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Romanian Military Thinking



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
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A New Gateway to Knowledge

Knowledge society, as a new stage of the information age, has to be a society of continuous learning, so that it can keep its authentic missions alive. The human resource, the most important capital of a state, is and will increasingly have to be the beneficiary of a new type of education, an information-based one. No matter how consistent we may be in crediting and exclusively preserving some traditional didactic practices, we have to accept that, in the arsenal employed on the front of knowledge, new weapons are convincingly gaining ground, high-performance, long-range, and high-precision ones. Computer assisted learning, the intersection of the education system and information technology, is undoubtedly capable of generating notable performances, a gain that we cannot deny ourselves. On the contrary, we will have to accept that the future of knowledge cannot be but the one of computer assisted learning.

The essential changes in the education systems have compelled the military body to align its education system with the same innovation trajectory. Moreover, we can say that the Romanian military school has shown a sincere, undisguised and unconditioned openness in this respect, even at the risk of having unconvincing results in the beginning, marked by inherent hesitation and desynchronisation, which finally proved to be beneficial to the durability of the further approaches.

Thus, the extensive use of computerised information technology in the activities related to teaching and learning as well as to training and education management and planning has been subsumed under the process of multidimensional transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces, implicitly meeting the declared desideratum to align with the Euro-Atlantic practices related to education.

A flexible, effective, profitable military education system, compatible and fully integrated with both the national and the Euro-Atlantic one, presupposed, among other things, the adoption of the best educational practices of the moment. Although, more often than not, it is but time that validates or annuls the appropriateness of a particular option, the military ventured and gambled, with inspiration, on the success of some particular learning methodologies and procedures that seemed simple utopian projects to many others. The courage to remodel an almost breakable matrix to mould the incandescent fluid of some new programmatic concepts to it has not only propelled us to the avant-garde of the Romanian education system but also resulted in the dialogue capacity with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic area, without having any inferiority complex.

A new strategy in the Romanian military education system is currently forged in the conceptual creation laboratories of the structures that have responsibilities in the field. Therefore, we will certainly have a response regarding what has to be done so that the relevance and effectiveness of the military educational process can be enhanced to meet the national education system benchmarks and the Romanian Armed Forces future structure and procurement requirements. Certainly, further adjustment and on the fly tuning will also be necessary but what is really important is that things will go ahead towards genuine performance and effectiveness in this field. If, as it is axiomatically stated in this new strategy, what is learned in schools is exercised in units and put in practice in theatres of operations, then the effectiveness of the educational activity will be visible in its entire dimension only when a mission or a mission cycle in a theatre of operations is completed. It is a truth that all those involved in the development of this *technological process* intended to educate and train combatants have subscribed to.

“Carol I” National Defence University, the standard bearer and, we say with certainty, the tone generator in the Romanian military education system, affirmed, once more, its capacity to respond rapidly to the real needs of the military body and got engaged to provide those higher qualifications that met the real needs of the Romanian Armed Forces. When others doubted – scepticism generated by fear or lack of knowledge ?! – the extraordinary potential of the virtual environment employed in the process of theoretical and practical-applicative education of the military personnel, there were some visionary people, adepts and preachers of this new cult of information technology and its miracles,

who enthusiastically took the risk of building, at conceptual and operational level, a new didactic edifice, the Advanced Distributed Learning Department. It is a construction whose virtual gateway, opened to knowledge five years ago, has been passed through by more than three thousand of course attenders so far. Many of them have accessed the electronic pages directly from their posts, in theatres of operations or international missions, and have found appropriate solutions for the missions conducted.

At the beginning of the 21st century, a challenge that has been met both in a courageous and professional manner, one that has already achieved highly international recognition, strengthens our confidence that the Romanian military education system will continue to be performance generator.

It has been stated, with good reason, that artificial intelligence will be the technological essence of the knowledge society that is taking shape more and more obviously on the horizon. We can affirm, *on good authority*, that the military institution is prepared for this permanently new and continuous confrontation.

What we have to do is invest efficiently in this human professionalism and technological performance binomial and it will certainly be better. At least in this domain, the one of knowledge and learning !

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*
English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU



Une neuve porte vers la connaissance

La société de la connaissance, comme une neuve phase de l'ère de l'information, doit être, pour la mise en place de ses rôles incontestables, une société d'apprentissage incessante.

La ressource humaine, ce capital inestimable d'un État, est et doit être de plus en plus le bénéficiaire d'une éducation de nouvelle manière. Pourtant, tant que nous sommes conséquents dans la conviction et la continuité distincte de certaines pratiques didactiques traditionnelles, nous devons admettre que dans cet ensemble engagé sur ce front de la connaissance on a besoin de plus en plus impérieuse de nouvelles armes, plus puissantes, avec un impact d'ampleur et de précision en coup. L'enseignement assisté par l'ordinateur, l'intersection du system éducatif avec la technologie de l'information, est sans aucun doute celui qui génère des performances remarquables, un gain qui en aucun cas nous ne pouvons pas le refuser. Au contraire, il faut accepter que le futur de la connaissance puisse être seulement celui de l'apprentissage assisté par l'ordinateur.

Les changements essentiels dans les systèmes éducatifs ont contraint aussi l'organisme militaire d'aligner leur système éducationnel sur la même voie de l'innovation. Oui, on peut dire que l'école militaire roumaine a montré dès le début une réelle approche, sans hypocrisie et absolue à cet égard, même au risque d'uns premiers pas non concluants, avec des hésitations et non concordances inhérentes, mais prouvés, finalement, lucratifs pour la durabilité des approches futures.

L'extension de l'utilisation de la technologie de l'information assisté par l'ordinateur dans les activités de l'enseignement et d'apprentissage, la gestion et la planification du processus instructif-éducatif, a été circonscrite au processus de transformation multidimensionnelle de l'Armée Roumaine, en répondant implicitement à la volonté déclarée pour l'alignement aux pratiques euro-atlantiques en matière d'éducation.

Un système d'éducation militaire flexible, efficient et économique, compatible et pleinement intégré dans l'enseignement national et celui de l'espace euro-atlantique, a présumé, entre autres, l'adoption de plus compétitives pratiques éducationnelles au présent. Même si, la plupart du temps, le temps seulement est celui qui valide ou invalide l'exactitude d'une certaine option, les militaires ont osé et ont parié, avec inspiration, par le succès de certaines méthodologies et procédures d'enseignement que pour unes semblaient de simples projets. Le courage de remodeler un moule presque fragile pour répandre dans ses formes le liquide incandescent de nouveaux concepts programmatiques non seulement que nous a propulsé au premier plan de l'enseignement roumain, mais nous a créé aussi celle disponibilité d'un dialogue sans aucun complexe d'infériorité avec nos partenaires de l'espace euro-atlantique.

Une nouvelle stratégie de l'enseignement militaire roumain se conçoit actuellement dans les laboratoires de création conceptuelle des structures ayant des responsabilités dans ce domaine et nous allons certainement une réponse à ce qui devrait être fait pour accroître la relevance et l'efficiencia du processus éducationnel militaire, en accord avec les repères de l'enseignement national et avec les exigences de la future structure et celle d'équipement de l'Armée Roumaine. Certainement, il sera nécessaire de suite des adaptations, changements sans arrêts, mais il est important que les choses avancent à une véritable performance, vers l'efficiencia en domaine. Si, comme axiomatiquement on affirme dans cette nouvelle stratégie, ce qui est appris dans les écoles s'exerce dans les unités et se pratique dans le théâtre d'opérations, alors l'efficiencia de l'acte éducationnel sera visible dans sa toute dimension seulement après l'achèvement d'une mission ou d'un cycle des missions dans un théâtre d'opérations. Une vérité à qui ont souscrit tous ceux impliqués dans le déroulement du ce *processus technologique* de formation et d'instruction des combattants.

L'Université Nationale de Défense "*Carol I*", ce porte-drapeau et, on dire avec toute la conviction, le générateur de tonalité de l'enseignement militaire roumaine, a-t-il dit, une fois de plus, sa capacité de percuter aux besoins réels de l'armée et il est engagé de fournir ces qualifications plus élevées adaptées aux nécessités réels de l'Armée Roumaine. Quand d'autres doutaient – un scepticisme engendré par la peur ou par l'ignorance ?! – par le potentiel insoupçonné de l'environnement virtuel engagé dans le processus d'instruction théorique et pratique du personnel militaire, il y avait quelques visionnaires, les disciples et les prédicateurs du ce nouveau culte de la technologie de l'information

et de ses miracles qui ont assumé avec enthousiasme le risque de construire, en plan conceptuel et actionnel, un nouvel édifice didactique, **le Département pour l'enseignement distribué avancé à distance**. Une construction dont la porte virtuelle, ouverte il y a cinq ans pour la connaissance, ils sont passés, jusqu'à présent, plus de trois mille d'étudiants. Beaucoup d'entre eux, présents aux théâtres d'opérations ou d'autres missions internationales, ont directement visité les pages électroniques depuis leurs postes de combat et ont trouvé des solutions appropriées pour leurs tâches.

Au début du XXI^{ème} siècle, un défi auquel a été donnée une réponse à la même courageuse et professionnelle, avec une déjà élevée reconnaissance internationale, renforce notre conviction que l'enseignement militaire roumain continuera à stimuler la performance.

Il dit, à juste titre, que l'intelligence artificielle sera l'essence technologique de la société de la connaissance, qui se dessine plus fortement en vue. On peut dire, *réellement*, que l'institution militaire est toujours prête pour ce permanent nouvel et continu affrontement.

Il ne reste plus qu'à investir d'une manière efficace dans ce binôme du professionnalisme humain et de la performance technologique et, certainement, nous serions plus heureux. Au moins dans ce domaine, celle de la connaissance et d'apprentissage !

Version française par Alina PAPOI



BETWEEN TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATION

Major General Alojz ŠTEINER

After six years of cooperation of the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovenian Armed Forces in NATO and the European Union structures, numerous indicators point to the conclusion that the political as well as the defence and security transition have been successfully completed. Also completed are the military transition and the five-year action plan for the integration into the Alliance. Despite the conviction that the Alliance is above all costly, it is a fact that defence expenditures, defence structure and defence forces are significantly smaller than in the case of building a self-sustaining system. Integration in the Alliance has created conditions for changing the national security strategy and, consequently, the military doctrine. The article discusses the characteristics of the Slovenian transition period, transformation challenges in the area of defence and military, as well as Slovenian military experiences from the process of integration.

Keywords: *transition; integration; integration process; lessons learned; transformation*

In 2009, at the 60th anniversary of NATO, activities began for the preparation of the new *NATO Strategic Concept (NSC)*, which is to respond to the current and, above all, future challenges of the Alliance. The work on designing the new NSC was completed in May 2009 by a special expert group. At the beginning of 2010, the Slovenian Armed Forces fulfilled its tasks arising from the integration plan and thus became comparable and interoperable with other armed forces in the Alliance.

It took Slovenia ten years of preparation in the context of the *Partnership for Peace (PfP)* programme to join the Alliance, while the political and military conditions for membership were fulfilled in the second accession cycle of the *Membership Action Plan (MAP)*. Legitimacy was assured by the 2003 referendum, when 66 percent of citizens voted for the membership of the Republic of Slovenia in NATO. One of the main conditions for Slovenia's membership was to carry out reforms in numerous areas, including the restructuring of the Slovenian Armed Forces, as well as its structural and functional professionalisation. Slovenia's achievement of NATO membership

Major General Alojz Šteiner – Chief of the Slovenian Armed Forces General Staff.

The article was featured in the *Bulletin of Slovenian Armed Forces*, year 12/2, July 2010, http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/bilten_sv/bilten_sv_12_2.pdf

was followed by a very intense five-year period of integration activities. One may claim that after five years of membership, the Slovenian path to transition and its integration in the Alliance have been successfully completed.

Slovenian Path to Transition

In Europe, the end of the *Cold War* and the bipolar division have led to major social transition processes. These processes were most intense in the European countries of the former socialist regime, while they also took place in the West European countries. Consideration of conceptual, structural and functional changes made during the transition in the defence and military field in Slovenia indicates a number of characteristics also found in other European countries after the end of the *Cold War*. At the same time, there are several particularities which, on the one hand, apply only to Slovenia as a newly established state and, on the other hand, exceed the period of transition and represent the characteristics of transformation changes.

The central common feature of transition processes was the *adaptation* of the defence and military organisation to the new circumstances in the period of social as well as defence and security transition. In the area of defence, efforts regarding the functionality were directed towards the provision of national defence during the intense structural changes, and towards the accession to military and political alliances, which led to cooperation in conflict solving in crisis areas abroad. Efforts in the social area were focused on the establishment of institutions for the democratic control of armed forces, which Cottey, Edmunds and Forster¹ consider the first and the second generation of problems in the civil-military relations².

Since 1992, Slovenia, as an independent state with international recognition, has participated in the processes of political, economic, national, as well as defence and security transition. It has established a multiparty political system of parliamentary democracy, introduced market economy, built its own state, along with the defence and security components, as well as prepared for and established liaisons with the UNO, OSCE, NATO and the EU. Slovenia spent part of the process

¹ A. Cottey, T. Edmunds and A. Forster, *The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations*, in *Armed Forces & Society*, 29 (1-2002), pp. 31-56.

² See also C. Donnelly, *Defense Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem* in *NATO Review*, 45 (1-1997), pp. 15-19. Available on 2 April 2010 at www://www.nato.int/docu/review/1997/9701-4.htm, G. J. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000 and C. C. Moskos, J. A. Williams and D. R. Segal (ed.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000.

of the defence and security transition developing and reforming the national security system.

The transformation of Slovenian military organisation ran in parallel with the process of independence and with military activities for securing the establishment of a democratic and sovereign state in 1991³. These activities were conducted on the basis of total defence and mass army concepts, founded on a large mobilised reserve structure of the Territorial Defence. The period after July 1991, after the end of the *War for Independence*, saw the demobilisation of enlisted reservists and the final establishment of the *Territorial Defence Learning Centres*⁴ which trained Slovenian military recruits on the basis of general compulsory military service. At the same time, a regular army and a large military reserve were also established. The process in Slovenia was conducted simultaneously with the processes of reducing mass armies and abolishing military service in some industrialised countries, for example in Belgium and the Netherlands. Considering the fact that Slovenia emerged from the war in 1991 and was, until 1995, under a military threat from war activities in its immediate vicinity in the former Yugoslavia, Slovenian deviation from the then processes in developed European countries can be better understood.

In the process of establishing a regular Slovenian army, several specific features emerged, which could not be eliminated in subsequent periods, as all transition changes were aimed at adaptation rather than at radical changing of the defence and military structures⁵. Thus, from the initial establishment of the military organisation, through the period of transition, to entering the transformation period, there have been characteristics present, which have impeded further changes in the Slovenian Armed Forces and thus its transformation. The establishment of compulsory service with the system of manning the regular and reserve structures has left an officer structure that is too vast and inappropriate, having a conscript army mentality; infrastructure that, on the one hand, is adapted to military service of the male population and, on the other hand, is spread throughout the country; as well as a wide branched civil and administrative recruitment network. The above-mentioned service has been reorganised several times during the military transition. However, it has not been abolished or overcome in accordance with the new tasks and missions of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The numerous

³ In reality, however, it began immediately after the first democratic elections and the assumption of power in May 1990.

⁴ The first two Slovenian Territorial Defence learning centres were established in May 1991, while altogether eight learning centres were established by June 1992.

⁵ A. Šteiner, *It is Time for Transformation*, in *The Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces*, 11 (3-2009), pp. 126-129.

reorganisation processes of the command structure and scope of the army, as well as gradual changes are thus essential companions in the period of transition, as can also be observed in other countries.

Through extensive support of countries with which the Republic of Slovenia has entered in cooperation in the military area (the USA, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Israel and others), it gradually became clear that it was necessary to abandon the outlived military organisation models and the past operational patterns. The accession of the Republic of Slovenia to the *Partnership for Peace (PfP)* programme in January 1994 signified, on the one hand, moving away from old models, while, on the other hand, it has led to the pluralism of following foreign examples. Following examples may sometimes signify the adoption of everything that has been offered and evaluated as good, regardless of the efficiency of the examples when they are placed in concrete situations and the defence and military system. Uncritical and unselective following of foreign examples is characteristic of all countries in transition, as described by Haltiner and Klein⁶.

The realisation of the necessity of abandoning the old model of military organisation and consequently of military structure and scope of the army has become one of the most important transition challenges. It was not easy to comprehend, let alone implement, as ideas of restoring old models are still present. A particular challenge was the necessity to open up and cooperate in the area of defence and military, which arose with the accession to the PfP. The tools and activities in the PfP thus appear as mechanisms of not only defence and military transition, but also political transition. For this reason, there are many changes and new processes conducted in the field of defence planning and, consequently, political decision-making with regard to defence issues⁷. Slovenia has been learning about and adapting to collective defence planning since 1994, through the *Planning and Review Process (PARP)* and the *Individual Partnership Programme (IPP)*, also followed by the *Membership Action Plan (MAP)* in 1999. Until the time of the accession to NATO and during very intensive preparations of Slovenia, which followed the five-year membership action plan, these tools provided effective interagency cooperation.

When, in 1997, in Madrid, the Republic of Slovenia did not receive a membership invitation, the initial disappointment resulted in the knowledge that the transition

⁶ K. W. Haltiner and P. Klein (ed.), *Europas Armeen im Umbruch*, Band 29. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002, pp. 7-22.

⁷ More on this in P. Šavc, *The Slovenian Experience of Defence Planning and NATO Membership*, in *The Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces*, 11(3-2009), pp. 52-55.

process would have to be brought to the point where it was evident that Slovenia took reforms seriously and would successfully implement them. The Madrid “no” thus helped rather than inhibited Slovenia on its path to transition and enhanced the political aspects of the defence reform⁸. Without the Madrid experience, Slovenia would have certainly delayed the professionalisation of its army, and the establishment of modern and deployable armed forces.

The transition period until 2002 was characterised by gradual and relatively slow changes. When the Slovenian government and the parliament decided to abolish military service as a component of the general compulsory military service, and the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002 resulted in Slovenia’s invitation to become a full member of NATO, this signified the continuation of even more intense changes in the military organisation. After the accession in 2004, the Slovenian Armed Forces prepared the *Accession and Integration Plan (AAI)*⁹, which was to be fulfilled by the end of 2010, but was already implemented by the end of 2009. One may claim that the essence of activities in the period of PfP, MAP and AAI lies in their orientation towards transition in the broadest sense of the word.

Based on the conclusions drawn during the period of Slovenia’s transition, two general characteristics can be defined. First, preparations for membership take several years and include the implementation of membership plans, which brings many changes to the military organisation and the defence system. Second, integration in the processes of joint decision-making and defence planning brings modifications and adaptations of national approaches to the functioning of the government, the diplomatic field, the provision of conditions for the protection of classified information and, ultimately, the public. It often appears that such changes are determined by the defence and military structure, especially with regard to participation in multinational operations and missions, when this structure needs to meet the conditions of interoperability and integrating in joint operations. In the context of NATO, Slovenia is an example of a member that has successfully overcome the tests and challenges of the transition period. As such, it can be a good example for the integration of other small countries and candidate countries, particularly the ones in its immediate vicinity.

⁸ This includes the operation of the government, creation of a positive public attitude to membership in the Alliance, and changes in the external activities. More on this in A. Grizold, *Slovenija v spremenjenem varnostnem okolju: k razvoju obrambno-zaščitnega sistema: izzivi in spodbude (Slovenia in the Changed Security Environment: Development of the Defence and Security System: Challenges and Incentives)* in *Security Studies*, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana, 2005, pp. 81-140 and A. Bebler, *Slovenia’s Road to NATO*, in *The Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces*, 11 (3-2009), 2009, pp. 105-116.

⁹ Implementation of the plan was monitored and supported by JFC Naples, Italy.

Integration Process - Lessons Learned

The integration into the Alliance is a comprehensive process including several procedures and activities that allow new members to be effectively integrated and to participate in the Alliance's mechanisms of decision making and fulfilment of its commitments and is, hence, given priority¹⁰. In discussing Slovenian lessons learned from the integration process, it should be stressed that the accession to the Alliance is only the beginning of intensive activities. The achievement of full membership is followed by a demanding period of association and integration as well as affiliation¹¹ of declared forces to NATO Force Structure. In the case of Slovenia, this integration process spanned over five years. When these processes came to an end, it became evident that it would be followed by further transformation processes of the military organisation, standardisation procedures and processes of integrating multinational force structures as well as capability building for the needs of national and collective defence.

There is no uniform definition of what is part of integration processes. In Slovenia, *the integration process* has been divided into: (1) integration into the allied processes of political decision-making and defence planning; (2) introduction of NATO doctrines and standards; (3) integration in NATO Command Structure; (4) affiliation of declared forces to NATO Force Structure (corps); (5) military capability building in accordance with the adopted allied force goals; (6) provision and maintenance of interoperability of commands and units, including NATINADS¹² and Air Policing; (7) participation in planning, preparing and conducting multinational operations and missions; (8) preparation for and contribution to NATO Response Forces (NRF); (9) financing joint projects through the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP)¹³. Integration areas are also shown in *figure 1*.


Slovenia was successfully integrated into the *allied political decision-making process and defence planning*. Defence planning encompasses seven different planning

¹⁰ Humar [L. Humar, I. Mikuž, Zanoškar S. and others, *Integration of the Slovenian Armed Forces in NATO* in *The Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces*, 11 (3-2009), p. 71] states that the NATO structure allows the respect of joint values and interests within the Alliance and, in particular, provides a frame, based on which member states may determine and implement common goals. In the NATO context, member states are the main decision-making players. As owners of the forces, they make decisions by consensus. Forces and capabilities which are provided by the member states for carrying out NATO activities are under NATO control and are, at the same time, part of the national chain of command and control at all levels.

¹¹ Affiliation refers to the integration of forces based on international agreements.

¹² NATO Integrated Air Defence System is an integrated and interlinked system of the allied air defence. Air Policing is the surveillance of the air space, including its capabilities for such operational use.

¹³ NATO Security Investment Program is the financial tool and programme for a joint investment into allied capabilities.



Source: Presentation by the SAF General Staff, 18 February 2010.

Figure 1: Integration areas

disciplines: *force planning, resources planning, planning of defence investments, logistical planning, C3 planning, nuclear planning and civil emergency planning*¹⁴. National defence planning as a whole is part of the sphere of defence policy and thus a matter of particular agencies and organisational units of defence ministries. Based on defence planning starting points, force planning is part of the domain of national as well as allied military staffs. In order to meet the purposes of military operation and functioning within multinational operations and missions, operational planning for individual NATO operations is applied. All NATO planning categories are described in particular allied publications respectively instructions, which serve as bases for preparing national regulations and instructions. In 2006, the defence budget structure in Slovenia was harmonised with the NATO method based on which reporting on defence planning is carried out within the Alliance. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that Slovenia is successfully participating in activities and operation procedures of most allied committees and working bodies. Slovenia did not use the basic principle in the decision-making process, that is to say consensus, for hampering the operation of the Alliance.

¹⁴ P. Savc, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

Furthermore, the area of *introducing NATO doctrines and standards* represents a particular organisational and intellectual challenge. The Ministry of Defence and the Slovenian Armed Forces adopted and introduced most of the standards that are necessary for achieving the interoperability of armed forces or defence measures and military procedures. As much as half of them were adopted in the original language with only the first page translated. These are used in the original language, whereas others were translated into the Slovenian language. Consequently, providing the capability of managing and employing standards in the English language is a speciality and ability, which is coupled with the fulfilment of English language standards. The Slovenian Armed Forces adapted and developed its Military Doctrine and the Military Logistics Doctrine, bringing them in line with allied documents. In addition, it has ambitious plans for continuing the preparations of doctrines in other areas.

Slovenia's integration into the *NATO Command Structure* is achieved in line with plans, taking into account the changes that occur in its peacetime structure. The integration into the peace-establishment command structure¹⁵ refers to national military personnel contributions to NATO commands and bodies as well as participation in its operational processes. The Slovenian Armed Forces is linked to the NATO Command Structure through military representations, which, in 2009, were transformed into a peacetime structure of the Slovenian Armed Forces abroad. The *Military Representative (MilRep)* in Brussels can be considered as part of the *Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO and the EU*. SHAPE near Mons, Belgium, includes the *National Military Representation (NMR)* at the *Allied Command Operations (ACO)*. In Norfolk, USA, the ACT includes the *National Liaison Representation (NLR)*. Interaction with NATO's command structure does not only exist at the strategic level. Significant connections and cooperation are carried out through the Slovenian Armed Forces' Force Command, which cooperates with the JFC in Naples, Italy. Of a total of 80 military representatives abroad, this is as much as 1 percent of the peacetime national military structure. Around 30 representatives are assigned to NATO commands and their bodies as well centres of excellence, and approximately 10 representatives are part of unit commands, to which the Republic of Slovenia can affiliate its capabilities.

In 2010, Slovenia completed the second rotation of personnel that represented the Republic of Slovenia to NATO and the EU. In this context, national representations

¹⁵ NATO uses the term NATO Command Structure – NCS. More about this in Humar and others, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-79.

played an important role in performing integration activities and achieving interoperability by implementing set tasks, in particular in understanding the Alliance, the political decision-making process as well as the preparation of military advice and its implementation. Efficient cooperation in working bodies and committees requires great efforts as well as learning. Often, this involves learning from doing or learning from those who have gained experience within the Alliance. The Alliance considers Slovenia to be a positive surprise, as it is well-integrated into NATO bodies, successfully communicates at the level of allied bodies and national decision-makers as well as processes. Furthermore, the positive experience of a balanced representation of national interests in relation to joint allied interests and goals should be emphasised.

The Republic of Slovenia and the Slovenian Armed Forces have carried out initial activities for the *affiliation of declared forces to the NATO force structure*. Affiliation into corps as multinational allied structures is considered as the integration of national capabilities into tactical and operational structures or commands¹⁶. One of the tasks of corps commands in peace is to increase the interoperability within NATO through training and preparing commands and units for possible combined joint operation. I have stated the fact that initial activities have been carried out in order to point out that comprehensive activities and changes that have to be carried out in the following years are under way.

Building military capacities in accordance with the adopted allied force goals is an area that reflects in particular the modernisation and transformation of armed forces and their capabilities. It is defined through national defence planning and force planning as well as harmonised with allied planning and based on the force goals. The force goals reflect the adopted political commitments to capability building that meet national requirements, as well as joint allied capabilities. This presents a special feature, as *Capability Based Planning* is carried out on the basis of capability requirements. During the *Cold War*, on the other hand, *Threat Based Planning* was prevalent with threats being easier to recognise and, hence, required capabilities being easily determined.

Capability building in states that are in transition or have just completed it has certain particular features, as most of the jointly agreed capabilities usually have to be established from the very beginning. Therefore, it is necessary to provide required resources, such as financial, personnel, material and infrastructural

¹⁶ It is about the affiliation of light battalion battle groups to the NATO Rapid Deployable Corp in Italy and the CBRN battalion to the Multinational Corp North-East in Poland.

resources. Capability building is based on the fact that it is expected to invest 20 percent of funds for modernisation and equipment. As the building of deployable capabilities is generally a priority task, there are not enough resources for other capabilities. Under such conditions, within the new member states and small states, it may occur that only joint or even foreign capabilities are invested in.

Modernisation of armed forces and the building of military capabilities represent a special challenge during the economic crisis and recession. In this context, the countries are reducing expenses for defence and military purposes and are therefore, reducing investments, in particular in the defence sector. This results in an impaired capability building or even its end. Thus, we can speak of a crisis of implementing plans of military capability planning and confidence into national promises. Modern capability building is not only the purchase of military equipment and its modernisation, but also demanding relations with personnel, training and readiness for operating together with other allied forces in a complex environment. Furthermore, we should consider the introduction of doctrines and standards which contribute to interoperability.

Provision and maintenance of interoperability of commands and units is an important area of integration which allows the Alliance's joint operation and is achieved through training, joint exercises and participation in operations. In addition to standardisation procedures, it is increasingly contributing to the transformation of the defence system and the achievement of comparability and interoperability. Interoperability should not be considered as a unification or cloning, but particularly reflects the ability to achieve shared points in procedures, equipment, qualified personnel and decision-making, as well as participation in operations.

Interoperability is most clearly reflected in the areas of *NATINADS* and *Air Policing*. The *Slovenian Air Space Operational Centre* is integrated into the Alliance's system and closely cooperates with the *NATO Combined Air Operations Centre* in Poggio Renatico, Italy. Air Policing in Slovenia is performed jointly by NATO air forces and Slovenian air controllers. Similarly, the *Maritime Operational Centre* is linked to the *Allied Naval Centre* at the *Maritime Component Command (CC MAR)* in Naples. This reflects the achievements of the Republic of Slovenia's membership in the Alliance, since it does not have nor has it developed certain capabilities.

Participation in planning, preparing and conducting multinational operations and missions is an area which was very exposed during the preparations for membership and even later on. The contribution to NATO Crisis Response Operations outside Article 5 reflects the credibility of a country that is aware

of the necessity of contributing to international peace¹⁷. The Republic of Slovenia has contributed little more than 0,6 percent of international peacetime forces in the past four years¹⁸.

Slovenia's military contribution to multinational operations and missions is directly linked to the remodelling of the military, its transition from a conscript to professional armed forces as well the development of deployable capabilities¹⁹. The Slovenian Armed Forces have been participating in multinational operations and missions for thirteen years, since 1997. So far, it has participated in nineteen multinational operations and missions and on three continents. By the end of May 2010, a total of 6 096 military persons and 15 civilian experts were deployed. The Slovenian contribution has increased from its initial dispersion and participation of individuals and groups to the participation of smaller tactical units. In 2007, a battalion was engaged for the first time. This proves the connection of a structural change of the Slovenian Armed Forces and its endeavours for an increased and more active participation in ensuring stability as well as in solving global crisis situations. In addition, multinational operations and missions have a significant impact on international activities, the provision of interoperability and joint actions on the international scene.

Lessons learned from various multinational operations and missions are a significant factor in building military capabilities. When multinational operations and missions are considered as a transformational tool at the national and international level, it can be established that lessons learned and good practice provide answers to various strategic, operational and tactical questions on the employment of armed forces and military capabilities. Operations provide an opportunity to test new equipment and resources as well as to confirm some experiments in the use of new capabilities or tactics, as well as to develop a combined and multinational interoperability and joint operation.

¹⁷ National contributions include operations that are under the auspices of the UN as well as those that are performed under the auspices of NATO and the EU. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations include: conflict prevention peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement and peace building. Non-Article 5 NATO crisis response operations are classified as peace support operations, which include (a) conflict prevention, (b) building, (c) exercise, (d) conservation and (e) the construction of peace and humanitarian operations. In addition, there are other NATO Non-Article 5 Operations and Crisis Response tasks, such as (a) humanitarian assistance operation, and (b) disaster relief, (c) search and rescue, (d) support in the evacuation of civilian personnel and (e) military support for civil authorities [*AJP-3 (A), Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 2007, Slovenian translation, (SVS STANAG 2490(2)), MoD, Ljubljana, February 2008, pp. 4-11; A. Šteiner and A. Geder, *Značilnosti delovanja Slovenske vojske v dosedanjih vojaških operacijah in misijah (Characteristics of the Slovenian Armed Forces Activity in Current Military Operations and Missions)*, in *The Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces*, 11(1-2009), p. 185].

¹⁸ See also L. Jelušič, *Oblikovanje strategije sodelovanja Republike Slovenije v mednarodnih operacijah in misijah (Developing a Strategy of Cooperation of the Republic of Slovenia in Multinational Operations and Missions)*, in *The Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces*, 11(1-2009), pp. 39-46.

¹⁹ A. Šteiner and A. Geder, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-210.

The thirteen years of participation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in multinational operations and missions can be divided in three periods: the first between 1997 and 2002, the second between 2003 and 2006 and the third after 2007²⁰. The first period is characterised by the involvement of smaller and less-demanding modules up to platoon-level. During the second period, a progress in terms of quantity and quality can be observed, although dispersion is most noticeable in this period. The third period is characterised by the fact that challenges of a comprehensive approach in multinational operations and missions have been taken over. This enabled the integration of Slovenian companies in multinational structures as well as the formation of national structures in the form of battalion groups that also include modules from other countries. If the first period is characterised by the fact that the Slovenian troops appear in the international environment and gain experience, one can say that the second can be referred to as a period of search and maturation within multinational operations and missions. Yet, the third period should be considered as a time when the Slovenian Armed Forces were given the opportunity to promote themselves in the international crisis response environment. In all of these three periods, the Slovenian contingents were, from a certain point of view, dependent on partner or lead countries, in particular as a result of limitations in the strategic air lift and reduced capability to supply forces in remote areas.

By preparing for and contributing to *NATO Response Forces (NRF)*, joint and combined allied forces are designated that are ready for rapid deployment and use for rapid interventions in the entire spectrum of NATO's military engagement. The forces support the allies based on rotations, that is for a certain period of time. Most of these forces are part of NATO Force Structure (NFS). Through forming the NRF, NATO as a whole and member states transform their capabilities in order to achieve greater effectiveness and responsiveness. The Slovenian contribution has developed gradually. The Slovenian Armed Forces began with the contribution of platoon modules, later companies and ended with the contribution of battalion modules, as for example the CBRN battalion.

In order to finance *joint projects through the NSIP*, the Republic of Slovenia contributes financial resources and also receives resources through it. In this context, Slovenia is a net beneficiary, in particular regarding NATO's contribution to arranging the multipurpose military airport in Cerklje. Furthermore, Slovenia has, through co-financing, been included in initiatives that enable access to knowledge and capabilities that otherwise would be hardly achievable (*Strategic Air Lift and Air Ground Surveillance* as well as *AWACS*).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

In order to describe international areas and lessons learned, one can refer to the assessment that the Republic of Slovenia, respectively the Slovenian Armed Forces in the last six years of NATO and EU membership have successfully completed processes of interoperability, deployability and also sustainability within multinational operations and missions. Slovenia is a good example, in particular due to its objectivity in what it offers and what it has managed to achieve. But also in what the Alliance gives back in the form of increased security or support through capabilities which the country cannot provide or will not provide by itself, such as air defence capabilities and airspace security. It would be advisable that all political elites be aware of success and the special features of the Alliance. Of course, certain joint plans and commitments in the capability development in the future depend on the further development of the economic situation and recession. In this context, it will be necessary to be realistic in order not to halt the development and modernisation of the Slovenian defence system or impact it to such a degree that it could stagnate, as this might result in long-term negative consequences.

