**Romanian Military Thinking**

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# Romanian Military Thinking

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Issue dedicated
to the 155th anniversary of the General Staff
and the 150th anniversary of the *"România Militară"* Journal,
founder of the *"Gândirea militară românească"* Journal

# Romanian Military Thinking
## Journal Awards

**These awards are yearly bestowed,
by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff,
on the most valuable works
in the field of military science, published in the previous year.**

Award
"Division General
Ștefan Fălcoianu"

Award
"Brigadier General
Constantin Hîrjeu"

Award
"Marshal
Alexandru Averescu"

Award
"Army Corps General
Ioan Sichitiu"

Award
"Lieutenant Colonel
Mircea Tomescu"

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*Géopolitique • Géostratégie*
*Sécurité internationale*

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## Opinions

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## Connexions internationales

# Together towards the Future

**T**he establishment of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff Corps, on 12 November 1859, during the sagacious reign of Colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza, represented, at that particular time, not only a natural act, meant to help the Romanian military body to find its calling, but also an act of great courage, in a country whose status and independent position in the European heterogeneous and fluid geopolitical context had not been completely acknowledged yet. Having a structure that would seem totally inadequate today, but being strongly determined to enforce and develop an organisational system proper to any modern army, the General Staff proved to be, from the very beginning, exactly the entity that the Romanian Armed Forces needed to lead them, under the axiomatic principle of an effective military hierarchy.

Generating profound changes in the military body, in line with its increasingly complex evolution and needs as well as with the permanent developments in the international security environment, the highest structure responsible for planning and commanding the Romanian Armed Forces has never hesitated to subject itself to sometimes painful but absolutely necessary transformations to correlate the goal with the means. The clear evidence that these operations have been successful in the depth of the military body, apart from the pain inherent in such interventions, is the invigorated body that has always been able to accomplish complex missions, sometimes not having available the necessary forces and assets, but having the particular determination derived from acknowledging the immense responsibility with which it has been entrusted by the country.

The General Staff has been built on strong pillars, which have secured, in the 155 years of existence as the highest edifice of the national military institution, durability and reliability in terms of its core duty and mission.

Structurally integrated in the architecture of the primary institution of the Romanian Armed Forces, shortly after its establishment, *România Militară* journal proved to be one of those pillars, on the one hand, and a strong binder of its constituent elements, on the other hand.

A forum for the affirmation and confrontation of the conceptual developments concerning the military body, in the context of this institution integration in the complex national socio-cultural structure, the journal has become, over time, a real treasure trove of military culture, the genuine wealth the Romanian Armed Forces have accumulated page by page, year after year, on their way forward. The pedestals of many virtual statues of great Romanian military thinkers lean on the volumes, fragile in appearance yet so strong in content, of the journal.

Part of the rich and precious cultural heritage of the country, the treasure trove of the publication will assure future generations of the solidity of the national military construction.

Its acknowledgement among the prestigious publications in the field of *Military Science, Intelligence, and Public Order* confirms its undeniable value accumulated during the 150 years since it has served, with honesty and dedication, the Romanian Armed Forces. Its pages have made the Romanian military spirit production perennial, have ensured its dissemination in the area of confrontation and affirmation of genuine conceptual developments, and have connected it to the universal values in the field.

The evolution and editorial changes it has undergone, due to the more or less deliberate understanding and acknowledgement of its mission and, particularly, to the need for survival in times of ideological confusion, have not stood in its path. On the contrary, they have reinforced its determination to overcome any obstacle. Therefore, today, *Gândirea militară românească* journal, the persevering successor to the publication that, 150 years ago, was named *România Militară – military science, art and history* by a group of young and enthusiastic officers, further remains the Romanian military journalism flagship product, with a well defined editorial programme, at the service of the Romanian army creative spirit assertion.

And, as nicely congratulated us an institution alongside we fight on the same military theory and science front, *Gândirea militară românească* remains a symbol of national military culture. A symbol and hope for the way towards the future along with the institution in whose service it has asserted itself, the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff.

***Many Happy Returns!***

✍ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

***English version by***
*Diana Cristiana LUPU*

# Ensemble vers l'avenir

L'établissement du Corps d'Etat-major général de l'armée roumaine, à 12 novembre 1859, sous le règne clairvoyant du colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza, a représenté, pour ce moment-là, pas seulement une action d'une naturelle implication du corps militaire roumain dans ses vocations, mais plus même, un geste de grand courage, dans un pays qui n'a pas encore été confirmée définitivement son statut et sa position indépendante dans l'hétérogène et l'instable ensemble géopolitique européenne. A son début, par une formule qui aujourd'hui nous semble peut-être tout à fait insuffisante, mais avec une détermination supérieure à faire respecter et à développer son système d'organisation propre à une armée moderne, l'Etat-major général s'est avéré d'être cette entité-là dont l'armée roumaine avait besoin à son élite, en vertu du principe axiomatique d'une hiérarchie militaire efficiente.

Etant un générateur de profonds changements dans l'armée, en ligne avec l'évolution et ses besoins de plus en plus complexes et d'un incessant développement de l'environnement de la sécurité internationale, cette la plus haute structure de la conception et du commande de l'armée roumaine n'a pas hésité un instant à se soumettre, lui-même, aux transformations parfois douloureux, mais absolument nécessaires en termes de permettre la corrélation entre le but et les moyens. Preuve de la réussite de ces opérations dans la profondeur de l'armée, au-delà de la douleur inhérente à ces interventions, c'est l'énergie d'un corps qui est toujours en mesure de répondre aux demandes des missions les plus complexes, avec des forces et des moyens qui ne sont pas toujours suffisantes, mais avec une détermination de comprendre les immenses responsabilités confiées à son pays.

L'Etat-major général a fondé sa construction sur des piliers forts, qui ont assuré, dans les 155 ans de son existence en tant que le plus haut bâtiment de l'organisation militaire nationale, la durabilité et la fiabilité de sa mission et de ses responsabilités essentielles.

Intégrée structurellement dans l'architecture de cette institution principale de l'armée roumaine, peu de temps après son établissement, la revue *România Militară*

a prouvé d'être, d'une part, l'un des ce piliers de la force, et, d'autre part, un liant ferme de ses éléments constituants.

Espace d'affirmation et de confrontation des élaborations conceptuelles concernant le corps militaire, dans le contexte de l'intégration de cette institution dans la complexe structure socioculturelle nationale, la revue est devenue, au fil du temps, un véritable trésor de la culture militaire. Une incontestable richesse, que l'armée roumaine a accumulé, page par page, année après année, sur son chemin vers l'avant. Le socle de nombreuses statues virtuelles de grands penseurs militaires roumaines se repose sur les volumes de la revue, fragiles en apparence, et pourtant si durables par son contenu.

Le thésaurus de la publication, comme une partie d'un patrimoine riche et précieux du pays, va garantir aux générations futures la solidité de la construction militaire nationale.

Sa reconnaissance parmi les publications prestigieuses dans le domaine *sciences militaires, informations et ordre publique* lui confirme la valeur indéniable accumulée au cours des 150 ans de service, avec honnêteté et dévouement, à l'armée roumaine. Ses pages ont conféré de la pérennité à la création de l'esprit militaire roumaine, ont assuré la diffusion dans le domaine de la confrontation et de l'affirmation de véritables élaborations conceptuelles et l'ont raccordé aux valeurs universelles dans ce domaine.

L'évolution et les transformations éditoriales supportés, de plus ou moins délibérée compréhension et l'acceptation de sa mission et, en particulier, de la nécessité de survivre en temps de confusion idéologique, n'ont pas rompue sa voie, au contraire, elles ont renforcé leur détermination à surmonter n'importe quel obstacle. Ainsi, aujourd'hui, *Gândirea militară românească*, cette persévérante publication, a continué l'activité commencée il y a 150 ans par un groupe d'officiers jeunes et enthousiastes. Ils ont appelé alors *România Militară – Ştiinţă, artă şi istorie militară*. A nos jours, la revue *Gândirea militară românească* reste, en outre, le porte-drapeau du journalisme militaire roumain, avec un programme éditorial bien défini, dans le service d'affirmation de l'esprit créatif de l'armée roumaine.

Et, quelle joie pour nous les beaux mots de la part d'une institution près de qui nous débattons sur le même front de la théorie et science militaire! En ce contexte, *Gândirea militară românească* reste un symbole de la culture militaire nationale. Un symbole et un espoir dans la route vers l'avenir ensemble avec l'institution au service de laquelle elle s'est affirmée, l'Etat-major général de l'armée roumaine!

**Joyeux anniversaire!**

*Version française par*
*Alina PAPOI*

# THE ACTIVITY OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE IN THE LAST DECADE
## – Adjustment and Response to the Challenges of the New Security Environment –

*Major General BEng Cristian Iulian DINCOVICI*

*In 2014, the General Staff and the Military Intelligence Directorate celebrate 155 years of existence, marked by their sustained involvement in the main events in our national history such as the Independence War, the First and the Second World War, the crisis in Czechoslovakia, and the conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan.*

*The author focuses on the participation of the Directorate in NATO activities and operations, following accession, deploying experts, the necessary forces and national intelligence cells in the Alliance headquarters, providing a continuous flow of intelligence products, and providing intelligence forces and resources for NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.*

*Keywords: cooperation relations; HUMINT; intelligence; command and control*

## Conditions and Characteristics of the Current Security Environment

Ever since the end of the *Cold War*, the international security environment has undergone significant transformations in terms of the nature and characteristics of the actors involved, their ideologies, interests and motivations, international demographics and economics, combat activities, weapon systems and the amount of information generated on the global level.

The progressive decrease in and degradation of all physical resources – land, food, conventional energy sources, water – resulted in the growth of international competition aimed at ensuring the fundamental needs for survival and social functioning, this being the underlying motivation for most geostrategically relevant actions of the states.

Major General BEng Cristian Iulian Dincovici – Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

These actions, with their different political and security motivations, are influenced by a new reality, which is the general access to information and its uncontrollable rate of multiplication at global level. The abundance of information and its inner entropy *(disorder)* has led to a new type of competition, to identify essential information, to order, process and transform it into knowledge, and to control the information infrastructure (*high-speed, high-capacity communication systems, IT systems, storage capacity etc.*). This competition is accompanied by hostile actions, such as cyber-terrorism, disinformation, manipulation, and promotion of radical ideologies.

All these recent realities spring from the globalisation process, which also has an impact, to different extents, on the battlefield: the combatants are exposed to new risks and threats, complex weapon systems are vulnerable to ingenious, simple and efficient improvised devices (e.g. improvised explosive devices) and to the subversive, hostile usage of public infrastructure. Moreover, combat operations are currently conducted in the context of ongoing complex information operations such as disinformation, manipulation, and recruitment campaigns, initiated by opponent forces, individuals, insurgent and radical groups and organisations.

Success of military actions in a globalised operational environment is strictly dependent on the **military intelligence activity**. The *intelligence driven operations* require both collection sensors and capabilities and the fusion of multisource information concerning not only the enemy or opposing forces but also the strategic stakes, the cultural and informational context, the different influence factors etc. These are all essential elements to the precise and efficient employment of combat forces.

## The Military Intelligence Directorate
## after Romania Joined NATO

In 2014, the General Staff and the Military Intelligence Directorate celebrate 155 years of existence, marked by their sustained involvement in the main events in our national history, such as the Independence War, the First and the Second World War, the crisis in Czechoslovakia (1968) and the conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Following the year 1989, the Romanian Armed Forces, through the General Staff, have undergone a process of deep transformation to meet Romania's defence and security needs as well as the main goal – to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Hence, in 2004, when Romania was granted NATO membership, most of the General Staff components, the Military intelligence Directorate included, had already undergone an initial restructuring process and were functionally

and organisationally prepared to live up to the new standards deriving from Romania's membership of the Euro-Atlantic structures.

The country's accession to NATO did not bring about any changes in the role of the Military Intelligence Directorate, which is to provide the political, political-military and military decision-makers with timely, actionable and relevant intelligence. However, it extended the area of responsibility, increased the number of beneficiaries, redefined the relationships with the military intelligence services of NATO member countries and increased the intelligence exchange with the aforementioned structures.

Gradually, the Military Intelligence Directorate has assumed its new responsibilities deriving from Romania's NATO membership, so that, currently, the entire activity of the Directorate is aimed at identifying, preventing and countering any external threats to national and NATO security. In order to fulfil this double-layered objective, the Military Intelligence Directorate efforts focus primarily on:

- identifying military and non-military threats to Romania and the Alliance, both on national territory and in NATO operations;
- monitoring the security situation in the areas of interest of Romania and the Alliance;
- providing the strategic beneficiaries, even during peace time, with relevant data and information concerning the potentially high-risk threats;
- ensuring a continuous flow of external political-military intelligence, to support decision-making at strategic and tactical-operational level;
- providing strategic, operational and tactical warning, in order to prevent surprise, and allowing political, political-military and military leaders to take appropriate countermeasures in due time;
- enlarging the general area of information provided, to include non-military, hybrid and asymmetrical risks;
- making a contribution to the defence planning process, in the national and allied context.

The participation of the Military Intelligence Directorate in NATO actions and operations has consisted, following accession, of deploying experts, the necessary forces and National Intelligence Cells in Allied HQs, providing a continuous flow of intelligence, in response to Allied priority intelligence requirements and requests for intelligence information, as well as providing intelligence forces and resources for NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

Making use of the experience gained from its involvement in the theatres of operations, especially in the field of *HUMINT*, the Military Intelligence Directorate established a *HUMINT Centre of Excellence – HCoE*, responsible for training NATO

military in the field of human source exploitation, at tactical level, by organising adequate courses, conferences and workgroups. The HCoE also focuses on research and experimentation, which has resulted in the development of numerous *HUMINT* studies, standard operating procedures and manuals now in use at NATO level.

## Transformation of the Military Intelligence Directorate in the Last Decade

In the context of maintaining the role and missions of the military intelligence structures, competitiveness in the field of *intelligence* resides in conceptual development, research and innovation in the intelligence activity. Operational research (*lessons learned*) ensures the correction and evolution tools essential to any learning and adaptive organisation. A systematic operational research process provides a useful scan of the organisation and its ongoing processes and helps identify the appropriate measures for improvement and enhancement.

Leadership and command-control relations, scientific planning and reduced bureaucracy are also important objectives of the transformation process. The desired end-state in this context is represented by inter-organisational relations based on trust, responsibility, visibility and transparency in the decision-making process.

The solid investment in general education and advanced, multi-disciplinary training, as well as the determination and proper attitude of the personnel have led to the development of the Military Intelligence Directorate. It has already generated visible effects such as the improvement of inter and intra-institutional cooperation and interoperability, and a certain degree of analytical independence and actional courage, at all levels of the command chain. In addition, the recent design of the organisational structure of the Military Intelligence Directorate has envisaged the development of a resilient and flexible operational capacity, able to absorb the *"shocks"* and ensure a proper career management in the field.

The transformation of the Military Intelligence Directorate has been facilitated by the procurement of modern collection capabilities and information technologies, by the implementation of flexible and efficient internal processes, as well as by the development of cooperation relations with other intelligence services and relevant organisations.

At national level, the structure and responsibilities of the Military Intelligence Directorate have largely evolved in the past decade. The Directorate is the sole coordinator of the intelligence activity carried out by all services of the Romanian Armed Forces. To this end, a unique doctrine has been developed concerning the intelligence support to combat actions, special attention being paid to standardisation,

procurement principles and requirements, and the implementation of an integrated request for intelligence management system.

The Military Intelligence Directorate is responsible for the command and control of the entire military intelligence activity regarding strategic multisource collection and analysis, and for the coordination and reach-back of the intelligence subunits deployed in the theatres of operation. The Military Intelligence Directorate currently possesses *SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT* and *IMINT* collection capabilities and conducts a sustained activity to develop its capabilities to counteract hostile actions in cyberspace.

At tactical-operational level, the Military Intelligence Directorate acts as a coordinator of the efforts of the armed forces services to develop the relevant capabilities allowing for force generation and the establishment of special subunits to be deployable in national, Allied and coalition operations, irrespective of the operational environment.

The Intelligence Brigade is a large unit subordinate to the Land Forces Staff and operationally coordinated by the Military Intelligence Directorate. The tactical-operational capabilities of the Brigade are of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) type, including a series of subunits specialised in *HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT* and *OSINT* collection, *BIOMETRICS, DOCEX/DOMEX, CELLEX* etc.

An innovative approach to *intelligence* has been the integration of special operations forces in the military intelligence activity. The complementarity of military intelligence and special ops subunits has been largely proven in their missions in Afghanistan theatre of operations.

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The transformation of the Military Intelligence Directorate entailing the development of the intelligence activity is a continuous process, influenced by the permanent evolution of the international security environment and the solid establishment of the information society. Romania's NATO membership has had a decisive role in the evolution of the Military Intelligence Directorate, which has continued the efforts to fulfil its national and Allied responsibilities and become a relevant actor in the process of permanent transformation and adjustment of the intelligence activity to the global context and challenges.

# A RELEVANT AND PERENNIAL EDITORIAL PROGRAMME: FROM *ROMÂNIA MILITARĂ* TO *GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ*

*Dr Florin DIACONU*

*This text explores, providing some details, three different topics. First of all, it identifies the three major priorities listed by the eight authors of the Programme (called* Prospect, *in the first issue of* România Militară/ Military Romania, *published in 1864). Then, the paper attempts to evaluate the way in which the programme proved to be both relevant and perennial. The final part of the article presents the professional experience of the author (a person working for entirely civilian institutions, but also a person with major professional interests in the field of strategic studies, geopolitics and military history, strongly relying on the realist paradigm in International Relations) in connection to the ongoing evolution of the professional military journal* Gândirea Militară Românească/ Romanian Military Thinking.*

**Keywords**: *military education and training; military traditions; the First World War; armed forces*

In 1864, when the first issue of *România Militară (Military Romania)* appeared (a publication which, let us not forget, is the direct *"ancestor"* of the current *Gândirea militară românească*), the army of the United Principalities had only existed for five years, and the modern Romanian national military structures, which were brought into existence in both Moldavia and Wallachia in the context of the Organic Regulations, were only about thirty years old. Therefore, we are talking about a *young national army (in fact, a very young one), going through an obvious institutional identity searching process, which – in the use of national interest – could add up a notable historical tradition (but broken by force, for more than a century after Brâncoveanu and Cantemir were forced to leave the Romanian political stage), as well as the most significant elements of the modern era, from a military point of view.*

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## 1864: Three priorities which also apply today

*România Militară* editorial programme, entitled *Prospect*, and published as a preamble in the first issue of the publication, speaks volumes about the modern Romanian military forces' search for an institutional identity. The signatories of the said text – eight relatively young officers, all captains at that moment and, we emphasise this, personalities who were to have a very important role in the development of Romanian military forces until after the War of Independence – started by clearly saying that there is a somewhat directly proportional link between the liberty of a state and its military strength: *"as the political regime of a nation is more and more free, its military organisation needs to be stronger"*[1]. The terminological ingenuity – which urged the eight not to use the term independence, which, in rapport to the Great Powers, up until the second half of the 1871-1880 decade, was rather counterproductive – is especially worth mentioning. Afterwards, making a direct reference to the legislative effort – in progress at that time – meant to organise and consolidate the military institution, the authors of the programme identified *three significant priorities*: first of all, *an undertaking meant to analyse and recuperate the historical tradition*, especially the national one *("accumulate and research the old military institutions of the Motherland, institutions which assured Romania's glory and our existence for centuries")*; then, the one regarding *the study, understanding and full assimilation of modernism, including taking over of the most consistent and relevant elements contained by the new military realities from the rest of the world* (we are also talking about the acute need to fill a vast intellectual space, relatively empty at that time, meant to comprise rather more technical knowledge about the organisation and the training of the army, as fast as possible and with very good quality content – *"lacking military scientific papers, to cover all that interests us regarding the training of the armed forces, the most solid pillar of an army"*); and, finally, *the effort to offer relevant information for the understanding of the main political and military events worldwide available to the entire officer body* (and, in more general terms, to any serviceman, regardless of rank) – *"to offer knowledge to the Romanian soldier about the military events happening in the world"*.

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[1] *"Prospect"*, in *România Militară. Sciinţă, artă şi istorie militară*, year 1, vol. I, January-February 1864 (see the recent anastatic edition, published by *Gândirea militară românească* (Editor-in-chief: Colonel Mircea Tănase, editors: Alina Papoi, Iulia Năstasie, Diana Cristiana Lupu, Adelaida Mihaela Radu), DTP: BEng Simona Calcan, Tudora Necoară, published in November 2010 by Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei – CTEA), p. 3.

### Important moments of one and a half century of history

The summaries of many issues of the *"military science, art and history"* professional publication to which we refer to here confirm, practically in a constant manner, with indifference (and even more) to the different constraints of the periods (which were not all very good) that succeeded in the history of Romania, *the force and perennial nature of this editorial programme*. For example, let us take a look at the summary of the first two numbers of *România Militară*. The January-February 1864 number comprises, beyond the *Prospect*, eleven texts[2]. Four of them contain interesting elements of Romanian political and military theory, presenting various thematic areas: the basic need for an army; then, a study with regard to several authors who write about the defence of states (including the analysis of the fortifications systems); the institution known as *Dotaţia Oastei* (*Army Procurement*, including its incomes and expenses, as well as *"its state of affairs on 31 December 1862"*); and the very interesting text entitled *Despre un sistem militar la noi* (an approximate translation would be *About a military system here*), which is based on the idea that the United Principalities were still seriously confronted with backwardness concerning military development (to be more precise, according to chief of staff Captain E. Boteanu, *"regardless of how small it is, there is not a nation in Europe today that has not developed its military powers in proportion to its population, wealth and geographical position; to be honest, only we have fallen back in this regard, and that is why it is so difficult to organise ourselves so as to be able to defend our land in times of need"*[3]. One way or another, these four texts correspond to the second editorial priority of the publication's programme – they highlight the need to construct a Romanian military (and political) theory.

Other three texts have *an obvious dominating historical element*. One of them explores the past – but also the perspectives of the future – of Gregorian fire and missiles. The second one focuses on the historic moment represented by the Battle of Cahul, regarded as the political (and military) highlight of Ioan Vodă of Moldavia's career; the third one focuses on evaluating Romanian military traditions and reclaiming them in the new set-up of Romania's military system, the basis being that *"the history of the army is strongly connected to the history of our Motherland"* and that *"the battles of Rovine, Rahova, Războieni and Călugăreni prove us that Romanians only keep their nationality and independence through the power of arms"*[4]. These three texts belong to a trajectory, described in a compact manner,

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[2] For *"Tabla de materii" (Contents)* of that first issue of the publication we are speaking about see *România Militară. Sciinţă, artă şi istorie militară*, year 1, vol. I, January-February 1864, p. 137.

[3] E. Boténu, *"Despre un sistem militar la noi"* in *România Militară. Sciinţă, artă şi istorie militară*, year 1, vol. I, January-February 1864, p. 35.

[4] George Anghelescu (căpitan de artilerie), *"Organisarea sistemului militar al României"* in *România Militară. Sciinţă, artă şi istorie militară*, year 1, vol. I, January-February 1864, p. 41.

by the first of the three editorial priorities listed by the authors of the *Prospect* – respectively the careful study of and the reclaiming of the historical tradition, especially the national one.

Four other texts are directly connected to the events which were taking place on the international stage at that time. In other words, one way or another, they complied with the third priority identified by the eight authors of the *Prospect* – according to which the specialised public had to be constantly kept up to date with significant military and political evolutions from the rest of the world. The first of these four articles focuses on utilising railroads as military operation lines[5]. The second one, after a short historical preamble, explored the evolution of the intense political and military conflict which pitted Denmark against the German states, which were at that time dominated by Austria and Prussia. The third text described and analysed the military forces of Denmark, with some references in regard to our own army. In the end, the fourth text was entitled *Chronică militară*[6] (*Military Chronicle*, in translation). In strictly quantitative terms, this text was the most consistent one of the first number of the publication; it thoroughly reviewed significant military and political recent evolutions from Romania (quoting from a Colson paper about the *"future of the Principalities"*, paper which enumerated problems and shortcomings – *"neither Principality has artillery, or a general staff"* – but also some significant trump cards – for example, the fact that *"the number of Romanian officers who studied abroad, especially in France, in the last four years is bigger than 60, 22 of which have returned to the country"*[7]), as well as from France, Austria, Bavaria, Belgium, the US, England, Serbia, Turkey and Denmark.

The second issue of *România militară* (March-April 1864) comprised a somewhat reduced number of articles (only 8[8], which meant that, in comparison to the first issue of the publication, the total number of articles dropped by almost a third, from 11), but they also strongly correspond to the same three priorities which we previously discussed. The only difference consists in the *different proportions* between the main thematic areas explored by the periodical. The issues *directly connected* to the ongoing international evolutions engrossed a significantly bigger part than in the first issue: an interesting presentation of Belgium's metallurgic industry (a relatively small country, offering an interesting comparison

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[5] G. Slănicénu, *"Căile ferate considerate ca linii de operaţii militare"*, in *România Militară. Sciinţă, artă şi istorie militară*, year 1, vol. I, January-February 1864, pp. 61-68.

[6] *"Chronică militară"*, in *România Militară. Sciinţă, artă şi istorie militară*, year 1, vol. I, January-February 1864, pp. 113-136.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 113.

[8] For the list of studies in the second number/issue of *România Militară* see *"Tabla de materii"* (Contents) in *România Militară. Sciinţă, artă şi istorie militară, op. cit.*, p. 269.

term for Romania); then, a detailed technical discussion about the pros and cons of the Armstrong Tower; then a study about the American Civil War (War of Secession), translated into Romanian; and, finally, another *Chronică militară*[9] (offering up to date information on France, England, Serbia, Portugal, Austria, the US and Russia).

The same large article and/or study categories – which, in one a way or another, correspond to the three major priorities clearly stated by the founders of the publication 150 years ago – can be easily identified after 1864 as well. We believe that, in order to highlight the *solid and perennial nature* of the publication's programme, some examples are sufficient. The most recent number of *Gândirea militară românească* (no. 3/May-June 2014[10]), which is also published online, has a total number of 21 studies and articles, organised into big thematic areas, in addition to which there are three other batches: one entitled *Univers publicistic military (Military Journalistic Universe)*, another one called *Evenimente editoriale (Editorial Events)* and one called *Cronica militară de altădată (The Military Chronicle of Bygone Years)*. Many of the 21 studies and articles focus on *military history*. The earliest period of time of our *national* history, directly explored in the texts of this very recent number of the publication is the medieval one (see the text entitled *Dezvoltarea puterii navale a formaţiunilor statale româneşti/The Development of Naval Power of Romanian State Formations*). *Universal history* is also consistently explored (a text about the war on maritime commerce during the First World War, as well as a text written by the journal's editor-in-chief, Dr Colonel Mircea Tănase, focused on the airborne operations which preceded the invasion of Normandy, as well as on the missions performed by the allied paratroopers during operation *Overlord*). Other studies explore *present day political-military or strictly military* thematic areas (see, for example, the text that discusses the current role of some traditional structures of the Afghan society, or the text about the Ukrainian crisis, regarded as a measure instrument for UN's relevance and functional character), as well as *seriously prospective* thematic areas (for example, see the second part of a study that discusses aspects referring to land-based artillery during the 2030s-2040s). *The connection of the Romanian public to the nowadays universal political-military thinking* is also present (see, for example, the brief presentation – throughout the effort made by some specialists from the National Military Library – within the framework of *Univers publicistic militar* of the summary of some military theory and history, as well as strategic and geopolitical culture publications

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[9] *"Chronică militară"*, in *România Militară. Sciinţă, artă şi istorie militară*, year I, vol. II, March-April 1864, pp. 261-268.

[10] *Gândirea militară românească. Revistă de teorie şi ştiinţă militară editată de Statul Major General al Armatei României*, new series, year XXV, no. 3, May-June 2014, .pdf text at the Internet address http://www.mapn.ro/smg/gmr/Arhiva_pdf/2014/revista_3.pdf.

from Switzerland, France, Spain, Germany, the US, UK, Japan; it is worth mentioning that, like Romania, the majority of these states are NATO members, while four of them are also part of the EU).

## GMR: A friendly and flexible intellectual platform

I read *Gândirea militară românească (GMR)* on a regular basis. During the past years, I have published more than half a dozen studies and articles in different issues (in Romanian and English, as well) of the journal. Therefore, on the occasion of this publication's anniversary (and a celebratory moment for its big-hearted editorial staff), I find it natural to review certain issues, which clearly go beyond a strictly circumstantial relevance. For quite some time (almost twenty years), I have been teaching and studying at a *civilian* (clearly *non*-military) faculty (that of Political Science, at the University of Bucharest) different topics that are directly – and massively – connected to military aspects. For example, you cannot talk about international relations without making consistent references to the military component of national power; or without thoroughly discussing about political-military alliances; or without seriously discussing wars (especially those which Gilpin[11] called hegemonic wars, assuming one of Raymond Aron's older formulations). Likewise, you cannot teach strategic studies without, once again, discussing the structures and the forms in which military power is exhibited and used. Even in the case of my Praxeology of International Relations course, which I have been teaching for over 15 years (the only one of this sort in Romania, to my knowledge), I find it very useful to extensively use examples from universal military history. Of course, professionally speaking, I have relatively little interest in strictly *tactical* matters, or in discussions which focus entirely on technologies with military relevance. But the courses I teach practically oblige me to constantly deal with *strategy* (especially what B.H. Liddell Hart called *grand strategy* or *superior strategy*[12]). I am not suggesting that you cannot write about these subjects in non-military publications. But my – and others, I presume – desire and availability are resumed by the proverb which tells us that *birds of a feather flock together*. From such a predominantly *professional* perspective, I clearly *feel at home* in the pages of *GMR*, alongside very diverse people (and who, in many cases, I know only from *what* they write and *where* they publish it), but with whom I have a very solid common denominator – complementary professional preoccupations, strongly connected to strategic & military topics. I also *feel very much at home* in the pages of *GMR* from another perspective: that of inter-human relations. I have been to the editorial office on several occasions;

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[11] Robert Gilpin, *Război şi schimbare în politica mondială*, Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 2000, p. 254.
[12] For the definition of *grand strategy* see B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategia. Acţiunile indirecte*, Ed. Militară, Bucureşti, 1973, p. 334.

I talk relatively often with the editor-in-chief, Colonel Dr Mircea Tănase. I also attended several academic activities alongside people from the *Gândirea militară românească* editorial staff (in some occasions, I was invited by them, while in others, I was the organiser/host). On *every* such occasion, *the politeness and openness towards dialogue* (not a mimed dialogue; a serious and in-depth one, compromise-free and aggression-free, that did not avoid delicate subjects) of *everyone* from the editorial office was faultless (and, I emphasise this, both features are *very special skills*, which many do not possess today, but that I have *repeatedly* come across in the nowadays Romanian military world – first of all, almost 15 years ago, while as a student of the National Defence College, I visited numerous military units from all the historic regions of the country; and then, on the numerous occasions – basically every year of the last decade – when I attended academic manifestations organised by the *Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies*, part of the *National Defence University "Carol I"*, now led by Colonel Dr Stan Anton; and, of course, in *all* the occasions when I interacted with people who are part of *Gândirea militară românească* editorial staff. Of course – at least on a long term – it is of little importance whether myself or other people are comfortable (a situation which I described through *feeling at home*), or not, in the pages of *GMR*. But *all* of these episodes (each of them small, but extremely numerous and, thus, not at all accidental) prove a *very important aspect of Romania's public life and 'market' of ideas: the military institution is remarkably opened to inter-institutional dialogue, voices and ideas from the non-military world.* In a general context in which, on different occasions, the professional vanities and rivalries often degenerate into conflicts, next to which the extreme savagery of inter-tribal conflicts fades away, the staff of *GMR* (as well as the staff of the *Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies*) is constantly *different*, in an *unexpectedly* good way. Thus, I am really glad that I was – and will be – able to collaborate (in a useful way, I hope, but that is only for the readers to decide) with such people. I am also glad that, alongside them, I had the chance of becoming part of *an institutional history and of an evolving path of ideas* which covers 150 years. I am also glad that *GMR* has shown *remarkable openness towards very young voices from the civil academic space.* For example, several of the *very* good students with whom I had the chance to collaborate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest and at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute had their texts accepted and published by the *GMR*. These are all important matters, if we look at them from the angle of *the functional relation between the professional military world and the civilian academic world.* In fact, if we are *"to dot one's i's"*, as we say in Romanian, all these are *very* important matters.

# "DECEBAL" TRAINING CENTRE FOR COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

*Colonel Dr Dorin ALEXANDRESCU*

*Between 2008 and 2013,* "Decebal" *Training Centre managed the education and training of 6 279 graduates (officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, civilian personnel) within 10 career courses, 3 initial training courses, 30 follow-up/speciality courses and other forms of training.*

*Since its establishment, opines the author, all the activities conducted have met their goals, the entire personnel demonstrating the qualities necessary to accomplish the centre core mission, fact that has been confirmed by the control commissions at different echelons that have assessed the training centre activity.*

**Keywords**: *specialised fighter; individual training; professional military; scientific research*

The extraordinary changes generated by the technological progress at the beginning of the millennium urges us to talk about an age of electronics and information technology, a real information age, communications playing thus a crucial role.

In the 21st century, the key technology has been linked to the collection, processing and distribution of information. We have witnessed the installation of telephone networks, the invention of radio and television, the unprecedented emergence and development of computer industry, the launch of telecommunications satellites. All these aspects have influenced the society and, implicitly, the military body.

For the past few years we have been witnessing the spectacular evolution of technology in the field of military communications. This fact demands highly proficient training for experts in this field.

Capitalising on the long tradition of military training in the communications and IT branch, *"Decebal" Training Centre for Communications and Information Technology* provides initial, speciality and follow-up professional training for officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers for the three services

Colonel Dr Dorin Alexandrescu – Commandant of *"Decebal"* Training Centre for Communications and Information Technology, Sibiu.

of the General Staff, as well as for the communications and IT experts belonging to other beneficiaries.

## Brief History

- **1 July 1942 –** the Signal Command and the Training Centre in Communications with the Signal Corps Officer Candidate School and the Signal Corps Non-commissioned Officer Candidate School were established on 1 July 1942, by Order no. 87223 on 23 June 1942, issued by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff;



*The building of the first Signal Corps Officer Candidate School*
*Cotroceni – București*

- **31 December 1942 –** the signal branch was separated from the engineer branch by Decree no. 3818/31.12.1942;

- **15 April 1944 –** the Signal Corps Officer Candidate School was evacuated and established in Mihai Vodă village, 30 km far from București;

- **27 May 1944 –** the school was evacuated in Gura Barza village, Hunedoara county, more precisely in the villages of Gura Barza, Țăndărei, and Crișcior, situated 5 km east of Brad;

- **28 November 1944 –** moved back to București, the school resumed its activities in its old building, situated on King Alexander I of Yugoslavia Boulevard, no. 3;

- **22 January 1945 –** the Chief of the General Staff ordered by Instruction no. 75500 the merging of the Signal Corps Officer Candidate School with the Engineer

Corps Officer Candidate School; the same fate befell *"Grădiştea"* Signal Corps Non-commissioned Officer Candidate School as well;

- **1 March 1945** – following merging, the Engineer and Signal Corps Officer and NCO Candidate School began its activity;

- **1948** – the school was moved to Sibiu;

- **1950** – by Order no. 123081 issued by the Chief of the General Staff, the Signal Corps Officer Candidate School merged with the Signal Technical Officer and NCO Candidate School, functioning in București, thus remaining only one signal corps officer candidate school with two specialities: combat officers and technical officers (in 1960, the signal corps technical officer speciality was dropped);

- **1951** – the school was named Military Signal School and, for a year, it trained radar specialists as well;

- **1961-1972** – signal corps officers were trained in *"Nicolae Bălcescu"* Superior Officer Candidate School in Sibiu;

- **1 January 1972** – by Decision no. 1616/17.12.1971 of the Council of Ministers, the Signal Corps Active Officer Candidate School was re-established in Sibiu;

- **14 July 1972** – the Signal Corps Active Officer Candidate School received its combat flag based on Order no. 4 issued by the Defence Minister on 3 June 1972 and on the Decree no. 126 on 18.04.1972;

- **1987** – Government Ordinance no. 42/14.08.1987 of the Minister of National Defence stipulated the school reorganisation in peacetime, by also training signal corps WO and NCO candidates; moreover, the school also trained IT WOs;

- **1 August 1990** – Government Ordinance no. 906/06.08.1990 changed the school's name into *"Decebal"* Military Signal School;

- **22 March 1991** – Government Ordinance no. 190/22.03.1991 changed the school's name into *"Decebal"* Military Signal Institute;

- **1 June 1997** – Order M-12/21.02.1997 changed the school's name into *"Decebal"* Training School for Communications, IT and Electronic Warfare;

- **1 August 2005** – Order MS-74/28.04.2005 changed the school's name into the *Training Centre for Communications and IT*, the school being subordinated to *"General Eremia Grigorescu"* Training School for Combat Support Units;

- **April 2006** – the Heraldry Commission of the Ministry of Defence approved, based on DR 1476, that starting on 18 June 2006 the school can bear the honorific title *"DECEBAL"*;

- **1 September 2008** – Order no. B/S 329/08.08.2008 issued by the Chief of the General Staff changes the school's name into *"Decebal"* Training Centre for Communications and IT, re-subordinating it to the Communications and Information Command.

## Education and Training

According to its main mission and fundamental goal, the training centre aims at providing:

- initial training, development and enhancement of individual and collective general military and specialised skills, in compliance with performance standards in the field of communications and IT;
- initial branch speciality training as well as training for the first speciality of officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers;
- follow-up professional development (career courses) and speciality training (specialisation courses) in the communications and IT branch of officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers;
- participation in operations and missions within NATO and other partnership coalitions;
- research, development and regulations in the branch;
- coordination of training in *"Fraţii Buzeşti"* Communications and IT Training Battalion;

The education and training activities conducted in the training centre are performed continuously in compliance with some clear principles, such as:

- unitary training planning and organisation so that the entire education

process can enjoy a systemic foundation of training objectives;
- efficient employment of all available human resources and assets;
- optimum ratio between the cognitive and the practical-applicable character of the training process;
- efficient concentration of efforts to sequentially meet the goals.

*"Decebal" Training Centre for Communications and Information Technology* is one of the two military education institutions in the Romanian Armed Forces having its own *ADL (Advanced Distributed Learning)* platform. The implementation of its own distance learning platform, optimised to respond to the communications and IT training requirements is one of the centre's ongoing concerns to meet the increased and more diversified training needs. Therefore, to optimise the ratio between the requirements of continuing professional education and the necessity to fulfil the job responsibilities, at least three determining factors need to be taken into consideration, such as:
- *reducing the time spent by trainees in the training centre* to facilitate the performance of current duties;
- *alignment with NATO standards* in terms of optimising the ratio between the operational requirements of modern warfare and the need for continuing training;
- *optimising/facilitating the acquisition of informational content* by trainees through the use of appropriate information technology tools.

*Claroline* e-learning platform has been chosen to achieve these objectives, being tested and customised previous to being used on the internet. The platform is operational starting in January 2013.

The activities conducted so far represent the defining prerequisite for launching new challenges in this context. Therefore, the continuous enhancement of training courses will continue through their *strict orientation towards the needs of the beneficiary*. Moreover, the courses scope will be enlarged by implementing *CYBERDEFENCE* – type *courses/ facilities/ solutions* in order to provide a real support in this context by offering possible solutions and appropriate training. Creating/hosting some courses meant to train by simulation experts in the field of simulation-based training (train the trainers) to facilitate the *implementation of the 3D Virtual Reality concept* is another direction that we intend to follow.

Another possible direction will be to extend the use of the platform in the Intraman network, too, so that the *courses/speciality laboratories to be conducted online.*

Between 2008 and 2013 the training centre managed the education and training of 6 279 graduates (officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, civilian personnel) within 10 career courses, 3 initial training courses,

30 follow-up professional development/speciality courses and other forms of training (Specialised Fighter Module, Individual Specialisation Training of professional soldiers).

Since its establishment, all the activities conducted have met their goals, the entire personnel demonstrating the qualities required to accomplish the centre's main mission, fact that has been confirmed by the control commissions at different echelons that have assessed the training centre's activity.

## Scientific Research

The research activities are organised and coordinated by the Research, Development and Regulations in the Branch Section, in compliance with the specific orders and provisions in force. The personnel of this section have to:

- develop specific documents and military manuals correlated with the existing ones, with the international treaties to which Romania is party, and with similar publications of the relevant structures in other NATO member states;
- organise and conduct, within mixed groups consisted of both trainers and trainees, fundamental research activities in order to improve and enhance the efficiency of the process of education;
- develop standardised training products, compatible and interoperable with the ones in force in NATO member countries;
- gather data and information to document lessons learned;
- exploit the positive experience gained in internal and international military practice;
- forward proposals for acquiring new equipment and for modernising the existing equipment;
- participate in activities for accepting and implementing NATO/EU standardisation documents;
- edit and publish the branch and the training centre periodicals.

The achievements and involvement of the military and civilian personnel of the research branch in this multitude of areas of responsibility demonstrate openness and availability to take the job further. The future activities of this branch include the development of military manuals to be used for training communications and IT units and subunits, the review of already existing manuals, and the development of the relationships with other research organisations and with organisations specialised in producing specific equipment.

