard to technical support (as basic pillar of interoperability) we can mention the efforts made by NATO to develop a network for current and future missions to support the process of decision-making by commanders of multinational forces in theatres of operations.

Current situation: The Afghan Mission Network (AMN)¹⁰ was created to address the need for the commander of ISAF to establish and maintain a common understanding of the operational environment. More than just a technology, the *AMN* has become the basis for training, exercises and operations. Most importantly, the *AMN* has created a culture based on a broader “*share to win*” NATO concept. This concept is aimed at federating heterogeneous, military and non-military capabilities in coalition operations, not only in terms of network and system architectures, but also in terms of information sharing, processes, policy and doctrine that facilitate sharing information and services.

In November 2012, a brand new concept of *federation of networks* was defined as the *Federated Mission Network (FMN)*¹¹, based on the lessons learned

⁹ Source: *Answering Questions on the Future Mission Network*, see <http://www.act.nato.int/article-2013-1-16>.

¹⁰ Source: *Lesson Learned from the Afghan Mission Network*, see http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR302.html.

¹¹ Source: https://www.eiseverywhere.com/life_uploads/2f6043f27e1576122f1b3e0319d5b1d8_FromAMNtoFMN-Friedrich.pdf, retrieved on 02.08.2015.

from the *AMN*, in order to allow all the possible actors to participate in future operations; each with a diverse mission, varying levels of technical capabilities and political commitment. The *FMN* is a network populated by a set of non-materiel (i.e. policy, processes, procedures and standards) and materiel (i.e. static and deployed networks, services, and supporting infrastructures) contributions of NATO, member states and mission partners. This just creates the conditions where, with no delays, the commander is able, since the beginning of an operation, to count on a minimum level of capabilities, which then could evolve throughout the phases of deployment until its termination.

FMN should create a single, mission-wide information domain, where each partner will decide individually what information to share. In order to reduce gateways and allow the exchange of information, this domain will have the minimum number of security levels necessary to meet the operational commanders' requirements. Information will be captured, processed, generated, stored, disseminated and disposed of in accordance with an information management plan, which will keep the information at the lowest classification level possible.

The recommendation is that the further system needs to be designed to defend against cyber and electromagnetic pulse threats.

General Conclusions

Interoperability remains a challenge for NATO, due to the complex involvement of 28 nations with divergent political and economic interests, the organisation of different military structures with different military equipment, with various training programmes for the military personnel.

Nations agree to support most of the ideas developed in NATO about increased “connectivity”. However, we do not consider them all as promising. In addition to these ideas, we propose further measures to improve interoperability in education and training, exercises, standards and technical support. According to military experts, these “pillars” of interoperability are of equal importance and must be addressed by NATO unitarily.

The design of exercises should include elements testing the ability of NATO forces to work together towards meeting common objectives.

It requires the introduction and development of English language specialists in the academia and, subsequently, the development of operational military terminology and language. To this end, the exchange of teachers who teach English in the NATO member/partner states should be enhanced. An emphasis should be placed on expanding English language exercises, to achieve interoperability. The level of knowledge of English set by *E-1101-English Language*

Proficiency must be applied integrated, by nations, to all staff (officers and NCOs) that will fit the command structure or will be deployed in NATO-led operations.

It is also important for NATO to encourage *interoperability* so as to reduce costs for nations and support the transformation process in order to create the response force, modern small, professionalised, adequately equipped, deployable, interoperable, capable of self-support and multidimensional protection, flexible, mobile and potentially able to execute the full spectrum of missions in the area of responsibility of the Alliance or beyond.

The future will not necessarily belong to the most advanced technologies but especially to those *interoperable joint forces* able to react rapidly to major changes and to adapt quickly and effectively to those requirements imposed by the permanently changing nature of the security environment.

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CLOUD COMPUTING IN PRIVATE DEFENCE NETWORKS

Colonel Dr Dănuț ȚIGĂNUȘ

The author describes the general context of cloud computing in defence networks and the principles of providing CIS services in the cloud computing architecture. The main part of the article refers to the specific aspects of providing CIS services for both international and national forces involved in military activities in private networks and domains. The most challenging process is to provide in cloud the necessary CIS services at all operational levels, especially those dedicated to deployable forces, to ensure security and sufficient transmission bandwidth. The information security for fixed and mobile networks and systems is one of the main driving factors in the transformational process of the current operational thinking when it comes to CIS support in cloud computing.

Keywords: *cloud computing; communications and information systems; private networks; Local Area Network*

loud computing (CC) consists of a set of technologies and service models that focus on the use and supply of computer applications, transmission, processing, and storage capacity, memory space, all based on the Internet.

Cloud computing in private defence networks represents the application of the same service supply architectural model, having the character of military communications and information services in a private IP environment, based on a common transport infrastructure, partitioned in functional and security domains with different levels of classification. Usually, in order to achieve unclassified information network traffic data, apart from the classified one, a secured infrastructure is used, connected to the Internet, following the application of implementation and functionality rules similar to those existing in the public or private business domains.

For both unclassified and classified military information system, *cloud computing* can generate important operational and economic benefits because information resources can be easily and rapidly configured, extended and accessed, on demand, using the IP transmission infrastructure. Besides the operational and economic benefits, CC can bring benefits in terms of information security, the military structures

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being able to efficiently use, in their permanent locations or when they are deployed for operations, military exercises and activities, high technologies, which, normally, would not be possible given the limited capabilities of an operational or tactical campaign communications and information system.

1. Cloud Computing in the Military Communications and Information Environment

The *cloud computing* infrastructure in the military communications and information environment is operated, simultaneously, by a national military structure (for national services) and by an international structure, NATO and the EU respectively. It can be managed at a central level or partially distributed to a third structure for operational use and can be installed at its headquarters or remotely. It should be emphasised that a “*private defence cloud computing environment*” is based on certain technologies that are also specific to “*public cloud computing environments*”, especially virtualisation technologies that enhance the reorganisation (or revision) of the data processing architecture.

The public *cloud computing* environment is based on the public *cloud computing* infrastructure, this being available for the public or a large commercial group, and owned by an organisation that provides *cloud computing* services¹.

A *private defence cloud computing* environment can be compared to a conventional data centre, the difference between them being that the implementation architecture is achieved step by step, in time, in order to optimise the use of gradually available information and communications resources, and to strengthen the particular resources through the projects implemented at central strategic level within the operational and tactical communications and information infrastructures.

The analysis of NATO CC environments is required in the current private defence *cloud computing* environment, in which the IP infrastructure is shared by several member states and permanent structures of the Alliance, to the benefit of a specific community of users for a certain headquarters, structure, mission, or operation. The flexibility and simplicity in configuring *cloud computing* systems allow for their “*elastic*” sizing, meaning that the systems can be tailored to meet specific requirements, according to an approach based on the type of use. Users do not need

¹ Notification no. 05/2012 regarding “*cloud computing*” of the Group work for the data protection, established based on article 29 in *Directive 95/46/CE*, p. 29, see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp196_ro.pdf

to fully manage the *communications and information services (CIS)*, as they can be made available for the headquarters and units that use them, and, therefore, fully managed by an agency, headquarters or third structure in whose *cloud computing* data are stored. The use of *cloud* services becomes totally transparent for military users, who are not interested in the identity of the supplier, or the location where these services come from, and the place where the data are stored. The responsibility for assuring *CIS* services in *cloud computing* environment lies with the national, NATO or EU military structures that provide the services. That aspect results in part of the operational advantages of using this architectural model to implement IT services. The private military *CC* model does not exclude the possibility, sometimes seen as a necessity, to ensure redundancy through the equipment/services installed at the level of the beneficiary structure.

2. Considerations regarding the Operation of Military Systems in “Cloud”

Before operating computers in the virtual cloud, some structural, organisational and technical aspects should be taken into consideration as follows:

a. Data property

The specialised military or civilian structure, national or international, which provides virtual cloud services, can own, manage, administrate the *hardware* infrastructure and *software* products that facilitate the service supply, while the data can have a different owner, in terms of collection, use, dissemination and sharing rights, as well as of the guaranteed assurance of permanent access to stored information, in accordance with the rights and user’s profile set up for a military operation or activity. This condition requires a suitable configuration of the information security model for the whole network cloud, from the service provider to the individual user, recognised as having the right to use the information through remote processing.

b. Data amount

Cloud computing represents a great solution for data processing with a maximum flexibility and mobility of providing information services to the headquarters and military structures that activate in permanent places, and especially when deployed for military operations, exercises or activities with an obvious increased capacity to use the data and information from multiple sources that are not located in the same place, in an absolutely transparent manner for the end user, regarding their generation, storage and processing. Moreover, the *cloud* solution enables

a superior capacity of data storage compared to the *client-server*² type with a local storage of data in a *LAN – Local Area Network* as most of the private military networks are currently configured. Despite all these advantages, as the necessity to store the data belonging to the users provided with *cloud* services increases, the problem of the storage capacity lies with the IT structure specialised in providing such services (the necessity to implement solutions to eliminate data redundancy).

c. Data exploitation

From this perspective, *cloud computing* entails creating standard databases³ for all military structures, the same architectural model to access data, achieving full interoperability between the equipment of the end users in the military structures that activate in the fields of national, coalition, NATO, EU information and information security. Another essential element is given by the encryption solutions in the places where *CC* services are used, which have to guarantee the maximum protection of data according to the functional and information security domains.

There are two important aspects:

- The data standardisation at each functional area (e.g. staff data, logistics data).
- The use of standard databases, specific to C2 systems in an operational environment, in order to ensure interoperability.

d. Shared use of IT resources

In a virtual cloud it can be difficult to access data from distance, simultaneously, by several users of a specific application, such as working with *GEO/GIS*⁴ products running on a server system in *cloud computing* architecture. To avoid the “*competition*” between military structures/users that access the same software resources, a rapid migration strategy on redundancy systems (*back up*) is necessary, based on the architecture able to ensure balanced distribution and efficiency for specific requests. Such architecture entails redistributing the users’ access requests by routing and *QoS*⁵ management based

² The *client-server* model is a structure or architecture with distributed application, which shares processing between service providers called *servers* and the elements that require services, called *clients*, within a computer network.

³ *Ibidem*, see <http://www.techyv.com/article/things-consider-when-moving-cloud>

⁴ Geographical (maps)/Geographical Information System.

⁵ *Quality of Services* – (QoS) for networks is an industry-wide set of standards and mechanisms for ensuring high-quality performance for critical applications. By using QoS mechanisms, network

on a *SLA*⁶. The services that require a well defined *QoS*, on different types of network traffic, can be:

- multimedia *streaming* services⁷ that require a guaranteed bandwidth;
- the IP telephony (VoIP and VoSIP) requires strict limits of *jitter*⁸ and delays;
- video teleconference (VTC) needs a limited *jitter*;
- alarm signalling and transmission of information from sensors also require priority in providing data;
- dedicated data links require guaranteed bandwidth and impose limits on maximum delay and *jitter*;
- critical applications, such as remote surgery, demand a guaranteed level of availability (also called *hard QoS*⁹).

e. Information security

Cloud computing is both a challenge and an advantage in ensuring information security. Based on the correctly defined risk management, data protection in *cloud* systems is superior because it ensures the access to information from a single centralised source. Moreover, through centralised, including the security services, management, the assignment of specialised personnel in information security is optimised. Cyber security is also superior in terms of a centralised tracking and monitoring of network traffic and the users' access to shared information resources. However, we appreciate that a change of mindset is needed, namely the transition from the concept of *avoiding the information security risk*, often practised today, by physically separating the data infrastructure, to that of *cloud computing cyberspace security information management*. In addition, a close collaboration between the service providers and users is necessary in order to analyse risks and vulnerabilities, to identify optimal protective solutions, and to detect any attempt of fraud or a faulty use of these services. The labels currently used as principles, such as *need to know*, *need to share*, *duty to share*

administrators can use existing resources efficiently and ensure the required level of service without reactively expanding or over-provisioning their networks, see <https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc757120%28v=ws.10%29.aspx>.

⁶ *Service Level Agreement* – a document which defines the relationship between two parties: the provider and the recipient, see <http://www.sla-zone.co.uk>.

⁷ The technique through which the transfer of data is seen as a continuous flow. By *streaming* the users can see or listen to a file before being totally transmitted.

⁸ Jitter is any deviation in, or displacement of, the signal pulses in a high-frequency digital signal. The deviation can be in terms of amplitude, phase timing or the width of the signal pulse. Among the causes of jitter are electromagnetic interference and crosstalk with other signals, see <http://searchunifiedcommunications.techtarget.com/definition/jitter>.

⁹ *Ibidem* footnote 1, see <http://www.cs.ucv.ro/staff/dmancas/CD-QoS.pdf>

(*responsibility to share*), do not have sense without a climate based on trust and individual responsibility in a virtual cloud.

A critical vulnerability is the staff having responsibilities in administering a *cloud* (especially for the civilian staff), regarding their access to the *cloud* military processed/stored data, meaning that they should know how to “guard” data: “*Quis custodient ipsos custodes?*”¹⁰.

f. Help- desk function in relation to the service-desk function assurance

The difference between the *help-desk* and *service-desk* concepts becomes more concrete once migrating to *cloud computing*. Until 2007, when the new version of *ITIL*¹¹ appeared, the two terms were interchangeable, with unclear differences acknowledged in the IT community. *ITIL 2007* provides global computer services in a unique process, based on a common strategy that brings together all the structures that provide these services to end users. Thus, *service-desk* becomes the central key of network management and the only way of ensuring the access to information and communications services, while the *help-desk* function remains a component of the *service-desk* package that focuses only on the local support needs of end users.

Service-desk function mainly provides:

- access to basic and functional network communications and information services;
- application management lifecycle services;
- central contact point on different types of services and functional applications;
- continuous information of client users on the operational status of the communications and/or IT service;
- rapid intervention in solving incidents and interruptions.

Service-desk deals with incidents, problems, and answers to users questions. In addition, it offers an interface for activities such as requests for changing the type of application, hardware and software maintenance, software licences, configuration service management, readiness management, financial management and IT service continuity management.

¹⁰ Juvenal, *Satires*, “Who will guard the guards themselves”?!...

¹¹ In May 2007, the Central Computer and Telecommunication Agency (CCTA), a British governmental organisation, issued version 3 of *ITIL*, consisting in 26 de processes and functions, in 5 volumes, around the concept of services in a system life cycle. Version 3 is now known under the name of *ITIL 2007 Edition* and it was updated in 2011, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ITIL>.

g. Integration technical solutions identification

Having centralised control over the global network architecture, on information and security areas, network designers can and must identify the technical solutions able to meet the requirements of military users communities, regardless the echelon they belong to, as far as they commonly share the same information. There is an obvious progress in using collaborative virtual cloud services, and also a challenge in terms of ensuring information exchange interfaces between physical network architectures belonging to multinational structures, as well as of information security solutions for separating the domains of the same network.

h. Cost estimate

When taking into account migrating to the *CC* system, a careful and precise cost estimate is necessary, even though, in principle, cost optimisation is anticipated for assuring *CIS* services for military users. Conventional costs refer, in general, to supporting *CIS*, communications and access to *CIS* nodes, wiring, licensing, implementation and execution, support for using specific applications, servers, active network infrastructure, storage, hardware and software maintenance, user equipment, support during operation (*help-desk*), supply of communications backup and of parts and accessories reserve. If some of the associated costs decrease or are eliminated for the beneficiary, there are other activities that require costs, especially for the service provider, as follows: assurance of the guaranteed communications bandwidth and of the access in all the beneficiary's permanent areas or when deployed, the configuration of services into the virtual cloud, training of technical staff and operators, costs for long-distance intervention, particularly for radio communications sectors, radio relay or optical fibre.

i. Resource assurance

In providing the communications and information services within the architectural *CC* model, the problem of assuring material, financial and staff resources (equipment, externalised commercial or governmental communications and transport services etc.) is critical. Although, from a technical point of view, the *CC* model has not reached the maturity regarding its architecture and implementation practices, we consider that, above all, the structures specialised in executing and providing *CIS* services within *CC* must develop an efficient operating and maintenance plan for such services, taking into account the military structures that benefit from such centralised provided services. It is required that, between the two entities, *provider-client*, formal *SLA* agreements should exist, following the commercial model that has deadlines, performance indicators, precise responsibilities and operative procedures for solving possible litigation.

On the other hand, *CIS* services being crucial in exercising command and control in operations, within the framework *one for all* offered by *cloud computing*, there must be a guaranteed permanent financial line to support the operation and maintenance activities of these services, apart from the possibilities and precise resources of the beneficiaries. The efficiency of this model within the business sector has as a basic principle “*pay as you use*”, like happens with the utilities, such as electricity or running water. However, in the military, the interruption of *CIS* services is not allowed, under any circumstances, for a military unit engaged in operations, exercises or activities in accordance with specific missions and tasks. *CIS* military services must be guaranteed, and the capacity of the central service provider must be independent of their private financing and budget.

Another determining factor in assuring *CC* services is the readiness of the specialised personnel of the *CIS* service providing structure. Ensuring permanent shifts must lead to guaranteeing the availability of services in 24/7/365 for the users. The mobile intervention teams for the remedy of faults and interruptions in communication flows must also be organised in order to shorten the time of intervening.

j. Functional applications requirements assessment

Before initiating the process of migrating in *cloud computing*, an evaluation of basic applications requirements is necessary, mainly that of functional ones for the distance users in choosing the optimum package of structures that are commonly used, on information and security areas. At the same time, there must be taken into account the technological evolution, in order to avoid investments in systems and applications that are at the end of their lifecycle, or for which the maintenance is difficult and costs a lot, without the possibility to upgrade or replace them in a gradually, transparent manner, and without affecting the beneficiaries’ activity. That is why we recommend implementing services in new functional *CC* applications that offer satisfaction for beneficiary users in supporting their own command, control and decision-making activities. In this context, we propose the establishment, based on lessons identified in military operations, exercises and actions, of a periodical analysing system of the level of the beneficiaries’ requirements achievement for remote services, starting from the minimal military approved requirements, related to investment and level of ambition in terms of military processes and actions automation.

k. Connectivity

We intentionally left at the end of these considerations the communication requirements for the transfer of services to *CC*. If, in the private business sector,

this requirement translates in the need to access the Internet guaranteed bandwidth, for the communications and information military networks it is vital to ensure an IP transport infrastructure able to allow broadband communications in fixed networks with the possibility of a rapid connection of the deployable military communications and information structures.

3. Benefits of Migrating to the Military Cloud Computing

Besides the advantages of using *CIS* services in the military *cloud computing* environment, presented in the previous chapters, we consider the following as being beneficial:

- it reduces cyber attack risks over the military data networks;
- it protects perimeter intrusions and eliminates anonymity in using the military communications and information systems;
- it improves information sharing and collaborative work;
- it allows the simultaneous data access from various information areas;
- it helps implementing the concept of *federated mission networking*¹²;
- it enables the achievement of *common operational image* for the users that come from different military services (land forces, air force, naval forces), and the access to this capability, regardless of location or echelon;
- it increases the capacity of early warning on the operational situation by sharing the information from sensor systems and transmitting tactical data;
- it increases the efficiency of the command and control act by rapidly responding to operational situations and facilitates the decision-making process through the flexible network architecture and the simultaneous access to information;
- it ensures superior cryptographic authentication and efficient crypto keys management;
- it standardises the access policies to network information resources and improves the using capacity of the functional applications that are jointly used by echelons;
- it increases the collaboration capacity in planning and executing the military actions;
- it achieves the optimisation of the implementing costs, providing scalability and modularity.

¹²The federated mission networking, in which there are interconnected more NATO and national *CIS* infrastructures in order to achieve a common information exchange environment for a specific mission.

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It seems, though, that a genuine transition to a military *cloud computing* system is not possible in the short term, because of several reasons that refer especially to the current structure of the armed forces and to the establishment of the technical and procedural communications and information support for the military structures at peace, in operations, during training and exercises, and also while conducting military activities. On the other hand, the reluctance in approaching the *CC* model is probably caused by the fact that the bandwidth and the communications network reliability are not yet sufficient or appropriate at national scale, in a certain region, or in terms of specific user-provider connections within *CIS* nodes in case of deployment. Furthermore, it is acknowledged the risk of disposing “*all eggs in one nest*”, for the case when *cloud* services become inactive, and all the beneficiaries/military structures are in danger of not being able to access them, especially during an operation.

This transition can be sustained mainly by two processes: firstly, the assurance of financial stimulus for the necessary investment in achieving such a transition; secondly, there must be taken into consideration the security elements of the classified information that is to be processed following a pattern that is different from the current one.

Another aspect that advocates for using the military *cloud computing* environment refers to the fact that, often, none of the local computer service providers can assure the access to all necessary *CIS* resources having a sufficient quality of the provided services, in accordance with NATO interoperability and profile standards, in order to face the critical nature, during operations and the military activities, of those *CIS* services that a central operator can provide in a *cloud computing* environment.

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THE USE OF SCENARIO METHOD IN PLANNING THE OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN HYBRID OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

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The author presents the characteristics of hybrid threats and the environment in which the current and future operations of the military are conducted, showing that a natural and necessary consequence is that their planning, preparation and execution should be adapted and improved. In this context, the use of scenario method in planning operations is the optimal solution for the successful development of this process, regardless of its aim – a contingency plan, training, assessment, experimentation. The main objective of using the scenario method is to eliminate uncertainty. This phenomenon leads to concentrating the efforts of planning structures to provide solutions in planning situations that are stressful because of the time shortage, their importance and/or their degree of uncertainty. In other words, the scenario method is a key instrument in planning the operations that are conducted in hybrid operational environment.

Keywords: *scenario method; hybrid threats; planning; prospective*

Motto:

“Scenarios are stories about the future, but their purpose is to make better decisions in the present”.

Ged Davis

Contemporary operational environment consists of a collage of actors, technical assets, weapon systems and modes of action that manifest simultaneously, affecting all situational coordinates of operations. These features have an extraordinary dynamics, a situation that requires the use of methods and tools to increase the efficiency of generating a sufficient and properly prepared military force as well as of planning the operations conducted by such a force in order to counter all threats that may emerge.

The Need for New Concepts

The assessment of the risks and threats that characterise modern military conflicts dictates the need for the international military scientific environment to address new concepts, which entail thorough analysis and complex measures as far as

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decisions, actions and information are concerned. In the context of the permanent imperative of adapting and transforming the modern military instrument in terms of doctrine, organisation and procurement, these concepts should be designed considering the hybrid aspect of the effects of the threats that may emerge during the conduct of operations. In this regard, the concepts that have been extensively developed lately are those related to *hybrid threat*, *hybrid warfare* and *hybrid operational environment*.

Hybrid Threat

Throughout history, there are examples of *hybrid threats* even in ancient times, although the term has been used only recently. Thus, in Ancient Rome, a hybrid force consisted of bandits, criminals, soldiers belonging to regular forces and mercenaries employed various combat methods in a combination of battles and ambushes organised on the lines of communication, using stolen siege weapons, to counter the Roman Legions of Vespasian, during the Jewish rebellion in 66 AD. In the Iberian Peninsula, in 1806, a hybrid-type force, consisted of Spanish guerrillas, combined with British and Portuguese regular forces, tried to obtain decisive military effects against Napoleon's Great Army. In the Second World War, between 1941 and 1945, on the Eastern front, the Soviet Army integrated and synchronised a poorly equipped irregular force with the conventional armed forces to generate more hybrid-type effects. In the Vietnam War, the People's Army of Vietnam (North-Vietnamese regular armed forces) synchronised the operations with Viet Cong (irregular forces) to sustain a long conflict against two of the most powerful conventional forces in the world: France and the USA.

In the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah, in 2006, the Lebanese non-state actor Hezbollah combined technical assets, armament and actions specific to conventional and unconventional warfare to fight against the most important conventional military power in the Middle East – Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Related to the emergence of hybrid threats, amorphous Hezbollah is representative in many respects. The 34 days of combat (12 July-14 August) in the south of Lebanon highlighted some shortcomings in the Israel Defence Forces, aspects that were taken into consideration by the US planners. By mixing an organised political movement with decentralised cells, which were using particular tactics throughout ungoverned areas, Hezbollah showed that it could cause important loss. Its cells, consisting of extremely well prepared and disciplined fighters, distributed in a decentralised configuration, acted against modern conventional forces, using a mix of guerrilla

tactics and modern armament and technology in densely populated urban areas. Hezbollah, as the Islamic extremist fighters in Fallujah in Iraq, in April and November 2004, skilfully exploited urban areas to create ambushes and avoid being discovered and to organise strong defensive fortifications in the close vicinity of non-combatants¹. Hezbollah leaders described own forces as a combination of regular armed forces and guerrilla forces, being convinced that they had developed a new force structure. The structure consisted of a mix of militias and groups of extremely well trained fighters who used cutting-edge armament and technical assets, such as anti-tank guided missiles, operational and tactical missiles, drones, anti-ship missiles, and radio surveillance equipment. The force had a wide range of missions, from direct combat actions to guerrilla actions, short attacks or information operations. All the mentioned characteristics recommend the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 as a “*by-the-book*” hybrid warfare.

In each of the historical cases presented, various forms of hybrid threat application against conventional forces can be noticed. Based on them, analyses and theories may be developed to anticipate the manifestation of hybrid threat. Following the analysis of the thinking of some remarkable military experts in the field, we can define *hybrid threat* as being the *action of a state or non-state adversary that employs in an adaptive and concerted manner political, military, economic, social or informational means, in a mix of conventional and unconventional modes of action in order to achieve the objectives set*. A very important aspect that makes the difference between the hybrid threat and the sum of threats that were present in past military conflicts is the fact that in the case of the hybrid threat, the classical (conventional) threat generated by the armed combat between two armed forces is secondary or absent. In other words, in the hybrid operational environment, the weight of actions, from the perspective of classification, migrates from regular to unconventional, mostly asymmetrical ones. In this regard, to address the effects of the hybrid threat application in the context of recently ended or still ongoing conflicts, military analysts and planners have to take measures able to implement, at the level of military structures, the doctrinal, procedural and technical instruments that are necessary to counter such a wide range of challenges.

¹ Andrew Exum, *Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment*, Policy Focus, no. 63, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., December 2006, see <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus63.pdf>

The hybrid threat is usually employed by the belligerent party with less military power, in order to strike the balance of forces and/or meet the set objectives with minimum loss. The belligerent that employs the hybrid threat is extremely volatile, flexible, heterogeneous in terms of combat capabilities, having an excellent adaptive capacity and a strong motivation. Another characteristic of hybrid threat is that it involves a great effort on the part of the actor that employs it so that it could extend the conflict in time up to the level of the war of attrition, situation that, combined with asymmetrical actions such as ambush or sabotage, significantly reduces the conventional adversary combat power.

Hybrid Warfare

The concept of *hybrid warfare* “emerged and developed, in the American military thought of the past decade, as a theoretical response to the need for the US forces to adapt to the new realities of an uncertain operational environment. The spearhead of the analysed concept development was a team belonging to the US Marine Corps, led by Frank G. Hoffman and James N. Mattis, who are considered the fathers of the concept of hybrid warfare². In 2005, the two³ published the article “*Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*”⁴, calling the international scientific environment attention to this form of contemporary conflicts. Moreover, they highlight the necessity of comprehending the concept as it will perpetuate and evolve in terms of action, and the consequences will be significant and difficult to predict.

A slightly different approach regarding *hybrid warfare* and its specific manifestation can be seen in Russian concept. It should be considered especially as it has been applied in the conflict in Ukraine. In his article “*The Value of Science in Prediction*”, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gherasimov, states that the rules of war have changed and presents one of the most lucid and concrete definitions of the concept of *hybrid warfare*: “*The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures – applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population*”. He considers that, in modern conflicts, asymmetrical

² Valerică Cruceru, *Despre conceptul de război hibrid în gândirea militară americană*, in Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, September 2014, p. 29.

³ In 2005, Lieutenant Colonel (r.) Frank G. Hoffman worked for the *Centre for Emerging Threats and Opportunities*, Quantico – Virginia. Lieutenant General James Mattis was the Commander of the *US Marine Corps Combat Training Development Command*, Quantico – Virginia.

⁴ Frank G Hoffman, James N. Mattis, *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, *Proceedings Magazine*, vol. 132/II/1,233, US Naval Institute, November 2005, see <http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf>.

actions are widely present, making possible for the advantages of a conventional adversary to be nullified in an armed conflict. Among asymmetrical actions, Gherasimov mentions the use of special operations forces or of internal opposition to generate a protracted tense operational situation throughout the enemy state. To them, constantly improved technological and informational means are added. Essentially, in modern conflicts, there are no separate threats that are differently addressed. Opponents employ different modes of action and tactics, often simultaneously, to mutually amplify the effects. In the *hybrid warfare* some irregular threats may converge, and the adversaries adopt a comprehensive approach to meet their objectives: “*Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template*”, adds Gherasimov.