Transformation Paradigm and Challenges

While Slovenia was preparing for participation in the Alliance and began functioning as a full member of NATO, a demanding transformation process took place within NATO, enabled by the 1999 concept. A period of transformation began, based on the knowledge of changes necessary for the future. NATO has been engaged in transformation challenges and processes for the entire decade²¹. The greatest challenge is its transformation and proper understanding as well as response to changes in the security environment, due also to the fact that there are more frequent questions on energy security and environmental issues, as well as questions on asymmetric threats which have long been only in the form of traditional military threats. Transformation within NATO is a proactive and innovative process of development and integration of new concepts, doctrines and capabilities for the improvement of efficiency and interoperability within the Alliance and with its partners.

Some see transformation changes as a *transformation paradigm*²². In this regard, it is about a new approach and new understanding of changes, not only in narrow

²¹ This was intensified through searching for answers to new terrorist and asymmetric threats after the attacks on the World Trade Center twin towers on 11 September 2001 in New York and the railway station in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The beginning of the transformation period was politically endorsed at the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002 (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *NATO Handbook*, Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, 2006, p. 20). Later, the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was also established.

²² H. Binnendijk and R. L. Kugler, (ed.), *Seeing the Elephant: The US Role in Global Security*, National Defense University Press & Potomac Books, Inc., Washington DC, 2006.

defence and military terms, but also in broader security and political terms. Transformation in the narrow sense of the word includes the area of remodelling and transfiguration within the defence and military system, which is extended to and connected with the social environment. Transformation is a global and transnational process. On the other hand, it puts an entirely new light on some national defence and security issues, particularly with regard to the provision of a stable and secure environment for the functioning of governmental, economic and civil institutions. Transformation paradigm is actually a shift from the armed forces of the industrial age to the armed forces of the information age. Transformation in the defence and military field is therefore seen as a reasonable alternative to the social transformation in the use of military force, thus becoming a new theory of the changing of military organisation.

A special feature of transformation is its focus on the deliberate and voluntary, or non-revolutionary changes²³, which, however, does not exclude the depth of changes. Revolutionary and radical changes in the defence and military sphere result in too many risks and negative consequences particularly due to the fact that the old is demolished while the new cannot be immediately established and simply replace the operation of the previous system. Transformation thus signifies the abandonment of revolutionary approaches to change in military affairs, making it sometimes difficult to distinguish from changes and adjustments in the period of transition.

Transformation objectives are aimed at achieving new levels of quality and changes which correspond to modern requirements in key areas of the organisation and operation of military forces and defence sector, namely in personnel, material, technological, information and political areas. In a practical manner, transformation is reflected in the changes of organisational structures, doctrines and operations, and in the focus on capabilities, especially the areas of research and development, experimentation and learning from experience. Perhaps the most important element of transformation is the intellectual element: knowledge, learning and understanding²⁴. Education and training, research and development, experimentation and learning from experience, and consequently the profile of military professionals are becoming key areas of the transformation process.

²³ The following text has a very meaningful title: *No Revolutions Please, We're British*. It was written by Potts and Thackray (D. Potts and J. Thackray, *No Revolutions Please, We're British*, in *The Big Issue: Command and Combat in the Information Age*, ed. Potts David, CCRP Publication Series, Washington DC, 2005, pp. 29-42) and compares models of changes of military capabilities, and gives reasons for abandoning the so-called revolutionary models.

²⁴ S. W. Knott, *"Knowledge Must Become Capability": Institutional Intellectualism as an Agent for Military Transformation*, Essays 200, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 2004.

For countries dealing with change from military transition to transformation, this signifies moving away from adjustments and focusing on renovation²⁵. If military transition is characterised by the adaptation of military structures, organisation and operation with regard to the emerging situations, transformation is an attempt to create advantages not only in structure, organisation and operation, but also in the monitoring and anticipation of what is possible, bringing a decisive advantage over new situations.

The Republic of Slovenia, or its defence system and armed forces, has also found itself in the middle of these processes. Given the scope of current changes, the speed and relative success of transition from the model of mass territorial army to the model of deployable and non-deployable forces, as well as change in the manning system, one could argue that Slovenia has overcome the main transition changes. It is, however, aware of transformation challenges and is gradually realising them, conscious of the fact that continual transitional adaptation of the structure, tasks, organisation and operation of the army can no longer achieve the objectives for the future.

Integration also Means Understanding NATO

A particular challenge of integration is maintaining and expanding the understanding of NATO and the characteristics of the Alliance. This is neither easy nor unambiguous, especially in the period of economic crisis and recession, or in situations when there is no immediate threat. In the first place, NATO membership requires proper understanding of joint military operations in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty of Alliance²⁶ as well as outside the scope of this Article. In the first case, it is about the understanding of collective defence which is, in the period of moving away from the bipolar division of the world and the threat this represents, changing its priorities. In the public and among the political elite, this may cast doubt on the necessity of the Alliance.

Through the participation in Non-Article 5 Operations, more commonly referred to as NATO Crisis Response Operations²⁷, countries face challenges regarding the mission of the Alliance and its interests. This is particularly the case when it comes to the engagement of military forces in crisis areas, making it more difficult to identify common interests and the impact on the threat to national

²⁵ More on this in A. Šteiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-134.

²⁶ Washington Treaty of 1949.

²⁷ In the *Strategy of Cooperation of the Republic of Slovenia in Multinational Operations and Missions*, the term *Multinational Operations and Missions (MOM)* is adopted as common for all types of international operations.

security and the Alliance²⁸. Hence, it follows that national force structures must be adapted to both requirements, that is to the provision of joint forces for the needs of collective defence, as well as the provision of forces for participation in multinational operations and missions in crisis areas. Such willingness must be real and not merely in the form of promises. At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, members undertook to have half their forces as Deployable Forces, while ten percent of these would be in readiness or engaged in operations. This commitment is often decisive in planning the development of forces and their equipping, as well as in achieving interoperability.

Another important finding is related to the consensus and responsibility, which are the cornerstones of the Alliance. An important contribution to the achievement of consensus is also the harmonisation of the efforts of individual members. Despite the multitude of interests and wishes, this harmonisation must be balanced, realistic, targeted, and based on the implementation of commitments undertaken by members²⁹. Commitments to the Alliance are made through the processes of association, integration, and joint defence planning, and must be considered and treated responsibly. Should there be objections or even breaches of commitments, other countries and everything that connects the Alliance become faced with questions and challenges.

Slovenia is a member of two large international organisations, NATO and the EU, which brings some particularities and challenges, especially in the provision of capabilities. The Slovenian Armed Forces provide the same capabilities for both organisations, following the principle of the Single Set of Forces. In doing so, it supports better cooperation and efforts for the improvement of cooperation of both organisations in the military field.

There is another feature with which the Alliance members are faced. Frequently, the requirement to become an Alliance member is emphasised, the reason being the reduction of defence and military spending. However, the real issue is another aspect related to a more rational and efficient use of budgetary resources, which is seen in the investment in real defence needs and military capabilities. In the national environment, this is often seen as a limiting factor which prevents the use of defence resources for the purposes and needs that are not necessary or essential to defence capabilities. There are examples when defence budgets are trying to show expenses which have little in common

²⁸ On account of this, the Republic of Slovenia offers its military contribution to NATO and other multinational operations and missions which have a UN mandate and are covered by relevant Security Council resolutions.

²⁹ P. Šavc, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

with real defence matters in order to seemingly show an increase in expenditure. In cases when the issue is promoting the transparency of the defence and military budget, the sense of limitation on account of the Alliance is understandable. However, the real issue is promoting the quality aspect of use, which is the fundamental multiplier of joint military power and capabilities of the Alliance.

An important question is whether Slovenia has learned enough in the process of transition and is able to change its actions. Can this provide a basis for realistic national plans which will meet NATO's expectations? There is also the issue of how NATO planners understand force goals for particular countries and how they define expectations for the joint capability building, and particularly their deficiencies. Then, there is the question of what is of primary and what of secondary importance in case the resources are limited. Is it the national defence capabilities or those which, in addition to being used for national purposes, may also contribute to the overall allied deployable capabilities? And finally, after joining the Alliance, countries must be aware of the reasons which have led them along the path of integration and achievement of objectives which they wish to attain through membership. Such awareness is important because transition periods and changes cannot be taken back or become undone.

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The article tries to address some special features of the Slovenian path to transition in the defence and military field. Some of these features will be evident in the transformation process in which Slovenia is included as a NATO member. The article lists several experiences from the period of preparation for the accession to NATO, from the process of Membership Action Plan, and from the five-year period of integration, following the accession to the Alliance. The common denominator of all knowledge is reality as the foundation of credibility. The path to the Alliance should not be strewn with promises which cannot be fulfilled or are unrealistic and beyond national capabilities.

Transformation is a challenge which brings great expectations but also doubts, not only within the Alliance, but also in national environments. In the period of transformation, countries set themselves the goal of establishing an army which is small, but effective, highly professional, modern equipped, deployable and interoperable, and can, together with NATO, successfully implement national and allied tasks and missions.

PARTICULARITIES OF FUTURE CONFLICTS

Lieutenant General Dr Sorin IOAN

Argument

Most current sources of conflict will exist five, 15 and even more years from now. But it is very likely, in the author's opinion, that significant changes will occur in the way battles are conducted. Moreover, no army can anticipate the way in which a future enemy will use imagination to surprise and, consequently, to prepare in advance for that kind of battle. The only way of thinking, then, is the one of the paradigm that is open to adapt quickly to any change in the conduct of the future conflict both at the technical and at the human resource level.

Any conflict, in the future, will have a common feature: violent confrontation, in a combination of risk, chance and volatile nature, in which one must strike a balance in front of apparently irrational attacks.

Keywords: *friction; technological improvement; conflict; Iraq; national values; NATO*

The *National Defence Strategy*, recently passed on to the Parliament to be debated, naturally brings to attention a fundamental document for the Armed Forces, namely the *Military Strategy*. A component of the document package that substantiates defence planning, which also comprises the *Defence White Paper, Defence Planning Directive, major programmes and operational plans to use forces*, the *Military Strategy* covers a medium and long time horizon. The benchmarks that substantiate this reference document define the conceptual and functional evolution of the institution, based on thorough studies, as follows: the strategic-military assessment of the international security environment, the identification of potential military risks and threats, the national military objectives, the strategic and operational concepts to meet the Armed Forces goals and missions.

The ideas expressed in this paper, even if they may seem romanticised at times, are intended to contribute, through their content, to the studies related to the construction of the above-mentioned document.

Lieutenant General Dr Sorin Ioan – Romanian Military Representative to NATO and the EU.

Generalities

The decision regarding the options to prevent and approach conflicts has to be made by the national political structures, depending on their objectives. These options comprise, besides diplomatic and economic approaches, the military power level of ambition. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the types of actions the Armed Forces are likely to experience in a future conflict, according to their fundamental missions and then, as a coherent consequence, the essential elements for the training and equipment that could ensure their success.

In this context, mention should be made that the development of conflicts always follows a cycle of adaptation in evolution. Therefore, the military response methods cannot be constant. The general principles are valid under any circumstance so they should be correctly defined. In order to adapt to meet the requirements of future operations, the transformation process should be optimised. The characteristics of transformation should be flexibly defined, as future conflicts will be increasingly hybrid¹ in character. It is determined by the forms of combat the adversary chooses in order to exploit the weaknesses in our forces defence capabilities.

This paper exactly follows the guidelines of the recently drafted *National Defence Strategy*, configuring the Armed Forces capability elements to adapt to the requirements of future conflicts and the identified security risks, under the circumstances of limited available resources.

Therefore, the main goal of the document is to define the national and international strategic context of defence, the main tendencies of future conflicts and the implications that should be considered for the transformation of the Armed Forces in the medium and long run.

Challenges to the International Security Environment

Classical security concepts and strategies acknowledge today, as well as in the predictable future, various forms of threats, difficult to predict, which seek surprise through actions that create shock and chaos as far as human activities are concerned, which have severe consequences. The unpredictable character requires force structures that are balanced in terms of assigned missions, and policies to plan their use, well delimited from the operational standpoint and tailored to available resources. The *first* requirement of these policies

¹Hybrid: combination between conventional, asymmetric and irregular conflict.

is the clear understanding of the specific elements of the indefinite and disproportionate forms of attacks compared to the routine of conventional conflicts, in which the ratios of forces were easy to define using mathematical formulae. The *second* requirement is represented by the achievement of advantage in an asymmetrical-type action, at every hierarchical level, through controlling events and having initiative or a rapid response to most unexpected attacks. Technological superiority, having the main advantage in planning and projecting the use of force, presents vulnerabilities in the context of current and future conflicts. The *third* requirement, to define some successful policies, refers to the distribution of resources, in the context of their depletion, so that credible effects could be achieved, through the pertinent selection of the risks that can be assumed.

The ability to understand the configuration of conflicts should be developed based on correct arguments across the whole structural spectrum of forces, from the institutional to the individual level, that of the planner or combatant.

Sources of Threats

There is a series of risks and threats to security. Among them, we will analyse the following threats:

- *direct*, to the national interests, values and objectives:
 - prolongation of some frozen conflicts in the neighbourhood, especially in the Black Sea area, that may encourage illegal trafficking and exacerbate some forms of crime;
 - severe civilian emergencies having catastrophic consequences, such as natural calamities or pandemics that are beyond the capacity to prevent the effects and manage the consequences;
 - alteration of the energy assurance structures security as well as of the critical infrastructure;
 - massive and combined cyber attacks, against the command, control and leadership system included;
- *indirect*, through the social and economic effects in the region or in the collective defence structures we are part of:
 - terrorist threat, through international organisations that have functional and operational capabilities and that are supported by resources;
 - globalisation that requires cooperation, on the one hand, and represents a source of tensions that may generate instability and conflict, on the other hand; the common organisations in the same field that contribute to increasing prosperity will have to be protected against risks;

- existence of failed states that are not able to adapt to the changes in the regional or global context, with effects that may be accompanied by violent reactions and extended instability;
- climate changes that may generate instability, especially in vulnerable states, where the measures and resources to protect the environment and to conserve the agricultural land are fragile, which could deepen poverty; the Armed Forces may be called to conduct operations in areas with extreme climate conditions;
- demographic growth that is disproportionate, having high rates in poor countries, affecting food security and/or the insufficiency of water sources, thus generating the population migration to countries that are economically stable, creating risks, including extremism in large communities and interethnic or religious conflicts;
- depletion of energy resources, in the context of a growing demand, especially in countries that are totally dependant on imports, which may generate conflicts, too.

Configuration of Future Conflicts

Most of the current sources of conflict will also exist in the next 5, 15 or even more years. However, significant changes are likely to occur as far as the ways to conduct combat operations are concerned. It is very clear that no army can anticipate how a future adversary can use its imagination to surprise so that it can prepare for that particular type of combat in advance. The only way of thinking in such a situation is that of the paradigm open to a rapid adaptation to any change in the development of the future conflict as far as both technical and human resources are concerned.

In the future, any conflict will preserve a common feature: *violent confrontation*, in a mix of risk, chance and a volatile character, in which one has to keep balance while confronted with apparently irrational attacks. Conflict may be initiated as an instrument of policy but, once commenced, it can shape policy.

Conflicts will remain in the realm of friction, with their forms of rage and uncertainty. It will always be a struggle to control, conducted against an adversary that is always innovative, thus forcing procedures and responses that have not been predicted.

Seizing the initiative is not a given; it entails military engagement that involves human losses. The force protection should be *zero priority*, and the inevitable losses should not intimidate and divert the effort from the final objective of the military operation.

Our engagement may seek own advantage out of this conflict, making it more predictable, even if it cannot be completely controlled.

Technological advance and performance in the field of information are absolutely necessary, contributing to precise strikes from distance. These will not be enough for the success of operations if they are not followed by actions on the ground, in the field, among people, the most unpredictable phase, involving challenges from all directions, which require making decisions in short time, at tactical, inferior level.

The patterns assimilated during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot exactly match a possible future conflict but, certainly, one of their characteristics will always be valid: the enemy, no matter how weak its capabilities may be, has a say.

Motivation for the Participation in Military Conflicts

Every time, in the latest conflicts, it has been very difficult to provide reasons why military men from democratic countries with a high living standard have been engaged in difficult theatres of operations, at distance, with high costs, both human and material ones.

In this context, there are two aspects that should be highlighted: the *first* refers to warfare *per se*, the offensive operation, when only a few armies can afford the projection of forces at distance, with all the assets and especially logistics; the *second*, the period of stabilisation and reconstruction, inevitable today and in a future conflict, which continues to involve direct combat actions to defeat resistance, concomitantly with taking the responsibilities by the civilian component.

Resuming the reasons for engaging in a military conflict, four of them may be clearly defined:

- *to defeat the fear of danger* – the civilian population in the threatened states needs safety and it cannot be forced to live with the fear of fierce terrorist attacks in public places or under the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction from a distance;
- *to honour and safeguard national symbols and values* – any dramatic attack of a state or non-state organisation aimed at the fundamental values of another state or community of states should be responded; otherwise, the aggressor will take the control and progressively dominate;
- *to safeguard the fundamental interests* – referring, for instance, to the tendency to ban the access to resources or to attack some investments in the context of globalisation;

- *to show solidarity to keep the cohesion of a collective defence structure*
– the UN, NATO and EU membership, which provides security guarantees for the normal social and economic evolution, also requires a participative dimension, even if national interests are not directly affected.

Any analysis of this type should not make a firm distinction between the four reasons. The aim of the Armed Forces is to achieve what the other peaceful means fail to do in their preventive approach, namely to fight to protect the people against the threats that affect their way of living.

Collective Defence

Besides the major advantage, that of security guarantees, both the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union represent open doors for partnership and cooperation. There is of course a cost we pay through our contribution to the common expenditure on the partnership programmes, but we should also be aware of our benefits. For instance, our partnership with the USA provided us with support for the command and control systems, armoured vehicles in the theatres of operations, as well as other facilities for force protection (support or Medevac helicopters). In the context of limited resources under NATO coordination, bilateral cooperation programmes may be developed with our southern partners: a joint programme, for example, for combat aircraft, in which maintenance services, on the one hand, and the pilot training centre, on the other hand, may be shared to reduce costs for both parties. It may work for other domains that encounter shortfalls as they are very costly, in both cases.

Any contribution, no matter how insignificant it may appear, to the common initiatives or to NATO and the EU missions means, besides enhanced national visibility, a gain in professional experience for the experts engaged in missions and a progress as far as interoperability is concerned.

Both NATO and the EU provide member states with the right to participate, with the possibilities of own defence industry, in the joint programmes meant to develop technology and capabilities. Programmes funded through a common budget may return the contribution of each country to national economy.

Hybrid Threats

In future conflicts, as current experience shows, adversaries whose capabilities are less competitive than those of the Coalition will become more innovative, opposing hybrid risks (combination of conventional actions, ambushes, remote attacks and asymmetric actions), simultaneously, in the same area of operations.

The adversaries in military conflicts will be groups, individuals and transnational groups, supported by states and international organisations, whose combat forms will become manifest not only locally, in the conflict area, but also globally. We are likely to be confronted with violence under different forms, such as: terrorism, insurgency, crime having objectives focused on domains (cyber attacks) and disorder through intimidation or interference. Tactics, procedures, assets and techniques will continue to enhance on directions that bring advantages and influence to the adversaries, including economic, financial and even diplomatic means. These forms of conflict exceed our perception regarding military actions, be they conventional or asymmetric ones.

The conflict paradigm is a fluent one and we should adapt on the fly to take the initiative, responding through forms that are not very familiar to us but lead us to success. Gaining superiority in the field of timely information and preventive measures will be crucial.

Interdependence and Integration

Any response to hybrid threats will require a comprehensive approach through the employment of a wide range of state instruments and structures. Joint actions at a superior level will not mean the state instruments merging but a joint strategic concept aimed at effects that lead to seizing control and to achieving final success.

Military operations will be more and more dependent on other non-military components and capabilities. Besides the information community, they will involve common actions with the forces of the Ministry of Administration and Interior for example, decentralised, at tactical level.

The comprehensive approach will mean, in fact, a symmetric, balanced response to asymmetric, chaotic threats.

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Future conflicts will be conducted in environments such as the urban, inhabited, crowded ones, where the effectiveness of allied forces technical assets is reduced, which works to the advantage of the adversaries, because of the asymmetric or hybrid actions.

Adversaries will seek refuge in places such as hospitals, schools, churches, locations populated by women and children, exploiting the operational culture of the forces in the West and the importance we attach to obeying the rules of engagement and international laws.

An important objective in the context of conflicts will be to maintain the freedom of movement and manoeuvre through controlling the communication nodes such as airports, ports, bridges, satellite stations and other infrastructure elements.

Expeditionary capabilities will represent an element of superiority not only for the rapid deployment of forces for support and evacuation missions but also for the logistic support of forces.

The main component of conflict management will be prevention, using all non-military instruments, although supported by credible military forces, as a backup instrument meant for deterrence.

The most dangerous future threats will be related to the emergence of nuclear, biological and chemical means, the development of major capabilities for cyber warfare and some anti-satellite programmes that may paralyse, even if temporarily, the command and control systems. They will be aimed at counterbalancing the traditional centres of power globally.

The main pillars of resistance for any military force deployed in a country in a conflict situation will be: determinacy in accomplishing the missions and the mandate; consolidation of credibility in front of the adversary; building the trust of the local population that is not involved in multinational forces and their objectives. Collateral damage will cause an increase in the number of adversaries.

English version by
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*



CONTINUOUS WARFARE

What Future Warfare Looks Like (I)

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ

The most powerful catalyst for international relations has been and will further be represented by interests and that is why the confrontation among states seems to never disappear, however, it will focus on its non-military components.

War has shaped humankind history and will most probably continue to do so in the future.

The future war is the continuous one and the so-called new types of war are in fact its components, which could be described as new ways of achieving the same goal: imposing one's will on others through grabbing more power, seizing new territories or markets, increasing political and economic influence etc.

The most preferred way of waging war is the hidden one, utilising non-military components: policy, economy, psychological influence and information.

Keywords: *continuous war; permanent confrontation; security; future war*

In our world, eager for sensation, my approach may be regarded with the suspicion that I seek cheap publicity launching a new “bomb” on the market, one that will be defused as fast as others alike. I may disappoint you telling, and – if you are patient enough to read what I have written – I will bring arguments that it is not my intention. I would simply like to analyse the world we are living in, starting from one of its elements of continuity most of us are no longer aware of – perhaps just out of habit – or they try to ignore, adopting the attitude of the ostrich that is said to hide the head in the sand when it is in danger. The element I have referred to is the *permanent confrontation*, which we nurture every day, in relation with other fellow men, amplified by the similar attitude of the communities (ethnic, religious, non-governmental organisations, states, alliances etc.) we live in, maintained by them to promote their specific interests – that should be ours as well.

General (r.) Dr Mihail Orzeată – Associate Professor at the “Carol I” National Defence University, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

We Should Know Better the World We Live In

Getting accustomed to daily confrontation, we call it stress and we consider it an annoying or a problem-generating factor only when it gives us headaches, in the literal or figurative sense. We have been taught to consider *confrontation* only that violent dispute that has tragic consequences for us or our fellow men. Wishing to live a peaceful, satisfied and – if possible – happy life, it seems that we do not pay the proper attention to the endless and almost daily verbal disputes and competitions (confrontations) we take part in – related to the workplace, shelter, gaining a market to the detriment of a competitor etc. – and we do not take the appropriate measures to defend ourselves against any type of aggression. This is the reason why we do not notice or we pretend not to be interested when we see how competitions become more and more fierce and they involve us more and more and not only spiritually. Sport is more and more a business and so are the arts. Competition in economic markets is so tough that it has been called “*economic warfare*”, while at the political level, disputes evolve fast towards confrontation (in international relations, it is called: ideological warfare, cold war, frozen conflict, relations break etc., and in the internal political environment, competition becomes fight and partners in political formations, that try to win the votes of the electorate, become adversaries and often enemies) and, to complete the spectrum of confrontations, debates on ideas are – almost anytime – generators of “*psychological warfare*”. Therefore, competing interests change into disputes that, in turn, change into non-military conflicts that are amplified and, many times, evolve to the stage of conflicts that make use of military means. Thus, the evil in us gathers drop by drop until “*the cup is full*” and then violence appears, which destroys everything, and hardly can we repair the damage subsequently, as, once thrown, the stone cannot get back.

It would be both interesting and useful for each individual to try to assess the world we live in, having security as a reference point – that of the individual, community or world. Probably then people could discover, possibly with surprise, that, all over the world, competition is confused – and sometimes deliberately replaced – with rivalry and confrontation in multiple domains: political-diplomatic, economic-financial, social, psychological, information and military. We have called this permanent confrontation *continuous warfare*, because no war starts spontaneously and is carried out using only military forces and assets. War, as it has been perceived by most of us – namely armed confrontation –, is only the tip of the iceberg.

The World We Live In Is the Arena of Permanent Confrontation

The confrontation between people, both at individual and community level, has existed since the appearance of human beings and has amplified as they have established social formations – families, kinfolks, tribes, unions of tribes, states, empires etc.

The germ of confrontation is in each of us and it is generated by the desire to impose our will on our fellow men. The forms confrontation manifests in depend on a multitude of factors. Among them, the most important ones come from each of us inner nature and from the way in which the community we live in influence us. In other words, the character and the level of education of each individual determine him to participate in the confrontations in progress, to initiate or to avoid them.

Confrontations exist in every field of activity, from sport to politics, under the form of competitions, debates, disputes and conflicts of interests. The slogan “*May the best win*” is used not only in sports, artistic, scientific and professional contests, but also in politics – especially during elections –, in economy – that has become preponderantly competitive worldwide –, in the social domain – when we want to have a job or to fill a better paid position in the organisation we work –, in the military field – manifested through the arms race in peacetime and through armed fights at war etc.

Competitions of any kind should be conducted correctly, following rules all competitors know and accept. However, many times some of the participants are eager to win the competitions they take part in and employ subversive methods through which they change the ratio of forces between parties and alter the results. Winners are usually forgiven almost everything because “*The reason of the strongest is always the best*”¹, and losers have to face all the consequences because, almost every time, it has been “*Woe to the vanquished*”². Treachery, deception, lie³, bribe, violence, constraint, threat, blackmail, manipulation of consciousness⁴ are but a few of the methods that exist in the arsenal of those who want to win any competition (confrontation), at any cost. Those that are vainglorious, paranoid, that are touched by the frenzy of power will always take any failure as a personal insult and they will try to revenge on those that have put them in the shade⁵.

¹****, *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, Editura Vestala, București, 2004, p. 191 (*La raison de plus fort est toujours la meilleure*, in French, in original).

² *Ibidem*, p. 341 (*Vae victis*, in Latin, in original).

³ Vladimir Volkoff, *Dezinformarea văzută din est*, Editura Pro Editură și Tipografie, București, 2007, p. 29.

⁴ Alex Mucchielli, *Arta de a influența*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2002, pp. 191-193.

⁵ Tom Ambrose, *Despoți și dictatori, de la Nero la Saddam Hussein*, Editura Litera, București, 2008, pp. 28-39, www.litera.ro.

Thus, people will always look at their partners in a competition (contest, race) as rivals (adversaries), no matter the situation. That is why we should not have any illusion as far as the future is concerned. Confrontation will not disappear from social life because we, the people, seem to be endowed with the gene of conflict, which made Plautus state *“Man is a wolf to his fellow man”*⁶. It is more than 2 000 years since Plautus made this assertion. However, there have not been essential changes in the attitude of most of our fellow men. Between the behaviour of the people in Ancient times – when some rulers of states and empires decreed death sentences only because the *“culprits”* belonged to another ethnic group⁷ or had opposed to them in wars –, the one of Genghis Han, who killed tens of thousands of his former enemies, piling their bodies up⁸, that of modern tyrants – Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Idi Amin, Mobutu etc. – and that of the employees of Blackwater *“private armies”* – that shot innocent civilians⁹ – and Triple Canopy – that practised the *“cult of crime”*¹⁰, there are not big differences ... The difference may lie in the number of the dead. It is maybe surprising, yet alarming that, in the 21st century, *“there are still people who are happy when they humiliate others and who live in an extremely competitive environment, where personal relationships are fictive. They pretend to be friends but they are actually rivals, and they want to destroy each other to take the other’s money and influence”*¹¹.

At individual level, confrontation may get manifest under the form of the Italian vendetta, the Albanian Kanun, the fight for survival of the individuals that belong to the tribes that live in the African, Amazonian jungle ... or that of the struggle to maintain our workplace. The urban jungle of the 21st century may seem different from the tropical jungle only as far as ... the landscape is concerned, because the fight for survival in the cities of the modern world is almost as tough as in the jungle. According to Stanley Bing, modern people are permanently engaged in a battle that *“takes place in the real world, and neither on the battlefield nor on the rugby or the golf field, but in one of the toughest trenches: the workplace. It is a world where those who do not kick each other’s feet, cheat, gobble – and who do not do it with a certain style and grace, I add – remain at the table to pay the bill, while winners go to the next trendy club”*¹².

⁶ ***, *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre, op. cit.*, p. 153 (*Homo homini lupus*, in Latin, in original).

⁷ ***, *Când, unde & cum s-a întâmplat. Cele mai dramatice evenimente ... și cum au schimbat ele lumea*, Editura Reader’s Digest S.R.L., București, 2005, p. 19.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 90.

⁹ Jeremy Scahill, *Blackwater: ascensiunea celei mai puternice armate private din lume*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2007, pp. 30-33, www.litera.ro.

¹⁰ Steve Făinaru, *Legea celor puternici*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2009, p. 40, www.litera.ro.

¹¹ Cristina Martin, *Clubul Bilderberg: stăpânii lumii*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2007, pp. 13-14, www.litera.ro.

¹² Stanley Bing, *Sun Tzu era un biet mototol. Subjugă-ți adversarii, ține-ți aproape toți prietenii și stăpânește adevărata artă a războiului*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2009, p. 14.

I suppose the majority of the people know it is not easy to find a job under the current conditions, as our world is confronted with economic recession, poverty and explosive growth of population. On the other hand, labour market mainly needs competitive workers and managers, so the positions that are well paid and “seasoned” with various benefits are coveted by many people and it is natural to be a fierce competition for them. Throughout history, people have fought for survival and for a better life and the competition has always been tough, maybe tougher than nowadays, especially in the physical plane, as life itself is a permanent fight. From this standpoint, reevaluating the situation, we find out that: “*we fight*” (compete, confront) at individual level, for a better paid job; sportsmen “*fight*” – not only in boxing rings – for trophies; artists, journalists and other social categories “*fight*” (confront, compete) for prizes and titles; communities (states, organisations etc.) “*fight*” (confront, compete) for power, resources, for having a greater influence in the international arena, for territories¹³ etc. In other words, we *have to confront* our fellow men for whatever we want or intend to do. Therefore, we have to recognise that *we are in a permanent confrontation*, both at individual and collective level. In most of the cases, competition takes place in a civilised environment (namely, legally, without involving verbal or physical violence, and respecting the rules and regulations that are established, known and accepted by all the parties). However, competitions end with winners and losers, in whose consciousness they leave traces that are sometimes impossible to erase. Losers often develop a sense of injustice and, instead of behaving according to the Olympic adage – “*you have won continue, you have failed continue*” –, they resort to violent means to take revenge on the winners or, more frequently, on those that have delivered the verdict. This way, antisocial deeds (offences) or even *terrorist activities* occur.

Some of those who take part in competitions, no matter the type, are so eager to win so that they may employ any method to achieve their objective – bribe, blackmail, threat, fakes, cheat, misguidance, psychological influence, deprivation of liberty, use of force etc. If such behaviour occurs between individuals or groups of people, it becomes the subject of a legal action and it is called *felony*, including in the field of organised crime. If the similar behaviour occurs between states, it may also generate armed violence, namely *war* as it is usually known.

Competition rapidly changes into rivalry and confrontation, as all the people want to impose their will on others. Those among our fellow men who are rational

¹³ Dr. Teodor Frunzeti, dr. Vladimir Zodian, coord., *Lumea 2009, Enciclopedie politică și militară (Studii strategice și de securitate)*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2009, p. 16.

and well educated, after they assess the causes of confrontation and the perspectives to achieve the goals, accept to negotiate a solution without provoking the escalation of confrontation up to the level of conflict (an armed one included). Unfortunately, some people take action preponderantly under the impulse of feelings and they accept only the solutions that lead to the achievement of their objectives. When such people become decision-makers, they may generate armed conflicts because the woman they love is stolen (the Trojan War¹⁴ ...), because they want to increase their possessions or the number of the states that are part of the empires (the Romans, Ottomans, Habsburgs, Prussians, Alexander Macedon, Carol the Great, Peter I of Russia, Napoleon¹⁵), because they ... do not have vital space (the Nazis, in the Second World War), because they want to export the Communist Revolution (the Soviet Russia, Che Guevara, Cuba), to prevent communism from expanding (the Korean War, the Vietnam War etc.), to free the states occupied by more powerful aggressors (the First Gulf War), to stop ethnic cleansing (the Kosovo War), to destroy terrorism and to prevent dictatorial regimes from producing nuclear weapons (the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) etc.