## Training Facilities

*"Decebal" Training Centre for Communications and Information Technology* provides training facilities that support a highly proficient training activity

comprising: 2 lecture rooms, 3 laboratories for communications and IT tactics, military security laboratory, conference room, English language laboratory, *Panther* radio stations laboratory, *Harris-Falcon II*, RF-5800V type radio stations laboratory, *Harris-Falcon II*, RF-5800H type, radio stations laboratory, laboratory for integrated communications systems, 2 laboratories for communications equipment maintenance, the Deployable Communications and IT Module laboratory, 4 laboratories for the Permanent Signal Network/National Military Communications Network centres, laboratory for command and control (C2) systems, power supply systems laboratory, 5 IT laboratories, ACT equipment laboratory, 2 Internet rooms, sports hall, sports ground, library with reading room and 12 classrooms/study rooms.

Moreover, the centre has two libraries: fiction and unclassified library with 22 009 titles/75 236 volumes (among which 213 titles/1 048 volumes in foreign languages) and the classified library with approximately 3 829 documents/volumes. All these provide the necessary bibliography for a proper conduct of the education and training process.

The sports hall facilitates the proper organisation of basketball, volleyball, handball and tennis games as well as the conduct of the physical training classes including gymnastics. In addition to the sports hall, there are two fitness halls with appropriate equipment and other necessary related facilities (shower, sauna), that are available for the entire personnel.

In order to provide information technology training and develop foreign language skills, the training centre has the necessary facilities to train, in rotation, all groups of trainees/students as well as the centre's military and civilian personnel.

We take this opportunity to assure all beneficiaries of our educational offer within the entire Defence and Public Order system that *"Decebal" Training Centre for Communications and Information Technology* will continue to develop its training capabilities, to implement the latest training methods in order to meet all the challenges of military education.

The year 2014 is an important one for the Romanian Armed Forces considering that this year we celebrate 10 years since Romania joined NATO, 155 years since the General Staff was established, as well as 150 years since the first issue of *România Militară* Journal, the predecessor of *Gândirea militară românească/ Romanian Military Thinking* Journal, was published. On this occasion the training centre staff wishes a warm **"Happy Anniversary!"** to the General Staff command as well as to the *Gândirea militară românească/Romanian Military Thinking* Journal.

# TOGETHER IN A TIME OF CELEBRATION

*Colonel Dr Filofteia REPEZ*

Gândirea militară românească, *a journal that was first published under the name* România Militară *150 years ago, on a group of young officers' initiative, celebrates its anniversary. The quality and content of the materials published in this journal over the years, the professionalism of the editorial staff and the journal visibility make up its presentation card. Over time, a lot of professors from the initially called Superior War School, now "Carol I" National Defence University, have had their articles published in the journal. Thus the University has demonstrated its quality of generator and promoter of novelty elements in the military theory and practice.*

***Keywords***: *România Militară; Gândirea militară românească; "Carol I" National Defence University; celebration; history*

## From *România Militară* to *Gândirea militară românească*

The *"România Militară"* (Military Romania) journal was established in 1864 by the initiative of a group of young officers, all active militaries from the elite of the first promotion of București *Cadet School*, planned by Vodă Bibescu but established by Barbu Știrbei.

Back then, it was the third military publication, after *Observatorul Militar (Military Observer)* established in 1859 and *Monitorul Oastei (Army Monitor)* in 1860.

The young officers who completed their homeland studies with those abroad were Captains: Slăniceanu G. (Corps of Engineers), Gramont A. (General Staff), Borănescu G. (Corps of Engineers), Angelescu G. (General Staff), Angelescu A. (Artillery), Arion E. (Artillery), Boteanu E. (General Staff), Pencovici E. (General Staff), Barozzi C. (Corps of Engineers).

The first issue of the journal, with the slogan *"Military Science, Art and History"* on its front cover, appeared on 15 February 1864. The initiators of the journal were also the authors of the articles published in the first issue: *"The Basic Need for an Army"* – G. Borănescu; *"Study on States' Defence"* – A. Anghelescu; *"Army Procurement"* – E. Pencovici; *"On a Military System in Our Country"* – E. Boteanu;

Colonel Associate Professor Dr Filofteia Repez – Security and Defence Faculty, *"Carol I"* National Defence University, București, Romania.

*"The Organisation of Romania's Military System"* – G. Angelescu; *"The Railroads Used as Military Operations Lines"* – G. Slăniceanu; *"Ion Vodă and the Battle of Cahul"* – E. Pencovici; *"The History of Schlesvig-Holstein Duchies and the Conflict in Denmark"* – E. Boteanu.

However, the documentary materials of the time do not include large information about the preconditions of the first issue: *"We do not have details on how this issue was created nor about the editorial or administrative difficulties encountered by the first founders in publishing the first pages of the journal"*[1].

In the first year, the subscription fee was set to 2 gold coins per year, 1 gold coin for 6 months, and a single issue was sold with $2^{1/2}$ bronze coins.

The intellectual activity of its initiators was appreciated even from the start, because they contributed to the dissemination *"in our armed forces of the idea that the military training, organisation and education should be developed in close relation to our people's behaviour, traditions, cultural and national aspiration"*[2].

The journal was published in four periods/series under this name – 1864-1866, 1891-1897, 1898-1916 and 1921-1947. The publication of the journal was ceased after 1866 due to the lack of money, and after 1916 because of our country's entry into the unification war. Starting 1908, *"România Militară"* was placed under the *"High Patronage"* of His Royal Highness, Prince Ferdinand of Romania.

Between 1898 and 1899, the journal had a companion publication, *"Buletin al României Militare" (Bulletin of Military Romania)* both with the same format. The Bulletin was published weekly in order to provide the readers with news from the country and abroad as well as relevant scientific and literary details. The lack of financial resources for the Bulletin did not make it possible for it to be transformed into a daily publication and eventually led to the publication being ceased altogether.

The year 1900 remains in the journal's history as a successful year, *"România Militară"* being present to the *"General Exhibition"* in Paris where it was awarded the Gold Medal, the jury acknowledging the value of the ideas regarding the progress of the army, which were included in the published materials.

The journal also participated in the Romanian general exhibition organised in 1906 in *"King Carol I"* Park and was awarded a *"Gold Medal and the special diploma"*.

The 40th anniversary of the journal was celebrated in the evening of 15 February 1904 at the residence of General C.I. Brătianu, Chairman of the journal's Editorial Board.

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[1] ***, *Din trecutul "României Militare". Cu prilejul comemorării a şaptezeci şi cinci de ani dela apariţia ei în viaţa armatei 1864-1938*, Bucureşti, 1939 (in the rare book fund of the *"Carol I"* National Defence University Library), p. 31.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 38.

To resume our story, in 1864, there was a trend among the military writers, who wanted to gather all military journals into a single one. There were pros and cons to this, but the opinions supporting the independence of the journals prevailed. Therefore, between 1864 and 1897, the journal was independent.

By the High Royal Decree no. 3663 of 8 December 1897, *"România Militară"* journal became, starting 1 January 1898, the official journal of the General Staff, in which all the active officers belonging to all the branches were able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interested the Armed Forces. The main goal of the journal, as stated in regulations, was *"to publish all the progress made by foreign armies which the other Romanian journals could not obtain"*[3].

The issues from July 1921 and October 1935 included a series of papers grouped according to the following topics: strategy and tactics; manoeuvres; battles in the mountains, crossing rivers; arbitrage; reconnaissance; situational awareness; tactical themes; artillery; cavalry; fortifications, motorisation, transports, transmissions, camouflage; aeronautics; navy; sanitary matters; services; gas; armament; chariots; fire plan; technical body organisation; intelligence; history; the history of our war; the First World War; news about foreign armies; general knowledge; physical education and pre-enrolment preparation; recruitment; education; role of different commanders; military chiefs; hero cult; military justice; various proposals, sketches; short stories; reports[4].

The best articles published in *"România Militară"* were awarded, therefore stimulating intellectual production. For example, in 1933, according to the decision of the journal's Editorial Board, some articles were awarded money prizes as follows: General Popescu B. Dumitru, for the articles *"The Matter of Wide Rivers Crossing in Future Conflicts"*, *"Determining Objectives in Attacks"* and *"Shaping the Soul of Tomorrow's Soldier"* – 3 000 lei; Major Mârza Eugen, for the article *"Operations Command in Wintertime"* – 3 000 lei; Captain Sandovici Constantin, for the article *"Returning to the Past"* – 2 000 lei; other articles were awarded honourable mentions: *"The Acts of Command in the Light of the Law"* by Colonel Manolache Constantin; *"Neuropsychological Disturbances during the First World War"* by Colonel Preda Gheorghe MD.

After 1947, the journal continued to exist but was published under different names: *"Revista Militară Generală/General Military Journal"* (1947-1948), *"Cultura Militară/Military Culture"* (1948-December 1958), *"Probleme de artă militară/Issues of Military Art"* (1959-1989), *"Gândirea militară românească/Romania Military Thinking"* journal (1990-present).

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[3] Marele Stat Major, *Regulamentul Revistei România Militară*, București, 1897, Art. 1, p. III.

[4] *Indicator al articolelor scrise în "România Militară", Revista Infanteriei, Revista Cavaleriei şi Revista Geniului în anii 1921-1935*, Tipografia Ministerului Apărării Naţionale, București, 1935, pp. 5-70.

Originated from the desire to promote ideas in the Romanian Armed Forces, *"România Militară"* contributed to the development of officers' esprit, *"encouraging them to pursue the military education and drawing leaders' attention to guiding the life of the state and the future of the country on the pathways of historic destiny"*[5].

The contribution to the development of our country's armed forces was acknowledged also in the pages reminding of the journal's history: *"România Militară, as one can see from its pages, has always been relevant for the spirit of the armed forces, always determining, in a competent and anticipated manner, and by intellectual discussions, precious proposals and suggestions to continuously organise, improve and make known the intellectual progress, which has widely contributed to the development of our military body"*[6].

After 1990, under a new name, *"Gândirea militară românească"*, unshackled from the limitations imposed by the communist ideology, the journal embarks on a new path, managing to be among the journals appreciated by military and civil readers alike.

Always connected to the realities of the national and international military and civil environment, the *"Gândirea militară românească"* journal remains the forum of presentation and debate for the various issues with which the military institution is confronted.

## The Contribution of the Superior School of War to the Creation of *"România Militară"* Journal

The revival in 1892 of *"România Militară"* was attributable to King Carol I, who *"came from a country where culture was developed in all the branches, therefore also in the military science branch"* and *"aimed to spread the culture in the army as well, harmonising the intellectual qualities and officers dignity in parallel"*[7].

The Romanian military science and art enhanced the thesaurus of ideas, concepts and orientations through the depth of scientific analysis, complexity and diversity of topics addressed, by connecting to the internal and international reality of the time or by viable solutions given to defending the territorial integrity of our country as well as by the papers of academics who were part of a prestigious institution of Romanian military education or officers who attended their classes.

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* Since 2005, the English version of the journal has been published under this name: *Romanian Military Thinking* (editor's note).

[5] ***, *Din trecutul "României Militare"*, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

[6] *Ibid,* p. 177.

[7] *Ibid,* p. 73.

The mentioned institution was the Superior School of War in București, one of the first in Europe after the ones in Berlin, Vienna, Paris, Torino and Brussels, which was permanently connected to *"România Militară"*.

The titles of the articles published years ago by the academics of this institution are very interesting even today. Here are a few examples: *"Operative Intentions of French General Staff in 1914 Seen from the Perspective of the German General Staff"* – Colonel I. Sichitiu, in the September-October 1921 issue; *"The Role of Large Units Commanders"*, Colonel I. Sichitiu, the May 1925 issue; *"The Personal Element in Tactics"*, Lieutenant Mircea Tomescu, the November 1931 issue; *"The Peace Treaty of Versailles"*, General I. Jitianu, the September 1931 issue; *"Military History"*, Captain Mircea Tomescu, the July-August 1931 issue; *"The Present and Future of Aviation"*, General V. Economu, the April 1932 issue; *"Historical Impossibilities"*, General V. Economu, the February 1933 issue; three articles named *"Cavalry – Possibilities – Missions – Means of Action"*, Captain Mircea Tomescu, the June, July-August and September 1934 issues; *"Spanish Civil War"*, General V. Economu, the December 1937 issue etc.

General Ștefan Fălcoianu, the first commander of the Superior School of War, was the only person to publish in the journal' pages, throughout seven years, a study on the history of the 1877-1878 war. That was a major study regarding our military history, actually the single one of this type.

Publishing such studies was considered at that time as a requirement *"for breaking through the darkness of the army life and describing the battles from the past... for the Romanian people to maintain its nationality, in order not to become slave of other nations and our country not to become foreigners property"*[8].

The *Forward* opening the 12th issue in December 1935 was signed by General Virgil Economu, graduate of the 18th class series and later professor at the Superior School of War (where he taught the Military History class) who wrote that *"one of the first duties and spiritual necessities of a soldier is to know his country"* and welcomed the initiative of *"România Militară"* journal to write in its pages about a Romanian territory considered *"a picture of the Romanian land that truly deserved its name of Sweet Bucovina"*[9].

A well-versed about the realities of his time, General I. Jitianu, head of the 21st class series and Professor at the Superior School of War (he taught the General Tactics and Military History classes between 1921 and 1926), wrote the following in the article *"Today's Europe"*: *"in all humankind there is a conflict*

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[8] *Ibid*, 1939, p. 256.

*today between the political illusions and the real economic needs of peoples ... As long as the elites were leading, peoples progressed, because their leaders had superior intelligence, character, desire to work, sacrificing everything for the community wellbeing"*[10].

Captain Mircea Tomescu, the 36th class series, distinguished himself by approaching the most general aspects of warfare in his writings. Among the articles published in *"România Militară"*, we should mention *"The Personal Element in Tactics"*, in which he claimed that the reason for divergences regarding tactical aspects was represented by the personal element *"intervening both in the manner of understanding and in the way of judging problems"*, also making an analysis of the intervention of the personal element in tactics, positive data assessment and choosing guidelines[11].

Not only the professors of this famous school published articles in the journal, but also graduate students. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Ion Cernăianu, who graduated from the Superior School of War in 1925, the 31st class series, had numerous collaborations with *"România Militară"*. In the article entitled *"War and Philosophical Trends"* he made an analysis of the war in 1806 and concluded *"... war develops a certain philosophical mentality, being caused, in its turn, by such a mentality... The real reasons of an armed conflict are not the ambition, the conflict of interests or certain personalities but the source and justification for war lies in the general psychological directive of a nation or even of the entire humankind"*[12]. Mention should be made that, in his published papers and articles, he insisted on the development of a strategic doctrine with defensive character, corresponding to the specifics of our armed forces, and argued that the manoeuvre must be based on the geometrical factor, which actually brought together combinations of directions, the preponderance of flanking manoeuvre or manoeuvre in the rear, the ingenuity in action[13].

The Superior School of War was acknowledged by the journal's writers as *"... the highest military education body that harmonises and develops the military art and science in all the branches"*, whose education *"should be generalised for the superior hierarchy, by selecting and training staff officers, developing moral and intellectual prestige ... therefore, the school must be provided with all the material and spiritual*

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[9] General Virgil Economu, *Cuvânt înainte*, in *"România Militară"*, no. 12, December 1935.

[10] Published in no. 1, January 1932, *"România Militară"*, p. 55.

[11] Published in no.11, November 1931, *"România Militară"*, pp. 44-51.

[12] Published in no. 1, January 1932, *"România Militară"*, p. 21.

[13] Emil Ion, *Şcoala Superioară de Război şi Academia Militară (1889-1989)*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 66.

*means necessary in order to correspond to the goal it has to fulfil in the intellectual life of the army"*[14]. Regarding the academics and the leadership, it was mentioned that *"they should be selected"* and the *"examination committees should have intellectual authority, moral prestige, competence and honesty"*[15].

The pages of the journal also included various proposals regarding the Superior School of War. For example, the proposal made in 1898 by one of the authors of the journal, namely that the Military School of Administration should be included in the Superior School of War *"as a section meant to train quartermasters, army economists... who must study law, political economy, finances, as well as applied science in the industry and commerce field"*[16].

## The Collaboration Continues

For the academics of *"Carol I"* National Defence University (NDU), *"Gândirea militară românească"* journal has a special place in their professional development. The articles published by the professors of this institution have addressed various topics, related to: international security, geopolitics and geostrategy, military management, international military reality, Romanian military history etc.

The collaboration and continuous exchange of ideas with the Editorial Board, the Editorial Staff and scientific reviewers is a constant of the relation established between the university professors and the journal.

The papers published in the journal's pages by the academics or student-officers proved once again that *"Carol I"* National Defence University continues to be an institution that generates and promotes novelty elements in the military theory and practice, in the security and defence field.

Therefore, the collaboration started a long ago by the body of professors of the Military School of War is carried on in all seriousness and with full commitment by the body of professors of *"Carol I"* National Defence University.

## Congratulations instead of Conclusions

No matter its name, the journal celebrating its 150 anniversary this year declared itself from the very first issue in favour of arming the nation, as guiding principle of the organisation of the country's military power, expressing the need for a permanent army and the importance of national reserves, promoting the knowledge of national military history and the integration of the Romanian

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[14] ***, *Din trecutul "României Militare"*, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-213.

[15] *Ibid*, p. 213.

[16] *"România Militară"*, March 1898, pp. 1-9, apud ***, *Din trecutul "României Militare"*, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-215.

people traditions, qualities and virtues in the training-educational process, as well as the assimilation of the universal values of military theory, organisation and practice.

The initial goal of *"România Militară"* journal – *"to bring the Romanian soldier up to date with the military events taking part in the world"*[17] – is further pursued with passion and dedication by the *"Gândirea militară românească"* journal.

In time, the journal has proved to be a continuous source of information and suggestions, by the variety and novelty of ideas, by the way in which it addresses different matters the army has been confronting with, by the way it has spread the military culture. Thus, the journal has always treasured the value of writing in the education and development of the Romanian military culture.

The ideas promoted, their intellectual value, the quality of the Editorial Board and Editorial Staff, the invitation to study made to the militaries, the support offered to the academics belonging to military education institutions for career development are just a few of the strengths that confirm the place of *"Gândirea militară românească"* journal among the most successful national publications.

The contribution of the journal to the development of military culture is undeniable!

To celebrate the road travelled so far, the goals reached and the hardships overcome, here it is a warm greeting from a professor from *"Carol I"* National Defence University: **May you publish as many issues as possible in the future! Happy Anniversary!**

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[17] *"România Militară"*, no. 1, 1864, Imprimeria Ministerului de Resbel, Bucuresci, p. 3.

# *"KING FERDINAND I"* NATIONAL MILITARY MUSEUM
## – Metamorphoses in Time and Space –

*Dr Cristina CONSTANTIN*

*One of the prestigious cultural institutions with an important role in promoting the historical-military traditions of the Romanian Armed Forces is "King Ferdinand I" National Military Museum. Even if the preoccupation in collecting military historical artefacts began in the middle of the 19th century, a military museum was to be created as an independent institution only in 1923. This paper makes a short presentation of the metamorphoses of this institution during 90 years of existence. Nowadays, the museum has a distinct place in the national cultural landscape, by offering to specialists as well as to the large public an interesting and different view on the military history. The efforts of the National Military Museum in the custody and popularisation of Romanian military traditions have continuously benefited from the support and cooperation of similar cultural institutions within the Romanian Armed Forces.*

*Keywords: military history; museum; cultural heritage; military cultural institutions*

*"A people's self-consciousness only stems from knowing its own past"*

Radu R. Rosetti

In 2014, it is 155 years since – based on Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza's High Order no. 83 on 12/24 November 1859 – the Romanian General Staff was established as the most important institution in coordinating the activities of the Romanian Armed Forces. Alongside the military activities directly managed by the Romanian General Staff, a particular attention has been given to the cultural component, emphasising the local military tradition and promoting the Romanian historical values.

The above-mentioned cultural component has taken several institutional forms over time. A series of publications have specialised themselves in highlighting and promoting the Romanian Armed Forces traditions during history as well as in describing the military objectives in the short and long run. Among them, *Gândirea militară românească (Romanian Military Thinking)* is one to distinguish itself in this respect.

Dr Cristina Constantin – *"King Ferdinand I"* National Military Museum, the Ministry of National Defence.

Known under several names, it became the official journal of the Romanian General Staff (through the High Decree no. 3663 on 1 January 1898). In 2014, it celebrates its 150th anniversary. While the custody of the Romanian Armed Forces archive documents has been the Armed Forces Historical Service responsibility, the collection, custody and exhibition of military artefacts have been the National Military Museum main functions. As an evidence of this enduring institutional cooperation, the National Military Museum includes the complete collection of *România Militară/Gândirea militară românească* journal in its patrimony.

In the Romanian Armed Forces, *"King Ferdinand I"* National Military Museum *(photo 1)* is an institution that provides not only specialists but also national and foreign larger audience with an objective and complex image of the historical



*Photo 1: "King Ferdinand I" National Military Museum current premises*

evolution concerning the main military components (such as infantry, cavalry, artillery, air force, navy etc.), as well as of our ancestors feats of arms and our country military history, in general. Such image is materialised into cultural heritage artefacts of an inestimable value, collected thanks to the support of outstanding personalities of Romanian history and culture, including King Ferdinand, Queen Mary, Brătianu family, Radu R. Rosetti, Alexandru Tell etc.

On 18 December 2013, *"King Ferdinand I"* National Military Museum celebrated its 90th anniversary. People often perceive such age as the moment of a gracious outlook on their past, while remembering the important events of their biographies. For an institution like the Military Museum, however, its anniversary is also an opportunity to rethink its role and place in the Romanian landscape, in a rapidly-evolving society.

To review, we need to go back at the beginning of our institution, which is not possible without evoking Radu R. Rosetti, who, on 19 January 1914, took the necessary steps for the establishment of a military department within the National Museum of Antiquities, starting by addressing a report to Ion I. C. Brătianu, the Romanian Prime Minister and Minister of Defence at that time.

With respect to the constitutive patrimony of the new institution, it was described to possibly include *"collections from the Museum of Antiquities (Stone Age weapons, Roman weaponry, and a few Romanian weapons),*

> *- collections from the Artillery Museum (Romanian Armed Forces Arsenal),*
> *- disparate artefacts belonging to private collections, which would be surely donated to the new museum to become known to the public,*
> *- trophies obtained in 1877-1878 and in the campaign in Bulgaria in 1913 …"*

As a result, following the High Decree no. 1789 on 19 August 1914, a military department was established within the National Museum of Antiquities. Artefacts from the Romanian Army's Arsenal were taken into custody, as well as were the projectiles and the armament donated by General Al. Tell. The outbreak of the First World War impeded a normal development of events, and the fact that the artefacts were sent to the city of Odessa, in 1916, and they remained there even after the end of the war, was regrettable.

The attempts to establish a military museum continued in 1919, in the context of the exhibition organised by the Romanian Cultural League, when the historian Nicolae Iorga, addressing a letter to the Romanian General Staff, asked for the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces to the event. It was by the Minister of Defence's Order no. 5150 on 18 September 1919 that a military section was established within the exhibition organised by the Cultural League. Following the event, the Palace of Arts and two annexes, with the surrounding land, were ceded to the Defence Ministry by the Ministry of Agriculture.

By the High Royal Decree no. 6064 on 18 December 1923, the Romanian Military Museum was finally established. Constantin Ştefănescu-Amza (promoted to the rank of General on 30 March 1919) was appointed as Director of the Museum. The core of the new institution's patrimony consisted of the artefacts shown at the military section of the exhibition staged by the Romanian Cultural League. The first regulation on the museum functioning was developed, the High Royal Decree no. 915/1924 stipulating that the museum was subordinated to the Romanian General Staff. By the High Royal Decree no. 2056 from 1924, the Executive Council was established, including important personalities in the Romanian culture such as Vasile Pârvan, Constantin Moisil, Constantin C. C. Giurescu etc. As the President of the Executive Council, Radu R. Rosetti was devoted to enriching the museum

collections. He succeeded in doing it also due to his close connections with personalities in the Romanian political, military, and cultural life (King Ferdinand, Queen Mary, Prime-Minister Ion I. C. Brătianu – a relative, through his wife –, Prince Barbu Știrbey – his wife's brother –, Henri Berthelot – Chief of the French Military Mission in Romania –, historian Nicolae Iorga etc.). The museum opened to the public in 1924. 17 halls and 8 galleries presenting the Romanian military history until 1922 could be visited. Moreover, there were some collections related to some military specialities such as artillery, infantry, engineer troops, navy etc. *(photo 2 and 3)*.





*Photo 2 and 3: The National Military Museum in Carol Park – 1923*

In the interwar period, the museum headquarters situated in Carol Park were partially destroyed by the fire on 15 June 1938 and the earthquake on 9 November 1940. Despite these problems, the museum continued to be an important cultural landmark of București. For several times (in 1925, 1927,

1930, and 1932), it was restructured in search of the best solution for attracting the public and presenting the Romanian military history in an accurate manner.

Between 1937 and 1942, the museum launched its periodical publication – *Buletinul Muzeului Militar Naţional (Romanian Military Museum Bulletin)*, ten issues being released during the above-mentioned period. On 5 May 1943, the museum building in Carol Park was demolished, following the order of Marshal Ion Antonescu, Romania's Defence Minister. New premises for the museum were to be given only on 12 October 1955, in a building that had belonged to Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza's staff, opposite Dalles House in Bucureşti. After being reorganised in accordance with the ideology of the new political regime established in Romania, the museum was to be opened to the public on 9 May 1957, under the name of *Muzeul Militar Central (Central Military Museum)*. Two years later, the museum moved to the premises of the former Infantry and Cavalry School in Bucureşti, in Dealul Spirii, being reopened on 9 May 1959. This time, the museum had 30 exhibition halls, an artillery park, tanks, airplanes, and collection repositories. In 1965, the Laboratory for Metal Restorations (the first laboratory of this kind in Romania) was established; during the next years, ceramics, paper, and textile restoration was also developed. In 1968, the museum's periodical publication was re-launched with the title *Studii şi materiale de muzeografie şi istorie militară (Studies and Materials of Museography and Military History)*; 18 issues were edited up to 1985. Within its new location, the museum was reorganised only once, in 1972, before its reopening on 3 March 1975.

In the context of building the current Palace of the Parliament, with everything concerning restructuring the urban space around it, the buildings from Dealul Spirii were demolished and the museum found its new headquarters in the an ex-barracks of the IVth Regiment Ilfov, built up in 1898, where our institution still functions nowadays. After the museum was reopened to the public in 1988, the following museum branches joined it: Constanţa – in 1989, Oradea – in 1992, and Bacău – in 1997.

In 1990, the museum took back its former name – *Muzeul Militar Naţional (The National Military Museum)*. Later, by Government Decision no 1181 on 6 September 2006, published in *Monitorul Oficial* no. 771 on 12 September 2006, the museum was named *Muzeul Militar Naţional "Regele Ferdinand I" ("King Ferdinand I" National Military Museum)*, adding the name of the Romanian king who promulgated the 1923 founding act.

Within an exhibition space of 22 150 square metres, including four buildings and an outdoor park for military assets, are presented artefacts from the 53 collections that make the museum patrimony, totalling a number of approximately 1 300 000 objects *(photo 4 and 5)*. From a structural viewpoint, in the museum main building there is a permanent historical exhibition thematically displaying the periods

*Photo 4 and 5: Aspects of the military history permanent exhibition in the main building*

of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary history in Romania, focusing on the evolution of the military phenomenon in Romania. The other buildings house the permanent exhibitions of the main collections: medieval, modern, and contemporary weaponry; Romanian military uniforms and accessories; air force assets; sleds, harnesses and horse riding accessories. In the museum park, the collection of artillery, armoured and military vehicles is presented.

The National Military Museum constantly collaborates with similar institutions in the country and abroad in organising temporary exhibitions to popularise its patrimony. Each year, in mid-May, *Zilele Muzeului Militar Naţional (the Days of the National Military Museum)* are celebrated, which is an activity with high public impact, representing a special manner of approaching the military history, with the support of teams specialised in historical and military reconstitution *(photo 6 and 7)*.

*Photo 6: Ionel Haiduc, President of the Romanian Academy, together with Captain Associate Professor Dr Olimpiu Manuel Glodarenco, Director of "King Ferdinand I" National Military Museum, 2013*



*Photo 7: Aspects of the opening ceremony of the "Day of the National Military Museum", May 2014*

The continuity in the collaboration between the Romanian Armed Forces specialised institutions – based on contributions such as the museographic (in the case of the National Military Museum and its branches), archivistic (provided by the Romanian Armed Forces Historical Service), and theoretical (represented by publications like *Gândirea Militară Românească, Observatorul Militar* etc.) ones – may develop and enhance the cultural projects of promoting the Romanian military traditions.

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# GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ – FORUM FOR HIGHLY SCIENTIFIC DEBATE –

*Colonel Dr Stan ANTON*
*Dr Alexandra SARCINSCHI*

*The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies aims to meet the strategic challenges of the contemporary security environment through the development, implementation and dissemination of research results, the active presence in national and international scientific research, as well as the involvement in the National Defence University educational process, and the provision of expertise and specific services for the institutions and organisations active in the field of defence and security. The mission of the institution, as it is shown by the authors, is subsumed under the broader goal of the University to become an important pole of knowledge and scientific expertise in the field of military science, security and defence in Romania.*

***Keywords****: military science; armed combat; military patrimony; security environment*

## Gândirea militară românească – symbol of military culture –

2014 is the year when a lot of important events in the Romanian military life are celebrated: 65 since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, 20 years since the Partnership for Peace Framework Document was signed, and 10 years since Romania became a fully-fledged NATO member state. Moreover, there are two anniversaries that are very important to the military and the civilians who have connections with the Romanian Armed Forces: 125 since the Superior War School, the predecessor of *"Carol I"* National Defence University, was established, and 150 since one of the most prestigious and enduring Romanian publications in the field – *Gândirea militară românească (Romanian Military Thinking)* appeared.

Colonel Dr Stan Anton – Commandant, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, *"Carol I"* National Defence University, București.
Dr Alexandra Sarcinschi – Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, *"Carol I"* National Defence University, București.

Therefore, in 1864, Romanian military culture was enriched by the appearance of an independent publication – *România Militară*. Being the initiative of a group of young officers, the journal has evolved into what it represents today – an extremely important benchmark in the Romanian military patrimony, celebrating a century and a half of activity. Throughout this period, it has succeeded in including and illustrating the complex structure of military thinking, in its aggregate, from the aspects pertaining to military science and social sciences, whose methodologies and methods can be applied in the field, to the issues strictly related to armed combat and the technologies used exclusively for military purposes. *Gândirea militară românească* has demonstrated, all these years, responsiveness to all new and innovative aspects in military science, consistency in and dedication to the identification of the authors that systematically analyse military phenomena and processes. Last but not least, the journal has demonstrated its remarkable ability to critically integrate the past and present values.

*Gândirea militară românească* is not only the General Staff official publication but also a symbol of military culture, a forum for debate over the most valuable conceptual productions in the field of military theory and science as well as a fervent promoter of ideas and young authors showing potential in the field.

## More than a decade of collaboration with the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies

With over a decade of experience, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies has a particular profile in *"Carol I"* National Defence University, representing the functional structure specialised in basic scientific research in the field of national defence and security.

The Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies aims to meet the strategic challenges of the contemporary security environment through the development, implementation and dissemination of research results, the active presence in national and international scientific research, as well as the involvement in the University educational process and the provision of expertise and specific services for the institutions and organisations active in the field of defence and security. The mission of the institution is subsumed under the broader goal of the National Defence University to become the most important pole of knowledge and scientific expertise in the field of military science, security and defence in Romania, an internationally acknowledged one, which is not possible in the absence of an instrument to establish the courses of action in this field.

In this regard, the goals of the research conducted in the Centre are as follows: to develop expertise for the political-military institutions in Romania; to provide the theoretical basis for the place and functions of the military component in the main strategic planning documents; to investigate the changes that occur in the evolution of the military strategic environment that have an impact on the interests of our country;

to explore the role of the Armed Forces in the future operational environment; to study the phenomena in the Romanian society that have an impact on the military; to develop cooperation with military and civilian research institutions as well as with other governmental and non-governmental structures in the country and abroad; to promote strategic and security culture in the Romanian society; to support professional training at strategic level within the National Defence University by integrating the results of scientific research in education. Moreover, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies has developed, over time, a series of national and international partnerships, thus the Centre having benefitted not only by exchanging experience but also by increasing its visibility in the academic community in Romania and abroad.

The cooperation relationship with *Gândirea militară românească* holds one of the most important positions in the list of the Centre collaborations. Thus the journal has hosted the results of the scientific research conducted in the Centre and the prestigious *GMR Awards* have rewarded the collective and individual works of the military and civilian researchers who have served in the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies in its 14 years of existence (editions in 2002, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012). Reciprocally, the members of the journal editorial staff have their articles published in the Centre scientific publication, *Impact Strategic (Strategic Impact)*, and have participated in the national and international scientific events organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies.

The collaboration between the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies and *Gândirea militară românească* has resulted in over 60 articles written by former and current members of the Centre staff in the pages of 33 issues of the journal, under the heading of debates or strategic reflections and projections, as well as in their presence in the prestigious editorial board of the journal. Thus were covered themes such as concepts and theories in the field of defence and security, geopolitics and geostrategy, European and Euro-Atlantic security, modernisation of the Romanian Armed Forces, and the role and place of the military profession in the globalising society.

Therefore, as *Gândirea militară românească* celebrates its 150th anniversary, the staff of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within *"Carol I"* National Defence University congratulate the editorial staff of the journal, wish them success in the mission assumed a century and a half ago, and thank them for the quality relations established during the past decade, being certain that, in the pages of the journal, the Romanian research in the field of military science will always find not only the latest information but also a forum for highly scientific debate!

*English version by*
*Diana Cristiana LUPU*

# GMR
# - 150ᵗʰ Anniversary -

*Colonel BEng Daniel BUCUR*

*In 1864, in Bucureşti, appeared the first issue of* România Militară *journal, a major milestone in military and national journalism, the cornerstone of the current* Gândirea militară românească *journal. The journal appeared as an independent publication, on a group of young officers' initiative, having the following motto on the cover:* Military science, art and history. *By the Royal Decree no. 3663, on 1 January 1898,* România Militară *became the official journal of the Great General Staff.*

*Up to 1989, it appeared under different names –* Revista militară generală, Cultura militară, Probleme de artă militară. *Since 1990 it has had the present name –* Gândirea militară românească.

The year 1864 represents a milestone in the development of the modern Romanian state. Only 5 years after the Union of the Principalities, which was made possible by the double election of the same ruler, and 2 years after the unification of parliaments and governments of the two principalities, in 1864, the first Constitution of the new state, a new election law and the rural law that provided the foundations for the agrarian reform were promulgated.

In 1864, the Deposits and Consignments House (today, the CEC) was also created and the Colentina Hospital was opened in Bucureşti. That year was marked by the development of two of the most important laws. The first one – *Law on the Organisation of the Armed Power in Romania*, adopted on 27 November/ 9 December – stated that the ruler was the supreme Commander of the army and the Minister of War was the Prince's intermediary for the command and administration of the army, the armed power consisting of the standing army, with its reserves, militia, infantry and guards.

On 3/15 December of the same year, it was promulgated the *Law on Officers*, who could be: active, available, inactive, in reform or retired.

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Colonel BEng Daniel Bucur – Commander of the Armed Forces Technical-Editorial Centre.

In this political-cultural environment of national unity and institutional reform, the first issue of *România Militară/Military Romania* journal appeared, on 15 February 1864, in București – a major milestone in military and national journalism, the cornerstone of the current *Gândirea militară românească/ Romanian Military Thinking* journal. The journal appeared as an independent publication, on a group of young officers' initiative, with the following motto on its cover: *Military science, art and history*. By Royal Decree no. 3663 of 1 January 1898, *România Militară* became the official journal of the Great General Staff.

By 1989, the journal appeared under different names – *Revista militară generală/General Military Review, Cultura militară/Military Culture, Probleme de artă militară/Issues of Military Art*. Since 1990, it has been published under the current name – *Gândirea militară românească* and has a periodicity of six issues per year. As a publication of military theory and science, published by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff, *Gândirea militară românească* addresses the officer corps, as well as the governmental and non-governmental institutions environments, colleges, academies, embassies, concerned with national and international military issues. Within the pages of the journal, there are discussed fundamental issues of national military construction, ideas on organising, equipping, training and commanding the armed forces, strategy and tactics, as well as the main concepts and doctrines affirmed in the international military thinking.

For many officers, this publication has been a generous and comprehensive source of information, a inspiration for promoting innovative ideas, a platform for launching their ideas, a framework for asserting their personality, a way of beneficially materialising the experience gathered throughout the military career and education.

Since 2005, the journal has been published in an English version – *Romanian Military Thinking*, four times a year. Annually, the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal Awards are given to the most valuable conceptual works in the field of military theory and science, stimulating the creativity in the field of military art, science and history, strengthening the relations between the generations of active and reserve military personnel to the benefit of the Romanian military thinking.

Since 2011, the *Gândirea militară românească* journal has been included among the scientific journals with acknowledged prestige in the field of *"Military Science,*

*Intelligence and Public Order"*, in keeping with the evaluation carried out by the National Council for Titles, Diplomas and Certificates.

Today, 150 years after its first issue, *Gândirea militară românească* is decorated by the President of Romania with the *"Meritul Cultural"/"Cultural Merit"* Order – in the rank of Officer, F Category – Promotion of Culture, *"in recognition of the fundamental contribution to the developement the strategic concepts that have supported the national military construction and the profound transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces"*.

In my capacity as Commander of the Armed Forces Technical-Editorial Centre, a structure that has continuously ensured the printing of this prestigious military publication, on this occasion, I would like to extend my warmest congratulations to the Editorial Staff and to wish *Happy Anniversary!* to the most successful military journal in Romania: *Gândirea militară românească*!

**English version by**
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

# WALES SUMMIT DECLARATION

## Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales

**1.** We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Growing instability in our southern neighbourhood, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational and multi-dimensional threats, are also challenging our security. These can all have long-term consequences for peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe.

**2.** Our Alliance remains an essential source of stability in this unpredictable world. Together as strong democracies, we are united in our commitment to the Washington Treaty and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion, and the indivisibility of our security, NATO remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territories and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As stated in the Transatlantic Declaration that we issued today, we are committed to further strengthening the transatlantic bond and to providing the resources, capabilities, and political will required to ensure our Alliance remains ready to meet any challenge. We stand ready to act together and decisively to defend freedom and our shared values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

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Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en

**3.** Today we reaffirm our commitment to fulfil all three core tasks set out in our Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. Here in Wales, we have taken decisions to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. We are reaffirming our strong commitment to collective defence and to ensuring security and assurance for all Allies; we are adapting our operations, including in Afghanistan, in light of progress made and remaining challenges; and we are strengthening our partnerships with countries and organisations around the globe to better build security together.

**4.** Every day, our troops deliver the security that is the foundation of our prosperity and our way of life. We pay tribute to all the brave men and women from Allied and partner nations who have served, and continue to serve, in NATO-led operations and missions. We owe an eternal debt of gratitude to all those who have lost their lives or been injured, and we extend our profound sympathy to their families and loved ones.

**5.** In order to ensure that our Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges, today we have approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan. It provides a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO's borders and further afield that are of concern to Allies. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications. It also responds to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa. The Plan strengthens NATO's collective defence. It also strengthens our crisis management capability. The Plan will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains a strong, ready, robust, and responsive Alliance capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise.

**6.** The elements of the Plan include measures that address both the continuing need for assurance of Allies and the adaptation of the Alliance's military strategic posture.

**7.** The assurance measures include continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis. They will provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and scalable in response to the evolving security situation.

**8.** Adaptation measures include the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face. We will significantly enhance the responsiveness of our NATO Response Force (NRF) by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats.

As part of it, we will establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a new Allied joint force that will be able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO's territory. This force should consist of a land component with appropriate air, maritime, and special operations forces available. Readiness of elements of the VJTF will be tested through short-notice exercises. We will also establish an appropriate command and control presence and some in-place force enablers on the territories of eastern Allies at all times, with contributions from Allies on a rotational basis, focusing on planning and exercising collective defence scenarios. If required, they will also facilitate reinforcement of Allies located at NATO's periphery for deterrence and collective defence. We will further enhance NATO's ability to quickly and effectively reinforce those Allies, including through preparation of infrastructure, prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and designation of specific bases. Adequate host nation support will be critical in this respect. We will also ensure that our Allied forces maintain the adequate readiness and coherence needed to conduct NATO's full range of missions, including deterring aggression against NATO Allies and demonstrating preparedness to defend NATO territory. We will enhance our Standing Naval Forces to support maritime situational awareness and to conduct the full spectrum of conventional maritime operations.

**9.** We will ensure that the current NATO Command Structure remains robust, agile, and able to undertake all elements of effective command and control for simultaneous challenges; this includes a regional focus to exploit regional expertise and enhance situational awareness. Contributing Allies will raise the readiness and capabilities of the Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast and will also enhance its role as a hub for regional cooperation. We will enhance our intelligence and strategic awareness and we will place renewed emphasis on advance planning.