Thus, the major difference between the Russian approach (applied in Ukraine) and the Western one refers to the fact that, as far as the former is concerned, conventional threats are absolutely absent from the combination or they are employed only as show of force: “*One of the main objectives pursued by hybrid warfare is to destabilise the opponent government and important institutions, creating chaos and vacuum of power*”, mentions Gherasimov. To meet this desideratum, opponents avoid using traditional methods. Therefore their actions are not predictable and they cannot be amended by international security organisations. They seek to obtain strategic advantages by using unexpected and violent means of attack, targeting the opponent actor vulnerabilities.

Hybrid Operational Environment

If, in history, this model of employing tactics and operational art has resulted in different outcomes, depending on the actor, the opportunities to coordinate and organise conventional and unconventional actions in modern operational environment generate a potential paradigm regarding the character of threat, organisation and military thinking. The *hybrid operational environment* represents the framework within which the hybrid threat gets manifest, entailing the complex and combined configuration of actors, means, actions and effects that concertedly and often covertly converge to meet the set objectives. It allows the conduct of all types of military actions, highlighting the integrated role of forces in joint actions with other actors in the theatre of operations. Thus, the situation generates joint, interagency and multinational actions in the context of major campaigns and operations whose success essentially depends on the efficiency, accuracy and rapidity with which the planning process is conducted.

Planning Process

Given the mentioned characteristics of the threats and the environment in which the current and future operations of the military instrument are conducted, a natural and necessary consequence is that their planning, preparation and execution should be adapted and improved. Focusing analysis on the operations planning, it is clear that the process approach should be *holistic* and *exhaustive*. When saying *holistic*, we refer to the approach to the enemy actions, on the one hand, and to the main characteristic of the operational environment, on the other hand. The enemy actions (which represent the threat) and the environment in which they are performed should be considered in the aggregate and not as a sum of processes or elements. It is due to the fact that in the case of both hybrid threat and hybrid operational environment, the component elements are causally and tightly connected so that we can have a real picture of what they represent and of the effects they have on the own forces only if we consider them in the aggregate. The need for an *exhaustive* approach to the planning process is evident due to its irrefutable significance for the operation development, on the one hand, and to the complex and diverse character of the actions entailed by such operations, on the other hand. However, even the reasons for the necessity of thorough and highly detailed planning make the desideratum difficult to meet. If we add the necessity of maximum efficiency to the already mentioned requirements related to the planning process, we have the reasons for identifying the instruments that can help the operations planning process in the hybrid operational environment to meet current and future challenges.

Two of the fundamental directions to augment the necessary capabilities to combat hybrid threats are the forecast of the possible crisis situations and the preparation and proper employment of specialised forces. The two mentioned aspects should be connected through an efficient planning process developed at all the levels of the structures involved in the conflict.

In what follows, we will refer to the forecast of crisis situations as well as to the connection between this process and the employment of scenario method in the planning process. Mention should be made that the two actions are not identical and they are not conducted simultaneously but rather consecutively. Briefly, it can be considered that the anticipation of crisis situations entails estimates regarding the evolution of the future operational environment based on the past actions and effects as well as on the characteristics of the current operational situation, estimates often obtained using the extrapolation method.

Scenario Method

Although scenario method was used even during the Second World War, the concept of *scenario-based planning* was introduced in 1964 by the French futurologist Gaston Berger⁵. He introduced the concept of *prospective (la prospective)*, which was developed in terms of methods in the '70s by Michael Godet. In parallel, in the USA, it was developed a rather similar approach, named *scenario planning*. In time, scenario method was developed especially in the civil (economic) environment, being transformed in a complex mechanism that allows for the integration of operational research methods (Brainstorming, Delphi⁶, SWOT analysis⁷, MICMAC⁸, MACTOR⁹ etc.) that exploit highly precision instruments and use quantifiable variables.

In his book, *"The Global Business Network"*, the US futurologist Peter Schwartz¹⁰ calls the scenario development process the *"art of the long view"*. Thus, the role of scenarios is to create a set of sequential and dynamic images of some events that determine a hypothetical situation. The aim of this approach is to place military planners in an operational framework that determine them to shape answers, often in the form of plans. Basically, the rationale for the scenario creation process is determined by the prospective dimension of planning. The commander should anticipate the evolution of the current situation in the configuration of possible situations and plan the necessary actions to counter hypothetical threats. To this end, scenario generators should develop planning hypotheses and generate hypothetical situations (scenarios) to start the planning process and make the necessary plans in order to prevent or resolve the crisis situations for which the plans have been developed.

The use of scenario method in planning operations is the optimal solution for the successful development of this process, regardless of its aim – contingency planning, training, evaluation, experimentation. The main objective of using the scenario method is to eliminate uncertainty or rather to establish some palpable and controllable limits of uncertainty in the hybrid operational environment.

⁵ Gaston Berger (1896-1960) is the founder of the *Centre International de Prospective* in Paris.

⁶ Method of rational prognosis of the situation evolution.

⁷ Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats – method used to project the overview of an organisation.

⁸ Impact Matrix Cross-Reference Multiplication.

⁹ Matrix of alliances and conflicts; tactics, objectives, recommendations.

¹⁰ Peter Schwartz (b. 1946) is co-founder of the *Global Business Network*, a corporation specialised in scenario planning.




Figure 1: Relation between the degree of uncertainty and certainty in a scenario

This phenomenon leads to focusing the efforts of planning structures on providing solutions in planning situations that are stressful because of the time shortage, their importance and/or their degree of uncertainty. In other words, the scenario method is a key instrument in planning the operations that are conducted in hybrid operational environment due to its increased dynamics in threats emerging and the character of diversity in applying them.

Scenario Application

Taking into account the volatile character of the threats in the hybrid operational environment, the contingency planning of current and future operations is *sine qua non*. It starts from the premise that in any operation planning process, the most important operational variables that determine the development of the planning process are the *enemy* (through the static and dynamic combat power – actions), the *operation environment* (physical, moral, informational) and the *own forces* (through the static combat power). To the characteristics of own force, the planning process adds the way of conducting actions, which represents the expression of the dynamic combat power. In this process, the mechanism of using scenario method is particularly implemented during the stages of situation assessment and response option development. In the initial stages of the process, scenario method allows for the enemy actions to be given a form by creating an operational environment and developing some possible courses of action. This set of the enemy “*forms of action*” is the real trigger for the planning process as well as the determining element for the entire

approach. Thus, the scenario sets the general framework that, in terms of action, is defined by a series of events that generate the operational situation. Given that the hybrid operational environment entails various threats, the information provided in the scenario, describing the major regional actors, the operational environment, and the participating forces capabilities become crucial for approaching the situation and providing solutions to counter the threats.

In the next steps of the operations planning process, the scenario method is applied by creating and exploiting *branches*¹¹. In this regard, the method allows for developing mini-scenarios, materialised in possible “*deviations*” from the enemy course of action, “*established*” in the main scenario, which makes planners generate different responses that may be applied to facilitate the adaptation of the initial plan. Testing and assessing the procedures developed for *branches* entail applying a set of scenarios obtained by varying certain parameters. Thus, there are analysed the effectiveness and the possibility to adapt the procedures as such and the plan in total, as well as the speed of response that is necessary to the user to achieve success (as it is very likely that the real course of events to be different from the initial one). The mentioned application of the scenario method should be limited. Otherwise, it can generate iterations that prolong and complicate the entire process.

The scenario method can be also employed to assess the capacity to direct and apply the own forces dynamic combat power. This activity is an important stage in assessing the effectiveness of implementing some strategies to transform and modernise the force structures assigned to conduct operations in the hybrid operational environment. In this regard, testing/assessing the capabilities of some structures that are to execute military actions in a certain environment can be performed more objectively by placing them in a scenario that is similar to that in which the mission is to be accomplished. It is essential that scenario planners can change a large variety of the artificially created environment characteristics so that they can cover as many forms and intensities of the hybrid threat as possible.

A similar aspect is proper to the employment of the scenario method to test some tactics, techniques and procedures or some armament systems that are already used or are about to be used. In the context of the permanent need for adapting

¹¹ Variant of action in an operation plan.

to the characteristics of the contemporary or future operational environment, an important stage in the strategy meant to meet this desideratum is the application of the most effective methods to identify the technical and conceptual parameters that have to be adjusted. The scenario method provides a flexible and controlled framework, a “laboratory” that allows using a wide range of methods to identify the appropriate measures and the arguments that justify their implementation.

The scenario method can be also employed to train some structures in running the planning process. Human thinking is based on models. In everyday life, the brain stores situational models or specific courses of action to which past decisions and their subsequent effects are matched. Consequently, when confronted with a surprising situation, the first impulse of the human brain is to “rely on data” to identify a similar *situation-decision-effect* set and to find a solution. This mechanism highlights at least two advantages of using scenarios to train the military structures in the development of the planning process. The first advantage refers to the enhancement of the speed of response in critical situations, which often result in mind-freezing for those untrained. The second one is related to the decision-making efficiency in situations that have not been anticipated (and there are many such situations in the operational environment). This “database” generated by training at the level of individual or collective consciousness is simply called “experience”. Moreover, the feeling determined by “*been there, done that*” significantly reduces fear, mental blockage or hasty and inefficient decisions because of the surprise generated by the moment when a certain situation occurs or by the novelty of the situation.

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The hybrid operational environment broadens the range of the threats that may be included in the scenario and allows the scenario planners to feel free in providing various scenarios able to cover an as wide as possible range of hypotheses related to future actions. Thus, the multidimensionality of crisis in the hybrid operational environment provides scenario developers with the opportunity to imagine situations in which risks are different from those specific to classical combat operations. Terrorist actions, cyber attacks or those in the electromagnetic spectrum, actions in the mass media, pressure at political level, manipulation of civil population, economic constraints or espionage actions are but few from the most important types of threats that are characteristic to this environment. The scenario method comes to meet the huge flow of uncertainty generated

by this context by using advanced operational research procedures that can be correlated with modelling and simulation of military actions. Thus, it plays a significant part in the development of some valid and viable plans, necessary for generating some flexible and effective response capabilities. This desideratum comes out in support of the fact that, although the process of developing military scenarios is laborious and resource (especially time) consuming, the results achieved by employing this method correspondingly facilitate the development of the military actions planning process, providing solid and viable solutions.

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THE REFLECTION OF THE *SMART DEFENCE* CONCEPT IN THE NATO MEMBERS AIR FORCES' INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROCUREMENT DOMAINS

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The concept of Smart Defence, amid the austerity measures and budget cuts implemented in defence sector, continues the initiatives undertaken since the establishment of the Alliance, in an attempt to maximise the limited resources available for defence, but from a modern and different perspective, by trying the intellectual conceptualisation of these efforts and providing a platform to allow the participation of member states in the conduct of exercises that lead to a reduction in defence spending, making use of the management structures and expertise needed to implement NATO Smart Defence initiative.

The implementation of the concept basic principles – prioritisation, specialisation and cooperation creates best practices in managing defence resources, air force included, through projects meant to maintain, generate and develop the operational capabilities that NATO greatly needs.

Keywords: *Smart Defence; air force; NATO; infrastructure; equipment; procurement; military organisation*

1. Theoretical Aspects of the *Smart Defence* Concept

The *Smart Defence* concept was officially launched by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, on 4 February 2011, in the Security Conference in Munich, Germany, as an alternative to drastic budget cuts in the defence area, manifested in the NATO member countries. Maintaining a strong and effective North Atlantic Alliance – in the context of the austerity measures imposed by the economic crisis emerged in 2008, as a confrontation for most countries, based on the new realities of the geostrategic environment (the situation in Ukraine, the rise and extremely violent actions of ISIS, the terrorist actions recently committed in France etc.) – is a challenge, which requires the identification of smart ways to spend the resources allocated to defence through **prioritisation, specialisation and cooperation.**

Prioritisation, an essential component of the *Smart Defence* concept, entails “aligning

*national capability priorities with those of NATO, [which] has been a challenge for some years*¹. “*Smart Defence is the opportunity for a transparent, cooperative and cost-effective approach to meet essential capability requirements*”². In 2010, during the NATO Summit in Lisbon, were set several priorities, focusing on the way the Alliance’s efforts and resources should be concentrated in the next period, consisting of *operations, cyber security, terrorism and countering piracy*, on the one hand, and *missile defence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), thus maintaining a high level of readiness and training forces, active engagement and force protection*, on the other hand³. The speech delivered by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, emphasised the significance of investing in those infrastructure components consistent with the new identified priorities, and not in static structures, outdated and inefficient, specific to the *Cold War*.

The transformation process that NATO is involved in, among other issues, aims at obtaining the Alliance’s command and control elements or force structures with high deployment capability both inside and outside its area of responsibility, very agile, well-trained and equipped and sustainable for long periods of time in the theatre. In this process, a special importance is that of the infrastructure associated, through its role in supporting and generating the combat power necessary to achieve the objectives at all levels (tactical, operational and strategic).

Specialisation is encouraged by NATO, to enable the Alliance member states to focus on (specialise in) the area where they possess the greatest expertise (thus becoming more efficient), being able (and agreeing) then to coordinate defence budgets with allies. This means harmonisation of requirements and coordination in the direction of developing those specific capabilities that meet NATO’s needs (the air campaign in Libya highlighted the lack of *ISTAR* capabilities, air refuelling platforms etc.). Such an approach entails *specialised capabilities, which involves holding by the Allies only distinct specialisation and not all of the capabilities, resulting in savings, and maximising defence resources within NATO*⁴. The role of the North Atlantic Alliance is that of an intermediary, through providing coordination among the nations involved and assisting them to obtain and maintain the capability to fulfil the necessary role within the Alliance.

¹ NATO, *Smart Defence – Components*, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm?selectedLocale=en, retrieved on 11.04.2015.

² *Ibidem*.

³ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, *Principles and Power*, Berlin, 27 October 2011, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_79949.htm, retrieved on 17.04.2015.

⁴ NATO, *Smart Defence – Components*, *op. cit.*

Cooperation entails developing, through the joint involvement (collective approach), those operational capabilities that NATO member states cannot afford individually. It refers to the (re)distribution of costs regarding research and development of complex military capabilities, resulting in substantial savings. Cooperation between NATO member states can take different forms, from the situation in which a small group of countries is led by another state to carry out a specific project to that of sharing tasks/involvement at strategic level between states that are close in geographical and cultural terms or whose aim is to meet the requirements related to the use of the same weapon systems or equipment.

This new approach, proposed as a solution to the shortcomings and risks generated by the austerity measures implemented, is conceived “*to ensure greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility*”⁵. In this regard, each NATO member is required to adopt measures such as: (1) pooling and sharing capabilities; (2) establishing a set of priorities concerning the necessary capabilities; (3) acting in order to achieve a better coordination of efforts. Along with the established priorities for the completion of defence budgetary programmes, other objectives to be met are reducing bureaucracy and optimising organisational structures.

Other issues highlighted by NATO Secretary General refer to the technological component of the *Smart Defence* concept, which is considered a priority for the future, requiring a redistribution of funds allocated to defence towards science and technology fields, and thus towards multinational *research and development/R&D* projects in defence.

At the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, it was presented a package of multinational projects for debate, which, once approved, determined the starting point for implementing the *Smart Defence* initiative. The assessments of Heads of State and Government of NATO member countries were positive as far as the projects were concerned, the importance of the aspects that the *Smart Defence* concept involved being emphasised in the *Chicago Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*⁶.

Reaching the parameters established for NATO forces in 2020 – “*modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so that they can operate*

⁵ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, *NATO Secretary General Calls for Smart Defence at Munich Conference*, 4 February 2011, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_70327.htm?selectedLocale=en, retrieved on 09.04.2015.

⁶ NATO, *Chicago Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*, May, 2012, see <http://www.rpfFrance-otan.org/Summit-Declaration-on-Defence>, retrieved on 11.04.2015.

*together and with partners in any environment*⁷ – involves major changes in how operational capabilities are developed and provided, exceeding the national and multinational existing forms of cooperation in areas such as strategic airlift (acquisition and sharing of aerial platforms C-17), airborne early warning and control capabilities (AWACS). Thus, it is required: “(1) *find new ways to cooperate more closely to acquire and maintain key capabilities; (2) prioritise on what is needed most and consult on changes to [...] defence plans; (3) deepen the connections among the Allies and between them and partners on the basis of mutual benefit; (4) maintain a strong defence industry in Europe; and (5) make the fullest possible use of the potential of defence industrial cooperation across the Alliance [which] remains an essential condition for delivering the capabilities needed for 2020 and beyond*”⁸.

In 2012, during the Chicago Summit, there were presented and approved 20 projects, in terms of initiatives, based on the principles and objectives of the *Smart Defence* concept, designed to provide greatly increased operational effectiveness, determine the forces’ connectivity, providing at the same time the knowledge and experience needed to run smart new projects in the future.

2. Implications of the *Smart Defence* Concept Implementation in the Infrastructure Domain

Understanding the characteristics, parameters and functions of infrastructure is extremely important in determining the implications resulting from changes in the approach regarding the use of defence resources by NATO member states by implementing principles such as **prioritisation**, **specialisation** and **cooperation**, in order to identify multinational solutions, considered basic components of the *Smart Defence* concept.

Infrastructure, providing mainly support functions for military operations, must also be analysed from the perspective of the relations of complementarity with serviced weapon systems. In the air force, operating air combat, reconnaissance and intelligence, command and control, transport, cargo, air refuelling platforms etc. – as major elements of the operational capabilities of NATO member states’ air forces – have direct implications on the characteristics/requirements that the infrastructure must meet.

⁷ *Ibidem.*

⁸ *Ibidem.*

To identify the above mentioned infrastructure aspects as well as to determine the implications that the *Smart Defence* concept can generate in the air force infrastructure, a brief analysis of infrastructure, air bases or logistics system is required. In NATO's acceptance, infrastructure is a term used to mean "static buildings and permanent installations required to support military forces"⁹ or "the static items of capital expenditure which are required to provide the material support for operational plans necessary to enable the higher command to function and the various forces to operate with efficiency"¹⁰. In accordance with US doctrinal documents, infrastructure is understood from a wider perspective, being "the provision of services, processes, facilities, and related support required for developing, generating, sustaining, maintaining, and recovering aerospace power. Infrastructure is a collection of physical elements, such as squadron operations buildings, and processes, such as the military personnel flight operations"¹¹.

Infrastructure supports operations across the entire spectrum of conflict, in both garrisons and expeditionary environment, including: (1) installations; (2) logistics; (3) personnel services; (4) health services support; (5) headquarters and headquarters support functions; (6) science and technology programmes; (7) test, evaluation, and target facilities and ranges; (8) electromagnetic frequencies; (9) non-unit training; (10) acquisition, contracting, and financial services support; (11) command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) systems; (12) installation support functions; (13) community support functions; (14) depot maintenance; and (15) associated aerospace support systems¹².

From an operational perspective, the infrastructure – through the support functions held – should allow carrying out different activities, relative to the attended weapon systems or to the nature of supporting activities, in accordance with the principle of specialisation. Referring to this criterion, airbases will be designed to: (a) **generate combat missions** executed independently or as part of major air operations/campaigns; (b) **generate offensive and defensive electronic warfare operations**, and provide information support and command and control (C2) associated functions; (c) **provide highly specialised technical support** for depot-level maintenance, repairs, research and development;

⁹ NATO Infrastructure Committee, *50 Years of Infrastructure – NATO Security Investment Programme Is the Sharing of Roles, Risks, Responsibilities, Costs and Benefits*, 15 May 2001, p. 18.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ US Air Force, *Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.4 – Bases, Infrastructure and Facilities*, 13 November 1999, p. 7.

¹² *Ibidem*.

(d) **provide medical care** through the use of owned capability, aeromedical evacuation staging areas or a stand-alone air transportation hospital; (e) **support technical training, flying training and education**; (f) **support test and evaluation of air platforms**, weapons and weapon systems¹³.

Air bases are locations from where operations are projected and supported, being defined as installations containing facilities and infrastructure. **Infrastructure**, as outlined above, contains all facilities/fixed and expeditionary assets, constructions, facilities and processes, which support and ensure the control of military forces. **Facility** means a real entity, consisting of one or more buildings, structures (including temporary structures – tents etc.), utility systems, pavements (runways, ramps, taxiways, roads) etc.¹⁴. The main functions of air bases include energy, fuel, ammunition, water supply, civil works, services, healthcare, and command and control.

Having clarified the infrastructure-associated structural, functional and procedural aspects, we may identify further areas being subject to the implementation and development of *Smart Defence* projects, based on the aforementioned principles (**prioritisation, specialisation and cooperation**), aiming to avoid duplication and overlap, and “*to generate operational capabilities in the cheapest, fastest and most efficient manner*”¹⁵.

The experience, lessons learned and shortcomings identified after the involvement of NATO in conflicts such as those in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya have helped firstly to formulate a consistent number of multinational projects, each accurately defining specific objectives, aimed at providing solutions in a very broad operational spectrum by the resulted functions and at determining the optimisation and standardisation of processes, and secondly to determine a fair burden-sharing within NATO, and to reduce excessive dependence on the US operational capabilities.

Many of these projects directly concern the air force, which, by the declared goals, will intend to not only improve but also develop and provide new operational capabilities, most needed for the Alliance to meet current and future threats. These projects are: (1) *NATO Universal Armaments Interface*; (2) *Pooling Maritime Patrol Aircraft*; (3) *Multinational Aviation Training*; (4) *Pooling of Deployable Air*

¹³ *Ibidem.*

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*

¹⁵ C. Grand, *Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century?*, in *Chicago Council of Global Affairs*, Chicago, Illinois, 28-30 March 2012.

Activation Module – DAAM; (5) Multinational Military Flight Crew Training; and (6) Multinational Logistics Partnership – Helicopter Maintenance, the latter being one of the six projects already completed.

The *Smart Defence* initiative is also intended to spur ongoing multinational projects (initiated before 2010), considered strategic programmes: (1) *NATO's Missile Defence Capability*; (2) *Alliance Ground Surveillance Programme – AGS*; (3) *NATO Air Policing*; and (4) *Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – JISR*.

During the Wales Summit in 2014 – in the context of Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine, and emerging threats from the Middle East and North Africa – was approved the *NATO Readiness Action Plan*, which consists of a “*coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures, designed to offer the Alliance the necessary capability to provide a firm and decisive response to new security challenges*”¹⁶, intended to contribute to maintaining a strong Alliance, ready to adopt an appropriate strategic posture to face such complex threats. The measures adopted are based on the same principles which are the foundation of Smart Defence: (1) **prioritisation** (identifying threats and developing responses to these threats – *Very High Readiness Joint Task Force/VJTF*); (2) **specialisation** (participation of the Alliance's air, land and naval elements that meet certain criteria associated with training, readiness, interoperability etc.); and (3) **cooperation** (multinational participation, in a rotational manner, within both *VJTF* and the missions planned to strengthen the Alliance eastern flank defence through a mix of adopted measures).

NATO member states' air forces involvement in missions performed on the eastern flank of the Alliance has certain similarities with the NATO Air Policing in the Baltic States – initiated in March 2004 as a 24/7 mission on Siauliai airfield in Lithuania to defend the airspace of the three Baltic States by rotation by the Alliance air forces that possess and use air platforms meant for such missions – with significant implications for the infrastructure.

The missions to strengthen the presence on the eastern flank of the Alliance (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria) do not entail radical processes of building a completely new infrastructure. However, they entail meeting specific requirements and conditions considered in the light of generating and supporting distinct air operations (from deterrence to collective defence within NATO). They include “*preparation of infrastructure, repositioning*

¹⁶ NATO, *Wales Summit Declaration*, in *Chicago Council of Global Affairs*, 5 September 2014, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, retrieved on 17.01. 2015.

*of equipment and supplies, and designation of specific bases. Adequate host nation support will be critical in this respect*¹⁷.

The designation of air bases to execute certain missions is required to be performed not only for tactical considerations (based on threat) but also from the perspective of costs (air bases involve a series of high operational and logistics costs). The situation in Ukraine has led planning and decision-making factors to establish a number of NATO bases already existing in the Alliance countries on the eastern border, relevant in terms of the criteria stated above.

The infrastructure preparation entails running processes – both technical (consolidation/extension of take-off/landing runways, taxiways, links and platforms, construction of new facilities to ensure the operation of air platforms and a type of equipment belonging to the Allies, different from those operated by the host nation/HN, in accordance with NATO standards etc.) and operational – to provide a range of functions, from primary ones, to ensure support for combat structures for generating combat power, to the survival and defence ones, in the case of conventional, nuclear and cyber attacks. From the perspective of the principles associated with the *Smart Defence* concept on optimising processes to achieve operational capabilities in an efficient manner, the *Host Nation Support (HNS)* is a key factor. *HNS* exercised on the basis of bilateral diplomatic agreements provides support in specific areas, based on predetermined conditions, in order to enhance/increase the ability of allied forces to perform the missions assigned. “*HNS reduces staffing, materials and services requirements*”¹⁸, thus offering more flexibility to the forces designated for operational and strategic objectives. The airbases, identified and established to be suitable for providing support in terms of *HNS*, provide/transfer to Allied Expeditionary Forces (*Sending Forces – SF*) a range of services and facilities owned by the *HN*, which determines saving resources within NATO. The resources thus saved can be targeted to areas that require urgency, to maintain or develop new operational capabilities necessary for NATO in the context of the current threats to the security of the North Atlantic area.

The *HN* transferable functions and capabilities to the allied sending forces (*SF*) are: (1) *Facilities and systems (structure of airfield, buildings, warehouses, hangars, control centres, communications networks, hospitals etc.)*. (2) *Supplying, services and equipment (purchase and supply services locally, cleaning, transport,*

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ US Joint Pub 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense*, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 July 1996, p. v-1.

feeding, technical maintenance, POL insurance, healthcare, escort of convoys, cargo services, air traffic control and aerodrome perimeter protection etc.). (3) Products of information type (sharing information gathered and interpreted by the national system of HN with SF). (4) Force protection against ballistic attacks, defending against nuclear, biological and chemical threats/NBC (information, warning and providing national means for protection against missile and NBC). (5) Civil Affairs (establishment and maintenance of civil-military relations with HN etc.).

The methods and mechanisms by which HNS is provided to Allied expeditionary forces respect the principles that underpin the concept of *Smart Defence*, the central aspect being based on cooperation, use of existing capacity and infrastructure, avoiding thus doubling capacity and redundancy, which results in obtaining major savings in defence resources.

3. Implications of the Implementation of the *Smart Defence* Concept at Procurement Processes Level

In September 2014, at the Wales Summit, there were debates on how financial resources were used, in an attempt “to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets to make the most effective use of funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities”¹⁹. They also addressed the manner in which defence budgets were invested, focusing on purchases of new equipment and recommendations that *allies currently allocating less than 20% of their annual budgets for defence, for new equipment or for research and development, will undertake to increase their annual investment to 20% or more of the total defence spending in the next decade*²⁰. These provisions continued the Alliance efforts to implement the measures introduced by the *Smart Defence* initiative starting in 2011 meant to facilitate procurement and equipment at a multinational level within the Alliance, in order to share the high costs of production and maintenance of the weapon systems and equipment in the inventory.

Since the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance there have been concerns manifested in various forms over the optimisation of procurement of weapon systems and equipment, being encouraged the cooperation between NATO member states. The cooperation between the Alliance members, along with purchasing and procurement, has also consisted in complex processes of development and production of new equipment, destined for the forces of NATO member states.

¹⁹ NATO, *Wales Summit Declaration*, in *Chicago Council of Global Affairs*, *op. cit.*

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

A July 1989 RAND²¹ Corporation study analysed the processes associated with certain approaches to the development, acquisition and procurement of weapons and equipment by structures of allied forces in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and interoperability, in relation to the direct opponent at the time, the troops of the Warsaw Pact. Along with cooperation in defence procurement, it was thus supported the idea that “*reducing the number of different types of new weapons can generate multiple benefits, such as (1) avoidance of duplication during development, (2) achieving significant savings during production; and (3) creating a context enabling allies to act more effectively together*”²².

The same study lists the various progresses achieved in the 40 years since the establishment of the Alliance, stressing the importance of cooperation agreements between the allies, which led to the foundation of the procurement regulatory framework on the development and equipment within NATO. Thus: (1) *Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)*, signed since 1970 between the European member countries of NATO and the United States (not less than 13, being known as double-sense path), have encouraged transatlantic procurement processes. (2) *Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)*, created in 1976, has acted to strengthen cooperation among the European members of NATO and (3) *Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS)* was introduced by NATO in order to increase long-term coordination regarding the equipment requirements, by connecting to the NATO force planning system²³. Creating *IEPG*, beyond the main purpose of strengthening the cooperation of European members of NATO in specific projects, has also as foundation the awareness of the situation that the costs associated with the development of new weapon systems have come to exceed the financial possibilities of a single nation.