Under these circumstances, the “*Perpetual Peace*”¹⁶ – imagined by Immanuel Kant, the Abbot of Saint-Pierre and others before them – is less likely to ever install ! However, we can hope for decrease in the number, scope and violence of confrontations, as more and more people, no matter their social condition, race, religion, ethnic group or the country they belong to, become aware of the danger represented by violent confrontations. Against this background, a system of relations between people may be built, at both individual and community level, in which confrontations should be preponderantly nonviolent, namely a system in which the potential for conflict that exists in every human being could find a suppression valve in participating in sports, art, scientific, professional etc. competitions. This way, negative energies may be consumed without causing too many physical and moral damages. *The maximal objective, which I consider utopian, would be the disappearance of violent confrontations, while the realistic objective is to bring confrontations at a bearable level !*

¹⁴ ***, *Începutul “Evlui întunecat” al lumii grecești*, in *Când, unde & cum s-a întâmplat. Cele mai dramatice evenimente ... și cum au schimbat ele lumea*, op. cit., p. 25

¹⁵ Hendrik Willem van Loom, *Istoria omenirii*, Editura Tai-Pan S.R.L., 1993, pp. 74-75, 91-101, 125-130, 257-259, 285-293.

¹⁶ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, in *Kant's Political Writings*, editor H. S. Reiss, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1977, and W. B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*, Cambridge University Press, 1978.

What Does Future Warfare Look Like ?

Many military experts and political-military analysts have addressed the theme of future war. Many opinions have been expressed, although no one can guarantee they will be confirmed, taking into consideration that many forecasts of this type have not been confirmed. In any field of activity, forecasts (prognoses) are probabilistic functions, as they include many random variables whose evolution is not easy to estimate because the factors that influence them cannot be integrally known or are not taken into consideration as potential participants in the process of events' development. As far as prognoses are concerned, a well-known author and a perceptive analyst in the political-military domain, George Friedman, states: *"I do not have a crystal ball ..., things that appear to be permanent and dominant at any given moment in history can change with stunning rapidity"*¹⁷. In the same vein, the Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, George Maior, considers that *"Forecast analysis in the medium and long term is always a very ambitious yet very difficult and risky project. Firstly, its testing in relation to the effective developments in reality is quasi-impossible to achieve, besides the validity and the logic of the argumentation and intellectual construction derived from the analysis and the type of information the analysis is grounded in"*¹⁸.

Although this type of approach may seem pessimistic, I consider it pertinent and useful, as each individual has to be well-informed about the aspects that may influence his life. Only this way can the public opinion be less vulnerable to manipulation and it can resist the attempts to influence according to the desire of certain interest groups more successfully. In our world "swamped" with information through tens of thousands of newspapers, thousands of television and radio stations, millions of blogs and sites on the Internet, I consider laudably the initiative of an American printing house – Greenhaven Press Inc. It publishes a series of volumes in the collection called *"Opposing Viewpoints"*, to *"present stimulating debates that can be used to enhance and teach skills ... to compare different viewpoints ... to attain the higher-level thinking skills ... so essential in a culture of diverse and contradictory opinions"*¹⁹.

The information related to the existence of tense relations between different communities, which may escalate and generate conflicts involving the use of military force, is useful not only for decision-makers, if it is timely and well argued to be credible,

¹⁷ George Friedman, *Următorii 100 de ani. Previziuni pentru secolul XXI*, Editura Litera, București, 2009, pp. 9, 12, www.litera.ro

¹⁸ George Maior, *Foreword* at Abram N. Shulsky, Gary J. Schmitt, *Războiul tăcut*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2008, p. 11.

¹⁹ Oliver W. Markley, Walter R. McCuan, Editors, *21st Century Earth, Opposing Viewpoints*, Greenhaven Press, Inc., San Diego, California, USA, 1996, p. 9.

but also for the people who are not preoccupied with national security or who are not so well-educated. The case of the second war in Iraq, following the presumption that it would have continued to work covertly on obtaining nuclear weapons, is one of the most recent and resounding manipulation of the public opinion in the USA and of an important part of the public opinion worldwide²⁰. This case has been widely debated in the international press, especially post facto, unfortunately.

It is difficult for me to express my opinions on the predictions of the American expert Trevor N. Dupuy who, in his book – *Future Wars*²¹, published in 1993, predicts the outbreak of ten wars – the Israeli-Arab War, the Egypt-Libya War, the Sino-Russian War, the India-Pakistan War, a new war in Iraq, a war for Transylvania etc. From a pessimistic standpoint, we can think that the author tried to influence the international public opinion not to react too harshly if the events occurred (among all the predicted wars, only the one in Iraq took place in 2003, although in a different context). From an optimistic standpoint, we can consider that the author tried to warn the public opinion worldwide regarding the possible evolution towards an armed conflict of some tense situations in some areas of the world. There have been predictions similar to those of Trevor Dupuy, and maybe there will be others in the future. It is therefore very important to protect ourselves against the traps of influencing, namely not to believe without assessing different data and statements, especially the shocking ones.

My intention here is neither to blame nor to get involved in polemics with anyone on this issue. I simply consider that we have to enlarge the horizon of our knowledge and investigation regarding the theme of war, as we live in a world in which events succeed at a higher and higher speed, and the reference systems, its stability and continuity elements are less and less, being replaced by permanent change. Even if I sometimes doubt that change is necessary at such a speed and I believe that some revaluations are generated by the desire to “*come to the fore with something new*”, the essence of the world tendency of evolution under the dominating influence of information and globalisation is the same. Therefore, I think the opinions that have been expressed on the future war will be validated or invalidated by the future. In fact, we will not know for sure what the future war looks like until we are confronted with it. Unfortunately, under these circumstances, the test of time will be more important for historians than for us, as it would have been a *fait accompli* !

²⁰ Michael Isikoff, David Corn, *Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal and the Selling of the Iraq War*, Crown, 8 September 2006, apud Martin Kettle, Editorial Reviews, published in *The Washington Post*, http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/b000jmk3e/ref=dp_proddesk1?ie=UTF8&n=283155.

²¹ Trevor N. Dupuy, *Future Wars*, Warner Books Inc., New York, 1993.

On the whole, war is a complex social phenomenon that has an important impact not only on those that are directly involved but also on the public opinion in the confrontation area and even in the entire world, because of the interdependencies between communities of people worldwide, under the pressure of globalisation. Although in the most important part of history, including a long period in the last century, war has been associated with the use of brute force, currently it does not have to be understood as only a confrontation that employs military means. This truth was known by experts in the military and political-military field long time ago and it seems to have become easier to understand for everyone, especially during the latest decades.

Among the opinions associated with future warfare, the most popular are the ones related to *the fourth generation warfare*²², *the Fourth World War*²³, *pre-emptive war*²⁴, *a new Cold War* – yet with other protagonists, and the *permanent warfare* (“*war has enormously expanded, taking forms that formerly were not specific to it, so we can say that we are confronted with a genuine continuous war, a permanent one*”²⁵). In these concepts, the military force does not have the predominant role. Moreover, some authors express the idea that, in the future, “*the majority of wars will be civil ones*”²⁶ or that future wars will be like the ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, namely the international community will intervene to put an end to the conflicts between different communities²⁷. Other concepts, relatively recent ones, related to the ways in which force may be used, named by most experts and analysts types of warfare – *parallel, network-centric, effects-based, unconventional, asymmetric, irregular, hybrid, information, electronic, psychological* etc., are, in fact, forms of manifestation of the military component of only one type of warfare, namely the *total and continuous warfare*, humanity has always conducted against itself.

I reckon that it may be shocking for almost anyone to hear that we are at war, without perceiving any important difference between the moment before this truth

²² Thomas P. M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating*, Berkley Books, New York, 2006, p. 8.

²³ Norman Podhoretz, *World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win*, Commentary 118, no. 2, 2004, pp. 17-54; Charles Krauthammer, *In Defense of Democratic Realism*, in *National Interest*, no. 77, Washington, 2004.

²⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *America la răscruce. Democrația, puterea și moștenirea neoconservatoare*, Editura Antet XX Press, Filipeștii de Târg, Prahova, 2006, p. 85.

²⁵ General dr. Mircea Mureșan, general de brigadă (r.) Gheorghe Văduva, *Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2004, p.14.

²⁶ Paul Hirst, *Război și putere în secolul XXI. Statul, conflictul militar și sistemul internațional*, Editura Antet XX Press, Filipeștii de Târg, Prahova, 2006, p. 69.

²⁷ M. Ignatieff, *Virtual War – Kosovo and Beyond*, Chotto and Windus, London, 2000, and Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in the Global Era*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 148.

was revealed – which, probably, some people will consider a simple statement (declaration, observation etc.) – and the one after it. It may also be shocking because “*decreeing*” continuous warfare as a *modus vivendi* refers not only to the next period but also to the previous one, turning upside down images, knowledge, perceptions about the world we have lived in.

I am convinced that most people have noticed an increase in violence with regard to the relations between people in almost all the fields of activity, from politics to sporting and artistic activities. I suppose that most of those that will read these lines will ask themselves some questions, among which there could be the following: *Why should we consider daily confrontations as the continuous warfare forms of manifestation ? How much truth does this idea express ? What does future have in store for us ? What are the solutions ?* The questions could be both a reflection of the desire to find out the truth and a form of manifestation of the scepticism regarding the previous statements. It is natural to be so, as all of us have been taught that war presupposes armed violence, casualties and important material and spiritual losses. I have no illusions about the fact that the readers will accept to change their views and adopt mine without solid arguments. That is why, in what follows, I will provide arguments to support the above presented statements.

In the preamble of my argumentation I will only remind the fact that during war, as it has been known by us so far, from our own experience, from the stories of our grandparents, parents or relatives, as well as from reading or films, life has continued: children have been conceived and born, fields have been sown and crops have been harvested, commodities and not only arms and ammunition have been produced, artistic production has been imagined and put into effect, and shots and bomb or missile explosions have not been the only causes for people’s death. In other words, although the armed conflict (war in the common acceptance) is a catastrophe, a drama for those directly involved, as well as for their families, friends and supporters, the other members of the community continue to live their lives, at a different pace, one altered by the events, but ... everyone adapts.

In the 16th century, the French officials invented the formula “*The King is dead. Long live the king*”²⁸, which was used up to the funerals of Louis XVIII. It was a concise way to express the continuation of royalty, maybe a little bit cynical one, but this is life: some people mourn their dead ones, while others celebrate children births, weddings etc. The French formula in the Middle Ages describes, to a great

²⁸ François Bluche, *De la Cezar la Churchill*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1995, p. 82.

extent, the current condition of humanity, which is dominated by confrontation: some people die, because of wars, but humanity continues to exist, as life has to take its course.

The total and continuous warfare I am referring to is different from the total war strategy, adopted by some neutral states in Europe during the *Cold War* period, whose central element was the use of military force to defend against any aggressor. In the period between 1968 and 1989 Romania also adopted the total war strategy, called the “*entire people’s war*”, although it was a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. This decision was influenced by the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, when the allied states in the Pact – except Romania – crushed the “*Prague Spring*”²⁹. The validity of our forefathers’ wisdom was proved on that occasion. They prayed to God to protect them against their friends as they could protect themselves against their enemies.

I am convinced that what is considered by some experts to be the future war is, in fact, a continuous transformation (adaptation) of its form of manifestation from what it was revealed by historians and experts in the field for the past to the conditions that have to be met currently and the predicted ones. Adaptability is conceived and implemented in the human mind that always finds new ways to surprise. Surprise has been, as it is known, the main cause of victories in any type of competition and confrontation and there are not enough reasons to make me believe that the role of surprise will diminish in the future. The area of confrontation has always been expanded, through adding non-military domains, as each competitor has wanted to win, escalating the stages of competition up to the armed violence. In other words, warfare has been and it will continue to be *multidimensional* and *continuous*.

The *multidimensional character* of warfare derives from the areas of confrontation in which it gets manifest: political-diplomatic, economic-financial, psychological, information, technologic, cultural, military etc. These components participate in the confrontation simultaneously or successively, depending on the situation configured by: the objectives set by the political decision-maker, the ratio of forces between parties and its evolution perspectives – through increasing or decreasing the number of allies and supporters –, the level of regional and global security, the attitude and the measures taken by neighbour countries and by the regional and world security organisations etc.

²⁹ Professor Nikolai Ianakiev, *Several Bulgarian Secret Records from 1968 concerning the Position of Romania toward the Invasion in Czechoslovakia*, published in: *On Both Sides of the Iron Curtain*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2000, pp. 118-121.

The *continuous character* of warfare is given by the permanent competition (confrontation) between individuals, between communities (states, alliances, religious, ethnic, professional etc. entities), between individuals and communities etc., to better support or impose interests on multiple planes: power, influence, territories and resources – human, material and financial ones. Competition, called by the majority of experts in international relations “*games*”³⁰, is preponderantly conducted “*covertly*”, namely without being declared, through the participation of non-military components – political-diplomatic (“*Influencing the strategies, events or circumstances in other countries is the essence of foreign policy ... The aim of covert actions is to influence the actions of some foreign governments ... These actions may be aimed at the government of a particular country, the population in general or a certain segment of the population*”³¹), economic, informational and psychological ones – but it may get to the so-called “*hot phase*”, namely the one in which military force is used. As a rule, confrontation using weapons signifies the impossibility of the parties to reach an agreement amiably.

Through this point of view, I would like to add my effort to those that want to warn that peace should not be only a break between two wars (namely, military confrontations). I consider it is a utopia to pretend that we can establish perpetual peace, but I am convinced that the number and scope of violent confrontations can decrease if we are well-informed, motivated and wise enough to prefer negotiation to the confrontation that employs violent means, namely to cede little now with a view to winning more in the future.

*

In the following articles, the author will approach confrontation in the political-diplomatic, economic-financial, psychological, information and military domains.

English version by
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

³⁰ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Seventeenth printing, 1999, USA, pp. 3-21.

³¹ Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Războiul tăcut, op. cit.*, p. 129.

THE LEVEL OF AMBITION

- Between Desire and Objective -

*Brigadier General Tomiță Cătălin TOMESCU
Commander Claudiu GROSU*

The socio-economic reality or, more accurately, the limited resources and the decreasing democracies' appetite for the military instrument have caused interesting evolutions at the political level. One of them concerns the way in which the final aspirations of the defence efforts are defined by states and relevant multinational organisations. These final aspirations are known, in most cases, as the level of ambition.

In this respect, defining the USA level of ambition can be considered as a complete theoretical model, which includes all the elements that are necessary for dimensioning and improving an extremely complex and broad security instrument.

Keywords: *threats; conflicts; partnership; counterinsurgency; level of ambition*

Romania, as a recent NATO and new EU member, still explores for a realistic expression of its *level of ambition*, in a way that accommodates the national aspirations, as well as the requirements deriving from the NATO and EU membership. We hope that our present endeavour will support the efforts made by those involved in defining the national level of ambition in defence matters.

Level and *ambition* are two relatively simple words, yet, capable of creating a wide range of perceptions when put together in a phrase like *level of ambition*. In a linguistic sense, the meaning of ambition is twofold: firstly, the desire for success, a strong feeling created by the aspiration for great accomplishments; secondly, an objective or goal that someone is trying to meet. It should be noted that, in fact, the connotations of *ambition* range between desire and objective or, in literary terms, between dreams and reality. *Level* is defined in many ways: an amount, number or degree of something; characteristics or qualities of an element; a relative position on a scale; height or altitude at a certain distance to a reference etc.

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The combination of the two terms, a non-material one and another with quantitative and qualitative implications, creates an idiom that troubles defence planners.

It is important to note the fact that, at the political level, the level of ambition is usually perceived as the desire for success; hence, its definition does not create a necessity for accomplishment. On the other hand, at the military level, the level of ambition is understood as an objective, a target that should be met. Obviously, a conceptual contradiction emerges and becomes visible, typically, as a discrepancy between the military and, lately, also the non-military capabilities required to meet the ambitions established at political level and the resources allocated by governments for the sustainment of these ambitions.

Expressing the Level of Ambition

Within the general context of defence strategies, the level of ambition is correlated with armed forces missions, the scale of effort, geography and the degree of concurrence. Based on these elements, a force structure is developed, decisions on acquisition and phasing out of equipment are made, and training requirements are defined in accordance with the specific personnel skills to be developed.

In short, one can identify the capabilities and the capacities for action needed to implement the defence strategy of a state.

Communicating the level of ambition is also important, especially for the relation between the civilians, on the one hand, and the armed forces and those elements that directly support the defence, on the other hand. Like it or not, in democratic societies, a few fight for the defence of the country and the others pay for this. Taxpayers must know, accept and support the institutions and the people responsible for national defence. Even if the language could seem blunt, a cold shower is needed to realise that we cannot assure our national security at an appropriate level without paying by the casualties in the operation, by acquiring modern armament systems – out of which the better were never the cheaper – and by sustaining forces that need salaries, equipment, training and moral support from the population. Bob Ainsworth, Secretary of State for Defence, states that the armed forces are “*our ultimate insurance policy*”¹.

In the specific case of NATO, the organisation with the most relevant military capabilities, “*a new Level of Ambition (LoA) (agreed in 2006) which aims to ensure NATO can conduct, in addition to Article 5 missions (collective defence),*

¹ *Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review*, the UK Ministry of Defence, February 2010, p. 6, http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/790c77ec-550b-4ae8-b227-14da412fc9ba/0/defence_green_paper_cm7794.pdf

*a greater number of more likely smaller-scale operations. But changing planning assumptions regarding numbers, size, duration and distance of operations and the required forces, assets, facilities and capabilities to undertake them has many implications for national defence planners...*². It must be noted that, when the military capabilities are significant (as for NATO and, as we will see further in this paper, for the US), the level of ambition is expressed as the capacity to successfully conduct a certain number of operations of different scale in defined geography and timeframe.

Nevertheless, there are more pragmatic manners to describe the level of ambition, mainly used by those states that define their security strategy based on their full integration in specific multinational organisations. For Belgium, a founding member of NATO, *“the level of ambition ... defines, as precisely as possible, the type and maximum number of deployable forces, the type of operations in which participation is desired as well as the duration and frequency of the participation”*³.

It is worth mentioning that a level of ambition can be defined not only for state or multinational defence organisations, but also for the services in the armed forces and other governmental institutions. For example, the level of ambition of the Swedish Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue is defined as follows: *“in the territorial waters of Sweden, in 90% of the situations, in 60 minutes following the alerting of the crews by the Sea Rescue Coordination Centre and when its position is known, be able to save a person in distress”*⁴.

Correlations between the Nature of Threats, Types of Conflict and Level of Ambition

We have already mentioned that the socio-economic reality has also produced changes in the political dimension of defence strategies. There follows a presentation of such a possible adjustment consisting in a tendency to identify the long-term geopolitical landscape with the present one. Some possible causes and implications of this phenomenon are suggested, but they should not be taken for granted.

The changes in the nature of conflicts, combined with the impact the military and non-military actions conducted in the conflict area have on the international community, have kept the states, individually or as part of alliances or coalitions,

² At <http://uknato.fco.gov.uk/en/uk-in-nato/nato-transformation/military-capabilities/>

³ *Note d'Orientation Politique*, Ministry of Defence, Belgium, 2008.

⁴ <http://www.sjofartsverket.se/en/About-us/Activities/Maritime-and-Aeronautical-Search-and-Rescue/Objectives-Level-of-Ambition-/>

engaged in lasting conflicts that evolve slowly from the initiation to the stabilisation and reconstruction phase.

In a situation like this, the missions and structure of the engaged forces are constantly changing and this requires a continuous adaptation of the involved capabilities, from a qualitative and quantitative perspective. Taking into account the rapid evolution of the threat, it is absolutely necessary for an adequate flexibility in reconfiguring the concerned capabilities to be permanently sustained with appropriate financial resources, due to the fact that requirements stemming from ongoing operations should be satisfied in the short term, in a couple of years.

A novelty, specific to prolonged involvement in operations, is the incessant emergence of urgent requirements throughout the entire duration of an operation. Concurrently, the medium and longer-term capability development should continue without gaps, in order to ensure that the capabilities to win the future wars will be available. Consequently, a competition, sometimes evolved to a rivalry, arises between the quasi-permanent short-term requirements generated by operations and those related with the capability development in the medium and longer term. In our opinion, solving this problem influences the manner to define the strategies for the participation in ongoing operations and for the development of the capabilities for future operations. As a result, one can notice a tendency to sub-evaluate the probability of a major conventional conflict for the following 10-20 years, or even more, up to 30 years. This tendency is favoured, at least relatively, by an increased visibility in media of the involvements in crisis management, articulated on political, military, economic and social coordinates. The combination of the above-mentioned aspects results in a temporary projection of the present types of conflicts – numerous, overlapping, different in nature and scale – towards the time horizon of the long-term defence planning. Hence, the level of ambition is being defined as the ability to resolve a greater number of conflicts with limited conventional military involvement or, as it is the case for the smaller states, as the capacity to sustain in operation certain capabilities or force packages. It is easily perceivable that such a definition satisfies both the involvement in the current operations and the long-term capability planning.

Although this reasoning looks like a pure intellectual guesswork, there are strategic documents recently issued by a number of states that offer support to this hypothesis. To this end, we will give some examples that show the manner the USA foresees the most probable threats, the characteristics of the future conflicts and the missions of the armed forces alongside illustrations of the defence levels of ambitions of US, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark.

Present and Future Threats

The most significant threats to the US are considered the following⁵:

- *rise of new powers (i.e. China and India) and the way they will integrate among the traditional global powers;*
- *continued growth of the influence of non-state actors on the configuration of the global security arena;*
- *globalisation, which is not a threat in itself, but facilitates the rise of non-state actors and the proliferation of WMD;*
- *terrorism, with organisations that learn and adapt rapidly. The interest of some terrorist networks in acquiring WMD exacerbates this threat;*
- *instability of states, where the worst scenario would be the collapse of a WMD-armed state;*
- *rising demand for some limited resources;*
- *rapid urbanisation of littoral regions;*
- *effects of climate change;*
- *emergence of new strains of disease;*
- *cultural and demographic tensions in several regions.*

Characteristics of Future Conflicts

The armed forces will be confronted with a wide operational and geographic spectrum and will need to cooperate effectively with a large variety of civilian entities and international structures. The main estimated features of the future conflicts are:

- *the hybrid warfare, which captures the increased complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blur between traditional categories of conflict;*
- *the expansion of the operational domain over those elements of the environment that are global commons⁶, where the adversaries can perpetrate acts of piracy and attacks against space satellites or cyber networks;*
- *the existence of the conflict sources associated with powerful states and, more probably, with chronically fragile states.*

⁵ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, USA Department of Defense, February 2010, p. 43, at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.

⁶ Global commons or universal commons are those elements of the terrestrial globe that are not the property of a person or state and are used in common by humans. The most relevant examples are the international air and maritime space, extra-terrestrial space, Antarctica, as well as virtual elements like cyber space.

Basic Missions of Defence Structures

The main goal of the US is to maintain the present international system, and this requires unparalleled military capabilities and the nation's desire to use them in order to protect the interests of the US and the common good, in general. The structure of the military capabilities is determined by the following key missions:

- *defend the country and support civil authorities at home;*
- *succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;*
- *build the security capacity of partner states;*
- *deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments, to ensure global force projection;*
- *prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction;*
- *conduct effective operations in cyberspace.*

These missions are valid both in the short and longer term, thus being possible the elimination of a possible source of the competition or rivalry that could arise between the short and longer term capability requirements. The analysis of these key missions has allowed US planners to identify *two priorities*:

- the development of key enabling capabilities including rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, intelligence analysis and foreign language expertise, and tactical communications networks for ongoing operations, as well as more robust space-based assets, more effective electronic attack systems and more resilient base infrastructure;
- the provision of forces that are flexible and adaptable so that they can confront the full range of challenges that could emerge.

Level of Ambition

The ambitions of the USA are uncomplicated to express, since this nation wishes to remain the most relevant military power, the only capable of conducting large scale military operations at strategic distance, and able to perform its role as primary security provider and defender of the wider international system.

The level of ambition is defined in qualitative terms, to describe the main military capabilities that should be developed, as well as in quantitative terms, to allow for the dimensioning of the force structure in the short and medium term. It must be underlined that, in contrast with the previous situation, the structural changes must be initiated immediately, in the short term, and continued in the foreseeable future, thus in the long term. This is probably another aspect of the debatable and possible dangerous merger and harmonisation between the short and longer-term perspectives.

With regard to quantitative aspects, and different from the past, it is not intended to preserve the capacity to fight and win two major regional conflicts in overlapping periods, but to develop the capability *“of conducting a broad range of several overlapping operations to prevent and deter conflict and, if necessary, to defend the United States, its allies and partners, selected critical infrastructure, and other national interests. This includes the potential requirement to conduct multiple concurrent operations, including large-scale combat operations, in disparate theatres”*⁷.

In order to facilitate the determination of the size and type of forces, the most probable scenario combinations are given, with a special focus on the following:

- *a major stabilisation operation, deterring and defeating a highly capable regional aggressor, and extending support to civil authorities in response to a catastrophic event in the US;*
- *deterring and defeating two regional aggressors while maintaining a heightened alert posture for forces in and around the US;*
- *a major stabilisation operation, a long-duration deterrence operation in a separate theatre, a medium-sized counterinsurgency mission, and extended support to civil authorities in the US.*

From a qualitative standpoint, the requirements are formulated, as we have already seen, at the level of the entire armed forces, and also for the services, in the following manner:

- *US ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners;*
- *US naval forces will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies;*
- *US air force will become more survivable as large numbers of fifth-generation fighters join the force. They will need greater average range, flexibility and multi-mission versatility in order to deter and defeat adversaries that are fielding more potent anti-access capabilities. We will also field aircraft, especially trainers that are well suited to support the security forces in partner states.*

The definition of the US defence level of ambition could be considered as a complete theoretical model that includes all the necessary elements

⁷ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report, op. cit., p. 9.*

for the development and improvement of a highly complex and ample security instrument. The US defence ambitions cannot be nowadays compared to those of any other state. Nevertheless, planners can largely use the threat characteristics and the foreseen types of conflicts, as well as the wide acceptance of the need for partnership. The image of the level of ambition is enhanced by presenting some more situations, resembling more with our national case.

For *Germany*, the level of ambition is defined considering the participation in operations and the possible contributions to NATO Response Force (NRF), EU Battle Groups (EU BG) and UN missions. The most unambiguous definition is given in the *Defence White Paper 2006*: “*The national level of ambition is to deploy up to 14 000 servicemen and women at any one time, distributed over as many as five different areas of operations*”⁸.

Belgium also defines its level of ambition in relation to its commitments towards UN, NATO, and EU, providing qualitative and quantitative aspects as well as details including for the services⁹. As an example, the qualitative level of ambition related to NATO is defined as the capacity to contribute to the NRF, to participate in NATO-led operations and to significantly contribute, if situation demands, to the collective defence of the Alliance. From a quantitative point of view, Belgium has recently augmented by 35% the number of personnel deployed in peace support missions led by NATO, the total rising up to 1 200. This number of personnel can be permanently maintained in different operation areas, through contributions from all services. It is in Belgium’s intention to avoid the involvement of micro-detachments in multiple operations, due to the fact that such a situation generates unacceptably high logistic support costs.

Denmark established in 2004 a level of ambition that stipulated the reorganisation of the defence system in order to “*provide operational capacities and to release resources that enable Danish Defence to mobilise and deploy forces promptly and flexibly in international operations and to maintain deployed capacities that are the equivalent of some 2 000 personnel (1 500 from the Army and 500 from the Navy and Air Force)*”¹⁰.

We only considered few states with military capabilities and capacities comparable to those of our country as examples that could form a basis for the establishment of a national concept regarding the level of ambition.

⁸ *White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, Federal Ministry of Defence, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Germany_White_Paper_2006.pdf

⁹ *Note d’Orientation Politique, doc. cit.*, 2008.

¹⁰ *The Danish Defence Agreement 2005-2009*, Copenhagen, June 2004, p. 7, at <http://www.fmn.dk/Forsvars-%20og%20sikkerhedspolitik/Forsvarsforlig/Documents/Implementeringsnotatet6.pdf>

During the past years, the *Romanian Armed Forces* have demonstrated their interoperability as well as the capacity to act jointly and efficiently in operations, from the initial phases of the military actions. Moreover, by the end of this year, through an increase in the participation in Afghanistan, the number of personnel deployed abroad will have reached about 2 000 servicemen and women. Probably, in the future, this figure could reach 3 500-4 000 troops.

In conclusion, we express our hope that the ideas presented, mainly focused on the identification of the future threats and types of conflicts as well as on the expression of the level of ambition, will constitute an impulse toward a careful examination of the national responses to an evolving security environment and a prolonged financial crisis. This effort should be finalised by defining, for Romania, a realistic level of ambition, feasible but challenging enough to support the transformation of our armed forces.



SECURITY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEMS OF LARGE UNITS AND UNITS PARTICIPATING IN MULTINATIONAL MILITARY ACTIONS

Brigadier General (r.) Dr Constantin APETROAIE

Providing the security of command and control information systems that are used in modern military actions has become a particularly important issue, because they are the main target of the enemy information attack, carried out with a view to gaining superiority in the command and control field.

At the same time with the broader use of command and control information systems, at the level of the Ministry of Defence, the shift of the centre of gravity from the strict control of the circuit of classified documents to the provision of information security and protection throughout all the phases of their existence is required, in keeping with the regulations in force, unanimously accepted within NATO.

Keywords: *virus attack; data integrity; digital systems; security measures; NATO information protection*

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According to the concepts and doctrines that lie at the basis of modern leadership systems development, the future forms of conflict will be fundamentally characterised by the attack on the information management systems. All future forms of combat will be aimed at controlling, namely gaining information supremacy and, implicitly, a superior form of conflict will be conducted, grounded on waging war techniques and information operations. That is why, the investigation of the measures taken to ensure the ceaseless functioning of the command systems of large operational and tactical units will have to prospect the evolutions of warfare, starting from the operational and tactical conditions of traditional warfare.

The goal of ensuring the security¹ of the *Command and Control Information System (CCIS)* is to “protect

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¹ The concept of CCIS “security” belongs to NATO terminology and has the same meaning with the notion of “protection”.

the information that is necessary for command, the software components and the computation and communication technical means, through the adoption of some intelligent measures that allow for preventing the enemy from intervening in the development of own processes of data collection, transmission, storage, processing, dissemination and display². That is why we consider that security is the complex priority that should be paid special attention not only during the CCIS design phase but also during the exploitation one.

Threats to CCIS

At the Ministry of National Defence level, adequate security measures have been taken since digital systems were introduced. Security measures have to keep pace with the level of threats that is constantly increasing, as hackers develop new and more and more sophisticated attacks (figure 1).

Threat Category	Threat Content
Denial of service	A form of information attack in which an entity takes action to prevent other entities in the network from fulfilling their functions.
Masquerade	An attack on the network in which an entity claims another identity.
Message modification	A threat that emerges when the content of a data transmission is altered by an unknown entity, which has an unauthorised effect.
Unauthorised disclosure	A form of information attack through which highly confidential data are compromised, being accessed by unauthorised persons.
Replay	A threat through which a message or a part of a message is repeated to produce an unauthorised effect in the network.
Trap	A threat through which an entity in the system is altered to allow an attacker to produce an unauthorised effect of a command or to predetermine an effect.
Trojan horse	An entity that, when introduced in the network without being detected, has a deliberately planned unauthorised effect in addition to the authorised function.

Figure 1: Main threats and security services to be taken into account

The hackers' attacks CCIS have to cope with are often classified as *denial of service*, *unauthorised access* and *virus attacks*. Given the severity of threats and dangers, it is very clear that the command and control information system and the related communication systems are prone to great risks. If they are not properly protected, the large units and units that participate in multinational military actions may experience the exposure of secret information to the access of unauthorised

² Maior dr. Ionel Ciobanu, *Conducerea forțelor armate la nivel strategic și operativ în condițiile realizării noului sistem de transmisiuni al armatei române – STAR*, doctoral thesis, the Academy of High Military Studies, București, 1999, p. 136.

persons, the destruction of important data, or simply the loss of *trust in the data correctness* and, implicitly, the potential loss of control over the subordinate forces. CCIS performance, *in the event of inappropriate protection*, may be reduced to zero by the enemy, in the most critical moments of combat actions.

Basic security services for a local network included in the OSI (*Open Systems Interconnection*) security architecture are the following:

- *authentication* – offers the possibility to verify the identity of a communication unit (message) at distance, as well as its source;
- *access control* – ensures protection against the unauthorised use of the accessible resources in the network;
- *data confidentiality* – achieves data protection against unauthorised disclosure;
- *data integrity* – guarantees the unaltered content of the data belonging to the users in the network or of some selected fields in an exchange of messages through a link that is focused or not on the connection, ensuring the detection of any data alteration, insertion or deletion;
- *non-repudiation* – service that may have two forms: non-repudiation *with proof of origin* and non-repudiation *with proof of delivery*.

**Functions Ensured
by Security Measures**

Resource and information access control can be exercised through different techniques, procedures and methods, among which an important place is held by the security functions regarding the identification, authentication, authorisation, access control, and access session closure.

Resource and information access control is mainly achieved through the *security measures* included in the operation system and in the other software components used in the local computer network, which generally guarantees the fulfilment of the following functions:

- establishment of a hierarchy related to the access rights in accordance with the hierarchical levels of the software products and the network resources, starting from the ones of general interest or universal use to the ones considered vital, of autosave or auto-destruction;
- separation of the network users in categories, depending on their importance in the process of command and on their allocated services and resources, mainly according to the types of information they have access to;
- permanent control of the operations executed over the network hardware and software resources, as well as over data packages and delivered messages;

- control and access limitation to the memory and computing equipment of the network server through verifying and validating or invalidating the individual or group passwords;
- assurance of dubious access interception and continuous verification of the correct management of the relational databases and information flows;
- strict administration of passwords so that they can be used by the users within the staff only, identification of passwords users and of the conformity of their right to use them, verification of the concordance between password signification and the rights to access the technical and informational resources of the computer network;
- limitation of time to access the information and resources in dependence on the specific of the activity of the users in staffs;
- cryptographic cover of information through hardware or software solutions;
- assurance of data integrity and detection of their changes or/and alteration through authentication or determination of communications and messages integrity codes;
- use of some safe and verified procedures of effective physical deletion or destruction (for the pieces of information that are extremely important) of magnetic supports.