**10.** We will establish an enhanced exercise programme with an increased focus on exercising collective defence including practising comprehensive responses to complex civil-military scenarios. The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) we agreed in Chicago will be instrumental in ensuring full coherence of the training and exercise elements of the Readiness Action Plan.

**11.** Development and implementation of the adaptation measures will be done on the basis of the evolving strategic environment in the regions of concern, including in the eastern and southern peripheries of the Alliance, which will be closely monitored, assessed, and prepared for.

**12.** We have tasked our Defence Ministers to oversee the expeditious implementation of the Readiness Action Plan, which will begin immediately.

**13.** We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design. It is essential that the Alliance possesses the necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces. This will also include enhancing strategic communications, developing exercise scenarios in light of hybrid threats, and strengthening coordination between NATO and other organisations, in line with relevant decisions taken, with a view to improving information sharing, political consultations, and staff-to-staff coordination. We welcome the establishment of the NATO-accredited Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia as a meaningful contribution to NATO's efforts in this area. We have tasked the work on hybrid warfare to be reviewed alongside the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan.

**14.** We agree to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities. Our overall security and defence depend both on how much we spend and how we spend it. Increased investments should be directed towards meeting our capability priorities, and Allies also need to display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed. A strong defence industry across the Alliance, including a stronger defence industry in Europe and greater defence industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic, remains essential for delivering the required capabilities. NATO and EU efforts to strengthen defence capabilities are complementary. Taking current commitments into account, we are guided by the following considerations:

• Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence will aim to continue to do so. Likewise, Allies spending more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research & Development, will continue to do so.

• Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will:
  ➢ halt any decline in defence expenditure;
  ➢ aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows;
  ➢ aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO's capability shortfalls.

• Allies who currently spend less than 20% of their annual defence spending on major new equipment, including related Research & Development, will aim,

within a decade, to increase their annual investments to 20% or more of total defence expenditures.

- All Allies will:
  - ☞ ensure that their land, air and maritime forces meet NATO agreed guidelines for deployability and sustainability and other agreed output metrics;
  - ☞ ensure that their armed forces can operate together effectively, including through the implementation of agreed NATO standards and doctrines.

**15.** Allies will review national progress annually. This will be discussed at future Defence Ministerial meetings and reviewed by Heads of State and Government at future Summits.

**16.** We condemn in the strongest terms Russia's escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine and demand that Russia stop and withdraw its forces from inside Ukraine and along the Ukrainian border. This violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity is a serious breach of international law and a major challenge to Euro-Atlantic security. We do not and will not recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate 'annexation' of Crimea. We demand that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; withdraw its troops; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border. Russia must use its influence with the separatists to de-escalate the situation and take concrete steps to allow for a political and a diplomatic solution which respects Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally recognised borders.

**17.** We are deeply concerned that the violence and insecurity in the region caused by Russia and the Russian-backed separatists are resulting in a deteriorating humanitarian situation and material destruction in eastern Ukraine. We are concerned about discrimination against the native Crimean Tatars and other members of local communities in the Crimean peninsula. We demand that Russia take the necessary measures to ensure the safety, rights and freedoms of everyone living on the peninsula. This violence and insecurity also led to the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. Recalling United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2166, Allies call upon all states and actors in the region to ensure immediate, safe, and unrestricted access to the crash site of MH17 to allow resumption of the investigation and the repatriation of the remains and belongings of the victims still present at the site. Those directly and indirectly

responsible for the downing of MH17 should be held accountable and brought to justice as soon as possible.

**18.** We are also concerned by Russia's pattern of disregard for international law, including the UN Charter; its behaviour towards Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; its violation of fundamental European security arrangements and commitments, including those in the Helsinki Final Act; its long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE); and its use of military and other instruments to coerce neighbours. This threatens the rules-based international order and challenges Euro-Atlantic security. In addition, these developments may potentially have long-term effects on stability in the Black Sea region, which remains an important component of Euro-Atlantic security. Russia's current actions are contrary to the principles on which the established confidence building mechanisms in the Black Sea were built. We will continue to support, as appropriate, regional efforts by Black Sea littoral states aimed at ensuring security and stability.

**19.** While Russia continues to intervene militarily, arm separatists, and foment instability in Ukraine, we support the sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU), the G7, and others, which are an essential part of the overall international effort to address the destabilizing behaviour of Russia, bring it to deescalate, and arrive at a political solution to the crisis created by its actions. Amongst these are measures taken by Allies including Canada, Norway and the United States, as well as the EU decisions to limit access to capital markets for Russian state-owned financial institutions, restrict trade in arms, establish restrictions for export of dual use goods for military end uses, curtail Russian access to sensitive defence and energy sector technologies, and other measures.

**20.** Allies have had, and will continue in the course of our ongoing work, a strategic discussion regarding Euro-Atlantic security and Russia. This discussion provides the basis for NATO's vision regarding our approach to, and the mechanisms of the Alliance's relations with, Russia in the future.

**21.** For more than two decades, NATO has strived to build a partnership with Russia, including through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council, based upon the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. Russia has breached its commitments, as well as violated international law, thus breaking the trust at the core of our cooperation. The decisions we have taken at the Summit demonstrate our respect for the rules-based European security architecture.

**22.** We continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia based on respect for international law would be of strategic value. We continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia, including reciprocal confidence building and transparency measures and increased mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe, based on our common security concerns and interests, in a Europe where each country freely chooses its future. We regret that the conditions for that relationship do not currently exist. As a result, NATO's decision to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia remains in place. Political channels of communication, however, remain open.

**23.** The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest. NATO is both transparent and predictable, and we are resolved to display endurance and resilience, as we have done since the founding of our Alliance. The nature of the Alliance's relations with Russia and our aspiration for partnership will be contingent on our seeing a clear, constructive change in Russia's actions which demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.

**24.** An independent, sovereign, and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. At a time when Ukraine's security is being undermined, the Alliance continues its full support for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The broad support for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, demonstrates the international rejection of Russia's illegal and illegitimate 'annexation' of Crimea. We are extremely concerned by the further escalation of aggressive actions in eastern Ukraine. We see a concerted campaign of violence by Russia and Russian-backed separatists aimed at destabilising Ukraine as a sovereign state.

**25.** We commend the people of Ukraine for their commitment to freedom and democracy and their determination to decide their own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. We welcome the holding of free and fair Presidential elections on 25 May 2014 under difficult conditions and the signature of the Association Agreement with the European Union on 27 June 2014, which testify to the consolidation of Ukraine's democracy and its European aspiration. In this context, we look forward to the elections to the Verkhovna Rada in October 2014.

**26.** We encourage Ukraine to further promote an inclusive political process, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, minorities, and the rule of law. We welcome President Poroshenko's Peace Plan and call on all parties to meet their commitments, including those made in Geneva and Berlin. We call on Russia to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Ukrainian government. We actively support ongoing diplomatic efforts towards a sustainable political solution to the conflict which respects Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.

**27.** We commend and fully support the actions of other international organisations that are contributing to de-escalation and pursuing a peaceful solution to the crisis, in particular the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU. We welcome the swift deployment of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, which must be able to operate unhindered and have access to all regions of Ukraine in order to fulfil its mandate. We also welcome the decision by the EU to launch a Common Security and Defence Policy mission to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, including police and the rule of law.

**28.** Recognising the right of Ukraine to restore peace and order and to defend its people and territory, we encourage the Ukrainian armed forces and security services to continue to exercise the utmost restraint in their ongoing operation so as to avoid casualties among the local civilian population.

**29.** Ukraine is a long-standing and distinctive partner of the Alliance. At our meeting here in Wales, we met with President Poroshenko and issued a joint statement. We highly value Ukraine's past and present contributions to all current Allied operations as well as to the NATO Response Force. We encourage and will continue to support Ukraine's implementation of wide-ranging reforms through the Annual National Programme, in the framework of our Distinctive Partnership. We have launched additional efforts to support the reform and transformation of the security and defence sectors and promote greater interoperability between Ukraine's and NATO forces. These efforts are designed to enhance Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security. We welcome Ukraine's participation in the Partnership Interoperability Initiative and Ukraine's interest in the enhanced opportunities within the Initiative, and look forward to its future participation.

**30.** Russia's illegitimate occupation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine have raised legitimate concerns among several of NATO's other partners in Eastern Europe. Allies will continue to support the right of partners to make independent and sovereign choices on foreign and security policy, free from external pressure and coercion. Allies also remain committed in their support

to the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova.

**31.** In this context, we will continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the south Caucasus, as well as in the Republic of Moldova, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the UN Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act. The persistence of these protracted conflicts continues to be a matter of particular concern, undermining the opportunities for citizens in the region to reach their full potential as members of the Euro-Atlantic community. We urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, within the established negotiation frameworks.

**32.** We are deeply concerned by the growing instability and mounting transnational and multi-dimensional threats across the Middle East and North Africa region. These threats directly affect the security of the people living there, as well as our own security. Peace and stability in this region are essential for the Alliance. Therefore, we emphasise the need for lasting calm and an end to violence. We continue to support the legitimate aspirations of the peoples in this region for peace, security, democracy, justice, prosperity, and the preservation of their identity. We will continue to closely monitor the situation and explore options for possible NATO assistance to bilateral and international efforts to promote stability and contribute to the response to the growing crisis in, and threats from, the Middle East region.

**33.** The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses a grave threat to the Iraqi people, to the Syrian people, to the wider region, and to our nations. We are outraged by ISIL's recent barbaric attacks against all civilian populations, in particular the systematic and deliberate targeting of entire religious and ethnic communities. We condemn in the strongest terms ISIL's violent and cowardly acts. If the security of any Ally is threatened, we will not hesitate to take all necessary steps to ensure our collective defence. The rapid deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and ISIL's expanding threat underline the necessity for a political solution based upon an inclusive Iraqi government with cross-sectarian representation. Additionally, in light of the dramatic humanitarian consequences of this crisis and its repercussions on regional stability and security, many Allies have already provided, and are offering, security and humanitarian assistance to Iraq on a bilateral basis.

**34.** We re-affirm NATO's continued commitment to the NATO-Iraq partnership, through which we will revitalise our effort to help Iraq build more effective security forces. That partnership encompasses, within the existing Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, cooperation in the areas of: political dialogue;

education and training; response to terrorism; defence institution building; border security; and communications strategy. Allies and partners should continue to help coordinate humanitarian assistance to Iraq through the appropriate channels. We welcome the role that the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre is playing. We have also agreed that NATO will help coordinate among Allies and partners security assistance support to Iraq; this could also include helping coordinate the provision of lift to deliver assistance. Should the Iraqi government request it, NATO will stand ready to consider measures in the framework of NATO's Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative with an eye to launching such an effort in the near term. NATO will support ongoing bilateral efforts of Allies and partners by soliciting and coordinating, on a voluntary basis, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets. Additionally, Allies will seek to enhance their cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters.

**35.** We continue to follow the ongoing crisis in Syria with grave concern. We condemn in the strongest terms the campaign of violence against the Syrian people by the Assad regime, which caused the current chaos and devastation in this country. We call on the Syrian government to fully comply with the provisions of all relevant UNSCRs and to immediately commit to a genuine political transition in accordance with the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué. We believe a negotiated political transition is essential to bring an end to the bloodshed. We highlight the important role of the moderate opposition to protect communities against the dual threats of the Syrian regime's tyranny and ISIL's extremism. More than three years of fighting have had dramatic humanitarian consequences and a growing impact on the security of regional countries. Despite possible destabilising effects on their economies and societies, NATO member Turkey, our regional partner Jordan, as well as neighbouring Lebanon, are generously hosting millions of refugees and displaced Syrians. The deployment of Patriot missiles to defend the population and territory of Turkey is a strong demonstration of NATO's resolve and ability to defend and deter any potential threat against any Ally.

**36.** We welcome the successful completion by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Mission and Allies of the removal and elimination of Syria's declared chemical weapons, as called for in UNSCR 2118 and OPCW Executive Council decisions. NATO Allies played a key role in ensuring this success as well as in the destruction of the chemical materials themselves. We remain highly concerned by continuing reports of the use of chemicals as weapons in Syria. Twelve chemical weapon production facilities are still awaiting destruction and questions remain concerning the completeness and accuracy

of Syria's chemical weapons declaration. We urge the Assad government to answer all outstanding questions regarding its declaration to the OPCW, to address all remaining issues, and to take action to ensure full compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, UNSCR 2118, and OPCW Executive Council decisions.

**37.** ISIL has, with its recent advance into Iraq, become a transnational threat. The Assad regime has contributed to the emergence of ISIL in Syria and its expansion beyond. ISIL's presence in both Syria and Iraq is a threat to regional stability. It has become a key obstacle to political settlement in Syria and a serious risk to the stability and territorial integrity of Iraq. The people of Syria and Iraq and elsewhere in the region need the support of the international community to counter this threat. A coordinated international approach is required.

**38.** We are deeply concerned by the ongoing violence and the deteriorating security situation in Libya, which threaten to undermine the goals for which the Libyan people have suffered so much and which pose a threat to the wider region. We urge all parties to cease all violence and engage without delay in constructive efforts aimed at fostering an inclusive political dialogue in the interest of the entire Libyan people, as part of the democratic process. Recognising the central role of the UN in coordinating international efforts in Libya, we strongly support the ongoing efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to achieve an immediate ceasefire, scale down tensions, and contribute to national reconciliation. Our Operation Unified Protector demonstrated NATO's determination, together with regional Arab partners, to protect the Libyan people. On the basis of NATO's decision in October 2013, following a request by the Libyan authorities, we continue to stand ready to support Libya with advice on defence and security institution building and to develop a long-term partnership, possibly leading to Libya's membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue, which would be a natural framework for our cooperation.

**39.** While Mali has re-established a constitutional order, we recognise that terrorist acts and the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people across the Sahel-Sahara region threaten regional and our own security. We welcome the efforts of the UN and underscore the importance of a strong commitment by the international community to address the complex security and political challenges in this region. In this respect, we welcome the comprehensive Sahel strategies of the African Union and the EU. We also welcome the robust and credible military commitment of Allies in the Sahel-Sahara region, which contributes to the reaffirmation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the African countries concerned,

and to the security of the Alliance. NATO is prepared to explore, upon request by the countries concerned, where it can contribute to address these challenges, in full coordination with UN, EU, regional and bilateral efforts.

**40.** In the strategically important Western Balkans region, democratic values, the rule of law, and good neighbourly relations continue to play a pivotal role in maintaining lasting peace and stability. The Alliance remains fully committed to the stability and security of the region, and we will continue to actively support the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of countries in this region. Allies and their Western Balkans partners actively contribute to the maintenance of regional and international peace, including through regional cooperation formats.

We welcome Serbia's progress in building a stronger partnership with NATO and encourage Belgrade to continue on this path. We also welcome the progress achieved in Kosovo and encourage further efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law throughout a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The 8 June 2014 parliamentary elections were largely in line with international standards and an important milestone. We look forward to the expeditious formation of a representative and inclusive government, committed to the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. We welcome the improvement of the security situation and the progress achieved through the dialogue. We commend both parties for their commitment to the Belgrade-Pristina agreement of 19 April 2013 and encourage continued work on its full implementation.

**41.** We met yesterday in an expanded meeting on Afghanistan and, together with our International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) partners, we issued a Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan.

**42.** For over a decade, NATO Allies and partner nations from across the world have stood shoulder to shoulder with Afghanistan in the largest operation in the history of the Alliance. This unprecedented effort has enhanced global security and contributed to a better future for Afghan men, women, and children. We honour the Afghan and international personnel who have lost their lives or been injured in this endeavour.

**43.** With the end of ISAF in December 2014, the nature and scope of our engagement with Afghanistan will change. We envisage three parallel, mutually reinforcing strands of activity: in the short term, NATO Allies and partner nations stand ready to continue to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014 through the non-combat Resolute Support Mission; in the medium term, we reaffirm our commitment to contribute to the financial sustainment of the ANSF; in the long term, we remain committed to strengthening

NATO's partnership with Afghanistan. We count on Afghanistan's commitment and cooperation.

**44.** We recognise the particular importance of advancing regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations for the security and stability of Afghanistan. We remain determined to support the Afghan people in their efforts to build a stable, sovereign, democratic, and united country, where rule of law and good governance prevail, and in which human rights for all, especially the rights of women, including their full participation in decision making, and those of children, are fully protected. Working with the Government of Afghanistan and the wider international community, our goal remains to never again be threatened by terrorists from within Afghanistan. Our commitment to Afghanistan will endure.

**45.** We commend the Kosovo Force (KFOR) for the successful conduct of its mission over the past 15 years, in accordance with UNSCR 1244. KFOR will continue to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in Kosovo in close cooperation with the Kosovo authorities and the EU, as agreed. KFOR will also continue to support the development of a peaceful, stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo. The Alliance will continue to assist the Kosovo Security Force with advice on the ground and will keep the nature of further support under review.

**46.** We will continue to maintain KFOR's robust and credible capability to carry out its mission. Sustained improvement in the security situation and the successful implementation of agreements reached in the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina will allow NATO to consider a possible change in its force posture. Any reduction of our troop presence will be measured against clear benchmarks and indicators, and will remain conditions-based and not calendar-driven.

**47.** Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean will continue to adapt to meet evolving security risks in an area of essential strategic interest to the Alliance. Somalia-based piracy has not been eradicated. NATO has contributed to a steady reduction in pirate activity off the coast of Somalia through Operation Ocean Shield, working in coordination with the relevant international actors, including the EU and other nations, in line with the relevant decisions taken. We have agreed to continue NATO's counter piracy involvement off the coast of Somalia until the end of 2016, utilising a focused presence to optimise the use of NATO assets. Both of these operations contribute to enhancing the Alliance's maritime situational awareness, interoperability, and engagement with partners.

**48.** The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. NATO will maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.

**49.** Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.

**50.** As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Alliance. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.

**51.** The Allies' conventional forces make essential contributions to the deterrence of a broad range of threats. They contribute to providing visible assurance of NATO's cohesion as well as the Alliance's ability and commitment to respond to the security concerns of each and every Ally.

**52.** Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. The capability is purely defensive.

**53.** Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation continue to play an important role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. Both the success and failure of these efforts can have a direct impact on the threat environment of NATO. In this context, it is of paramount importance that disarmament and non-proliferation commitments under existing treaties are honoured, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which is a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security. In that regard, Allies call on Russia to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance.

**54.** The threat to NATO populations, territory, and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles continues to increase and missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter it. At our Summit in Lisbon in 2010 we decided to develop a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to pursue our core task of collective defence. Missile defence will become an integral part of the Alliance's overall defence posture and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.

**55.** The aim of this capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of indivisibility of Allies' security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability, and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can and will adapt accordingly.

**56.** At our Summit in Chicago in 2012, we declared the achievement of an Interim NATO BMD Capability as an operationally significant first step, offering maximum coverage, within available means, to defend our populations, territory, and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack. NATO Interim BMD is operationally capable.

**57.** Today we are pleased to note that the deployment of Aegis Ashore in Deveselu, Romania is on track to be completed in the 2015 timeframe. Aegis Ashore will be offered to NATO and will provide a significant increase in NATO BMD capability. We are also pleased to note the forward deployment of BMD-capable Aegis ships to Rota, Spain. Building on the Interim Capability, the additional Aegis BMD-capable ships could be made available to NATO.

**58.** Today we are also pleased to note that additional voluntary national contributions have been offered, and that several Allies are developing, including through multinational cooperation, or are acquiring further BMD capabilities that could become available to the Alliance. Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces, based on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and on the expansion of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability. Only the command and control systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defence are eligible for common funding.

**59.** We note the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defence, and encourage Allies to explore possible additional voluntary national contributions, including through multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment. We also note that BMD features in two Smart Defence projects.

**60.** As with all of NATO's operations, full political control by Allies over military actions undertaken pursuant to this capability will be ensured. To this end, we will continue to deepen political oversight of NATO BMD as the capability develops. We welcome the completion of the Alliance's review of the arrangements for NATO Interim BMD Capability and note that the Alliance will be ready to make use of additional Allied contributions as they are made available to the Alliance. We also task the Council to regularly review the implementation of the NATO BMD capability, including before the Foreign and Defence Ministers' meetings, and prepare a comprehensive report on progress and issues to be addressed for its future development by our next Summit.

**61.** We remain prepared to engage with third states, on a case-by-case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase ballistic missile defence effectiveness. Initial steps have been made and could lead to various forms of engagement with third states on missile defence. As we did in Chicago in 2012, we reaffirm that NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities. NATO missile defence is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

**62.** The Alliance reaffirms its long-standing commitment to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security and emphasises the importance of full implementation and compliance to rebuild trust and confidence. Russia's unilateral military activity in and around Ukraine has undermined peace, security, and stability across the region, and its selective implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) have eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments. Allies call on Russia to fully adhere to its commitments. Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent.

**63.** At our last Summit in Chicago we set ourselves the ambitious goal of NATO Forces 2020: modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised, and commanded so as to be able to meet NATO's Level of Ambition and so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment. We judge that the goal remains valid and reaffirm our commitment to delivering it. The Readiness Action Plan complements and reinforces NATO Forces 2020 by improving our overall readiness and responsiveness.

**64.** NATO needs, now more than ever, modern, robust, and capable forces at high readiness, in the air, on land and at sea, in order to meet current and future challenges. We are committed to further enhancing our capabilities. To this end, today we have agreed a Defence Planning Package with a number of priorities, such as enhancing and reinforcing training and exercises; command and control, including for demanding air operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; NATO's ballistic missile defence capability, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 2010 Lisbon and 2012 Chicago Summits, including the voluntary nature of national contributions; cyber defence; as well as improving the robustness and readiness of our land forces for both collective defence and crisis response. Fulfilment of these priorities will increase the Alliance's collective capabilities and better prepare NATO to address current and future threats and challenges. We have agreed this Package in order to inform our defence investments and to improve the capabilities that Allies have in national inventories. In this context, NATO joint air power capabilities require longer-term consideration.

**65.** We continue to emphasise multinational cooperation. Following the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) initiative launched at our Chicago Summit, work is on track to deliver an initial operational capability to support NATO operations and NATO Response Force rotations from 2016 onwards. In this context, we note the progress in the development of the Alliance Ground Surveillance capability that will become available for operational deployment in 2017. Furthermore, NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control Force will continue to be modernised to maintain its full operational capability. JISR exemplifies the advantages of multinational cooperation in capability development and employment among Allies, which allow for significant operational and cost benefits. In this spirit, several Allies are establishing a multinational MQ-9 remotely-piloted air system users group, in particular to enhance interoperability and reduce overall costs.

**66.** In a similar vein, we highlight the fact that, since we launched the Smart Defence initiative at our Chicago Summit, an ever growing number of multinational projects have been set up to help Allies harmonise requirements, pool resources, and achieve tangible benefits in terms of operational effectiveness as well as cost efficiency. We are building on this positive momentum, in particular to address Alliance priority capability requirements. Specifically, two groups of Allies have agreed to work on, respectively, increasing the availability of air-to-ground Precision Guided Munitions, and on the provision of a deployable airbase capability, and have signed Letters of Intent to this effect. A further two groups of Allies have decided to establish concrete projects for improving JISR information exchange in operations and ballistic missile defence, including naval training.

**67.** Today we have also endorsed the NATO Framework Nations Concept. It focuses on groups of Allies coming together to work multinationally for the joint development of forces and capabilities required by the Alliance, facilitated by a framework nation. Its implementation will contribute to providing the Alliance with coherent sets of forces and capabilities, particularly in Europe. It will help demonstrate European Allies' willingness to do more for our common security and also improve the balance of the provision of capabilities between the United States and European Allies as well as among European Allies themselves. To implement this concept, today, a group of ten Allies, facilitated by Germany as a framework nation and focusing on capability development, have, through a joint letter, committed to working systematically together, deepening and intensifying their cooperation in the long term, to create, in various configurations, a number of multinational projects to address Alliance priority areas across a broad spectrum of capabilities. They will initially concentrate on creating coherent sets of capabilities in the areas of logistics support; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection; delivering fire-power from land, air, and sea; and deployable headquarters. Another group of seven Allies, facilitated by the United Kingdom as a framework nation, have also agreed today to establish the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a rapidly deployable force capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations, including high intensity operations. The JEF will facilitate the efficient deployment of existing and emerging military capabilities and units. Additionally, a group of six Allies, facilitated by Italy as a framework nation and based on regional ties, will focus on improving a number of Alliance capability areas, such as stabilisation and reconstruction, provision of enablers, usability of land formations, and command and control. Other groupings are being developed in line with the Framework Nations Concept.

**68.** Two Allies have announced their intention to establish a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, to be delivered from 2016 and to be available for the full spectrum of operations, including at high intensity.

**69.** We continue to build on the experience gained in recent operations and improve our interoperability through the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). Today we have endorsed a substantial CFI Package consisting of six key deliverables, including the high-visibility exercise Trident Juncture 2015, with 25,000 personnel to be hosted by Spain, Portugal, and Italy; a broader and more demanding exercise programme from 2016 onwards; and a deployable Special Operations Component Command headquarters. As a key component in delivering NATO Forces 2020, the CFI addresses the full range of missions, including the most demanding, thereby demonstrating the continued cohesion

and resolve of the Alliance. It provides the structure for Allies to train and exercise coherently; reinforces full-spectrum joint and combined training; promotes interoperability, including with partners; and leverages advances in technology, such as the Federated Mission Networking framework, which will enhance information sharing in the Alliance and with partners in support of training, exercises and operations.

**70.** In this context, NATO will continue to work closely with the EU, as agreed, to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU's Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and to support capability development and interoperability with a view to avoiding unnecessary duplication and maximising cost- effectiveness. We welcome the efforts of NATO nations and EU member states, in particular in the areas of strategic airlift and air-to-air refuelling, medical support, maritime surveillance, satellite communication, and training, as well as efforts of several nations in the area of remotely piloted aircraft systems. We also welcome the national efforts in these and other areas by European Allies and partners, which will benefit both organisations. The success of our efforts will continue to depend on mutual transparency and openness between the two organisations. We encourage making the fullest use of existing NATO-EU mechanisms to this effect.

**71.** The geopolitical and economic importance of the maritime domain in the 21st century continues to grow. NATO needs to adapt to a complex, more crowded, rapidly evolving, and increasingly unpredictable maritime security environment. This necessitates a strengthening of the Alliance's maritime capabilities, which should not be seen in isolation but as an integral part of NATO's larger toolbox to safeguard the Alliance's interests. We will therefore continue to intensify and expand our implementation of the Alliance Maritime Strategy, further enhancing the Alliance's effectiveness in the maritime domain and its contributions to deterrence and collective defence, crisis management, cooperative security, and maritime security. We will reinvigorate NATO's Standing Naval Forces by making their composition and the duration of national contributions more flexible and, in principle, no longer using them for protracted operations or for operations with low-end tasks. In addition, we will enhance their education, training, and exercise value, especially at the high end of the spectrum. We will also investigate ways to enhance further the effectiveness of the full range of Alliance maritime capabilities. Greater co-ordination, cooperation, and complementarity with relevant international organisations, including the EU, in line with the relevant decisions taken, as well as work with partner and non-partner nations, will be an important element of the implementation of the Alliance Maritime Strategy. We welcome the adoption

of the EU's Maritime Security Strategy in June 2014, which will potentially contribute to the security of all Allies.

**72.** As the Alliance looks to the future, cyber threats and attacks will continue to become more common, sophisticated, and potentially damaging. To face this evolving challenge, we have endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, contributing to the fulfillment of the Alliance's core tasks. The policy reaffirms the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and of prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and defence. It recalls that the fundamental cyber defence responsibility of NATO is to defend its own networks, and that assistance to Allies should be addressed in accordance with the spirit of solidarity, emphasizing the responsibility of Allies to develop the relevant capabilities for the protection of national networks. Our policy also recognises that international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.

**73.** We are committed to developing further our national cyber defence capabilities, and we will enhance the cyber security of national networks upon which NATO depends for its core tasks, in order to help make the Alliance resilient and fully protected. Close bilateral and multinational cooperation plays a key role in enhancing the cyber defence capabilities of the Alliance. We will continue to integrate cyber defence into NATO operations and operational and contingency planning, and enhance information sharing and situational awareness among Allies. Strong partnerships play a key role in addressing cyber threats and risks. We will therefore continue to engage actively on cyber issues with relevant partner nations on a case-by-case basis and with other international organisations, including the EU, as agreed, and will intensify our cooperation with industry through a NATO Industry Cyber Partnership. Technological innovations and expertise from the private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allies to achieve the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy's objectives. We will improve the level of NATO's cyber defence education, training, and exercise activities. We will develop the NATO cyber range capability, building, as a first step, on the Estonian cyber range capability, while taking into consideration the capabilities and requirements of the NATO CIS School and other NATO training and education bodies.

**74.** NATO recognises the importance of inclusive, sustainable, innovative, and globally competitive defence industries, which include small and medium-sized enterprises, to develop and sustain national defence capabilities and the defence technological and industrial base in the whole of Europe and in North America.

**75.** The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery, by states and non-state actors continues to present a threat to our populations, territory, and forces. The Alliance is resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. Addressing serious proliferation challenges remains an urgent international priority.

**76.** We call on Iran to seize the opportunity of the extension of the Joint Plan of Action until 24 November 2014 to make the strategic choices that will restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. We continue to call on Iran to comply fully with all its international obligations, including all relevant Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors. We also underscore the importance of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, in particular those related to possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

**77.** We are deeply concerned by the nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes and proliferation activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and call on it to comply fully with all relevant UNSCRs and the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. We call on the DPRK to abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities. We strongly condemn the DPRK's December 2012 launch, which used ballistic missile technology, the nuclear test carried out by the DPRK in February 2013, and the various launches of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles since February 2014. We call on the DPRK to refrain from any further nuclear tests, launches using ballistic missile technology, or other provocations.

**78.** The upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference is an opportunity for parties to reaffirm support for this Treaty and for its non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses pillars. Allies support efforts towards the success of this conference. We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the NPT and the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and call for full implementation

of UNSCR 1540 and welcome further work under UNSCR 1977. We call on all states to commit to combating effectively the proliferation of WMD through the universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and through the Proliferation Security Initiative. We also call on all States to continue strengthening the security of nuclear materials and of radioactive sources within their borders, as they were called on to do by the Nuclear Security Summits of 2010 (Washington), 2012 (Seoul), and 2014 (The Hague). We will also ensure that NATO is postured to counter Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, including through the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force.

**79.** Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries and to international stability and prosperity more broadly, and will remain a threat for the foreseeable future. It is a global threat that knows no border, nationality, or religion – a challenge that the international community must fight and tackle together. We reaffirm our commitment to fight terrorism with unwavering resolve in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter. NATO Allies are exposed to a wide range of terrorist threats. NATO has a role to play, including through our military cooperation with partners to build their capacity to face such threats, and through enhanced information sharing. Without prejudice to national legislation or responsibilities, the Alliance strives at all times to remain aware of the evolving threat from terrorism; to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist threats; and to engage with partners and other international organisations, as appropriate, promoting common understanding and practical cooperation in support of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including in areas such as Explosive Risk Management. Building on our Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work, we will continue to improve our capabilities and technologies, including to defend against Improvised Explosive Devices and CBRN threats. We will keep terrorism and related threats high on NATO's security agenda.

**80.** NATO Allies form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The Alliance is convinced that these shared values and our security are strengthened when we work with our wide network of partners around the globe. We will continue to engage actively to enhance international security through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations, in accordance with our Berlin Partnership Policy.

**81.** Partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works. Partners have served with us in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and other operations, sacrificing alongside Alliance troops, and work with us in combating terrorism and piracy. Partners make significant contributions to our practical cooperation activities in a number of different areas, including Trust Funds. Together with our partners, we have built a broad cooperative security network. Allies are resolved to maintain and build on this legacy, as our partnerships play a crucial role in the promotion of international peace and security. At this Summit, we therefore collectively pledge to strengthen the political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners who share our vision for cooperative security in an international order based on the rule of law. We will continue to build defence capacity and interoperability through such initiatives as the Defence Education Enhancement Programme and the Professional Development Programme. We will also continue to promote transparency, accountability, and integrity in the defence sectors of interested nations through the Building Integrity programme.

**82.** This year we celebrate twenty years of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council are, and will continue to be, a part of our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. They have forged political ties across Europe, through the Caucasus and into Central Asia; they have also been the foundation for practical cooperation to address common threats to our shared security, including in the field of human security. This cooperation was driven, at heart, by the common values and principles to which Allies and partners have all committed in the PfP founding documents. They include the promise to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, to respect internationally recognised borders, and to settle disputes by peaceful means. These principles are as important as ever today and must be upheld unequivocally across the Euro-Atlantic community.

**83.** We reaffirm our commitment to the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and the principles that underpin them; MD and ICI remain two complementary yet distinct partnership frameworks. We look forward to deepening our political dialogue and practical cooperation in both fora, building on many years of steady progress. We remain open to welcoming new members from the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East region to these frameworks.

**84.** This year we also celebrate twenty years of the Mediterranean Dialogue. Today, as the Mediterranean region faces huge security challenges with wide-ranging implications for Euro-Atlantic security, the importance of this forum, which brings

together key countries from NATO's southern border, is clearer than ever. Enhancing the political dimension of MD will help to address the challenges of the region. We stand ready to continue working with our MD partners to make the most of the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO, including individual partnership and cooperation programmes.

**85.** We also celebrate ten years of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which has helped to promote understanding and security cooperation with our partners in the Gulf region. We encourage our ICI partner countries to be proactive in taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO, including individual partnership and cooperation programmes.

**86.** We will also intensify efforts to engage with and reach out to those partners across the globe that can contribute significantly to addressing shared security concerns. The Berlin Partnership Policy has created increased opportunities for these countries to work individually with NATO at the political and practical level. We welcome that some of our partners across the globe have seized these opportunities by providing support to operations and engaging in security cooperation and dialogue to enhance common understanding of our shared security interests.

**87.** We will likewise look to further develop relations with relevant regional international organisations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, and be open to engaging with others, including in the context of regional crisis situations.

**88.** As combat operations end in Afghanistan, we will ensure that the bonds forged between Allied and partner nations' armed forces remain as strong as ever. We have fought together. Now we will focus on preparing and training together. We have therefore adopted a comprehensive Partnership Interoperability Initiative to enhance our ability to tackle security challenges together with our partners. Here in Wales, our Defence Ministers launched the Interoperability Platform, meeting with 24 partners[1] that have demonstrated their commitment to reinforce their interoperability with NATO. These partners have been invited to work with us to take forward dialogue and practical cooperation on interoperability issues. Defence Ministers also met with five partners[2] that make particularly significant contributions to NATO operations to discuss further deepening dialogue and practical cooperation as part of the enhanced opportunities within the Partnership Interoperability Initiative. We stand ready to consider the addition of other partners as their contributions and interests warrant.

**89.** Today we have decided to launch a Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative to reinforce our commitment to partner nations and to help the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as part of the Alliance's overall contribution to international security and stability and conflict prevention. The Initiative builds upon NATO's extensive expertise in supporting, advising and assisting nations with defence and related security capacity building. Building on our close cooperation and following their requests, we have agreed to extend this initiative to Georgia, Jordan, and the Republic of Moldova. We are also ready to consider requests from interested partners and non-partners, as well as to engage with international and regional organisations, with an interest in building their defence and related security capacity through this demand-driven initiative. We reaffirm NATO's readiness to provide defence and related security capacity advisory support for Libya when conditions permit. We will pursue these efforts in complementarity and close cooperation with other international organisations, in particular the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as appropriate. Some partner nations themselves can bring unique partner insight and contributions to NATO capacity building efforts. We welcome the appointment of NATO's Deputy Secretary General as Special Coordinator for Defence Capacity Building, as well as the establishment of a military hub in the NATO Command Structure, to help ensure a timely, coherent and effective NATO response, taking into account efforts by partners and individual Allies, on a voluntary basis.

**90.** We attach great importance to ensuring women's full and active participation in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, as well as in post-conflict efforts and cooperation. We remain committed to preventing conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. Since our last Summit in Chicago, we have made significant progress in implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related resolutions. We are now implementing the results of the Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of Operations. A revised Policy and Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security have been developed with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and with other partners[3]. The establishment of a permanent position of NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security underscores the Alliance's active engagement and commitment to this agenda. NATO's cooperation with partner nations, international organisations, and civil society has been strengthened and should be further enhanced. Our ongoing efforts to integrate gender perspectives into Alliance activities throughout NATO's three core tasks will contribute to a more modern,

ready, and responsive NATO. We have directed the Council to submit a progress report on NATO's implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions for our next Summit.

**91.** We recall NATO's firm commitment to the implementation of UNSCR 1612 and related resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict and remain deeply concerned about the damaging effects of armed conflicts on children. NATO will continue to carry out its responsibilities as part of the wider international effort and to build on initiatives already taken to properly integrate this issue into the planning and conduct of its operations and missions, as well as its training, monitoring, and reporting. Therefore, in close cooperation with the UN, NATO will assess how to ensure it is sufficiently prepared whenever and wherever the issue of Children and Armed Conflict is likely to be encountered.

**92.** The Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty is one of the Alliance's great successes. Successive rounds of NATO enlargement have enhanced the security and stability of all our nations. The steady progress of Euro-Atlantic integration fosters reform, strengthens collective security, and ensures the stability necessary for prosperity. NATO's door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion will contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance, judging each on its own merits. Decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself. We encourage partners to continue to implement the necessary reforms and decisions to advance their aspirations and prepare for membership, and we will continue to offer political and practical support to their efforts. Today we have endorsed decisions that take forward our Open Door Policy based on progress by individual partners that aspire to join the Alliance.

**93.** NATO recognises Georgia's significant efforts to strengthen its democracy and to modernise its military forces and defence institutions. We welcome the democratic development of Georgia, including through the peaceful transfer of power following parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012 and 2013, respectively. We encourage Georgia to continue implementation of reforms, including consolidating democratic institutions, taking forward judicial reforms, and ensuring full respect for the rule of law. NATO highly appreciates Georgia's sizeable contribution to the ISAF operation and recognises the sacrifices Georgian troops have made

in Afghanistan. Together with Georgia's offer to participate in the NATO Response Force, these contributions demonstrate Georgia's role as a contributor to our shared security. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. Since then, Georgia has made significant progress and has come closer to NATO by implementing ambitious reforms and making good use of the NATO-Georgia Commission and Annual National Programme. We note that Georgia's relationship with the Alliance contains the tools necessary to continue moving Georgia forward towards eventual membership. Today we have endorsed a substantial package for Georgia that includes defence capacity building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison, and enhanced interoperability opportunities. These measures aim to strengthen Georgia's defence and interoperability capabilities with the Alliance, which will help Georgia advance in its preparations towards membership in the Alliance.

**94.** We reiterate our continued support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders. We welcome Georgia's full compliance with the EU-mediated cease-fire agreement and other multilateral measures to build confidence. We welcome Georgia's commitment not to use force and call on Russia to reciprocate. We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states and to withdraw its forces from Georgia. We encourage all participants in the Geneva talks to play a constructive role as well as to continue working closely with the OSCE, the UN, and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict resolution in the internationally recognised territory of Georgia.

**95.** We welcome the significant progress made by Montenegro in its reforms, its constructive role in the Western Balkans region and the contribution that it makes to international security, including its contribution to our engagement in Afghanistan. In recognition of Montenegro's progress towards NATO membership, the Alliance has agreed to open intensified and focused talks with Montenegro, and agreed that Foreign Ministers will assess Montenegro's progress no later than by the end of 2015 with a view to deciding on whether to invite Montenegro to join the Alliance. These talks will be conducted in conjunction with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. In the meantime, we look to Montenegro to continue its efforts to address the remaining challenges, particularly with respect to rule of law and completing security sector reform. We also welcome the increase in public support in Montenegro for NATO membership and encourage continued efforts in this area.

**96.** We reiterate the agreement at our 2008 Bucharest Summit, as we did at subsequent Summits, to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[4] to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN, and strongly urge intensified efforts towards that end. An early solution, and subsequent membership, will contribute to security and stability in the region. We encourage and support the continuation of reform efforts within the country, particularly with a view to ensuring effective democratic dialogue, media freedom, judicial independence, and a fully-functioning multi-ethnic society based on full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. We also encourage further efforts to develop good neighbourly relations. We appreciate the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's long-standing contribution to our operations and its active role in regional cooperation. We value the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's long-standing commitment to the NATO accession process.

**97.** We continue to fully support the membership aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We look forward to free and fair general elections in October, which we hope will lead to an efficient and effective government coalition, ready to address the issues related to the country's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. We acknowledge the efforts undertaken since 2012 to come to a political agreement on registering the immovable defence property to the state. We remain concerned that little progress has been achieved to comply with the condition set by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010. As Allied Foreign Ministers will keep developments under active review, we encourage the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in that regard so that its first MAP cycle can be activated as soon as possible. We appreciate Bosnia and Herzegovina's contributions to NATO-led operations, and we commend its constructive role in regional dialogue and security.