The mid 80s found NATO in an ample process of defining procurement strategies in the military area, both among European members and between them and the USA, trying to expose them to free market rules, similar to other industrial fields. Among the difficulties were those regarding the sources from which were to be purchased equipment and weapons in the Alliance by each member state individually. Some of the allies approaches, focused on internal orientation, have been considered unjustified, “*the traditional strategic arguments of (re) acquisition*

²¹ Simon Webb, *NATO and 1992 – Defense Acquisition and Free Markets*, Library of Congress, RAND Corporation, the USA, July 1989.

²² *Ibidem*, p. V.

²³ *Ibidem*.

and supply by purchasing most of the equipment from domestic suppliers being downright unconvincing²⁴, since: (1) **at strategic level**, NATO member countries are engaged in a common defence process, based on mutual trust, which reduces the appearance of an extra risk of dependence in terms of providing arms; (2) a possible requirement **to supply weapons in wartime** does not justify the diversion of funds towards supporting domestic production lines intended for complex military equipment, since, in the case of a conflict, they would need a period of months to provide this newly manufactured equipment; and (3) **the preference for domestic procurement** in Europe would create a kind of national monopoly (even if the European industrial companies were restructured to match the US defence suppliers, their number coming to be two or three)²⁵.

Despite the theories expressed in the decision group of NATO, the governments of the member states were subject to political pressure towards supporting national industries, even with increased costs, which highlighted the lack of application of the rules of the free market in the defence procurement area within the Alliance. Even in these conditions, *IEPG* ministers, in an attempt to increase transnational competitiveness among European NATO countries, took steps to implement the above-mentioned principles by: (1) publishing internationally both requirements and industrial capacities of member countries; (2) accepting any qualified companies in the bidding process in order to obtain contracts in any department of defence (directly or as subcontractor). A programme with similar objectives was implemented between the USA and Canada, aiming to create cross tender opportunities between the two NATO partner states – *the Deferred Profit-Sharing Plan (DPSP)*. Such actions were closely correlated with how NATO member states were carrying out acquisition and procurement processes, in a first phase (between 1950 and 1960), the weapons being designed and developed by a single country, and then sold (or made under license) to another, and between 1970 and 1980, when appeared different forms of multinational cooperation in the development and production of new equipment²⁶.

At the NATO Summit in December 1957 it was debated the need for *rationalisation (systematisation), standardisation and increasing interoperability (RSI)* among allies through integration processes in the force structures.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. VI.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. VII.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

The juxtaposition of the three aspects in one concept – *RSI* – can be considered a precursor of the current initiatives related to *Smart Defence* by both military benefits in terms of interoperability of allied forces and savings achieved by reducing duplication of costly development programmes, namely facilitating long-term production²⁷.

If involved in some joint projects – from the perspective of full cooperation from the development phase to final production –, defence departments will agree as much as possible on the military/operational requirements and the implementation deadlines such a project executed in a joint manner involving multinational feasibility studies, project definition, development and prototype completion²⁸. Participation during these phases is usually distributed equally between participating countries or in certain proportions determined by the amount of equipment to be purchased in the end. Another aspect that may be encountered involves any changes to the original project, to meet specific national requests²⁹.

Once the new equipment thus produced enters into operation, co-production processes can continue to supply spare parts or to deliver complete systems to different customers. Other forms of collaboration involve logistical support or military personnel training to operate the purchased equipment.

Weapons, weapon systems or equipment have been developed through the joint participation of several NATO member states. It is the case of the *European Eurofighter combat aircraft (EFA)*, a project involving the FRG (later Germany), Italy, the UK and Spain; the *EH101* helicopter designed and built by Italy and the UK; or the replacement of NATO frigates in the '90s, attended by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the USA.

Between 1968 and 1988 other aircraft have been developed and manufactured by the joint participation of some members of the Alliance: *Jaguar* (France, the UK), *Alpha-Jet* (France, West Germany), *Tornado* (West Germany, Italy and the UK) and *Harrier AV8B* (the UK, the USA). Other projects carried out jointly by NATO member states included *Identify Friend or Foe (IFF)* system, *airborne radar*, *missiles Roland 1 and 2* (France, West Germany), *Milan* (France, West Germany), *Martel* (France, the UK), rocket launchers *FH Howitzer* systems (West Germany, Italy and the UK), *MLRS* (France, West Germany, the UK, the USA and Italy) etc.

The acquisition, in an efficient manner, of new sophisticated weapon systems (such as combat aircraft) is a laborious process consisting, on the one hand, in carrying out predetermined evaluation procedures (performance, costs, logistics

²⁷ *Ibidem.*

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

²⁹ *Ibidem.*

support, issues of domestic industry participation as offset etc.) and, on the other hand, the allocation of budgets of millions or billions of Euro. The platforms or equipment itself represent only the initial part of a long-term contract with the supplier, following their spare parts, various complex repairs, improvements and updates to the structure or operating software versions running on board computers etc. Within the Alliance, a specialised structure is established to harmonise procurement and supply processes.

The application of the *Smart Defence* concept principles at the level of the defence ministries of NATO member states, even if it has had particular forms, **is aimed at achieving the goal focused on improving and optimising defence procurement processes and ways, meant to lead to the acquisition of military capabilities in a very short time, in a better and cheaper manner, focusing, at the same time, on their integration with existing capabilities.** In this respect, an **intelligent procurement** objective is that of the UK Ministry of Defence, as follows: “(1) to deliver and sustain defence capabilities within the performance, time and cost parameters approved at the time the major investment decisions are taken; (2) to integrate defence capabilities into their environment within Defence, with the flexibility to be adapted as the environment changes; (3) to acquire defence capabilities progressively, at lower risk. Optimisation of tradeoffs between military effectiveness, time and whole life cost is maximised; and (4) to cut the time for (key) new technologies to be introduced into the frontline, where needed to secure military advantage and industrial competitiveness”³⁰.

4. Projections of Smart Defence Application in Infrastructure and Acquisitions

Since the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance and to date there have been various attempts by NATO member states, at national and multinational level, to maximise the use of existing resources through initiatives that allow procuring military capabilities necessary for the Allies defence and security guarantees. The *Smart Defence Initiative* is developed based on the same concerns (due to the budget cuts and austerity measures implemented in the defence sector), but from a modern and different perspective, being “*the intellectual attempt to conceptualise these efforts and provide a framework where nations could engage in different cost saving exercises*”³¹ by providing NATO management structures and expertise needed to implement *Smart Defence* initiatives.

³⁰ UK MoD Procurement Agency, *Smart Acquisition Programme*, see www.ams.mod.uk, retrieved on 21.10.2014.

³¹ Vaidatos Urbelis, *Implications of Smart Defence Initiative for Small Members of NATO*, in *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review*, vol. 11, no. 1, December 2013, p. 11, see <http://www.rpfFrance-otan.org/Summit-Declaration-on-Defence>, retrieved on 11.04.2015.

The implications of applying the concept of *Smart Defence* in infrastructure and procurement by the air forces of NATO member states are manifold, the implementation of the concept basic principles – **prioritisation, specialisation and cooperation** – creating best practices in managing defence resources through projects meant to maintain, generate and develop the operational capacities NATO greatly needs, to rebalance the wide gap between the USA and European partners and Canada, so that ultimately will result increased operational efficiency, achieving substantial savings and connectivity of forces, while at the same time providing the knowledge and experience needed to run smart future projects for decades.

Since its launch in 2011 until now, the effects of the implementation of *Smart Defence* concept have been felt in all areas of expression of the Alliance. The current situation in Eastern Europe – generated by the annexation of Crimea by Russia and by the maintenance of a war in Eastern Ukraine – has tested NATO internal decision mechanisms, not only from an operational perspective but also from that concerning the arrangements for the allocation and use of defence resources. The prolongation of the crisis in Ukraine, amid the austerity measures and the cuts in NATO member states defence budgets, requires the adoption of intelligent decisions on developing and maintaining the needed deterrence and defence capabilities of the Alliance, not only in the short but especially in the medium and long run.

The measures implemented so far have been based on *Smart Defence* specific principles, the host nation support representing its specific approach by incorporating those principles. In the future, *HNS* will play a pivotal role in meeting operational and strategic objectives, through positive implications in infrastructure and acquisitions, generating the necessary Alliance capabilities by a judicious manner of spending resources. Moreover, based on the assessment of risks, threats and vulnerabilities, must be determined (in terms of prioritisation) the necessary capabilities (to be developed, purchased etc.) in the air force to counter possible aggression. In this manner, the type of weapons and the amount thereof, i.e. the type of infrastructure that serves them will be not only appropriate, meeting the requirements, but also sustainable. High operating costs sharing by common projects (cooperation) and assuming certain specific tasks by the Allies (specialisation) for the next period (*AWACS, SAC, ISTAR and AGS, NATO air policing service, use of HNS* etc.) will determine achieving operational effectiveness and efficiency, reflected in obtaining and maintaining military capabilities relevant to the Alliance.

The *Smart Defence* concept has been applied through a range of bilateral and multinational projects directly or indirectly aimed at the infrastructure of the air forces of NATO member states, its underlying principles constituting, in the future as well, the approaches (to address certain issues) by: **(1) identifying the critical elements to be maintained, developed or upgraded, giving up the outdated, expensive, irrelevant ones in the new security environment;** **(2) developing a modular infrastructure with high capacity of deployment in theatres, allowing support for modern, flexible, agile forces;** **(3) association of NATO member states in various forms to develop joint infrastructure projects at regional level in terms of operating the same weapon systems and equipment** (centres for education and training of pilots and technical personnel, flight simulators, technical facilities necessary for the provision, maintenance of equipment serviced jointly etc.); **(4) regional cooperation of allies in terms of developing infrastructure elements to respond to regional threats** (development of the missile shield project benefiting a large number of NATO member states); **(5) bilateral or multinational cooperation in order to build a joint base of capabilities to then be used/shared by all members of the Alliance (Pooling and Sharing), as needed** (*AWACS, Airspace Management System, Air Policing Service, strategic airlift, aerial surveillance system* etc.); **(6) multinational cooperation to develop the infrastructure needed to run research and development processes** (so that results can be used in the defence industry across the North Atlantic Alliance); and **(7) (re) assessment of HNS from the perspective of obtaining operational efficiency and maximising defence resources by avoiding the duplication of processes and operational capabilities.**

Through such an approach, the *Smart Defence* initiative can be considered “*changed outlook, the opportunity for a renewed culture of cooperation in which multinational collaboration is given new prominence as an effective and efficient option for developing critical capabilities*”³².

³² NATO, *Chicago Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*, *op. cit.*

ROMANIAN MILITARY REPRESENTATION TO NATO AND THE EU

For a Dynamic and Robust Partnership

Romania's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation represented a fundamental option, having major and decisive influence on its foreign and domestic policy. The membership of NATO is a guarantee of security, essential for the country's development as well as for the citizens' prosperous future.



By promoting the values and objectives of the Alliance, participating in its operations and missions, by being actively involved in the transformation of the organisation, Romania confirms the active role it plays within NATO. A strong alliance, able to respond effectively to the new threats to security, needs the permanent support of its members, the dynamic and robust partnership of transatlantic democracies.

Romanian Military Representation to NATO and the EU, as the specialised structure of the Ministry of Defence in liaising/networking with NATO Headquarters (NATO-HQ) and in permanently representing the Chief of the General Staff at the NATO Military Committee (MC) and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), has, among its missions, to permanently sustain Romania's military interests in its relations with the military structures of NATO, the EU, the member states and those involved in the Alliance various forms of partnership. The promotion of a positive image of Romania, in general, and of the Romanian Armed Forces, in particular, is also one of the objectives of this structure subordinate to the General Staff.

Along with the troops in the theatres of operations, the members of the Representation contribute substantially to the projection of national interests and pride in the international arena. In addition to fulfilling their complex and difficult job duties, they have shown considerable enthusiasm for presenting some of their conceptual developments resulting from experience as well as from individual and collective research.

The North Atlantic Alliance's response to the new risks and threats to the Euro-Atlantic area in its eastern neighbourhood, the new challenges to the security environment in the Wider Black Sea Region, NATO's position regarding the implementation of the new European air traffic management system, the logistics support in expeditionary operations, the strategic defence review in light of the new courses of action established at the European Council in 2015, the military planning at the political-strategic level in the European Union are just some of the topics discussed and proposed to both specialists and those interested in these issues.

*The editorial staff of the **Romanian Military Thinking** journal thank the management and members of the Representation for responding to this editorial challenge!*

THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE'S RESPONSE TO THE NEW RISKS AND THREATS TO THE EURO-ATLANTIC AREA IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

Lieutenant General Dr BEng Gheorghe SAVU

As a NATO member state, Romania continues to be, according to the author, a dynamic factor in the process of implementing the assurance and adaptation measures adopted at the summit in 2014, organising national military exercises and hosting numerous Allied naval, land and air exercises. Romania is among the six countries on the eastern flank of the Alliance that will have its own NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) operational up to the NATO Summit in July 2016, which will be a major contribution to the Alliance potential to deploy the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) on the eastern flank, to organise large-scale exercises and to pre-position equipment, military assets and logistics support elements.

Keywords: *strategic partnership; the Russian Federation; collective defence; partner states*

1. The Main Risks and Threats in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the North Atlantic Alliance

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and *de facto* occupation of important parts of southeastern Ukraine, in conjunction with the Russian-Georgian War of 2008 and the concrete measures taken by the Russian Federation for *de facto* annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and subsequent steps to annex *de jure* these two separatist republics, underline the strategic Russian objective: maintaining and expanding the Russian sphere of influence over the former Soviet states, excepting the Baltic ones. To achieve its control over what it calls the “*near abroad*”, the Kremlin uses a complex of diplomatic, informational, economic, political and military factors, gravely violating the international law concerning the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states, and breaching the agreements and international treaties to which the Russian Federation is a party. By 2008 Moscow preferred to employ mostly less intrusive means: pro-Russian media, energy instrument, nurturing pro-Russian political class and business

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environment, trade leverages, immigrants' regime, promoting Russian language and culture, cyber attacks, supporting separatist movements in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia etc. The Russian-Georgian War and the illegal and immoral aggression against Ukraine from 2014 on, resulting in the annexation of Crimea and triggering a serious separatist conflict in southern Ukraine, mark a new and strong approach of the Russian Federation to impose its interests in former Soviet states. The international community was taken by surprise by the Russian overt military actions, as it was the case in Georgia in 2008 and in Crimea in 2014 or by the covert actions of what is called *hybrid warfare*, as it is the current situation in southeastern Ukraine. The surprise was caused by the unprecedented way, in the last 50 years, in which the Russian Federation violated basic principles of international law on the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, risking a serious deterioration of the European security and its relations with the Euro-Atlantic community.

Since 1991, Russian policy has focused on the idea that its close proximity is a geographic area in which Moscow must have privileged interests; it has worked to create a community of integrated states built around the pillar represented by the Russian Federation, which has to serve firstly Russian geopolitical interests. To achieve this objective, Moscow has always tried to exploit its historical regional relations in order to develop its economy and to exercise absolute control over the former Soviet states, excepting the Baltic ones. After 1991, Moscow has launched numerous multilateral integration processes of these countries to ensure full control over them, which constitutes the indispensable foundation for the Russian Federation's aspirations to become an economic, political and military great power.

When non-military instruments failed, the Russian Federation has proceeded to the outbreak of armed conflicts, such as those recently mastered in the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance. Basically, the Russian Federation wishes to minimise as much as possible the Euro-Atlantic influence in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and even Belarus to be able to promote its own geopolitical interests in the region and to block any possible expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU) within its sphere of influence. The Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine is considered by the Putin regime as a real threat to the integrity and stability of the Russian Federation. To do this, the Russian Federation creates and maintains frozen conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, southeastern Ukraine) or annexes territories of other states (Crimea), transforming the Wider Black Sea Region into an area with a more and more increased dynamics of instability (*figure 1*).



Figure 1: Wider Black Sea Region¹

Among former Soviet states, Ukraine is the most sensitive issue for the Russian Federation; in its perception, Russian and Ukrainian peoples are one and the Ukrainian statehood is out of question. For this reason, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Moscow was deeply marked by the loss of Ukraine, which became an important obstacle to the implementation of the Russian Federation's aspirations of great power and to its integration initiatives, as it is the case of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Moreover, the loss of Crimea had a major impact on Russia and the Kremlin has never given up the idea to regain its control over the peninsula.

¹ Geopolitics South Russia 1, see http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Geopolitics_South_Russia2.png

To that end, the State Duma adopted numerous resolutions on Crimea and Sevastopol and complex negotiations were conducted on the stationing of the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea. Actually, they have always been a signal of Moscow's refusal to accept the *de facto* sovereignty of Ukraine over the Crimean Peninsula. The prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine has generated a broad concern at the Kremlin, which decided to act in force in Ukraine. Thus, Moscow has violated the international law, including the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*, requesting explicitly the two parties to refrain, "from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act"². The serious violation of the Founding Act by the Russian Federation is questioning the status of this state as a strategic partner to NATO; therefore, even the functioning of NATO-Russia Council is under question, its activity being suspended unilaterally by the Alliance in 2014.

Faced with an unprecedented situation in its eastern flank since the *Cold War*, in which the Russian Federation used military force against a sovereign state and annexed an important part of its territory, after the failure of diplomatic approaches, the Alliance had to act firmly against its most important strategic partner. While NATO promotes proper relations based on the norms and principles of the international law, the *hybrid warfare* triggered by the Russian Federation in the proximity of the eastern allied flank exploits the vulnerabilities of the countries belonging to its near abroad, hinders their democratic development and generates mistrust and instability to undermine the unity and cohesion of both NATO and the EU. In response to Russian actions, the allied political and military strategists have designed a comprehensive adaptation programme of the Alliance to the new threats in its eastern flank and of assurance of the allied states that they will be protected against a possible Russian military aggression. This programme is based on current realities in the eastern part of the Alliance, takes into consideration the possible evolution of the security situation, starting from the excessive militarisation plans of Crimea and, implicitly, of the Black Sea, and from the fact that it is unlikely that the Russian Federation will ever give up Crimea, Abkhazia or South Ossetia.

² *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*, Part 1, Paris, 1997.

2. NATO's Response to the Risks and Threats in Its Eastern Neighbourhood

The challenges to the Euro-Atlantic security manifested in the eastern neighbourhood of the Alliance are obvious and are represented by the Russian Federation's actions in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, by the large-scale military activities in the eastern flank and by the military buildup in Crimea following the Kaliningrad model. The illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and the further destabilisation of Ukraine have returned the armed conflict in Europe, causing the loss of more than 6,000 lives, destabilising a sovereign state and generating the danger of an extended armed conflict if a political solution is not reached immediately by the parties concerned, most probably through full implementation of Minsk agreements. By supporting separatists in southeastern Ukraine with arms, intelligence, personnel, military equipment and training, along with the stationing of significant armed forces close to the border with Ukraine, the Russian Federation bears the primary responsibility in creating and perpetuating the current situation.

The actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine represent the culmination of a destabilising process that it triggered in the former Soviet states belonging to the Wider Black Sea Region that undermines the basic principles of European security: respecting the territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty, transparency and predictability of military activities. In the period that followed the end of the *Cold War*, backed by Russian cooperation, the Euro-Atlantic community has made continuous efforts to build a stable security system in Europe to reduce the risk of armed conflict and of strategic error, based on the reduction of military forces, large-scale exercises and armaments as well as on mutual exchange of information on military activities, agreements on arms control etc. Despite these achievements, to which it made a significant contribution, the Russian Federation unilaterally suspended the implementation of the *Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe*. Moreover, it has obstructed the activities specific to *Open Skies Treaty* and has avoided the provisions of the *Vienna Document* on notification of large-scale exercises by executing big alarming exercises and cumulating individual activities of alarmed military units up to 80,000 troops, to cover up the deployment and manoeuvre of forces (annexation of Crimea, military support to the separatists in southeastern Ukraine or rotation of troops close to the border with Ukraine).

Faced with the resurgence of Russian show of force, including the resumption of nuclear rhetoric, the intensification of strategic flights and provocative naval actions even in the proximity of Western allies, NATO continues to promote

the dialogue to solve the situation created by the Russian Federation in Europe. Now, after decades of positive building of the new European security architecture, the Russian Federation acts to modify it for its own benefit and against the general European consensus. Europe has not returned to the *Cold War* yet but we cannot speak any longer of a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. This situation has led the Alliance to initiate a comprehensive process of adaptation to meet the new security challenges that are more long-term than short-term ones as long as the Russian Federation does not conceive to give up Crimea, Abkhazia or South Ossetia, to facilitate a solution to the Transnistrian conflict or to cease support to Ukrainian separatists. To this end, during the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014, after a complex process of reflection carried out by the Alliance and its member states, the heads of state and government approved concrete measures to adapt NATO to the security situation created in its neighbourhood, which have three main pillars: 1) reinforcing deterrence and collective defence; 2) managing relations with the Russian Federation; and 3) supporting partner countries.

Collective defence (Art. 5 of the *Washington Treaty*) is now more important and more relevant than at any time since 1990. It has led to the intensification of air policing missions and military exercises on the eastern flank and to the increase in the allied land, naval and air military presence in the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria as well as in the Baltic and Black Seas. The *Readiness Action Plan* generates a *NATO Response Force* doubled as strength, with a core of forces capable of deployment within 48 hours, for whose creation and leadership 7 allied countries have already volunteered on an annual rotational principle, proving the unity and solidarity of the Alliance. The rapid response of the Alliance to potential threats and risks to its borders will be provided firstly by the *Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)*; it consists of a land component, supplemented by special operations forces, air and naval assets, being capable of deployment in a few days on the territory of any ally. In addition, it was decided to establish some NATO command units, called *NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs)*, initially in the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. The role of these units is to facilitate the conduct of exercises, deployment and reinforcement of NATO forces stationed permanently or temporarily in those states. The six *NFIUs* were activated on 3 September 2015, and their complete operational capability is planned to be declared at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016. Probably in the future other such structures will be activated on the eastern flank of the Alliance.

By implementing the *Readiness Action Plan*, the Alliance will be able to strengthen the defence capabilities of the member states on NATO's periphery for deterrence and defence, including through infrastructure upgrading, pre-positioning

of equipment and materials, while reinforcing the ability of the eastern allies to provide host nation support to NATO forces that are quickly deployed on their territory. Considering the geostrategic importance of the Baltic and the Black Seas from the Russian threat point of view, NATO has decided to strengthen the *Standing Naval Forces* to be able to conduct the full spectrum of classic maritime operations, including supporting the creation of a complete warning maritime picture. Adaptation measures are extended to strengthening the Alliance's cyber defence, starting from the fact that a cyber attack against any member state can trigger a collective response. Meanwhile, work is underway to optimise allied decision-making process and to increase exchange of information, especially that specific to the strategic warning on military actions of the Russian Federation, as the avoidance of a strategic error is a core concern of the allied military structures. The *hybrid warfare* waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine is a major concern of the Alliance that has triggered a deep cooperation with the European Union (EU) in this area.

Maintaining its status as a security provider, NATO pays attention to its European partners, especially Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, countries subject to multiple pressures from the Russian Federation, which need support to proceed with the reform process and with building strong state institutions. As the Euro-Atlantic full integration of any of these states is difficult to be achieved soon, the Alliance focuses on bilateral partnerships in order to contribute to their stability and security through the development of armed forces and security institutions which guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. These states form a buffer area between the Alliance and the Russian Federation, their stability contributes to the Euro-Atlantic security, and developing partnerships with them should be a priority for NATO and the EU. The Alliance takes into account that some countries in the Wider Black Sea Region have NATO membership as a strategic goal, as it is the case of Georgia; other states advocate for an enhanced partnership with the Alliance to modernise their armed forces and to build a functioning national state. Meanwhile, some countries in the region have either a privileged or a balanced relationship with the Russian Federation. Although the Alliance has not tried to change this situation, in recent years the Wider Black Sea Region has suffered from the fact that the Russian Federation has transformed itself profoundly. As a consequence, the dialogue, cooperation and trust of the Euro-Atlantic community with this state have reached a minimum. The new security environment generated by the Russian Federation compromises the security of partner states in the region and of Europe as a whole; thus, the concept of "*whole Europe, free and at peace*" is far from being met now than in any other period since the *Cold War*.

NATO's assurance measures already taken and the need for continuous adaptation point out the need for member states to honour the commitment they made at the Summit in 2014 on stopping the decrease of defence budgets and gradually increasing them until the threshold of 2% of GDP within 10 years, of which 20% to be allocated for major equipment expenditures (*Defence Investment Pledge*). Thus, acting to avoid direct confrontation with the Russian Federation and promoting the dialogue conditioned by the full respect of the international law, the Alliance is strengthening in order to safeguard itself and to have an appropriate negotiating position in its relationship with the Russian Federation to preserve the security of all Euro-Atlantic space. As the reality of the past 7 years proves, the Russian Federation has changed the ways of promoting its geostrategic interests. That is why NATO must adapt itself to the new reality in order to preserve the Euro-Atlantic security and international order in compliance with international commitments assumed by all states, including the Russian Federation, regarding the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of European states. Thus, continuing to believe in the potential of dialogue with the Russian Federation, the Alliance takes actions regarding its defence and deterrence against a possible Russian aggression against any member state.

3. Military Implications for Romania

In terms of national security, Romania's geographical position in the Wider Black Sea Region generates both advantageous and disadvantageous factors. If the geographic location of Romania at the eastern border of the Euro-Atlantic area has been an important contributing factor for its integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, the same location is considered a negative factor, which requires substantial national efforts for achieving security and a significant contribution to the international community's effort to ensure peace and stability in Europe. Due to its vicinity to the Russian Federation, often the main destabilising factor in the Wider Black Sea Region, Romania is facing a wide range of security challenges that have to be managed in national and allied context. Among them, in this paper only the military component will be addressed in the light of the new Russian Federation military posture in the Wider Black Sea Region and of the adaptation process being implemented in NATO.

The annexation of Crimea allows the Russian Federation to carry out a comprehensive process of militarisation of the Black Sea Region, turning the peninsula into a *Kaliningrad of the South*, which will host major land, sea and air military installations. President Putin was very explicit stressing Moscow's determination to keep Crimea under its authority and to proceed to the militarisation of this peninsula, to secure it, to put pressure on the entire region and to have

an additional negotiating tool with NATO and the EU. The announcement regarding the approval by President Putin (on the occasion of celebrating one year since the annexation of Crimea) to deploy in Crimea the new short-range ballistic missiles *Iskander* (NATO codification SS-26/Stone, 500 km range, capable of delivering nuclear warheads at target) and *Tu-22M3 Backfire* bombers operated by the Russian Navy and able to carry nuclear warheads, alongside the earlier deployment of strategic bombers *Tu-95 Bear* and *Tu-160 Blackjack* and warships, represents a real threat to regional security, with serious implications for the Euro-Atlantic security. Practically, by deploying *Tu-22M3* aircraft in Crimea, the Russian Federation begins to revert to its *Cold War* posture and it is likely to proceed at strengthening the naval and air potential in the vicinity of the Black Sea at levels existing before 1990. With the weapon systems already deployed in Crimea, the Russian Federation controls over 40% of the airspace of the Black Sea and over 90% of its surface. Through highly probable deployment of new *Iskander* missiles, the Russian Federation will be able to hit targets in Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, which constitutes a serious threat to the security of these states and of the Euro-Atlantic community (figure 2).



Figure 2: The range of *Iskander* missiles deployed in Crimea³

³J. E. Dyer, *For Russia and NATO, the Year of Manoeuvring Dangerously Continues*, 20 March 2015, see <http://libertyunyielding.com/2015/03/20/for-russia-and-nato-the-year-of-maneuvering-dangerously-continues>

The air and naval military bases in Crimea will facilitate the Russian military power projection in South-East Europe, the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East and will ensure the Russian Federation with a greater manoeuvring freedom of its forces and the ability to conduct significant military actions along the southern and eastern flanks of the Alliance. Basically, having Crimea in the south and Kaliningrad in the north, the Russian Federation has now the capability to project its air and naval power on all the allied flanks, achieving the encirclement potential of the European part of NATO. It has been already proved by strategic aviation flights in the proximity of Portugal's airspace and by the deployment of Russian naval battle groups in the Baltic, Barents, North and Mediterranean Seas.