It is also forbidden to use, in computer networks, magnetic supports other than the ones that are technically verified and checked for viruses, which have to be registered adequately.

CCIS Security

In conformity with the experience of modern states armed forces³ and with NATO standards, information protection during their existence in the command and control information systems of joint large units (units) that participate in multinational military actions is provided through applying the security services that are capable of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and non-repudiation.

Confidentiality services assure that data are not accessible, seen or made available to unauthorised users. The right to access information has to be ensured so that it respects the command hierarchical structure of large units and units. A commander (chief) is granted command and control authorised access rights to all the pieces of information of the subordinate organisational structure but not to the information of other structures (of the large unit, the unit), which may be obtained on request, depending on the combat requirements.

³ AR 380-19, *Information Systems Security (Army Regulation 380-19)*, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1998.

Integrity services provide data protection against their altering or destroying by an unauthorised action. The mechanisms used to ensure integrity include message packing, encryption, and access control through the use of authentication codes.

Availability ensures that the information sources of each and every large unit or unit are accessible and usable only at the request of the personnel authorised by the commander.

Authentication is the mechanism through which a user demonstrates to be the person it claims to be, thus the authorised and unauthorised personnel being identified. Through the information authentication, it is understood the capacity to establish its correct character exclusively on the basis of its internal structure, independent from the sources of information, receiver or sender. Usually, the authentication process is directly implemented in the information and communication equipment.

Non-repudiation is a service that does not allow any user who takes part in the information exchange to deny the fact that it has been the initiator of a message (communication) or that it has received a message (communication). The electronic signature is a safe solution for the fulfilment of the non-repudiation service.

The minimum level of information security services that have to be ensured in multinational military actions is the one established through the STANAG 4250 OSI Reference Model.

The mentioned security services have to ensure the sender that the message (communication, image) will be safely delivered to the receiver, who is the only one that can understand the information content, at the same time confirming for the receiver the authenticity of the sender and the message integrity.

Information protection in command and control information systems for large units (units) that participate in multinational military actions can be achieved by taking the following security measures⁴: communications security (COMSEC: EMSEC – emission security, TRANSEC – transmission security); network security and the communication and information systems/CIS security (COMPUSEC); security against spurious emissions (TEMPEST).

Communications Security (COMSEC) comprises all the measures that ensure the stable and continuous functioning of the networks, lines and means of own communications under the conditions of the execution, by the enemy, of intense reconnaissance and jamming actions. Also, through the application of some appropriate means meant for control and protection, the unauthorised

⁴ Locotenent-colonel Constantin Gabriel, *Organizarea protecției informațiilor în sistemele de transmisiuni ale marilor unități de arme înrunitate*, doctoral thesis, the Academy of High Military Studies, București, 2001, cap. 3.

access to the communication networks and lines to obtain information or to reduce the authenticity of the information conveyed under different traffic forms (telephone, teleprinting, data, facsimile, video) has to be banned.

The basic principle regarding the assurance of communications security is the obligation to automatically make secret all the links that use technical assets based on the electromagnetic waves propagation.

In the military specialised literature⁵, it is appreciated that the optimal organisation of information protection in the large units and units transmission systems must have the following objectives: elimination of transmission errors on the linking channels through their detection and correction; cryptographic security of the emissions and transmissions on the networks circuits and busses; transmission security (TRANSEC); emission security (EMSEC); physical protection of personnel and signals equipment.

We highlight, in this context, the importance of providing the information security through cryptographic methods that are based on the use of competitive and diverse technical assets and cryptographic algorithms.

Cryptographic equipment has to meet EUROCOM standards⁶ and to ensure optimal conditions to interconnect the signal systems of the large units and units belonging to different national armed forces, at the level of bus networks or channels.

According to NATO standards, encryption is *mandatory* at the bus network level (2Mbit/s) and in mono-channel radio networks of mobile clients and *optional* between terminals, on independent circuits, in campaign radio networks and in ground to air radio networks.

Network security and the communication and information systems security (COMPUSEC), mainly of those installed in the command posts of large units and units, is a fundamental and omnipresent measure in the command and control information systems. The security environment of networks and CIS as well as of the related equipment represents a multidimensional environment in which they can exercise their functions without being influenced and destabilised by the environment conditions in the battlefield and safe from the possible information attacks and threats.

The evolution of the security environment is related to the complex protection of networks, comprising all the domains that influence their safe functioning, namely the physical, technological, informational, and human ones. Experience

⁵ AR 380-19, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-21, 36-37.

⁶ D/1 *Enhanced EUROCOM System*, Crypto Supplement, 1999.

has proved that computer networks security depends, firstly, on people (the personnel that exploit them) and they are implemented through specific technologies of technical security, software and firmware, as well as through the adoption of some organisational measures to protect own information through preventing the information divulgation, interception, unauthorised electronic access, manipulation and modification.

Communication and information systems security comprises the aggregate of measures that ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information that is proceeded and stored, while computer networks security⁷ represents their capacity to cope with any attack of intended or accidental destabilising factors that most of the time come from the inside, so that the main functions of the CCIS could be permanently preserved.

The security policy of the networks and CIS within the command and control information system of a large unit or unit represents a continuous activity that takes into account the hardware, software and procedure domains.

Special attention has to be paid to the protection of software and hardware components as well as of the databases against virus attacks, not only for the communication and information networks and systems but also for their equipment.

Technical equipment of modern command and control systems security against the interception and analysis of spurious emissions (TEMPEST) prevents the information content from being disclosed, received, subject to processing or other operations made especially by the communication and information systems as well as by the related equipment that, during their functioning, emanate spurious transmissions. The security is ensured through diminishing the level of spurious emissions, limiting the access of unauthorised persons in the areas where communication and information systems and related equipment are installed, continuously measuring the level of spurious emissions and adopting some severe organisational and technical measures to eliminate or reduce the possibilities to intercept them.

Of course, the measures taken to physically protect the personnel and the equipment within the CCIS, especially against espionage, sabotage, failure or stealing, as well as against the enemy attack by fire are significantly important. Therefore, the following will be ensured: the strict access partition, the establishment of a strictly delineated responsibility domain for each operator, the arrangement

⁷ Gh. Ilie, I. Stoian, *Securitatea informațiilor*, Editura Militară, București, 1996, pp. 213-222.

of the equipment under shelter, the ceaseless control and surveillance of the lines, terminals, communication and information systems and related equipment.

The thorough organisation of the guard and defence of the transmission centres and lines, as well as of the computer networks is an essential and mandatory action, not only in the multinational military actions in peacetime but also at war and it has to be included in the general security measures planned by the staff of the large units and units.

**Protection
of NATO Classified
Information**

We highlight the fact that, at the level of NATO and of a multinational force headquarters, the achievement of adequate levels of security for the protected information depends on the cooperation of allied members.

The fundamentals of this approach, within an alliance of independent and sovereign states like NATO or within a multinational force, are presented in the document *C-M(2002) 49*, also called “*Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)*”, which was unanimously agreed upon by member states. This document provides the minimum security requirements the states agreed to meet to protect the classified information within the Alliance. Through this framework document, the basic principles and minimum security standards that are to be applied by NATO member countries to ensure a common level of protection for the classified information exchanged between parties are established. Based on this document and on other specific norms established by the Alliance, each state makes a commitment at national level to ensure the adequate protection of NATO classified information, which is not the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence only.

When a state joins the Alliance or takes part in a NATO-led multinational force, it will agree on the common commitment to the adequate protection of NATO classified information. Each state makes its own evaluation of the measures taken by the other states to respect this common commitment and, on this basis, determines what type of information it will exchange within the Alliance. Thus, any failure of one or more large units that participate in the multinational force regarding meeting the security requirements may lead to the quantitative and qualitative diminution of the military information exchanged between them.

Considering the above-mentioned facts, it is clear that, since Romania joined the Alliance, the bilateral relations with the allied members in peacetime and in common military actions have been consolidated, and it has been an increase

in the responsibilities related to the protection of classified information from NATO and the allied members (multinational coalition), in conformity with the regulations in force, unanimously accepted.

*

It can be appreciated that the *information and communication technology* has a major impact on the way multinational military operations are conducted, as the large units and units in the armed forces of modern states largely use commercial hardware and software that, besides numerous advantages, entail serious risks. Military command and control systems as well as the current activity depend on the information infrastructure more and more. That is why, the goal of information security – as part of defensive information operations – is to protect not only the computer and communication networks but also the basic information infrastructure in order to ensure the ceaseless functioning of command systems in combat actions.

It is a reality that the armed forces of modern states train intensely to cope with the new missions for which they will adopt a specific structure. Under these circumstances, to ensure a real command capability is an essential condition for the fulfilment of assigned missions.

To provide CCIS with the adequate information security to counter these substantial threats is a difficult problem that requires a structured approach, starting from the level of ministry, general staff and services, down to large units and units. This approach requires a set of effective policies and procedures to establish the necessary framework for the construction and evolution of the necessary organisational structures and capabilities. It requires the development of information security architecture (INFOSEC) based on a thorough analysis and on the understanding of dangers and threats, of the vulnerable parts of the system, as well as of the availability of countermeasures. The approached architecture should be founded on the reality and then on the existent security products as well as on the ones that are under development.

English version by
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THE TRANSFORMATION OF MILITARY ORGANISATIONS – Change-generating Factors, Stages and Finality – (I)

Colonel Gheorghe DIMA

As a body specialised to wage wars, the military is a group with a specific organisation, which operates based on specific rules and regulations arising from the military life and the requirements of armed combat.

Organising military structures is an ongoing process that takes place in stages, either slower or dynamic ones, depending on the evolution of a complex of factors that determine changes in the organisation and operation of security and defence of states or coalitions of states.

The evolution of the contemporary military phenomenon has significant implications on the structure of military forces, the procurement of war equipment and materials and the headquarters, staff and troops development and training. The aim of the whole activity is to improve the organisational structure, to increase the combat capacity of all echelons, particularly those directly fighting, to ensure greater firepower and manoeuvre capacity on the battlefield.

Keywords: *transformation; modernisation; national security; joint operations; organisational change*



The world around us undergoes continuous change. Political relations, economic borders, technological limitations and social interactions are continuously redefined. War and the way it is waged, as an expression of the political goals of one nation or some persons, are subject to similar turbulence.

As these factors combine to model the nature of the future conflict, it is the duty of professional military to anticipate and foresee the impact and to plan the response in order to develop security strategies, appropriate organisations, equipment, doctrines and roles. The process requires the evaluation and assessment of the influence of the current security risks on the future. At the same time, based on the existing concepts and reasoning, the trends in evolution will be analysed and predictions will be made.

The armed forces conduct this process, usually calling it *transformation*.

Colonel Gheorghe Dima – Structures and Armament Planning Directorate, the General Staff.

Military Organisations Transformation

Transformation in the military field has been given different definitions by the experts who have addressed this issue. The opinions expressed are diverse and the simple presentation of some of them comes to support the above statement.

What is transformation ? What is the significance of the fundamental transformation of the military forces ?

Webster's Dictionary¹ defines transformation as follows:

- the operation of changing one configuration or expression in another; in other words: *What will the impact of transformation on the equipment, force structure or doctrines be ?*;
- the change of characteristics, for example: *Which will the implications of transformation for joint operations be ?*;
- the change of nature or functions: metamorphosis; for example: *How exactly will a series of things, such as the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), computer and information technology, other advanced or future concepts influence the military functions on the battlefield ?*

At the level of the North Atlantic Alliance, experts appreciate that *"military transformation means more than just a gradual reform or the acquisition of new weapon systems. It encompasses accelerated technological modernisation, doctrinal reform, reorientation and reorganisation of force structures, and a culture more open to change and risk. It redefines the way combat power is generated and engaged in combat and leads to new ways to design and conduct military operations"*².

The former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in his speech regarding the *US Armed Forces Transformation in the 21st Century*, delivered at the National Defense University in Washington, stated that *"transformation in the military field means more than just building high-tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. It is also about new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting. [...] Preparing for the future will require us to think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. An ability to adapt will be critical in a world where surprise and uncertainty are defining characteristics of our new security environment"*³.

At the Romanian Armed Forces level, transformation has been the subject of many studies and analyses in which specialists have identified and explained the reform dimensions: *the conceptual dimension, the structural dimension,*

¹ Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition, 2008, <http://m-w.com/dictionary>

² *Understanding NATO Military Transformation 2005*, Allied Command Transformation, p. 4, <http://www.act.nato.int/media/5-Multimedia/Doclibrary/unmtbooketenglishversion.pdf>

³ <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183>

the operational-functional dimension and the infrastructural dimension⁴, the main characteristics of this domain: *complexity, multidimensionality and continuity*, as well as the conceptual elements which became the theoretical foundation that allowed for the development of the military institution reform plans, which materialised, in 2005, in the first form of the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, updated in 2007.

*The Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy stipulates that “As far as the force structure is concerned, the **fundamental goal of transformation** is to achieve the new capabilities that allow Romania to respond to the current and future challenges in the security environment. They will meet the specific requirements stipulated in the Constitution, the commitments made by Romania to NATO, the European Union, as well as within regional initiatives and coalitions.*

*The **general objective** of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation is to achieve a structure that is modern, completely professional, highly mobile, efficient, flexible, deployable, sustainable, able to act jointly and to address a large spectrum of missions, both on the national territory and outside it”⁵.*

Transformation is an effort that requires the active participation of all the important components of the organisation. It is a process that models the changing nature of the military domain through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organisations.

It can be stated with certainty that transformation is a continuous process. It does not have an endpoint. Transformation anticipates and creates the future and it is related to the correlated evolution of concepts, processes, organisations and technology. Transformation generates new competitive areas and competencies and identifies, leverages, or creates new underlying principles for the way missions are carried out. Transformation also identifies and leverages new sources of power. The main objective of these changes is to gain advantage, superiority in all types of operations.

In Romania, the military reform has undergone a natural evolution: firstly, in the field of concepts and attitude and then through the structural, operational-functional and infrastructural re-evaluation and re-dimensioning.

The Romanian Armed Forces transformation – from the ones organised, equipped and trained to be part of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation into the ones able to meet the new risks and threats at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st one – has presupposed important efforts in the economic-financial

⁴ General de flotilă aeriană dr. Mihail Orzeată, *Opinii privind domeniul conceptual al reformei în Armata României*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 4, July-August 2003, p. 12.

⁵ *Strategia de transformare a Armatei României*, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 14.

and moral domain, and the risk-taking on the part of the decision-making structures at national level, knowing that any ample transformation involves vulnerabilities, as a result of the reduction in the combat capacity of the military body that is subject to restructuring⁶.

Transformation is a vital component of any fundamental innovation strategy of an organisation, a strategy that also includes another vital component – *modernisation*. Transformation and modernisation do not compete but they need to balance. They are important processes and any large organisation, as the military one is, has to undertake both of them in order to enjoy success.

There is a series of questions that arise such as: *What actually changes ?; Where do these changes occur ?; What is the pace of these changes ?* The answers are not always simple.

Many agree that change occurs in the field of military thinking, equipment and organisation in order to meet the future requirements of national security. It is clear that the security environment is different from the one that existed a decade or more ago. Some changes are significant or even revolutionary. Some of them are fast while others are slow.

The identification of some viable solutions requires clear responses to the basic issues involved. Among these issues, the following can be mentioned:

- *What is the vision for the future force structure, how will its structure, procurement and training be changed ?*
- *Accommodate the requirements regarding the resources necessary for modernisation and transformation.*
- *Determine the correct way to follow for the transformation of military forces.*
- *Decide the future role of the armed forces services and the other components.*
- *Determine the appropriate impulses for the transformation process and the actors that are to be involved.*

The transformation of the armed forces organisation presupposes the achievement of full concordance between the organisation of units and large units and their combat missions. Only in this way will the organisation of the armed forces as a whole correspond to the aim of waging the war or of carrying out the other missions.

Taking into consideration that the armed forces represent the main component in the structure of the national defence system, they have to permanently meet the requirements of armed intervention, namely to be organised and equipped

⁶ General-maior dr. Mihail Orzeată, colonel dr. Costinel Petrache, *Reforma armatei în perioada 1990-2004*, in *Statul Major General. 1859-2004. Istorie și transformare*, coordinator general-maior dr. Mihail Orzeată, Centrul Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2004, p. 278.

so that any moment they could carry out a combat mission established by the state leadership.

To this end, the armed forces organisation in peacetime has to ensure the functional framework in keeping with which structure all the armed forces necessary at war can be rapidly constituted. Secondly, the organisational framework in peacetime should allow for the successive training of the reserves that augment the armed forces at war.

At the same time, the organisation of the armed forces in peacetime has to meet the requirements of modern combat so that they could carry out a combat mission even if they do not adopt the wartime organisation.

The way in which the armed forces are organised at war represents the synthesis of the combat experience, of the creative thinking of commanders and staffs, and it is an expression of the judicious, rational employment of the forces and assets earmarked for carrying out the war and the assigned missions⁷.

The optimisation of the organisation of the army force structure should be a constant of its evolution, which requires that each headquarters or combat structure should be organised so that they could operate with maximum efficiency and in a short period of time, with as reduced as possible material, financial and human resources. The elements that do not directly meet the training needs or the requirements related to carrying out combat missions should not be part of the army force structure. Forces should be organised, equipped and trained so that they could act in a timely manner, in any situation, and with their full combat power.

In the development of the transformation process, the fact that, for the armed forces organisation, considerable material and human resources are used, both in peacetime and especially at war, should be taken into consideration. These resources are not inexhaustible, and modern warfare brings to attention their continuous refreshment, hence the existence of as large as possible reserves. That is why, not only the limited quantity of the existing forces and assets but also the one of the reserves earmarked for war require that they should be used rationally and with maximum efficiency. Therefore, the organisation of the force structure, irrespective of the echelon, should ensure the optimisation of the combat technique manning with the necessary personnel to cope with the prolonged efforts and the situations specific to the combat preparation and conduct.

⁷****, *Teoria organizațiilor. Note de curs*, coordinators colonel Neculai Bălan, maior dr. Dumitru Iacob, in *Buletinul Învățământului Militar*, Year III, no. 1-2, special issue, Direcția Învățământului Militar, 1996, p. 202.

Change-generating Factors

The issue of organisational transformation is without doubt one of the most debated ones in the specialised literature. The majority of change analysts and theorists tend to accept the idea that organisational transformation has two main sources: on the one hand, the changes in the environment and, on the other hand, the changes of the organisation from the inside, more precisely the ones determined by the strategic command. It is obvious that the two types of change can be separated only at theoretical level, if we take into consideration that many of the organisational changes that seem to be determined by the environmental requirements generate, in their turn, a chain of many other changes. Some of them could influence in themselves the characteristics of the environment.

The decision to initiate the reform process as well as its entire development is influenced by a series of *internal factors* (the force and dynamics of national economy, the priorities established by the political decision-makers as far as the resource allocation is concerned, the economic-social stability of the country etc.) and *external ones* (risks and threats to national security, trends in the evolution of the international political-military situation – especially the one in the area of strategic interest –, the international commitments of the state etc.)⁸.

We certainly live in a permanently changing environment, characterised by growing complexity, turbulence and dynamism. Among the main transformations occurred or expected in the post-industrial society, the organisational environment respectively, we can mention globalisation, competition, the rapid pace of technological change and especially of the new information technology, the more and more evident focus on knowledge and information etc. It is evident that each of these tendencies, individually or in combination, contributes to the organisational change.

Experts in the field of transformation management list the following as the most popular and efficient strategies of organisational change: downsizing, strategic innovation, strategic planning, organisational learning, total quality management and defensive restructuring.

Warfare changes continually, led by the vectors of demography, political forces, ethnic-religious influences, economic factors, environmental factors, technology and development. Change induces corresponding modifications in the relation between the state, population and the military domain. As these relations change, the means employed to achieve the political objectives also evolve. The progress of the military means and operations has to be constant and relevant for the changes in the nature of warfare.

⁸ General de flotilă aeriană dr. Mihail Orzeață, *Opinii privind relația resurse – reformă în Armata României*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 5, September-October 2003, p. 11.

There have been numerous such moments in history: the gunpowder revolution, the first industrial revolution (involving the appearance of the musket), the second industrial revolution (involving the appearance of tanks and aircraft) or the current information revolution. Each of them has profoundly changed the way military actions are conducted.

The factors that generate the change of the military organisation are found in the context of the changes that occur in society, the transition from the industrial age to the information age, the mutations in the characteristics of warfare, as well as the threats in the security environment.

As a consequence, there are essential changes in the content of the security strategies, military, departmental ones, as well as of those that approach risk and threat management.

The importance of the analyses regarding the future of military capabilities becomes greater and greater under the influence of the factors that generate change in the nature of warfare. For a long period of military experience, the nation-state has had the monopoly on the use of violence. The erosion of the state monopoly, combined with the enlargement of the possibilities to procure modern technique and armament highlight the need for a new re-examination of the way to perceive the nature of warfare and its role. War remains a form of expression of the community, employed by a larger number of actors than it used to be in the past. The increase in the number of actors leads to questions regarding the relevance of further use of the existing methods and instruments to wage the war.

Transformation is a process that allows for strategic interests sustainment.

Transformation Stages

According to the types of changes that are specific to military organisations, experts have also identified, in principle, the stages to be completed. Although the opinions expressed are quite different, it can be appreciated that there are some general theories which may be accepted in the military domain too. Their synthetic approach allows for the correct understanding of the way in which general rules (viable for large and complex organisations) become manifest at particular level (military organisations).

In general, the opinions converge on the existence of the following phases and stages of transformation:

a) Preparation phase that entails: acknowledgement of the necessity for change (identification of a need for change, often generated by some external pressure on the organisation); identification of the level or levels where change has to occur – individual, team, group or organisational – and of the probable degree of complexity; identification of the change driving and restraining

forces (force field analysis); identification of the level of opposition to change, its possible causes and the methods to diminish it.

b) Implementation phase – a way to implement change, almost unanimously recognised by experts, is the one identified by Kurt Lewin, which presupposes three essential sub-phases, each of them having specific elements. Lewin expressed the balance of changing forces using the following algorithm: “*unfreezing behaviour – changing behaviour – refreezing behaviour*”⁹.

“*Unfreezing*” represents the change of the initial state of equilibrium that sustains the existing behaviour and attitudes. This process has to take into account the threats related to change, as they are perceived by people, and the necessity to motivate the affected people to achieve, through change, the natural state of equilibrium. It may be performed by managers, through introducing information that allows for a comparison between the desired state, which determines change, and the actual one.

“*Change*” refers to the implementation of new reactions, based on the new pieces of information, transformation that allows for the transition to the desired situation. A change may be made rapidly or in time. Fast changes are the ones that have been clearly planned, require the little involvement of other people, so the opposition may be overcome easily. Slow changes are less planned, need more involvement on the part of people, and opposition cannot be eliminated but diminished.

“*Refreezing*” represents the stabilisation of change through implementing the new reactions in the personality of those involved. Many times, a carefully planned change may result in failure because of the insufficient attention given to the consolidation or refreezing period. Things can go bad, which generates new opposing attitudes. The most important risks a renewal action may encounter occur exactly during the refreezing stage. Because of the unforeseen difficulties, enthusiasm begins to erode and people slip back into the comfortable routine they were accustomed with. Therefore, the refreezing stage may take place without the particular renewal being actually incorporated. That is why the change process has to be monitored so that the management measures required by the situation could be taken. Otherwise, the refreezing stage cannot be completed satisfactorily.

c) Change assessment phase. It is one of the most difficult phases. It is often difficult to appreciate the results of change in relation to the initial objectives, and it is sometimes difficult to define criteria properly. Then, many times, unexpected effects may occur. However, if the objectives and assessment criteria have been carefully established, this process may develop.

Managers have the duty to set measurable objectives and to monitor the essential criteria before, during and after the implementation of change programme. Many times the assessment may be carried out in parallel with the change programme, so it is not mandatory to do it at the end of the implementation programme only. Moreover, change assessment should provide the information that lies at the basis of the preparation and implementation of the next one¹⁰.

In conclusion, before being implemented, any change has to be planned. Furthermore, after the process completion, it has to be assessed, to find out if it has been a success or a failure. Putting in practice the change planning,

⁹ ***, *Teoria organizațiilor ...*, *op. cit.*, 1996, pp. 138-139.

¹⁰ General-maior (r.) dr. Emil Ciobanu, *Managementul schimbării*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 4, July-August 2008, p. 23.

implementation and assessment model does not allow forgetting that all the phases of the process have to be carefully performed. This theory, which analyses transformation in relation to the three phases – preparation, implementation (unfreezing, change, refreezing) and assessment –, allows for a concrete approach in the military field.

Within military organisations, change is a permanent element. That is why, in the preparation phase that precedes transformation, stress should be laid on the correct identification of the need for change and of the level or levels where change has to occur – individual, team, group or organisational –, of the domain it becomes manifest and of the probable degree of complexity.

The complexity, scope and importance of the military capabilities transformation require for a strategy or a similar normative framework to be initially established to guide the transformation efforts and to monitor the resources that are to be invested to meet the transformation objectives. This normative framework has to include guidelines and objectives, responsibilities so that results could be achieved, and the management instruments that are indispensable to guide the activities and to monitor the results. Equally, the following set of principles has to be rigorously respected¹¹:

1. *Transformation has to be led by important leaders.*
2. *A coherent mission and integrated strategic objectives have to be set to direct transformation.*
3. *A set of basic principles and priorities has to be focused on right from the beginning of transformation.*
4. *The implementation of each objective has to be monitored and progress has to be assessed starting the first day.*
5. *A competitive management system has to be employed to define responsibilities and to ensure the responsibility for change.*
6. *A communication strategy has to be established to share the expectations and the progress made.*
7. *Employees have to be involved to provide their ideas and to take part in change.*
8. *An optimal organisation has to be designed.*

The change implementation phase requires a roadmap able to ensure the evolution of the military organisation since the moment transformation is initiated up to the objectives set by the strategic command are met.

The analyses related to the three above-mentioned stages, namely unfreezing, change and refreezing, even when it comes to such a complex organisation as the military one is, allows for the transformation process to be divided into stages. Mention should be made that, at the organisation level, more than one process

¹¹ ***, *Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations*, The US Government Accountability Office (GAO-03-669), Washington, DC, July 2003, p. 2.

develops simultaneously, and their different evolution pace generates the situation in which, at the same moment, some of the transformations that are planned or under implementation are at the unfreezing stage, others at the change stage, and others at the refreezing stage.

At the elements of the military organisation level, such as the force structure, the development of the change implementation phase allows for a different approach. I suggest, in this context, that the objectives achievement should be prioritised and divided into stages as follows:

- the transformation of doctrines, tactics and specific training;
- the transformation of command structures, combat structures, combat support and logistic structures;
- the transformation of the structures at the strategic level, initially, and then of the ones at the operational and tactical level;
- the organisational transformation, the combat and protection equipment transformation.

In this variant, transformation may be planned and performed in stages, setting some activities and objectives that are clear, time-limited, as well as precise responsibilities to achieve them.

The chosen solutions have to respond, in relation to the future situations, to the following questions:

- *What is the most appropriate structure to defeat the current and future adversaries ?*
- *How could the transition from a force structure appropriate for the current adversaries to one appropriate for the future adversaries be made ?*
- *What changes in the force structure could lead to an efficient combat force against the known and unknown adversaries ?*
- *What new weapons and armament systems should be procured ?*
- *How should training be reorganised and what should be intended to do ?*
- *What tactics are efficient against potential adversaries ?*
- *What should we do to discover and use new tactics ?*
- *What are the operational concepts that should guide the projection of some new tactics ?*
- *How should command and control be organised to be more effective ?*

An important moment for the implementation of change, often omitted, is experimentation. For a series of changes, as those belonging to the category of structural organisation, preparation and conduct of combat actions, training for fight, procurement of armament and combat assets etc., initial experimentation is required. It provides those responsible for change with a rapid response regarding the effectiveness of the measures under implementation and allows, at the same time, for timely decisions to be made to continue, stop, or rethink some processes subsumed under transformation, in order to meet the set objectives. Important savings in resources as well as the exercise of the involved force structures result in an increase in their cohesion and in operational capabilities.

For the change implementation phase, I consider relevant the principles that are common to all military organisations, the stages being milestones for the establishment of an effective roadmap. These stages are different and specific to each and every organisation, although they may be subsumed under freezing, change and refreezing. They are determined by the initial situation and the fundamental goal, by the set objectives, the way to approach transformation, the capacity to fund the planned transformations etc.

After the completion of the implementation process, any change in the military domain has to be assessed to find out to what extent it has been a success or a failure. This action is performed by specialised, professionalised structures that have a high degree of adaptability, effective and multidisciplinary ones, whose results develop the data and information support necessary for the substantiation of the decisions and support the planning and development of other activities related to transformation.

The systemic and structural assessment has to be aimed at the identification of the state and evolution of the planned parameters of the transformation process and to provide the data and information necessary for the substantiation of the correction decisions. It is necessary to determine the correctitude of the implementation of the policies and of the development of the plans and programmes initiated within the main fields of activity in the military system, in direct relation to the priority courses of action established through the normative planning act, to identify the possible malfunctions/deviations from the planned/predicted parameters, to establish the causes and to promote repair solutions/recommendations necessary for the military organisation leadership. As far as our armed forces are concerned, the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* in 2007 stipulates the following evolutions for the domain of systemic and structural assessment¹²:

- *conceptually*: the adaptation and enhancement of the normative and methodological framework regarding the assessment planning, development and completion, in accordance with the transformation process and stages;
- *organisationally*: the establishment of a modern structure, capable of adapting to the process of armed forces transformation, one that is efficient, credible and harmonised with the similar institutions in the armed forces of other NATO member states;
- *operationally*: high specialisation, able to provide multidisciplinary expertise in the systemic and structural assessment of the domains that are specific to the military institution; configuration and implementation of a modern system to train and certify assessment officers (or assessors), compatible with the similar ones in the armed forces of other NATO member states; adoption of some information procedures and applications to lead to the improvement of the collection, storage, processing and interpretation of the data and information related to the state of the military body.

¹² *Strategia de transformare a Armatei României*, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 27

Armed forces undergo transformations to be able to better fulfil the missions determined by the main goal: to ensure security. Existing capabilities are changed, other new ones are established where they are necessary, so that they may respond efficiently to any assigned mission. The necessary changes are made so that they could adapt to the new conditions in the environment in which they conduct their activity and to the requirements of the new missions they are required to carry out. Structures are reorganised to be more mobile, efficient, flexible, and modular. Thus, only the necessary forces will be employed and not the same forces each and every time.

All these happen because any large organisation that does not change as far as the response and anticipation of the changes in the environment are concerned will lag behind and will not be able to carry out the assigned missions.

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In the second part of the article, the author will present the particularities of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation in the context of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

English version by
 **Diana Cristiana LUPU**

YEAR 2010 - Between Forecasts and Confirmations -

Fleet Rear Admiral Cătălin Silviu DUMISTRĂCEL
Commander BEng Adrian VOINEA

The American concern in the field of defence that is aimed at maintaining the US global action capacity, as well as the revival of the military relations with allies and partners are highlighted in the Quadrennial Defence Review Report 2010, which represents the main document of the US Department of Defence lying at the basis of the long-term agenda of the activity in the field of defence. In line with it, one of the priorities according to which the USA will adapt its regional military architecture for the next five years is represented by the reaffirmation of the commitment to Europe and NATO, through maintaining a robust presence on the continent and developing the European anti-missile defence capabilities.

Keywords: anti-missile defence system; Jihad; credibility; Afghanistan; threat; NATO

The dominant theme of 2009 was the global recession that had major implications on all the sectors of social life and on the majority of the population. A series of financial events that shook the US banking system spread rapidly to the rest of the global economy. From the high-technology producers to the raw commodities providers, everyone was deeply affected by this phenomenon. At the end of the last year, there were signs of recovery in global economy. Although recession ended in some sectors of the US economy even in the middle of 2009, the problems related to poverty will continue to manifest in other areas of the world. The recovery is still unsteady, but there are signs for a positive forecast in the next period.

As George Friedman, the Chief Executive of STRATFOR¹ states, 2010 should have been characterised, among others, by the revival of Russia as a great power in the international arena,

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¹ Strategic Forecasting Inc. – a private intelligence company in the USA, the main online editor of geopolitical analyses worldwide, also known as the “Shadow CIA” (E. N., see also <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-6702261-stratfor-gandeste-din-nou-romania-paradigma-razboiului-rece-rezultatul-alegerilor-poate-duce-revolte-sociale-care-bine-primate-rusia.htm>).

following the relaxation of the USA in the '90s, when the idea of Russia's weakness generated a state of comfort, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s devoured, in their turn, the US military resources. With the recent decision to send even more forces into Afghanistan, the US preoccupation with the Islamic world will become more resource- and energy-consuming, allowing Russia to have its own policy in its near vicinity².

Another element that favours this situation could be a sharpening crisis in the Middle East. Israel is more and more convinced that the nuclear programme of Iran has become mature enough to be a real threat to the existence of the Jewish state itself. International diplomatic efforts to keep this programme under control are aimed not only at forestalling a future nuclear threat from Iran but also at preventing a possible attack from Israel on Iran, fact that would cause a general battle in the area of one of the greatest "energy artery" in the world – the Persian Gulf. The only questions that arise refer to the military or non-military nature of this crisis and to its limitation to the Persian Gulf only.

In this context, it could have been anticipated a year 2010 in which Israel would have tried to force a conflict to break out, the USA would have done its best to avoid it, Iran would have prepared for it, and Russia would have manipulated all the parties to be sure that the above-mentioned standoff would not resolve so soon. This year, Washington wants nothing more than to focus its efforts on the expanding war in Afghanistan and the withdrawal from Iraq, as well as on the Iranian issue procrastination.