**98.** Here in Wales, our Foreign Ministers have met their counterparts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Ministers discussed the progress made by these countries, the Euro-Atlantic integration process, and other key Summit issues, including the international security situation. NATO is grateful to these partners for the significant contributions that they continue to make to NATO's objectives and to international security and stability.

**99.** In light of NATO's operational experiences and the evolving complex security environment, a comprehensive political, civilian, and military approach

is essential in crisis management and cooperative security. Furthermore, it contributes to the effectiveness of our common security and defence, without prejudice to Alliance collective defence commitments. Today we reaffirm our decisions taken at the Lisbon and Chicago Summits. The comprehensive approach is conducive to more coherence within NATO's own structures and activities. Furthermore, NATO has developed a modest but appropriate civilian capability in line with Lisbon Summit decisions. As part of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach by the international community, we will enhance cooperation with partner nations and other actors, including other international organisations, such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE, as well as non-governmental organisations, in line with decisions taken. We will ensure that comprehensive approach-related lessons learned, including from ISAF, will be carried forward and applied in various strands of work and new initiatives, including, as appropriate, the Readiness Action Plan, the Connected Forces Initiative, the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, and the Partnership Interoperability Initiative.

**100.** In the spirit of the comprehensive approach and in light of a changing security environment in Europe, our Foreign Ministers met with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to discuss closer cooperation. At a time when the values and principles that underpin the major institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area are being challenged, Allies emphasised the need to work together to ensure our shared goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace. We look forward to continuing the dialogue to advance this further.

**101.** NATO's cooperation with the United Nations (UN) strengthens international security. We welcome our regular political dialogue on areas of common interest. We are encouraged by the growing practical cooperation between the staffs of our organisations, including exchanges of best practices and lessons learned in operations, training and exercises, and sharing of expertise. We are committed to exploring ways to reinforce our practical support to UN peace operations, including by enhancing cooperation between NATO and the UN in building defence and related security capacity.

**102.** The European Union (EU) remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share common values and strategic interests. In a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both NATO and the EU, and as agreed by the two organisations, we will continue to work side-by-side in crisis management

operations, broaden political consultations, and promote complementarity of the two organisations to enhance common security and stability. The current strategic environment has highlighted the need for further strengthening our strategic partnership and reinforcing our joint efforts and our common message.

**103.** NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, which will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance the security of all Allies and foster an equitable sharing of the burden, benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership. In this context, we welcome the EU member states' decisions to strengthen European defence and crisis management, including at the European Council in December 2013.

**104.** We look forward to continued dialogue and cooperation between NATO and the EU. Our consultations have broadened to address issues of common concern, including security challenges like cyber defence, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism, and energy security. We will also seek to work more closely together in several other areas, including maritime security, defence and related security capacity building, and addressing hybrid threats, in line with decisions taken.

**105.** Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU's efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies' fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. We encourage further mutual steps in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership.

**106.** We welcome the Secretary General's report on NATO-EU relations. We encourage him to continue to work closely with the EU High Representative and the leaders of other EU institutions across the broad spectrum of the NATO-EU strategic partnership and provide a report to the Council in time for the next Summit.

**107.** As demonstrated most recently by its activities in the framework of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) plays an important role in addressing the security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic area. We fully support efforts undertaken by the OSCE and continue to work closely with the OSCE in areas such as conflict prevention and resolution, post conflict rehabilitation and in addressing new security threats. We are committed to further enhancing our cooperation, both at the political and operational level, in all areas of common interest.

**108.** We welcome the increasing emphasis by the African Union (AU) on addressing transnational security threats, and its growing efforts to build the African capacity to rapidly respond to emerging conflicts. We encourage deeper political and practical cooperation between NATO and the AU to support the African Union in establishing a more robust African peace and security capacity. Based on the AU's request, NATO will continue to provide technical support and stands ready to explore, in consultation with the AU, opportunities to expand our logistical, training, and planning assistance in support of African peacekeepers. We welcome the recent progress in establishing a sound legal framework for NATO-AU cooperation.

**109.** A stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks remain of critical importance. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations, NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security, including in relation to the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa region. We will continue to consult on and further develop our capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. In particular, we will enhance our awareness of energy developments with security implications for Allies and the Alliance; further develop NATO's competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and continue to work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces, and in this regard we note the Green Defence Framework. We will also enhance training and education efforts, continue to engage with partner countries, on a case-by-case basis, and consult with relevant international organisations, including the EU, as appropriate. Today we have noted a progress report on NATO's role in energy security and we task the Council to continue to refine NATO's role in energy security in accordance with the principles and guidelines agreed at the Bucharest Summit and the direction provided by subsequent Summits and the Strategic Concept. We task the Council to produce a further progress report for our next Summit.

**110.** Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity, and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

**111.** At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Allies agreed on an ambitious reform programme, encompassing reviews of the Agencies and NATO Command Structure; resource reform; Headquarters reform; and an end-to-end review of all structures engaged in NATO capability development. Heads of State and Government took stock of progress at the 2012 Chicago Summit. Since then, NATO has continued to reform by instituting new policies, overhauling its structures, and streamlining procedures to improve efficiency and to ensure our Alliance is responsive and agile against the diverse challenges and threats it faces.

**112.** NATO has adapted to drive further financial reform, harnessed the best efforts of our International Staff and International Military Staff, developed its NATO Command Structure, and achieved a greater level of coherence between its Agencies. While significant progress has been made in the reform of the Alliance, ongoing initiatives still need to be fully delivered and further efforts will be required. We have tasked further work in the areas of delivery of common funded capabilities, reform governance and transparency and accountability, especially in the management of NATO's financial resources. We look forward to a further report on progress on these reforms by the time of our next Summit.

**113.** We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the Government of the United Kingdom and the people of Wales. The decisions we have taken at our Summit will help to keep our nations and populations safe, the bond between Europe and North America strong, and our region and the world stable. We will meet again in Poland in 2016.

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[1] Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates.

[2] Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden.

[3] Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates.

[4] Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

# THE WALES DECLARATION ON THE TRANSATLANTIC BOND

1. The North Atlantic Alliance binds North America and Europe in the defence of our common security, prosperity and values. It guarantees the security of its members through collective defence. It strengthens security in Europe, and projects stability further afield through crisis management and cooperative security with its unique set of partnerships. Our commitment to defend freedom, individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law makes our community unique.

2. Our predecessors met in London in 1990 to adapt the North Atlantic Alliance to a changed environment. We meet now in Wales at a time when our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace faces multiple challenges. We face serious crises which affect security and stability to NATOs east and south. These include Russias illegal self-declared annexation of Crimea and Russias continued aggressive acts in other parts of Ukraine and the spread of violence and extremism in North Africa and the Middle East.

3. So today, we have taken the necessary decisions to prepare our Alliance for the future. With this aim, we have agreed a Readiness Action Plan, enhancing NATOs preparedness and responsiveness, including its posture. The Alliance poses no threat to any country. But should the security of any Ally be threatened we will act together and decisively, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

4. We will therefore strengthen the military capabilities the Alliance needs. After two decades of intensive operations, Allies now have the most experienced, capable and interoperable forces in NATOs history. We will continue to invest in modern and deployable armed forces that can operate effectively together and at a high level of readiness to fulfil NATOs tasks, in full accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.

5. We recognise that these steps will take the necessary effort and funding. In light of this, we agree to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets and aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows; we will direct our defence budgets as efficiently and effectively as possible; we will aim to move towards the existing NATO guideline of spending 2% of GDP on defence within a decade, with a view to fulfilling NATO capability priorities. We will display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed.

6. These decisions will further strengthen the Transatlantic Bond, enhance the security of all Allies and ensure a more fair and balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities. We welcome efforts both by NATO Allies and EU members to enhance their defence capabilities and, in this respect, we support continuing close cooperation and complementarity between the two organizations. A stronger European Defence will contribute to a stronger NATO.

7. We are mindful that our security and our prosperity are interlinked. Our economies and prosperity require security. And our common security requires investment, based on strong economies. As we emerge from the recession, we do so with renewed dedication to promoting free trade, competitiveness, and growth across the transatlantic community, including greater defence industrial cooperation in Europe and across the Atlantic.

8. Our wide network of partnerships is of utmost importance to our shared stability and security and how we promote our values. We agree to further strengthen cooperation with our partners and to keep the door of the Alliance open.

9. Today, we reaffirm our continuing and unwavering commitment to defend the populations, territory, sovereignty, and shared values of all Allies in North America and Europe and to meet challenges and threats from wherever they may emanate. With our decisions here in Wales the North Atlantic Alliance will remain the bedrock of our collective defence.

# JOINT STATEMENT OF THE NATO-UKRAINE COMMISSION

As we meet today, Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence continue to be violated by Russia. Despite Russia's denials, Russian armed forces are engaged in direct military operations in Ukraine; Russia continues to supply weapons to militants in eastern Ukraine; and it maintains thousands of combat-ready troops on its border with Ukraine. These developments undermine the security of Ukraine and have serious implications for the stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, stand united in our support of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

We strongly condemn Russia's illegal and illegitimate self-declared "annexation" of Crimea and its continued and deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine in violation of international law. We call on Russia to reverse its self-declared "annexation" of Crimea, which we do not and will not recognise. Russia must end its support for militants in eastern Ukraine, withdraw its troops and stop its military activities along and across the Ukrainian border, respect the rights of the local population, including the native Crimean Tatars, and refrain from further aggressive actions against Ukraine. Allies consider any unilateral Russian military or subversive action inside Ukraine, under any pretext, including humanitarian, as a blatant violation of international law.

Allies support the efforts of the Government of Ukraine, including through the Ukrainian Peace Plan, to pursue a political path that meets the aspirations of the people in all regions of Ukraine without external interference.

Allies welcome the commitments made by all parties, including in Geneva and Berlin, and other ongoing negotiations to work toward establishing the conditions for a peaceful solution. However, despite the commitments it has made, Russia has, in fact, carried out direct military intervention inside Ukraine and increased its support to the militants. We call on Russia to change course and to take active steps to de-escalate the crisis, including to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the Ukrainian authorities.

Allies recognise Ukraine's right to restore peace and order and to defend its people and territory and encourage the Ukrainian Armed Forces and security services to continue to exercise the utmost restraint in their ongoing operation to avoid casualties among the local population.

Allies commend the Ukrainian people's commitment to freedom and democracy and their determination to decide their own future free from outside interference. They welcome the holding of free and fair Presidential elections under difficult conditions and the signature of the Association Agreement with the European Union, which testify to the consolidation of Ukraine's democracy and its European aspiration. We expect that the upcoming elections to the Verkhovna Rada in October of this year, as an important element of the Ukrainian Peace Plan, would contribute to this end.

We welcome the actions of other international actors to contribute to de-escalation and to a peaceful solution to the crisis, in particular the OSCE, the European Union and the Council of Europe, as well as individual Allies.

In the framework of our long-standing Distinctive Partnership, NATO has consistently supported Ukraine throughout this crisis, and all 28 Allies, including through NATO, are enhancing their support so that Ukraine can better provide for its own security. Recognising Ukraine's intent to deepen its Distinctive Partnership with NATO, we are stepping up our strategic consultations in the NATO-Ukraine Commission. NATO has already strengthened existing programmes on defence education, professional development, security sector governance, and security-related scientific cooperation with Ukraine. We will further strengthen our cooperation in the framework of the Annual National Programme in the defence and security sector through capability development and sustainable capacity building programmes for Ukraine. In this context, Allies will launch substantial new programmes with a focus on command, control and communications, logistics and standardisation, cyber defence, military career transition, and strategic communications. NATO will also provide assistance to Ukraine to rehabilitate

injured military personnel. Allies are reinforcing their advisory presence at the NATO offices in Kyiv. Allies have taken note of Ukraine's requests for military-technical assistance, and many Allies are providing additional support to Ukraine on a bilateral basis, which Ukraine welcomes.

NATO and Ukraine will continue to promote the development of greater interoperability between Ukrainian and NATO forces, including through continued regular Ukrainian participation in NATO exercises. Allies highly value Ukraine's ongoing contributions to Allied operations, the NATO Response Force and the Connected Forces Initiative. Allies welcome Ukraine's participation in the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, appreciate Ukraine's interest in the Enhanced Opportunities Programme within the Initiative, and look forward to its future participation.

With Allied support, including through the Annual National Programme, Ukraine remains committed to the implementation of wide-ranging reforms, to combat corruption and promote an inclusive political process, based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities and the rule of law.

As noted at previous NATO Summits, including in Madrid, Bucharest, Lisbon and Chicago, an independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. We reiterate our firm commitment to further develop the Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine which will contribute to building a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe.

# WALES SUMMIT DECLARATION ON AFGHANISTAN

## Issued by Heads of State and Government of Allies and their International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troop contributing partners

1. Today we honoured Afghan and international personnel who have lost their lives or been injured while serving in the largest military coalition in recent history. We also pay tribute to the hundreds of thousands of military and civilian personnel who have served with ISAF and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) over the past thirteen years. Their sacrifices and efforts have made all of our nations safer and improved global security. For that, we are grateful.

2. ISAF has assisted the Afghan people to regain control over their nation's destiny. It has enabled Afghanistan to develop its security capabilities. It has helped Afghanistan make significant advances in education, health, economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, notably for women. Moreover, ISAF has demonstrated political solidarity among our nations and improved our ability to act and operate together.

3. ISAF will conclude at the end of 2014 as planned. For over a year, the ANSF have been in the lead for combat operations throughout the country. Although many challenges remain, they have demonstrated that they are an effective force, gaining the respect and confidence of the Afghan people and able to prevent insurgents from achieving their objectives. When ISAF operations end, the Afghan

authorities will assume full responsibility for security. However, our commitment to Afghanistan will endure beyond ISAF along with our determination to ensure that we are never again threatened by terrorists from within Afghanistan.

4. With the end of ISAF, the nature and scope of our engagement with Afghanistan will change. We envisage three parallel, mutually reinforcing, strands of activity:

a. *In the short term, the Resolute Support Mission.* As decided at the Chicago Summit in 2012, at the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and in the context of the broader international effort to help Afghanistan, NATO Allies and partner nations stand ready to continue to train, advise and assist the ANSF after 2014. This will be done through a new, non-combat mission with a sound legal basis. The mission's establishment is contingent on the signing of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement and NATO-Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement. The Resolute Support Mission should ideally, in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan, be supported by a United Nations Security Council Resolution.

b. *In the medium term, our contribution to the financial sustainment of the ANSF.* At Chicago, NATO allies and ISAF partners decided to provide support to the ANSF, as appropriate, through the Transformation Decade, on the understanding that the Afghan Government will make an increasing financial contribution to this endeavour. Today, nations renewed their financial commitments to support the sustainment of the ANSF, including to the end of 2017. We also urge the wider international community to remain engaged in the financial sustainment of the ANSF. We will maintain and strengthen the transparent, accountable and cost-effective funding mechanisms we have established since Chicago, including the Oversight and Coordination Body, which will ensure donors can confidently commit this support. Realising the full promise of the pledges made at Chicago on the financial sustainment of the ANSF, which we have reaffirmed today, will require transparency, accountability, and cost-effectiveness of the relevant international funding mechanisms. We encourage the Afghan Government to continue and strengthen efforts to fight corruption. We look forward to working with the Afghan authorities to review the force structure and capabilities of the ANSF to achieve a sufficient and sustainable force. We restate the aim, agreed at Chicago, that Afghanistan should assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces.

*c. In the long term, NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership*. NATO Allies remain committed to the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership, agreed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. The strengthening of this partnership will reflect the changing nature of NATO's relationship with Afghanistan whilst complementing the Resolute Support Mission and continuing beyond it. Both the political and practical elements of this partnership should be jointly owned and strengthened through regular consultation on issues of strategic concern. NATO is ready to work with Afghanistan to develop this partnership in line with NATO's Partnership Policy, possibly including the development of an Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme at an appropriate time.

5. We will continue to support an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and inclusive peace process, as stated at the 2011 Bonn Conference and at the Chicago Summit in 2012. We welcome efforts by all parties that further this process.

6. Good neighbourly relations, as well as regional support and cooperation will remain essential. This has been strengthened notably by the Istanbul Process in the Heart of Asia region.

7. A stable Afghanistan will be able to make a positive contribution to the wider region including through delivering progress in the fight against narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism and crime.

8. We are resolved to support Afghanistan in making further progress towards becoming a stable, sovereign, democratic and united country, where rule of law and good governance prevail and in which human rights, and notably those of children, are fully protected. We emphasize the particular importance of strengthening efforts to implement the rights of women and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, and to include women fully in political, peace and reconciliation processes. We further recognize the need for the protection of children from the damaging effects of armed conflict as required in relevant United Nations Resolutions. We also welcome continued work to strengthen the protection of civilians by all parties concerned. Thus, we are committed to continue working with Afghanistan to further strengthen these values and principles.

9. Today we have extended significant offers of support and partnership to Afghanistan as it determines its own future. We remain steadfast and resolute in our commitment to the Afghan people.

# UKRAINE CRISIS
## – How Relevant and Functional the UN still Is –

*General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ*

*Ukraine crisis is complex and it could trigger a new cold war between Russia, on the one hand, and NATO and the EU, on the other hand. The management of the crisis might raise doubts about the UN credibility and authority to uphold international security.*

*The US, Russia and the EU try to de-escalate the Ukraine crisis because of the high risk of spreading violence in Eastern Ukraine.*

*According to the author, the UN has limited functionality and relevance in security issues as it depends on the interests of the great powers that have the right of veto over any decision that disadvantages them.*

*Keywords: international security; crisis; UN credibility; propaganda warfare*

## 1. The UN Charter on the Role of the World Organisation in the Maintenance of International Security

The UN Charter sets out that the maintenance of international security is the primary responsibility of the Security Council. It has 5 permanent members – the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – and 10 non-permanent members elected by vote for a period of 2 years. The Security Council decisions are taken by majority vote, which must necessarily include the votes of the permanent members that have the right of veto. Therefore, permanent members can block any decision of the Council, if it is against them or their interests.

## 2. Brief History of the UN Role in the Maintenance of International Security

The major powers right of veto has often blocked the activity of the UN Security Council. Among the few important security situations in which the Council members have reached consensus or have not blocked decisions, abstaining

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from voting, are the crisis in Korea (1950-1953) and the crisis in the Middle East (1990-1991).

In 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea in order to unify the country and impose a communist regime in the whole peninsula. The North Korean leadership decision was influenced by the Soviet and the Chinese support. Stalin and Mao would have consulted after the US Department of State issued the *"defence perimeter"* that did not include South Korea. Moreover, historians say that Secretary of State Dean Acheson would have explicitly declared that the USA did not have interests in South Korea[1]. Under these circumstances, the two communist leaders thought it was an opportunity to implement the slogan *"Proletarians of all countries, unite!"*[2].

The attack on South Korea, on 25 June 1950, prompted the USA and Western states to ask the Security Council to resort to force so that North Korean troops withdrew from the territory of South Korea. The Council passed the resolution unanimously, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the USSR representative from the UN, 6 months before, because the Soviet request to approve the inclusion of communist China among the members of the world organisation was not accepted[3].

In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and then annexed it, declaring that the emirate had been part of the Iraqi state. The action of the regime in Baghdad, led by President Saddam Hussein, was sanctioned by the Security Council, first by economic blockade, and then by the decision to use force for the liberation of Kuwait. The USSR agreed with the decision hoping to avoid international isolation after the overthrow of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (1 July 1991[4]). Moreover, under the influence of the events in 1989 in Eastern Europe, decentralist trends emerged in the USSR, and a failed coup took place in Moscow, on 19-21 August 1991[5].

In the other major security crises arising after the establishment of the UN, the Security Council could not make decisions because of the opposition of great powers – permanent members – that vetoed when they were directly involved in the conflict or when they considered that their interests could be negatively affected.

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[1] John Lewis Gadis, *Războiul rece*, Editura Rao, București, 2006, p. 59.

[2] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, London, 1848, cited by I. Berg in *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, Editura Vestala, București, 2004, p. 270.

[3] *Teaching with Documents: The United States Enters the Korean Conflict*, article published in *National Archives*, see http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict/, retrieved on 02.04.2014.

[4] *International Conference Commemorated the 20th Anniversary of the Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact*, article published on 23.06.2011 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Check Republic, see https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/public_diplomacy/international_conference_to_commemorate.html, retrieved on 02.04.2014.

[5] Katerina Azarova, *Coup of '91: Tank Tasks to Democracy*, article published in *RT* on 20.04.2011, see http://rt.com/news/soviet-august-coup-1991-222/, retrieved on 01.04.2014.

George Friedman, CEO of STRATFOR, an independent intelligence agency, writes that, during the *Cold War*, the US and USSR foreign ministers used to meet and negotiate the outcomes of crises and even the fate of some countries[6]. This disclosure confirms the opinions of several experts and foreign policy commentators, including Mike Moore, who considers that the current world order no longer corresponds to the one existing when the international architecture was established at *"Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire"*[7].

A brief overview of major international crises after 1990 is eloquent to illustrate the division of the international community as a whole, and the significant differences in attitude between the permanent members of the Security Council with regard to the way crises can be resolved.

In the first part of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1993), Russia had to vote in favour, not even abstain, of the proposals of Western states, because of its economic dependence on Western Europe, considers Chinmaya Gharekhan, former  Indian Ambassador to the UN, and subsequently Head of the international organisation Secretary General secretariat[8]. In the second part of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994-1995), Russia became firmer and the Western members of the Security Council had to take into account the position of the Kremlin.

In the Kosovo crisis (1999), Russia and China declared that they would not accept the use of force against Serbia under UN mandate. In this context, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, persuaded NATO allies not to submit any draft resolution to the UN Security Council[9]. As a result, NATO intervened militarily using air strikes against the Serbian armed and police forces, without the consent of the Security Council.

In 2003, when the USA and the UK requested the Security Council to approve the use of force against Saddam Hussein's regime to halt Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programmes, Russia and France declared that they would use their veto to prevent the approval of the resolution, if the USA could not provide credible evidence[10].

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[6] George Friedman, *Russia and the United States Negotiate the Future of Ukraine*, article published in *Geopolitical Weekly* on 01.04.2014, see http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russia-and-the-united-states-negociate-the-future-of-ukraine/, retrieved on 02.04.2014.

[7] Mike Moore, *Multilateral Meltdown*, article published in *Foreign Policy*, March-April 2003, p. 22.

[8] Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, *The Horseshoe Table. An Inside View of the UN Security Council*, Pearson/Longman, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 103-105.

[9] *Interviews – Madeleine Albright: War in Europe*, article published by *Pbs.org Frontline*, see http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html, retrieved on  05.04.2014.

[10] Jeff Koinange and Jim Bitterman, *France, Russia Threaten War Veto*, article published by *CNN.com*, on 11.03.2003, see http://edition.cnn.com/2003/world/europe/03/10/sprj. france.chirac/, retrieved on  02.04.2014.

Although deeply dissatisfied with the attitude of France, to which another important NATO member – Germany rallied, the US followed the *"principle" "multilaterally whenever we can, unilaterally when we must"*, issued by former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. Therefore, the USA formed a *"Coalition of the Wiling"*, consisting of 30 states, many states being left off, including Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, where the US troops and assets were massed for the military intervention[11]. The international coalition attacked Iraq, without a UN mandate, and led to the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein.

In August 2008, Georgia sent its armed forces to reintegrate the rebel South Ossetia province, self-declared independent following the Georgian – South-Ossetian clashes in 1992[12]. Russia intervened in confrontation on South Ossetia side and occupied a great part of Georgian territory, attacking from two directions – from the North (South Ossetia) and the West (Abkhazia). Finally the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was recognised by Russia. This decision, according to Edward Shevardnadze, former foreign minister of the USSR and President of Georgia, was a time bomb that could explode by the requests for secession of Chechnya, Dagestan, Tatarstan and other republics of the Russian Federation[13].

In the Syrian crisis (2011 – present), all Western attempts to obtain the consent of the Security Council to use force against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad have met the opposition of Russia and China. On 21 August 2013, when sarin gas missiles were used against some rebel positions in the suburbs of Damascus[14], most Westerners accused the Syrian government army of genocide[15]. Moreover, the President of the United States, Barack Obama, stated that the military intervention against the government forces would be used so that weapons of mass destruction could not be used either in Syria or anywhere else in the world. The UN experts could not establish if the sarin gas missiles were launched from the armed forces

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[11] Steve Shiffers, *US Names 'Coalition of Willing'*, article published by *BBC NEWS*, on 18.03.2003, see http://news.abc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm, retrieved on 02.04.2014.

[12] *Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili Faces the Vengeance of His Rivals*, article published in *The Telegraph*, on 10.10.2013, see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/10/oct/2013/georgias-Mikheil-Saakashvil-faces-the-vengeance-of-his-rival.html, retrieved on 05.04.2014.

[13] Uwe Klussman, *Interview with Edward Shevardnadze: We Couldn't Believe That the Warsaw Pact Could Be Dissolved*, article published in *Spiegel Online International*, on 20.11.2009, see http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-edward-shevarnadzw-we-couldn-t-belive-that-the-warsaw-pact-could-be-dissolved-a-663595.html, retrieved on 02.04.2014.

[14] John Laurenson, *Francois Hollande and the Syrian Trap*, article published in *Deutsche Welle* on 03.09.2013, see http://www.dw.de/francois-hollande-and-the-syrian-trap/a-17062564, retrieved on 18.11.2013.

[15] Josh Levs, *US on Syria Chemical Attack: What's the Evidence?*, *CNN*, 9 September 2013, http://www.edition.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/syria-us-evidence-cemical-weapons-attack/index.html, retrieved on 10.10.2013.

or the rebel positions. President Putin requested that the Syrian chemical arsenal should be placed under international control to eliminate the suspicion or fear that it could be used in the future. The US President accepted the proposal[16], provoking strong criticism from the Republicans that considered him weak and dominated by the Russian President.

In the recent crisis in Ukraine (November 2013 – present)[17], the UN limited to urge the parties (at the beginning the protesters in the opposition and the Ukrainian Government, and later Russia and Ukraine) to refrain from violence and to reach an agreement as soon as possible. The agreement was signed on 21 February 2014, in the presence of the French, German, and Polish foreign ministers. The three Western ministers also involved in the crisis relief actions by virtue of the so-called *"Weimer Triangle"*, established in 1991 by France, Germany and Poland[18]. The agreement was breached by the opposition, especially by the right-wing extremist group Sprava (Right) Sector[19], and violence broke out again in anger, prompting President Yanukovych to flee to Russia to save.

The Parliament in Kiev ousted President Yanukovych and validated the interim government under pressure from the street, states David Mandel[20]. The interim government signed the Association Agreement with the EU, although it was not approved by the majority of the population, says the same Mandel.

## 3. Are We Moving towards a New Cold War?

In most of the cases when there are differences of opinions between Russia and the USA in the UN Security Council, some political analysts rush to announce the beginning of a new *Cold War*. After Russia's military intervention alongside South Ossetia in its confrontation with Georgia, the references to the initiation of a new *Cold War* have multiplied. Edward Lucas wrote that Russia's action in the Caucasus, in 2008, was its response to NATO military intervention in Kosovo,

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[16] Thomas L. Friedman, *Threaten to Threaten*, article published in *The New York Times*, 10 September 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/opinion/friedman-threaten.html, retrieved on 12.09.2013.

[17] Alec Luhn, *The Ukrainian Nationalism at the Heart of Euromaidan*, article published in *The Nation*, on 21.01.2014, see http://www.thenation.com/article/178013/ukrainian-nationalism-heart-euromaidan, retrieved on 24.03.2014.

[18] *Germany, Poland, France Consult of Ukraine*, article published by *ABC News* on 01.04.2014, see http:///abcnews.go.com/international/wirestory/germany-poland-france-consult-Ukraine-23138416, retrieved on 01.04.2014.

[19] David Mandel, *Ukraine: Popular Uprising for Democracy or Fascist Putsch*, article published by *Global Research* on 12.03.2014, http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukrainian-popular-uprising-for-democracy-or-fascist-putsch/5373207, retrieved on 24.03.2014.

[20] *Ibidem*.

in 1999, while Russia considered the action a peacekeeping one[21]. The application for asylum in Russia of the former employee of the US intelligence services, Edward Snowden, happening in 2013, added fuel to the smouldering fire of Russian-American rivalry and boosted journalists to announce once again that we were in a new *Cold War*[22].

The expansion of the Chinese air defence zone, the authorities in Beijing imposing the mandatory identification of all aircraft flying in the area, prompted Ann Applebaum to denounce the use of the *Cold War* tactics by China and Russia[23].

After Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, on 29.11.2013, in Kiev started the protest rallies against the Ukrainian Government and President, accused of bowing to pressure from Russia[24].



***Armed protesters shooting other protesters in the Independence Square ("Maidan") in Kiev*[25]**

[21] Edward Lucas, *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West*, Palgrave McMillan, 2009, New York, USA, the review of the book may be read at http://www.amazon.com/the-new-cold-war-putins/dp/02302614345âreader-0230614345, retrieved on 20.08.2014.

[22] Steve Horn, *US-Russia "New Cold War": The Battle for Pipelines and Natural Gas*, article published by *Global Research* on 20.08.2013, see http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-russia-new-cold-war-the-battle-for-pipelines-and-natural-gas/5346344, retrieved on 20.02.2014.

[23] Ann Applebaum, *China and Russia Bring Back Cold War Tactics*, article published in *The Washington Post.com* on 26.12.2013, may be read at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ann-applebaum-china-and-russia-bring-back-cold-war-tactics/2013/12/25, retrieved on 20.02.2014.

[24] Dave Keating, *Georgia and Moldova Sign EU Association Agreements*, article published by *European Voice*, 29.11.2013, see http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/11/29/georgia-and-moldova-sign-eu-assotiation-agreements/78910.aspx, retrieved on 20.12.2013.

[25] Source: Antonio Delgado, *How Does the EU Solve a Problem Like the Ukraine?*, article published by *Openeurope blog*, on 19.02.2014, may be read at http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.ro/2014/02/how-does-eu-solve-problem-like-ukraine.html, retrieved on 06.04.2014.

President Yanukovych refuge in Russia marked the *"Maidan"* victory that took power in the country.

In an attempt to find the causes of violent protests in Kiev, which have spread to most major cities of the country, some journalists have presented the theory of *"ethnic division"*, especially between Ukrainian and Russian speakers[26].

**LINGUISTIC DIVISION IN UKRAINE**



Others have *"found"* corruption and the poor state of economy as the main causes of protests[27]. There are opinions accusing external interference. Diane Bukowski quotes the declaration of the Assistant Secretary of State, Victoria Nuland, saying that the United States invested $ 5 billion to *"build democratic skills and institutions"* in Ukraine. She also publishes a photo of the US republican Senator McCain meeting the current interim Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and the leader of the ultra-nationalist Svoboda, Oleh Tyahnybok, who called for the liberation of his country from the Muscovite-Jewish mafia[28].

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[26] Daniel Mitchell, *Ukraine, Ethnic Division, Decentralization and Secession*, article published in *Forbes* on 03.03.2014, see http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielmitchell/2014/03/03/ukraine-ethnic-division-descentralization-and-secession/, retrieved on 04.03.2014.

[27] Richard Balmforth and Thomas Grove, *Boxing Champ, Klitschko Emerges as Contender in Ukraine Crisis*, article published by *Reuters* on 04.12.2013, see http://in-reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/ukraine-opposition-id/NDEE9820h120131203, retrieved on 25.03.2014.

[28] Diane Bukowski, *Is the US Backing Neo-Nazis in Ukraine?*, article published in *Voice of Detroit*, on 02.03.2014, see http://voiceofdetroit.net/2014/03/02/is-the-u-s-backing-neonazis-in-ukraine/, retrieved on 24.03.2014.

*US Senator McCain meets interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the leader of extremist group Sprava (Right) Sector, Oleh Tyahnybok, in Kiev*[29]

Paul Joseph Watson accuses the West, especially the USA, of providing the right-wing protesters with funds and weapons, making public the conversation of the Assistant Secretary of State, Victoria Nuland, who asked the US Ambassador to Kiev to neutralise Russia's influence in this country. The author also mentions the billionaire, George Soros, who funded the right-wing extremist group Sprava[30].

Daniel Moynihan describes the arrival of several members of the right-wing extreme in Sweden – Nordisk Ungdon (Nordic Youth) group, whose representative – Frederick Hagberg – gave a television interview in which he expressed support for the opponents in Ukraine. Members of *Falanga* came from Poland to also strengthen the opposition[31].

The West accused Russia of involvement in events both by subversion and by concentrating approximately 40 000 troops on the border with Ukraine. Subsequently, the penetration of Russian forces in Crimea and the peninsula secession from Ukraine to join the Russian Federation further inflamed public opinion

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[29] Source: Adam Taylor, *John McCain Went to Ukraine and Stood on Stage with a Man Accused of Being an Anti-Semitic Neo-Nazi*, article published in *Business Insider* on 16.12.2013, see http://www.businessinsider.com/john-mccain-meets-oleh-tyahnibok-in-ukraine-2013-12-16/, retrieved on 06.04.2014.

[30] Paul Joseph Watson, *Exposed: Ukrainian "Protesters" Backed by Kony 2012 – Style Scam*, article published in *Infowars* on 20.02.2014, see http://www.infowars.com/exposed-ukrainean-protesters-backed-by-kony-2012-style-scam/, retrieved on 24.03.2014.

[31] Michael Moynihan, *Neo-Nazis Pour into Kiev*, article published in *The Daily Beast* on 28.02.2014 see http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/28/the-swedish-neo-nazis-of-kiev.htms, retrieved on 24.03.2014.

***Assistant Secretary of State, Victoria Nuland, with the leaders
of "Maidan" in Kiev, on 15.12.2013**[32]*

in Western and Eastern Europe. The countries of Central and Eastern
Europe fear the escalation of hostilities by invading Ukraine. After the visit
of Russian Prime Minister Medvedev in Crimea, German Minister of Finance,
Wolfgang Schauble, stated that an invasion of the Baltic States and Poland
was also possible[33].



***Russian troops massed on the border with Ukraine**[34]*

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[32] Source: *Ukraine Says Not Investigating Bugging of US Diplomats Phone Call*, article published
by *Reuters* on 08.02.2014, see http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/08/ukraine-call-
idINDEEA1704520140208, retrieved on 11.04.2014.

[33] Shaun Walker, *Dmitry Medvedev Visits Crimea as Russia's Army Begun Border Withdrawal*,
article published in *The Guardian*, on 31.03.2014, see http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/31/
dmitry-medvedev-crimea-army-border-withdrawal-ukraine, retrieved on 01.04.2014.

[34] Source: *West to Help Ukraine with $18 Billion on Bailout*, article published in *Japan Times*,
on 28.03.2014, see http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/03/28/world/west-to-help-ukraine-
with-18-billion-bailout/, retrieved on 06.04.2014.

The example of Crimea seems to be contagious, with Russian support, state many journalists and Western intelligence services. The scale of the protests in Eastern Ukraine for greater autonomy, federalisation of the country, and even for the unification with Russia gets larger. Despite Kiev calling for calmness, promises to increase the autonomy of eastern provinces and to amnesty the protesters who occupied official buildings, the miners in Donbass basin joined the protesters for fear of losing their jobs as a result of blocking trade with Russia. They were against the current government, considering it nationalist-extremist, saying that they fought for rights and against Banderra's neo-Nazi supporters, who was a war criminal, although several memorials to him were built in the west of the country[35].



*Protesters in Donetsk*[36]

In an attempt to find a solution to stop the invasion of Ukraine and, possibly, of other states in Central and Eastern Europe by Russia, George Friedman proposes a *"buffer zone"* between Russia and the West. The area should be established in the Baltic States, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Georgia and Azerbaijan. For the idea to be viable, the United States should support Poland, Romania and Azerbaijan militarily, therefore establishing a new alliance, because, in his view, NATO is dysfunctional, and Turkey is too dependent on Russia[37].

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[35] Alex Luhn, *East Ukraine Protesters Joined by Miners on the Barricades*, article published in *The Guardian*, on 13.04.2014, see http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/12/east-ukraine-protesters-miners-donetsk-russia/, retrieved on 13.04.2014.

[36] *Ibidem*.

[37] George Friedman, *From Estonia to Azerbaijan. American Strategy after Ukraine*, article published on 25.03.2014 in *Geopolitical Weekly*, see http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/estonia-to-azerbijan-american-strategy-after-ukraine, retrieved on 25.03.2014.

THE NEW CONTAINMENT



*A new containment of Russia suggested by STRATFOR Director*[38]

The Western accusations against Russia resulted in a resolution of the UN General Assembly condemning the annexation of Crimea by 100 votes for, 11 against, 58 abstentions. 24 countries did not participate in the vote. Several diplomats declared, on condition that their names would not be mentioned, that Russia would have threatened some states not to vote against it. The author also writes that other diplomats have declared it is a common practice of the great powers in such situations. Powerful states use the *"stick and carrot"* policy to get what they want. An example is Yemen, which did not vote for the UN Security Council resolution that called for the use of force against Iraq in 1991, and the United States cancelled the humanitarian aid totalling several million dollars[39].

Telephone consultations between Russian and American presidents[40] and the meetings between foreign ministers Kerry and Lavrov emphasised the common opinion to reduce tension and settle the crisis peacefully. Henceforth, views differ, as Russia wants Ukraine federalisation and minority rights compliance,

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[38] *Ibidem.*

[39] Louis Charbonneau, *Russia Threatened Countries Ahead of UN Vote on Ukraine, Diplomats Say*, article published by Reuters on 28.03.2014, see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/28/exclusive-russia-ukraine_n_5052313.html, retrieved on 29.03.2014.

[40] *Putin Calls Obama to Discuss Ukraine, White House Says*, article published in *The New York Times* on 28.03.2014, see http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/world/europe/putin-calls-abama-on-ukraine.html, retrieved on 29.03.2014.

while the USA requires the withdrawal of 40 000 Russian troops from the border with Ukraine and the restitution of the Crimean Peninsula.

Neither party can afford to appear weak in order to keep credible in the eyes of the international community[41]. Russia intends to give the impression that it is prepared to support the co-nationals in Ukraine against the Ukrainian extremists and to show strong and ready to fight against the West, if necessary. In turn, NATO intends to maintain its credibility as the strongest alliance in the world, although it could not prevent the annexation of Crimea[42]. Moreover, the Alliance actions and attitude (sending AWACS aircraft to patrol the airspace of NATO member states in Eastern Europe, sending some warships in the Black Sea[43], analysing the options for sending troops in NATO member states in Eastern Europe, supporting Ukraine to enhance the armed forces procurement and training etc.) should reduce the fear of the Baltic States and other member states that they could be the target of aggression from Russia.



***"US Navy Ship to Arrive in Black Sea by Thursday"***[44]

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[41] George Friedman, *Russia and the United States Negotiate the Future of Ukraine*, article published in *Geopolitical Weekly* on 01.04.2014, see http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russia-and-the-united-states-negociate-the-future-of-ukraine/, retrieved on 02.04.2014.

[42] Maria Dejovsky, *News of a Russian Arms Buildup next to Ukraine is Part of Propaganda War*, article published in *The Guardian*, on 11.04.2013, see http://www.theguardian.com/commentsisfree/2014/apr/11/russian-arms-buildup-ukraine-propaganda-war-nato/, retrieved on 13.04.2014.

[43] Barbara Starr, *US Navy Ship to Arrive in Black Sea by Thursday*, article published by *CNN.com*, on 09.04.2013, see http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/08/politics/us-navy-ship-ukraine/index.html, retrieved on 11.04.2014.

[44] *Ibidem*.

# 4. Conclusions

We live in a world of conflict, where the crises and conflicts are settled mainly by force and, therefore, they *"become chronic"*, but *"do not cure"*.

The UN has limited functionality and relevance in security issues, as it depends on the interests of the great powers that have the right to veto any decision that disadvantages them.

We will have a better world only when policymakers will be more responsible for those they lead (represent) and for the future of the communities to which they belong. How to interpret the absence of 24 UN Member States representatives when the UN General Assembly resolution regarding Crimea was voted? Or the absence of more than half of the member states – 105![45], in the similar case when it was voted the resolution regarding the war between Georgia and South Ossetia in 2008, in which Russia intervened on the side of South Ossetia?

*English version by*
*Diana Cristiana LUPU*

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[45] Louis Charbonneau, *op. cit.*

[46] Sangwon Yoon, *Crimea Resolution Backed by US Barely Gets UN Majority*, article published by *Bloomberg Businessweek* on 27.03.2014, see http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-03-27/crimea-resolution-backed-by-west-gains-slim-majority-in-un-vote/, retrieved on 04.04.2014.

# EVOLUTIONS IN THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS
## - from Technical Assurance
## to System Life Cycle Management -

*Colonel Dan LĂPĂDAT*

*In the period before the Revolution in 1989, the essential equipment in the inventory of the Romanian Armed Forces technical condition management was achieved by the activities subsumed under the concept of "technical assurance". It represented, as the author highlights, a set of regulated activities covering a significant portion of the spectrum of issues that needed to be addressed in order to permanently maintain the military equipment technical availability. The regulatory framework regarding technical assurance approached not only the equipment maintenance but also the establishment of consumption rates related to the equipment exploitation.*

*Keywords: technical supervision; specific goods and services; prevention; health and safety*

## 1. The impact of logistics on military actions.
## To want, to be capable and to perform

The Romanian Armed Forces logistics system represents, in its actual configuration, the result of the evolution of an ensemble of strictly specialised structures and military activities meant to assure the necessary resources and services for the combat forces so that they can fulfil their specific missions.