Romania is close to Crimea and the *Iskander* missiles can hit targets located on almost 25% of its territory. Taking into account the important naval and air Russian capabilities in Crimea and the Black Sea, an overall analysis process should be generated by the Romanian military and political-military authorities on the need to increase Romania's potential for deterrence and defence against a possible aggression from the East. This has to be done in national and allied contexts and the result should be a comprehensive and coherent strategy to increase the national defence capacity, agreed by both political and executive authorities. In the national context, following the decisions of the NATO Summit in 2014, Romania is the first country that has announced the national political consensus on increasing the defence budget to reach at least 2% of GDP starting in 2017 and to maintain this level for the next 10 years; this should be reflected in better equipping the armed forces and in achieving the allied standards in the areas of education and training.

As a member state, Romania continues to act as a dynamic factor in the process of implementing the assurance and adaptation measures decided at the 2014 NATO Summit, organising numerous national military exercises and hosting allied land, air and naval ones. Romania is among the six countries in the eastern flank of the Alliance that will make its own *NFIU* operational by the NATO Summit in July 2016. This will be a major contribution to the allied deployment capability of *VJTF* on the eastern flank and will facilitate the planning and execution of large-scale exercises and pre-positioning of equipment, armaments and logistical support elements. Moreover, with the consciousness of its responsibility within NATO and the imperative of strengthening its national defence capacities, Romania establishes on its territory the so-called *Multinational Division Headquarters South East (MND-SE)*, which is to reach its full operational capability in the next years and will contribute to the Alliance defence capacity in its southeastern flank.

The establishment of *MND-SE* is clearly the most important military achievement of Romania after joining NATO. It is the result of the contribution of the Romanian Armed Forces to NATO operations and to the strengthening of the allied defence capacity; it is a consequence of the professional value of Romanian soldiers and of a military and political-military leadership and a military diplomacy that have demonstrated vision, coordination, planning and proactive thinking. Through *MND-SE*, NATO achieves a balanced coverage of its eastern flank with existing headquarters from the force structure, Romania and Poland being the only allied countries on the eastern flank that host such structures.

All these initiatives and actions constitute an important financial and human effort assumed by the Romanian authorities, strengthening significantly Romania's potential as a security provider in the Wider Black Sea Region, including through military instruments. Such an approach is not directed against the Russian Federation; it is the Romanian contribution to the Alliance's response for deterrence and defence against a Russian Federation whose behaviour reminds of the *Cold War* and whose attitude will not change in the coming years according to current estimates. Now, more than ever, Romania acknowledges the importance of its membership status of the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Therefore the Romanian Armed Forces must have the necessary resources to increase the national capacity for deterrence and defence, including in the *hybrid warfare* area.



THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION

– The End of the Period of Openness to Multilateral Cooperation? –

Captain (N) Vicențiu CĂTĂNEANU
Captain (N) Constantin SAVU

In order to fulfill its strategic objectives, following the Wales Summit, Romania must advocate for transforming the Black Sea region into an area of cooperation, security and stability through the mutual potentiation of six components: increasing EU involvement in the region; creating projects within the “Black Sea Synergy”; BSEC efficiency; strengthening the Black Sea Euroregion; strengthening bilateral dialogue with the states in the area; meeting the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership goals.

According to the authors, for Romania, the Black Sea region represents both an asset and an area of vital interest to national security, and the economic revival and integration into the world values circuit necessarily require the maritime component substantial contribution, which is of the utmost importance.

***Keywords:** ecological balance; maritime communications; air policing missions; the Crimean Peninsula*

Motto:

“We are deeply concerned that the violence and insecurity in the region caused by Russia and the Russian-backed separatists are resulting in a deteriorating humanitarian situation and material destruction in eastern Ukraine... We are also concerned by Russia’s pattern of disregard for international law, including the UN Charter; its behaviour towards Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; its violation of fundamental European security arrangements and commitments... and its use of military and other instruments to coerce neighbours. This threatens the rules-based international order and challenges Euro-Atlantic security. In addition, these developments may potentially have long-term effects on stability in the Black Sea region, which remains an important component of Euro-Atlantic security.... We will continue to support, as appropriate, regional efforts by Black Sea littoral states aimed at ensuring security and stability”.

(Wales Summit Declaration, 04 – 05.09.2014)

Introduction

Throughout its entire history, the Black Sea has always been an area of confluence of great empires: Roman, Persian, Ottoman and Tsarist. This region has been subject to different interests depending on the power and involvement

Captain (N) Vicențiu Cătăneanu, Captain (N) Constantin Savu – Romanian Military Representation to NATO and the EU.

of the particular empires leaders, thus representing a bridge and a border, a buffer zone and a transit area between the East and the West, between the South and the North, and a major trade route to markets and energy-rich regions.

The Black Sea region includes both the physical territory of the Black Sea and the neighbouring states. Of the states bordering the Black Sea, Turkey, Ukraine and the Russian Federation possess the longest coastline.

The concept of *Wider Black Sea Region (WBSR)* appeared relatively recently, shaped up following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, and became visible as a result of the enlargement of NATO and the EU. The natural geographical limits of NATO and the EU undergo a new identity, the European and Euro-Atlantic character and affiliation of the *WBSR* being indisputable: three of the six littoral states are NATO members – Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, the last two having the status of EU member states as well, while the eastern coast and the Caucasus are located on the eastern border of the European and Euro-Atlantic area – Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the three South Caucasus republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

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Through its geographic characteristics: 451,490 km² area, water volume of 529,955 km³, shoreline length of 4,790 km, maximum depth of 2,245 m, 1,228 m average depth, its hydrological peculiarities (increased salinity with the depth, water dynamics, thermal regime, strong stratification, bio-ecological features etc.), the Black Sea polarises states totalling about 6 million km² and 275 million inhabitants.

Moreover, the Black Sea, which is the third largest sea in Europe, after the Mediterranean and the North Sea has become, in economic terms, a real “*gold mine*” in the past few years, taking into consideration that significant oil, natural gas, iron, titanium, rare metals reserves have been recently discovered here.

Area of contact between Europe and Asia, between the West and the East, between Christianity and Islam, it reflects, at small scale, the mutations, developments and trends in the European political, economic and social life. There are also important lines of communication that converge in the Black Sea, connecting this region with other areas of geopolitical interest such as the North Sea, Western Europe, Central Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Caspian area, the Balkans, Central Russia and the Baltic area. These aspects together with the Black Sea role of bridging the two continents provide the geopolitical concept of *EURASIA* or *ASIROPA* with real solidity.

Any analysis of the *Wider Black Sea Region* geopolitical characteristics should start from the events that have marked the history of the region, identifying

the paradigms the region has to face and, most importantly, understanding the impact of post-communist transition on the littoral states while adapting to the new Euro-Atlantic security order. Moreover, the analysis of the geo-economic interests of certain powers, especially in terms of energy competition and transit routes for resources, linking the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, is another determining factor for defining the geopolitical perspective in the short and medium term.

Following the fall of the *Iron Curtain* and the disappearance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Black Sea area turned into an area of instability, marked by disputes between littoral states and other states to review the interests in the area. These events led to the transition of the Black Sea area from the periphery to the centre of Western attention.

Later on, after the end of the bipolar global confrontation, the Black Sea and its vicinity reentered into the flow of continental and regional geopolitical transformations.

The economic interests triggered by the discovery of important oil and natural gas reserves in the Caucasus and Central Asia have turned the Black Sea basin into a geostrategic stake. The trade and economic potential of the Black Sea in conjunction with its position as a bridge between Europe, Central Asia, the South-Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East have led to involvement in the area, along with the littoral countries, of other actors (the USA, Russia, the EU, Japan, Arab countries, Caspian countries etc.) that wish to play an important role in the region.

The Black Sea area, which is a continuation of the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean – marked by both the conflicts in the Middle East and the exacerbation of Islamist terrorism, situated between the Balkans and the Caucasus (two areas with a huge conflict potential), is characterised by the following elements:

- represents the geopolitical crossroads of four corridors: the Caspian, the Dnieper, the Danube and the Aegean ones, which are the main communication routes that make connection with areas of major geopolitical importance;
- is the interference area of three geopolitical and geostrategic areas considered among most active areas, with particularly acute problems of security and stability (the Southern Europe, the Eastern Europe and the Middle East);
- represents a segment of the southern border of the Russian Federation, especially after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the southern boundary of the eastern flank of NATO;

- will ensure the planned route for transporting Caspian oil and the one in Central Asia to consumers in the West;
- includes a pathway segment of illegal trafficking in arms, drugs and of illegal migration from Central Asia and the Middle East to the West;
- has important resources (large fish stocks: sturgeon, turbot, dolphins, sharks, mullet, mackerel etc.) as well as oil and gas reserves;
- is the shortest way to Russia southward and to the North African coast eastward, and, according to an old Russian conception (the testament of Peter the Great), it is the only way which ensures immediate access to the “warm seas”;
- provides commercial and tourist facilities¹.

All these elements define the important role of the Black Sea, which has always been a junction point for trade routes and energy-rich regions. Thus, most routes for the transit of energy resources from Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus to Europe, along the southern road, cross the Black Sea, for example, from Baku to Tbilisi and Ceyhan or from the shores of Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea to the port Novorossiysk. The northern half of the Black Sea offers significant economic and transport opportunities through waterways such as rivers: the Danube, the Dnieper and the Don, while the south can liaise with the Mediterranean ports.

Moreover, in the Black Sea there are a several “key positions” that make it particular, giving it special valences in any analysis and contributing decisively to the value and geostrategic importance of this area:

- the Crimean Peninsula, a “forward maritime bastion”, “a real aircraft carrier, well-anchored” with multiple facilities, surrounded by sufficient naval forces ready for action;
- the Danube and other major rivers that also connect it with oceans worldwide;
- the straits system through which it communicates directly with the planetary ocean. The traffic through these straits is three times more intense than through the Suez Canal and four times more intense than through the Panama Canal.

Therefore, we can say that nowadays the strategic importance of the Black Sea area lies in the implementation of the two strategic flows – raw materials from east to west, and security, democracy and stability in reverse. It is obvious that there is a close connection between the two especially in the context of the enlargement of NATO and the EU in the Black Sea region.

¹ In *Buletinul Forțelor Navale* no. 18 in 2013, p. 23.

The European and Euro-Atlantic security is closely linked to the Black Sea area security. Many transnational threats facing Europe come from this region. Among them we can mention: domestic instability in many states established after the USSR dissolution; economic competition triggered by the exploitation and transport of the Caspian oil, which can contribute to either settling disputes or deepening and diversifying tensions; organised crime, including arms, nuclear materials and narcotics trade; increasing pollution of the Black Sea basin; accentuation/maintenance of ethnic-separatist conflicts; achievement of political power for the separation of a territory and the establishment of an independent state (Transnistria, Abkhazia, Adjara); increasing number of Islam converts, especially among intellectuals and young people; export of instability: promoting Islamic fundamentalism and the interests of Islamic countries in South East Europe, by the existence of compact ethnic groups in adjacent areas (Turkish-Tatars in the Crimean Peninsula, Gagauz people in Moldova, Turks in southeastern Bulgaria, Bosnians, Kosovars and Albanians in the Balkans); organised crime networks interests and actions (providing financing sources for terrorist groups, maintaining a climate of instability, using the region as a transit area from the drug suppliers in Central Asia to the consumers in Europe, supplying weapons and facilitating their transit/illegal trade).

The failure to control terrorist and organised crime networks, the arms trafficking in the region, the strong demand of drugs in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and the human trafficking have led to boosting the number of routes that pass through southern Russia, favouring the expansion of this phenomenon in the entire Black Sea region, with consequences for the states on the western shore of the Black Sea, if the phenomenon cannot be managed. The above-mentioned aspects are only part of the challenges that the Black Sea region needs to face, challenges that also include: nationalism and local frozen conflicts; security; natural resource management; economic disparities; youth problems, including unemployment and radicalisation; development of civil society and the media; border issues, secessionist republics and interstate relations; corruption.

It should be stressed that until the tragic events on 11 September 2001 the Black Sea region was not on the OSCE agenda, although there had already been violent clashes in Transnistria, military conflicts between Georgia and Russia, the second war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as numerous terrorist and organised crime activities throughout the region. All mentioned facts were the result of Russia's stubbornness to not let anyone involved in resolving crises and conflicts in its area of interest, defined by the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The terrorist attacks that occurred in the USA and Europe between 2001 and 2004, the long-term NATO

involvement in Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism made the West rethink its perspective on the Black Sea area. Thus, at the Istanbul Summit, NATO officially confirmed, for the first time, the importance of the Black Sea for the Euro-Atlantic security and expressed interest in exploring ways to strengthen stability in the region, to complement the efforts of the littoral states, allies and partners, within the existing regional cooperation mechanisms. *“We note the importance of the Black Sea region for Euro-Atlantic security. Littoral countries, Allies and Partners are working together to contribute to further strengthening security and stability in the area. Our Alliance is prepared to explore means to complement these efforts, building upon existing forms of regional cooperation”*².

The West, through NATO, the EU, and also through every major power with regional or global implications, in partnership with Russia, Central Asian countries, Turkey and Caucasus countries, is firmly committed to building lasting peace and security in Europe, the Middle East, the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region, which will lead to the internationalisation of the Black Sea basin.

In this regard, since the '90s, the **USA** has expressed very clearly the basic directions of its policy in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea region. With this statement it was confirmed the objective of strengthening the positions of the USA and Turkey in the region to counterbalance Russia's interests.

The strategic objective pursued by the USA was to ensure, in the long term, the necessary resources to maintain the pace of economic development through access to resources and freedom of transit, given that the USA needs amount to approximately 15 million barrels of oil/day, representing 20% of global consumption³. The US special interest in this area is confirmed by NATO's changing tactics and the new direction of the US geostrategic interests in the post-Soviet space. For both the United States of America and the European Union, securing energy routes passing through the Black Sea to the Caucasus is and will remain crucial.

Moreover, the Black Sea is a strategic corridor for the USA for three inter-related fundamental strategic reasons. First, the Black Sea connects Europe to Central Asia through the Caucasus, Central Asia being the centre of interest, as the level of influence and control that the only one existing superpower will have in Central Asia will largely determine the preconditions for the global competition already existing between Washington and Beijing. Moreover, the level of Western control over Central Asia plays a key role in setting the strategic choices of the Russian Federation between China and the West. In addition, the Black Sea is the main gate from Europe to the Greater Middle East.

² *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*, 28-29. 06. 2004.

³ See <http://gv3.com/policypete/policypete.htm>

The **Russian Federation** is the main “*heir*” of the former Soviet Union, since it holds 75% of the territory and 55% of its population⁴. Losing big commercial ports in the region, Russia has seen threatened its ability to ensure the transport of hydrocarbons from Central Asia to the West. This creates the danger of building a new network of oil and gas pipelines that would avoid Russian territory, considering other areas, such as Turkey or Iran. The implosion of the Soviet Union has made Russia only a regional power in the Black Sea basin, posture that is not agreed by some policy makers from Moscow.

Recently, the Russian Federation, under the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, updated its *National Strategy for Defence, the Military Doctrine and the state policy in the nuclear field*. According to these documents, Russia has a very important role in regional and global geopolitics. Currently, they claim that there are external and internal aggressions against the Russian Federation security, and that Russia’s national security is being undermined socially, politically, economically, territorially, regionally, ethnically as well as by other contradictions. A great danger for Russia is represented by the military conflicts in the border areas of the territories of the former USSR as well as by the North Atlantic Alliance and its enlargement process. The Russian Federation has clearly defined its strategic focus areas such as the Black Sea and the Azov Sea, Central-Asia, and declared its economic interests and, therefore, the areas of economic interest, as elements of strategic interest. Moreover, Russia has clearly manifested its intention to comply with “*its natural obligation*” to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities existing in neighbouring countries.

In addition, the current foreign policy of Vladimir Putin seems to be largely inspired by Alexander Dugin’s expansionist theories and the ideas regarding Euro-Asia, if we think of Russia’s special relationship with Germany, to which it supplies about 70% of the energy demand; the protection the Kremlin offers to Iran (including the hundreds of Russian physicists working for the regime in Tehran); the revitalisation of the economic cooperation with China; and recent dialogues with Japan.

In the energy competition, Russia is based on its energy resources, particularly oil and gas, being the second largest oil producer in the world. It consistently pursues its goal to achieve a system of dependencies in which its position has the necessary weight for major economic development through which it can impose in the global issues and to ensure its security. It is asserted, rightly, that Russia is dependent on the income generated by energy exports. Advantaged by these resources,

⁴ See <http://infoeuropa.ro>

we notice how Moscow imposes itself on the international political scene, using them as efficient weapons, whose effect is becoming more and more visible.

Ukraine is another important actor that exerts influence in the Black Sea, being present in three geopolitical areas: Pontic, Central-European and Eastern European, situation which, besides some advantages, also carries several risks, especially given by the Ukrainian weak economy, poorly consolidated, which is currently more weakened by the loss of the Crimean Peninsula and the internal battles with pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, the most industrialised area of the country.

Ukraine promotes a pro-West (EU and NATO) but militarily neutral position, and aims to strengthen its economic relations with the European Union. Keen to find a niche in the East-West divide, Ukraine is more focused on maintaining the balance of power through bilateral agreements with countries in the Black Sea region, particularly Turkey. Only after joining the *GUAM*⁵ and after developing the corridors needed to transport energy to the EU, Ukraine started to consider the Black Sea region as a part of enlarged Europe that deserves more attention.

Ukraine controls the European oil transport routes, and any alternative transportation through the Black Sea will break this control, as a strategic energy transport route for Western Europe. However, because of inconsistent policies, Ukraine badly uses the opportunity to get a leading role among regional oil carriers, and it even risks being excluded from the process. Kiev blames Russia for this fact, as it has actively developed a lot of transport corridors around Ukraine.

Ukraine is perceived by the Kremlin political elite, regardless of its political colour, as important for the Russian state long-term defence and survival. Currently, it is not only the key transit of Russian gas to Europe but also a connection point for almost all its infrastructure between the East and the West. It is estimated that 93% of Russian oil and gas export to the West crosses Ukrainian territory. As appreciated by Peter Zeihan, a prestigious *Stratfor* analyst, the centrality of Ukraine gives it an important advantage in the dispute with Moscow. On the other hand, it should be noted that the country has the second largest gas transport infrastructure in Europe: 35,300 km network, with a transport capacity of 29 billion cubic meters of gas⁶.

Many analysts consider that the dispute in the energy sector has an important political stake. Moscow believes that Kiev must be punished for the "*glorious orange*

⁵ *GUAM* – regional initiative of 4 states (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan and Moldova), established on 10 October 1997. Initially there were 5 states, the organisation being called *GUUAM*, but Uzbekistan gave up.

⁶ See <http://wikipedia.com>

revolution” and especially for the recent rapprochement with the West. By the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, taking the maritime oil fields in eastern Crimea, and the support for the separatists in eastern Ukraine, the Russian Federation has shown determination to restore and maintain its sphere of influence required for achieving the desired Eurasian economic community.

If until 1989 **Turkey** was mainly oriented towards the Eastern Mediterranean, after that date it has also directed its activity to the Black Sea region, aspiring to the regional power status. The main objective is to become a real regional leader, able to monitor and mitigate tensions in the proximity of its borders. Declaring itself a promoter of the interests of Western policy (particularly the US) in the region, Turkey acts to project its own interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, entering into conflict of interest with its main competitors, namely the Russian Federation and Iran.

It is very interesting to analyse the logic of Turkey transformation from the most devoted Euro-Atlantic partner during the *Cold War* into a status quo power in the Black Sea region. Since the first decade of the 21st century we can notice a distance between Turkey and its main partner in the West, moment that coincides with two major transformations of the US global strategy. The first of them refers to the events of 11 September and the war against terrorism started by the USA.

The second transformation of the Atlantic global strategy refers to the increasing importance of the Black Sea region, concurrently with the integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as full members of NATO. From the beginning Turkey supported the *“open door policy”* and NATO enlargement *“from Tallinn to Burgas”*, but now it is reluctant to see the Black Sea region fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community, given that Turkey’s national doctrine – as Russia’s – hosts a traditional nationalist-imperialist vision of the 19th century regarding this area. Thus, according to this doctrine, the world is composed of great powers – and their hegemonic spheres of influence –, which control smaller powers and the balance of powers produces a viable international system.

For Ankara, as well as for Moscow, the Black Sea is a Russo-Turkish lake. America and Europe *“are welcome”* to take care of the Black Sea strategic identity, but only through partnership and through the mediation of the hegemonic powers in the region.

Because of the conflict in Transnistria, the **Republic of Moldova** was forced for a time to renounce its pro-Western path and to head towards Moscow. The greatest threat hanging over Moldova’s security comes from Moscow – economic, media, informational, political etc. The excessive polarisation of the conflict,

in the context of the Dniester conflict, and the use of Transnistria as a coercion tool clearly reveal that resolving any conflict in the world requires the formal, informal, tacit, direct, indirect approval of at least one of the two centres of power, which has not been achieved so far.

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Regional cooperation is credited to have significant potential for the dissipation of the new dividing lines resulting from NATO and the EU enlargement in the Black Sea region and it can have a positive impact on the energy and environmental security as well as on countering the new transnational threats to security, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trafficking in drugs, small and light weapons and fissile material, and illegal migration and human trafficking.

The need for broad regional cooperation in the Black Sea region to ensure security arises from the multiple interdependencies that occur in this area. Cooperation should mainly focus on prevention, terrorism control and countering, combined complex measures – military, political, economic – to improve living conditions and ensure equality of chances.

The importance of the Black Sea in the European Union policy has increased every year since 2005, given that more than half of the Black Sea coastline belongs to EU member or candidate states.

The economic regional cooperation, sustainable development, favourable conditions for attracting foreign and EU investments, environmental protection and areas of nuclear safety are also priorities for the EU. In this regard, the European Commission launched, on 11 April 2008, the *“Black Sea Synergy”*, a cooperative initiative of the European Union for the Black Sea region within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). According to this document, the Black Sea is to the EU, above all, *“a distinct geographical region, rich in natural resources, occupying a strategic position at the crossroads of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East”* and *“an expanding market with great development potential”*, constituting *“a hub for energy and transport flows”*.

In this context, the European Union has developed and intensified an ambitious strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, complementary to NATO-Russia strategic partnership. However, the Russian military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 to support the entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the Russian Federation support for separatists in eastern Ukraine have led the EU to reconsider this partnership and to adopt a series of economic sanctions.

NATO was one of the first international actors involved in the region, as part of discussions for its enlargement. In this context, the *Partnership for Peace (PfP)* documents were signed with countries from the *WBSR* (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine) between 1994 and 1995. Moreover, the *Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council* was established in 1997 to add to the *PfP* programmes. There were 19 allies and 27 partners, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.

At the same time, NATO has developed a series of special partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, and recently with Georgia, partnerships that are forums for discussion and negotiation playing a major role in maintaining stability and security in the *WBSR*. Currently, the relationship with the Russian Federation is interrupted because of its aggressive actions against Ukraine.

As a counterweight to these efforts, the *Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)* was established. Although it is not positioned in the Black Sea close proximity, through its components (Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), it has a significant importance in the region, in particular by the strategic West and South directions. Russia has transformed the former *Collective Security Treaty* by creating a functional system of collective defence, which is intended as a mini-NATO into former Soviet space, in order to counterbalance the increasing influence of the USA and NATO in this area, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

CSTO statute provisions are similar to those of NATO, including the obligation of participating states to support each other, including militarily, in the case of aggression against one of them (provision similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty) and the prohibition of *CSTO* member states to join other military alliances or to participate in actions directed against any of the *CSTO* member states.

The evolution of the strategic East-West relationship and the economic openness promoted by the enlargement of the European Union and NATO require conceptual clarifications for the EU's eastern border, as a complementary area with those states which have not been included in the integration project so far. The transformation of the Black Sea region into a pole of political stability and economic growth with the aim of extending the climate of peace and security to the Balkans – Caucasus and Central Asia – was established as a priority among the activities carried out by NATO and the European Union, as well as by the USA.

The cooperation process brought into focus issues related to the European prospects of the countries in Central Asia, South Caucasus, bordering the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea coast. Thus, numerous initiatives were launched in various

areas of European military cooperation: *Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)*, *NATO's Partnership for Peace*, *Open Skies*, *SEEBRIG*, *BLACKSEAFOR*.

The fall of the *Iron Curtain* and the openness displayed by most of the main actors with interests in the *WBSR* led to launching the political-military cooperation process in the region as a unique opportunity for the Euro-Atlantic community and the states in the region. There were two decades of intense activity in the field of consultation and regional cooperation, with NATO and the European Union active involvement.

On 2 April 2004 Romania became a country border to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and, on 1 January 2007, a state bordering the European Union. Thus, currently, Romania has the second longest external frontier within the two organisations, after Poland, and it assumes the perspective of protecting the border, by the rules of the EU and NATO.

Thus, according to the *National Security Strategy for the period 2015-2019*, recently promoted, the national security goals are, inter alia, to consolidate Romania's profile within NATO and the EU, to enhance regional cooperation, including in defence, to deepen cooperation with neighbouring countries and with those on the eastern flank of NATO, as well as to ensure security in the Black Sea area.

With regard to strengthening regional security, Romania's fundamental strategic interest is that the Black Sea region should be stable, democratic and closely connected to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Romania addresses the Black Sea security as one of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture elements, based on transparency, involving all states in the region, assuming primary responsibility at regional level, identifying profitable solutions for each party involved.

Focusing attention on the direct neighbourhood is considered to be of strategic importance to both NATO and the EU. From this perspective, Romania plays a dual role, derived from both the Black Sea region membership and the status of NATO and the EU member state.

Conclusions

In a world of global processes, the Black Sea has an important role for the regional and European security environment. The *Wider Black Sea Region* tends to become an area of convergence and cohabitation of political trends that emerged in the late 20th and the early 21st century.

The importance of the Black Sea area lies in its transport facilities, as well as in its energy and raw material resources available to the countries in the region.

The Russian Federation recent actions demonstrate that “*the era of cooperation and friendship*” is history, and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the throw of Ukraine into chaos by supporting separatists in eastern and southern Ukraine demonstrated Russia’s determination to maintain its strategic areas of influence by providing certain “*buffer areas*”. Thus, by redeploying some important military structures in the Crimean Peninsula, equipped with relatively modern military capabilities, the balance of military capabilities, nuclear ones included, in the area has been significantly altered; as highlighted by Ioan Mircea Pașcu in his report to the European Parliament on the strategic military situation in the Black Sea basin, after the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, it “*has gained a very important springboard both westward (the Balkans, Transnistria, and the Danube) and southward (the Eastern Mediterranean)*”.

All these actions have led to interrupting any contact with the Russian Federation, freezing the regional initiatives in which it was party, and reconsidering NATO and the EU security policies. Therefore, at NATO level, there have been taken allied reassurance measures, concentrated in a complex *Reassurance Action Plan (RAP)*, providing concrete tasks to increase the allied military presence on the eastern flank by intensifying military exercises and air policing missions, as well as by creating new capabilities for a rapid response. At the EU level there have been also taken measures, including the imposition of economic sanctions against the Russian Federation.

Our interest at national level lies in having in our immediate proximity stable, democratic and prosperous states, because they are the only ones capable of maintaining peace and good relations in the region, of building pluralist regional communities, and of having a predictable behaviour in the field of security. For Romania, the Black Sea region represents both an asset and an area of vital interest to national security, and the economic revival and integration into the world values circuit require a substantial and important contribution of the maritime component. That is why Romania is interested and involved in: preserving the territorial integrity of the littoral area, maintaining its maritime and fluvial borders, preserving the freedom of movement on the rivers and in the Black Sea, and preserving the ecological balance in the Black Sea and the Danube.

In this respect, Romania, following the Wales Summit decisions, has taken specific measures such as strengthening the air policing missions, increasing national and multinational military exercises, setting up a multinational divisional headquarters and a NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU), along with the commitment to increase the defence budget up to 2% in the coming years.

In addition to these measures in the military field, in order to fulfil its strategic objectives, Romania must continue to advocate for transforming the Black Sea region into an area of cooperation, security and stability, through mutually reinforcing six cooperation components: increased involvement of the EU in the region by creating and implementing new projects in the “*Black Sea Synergy*”; BSEC efficiency; Black Sea Euro-region; strengthening bilateral dialogue with countries in the region; achieving the objectives of the *Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership*.

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2015 – The Way Ahead –

Colonel Dr BEng Aurel IACOBESCU

The Common Security and Defence Policy remains one of the most visible and concrete actions of the European Union. A notable consequence is that the EU operational commitment through CSDP will continue by developing new potential actions. Operations and missions have been fully successful where member states have provided the necessary resources and have had common political objectives. Therefore, a clear mandate and clear objectives are necessary, as part of the comprehensive approach concept developed at EU level.