Turkey's efforts to assert itself as a great power in the Wider Black Sea Area should not be neglected, although, under the conditions of only timid attempts, Ankara would like to avoid being involved in a possible American-Iranian conflict until it is more confident of its position. Currently, Turkey is not able to prevent a military conflagration between the USA and Iran, and it does not have the necessary force to impose its position regarding the issue of the Caucasus on Russia. Therefore, Turkey will try to "infiltrate" in all the places in which the other actors do not seem to be so interested, focusing its efforts mainly on the Balkans and Iraq.

With reference to South Asia, in 2010, we should have witnessed the implementation of the new Washington strategy in Afghanistan: to increase the number of troops from 70 000 to 100 000 to minimise the Taliban "moment of glory", stir the Taliban factions and train the Afghan Army. At first sight, the US decision

² George Friedman, *2009 in Review: The Year of Obama*, STRATFOR, 14.12.2009.

seems to enable the full control on the situation but, practically, it will be quite difficult to achieve. The Taliban represent a guerrilla force that will never get engaged in a direct confrontation. On the contrary, they will focus on rapid attacks whose aim is twofold – to protect themselves against the US attempts to fracture the movement and, concomitantly, against the al-Qaeda efforts to divert their ideals for its own benefit. This state of play could determine the engagement in various negotiations as important as the development of the situation at military level. As General William B. Caldwell, Commander of NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, recently declared in an interview for a large circulation daily newspaper in Romania, *“the US troops will come back home as soon as possible. Our mission in Afghanistan is to help those people (the Afghans – A.N.) until they are able to help themselves. We do not want to remain there more than it is necessary”*³. As for the duration of this *“absolutely necessary”*, General Caldwell mentioned the decision adopted at the latest meeting of the defence ministers in NATO member countries, where it was agreed that the transition period should start in July 2011. The US military official appreciated that, currently, *“the Afghan police and military forces are not capable of self-sustainment, but they will be in October 2011”*⁴. The situation at the border with Pakistan will also be considered, as there are signals that it is the place where the nature of warfare will change significantly.

While the USA will focus its attention on the Middle East, Europe will be confronted with a Russia in full process of revival.

In 2009, *“the Year of Obama”*⁵, as it was characterised by George Friedman, the United States adopted a policy to align with the international public opinion that responded, in turn, through a wave of enthusiasm that could not be compared to the one shown to George Bush. Consequently, President Obama publicly expressed his pride to have 43 nations next to the USA in the war in Afghanistan, compared to 33, the number of nations that participated in Iraq, a sufficient number at that time so that it could not be talked about containment. In both cases, popularity should not be mistaken for power. Sending troops in the two theatres of operations, next to the US troops, was sometimes interpreted as a gesture of goodwill, sympathy, solidarity for the values of democracy rather than as one of alignment with the US foreign policy. However, President Obama succeeded in creating an international coalition based mainly on perceiving the USA as a partner deeply

³ William B. Caldwell, *Trupe SUA sub comandă românească. Admirabil !*, in *Adevărul*, 20 June 2010.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ George Friedman, *loc. cit.*

involved in the issues in international community more than on the promoted policy. This perception, sometimes deliberately induced, does not meet the actions carried out or, in other words, the responses do not meet the expectations. For example, the openness towards Iran and Cuba was not reciprocal. The openness towards the Islamic world did not revolutionise the US relations in the region. The Russians continue to be suspicious about Obama as far as the issue of Eastern Europe is concerned. China does not seem to see any difference from his predecessor. However, a major impact can be noticed in Western Europe, especially if we take into consideration the case of Poland.

More and more political analysts state that Europe is the area where the strategy of President Obama will prove its validity. Besides, referring to Europe, the expectations of the two great actors are different. For the Europeans, a new era is that in which the United States will cease to require their support for their external initiatives and, ideally, it will not engage in such actions, excepting the ones approved by them. In his turn, President Obama expects that the Europeans response, when requested, to be prompter and even friendly, due to the positive perception created by the USA.

The US preoccupations in the field of defence aimed at the maintenance of the USA capability for global action as well as at the revitalisation of the military relations with the allies and partners are highlighted in the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010*⁶, the main programmatic document of the Department of Defense, approved by the US Congress, that lies at the basis of the activity in the field of defence schedule in the long run.

In conformity with the document, one of the priorities according to which the USA will adapt the regional military architecture for the next five years is represented by the reaffirmation of the commitment to Europe and NATO, through maintaining a robust presence on the continent and through developing the European missile defence capabilities in order to deter the political intimidation of the allied and partner states, to promote stability in the areas that are adjacent to the Aegean Sea, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, and to facilitate multilateral operations to support mutual interests on the European continent and outside it.

In this context, the USA new approach to the development of missile defence system in Europe (*Phase Adaptive Approach – PAA*) is in agreement with the decisions adopted at the Strasbourg-Kehl NATO Summit regarding the development of missile defence capabilities at the Alliance level and ensures the protection of its eastern and southeastern flank.

⁶ ***, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010*, USA Department of Defense, February 2010.

This approach is the result of the threat assessment update regarding the short-and medium-range ballistic missiles, especially those belonging to Iran, Syria and North Korea. The assessment mainly highlights that Iran has developed the short-and medium-range ballistic missile systems more rapidly than expected, fact that could be a threat to the allies and partners in the Middle East, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. At the same time, the USA carefully monitors the development of those long-range ballistic missile systems that may reach targets in the United States and in NATO member states. From the American standpoint, PAA will ensure a better integration of the national contributions in the Alliance and the development of a system adapted to each region, depending on the potential threats.

Another US priority in the field of defence is, of course, represented by the continuation of the commitments in the current conflicts, especially the one in Afghanistan.

Referring to the policy of the American Administration regarding Afghanistan, George Friedman and Reva Bhalla⁷ mention that, during the presidential campaign in 2008, the current President stated that *“the war in Iraq was a wrong war at a wrong time, while the war in Afghanistan was a necessary one”*⁸. The argument was aimed at the al-Qaeda threat to the USA, Afghanistan being considered the sanctuary of this terrorist movement. The possible withdrawal from Afghanistan could have increased the terrorist threat and, consequently, the continuation of the war was considered necessary.

Subsequent to the installation of President Obama to the White House, he had to define clearly the strategy for the war in Afghanistan.

The USA interest in Afghanistan is to defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent the revival of the forces that support the Jihad. The problem is that, no matter how safe Afghanistan could become, these forces may train and make plans (within certain limits) in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia or even in Cleveland or worldwide, including on the USA territory, wherever there are Muslim communities. Thus, securing Afghanistan proves not to be a precondition for defeating al-Qaeda.

The most important argument in favour of continuing the fight in Afghanistan is the preservation of credibility. Abandoning this country will provide a powerful instrument to convince the Islamic world about the USA weakness.

⁷ STRATFOR analyst.

⁸ George Friedman and Reva Bhalla, *The US Challenge in Afghanistan*, 20 October 2009, STRATFOR.

The withdrawal from any conflict area, if not accompanied by certain progress at political level, could destabilise even other regimes that cooperate with the US Government. Therefore, stationing in any country is less linked with the strategy but more linked with the perception regarding the mere presence in the area.

Unfortunately, the statements of some Jihad leaders, according to which the United States of America is not interested and does not have the necessary capabilities to get engaged in Afghanistan or Iraq for a long period of time, seem to be confirmed to some extent. The American interests exceed the Islamic world and currently there are many other threats (not to mention the future ones) outside the area we are referring to, threats that require the engagement of troops. Over-engagement or the engagement over the limits that are normally accepted in a certain area, to the detriment of others, could be even more dangerous than withdrawal.

Certainly, one idea begins to take shape: now it is not the moment to withdraw from Afghanistan. President Obama, who certainly does not want his name to be associated with this war in history, as it happened with the names of his predecessors, George W. Bush, in the case of Iraq, or even Lyndon Johnson, in the issue of Vietnam, should however provide the answer to the question regarding the place taken by the securitisation of Afghanistan in the aggregate of the USA interests.

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The election of Barack Obama as President of the USA represents the chance for America to reinvent itself, and for Brussels the opportunity to enhance the transatlantic relation with Washington. Nevertheless, to this end, the members of the European Union should not expect the USA to cease requiring the application of some policies they do not want and they should also assume a more active role in the resolution of the issues humanity is currently confronted with, such as the world financial crisis, Pakistan instability, the complicated situation in the Middle East, Russia's revival in force as a great power in the international arena, the international terrorism amplification and the emergence of the Chinese economy.

As for the common defence and NATO, if the USA really wants the Europeans to benefit from common defence, then it has to seriously consider the EU a strategic partner – a partner that is naturally willing to assume the commitments at international level. A real cooperation between the EU and NATO, a close coordination between the EU and the USA regarding security issues and the enhancement of the relationship with Russia are necessary for Europe to address the “*current threats*”, appreciate the leaders of France and Germany in an article published

in *Le Monde*⁹. To meet the “future requirements”, the EU-NATO cooperation is essential: “To our great regret, the Strategic Partnership between NATO and the EU is not living up to our expectations, because of persistent disagreements between some nations”, state the two heads of state, concluding that things should be changed towards “genuine cooperation, based on their necessary complementarity”.

This moment, in the middle of 2010, it is more and more evident the fact that the years of financial and economic crisis all the world have to currently cope with, added to the inefficient governance in some countries, seem to be the greatest threat to security worldwide, because the economic crisis stimulates underground economy, organised crime and extremism, leads to poverty and awakes deep frustrations for hundreds of millions of people.

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⁹ Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, *La sécurité – notre mission commune*, in *Le Monde*, 03.02.2009.

THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK AND THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Colonel Nicu BEGANU

Considering the increase in the difference between the US military capabilities and the ones of the European countries and the decline of European defence budgets, the European officials have pointed out many times the “soft” power and the instruments of EU member states to manage crisis situations as means meant to cover a wider range of commitments regarding the provision of the level of security sought in various regions on the globe. In this respect, some European officials have already noticed the danger represented by this fact and are not pleased with what they consider to be a tendency of the USA, namely to leave the “dirty businesses”, such as reconstruction and peacekeeping, to Europe, while the USA is in charge of only the highly technological military interventions that result in the rapid completion of the mission.

Keywords: *military capabilities; defence expenditure; NATO-EU relations; multilateral cooperation*

There has been a lot of talking lately on the interest that the United States continues to show in NATO, despite the fact that the US has the largest contribution to NATO’s common funding and the most important advanced military capability within the Alliance, and NATO needs the US decisive role to operate. Other sensitive aspects are often invoked, including the divergent opinions of the USA and of the Europeans regarding the threats and the role of *hard* and *soft* powers in countering such threats. The answer to this question can be given in simple, realistic terms: it is in the interest of the USA to remain committed to the Alliance, as the benefits derived from this fact still balance their substantial contribution. Nevertheless, the Alliance remains too much dependent on the influence, leadership, financial resources and capabilities of the USA, and this may erode the perception of common risks, of common missions, as well as the consensus-based decision-making process within the Alliance. Should this extreme dependence upon the USA remain at a high level, this may trigger new challenges

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to NATO cohesion, the Europeans being the ones who may ultimately lose interest in the Alliance.

We will further try to show what the US interests in maintaining the Alliance are, as well as what the main aspects that devolve upon the European side in maintaining the Alliance's political cohesion are. The USA has stated and expressed, through various ways, that it needs a strong and capable Europe, yet, the evolution of the political will, of the economy, as well as the demographic trends shows an increasing asymmetry between the USA and Europe. This article intends to state that one of the efficient ways to prevent the gap between the two continents from widening is the continuation of the enhancement of NATO's European component and, probably, the only remaining option to do this is through a *common security and defence policy – CSDP*¹, which is well defined and supported.

The Multilateral Interest of the USA within the Alliance

Both Europe and the USA observe the democratic values and fundamental human rights and actively cooperate through NATO in order to promote these values (for instance, in the Balkans and in Afghanistan), as well as peace and stability, in a series of regions worldwide, and in the Middle East and in Africa, through the *Mediterranean Dialogue* and the *Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*. Europe is equally vulnerable to the threats coming from far and instable regions, from failed states or states with weak governance and to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, therefore being an essential partner and an active participant in the war against terrorism.

The European allies operate in Afghanistan within *ISAF*, actively participate in the US information exchange, are involved in antiterrorist actions through detecting and neutralising terrorist networks that are present in Europe, determining coordinated measures with the USA in order to meet future challenges, terrorist attacks included. Moreover, European nations remain committed to reform NATO alongside the USA and to take action multilaterally in order to meet security challenges generated by a world that is increasingly characterised by globalisation.

The US security is enhanced through the agency of NATO and the USA derives full benefit from the role of a leader inside the Alliance. The US military power remains undeniable, against conventional threats, and is enough developed

¹The Common Security and Defence Policy, as stipulated in the *Treaty of Lisbon*; <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/531&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

to unilaterally protect the US interests at world level. However, the further excessive use of this power might significantly reduce its diplomatic and political influence at international level. The US must see that its military supremacy does not overshadow the means through which it has gained its reputation as a free and democratic society. Too much *hard* power and too many military interventions similar to the one in Iraq, perceived as examples of unilateral imperialism in many parts of the world, might cause a counterproductive reaction that could jeopardise America's security and its global influence. Yet, there is a series of reasons for which NATO remains the most important multilateral security instrument for the USA, as follows: the unilateral exercise of military power by the USA will transform it into a point of convergence for anti-American feelings; most Americans would rather not participate in military interventions without an active involvement of the allies²; the American military forces are more and more demanded and used as a consequence of the increasing number of areas of instability; unilateral *hard* power is not the answer to any problem. American foreign policy, just as the foreign policy of any great contemporary power, is most efficient when it has a multilateral aspect, involving not only military, but also diplomatic and economic aspects, and these are the arguments for which the United States needs an ally as Europe is.

Challenges Facing Europe

Even before the recent economic crisis, the European defence budgets were decreasing and only a few European allies got close to the NATO target of spending 2% of the GDP for defence. Moreover, a large amount of this expenditure is for personnel and not for the development of expeditionary capabilities or state-of-the-art technology for command and control systems. Considering the numerical decline of the European population, through the decrease in the birthrate and in the proportion between contributors and pensioners, it is likely that the resources for defence will continue to decrease. Numerous studies suggest that Europe will use the labour force from immigration to solve this deficit, as it is the case of Romania, and many of these immigrants will come from Muslim countries. It is probably that a combination between citizens who get old and non-Europeans whose number is increasing will have significant

² "NATO after the Prague Summit" – The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), December 2002, vol. 8, no. 10, p. 2, at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:etKeV_1bQEJ:www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-8—2002/volume-8—issue-10/natoafter-the-prague-summit/+NATO+after+the+Prague+Summit%E2%80%9D+%E2%80%93+International+Institute+for+Strategic+Studies,+decembrie+2002,&cd=1&hl=ro&ct=clnk&gl=ro

effects on the allocation of budgetary funds in many European countries. Consequently, because of increasing needs for providing social protection and economic development measures, one can say that the economic resources meant for defence in the European states will at best remain at the current level or will continue to decrease. In its turn, the public opinion exerts a powerful pressure on the political decision-making factor, and when the idea that there really are no foreign security threats gains more and more ground, this translates both in the significant cut in defence expenditure and in the engagement of troops in foreign missions in the Alliance's name.

Another aspect that tends to become more and more manifest is connected to a decline of the political will of the European allies for risky military operations, the level of engagement in these military operations being very different among allied nations. That is why the discussions between member states can become slightly contradictory because of the perception that some states have been willing to assume areas of responsibility in Afghan regions with a high level of risk, while others have not been ready for this situation. This has been described as the development of an alliance with a strong "*division of labour*", where some countries fight (and suffer human losses), while others carry out only the tasks similar to the peacekeeping ones, with a low level of risk.

The Decision-Making Process

The perception that NATO relies on the supremacy of the USA and, consequently, it operates only as an extension of the American security policy is totally untrue and unproductive for both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. NATO has been designed to rely on the common decision-making principle based on consensus and balanced internal influence. However, the differences between the American and European military capabilities may distort the common decision-making process and may influence the general attitude within the Alliance, some observers suggesting that the differences between the European capacity and the USA make the European perspective on security issues less convincing. For instance, Dr Peter van Ham³ points out the difficulties with which the Europeans confronted when trying to convince President Bush that Saddam Hussein could be persuaded to act in keeping with the demands of the international community without resorting to the use of force. He noticed that the European arguments criticising the American policy were easily rejected and they were not evaluated as far as their content

³Director of Global Governance Research at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "*Clingendael*" in The Hague and Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium.

was concerned, because they were seen as coming from a weaker and less capable militarily Europe⁴. If these perceptions are really accepted, striking a balance or at least establishing an acceptable relation between the military capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic can make the voice of Europe more powerful and can provide the USA with viable alternative solutions.

Contribution and Assuming Responsibility

Taking into account the widening gap between the US and European military capabilities and the decline of the European defence budgets, European officials have often highlighted the *soft* power and the crisis management instruments of the European Union member states as means of covering a wide portion of the obligations regarding the provision of the level of security desired in different regions on the globe. Yet, this creates a de facto division of labour, which directly contrasts with the principle of commonly assuming tasks and risks. Some European officials have already noticed the danger this might represent and are not content with what they perceive as being a tendency of the USA, namely with leaving the “*dirty work*” to Europe, meaning peace reconstruction and peacekeeping, while the USA deals only with highly technological military interventions that end in the rapid fulfilment of the mission. In other words, the “*USA cooked, and we do the dishes*”⁵. On the other hand, the Americans experience to the full the involvement in providing global security, a fact from which the Europeans do not resist to derive full benefit.

Seeking a long-term strategy of “*division of labour*” means nothing else but widening the capabilities gap between the USA and the European forces. As the American armed forces continue to make great progress in warfare technology, doctrine and tactics, the United States may reach a level that is much more advanced than its allies’ one, making practically impossible the multinational operations with common European and American participation between Europe and the USA. In one of their articles, Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler state that a relation would eventually develop in which “*the United States would be forced to play the <bad cop> in order to suppress the new threats occurred in far and dangerous regions, while the European partners would be the <good cops>, who try to reconcile with their enemies while attempting to promote their commercial interests abroad*”⁶.

⁴ Peter van Ham, *A European View of the US and the ESDP – The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role*, Center for Transatlantic Relations “*Johns Hopkins*” University, Washington DC, 2003.

⁵ Richard G. Whitman, *NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labour ?*, at <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a713947074>

⁶ Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, *Transforming European Forces*, at <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a780011953>

Moreover, initial military operations of entry into the theatre, even if highly technologised, as seen in the latest conflicts, cause more unwanted collateral effects on the passive civil population than in the consequent peacekeeping and national reconstruction operations. This leads to an increase in the USA's vulnerability towards anti-Americanism, if it is considered responsible for destroying certain values and for the casualties in these operations. Consequently, a strategy in which acknowledging risks and assuming responsibilities have different meanings and results, which lead to the "*division of labour*" between the USA and Europe, is not in America's interest.

Support for CSDP

Throughout the years, numerous NATO capabilities initiatives have resulted in a series of agreements requiring increasing European defence capabilities with the purpose of improving action capabilities, however, neither of them has reached its objectives. It is difficult to state that there is a will among European citizens to support political strategies to increase national defence expenditure, especially in the circumstances of the current economic crisis, and it was obvious in the content of most of the presentations in the European capitals visited during the study trip organised by the NATO College this June.

The EU plans to meet all *CSDP* objectives might be the answer to the rationalisation of European defence expenditure. In this respect, most EU officials and European leaders believe that the European Union can be more effective than the North Atlantic Alliance in gaining the support of member countries for the rationalisation of this expenditure with the purpose of enhancing their capabilities⁷. However, the EU plans remain relatively modest for the time being, a better European integration in the field of foreign and security policy being necessary if Europe really wants to create the needed capabilities and maintain political cohesion in NATO-EU relations.

Yet, we must recognise that the method approached by the European Union, ever since the establishment of the European Steel and Coal Community, seeking to develop and more and more integrate the relations between own members, has proved to be extremely productive and beneficial for these states, leading to the current economic union.

One of *CSDP*'s original purposes was to respond to the USA's appeal to a better division of responsibilities within the Alliance through the enhancement

⁷ Jacques S. Gansler, *Spending Wisely*, in *Transforming NATO Forces: European Perspectives*, 2003, pp. 29-33, at <http://www.acus.org/publication/transforming-nato-forces-european-perspectives>

of NATO's European pillar. Even if *CSDP* operates, for the moment, strictly at intergovernmental level within the EU, and the progress so far has been relatively modest, there is a serious potential, mostly generated by the current restrictive financial aspects, for the *CSDP* to benefit from more consistent support and more accentuated integration in the future. The USA should see this as an opportunity to enhance NATO's European pillar and fully support this possible evolution. Thus, America will have the allies it wants, and *CSDP* can be the instrument for enhancing European military capabilities.

In fact, this enhancement comes under the shape of new provisions in the *Treaty of Lisbon*, according to which the mutual support and assistance become compulsory for the member countries in the situation of an armed aggression against one of them, given the circumstances in which there will be no European armed forces and each member state will make available its own capabilities in support of the EU for the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

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In a more and more unstable and globalised world, NATO and the transatlantic link remain vital for the security interest of the USA. Europe and the United States are still indissolubly connected through the common values and interests facing some of the most serious threats to security and the United States cannot afford to manage these threats on its own.

The USA needs the European partners to share the burden of the threats and to legitimise the USA policies through multilateral cooperation. However, for NATO to remain a relevant organisation and for the transatlantic link to stay viable, a renewed engagement is necessary for acknowledging common treats, assuming responsibilities, as well as exerting influence within the Alliance. Consequently, the enhancement of European capabilities through the *CSDP* should be encouraged and supported by the USA, while Europe must fully commit to enhance NATO's European pillar, through the *CSDP*. All the more so as it is the only way to really narrow the increasing capability gap.

The reduction of military asymmetry can increase Europe's influence on American policies, thus balancing the tendency of the USA to act isolated from the allies, a strategy that does not serve its long-term interests. Moreover, an enhanced Europe can prevent the potential internal issues in Europe, which may be caused by the perception or real hypothesis that some European allies are more involved and are in favour of the financial and human costs of transatlantic security while others are not.

Although many of us can say that Europe is NATO's best ally, it is believed that currently, even an apparently positive, encouraging statement is particularly sensitive to NATO's cohesion and slightly confused, because, even if it brings about self-content on the part of the Europeans, it still ostentatiously ignores the present, namely the total superiority of the US within the Alliance as far as contributing, assuming risks and exerting influence in making common decisions, suggesting perhaps that *CSDP* will be a success. A statement better connected to reality is that Europe can be NATO's best ally. The Europeans who support the adoption of a more prominent *Common Foreign and Defence Policy* must take *CSDP* seriously, otherwise success is not in any case easy. If this does not happen, the US and NATO will gain the least desired result, respectively a weak NATO and a weak Europe.

As far as our opinion is concerned, we are convinced that it reflects the hope that, in the future, there will be not only supporters but also political decision-makers involved in reaching an objective that will definitely be found in the future *NATO strategic concept* and that will better meet the security needs in the Euro-Atlantic area, as it was stated in Brussels: "*full complementarity between NATO and the EU will be essential if the allies are to forge a comprehensive and cost-effective approach to security*"⁸.

English version by
✍️ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

⁸ *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement – Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO*, Brussels, 2010.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

– An Unknown

in the European Security Equation ? –

Colonel (r.) Eugen LUNGU

There are specialists in European security who claim that Islamic fundamentalism could create problems for European security in the coming decades. Phrases that include “Europe’s Islamisation” are increasingly common in today’s media. Regarding Bosnia Herzegovina, West Muslim communities and Turkey, we believe that some conclusions about the possible developments in Europe regarding Islamic fundamentalism may be drawn. Even if in some parts of Europe there is a trend towards developing Islamic fundamentalism, we believe that the experts in the security field have the ability to draw up viable strategies in order to stop the escalation of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

Keywords: *Islamic fundamentalism; European security; Muslim communities; Islam; religious fundamentalism*

A

fter the fall of the *Iron Curtain*, Western-type democracy experienced a boom and a geographical expansion

difficult to anticipate before, and certain states, feeling “*threatened*” by this wave of changes, reacted accordingly. As Virginia Mircea writes, “*the widening process of the circle of democracies is accompanied by a simultaneous movement in the opposite way, namely an increase in the resistance to change in most non-democratic states, in the resurrection of ideological and religious fundamentalisms, as a basis for some new antidemocratic and totalitarian government regimes*”¹.

Islamic Fundamentalism and European Security

According to Robert Cooper, “*in the post-Cold War world, threats are much harder to identify and analyse*”². The religious revival at world level in the latest decades, one of the obvious threats of the world today, has drawn the attention of cultural anthropologists, sociologists, theologians, political

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¹ Virginia Mircea, *Islamul și soarta lumii. Fundamentalismul islamic ca ideologie politică*, Editura SEMNE, București, 2009, p. 13.

² Robert Cooper, *Destrămarea națiunilor. Geopolitica lumii secolului XXI*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2007, p. 189.

scientists, as well as of specialists in the field of security. In a *SOFRES* survey³ conducted in 1999 in France, at the request of the National Assembly's Defence Committee, 64% of the persons inquired said that the main threat posed to the planet "is the rise of religious extremism in Islamic countries"⁴. The moment September 11, 2001, through the great damage caused and the psychological effect created at the level of the masses, can be considered as a key date after which the Western world has totally changed its attitude towards Islamic religious fundamentalism. In fact, for Francis Fukuyama as well, "*September 11, 2001 is an attack against modernity, based on the Islamic fundamentalist hatred of all Western values*"⁵. After the terrorist attacks in the USA in September 2001 and the war against terrorism that followed, one could say that the interest shown by European researchers in the field of political sciences grew, as they began to consider religious fundamentalisms in a long-term field of research, with great implications on the study of states, societies, conflicts, regional and global security.

The equation of the current European security, as well as the strategies in this field for the following decades cannot leave aside the "variable" named *Islamic fundamentalism*. Therefore, according to some hypotheses featured in the Western media, as well as in the academic debates, it appears to be very likely that the Islamic fundamentalist movements will proliferate and become more radical in certain European states with significant Muslim communities number-wise in the next 15-20 years. This is what French-Tunisian journalist Sophie Bessis has to say about these movements: "*No one, except for their followers, can deny the destroying capacity of the movements that derive from radical Islam, which do not hesitate to use force in order to impose order and to rise to power*"⁶.

In our theoretic approach, in order to grasp a few elements that are significant for the relation between "*Islamic fundamentalism*" and "*European security*", we believe that the cases of Bosnia Herzegovina, of the Muslim communities in the Western part of the continent (France, the UK, Germany etc.), as well as that of Turkey are relevant. We will further see, as we analyse the three cases, what is the potential danger that the exacerbation of Islamic fundamentalism may induce in some regions of Europe, with direct consequences on continental security.

First, in relation to Bosnia Herzegovina, mention should be made that the "*history*" of this state, in the early '90s, is circumscribed to the "*phenomenon of global turbulences*"⁷, a profoundly complex and with a significant violence potential

³ Important French group of marketing research companies, located in Montrouge.

⁴ Sophie Bessis, *Occidentul și ceilalți. Istoria unei supremații*, Editura Runa, București, 2004, p. 251.

⁵ Tariq Ali, *Ciocnirea fundamentalismelor. Cruciade, jihaduri și modernitate*, Editura Antet, Filipeștii de Târg, Prahova, 2006, p. 261.

⁶ Sophie Bessis, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Marea dilemă – A domina sau a conduce*, Editura Scripta, București, 2005, p. 217.

phenomenon, which contributed, through its originality, to the configuration of the new strategies and intervention missions specific to regional crises management: “In some regions, as Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, *there is ethnic pressure, in others, there are conflicts between tribes, in other regions, religious fundamentalism appears. These turbulences manifest through violent outbreaks, as well as through disorder*”⁸. Thus, this kind of turbulences generated by religious fundamentalisms, as everybody knows, is not nor has it been⁹ unknown to the European continent. In this respect, the Bosnian War (1992-1995), assimilated to a ethnic-religious conflict, in which over one hundred thousand people lost their lives, pointed out the fact that, when it degenerates, religious fundamentalism, either Serbian or Muslim, cannot bring about but violent confrontation, irrecoverable material losses and many casualties. Taking place between Orthodox Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, but with the participation of Catholic Bosnians and Croats, in different stages of the armed confrontation, this war definitely is the most violent conflict in Europe after the end of the Second World War. Thus, only during the military operation to occupy the city of Srebrenica, the armed and paramilitary forces of the Serbs killed over seven thousand Muslim men, a genocide that was consequently confirmed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Mention should be made that foreign Muslim combatant units (mujaheddin) also took part in the Bosnian War, who operated in independent structures and did not commit war crimes against the civil population. In fact, a UN report from 1993 mentions the activity of the El Mujahid units during the Bosnian War, noticing that most mujaheddin fighters were mercenaries from Arab countries, who preached a life style that had been unfamiliar to Bosnian Muslims. The actions and conduct of the foreign Muslims that took part in the war, as recorded in the testimonies of the civil population, influenced the units of the Bosnian army also. In this respect, it is well known the attitude of the Armed Corps named “*Allah Akbar*” (the Bosnian army corps in Zenica), which manifested in the spirit of the Islamic fundamentalism towards the civil population, imposing by force the observance of the precepts of the Islam to the letter. The *Dayton Agreements*, which have a historical significance for this Balkan country, marked the end of the military operations in Bosnia and the creation of a decentralised state structure, consisting of two entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Srpska Republic. These agreements were followed by peace enforcement missions, with the participation of NATO, then EU, forces, as well as by international

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 216.

⁹ Europe also experienced the conflict in Northern Ireland, between Catholics and Protestants, in the period 1960-1998.

reconstruction actions. Currently, Bosnia-Herzegovina has a promising “*European path*”, namely a *Stabilisation and Association Agreement* with the European Union, since July 2001 and the NATO accession process is in an advanced stage (in April 2010, the *Membership Action Plan* programme started).

According to the statistics in the media, approximately half of the current population of Bosnia-Herzegovina is represented by Muslims (about two million people), the other part consisting mainly in Orthodox Christians (approximately 37%) and Catholics (14%)¹⁰, the rest of the population belonging to other ethnic groups. Therefore, looking at these numbers, which are often questioned, the subject being “*Bosnia-Herzegovina*”, one can notice that most part of the population from this European country is Muslim. Yet, what is worth mentioning is that, during the latest years, leading figures of the Muslim community in Bosnia-Herzegovina talk more and more categorically of the aggressive actions launched by certain Islamic fundamentalist movements in this Balkan country, which aim at the “*Islamisation*” of Bosnian Muslims. Mainly, this is about the Wahhabi Saudi Islamic fundamentalists¹¹, who advocate Pure Islam and a radical interpretation of the Qur’an and wish to increasingly infiltrate in the religious structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This fundamentalist Islamists are the supporters of financing the Islamic radical movements wherever they may be in the world and of a “*permanent jihad against all enemies, Muslims and non-Muslims*”¹². The actions of these extremist Islamists, who wish to revive the “*true Islam*”¹³, cause fear among indigenous Muslims, who are mostly moderately oriented, because fundamentalists suggest that they want to introduce the Islamic religious law – “*Sharia*” – in the political life, if they succeed in abolishing the secular state. The aggressiveness of this Islamic fundamentalist movement, which, according to some pieces of information in the Bosnian media, is supported by approximately 12% of the autochthonous Bosnians¹⁴, causes concern and raises questions for some EU and NATO officials, who belong to these two organisations that are currently carrying on association agreements with this Balkan country. If we add to these aspects the warnings of some officials from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia regarding

¹⁰ At http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demografia_Bosniei_%C8%99i_Her%C8%99egovinei

¹¹ According to the data published in the Western press, the Wahhabi movement reached Bosnia also owing to the support on the part of Saudi Arabia, where this is the official religion.

¹² Tariq Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

¹³ At http://www.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles%7CdisplayArticle/articleID_9782/Este-Bosnia-amenintata-de-fundamentalismul-islamic.html

¹⁴ The figures are taken from a poll conducted by the private agency *Prism Research*, according to website http://www.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles%7CdisplayArticle/articleID_9782/Este-Bosnia-amenintata-de-fundamentalismul-islamic.html

the risk of some terrorist attacks on the part of extremists that are close to Islamic fundamentalist movements, we believe that there are sufficient elements to express the fact that in Bosnia-Herzegovina it really is an “*insecurity potential*” that might damage the regional security environment.

One must admit that there is concern that Bosnia might transform into a “*base for Islamic fundamentalism*”, from the perspective of the fact that, in the European area, this country provides a social and religious “*environment*” that is similar to the options of the members of this extremist movement. However, reality just goes to show that, even if Islamic fundamentalism has entered the Bosnian state space, most of Bosnian Muslims do not consent to the rigid implementation of the precepts of the Qur’an in the political and social life; yet, this does not mean that the situation cannot change in the following years. We believe that the Bosnian authorities will know how to capitalise on the success of the peacekeeping missions conducted by NATO and the EU and, during the NATO and EU accession process, they will also find and promote those policies that hinder any manifestation of Islamic religious fundamentalist. That does not mean that we categorically leave aside the possibility of the exacerbation of Islamic fundamentalism in this country or the “*export of fundamentalism*” from the Western Balkans to the Islamic communities in Western Europe.