During its development, the Armed Forces logistics system has undergone transformations being subject to several conditions, among which two are truly essential: the need to permanently meet the logistics support general requirements[1] and the obligation to adapt to the general, socio-economic and politico-military context of the time. The first condition, which refers to meeting the troops essential needs in both peace- and wartime, has underlain, over time, the permanent

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Colonel Dan Lăpădat – Chief of the Logistics Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

[1] In terms of meeting the essential troops needs, providing specific goods and services, campaign services, transportation, military equipment maintenance and repair services etc.

logistics principles, laws, rules and procedures, starting from the idea that regardless of the historical context, the troops basic needs are the same – troops must be equipped, fed, sheltered, protected, supplied, medically attended etc.

However, the second condition, related to the particularities of the specific historical moment, has always been the true engine of change in relation to the way the Romanian Armed Forces logistics has been conceived, organised, regulated and executed.

At the junction point of these two antagonistic conditions, the Romanian Armed Forces logistics system has constantly evolved keeping up with the times, preserving its ability to address the force structure needs and, considering that logistics is in fact a science, preserving some elements that are at the confluence of science and art: the art of not significantly alter domain-specific customs and traditions, the science of capitalising on what worked up to the moment change was necessary, the art of reconciling the old with the new. From this perspective, it can be said that there have been no moments in the evolution of the Armed Forces logistics system when it was conceptually modern or outdated. However, there have been moments when it was efficient and moments when it was less functionally adapted to the troops real needs.

In one form or another, the military did the duty honourably in the two world wars, supported the civilian population in crisis situations, participated in missions in theatres of operations, enhanced its training in drills and exercises, honoured state and military ceremonials, harvested crops, and built socio-economic installations when asked. All these tasks were both preceded and especially accompanied by an immense logistic effort, made with the often insufficient means available, following the coordinates established by the rules and regulations existing at that particular point in time.

Logistics becomes an increasingly complex science as the range of activities necessary to perform it continually expands. The rising complexity of this domain derives, first of all, from the multidisciplinary activities that need to be performed, which, in turn, in order to efficiently manage current activities, requires integrated conceptual and functional solutions to the real problems in the operational research area. Another essential element that adds complexity to most logistics problems is the need for modularity in the organisation and functioning of the logistics support structures. *The ability to integrate logistics support solutions in an open architecture system, established depending on the mission scope, specific requirements and stage, is essential.*

More than ever, as the global trend is to reduce defence spending, logistics tends to directly influence, through the resources needed, any course of action

potentially identified by military planners. *To follow a course of action, one has to decide if one can afford it*. To do it, a necessary logistic decision has to be made based on distributed, inconsistent, confused or contradictory premises. To make this decision in the given window of opportunity and based on realistic facts, it is necessary that the logistics system should provide a plausible and timely response. In other words, *the logistics system should be efficient under the operating conditions*, and this efficiency can be achieved at the confluence of several courses of action: the clear definition of logistics structures competencies and responsibilities, the structure and staff specialisation, the establishment of the regulatory framework for the logistics support solutions integration.

To illustrate the above-mentioned aspects and the way logistics has evolved, one can imagine a *case study* focused on a fundamental logistics functioning domain – equipment maintenance and repair. In this respect, we will try to show that *any logistics aspect cannot be treated independently of the context in which it gets manifest* and that any action taken to reconfigure the logistics system, be it organisational or functional, should be addressed in an integrated manner, as to resolve not only single issues but the entire ensemble/system of problems. The results of this study, with certain particularities and reserves from case to case, can be then extrapolated to all the other fundamental logistics domains.

## 2. The past. Technical assurance, integrated ensemble of measures for the military equipment technical condition management

Before the Revolution in 1989, the essential equipment in the inventory of the armed forces technical condition management was achieved by the activities subsumed under the concept of *"technical assurance"*.

*Technical assurance represented an ensemble of rigorously set and regulated activities* that covered a considerable portion of the spectrum of issues that needed to be addressed in order to permanently maintain the military equipment technical availability. The regulations for technical assurance approached many aspects, like equipment maintenance and establishment of consumption rates related to exploitation[2], technical surveillance of lifting and high-pressure equipment, specific assets and services supply management, metrology, fire fighting, health and safety, personnel technical training etc. Basic regulations were comprehensive, comprising scientific underlying technical data, treating subjects in an exhaustive manner[3].

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[2] Exploitation = operation + maintenance

[3] Being written by the services technical directorates, the joint characteristic of the regulations was nearly inexistent, although they had a pronounced general characteristic, fact that allowed them to be used for a long time.

Generally speaking, technical assurance was performed differently, based on the regulations, rules and specific organisational culture of each type of armed forces' branches and for each specific equipment category[4]. Less comprehensive than the *Integrated Logistics Support/ILS*[5] concept, the concept of *"technical assurance"* provided the opportunity to perform the integrated management of the military equipment technical availability, adapted to the political and socio-economic conditions of the time.

The material and organisational basis for the execution of technical assurance process was extended, with command structures and execution/production capabilities having clear competencies and attributes, with no or very few common elements with those belonging to defence industry[6]. Cooperation in production and supply management was the dominant in the technical assurance process[7]. Equipment maintenance was mainly focused on the preventive-planned characteristic of maintenance and repair activities, starting from definitions and notions that were different from the ones that are valid today[8].

*The Chief Technical Officer*[9] *represented the focal point of the military equipment technical condition management system at all echelons.* The Military Technical Academy educated, for 40 years, successive generations of military engineers specially trained to conduct the technical assurance process in military units as well as technologists to be employed in the engineering technical processes within specific production/execution units. Through education, technical and technological culture, spirit of competition and functional authority, *the chief technical officer represented a guarantee that the military equipment technical condition was properly managed* as well as an essential support for the military unit combat capability.

Seen from the perspective of current reality, different from the one existing at that specific moment, one can consider that the most *eloquent disadvantages of the technical assurance process can be the short/limited time span of the planning*

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[4] Armoured vehicles, tractors and vehicles, aviation, anti-aircraft defence, signal, artillery, engineer etc.

[5] The ILS concept will be explained and detailed in the following pages; there are about 70% similar elements of specific technical assurance activities and ILS.

[6] With which the Army formed a tight bond regarding technology, research and lucrative activities.

[7] Later on, when the political, social and economic climates changed, this collaboration transformed from an important asset to a considerable disadvantage; in the absence of the execution/production capabilities modularity, by the domino effect, dismantling a capability led to dismantling other capabilities that essentially depended on it.

[8] For example, the repairs made after the operating cycle were considered preventive repairs; currently they are considered corrective repairs, as their purpose is to correct the effects of normal usage accumulated during exploitation.

[9] The Chief Technical Officer was, at that time, the Deputy Commander of the unit to whom, technically, all personnel was subordinated.

*process*[10] *as well as the absence of the "financial resource" factor from the planning equation*[11]. It is worth mentioning that, unfortunately, although the political and socio-economic situation has changed essentially during the 25 years that have passed since the Revolution, in the mentality still persists, at some degree, this type of approach in the functional relationships between individuals, structures and hierarchical echelons. In conclusion, one can retain these two aforementioned deficits as primary objectives to improve and continuously optimise the military equipment technical condition management system.

### 3. The present. Maintenance – the interim solution for reconstruction

From the beginning of the armed forces reorganisation process, which reached its climax in the years preceding Romania's joining NATO, technical condition management has undergone significant modifications. Some of these modifications were determined by the profound change in the economic environment in the first 10 years after the Revolution[12]. However, the armed forces downsizing has had the most significant effects on changing the philosophy of technical condition management, the maintenance system being one of the main collateral victims.

The idea to renounce the *"technical assurance"* concept and to replace it with the *"maintenance"* concept has created, first of all, the necessary frame for the reconstruction of the technical management system, greatly affected by the reorganisation. Therefore, technical management had to identify its more or less unaffected elements, to find a way to make them work together again, and to add new elements to achieve a self-sustaining system.

In relation to technical assurance, the equipment maintenance represents only one part of the ensemble, but when the reconstruction/reconfiguration began, in the years 2006-2007, the objectives and ambition level could be established only in relation to what was available, as both material and human resources. On the other hand, the idea of replacing the concept of technical assurance with that of maintenance was supported by the plans[13] to replace the old equipment, physically and morally worn out, with new generation equipment which would benefit, if possible, from a simplified maintenance, accomplished mainly outsourced,

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[10] For a year, as nowadays.

[11] The system was working based on the principle *"ask, and if you have the right, it will be given to you"*.

[12] The establishment of the market economy, the emergence of private economic operators in defence industry, the effects of inflations and the *Leu* devaluation compared to strong currencies etc.

[13] That were in use at that specific moment.

and when needed (on-condition maintenance), to require a more succinct technical management, performed with fewer and less specialised forces[14].

The chief technical officer position, once re-established, even though not under the initial coordinates[15], represents the technical management authority at all echelons. Nominally, it is defined as a formal authority in the maintenance management process, even if in reality, the chief technical officer performs most of the specific functions of *"technical assurance"*[16], because part of the present equipment is of old generations and is designed having in mind this logistics support concept.

A very sensitive point related to technical management in the current conditions is the mandatory aspect of taking into consideration the *"financial resource"* factor in the maintenance planning equation. Currently, because of limited financial resources, the concurrent operational requirements put great pressure on the maintenance planners who are not always able to find, strictly within the maintenance regulations' sphere, adequate solutions to current issues. 4-5 years ago it became obvious that, considering the effects of the economic crisis and drastic budget cuts, affecting goods and services supply, the operational capability generated by a military equipment cannot be assured in a fragmented manner, taking into account only part of the involved aspects[17]. *In order to generate viable capabilities based on military equipment, management needs to be integrated, considering both technical and financial aspects*.

Technical measures need to be analysed, prioritised, limited, adapted, enhanced etc., in relation to financial conditions. For any possible course of action that takes into account technical aspects, the key word is *supportability*[18]. *The ideal aspect is that supportability should be ensured in conditions of efficiency*. In this respect, it is important to highlight that matching technical management activities with available financial resources has to be considered in the long run, preferably throughout the entire life cycle of the military equipment, in order to minimise the total generated costs in the budget of the operator.

The above mentioned approach is not a new one, but one which has a long history in the United States Armed Forces, representing a subject of current interest

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[14] As a result of the economic crisis effects on the defence budget, these plans could not be entirely materialised in the estimated time span.

[15] His functional authority is reduced at the technical management level.

[16] With the exception of the attributes/competencies regarding health and safety issues and fire fighting.

[17] Maintenance, consumables supply, fuels and munitions, filling vacancies, personnel training level etc.

[18] Supportability – the degree to which all necessary resources for the exploitation and maintenance of a system can be provided in the sufficient quantity and in the given window of opportunity, in *Allied Reliability and Maintainability Publication*, 7 (ARMP-7), 2nd Ed., 2008.

in the North Atlantic community in the last 5-10 years. The solution to the problem was developed through the *system life cycle management* concept.

Currently, the implementation of this concept is a top priority of the Romanian Armed Forces logistics in the medium and long term.

## 4. The future. The system life cycle management – integrated logistics support and its cost footprint

The *System Life Cycle Management – SLCM* is a promising concept, as it provides an integrated and efficient approach for the construction and exploitation of a defence-specific capability. The goal of the concept is to optimise the way the military capabilities are created and kept in usage throughout their envisaged life cycle.

*SLCM represents the aggregate of the activities and processes developed for the optimisation of defence capabilities taking into account the performance, cost, planning, quality assurance, operational environment, integrated logistics support and physical/moral wear and tear associated with a system, throughout its entire life cycle.*

*SLCM* is performed on the basis of applying an integrated set of measures, taking into account the set operational requirements, the terms and costs associated with the capability achievement programme, the constraints related to quality assurance, the characteristic traits of the presumptive operational environment, the *Integrated Logistics Support – ILS*, and the moral wear and tear during the life cycle. Mitigation of the programme risks, the reduction in the term for achieving the envisaged capability, and especially the control of capability-associated costs are expected by implementing *SLCM*[19].

The premises for the processes used within the project meant to achieve and exploit a military capability can be consistent and convergent, and for the involved information and technologies can be coordinated and distributed efficiently are, practically, created by applying *SLCM*.

Although at theoretical level the *SLCM* concept can be approached through sophisticated system theory methods, there is the possibility that, simplistically, the concept can be reduced to two essential components: the integrated logistics support, and the long-term *ILS* cost footprint, meaning the *Life Cycle Costs – LCC*. Each of these two new concepts will be defined as follows:

*ILS represents the technical and management process through which a system supportability and logistics support needs are identified for its entire life cycle and integrated*

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[19] As soon as possible and continually for the entire life cycle.

*in the content of the development/acquisition programme, from the programme initiation until the system removal from service.*

*ILS* is composed of nine elements: maintenance planning, acquisition, test and support elements, configuration management, personnel, training, technical information and data, support infrastructure as well as packing, handling, storing and transporting, System/equipment life cycle management is achieved by planning the specific activities for every *ILS* element, through iterative identification, implementation and revision process, in relation to the operational profile prescribed for that specific equipment and taking into account the given window of opportunity.

*LCC cumulates all direct and indirect variable costs associated with the acquisition and exploitation of the system/equipment of interest as it goes through its life cycle stages.*

*LCC* also includes collateral costs, both direct and indirect ones, generated by the introduction and exploitation of a new capability and it is used as a minimal standard for alternative analysis[20].

Practically, by implementing the concepts and notions briefly described above for a system/equipment of interest, a long-term integrated management mechanism of the military capabilities based upon that particular system/equipment is created. This mechanism permanently and iteratively weighs the need for meeting certain operational requirements and the financial availabilities, creating the possibility for the *system manager* to be able to ensure the supportability of that specific capability.

From a functional point of view, *the most important effect expected* through implementing *SLCM* in the Romanian Armed Forces is to *transform the chief technical officer into a system manager*. As opposed to the chief technical officer, the system manager will have extended competencies and responsibilities, which will cover both the responsibilities of the chief technical officer who accomplished the *"technical assurance"* 15-20 years ago as well as new responsibilities regarding *ILS* financial management for the system/equipment of interest. In other words, at all echelons, the system manager will be totally responsible for the managed military equipment, regarding technical aspects as well as economic-financial aspects, throughout the equipment entire life cycle, starting from the project stage and concluding with the removal from active service. The transition from maintenance to system life cycle management and from chief technical officer to system manager is intended to create the necessary conditions to ensure the necessary military capabilities based on the systems-of-interest predictability in planning, long-term sustainability and maximum economisation[21].

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[20] Mostly for economic analysis.
[21] By facilitating the insertion into projects of the most economically efficient technologies, equipment modernisation and avoidance/reduction in the moral wear and tear of equipment during its life cycle.

## 5. Managing logistics activities
## through total cost management

Matching the general objectives of a military structure with the available resources has never been one of the easiest tasks. Taking into account the fact that the share of the most significant operational costs[22] involved by the existence of a military structure is represented by logistics costs, an integrated systemic approach of the cost-activity/action relation is required, from a functional, organisational, relational and informational point of view, in which there should be accurately identified the main logistics requirements, the structures capable of and dedicated to meet these requirements, the structures responsibilities as well as the functional relationships between structures, and the specific activities performed to meet these requirements.

By this approach, the total cost management is conceived based on the idea of achieving the gradual improvement of the key system processes, each activity being analysed during the process. The following processes generate costs and require optimisation: supply chain management, equipment/system life cycle management, troops movement and transport, campaign services etc.

The total cost management methodology consists in developing successive stages at the end of which a mission can be executed, generically called, in this context, process. Within this methodology, the cost evaluation is essential in establishing the necessary logistics support as well as in optimising its achievement in the combat forces benefit. The total cost management methodology is based on the following axioms:

a) If it cannot be assessed, it cannot be controlled.

b) If it cannot be controlled, it cannot be managed or improved.

Assessment is the starting point of improvement, because it helps understand the current situation and plan future objectives. For cost evaluation the following steps need to be taken in order to obtain optimal results: assessing important objectives; prioritising missions; debating alternative solutions for mission accomplishment; adopting adequate solutions at an optimal cost/efficiency ratio. In the given context, the relationship between missions and total associated costs becomes structural and, in consequence, it needs to be differentiated and analysed in terms of resource consuming and result producing activities and it needs to be dimensioned through process cost calculation.

Any expense becomes a cost if it is associated with the following elements: the consumed resource, the time span, the place of consumption, campaign

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[22] Operational costs are defined as total costs from which personnel costs are substracted.

activity/services. The total cost management can be implemented starting from the general use of certain instruments available to the Romanian Armed Forces, which are currently applied distinctively, as follows: structure cost catalogues; maintenance cost catalogues; integrated logistics support cost charts for the available equipment; data bases with equipment life cycle costs etc. All these instruments can be used altogether through an assessment system that should lead to maximising benefits/savings by acting upon the aspects which produce the most significant effects at economic efficiency level.

The following advantages can be achieved by implementing the total cost management: ensuring an efficient ratio between the missions' level of ambition and the cost level for the entire development period; removing ill-judged/unplanned expenses associated with the missions; periodical self-adjustment of costs by means of cost analysis and evaluation; developing solid planning, with full visibility regarding necessary resources.

Through total cost management, a total and anticipated control of expenses can be achieved, by specific methods, orders and dispositions, and solid alternatives regarding the forces actions and missions planning can be provided. Moreover, highly accurate assessments can be performed regarding the forces reaction/ execution capability in the given conditions, determined by the persistent under financing during the last years.

The association of resources and activities management by total cost control is a course of action that will be analysed to be implemented in the future.

# RADIO SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT IN THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES (I)

*Colonel Dr Liviu-Viorel BÎRSAN*

*In 1904, in the United States of America, it was established one of the first national structures having radio communications regulatory responsibilities,* Roosevelt Board, *as a federal institution. It resolved all the problems related to radio communications, providing the coastal radio service that received any call from the vessels offshore.*

*In 1906, in Berlin, 27 countries, including Romania, signed the first fundamental documents regulating radio communications – International Radio Telegraph Convention, Final Protocol and Service Regulations, as an annex to the Convention.*

***Keywords****: communications; Marconi; telegraphy; electromagnetic compatibilities*

Radio spectrum management is one of the latest military specialities within the Romanian Armed Forces. Its birth is linked to the Order of the Chief of the General Staff no. S.M.G.-(S) 53 on 07.06.2011, issued to amend and complete the nomenclature of military services, branches, and specialities. In the document, the *frequency management* speciality is mentioned as part of the Communications and Information Systems – CIS branch for the military personnel, as a result of the steps taken over time to recognise the hard work of the people in this area and the need to train and have specialised personnel to conduct activities in a complex and strictly regulated field at national, regional and global level.

The establishment of this independent speciality in the Romanian Armed Forces was not a simple and immediate process, but one entailing accumulation and duration, beginning at the early dawn of wireless telegraphy and the discoveries that made it possible to transmit information at distance by using radio waves.

Although the way of conducting military actions, the complexity of radio equipment and the diversity of services required for commanding forces generate

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some particular characteristics, the radio spectrum management in the Romanian Armed Forces has to be analysed, understood and detailed as part of the entire management system in place at national, regional and global level.

It is necessary to emphasise from the very beginning that the management of radio frequencies is undeniably connected to the emergence and existence of the electrical equipment that uses radio frequencies as the way of transmitting and receiving information.

The first globally recognised and successful attempts to use the properties of the ether to establish communication between two correspondents at distance occurred between 1895 and 1897, when Guglielmo Marconi[1] established the first transmissions, successively, from 1 km and 6 km up to 16 km. At the same time, in Italy, La Spezia, Marconi established communications with Italian warships at a distance of 19 km, in 1901 he established communications up to 2 500 km in the daytime, and up to 3 500 km at night, and in 1902 he crossed the Atlantic Ocean and established the first radio communication between North America and the UK. He received, connected and revealed a number of his own findings and those of other inventors of the time, including Alexander Popov, David Edward Hughes and Nikola Tesla. Thus, a new era in communications was opened, which continues to decisively influence the organisation and development of humankind.

All those discoveries were anticipated by the research and theoretical development in the field, by introducing terms and concepts that are still valid today. In 1860, James Clerk Maxwell introduced the concept of *electromagnetic field* that moves not only in the air but also in space, as electromagnetic waves with a speed equal to the speed of light of 300 000 km per second. He also determined the measurement of those waves, they thus becoming kilometric waves, metric waves, decimetric waves etc. or long, medium, short, ultra waves etc., the term *wavelength* deriving from it. Subsequently, the term *cycle* was introduced, appearing also its multiples, such as kilocycle, megacycle, and gigacycle. Later on, in memory of Heinrich Rudolph Hertz, who, in 1886, demonstrated that rapid variations of the electric current produce an electromagnetic field whose movement in space takes the form of electrical waves, which propagate and can be reflected, refracted and polarised, the oscillation of one second was named *hertz (Hz)*. Thus, the *hertz* becomes the term for measuring the emission frequency, which is also used nowadays[2].

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[1] The term *antenna* was introduced in the specialised language following the experiments conducted by the inventor, coming from the Italian word *l'antenna* (pillar, pole, element that supported the system for the reception of radiant energy) (A. N.).

[2] The *hertz*, abbreviated Hz, was established by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in 1930 and adopted by the General Conference on Weights and Measures (GCWM) in 1960 to replace the *cycle per second* older unit of measurement for the signal and radio waves frequency.

It should be noted that the work done to identify the elements and develop the concepts that characterise radio spectrum is considered by some experts[3] as being similar to the *discovery of a new continent*, which, although it is not a physically bounded territory in terms of a continent itself, is identified as a new space with invisible resources of a still unknown value.

Those who first understood the usefulness of transmitting information by electromagnetic medium were the sailors. In 1899, the English Royal Navy installed a wireless telegraphy system on the ship *HMS Hector* and the German Navy did the same on the *Kaiser Wilhelm Der Grosse* ship in 1900. In the same year, in Brazil, Roberto Landell de Moura managed to transmit voice wireless, all these opening the way of using radio waves for different purposes.

Industrialised countries anticipated the commercial importance of those systems that could facilitate communication and started to produce them in series. The equipment was named by inventor, hence it was known as Marconi, Lee De Forest, Salby-Arco or Branly-Popp equipment, as it was produced by the UK, the USA, Germany or France.

It should be noted that, in Romania, the first attempts in the field were made in 1901 by Dragomir Hurmuzescu, who repeated the communication experiments performed by Marconi and Popov, in Iași, presenting them at the First Congress of Science in Romania in 1902[4].

The use of spectrum was regulated by necessity, to prevent mutual interferences and to allow communication between ships, regardless of the equipment manufacturer. At global level, a crucial moment was in 1902, when, while travelling across the Atlantic to visit the United States, Prince Henry of Prussia wanted to send a courtesy message to President Roosevelt. The request was denied because the coastal station, operated by Marconi Company, did not want to take a message sent by its German competitor, which highlighted the lack of regulation in that new field. Moreover, although some countries introduced a number of administrative measures at national level, the fact that the propagation of radio waves does not respect political boundaries revealed that regulating this field at global level required international cooperation.

The first global attempt to regulate this field was initiated by Germany, which held the International Radio Telegraphic Conference, in Berlin, in August 1903, with the participation of 9 countries: Germany, Austria, Spain, Russia, Hungary, the USA, France, the UK and Italy. Only 7 countries signed

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[3] Hugh GJ Aitken, *Syntony and Spark*, 1976, p. 32.
[4] I. Cerăceanu, *Repere cronologice principale din istoria telecomunicaţiilor*, Editura Dacia, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 26.

the Final Agreement, the UK and Italy submitting a statement for reservation of rights by not accepting to take any call from a ship offshore. With all the existing disagreements during the event, it was considered the first conference on radio problems, although the document referred only to the obligation of any coastal station to answer a call from any vessel at sea. It can be considered as the beginning of radio communications management, which marks the end of the uncontrolled rivalry in the field of radio communications. At that time, the spectrum resources were limited to two wavelengths: one near 500 kHz and the other around 1 000 kHz.

In 1904, the United States of America established one of the first national radio communications regulatory structures, named *Roosevelt Board*, as the federal institution to deal with all the radio problems, including to provide the coastal radio service to receive any call from the vessels offshore.

At the next conference in Berlin, there were 27 participating countries, including Romania. There were signed the first basic documents regulating radio communications, the International Radio Telegraph Convention, the Final Protocol and the Service Regulations[5], as an annex to the Convention.

The event focused on how to transmit radiograms, and on issues related to the allocation of radio frequencies worldwide. Thus, the Service Regulations established two wavelengths for public use: 300 and 600 metres, translated into 500 kHz, and 1 000 kHz respectively. The states could also establish another frequency for the public service or another governmental service, but only between the wavelengths of 600 and 1 600 metres (between 187,5 kHz and 500 kHz), while those below 600 metres were reserved for long distance communications with coastal stations. The equipment on board had to operate in the wavelength of 300 metres. The states were allowed to choose any type of equipment they wanted and had the obligation to inform the Telegraph Office in Switzerland on the wavelength they used. It was established that all telegraphic transmissions should be performed using Morse code and the distress signal should be *"SOS"*, with the meaning of *"Save Our Souls"*. Thus we can speak of the early days of global frequency management.

Romania was represented by Grigore Cerkez[6], General Director of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones and by Lieutenant Commander Cesar Boerescu, Romanian Maritime Service Inspector, who wrote a paper on the use of electricity when he was a Lieutenant. The participation of a military man at the event

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[5] Service Regulations can be considered the first version of what is now Radio Regulations (ITU-RR) (A.N.).

[6] At that time he was a Professor at the National School of Bridges and Roads in București. He wrote a *Course in Elementary Mechanics*, edited by the Infantry and Cavalry Military School in București (A.N.).

demonstrates the high interest of the military in the field of communications. From that moment on, the Romanian delegation at future conferences included a military member, and when their presence was not possible for economic reasons, they were represented by the military attachés accredited in the organising countries.

The event which decisively contributed to enhancing the international regulatory framework was related to the *Titanic* disaster, when subsequent analysis showed up that the vessels nearby did not respond to the distress signals that were launched, ending up with the loss of more than 1 500 lives. In this context, a new conference on telegraphy took place in London in 1912, attended by 43 states, including Romania; the agenda was focused on the standardisation of radio communications and the development of international regulations to update the new requirements in the field.

The wavelengths of 300 and 600 metres were maintained for the public service and the interested states were allowed to use the lower spectrum up to the wavelength of 1 800 metres (166,6 kHz). The wavelength of 150 metres (2 MHz) could be used by the vessels, and the transmission power was limited to 1 kW; that limit might be exceeded only if the ship was at more than 200 miles from the coastline. It was introduced into the Service Regulations the obligation of radio operators' certification by the government of the flag state, a list of abbreviations, and the Q code on question and answer. The concept of air stations appeared for the first time. The coastal stations were required to be in function permanently and the ship stations were divided into three classes: Class 1 in function permanently; Class 2 in function based on a schedule; Class 3 to work when needed.

From Romania participated Admiral Cesar Boerescu, promoted in the meantime as a Deputy Director of the Romanian Maritime Service.



In our country, the civil and military administrative authorities responsible for communications were hardly established. According to the *Law on Post Office and Telegraph* in 1880, the administration of telegraph and post offices fell under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where it remained until 1920. Mention should be made that, in 1888, it was set up the General Directorate of Posts and Telegraph within the same Ministry, which, much later, established a wireless telegraphy service.

The concerns related to the development of radio communications in the country

are highlighted by the appearance of works like that of Lieutenant Constantin Botez, *Descrierea aparatelor de recepţiune şi de transmisiune (radio-telegrafia) în telegrafie fără fir prin unde hertziene (Description of Reception and Transmission Devices <Radio Telegraphy> in Wireless Telegraphy by Radio Waves)*, a book published in 1903, and by the development of public and military telegraph and telephone networks.

Soon after the first stations were used, the Romanian Maritime Service installed, starting in 1903, the first stations on land and on board ships. In 1912, the Navy installed the first telegraphic equipment on the cruiser *Elisabeta* and in the ports of Giurgiu, Calăraşi and Cernavodă, and then on the river monitors on the Danube.

The procurement of the new equipment triggered the appearance, in 1908, of a *Cărţi de semnale din serviciul marinei (Book on Signals within the Navy)*, one of the first documents that established the criteria and rules for the operation of radio resources in the military[7]. In the Land Forces[8], the telegraphic communications equipment was introduced starting in 1908 – three Telefunken spark transmitters, out of 16 necessary posts and, in 1909, the first speciality company was established, including a wireless telegraphy section.

In 1913, the speciality battalion was established, being equipped with: 14 stations of wireless telegraphy, Marconi type, with an output of 1,5 kW placed on carriages, having a coverage of 400 km and a wavelength between 60 m (5 MHz) and 1 400 m (215 kHz); two deployable stations, with an output of 0,5 kW, and 6 portable stations with an output of 40 W, carried by soldiers.

In August 1914, new experiments with radiotelegraph stations belonging to the Land Forces were conducted, ending up with a report which, although showing the lack of reliability on these new assets, highlighted the importance of knowledge in the field of radio spectrum in the following conclusions: *"When three or more stations work together simultaneously being 10-12 km away, nothing can be understood because they are all built on a single wavelength"* or the fact that because of the *"strong atmospheric discharges"*, corresponding stations heard each other very weak, or *"(…) the poor quality of the signal decreases the station effectiveness"*[9]. Therefore, aspects related to **radio frequency management** were presented for the first time in an official military document, highlighting the need to provide **electromagnetic compatibility**.

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[7] Gh. Enciu, *Poşta şi telecomunicaţiile în România*, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1984, p. 137.

[8] 16 posts were estimated to be necessary at that time.

[9] *Ibidem*, pp. 147-148.

The increase in the number of communication stations, traffic and users required new regulations at national level, which were stipulated in 1914, in the *Law on Telegraph, Telephone and Postal Services*, a normative act based on the regulations issued by the International Telegraph Convention in 1912.

It is noteworthy that, based on the two acts mentioned above, the representatives of the Ministry of War (General Sc. Panaitescu and Captain Eug. Roșca), the Romanian Maritime Service, and the General Directorate of Post, Telegraph and Telephone (GDPTT) met in 1914 in București *"to agree on the rules of organisation and operation of wireless stations in the country"*. Among other matters of an administrative nature, the resulted draft regulation can be considered as one of the first relevant documents in the management of radio spectrum. The issues addressed were: the way of authorising a military station; the classification of wireless military stations; the way of operating in peacetime and wartime; the establishment of a joint high commission, composed of members from the Ministry of War, GDPTT, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Director of the Romanian Maritime Service, or the representative of the Ministry of Public Works to deal, among other problems, with monitoring the wireless telegraph station network situation in the country and with studying the different types of systems and the developments in the field of telegraphy in order to explain them.

We consider that this commission is the first structure at national level, interdepartmentally oriented, having responsibilities in the field of radio spectrum management, somehow similar to what is known today as the **Interdepartmental Commission for Radio Communications**.

Based on the draft regulation, the Ministry of War developed its own document, *Guidelines on the Organisation and Functioning of Wireless Telegraphy*, which detailed, in four chapters, the problem of wireless telegraphy in the military. As characteristic of radio spectrum, we can note the following: the organisation of wireless telegraphy in the Romanian Armed Forces, wireless telegraphy service at war; technical guidelines (choosing locations for installation, transmission distance, hours of service, setting wavelength, traffic regulations); relations with other countries. Tacking into account that other administrative aspects (forms and documents for work stations) were clarified, we can consider this document as the first regulation on radio communications.

Before Romania entered the First World War, the civilian and military structures with responsibilities in the field were in the early stages of organisation, and the provision of wireless telegraphy equipment was not up to the level required for military actions. Based on observing the use of radio resources in other modern armed forces, certain measures were taken to improve the existing situation.

Although there was no structure specialised in wireless telegraphy among the armed forces decision-making structures, there were concerns for providing the armed forces with new radio equipment[10].

Moreover, steps were taken to specialise personnel in knowing and working with radio stations. In 1913, under the leadership of Lieutenant George Bora, the first training courses were organised for the personnel who worked in the wireless telegraphic service, especially for chiefs of telegraphic posts. In 1916, the *Regulation on the Telegraphy, Telephony, Wireless Telegraphy and Projectors Training School* was developed, document that established the framework for training those who would exploit technical assets, which, inter alia, specified that the duration of the school was 11 months, that those with technical knowledge were preferred, and that the graduation score was at least 6 or at least 7 for the special course in wireless telegraphy. Among the subjects that were taught there were, among others, electricity and magnetism, transmission equipment, reception equipment with 3 wavelengths, equipment tuning[11].

The first two years of the First World War highlighted the importance of radio resources in managing forces during military actions. In this context, in December 1915, it was estimated that the demand for wireless telegraphy equipment, taking into consideration the existing organisation of the Ministry of War, was 4 stations on motor vehicles, 22 stations on horseback, and 196 different power stations in knapsacks. In fact, there were 14 stations for the Land Forces. There were also necessary 15 stations for the 8 gun boats, 4 cannoneers, and 3 mine carriers on the Danube[12], given that the *Elisabeta* and 4 monitors already had their own radio stations.

When Romania entered the war, Bureau 12, consisting of 2 persons, was established in the Great General Staff to coordinate all the aspects related to wireless telegraphy. On 15 December 1916, due to the support of the French Military Mission, and especially to the emergence of radiogoniometry stations, impacting radio spectrum, the bureau was transformed into the Wireless Telegraphy Service within the Operations Section of the Great General Staff, consisting of 7 persons (4 officers and 3 lower ranks). The establishment of this structure improved work in the field, as it succeeded, with the French support, in providing the armed forces with the first radio equipment specially designed for the Air Force and with new equipment for the Navy, Artillery and the Land Forces. However,

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[10] At the end of 1914, in Romania there were 40 radio stations, 24 military (20 in the Land Forces and 4 on monitors) and 16 civilian, including the private ones.

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 162.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 178.

the overall situation did not improve significantly because in units, at all echelons, the wireless telegraphy issues were handled by the heads of engineer troops, and there was not a serious concern for determining the characteristics of working with wireless telegraphy stations. The tables coding radio transmissions were not upgraded and there were significant delays in updating them. Moreover, the periodical change of wavelength was not appreciated as an important activity.

Meanwhile, Germany developed the use of radio equipment considerably; it installed and used extensively wireless telegraphy on board airplanes and airships; it realised the benefits and studied thoroughly the use of radiogoniometry and the reception of telegraph and telephone transmissions. All the mentioned aspects led to the reticence of Romanian decision-makers regarding the use of telegraphy during the First World War although, in certain cases, as in Târgu-Jiu or Turtucaia, they would have been useful and could have minimised the consequences.

Because of the difficult cooperation between the Allied armed forces, in November 1916, in Chantilly, the Military Inter-Allied Commission was established. In addition, the Telegraph Inter-Allied Commission was established, whose goal was to coordinate the radiotelegraph links in the areas of conflict in Europe, and, after 20 March 1917[13], the work programme of allied radiotelegraph communications in the European theatre of operations and the transmissions to America.

Lieutenant Colonel Șuțu, our country's military attaché in France, attended the meetings of the Telegraph Inter-Allied Commission. Under the concluded protocol, Romania had to move the CW station from București to Vaslui and transmit on a wavelength between 2 000 and 3 000 metres. The General Headquarters established the wavelength of the station in Vaslui at 2 500 metres and the working hours with Paris, Thessaloniki, Lyon and Sevastopol. The communications with Paris were encrypted. Later, another 150 Kw station was also installed in Botoșani, and the traffic loads were divided starting on 1 June 1917. There was mutual information between allies to improve the quality of reception, agreeing to change several parameters of the equipment or to install new stations, especially after the German and Austrian stations began to carry out intense jamming.

All these aspects have been mentioned to highlight that, after the withdrawal of the Romanian troops in Moldavia, the signal links with the allies were ensured through radiotelegraphy, the use of radio frequencies being coordinated at both national and international level, as it happens today.

At the end of the First World War, Romania and its armed forces made some progress in the knowledge of radio communications, consolidating

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[13] The United States entry into the First World War (A.N.).

certain structures with responsibilities in the field, equipping them, and using new services[14].

After the First World War, several conclusions were drawn that influenced the future of wireless telegraphy. New weapons emerged such as the aircraft and the tank[15] needing wireless communications not only with the control points but also between them to coordinate combat actions. It was shown that the connection with offensive units as well as the change in direction could not be achieved except by radio.

The technological advances in radio telecommunications during the war and immediately after it were significant. The electronic tube appeared and improved. Its use resulted in the elimination of spark transmitters. The wireless transmission/reception devices reduced their volume, the operating voltage decreased, batteries had reduced dimensions, and by using the triode as generator of electromagnetic waves the frequency of the transmitter could increase. All these changes allowed the installation of equipment on airplanes, tanks or troops. Also, public radio emerged and some experiments leading to the invention of television were conducted. Therefore, new international regulations were required.

In this context, a new international conference on telegraphy issues was necessary. It was held in Washington in 1927. Delegates from 78 countries, including Romania, attended the conference[16]. They resumed the issues that remained unresolved at the previous conference, analysed them and sought out solutions to the new aspects arising from the emergence of radio broadcasting[17], the installation of radio equipment on board aircraft or the regulation on spectrum below 3 MHz.

The service regulation was improved by introducing normative articles, stations were defined as mobile, onboard and aircraft stations, waves were classified as modulated and unmodulated waves, the term *nominal frequency* in kilocycles per second (kc/s) and the difference in working frequencies were introduced.

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[14] Among the most important: equipment was installed on aircraft and connections were established between them and ground based stations; stations for long distance communications were installed; radiogoniometry was established as a speciality (a Bureau within the Wireless Telegraphy Service) – at the end of 1917 there were five direction finding stations in operation (A.N.).

[15] During the First World War, to maintain the link with the base unit, tankmen used pigeons to send messages to communicate where they arrived or if/where the combat asset failed, to request support etc. (A.N.)

[16] George Cretziano, the ambassador of our country to Washington; he participated as ad referendum, meaning that the country was represented and the final agreement could be signed (A.N.).

[17] The first demonstration of radio broadcasting took place in 1906, being done by Canadian inventor Reginald Fesseden. Regular radio broadcasts were organised starting in 1919-1920 in the USA and the USSR, in 1922 in England and France, in 1923 in Germany, in 1924 in Italy. In Romania, the first transmissions were broadcast in 1925.

For **the first time** the *Table of Frequency Allocations in the Electromagnetic Spectrum* was used, having limits from 10 Kc/s to 60 Mc/s, and the mentioned services were: mobile, fixed, radio systems and amateur. Call letters were assigned to countries, Romania receiving CVA to CVZ, and radio frequencies were distributed by geographical areas: Europe and other regions. International distress and rescue frequencies were established, 333 Kc/s for the air service and 500 Kc/s for the land and naval service. Moreover, the notion of *jamming between stations* appeared.

Following the event, the International Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) was established, which was an authority equivalent to the one already existing in the field of telegraphy.

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*In the second part of the article the author continues the presentation of the aspects related to radio spectrum management in the Romanian Armed Forces since the Conference in Madrid, in 1932, up to the present moment.*

# THE RED SCORPIONS PARTICIPATION IN *IRAQI SUNSET* AND *ISAF 2011* MISSIONS

*Major Vasile STĂNESCU*
*2nd Lieutenant Daniel LĂZUREANU*

*The authors present the most difficult mission of the Red Scorpions in 2009, that of repatriating the assets and materials used by the Romanian contingents in the theatre of operations in Iraq. Thus, day and night, the troops in the logistics support module, coordinated by the personnel of the unit logistics structure, conducted activities specific to this task: inventory of goods, arrangement of goods on pallets and their shipment, the military assets repair and their shipment, the transportation of military assets in Kuwait, and again their shipment. More than half of the detachment troops took part in this activity.*

*Keywords: infantry; operating procedures; Kandahar; responsibilities*

In 2004, the 26th Infantry Battalion *"Neagoe Basarab" – "Red Scorpions"* troops stepped for the first time on Iraqi soil, thus making a substitution with the 811th Infantry Battalion's Transilvanian military within the IRAQI FREEDOM mission. Nobody had thought that most of them will find themselves on the same soil six years later, participating in the Romanian Armed Forces last mission in this country. Many *"Scorpions"* knew very well this country, being part in different missions such as *IRAQI FREEDOM* in 2004, *UNAMI* in 2005 and finally *IRAQI SUNSET* in 2009.

For the Red Scorpions, the 2009 mission was a particular one. Participating in missions in Afghanistan, Iraq or the Balkans, the battalion's troops military experience was vast. They had knowledge upon the terrain, climate, population from the three theatres of operation in which they accomplished their mission. Being far away from their country and their dear ones, they went

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through tensioned moments but they always accomplished their missions. Within the *IRAQI SUNSET* mission, they faced a new challenge: along the usual missions, the Scorpions also received the task of bringing back home the equipment and materials used by the Romanian forces in Iraq throughout the six years of missions. At that time, Romania ended its mission in Iraq.