Clear objectives are set in the long run to allow partner countries and regional organisations to take responsibility for managing issues related to security, a clear connection between the concept of security and that of development existing in this respect.

Keywords: *defence planning; cooperation; operational commitments; maritime security*

cooperation with NATO, the EU response capacity, including the military, remaining a strategic value.

1. Background

The security situation has deteriorated significantly in the EU's neighbourhood since December 2013 European Council until the present time. In the East, the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia and the subsequent actions represent a violation of the European security basic principles foundation. In the South, conflicts have become a dominant feature of the region, leading to increased migratory pressure. Moreover, the terrorist attacks in several EU member states had an impact on internal security and highlighted the link between internal and external security.

The deterioration of the security environment has also consequences on the *Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)*, as well as on defence cooperation. In this context, the *CSDP* will remain a key element for managing these challenges, requesting an increased EU involvement in this respect. Also, the new challenges have given a new impetus for strengthening

2. Future Action Directions Outlined by the 2015 European Council

During the 25-26 June 2015 meeting, the European Council defined the main directions for action, focusing on the following areas: *migration of people, EU security and defence*, as well as *job positions, economic growth and competitiveness*.

In this context, Europe needs a **geographically balanced and comprehensive approach to migration**, based on solidarity and responsibility. In this respect, concrete measures have been taken to prevent further loss of life at sea, to find new ways to combat traffickers actions and to step up cooperation with countries of origin and transit, while respecting the right to seek asylum. The launch, on 22 June 2015, of *EUNAVFOR MED* operation, is an important contribution in this regard. The operational action to combat traffickers and persons who smuggle migrants, in accordance with international law, is an essential part of the overall European approach. There are needed broader efforts, including strengthening the EU's external border management to effectively limit the increasing flows of illegal migration. In this regard, the European Council focused on three key dimensions which should advance in parallel, namely: *transfer/relocation, return/readmission/reintegration and cooperation with countries of origin and transit*. Moreover, the Council will periodically evaluate the progress done in all these three directions, and will report on this issue later this year.

Europe's security environment has dramatically changed in recent years, this issue requiring action in three interconnected areas. Further to the Commission's "*European Agenda on Security*" and the Council conclusions of 16 June 2015, the work will continue forward on the renewed **European Union Internal Security Strategy**, as well as on the full implementation of the directions on the fight against terrorism. Also, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, will continue **the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy**, in close cooperation with member states, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016.

In line with the European Council conclusions of December 2013 and the Council conclusions of 18 May 2015, work will continue on a more effective, visible and result-oriented *CSDP*, the further **development of both civilian and military capabilities, and the strengthening of Europe's defence industry**,

including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). The European Council recalls the need for:

- *the member states to allocate a sufficient level of expenditure for defence and the need to make the most effective use of the resources;*
- *the EU budget to ensure appropriate funding for the preparatory action on CSDP-related research, paving the way for a possible future defence research and technology programme;*
- *fostering greater and more systematic European defence cooperation to deliver key capabilities, including through EU funds;*
- *mobilising EU instruments to help counter hybrid threats; intensifying partnerships, namely with the UN, NATO, OSCE and African Union;*
- *empowering and enabling partners to prevent and manage crises, including through concrete projects of capacity building with a flexible geographical scope.*

The European Council concluded the 2015 European Semester by generally endorsing the Country Specific Recommendations and calling for their implementation. The European Council welcomed the agreement reached on the *European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI)* and called for its rapid implementation. Digital technologies bring immense opportunities for innovation, growth and jobs. In order to fully benefit from this technological revolution, it is needed to tackle market fragmentation, ensure future-proof regulation, build supporting infrastructure, help the digitisation of industry, create conditions to facilitate growth in all sectors and protect our citizens. The *Digital Single Market* should be used as a vehicle for inclusive growth in all regions within the EU. While emphasising the importance of all dimensions of the Commission's strategy and pursuing an ambitious reform of the telecommunications framework, including more effective frequency spectrum coordination while respecting national competences, the European Council agreed that:

- *the Telecommunications Single Market Regulation, including roaming, and the Directive on Network and Information Security must be rapidly adopted;*
- *the Data Protection package must be adopted by the end of this year;*
- *action must be taken on key components of the Commission communication, notably to remove the remaining barriers to the free circulation of goods and services sold online and tackle unjustified discrimination on the grounds of geographic location;*

- *guarantee the portability and facilitate cross-border access to online material protected by copyright, while ensuring a high level of protection of intellectual property rights and taking into account cultural diversity, and help creative industries to thrive in a digital context;*
- *ensure effective investment instruments and improve the innovation climate, targeting in particular SMEs and start-ups;*
- *identify the key ICT standardisation priorities;*
- *ensure the free flow of data;*
- *assess the role of online platforms and intermediaries;*
- *improve digital skills;*
- *encourage e-Government.*

3. Conclusions

The main conclusions emerged from the discussions of the 2015 European Council (EC 15) provide **strategic defence review**, which requires the adoption of a timetable for a new strategy for foreign and security policy, in close cooperation with member states. Also, the Common Security and Defence Policy remains one of the most visible and concrete European Union action implying as consequence the continuity of the **EU operational commitment under CSDP**, by developing new potential action. Operations and missions were fully successful where member states provided the necessary resources and had common political objectives. Therefore, it is needed a clear mandate and objectives, this issue being a part of the **comprehensive approach concept developed** at the EU level.

There were established clear long-term objectives that would allow partner countries and regional organisations to take responsibility for managing issues related to security, being noticed in this respect a clear link between **security and development** concepts.

Efficiency in missions and operations is also the result of **cooperation with partners**, such as UN, NATO, OSCE and AU. EU-NATO cooperation determines the improvement of European defence, in addition to operational commitments and other areas such as defence planning, maritime security, cooperation with third countries, hybrid threats, strategic communication, security/cyber defence and rapid military response. It seeks to extend CSDP partnership policy by promoting policy dialogue and involving third states in missions, operations and reconstruction.

Member states must **be committed to invest more and better** together, taken into consideration the targets adopted by Defence Ministers in 2007: 20% of defence expenditure to be allocated for acquisitions, research and development; 35% of purchases to be allocated for joint cooperation projects; 2% of defence expenditure to be allocated for research and technology (R&T); 20% of R&T to be allocated for joint cooperation projects.

It is necessary to fully implement the **Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Cooperation**, and to address at European level the **incentives to boost cooperation** between member states in the development of military capabilities. **Defence cooperation** should include concrete capabilities development projects within the *European Defence Agency (EDA)* framework, based on newly identified security risks and *Capability Development Plan (CDP)*. Moreover, the **investments in research and technology** should be stimulated by complementary measures, thus contributing to increase the **EU's strategic autonomy**.



THE EU MILITARY CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Lieutenant Colonel Dr BEng Valentin IONAȘCU

NATO members are dedicated to providing military forces fully capable of permanently meeting the challenges. However, civilian capabilities development issues emerged within the Alliance as a result of events in Iraq and Afghanistan, which demonstrated the need to develop capabilities and skills in the field of reconstruction and stabilisation. Thus, while currently there is a tendency to overlap military capabilities development, there is also a risk of overlap in the development of non-military capabilities.

The European states that are NATO members have one set of forces available for both the Alliance and the EU as well as for national purposes, consistency being desired as far as the purposes they serve within the organisations to which they belong.

Keywords: *political dialogue; common security; crisis management; military capabilities*

The issue of *military capabilities* was a central point in the evolution of the *European Security and Defence Policy* since the early stages of its development, after the Franco-British Summit on 3-4 December 1998. The following period was marked by further efforts towards providing the Union with the military and civilian capabilities needed to respond quickly and effectively to the risks and threats to Europe's security.

The *first stage* in addressing defence capabilities development aimed to solve the quantitative shortfalls. The *Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG or HLG 2003)* thus set the European needs in the field as well as the deadlines to be met. In this regard, the European leaders agreed that by 2003 the EU had to provide a package of forces and capabilities, being able to carry out the so-called "*Petersberg tasks*", namely that member states should be able to deploy within 60 days an EU Rapid Reaction Force (army corps level – 50-60,000 personnel, with the command and control, logistics, combat support, naval and air elements necessary capabilities), and to sustain the force in the theatre of operations for at least 1 year.

The tragic events on 11 September 2001 influenced the EU response to such threats. In this respect, the June 2002 European Council in Sevilla decided to extend the range of *Petersberg missions* in order to include the fight against terrorism.

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Meanwhile, the EU-NATO relationship became institutionalised by adopting, in December 2002, in Copenhagen, the NATO-EU agreement allowing the EU to draw on some of NATO's military assets and capabilities, other than national ones, in order to conduct its own peacekeeping operations. Known as the "*Berlin Plus*", it states:

- the EU assured access to NATO planning capabilities for its own military operations;
- the availability of NATO assets and capabilities for the EU;
- the terms of reference for the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and European Command Options for NATO in the context of an EU-led operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities.

The *second stage* in the Union defence capabilities development consisted of changing the focus from the quantitative to qualitative approach, being influenced by the *EU Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World*, which provided the strategic guidance elements for generating European capabilities in the security and defence field. As a result, the European leaders adopted, at the European Council in June 2004, the new *EU Headline Goal 2010 (HLG 2010)*, which represents a new approach regarding the development of European capabilities on security and defence matters, focusing on the qualitative improvement of defence capabilities, as well as on how to adapt them to the requirements set out by the *Security Strategy*.

Specifically, the new *EU Headline Goal (HG 2010)* aims to:

- increase the interoperability of available EU forces and strengthen their deployment and sustainment capabilities;
- expand the spectrum of EU missions, into the spirit of the *Security Strategy* provisions, by including new types of operations such as: disarmament, military assistance to third countries on combating terrorism, security sector reform;
- develop an EU rapid response capability, not only regarding decision-making (with the objective to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days) but also regarding deployment in theatre (within 10 days following the decision).

The *Capability Development Plan (CDP)* is not a "*plan*" in the traditional sense that shows the number of units or amount of equipment that member states make available. It rather provides an estimation of the capabilities needed in the short and long term, considering the impact of future security challenges, technological development and other trends. It supports member states in national defence and programmes planning and it is the "*basic element*" in the process of developing capabilities, as well as in all the *European Defence Agency (EDA)* directorates' activity.

In the context of increased security threats at Europe borders, combined with continuing constraints on national military budgets that have shifted the debate on Europe's defence capabilities, it is increasingly under discussion the way Europe will maintain and develop the necessary capabilities in order to respond to the threats that may arise in the coming decades.

In late 2006, *EDA Steering Board* tasked the Agency to develop a capability development plan, based mainly on *Headline Goal 2010*, which was agreed in July 2008, considering three terms: short, medium and long. In the first *CDP* version, published in 2008, they correspond to the following periods of time: 2008-2012, 2013-2018, 2025 and beyond.

The *CDP* was jointly developed with the participation of member states, the Council Secretariat, the *EU Military Committee (EUMC)*, with the support of the *European Union Military Staff (EUMS)* and under the *EDA Steering Board* guidance. Being endorsed by all member states, it is a reference document for the European military capability development.

The *CDP* is a comprehensive planning method providing a picture of the European military capabilities over time. It can be used by member states' defence planners when identifying priorities and opportunities for cooperation.

Its content is structured in four chapters, on military tasks assigned to time periods, listing the key issues according to their importance, future trends, and time periods:

- **A:** short-term capabilities' shortfall analysis against the requirements stated by the *HLG 2010* and the operational risks that may result;
- **B:** long-term identification of potential challenges and risks based on *Long Term Vision (LTV) 2025*;
- **C:** potential cooperation, based on bringing together the plans and programmes developed by member states and identifying cooperation opportunities;
- **D:** lessons learned from current EU-led operations and validation of capabilities' development priorities through the experience gained in current operations, various national operations and other conflicts.

Since the first *CDP* was released in 2008, the global security situation has changed significantly. The strategic situation in the European Union and the world has evolved considerably, while the economic crisis has also had profound knock-on effects on the European military community. These recent changes have highlighted the difficulty in accurately predicting what will happen even over a short period of time.

To date, the capability requirements linked to the *Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)* have focused primarily on crisis management and deployable forces.

This is still the case, with no fewer than **11 operations** and **21 missions** ongoing across three continents, both military and civilian. However, insecurity around Europe has begun to shift this focus, bringing back the question of territorial defence on the EU member states agenda.

CDP is not a static document, being updated constantly based on the decisions of member states Defence Ministers, at the biannual meetings of the *EDA* Steering Board in Defence Ministers format, which is the decision-making body of the Agency. The last review was initiated in 2013, five years after the initial *CDP* was presented, and at a stage when a comprehensive approach for the EU civil-military capability had been significantly developed. Member states and other stakeholders were consulted, in order to take into account the experience they gained in the initial *CDP*.

The revised *CDP* took into consideration the full range of possibilities that might occur by 2030 and beyond, from a generally peaceful world to the worst case scenario of an aggressive environment that includes interstate conflict.

The last revised *CDP* was approved by the *EDA* Steering Board in Defence Ministers format on 19 November 2014 and contains a list of *16 priority actions*, of which *12 main actions* (classified into *4 strands*) and *4 crosscutting activities*, as follows:

a) Main actions

- gain information superiority
 1. counter cyber threats (cyber defence);
 2. provide satellite communication capabilities;
 3. enhanced battlespace information and communication services;
 4. Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS);
- support to military operations
 5. enhance C-IED and C-CBRN capabilities in operations;
 6. provide air and theatre missile defence for deployable forces;
- force protection in theatre of operation
 7. inter-theatre air capabilities;
 8. intra-theatre combat capabilities;
 9. enhance logistic support for deployed forces;
 10. medical support to operations;
- secure the sea lines of communications
 11. maritime patrolling and escorting;
 12. maritime surveillance.

b) Crosscutting activities

1. energy and environmental protection in defence;
2. single European sky;

3. Modelling, Simulation (M&S) and Experimentation;
4. Space-based Information Services.

The priority actions identified in this action plan are more concrete than the previous versions, being consistent with those identified by NATO, and in accordance with EU priorities. Thus, two thirds of them are similar to those identified by NATO, but in a European approach to the phenomenon.

The capability development in the areas of sea or air transport, air refuelling, logistics support for forces in theatres of operations and medical support operations remain essential elements for the development of territorial defence and deployable forces. An important element is the fact that the current financial situation of the member states does not allow the development of distinct forces for defence operations and crisis management. Generally, a compromise between a small number of European combat forces, a more complex opponent, and an increasingly diversified nature of the security environment requires a high degree of flexibility, agility and adaptability of military capabilities.

The *European Union Military Committee (EUMC)* is the supreme military body established within the EU Council. *EUMC* members are the chiefs of defence from the EU member states or their representatives to Brussels. It gives military advice and makes recommendations to the *Political and Security Committee (PSC)* on the overall concept of crisis management in its military aspects, the risk assessment of potential crises, the ongoing military operations management, as well as on the establishment, assessment and review of military capability development objectives.

EUMC meetings are prepared by the *European Union Military Committee Working Group (EUMCWG)*, *EUMS* or other specific structures. In order to manage the military defence capabilities development issues, in accordance with *HLG 2010*, it was created a special structure under *EUMC* coordination, the *European Union Military Committee Working Group/Headline Goal Task Force (EUMCWG/HTF)*, composed by military experts appointed by member states, with the following tasks:

- establish the *Strand A (Shortfalls)* input to the *CDP*, in particular to conduct the translation and adaptation process to establish a basis for the *Scrutiny, Analysis, Evaluation and Prioritisation (SAEP)* process;
- continue working on *Strand D* of the *CDP*, based on the analysis of the *Lessons Identified (LI)* which are relevant to capability development purposes;
- draft *Collegiate Views (CV)* to express the view of the *EUMC* regarding the work of the *EDA*, based on an agreed methodology, mainly for the format of *Steering Boards (SB)*;
- produce a yearly *Single Progress Report (SPR)* in order to contribute to the evaluation of the EU capability development;

- increase member states’ awareness of the work of the *EDA Integrated Development Teams (IDT)*;
- enhance the coordination between the EU and NATO via the “*HTF Plus*”.

The new *SAEP* process, based on the results reflected in the *Progress Catalogue (PC)*, which is the connection between the *Requirements Catalogue (RC)* and the *Force Catalogue (FC)*, is aimed at producing a valuable input to the *CDP*, in particular to *Strand A (Shortfalls)*. The input, together with the analysis of *Lessons Learned* from EU-led operations under *CSDP (Strand D)*, represents the *main contribution of the EUMC to the CDP*.

The entire capability development process is in accordance with the *Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)* and the *Headline Goal Process cycle (figure 1)*.




Figure 1: EU Military Capabilities Development Process

The *CDM* is based on the principle of decision-making autonomy of the Union and the voluntary nature of contributions from member states. The European Council defines the Union’s military capabilities development policy objectives and defence ministers play a central role in their development, *EUMC* having a significant role.

To meet the targets set by the *European Security Strategy* and the *Headline Goal 2010*, *EUMC* defines the defence military capabilities needed for EU action,

based on *Illustrative Scenarios (IS)* and *Strategic Planning Assumptions (SPA)*. The RC is endorsed by the PSC and further on by the EU Council.

On this basis, EUMC develops the *EU Military Capability Questionnaire (EU MCQ)*, which is forwarded to member states and acceding countries, and represents the way to provide responses on national capabilities available to the EU, in order to be included into the *EU Force Catalogue*. Moreover, *EU MCQ* provides a framework where member states can present, in a homogeneous and comparable manner, their capabilities potentially available for *EU CSDP* operations and their defence and financial plans over the next period.

Through the significant amount of data requested, it will be allowed a more profound analysis of contributed capabilities, more detailed identification of capability shortfalls and possible development programmes. The questionnaire also provides the possibility for member states to report their participation in the *Pooling and Sharing* projects, their contribution to current crisis management operations and to different standby formations like EU Battle Groups.

After performing the analysis, evaluation, comparison and prioritisation of data on the basis of contributions compiled in the *FC* against the requirements set out in the *RC*, is produced the *Progress Catalogue (PC)*, which provides a structured assessment of the deficits identified in qualitative and quantitative terms. Also, at the end of each Presidency of the EU Council, is produced a *SPR*, which outlines the progress achieved during the reference period of 6 months.

After being drafted, these documents are transmitted to PSC, which makes its recommendations and forwards them to the EU Council and, finally, to the Heads of State and Government at the European Council level.

As a structure involved in the development of EU military capabilities, the *EUMS* is a department of the European Union, responsible for supervising operations within the realm of the *Common Security and Defence Policy*. It is directly attached to the private office of the *High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy*, and is formally part of the *European External Action Service*, being the source of the EU's military expertise. Within the *EUMS*, the *Concept and Capability (ConCap) Directorate* is the principal directorate dealing with all aspects of capability development, in conjunction with *Intelligence, Operations, Logistics and Communications and Information Systems (CIS)* directorates, which also play key roles in supporting capability development within their respective competencies. *ConCap* helps the member states concerned to establish, assess and review capability goals, thereby striving for consistency with *NATO Defence Planning Process (DPP)*, and also taking into account

the *Planning and Review Process (PARP)* of *Partnership for Peace (PfP)* in accordance with agreed procedures. In the context of capability development, the *EUMS* also works in close coordination with the recently established *EDA*.

Another EU structure with responsibilities in developing *CSDP* capabilities for EU missions and operations is the *Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)*. It is at the core of moving from comprehensive approach to comprehensive action by translating strategies into *CSDP* action, in concert with the use of other EU instruments. With regard to the military capability development, the *CMPD* is in close consultation and cooperation with the *EDA*, *EUMS* and *EUMC*, in order to support the development of European defence capabilities, focusing in particular on the most critical gaps in the field while keeping *Pooling and Sharing* high on the political agenda.

The development of military and other capabilities at the EU and at NATO level answers to different member states priorities. The EU has a greater civilian focus and deeper instruments than those available to the politico-military Alliance, which aspirations on civilian capabilities under *CSDP* require the development of military capabilities.

On the other hand, NATO members are extremely dedicated to ensuring that its military forces are fully capable of meeting the challenges of the time. However, the question of developing civilian capabilities has arisen within NATO as recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the need for capacity and abilities in the areas of reconstruction and stabilisation. Thus, while current overlap of capability development is in the military sphere, there is a risk of future duplication in non-military capabilities as well.

Individual European NATO Allies have a single set of forces for NATO, the EU and national purposes and do not want to have separate and inconsistent goals from the organisations they belong to, having thus a strong interest in ensuring that the capability development is not conducted in two directions. Many EU member states are currently committing capabilities to both organisations, which is difficult to financially sustain in the long run. That is why there are currently concerns to bring together the NATO and EU defence planning process, where both organisations have identified certain similar shortfalls in the area of crisis management during their respective capability development processes. They have established coordination mechanisms, in particular the *EU-NATO Capability Group*, which is a body for exchanging information on requirements common to both organisations.

Another cooperation format between the EU and NATO in the domain of military capabilities, in accordance with the *Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)*,

is the *HTF Plus format* (with recourse to NATO expertise), which ensures transparency of work in progress between the two organisations, minimising any risk of divergence between the works. In this regard, it contributes to the work of the EU-NATO Capability Group and the efforts conducted by the *CMPD*; at the same time it supports the mutual complementarity between the two organisations, whenever appropriate and deemed necessary.

Romania is an active participant in the political dialogue inside the EU. It has played an important role in the *CDSP* since the beginning. Today, Romania is an active participant in *CSDP*, at both political level, constantly supporting the interests identified by member states as common security and defence, and operational level, contributing to numerous EU crisis management missions.

In terms of participation in the development of European defence capabilities, Romania made its first offer of military forces and capabilities to be used in the missions under *Petersberg tasks*, during the *EU Military Capability Commitment Conference* (Brussels, 20 -21 November 2000).

Moreover, Romania participated in the entire set of activities conducted for the adoption at EU level of the *Requirements Catalogue 2005*, which defines the Union's defence capabilities needed to meet the goals of the *European Security Strategy* and the *Headline Goal 2010*. In this context, Romanian experts participated in workshops dedicated to developing the initial draft and subsequent variants of the document, the *Headline Goal Questionnaire* and verification methodology, analysis and assessment of contributions from member states and acceding countries. All contributions of forces and capabilities have been finally included in the *EU Force Catalogue*.

After reconsidering the relationship between Romanian contribution to NATO and to the EU, the Romanian offer was improved to achieve convergence between the forces and capabilities made available to the two organisations. Thus Romania's contribution in the *EU Force Catalogue 2014* included units from all services: land, naval and air.

As far as the military capability development is concerned, Romania is an active member of several key structures within *CSDP*, such as the *European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC)*, located in Torrejon (Spain), the *EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS)*, located in Paris, and the Brussels-based *European Defence Agency*. Depending on the interests and needs in the military equipment field, Romania has also got involved in programmes meant to achieve last generation capabilities, by developing cooperation programmes, further implemented by the member states under the *EDA "umbrella"*.

THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC ACTION AND ADAPTATION TO THE NEW PATTERNS OF CONDUCTING MILITARY OPERATIONS

*Lieutenant Colonel Florian IANOȘIU HANGAN
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NATO is currently engaged in operations and missions on three continents, from crisis response operations to training missions, disaster relief and humanitarian operations. The military forces of NATO member states have reached, according to the authors, a high level of interoperability as a result of years of joint planning, participation in training activities and joint exercises. Recently, the Allies have demonstrated in practice, by participating in NATO operations and missions in the Balkans (KFOR, SFOR), the Mediterranean Sea (Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR), Libya (Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF and Resolute Support Mission), their ability to operate effectively in totally new operational environments.

Keywords: *military operation; task force; defence; manoeuvre; strategic mission*

Motto:

“Military operations play an essential part in ensuring the stability of areas emerging from a conflict and, therefore, require undertaking a series of complex actions meant to find solutions to an extensive range of issues including establishing internal security and the rule of law, facilitating political transition, rebuilding infrastructure, and launching economic recovery in a specific operational environment”.

Introduction

The future security environment tends to become ambiguous, complex and highly changeable, in a very short time unit. The Alliance transformation process, coupled with the possible development of new capabilities, must be based on long-term estimates, objective analyses of the evolution of the security environment and studies in order to correctly identify trends, prospects or developments of any kind: political, economic, social, military, historical, geographical, scientific/technological. In the present paper

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we intend to approach the Alliance strategic directions of action from another perspective. From this perspective, it is clear that long-term and accurate forecasts on challenges and responses to them are difficult to achieve.

To understand the impact of all these changes and to effectively manage future challenges to the Alliance, we must view the future reality closer to the way the Alliance will adapt to the security and operations environment foreshadowed in the long run.

1. The Alliance Strategic Action

Humanity is going through a transition period. This transition period is characterised by the increasing speed with which transformations occur in all social areas, probably the fastest ones in human history. From the historical point of view, such a transition period is one of the greatest challenges to the security of nations and the stability of international relations. Moreover, such a transition period involves defining and redefining the roles played by the powers in the international relations equation.

In this context, it should be also noted the emergence of new state or non-state actors on the international stage, actors that can influence or destabilise, more or less decisively, international relations.

The attempts to understand the potential outcomes of this period and the way they can influence the evolution of society are extremely complicated and cannot fit into a more or less precise term. Moreover, the changes generated by technological innovation and the increasingly rapid evolution of technology are *nonlinear in relation to society but affect all areas of society, interact and produce synergies, unimaginable not long ago*¹.

The Alliance adaptation will entail identifying those priorities and means of action to remain relevant in the new international security context. However, the vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity generated by hybrid threats will make it difficult to identify appropriate response mechanisms.

The concepts of *defence* and *security* evolve continuously. As a consequence, the security environment as well as the operational one will undergo continuous transformation, which will have significant effects on how the Alliance fulfils its basic missions (*Core Tasks*), as they are defined by the *Strategic Concept: Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Security Cooperation*².

¹ Ray Kurzweil and Chris Meyer, *Understanding the Accelerating Rate of Change*, interview published in *Perspective on Business Innovation*, May 2003.

² *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the members of NATO adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Lisbon Summit, 19-20 November 2010.

In the context of defence and deterrence, the concept defines the greatest responsibility of the Alliance: to protect and defend its members' territories and populations, under article 5 of the *Washington Treaty*, deterrence remaining one of its main components.

We consider that these core tasks constitute the Alliance basic strategic directions of action.

For the current and future security situation, the Alliance is and will be able to reconfigure the overall approach to simultaneously meet all challenges by:

- deterrence – against the threats generated by states;
- isolation – against the threats generated by non-state entities;
- protection – of the infrastructure and territories of the member states, lines of communication and common goods.

The challenges to the allied area security have intensified as the risks have been to be highly delocalised. The security environment will turn into a multipolar system in which power poles will be more difficult to identify and threats will be more diffuse.

At present, the challenges to the Alliance as well as to other entities are generated by terrorist attacks, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction coupled with: the danger that they get in the possession of undemocratic regimes, organised crime entities or terrorist cells, the existence of undemocratic regimes or failed states, massive refugee flows, ecological imbalances or major natural disasters, economic insecurity, situations of conflict in certain areas or regions, which are out of governmental control, local or regional ethnic conflicts, criminal groups with different interests. To these challenges are added conflicting interests, different perceptions of nations regarding desirable strategies and procedures, given that the interests of actors do not always converge.

To combat such risks, poorly defined, diffuse, having massive destructive potential, there should be increasingly complex military or other than military strategies and policies. From this perspective, we consider that the Alliance adaptation should refer to the following:

- military and technological potential to combat threats;
- allocation of proper resources for defence;
- ways and mechanisms to use military means to the detriment of other means of retaliation.

This process of adaptation will be dependent on the domestic policy priorities of the European and North American allies, to which there should be added the differences in the perception of risk, the means and procedures to respond to them, as elements that will directly influence the design of a visionary approach to missions and the adaptation process.

Moreover, in terms of the essential components of the adaptation process that could underpin the strategic directions for action, we consider that they might be:

- interoperability and interdisciplinarity (effective integration at the level of joint forces);
- development of efficient, flexible, modular, rapidly deployable and sustainable expeditionary capabilities;
- maintenance of technological advances in the development of Allied capabilities;
- achievement/maintenance of information supremacy;
- development of capabilities for network-based systems.

It is very important to analyse every detail of threats with means that can be easily adapted to the needs of the Alliance. It is essential that NATO can generate solid analyses of each and every possible threat. Different scenarios should be considered by the Alliance to be able to respond to many types of challenges, launched simultaneously from multiple directions. Not only NATO's political but also its military response should cover these types of aggression and meet, as appropriately as possible, even unimaginable scenarios. It thus follows that strategy outweighs policy – political reality should be firstly considered, and then the limitations and constraints of political-bureaucratic type.