If we take a look at the Muslim communities in Western Europe, it is more and more obvious that some important states in the European Union – France, the UK, Germany, Belgium etc. – are increasingly preoccupied with the potential danger that may be represented by the development, in the following years, of the Islamic fundamentalism within their borders. After September 11, 2001, as the media has developed more and more the idea that the Islam is “*an ideology that threatens the Western values*”¹⁵, the aspects regarding the Islamic communities in the Western part of the continent have started to be more and more interesting for the public. Mention should be made that, “*mechanically*” and with no scientific grounds whatsoever, after the tragic terrorist actions in the USA, then the ones in Madrid and London, the public opinion has more and more inculcated the idea that Islam and violence are inseparable: “*The terms <Islamism>, <Islamic radicalism >, <terrorism> and <fundamentalism> (plus, in France, the word <integrism>) are therefore used more or less indifferently and always in the idea that there really is a Muslim exception, a particularity of the religion that makes it more capable of developing violence*”¹⁶. Even if most members of this Muslim community belong to moderate Islam and have managed to integrate in the Western society, the measures that some states

¹⁵ Oliver Roy, *Semiluna și haosul*, Editura Nemira, București, 2010, p. 43.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

of adoption have already taken¹⁷, far from making us think of Samuel Huntington, however point to the increasing attention of the authorities towards the so-called “Islamic issue”, which can be determined in the future by the development of Islamic fundamentalism in these states in Western Europe. Even if these measures are in general aimed at the legislative and administrative domains, still, from a broad perspective, we believe that they are oriented towards the “area” of enhancing the internal security of these states, as part of some “measures packages” meant to counter in good time a potential danger to security. Thus, the “Islamic demographic pump”¹⁸, which will continue to “function” and increase the number of immigrants, together with a demographic growth that is superior for these communities in relation to the indigenous population, both “adorned” with a possible escalation of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim communities in Western Europe are a collection of elements that most certainly have the ability to generate regional insecurity. Therefore, we believe that a major and extremely serious challenge to those who design homeland security strategies of the European states with Muslim communities must maintain the social stability of these communities, within the states of adoption, simultaneously with the “protection” of these communities from the expansion and influence of Islamic fundamentalism. We reckon that the obstruction of the development of unsecuring Islamic fundamentalist movements will take place through adopting and implementing in due time certain social, economic, cultural policies in the field of the protection of minorities and that of homeland security, in keeping with the constitutional values accepted by the majority population, which will generate safety, stability and social order.

As far as Turkey is concerned, a secular state in which Islam is majority religion, one can say that “this country has as many things in common with the rest of the Muslim world as it has with Europe”¹⁹. The opening of the discussions regarding Turkey’s accession to the European Union in November 2005 was followed by democratic reforms, in accordance with the community exigencies, as well as with the demands of the civil society. The big issue of community Europeans

¹⁷ In May 2010, the French Parliament passed a resolution that condemned the Islamic veil covering women’s face; the deputies of the Belgian Parliament passed a law, in April 2010, which prohibited the wearing of the Islamic veil in public; starting June 2010, the officials in Barcelona forbade the wearing of the Islamic veil in public buildings.

¹⁸ According to British daily *The Telegraph*, in 2009, 5% of the population of the 27 EU member states was Muslim. The increase in the number of immigrants from Muslim countries and the low birthrate among the indigenous population will make the Muslim population in Europe to be 20% of the entire population by 2050 – source: http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/UE-Telegraph-The-musulmana-populatia_0_95390573.html

¹⁹ Pierre-Jean Luizard, *Modernizarea țărilor islamice*, Editura Artemis, București, 2008, p. 207.

regarding Turkey is whether this country, on its path towards the EU accession, can transform its political system towards a genuine, demilitarised democracy, having an “open” secularity²⁰, in which religion is respected, leading to a real separation of the religion from the state. Thus, there is a certain precaution towards Turkey’s accession to the EU on the part of “Huntingtonian” Europeans: “They are either afraid that Turkey’s accession might bring conflicts within the EU or they sincerely estimate that only the countries with a Christian culture can take part in the European establishment”²¹. The today Turkish society, given the important events of the last decades, “is divided in opposite groups: on the one hand, urban elites and middle classes with secular culture more and more Europeanised, and, on the other hand, the mass of the rural population or with rural origin, attached to a popular and/or reformative Islam”²². Therefore, the democratic reforms of the latest years – abolition of death penalty (2004), demilitarisation and reform of the National Security Council (MGK), in August 2004, the dissolution by vote of homeland safety courts (which functioned from 1983), the election of the President of the Republic through universal vote (adopted through a referendum in October 2007) etc. – are part of the important political measures aimed at guiding Turkey towards the EU. In conformity with the negotiation chapter opened by Turkey for EU membership, there are also considered the following: the “Cypriot issue”, the fight against corruption and organised crime, the harmonisation with the European standards regarding minorities rights and the acceleration of administrative and political reforms.

The transformations that Turkey must undergo in the years to come, in order to gain EU membership, will definitely not be too easy to “digest” by a part of the political parties, as well as one of the Turkish population, represented by these political institutions. We believe that the greatest issue that must be addressed remains transforming/modernising the state and the Turkish society in keeping with the European Union’s standards, concomitantly with respecting the secularity, cultural identity and Islamic religion: “If, in the Western world, democracy, liberty and secularity are part of the same area of political significance, in the Arab-Islamic world, the idea of designing a society that is completely situated outside the religious frame is difficult to imagine”²³.

The current power in Turkey has often stated that it does not wish to create an Islamic state, thus responding to the accusations of the secular opposition,

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Sylvain Kahn, *Geopolitica Uniunii Europene*, Editura Cartier, Chişinău, 2008, p. 124.

²² Pierre-Jean Luizard, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

²³ Laura Sitaru, *Gândirea politică arabă. Concepte cheie între tradiție și inovație*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2009, p. 19.

in turn, sustaining that the promoted reforms are necessary in order to get Turkey closer to the democratic norms of the European Union. However, there are loud and numerous voices inside the Turkish society speaking of the fact that the secularity of the Turkish state is threatened. According to polls, more than 75% of the population believe that secularity does not seem to be threatened²⁴ by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party that comes from an Islamic movement and is now in office, even if in April and May 2007, millions of Turks demonstrated in Istanbul and Ankara, their “*target*” being, among the most important demands, the preservation of the secularity of the Turkish state.

In this respect, we consider that the highest stake for Turkey at this point is whether it will succeed in overcoming, “*obstacle by obstacle*”, the political, economic, religious, cultural etc. difficulties and successfully end, in the following years, the EU accession process or this country, with a population of over 67 million people, out of which 99,8% are Muslims, will remain outside the Union, given the circumstances in which the political forces that are closer to “*traditional Islam*” will have the final word. The big exam of Turkey with the European Union is watched with interest by the other countries with Islamic religion, because this endeavour, if it succeeds, would undoubtedly show that Western democracy and Islam are not incompatible, as Islamic fundamentalists maintain.

Possible Evolutions of the Relation between Islamic Fundamentalism and European Security

Both the “*import*” of Islamic fundamentalism and its “*production*” within Muslim communities in Western European states, a phenomenon perceived by the indigenous communities as an attempt of “*Islamisation*” of the respective societies, will definitely cause problems for the institutions in charge of the homeland security of the states taken into account, if this type of fundamentalism has the rise foreseen by some specialists in the field of European security. If this expansion of Islamic fundamentalism takes place, the authorities in charge from the Western European states will have to provide response strategies to preserve the rule of law, unity and social stability. However, we believe that, in the next 20 years, the process of transformation and modernisation of Muslim communities, accompanied by measures regarding the respect for the Islamic cultural traditional values and, at the same time, the respect for the constitutional values of the countries of adoption will go in that direction in which the security and safety of the people

²⁴ Pierre-Jean Luizard, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

will not be endangered. Even if “*there will always be a gap between the triumphant modernity of the stronger and the confusing modernity of the colonised*”²⁵ and this gap will further be perceived as a source of dominancy, we nevertheless believe that the Western European society will be capable of discovering the “*social adjustments*” that enable the continuity of the social integration of all communities, including the Muslim ones. Thus, we think that the European West, cautious as in many moments in history, will build, in time, security strategies able to preserve and develop the human, material and spiritual values of the European Western world, respecting those who stand beside them. The Western European states will have the ability to determine that, through the public policies adopted, the Muslim communities could benefit from a “*political space*” that is not familiar with the manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism. This does not mean that it is impossible for a riot to occur in the Muslim communities in some Western states (just like those on the outskirts of Paris, in 2005) in which the main actors will be the Muslim residents in this states, with the purpose of defending their civil rights, cultural and religious identity.

Another possible direction of evolution of the relation Islamic fundamentalism – European security also includes the terrorist phenomenon. The 2003 European Union Security Strategy and those security strategies of the main community states (France, the UK, Germany) point out the terrorist phenomenon currently as a potential factor for generating insecurity in the European Union area. Unfortunately, the vague definition of this concept, as well as the forced identification of terrorism with the Islam²⁶ in the period that followed the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, without any serious analysis regarding the complexity and causality of this phenomenon and without any intuition regarding the possible consequences in the long run of such a stigmatisation, resulted in the creation of an unfavourable perception, at the level of the wider public, towards the population with Islamic religion. It seems that, deliberately, during the last years, when “*amnesia*” developed in the issue of the so-called terrorism generated by “*national movements*” (ETA – in the Basque Country, IRA – in Northern Ireland etc.), the references to the terrorist phenomenon being mostly focused on the “*transnational al-Qaeda-type terrorism*”²⁷, which takes place in a globalised and deterritorialised space²⁸. The media campaigns run by the states that participated with military forces in the “*war against terrorism*”, started with the campaign in Afghanistan, have used, often incorrectly, key messages through which terrorism has been identified

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 217.

²⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

²⁷ Olivier Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 46.

with Islamism in order to gain popular support for the participation in military actions. We believe it will not be easy for the Western European society, in the following years, to evolve at least to the level of tolerance before September 11, 2001, when the Muslims in these states, otherwise integrated in their countries of adoption, were regarded more leniently, with no suspicions regarding some connections with Islamic terrorist organisations. Deciphering and understanding correctly the causality of the terrorist phenomenon, giving up for good the harmful idea “*Islamism equals terrorism*”, unfortunately quite “*popular*” in Western Europe after the outbreak of the war against terrorism, paralleled by clever policies and actions in the field of international relations and regional security, are elements that can substantially contribute to the creation of a better climate of understanding and safety between the Islamists and non-Islamists in Western Europe. As for the need to “*decipher*” the causality of the contemporary terrorist phenomenon, we believe that the opinion of François Massoulié, as well as other similar ones, will be seen much more carefully: “*Paradoxically, even if the war in 2003 (in Iraq, ed. n.) was a <war on terror>, it is possible that it might have created the circumstances favourable to the appearance of <bin Ladens>, be they Islamists or something else*”²⁹.

After the outbreak of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the events that followed proved more clearly the existence of some extremely dangerous terrorist organisations that operate at global or regional level and are based on the precepts of Islamic fundamentalism, as a “*doctrinal support*” for the justification of their attacks. I agree with Virginia Mircea, who says that “*Islamic terrorism cannot be taken out of the context of Islamic fundamentalism and globalisation*”³⁰, yet, I want to mention once more that even if Islamic militants have been and will continue to be involved in terrorist attacks, we cannot accept the formula – “*Islam is a pro-terrorist religion*”. It would be such a great untruth and a mistake with long-term consequences regarding the maintenance of a climate of security and understanding in the European countries with important Muslim communities. I believe that, in order to counter the fundamentalist-Islamic terrorist phenomenon, an important part is played by the Alliance of Civilisations, established in 2005 at the initiative of the UN Secretary General together with two European countries – Spain and Turkey, a movement that was created for the mobilisation of certain initiatives and political actions at world level with the purpose of developing respect, understanding, reconciliation and eliminating all prejudices and adversities between cultures and religions. Through the actions of this planetary movement, which has succeeded in bringing

²⁹ François Massoulié, *Conflictele din Orientul Mijlociu*, Editurile All, București, 2010, p. 154.

³⁰ Virginia Mircea, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

together famous people from all around the world, including from the most important European states, it is possible that a great contribution would be made to better analysing and identifying the causes of the current intercultural and interreligious tensions, favouring the elucidation of the unknowns that are related to the contemporary terrorist phenomenon, which is more and more manifest at global level. Starting from all these aspects mentioned, we believe that European states have the ability to mobilise in front of such an asymmetrical threat and can cooperate efficiently in order to initiate credible strategies meant to counter this dangerous phenomenon for the security and tranquillity of the citizens on the European continent.

Islamic fundamentalism may affect the European security from the inside, through the proliferation of this form of radicalism among the Muslim population, as well as through outside actions (be they terrorist or military), which can be prepared in advance, coming from some regions that are closer or even further from the European continent. Thus, through the voice of the community institutions in charge of security and defence, as well as through the official attitude of the North Atlantic Alliance, Europe is currently more and more concerned with enhancing its security against a possible surprise attack on the part of some states led by Islamic fundamentalists or on the part of terrorist networks belonging to violent religious extremism³¹, which may obtain weapons of mass destruction. As it is well known, NATO is about to deploy, within the new anti-missile defence systems, some components of this system in Bulgaria, Turkey and Romania. Official documents that have been presented by the Romanian state authorities to the public in our country regarding the setup of this system refer to the protection of the entire territory of our country against a possible attack from Iran, a Muslim country that is able to launch ballistic missiles targeting NATO member states. The concern regarding the defence against a possible attack with ballistic missiles from Iran, which is considered by many Westerners to be a fundamentalist Islamic state, can also be found in the recommendations of the group of experts regarding the new *NATO Strategic Concept*/17 May 2010 and has become, for the North Atlantic Alliance, according to this document, a pretty important military mission. It is not less true that "*Iranian fundamentalism*" makes more and more analysts in the field of European security think and we believe that it will take long before solutions are found for the peaceful regulation of this issue. This type of fundamentalism is "*an ideology fully affirmed at the time of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), which proposes the return to the lost glory through the elimination of Western influences that perverted Islam*"³². The nomination, once more, of Iran

³¹ *European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 3, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

³² Virginia Mircea, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

in an official document of the North Atlantic Organisation, which is to be discussed and approved this fall by the NATO member countries, reconfirms the fact that the allied European countries, together with the USA, take into account the behaviour of some states in the Islamic world, which are fundamentalist-oriented and which can jeopardise European security through their policies. The settlement of this complex situation, in which Iran will have to totally give up its nuclear military programme, is something that will require a convergence of the positions within the UN and a common platform for action for the permanent members of the Security Council, which is not at all an easy task.

A final aspect regards Turkey. We dare say the *“future”* of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe will be mostly influenced by the evolution of the process of Turkey’s accession to the European Union. Why do we say this? Community officials, concerned with the issue of the EU enlargement, know very well how complex the integration of this state with mostly Islamic religion in a mostly Christian Europe is. For the time being, the important states of the Union are divided as far as Turkey’s accession to the EU is concerned: France³³ and Germany are against it and want a *“privileged partnership”* with Turkey, while the UK, Spain and Italy agree with the membership. Turkey’s integration in the European Union, as Miguel Angel Moratinos, Spain’s Foreign Minister states, *“is our challenge in the relations with the Islamic world: we must show that there are interferences between the Muslim societies and the universal values, represented by the EU. Coexistence and consensus are possible”*. The completion of the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU, estimated by some specialists in the community field that may end in 2020-2025, would represent a moment in which many frustrations of the Muslims, either from Turkey or Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Islamic communities in Western Europe, could be overcome. We believe that the fact that Turkish Muslims will become *“citizens of the Union”*, with all the rights deriving from this quality, including the freedom of movement in the EU space, will bring about a certain relaxation of the *“attitude”* of Islamists in the European space towards the other citizens of the Union. At the same time, the Muslim world would understand that the European Union, by accepting the accession of this Muslim state, proves that it recognises and accepts the specifics, traditions, culture and forms of religious manifestation that are characteristic to this country. Given these aspects, Islamic fundamentalism will no longer have available the entire *“package”* of ideological motivations it has at the moment in order to promote the *“drama of the colonised”* and, consequently, will have a downward trajectory in the European space. At the opposite pole, it would be Turkey’s failure in the accession negotiations,

³³ In a poll conducted in 2009, in France, by the High Audiovisual Council, 50% of the French were in favour of Turkey joining the EU, while 35% did not agree with the accession – source: <http://www.ziare.com/articole/francezi+opun>

a less likely, yet not impossible version. However, if Turkey were to remain outside the EU, we would speak of a feeling of frustration for the population of this country that would feel marginalised by the “*other Europe*”. This would give a strong impulse to the Islamic fundamentalist movements in Turkey, as well as to the Muslim communities in Western Europe, which would take advantage of the situation to refresh their “*anti-Western ideologies*” and would certainly generate chaos and insecurity. The same thing was stated by the Turkish Minister for European Affairs, Egemen Bagis, this year, who warned about the risk of the Islamic radicalisation in the case of the failure of Turkey’s accession to the EU: “*by excluding Turkey, the EU countries assume the risk of building a discrimination wall with the Islamic world*”³⁴.

Currently, in the European countries, at the level of the public, in general, there is the wrong impression that fundamentalist movements are specific only to Islam. This idea has perpetuated even more after September 11, 2001, and then after the terrorist attacks that took place in London and Madrid, from which resulted the involvement of the Islamic fundamentalists. Today, it is quite unknown the fact that the term of *fundamentalism* first appeared in the Christian religion and has nothing to do with the current contemporary significance of this term. As well as the fact that the Islamic fundamentalism, as a radical movement, can be found not only in the Christian religion, but also at Jews, Buddhists, and Islamists. From this perspective, we believe that a “*step*” towards a better understanding of the specifics of the Muslim world, as well as towards finding the proper security strategies in this “*field*”, for the European state authorities with important Muslim communities, is determined by the awareness of the fact mentioned earlier, namely that Islam does not “*organically*” include the germs of violence, just as this one is not comprised in the other religions.

To conclude, I would like to refer to a quote, as simply put, as it is untrue: “*The Muslim is Turk in Germany, Maghrebian in France, Pakistani or Egyptian in the UK, he is the one you live near to, but from whom you must fear, because, even if he is close, he is the other*”³⁵. Just as we will never accept Islamic or other religion fundamentalism, so we will not agree, under any circumstances whatsoever, with such a message. We believe that the “*September 11*” effect, regarding the “*mass*” blaming of the Muslim world, must sink into oblivion, in order to rediscover the truth, tolerance and path towards normality, in a world in which Samuel Huntington’s anticipations regarding the “*clash of civilisations*” should be far from being confirmed.

English version by
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

³⁴ At <http://karadeniz-press.ro/kara/turcia-respinsa-de-ue/>

³⁵ Sophie Bessis, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

THE NEW FACE OF AIR ORIENTED TERRORISM AND AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS VULNERABILITIES

Major General Dr Fănică CÂRNU

The Air Defence System's efficient and effective reaction to the threat of air oriented terrorism depends on the existence of realistic plans for the coordination of efforts and for the command-control of forces involved, starting from the identification phase of the aircraft until the final resolution of an air traffic incident.

At the Prague summit, NATO defined the "RENEGADE" threat as the use of hijacked civilian aircraft as weapons to commit a terrorist attack. The Alliance developed the concept of "RENEGADE" and established the responsibilities of all structures involved in counteracting this threat and the necessary measures to be implemented including standing operating procedures within the NATO Integrated Air Defence System – NATINADS.

Keywords: *air oriented terrorism; RENEGADE; NATO Integrated Air Defence System; Air Command and Control System; UAVs*

Before 11 September 2001, airliners were used by air pirates as means that coerced governments to release political detainees or to obtain significant amounts of money to finance terrorist actions.

Terrorist activities were initially developed under the state nationalism umbrella, a fact that has fundamentally changed over time through the evolution of the terrorist phenomenon. Today, most terrorist organisations are international in nature. Their members can get information, funds and procure weapons through less traditional means and the possibility of tracking and locating them is much more difficult.

Terrorists have also improved their strategies and tactics by studying closely the vulnerabilities of modern society, which has developed very rapidly, primarily on efficiency criteria. Trust and openness have thus been cultivated, combined with more and more relaxed security measures. Therefore, it came to the events

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that began with the disaster of 9/11, when terrorists exploited security breaches of the air transport sector transforming the hijacked civil aircraft into bombs that penetrated and destroyed targets emblematic for humankind. That terrorist action was not the “*work*” of a state actor, but of an international terrorist organisation that used the simplest and most innocent international communication network for its members’ recruiting and training and for the information and funds management – the Internet.

Air oriented terrorism was thus conferred a new relevance, being already the most effective and efficient form of building terror. Today, air oriented terrorism is a new chapter in the history of terrorism and the nightmare of Air Defence Systems.

The conclusions of the latest analyses show that future terrorist operations will engage existing security structures in directions difficult to predict if a conceptual change is not made at strategic and political level. The prevention of these devastating air attacks has become an essential requirement for modern Air Forces.

The first step towards this change should be made through the definition of these new threats against air security. These may be air attacks using piloted aircraft, civilian or even military, small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or even cyber attacks against computer networks, part of the military Air Command and Control Systems and of the civilian air traffic management ones. Anti-hail rocket systems cannot be excluded, because, through small changes, they can become a tool of terror for urban agglomerations.

At the Prague summit, NATO defined the “*RENEGADE*” threat as the use of hijacked civilian aircraft as weapons to commit a terrorist attack. The Alliance developed the concept of “*RENEGADE*” and established the responsibilities of all structures involved in counteracting this threat and also the necessary measures to be implemented including standing operating procedures within the *NATO Integrated Air Defence System – NATINADS*.

The decision to engage and destroy a civilian aircraft classified as “*RENEGADE*” belongs to a national governmental authority of the state in whose airspace the aircraft evolves, due to the exclusive state sovereignty in its airspace. The decision to destroy such an aircraft is extremely critical in terms of time available and also difficult to make considering the nature of the consequences. Think about the fact that aboard might be hundreds of innocent passengers ! – which substantially complicates the decision-making process because of the passive time spent to clarify the situation from the legal point of view.

Moreover, if the aircraft classified as “*RENEGADE*” is intercepted and shadowed by fighters belonging to a neighbouring state, it cannot be tracked for a long period of time after crossing the state border if international Air Policing cooperation

agreements are not implemented in that area, or even throughout the whole flight over a state unable to act (e.g. Air Policing assets are not appropriate, the air/meteorological situation does not allow for an effective action etc.).

In reality, there are many other situations that could foster unhindered actions of air oriented terrorism, which are related mainly to the equipment technical limitations and the Air Defence forces' level of training and readiness, whose reaction time should be shorter than the time available to counter the threat. An Air Defence that cannot react effectively to such challenges is very redundant and requires the revision of all its functions.

Air oriented terrorism can occur rarely, but its consequences are devastating. Both at NATO and national levels, counteracting "*RENEGADE*" threats is frequently exercised by developing complex scenarios and involving state-of-the-art Air Defence assets, including those belonging to the *NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System*, as it happens during NATO high visibility events.

The Air Defence System's efficient and effective reaction to this type of threat depends on the existence of realistic plans for the coordination of efforts and for the command-control of the forces involved, starting from the identification phase of the aircraft until the final resolution of an air traffic incident.

Today, air terrorist threat is very serious. Its development may be so threatening to determine the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of any national Air Defence System analysed individually. Only the intelligence communities and the modern command and control systems belonging to the collective security systems can fight successfully in the new circumstances. For their appropriate action, it is imperative to remove the existing legal barriers against international synergy and to review the traditional command and control structures/relationships, particularly where the transnational actions are slowed down.

Sensitive areas on which it must be insisted include the rapid and efficient transfer of authority over air defence assets between neighbouring nations, transfer of responsibilities between the regional command and control structures, transfer of authority between NATO and national authorities and legal actions taken by each entity involved in the resolution of an air traffic conflict.

Declaration of Full Operational Capability of the new *NATO Air Command and Control System – ACCS* will require, in my opinion, granting more autonomy for the regional allied air command control structures in decision-making and action to neutralise/destroy a "*RENEGADE*" aircraft. Fully reliance exclusively on national resources and authorities may cause delays that compromise the counter-terrorist action.

Although “RENEGADE” is the most revealed air threat in the last decade, against which substantial traditional new capabilities were developed, it is imperative to consider other possible terrorist threats against air security, such as attacks of civil and military air traffic control systems (conventional or cyber attacks), use of unmanned air vehicles/systems (UAV/UAS) as weapons or even of military air assets (aircraft or missiles).

The experience of Lebanon in 2007, when the traditional Air Defence System showed its limits in countering the small UAVs, demonstrates the difficulties faced by military planners in situations of this type. The UAVs industry is flourishing today, a wide range of unmanned air vehicles being available for civil and military applications, and even as toys for children. These can be procured without any difficulty, have low cost, are easily transported and reconfigured in order to transport various types of payloads, can fly at very low altitudes, are easily remotely controlled, difficult to be seen visually and electronically and to be neutralised. Terrorists can use them easily to launch incendiary materials, classic bombs or chemical and biological weapons. As a consequence, the development of effective countermeasures becomes more and more a must due to the difficulties faced in the control of their use by the security systems.

There can also be even more complex situations. What reaction should decision-makers have in situations in which they have information that an aircraft suspected of terrorist intentions has chemical or bacteriological agents onboard ? It is really difficult to answer this question ! The destruction of such aircraft on its flight path may have consequences as disastrous as in the case the target would be reached.

At international level, restrictive measures are taken to forbid access to chemical and bacteriological agents. The difficulties to store them as well as the fragility of biological agents diminish the likelihood of their effective use by terrorists. As a result, biological attacks are seen as mishaps by some experts. Even if the terrorist attack with chemical or bacteriological agents represent “*a scenario with low probability/high consequences*”, nobody can afford not to consider this threat and not to develop appropriate countermeasures.

Experience so far shows that terrorists have learned and studied the techniques of transforming domestic technology in destructive weapons. Research and development of the counteracting techniques must therefore be oriented in this direction, making, at the same time, efforts to anticipate terrorist intentions.

There are NATO structures that work on projects to prevent and mitigate the disastrous effects of air oriented terrorism. By far, the results of these studies

are promising but they are not fully exploited yet to ensure the synergy of the organisations involved in tackling terrorism.

The development of complex scenarios for exercising anti-terrorism combat logically leads to the identification of potential vulnerabilities. In these exercises, it is necessary that the aspects concerning after-attack action should be presented, action in which an important role belongs to the Police, Gendarmerie, civil emergency services, security and intelligence services, whose action must be part of the overall synergy.

In conclusion, global threats require a coordinated, globally oriented response. Air Defence continues to be an essential capability to support the global security domain. Integrated in the global security network, it can closely support, in real time, every stage of anti-terrorism combat with information, forces and means and, most important, expertise. The readiness and flexibility of Air Defence, connected to the power of the integrating network provide immediate access to the most appropriate instruments for action, anytime and anywhere. On one condition, however: Air Defence Systems to keep pace with the evolution of threats.



THE ROLE AND USE OF THE RESERVES IN NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES

Colonel Adrian BĂLĂLĂU

As a result of recent security threats, new policies have been implemented, which are the drivers of the need for transformation and, as a result, there are new roles and responsibilities for the NATO Forces and, in particular, the Reserve Forces.

While the regular force rapidly builds increasingly joint, deployable force structures, a fully integrated Reserve Force is the only way the NATO countries will be able to bring sufficient and appropriate resources for different types of operations. As the Regular Force faces significant transformation, significant transformation of the Reserve Forces is necessary as well.

Keywords: *crisis; reserve forces; national security; international missions; interoperability*

trained to meet the requirements of the most probable future missions. This fact has had an important effect on the redefinition of the structure of “reserve forces”: “We need to embrace transformation – transformation of the way we think about military

Today, the North Atlantic Alliance is not only a simple alliance between nations aimed at collective

defence, but an important organisation that provides the foundation for stability, for its members and many other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. The peace, security and territorial integrity of the Alliance member and partner nations are ensured through the transformation of their forces and military capabilities. The new concepts, doctrine and ways of training will contribute to a more agile Alliance, one with enhanced expeditionary capabilities, being thus more effective in the current and future military engagements.

Following the continuous change in the security environment, the new threats and risks to NATO global security interests, it has become necessary for the Alliance to continually improve its response capabilities. Therefore, the majority of NATO member states have transformed their armed forces, the reserve ones included, to be better

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force, the way we organise it, and the way we apply it. Only if we embrace transformation can we confidently speak about preserving NATO's military competence", stated Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General.

The requirements related to the use of reserves in current operations have led to the necessity of developing a new concept to establish the principles according to which they are constituted and employed in different situations. The development of this concept was necessary especially because there was not a doctrine or an official document approved by all the member nations, at NATO level, the reserves not being registered in the Alliance force structure.

Thus, in October 2005, the *NATO Military Committee Concept regarding Reserve Forces* was adopted, defining the reserves, their characteristics, the way command and control are exercised, their generation, their employment by the EU, the participation of partners and the responsibilities of different structures related to their use.

According to this concept, the "*reserve forces*" are those forces that are at the commander's disposal, established to counter the unforeseen situations while operations are conducted. They may be used across the full range of missions and tasks, not only for combat operations within the framework of collective defence but also for response operations in crisis situations.

Under certain circumstances, determined by the national juridical context, some countries have decided to use the "*reserve forces*" complementarily, together with the active forces, others have decided to disband the reserve units and to use individual reservists as part of the active units, no matter the circumstances may be, while other countries have decided to use the reservists in a balanced combination of reserve units and individual reservists integrated in active units.

There is a common denominator of all the above-mentioned variants – the necessity to enhance the reservists' level of training and their contribution to NATO missions. Therefore, the "*reserve forces*" remain a national responsibility, and this is the reason why each member of the Alliance has structures, roles and policies that are specific to the national requirements and to the assumed international commitments.

General Considerations

In order to clarify the concepts related to the theme addressed, it is necessary to state that the term "*reserve force*" used in this paper has different meanings from one country to another. *NATO Concept* defines them as those forces used appropriately by commanders at tactical, operational and strategic level,

during operations. The above-defined system refers only to the units that have already been established in peacetime.

There are other states, Romania included, in which the reserve forces are the ones that staff the units established at mobilisation and ensure the generation and regeneration of the large units and units earmarked for crisis situations management or combat missions.

The reserve forces organisation, structure, missions and training are different, being adapted to the specific of national tradition, legislative system, and the experience gained by each country.

It is important to mention that, in the event of existing risks, threats and aggression to the national territory, all the states stipulate the compulsory mobilisation of the citizens that are fit for the military service.

Filling the positions up to the necessary strength for war is aimed at meeting the needs of the armed forces across the full spectrum of operations, and the main sources to man the force structures are organised according to the law, so that they can ensure the reaction capacity in crisis situations.

It is also necessary to clarify the term “*reservist*”, as there are three categories of reservists in NATO concept, described in the NATO Military Committee document, MC 441/2005 – *volunteers, former ex-regulars* and *conscripts*. Therefore, the reservist may be a *volunteer* who has put his name on a waiting list, expressing his availability, depending on his skills, for a NATO-led peace support operation. As a rule, this person has received basic military training. For instance, in the USA, thousands of people opt for a career in reserve forces and they get a pension for their service at the end of career. To this end, they have to perform training for two days per month, at weekends, and for two consecutive weeks annually.

The *ex-regular* is the person who may be determined to perform military duties in the forces structures, occasionally or based on a contract concluded according to the legal provisions.

The *conscript* who has fulfilled the national military duties may be mobilised until a certain age. For instance, in Norway, this age is 45.

In most countries, the compulsory service of reservists in peacetime is not referred to. The tasks for reservists are based on a commitment, made on a voluntary basis initially, for a certain period. Adequate education, expertise and experience are important elements that allow reservists to have a capability equivalent to that of the active forces. Therefore, as many reservists as possible should be trained at the level of the active forces training.

Reserve Forces in the Armed Forces of NATO Member States

Each service in the armed forces of NATO member states has its own reserve forces, the manpower in reserve forces compared to the active ones being variable. In percentage terms, they vary from 10% to 80% (e.g. the Netherlands – 10% reserve forces out of 53 000 active forces, Great Britain – 20% reserve forces out of 213 000 active forces, Belgium – 36% reserve forces out of 39 000 active forces, the Czech Republic – 62% reserve forces out of 50 000 active forces, Greece – 75% reserve forces out of 178 000 active forces, the USA – 80% reserve forces out of 1 434 000 active forces).

For the majority of NATO member states, the *reserve forces are structured*, in general, depending on their employment and training as follows:

- *ready reserve* – comprises the reservists who augment the active forces and who are obliged to take part in training activities systematically;
- *selected reserve* – comprises reserve personnel who have the education and training to work in professions that are common to the ones in the civilian society (e.g. doctors, lawyers, translators etc.);
- *general reserve* – comprises reservists who are not included in the mobilisation plans but take part in training activities on a voluntary basis.

The reserve forces usually comprise individual reservists that may be used to augment the active forces or to replace the active personnel, as well as reserve units that may replace active units or contribute to the regeneration of the forces that participate in missions, following training to meet the required level of training and operational standards.

In NATO member countries, the missions of the reserve forces in peacetime, crisis situations and at war are the same with those of the active forces, as follows: to defend the national and the Alliance territory, to support the state institutions and the civilian authorities in emergency situations, to prevent international crises, to manage conflicts, to save and evacuate the citizens and the material assets in the event of natural disasters, as well as to participate in the cooperation initiatives in the field of defence and partnership.

In NATO concept, the reservists' *training system*, both the individual and the collective one, in the subunits and units, is an exclusively national responsibility of the state they belong to and it is based on the national legislation and the own experience.

These are the reasons why the reservists' training is very different from one state to another, although it has some general characteristics, as follows:

- training, which is received through convocations, exercises and tactical applications, in units specially designed for this purpose, both on the national territory and outside it;
- duration of the training convocations that depends on the category of personnel and the job/specialisation in the civilian life;
- obligation for each reservist to train for a minimum number of days annually, having the option of further training.

The policy regarding the reservists' training has to lead to the achievement of the goal to prepare and use reserve personnel to take part in the whole range of NATO missions. It is mainly based on the period of training established to be performed before the deployment in the theatre of operations.

Reservists have to be available to participate in missions and in periodical training programmes. That is why, in NATO member countries, there are laws and regulations that stipulate that they should be encouraged and the community should support their families and employers. In this context, the programmes aimed at the support of the employers are encouraged and sustained by the national governments.

To exemplify, some of the main elements that characterise the reserve forces in some NATO member states will be presented as follows.