The 311 troops from the 26th Infantry Battalion accomplished various missions such as: training the Iraqi security forces, assuring the security of the deployment base, initialising and maintaining the liaison with the local leaders *KLE (Key Leader Engagement)* in order to state responsibilities for the security and reconstruction of the influence zone, humanitarian and medical support actions, transfer of the forces deployed in Iraq back to Romania.

During the five months of mission, the Red Scorpions accomplished successfully all their duties. The Iraqi special forces training was developed under the best terms, the military instructors within the *"Training Module"* being appreciated for their activity. The appraisals came simultaneously on behalf of the Iraqi officers and on behalf of the American partner throughout the entire training phase, especially at its final part, at the evaluation of the Iraqi forces level of preparedness and readiness.

The humanitarian and civilian support actions had a special importance for the Red Scorpions. They were important because they came to the aid of the civilian population and also for the image promoted among the local authorities. Multiple humanitarian actions were developed by the Red Scorpions. The CIMIC platoon, under the command of Lieutenant Bogdan Gherghe, was the one that carried out these actions. Weekly, the military commanded by the young officer allocated

water, food and other necessary materials. Lieutenant's Gherghe platoon had tactical command upon a medical structure that provided medical assistance in the villages in which the food was distributed, especially for the women and children. All these actions had Lieutenant Gherghe's distinctive mark. With the enthusiasm specific for his age, he got involved in an active manner in the aid of the poor population within the responsibility zone. With every occasion, local leaders insisted on thanking the Red Scorpions for their operating manner.



Another mission for the 26th Battalion was participating in assuring the security of Tallil Base. This was the *Protection of Force module*'s task. With its platoons, this subunit fulfilled the specific tasks of protecting and ensuring the base entrances (ECP), patrolling the base perimeter and ensuring fire support for the subunits in charge with the base security.

Probably the most difficult mission for the Red Scorpions in 2009 was the repatriation of the technique and materials used by the Romanian detachments in the field of operations in Iraq. Day and night, the soldiers of the *Logistic Support module*, coordinated by the unit's Logistic Structure personnel, conducted specific activities: the inventory of the material assets, palletising and boarding them, quashing the ones that met their duration of use, repairing and boarding the military technique, shipping all the materials and technique in Kuwait, boarding them on transport ship etc. More then a half of the detachment was engaged in this activity, starting with April. The military technique and the material containers were boarded in means of transport and shipped, by several convoys, in Kuwait, where a team led by Captain Marius Udroiu boarded all these materials on the transport ship *Albatros* that ensured their shipping into the country. This activity was executed in two phases due to the large quantity of materials and military technique.

The first phase took place in April, while the second phase occurred in June 2009. Simultaneously, the quashing of the Romanian ammunition that was stored in Camp Adder Tallil's armoury took place, ammunition that met its terms of use, was kept under special climatic conditions and could not be transported under safe conditions back in the country. Simultaneously with the shipment, there were made several transports by air for the materials that could not be transported by sea. The battalion's troops worked day and night so that at the end of June the last materials that remained were the materials necessary for the redeployment of the Romanian troops being in Iraq.



All of the Red Scorpions' missions were accomplished successfully. At the end of the Romanian's Armed Forces mission in Iraq, being at the festivity organised in Camp Dracula within Tallil base, the commander of the Red Scorpions, Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Toma, was able to report to the Romanian President: *"Mission Accomplished!"*. It was a new mission accomplished by the Red Scorpions, a new success for the military from Craiova, ending an important phase in the 26th Infantry Battalion's history and also in the Romanian Armed Forces history.

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**2011 Afghanistan. A New Mission for the 26th Infantry Battalion**

A new challenge for the Red Scorpions. On January 2011, serving under a new commander, the Red Scorpions headed towards the country they had met years ago starting with 2002 and continuing with 2005, 2006 and 2007. *"A new commander"* expressed only the position in which Lieutenant Colonel Dan Ionescu was in that moment, because his career was an integrant part of the Red Scorpions' history.

The battalion commander had an elaborate knowledge upon his subordinates, throughout his career being platoon commander and company commander within the 26th Infantry Battalion. Although most of the battalion's military had participated since 2002 in missions in the hot Afghanistan, this mission would be a difficult one. Lieutenant Colonel Dan Ionescu was certain about this issue demanding maximal involvement on the mission preparedness terms.

1 540 square kilometres. Shay Joy District. FOB Bullard, FOB Al Massak, PB 10, PB 13... A1 highway... Names, places unknown for the Romanians back home but so familiar for the Red Scorpions. FOB Lagman, KAF... places that do not say anything for many people, but for the 26th Infantry Battalion meant the places they were supplied from... Of course, the unit's veterans were at duty. Captain Marius Udroiu, meanwhile Major Udroiu, led the logistic structure of the battalion in FOB Lagman. There, along with the other military within the structure, they were sending supplies to the other FOBs and PBs. Also, there was the place where the damaged equipment was repaired.



The battalion's subunits were deployed in different bases and for the first time the soldiers with the vastest experience remembered the year of 1996 in Angola. The battalion's commander knew what that meant, as he had participated in Angola as a young officer in 1996. The infantry companies received responsibilities areas within the battalion's area, meaning the north side of Qalat district. Lieutenant Bogdan Gherghe, now in his third foreign mission, was in command of the 3rd Infantry Company. Along with the battalion's headquarters and with the Staff's company structures, they were deployed in FOB Bullard, a small base within Shah Joy district. There, the officer who 2 years ago was commanding

his platoon accomplishing all of his duties, was confronted with a new challenge. This mission was not similar with what he had experienced before in Iraq, in 2009 or in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2007. The Lieutenant's subordinates patrol missions identified improvised explosive devices almost on a daily basis. The troops were put under light infantry fire while being in missions outside the base. The base, on the other hand, was attacked with infantry weapons or with indirect fire through the Taliban' launchers. There, the military from the 3rd Infantry Company proved their true military value. Developing actions with precision and efficiency, respecting the operational procedures, possessing a well-formed training, the military successfully accomplished all their duties within their specific missions.



In their responsibility areas, the military within the other infantry companies also managed to fully accomplish their missions. Even though there were missions that involved patrolling on the A1 highway, escorting missions or KLE, the Red Scorpions were always making their presence felt in their responsibility areas acting independently or alongside the American or Afghan partners. The 26th Infantry Battalion troops confronted with the effects of an unconventional warfare, a conflict in which today's ally could be tomorrow's enemy, in which the one who was thanking you for giving him water and food at daytime could plant an IED on a patrol's route at night, for the next day. The command and the battalion's headquarters understood that in order to comprehend the Afghanistan phenomenon, it was not enough to limit one's knowledge upon one's area of operation but extend it to the cultural and ethnical background, very different from the European or Romanian cultural background, the unwritten laws that govern the locals' lives

and the relations between them. During the 6 months of mission in Shah Joy district, multiple KLE missions were initiated, also many humanitarian assistance and population support missions were carried out in the area of responsibility, the Red Scorpions discussing in a successful manner with the Afghan partner.

The environment in which the 26th Infantry Battalion operated was extremely hostile. The responsibility area was a transit zone of the insurgent's forces from Pakistan towards the rest of Afghanistan. The Scorpions' main duty was to ensure the coalition and Afghan forces freedom of movement along the A1 highway and also to assure a security climate within Shah Joy province. Due to the length of the A1 highway, the distances between the battalion's deployment bases and the population's hostility, the mission was a very tough one. The Romanian troops were attacked with diverse fire weapons almost on a daily basis, being under infantry fire, RPGs, 82mm launchers, rocket launchers and, of course, IEDs. Right after the dry season came, the insurgents main activity was to plant IEDs. The Scorpions patrols managed to identify even 3-4 IEDs on a single day. The war against the invisible enemy was a very tough but not impossible one. Throughout the 6 months of mission, many insurgents were captured by the Romanian patrol.

The IEDs took two comrades from the Scorpions lines, two heroes that left their colleagues much too early. The 2nd Lieutenants (posthumous) Constantin Laurenţiu Lixandru and Cătălin-Ionel Marinescu fell in the line of duty in May while executing a patrol mission on A1 highway. Their comrades lit candles in their memory, carried them in their hearts and returned on the A1 highway in order to prevent similar tragedies. Also, other four soldiers were injured while executing patrolling missions within the area of responsibility.

Although the environment in which they carried out military actions was extremely hostile, the 26th Infantry Battalion troops accomplished with success its mission. Almost 2 500 counter-insurgency missions were performed in order to ensure a security climate for the civilian population in the area. The battalion

commander Lieutenant Colonel Dan Ionescu highlighted the Red Scorpions' contribution towards developing a stability climate in the area stating that: *"The 26ᵗʰ Infantry Battalion's missions were various, having the aim of assuring a stability climate within Shah Joy and Qalat district and, at the same time, of ensuring the freedom of movement on A1 highway for the local population as well as for the ISAF forces and non-governmental organisations. The mission results gave us extraordinary satisfaction".*



The 26ᵗʰ Infantry Battalion *"Neagoe Basarab" – "Red Scorpions"* accomplished once again its mission under very good terms. It demonstrated, even though it was not necessary, that the 26ᵗʰ Infantry Battalion is an elite unit within the Romanian Armed Forces always ready to accomplish with honour and glory any mission given, serving under the motto: *"SEMPER GLORIOSI!".*

# MILITARY POLICE
# IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

*Colonel Dr Gabriel-Tiberiu BUCEAC*
*Cosmin-Dragoş BUCEAC*

*The security environment is characterised by latent tensions and unpredictable developments requiring new responses and solutions. They determine the need to adapt to the revolution in military affairs new requirements and to globalisation. The implementation of certain techniques, tactics and procedures to ensure maximum flexibility at conceptual, structural and actional levels is a pre-condition for achieving success in a multinational operation. The development and modernisation of military police forces and their consistent participation in operations abroad stress the importance of these structures in the context of modern operations. Designated to perform complex and high risk missions, the military police units demonstrate their utility in both peacetime missions and multinational operations.*

*Keywords: military police; globalisation; multinational operations; modernisation*

## Introduction

The current security environment, particularly complex and often with surprising developments, influenced by the expansion of international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and emergence or development of instability in various regions of the world, has led to the adoption of diversified measures to meet increasingly pressing requirements.

At the international level, we should notice that states act at political, diplomatic, economic, social, legal, information and military level to promote and protect democratic values and general interests of the international community as well as their own interests. Whether acting individually or in cooperation with other states or in different multinational organisations, the international community focuses its efforts on prevention and effective management of various crises.

If political action is essential in regulating various controversial aspects of international security, the use of military force is an option of last resort, but should still be considered, if necessary. This is why countries develop their own military capabilities needed

to participate in joint operations in international collective security and defence bodies and to fulfil various defence commitments. In this respect, we consider that, in the military field, nations are moving towards creating a modern force structure, which is professionalised, has high mobility, is efficient, flexible, deployable and sustainable, capable of performing a wide range of actions far away from the national territory and in complex and hostile environments. Also, these forces must be able to perform complex operations in case of crisis and provide support to civilian authorities in order to promote regional and global stability and create a favourable climate for sustainable development of the various regions characterised by increased instability.

As noted by General Van Fleet during the Korean War, the desire to expend *"steel and fire, not men"* has led to the development of new state security policy guidelines and to the restructuring of security forces earmarked for national defence or operations under alliances or coalitions command[1]. They are aimed at replacing the power of weapons with the force of the human factor, which thus becomes a priority in addressing security strategies and policies and creating flexible, mobile and overwhelming technological superiority forces, able to take action in the most hostile environments. We appreciate that even if on relatively medium term the advantage of technical and material superiority will remain defining in achieving victory, the trends are that quantity will be replaced by the embedded technologies and the human factor that manages it. However, the human factor tends to be more specialised in order to better meet the technological challenges and actions.

In this framework, the employment of Military Police structures in multinational operations, as specialised forces, carrying out a broad range of force protection and combat support missions, becomes more evident and consistent.

## Romanian MP background

Romanian Military Police have their origins in the Romanian Gendarmerie and, to a certain stage and time, evolved together with these structures, though having a distinct place and role in the Armed Forces structure.

*Gendarmerie* is the generic name of the nineteenth century for *"the troops police"*, founded under the command of the *Ministry of War* through the documents related to *"the founding of Gendarmerie"* of 3 April 1850 issued by Prince Grigore Alexandru Ghica. Subsequently, specific tasks and types of missions were described and detailed in Ordinance 896 of 20 June 1864, signed by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza[2].

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[1] Gl. James A. Van Fleet, *War and Politics*, MacMillan Press, New York, 1973, p. 91.
[2] http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jandarmeria_Rom, retrieved on 15.03.2014.

Formations and specific structures with the explicit name of *"Military Police"* came into being in 1893 in the time of King Carol I, with the promulgation of the *"Law on Rural Gendarmerie"*.

At that time, the Gendarmerie was directly subordinated to the Ministry of War with the mission to *"fully impose the military discipline and support the command process and training of the troops"*. In the Gendarmerie some structures were established, which were subordinated and acted in support of both the *"Ministry of Interior related to everything concerning domestic order and security"* and the *"Ministry of Justice and Head of County"*[3].

The Gendarmerie conducted various training programmes and strengthened its own organisation in order to be able to perform specific tasks set by the legislation. The main missions were related to maintaining order and discipline in the garrison, carrying out requisitions and functioning as military police during manoeuvres. The Gendarmerie units were considered as being part of the active Army with the same rights and obligations as the regular military units.

Between 1913 and 1916, the number of troops was increased and several specialised formations were established (special positions in the factories that were producing military equipment in the Capital, special guard points and control of all the passes of the Carpathians Mountains and a detachment for security and defence of the oil fields).

During the two World Wars and the interwar period, Military Police structures were part of the *national military system*.

After the end of the Second World War, the Gendarmerie was again subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and specialised military police formations were disbanded, the personnel being reassigned to other structures.

After 1947 and until 1990, some special structures were created, which were standalone and inefficient, with different subordination and competencies, meeting the needs for monitoring, controlling and maintaining military regulations (order and discipline, traffic control and troops movement, special criminal investigation, military prison etc.).

Subsequently, since 1990, in order to meet the Armed Forces missions and requirements of the guidelines on national security, the Romanian Government approved the request of the Minister of National Defence to set up, as separate structures with echeloned operational command, in keeping with military modernisation and integration into NATO, military police units and subunits that are able to perform with superior combat capacity tasks related to maintaining military order and discipline,

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[3] http://www.mapn.ro/despre_mapn/zilele_armelor/index.php, retrieved on 15.06.2014.

controlling military vehicles traffic, ensuring mobility of forces, guarding military facilities and infrastructure, protecting Romanian or foreign dignitaries and ensuring force protection in homeland bases or in missions abroad.

The Military Police have changed and upgraded constantly, in order to achieve objectives and performance standards specific to the military, and after 2004 they have continued the modernisation process, constantly upgrading operational readiness, according to NATO standards, in order to achieve the harmonisation with similar structures in Nord-Atlantic Alliance.

## General characteristics of Military Police

Established initially as a consequence of the need to secure the military facilities and infrastructure and provide appropriate force protection, the Military Police have undergone many changes and reorganisations, in terms of structural, organisational and conceptual fields.

In a broader sense, the Military Police are defined as an organisation connected to or being part of the Armed Forces of a state, responsible for specific actions, both within and on the armed forces and, in some cases, on the civilian population[4].

In a larger approach, we can state that the Military Police represent a specialised structure that enforces military discipline and order, ensures security of important military facilities, provides force protection and enforces military traffic regulations and security of transportation routes and lines of communication within the national territory and in theatres of operations.

Through missions and organisation, the Military Police are a specialised structure of the Romanian Armed Forces intended to maintain order and military discipline, both in peacetime and in crisis situations, in multinational operations, during military and civil emergencies, and in war time as well, thus contributing to strengthening military morale and increasing efficiency of military action.

In all situations, by specific means and using particular techniques, the Military Police provide the Force Commanders with an important tool to achieve the desired end state of any operation. In this way, the Military Police represent a multifunctional structure able to perform a variety of missions, both on national territory and in theatres of operations. The Military Police support manoeuvres and mobility of combat units, ensure the security of important areas, maintain and restore order and discipline, collect and process data and information and undertake specific investigations, along with continuous training to maintain and enhance the operational readiness level.

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[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_police, retrieved on 12.02.2014.

To accomplish specific missions, Military Police structures can act independently, as standalone entities, as well as integrated or in cooperation with other elements of the national defence system and other military structures or legal civilian bodies, during participation in international missions.

Usually, on the national territory, the Military Police work with other entities specialised in security and with military units deployed in garrisons or in other areas, and during emergency situations, based on decision-makers guidance of the Ministry of National Defence, along with specialised structures of the Ministry of Interior, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Special Protection and Guard Service and local or central administration authorities[5].

In multinational operations, in some cases, the Military Police may provide liaison missions to other security forces within specialised structures in the area of operations according to force commander's concept of operations.

On the national territory, Military Police exercise the authority conferred by provisions of national laws, while in multinational operations they act in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement – SOFA or other arrangements and agreements with the host nation.

In order to fulfil specific missions in peacetime, within the national territory, the Military Police leadership is provided by the General Staff through specialised structures, while in multinational operations, by the Force Commander, after the transfer of authority.

Units' commanders are responsible for carrying out the received tasks, establishing the concept of operations as required, the preparation and accomplishment of military police actions.

The commanding process of Military Police units includes:
- obtaining, analysing and exploiting data and information on the operational situation in the area of responsibility;
- timely decision-making and missions assignment;
- ensuring efficient communication and information system that meets communication needs;
- organising and coordinating the activities of Military Police units/sub-units in a unitary manner;
- subunits control and continuous guidance to perform the assigned tasks;
- maintaining a strong response capacity and high psycho-moral conditions;
- continuously adapting tasks to the evolving operational situation.

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[5] www.rumaniamilitary.wordpress.com, accessed on 20.02.2014.

The commander of the Military Police structure is the Force Commander's advisor for specific policies and submits proposals on effective engagement of Military Police forces, tactics, techniques and procedures that will be used to perform the tasks. In addition, the commander of the Military Police structure provides counselling for:

- cooperation and liaison with civil police authorities;
- engagement of Military Police in crowd control missions, under the provisions of law;
- inquiry/investigation of events that could have a negative effect on the credibility of the mission and the morale of friendly forces;
- interaction between Military Police structures and other organisations engaged in similar police activities.

All these provide the Military Police with a well-customised role and a distinctive place in any overseas operations or missions performed on national territory.

## Particularities regarding the place and role of the Military Police in multinational operations

Based on their flexibility, mobility, specialised training of the staff, high deployment capacity and adaptation to new, unique and complex situations, the Military Police structures are able to provide a wide range support. Acting as a combat power multiplier, they provide permanent support to the combat unit commanders by performing the six Military Police functions, integrating own efforts with the combat and combat service support of other elements and formations.

By planning and conducting missions as: manoeuvre and mobility support; security, protection and defence; collection, temporary guarding and escorting prisoners of war and suspect civilians; enforcement and restoration of law and order and military discipline; collection, processing and dissemination of data and information and specific police investigations, the Military Police prove to be a valuable tool, able to provide the commanders with greater freedom of action and decisively contributing to achieving the end state of any operation.

The complexity of multinational operations requires better efforts coordination, starting with forces pre-deployment phase in theatre of operations. Military Police structures provide *manoeuvre and mobility support* by establishing and enforcing necessary measures to improve the possibilities for carrying out manoeuvre of forces and equipment at strategic, operational and tactic level and movement of friendly forces in theatres of operations in any environment or terrain conditions.

Military police actions generally include support for watercourses crossing, passage across the lines of operations, movement control of displaced civilians who transit the area of operations, surveillance and reconnaissance missions of roads and enforcement of traffic regulations on Main Supply Routes.

Typically in multinational operations, particularly in post-conflict phase, the redeployment of troops, withdrawal and redeployment/replacement of units and movement of a tremendous amount of equipments are required. All these, in conjunction with the movements of civilian population, require specialised and robust structures capable of effectively managing these actions. In this context, we can say that the main role concerning the manoeuvre and mobility support lies under the Military Police structures that ensure, through specific missions, the freedom of movement and proper conditions for receiving, onward movement and staging of personnel, equipment, weapons and materials in appropriate time and place, as required by the Force Commander.

An important mission performed by the Military Police in multinational operations is to ensure the *security, protection and defence.* This includes all measures taken to ensure commanders freedom of movement and flexibility for conducting operations. Usually these are aimed at: reconnaissance missions, controlling areas with high level of potential risk, assembly areas/bases defence, ensuring security of installations and military facilities, force protection measures and physical security of civilian or military VIPs visiting the theatre of operations. Battlefield nonlinearity, dispersion of forces and existence of high sensitive objectives in different areas require specific forces and involve important resources. Due to their modular organisation, structural flexibility and high possibilities of manoeuvre, the Military Police are best suited to fulfil this mission. Being able to work with relatively small structural elements, the Military Police have the ability to effectively ensure security and defend various facilities thus relieving the multinational force commanders from a series of additional tasks and allowing targeting the main effort toward strategic objectives. In all cases, the military police actions have as an ultimate end result the force protection and preservation of combat readiness.

*Collecting, temporary guarding and escorting prisoners of war and suspect civilians* is one of the most sensitive missions Military Police structures conduct in multinational operations. This MP function requires measures to ensure housing, support, security, protection and registration of prisoners, displaced civilians and refugees in the area. This task is specific for Military Police in multinational operations only. On the national territory, during peacetime, these missions are placed under the responsibility of Ministry of Interior forces. Nevertheless, being one of the functions of Military Police, specialised training of personnel

before deployment in theatre of operations includes techniques, procedures and methods for effective management of the activities. Particular attention is given to suspects and civilians that usually are handed over to the competent authorities of the Host Nation, unless otherwise stipulated in the multinational force procedures. Having in mind that these categories of civilians are highly visible and under mass-media attention while human rights protection is a matter of sensitivity to public opinion, military police structures designated for these types of missions must have a solid training in international humanitarian law and include specialised capabilities.

In multinational operations, *enforcement and restoration of law and military order and discipline* helps to minimise the effects of threats posed to own forces and strengthen the troop's morale.

The multinational character of modern operations, the presence of various organisations and civilian entities and the permanent interaction with the civil authorities and the local population bring about a number of additional risk factors and generate new threats to friendly forces. For an effective risk and asymmetric threats management, military police structures establish, propose and implement specific measures leading to the reduction or elimination of conditions and opportunities for violations of law, thus preventing acts of indiscipline from happening, which could affect the image and morale of troops or have a negative impact on providing logistic support of combat forces. Through the specific measures imposed, increased confidence of civilian population and host nation in the potential of multinational force to fulfil its mandate can also be built. To achieve this function, the military police are authorised to conduct law enforcement operations, criminal investigations, limited customs operations and, in some cases, provide training and assistance to local specialised police forces or other legal entities/organisations acting in theatres of operations.

*Data and information collection, processing and dissemination and specific investigations* are military police missions that support, enhance and contribute to the protection measures established by the multinational force commander, provide a more realistic picture of the battlefield and troops situation and a relevant threat information that may affect the operational environment. Typically, this military police mission is planned and conducted both independently and during other actions. Being in constant contact with the civilian population and local authorities, military police structures are an important vector in providing credible data and information to the commander of the multinational force. Use of military police structures as *"information sensor"* can contribute to using less forces and making less efforts, having rapid access to vital information and a better collaboration with partners.

*Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield – IPB*, passive and active intelligence missions and specific military police assessments contribute to meeting critical information requirements for specific multinational operations.

Whatever the case, employing military police structures in gathering information and specific inquiries provides relevant data to the Force Commander and is a valuable source of information which, intelligently exploited, may help to mitigate the risks and threats to friendly forces.

We may note that, especially in multinational operations, military police functions represent a comprehensive approach to the action domain, while specific tasks within the functional area are a breakdown of these functions. As a specific feature, we consider that a series of missions are not solely characteristic to a single function, those being relevant for two or more. This may cause an increased interdependence of the internal structures and an organisational model able to cover the whole area of missions with relatively reduced forces and capabilities.

Characterised by high capacity of adaptation to the actions and particular situations of the theatre of operations, capacity to immediately take action in the designated area or, depending on destination, far away from home bases, with great mobility and flexibility, Military Police structures are able to generate resolute response capabilities in any situation, being a valuable tool to reach the commanders desired end state.

In multinational operations, the enemy's actions characteristics, the place where Military Police units and subunits are deployed or act and their specific missions generate a considerable increase in the independence of tactical echelons, in some cases, up to squad level.

This leads, in our opinion, to the need to determine, impose and predict certain actions in the area of responsibility in order to react properly, regardless the conditions in theatre of operations.

The relative independence of the Military Police structures requires from the subunits commanders continuous adaptation to the operational requirements, creative thinking and extended initiative.

Also, Military Police structures can act within or in cooperation with Multinational Specialised Units – MSU or host nation civil police structures in accordance with the mandate of the mission and the rules of engagement. This leads to the need for modular and flexible MP structures, able to work independently, within a coalition or in cooperation with other specialised entities.

In modern multinational operations, the range of military police missions has broadened, particularly those relating to manoeuvre and mobility support

missions through military convoys escort or humanitarian operations, security, safety, enforcement and restoration of law and order and VIPs protection. Due to the considerable reduction of the time available, preparation and accomplishment of tasks can take place simultaneously. For this reason and because of the actions carried out on large areas with relatively small subunits, a decentralisation of management is required. All these require high level of interoperability, proper command and carrying out tasks in a timely manner together with other coalition forces.

The modern battlefield is not dominated by a single type of threat, a reality which determines the need for a flexible approach in deploying military police in specific missions. Since military police structures have to face both traditional and asymmetric threats in the multinational operations, *"atypical"* missions with a strong non-military character should be considered. Thus, combating trafficking and illegal immigration, escorting humanitarian convoys, monitoring separation zones, managing flows of refugees and displaced civilian population movements require adapting the training and mode of action of MPs to the specificity of theatres of operations.

The ultimate goal of employing Military Police structures should be optimum use of all available specific capabilities to support operational efforts of the multinational force commander and relieve combatant structures of a number of additional tasks.

We can proudly state that the Romanian Military Police currently include well articulated central structures, specialised units and subunits prepared and trained according to NATO standards, able to perform specific tasks for the benefit of the Romanian Armed Forces and NATO with significant effects, both on national territory, and in the overseas missions in which we are involved.

# NATO AIR POWER PARADOX[*]

*Major General Dr Victor STRÎMBEANU*

*Airpower is, on the one hand, an important pillar of the Alliance defence capabilities. On the other hand, in the author's opinion, NATO air power is in continuous decline. To detail, capabilities deficits continue to grow, which results in the Alliance vulnerability and exposure to the risk of not being able to adequately meet the security needs and the set level of ambition.*

*In addition, the future security environment analysis and prognosis lead to the conclusion that the Alliance will have to operate in a new environment, a complex and multidimensional one, across the full spectrum of objectives and missions, required by a new global balance of power.*

*Keywords: Security Council; air operations; lines of communications; security needs*

## Introduction – The terms of the paradox

### 1. The decisive role of Air Power

Air Power (AP) has proved to be *of utmost importance for the Alliance*, since its very inception. A key pillar of the Alliance's *Cold War* deterrence capability has been represented by the strength, flexibility and high quality of its air forces, including those belonging to naval or land forces. These key AP capabilities have been based on state of the art technology, superior training, interoperability, experience, supported and amplified by a firm and efficient leadership through a solid, reliable and redundant Air Command and Control (Air C2) system. The Air Force has been *permanently the first line of defence* for the Alliance's air space and territory. Every now and then, the Alliance has turned to AP as the first choice for response to military actions. More recently, in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, together now with the Space Power (SP), the AP has continued to prove its unprecedented value through its implicit unmatched characteristics, like speed, perspective, precision, ubiquity, independence of terrestrial obstacles, easy access, economy of forces. In experts' opinion, *first of all NATO has been an Air Power Alliance.*

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**2. The decline of Air Power**

Contrary to its decisive role, after a six decades odyssey, due to continued budgetary reductions, the AP is today at risk. Its main capabilities, first of all the deployable ones, have become almost inoperable. This situation has further led to a downward trend, a real *"spiral of death"*, inflicted by a diminishing readiness capacity, contracting structure, reduction of training and, implicitly, of combat potential. The resource scarcity, together with the permanent need and requests for operational forces, has determined the decision-making factors to concentrate these minimal resources towards maintaining the readiness level of the already operational forces, on the expense of the young trainees and on the overall force generation process.

## The system response

To compensate the negative impact of this phenomenon, stop the Air Power decline and cover the capabilities gap, a series of measures have been taken by the Alliance. Firstly, a contribution of two percent (2%) from the national GDPs has been recommended for the construction of the NATO common budget. Secondly, starting with 2009 (Strassbourg-Kehl *Summit*) and especially after 2012 (Chicago *Summit*), there have been implemented some projects and initiatives designed to improve the efficiency of resource spending and stop the decline. The most significant of them are the *NATO Defense Planning Process* (*NDPP*), the *Connected Forces Initiative (CFI)* and the *Smart Defense (SD)*. However, disregarding the AP's pivotal role, contrary to the above-mentioned initiatives and NATO recommendation on the minim defense spending of 2% GDP, the nations continued to reduce AP capabilities pushing the Alliance at risk of not being able to cover its security needs and making it unable to fulfil its assumed level of ambition.

## Sub-conclusions from the recent operations

❖ *Allied Force Operation (OAF) – FYR (Former Yugoslav Republic)*

The legal *OAF* base was the *UNSCR (United Nations Security Council Resolution)* 1199; however, it only enabled AP application because the nations did not agree to send land forces.

The deployment and force build-up were done fast, within four days after the conclusion of the Rambouillet talks, 19 March 1999.

The destruction of the dual-use (military-civilian) infrastructure was possible from the air, only. The air strikes on the power plants and economic infrastructures led to population unrest, economy deterioration, and increased the pressure on Milosevici. The lines of communications and supply of the Serbian Army

were rapidly disrupted. In order to avoid being hit by the air strikes, the Serbian Army had to disperse in smaller units, camouflage its manoeuvres and limit its daytime movements. The targets were identified by the *ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Recce)* platforms, the global operational picture was obtained and disseminated using the space assets and the objectives were attacked and destroyed by PGMs with minimum collateral damage.

The political pressure, the loss of Russian support, the threat posed by land forces intervention, the population unrest and the air strikes all determined Milosevici to comply with Rambouillet Agreement.

However, without US involvement, OAF would not have been possible. *AAR ("Air-to-Air Refulling")*, ISR, SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) were not available in sufficient extent and quantities on the European side of the Alliance. It means that *no other future operation with AP full spectrum* will be possible without *USA* and, due to the fact that US support cannot be permanently and fully guaranteed, the conclusion is that the *European allies have to cover the capabilities gaps.*

Although there were certain limitations (partial and non-continuous ground control, incomplete blockage of violence against population, impact of inclement weather, complex environment and insufficient ISR), one can assess that without AP, the OAF success could not have been achieved or it would have had un-acceptable human and material costs for the Alliance.

❖ *ISAF – Afghanistan*

The legal base for AP in Afghanistan was UNSCR 1386. The AP use in this case inflicted a series of adaptations to enable it to respond to the peculiarities of an asymmetric conflict. Amongst them, the most important are: precision, non-linear battle space, intense use of UAVs, ISR fusion, specific, complex and dynamic targeting. The AP remains the most prominent asymmetry factor of the allied operation in Afghanistan through its implicit characteristics such as speed, precision, persistence, ubiquity, flexibility, sophistication, robotisation, mobility etc. Close to 100% of the ammunitions used in operation were PGMs. All air-to-ground aircraft have a targetting pod attached. All CAS and ISR air assets have the capacity to relay the imagery to the ground operators, in real time. The maximum response time for TIC *("Troops in Contact")* events is 15 minutes. The command and control flexibility and optimisation were possible by reducing the reaction time through dynamic targeting. This was possible by two ways. Firstly, by transferring the control of the air assets to the on-scene-commander. Secondly, by changing the airborne assets' missions, re-prioritising them for *HVA*

*(High Value Assets)*, *TST (Time Sensitive Tragets)* or *CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue)* more important than the initially allocated ones. On the other hand, the intra-theatre logistic support and mobility of troops provided by helicopters and short-to-medium range airplanes, as well as the extra-theatre movement by strategic aircraft, proved to be mission essential for *ISAF*, while operating in hostile, land-locked environment, far away from the own bases and supply sources.

However, a first conclusion is that the solution for the future is not adapting AP to the asymmetric conflict, but re-building and maintaining its *full spectrum* capabilities. Another conclusion, at least as important as the previous one, is that *ISAF* revealed, again, the capability gap between the USA and the European allies. Europe does not possess a sufficient PGMs stock, or full ISR, AAR, and strategic bombing capabilities. The necessity to cover this vital capability gap by the European allies becomes even more important today, when witnessing the shift of USA effort from Europe to Asia.

❖ *OUP (Operation Unified Protector) – Libya*

*OUP* had three main pillars, as follows: an arms embargo, based on UNSCR 1970; a *no-fly-zone*; and protection of population against governmental forces' attacks; (last two pillars, based on UNSCR 1973). The AP participated in all three *OUP*'s components.

*Note:* UNSCR 1973, again (see UNSCR 1199), did not authorise land forces intervention. Therefore, the three *OUP* pillars rested with Air and Naval Powers.

Monitoring the implementation of arms embargo was mainly a Naval Power responsibility but the use of Air and Space ISR assets significantly reduced the number of ships required for this operation, to a sustainable and efficient quantity. AP contribution to this pillar was assessed as mission *essential*.

The blockage of Libyan air assets, through the enforcement of a no-fly-zone, was an AP mission by default and it was carried out at the same time with the protection of civilian population against governmental forces' attacks. The Libyan air-defence assets were neutralised during the initial phase by the allied *SEAD* aircraft, properly sustained by the ISR.

The protection of population was done almost entirely by the AP, since the UNSCR 1973 did not authorise the use of land force. NATO Air Forces attacked the governmental forces, forced them to disperse, blocked their combat actions and movements, thus setting the context for the opposition forces' success.

However, the absence of the boots on the ground did not make possible the complete neutralisation of the terrorist groups and could not block their withdrawal and re-grouping outside Libyan territory.

The analysis of AP employment in *OUP* demonstrated again its utmost role, but it also revealed some already known deficiencies such as the excessive dependency on the USA potential, the absence and/or the insufficiency of strategic enablers (ISR, AAR, PGMs).

Overall, the *OUP* comparative analysis, with and without AP employment, showed the efficiency and economicity of the AP consistently sustained operations. *OUP* achieved all its objectives. The AP had the main role, or even the singular one in some cases. Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that in the *OUP* no human life was lost from the allied side.

❖ *Conclusions on Air and Space Powers' employment in recent operations*

All three above analysed operations had UNSCRs as legal base and were developed as *NATO operations* or *NATO-led operations.*

For two of them (*"Allied Force"* – FYR and *"Unified Protector"* – Libya), the AP was the main or the singular employed allied capability due to the political decision not to use the land force on those areas. The AP remains a vital instrument for the defence and protection of sovereignty and integrity of the allied territory and for enforcing the decision to attain the Alliance political, strategic and economic objectives.

All three operations demonstrated the AP decisive role in achieving the operative, strategic and, in the end, political objectives. The space capability provided the communications and information required for navigation, targeting and weather forecasts.

At the same time, all three operations revealed a series of caveats and limitations to be approached and eliminated for the future, such as:
- operational, geographical and capabilities limitations;
- air assets deployment capability deficits into the operations areas; insufficiency or absence of bases for deployment and of logistic support and maintenance conditions on these bases;
- intelligence deficits;
- insufficient qualified staff for targeting, analysts, CIMIC/Influence;
- insufficient quantities of PGMs;
- insufficient strategic enablers (ISR, AAR, SEAD etc).

These limitations are the direct consequence of the lack of allied political willingness to participate in operations and of the sub-financing of the defence, leading to capabilities deficits.

In addition, all three operations showed a major capability gap between USA and the European allies. ISR, AAR, transport and combat helicopters, strategic

aircraft, PGM, EW, SEAD are the main capabilities lacking, or insufficient, on the European side. Europe is practically dependent on USA from this perspective, which should not be a problem as long as USA is willing to support Europe, but the eventual shift, or re-balance, of American effort to any other areas of interest obliges the European allies to cover the capabilities deficits, highlighted by the analysis of the above-mentioned operations.

Furthermore, all analysed operations demonstrated the advantages of advanced technologies, with evident progress from one operation to another. If in *OAF (FRY)*, the sensor platforms were employed for the first time in an operation while the data processing and analysis were still done back in parental bases, in *ISAF* this way of operating became the norm. On the other hand, if in *OAF* the PGMs employment was around 30% of total, in *ISAF* it mounted to almost 100%. Another major step forward, based on advanced technology, was the satellite fed *ISR* and *GPS* guided PGMs. Last but not least, the intense data flow and robotisation proved to be catalysers, effort and effects multipliers, with still high future development potential.

The air transport capability enabled the decision-making factors with not only the required troops mobility but the humanitarian intervention capability as well. As for the troops and cargo related movement, in some cases in ISAF, it was directly done from the origin APOEs to the theatre APODs with no intra-theatre or intermediary stopovers.

*ISAF* and *OUP* demonstrated the role and value of the helicopters in achieving the strategic objectives of the Alliance in an asymmetric conflict. Even though the helicopters are tactical air assets by design (CAS, CSAR, special forces insertion/extraction, troops, munitions and supplies movements), their effects are strategic by effects and importance. Therefore, NATO has to provide sufficient helicopters and properly trained crews to guarantee the future operations' success.

However, a simplistic analysis of the three operations may involve the risk of an unhealthy conclusion in accordance with which the air defence assets and GBAD are no longer necessary for attaining and maintaining air superiority or supremacy. It must not be forgotten that all three operations above analysed belong to the asymmetric class, with specific, limited objectives that do not require the air power full spectrum of missions, roles and objectives. The future security environment, its symptoms and evolution trends clearly show that the Alliance may face a major armed conflict in the future, at full scale level of ambition or even above it, which might put the security, sovereignty and integrity of allied airspace and territory at risk if measures to cover the capabilities deficits and to re-build the AP full spectrum potential are not taken, with no delay.

## The diminishing air power

Many NATO member states are reducing the defence budgets at a pace that puts at risk the Alliance capacity to cover the security needs and the assumed level of ambition. This involves the risk that NATO could no longer comprehensively and efficiently use its Air and Space Power for the defence of its populations and territories or for the protection of its interests in operations outside its traditional geographical area of responsibility.

The continuing increase of the capabilities gap between the US and European NATO members also shows that the Alliance is not on the right path. The most obvious example of the sub-financing's negative effect is the drastic reduction of the number of air platforms and personnel. Although stopping these trends requires urgent intervention, it looks like the political decision-making factors are not able, or not willing, to join efforts to stop the AP's decline and to rebuild the potential required by the security needs and the level of ambition. In the end, this attitude will further accelerate NATO's vulnerability.

❖ *Priority Shortfall Areas (PSA) identified by NDPP*

*Note*: the *PSA* concept must be understood as a capability deficiency that has to be given priority. Following an *ACT (Allied Command Transformation)* complex study, done in 2008, there were identified, on mathematical bases, 50 PSAs requiring financing priority for urgent remedy. The study conclusions and recommendations were sent to the nations for action, but the project, as many other similar initiatives, remained with no significant effect if any at all.

The *NDPP* analysis revealed the following *PSA*s requiring urgent attention and financing:
- *Theatre and Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD)*;
- *Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Technologies (C-IED-T)*;
- *Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (J-ISR)*;
- *Cyber Defence (CD)*;
- *Deployable Medical Support*;
- reduced operational cycles for weapons and technical systems;
- the level of flight hours/pilot/year, much below NATO standard *(Allied Force Standards Volume III – Prescribed hours standards)*;
- incomplete and insufficient ammunition stocks, especially *PGM*s;
- under-manning;
- non-compliance with assumed obligations to participate in *NATO Command Structures (NCS)* or *NATO Forces Structures (NFS)*, for example in *NATO Response Force (NRF)*.

Under the continuous budgetary cuts, the nations have adopted implicit measures, focusing the remaining (scarce) resources on the operational commitments that further led to sacrificing the force generation, modernisation and transformation. Some nations have moved the deadlines for some of their essential capabilities until 2018 or beyond; they have delayed the procurement programmes behind the normal planning and operational cycles; or have completely deleted certain projects, without consultation and coordination at Alliance level for eventual compensation by the other nations in order to avoid the risks to security needs and level of ambition overall.

## The "Spiral of Death"

On short term, these budget reductions may have some positive effects on economy, by and large, but on medium and long terms, they lead to complete loss of essential AP capabilities and of the overall combat potential. This way, it has already inflicted an excessive use of air assets, implicitly requiring anticipated repairs and modernisations; the de-commissioning plans have been extended, thus consuming additional resources out of those initially planned for upgrades; the training has been reduced and oriented towards low-intensity operations which have in turn further affected the readiness status and the range of missions; the successive reductions of the staff expenses have led to manning deficits, diminishing or even suspending the recruitment and force generation process, as well as to salary and dividends reductions.

For some arguable short-term benefits, *expenses and costs much bigger* than those normally required by the budgetary planning cycle *are being propagated and amplified on long term*; or, if covering the capability gap is abandoned, then the security needs and the level of ambition are at risk.