2. Hybrid War

The current and especially future security environment cannot be defined without reference to *hybrid war* and its consequences for the process of the Alliance adaptation in the long term. Hybrid war has practically redefined the entire spectrum of military operations. The Allies and partners will have to develop new strategies, at both allied and national level, strategies that should focus equally on training, deterrence, credible defence, and response and rebalancing capacity.

In order to achieve a NATO policy able to counteract the effects of *hybrid war*, the Alliance should consider the following 6 main directions of action:

1. maintain the Alliance political cohesion;
2. conduct an inter-organisational action group to counter *hybrid war* actions, having NATO in the foreground, consisting of the UN, the EU, the African Union, the Arab League etc;
3. improve the information and early warning systems, establish an appropriate communication system, contributing thereby to shorten the time needed to make the political decision;
4. continue to transform and adapt NATO to face any kind of challenges ahead;

5. implement the new scientific and technological discoveries in education and training by exercises in order to address the full spectrum of military operations;
6. improve permanently the Alliance flexibility and the Alliance forces responsiveness by raising the quality of the forces training and readiness.

The same organisation of military forces changes in network structures that together allow a maximum concentration, the so-called “*critical mass*” effect, and a maximum decentralisation, so the initiative, flexibility and rapid reaction. The reduction in reaction time is essential. The effects of actions at strategic, operational and tactical level grow exponentially, inversely proportional with the time of own “*information-management-decision-action*” cycle compared to the one of the opponent. When reaching a certain speed of this cycle, the weakest of opponents remains paralysed, unable to react or defend.

In this case, knowledge is an inexhaustible and self-replicating resource, as knowledge generates knowledge. Information warfare, which includes all these three areas, is the type of confrontation that tends to take place “*without bloodshed*”, thus being, by definition, structure, concept and objectives, selective and “*surgical*”, perfectly adapted to the values of modern industrialised society.

This reality provides the West with a significant advantage as it currently enjoys an enormous superiority, especially in the field of technologies related to information and intelligence. It is necessary, however, to maintain this constant superiority as compared to South East Asian countries (“*Asian tigers*”), whose economy is precisely due to the ability to effectively use information technologies, as well as to those states that support international terrorism.

Robotics, non-lethal weapons or those having lethal complementary roles – such as fuel gelation, computer memory demagnetisation, artificial viruses/their substitutes etc. have been continually developed.

The intelligence community will assume an increasingly important role and will use all available knowledge in society, essentially the so-called “*special sources*”. In other words, smart weapons would be smart just to whom will most effectively manage information.

More than likely, by increasingly employing special operations forces, the application of new technologies in low-intensity conflicts will put the West in the position to successfully face the own public opinion counter-reaction. These types of conflicts cannot be managed using numerous armed forces, as it was during the *Cold War*. Probably mass armies will not be required, not even to counter an invasion of the territory. It becomes increasingly obvious that such a scenario is not one to implement at the expense of the West.

The new threats will be no longer faced using numerous armies, constituted following processes and methods belonging to the past (conscription and mobilisation). A nuclear and classical deterrent capability is obviously needed, one able to minimise the effectiveness of terrorist, nuclear, chemical or biological threats of the opponent.

However, the security function of nation states will remain essential in the future. Only these states may employ the theoretical and practical elements needed to fight. A supranational, permanent, reaction capability thus becomes plausible, especially in the conditions mentioned by Samuel P. Huntington related to the development of his new scenarios regarding the “*clash of civilisations*” considering the Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Confucian etc. ones³.

What kind of strategy should NATO opt for in the future? Offensive or defensive? Despite all utopias, military force remains a factor of order during periods of disturbance, in the global geopolitical context. It is important to understand that war, as von Clausewitz says, is “*like a chameleon that changes depending on the specific situation in a certain historical period and in every state*”⁴. It is known that no military operation resembles another, and it is thus necessary to learn from the experience of each war individually, and to develop, depending on these experiences, “*anti-war*” systems adapted to the circumstances and challenges. Before the fall of communism, nuclear, biological or chemical threats were not considered able to endanger the West.

Things have moved fast and the situation has changed radically. The most relevant current and future threats to the West are non-military threats such as: population explosion in the “*Third World*”, massive and likely out of control emigration, existence of radical movements that could instrument terrorism, mobilisation of an internal “*fifth column*” constituted of millions of Islamic immigrants living in European countries. In areas of “*fracture*” as the Mediterranean Sea, such scenarios are more likely to happen. There are major differences, in terms of wealth or population growth, as well as real threats of using nuclear, biological or chemical means.

States should remain fundamental elements of international relations. Globalisation as well as economic and financial mechanisms independence direct strategies and goals. Strategy is directly dependent on politics and it uses means that are different from the proclaimed goals that are political in nature. Military conflicts do not deliberately tend to destroy the opponent completely.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilisations*, Simon and Schuster, 1996, p. 22.

⁴ Von Clausewitz, *Principles of War*, Princeton University, 2008, p. 8.

There will always be more convenient “to buy the enemy” than to destroy it through a costly action, with many casualties on both sides. The logic of a “total military war”, which always tends to zero, must give in to the “logic” of a limited war, as close as possible to the economic type.

3. New Patterns of Conducting Military Operations

Today, NATO is engaged in operations and missions on three continents, from crisis response operations to training missions and disaster relief operations. The military forces of NATO member states have reached a high level of interoperability as a result of decades of joint planning, participation in joint training and exercises. Recently, the Allies have demonstrated in practice, through the participation in NATO-led operations and missions in the Balkans (*KFOR*, *SFOR*), the Mediterranean (*Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR*), Libya (*Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR*), and Afghanistan (*International Security Assistance Force* and *Resolute Mission Support*), their ability to operate effectively in totally new operational environments.

Studying these operations we could better define the notion of *military operation*. Therefore, a *military operation* could be the set of activities, actions and measures prepared and conducted by the task force to meet the assigned objectives/tasks, including the proper action, transport, supply, attack, defence, manoeuvres etc. or the execution of strategic, operational, tactical, and administrative missions.

Probably, in the long-term future, the types of operations will remain the same:

- Operations specific to armed combat, in the two basic forms, offensive and defensive;
- Stability and support operations;
- Intermediate operations⁵.

On the basis of what has been previously stated, we consider that the elements of modern operational environment will be grouped into the following categories: physical environment, threats and uncertainties, local population, presence and involvement of other agencies and organisations⁶.

The physical environment is still the three-dimensional space in which operations occur. Military campaigns will take place in areas that will include a combination of at least two categories of land, and climate, as part of the physical environment, will complete its complexity.

⁵ F.T.1 – *Doctrina operațiilor Forțelor Terestre*, București, 2014.

⁶ *AJP 3.2. Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, NATO HQ, Brussels, 2007, pp. 1-3.

Most operations have been conducted in increasingly populated areas, and at tactical level, forces will have daily contact with local people. And this is not necessarily due to the threats arising from these areas but especially because of the extraordinary expansion of populated areas, predicted for the coming years. Conducting operations in these circumstances will require that, at all levels, commanders consider the effects of military actions on population and infrastructure.

It will be vital that, during a military operation, local culture should be understood, this constituting a major part in achieving or not the expected results and operational effects⁷.

On the other hand, military operations have already entailed actions in which military structures act together with various agencies and organisations, along with them, in their support or being supported by them. The agencies and organisations that are present in a theatre of operations will include: local government agencies, NGOs, private organisations and even business interests, police and security forces of the host nation, private security organisations and companies.

The objectives of these operations in the long term will have to rely on the elimination of tensions that could lead to the resumption/amplification of conflict and the creation of conditions for transition to peace.

The immediate contribution of military forces will most likely be to restore and maintain the security of local people and civil organisations/agencies in order to facilitate progress in the stabilisation process. This contribution will involve actions to prevent and limit violence as well as to protect the population and key institutions.

Military operations, most likely, will not certainly lead to achieving a clearly defined end state (decisive victory, for instance) but they will rather facilitate the achievement of the objectives that favour the situation stabilisation and create the conditions for transition to peace.

As a result, we consider that the military forces involved in operations will support the actions of other actors for the protection, restoration and strengthening of the civil society, governance, rule of law and economy to return to normality.

The success of military actions, in our opinion, will require focusing the efforts of commanders at all levels in the following areas:

- a) Knowledge of the operational environment. Military planners and commanders of military structures must know in detail the operating environment in which they are to act. This requirement is generated by the need to reconfigure and equip the structures that are to be engaged as well as by the use of military power commensurate with the reality on the ground;

⁷ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2008, p. 137.

- b) Achievement of a stable security environment. Military structures should focus on: creating a safe and stable environment for the local population, then developing stable and legitimate local security institutions, and finally cultivating and strengthening the capacity of local authorities to maintain the state of peace and normality;
- c) Reducing the risk of conflict recurrence. Military operations should be directed towards reducing the risk of the resumption of the conflict and the armed combat specific operations, through appropriate measures to encourage reconciliation;
- d) Multilateral involvement. The success of an operation is primarily ensured by the participation in the stabilisation process of a wide range of national and international actors, with defined and especially accepted and understood roles⁸.

In this context, Romania will have an important role to play in the Wider Black Sea region and it should focus on working with other allies in this area to fulfil the aims of the Alliance.

Being one of the main “*gates*” toward the West, it will have to take strict measures to regulate and restrict the immigration from the East. These efforts will entail both suspicions and acts of “*enmity*” on the part of some countries in the Middle and Far East, which could be materialised in the escalation of terrorist actions in the country. The failure to take appropriate measures in the border area of eastern Romania could put in difficult situations other partners in the Alliance.

Professor Sir Michael Howard⁹ states: “*The world is not safer today and it will not be more secure in the 21st century than it was in the 20th century. War is always possible. Therefore, we, new NATO members, form the community that can and must prevent war*”¹⁰.

Ultimately, NATO existence is based on the political will. Political consensus can lead to avoiding crisis situations escalation and defusing conflicts. However, it should also lead to achieving a credible and effective military force, agile and flexible, able to generate an adequate military response to any threat.

⁸ James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building*, RAND Corporation, 2007, p. 15.

⁹ Military British historian, born in 1922, founder of Department of War Studies, London Royal College. He has been described, by the *Financial Times*, as the greatest British historian alive.

¹⁰ Michael Howard, *Liberation or Catastrophe? Reflections on the History of the 20th Century*, 2007, p. 139.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT IN EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS – Logistics Planning and Operations Logistics Chain Management –

Lieutenant Colonel Cristian CEAUȘU

The experience gained in NATO operations calls for the improvement of logistics effectiveness in a rapidly changing and complex expeditionary environment to benefit all actors. An Operational Logistics Chain Management (OLCM) capability will timely produce relevant and accurate logistics information and enable the NATO commander to exert greater influence on operations support by translating operational requirements into direct support actions.

In this context, according to the author, OLCM provides the intellectual foundation that will ensure long-term coherence to numerous ongoing, interrelated logistics initiatives, and aims to generate other capabilities, subsidiary to OLCM, for the Alliance that is evolutionary in character and design.

Keywords: *logistics support; operational planning; operational control; operational area*

Motto:

“...One of the most difficult things we have to do in war is to recognise the moment for making a decision. Information comes in degrees. Shall we make a decision now or shall we wait a little longer? It is usually more difficult to determine the moment for making a decision than it is to formulate the decision itself”.

Adolph Von Schell

Background

The *Alliance Strategic Concept*, approved by NATO Heads of State and Government in Washington on 23 April 1999, articulates NATO’s approach to the security challenges in the new century. It requires that the Alliance should be able to undertake the full spectrum of missions through a common set of structures and procedures, which reflect its commitment to both collective defence and crisis response.

Therefore the Alliance has taken steps to adapt its command and force structures to meet the needs of the evolving security environment.

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Necessary changes in NATO command and force structure to better fit them for the conduct of expeditionary operations are set out in relevant NATO documents.

Defence Ministers concluded in their sessions that NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.

There will be a continuing need to adapt to new challenges and to ensure that the Alliance and NATO nations have the structures, and deployable and sustainable forces capable of responding to emerging threats in the future.

The shift to more expeditionary operations has significant implications for NATO logistics policy and posture. The deployment of forces to locations with little or no Host Nation Support (HNS), at much greater distances than previously necessary, operating along extended and perhaps very limited lines of communication, places an emphasis on deployable logistic capabilities that were less important for territorially-based defence.

The uncertain location of operations and composition of forces to be deployed pose challenges for logistic readiness. Operations of any significant duration also raise sustainability issues, including those relating to the logistics force elements required to keep the combat forces supplied and maintained. In addition to the above political and military strategic influences on NATO logistics policy and principles, a number of wider developments have occurred during the last decade. These include: promulgation of the NATO Policy on Cooperation in Logistics, which defines the principles and policies for cooperation in logistics and establishes a common vision across the full spectrum of logistics executed through the NATO Logistic Vision and Objectives process; and developments in logistic support to civil authorities, including the possible use of NATO logistics assets for international disaster relief operations.

Logistics support management, including *Operational Logistics Chain Management (OLCM)* concept developments within the Alliance nations that are relevant to NATO and strategic level logistics policy implications of the experience gained from recent NATO operations are also taken into account.

Logistics Planning in Defence, Operational Planning, Logistics Command and Control, Funding Possibilities

Logistics planning is one of the disciplines of defence planning. It must identify the different logistic capabilities that need to be acquired by nations and NATO to support the *NATO Level of Ambition (LOA)* included in the Alliance Defence Planning Process. These logistic capabilities can be called upon by NATO

commanders as part of the operational planning process to be used in a specific NATO-led operation.

❖ **Logistics Planning in Defence Planning**

Logistics planning is an integral part of defence planning through the force planning process and *Partnership Planning and Review Process (PARP)*. It is at this level that identification of the civil and military logistic capabilities required to deploy, sustain and redeploy Alliance forces is carried out by the strategic commanders in consultation with nations. The required specific capabilities can be addressed to the nations by force proposals or by capability packages. The resulting logistics support concepts, structure and procedures must be tailored to the respective forces and their related employment options.

Strategic commanders must ensure the timely and proper inclusion of requirements for logistic forces and capabilities in the force planning process so that nations, including partner nations, can agree to acquire and to provide them to NATO in order to be used during operations. The authority, responsibility and funding for multinational logistic arrangements are to be established during the operational planning process.

❖ **Logistics Planning in Operational Planning**

Logistics operational planning is mentioned in *MC 133/3, NATO's Operational Planning System*. The level of detail is related to the planning category and the level of responsibility. Logistics support concepts and structures must be tailored to the respective forces and their missions. To achieve the desired level of multinationality, national and NATO logistics planning must be harmonised from the beginning of the operational planning process.

The force generation process must take into consideration the different levels of standardisation and the logistics operational planning should consider the contributions of non-NATO nations and other organisations.

❖ **Logistics Command and Control**

Logistics support to NATO forces must be as effective and efficient as possible. Therefore, nations must provide NATO commanders with the logistics command and control authority and capabilities they require to meet their responsibilities throughout all phases of an operation. It includes coordination, prioritisation and deconfliction of logistics as well as the *operational control (OPCON)* over the logistic units that are allocated in the joint operation area. This aspect will ensure that effective logistics to support the operation can be planned for and executed.

The assets belonging to the national support chain, which includes the units performing *Logistic Lead Nation (LLN)* and *Logistic Role Specialist Nation (LRSN)* missions, normally remain under national command unless there is a specific disposition in the *Transfer of Authority (TOA)* message or special arrangements related to funding.

❖ **Funding Possibilities**

Nations are responsible for the deployment, sustainment and redeployment of their forces. National logistic resources are procured and maintained for that purpose at national expense, although cooperative multinational arrangements should be taken into consideration by nations and the NATO commander.

Strategic infrastructure may be funded via the *NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP)* dependent upon the context of individual projects, while funding of the operations and maintenance costs via the military budget should be taken into consideration through categorical budget allocations.

The Current Status of the OLCM Process within the Alliance

NATO operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans confirm the need for modern, deployable, sustainable, and interoperable, highly capable forces, able to operate across the full spectrum of conflicts and crisis for extended periods of time beyond the Alliance territory, both on its periphery, and at strategic distances. To respond to these challenges logistics should be recognised as an effective force multiplier to achieve joint deployment and sustainment without geographical limits.

In this context, a *NATO Operations Logistics Chain Management (OLCM)* capability has the potential to reduce the degree of redundancy within national processes, to streamline NATO's logistics footprint and to provide the NATO commander with the required logistics visibility, authority and flexibility to meet his operational requirements.

OLCM is NATO's forward looking logistics concept that links the main actors, policy and doctrine as well as technology in order to improve logistics effectiveness and efficiency.

A logistics chain management capability for the Alliance operations, driven by the NATO commander's intent, is absolutely needed to improve the logistics effectiveness of NATO forces in rapidly changing, complex expeditionary environments, maximising efficiency for supporting nations, NATO agencies and civil actors.

Why do we need this capability? What and where are the problematic areas? I consider the following as possible answers to the mentioned questions.

- significant equipment, financial and manpower inefficiencies,
- independent and often uncoordinated, unnecessarily redundant national support systems,
- incomplete visibility of available logistic resources, resulting in wasted opportunities and the needless provision of additional supplies,
- insufficient logistics decision support.

An *Operations Logistics Chain (OLC)* is a network of logistics facilities and distribution capabilities operating together along lines of communication to receive, transport, store, distribute and re-distribute equipment, material and personnel to an end user.

The purpose of an *OLCM* capability is to optimise the operational planning and execution of the flow of logistic resources and services into, within and out of the *NATO Joint Operational Area (NATO JOA)*. The flow will be synchronised to meet the NATO commander's requirements and will also assist nations to achieve the level of support necessary to meet the NATO commander's operational intent.

❖ **The Benefits of Having an OLCM Capability:**

- it will provide the NATO commander with more effective logistics support to operations;
- it will help determine the optimal means to meet the NATO commander's operational capability requirements;
- it will assess shortfalls of logistic resources and help map the best approach for meeting those shortfalls;
- it will facilitate consideration of logistic resources made available by nations, NATO and civil actors, including those logistic resources in the *JOA*;
- it will assist in optimising movement and distribution into, within and out of the *JOA* in all phases of NATO operations.

❖ **The Logistics Planning Process**

The logistics operational planning for specific NATO operations is an integral part of the overall *NATO Operational Planning Process (OPP)*. During the *OPP* logistics entities are responsible for developing, evaluating and updating the logistics concept of operations through the following processes (*figure 1*):

- logistics translation of the NATO commander guidance;
- logistics mission analysis, assessment of logistic resources and requirements, identifying critical areas;




Figure 1: Logistics concept of operations

- logistics estimate of the situation, logistics assessment of location, operational status, availability/usability of committed resources;
- logistics concept of operations;
- review of the logistics concept of operations;
- evaluation of the logistics plan;
- revision of the logistics plan.

❖ Key Components of the OLCM Capability

In this context, an *OLCM* capability is designed to optimise the operational planning and flow of logistic resources and services into, within and out of the NATO *JOA*.

An *OLCM* capability is designed to assist the operational planning and execution process. In order to manage the flow of logistic resources and services into, within and out of the NATO *JOA* an *OLCM* capability is built on visibility, authority and flexibility (figure 2).

Responsibility and **authority** are interdependent. The responsibilities assigned to a NATO commander by the member countries and by NATO bodies must be complemented by the delegation of the authority he needs to discharge his responsibilities. This means that NATO and the nations must provide the NATO commander with the required logistics C2 authority, visibility and capabilities to meet his responsibilities throughout all phases of a specific NATO operation. It includes coordination, prioritisation and deconfliction of logistics.




Figure 2: OLCM capability

Concerning **visibility**, the NATO commander requires timely, accurate and relevant information to make effective decisions. *OLCM* enables the logistics support entities to execute the NATO commander's authority over multinational and national logistics capabilities in a credible way. The key to this information is visibility on logistics requirements, resources and processes. This visibility must extend across the multiple levels of management and command for NATO, nations and other actors and must provide the information required at each level. An *OLCM* capability requires relevant visibility over logistics requirements, regardless of the originator or level, to best optimise overall logistics chain management functions through all phases of the operation.

Nations and other actors perform the same *OLCM* functions within their own logistics chains in support of the NATO commander's intent. In order for them to provide the required logistic resources, a bi-directional flow of information between the NATO commander, nations and other actors is essential. In order to meet the identified operational requirements, the NATO commander requires relevant visibility of logistics resources in the NATO *JOA* committed by nations and other actors. This visibility provides the NATO commander, nations and other actors with the logistics segment of location (in place, in use, in transit, in repair and in reserve), operational status, and the availability/usability of committed resources. For an *OLCM* capability to link requirements to available resources, the visibility of the operational underlying logistics chain processes is necessary. This entails the visibility of the inter- and intra-theatre lines of communication, and includes the capacity and status information on point of embarkation and point of disembarkation, transportation assets and logistics chain infrastructure.

Regarding **flexibility**, the planning, implementation and execution of *OLCM* follows an adaptive and flexible approach. An *OLCM* capability must be sufficiently flexible to be able to coordinate and manage effectively when subjected to a wide range of design parameters.

❖ **The Development of the OLCM Capability:**

An *OLCM* capability will be designed on the basis of a single operation; however it has to meet NATO's level of ambition. The capability development (*figure 3*) will follow an incremental, step-by-step approach that involves close coordination and effective interaction between the Bi-Sc, nations and other relevant NATO bodies.




Figure 3: Capability development

The *Allied Command Operations (ACO)* will act as operational sponsor in order to ensure the accurate reflection of the operational requirement.

Conclusions, recommendations

Why do we need to deal with the *OLCM* capability? The answer is very simple, in my opinion. There are several implications of the decision-making process including operational and logistics planning procedures and processes, which we should always improve based on lessons learned and approved concepts.

Finally, let us have a look at the following decision-making principles and take them into consideration, because they are really important for operational and logistics planners during their activities:

- quality and timeliness of decisions are critical to operational effectiveness;
- commanders should make decisions personally and express these decisions clearly and succinctly;
- commanders make better and quicker decisions through training;
- staffs assist commanders to make decisions through the provision of information and its subsequent assessment, analysis and arrangement;
- commonly understood decision-making methods enable commanders and staffs to work together effectively.

More specifically, experiences from current and previous NATO operations call for the improvement of logistics effectiveness in a rapidly changing, complex, expeditionary environment, benefiting all actors. An *OLCM* capability will produce timely, relevant and accurate logistics information and enable the NATO commander to exert greater influence on operations support by translating operational requirements into direct support action.

In this context, the *OLCM* concept provides the intellectual foundation that will ensure long-term coherence to numerous ongoing, interrelated logistics initiatives, and aims to create an *OLCM* capability for the Alliance that will be evolutionary in character and design.



MILITARY PLANNING AT THE POLITICAL-STRATEGIC LEVEL IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Major Irinel VÎNTURIȘ

Military planning is an iterative process that requires the analysis of all the relevant factors to configure a military mission in order to meet the specific military/political objectives.

At the political-strategic level, it includes the analysis of the policy objectives implications, the ultimate goal of the EU, the limitations, as well as the analysis of the required capabilities in order to develop military options, in tune with the capabilities offered or potentially available. The author analyses the process of military planning in terms of the 4 stages of development: political-strategic (EU institutions); strategic-military (OHQ/MHQ); operational (MHQ/FHQ) and tactical (component commands and subordinate units).

Keywords: *comprehensive approach; EUMC; crisis management; military planning*

A. Introduction

The planning process for EU-led operations and missions takes into account the *comprehensive approach* to crisis management. The tools available to the EU in time of crisis are wide-ranging across its institutions and policy areas and comprise political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military actions.

The planning effort must be coordinated both internally, within the *European External Action Service (EEAS)*, and with the Commission so that it is coherent.

Furthermore, it is worth noting the ongoing discussion at different levels (political, diplomatic and military) on the need to increase the efficiency of civilian and military activities under the *Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)*.

B. Military Planning

In general terms, *planning* is the preparation of an operation or mission, based on a political objective or on a mission assigned by a higher authority, to ensure that the necessary measures can be taken in a timely manner, both before the activity is launched or during its development, in the light of foreseeable contingencies or of unforeseen

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events. It often includes the preparation of options and the consideration of alternatives that may lead to final plans.

Military planning is an iterative process that needs to analyse all relevant factors to shape the military mission in order to achieve the specific political/military objectives. At the political-strategic level, it will include the analysis of the implications of political objectives, the desired EU end state, constraints as well as an analysis of the capabilities needed, in order to develop potential military options balanced against those capabilities offered or potentially available.

Military planning is conducted at 4 levels:

- the political-strategic level (EU institutional level);
- the military-strategic level (*Operation/Mission Headquarters – OHQ/MHQ*) level;
- the operational level (*Mission/Force Headquarters – MHQ/FHQ*) level;
- the tactical level (Component Headquarters level and below).

Military planning at all 4 levels is interdependent and, in practice, these levels can overlap and the specific activities can be conducted in parallel. Prior to the establishment of the Command and Control (C2) structure for an EU-led military operation, some planning actions at one level have to be assumed by another.

C. Military Planning at the Political-Strategic Level (Details)

Under the direction of the *European Union Military Committee (EUMC)*, the *European Union Military Staff (EUMS)* conducts military planning during all phases of the crisis response planning at the political-strategic level. This supports comprehensive planning and may include, among other activities, the development of military options that encompass the full range of the tasks defined in the *Treaty of the European Union (TEU)* and the *European Security Strategy (ESS)*.

Military planning at the political-strategic level comprises *advance and crisis response planning*. Both are underpinned by a continuous *EUMS* internal process of information collection, military assessment and analysis.

The *EUMS*, under the *EUMC* direction, may draw on planning support from external sources, such as national or multinational HQs that member states make available to the EU, in order to ensure a smooth transition from political-strategic to military-strategic planning. For advance planning, under *EUMC* direction, the *EUMS* may also draw on additional augmentation for planning support from external




Figure 1: Relationship between military assessment and analysis and planning at the political-strategic level

sources, to increase knowledge in highly specialised areas. For crisis response planning this should be conducted in accordance with the “*Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations*”. Any exchange of classified information will take place in accordance with *Council Decision 2013/488/EU*, amended by *Council Decision 2014/233/EU* on the EU classified information protection.

D. Advance Planning at the Political-Strategic Level

Advance planning can be conducted at the request of member states or by the initiative of the *EEAS* services themselves. Whilst advance planning is conducted continuously at different levels (political-strategic and military-strategic, operational, tactical) to allow the EU to deal better with potential crises in a timely manner, the *Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)* ensures the political-strategic coherence of advance planning. The products of advance planning can range from country books, in their most generic form, to possible military and/or civilian actions suitable for dealing with specific crises, in their most detailed form. These products inform and allow a smooth transition to the formal crisis response planning for an identified crisis. The EU’s response time is significantly reduced by the use of advance planning and the availability of advance planning products could influence the decision to opt for the *fast track* process.

Military planning has two forms of advance planning:

a. *Generic planning* is the production of basic planning documents for potential operations where some planning factors have not yet been fully identified or have not been assumed. It identifies the general capabilities required.

b. *Contingency planning* is the production of detailed planning documents for potential operations where the planning factors have been identified or have been assumed.

In accordance with the priorities set by the *Director General (DG)*, the *EUMS* routinely conducts military assessment and analysis as an internal activity at the political-strategic level. This activity can also provide the required military strategic, operational and, in some cases, tactical level of detail to support the planning process¹. It can occur both concurrently or in advance of the political process and can be led either by the *Situation Analysis Team (SAT)* or the *EUMS Crisis Planning Team (CPT)*².

Information gathering missions – *Fact-Finding Missions (FFM)* or *Technical Advice Missions (TAM)* allow the collection of data to permit assessment and analysis to be conducted. Such activity leads to greater planning granularity and may also assist in turning generic plans into contingency plans. Additional value could be provided to these missions by including OHQ, MHQ, FHQ and/or HQ personnel (if already identified and available) to gather information required at the military-strategic and operational levels.

E. Crisis Response Planning at the Political-Strategic Level

The complete details of the *EEAS* interaction with other *EU* actors in the crisis response process are in accordance with the “*Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations*”.

The standard and the fast track EU military crisis response planning processes are depicted schematically in *Annexes A* and *B*. Crisis response planning is conducted to enable the EU to deal with emerging or existing crises and built on advance planning products, whenever available. It starts as soon as a crisis is identified by the EU at the political-strategic level. It is normally based on the evaluation

¹ For a specific EU-led military operation, the provision of such information will mainly be taken over by the headquarters at these levels as soon as they are established and their respective commanders nominated.