➤ **The United States of America**

The US Reserve Forces include the *National Guard* and the *Reserve*. The *National Guard*, the oldest component of the US Armed Forces, has two types of missions:

- *at state level* (in the 48 states) – to provide the trained and equipped forces to intervene in crisis situations in order to protect the life of the citizens and their private property;
- *at federal level* – to provide the properly trained and equipped units to be mobilised in internal crisis situations, at national level, or in the event of war.

The *National Guard* organisation, and the command and control, when it is under federal control, fall under the responsibility of the President of the USA, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Army, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and when it is under a state control, fall under the responsibility of the Governor or Deputy Governor of the particular state. As it has been shown above, command is exercised by the authorities belonging to both the political and the political-military power.

The *National Guard* members perform training one weekend per month and two continuous weeks at some time during the year.

The funding for the *National Guard* is provided by the federal budget and it is used for the expenditure on personnel, training, operation and maintenance. The *National Guard* is composed of approximately 456 000 reservists, out of which 346 000 represent the *Army National Guard* (15 independent brigades, 8 divisions, 3 strategic brigades and 2 groups of Special Forces) and 110 200 the *Air National Guard*.

The second component of the US Reserve Forces is represented by the *Reserve*. It consists of the *US Army Reserve*, with 563 000 reservists, the *Air Force Reserve* – 74 358, the *Naval Reserve* – 88 900, the *Marine Corps Reserve* – 39 558 and the *US Coast Guard Reserve* – 7 960 and they are used to:

- augment the large units and units so that they could achieve their operational capability to carry out their missions;
- generate large units and units at war;
- carry out missions together with the active forces outside the national territory;
- provide replacements for combat losses to in-action units and large units;
- manage some crisis situations internally (natural disasters, civilian unrest etc.).

Unlike the *National Guard*, the *Reserve Forces* are strictly subordinated to the Pentagon (the Ministry of Defence) and execute missions at federal level, but only by augmenting the active forces. Within these components of the US Reserve Forces, the personnel are assigned to one of the three categories: the *Ready Reserve*, the *Standby Reserve*, or the *Retired Reserve*.

According to the federal legislation, reservists may be mobilised following the President's Executive Order. During mobilisation, the civilian companies that have reservists as employees have to preserve their positions. The reservists who have their own business are paid compensation by the state, under the provisions of law, in direct relation to the duration of mobilisation.

> **Germany**

The augmentation of forces up to the necessary strength for war is performed in different ways, depending on the existing manpower and the deadlines that have to be met in combat actions. Thus, at the first stage, the *Crisis Reaction Forces* are manned with reservists. In peacetime, their assigned strength is only 70-90% of the one necessary for war. These forces are earmarked for NATO-led actions, and a part of them is assigned to perform missions under national command.

Subsequently, the *Main Defence Forces* are augmented. Their assigned strength in peacetime is only 50-60% of the one necessary for war. These forces are under the national command, and they may be made available to NATO.

Only at mobilisation are the basic military organisations constituted following the territorial principle. They are under the national military command and only key and command positions are manned in peacetime.

The Reserve Forces consist of:

- *Active Reserve*, in which all the volunteer reservists who express their agreement to be part of this category are included. In peacetime, they are assigned to staff the units that are undermanned or to increase the units' operational capability.
- *Passive Reserve* consists of all the registered reservists who have not expressed their willingness to be part of the active reserve but who, in the event of tension or war, will be called up for the armed forces augmentation.

The armed forces manpower reserve consists of reservists, former active duty personnel (generals, officers, non-commissioned (NCOs) as well as former conscripts) and it is divided into:

- *Alert Reserve* – reservists mobilised gradually, while passing from peacetime to war.
- *Volunteer-based Reserve* – consisting of reservists who want to fill a position in the Armed Forces.

In conformity with the laws on reservists' career, there are different periods of time allocated for the basic, further and advanced training. The medium training period is 10 years for officers, 7 years for NCOs, and 4 years for privates/enlisted personnel.

The period may be extended especially for the personnel that are to fill positions in a field that has a shortage of personnel or require special knowledge and qualifications.

During the period they are in the alert reserve, it is mandatory for reservists to participate in convocations, as follows: privates/enlisted personnel – 24 days, NCOs – 45 days and officers – 84 days. They are also called up, usually once in 2 years, to take part in mobilisation exercises.

Volunteer reservists may take part in the training sessions on a voluntary basis, on their request, depending on the available places. As for the basic, advanced and continuous training, similar principles apply for both active personnel and reservists.

Training is performed in conformity with the requirements of the positions filled by reservists. The reserve training conducted during crisis situations,

designed to enhance operational readiness or to secure the armed forces operation and, furthermore, the reserve training during on-call duty as well as during a state of emergency declared by the Federal Parliament are not affected by this provision.

All reserve duty training within the context of assignments up to the maximum duration prescribed by conscription law is always mandatory.

The missions abroad will not be counted as basic training. The focus is on the individual training of reserve personnel for command, administrative and specialised positions that is designed to maintain and enhance the skills and proficiency through regular reserve duty training.

Reservists earmarked for national disaster relief operation as well as for the protection of German citizens in peacetime must be trained and supported, while attending reserve duty training, in the assistance practices, with sufficient frequency and in close cooperation with the responsible civilian agencies.

The overall duration of military service as a reservist will be 12 months for officers, 9 months for NCOs and 6 months for privates/enlisted personnel. Following the completion of the compulsory military service as a reservist, additional periods may be attended for duty on a voluntary basis.

> **France**

The augmentation of the military units with reservists up the level necessary at war is aimed at the reinforcement of military capabilities, and the maintenance of a proper defence spirit and of a strong connection between the nation and the armed forces.

The military reserve components consist of:

- The *Operational Reserve*, made up of volunteers who agree to sign a contract with the armed forces for 5 years and former active military personnel who are required to serve an additional period after having been discharged from the active service. The Operational Reserve comprises 100 000 reservists, as follows: Land Forces – 28 000, Naval Forces – 6 500, Air Force – 8 000, Gendarmerie – 50 000, Medical Corps – 7 000, Energy Corps – 500.

- The *Citizens' Reserve* comprises the other reservists who have not expressed their willingness to be volunteers and its possible manpower is limitless. The officers and NCOs who leave the active service serve in the reserves for at least 5 years.

Reservists are assigned to augment the active units as well as to establish reserve units, in peacetime.

Active units are manned with active military personnel and they are augmented with reservists up to the level necessary at war. A part of the active personnel represents the nucleus of the reserve units established by the active unit, following mobilisation.

This active nucleus represents 10-15% of the mobilised unit manpower and not more than 5% of the manpower of the active unit it results from.

Currently, reservists' training lasts for 18 days annually and, starting 2012, it will last for 27 days annually and consists of an individual basic training in the first year of volunteer work, specialised training for missions in the second year and advanced training for operations in the third year.

➤ **Great Britain**

The reserves augment the active military units to reach the level of organisation at war. Moreover, they generate units in the event of a war, units that carry out missions together with the active forces. The armed forces are interested in maintaining a representative reserve pool, especially because they ensure the connection between the military and the civilians. There are more types of reserve forces:

- The *Volunteer Reserve Forces*, which consist of people who have joined the volunteer reserves from the civilian community, who train in their spare time and may be conscripted.
- The *Regular Reserve Forces*, comprised of people who have a liability by virtue of their former service in the regular forces.
- The *Retired Military Personnel Reserve*, consisting of the retired military personnel over 55 years of age.

Reservists form the Territorial Army are divided in: the *Army Reserve* with a strength of 191 000 reservists, the *Royal Naval Reserve*, comprising 26 300 reservists, and the *Royal Auxiliary Air Force*, with 47 000 reservists.

➤ **Poland**

In peacetime, the Polish Armed Forces consist of 150 000 active duty personnel (27 500 officers, 55 000 NCOs and 67 500 conscripts, who will be gradually replaced by professional military men). In the event of a war, 240 000 reservists may be called up to augment the existing units in peacetime, up to the necessary strength at war or to man the newly established units, following mobilisation. They are active duty personnel and conscripts (the military service is compulsory) in reserve.

Reservists represent the main manpower pool to replace the combat losses. A particularity is represented by the fact that the reservists with special skills (physicists, lawyers, translators, psychologists, IT experts, doctors etc.) may be called up to fill the positions in the personnel establishment in crisis situations, too.

Reservists, officers and NCOs may take part in missions outside the national territory only on a voluntary basis, and a mission cannot exceed 12 months.

The Reserves may be:

- The *Alert Reserve* – composed of the youngest and best trained reservists that augment the military units if they are not older than (officers – 40 years old, NCOs – 40 years old, privates – 30 years old);
- The *Qualified Reserve* – consisting of skilled reservists who are appointed periodically, in rotation, to mobilisation posts and perform training together with active personnel in peacetime, if they are not older than (officers – 40 years old, NCOs – 35 years old, privates – 35 years old);
- The *Passive Reserve* – composed of reservists who are skilled and qualified in a military specialisation. They may be called up in the event of mobilisation or war but they are not required to augment the armed forces as a rule. The reservists assigned to military units or to take part in civil emergencies, following mobilisation, have to be within specific age limits (officers – 60 years old, NCOs – 50 years old, privates – 50 years old);
- The *Ineffective Reserve* – consisting of reservists who, because of their age, health problems or lack of training, are not part of any of the above-mentioned categories. They may be used for military purposes following proper training.

➤ **Bulgaria**

As a NATO member country and following the changes in the new security environment, the Bulgarian Armed Forces have undergone a transformation process based on an organisation, reconstruction and modernisation plan, which lasts up to 2015.

The Reserve Forces consist of: the *reserve with a high training capacity*, made up of the reservists who have signed a contract to express their agreement to be part of the Reserves, and the *reserve with a low training capacity*, which consists of ex-regulars or ex-conscripts who are reservists.

The Reserve Forces missions are: to defend the country, to provide support for peacekeeping missions and to contribute to national security during peacetime. The reservists are citizens who have performed the military duties or who have a specialisation in the civilian life, meet certain requirements and have agreed to be mobilised or called up in the event of a war.

The *Reserves' training* is executed annually, for up to 15 days, in military academies and special training centres, in 2 modules: basic military training and specialised military training.

The Use of the Reserves in NATO-led Operations

Reservists are generally assigned to augment the existing peacetime units in order to allow small-scale operations to be conducted as well as the personnel to be rotated in the event of long-lasting operations or the rapid augmentation of the armed forces during crisis situations or mobilisation. In 2003, the first statistics were drawn up regarding the employment of reservists in NATO current operations. Following the data analysis, two trends were highlighted as far as the countries reserve forces contribution to NATO-led missions was concerned. Therefore, states like the USA, Canada, Germany and Great Britain approve the employment of large contingents in such missions. To justify this trend, it is brought to attention the fact that for main activities it is necessary not only for the reservists to be re-called up but also for the use of the reserve units existing in peacetime, as well as for the staff officers to be called up individually for special functions. Typical examples of functional specialists: engineers belonging to all specialisations, financial experts, accountancy experts, public relations (CIMIC, J-8), journalists and other media specialisations (public information, PSYOPS), lawyers (LEGADs), doctors, dentists, IT experts, technical experts (network administrators, J-6, INFO OPS). In this context, it can be stated that the reservists have the monopoly on a large spectrum of special skills that may be employed to support military goals, being those who bring maturity and experience in the thorny and often uncertain aspects related to humanitarian operations.

The other group, to which Finland, Denmark, Austria, Norway and the Netherlands belong, consists of the countries that do not usually deploy reservists abroad. The trend is justified by the relatively reduced dimension of their armed forces, the conscript system, and the “*total force concept*” that “*produces*” reservists. The majority of the male population have fulfilled the national service obligations, many of them have performed the basic training for officers, and the ones who have specialised skills as civilians have become temporary valuable armed forces employees, on a contract. Many of them are the so-called functional specialists.

The Netherlands is included in this group, having only 1% of the reserves employed in missions abroad, because it is the first country that redefines the term of reservist more as a functional specialist than as an “*active*” combatant. That is why the situation is similar to the one in the Nordic countries and in Austria.

If we put together the forces in the countries that actively employ reservists in NATO-led missions (both categories mentioned above, excepting, in this case,

the Netherlands), the percentage of reservists is 20,4% on the average. Moreover, the group of the countries that do not usually deploy reservists abroad may be divided in two subgroups. The first one is that of the countries that have recently become NATO members or the partner countries that have not developed their own participation patterns yet, especially as far as functional specialists are concerned, or have not had a “*tradition*” of participating in crisis response international operations yet, and whose national legislation in force does not ban it (e.g. Croatia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia). The second subgroup is the one of the countries that have already had available reservists but (as a rule) the national legislation bans it (e.g. Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania). The trend seems to be that the Eastern European countries are “*on the road*” to change their legislation in favour of the reservists’ participation in missions abroad.

In the future, it seems that more and more reservists may serve in international missions. Many countries appreciate that they do not fully capitalise on their reservists’ capacity (for NATO-led operations). Among them, we can mention Finland, that has employed 85% reservists for the two missions, KFOR and ISAF.

Hungary and Romania are in full process of changing their national legislation to allow reservists to be deployed. For example, the project of the *Law regarding the status of the volunteer reservist* stipulates that the volunteer reservist may be concentrated or mobilised to carry out missions on the national territory or outside it, depending on the needs of the forces intended for defence. It can be also estimated that Norway may be a future capability to capitalise on. The national legislation in Ireland bans the reservists’ deployment abroad, although it admits this potentiality. There is no mention that the Irish legislation undergoes a transformation process.

Only Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the USA appreciate that all the capacities of their reservists have already been employed in NATO-led missions. In this context, it is interesting yet typical the discrepancy between the opinion of the Ministry of Defence in Germany and the Reserve Officers Association regarding this issue. This fact may exist in all the countries, ministries of defence having the tendency to be more conservative and restrictive when it comes to the employment and integration of reservists.

There are databases (or other registers) in all the countries containing the reservists’ level of training, special skills, availability/deployability etc. However, there may be financial constraints and many other reasons, except having a good database, that may forbid a country from integrally employ the potential of its reservists. The issues regarding the reserves are indeed a national prerogative.

Furthermore, the reasons why the NRFC or other NATO-led initiatives aimed at the idea of a standard classification for the required training and skills are still valid, the most important argument being interoperability.

The majority of the countries highlight the fact that volunteer reservists, functional specialists included, represent an important category (if not the only one) they send in NATO-led missions. Countries like Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, and Slovakia state that the former conscripts represent the most important group of reservists for international operations. In the case of the following countries, functional specialists and other volunteers are the most important reservists to be sent in conflict areas, in NATO-led missions: Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Great Britain and the USA.

*

Individual reservists and the reserve units in NATO member states represent an essential part, an independent one, of the structures of forces made available to NATO. They more and more take part in the new missions, especially the ones aimed at humanitarian aid, as well as the ones that are specific to crisis response operations.

Individual reservists are used to fill the manpower needs of not only the units but also the headquarters. Moreover, those who, in their civilian life, have jobs or specialisations that are similar to the ones stipulated for the active personnel may be employed, in case of emergency, to replace the personnel that are not available at a certain moment.

In the context of the new NATO missions, it has become very important to employ the reservists belonging to the selected reserve, trained and skilled in the field of post-conflict reconstruction, CIMIC, public relations and medical personnel.

Having in view the evolution of the processes under development aimed at the forces restructuring, the reserves are reduced as far as their number is concerned, but it is sought to provide more opportunities for them to be deployed. Irrespective of the ways to fulfil the military duties, conscript or volunteer, there has been special preoccupation with the revision of the concepts regarding the reserve forces, especially to provide the governments with the necessary support in civilian emergencies, to enhance national defence, and to provide experts in peace support operations.

So that more reservists could take part in NATO-led operations, it is necessary to establish a system, at national level, able to allow not only them but also their employers to be motivated. The system should be permanently enhanced

so that reservists could be rapidly available to be employed in missions, and the pressure on their families and employers could be reduced. Reservists are guaranteed the positions they have filled before concentration, and their employers continue to pay their salaries. The government reimburses the expenses, according to the documents presented by the employer.

It is recommended that *two categories of reservists* should be created, depending on their availability, and that reservists could opt for one of them, as follows: one category can be called up irrespective of the purpose, for an undetermined period of time, and the second category, which can be called up only in the event of internal or international crisis situations, for a limited period of time.

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English version by
✍️ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*



SOME OPINIONS ON A POSSIBLE INTEGRATED INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REGARDING COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TRAINING (I)

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Gheorghe DINCĂ

The general objective of an integrated information management system is to sustain a joint training system that meets the latest Alliance requirements. Such system should bond the unit training with mission requirements, providing, at the same time, the necessary tools for unit training evaluation.

Considering the obvious transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces, in the context of the Alliance transformation to meet the new challenges of the third millennium, the author believes that designing a joint training system as well as one at the level of our armed forces should become a priority for military decision-makers.

Thus, it can represent a certain way of enabling the commanders at all echelons to identify and evaluate own training needs, to plan and schedule various training events/types.

Keywords: *lessons learned; forces capability; theatre of operations; integrated system*

Having as starting point the fact that the *Network-Centric Warfare* or the highly technologised confrontation has become more and more manifest in the current armed conflicts, as well as the extraordinary determinants of this new concept, among which I personally attach a particular importance to the role *Advanced Distribution Training (ADT)* plays in determining the training transformation in general, we consider that the existence and functioning of a management system with regard to training may and have to become a reality in the current Romanian military environment.

The training process is planned and developed on rigorous juridical bases, in strict correlation with the requirements of training, and closely and continuously monitoring the system outputs – operational capabilities.

An important role has to be granted by military experts to the *training process management* that has to be rigorously planned, conducted

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and assessed. The commander is the one who decides on the training requirements, making use of specific instruments. He set the goals for individual training and the standards for collective training. Sometimes, commanders also decide on the training procedures that are specific to the unit or structure they command, which, capitalising on the lessons learned and previous results, optimise the process as such and enhance all the stages of the training cycle, avoiding possible syncope and reducing costs.

Training resource and methods are, naturally, attached a great importance. A component of great interest for the factors that project, plan, organise, conduct and execute the training process is represented by financing training facilities, providing and maintaining operational the equipment, systems and materials.

The use of the lessons learned system, the activities simplicity and effectiveness may allow and determine the development of some training encyclopaedias for its different stages, which facilitate the access of any person that takes part in the training process (as a trainee or trainer) to certain concepts, principles, norms, documents, algorithms etc. This fact will facilitate standardisation as far as concepts and actions are concerned, thus generating the premises for the achievement of exercises and training interoperability, which may determine the appearance of the concept of JOINT training.

Training methods and procedures have to be analysed periodically, compared and assessed in terms of their effectiveness and adaptability to the training system inputs, as well as of the determinants of the system outputs. The use of simulation on a large scale, the itinerant training teams or the training in the theatre of operations may represent interesting elements that, as their positive aspects are highlighted, may be successfully used in our armed forces.

Main components of the joint training system

Taking into account the evident transformation undergone by the Romanian Armed Forces, in the context of the transformation undergone by the Alliance to meet the new challenges proper to the 3rd millennium, we consider that the development of a joint training system at the level of our armed forces has to become a priority of the military decision-makers. Thus, it may become a reliable method that enables commanders at all echelons to identify and assess the own training needs, to plan and schedule different training events (types).

It is certain that such a system would allow commanders to monitor forces capabilities¹. In this context, one of the main ideas this article proposes

¹ Gh. Boaru, V. Păun, *Războiul informațional și operațiunile informaționale. Monografie*, Editura U.N.Ap., București, 2003.

is the *integration, in a system, of all the training subsystems that are specific to all services and branches in the Romanian Armed Forces*. A result of the integration would be a *joint system*, similar to the one of some armed forces in the Alliance member countries, which would enable the Romanian Armed Forces training to achieve the established goals, in general, and the *integration of the used training methods and forms with the assigned missions, in the circumstances of the available resources and taking into account the command priorities*, at particular levels.

We appreciate that an integrated training information management system has to be structured obeying the following principles²:

- “*commanders are the first trainers*”;
- “*document fighting missions*”;
- “*train as you fight !*”;
- “*apply the provisions of the training doctrine !*”;
- “*centralised planning, decentralised execution*”.

Another proposal for the generation of such a system would be the one related to delegating the responsibilities in this field to all the structures having duties as far as the Romanian Armed Forces training is concerned.

A probable structure of the integrated training information management system

The realities in the current Romanian system of training in the field of communications and information, both in particular and in general, as well as the analysis of some training systems belonging to the armed forces in NATO member countries enable us to consider that a possible structure of an *integrated training information management system (ITIMS)* would be like the one presented in *figure 1*.

Utilising the integrated database of the lessons learned system, such an integrated system should be able to define and identify the possible




Figure 1: ITIMS possible structure

organisational structure, the tasks (requirements) and the goals of the joint training process. We consider the goals of such a system should be the following: to specify the software; to set the hardware and software requirements; to establish

² ***, *Force XXI, Signal Army Training and Evaluation Program*, Washington, 1998.

the group of users and their management; to establish the programme that provides the management; to configure the system management plan; to draft the training plan.

General description of the probable ITIMS framework structure

The goal of such an integrated system is to automate and support a joint training system, in the context of the transformation of training to better meet the Alliance requirements. Such a system could provide an evident connection between the requirements of a possible mission and the execution of training as well as the evaluation of the unit training, and it would also provide the methods for the assessment of training and the effectiveness of accomplishing the possible missions in relation with the identified requirements.

The system may be an efficient soft “tool”, meant to support the collaboration and integration of the training processes specific to different structures, through which the assigned commanders can train their units under their own command. The implementation of such a system in such a domain may be a major step in the thorough integration of the joint training system in the Romanian Armed Forces.

As far as a possible architecture of such a system is concerned, we consider it could “harmonise” with the structure of the *Ministry of National Defence Integrated Information System (MODIIS)*, benefiting from all the facilities³ the latter provides (will provide): interoperability; effectiveness; information availability; achievement of the concept of joint actions; standardisation; effective management of the resources necessary for the system implementation, exploitation and development.

ITIMS could be integrated in the computer-assisted military learning system (CAMLS)⁴ or it could be an independent structure, providing training for future users and specialisation for the personnel that administrate the information equipment and systems, using, on the one hand, distance learning and, on the other hand, competency centres equipped with mobile training laboratories, following the structure and model of modern armed forces. The use of *ITIMS* under these conditions will facilitate the achievement of an evident connection between the mission requirements and the unit that is trained, as well as of the training resources that are necessary to prepare the force to conduct the (required) planned military operations.

³ Cristea Dumitru, *Sisteme – CAI*, Editura Militară, București, 2005.

⁴ Cristea Dumitru, Ion Roceanu, *Războiul bazat pe rețea*, Editura U.N.Ap., București, 2005.

Steps of the process	Validation			Development											
	1	2	3	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Document requirements for the chosen domain	X														
New requirements functional analysis	X														
New requirements technical analysis		X													
Analysis of the conclusions related to requirements		X													
Finance the new requirements development			X												
New requirements validation				X											
Issue the new requirements document				X											
Draft the new documentation form					X										
Draft the requirement specifications					X										
Draft the way information is exchanged					X										
Software development						X			X						
New concept creation							X		X						
New concept testing							X		X						
Draft the user's guide								X	X						
Basic training network development								X	X						
Defects correction								X	X						
Completion of the newly created concept									X						
Re-testing in virus infection conditions									X						
Valid concept creation												X			
Installation kit preparation												X			
Installation testing													X		
Independent testing validation														X	
Installation completion and first use														X	
New version installation															X

Figure 2: A possible variant of ITIMS implementation cycle

The type of *ITIMS* has to meet the needs of its beneficiaries, at the level of the general staff, the services, commands, large units, units and groups to collect, configure the target groups, and coordinate the data associated with training, which, once entered in the system, can have many users. Therefore, after the system has been “*designed*”, it will continue to develop, through an intrinsic process, in which the increase in the information in the system can determine the intensification of the management of the data regarding the “*training community*” as well as the development of the facilities to interface with not only other users of the system but also with other databases. In this context, we appreciate that the requirements of the integrated information management system specific to training can be adapted to meet each major change in the field of training, verified, developed, experimented and accepted.

In *figure 2* (page 131) some steps of the *ITIMS* implementation process are presented in their logical sequence.

ITIMS can become a mechanism able to facilitate the relations between the information regarding training and the community interested in the field of training. In addition, it should be mentioned the connection that can be established between the joint training system and *ITIMS* as far as the phases of the training cycle are concerned – requirements, planning, execution, assessment.

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In the second part of the article, the author will present some of the ITIMS determinants on the management system of the individual career and the operational capabilities.

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN IRAQ – Blackwater Case –

Andreea C. ZUGRAVU

This paper is a case study on the Rules of Engagement that Blackwater Worldwide, a private security company that today is known as Xe Services, followed while it was involved in various incidents in Iraq, namely Fallujah 2004, Najaf 2004, and Nisoor 2007.

The paper starts with a background introduction on the new security environment, private military companies and the specifics of the war in Iraq.

Moreover, it addresses the existing legislation on the Rules of Engagement applicable to contractors. The last part of the paper is an analytic view on ROE.

Keywords: *Blackwater; defence contractors; private security companies; rules of engagement; Iraq*

The war in Iraq has brought into public light a silent yet persistent non-state actor: *the private military company (PMC)*. The privatisation of the military industry challenges the most standard conception of international security: the fact that states are the central, if not the only truly relevant actor in world politics.

A New Actor in International Conflict: The Private Security Company

The rise of non-state groups in the last years has shown that, on the international arena, states share power with “*interdependent players caught in a network of transnational transactions*”¹. Moreover, “*in many of our modern conflicts it is only the soldiers that are representatives of states – yet, they are operating within groupings and environments*

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¹ Peter Singer, *Corporate Warriors, The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2003, p. 169.

that are either sub- or supranational”². In light of past developments, this article aims at presenting, understanding and challenging the *rules for the use of force or rules of engagement* these companies abide by.

The article does not make judgments about privatisation as a process for the military sector nor does it address the question of whether the state should keep its monopoly over coercive action. The basic assumption for the paper is the fact that *PMCs* are a reality and a necessity on the ground and their importance will increase even more in the years to come.

Defining the Concepts

Trying to define a *private military company* is not an easy task, most notably because of the vast array of services that these companies perform. Juan Carlos Zarate, international terrorism expert, argued that “*the panoply of services defies classification, but they all involve the export of private military expertise in some fashion*”³. There are generally three types of private military companies: the ones that directly engage in combat – *military combatant companies* (DynCorp, Blackwater, Aegis), the ones that provide *back-office support and military technology* – *military consulting and support firms* (Raytheon, MPRI, BAE Systems, GE) and the ones that provide *military logistics and supply*. More simply put, these are *active PMCs* and *passive PMCs*. Some analysts have objected to these classifications, because they “*are more for simple convenience [...] rather than as a taxonomy designed to yield explanatory and predicative implications*”⁴. However, *PMCs* are businesses and any kind of typology that does not factor the economic implication would most likely fail to offer a comprehensive view of the industry.

The focus of this paper is the first category of private military companies, herein referred to as *private security companies (PSCs)* defined as private companies recognised by a coalition government that offer security solutions and military support to public, private and non-profit sector. These companies provide security for reconstruction and logistics firms, as well as for the former *Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)* and other US agencies, Western media or non-governmental organisations. There are several issues affecting this industry, namely increased allegations of corruptions, contracting, vetting, and many others, but none is as bad as the massive outrage that these companies have been exposed to for the human

² Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force, the Art of War in the Modern World*, Penguin Books, New York, 2006, p. 303.

³ Juan Carlos Zarate, *The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law and the New World Order*, in *Stanford Journal of International Law*, 1998, pp. 75-156.

⁴ Peter Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

rights' abuse accusations. Particularly, the paper discusses the *Blackwater case*, the company that due to its size and prominence has become the *poster-child* of everything that is wrong with the industry. One thing worth mentioning about the decision to have *Blackwater* as case of study lies in the danger of taking the exception and make it the rule. Not only *Blackwater*, but mostly every other private security company in Iraq has been involved in several incidents that really question the rules for the use of force these companies abide by. Defining and gauging a real understanding of these companies, in general, and *Blackwater*, in particular, has been even more difficult due to the many "spicy-merc" perceptions of these companies. However, labelling them and their employees as *mercenaries* is not only unjust but also completely wrong. It is unjust, because it disregards the role the private sector plays in peace and stability operations and it is incorrect because *PMCs* personnel do not comply with the universally-accepted definition of "mercenary" from the *Geneva Conventions*. Accordingly, a *mercenary* is someone who:

- a. *Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict.*
- b. *Does in fact take part in the hostilities.*
- c. *Is essentially motivated for the desire of private gain.*
- d. *Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of the territory controlled by a party to the conflict.*
- e. *Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict.*
- f. *Has not been sent by a state that is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.*

It is obvious that *PMC* personnel do not meet these criteria. Of the approximately 120 000 contractors in Iraq as of June 2009, 31 500 were US citizens, 32 000 were local nationals, and 56 000 were third-country nationals⁵. Thus, 50% of the contractors are American and Iraqi nationals and as such are nationals of a party to the conflict. Second of all, not all contractors take part in the hostilities. In addition, these companies have been sent in Iraq on official duty and often work under the authority of regular armed forces.

However, despite the fact that these companies are not legally defined as mercenaries, one cannot deny that they are a non-state group, insufficiently known and poorly defined. One immediate question that arises is *whether or not PSCs are combatants and thus legitimate targets of war*. This question has been very acute in the case of the four *Blackwater* employees slaughtered in Fallujah⁶. The fact

⁵ Moshe Schwartz, *DOD Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis*, September 2009, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf>

⁶ City in Iraq, situated at 69 km West to Baghdad, on the Euphrates, in the province of Al-Anbar.

that they are considered civilians, but do carry weapons, puts contractors in a murky legal status. Things get even more complicated because some of these contractors are nationals of other countries and thus abide by different national laws, while the overwhelming majority of the existent international law is very state-centric and addresses either military combatants from a specific nation or civilians. The other category is mercenaries. As we have seen above, these companies are neither. They are not mere civilians because they can carry guns, they are not military combatants because they work in the private sector and they are not mercenaries either. It is very likely that this subject is going to be an important one for building the international law body, but in the meantime, until that happens, the US and its allies, including Romania, will have to define PSCs specifically for each case.

Specifics of the War in Iraq

One of the most common spread explanations for the rise of private security companies is that the end of the *Cold War* brought significantly cuts in military budgets and military spending and there was suddenly a pool of highly skilled military personnel who was unemployed. Thus, on the one side, you have available specialised military services as well as excess of weapons⁷. At the same time, Fukuyama's end of history did not come, and in the new world order long-simmering conflicts emerged, conflicts previously held in check by the two superpowers. PMCs evolved as a natural way to fill the security gap in the market. The inevitable happened and Eben Barlow, founder of *Executive Outcomes*, said it best: "*The Cold War left a huge vacuum and I identified a niche in the market*".

Although contractors on the battlefield have been a constant reality for the US military, the degree of this reliance has dramatically changed with *Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)* in Afghanistan and especially with *Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)* in Iraq. The insurgency in Iraq "*drove the amount of world attention focused on the role of PMCs to new heights*"⁸. As the insurgency continued, PSCs became vital enablers for the non-military organisations to perform their duties and purposes on the battlefield. In Iraq, PSCs perform a wide array of services. As of June 2009, 71 783 personnel (60% of contractors) performed base support functions such as maintenance of the grounds, dining facilities, and laundry services. The second most common service provided was security

⁷ Rolf Uessler, *Servants of War, Private Military Corporations and the Profit of Conflict*, Soft Shell Press, Brooklyn, 2008.

⁸ David Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, Praeger Security International, Westport, 2009, p. 24.

(11% of contractors)⁹. In Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, contractors offer support for highly sophisticated systems such as *Patriot* and *JSTARS* and they train Iraqi armed forces as well as police forces¹⁰. In Iraq though, it is often argued that the poor preparations before the war increased the reliance on such actors. And it is even more often argued that because of these poor preparations there are no adequate oversight mechanisms to prevent contractors from financial abuses or to regulate their behaviour in the theatres of operations.

The current debate over these companies fails to provide an accurate description of the mission statement and why these companies are needed since most of the comments have their own agenda to support. However, it is clear that *PMCs* exist because they can provide solutions to peoples' and states' security problems. *PMCs* operate in one of the most dangerous and violent theatres of operations in the world and they are often hired because other more traditional measures have proved inadequate. Singer argues that "*if a state cannot provide security and protection for its citizens and no other public party is willing to help, then it seems hypocritical to say that private options must be forsworn completely*"¹¹.

In terms of *cost-benefit* analysis, there are some unclear results. Contractors do charge high premiums for their work, often costing much more than regular armed forces. However, in this way, the qualified individuals can be hired and used for the short needed period of time, without having to pay benefits, health care and other governmental incentives. In addition, armed forces simply do not have the capabilities to effectively operate under the conditions of "*wars among the people*". If the torture scandal at Abu Ghraib has managed to show something, that is the great lack of interpreters and translators the US can rely on. On the ground, *PSC* personnel are not merely independent contractors, but also former members of elite units, usually in the special forces (SOF) who are able to bring a lifetime of training and experience to the job, contributing to a more relaxed environment, which simplifies operations. A typical SOF soldier is also more used and trained to interact with locals and can establish relations with members of the community, which are denied to the military locked up in a base.

Even more important, value is not measured solely by cost. Value is often described in terms of cost, quality of service and speed of delivery. *PMCs* are more flexible and can deploy personnel more quickly. If you need a certain something in a war zone and you need it tomorrow, you cannot expect

⁹ Moshe Schwartz, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ Peter Singer, *The Dark Truth about Blackwater*, Salon, 2 October 2007.

¹¹ Peter Singer, *Corporate Warriors...*, p. 103.

that *Federal Express* can get it there for you. But the private sector can. There are inherent differences in the way these two sectors operate that affect the balance of value, while increasing quality but also price. For example, *Blackwater's* capabilities include a logistics operation that can deliver 100- or 200-ton self-contained humanitarian relief response packages faster than the Red Cross¹².