The so-called *"vertical cuts"* (complete deletion) of some planned projects and capabilities will lead to limited range of AP roles and missions and to increased European dependency on USA, exactly when the latter announces the intention to shift its effort from Europe to Asia.

The *"horizontal cuts"* (quantitative and qualitative limitations), or the *"capabilities slicing"*, lead to severe deficits and increase the interdependency of the allies, with no symptom from the political side to improve the nations' answers to the Alliance requests for resources and force commitments.

The instruments designed to compensate these negative trends (NDPP, SD, CFI etc.) did not produce the expected effects due to *lack of political will* in complying with Alliance recommendations and requests to participate in operations, and NATO

does not possess a mechanism to guarantee that nations will commit and fulfil the assumed obligations. The explanations reside, again, with the lack of political will and with the *prevalence of national interests on the expense of the Alliance ones* overall. Under these circumstances, the instruments designed to compensate the capabilities deficits *cannot solve the problem*; the transatlantic capability gap is not sustainable on long-term; the discrepancy between the security needs and level of ambition, on the one side, and the capability level, on the other side, will increase; and lastly, if this trend continues, the Alliance will no longer be able to cover the security needs and the level of ambition.

It is true that a critical capability level has not been defined. This is dynamic by definition and only a full-scale conflict could reveal whether this threshold has been touched. Can NATO afford such a risk?

The AP *"full spectrum"* and the *"assured availability"* have to become realities. The solution is there and it is political in nature: a mechanism to guarantee that nations will fulfil the assumed obligations.

## The Future Security Environment

The security environment, by and large, and the battlefield in particular are rapidly changing. The technological advances, non-state actors, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, demographic balance disruptions and climate changes all contribute to the construct of a new, complex, multi-dimensional, non-linear, unstable, uncertain, contested, congested and lethal confrontational environment. The future armed conflicts will be based on a multitude of reasons and will evolve simultaneously on multiple levels (political, military, economic, social, religious, information), on own territories or wherever in the world. In some, certain, contexts, a clear delimitation between conflicting parties will no longer be possible and the need to delineate the combatant from the non-combatant will be more pressing, leading to request for more information, faster data processing, clearer and safer targeting and, last but not least, smarter weapons.

We are witnessing, as well, a transfer within the global balance of power, due to fast economic evolution of some of the developing countries, while the western economies are still recessing. At the same time, the technology is fast evolving. One could already estimate today that A&SP will have to face a completely new model of armed conflict.

The economic development of Asian countries leads to a rapid shift of global power towards the Eastern hemisphere. This economic shift will be followed by the adjustments of military balance, especially of A&SP. The engine of these anticipated

changes resides in the major ASP investments made by China, Russia and India, while the westerners dramatically reduce their defence spending.

The physical and digital space will likely be very much contested in the future. The future military operations will be extremely difficult or even impossible if NATO fails to maintain the current capabilities advance and if it does not develop them to the same rhythm with its potential competitors. The competition for continuous access and information superiority is sharpening, the possibilities for connectivity, as well as for blocking the access, are increasing, with a major impact on the future security environment. The initial advantage of NATO states in this regard is rapidly diminishing. China already won this competition when it created a cyber attack capability, able to hinder the allies' freedom of movement in this environment. The most affected capabilities will be the hi-tech ones, such as the Air Force.

For the time being, NATO still has an advantage in the air space command and control, compared to its potential adversaries. But, due to chronic defence sub-financing, this advantage is rapidly eroding. At the same time, the air-defence systems proliferate and become available to potential adversarial states or even to non-state actors.

## Conclusion

We see today a *"true paradox"*[1] of Air Power. On the one hand, the AP has represented, and continues to do so, a key pillar of the Alliance defence capacity to such an extent that specialists consider NATO an *"Air Power Alliance"*. On the other hand, the AP is diminishing the capability gaps, the allied interdependency and the dependency on USA are increasing, making the Alliance more vulnerable and risking its security needs and the assumed level of ambition.

Additionally, the analysis of and the prognosis on the future security environment show that the Alliance will have to operate in a completely new, complex, multi-dimensional environment, requiring full spectrum capability, determined by a new global power distribution.

The Alliance has to adapt or it will lose its relevance. The solutions are possible and they rest with the political factor. Amongst them, the most relevant are the following:

- a national defence budget contribution up to 2% of GDP, accepted by all nations;

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[1] A *"true paradox"* may seem a contradiction in terms; it has to be taken as a metaphor intended to highlight the dramatic situation of Air Power today.

- fulfilment of assumed capabilities obligations by each nation and offering them for allied operations;
- common agreement to provide capabilities and resources not only for collective defence, but also for crisis management and cooperative security;
- planning, designing and resourcing the development, the transformation and modernisation requirements, based on a correct evaluation of the future security environment;
- re-building the *full spectrum* AP (missions and roles) potential;
- maintaining the freedom of movement in the air, space, and digital environments; assured access for own forces and denying it to the adversaries;
- cooperation with partners in building the capabilities, assuring the access and the host nation support.

All these above-mentioned measures, stemming from objective analysis, are viable, realistic and possible. They only have to be promoted and resourced.

# NATIONAL SECURITY UNDER THE IRREGULAR FORMS OF THE MODERN WAR

*Colonel Marinel MARE*

*Within the current international system, besides the overall trend and the real initiatives of new transnational states, the nation still represents a model, as the system is a nation-state based one. State institutions are designated to manage national security – as one of the fundamental acts of governance – using political tools and judicial and administrative democratic mechanisms. Much of the historical basis of our knowledge about war needs a refreshing breeze that can be generated only by some creative approaches, other than the traditional patterns. Irregular/hybrid warfare is a factor that will seriously complicate the 21st century defence planning process. Its potential impact must be considered in depth.*

***Keywords****: nation; state; security; irregular war; hybrid war; terrorism; insurgency*

## Nation as Object of State Security

The elements that support the idea of *state* can be identified within the concept of *"nation"* and its ideology. National security directly implies that the subject of security is the *nation* itself. This emphasises the connection between the *state* and the *nation*. Within the current international system, besides the overall trend and the real initiatives of new transnational states evolvements, *nation* still represents a model that covers humanity, being a nation-state based one. Barry Buzan[1] identifies four types of states:

• *state-nation*, where the nation precedes the state and plays an essential role in its birth. These are nations such as Germany, Japan, Romania etc., which have reached the self-awareness (i.e. national culture) before having their own states. In these cases, the purpose of the state is to represent and protect the nation. The nation, in turn, provides a strong identity in the international arena, as well as an important internal legitimacy basis;

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[1] B. Buzan, C. Jones and R. Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.

• *nation-state,* in which the state plays an important role in defining the nation. United States and Australia are illustrative examples of states of this kind;

• *divided state-nation*, in which the nation is territorially divided, distinct parts being under separate constitutional authority of distinct states. This is the case of the German nation (Germany and Austria), Romanian nation (Romania and the R. Moldova), the Korean nation (North Korea and South Korea) etc.

• *multinational state*, as it is the case of those states which comprise several nations. One can mention the *federal states* and the *imperial states*. Today's Russia and the Soviet Union of the past are suitable examples for this category.

Therefore, defining the *nation* as the object of security involves a subjective approach, through which sets of values and identities are protected.

The state exists, is recognised and performs its functions through its institutions. State institutions include the entire *"machinery"* of the government: executive, legislative, administrative and judicial structures. We can add to this the *legislation*, the *procedures* and the *rules* based on which the machinery operates. State institutions are designated to manage national security – as one of the most fundamental acts of governance – using the political tools and the judicial and administrative democratic mechanisms. The risks and threats to the institutional structure of the state relate differently to the nation, depending on their relevance for national security. Political security, for instance, refers to the risks and threats to the optimal functioning of public institutions. Terrorism is a threat to political security but, above all, it is a *political risk*.

Regarding the physical basis of the state, there must be emphasised that its fundamental constituent elements are the *population*, the *territory* and the *natural resources*. Viewed as the object of the security, the physical basis of the state could be more easily defined and understood. Thus, territory and natural resources are popular examples of elements perceived as objects of the security. Territorial control is an important indicator of the state sovereignty, as much as of the political security, while resources are an important indicator for economic security.

In terms of population, *migration* is perceived as a considerable source of insecurity. Especially inward migration (immigration) has a negative potential to the security of a nation, the highest sensitive effect on the security of a nation being a significant change of the ethnic balance within specific geographical areas, especially due to *"aggressive"* displacement policies promoted (overtly or covertly) by some states, in some dedicated foreign territories. Subsequently, taking advantage of favourable international environment, states can initiate (and/or support from outside) aggressive secessionist campaigns which, connected with a potential inability of the host state in the democratic management of such crises, could prove

devastating – in terms of territorial loss – for the nation subject to aggression. This explains the success of the recent intervention of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, which actually meant the *"annexation"* of the Crimea region, to the detriment of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

In terms of territory, among the ways in which national security could be affected, one can find: total or partial occupation; foreign military bases stationing; internal secessionist movements; soil pollution due to natural disasters, industrial activities or military actions. Nowadays, there are few states that could show a *"clean"* security agenda, concerning their national territory. Most states cope with unresolved or pending territorial disputes: United Kingdom – the dispute with Ireland on Northern Ireland area; Russian Federation – the dispute with Japan on South Kuril Islands; the dispute with Georgia on South Ossetia and/or Abkhazia; the recent dispute with Ukraine on Crimea etc.; Greece and Turkey – the dispute over Cyprus; China – the dispute over Taiwan; Moldova – the dispute regarding Transnistria[2] etc.

## Security Dilemma

According to the traditional approach to security, the increased security of a state often means a perceived lower security level of at least one other state. During the *Cold War*, the development of advanced military technology by one superpower generated the other superpower's military inferiority. The US *"Star War"*, for example, ultimately contributed to the collapse of the USSR. Security studies describe this phenomenon as *"security dilemma"*.

Security dilemma becomes evident when many of the means by which a state struggles to increase its security generate an apparent decrease in the security of other states, possibly states competing in the regional or global security arena. The most probable evolution is described as the *spiral phenomenon*: the more security oriented a state is, the more threatened the other states feel themselves, therefore the more steps they take to increase their security (e.g. *arms race*). The phenomenon depends on the perceived *offensive/defensive* balance and on the perceived offensive – defensive differences – as interdependent variables.

The potential economic/material consequences of the security dilemma spread on the continuum limited, at one side, by *state's resources saving*, as a result of successive/simultaneous opponents' involvement in continuous decrease

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[2] *Transnistria* = the separatist region of Trans-Dniester – a narrow strip of land between the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border – proclaimed independence from Moldova in 1990 and is considered one of the post-Soviet space's *"frozen conflicts"*. The international community does not recognise its self-declared statehood, and the territory, which remains in a tense stand-off with Moldova, is often portrayed as a hotbed of crime.

in their level of arming – assuming the risk posed by the honesty/dishonesty of others and, on the other hand, *unnecessary resource consumption* due to employment of the opponents in the *"arms race"* – as a result of unacceptably low levels of mutual trust, due to their inability to take the risks posed by honesty/dishonesty of the other.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the *Iron Curtain* and upon the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the bipolarity of the world security balance – marked by the two military-political blocks, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, represented by their respective most relevant military powers (USA and USSR) – created the conditions conducive to a new security paradigm. Despite the prevalence of expectations that NATO would become the only global military power pole, the social and economic development of countries such as China, India, Brazil, as well as the effective use by Russian Federation of its ascendancy in the area of natural resources, specifically in terms of hydrocarbon reserves, fuelled by the global financial crisis and certain evolving aspects of globalisation, have made the *multipolar nature of security* increasingly clear.

## War and National Security Irregularities in Western Culture

Recently, Vladimir Putin, as head of state, has presented his annual message to Parliament. *"The coming years will be decisive; even a turning point. Increased competition for resources, for not only metals, oil and gas, but for human and intellectual resources. Who will be the winner or the loser depends not only on the economic potential, but also on the will of each nation and their respective ability to make progress. Russia must make a new technological leap. Russian economy needs to develop high-tech industries and create innovative businesses. In this way, it can withstand the fierce competition in world markets and maintain its sovereignty and national identity"*, President Putin said.

Western democracies have encountered difficulties in managing violent terrorist actions performed worldwide. The history of *irregular warfare* – a category that includes, inter alia, *terrorism* and *insurgency* – is crossed by two fundamental themes. The first one refers to the fact that all forms of violent conflict subsumed under the category of *"irregular warfare"* resonate with the sensibilities of those who wish to change the *status quo*, whether viewed in its social and economic dimensions or rejected/undermined under its political, religious or ethnic dimensions. Yet, what role – the Western societies wonder – can policy play for those willing to kill others or even to end their own lives for or expected rewards promised in the afterlife?

The second theme refers to the fact that the successful conduct of the actions specific to irregular warfare, aiming to achieve the social change, is an initiative challenging particularly in terms of *individual* and *group showing determination* to reach their political purpose. The historical balance of such kind of confrontation permanently tilted in favour of the party that fights against terrorists and insurgent groups. Even under these circumstances, for the individuals and groups affected by certain frustration or dissatisfaction, forms of irregular warfare are the most attractive option, as they offer the promise of changing for the better the errors they feel affected by. Often, these forms of violent confrontation are the only practical methods they can use, in terms of potential operational effectiveness and efficiency.

During the historical period marked by the most intense irregular wars (1962-1965), also known as *"national liberation wars"*, Robert Taber, an American journalist, spent a lot of time in Cuba, within the context of revolutionary actions there. This experience led him to assert that *"The guerrilla fighters' war is political and social, his means are at least as political as they are military, his purpose almost entirely so. Thus, we may paraphrase Clausewitz: guerrilla war is the extension of politics by means of armed conflict"*[3]. Recent critics suggest that issues of identity and cultural crisis explain the sub-state violence, which US General Rupert Smith calls *"war against the people"*[4]. In addition, technologies related to globalisation, including the Internet, reshape the politics and violence. In summary, the religious, social, cultural and economic factors determine the context defining the fundamental features of the violent conduct of irregular warfare, but ultimately, non-state combatant actors – *insurgents* or *terrorists* – aim at obtaining, by force, political results. At the same time, these results serve the goals set by states against those who wish to change, by armed conflict, the *status quo*.

As for the origin of Islamic terrorism, the understanding of the nature of violence by the Westerners is prevented by the extremist interpretation of Islam itself. In Western culture, there is a clear separation between religion (religious leaders) and politics (political leaders). In the interpretation of *Salafist militants*[5] of Islam, there is no practical difference between the two: religious leaders, simultaneously and by the same means, promote the word of Qur'an and the political objectives. Thus, adherence to religious principles means, at the same time,

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[3] Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice,* New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1965, pp. 27-28.

[4] Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World,* London: Allen Lane, 2005, p. 26.

[5] *Salafi movement* – a militant group of extremist Sunnis who believe themselves the only correct interpreters of the Koran and consider moderate Muslims to be infidels; they seek to convert all Muslims and to insure that its own fundamentalist version of Islam will dominate the world.

adhering to and promoting certain forms of government. While the religious aspect justifies human sacrifices, rewards suggested by spiritual leaders like al-Zawahiri emphasise power and political control: *"victory of Islam will not be known until there will be a Muslim state, according to the word of the Prophet, in the heart of the Islamic world, namely the Levant, Egypt, neighbouring states of the Peninsula and Iraq"*.

Confusion about terrorism is determined by the *"lens"* through which the goals and actions of the forces involved are viewed. You cannot simply compare the figures representing the victims of fatal accidents – such as *traffic-related death rate* – with the figures representing *violent-orchestrated actions* directed towards spreading insecurity and terror among non-militant population. The biggest confusion is generated by either ill-intentioned use of numerical scale or exaggerated use of emotive language. The phrase *"freedom fighter"*, for instance, has got a positive connotation – suggesting heroism – while the term *"terrorist"* suggests cowardice. By the same logic, the term *"guerrilla warfare"* still evokes the spirit of chivalry and adventure, specific to the rebellion of the legendary Ernesto *"Che"* Guevara.

To some extent, there is also disagreement regarding the designation and classification of this sort of violent action: political violence, terrorism, irregular warfare, military operations other than war, low intensity conflict, popular war, revolution, guerrilla warfare, hybrid war etc. In the best case, terrorism and insurgency are perceived as *"adverse action"* and, in the worst case, as forms of *"dirty war"*. The imaginary line of demarcation between combatants and non-combatants is diffuse, their objectives are unclear and the way forward and the time needed to obtain victory are unknown. Moreover, in such an environment, military forces are put in the position to carry out specific functions of the security and law enforcement forces assuming any danger and even one of the lowest levels of *"operational glory"*.

Defining the *"insurgency"* is just as problematic, as it is a form of neither conventional warfare nor terrorism, even if it shares the use of forces with both, to achieve political purpose. The crucial difference from terrorism lies in its scope and level of violence: terrorism rarely leads by itself to the actual political change, while the insurgency has the political change as its fundamental purpose. On the other hand, while in the conventional war two *"symmetric"* opponents fight against each other, when it comes to insurgency, symmetry is the fundamental characteristic, both in terms of training and the equipment used and in terms of the doctrinal aspects. Insurgents, usually sub-state groups, are *"weaker"* than institutional forces. They seek a change in politics, using guerrilla-specific tactics such as *"hit and run"* raids, ambushes organised against local security

forces and, sometimes, terrorist tactics – which further increases the confusion. Unlike terrorists, insurgents enjoy widespread support of the population, which they succeed to mobilise to a significant extent.

## Potential Impact on National Security

The momentum registered by irregular/hybrid warfare does not replace the old/traditional military confrontation. It should be noted, instead, that it is a factor that could seriously complicate the defence planning of this century. Operational impact could also be significant. So, its potential impact must be considered in depth.

Much of the historical basis of our knowledge about war needs a refreshing breeze that can be generated only by some creative approaches, other than the traditional patterns. According to many military thinkers *"While history provides some useful examples to stimulate strategic thought about such problems, coping with networks that can fight in so many different ways – sparking myriad, hybrid forms of conflict – is going to require some innovative thinking to go along with more traditional introspection about the relevant lessons of history"*[6].

Knowledge of the history is useful but it should not blind the security community representatives concerning the upward evolution of risks and threats of a hybrid nature. Future operations to be conducted against this kind of threats will require the engagement of nation's vital interests and will not fall into the category of conflicts that nations can categorise as *optional wars*. The armed forces will not enjoy the luxury of focusing only on the conflicts that they prefer. They will be required to defend the security interests of their states and, it becomes increasingly clear, they will have to do it in a broader approach of waging war, a concept that exceeds the *Westphalian model* and the *conventional operations*.

## Force Planning

Nowadays, military confrontations – on the one hand – and peacekeeping operations – on the other hand – are two *"ingredients"* that harmoniously combine to ensure unique features to the international security environment, melting into each other. The pursuit of one will cause the success of the other. Combat operations and peacekeeping add to the reconstruction operations, international aid, information operations, as well as all types of military actions related to stability operations. As combat operations and peacekeeping operations do not unfold

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[6] John Arquilla, *The End of War as We Knew It*, US Naval Postgraduate School, p. 369.

as successive, but simultaneous stages, the armed forces will be prepared to carry them out in this manner and, at this level of complexity, with or without the support/ co-participation of civilian agencies bearing the required specific responsibilities and skills.

The force planning process must be able to respond to this kind of requirements. Besides, it involves a force structure not necessarily of general *purpose*, but *multi-purpose* units, flexible and with a credible combat capability.

## Information

Implications on intelligence community could be very profound. Particular attention should be paid to ensure commanders ability to acquire knowledge and understanding of an enemy whose key feature is adaptability, and their skills in running an information management process, which has to result in optimal merging data from a wide variety of non-traditional sources. *"Commanders at various echelons create fusion centres to manage the flow of information and intelligence, focus on information collection to satisfy information requirements, and to process, exploit, analyse, and disseminate the resulting collection. Fusion centres are most effective if they have participation from all the key elements in an area of operations and representatives from all the warfighting functions"*[7].

## Interagency Approach

It is axiomatic to most security experts that, as a result of several missions' convergence in a single battle space, future security challenges require a more obvious ability to integrate power tools. In the military literature, this idea is found as *"joint up approach"* or as *"cross-government approach"*. Special attention should be paid to the harmonious integration of all available non-military instruments of national arsenal within the overall operational effort.

There is a broad consensus on the need for raising the capacity of non-military instruments of government to support actions to improve (in failed states) such areas as good governance, infrastructure, judiciary, commerce, finance, law enforcement etc. Most likely, such functions will need to be provided by military forces, for a certain period of time (till the deployment of civilian specialised agencies). Hence the need to prepare a strictly limited number of troops to be able to temporarily manage such areas.

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[7] FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, Washington, DC, 2 June 2014, p. 8-4.

## Organisational Culture

Despite their valuable institutional legacy of professional excellence, continuous development and ability to improvise at tactical level, military forces will need to expand their efforts to raise their organisational culture and operating procedures to a higher level. They must always be able to shape themselves to successfully operate within joint civil-military tactical groups and perform simultaneous multiple missions.

The force structure appropriate to irregular warfare will have to possess a complete set of expeditionary capabilities. Its preparation to conduct warfare in densely populated environments, as well as its willingness to protect and control large groups of non-combatants will be essential factors in the economy of irregular/hybrid war. Soldiers will have to be able to deal with a versatile enemy, which applies unpredictable tactics and uses asymmetric technologies. Of particular importance for the success of the operation will be:

- long-term forward-looking skills/capability;
- research based for future risks and threats;
- ability to accurately determine the opponent's reasoning.

## Doctrine

The development of joint and/or service doctrines regarding irregular warfare meet the requirements of unitary activities, neither in Romania nor in other EU and NATO member states. This is probably one of the causes of the fact that they often fail to keep pace with the constant change, to adapt to the characteristics of the opponent. Besides, this is why they fail to permanently absorb and integrate the most important changes in security environment.

## Education and Training

To be able to fight hybrid threats, forces will need a certain sort of education and training. Most probably, education is the element having the highest potential to delay the overall process of force structure transformation, including the process of reaching the required operational capability. Cognitive requirements, associated with the current environment – whose main feature is *ambiguity* – are very high, requiring greater mental agility and an even higher-level capacity to tolerate uncertainty.

Obtaining success in irregular warfare also requires that leaders at the lowest levels of military hierarchy are able to make sound decisions and show prominent tactical sense, to face the unknown. In addition, they must have the military

equipment required to initiate the appropriate reaction in order to adapt more quickly and more easily than their enemies do. In the first place will therefore be features such as adaptability and organisational learning.

## Strategic/Operational Planning

Achieving success will require, at the same time, new interagency doctrines capable to catalyse the development of homogeneous and unitary programmes involving military and non-military forces, as well as new procedures developed to integrate initiatives intended to support the implementation of those plans. The current model of operational planning has not intellectually included the multidimensional forms of influence – essential to successfully conduct irregular warfare. Thus, the kinetic and non-kinetic effects will be harmonised with each other and, on the other hand, the combined effect will be reported to the criteria regarding discriminatory application of force. *"Operational design employs various elements to develop and refine the commander's operational approach. Operational design involves conceptual planning. Conceptual planning establishes aims, objectives, and intentions, and it also involves developing broad concepts for action. It generally corresponds to the art of war. The commander's activities of understanding and visualisation are key aspects of conceptual planning"*[8].

Building capacity to defeat a hybrid enemy requires changing the strategy applied by the mixed – *military* and *state security* – structures. In addition, it requires changing the way military and civilian leaders are educated. Commanders will need skills related to cross-organisational, allied and/or coalition work, as well as to working together with international organisations and/or non-military government agencies. *"Failure to halt an enemy invasion rapidly would make the subsequent campaign to evict enemy forces from captured territory much more difficult, lengthy, and costly. Such failure would also weaken coalition support, undermine US credibility, and increase the risk of conflict elsewhere"*[9].

On the other hand, irregular war, with all its hybrid forms of confrontation, will require representatives of all structures comprising the intelligence community to adhere to a professional philosophy based on integrating data provided by multiple agencies and to the principle of sharing information with all organisations with responsibilities in security and defence area.

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[8] FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, Washington, DC, 2 June 2014, p. 7-4.

[9] Stephen Blank, *The War That Dare Not Speak Its Name*, http://sandipksingh88.blogspot.ro/2011/02/war-that-dare-not-speak-its-name-by.html retrieved on 18.06.2014.

*"The requirements of the culture-centric warfare will have a particular resonance"*[10]. Co-operation of experts in different areas implies a considerable level of expertise in other areas than their own – to ensure the premises of effective, facile and innovative fusion of all and every dimension of the operation/campaign.

## Communicational Duel

The need to incorporate what could be seen as the most significant change in the character of the modern war – *the exploitation of modern media* and their mobilising in support of one's purpose, is commonly understood as relevant impact of irregular warfare on national security. We need to learn how to engage in the evolving portion of the battlespace – *mind handling* – concerning both our enemy and the populace as a whole. Today, many small groups have reached a high level of mastery in managing *"armed theatre"* and the use of propaganda. Many of them are able to gain the support of large populations and even trigger/sustain global discord.

Today, the evolving communications alter the patterns of mobilisation of population, in terms of both participation and the purpose they wage war for. They determine steps such as recruitment, training and motivation.

## Conclusions

By combining the fundamental elements of security (population, territory, institutions) one can get the *national security equation*. Due to the diversity of elements entering this combination, the particular nature of security differs from one state to another. All the countries are vulnerable to military threats and environmental hazards. Environmental degradation can equally affect strong and weak states. Also, the process of globalisation poses economic risks to all the states, while the societal and political insecurity are more and more obvious.

In the new political configuration, based on the momentum of democratic movements and the universal principle of *"the right to self-determination"*, the secessionist initiatives have grown in number and extent. Connected with the erosion of the authority and credibility of many of the regional security organisations, including the UN, and with the emergence of non-state actors and terrorist – promoters of terrorist doctrines, transnational organised crime – *nation states* re-enter the international security arena. One cannot deny that perception matters. Moreover, it matters to the extent that it can determine the outcome of war. It is compulsory for the military

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[10] Robert H. Scales, *Culture-Centric Warfare*, Naval Institute Proceedings, 2004, p. 33.

to be able to fight as effectively using *"mind ammunition"* as using *artillery ammunition* or *close air support*.

The lack of historical culture can often play tricks, making us victims of absurd but tenacious propaganda, designed (as it has been proved by major conflicts of the last two decades) to turn white into black and black into white; perpetrators into victims; traitors and murderers into heroes; truth into untruth; the thief into the honest merchant; genocide into crusade for peace in the name of some imaginary *"collective rights"* and at the expense of the inalienable rights of citizens, peoples and nations.

The greatest impediment – proved and confirmed – in achieving successful adaptation of national security architecture and increasing its operational capability in accordance with a potential more cross-dimensional and multi-modal adversary is of a purely cultural nature. The inability of some political and military leaders to enable refreshing military thinking, as a result of their traditional security paradigm, should be viewed as *serious risk* and must immediately be treated, as it may substantially degrade national security. We cannot expect to conduct successful transformation initiatives aiming to meet future threats if we do not give up conservative horse *"blinders"* (or, at least, do not properly weaken their straps) and do not remove certain leaders' cultural barriers that *"innovative thinking"* bumps up against.

# ROLE OF FACT-FINDING MISSIONS IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

*Lieutenant Colonel Dr Iuliana-Simona ŢUŢUIANU*

*Fact finding is increasingly important both in and to crisis management. It can alert to potentially explosive situations; it can allocate responsibility, assist accountability and inform deterrent actions that may range from the imposition of sanctions to the referral to an international court prosecutor; it can even be the basis for humanitarian intervention. It can identify ways forward for peace-building and lessons that must be learned to prevent the recrudescence of conflicts in the future. But fact finding has been little studied and never theorised. This article argues that for fact-finding exercises to be worthy and credible they must comply with a number of protocols which draw upon ethics, law, and pragmatic best practice, so as to ensure that they come as close as possible to establishing the truth and thus providing a sure basis for the delivery of justice.*

*Keywords: fact-finding mission; crisis management; human rights; ethics*

## Introduction

History, as Richard Nixon said, depends on who is writing it. The challenge for human rights fact finders is firstly to ensure their independence. This is not just independence from strings attached by funding bodies, and freedom from their own nation's allegiances or sympathies, but as Professor Bassiouni points out, from the politically expedient findings desired by the UN bureaucracy or other sponsoring bodies[1]. Allied to this overriding concern, fact finders must have sufficient expertise to know when witnesses have been coached by political groups to tell a particular story or whether they are motivated by a desire to achieve asylum or special treatment by exaggerating the horrors of their oppressor. Then, there are ethical constraints on interviews *in situ*, which might expose the witness to lethal reprisals. These and other problems of human rights fact finding are exacerbated in conflict situations where the consequences can be deadly and the stakes for the local government can be much higher. However crisis management

must have available an accurate account of the origins of the crises and a truthful record of crimes against humanity or war crimes and their perpetrators in order to consider options that may range from humanitarian intervention to establishing an international criminal court or some lesser measures such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Accepting the slogan that there can be no peace without justice, the issue of whether to use justice mechanisms in crisis management depends on effective and professional ascertainment of the facts.

The history of international crisis management demonstrates the need for effective and speedy fact finding. The first use of this process by the League of Nations was a mission to Manchuria after Japan had invaded it on the pretext of sabotage by the Chinese Army. China complained to the League, which dispatched the Lytton fact-finding mission[2] that travelled by sea and took a year to report, by which time Japan had appointed a puppet governor for the territory it had conquered – unlawfully, as the report eventually concluded. Its publication was too late to have any effect. By this time Japan's aggression was a *fait accompli*. A similar failure occurred with the next mission to investigate the justification for Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia, which took nine months to report that there was no justification at all. By this time, Mussolini was in control of the territory and the League of Nation's members could do nothing. As Geoffrey Robertson QC concludes *"this early history emphasises that fact finding investigations of recent human rights disasters must report as soon as possible after they have set up; the more they delay, the less their impact"*[3].

The world is currently facing a number of crises that appear unmanageable. In Syria, the supporters of President Assad at the Security Council have blocked any fact-finding missions that could lead to a reference to the International Criminal Court. In Gaza, in 2014, a conflict lasting three weeks at the time of writing – with likely commission of war crimes by both sides, e.g. Hamas firing rockets aimed at civilians and Israeli commanders ordering the bombing of schools and hospitals – has just been made the subject of a fact-finding mission. The Human Rights Council decided to establish a commission of inquiry at its twenty-first special session on 23 July 2014 *"to investigate all violations of international humanitarian law*

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[2] Lytton Report was published in October 1932, based on the findings of the Lytton Commission. Its main goal was to identify the causes of the Manchurian Incident, which led to the Empire of Japan's seizure of Manchuria.

[3] International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute, *Human Rights Fact Finding: Some legal and ethical dilemmas,* Thematic papers no. 1, May 2010, p. 6, see http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=c873cc48-b0f4-4ea1-80b3-fc11c85b2df4, retrieved on 15 August 2014.

*and international human rights law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, in the context of the military operations conducted since 13 June 2014, whether before, during or after, to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and to identify those responsible, to make recommendations, in particular on accountability measures, all with a view to avoiding and ending impunity and ensuring that those responsible are held accountable, and on ways and means to protect civilians against any further assaults"*[4].

In order to evaluate the claims of each side, it will be essential for investigators to study the evidence while it is fresh; however, this is unlikely to be possible because of Israel's hostility to independent fact-finding missions. When such a mission was set up by the Human Rights Council in 2009, after *Operation Cast Lead*, Israel refused to allow its members to enter the country, despite the fact that it was led by a distinguished South African Jewish jurist Richard Goldstone. This is a familiar tactic of governments that do not want to be investigated, and it means that fact-finding missions working abroad must adopt different techniques for obtaining information. The Arab-Israeli conflict truly requires for the establishment of facts. For example, when Israel bombs a school, it always claims that the school has been used for the storage of Hamas rockets. Frequently, the school denies it and only an objective fact-finding mission can decide whether there is a basis for prosecuting the commander for a war crime.

It may seem ironic that we need fact finding at a time when *"facts"* jump out at us from television screens, social networking services, photos and other social media. But such scenes may be contrived for propaganda purposes and they do not in any event depict the intentions and motives that are so important in judging war crimes. The likely cause of monstrous crimes such as the downing of MH17 in Ukraine still requires an independent investigation to prove beyond reasonable doubt. The conflict in Eastern Ukraine, however, has prevented access by forensic investigators for several weeks and then only to examine the wreck of the plane – not those persons likely to have shot it down. States which have something to hide will invariably try to cover up by not allowing fact finders to enter and investigate. Thus, the government of Sri Lanka refused in 2010 to permit the members of a high-powered UN investigation team to come to Sri Lanka and see

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[4] Council President appoints Members of Commission of Inquiry under HRC resolution S-21/1, see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14934&LangID=E, retrieved on 15 August 2014.

for themselves. They did however allow the Red Cross because of its commitment to confidentiality and they were satisfied that it would not allow reports of their brutality to reach the international public. Nonetheless, an UNHRC report was published based on interviews with Tamil refugees, despite the attendant difficulties in this process. These cases demonstrate just how important a fact-finding mission is to clarify options for dealing with an ongoing crisis and how governments which want to escape responsibility will refuse entry to members of the delegation and adopt various blocking techniques.

## 1. The problems of independence and expertise in conflict situations

The object of fact finding in conflict situations is usually to clarify issues of responsibility and accountability and so to pave the way for peaceful settlement according to some form of justice. Its purpose may be to activate the international community, as in a Human Rights Council mission to assess a crisis and to lay its report before the Security Council in the hope – often a forlorn hope – that action will be taken. Such action, at least in the case of Darfur, was based on a UN fact-finding mission and resulted in an indictment of President Bashir. In other cases the fact finders may well be officers of the International Criminal Court whose objective will be to gather evidence for the prosecution and their efforts will be made public in the form of an indictment. But whatever mode is used to present to the public the facts as they are found, it is essential that the mechanism should not be open to challenge on the grounds of lack of impartiality. Most conflicts engage strong feelings and many experienced fact finders have difficulty in remaining objective when faced with atrocities such as the killing of children. Unless they manage to adopt a neutral position, their report will be open to criticism from governments on the grounds that they are biased, all the more so if the fact finder has previously expressed a view on the subject under investigation.

This is a particular problem in crisis management, where fact finders with the relevant knowledge and expertise may be few and for that reason may well have already passed judgments on the subject. The issue is dealt with in the Lund-London Guidelines on international human rights fact finding, which provide: *"The mission's delegation must comprise individuals who are and are seen to be unbiased. The NGOs should be confident that the delegation members*

*have the competence, experience and expertise relevant to the matters pertaining to the terms of reference"*[5].

This is all very well, but in some crisis situations the only knowledgeable fact finders will be those who have already been involved in the situation. However, there is no doubt that the rule must be absolute and the members of the fact-finding mission should be subject to the same tests for impartiality as a judge. Fact-finding reports are open to challenge by those adversely affected and particularly by governments which now pay large sums of money to public relations firms to discredit adverse reports. Richard Goldstone changed his mind about a key finding, namely that Israel had deliberately targeted citizens in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead in 2009, and thus drastically reduced the impact of his report. Amnesty International refuses to have nationals of the countries in conflict appointed to its missions, which excludes a number of well qualified people but nonetheless protects missions from criticism on grounds of possible bias.

Another important issue for missions that wish to be taken seriously is whether they should examine only the case against the government or whether in reviewing a conflict they should if appropriate criticise the both sides. It is important for them to be seen to be even-handed and so they should criticise insurgent groups if appropriate as severely as they criticise the conduct of government forces. The Human Rights Council Report on the Sri Lankan conflict of 2009 made a point of condemning the terrorist tactics of the Tamil Tigers as well as the Sri Lankan army's crimes against the local people. Amnesty International however takes the position that it should investigate the conduct of governments and not of their opponents. This is a mistake, if only because the reasonableness of emergency measures can best be judged by the conduct that has provoked them. In 2009, the Human Rights Council set out a fact-finding mission, which was initially limited to looking at Israel. Goldstone and his fellow fact finders refused to accept the task, unless the terms of reference were changed so they could assess the conduct of Hamas as well.

An important aspect of independence will be the origin of the funding for the mission. It is generally recognised that *"He who pays the piper calls the tune"*. No matter how benign, inferences would be drawn by critics if the funding is not fully disclosed and is not seen to come from impartial sources. There have been

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[5] *Lund-London Guidelines on International Human Rights Fact-Finding Visits and Reports*, paragraph 8, see http://www.factfindingguidelines.org/guidelines.html, retrieved on 5 August 2014.

a number of examples of fact-finding missions being discredited when it has turned out that they have been funded by governments with an ideological axe to grind. The secret funding of *Encounter* magazine by the CIA in the 1960s show the extent to which government agencies will go to promote their principles and the best advice for NGOs and others setting up fact-finding missions is to ensure that all funding is transparent. It is much better to be open about the identity of mission funders than to bring suspicion by keeping their donors' names secret.

A particular problem with crisis management reports comes from appointing fact finders with sufficient expertise to understand the specialised issues involved, for example in the analysis of military issues or in tracing the roots of ethnic or religious conflicts. Here again the standard must be to avoid those experts who have previously committed to an opinion on the subject of the mission. In many cases, fact finders are lawyers whose expertise is in making judgments on facts that are already found for them. In these situations there can be no objections to experts giving evidence to the fact finders and so long as they declare any previous involvement in the issue and can be cross-examined, the independence of the mission will not be open to challenge. It goes without saying, and the Lund-London Guidelines say it, *"that all persons associated with a mission and/or a report are aware that they must, at all times, act in an independent, unbiased, objective, lawful and ethical manner"*. This is particularly important in the case of interpreters. It frequently happens that fact finders are lacking in any knowledge of the language and culture of the crisis area and will therefore be reliant upon interpreters telling them what witnesses are actually saying. In such circumstances, they must be sure that the interpreters are not partisan and do not prompt the witnesses.

M. Cherif Bassiouni has pointed to a more subtle bias in UN fact-finding missions that relate to justice, which reflect *"the conflict between realpolitik and the value of justice"*. The UN system functions as a political process and *"justice becomes another card for the realpolitician to play and eventually barter away, in a mostly hidden manner, when in pursuit of achieving a political goal"*[6]. He argues that UN staff missions are conditioned to avoid conclusions that are politically inconvenient or produce unwanted results. He also criticises *"an almost incestuous tendency to reappoint the same experts to the missions and the same UN staffers to support them. More frequently than not, the reports produced are designed to please*

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[6] M. Cherif Bassiouni, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

*the influential Geneva-based NGO community and certain governments, particularly the three Western permanent members and a number of Western European countries that champion human rights"*[7].

## 2. The use of fact-finding reports

As Robert Gates remarks in his recent memoirs, "*the challenge of the early 21st century is that crises do not come and go – they all seem to come and stay*"[8]. This phenomenon poses a particular challenge to fact-finding commissions, not merely to sort out truth from propaganda about a current conflict, but to delve into the cultural and historical background and to discern roots of ethnic and religious hatreds that may go back decades, even centuries. Most commissions are headed and staffed by lawyers and employ former law enforcement officials – their training and background will not qualify them to make such judgments. Thus, every fact-finding commission must be prepared to receive evidence from historians, ethnologists, anthropologists and the like, in order to unravel the roots of the conflict and to make recommendations for social and community action that will tackle the underlying causes.

It is at this point that we must consider the uses that are made of fact-finding reports in the course of managing a crisis. They tend to be more helpful in the case of long-running conflicts, rather than short-term flare-ups. However, even in the latter case, it can be important to attribute blame at an early stage and the work of authoritative, impartial and immediate fact-finding mission will assist states and international agencies to attribute responsibility and to take action to ensure that the crisis is dampened down or is less likely to explode. This is an optimistic scenario because in the case of most short-term crises, there will be attempts by perpetrator states or their supporters to delay any fact-finding exercise or to engage in cover-ups. For example, the recent crisis caused by the shooting down of MH17 plane allegedly by Ukrainian terrorists could not be investigated even by air safety inspectors for two weeks, while the perpetrators presumably removed the evidence and blocked access to the site of the crash. An authoritative report, e.g. by a UN investigation team, which had attributed responsibility to the Ukrainian separatists and gathered evidence of Russian

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[7] *Ibidem*, p. 40.

[8] Mark Danner, *How Robert Gates Got away with It*, in *The New York Review of Books*, Summer Issue, August 14-September 24, 2014, Volume LXI, Number 13, p. 78. See also Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War,* Knopf, 2014.

complicity in the crime, would have provided justification for the use of sanctions and other punishments, possibly including legal actions against Russian Federation, and would, in effect, manage the crisis by deterring further Russian armed assistance to the irresponsible separatist groups. It is interesting to speculate what would have happened if an authoritative fact-finding mission had reported in the wake of the crisis in Europe engendered by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914 – by allocating responsibility it may well have avoided the diplomatic chain reaction which ignited the First World War. But at that time, of course, the mechanism of the independent fact-finding mission was not available as a rational means of diffusing the impact of such *"historical accidents"*.

However, it must be pointed out that such missions may not in the end solve the crisis however useful they may be in the short term. An example in this regard is the Bassiouni investigation which was commissioned by the King of Bahrain to report on the crisis that arose after 32 peaceful protesters were killed by his army and his police force[9]. The inquiry was given wide ranging powers to investigate and produce a report and made a host of recommendations to ensure that the security forces could not behave in this way again. Some but not all of these recommendations were implemented and, although the report's publication assisted the return to normality in Bahrain, it did not alter the basic cause of the protests, namely the lack of democracy. So, the crisis continues, although at a much reduced level, and has not again been exacerbated by security force brutality. This provides a good example of the short-term benefits to crisis management of a fact-finding exercise, even one that because it is dominated by lawyers and concentrates on human rights violations does not examine ways of removing the basic grievance about the political system.