² Full details on planning teams in the EUMS are available in the *EUMS Crisis Management Manual*.

of the *Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA)*, prepared by the relevant *EEAS* geographical directorate. The *PFCA* is the conceptual framework describing the comprehensive approach of the EU to the management of a particular crisis. Its inclusive development provides a common appreciation of the crisis to all EU stakeholders and assesses the impact of the crisis on EU interests, values and objectives. It envisages possible lines of engagement, objectives and effects for EU engagement to address the crisis in the short, medium and long terms and seeks synergies across potential instruments. For the development of the *PFCA* the *EUMS* role will be twofold: • providing military contribution (analysis of the military dimensions of the crisis, security challenges to be addressed and risk assessments, availability of the military *CSDP* instruments etc.); • supporting the production of any *EUMC* military advice.

During the crisis planning process, the *PFCA* may lead to the development of a *Crisis Management Concept (CMC)*, which may then result in *Military Strategic Options (MSO)* and an *Initiating Military Directive (IMD)*. These products allow



* Aspects from *Concept Development and Experimentation Seminar*, 16 June 2015, Brussels, see eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments/eu-military-staff/news/archives/2015/20150619

the development of a *Concept of Operations (CONOPS)* and an *Operation Plan (OPLAN)*³ by the *Operation/Mission Commander (OpCdr/MCdr)*. This linear, sequential planning process should be regarded as an ideal rather than a mandatory one. In practice, often due to time constraints or events, steps can be skipped (under the “*Urgent Response*” option and the “*Fast Track Process*”), which allows for flexibility and pragmatism to be applied to the process. If the *fast track* process is to be used, it is envisaged that the military advice on the *CMC* should consider and assess the level (quality and quantity) of advance planning available documents and if the *CMC* provides enough details and indications for the subsequent *IMD* (skipping some planning steps).

The *EUMC* provides advice to support the EU political decision-making process. The *Political and Security Committee (PSC)* consideration of military advice, amongst others, and the determination that EU action is appropriate trigger the development of a *CMC*. Further, it should be noted that the Council working bodies (*EUMC/Civil Committee – CIVCOM/Political and Military Group – PMG*) provide an essential role in finalising the planning documents, thereby achieving member states consensus in advance of their presentation to the *PSC*.

Crisis Management Concept – CMC is the conceptual framework describing *CSDP* activity to address a particular crisis within the EU comprehensive approach. It is initiated once the *PSC* has analysed the situation and determined that *CSDP* action may be appropriate. The *CMC* defines the political-strategic objectives for *CSDP* engagement, and provides *CSDP* option(s) to meet the EU objectives. It is prepared by *CMPD*, supported amongst others by *CPCC* and *EUMS* for civilian and military considerations. The *EUMS* contributes to the development of the *CMC* by analysing and evaluating the military parameters of the envisaged operation. The *EUMS* evaluates the feasibility of the options and provides an initial estimate of the military capabilities required. Thus military options may be included in the *CMC*, enabling the official *Military Strategic Options* stage to be skipped (as described under *Fast Track Process*).

Military Strategic Options. If not already included within the *CMC* (as described under *Fast Track Process*), the *EUMS*, under the *EUMC* direction, develops and prioritises the *Military Strategic Options (MSO)*, which describe the military actions designed to achieve the EU objectives as defined in the *CMC*. A *MSO* will outline a military course of action with the constraints and, in general terms, the required

³ Mission Plan/MPLAN is developed for military missions.


resources. It should also include an assessment of feasibility and risk, an outline of the Command and Control structure and an indicative force capability. It will contain the mission statement, the objective, the desired end state, the exit strategy, the general objectives of any military engagement and the degree to which armed forces will be employed, which are all derived from the *CMC*. The *EUMC* evaluates the *MSO* and forwards them, together with its advice, to the *PSC* for the subsequent selection of a preferred option and possible approval by the Council.

Initiating Military Directive. On the basis of the selected option and following the *EUMC* guidance, the *EUMS* develops an *Initiating Military Directive (IMD)*, addressed to the military *OpCdr/MCdr*, with a view to ensuring that the *CMC* is well translated into military direction and guidance with the appropriate level of detail. The draft *IMD* will be submitted to the *EUMC* for consideration, approval and authorisation for subsequent release to the *OpCdr/MCdr*. The *IMD* should provide a clear description of the EU political/military objectives and the envisaged military mission to achieve these objectives and it should comprise the strategic effects to be achieved and the actions to be taken. It should also include any direction, guidance, limitations and assumptions that the *OpCdr/MCdr* should take into account during the development of the *CONOPS* including the *Provisional Statement of Requirements (PSOR)*, *OPLAN/MPLAN* and the *Rules of Engagement Request (ROEREQ)*, and how the operation will be concluded. In order to ensure the continuity of the planning process, it is highly desirable the cooperation between the *OpCdr/MCdr* (and associated HQ) and the Advance Planning Team.

Military planning does not end with the release of the *IMD* to the *OpCdr/MCdr*. The *EUMS* provides planning support for the operation to the military-strategic level in order to guarantee a smooth transition of the planning process from the political-strategic level to the military-strategic level.


After the operation is launched, the *EUMS* continues to monitor the strategic environment and to provide assessment and analysis at the political-strategic level. This is conducted by the establishment of a *Mission Monitoring Team (MMT)* replacing the *Crisis Planning Team (CPT)*. The *MMT* ensures that the *OpCdr/MCdr* and the *OHQ/MHQ/FHQ* are supported throughout the mission by the continuing provision of advice. The *EUMS* will also be ready to offer support or undertake post launch military planning.

Standard EU Military Crisis Response Planning Process



Notes: * Council may authorise PSC to approve CONOPS.
 ** CMP leaves this decision open (Ref. F., PSC agrees MSO).
 *** Council decision to establish can be taken at any time during MSO or IMD development.
 † This stage is complementary to Ref. F.

Fast Track EU Military Crisis Response Planning Process



NOTES: † Council decision to establish can be taken at any time during IMD development.
 * The minimum decision-making steps.

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THE HISTORY OF THE GENERAL STAFF PUBLICATIONS DEVELOPMENT – Chronological Milestones –

Alina PAPOI

România Militară and its successor, Gândirea militară românească, are publications that have accompanied the Great General Staff and then the General Staff for 151 years, namely since its establishment, capturing the development and transformation of this military body as well as its principles of organisation and functioning. The journal was a true pioneer in the field of military culture, grasping the problems faced by the military, analysing them, and providing solutions to improve different situations. Moreover, it has highlighted the main stages the Romanian armed forces and even the society as a whole have undergone, presenting all the events soon after their occurrence.

The author emphasises the role played by the publication in increasing the visibility of the General Staff in the context of connecting Romanian military thinking with universal military thinking.

Keywords: *military studies; Great General Staff; manifesto; military culture*

The General Staff has been, ever since its establishment, on 12/24 November 1859, the top management and military command body, the central point of the Romanian Army development and consolidation. For over a century and a half of existence, the emblematic institution of our army has undergone various structural and functional changes in line with the events occurred in different periods. Throughout its existence, since the War of Independence, through the two world wars and the recent participation of the Romanian Armed Forces in the theatres of operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, the General Staff has demonstrated its objectivity and ability to adapt to the new realities and historical and geopolitical exigencies.

The measures taken in the military by the ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza (Alexandru Ioan I), in a period of seven years, were aimed not only at the reforms adopted and materialised in the establishment of certain structures and the legislation

Alina Papoi – the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

for the training of the army, but also at the development of theoretical activity, particularly of local military thinking. The seeds of the project had existed since 1845, when General Inspector of Moldova Dimitrie M. Sturza, drew attention to the poor theoretical contributions of the Romanian army and urged the officers to study and write by themselves¹.

In the context of the social, political and military events that took place around 1864, as well as of the organisational changes occurred during the reign of Alexandru Ioan I, the Army theoretical activity started to develop. Thus, between 1859 and 1864, there were three major military journals: *Observatorul Militar* (1859) *Monitorul Oastei* (1860) and *România Militară* (1864), the predecessor of the current publication – *Gândirea militară românească*, a journal published by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff.

România Militară appeared following the proposal of a group of nine Captains, graduates of the first series from the Cadet School in București, established by Barbu Știrbei: G. Slăniceanu, A. Gramont, G. Borănescu, G. Anghelescu, A. Anghelescu, Eraclie Arion, E. Boteanu, E. Pencovici and C. Barozzi, as they are presented in the jubilee edition in 1939². The appearance of a Romanian military journal in the young and quite small army at that time was an “*audacious*” idea, as the authors of the mentioned paper stated, especially as the journal was an independent publication under the aegis of the Ministry of War! I consider that, throughout the 151 years of existence, besides the encountered and why nor inherent interruptions and disappointments as well as the more or less appropriate names it has had (*Revista militară generală* – 1947, *Cultura militară* – 1948, *Probleme de artă militară* – 1959, *Gândirea militară românească* – 1990), the journal has succeeded in carrying forward the spirit and the soul of those officers who chose for the *România Militară* journal the motto “*Military science, art and history*”.

Although, in 1866, *România Militară* ceased to appear for a while, the other publications edited by the Romanian Armed Forces continued to support the theoretical activity in the field: *Monitorul Oastei*, *Revista Armatei*, *Revista Artileriei*, *Revista Infanteriei*, *Revista sanitară militară*, *Marina*, *Revista maritimă*, *Buletinul Cercul publicațiilor militare*.

¹ Colonel Dr Petre Otu (coordinator), Colonel Dr Teofil Oroian, Lieutenant Colonel Ion Emil, *Personalități ale gândirii militare românești*, vol. 1, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 1997, pp. 8-9.

² *Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul comemorării a șaptezeci și cinci de ani dela apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1938*, București, 1939, p. 32.

From România Militară to Gândirea militară românească

The cultural programme of the journal was included in the first issue that appeared, as it is mentioned in documents³, on 15 February 1864. It contained innovative ideas, daring approaches, based on the experience of the founders who were educated not only in Romania but also abroad and animated, as time proved, by the necessity to develop a theoretical activity in the Romanian Army too. In my opinion, a fact to be considered is that, at that time, the military leaders welcomed and even encouraged the endeavour of the young officers. Thus, General Ion Emanoil Florescu, the Chief of the General Staff, not only inspired the armed forces but also supported the theoretical activity within the Army. He highlighted, in a letter addressed to the commanders of divisions and corps, that *“whatever the value of troops, they cannot be successful in wars if they are not commanded by officers who have thorough military knowledge for the position they fill”*⁴. It is exactly what the seven officers achieved through their programme, combining theory and practice harmoniously and efficiently.

Initially, it was not easy at all, as the editorial staff had neither its own location nor the material resources that were necessary to print the journal. In addition, there were few subscriptions as there were not many active officers. However, the initiators strived hard and, in spite of difficulties, they continued their endeavour, being also the authors of most of the articles featured in the journal. They were editors, contributors and administrators! It did not prevent them from complying with the journal programme. They continued to publish studies and documents related to military history, organisation of the army, as well as numerous articles that were *“well thought, stylised, documented, perseveringly requiring the establishment of a strong army”*⁵. The editors advocated for an as appropriate as possible organisation of the army, able to meet the needs of the Romanian state that had a population of five million inhabitants in 1864, according to the available sources⁶. It was therefore more necessary, as editors stated, for the country to have efficient, strong and permanent armed forces to rely on if needed! Among their proposals I would like to mention the following: the establishment of factories and arsenals, workshops, hospitals for the sick and wounded, the segmentation of the cavalry into two divisions, of the infantry into four divisions,

³ *Ibidem*, p. 31.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 54.

the organisation of the artillery in regiments, military administration issues. As far as education in the army was concerned, the focus was on physical, moral and intellectual education. Many of the proposals found their answer at the level of “*the leadership of the country*”⁷.

However, because there were not enough funds and subscribers, in 1866, the journal ceased to appear. It resumed publication in 1891. A quarter of a century! It was a period during which the country social-political life underwent important transformations that marked the destiny of the country led by Prince and subsequent King Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. He was 27 when he took the oath of office as the ruler of the Romanians. As he portrayed himself and history demonstrated, he would contribute substantially to the development of military culture and military journalism. *România Militară* resumed its appearance due to a group of officers in the General Staff, who were also graduates of military schools abroad: Captains M. Ghica, St. Cotescu, Al. Averescu, Gh. Cristodulo, N. Constantinescu, C. Rădulescu, C. Mihăescu, I. Mironescu, Majors Gh. Lambru, G. Teișanu, Al. Iarca and Lieutenant Colonel R. Boteanu. Their programme focused on the progress of military science, art and technique, being more realistic than the previous one but nearly eliminating military history studies! It is possible that, through this proposal, the editorial board could aim to develop thorough studies on strategy, organisation, and military art, desideratum that should be met not only by the officers in the Great General Staff (name adopted in 1882), but also by the officers belonging to other services and branches.

Over time there have been organisational changes in the editorial staff, in conformity with the provisions of the statute in 1891⁸. Thus a steering committee was established. To attract collaborators, the editorial staff launched a competition in 1894. The competition was intended to encourage and award prizes to “*meritorious military pieces of writing*”⁹.

Although it was an independent publication, the journal was coordinated by the Great General Staff and the Ministry of War. The two bodies exercised their authority and, quite often, intervened in establishing some rules of conduct regarding the editorial and administrative activity, which was not always welcomed by the editors and readers!

By 1897, the activity of the journal was quasi-independent, being functionally managed by staff officers although the journal was not officially the publication of the Great General Staff. *România Militară* became, on 1 January 1898,

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 65.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 141.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 134.

the official publication of the Great General Staff¹⁰ under the Royal Decree no. 3663 on 8 December 1897. Although it did not always have available the desired financial resources, *România Militară* encouraged and rewarded, when possible, the productions of military authors. Thus, in 1900, the journal allocated, following the approval of the Ministry of War, the sum of 1,000 lei so that prizes could be awarded to the best pieces of writing in the pages of the journal. 7 papers won prizes¹¹. The editorial staff considered the action as a call to authors to read, study, and then conceive by themselves papers containing their own opinions and proposals.

In 1900, at the *General Exhibition* in Paris, the journal was represented by its collection, published in excellent graphical conditions. In recognition of its intellectual value, the journal was awarded the *Gold Medal* and the *Diploma* by the jury in Paris. Unfortunately, they were burned during the First World War.

In 1906, it was organised in Bucureşti “the *General Exhibition to commemorate King Carol I 40-year reign*”. *România Militară* participated with a history of the army, in an impressive volume, developed by the editorial staff, along with the historical referent of the journal, Nicolae Densusianu. Moreover, the entire collection of publications, from 1864 to 1906, was presented. For all the above-mentioned achievements, the journal was awarded the *Gold Medal with Special Diploma*¹². Unfortunately, none of those “*documentary relics*”, as they were called by the authors in 1939, are not in the journal archives today, being destroyed during the war.

In 1907, against the background of both the steering committee and the editorial board dissatisfaction, *România Militară* became independent again, following a Decree signed by the King¹³.

Another significant event in the life of the journal occurred in 1908, when Prince Ferdinand of Romania, the successor to the Throne, took *România Militară* under his patronage. During that period the publication appeared regularly, led by the same administrative and cultural rules, becoming “*a publication of the first rank in the development of our military writing*”¹⁴. Starting in 1912, an element of novelty in the pages of the journal also added value: the publication, at the beginning of each issue, of an article called “*Cronica*”, in which the development of the military events during the Balkan War was presented.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 151.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 136.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 144.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 164.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 115.

The war was about to break out in Europe... Through its editors and collaborators, the journal managed to establish a so-called “*intelligence service*” that collected the pieces of news, analysed, selected, and presented them to the public, in the form of a chronic in the journal¹⁵.

In August 1916, the journal ceased to appear. The collection of manuscripts, the archives, the printed and undistributed brochures, in the context of the events, namely the entire cultural heritage of the journal was destroyed during the conflagration, as it could not be evacuated.

For four years and four months, *România Militară* ceased to exist. However, in January 1921, in a period of the reconstruction of the country, the journal resumed its publication as “*a natural necessity in the military life*”¹⁶. That time, the idea of the journal resumption belonged to the Minister of War, General I. Rășcanu, and to the Chief of the Great General Staff, General C. Christescu. They were aware of the importance and the role played by the journal for the morale of the army and the entire country. Thus, in the *Minute* on 17 May 1920, paragraph 7¹⁷, the resumption of the *România Militară* journal was mentioned, and a ministerial decision in the same year¹⁸ established its organisation. The journal had a Steering Committee, an Editorial Board, administrative personnel, military clerks, cyclists and guards. There were a lot of financial problems, as the expenses related to maintenance and working conditions enhancement were high. Throughout that particular period, it was the Great General Staff that supported the activity of the journal in terms of administration and material resources. In addition, mention should be made that the journal subscriptions represented an important contribution although, at that time, it was the *cheapest among all military publications*¹⁹.

In the programme-article, called “*1916-1920*”, which was published in the first issue in 1921, the editorial staff provided explanations related to the causes that led to the journal interruption as well as to the new conditions and directions imposed by the Steering Committee. The programme was an appeal to both those in the military and the readers to contribute information and details about the progress in other armed forces, studies based on the experience of the war that had just ended.

For about two decades, the journal played a substantial role in disseminating military culture, in addressing key aspects of the national defence system, in creating, among readers, a current of opinions as close to the surrounding reality as possible.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 120.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 262.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 267.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 270.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 334.

In 1939, 75 years after the establishment of *România Militară* journal, the editorial staff published a reverential volume – *Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul comemorării a șaptezeci și cinci de ani dela apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1938* (*From the Past of România Militară on the Occasion of Commemorating Seventy-Five Years since It Appeared in the Military Life. 1864-1938*). In the volume it was reconstructed, step by step, the documentary material contained in the pages of own collection as well as in other military pieces of writing related to *România Militară*. The volume can be considered, in my opinion, a true Bible of the journal, because it contains both the history of the publication and the rules of editorial and administrative conduct, as well as conclusions and lessons learned over time!

Between 1939 and 1943, the journal continued to appear under the aegis of the Great General Staff. According to the journal *Activity Plan* for 1941, the editorial staff considered that the publication had to be permanently connected to the events that took place and to present them. Therefore, the journal had two parts: *military studies* and *military news*, the focus being on the description of military operations, new types of armament, technical assets, new directives and guidelines, laws of organisation in other armies, as well as on presenting the most important thoughts on the Second World War.

Between 1943 and 1947, *România Militară* as well as the Romanian Armed Forces acquired a new physiognomy. Ideological impositions were also found in the pages of the journal. The Great General Staff reorganised the military press and the publication was called *Revista militară generală* up to August 1948, when its name was changed to *Cultura militară*. It was considered as a central publication of military theory and ideology belonging to the Ministry of Defence. Its goal was to present the elements of military conception of the Popular Romanian Armed Forces and their influence on the military art.

Between 1952 and 1989, the journal was called *Probleme de artă militară*. In keeping with the political regime requirements, the publication focused on illustrating the fundamental issues of national defence and on defining the defensive character of the Romanian military doctrine.

Since 1990 the journal is called *Gândirea militară românească*. It is a military theory and science journal, published by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff. Currently, the Editorial Board, consisting of the leaders in the General Staff, the Scientific Reviewers, and the Editorial Staff contribute together to the development of the journal.

Since 2005 the journal has had an English version – *Romanian Military Thinking*.

English version by
 Diana Cristiana LUPU

THE ACTIVITY OF THE 1st CAVALRY DIVISION IN THE SECOND BALKAN WAR (1913)

Daniel Silviu NICULAE

The author presents the most important missions of the 1st Cavalry Division in the Second Balkan War. The division was the first to enter Bulgaria, and, marching from the Danube to the heart of Bulgaria, in Ghinti, a unique march due to the speed at which it was executed, the large unit succeeded in demoralising the enemy troops, occupying the most important strategic points, and timely achieving the liaison with the Serbian armed forces, encircling the capital of Bulgaria. During the campaign, the troops and commanders of the division demonstrated the utility of cavalry, consisting in reconnaissance missions, rapid marches and surprise actions. The reconnaissance missions performed by the division resulted in collecting pieces of information that played a key role in the organisation and development of the military operations.

Keywords: *the Second Balkan War; the 1st Cavalry Division; reconnaissance missions; mobilisation*

Background

The outbreak, in 1913, of the Second Balkan War, the Serbian-Bulgarian conflict near the border of Romania, and Bulgaria's position in relation to our country called the attention of the Romanian Great General Staff to a possible military action south of the Danube¹. In those circumstances, it was developed, on 17/30 June 1913, following the initiative of General Alexandru Averescu, the Chief of the Great General Staff, a *Memorandum regarding the Guidelines for the Operations of the Romanian Armed Forces in Case They Intervene in the Serbian-Bulgarian Conflict*². Known as *Hypothesis 1 bis*, the memorandum stated: the main envisaged operations, the choice of the base and the line of operations, the way of conducting actions, and the measures to defend the north bank of the Danube³. According to the above-mentioned plan, *"In the event that the course of action in the Balkan Peninsula required the military action of Romania*

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¹ Brigadier General Dr Vasile Apostol, Colonel Dr Ion Giurcă, Lieutenant Colonel Dr Mircea D. Chiriac, Colonel (r.) BEng Corneliu Baltă, *Comandamentele strategice române în acțiune (1859-1947)*, Editura Tipo-Lith, București, 2000, p. 35.

² *Ibidem*, p. 36.

³ *Ibidem*.

against Bulgaria, it would seem appropriate for the operations to be conducted following two directions: the main one, towards the strategic centre of gravity of the Bulgarian forces, considering their current disposition; the secondary one, towards Rusciuck-Varna line. The first direction is an option based on military reasons only, while the second one is based on rather political reasons⁴. It was actually the Romanian Armed Forces Plan of Operations in the Second Balkan War (June-August 1913)⁵.

Romania stated its position on the war in its vicinity from the very beginning. The Government led by Titu Maiorescu, considering the declarations made by the Balkan allies and the posture of the great powers, expressed its willingness to remain neutral, provided that there were no territorial changes likely to affect the historic rights and the interests of all the people in the Balkans, and that none of the states engaged in the conflict could threaten Romania's security or try to impose hegemony in the region. Romania's position was positively assessed not only by almost all great powers but also by belligerent states. The decision on Romania's entry into the war was taken on 26 June/9 July 1913. The Minister of France in București, after consulting with his Russian counterpart, N. Schebeko, met Titu Maiorescu. During the meeting, the Romanian Prime Minister stated that Romania had declared its intentions to enter into the war long time before. It would do so if the hostilities between the Bulgarians and the Serbs did not cease, in order to prevent the weakening of Serbia as a result of Bulgaria's ambitious attempts, which was to ensure, if possible, and taking part in the discussions, the balance in the Balkans. Moreover, he stated that the Romanians mobilisation and its consequences proved the decision to pursue the objective, without exceeding its scope. The goal was to guarantee the arrangements that could be offered or imposed⁶.

On 27 June /10 July 1913, the Romanian Minister in Sofia received a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its text stated: *"the Romanian Royal Legation is assigned by its government to communicate to the Royal Government of Bulgaria the following: the Romanian Government warned the Bulgarian Government in due time that if the Balkan allies had been at war, Romania could not have remained*

⁴ Central National Historical Archives, Casa Regală Collection, File 2/1913, p. 2.

⁵ Colonel Dr Petre Otu, *Statul Major General și reformele organismului militar. 1878-1916*, in *Statul Major General. 1859-2004. Istorie și transformare*, coordinator Major General Dr Mihail Orzeacă, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2004, p. 59.

⁶ Nicu Pohoată, *Politica externă a României în timpul războaielor balcanice (1912-1913)*, Editura ProUniversitaria, București, 2010, p. 205.

reserved as it had been up to that moment in the interest of peace or it would have been forced into action”⁷.

The fact that international relations worsened determined our country to strengthen its defence capability as well as to properly train and equip the armed forces so that they could meet all the challenges generated by the unstable environment. Thus the Ministry of War, led by Divisional General Constantin N. Hirjeu, was assigned the task of developing a comprehensive programme that, starting from the armed forces needs and the existing possibilities to meet them, focused on: completing the equipment with modern fighting assets; enhancing tactical training and fire power; increasing the strength annually; establishing new units. To that end, the Ministry was provided with additional and extraordinary credits, which were unanimously voted for by Parliament. Two such credits were approved, amounting to 151 000 000 lei, of which one was for “*procurement for war*”, and the second for the constructions that were necessary for the newly established units, depots and other military needs⁸. Overall, the defence budget for the years 1913-1914 represented 15% of the general budget⁹.

The most significant funds were engaged to buy weapons and ammunition (“*Mannlicher*” rifles, pistols, machine guns for reserve divisions and cavalry regiments, carbines for cavalry and artillery troops). Moreover, measures were taken to increase the stock of ammunition by contracting projectiles, cartridges and certain raw materials from abroad as well as by increasing the domestic military enterprises production.

On 20 June/3 July 1913, Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu suggested King Carol I that he should order mobilisation, considering the outbreak of the Balkan War. Thus the ministers signed the mobilisation decree at 5 o'clock p.m.¹⁰. It contained the following provisions: “*1. Active armed forces and their reserves get mobilised and form the operational army; 2. Mobilisation will be executed following the provisions in the Regulation on the armed forces mobilisation; 3. To complete the war establishment, the necessary reserve contingents and militias will be called; 4. The order of battle will be decided by the mobilisation plan in force*”¹¹. Prince Ferdinand, General Inspector of the Armed Forces was appointed, by Royal Decree, on 22 June 1913, Commander of the operational army in the Balkan War.

⁷ Cătălin Negoită, *Țara uitată – Cadrilaterul în timpul administrației 1913-1916*, Editura Fundației Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 2008. p. 134.

⁸ *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. 5, Editura Militară, București, 1987, p. 265.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 266.

¹⁰ Corvin M. Petrescu, *Istoricul Campaniei Militare din anul 1913*, Tipografia Jockey-Club, București, 1914, p. 36.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

The Romanian Armed Forces Mobilisation

Mobilisation is a rather complex activity. That is why it is planned since peacetime, and it is possible in crisis situations in the political, economic, administrative and military fields, having a well set goal, namely the transition of the nation from the state of peace to that of war. Depending on the context, mobilisation can be general or partial. Mobilisation has two distinct components: 1. mobilisation preparation, when the mobilisation plan is developed and updated; 2. mobilisation execution, when the mobilisation plan is implemented¹². As far as the armed forces mobilisation is concerned, the conducted activities are specific to the military environment and consist of completing the units according to the war provisions, organisational charts and procurement requirements, using, to that end, both the own human and material resources as well as the concentrated or requisitioned ones¹³. This activity is one of the main operations that, depending on the speed at which it is conducted, can decide the outcome of a war. In order for mobilisation to be successful, the nation moral and material preparation is necessary. With regard to the moral preparation, in 1913, the population responded rapidly and enthusiastically to the call for mobilisation. The military reserve forces, all those capable of using a gun, were present to the units regardless of the contingent. Moreover, a large number of volunteers were also present¹⁴.

The mobilisation activity and transports started on 22/23 June, at 12 o'clock a.m. On 23 June, passenger trains were suspended. Up to the mobilisation completion, only one passenger train for each direction was functional. The railways were busy with military transport¹⁵. The troops and assets were transported using more than 500 military trains, on foot, or by vessels on the Danube¹⁶. The requisitions, started immediately after the mobilisation decree was issued, were carried out with rapidity and in order by the administrative authorities all over the country. The population benevolently put at the armed forces disposal the available vehicles and livestock for traction¹⁷.

The members of the 1900-1911 reserve contingents were called up, the 1901-1897 contingents were called up based on individual orders, and the 1896-1895 contingents (militias) were called based on special orders.

¹² *Military Dictionary, tactical-operational terms*, București, 1972, p. 201.

¹³ Nicolae Pășinică, Dumitru Antohi, Ion Călin *et al*, *Culegere de termeni, concepte și noțiuni de referință din domeniile politicii militare, securității naționale și apărării armate*, Tipografia Militară a Ministerului Apărării Naționale, București, 2000, p. 186.

¹⁴ *Participarea Armatei Române la cel de al Doilea Război Balcanic. Modul cum s-a desfășurat mobilizarea (22-30 iunie 1913)*, p. 4.