Another example of the beneficial role of a fact-finding report came as a result of the Security Council Resolution no. 780 in 1992, which established a commission headed by Bassiouni to investigate war crimes in former Yugoslavia. That crisis had already caused some 200 000 deaths in the Balkans and had displaced two million people. The report led to the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – ICTY that, after a slow start, has worked to assist in the management of the post-conflict situation through offering a form of justice to victims and deterrence to potential perpetrators. It may be said

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[9] The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (Bassiouni Commission) was established on 29 June 2011 to investigate the incidents that occurred during the period of unrest in Bahrain in February and March 2011 and the consequences of those events.

that the essence of fact finding, or at least its prime objective, is to support justice, either by allocating blame or by providing evidence for prosecution in a court that can allocate guilt for instigation of a crisis in which multitudes are killed or tortured by human agency. Where the crisis has come about through a non-human agency, such as disease or cyclone, such fact finding is not necessary although it may still have an important role to play in identifying the cause of the spread of the disease or assessing governmental negligence in failure to tackle the effects of the natural disaster.

It is difficult to generalise about fact-finding missions because the circumstances in which they are called into existence vary greatly, as do the reputation and managing ability of the bodies which sponsor them, and the ease or difficulty of their task. A recent example of professional excellence in the field was the Human Rights Council sponsored inquiry into human rights violations by North Korea conducted by a three-person panel chaired by Michael Kirby, formerly a judge of Australia's highest court[10]. His mission of course received no assistance from North Korea and was not allowed to enter the country but it conducted rigorous interviews with hundreds of refugees and took evidence from most of the recognised experts living outside the country. It completed its work within a year and its report was widely publicised, putting pressure on North Korea to open up just a little. This was not exactly a *"crisis management"* report, although in a wider sense it did help the UN to manage its most unruly and unpredictable member.

Fact-finding exercises are increasingly vulnerable to attack by states and state agents when they report critically about particular countries. North Korea is an obvious example but other countries like Kuwait and Turkey and Sri Lanka spend many millions on hiring lawyers and public relations firms to repair their image after an adverse report and to challenge disquieting facts. This has had the effect of forcing human rights monitors to adopt protocols for their work, the best known of which is the Lund-London Guidelines promulgated by the Raoul Wallenberg Institute. This is no bad thing because the work of human rights NGOs can often be distorted by sources that, for their own political reasons, tell exaggerated tales about regimes

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[10] On 21 March 2013, at its 22nd session, the United Nations Human Rights Council established the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Resolution A/HRC/RES/22/13 mandates the body to investigate the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular for violations which may amount to crimes against humanity. See more about the Commission at http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/coidprk/pages/commissioninquiry onhrindprk.aspx, retrieved on 29 August 2014.

they wish to denigrate. One of the worst examples came during the Gulf War in 1990 when a Washington public relations firm acting for the Kuwaiti government disseminated a story from an Amnesty International researcher that Iraqi revolutionary guards were entering hospital and bayoneting babies. This turned out to be a complete fabrication, unwittingly believed by the researcher. The extravagant publicity for this story helped to win support for US intervention in Iraq in 1990 and it shows how even the best human rights organisations can be manipulated or led into error. For this reason, it is a useful discipline for fact finders to be subject to ethical standards.

There is a particular problem in some cases as to whether the report should be published. The Red Cross, for example, refuses point blank to publish any of its reports. It claims that this is a necessary precaution otherwise its sources may be identified and those governments criticised in its reports will not allow its access to their prisons in the future. Thus, the Red Cross secretly reported to American and British commanders that torture was being used in Abu Ghraib prison after the invasion in 2003, but those commanders did nothing with the report. It was only when the report was leaked and published in the Wall Street Journal that the public became aware of the torture and it was stopped. This is an interesting example of a fact-finding exercise having an enormous impact, which it would not have had if it had remained secret. Many fact-finding reports are not published in full; names of perpetrators may be withheld if there is concern about them obtaining a fair trial. In most cases however, the report will have more impact.

Fact finders are vulnerable to attack through libel litigation in the courts of some countries, although not in the US where the first amendment protects any publication which is not malicious. NGOs must therefore be careful about what they publish although UN agencies and rapporteurs have international law immunity from suits for defamation. This was established by the International Court of Justice – ICJ in 1999 in the *Cumaraswamy* case where it ruled that a UN rapporteur on the judiciary could not be sued for libel in Malaysia over critical remarks he had made in his report about corruption among Malaysian judges[11]. This ruling protects UN fact finders but would not extend to those working

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[11] ICJ Press Release 1999/16 (29 April 1999), *Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights – Court says that Mr. Cumaraswamy is entitled to immunity from legal process for the words spoken by him during an interview,* see the Court's website: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=154&code=numa&p1=3&p2=1&p3=6&case=100&k=9, retrieved on 29 August 2014.

for the International Bar Association – IBA or for NGOs who would have to rely on any public interest defence that happen to be available in the law of the country where they are sued.

## 3. Ethical and legal dimensions

The legal and ethical dilemmas in fact-finding tend to overlap and mainly concern witness protection. Obviously, in conflict situations governments or powerful militias will regard as treason the giving of information to human rights monitors or to fact finders whose report is likely to be critical. For that reason, it is essential for fact finders to protect their sources even if this may mean reducing the credibility of their report. It is a difficult dilemma but ethical guidelines insist that protection of the witness should come first. When UN rapporteur Philip Alston held hearings about post-election violence in Kenya, two witnesses who had given evidence in secret were named and, in consequence, assassinated[12]. This aspect demonstrates the importance of keeping secret the identity of informers at all costs. It includes situations when the fact finder is called to give evidence at a war crimes court – she or he must not answer questions which will reveal the name of a witness who could suffer reprisals. Investigators for the Red Cross have what is termed absolute privilege and the courts will generally uphold claims of confidentiality by human rights monitors and the like who wish to withhold the names of their sources of information. This will inevitably mean that their testimony is less credible but it is the only compromise that can secure the protection of sources.

The essential objective of the fact finder is to discover the truth. This requires adherence to protocols that require the avoidance of leading questions, the employment of reliable and independent translators, and the search for corroborative evidence such as checking witness testimony with other evidence. It is too easy for witnesses, particularly children, to be brainwashed or forced by relatives to invent a story or for other older witnesses to be lured by money into giving forced evidence. The duty on a fact finder to get at the truth through use of forensic tactics and some degree of cynicism is described by Geoffrey Robertson QC:

*"The fact finder must be astute to detect any personal or political motivations for lying or exaggerating or for blind partisanship. Many witnesses will have an axe*

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[12] UN Human Rights Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: addendum: mission to Kenya*, 26 May 2009, A/HRC/11/2/Add.6, See http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a3f56432.html, retrieved on 27 August 2014.

*to grind: they have undoubtedly suffered and will be anxious to emphasise the guilt of those they believe (or have been made to believe) are to blame. Fact finders must also factor in the motive that many witnesses have to exaggerate or to emphasise their own innocence: when claiming refugee status, or hoping to claim such status, they will have a motive to exaggerate the extent of their persecution, especially if they think the fact finders' report may subsequently assist their asylum claim. Always ask: cui bono? (who benefits?)"*[13].

Just as the protection of witnesses is of vital importance, so is the protection of fact finders themselves and their investigators. They should not be sent to areas where their lives are endangered. This rule may make it more difficult for the truth to be extracted but it is nonetheless fundamental. It is also important that whilst investigating facts in foreign countries, there should be obedience to local laws, even when locals do not observe them. Fact finders in crisis areas will often be followed by government agents and spied upon, so they should not breach local law and thereby give any excuse to be removed from the country. In these circumstances, too, they are ethically bound not to meet witnesses when they are under surveillance. Lest those witnesses suffer reprisals, they should be particularly careful if allowed by the state to interview people in prison because it is so easy to place hidden microphones so that state agents can listen in and punish the prisoner later. These are basic rules of prudence that are now reflected in the ethics of fact finding developed for organisations like Human Rights Watch.

There are particular problems encountered in certain countries with interviewing victims of sexual crimes, who are inhibited by social taboos and are in any event reluctant to tell of their trauma to a stranger. It may be necessary for the victim to have a supporter who will encourage her to tell about the rape and that supporter will sometimes be from an organisation that is actively campaigning for something to be done about rape. However, it will be for the individual interviewer to make delicate and difficult judgments and to try to elicit a story without putting words in the interviewees' mouth. Fact-finding missions in respect of the Sri Lankan government's attack on its civilian population report particular difficulties in encouraging rape victims to come forward and in this situation it may be necessary to rely on hearsay evidence i.e. second hand evidence of what victims have reported in confidence to their own ethnic organisations.

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[13] International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute, *Human Rights Fact Finding: Some legal and ethical dilemmas,* Thematic paper, May 2010, p. 11, see http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=c873cc48-b0f4-4ea1-80b3-fc11c85b2df4, retrieved on 15 August 2014.

Special difficulties are encountered in obtaining truthful or at least unexaggerated accounts from refugee camps. Refugee crises call for special fact-finding skills, especially as most refugees will end up in camps which will be internally controlled by a political group which has become committed to a particular story about how the crisis arose and there will be pressure from within that all refugees should tell the same story. Additionally, refugees will want to tell a story that portrays them as fleeing from persecution rather than simply seeking a better economic life abroad. They may be tempted to invent or embroider stories about government oppression and it will be important for the fact finder to detect and discount such stories. Of course, fact-finding work in relation to refugees goes on all the time, whether it is at the border in order to take their testimony about what happened in the place to which the fact finder has been denied access or may take place in a third country of refuge where the victim has applied for refugee status and that application is being tested. It is important for proper application of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention that applications for refugee status are accepted or denied on the basis of good and professional investigation, so that here the emergence of guidelines for interviewing is particularly welcome.

It is an interesting practical as well as ethical question as to whether a fact-finding mission should notify the government in question of its intention to enter the country. In many sensitive situations, governments will simply refuse entry once a visitor admits to being on a fact-finding mission. NGOs have different policies in this respect – the IBA, for example, always tells the governments and often has the members of its missions refused entry. Other NGOs follow this policy, but the Lund-London Guidelines insist that *"the delegation is under no obligation to advise the government of the people it intends to meet"*. But if the government finds out they are in the country, then potential interviewees should obviously be told about it in the interest of their own safety and security. The Guidelines lay down: *"The delegation should take a careful note of whether an interviewee provides informed consent to be interviewed and identified or quoted and of future possible uses of their statements. If they do not consent, their wishes must be respected"*[14]. This is an example of the increasing professionalisation of fact finding. The Guidelines go on to ensure that at least two members of the delegation conduct the exercise and that victims should be interviewed together with a support person if they wish.

There has been surprisingly little analysis in the literature or indeed in reports themselves about the burden and standard of proof to be applied in conflict situation fact finding. When this is done by an international court, the prosecution bears

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[14] *Lund-London Guidelines on International Human Rights Fact-Finding Visits and Reports*, paragraph 42.

the burden of proof and the standard is that of beyond reasonable doubt. But in deciding what has happened in a crisis and who is to blame, there is no prosecutor and the standard of *"beyond reasonable doubt"* will be too exacting. For most cases, it will be appropriate to adopt the standard of proof on balance of probabilities (i.e. at least 51% likelihood that the finding is true). The more important a finding, in terms of individual or government complicity in serious crime or corruption, the higher the standard – the evidence should be *"compelling"* or the finding not susceptible to any reasonable alternative explanation. The fact finder should be careful to avoid acting as a prosecutor and must be open-minded and have no pre-judgment. Otherwise, where atrocities have occurred, the fact finders' only position must be to establish truth and to assist justice. Fact finding, outside the court process, does not necessarily mean guilt finding.

## Conclusions – Recommendations for best practices in crisis situations

There is growing recognition of the importance of fact-finding, both *in* crisis management and *to* crisis management. In the former situation, the establishment of a fact-finding process may clarify issues of causation of and responsibility for the particular crisis and, if the report is accepted as reliable, it may assist peace building organs such as the Security Council or the EU or NATO or the Commonwealth to decide how to act. Actions in pursuance of recommendations by an experienced fact finder may indeed resolve the crisis, at least in the short term and sometimes in the long term – see as an example the 1992 Bassouni report which recommends that the Security Council should establish the ICTY, which has been an important element in managing a long-running crisis situation in the Balkans. The importance of fact finding *to* crisis management and certainly to theories of crisis management is that it offers an objective account of the lessons that must be learned and acted upon in the management of continuing crisis and indeed in the management of crises yet to come. Crisis managers must learn from the mistakes of the past and fact-finding reports are amongst the best references for this task. The UN, for example, will never forget the lacerating Ingvar Carlsson report[15] on the incompetence of Kofi Annan and his peacekeeping section during the 1996 Rwandan crisis, where the UN inaction cost hundreds of thousands of lives.

So, the increasing visibility and earlier attempts to develop theories of fact finding and to consider the law and ethics relevant to them are very much to be welcome.

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[15] Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, see http://www.un.org/news/dh/latest/rwanda.htm, retrieved on 27 August 2014.

This development is still in its intellectual infancy: apart from articles by Diane Orentlicher, Cherif Bassiouni and Geoffrey Robertson QC, and the publication of the Lund-London Guidelines, the subject awaits a full theoretical treatment. However, a number of elements can be established at this stage, which have been briefly discussed in this paper. In order to pass the test of an authoritative crisis management mechanism, the fact-finding body or mission must:

- be perceived as independent of any body or power source with an interest in the subject matter of the inquiry. Such perception will only be achieved if there is full disclosure of funding sources. Staff members should be identified, as should sources, except for those who may suffer reprisals;
- be chaired by a person of high repute for his/her forensic expertise and moral judgment, and have sufficient funding to hire investigators and to conduct the exercise according to the Lund-London Guidelines;
- be time-efficient, capable of bringing in a report within such time as will enable it to have an impact. The Kirby report on North Korea, which took 11 months, is an exemplar in the case of a country report but fact finders in urgent situations must be able to report in a much shorter space of time to enable international bodies to adopt recommendations to ameliorate a crisis. The commission of inquiry established under HRC resolution S-21/1, which represents an important opportunity to break the cycle of persistent impunity for crimes under international law in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, has been given six months to elaborate the written report on its findings and issue recommendations for measures to be taken by the parties to the conflict, the Security Council and others, aimed at ending and preventing further violations of international law and ensuring justice, truth, full reparations for victims and guarantee of non-repetition;
- be put in place immediately in cases where forensic investigation is required and where evidence will disappear or become stale unless it is collected and analysed immediately – e.g. bombing in Gaza, MH17 crush etc.;
- follow best practice protocols for interviewing witnesses, protecting staff members in the field, taking statements from victims, particularly victims of sexual crimes, ensuring impartiality of translators, local guides etc.;
- be equipped, via experts or assessors, to unravel the historical, cultural or ethnic/religious roots and causes of the crisis in order to provide a report that does not merely describe current events but gives some sociological explanations for them, which can be drawn on by civil society in the future.

Nowadays, NGOs exert significant influence in shaping governmental and inter-governmental policy. They can contribute to output legitimacy, but in order to achieve this goal, the quality of their fact-finding methodologies is essential. As Steve Charnovitz has observed, a significant contribution NGOs can make to multilateral decision-making processes *"is to offer their specialised expertise to enable more informed decisions"*, for *"NGOs can often be sources of information that governments may not have"*[16]. Also, Diane Orentlicher argues that *"no asset is more important to a human rights NGO than the credibility of its fact finding and, in particular, its reputation for meticulous methodology"*[17]. In other words, the need for the development of standardised NGO fact-finding methodologies is vital. A common platform that can be used in multiple languages for accessing lessons learned from *"bad practices"* would enhance the work of NGOs everywhere, although considerable care must be taken to ensure a safe space for exploring these issues[18]. And what is needed is not just a platform for accessing information, but an accessible platform for debate and discussion. Otherwise, NGO fact finding missions might run the risk of *"remaining ad hoc affairs that tend to operate fast and loose as far as procedural standards are concerned"*[19].

Fact-finding exercises undertaken in or about a crisis are not merely tools to gather information, although that may in itself be valuable for crisis managers. They can have other purposes. For example, at the outset of what seems to be a manageable situation, they may identify elements that make it potentially explosive and need to be addressed urgently. In mid-crisis, they may allocate blame in a way that allows the international community to justly calibrate its responses, which may range from sanctions and aid-withdrawals to a reference to the International Criminal Court prosecutor. In the post-crisis situation, the report may be the basis for retribution which can itself assist in peace-building if delivered through the verdicts of international criminal courts. Finally, the importance to crisis management may come in the establishment of facts that are of importance to management theories and the learning of lessons. For all these reasons, it is time to develop a theory of *just fact finding*, where the conclusions and recommendations of a report may be relied on by the international community

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[16] Steve Charnovitz, *Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law*, in *American Journal of International Law* (2006) 348, p. 367. See also Robert O. Keohane, *Global Governance and Democratic Accountability* – Chapter prepared for a volume edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi from the Miliband Lectures, London School of Economics, Spring 2002.

[17] Diane Orentlicher, *Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact Finding*, in *Harvard Human Rights Journal,* V. 3 (1990), pp. 83-135.

[18] *Ibidem.*

[19] Robert Charles Blitt, *Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case for Regulation*, UMI Dissertation Services, 2004.

because it has followed the protocols identified and presented in this article, as necessary for the ascertainment of truth and the delivery of justice.

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# THE NEED TO ADAPT THE LAND FORCES LARGE TACTICAL UNITS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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*The geopolitical and geostrategic environment, the emerging technologies, as well as the financial constraints are factors that influence the evolution at the land forces level, in general, and at the tactical level, in particular. The current security environment calls for modern, deployable and interoperable forces, able to operate in a different context of expanded training and education, as well as for better use of new equipment and technologies.*

*In this context, the paper addresses the impact of the aforementioned elements on the evolution of the brigade level tactical units in terms of organisational, functional, and training opportunities.*

***Keywords**: security environment; comprehensive approach; technology; organisational structure; functional requirements*

## 1. The security environment and its influence on the evolution of conventional forces

The global security environment has continuously changed over the years and it has been governed by uncertainty, amplitude and long-lasting systemic discontinuity. The proliferation of new risks and threats (e.g. terrorism, cyber criminality, transnational organised crime etc.) will ultimately amplify the global systemic insecurity, in all aspects, *"fact that may trigger a complete de-structuring of the previous international order so that, in the forthcoming years, the global order will be significantly different"*[1].

Traditionally, the strategic interest of a particular country is placed in its close geographic proximity. On the other hand, globalisation has eroded the borders, and state and non-state actors have extended their interests beyond national borders and used different external tools to protect them. The threats that the EU faces are similar to those mentioned before.

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[1] Crăișor Ioniță, *Superioritatea decizională în campanii și operații militare*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare *"Carol I"*, București, 2012, p. 8.

They have a transnational impact and affect the security and safety of the entire territory of the EU[2].

Terrorism, in all its forms, through its global dimension and devastating consequences, its recruiting capacity by using manipulative extremist messages and radical internet propaganda, as well as its funding means, poses a significant risk to global security. Suffice it to mention here, as threats in our area of strategic interest, the transit of terrorist elements to Central and Western Europe, the massive influx of people migrating from Asia and Africa to Europe or the undue pressure exerted over the Republic of Moldova and the interests around the North-Western Black Sea shore.

Energy security dominates the debates between Russia and the EU, the starting point being the diversification of energy sources. The Russian Federation plays its energy card as an economic and political weapon to impose its will and keep former Soviet states within its sphere of influence. It also uses energy as a weapon in its political confrontation with NATO and the EU. It is worth mentioning that, currently, the EU imports about 50-60% of its gas and oil needs. The vast majority of these natural resources come from the Russian Federation and other member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, most of them being transported through the Russian pipeline infrastructure.

In this context, *"the greatest strategic opportunity for Romania is to ensure its role as a regional power in the Black Sea area"*[3], which requires capabilities to cope with the negative effects caused by the proximity of a geographical area characterised by numerous security problems. *"For this particular reason, the energy security is no longer just an economic issue, and while it deepens more and more it reaches a political-military dimension"*[4]. It is also connected to other social-economic and regional security related issues.

NATO's enlargement to the East, the signing of the association agreements of the EU with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, the installation of certain elements of the US missile defence system in Poland and Romania, the use of Romanian and Bulgarian military facilities by the US have strained the relations between the Russian Federation and NATO, at regional level. The annexation of Crimea and the current confrontations in Eastern Ukraine indicate a radicalisation of Russia's response to NATO's and EU's enlargement to the east, which has triggered

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[2] *The EU Internal Security Strategy towards a European Security Model*, see www.consilium.europa.eu, retrieved on 19.06.2014.

[3] *The EU as a Model of Soft Power in the Eastern Neighbourhood*, Centre for European Studies, *"Alexandru Ioan Cuza"* University, Iași, 2013, p. 30, see http://www.cse.uaic.ro/Jean_Monnet/Volum%20EURINT%202013_oct_v2.pdf

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 329.

a reorientation of the Alliance security strategy towards managing the risks in its vicinity, rather than conducting out-of-area operations.

The rapidly changing geopolitical and geostrategic environment has determined the Alliance to focus on aligning both the concepts and the military capabilities. The development of information technology had as an immediate effect the shift in focus from network-centric warfare to a *"system of systems"* concept. Although not new, the concept is especially valid in conventional warfare. It brings flexibility to the operational capabilities and allows for simultaneous and immediate reactions at tactical level, regardless of location and remoteness of forces.

Deterring and responding to asymmetrical threats remains a nowadays priority. In the fourth generation asymmetrical warfare the conventional forces will be most likely deployed against opposing groups or nations that have unequal military capabilities, however committed to close this gap through unconventional weapons and tactics designed to exploit the vulnerabilities of a superior adversary. The implementation of this concept requires highly mobile expeditionary forces at tactical level, fully equipped with advanced weapon systems, able to project force worldwide.

The characteristics of these types of operations and forces are part of a complex NATO philosophy called *"comprehensive approach"* which requires *"all actors, military and non-military, to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination and taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, in order to create those effects of joint operations that lead to achieving the desired objectives"* [5].

On the other hand, the NATO *Connected Force Initiative* concept calls for modern, deployable and interoperable forces, able to operate in a different context of expanded training and education, increased exercises and better use of new equipment and technologies, while gradually shifting the emphasis from operational engagement in current theatres of operations to operational preparedness[6].

These issues raise the need to consider, first and foremost, the role of the tactical level in the battlefield of the future.

## 2. The role of the Land Forces' tactical units in shaping the battlefield of the future

Military experts state that *"the operation physiognomy will have different aspects from one conflict to another"*[7]. The battlefield of the future will be characterised by high tempo military operations. War dynamics will face spectacular changes

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[5] *Doctrina privind participarea la operaţii multinaţionale împotriva insurgenţei*, Bucureşti, 2012, p. 14.
[6] See www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_98527.htm, retrieved on 18.06.2014.
[7] Colonel Gheorghe Toma, *Câmpul de luptă al viitorului, Tratat de ştiinţă militară*, vol. I, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2001, p. 187.

as the enemy's operational design will be characterised by simplicity, mobility and efficiency, emphasising those actions which will guarantee a quick victory. In their dynamics, the operations will rely on powerful high-precision weapons, modern and fast means of transportation, and flexible, mobile and modular structures with greater combat power, as well as on well-trained and equipped personnel. Preparation and conduct of manoeuvres, as well as simultaneous engagements of troops and targets will take a different form. The techniques, tactics and operational procedures used by the enemy will be more diverse and *"operations will increasingly belong to the tactical domain"*[8]. In this context, *"the battle will lie at the basis of large-scale conflicts, which, from a conceptual point of view, can be operational or strategic though, in reality, the battle will be fought at the tactical level"*[9].

The employment of troops at the tactical level should be based on seizing the initiative against the enemy, in order to accomplish the mission. Mobility, fire power, force and information protection as well as a flexible and efficient command and control system are essential elements that should be taken into consideration during the force generation process.

Modern armed forces have already re-structured or are in the process of transformation of their land forces towards a brigade-centric model (e.g. USA – *Brigade Combat Team*[10] or UK – *Future Army Structure 2020*[11]).

It becomes obvious that the brigade level unit is the best suited force to conduct land operations, to prevent and deter armed attacks, to manage crisis situations and, ultimately, to achieve military success. The brigade has a specific organisational structure and its actions are bound by clear laws, rules and regulations. The mission of this tactical unit is determined by the concept of operation, the nature of aggression and the actions of the adversary. The brigade should exploit the effects of surprise to achieve operational success. Moreover, its operations should be characterised by synchronised manoeuvre and simultaneous engagement, while avoiding being decisively and lengthily engaged against superior enemy forces, using the terrain to its advantage, exploiting artillery and aviation fire effects, as well as the effects of INFOOPS and PSYOPS campaigns and employing effective force protection measures.

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[8] Colonel dr. Viorel Brat, *Dinamica posibilă a confruntărilor armate în războiul viitorului*, Conferința Doctrinară a Forțelor Terestre – 10th edition, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2013, pp.159-165.

[9] Colonel Gheorghe Toma, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

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[11] See www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Army2020_brochure.pdf, retrieved on 18.06.2014.

In this context, the geopolitical and geostrategic environment, the emerging technologies, as well as the financial constraints are factors that influence the evolution at the land forces level, in general, and at the tactical level, in particular. All these elements are to be analysed as it follows.

## 3. The evolution of the Land Forces
## brigade level tactical units – challenges and opportunities

The strategic environment, as already mentioned, is more and more complex and poses a wide range of possible threats, bringing to attention state and/or non-state enemies that are increasingly unpredictable as far as their actions are concerned. Regular forces, criminal, paramilitary or terrorist organisations interact in many ways, as we do with our coalition partners, and governmental/non-governmental organisations. In this context, *"social media"* enables the above mentioned actors to mobilise people and resources in ways than can quickly constrain or disrupt operations.

Modern warfare shows how profound the impact of technological advancements is in shaping the current battlefield. Recent conflicts have also proved that technological surprise and information superiority are crucial in achieving military success. The interdependency between technological progress and financial factor should be also considered, especially as the current budgetary constraints do not allow for major investments in military equipment. On the other hand, mention should be made that new technologies may offer cost-effective opportunities for improving the efficiency of personnel training.

Besides conventional weapons, state and non-state actors have been quick to use and adapt a broad range of affordable existing or emerging civil technologies, which they can easily modify and adapt into potential lethal weapons. The high rate of technological innovations provides unprecedented opportunities to acquire sophisticated equipment and weapons. The so called *"commercial"* technologies have grown much larger and faster than the traditional defence sector. They may be used for the modernisation of certain equipment and weapons components, sub-systems and systems. The advantages of using commercial innovations, at least in theory, are obvious as the defence sector could save significant sums of money in research and development. At the same time, defence decision-makers should correctly assess the technological gaps between own and potential enemy forces, taking into consideration the fact that any new equipment procured by potential adversaries may require the development of costly solution to mitigate potential vulnerabilities.

On the other hand, in an era of digitisation and automation, one must consider the most feasible solutions to reduce training costs, by maximising the use of modern technologies and software designed to standardise and increase the efficiency of training processes and procedures. Simulation is a form of training used on a large scale by all armed forces. *"Simulation is generally used to establish whether the forces equipment, the personnel training and the command and control system ensure the success of military operations"*[12].

The existing Land Forces simulation capabilities[13] could be integrated in federations of *LVC (Live-Virtual-Constructive)* simulation, which allows for distributed training at brigade level. The brigade HQs battle staff could be trained in the home garrison (i.e. the main Command Post) using *LVC* simulation, one battalion could be trained in the training centre using *VBS* and *MILES* systems, while the other brigade's subordinated battalions would be simulated by *JCATS (Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation)*. The advantages of the *LVC* for the brigade HQ are obvious. The staff in the main Command Post would conduct operations from the peacetime location in a synthetic environment that include the replication of war fighting equipment and the expected operational environmental conditions, where a unit would have combat losses in personnel and equipment, supplies consumed, weather conditions that affect the mobility of friendly forces and of equipment etc. Moreover, it provides the opportunity – through *CPX (Command Post Exercises)* and *CAX (Computer Assisted Exercises)* – to schedule as many training events as are required to achieve the overall objectives, using the existing network capabilities and data transfer infrastructure.

On the other hand, it is necessary that the *organisational requirements* should ensure that brigade level tactical units can operate in a joint environment. They must have a modular and agile structure with organic and integrated intelligence and service support elements; C4ISR capabilities that provide situational awareness and support commander's decision-making; enhanced force protection; attached or organic *CIMIC* and *PSYOPS* elements; enhanced personnel and assets protective equipment; means of transportation for troops and supplies that can operate over long distances and for long periods of time, thus providing high tactical mobility. *"Blue Force Tracking"* – like systems with tactical editing capabilities, mapping software that provide timely and accurate friend-or-enemy location, route

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[12] Colonel dr. Traian Nicula, colonel ing. Gigi Tiliță, *Infrastructura de simulare distribuită, cu utilizarea sistemelor C4I, pentru instruirea unităților din forțele terestre*, in Revista comunicațiilor și informaticii no. 2/2013, pp. 23-26.
[13] The Land Forces Combat Training Centre has live – MILES, virtual – VBS2, and constructive – JCATS simulation capabilities.

planning tools and command-and-control communication system that allows real-time relay of information are a must, especially within the current context of technological evolution.

The *functional requirements* envisage: a command and control system with increased procedural and technical capabilities, in joint environment included; a quick decision-making process; high mobility and interchangeability between different components of the force; multifunctional cooperation between both organic and other elements; streamlined information flow management system; a pool of readily available and adequate replacements for personnel and equipment; equipment and force interoperability.

The *leadership skills inventory* may include: continuity and firmness; analytical, conceptual and critical thinking; mental agility, sound judgment and persuasion, increased self-discipline and self-control.

Needless to say, in conclusion, that without the appropriate funding there will be no investment in equipment. In recent years, the budget cuts have posed real problems for the Army's tactical units that have barely managed to keep their equipment operational. There were no funds available to upgrade the existing equipment or to acquire new equipment that would boost the combat readiness of a brigade or increase the protection of personnel on the battlefield. The plans of the government to increase the defence spending over the next years offer solutions for the future provided the procurement programmes are realistic and take into account that what the Land Forces tactical units need is modern equipment to carry out their assigned tasks anytime, anywhere.

## 4. Conclusions

The modern battlefield characteristics bring up to the military experts and commanders new and complex challenges. The evolving security environment that accounts a wide range of threats, the technological evolution envisioning sophisticated and effective systems along with an intelligence environment capable of increased data collection and processing capabilities aimed at achieving information superiority add up to the already mentioned aspects.

In this context, the Land Forces brigade level tactical units should rely on information systems better than the existing ones to ensure their command and control. Their capabilities should ensure the collection of the required information that can provide an accurate situational awareness and an appropriate support for a timely decision-making process, as a key prerequisite for the mission success, regardless of the battlefield characteristics. At the same time they should be fully equipped with advanced high-precision weapon systems.

It is also required to review the brigade organisational structure in order to ensure the required support elements. We also consider enhanced intelligence capabilities, force protection elements and C4ISR capabilities to improve the operational effectiveness.

As far as the functional requirements are concerned, we consider that there must be a command and control system that ensures timely and efficient flow of information and support the commander to make quick decisions and to refine and update the Common Operational Picture of the battle space. All these aspects should generate a continuous and interactive process of mutual influence between the commander and his staff, so that they would be able to quickly react to the changes on the battlefield.

In terms of personnel training, we consider that simulation deserves more credit, as well as analysis and support to carry out distributed exercises at brigade level using federations of *LVC* simulation. Down to individual soldier and squad level, things should be kept clear and simple, while the complexity should be gradually transferred to technology.

Taking into consideration all the above-mentioned aspects, the current architecture of the crisis response operations dedicated forces should be reviewed so that it would allow them to swiftly change capabilities, conduct operations with tactical formations (from small units up to brigade level), able to rapidly deploy and engage in the operational and tactical battlefield.

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# The Secretary General's

## Annual Report 2013 (III)

## Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance provides the foundation for all military operations and its principles have been used for centuries. However, although these principles are not new, the military technological advances made since NATO operations began in Afghanistan have meant that surveillance and reconnaissance can better answer the *"what"*, *"where"*, and *"when"*. This gives a commander the information needed to make the best possible decision.

NATO's JISR initiative aims to provide the Alliance with a mechanism to bring together data and information gathered through these and other systems. It will enable coordinated collection, processing, dissemination and sharing of this data and information within NATO, maximising interoperability without hampering the performance of each system. It will also provide common standards and a common vision of the theatre of operations.

JISR was endorsed as a NATO initiative at the Chicago Summit in May 2012. A revised concept was approved in 2013 and measures were agreed to coordinate the strands of work pertaining to the three main lines of development: procedures for data sharing, training and education, and the networking environment. In addition, there is need for a longer-term JISR strategy; work to that end also began in 2013. Progress in 2013 built on a technical trial held in 2012 (Unified Vision 12). This exercise, testing the interoperability of national systems and developing pragmatic solutions for improved coordination, was an important step, and a follow-on exercise is being planned for 2014. Future NRF exercises will also be used to continue developing JISR to ensure seamless compatibility as NATO develops these important capabilities.

## Alliance Ground Surveillance

As part of JISR, the NATO-owned and -operated Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) capability will give commanders a comprehensive image of what is happening on the ground before, during and after an operation. It is therefore a critical capability that will enable surveillance over wide areas from high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aircraft.

The AGS core capability is composed of five Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles and associated fixed and deployable ground and support segments.

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Fifteen Allies are participating in the acquisition of the system that will be made available to the Alliance in 2017.

Progress in 2013 included the production of the first NATO AGS aircraft. Additionally, all the requirements for the AGS project were confirmed in November, opening the way for the finalisation of design activities scheduled for May 2014, after which production of the numerous components of the system can commence. In parallel, Allies have started work to establish the AGS main operating base at Sigonella (Italy) and have made significant progress toward establishing the AGS force, which in time will be manned by personnel from the Alliance.

## Ballistic missile defence

The proliferation of ballistic missiles, carrying conventional, chemical or nuclear warheads, continues to pose a grave risk to the Alliance. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO agreed to extend its own ballistic missile defence capability beyond the protection of forces to include all NATO European populations and territory. In May 2012 at the Chicago Summit, Allies took a first step towards operational status by declaring an interim capability for NATO's missile defence system.

In 2012 and 2013, NATO built on this interim capability, working towards a fully operational capacity in the years to come. Recent efforts enhanced the command and control structures of both territorial and theatre missile defence and will significantly increase the operational value of NATO's integrated air and missile defence system.

Individual Allies have offered additional systems, are upgrading national equipment, and are developing or hosting capabilities that contribute to the strength of the system.

The US European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is a major contribution to the NATO ballistic missile defence architecture. In early November 2013, the groundbreaking ceremony for the missile defence facility in southern Romania was a significant step forward for Phase 2 of the US EPAA – two of three phases in total. Phase 4 was cancelled by the US government, with no impact on the coverage provided for NATO members on the European continent.

In parallel, NATO and Russia continue to explore possibilities for cooperation in this domain. In 2013, discussions made little headway. However, the offer NATO has made to cooperate with Russia in building a missile defence architecture that would protect both NATO and Russia from the growing ballistic missile threat, still stands. Due to the design and configuration of its architecture, NATO's ballistic missile defence system cannot pose any threat to Russia's strategic deterrent forces. NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defence, however, would raise the partnership to a strategic level and enhance security across the Euro-Atlantic area.



In 2013, NATO also began discussions and exchanged information with a number of other partner countries on NATO's ballistic missile defence system, and agreed to continue regular exchanges in the future.

## Cyber defence

2013 was a year of considerable progress in NATO's ability to defend itself against cyber attacks. NATO has implemented NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) centralised protection at NATO Headquarters, Commands

and Agencies. This is a major upgrade of NATO's protection against the cyber threat. NATO networks in the 51 NATO locations that make up NATO Headquarters, the NATO Command Structure and NATO Agencies are under comprehensive 24/7 surveillance and protected by enhanced sensors and intrusion detection technologies.

While NATO's primary role in the cyber domain is to defend its own networks, in 2013 the Alliance broadened its efforts to address cyber threats. For the first time, cyber defence has been included in NATO's defence planning process. This will help to ensure that Allies have the basic organisation, capabilities, and interoperability to assist each other in the event of cyber attacks. NATO also continued to feature cyber defence scenarios in its exercises, training, and education. NATO's annual Cyber Coalition exercise was held in November 2013 and included the participation of seven partner countries and the European Union. During the exercise, 400 national and NATO cyber defence experts participated remotely from their locations, and 80 experts participated from Tartu, Estonia where the exercise was hosted.

## Counter-terrorism

NATO's work to counter terrorism is an area of continued advancement within the Alliance and with national and institutional partners, both in the lab and in the field. Through its 2013 activities, NATO continued to develop capabilities to protect its soldiers from many of the devices terrorists use, including improvised explosive devices. It also pioneered work in biometrics, non-lethal capabilities, and harbour security. Operation Active Endeavour, in which NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity, was initiated immediately after 9/11 and is ongoing.

Allies increased exchanges of intelligence and expert analysis of the evolving terrorist threat. NATO also increased interaction with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Director, and the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator briefed the North Atlantic Council on developments in Syria related to international terrorism.

# Defence in an age of austerity

## Economic pressures on defence spending

Since 2008, economies in Europe and North America have been challenged by the persisting global economic crisis. Declining or low-level economic growth among many member states has increased government budget deficits, raised the levels of government indebtedness and prompted tighter constraints on government spending.

The weaker economic performance in Europe and North America has, in many cases, been reflected in consistently declining defence spending[1].

As economic conditions in many NATO countries have begun to stabilise, the cuts to defence spending have begun to level off. However, the need to maintain defence spending levels will remain crucial in order to retain the capacity to provide security across the Alliance. Investment in defence is a long-term requirement; what may appear to be savings in the near term can have lasting consequences. Further reductions in defence spending risk undermining NATO's efforts to ensure a modern and capable Alliance.

## Sharing responsibilities

Members of NATO are committed to the collective defence of the Alliance. That mutual commitment is reflected in the principle that members should contribute fairly to the provision of the forces and capabilities needed to undertake the roles and tasks agreed in NATO's Strategic Concept. While there is a critical difference between what any Ally chooses to invest in its defence and what it makes available for any Allied undertaking, overall investment in defence has implications for any Ally's ability to share the overall responsibility. The gaps in defence expenditures within the Alliance are growing, as illustrated by the pie charts below. Between 2007 (taken as the pre-crisis baseline) and 2013, the share of US expenditures has increased from 68 to 73 per cent. In 2013, the European share of the total Alliance defence expenditures continued to decrease as a whole.

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[1] For all the graphs in this chapter of the report, it should be noted that Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance in 2009 and that Iceland has no armed forces.

**Alliance real GDP and defence expenditures**
**Percentage changes from previous year**
**2007-2013**



Source: NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2013-14, OECD, ECFIN and IMF.
Based on 2005 prices and exchange rates. Estimates for 2013.

It is essential that all Allies contribute to developing the capabilities that will underpin NATO's role in the future. This is possible only if Allies hold the line on defence spending and focus investment on key capabilities. Allies have collectively agreed to two guidelines to help encourage an equitable

**Percentage of Alliance defence expenditures**



Source: NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2013-14. Based on 2005 prices and exchange rates. Estimates for 2013.
Note: Figures have been rounded off in the small pie charts.

**Alliance defence expenditures
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 2007 and 2013**



Source: NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2013-14. Based on 2005 prices.
Estimates for 2013.

**Alliance major equipment expenditures
as a percentage of defence expenditures 2007 and 2013**



Source: NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2013-14. Based on 2005 prices.
Estimates for 2013 except Spain 2012 figure.

**Defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP
versus major equipment expenditures as a percentage of defence expenditures**

## 2007



## 2013



Source: NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2013-14. Based on 2005 prices. Estimates for 2013 except Spain 2012 figure for major equipment.
Note: United States is not included.

sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities. First, members should devote at least 2 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defence. Second, at least 20 % of those funds should be allocated towards major equipment.

The financial crisis has impacted upon both goals. While the United States has reduced defence expenditures in the last five years, reductions made by European Allies have been more extreme in relative terms. As the graphs above show, only three members met the 2 % guideline in 2013, down from five in 2007. Moreover, where major equipment expenditures[2] are concerned, many Allies are falling short of the 20 % guideline.

\*

*In the final part of this report, the author writes about the transformation of the Alliance in order to meet the 21st century security challenges.*

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[2] Major equipment expenditures also include research and development spending devoted to major equipment.

Cover 1: *The Ministry of National defence building, Bucharest. Photo: Valentin Ciobîrcă.*

Cover 3: *2014 NATO Wales Summit. Ceremony honouring NATO military personnel for service in operational theatres of the Alliance (4 September 2014), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_112564.htm*

Cover 4: *The Army Great General Staff, 1902 ("King Ferdinand I" National Military Museum archives).*

http://www.mapn.ro/smg/gmr