¹⁵ Corvin M. Petrescu, *Istoricul Campaniei Militare din anul 1913, op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

Thus, Romania mobilised, on 23 June 1913, 5 army corps and 15 divisions (of which 5 reserve ones), 3 reserve brigades, 2 cavalry divisions, and a cavalry brigade. The strength of the mobilised armed forces was 247 battalions, 83 squadrons, 100 batteries, which was 6 % of the country population¹⁸. Mobilisation lasted for 8 days, starting at 12 o'clock a.m., on 22/23 June 1913, and ending on 30 June 1913. The Bulgarians expected that the Romanian armed forces mobilisation would last for 14 days and therefore the Romanian troops would enter Bulgaria on 7 July 1913¹⁹. Starting on 27 June, as the transport plan was strictly implemented, the 1st Army Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division were concentrated on the Danube line, amounting to 70 000 people, and the 13th Brigade, the 4th Army Corps and the 7th Brigade in the 2nd Army Corps, amounting to 12 000 people, were concentrated in Corabia²⁰.

Highlighting the limit situation in which the Government in Sofia was, in the context of an imminent invasion from the north, Bulgarian Academician Gheorghii Markov, in the paper "*Catastrofa bulgară 1913*" (*Bulgarian Catastrophe 1913*), states that the Prime Minister Danev "*went to another extreme*" appealing to "*a foreign state*", Russia, to negotiate on behalf of Bulgaria. Nevertheless, **on 27 June, 5.30 p.m., King Carol ordered to launch offensive in Bulgaria**. The Government in Sofia protested sharply and requested Russia to mediate to cease the military actions, mentioning that the Great Powers regulated, at the St. Petersburg Conference, the problem of Romania's territorial claims so that Romania could not make other new justified territorial claims. The motivation of București was as follows: "*A mandate regarding the re-establishment of balance and peace in the Balkans*". Gheorghii Markov specified that "*on 28 June in the morning, the Romanian troops invaded southern Dobruja*", the fact generating "*the illusion that the advance will limit to the frontiers related to the known territorial claims*"²¹.

Activity of the 1st Cavalry Division

Once the mobilisation order was issued, the Great General Staff, through a telegraphic order, decided to open the secret envelope, containing the provisions for the establishment of the 1st Cavalry Division as well as the combat order for it²². The 1st Cavalry Division was assigned the mission

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

²¹ Constantin Iordan, *Istoriografia bulgară postcomunistă despre participarea României la cel de-al doilea război balcanic*, în *Revista de Istorie Militară*, no. 3-4, 2013, p. 24.

²² Corvin M. Petrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

to be the first to enter Bulgaria on the far right flank; to reconnoitre the enemy territory; to advance rapidly and establish the liaison with the Serbian armed forces²³.

Marching from the Danube to the heart of Bulgaria, in Ghinti, a unique march due to the speed at which it was executed, the large unit succeeded in demoralising the enemy troops, determining them to surrender, and thus occupying the most important strategic points and timely achieving the liaison with the Serbian armed forces, encircling the capital of Bulgaria²⁴. During the campaign, the troops and commanders of the division demonstrated the utility of cavalry, consisting in reconnaissance missions, rapid marches and surprise actions. The reconnaissance missions performed by the division resulted in collecting pieces of information that played a key role in the organisation and development of the military operations.

The division commander, General Gheorghe Bogdan, for the bravery and audacity he demonstrated, qualities he transmitted to his subordinate officers, who followed his example, was decorated *proprio motu*²⁵ by His Royal Highness King Carol on the occasion of the opening of the Legislative Bodies session 1913-1914.

The large unit was concentrated in Corabia on 28 June, the 1st Cavalry Division coming by train from Bârlad to Zimnicea, and then on horses up to Călărași; the 2nd Brigade came on horses from București; the 3rd Brigade came by train from Iași and Botoșani to Zimnicea, and then on horses up to Corabia. On 28 June concentration was performed at 6 o'clock p.m., the officers being present in front of the division commander²⁶. The next day, on 29 June, the march Corabia-Dăbuleni was executed, the troops stationing in Dăbuleni and Călărași. In Dăbuleni, it was established a horse depot, under the command of Captain Homoriceanu. On 30 June 1913, His Royal Highness Prince Ferdinand, the Armed Forces Generalissim, along with General Al. Averescu, the Chief of the Great General Staff, got to Dăbuleni organising the officers who were to perform strategic reconnaissance missions that were necessary for the operational forces²⁷.

Six reconnaissance missions were carried out following the routes: Rahova-Tibar-Varas, Lom-Palanca, on the Lom Valley, Belogragic-Kutlovita (Ferdinando); Rahova-Altimir-Borovan-Vrata; Varosla-the Tibar Valley-the Dram Valley; Rahova-Butan-Ferdinando; Rahova-Kniaja-Cumakovita, then Borovan-the Ogost Valley; Rahova-Lucovita-Cuma-Kovski-Borovan²⁸.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 89.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ See <https://dexonline.ro>, retrieved on 21.08.2015.

²⁶ Corvin M. Petrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

On 2 July, at 10.30 o'clock, the troops started crossing the Danube, according to the order. On that day, a squadron from the 4th Regiment, the 2nd Cavalry (Roşiori) Regiment, 8 mounted batteries, the Cyclist Detachment, the Machine Gun Detachment, the Division Command crossed the Danube, and the 2nd Brigade Command and the 4th Cavalry (Roşiori) Regiment crossed the Danube in Rahova during the night²⁹. The next day, the rest of the troops crossed the Danube, and a march was executed in Butan and Serbanița, to have the division concentrated. The troops stationed in Raz-Krivabar-Butan, Serbanița and Rahova³⁰.

Following the reconnaissance missions, the news from the battlefield appeared, highlighting that the population was hostile and started to gather. Vrata was occupied; the railway was in good condition and the transport of troops had been stopped two days before³¹. On 4 July, Bol-Marcevo and the rail bridge were reported to be occupied. General Bogdan, the Division Commander, ordered the reconnaissance detachment that had to stop in Cobilak to advance towards Luta. To that end, the Division Chief of Staff was also sent to Luta³².

The Reconnaissance Detachment Commander, General Popovici, initiated measures to attack Luta. The Cyclist Detachment and the Squadron from the 8th Cavalry (Roşiori) Regiment, which came from Cobilak, backed it up. Moreover, a Machine Gun Section belonging to the 4th Regiment was in disposition southwest of Cobilak, while the Artillery Battery surveyed the heights northwest of Cobilak³³. The Cyclist Detachment advanced towards Luta, up to about 600 m from the edge of the forest, without being met with fire. It entered the village, along with the 9th Regiment, which, short time before, had been met with fire. The Cyclist Detachment occupied the heights southwest of the village, and the Squadron occupied the heights eastward, on the right bank of the Ogost, to find out what was beyond the gorge. To that end, two reconnaissance missions were organised, to Vidin-Vrata and to the forest on the right flank³⁴.

Two Bulgarian companies occupied Bel-Marcovo heights and fired. The cyclist soldier Ion Marius Teodorescu was killed. Throughout the period, the Cyclist Detachment was met with fire by the Bulgarian troops that occupied the heights north of Bel-Marcovo³⁵. At 4.30 o'clock the Artillery Battery opened fire,

²⁹*Ibidem*, p. 86.

³⁰*Ibidem*.

³¹*Ibidem*.

³²Corvin M. Petrescu, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

³³*Ibidem*.

³⁴*Ibidem*.

³⁵*Ibidem*.

following the indications of 2nd Lieutenant Roșca. Three salvoes were fired, moment when the troops retired to the forest northwest of Bel-Marcovo. General Popovici ordered to cease fire. On the same day, in the evening, there was information that part of the troops in the army of Bulgarian General Kutinceff headed to Bucovita and Vrata³⁶.

On 5 July, all orders were issued to occupy Ferdinando. To that end, the 7th Cavalry (Roșiori) Regiment, an Artillery Battery and a Machine Gun Detachment, commanded by Colonel Herascu, were assigned the mission to occupy the railway station Marcovo, to destroy the railway from Vidin and to advance towards Ferdinando³⁷.

The first pieces of information arrived around 3 o'clock. The station was occupied by enemy troops. The battery under the command of Captain Vasilescu was ordered to open fire and 24 projectiles were fired, destroying the station almost totally. The railway was then destroyed by 2nd lieutenants Șt. George and Vasilescu, between the Ogost River and the road Luta-Ferdinando. At 9 o'clock, the troop was engaged in the gorge. 2nd lieutenants Dombrovski and Boureau were there, the latter being severely wounded. They were coming back from the reconnaissance mission in Ferdinando³⁸.

The reconnaissance detachment got 2 km far from Ferdinando, where its commander received, from Lieutenant Lambrino, the information that two Bulgarian companies that were in the town came to surrender to the Romanian armed forces that advanced towards the locality. Then, Colonel Herascu immediately informed the Bulgarian commander that the town would be bombed if they did not surrender. Therefore, the proper disposition to accomplish the mission was achieved, a battery being ready to open fire against Ferdinando. Meanwhile, the Division Commander, General Bogdan, ordered that the other two batteries should execute surveillance missions, order that was rapidly executed. Everything was prepared and it was expected the decision of the Bulgarian troops commander in Ferdinando. At 11.30 o'clock, 2nd Lieutenant Lefter brought the information that the Bulgarian garrison decided to surrender to the Romanian armed forces. Then, Colonel Greceanu, at his request, entered along with his squadron in Ferdinando, to see if the garrison surrendered or not³⁹. 10 minutes after it,

³⁶ *Ibidem.*

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 87.

³⁸ *Ibidem.*

³⁹ *Ibidem.*

the reconnaissance detachment advanced towards Ferdinando, entering the town at 11.40. Ferdinando was controlled by the Romanian armed forces, the garrison being surrendered and disarmed. An enormous quantity of ammunition and supply was found in Ferdinando⁴⁰.

Meanwhile, the greatest part of General Kutinceff army was south of Ferdinando, intending to save time while retiring to Sofia. The latest news was that the Bulgarian troops, under the command of General Kuttinceff, demoralised, intended to surrender to the Romanian armed forces. In this context, the reconnaissance detachment left a platoon in Ferdinando, advancing southwards with the rest of the troops. Less than 1 km far away, it found an infantry brigade without officers, with 12 field cannons and 5 mountain cannons that surrendered. The Bulgarian officers, leaving the brigade behind, hurried to get to Berconita. Colonel Greceanu, understanding that they were not far from the location where he was, along with a squadron, decided to chase them. Surprised by the squadron mobility, the officers came across it, waving a white flag⁴¹.

While General Bogdan attended the parade of the troops that entered Ferdinando, the group of officers was brought before the commander. Only then was it found out that the officers were General Siracoff (the brigade commander) and its entire staff⁴².

During the night, the troops stationed: the 2nd Brigade in Bania and Kosarnic; the 1st Brigade and the Division Headquarters in Ferdinando, and the 3rd Brigade in Malco-Kutlovitza⁴³. The prisoners and cannons were transported to Kosanic and Bania. On 7 July, they were invited to swear to the priest in Ferdinando that they would not take up arms against Romania, being then freed⁴⁴.

Some Bulgarian troops were reported to be present around, especially in Bercovita, where infantry and artillery troops were patrolling. That is why a reconnaissance division was sent there. Under the command of Major Iernia, the division belonging to the 7th Cavalry (Roşiori) Regiment entered Vorobei. There they found a Bulgarian company that, when seeing the Romanian troops, hurried to surrender. When the division came back to Ferdinando, it was attacked by Bulgarian factions, one mounted soldier being killed⁴⁵.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem.*

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 88.

⁴² *Ibidem.*

⁴³ *Ibidem.*

⁴⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁴⁵ *Ibidem.*

On 8 July, all the weapons and cannons captured from the Bulgarians were sent to the country, and General Siracoff and the other officers made prisoners near Ferdinando were sent to the Great General Headquarters in Corabia⁴⁶. On the same day, following the attempt of the 1st Cavalry Division Commander, General Bogdan, to get in touch with the Serbian armed forces, Lieutenant Zamfirescu, who was sent to Belogratic for that purpose, succeeded in liaising the two armed forces⁴⁷.

The 1st Cavalry Division, during the operation in Cizlic-Komarevo, on 8 July, under the command of Major Negrutti belonging to the 7th Cavalry (Roșiori) Regiment, succeeded in capturing 800 Bulgarian infantrymen. To strengthen the Division, the 1st Hunter's Regiment was sent to Ferdinando⁴⁸. The large unit left Ferdinando on 9 July 1913, marching to Bercovita and entering it at noon. The 1st Regiment was sent to Klissura, where it stationed. Two hunter companies occupied Petrovan, reaching, by installing posts in Ghinti, the forward position intended by the division⁴⁹.

On 12 July, the former military attaché in București, Bulgarian Colonel Stancioff, visited General Bogdan, requesting him not to let the Serbian troops go beyond Petrovan. The Bulgarian representative request was rejected as his official position was not recognised by the Romanian armed forces⁵⁰. The next day, the Division commander received the order to occupy Bucinu-Derveni, order that was later cancelled. The Division remained in Bercovita up to the end of the campaign⁵¹.

On 18 July, it was announced the conclusion of a 5-day armistice, followed by the conclusion of the Peace Treaty in București⁵². On the last day of July 1913, the peace ceremony and the troops review took place in Bercovita⁵³. The Division was given the order to advance towards the Danube, marching on 4, 5 and 6 August, following the same route as it did when entering Bulgaria. On 6 August, the 1st Cavalry Division got to Rahova, and between 7 and 9 August, it crossed the Danube, in Corabia, being reviewed in the end. On 10 August 1913, the troops were given the order to disband, transiting to peace establishment.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 89.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem.*

⁴⁹ *Ibidem.*

⁵⁰ *Ibidem.*

⁵¹ *Ibidem.*

⁵² *Ibidem.*

⁵³ *Ibidem.*

Conclusions

The Romanian armed forces intervention in Bulgaria demonstrated their mobilisation capacity, although they were not properly prepared for such events. The lessons learned from the short regional campaign highlighted a series of shortcomings the Romanian armed forces had to face. One of them was the weak organisational cohesion of the mobilised large units and units that were “*poorly equipped, trained and manned*”⁵⁴. Another one was that, of more than 10 000 mobilised officers, only a third were active! Last but not least, the war materiel was insufficient. In 1913, in the pages of *România Militară* journal, General Averescu stated: “*The General Staff is well prepared. However, there are some shortcomings. Its organic movements are slow. Its structure is still frail, and its drive is sometimes uncertain*”⁵⁵.

Besides all the shortcomings, which culminated with the cholera epidemics and the loss of more than one thousand people, the Romanian Armed Forces campaign in Bulgaria contributed to the increase in the prestige of our country due to the operations on the Danube and the conclusion of the Peace Treaty in București. Mention should be made any military conflict, regardless of its political and diplomatic dimensions, should be seen from the socio-human standpoint. It is because, after all, people were those who fought.

English version by
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
⁵⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁵⁵ *Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul comemorării a 75 de ani de la apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1938*, București, 1939, p. 195.

EDITORIAL EVENTS


✍️ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

Florian Bichir, a friend of the Romanian military – decorated by the Ministry of National Defence with *Emblema pentru Merit Partener pentru Apărare* (*Emblem for Merit Partner for Defence*) –, succeeds once again in demonstrating that the closeness to the military institution is not situational but it is actually fruitful. Last year he published two books, which can, to some extent, stir the envy of the researchers who do not have the physical time – or motivation – to search the archives and bring to light novel histories. I refer here to *“CORSARII UITAȚIAI ADÂNCURILOR: DELFINUL, RECHINUL ȘI MARSUINUL”* (*“FORGOTTEN BUCCANEERS OF THE DEPTHS: THE DOLPHIN, THE SHARK AND THE PORPOISE”*) and *“PAMFIL ȘEICARU. UN CONDEI DE GENIU STRIVIT ÎNTRE DOUĂ DATE: 23 AUGUST 1944 - 23 AUGUST 1976”* (*“PAMFIL ȘEICARU. A GIFTED MAN OF LETTERS CRUSHED BETWEEN TWO DATES: 23 AUGUST 1944-23 AUGUST 1976”*), both published by *Editura Militară* (*Military Publishing House*). Novel documents, a large proportion of them from the collection of the Armed Forces Historical Service, presented by a professional writer having bold opinions and expressing pertinent conclusions, are some of the ingredients of a successful editorial recipe. And the race continues, because, not long ago, at the International Book Fair *Bookfest 2015*, Florian Bichir made another journalistic success, through the two books that historians – and not only – cannot ignore: *ATENTAT LA MAREȘAL. Olănești, 28 iulie 1944. Ion Antonescu – ținta parașutiștilor sovietici* (*ATTACK ON THE MARSHAL. Olănești, 28 July 1944. Ion Antonescu – the Target of Soviet Paratroopers*) and *RĂZBOI ÎN ETER. 23 august 1944 pe unde radio. (WAR IN THE ETHER. 23 August on Air)*.



of almost recent history, less known to the general public and even to many historians. The action of the Soviet paratroopers sent, in July 1944, to suppress Marshal Ion Antonescu, who was receiving spa treatment in Olănești, Vâlcea, mission that, although a failure was rigorously recorded by intelligence services, becomes a thrilling topic, with moments of suspense, also highlighting the lamentable behaviour of some “*experts*” in such actions. A topic that is capitalised on and supported through the force of archive documents, some of them novel, by the historian Florian Bichir, favoured, I would say, with respect and little envy, by the position of a member of the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS). The evidence of the author’s fair-play is present in the book, as the contribution of other experts in the field who have addressed the topic is acknowledged. We thank Florian Bichir and we suggest reading the books. It is no doubt worthwhile!

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INFO-PSIHO 2015 Symposium, organised by the Defence Intelligence General Directorate on 23 April 2015, provided us, in addition to interesting plenary and section debates, with a comprehensive approach to this field of general psychology, in a volume based on the contribution of the experts involved in its management.

Given that the new, hybrid, confrontations increasingly entail the psycho-physical engagement of the military in the theatres of operations, requiring a flexible and advanced response to unpredictable situations, a strong personality, as well as superior cognitive and intellectual skills, the book ***Psihologia militară – componentă esențială a mediului de securitate actual (Military Psychology – Essential Component of the Current Security Environment)*** can be an instrument of real theoretical and practical utility in the effort meant to enhance the knowledge of the psychosocial and sociological mechanisms, having beneficial results in terms of cognitive performance, decision-making effectiveness, easier adaptation of personality to hostile environments, improvement of the effectiveness of social networking and adaptation. Military collective cohesion rapid crystallisation, organisation dynamic and harmonisation, conflict resolution and prevention, special moral traits development in the personnel belonging to the national defence and security system, as well as better understanding of hostile

entities, in multicultural context, in order to reduce engagement risks are some of the expectations of the symposium organisers and the volume authors. A book that comprises the views of experts in psychology belonging to different structures in the national defence and security system as well as of specialists belonging to partner armed forces.

The volume, coordinated by **Colonel Dr Psychologist Cristian Dobre**, aims to provide a new perspective on military psychology and psychological operations, techniques and procedures for effective psychological assurance, multidimensional assessment of personality, detection of simulated behaviour, prevention of deviant behaviour, role and place of the leader within the organisation, aspects regarding the adaptation to the military environment, analysis of the organisational climate in groups of military or policemen, imperatives of communication in the organisation. We are convinced that the volume will lead the reader to cognitive horizons, where answers and solutions to many psychological concerns can be found.

The book appeared under the aegis of *Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I"* ("Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House).

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"Witness or directly involved in the events or actions undertaken by the Romanian Armed Forces in international missions in various theatres of operations, I have benefited from the opportunity to observe how the geopolitical and military science ideas, concepts and conceptions are applicable in practice, in the real battlefield". This is the motivation provided by **Major General (r.) Dr Visarion NEAGOE** for its latest editorial achievement, the volume *Aserțiuni euroatlantice (Euro-Atlantic Assertions)*, printed by *Editura Militară (Military Publishing House)*.

Faithful to the power of the written word and supporter of the utility of combining theory and practice, as he portrays himself, the author selected only a part of the articles and papers published or presented in some scientific forums in the country and abroad, convinced that they are still predictable and up to date. We can easily see that the promises in the foreword are supported by the contents of the book, which reveals its structure: *Security and Geopolitics, Military Art, Intelligence, Theatres of Operations*. Of course the fields are vast and the author,



without attempting to treat them exhaustively, succeeds in providing the certitude of some responsible approaches, with the expertise gained following the experience of the command and staff officer who worked for many years in the field of tactical, operational and strategic operations, writing with skill and passion at the same time.

Already acknowledged in the military and academic environment as a remarkable writer, having reference papers in the field of military theory and science, some of them being prized by our journal, as well as in the field of memoirs – and here I refer to the exceptional *front diary* “**185 de zile în Irak**” (“**185 Days in Iraq**”) –, General Neagoe does not surprise us with this new book but, on the contrary, reconfirms what we have already known, namely that he has the same passionate interest in scientific research, being preoccupied not only with exploring new areas of military theory and practice but also with potential beneficiaries capitalising on the provided knowledge. *“I consider that experience as well as the outcomes of scientific research should be transmitted to the generations to come. The ideas and concepts in the field of geopolitics, military art and intelligence developed in the first years of the 21st century should be made known and transmitted through the written word. All the more as they incorporate the war experience gained by our armed forces in different theatres of operations, where they have honourably represented Romania, continuing the Romanian people glorious tradition in the field of combat”.*

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 **Adelaida-Mihaela RADU**



This year, in March, the **Romanian Intelligence Service** celebrated 25 years of activity! A quarter of a century of *intelligence*, marked by important social and geopolitical transformations, during which the emblematic institution of the Romanian state has demonstrated that it is “*an indisputable guarantor of national interest*”.

In no. 29 issue of the journal **Intelligence** are presented the anniversary messages of the Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), Eduard Hellvig, the former Director of SRI, Ambassador George Cristian Maior, the First Deputy Director of SRI, Lieutenant General Florian Coldea and the Deputy Directors of SRI, Major General Ion Grosu, Lieutenant General George-Viorel Voinescu and Lieutenant General Dumitru Cocoru.

In this issue we signal: *De la mIRC și “don’t disturb” “într-o relație” (From mIRC and “do not disturb” “in a relationship”); Intelligence în Societatea cunoașterii (Intelligence in the Knowledge Society); Alexander Dughin și “Ministerele de forță” ale Federației Ruse (Alexander Dugin and the “Power Ministries” of the Russian Federation); Sportul amenințat de terorism (Sports Threatened by Terrorism); Dezvoltarea durabilă – o componentă a securității alimentare (Sustainable Development – a Component of Food Security); Arhitecturi și perspective operaționale – intelligence în prevenirea și combaterea terorismului (Operational Architectures and Perspectives – Intelligence in Preventing and Combating Terrorism); Constantin Brâncoveanu (1688-1714) – un precursor al diplomației secrete și al informațiilor (Constantin Brâncoveanu (1688-1714) – a Precursor of Secret Diplomacy and Intelligence); Investiție, securitate și prosperitate – trei piloni fundamentali în asigurarea și îmbunătățirea relațiilor interculturale transfrontaliere (Investment, Security and Prosperity – the Three Pillars in Ensuring and Improving Cross-border Intercultural Relations); I pak dau știre – Orele-Om-Effort (I pak Informs – Hours-Man-Effort).*

In 10 pages, we are invited to enjoy a series of photographs in the history of the SRI in which we can see the current and former presidents of Romania, former and current directors of the SRI, the emblematic figure of Pope John Paul II visiting our country in 1999, and aspects of the high-level meeting between the Director of the FBI and the current leadership of the SRI.

In the last part of the publication, Diana Ivan presents the review of the film “*L’Affaire Farewell*”, in which the central figure is the intelligence officer, the man who, beyond the profession, is “an idealist without illusions”. Moreover, *Colțul cu artă (the Art Corner)* incites us to enter, even for a second, the world of artists Daniela Sticlaru, Bogdan Mihai Radu and Matei Stoian.

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
 **Alina PAPOI**

25 May 1860. The Minister of War, Colonel Ion Emanoil Florescu submitted the *Order of the Day for the Entire Army no. 93* for the ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza approval. Through the order, the Ministry of War Library was established. For more than a century and a half the National Military Library has been “*the Romanian Armed Forces emblematic cultural institution*”, as it was suggestively called by the Commander of the Joint Logistics Command, Lieutenant General Dr Cătălin Zisu, to whom the institution has been subordinated since 2013.

We “*are told*” about this century and a half of history and culture in *Biblioteca Militară Națională – 155 de ani de existență* (*the National Military Library – 155 Years of Existence*), a book printed by the prestigious *Military Publishing House* with the support of the Joint Logistics Command. The narrators are **Colonel (r.) Dr BEng Alexandru Mihalcea**, Director of the institution, **Colonel (r.)** and remarkable poet **Liviu Vișan**, **Dr Mihai Popescu**, **Petre Florea**, **Iolanda Paraschivescu** and **Delia Petrache**. Thus, the main stages in the development of the Library are mentioned, starting from the provisions of the *Order of the Day* in 1860, according to which *the collection of books, clothes, weapons and material samples should be stored, maintained and controlled regularly (...) so that any officer can consult books, examine objects, weapons or material samples, provided by the custodian who should first inspect them and then get them back to put them in their place in the same condition*, up to now. In 2010 the Library was awarded the *Order Meritul Cultural, in the rank of Officer, E category – National Cultural Heritage*, through a Presidential Decree. The book also reproduces “*vintage*” papers originally featured in *România Militară* journal, in 1864, 1912, 1928 and 1937, as well as in specialised journals such as *Revista bibliotecilor* or *Biblioteca* journal. The directors of the cultural forum are mentioned. Of them I present the historian Nicolae Densușianu, who managed the institution for 27 years, a period considered, as Dr Mihai Popescu highlights, “*the most flourishing in the old history of the Library, marked by many accomplishments: modern library card catalogue, one of the first in the country, the last and most comprehensive printed catalogue, two regulations, the right to legally store part of the papers edited in the armed forces*”. In *România Militară* journal, Nicolae Densușianu presented, in a regular column, the most important Romanian and foreign papers purchased by the library.

The book completes, on the anniversary, the thoughts and words of those who work for the Library, the tireless and book loving people, somehow “*hidden*” among the thousands of pages, who have succeeded in creating the sometimes so fragile bridge between the ordinary man and the reader, the two important features of our natural existence.

Many Happy Returns to the National Military Library!





Issue no. 2/2015 of *Buletinului Arhivelor Militare Române – Document (Romanian Military Archives Bulletin – Document)*, appearing under the aegis of the *Armed Forces Historical Service*, has, on the front page, the message of the Minister of Defence at that time, Mircea Dușa, on the anniversary of the War Veterans Day (29 April): “*You, war veterans, are for us, your children, grandchildren and great grandchildren, an example of genuine patriotism, expressed through deeds and not through masterful words, lived with pain and suffering as a result of injuries and mutilations, but, at the same time, with dignity and honour*”. The moment is part of the suit of events

dedicated to the Year of War Veterans, the quality of veteran being officially acknowledged in 1902, through the High Royal Decree signed by Carol I, having the following motivation: *so that each veteran soldier could have a peaceful life and a job, he will be provided with all that is necessary for this purpose, as an incentive for future generations.*

As usual, the journal contains interesting materials, some of them certainly novel, the authors approaches in this issue focusing on illustrating personalities in the Romanian Armed Forces (Colonel Ștefan Fălcoianu, General Florea Țenescu), on describing some aspects from the time of the initial Romanian military postal correspondence, a “*feminine view*” on the first world conflagration, some legislative steps on strengthening the Romanian aviation combat capacity between 1938 and 1940, the effects of the Romanian Armed Forces mobilisation from 1830 up to 1941, as well as some significant aspects of the military applications within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Among the titles in the journal: “*De la spionaj la decizii diplomatice. România versus Imperiul austro-ungar (iulie-decembrie 1915)*” (“*From Espionage to Diplomatic Decisions. Romania versus Austria-Hungary – July-December 1915*”), “*Mobilizarea armatei la români. Repere istorice*” (“*The Armed Forces Mobilisation in Romania. Historical Milestones*”), “*Grănicerii Diviziei 2 Gardă*” (“*The 2nd Border Guard Division*”), “*Momente din viața generalului Nicolae Z. Vasiliu (1880-1961)*” (“*Moments from the Life of General Nicolae Z. Vasiliu (1880-1961)*”), “*Adjutantul stagiar aviator Vasile Scripcaru*” (“*Adjutant Aviator Vasile Scripcaru*”), “*Colonelul Ioan Strujan*” (“*Colonel Ioan Strujan*”).

English version by
✍️ Diana Cristiana LUPU

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Cover 1: NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, visiting the headquarters of the NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) in București, 2 July 2015. Photo: Ion Adrian Curiman. Source: <http://rft.forter.ro>

Cover 3: Military Committee Conference, 11-13 September 2015, Istanbul, Turkey. Source: www.nato.int

Cover 4: Exercise "Histria 15", in Cincu Shooting Range, 18 August 2015. Photo: Valentin Ciobârca. Source: http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20150818_1/9W2A9220



<http://www.smg.mapn.ro/gmr>