In addition, outsourcing support functions allows the military to focus on the core competencies, freeing up military personnel available for combat. Outsourcing empowers regular armed forces by taking advantage of the technological advancements that *PMCs* develop, as they very often have specialised expertise in areas where the Department of Defense does not. Contractors can be hired when a particular need arises and let go when that need stops. This operational flexibility can be cost-saving in the long run, when compared to developing an in-house permanent capability. Moreover, there is a not-so secret going around, that governments like turning to private companies because of the low political costs: low level of national troops, low level of declared casualties, and lower level of “official” contributions to the war-effort.

Formulating the Problem – The Blackwater Case Worldwide

The increased reliance on *PMCs* and the expansion of the type of services that they perform have brought these companies closer to the battlefield, raising their exposure and increasing the stakes. Among other factors, such as contracting regulations, vetting, or licensing, *PMCs* often make the news in the context of human rights abuses and improper use of force. The purpose of this paper is to take a look at the current legislation on the rules of engagement applicable to *PSCs* and evaluate the efficiency and the problems with these rules in the case of *Blackwater International*, now rebranded as *Xe Services*.

Blackwater was founded by former Navy SEAL¹³ Erik Prince and, in 2002, signed a contract with the Pentagon to train more than 10 000 soldiers in force protection. In August 2003, it earned a \$21 million no-bid contract to guard Paul Bremer, the Head of the *Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)* in Iraq. From 2002 until the end of 2006, the value of contracts *Blackwater* received exceeds 1 billion dollars¹⁴. Some of the capabilities *Blackwater* has developed are really

¹² Bruce Falconer, Daniel Shulman, *Blackwater's World of Warcraft*, March-April 2008, <http://motherjones.com/politics/2008/03/blackwaters-world-warcraft>

¹³ Acronym used in the US Navy – “Sea Air and Land” for a fighter in an elite naval unit, trained for unconventional warfare.

¹⁴ David Isenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

impressive, including a Florida aviation division with 26 different platforms, from helicopter gunships to a Boeing 767. *Xe/Blackwater* owns the country's largest tactical driving track for drivers learning to escape ambushes, a 20-acre manmade lake with shipping containers used to teach how to board a hostile ship, a K-9 training facility that has 80 dog teams deployed around the world, a 1 200-yard-long firing range for sniper training, a sizeable private armoury, and an armoured personal carrier called the *Grizzly*.

Events Blackwater Was Involved in

Blackwater is one of the most controversial PSCs currently operating in private security industry and the main criticism it faces is the problem of over aggressiveness. This raises significant issues over its policies in regard to the rules for the use of force as well as the current oversight and jurisdiction on which is ultimately responsible to judge whether these companies have overstepped their limits. *Blackwater* has been involved in several incidents. The most notable three examples are the ones in Fallujah (March 2004), Najaf (April 2004), and Nisoor Square (September 2007):

❖ *Fallujah, 31 March 2004*

While escorting a convoy carrying food for US troops, four *Blackwater* employees were attacked by Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah. They were killed with grenades and small arms fire and their bodies were burnt and mutilated. This was a very high profile event that caused the US military to launch an all-out attack of the city. The event was covered extensively and the main issues debated were twofold: first, was the company properly preparing its employees for the missions it was sending them? And secondly, as we mentioned before, are contractors combatants in the eyes of the insurgents? The four men who died had previous military affiliation and they were carrying guns. The rules of engagement stated that they could be used in self-defence within the scope of their contract and the coalition's rules of engagement. However, these contractors also had

a quasi-military mission of guarding the convoy. Isenberg launched the idea that "*as horrifying as their deaths were to many, they could have been considered acts of war, not crimes*"¹⁵.

❖ *Najaf, April 2004*

Another notorious event involving *Blackwater* employees puts them in a more favourable light. In April 2004, the US government headquarters in Najaf was under attack by several hundreds of Iraqi militia members. The attack was "*repulsed not by the US military, but by eight Blackwater commandos*"¹⁶. Before US reinforcements could arrive at the scene, the company even sent its own helicopters to resupply its employees and ferry out a wounded Marine. Despite the obvious positive consequences of their timely intervention, the incident has shown that *Blackwater's* rules of engagement as bodyguards significantly differ from their actual operations in an active

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 77.

¹⁶ Dana Priest, *Private Guards Repel Attack on US Headquarters*, in *The Washington Post*, 6 April 2004.

war zone. On more than one occasion, *Blackwater* has performed beyond the call of duty or the provisions of their contract. In this context, one can reasonably ask the question of whether the existing ROE are valid within the realities of a war zone.

❖ *Blackwater* employees were escorting a convoy in the Mansour district of Baghdad, near Nisoor Square, when a nearby car exploded. The company's employees opened fire and killed 17 Iraqi civilians, claiming they were under attack from insurgents. Several US military and FBI reports concluded that *Blackwater* guards opened fire without provocation and used excessive force against Iraqi civilians. The events apparently started as a single bullet fired by a guard killed an Iraqi driver, whose leg remained pressed on the acceleration, moving the car forward towards the convoy. The convoy responded with a shower of fire. Minutes after the shooting stopped, the same convoy

opened fire on another line of traffic a few hundred meters away. The FBI reports have identified that 14 of the deaths were unjustified and violated the deadly-force rules in effect for contractors operating in Iraq¹⁷. The State Department position was that *Xe* employees are working under contract to provide diplomatic security and thus enjoy the same immunity from prosecution as any other State Department employee in a foreign country. Following this perspective, some analyses have hastened to conclude that “the State Department is partly to blame for these shootings, given that *Blackwater* operated under State Department authority that exempted the company from US military regulations governing other security firms”¹⁸. Others in the industry have pointed out that the immunity *Blackwater* gets from its State Department contract encourages it to emphasise its mission – protection of its clients – to the exclusion of all other considerations¹⁹.

Legislation on ROE

Five of *Blackwater*'s former employees that took part in the Nisoor Square shootings were under trial for manslaughter and weapons charges. The prosecutors invoked the *Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)* to trial the case, but defence lawyers have argued that the document applied only to contractors working for the Pentagon. In addition, analysts argue that *MEJA* is an act that can be used to judge “street crimes”, not “war crimes”, as there is a distinction between the two, distinction that favours the position taken by the defence attorneys²⁰. As the first trial of such type, its outcome was of interest for many, as it was thought that it would establish a precedent in the way contractors used force on the ground. However, the results of the trial left many disappointed, as federal

¹⁷ Scott Horton, *Getting Closer to the Truth about the Blackwater Incident*, in *Harper's Magazine*, 14 November 2007.

¹⁸ Steve Făinaru, *Where Military Rules Don't Apply*, in *The Washington Post*, 20 September 2007.

¹⁹ Paul Richter, *State Dept Ignored “Repeated Warnings” Blackwater Endangered Iraqi Civilians*, in *The Huffington Post*, 7 October 2007.

²⁰ Tara Lee, *MEJA for Street Crimes, not War Crimes*, in *International Human Rights Journal*, August 2009.

judge Ricardo Urbina dismissed all charges against the employees due to procedural errors and accusing the Justice Department of building its case on sworn statements that the guards had given under a promise of immunity.

In terms of legislation, there are four key documents that establish the rules for the use of force that are applicable to contractors: *Memorandum Number 17 (Memo 17)* issued by the CPA, entitled “*Registration Requirements for Private Security Companies (PSC)*” dated 26 June 2004; *Instruction 3020.41 (DODI)* of the Department of Defense, entitled “*Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*”; third, US Central Command²¹ published guidance further refining the rules in DODI and entitled “*USCENTCOM Policy and Delegation of Authority for Personal Protection and Contract Security Service Arming of DOD Civilian Person* (herein referred as *CENTCOM Policy*). The fourth document is *MEJA*, but it mostly deals with holding contractors responsible for their actions. Though proper enforcement of ROEs is a vital part of the issue, it is a step beyond the focus of this paper and it will not be dealt extensively here.

Memo 17 is the first policy attempt to specify the role and obligations of contractors operating in the theatre of operations, but it failed to address US responsibilities towards *PSCs*. The *Memo* appears to be the direct result of the slaying of *Blackwater* employees in Fallujah, in 2004. However, the memo places an overwhelming responsibility on the weak, infant Iraqi government and the control of *PSCs* was one of the numerous issues that it did not have the capabilities to deal with. The *Memo* does not issue standards of prior experience and training necessary for *PSC* personnel to be allowed to operate in the field. Appendix A of the Memorandum details the rules for the use of force contractors can use in Iraq²². *PSCs* have to comply with theatre force protection policies. The *Memo* considers the use of deadly force as acceptable in three cases: as self-defence, in defence of the persons as specified in the contract or to prevent life-threatening offences against civilians. The principle applied is “*graduate force*” and the Appendix actually specifies four “*techniques*” to ensure the applicability of this principle – the four “*S*”-es: *shout, shove, show* and *shoot*. The *PSC* employee should shout verbal warnings to halt. If that fails, it should shove to physically restrain and block access. Next, the contractor should show his gun and demonstrate

²¹ The unified command of US armed forces is divided in six strategic geographical regions. US Central Command includes the Middle East, including Egypt, and Central Asia, being in charge of the theatres of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current USCENTCOM Commander is General David Petraeus.

²² Coalition Provisional Authority, *Memorandum 17, Appendix A*, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/cpa-orha/07-F-1059_doc4.pdf

intent to use it and last it can shoot to remove the threat only when necessary. In the case the contractor does reach the point where he has to shoot, he can fire only aimed shots, with regard for the safety of innocent bystanders and should immediately report the incident. In addition, the contractor has to treat civilians with respect, humanely, and make all possible efforts to avoid civilian casualties. Nonetheless though, the contractor can stop, detain, search and disarm civilians if the mission justifies it.

The *DODI* is a far more enhanced approach not only to *PMCs* in Iraq, but to *PMCs* throughout the *DOD*. The main distinction from *Memo 17* is that the responsibility for *PMC* control now belongs to the US leadership in the country of conflict. *DODI 3020.41* “delegates the planning and conduct of contractor theatre reception and accountability reporting to the geographic combatant commanders”²³. In the context of ROE, it means that contractors will now receive their orders from the geographic combatant commanders. In addition, the *DODI* requires that all *PSCs* provide documentation of individual training for all its employees in areas such as rules for the use of deadly force, limits on the use of force including whether defence of others is consistent with host-nation law, and the Law of armed conflict. Although on paper these requirements are nothing but beneficial, de facto, because they do not specify which documentation is needed to prove these qualifications, the rules have little value since contractors could very easily falsify these requirements for under qualified personnel.

The *CENTCOM Policy* states that the USCENTCOM Deputy Commander is the approval authority for *PSC* contracting and arming requests and it creates the possibility for future delegation to general officers or civilian equivalents in specific staff positions. The policy also clarifies the expectations and responsibilities of the US military authorities in Iraq. In terms of the rules for the use of force, the policy clearly states that *PMC* employees are not combatants, but that they have the inherent right to exercise self-defence in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. The other rules are basically a reinstatement of the same rules expressed in *Memo 17*. The policy addresses the issue of host-nation *PSC* employees that are not covered by the immunity provided by *Memo 17*, and advises not to place them into positions requiring deadly force defence of mission essential or US national security equipment/property.

²³ Colonel Cliff Crofford, *Private Security Contractors on the Field*, USAWC Strategy Research Project, 25 March 2006.

Generally, once on the field, *PMC* personnel are handed a complete copy of the *ROE* set forth by the theatre commander. The employees have to study and sign this document. In addition, they are also briefed on any changes or updates on *ROE* and, before each operation, the convoy leader reviews the rules.

ROE and Perception – Fighting the War among the People

If we accept Rupert Smith's argument that we are fighting a war among the people, and the war in Iraq is a living proof of such stands, then General Petraeus's strategy of "*winning the hearts and minds*" of the Iraqis and Afghans is paramount in terms of the success of any operation. The people "*can be the target as much as the opposing force*"²⁴. The insurgent fighter is using the people as a pool for recruitment, as a means for concealing and hiding and as a pillar of support. As so, abusing and mistreating the population can, on a tactical level, severely undermine counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. The Army Manual Field on Counterinsurgency acknowledges that firmness by security forces is a necessary step for working in the actual environment, but it can also generate resistance from the population. Security force abuses can thus be a major escalating factor for insurgencies. Lieutenant General John Kelly declared that one of the largest contributors to the success of the COIN efforts in the Anbar province was, without a doubt, the restraint that Maine commanders showed in using force²⁵. What does this mean in the context of *PSCs* and Rules of Engagement? Because local nationals do not often distinguish the blurred line between contractors and US military forces, the excessive use of force on behalf of contractors can undermine US efforts in Iraq.

Following this line of argumentation, the US government is put in a *Catch 22* position: it cannot go to war without contractors, but it cannot win with them. Is this a legitimate concern? On the one hand, it is. Lax rules for the use of force and especially ambiguity in punishing excessive use of force can lead to abuses. In the case of *Blackwater*, a report prepared by the Democratic Staff of the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government has identified that the company has been involved in 195 shooting incidents since 2005 and shot first 84% of the time²⁶. Despite this fact, to date, no contractor has been prosecuted and despite the increase in policies, actual accountability on the ground is still lacking.

²⁴ Rupert Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

²⁵ Lieutenant General John Kelly speaking at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 4 May 2010.

²⁶ Sue Fleming, *Report Says US Contractor Involved in 195 Iraq Shootings*, Reuters, 1 October 2007.

On the other hand, in fairness to the contractors, the “shoot first” attitude is something that they deeply share with the American military, “that elevates force protection to something approaching an absolute”²⁷. Generally, this emphasises saving American lives at the cost of Iraqi lives²⁸. The incidents in Haditha in November 2005 show that over aggressiveness is a general problem in an armed conflict, and not just a characteristic of contractors. Historically, even the blood-thirstiest mercenaries from Ancient times would have had a hard time rivalling the violence exerted by national armies. If we go on the hard stance of contractors and label them as mercenaries, like Jeremy Scahill does in his book about *Blackwater* and other journalists too, we would still be faced with the fact that it was not mercenaries who invented concentration camps or who used nuclear weapons on civilian cities, nor could they imagine committing “the kind of carnage that contemporary regular military forces routinely plan and train for”²⁹.

However, in terms of *ROE* compliance, there is a significant difference for regular armed forces and contractor personnel: the matter of incentive to obey *ROEs*. As a member of the regular armed forces, one has to report every time a gun is fired and the incident is normally followed by an internal investigation that can easily go all the way up to the Martial Court. For contractors, although they are supposed to report the incidents when fire is open, that often does not happen. In June 2005, *Blackwater* failed to report a shooting that left an Iraqi civilian dead³⁰. If a contractor is found guilty of misbehaviour, the likeliest consequence is that he will be fired by the company, asked to leave the country and three months later return in the same theatre of operations working for another company. Such was the case of Andrew Moonen, a *Blackwater* employee, who in December 2006 shot a bodyguard of Adil Abdul-Mahdi, the country’s Shiia Vice President. With the help of the State Department, Moonen was taken out of Iraq in less than 36 hours following the incident, although the Iraqi authorities had asked for his surrender³¹.

These tactical, strategic and diplomatic problems are unfortunately replicated in Afghanistan. *Paravant*, a subsidiary of *Blackwater*, was involved in yet another incident involving excessive use of force and the death of Afghani civilians, while working

²⁷ David Isenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

²⁸ Andrew Bacevich, *What’s an Iraqi Life Worth ?*, in *Washington Post*, 9 July 2006.

²⁹ David Isenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

³⁰ Corey Flintoff, *Timeline: Blackwater and Security Regulation*, National Public Radio, 14 December 2007.

³¹ Karen de Young, *State Department Struggles to Oversee Private Army*, in *Washington Post*, 21 October 2007.

on a project for *Raytheon*, the US defence giant. The international force existent in Afghanistan makes establishing international law rules a daunting challenge and a radio-active political issue. However, if the solution is unlikely to come from that area, then it is the responsibility of the economic forces and private-sector principles to solve it. Through their contracts, these private security companies can be both rewarded as well as punished for respecting and abiding by agreed and desired rules. If this can happen, then these companies could really fulfil their mission and be an enhancement for regular armed forces and not an impediment.

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KEEPING THE MED SAFE

- HOW IT'S DONE -

Commander Brian FINMAN

The author writes that there has not been a single incident of terrorist arrests in the Mediterranean since the beginning of counter-terrorist operations started there in 2001 and explains how the sea is kept safe.

First, he mentions Operation Active Endeavour, established in late 2001 as NATO's first and only Article V Operation, and its core mission: to deter, defend, and disrupt the use of the Mediterranean Sea for terrorist purposes.

Then, he presents NATO's dynamic initiatives in Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) and Maritime Security Operations (MSO), as well as the Headquarters Maritime Command (HQ MC) Naples, the Task Force Commander of the OAE mission and their tasks.

To conclude, he points out that NATO's maritime community will continue to influence the legal framework, develop the doctrine, match the means to the ends, and perfect the tactics to make the sea as unwelcoming as possible to terrorists and pirates alike.

Keywords: *Operation Active Endeavour; Maritime Situational Awareness; Recognised Maritime Picture; Headquarters Maritime Command Naples; Maritime Security Operations*

If the emerging security environment favours finesse over firepower, cooperation over coercion and networks over numbers, then NATO's role in the Mediterranean offers some important insights to the future. In addition to being a super-highway of seagoing trade, the Mediterranean is one of history's great strategic crossroads and continues to offer a wealth of opportunity for shaping NATO's future.

With *Operation Active Endeavour (OAE)* acting as a catalyst, NATO's dynamic initiatives in *Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)* and *Maritime Security Operations (MSO)* have put it at the forefront of technology application and concept development in the global maritime community.

The core mission of *OAE* is to deter, defend, and disrupt the use of the Mediterranean Sea for terrorist purposes. From *OAE*'s inception

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in late 2001 as NATO's first and only Article V Operation, the inherent challenge has been to discriminate terrorist activity from the myriad of other sea-going enterprises.

Unlike the *Recognised Air Picture (RAP)*, in which practically every contact can be identified in near real-time and correlated to known patterns, the maritime environment is rife with ambiguity. Limited sensor ranges, weather effects, territorial sea restrictions, and the sheer size of the Mediterranean are central to the environmental challenges. The *Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP)* is further complicated by the very large



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and very diverse population of vessels conducting both legitimate and illicit, albeit non-terrorist related, activities in the Mediterranean.

Today's network represents a quantum leap in surveillance capacity over just a few years ago

However, several factors favour the unique aspects of capturing a Mediterranean *RMP*. Geographically, the Mediterranean is a large but relatively closed system and has limited access points (such as the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal) that can be closely monitored. Such surveillance is especially effective when the cooperative efforts of national governments and port authorities are brought to bear.

Politically, nations making up the Mediterranean neighbourhood largely agree that their interests are best served by sharing information and resources to develop an as comprehensive as possible *RMP*.

Against this backdrop of geographic and political factors, *Headquarters Maritime Command (HQ MC) Naples'* daunting task is to discriminate the needle of terrorist-related activity against the haystack of the Mediterranean's complex patchwork of life in the maritime domain. As Task Force Commander of the *OAE* mission, *HQ MC Naples* has worked in close cooperation with other NATO entities to develop and implement a tool kit of *Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)* networks and processes.

Using these tools, watchstanders in the *Maritime Operations Centre* can process vast amounts of raw data received from shore-based, sea-based, and airborne sensors. Some of these data come in the form of *Automated Identification System (AIS)* signals, which all commercial vessels greater than 300 tons are legally obliged to transmit. With an expanding array of networked sensors based in over 15 countries

around the Mediterranean and Black Sea, this information system provides real-time data on a daily average of 8 000 contacts.

Today's network represents a quantum leap in surveillance capacity over just a few years ago. With so much raw information available, the trend in MSA is to develop technological tools that can compare in real-time the transmitted data to database information in order to validate the contacts' names, registry numbers, cargo, owners, recent and upcoming ports of call etc.

These tools enable watchstanders to focus on anomalous contacts and concentrate intelligence and maritime analyst resources on irregular behaviour, such as unexplained loitering or course deviations, in order to make the most of limited assets.

AWACS flights have encouraged the development of relationships and adoption of new techniques

Recognising that shore-based sensors are integral to *Maritime Situational Awareness* and that nations have an interest in accessing the system's

cumulative raw data, *HQ MC Naples* has made the expansion of this network a cornerstone for reaching out to partner nations, largely under the aegis of the *Mediterranean Dialogue*. This initiative, borne of genuine shared interests, has proven highly effective in building relationships that, in many cases, have developed into other areas of military cooperation. In addition, national efforts such as Turkey's *Operation Black Sea Harmony*, Italy's *Operation Constant Vigilance* or France and Spain's *Operation Levrier*, as well as international efforts such as the *United Nations mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL)* also provide opportunities for fruitful cooperation at the tactical level.

The use of airborne sensors greatly adds to Mediterranean surveillance capacity, especially in areas of the Mediterranean that lay beyond shore-based sensors. *HQ MC MAR Naples* continues to employ traditional Maritime Patrol Aircraft from a variety of NATO nations in dedicated sorties for *OAE*. In addition, E-3 aircraft from both the NATO *Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) Squadron* and from national contributions have flown missions in the past year dedicated to building *RMP* for the operation. These *AWACS* flights have encouraged the development of cross-component staff relationships and the adoption of new techniques and procedures, both of which have had positive effects for NATO's joint operability.

HQ MC Naples similarly leverages the two *Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs)* and the two *Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMGs)* in providing elevated *MSA* in select areas. Termed "*Surge Operations*", these focused efforts last one or two weeks and are designed to achieve either surveillance

effects or deterrence effects, with the relative weight of effort depending on available assets, geographic location, and information operations priorities.

During these surge operations, NATO has also employed naval asset contributions from NATO nations that do not normally contribute to the Mediterranean-based *SNMG-2*



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and *SNMCMG-2*, such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. This provides a challenging real-world context in which NATO units can practice interoperability.

Furthermore, NATO partners, such as Ukraine and Russia, have also contributed forces to *OAE* surge operations, providing valuable opportunities for cooperation, interoperability, and mutual awareness while contributing to a relevant real-world mission.

Operation Active Endeavour experience was already used in NATO's first counter-Piracy operation (Allied Provider) around the Horn of Africa in 2008

The *Maritime Operations Centre* in *HQ MC Naples* also routinely identifies anomalous information that is not terrorist-related but is of interest to regional national authorities.

Whether this information is an indicator of illegal activity or simply errors in transmitted *AIS* data is not always clear. On more than one occasion though, national authorities have acted to the benefit of their wider national safety and security interest.

More significantly, such exchange of information builds mutual understanding, trust and shared awareness. As NATO's *MSA* toolkit evolves, it can expect to become increasingly a partner of choice with national and multinational organisations seeking to share information about the Mediterranean maritime patterns.

Integral to conducting *OAE* surge operations, *HQ MC Naples* executes a robust *Information Operations (IO)* campaign aimed at educating the maritime community on NATO's commitment to denying terrorists the use of the sea. These information efforts maximise the deterrent and disruptive effects by communicating to owners and operators of commercial vessels that NATO is actively patrolling the Mediterranean and is closely monitoring all maritime patterns of activity. Another goal is to educate the masters of larger vessels that NATO is ready to respond and also to provide instructions and points of contact for them to report suspicious behaviour, further expanding the information network.

Using its *OAE* experience, *HQ MC Naples* extended its reach into commanding NATO's first counter-piracy operation (*Allied Provider (OAP)*) around the Horn of Africa in 2008. Under *HQ MC Naples'* command, *SNMG-2* operated in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin for three months to provide security to United Nations (UN) *World Food Programme (WFP)* vessels delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia and to conduct anti-piracy patrols along shipping routes. This operation was mounted in just 2 weeks following NATO's positive response to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon's request for assistance in securing *WFP* deliveries to Somalia. This rapid military response to a political imperative provides a classic example of the agility of maritime forces, in general, and the *Standing NATO Maritime Groups*, in particular.

The success of *OAP* led, in part, to NATO's now enduring commitment to combating piracy. This started with *OAP* becoming *Operation Allied Protector* with a broader counter-piracy remit. Following handover of command to *HQ MC Northwood* in 2009, that operation further evolved into today's contribution to international efforts to counter-piracy in and around the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean – *Operation Ocean Shield (OOS)*, which was recently extended until 2012.

Maritime Situational Awareness tools promise to be far more adaptable to future threats than torpedoes or anti-ship cruise missiles

As *HQ MC Naples* and *HQ MC Northwood* continue to develop the tools, organisation, and doctrine for addressing terrorist and pirate activity on the high seas, we must ask ourselves how well we will be poised for the emerging threats in tomorrow's maritime domain. It would seem that our focus would remain on understanding the broader patterns of maritime activity.

Perhaps the threats and risks related to illicit maritime activity such as drug smuggling, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal migration will one day grow beyond the capacity of national law enforcement agencies. If so, the *MSA* tools and mindset for discerning the good from the bad in the maritime domain, being forged on the anvil of *OAE* and more recently *OOS*, will largely be in place for that future. While NATO navies must maintain their traditional naval mission capabilities, these *MSA* tools promise to be far more adaptable to future threats than would be a torpedo or anti-ship cruise missile.

In the meantime, NATO's maritime community will continue to influence the legal framework, develop the doctrine, match the means to the ends, and perfect the tactics to make the sea as unwelcoming as possible to terrorists and pirates alike.

ASIA, NATO AND ITS PARTNERS: COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIPS ?

Michito TSURUOKA

The author writes about NATO's new partners, which come from in or around Asia and about how each side sees the other, and what the way to ensure both benefit from working together is.

In this respect, he approaches NATO from a few standpoints: as a political partner, as a means of cooperation with the US, as a multilateral school, mentioning the role played by the Alliance in operational cooperation and noting that as the world's biggest and most capable political-military alliance, it carries a certain – both intended and unintended – weight in international security affairs and that in fields as interoperability, standardisation, joint procurement, research and development, multilateral planning and defence planning, NATO has an unparalleled unique set of expertise and experience.

To conclude, he presents the challenges ahead for NATO, emphasising that the Alliance has been successful in assisting partners aspiring to become a NATO member. However, it is still a new business for the Alliance to cooperate with non-European advanced democracies.

Keywords: *international cooperation; partnership policy; ISAF; security relations*

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ATO's relationships with the countries outside the Euro-Atlantic region have developed rapidly in the last few years. Cooperation in Afghanistan has driven the development. Countries like Australia, New Zealand and Singapore are now troop contributors to the ISAF (*International Security Assistance Force*) in Afghanistan. Others, like Japan and South Korea, are making direct and indirect contribution to the Alliance's effort there. These countries are now called "*other partners across the globe*".

While countries like Australia and Japan are often seen as objects of the Alliance's partnership policy, it is NATO who is the partner from those countries' perspective. This article will examine how NATO is perceived as a partner by the Alliance's new "*partners across the globe*". Why have those countries strengthened relations with NATO ? What kind of partner is NATO in the eyes of those countries ? And what do they expect from NATO ?

It is Japan's intention to use NATO as an additional venue to raise international, particularly European, awareness of the Asian security situation

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NATO as a Political Partner

To begin with, each country has a different set of motivations regarding its relationship with the Alliance. When Japan made an overture to NATO in 2006 and 2007, it was predominantly a diplomatic move. It is true that both Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe mentioned the possibility of operational cooperation



between Japan and NATO during their respective addresses to the NAC (*North Atlantic Council*). It should be remembered, however, that both men spent much time there explaining the Asian security situation, including China and North Korea. Abe even directly “requested” the Allies “to urge North Korea to take sincere steps towards the resolution” of the issue of abduction of Japanese citizens by the North Korean authorities.

It is Japan’s intention to use NATO as an additional venue to raise international, particularly European, awareness of the Asian security situation. That is why Tokyo appreciated the NAC statements condemning the North Korean missile launch in July 2006 and the nuclear test in October the same year. Despite highly bellicose languages from Pyongyang, dealing with the country remains a diplomatic game, where international solidarity matters a lot.

NATO may not be a political actor in its own right. But as the world’s biggest and most capable political-military alliance, it carries a certain – both intended and unintended – weight in international security affairs. This also explains why those who are sceptical about NATO, not least those who do not share values with NATO, fear the expansion of the Alliance’s area of activities and influence. NATO’s image in the outside world as an influential security actor is arguably stronger than NATO itself recognises. But precisely because of this, Japan sees NATO as an important new political partner. Other partners may follow suit.

NATO in Operational Cooperation

Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationships with NATO have developed largely based on their troop contribution to ISAF. As a result, operational cooperation is the main pillar of Australia-NATO and NZ-NATO relations, unlike Japan-NATO. These countries use NATO as an international framework too. Without NATO, Australia and New Zealand would not have been able to participate in international military efforts in Afghanistan. NATO has enabled these countries’ contribution to international efforts there. Once in the ISAF, it is legitimate that Australia

and other contributors demand more information-sharing and more involvement in policy-shaping and eventually decision-making. Australia, a country which has more than 1 000 troops in the South of Afghanistan engaged in combat missions, has been the most vocal partner in making these cases, which NATO has tried hard to accommodate.

Both at the political and strategic level and the theatre level, the level of information-sharing and involvement seems to have improved substantially in the past year. Ministerial (mainly Defence Ministers') meetings in the ISAF format have become a regular event and working level troop contributors' meetings such as in the *PCG (Policy Coordination Group)* framework serves the venue for more substantial consultation.



© Reuters/Omar Sobhani

Afghanistan is a place where partners have been able to offer real tangible links with NATO

However, the question of to what extent NATO is prepared to involve non-NATO contributors in the Alliance's internal processes will not be solved in a clear fashion in the foreseeable future. For NATO, to accommodate the partners' demands and satisfy them is necessary to secure their continued contribution. The principle of "*no taxation without representation*" holds true here.

It is certainly no coincidence that so far, most of the Alliance's new partners beyond the Euro-Atlantic region are in fact US allies, such as Australia and Japan

NATO as a Means of Cooperation with the US

When countries such as Australia and New Zealand decided to send troops to Afghanistan, the partner they chose did not have to be NATO. In fact, when NZ deployed troops to Afghanistan for the first time, it was done under the framework of the *Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)* in close bilateral cooperation with the US. There was no secret that it was a decision to support specifically the US and to show solidarity with the country in the wake of the 9/11, which had nothing to do with NZ-NATO cooperation at that time. As a result of the geographical expansion of the ISAF in late 2006, the NZ troops stationed in Bamyan province had to move from the OEF command to the ISAF. From NZ's point of view, the resultant cooperation with NATO was largely an unintended by-product of what it had been doing regardless of the ISAF.

This clearly shows another critical value that NATO has as a framework to cooperate in international peace operations and other areas. It is that NATO offers an additional route to cooperate with the US. Cooperation with NATO including troop contribution to NATO-led missions and operations can take place in the context of cooperation with the US. This should not be a surprising element given that, even among the Allies, contribution to the ISAF and other NATO-led activities are often seen as a way to ensure positive relations with the US. “Partners across the globe” are not an exception here.

It is certainly no coincidence that so far, most of the Alliance’s new partners beyond the Euro-Atlantic region are in fact US allies, such as Australia and Japan. Australia-NATO and Japan-NATO cooperation are new faces of these countries’ bilateral security relations with the US. A Joint Statement of the US-Japan 2+2 (*Security Consultative Committee: SCC*) of May 2007 placed Japan-NATO cooperation in the context of ‘common strategic objectives’ of the two allies.

NATO as a Multilateral School

Cooperation in Afghanistan is one thing, but it needs to be remembered that it is not the whole story about the relationships between NATO and the partners across the globe. In the first place, conducting operations like the ISAF is still a new business for NATO and the Alliance has many other things to do. In such fields as interoperability, standardisation, joint procurement, research and development, multilateral planning and defence planning, NATO has an unparalleled unique set of expertise and experience. These are the areas, in fact, where the partners can benefit most from cooperation with NATO.

The key is NATO’s multilateral nature. Countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area generally lack multilateral experience in security and defence. For example, in the Asia-Pacific region, where most of NATO’s new partners are situated, multilateral security cooperation is still weak if not totally absent. The *ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)* only conducted the first ever real joint exercise on civil emergency (disaster relief) in May 2009. Multilateral planning and operation is still a new idea in the region and the militaries in the countries of the region have limited multilateral experiences.



In this context, practical cooperation with NATO – participating in NATO’s exercise and seminars – provides a good opportunity for the partners to become familiar with multilateral ways of planning and operations. Also, in this globalised

world and the period of limited resources to military, research and development and procurement of defence equipment need to be approached multilaterally with cooperation with other countries. NATO's history in this regard is far from perfect. But still, it provides a useful platform to advance multilateral approach to security, which the partners can take part in.

Challenges Ahead for NATO

NATO's new partners outside the Euro-Atlantic region see NATO very differently from the Alliance's traditional partners in the *PfP* (*Partnership for Peace*) framework. New partners do not seek membership. They are not countries in transition from communism either. They do not need NATO's advice on how to ensure the democratic control of armed forces etc. NATO has been successful in assisting partners aspiring to become a member of the Alliance. However, it is still a new business for NATO to cooperate with non-European advanced democracies.

On NATO's side, there is still no consensus on what way NATO should go in terms of relationships with its new partners outside the Euro-Atlantic region. Getting more help, both military and civilian, to the ISAF and other NATO-led missions and operations from those countries is one thing. Given the diverse nature of motivations those countries have in moving closer to the Alliance, however, it is now evident that NATO needs a clearer idea of what it wants to achieve through the development of the new partnerships. The development of its new Strategic Concept in 2010 provides an opportunity.

At the very least, NATO needs to think through how it can respond to the partners' expectations towards the Alliance. A window of opportunity is now open for NATO to take part in shaping a new international security network. It is up to NATO whether it will seize it.





THE THINK TANKS AND CIVIL SOCIETIES PROGRAM 2009

European Think Tanks: Regional and Trans-Atlantic Trends (III)

CONCLUSION

Although they operate in different socio-economic environments, both European and American think tanks remain responsive to political and societal trends and important civil society actors. Moreover, they show a surprising amount of heterogeneity and reflect the outstanding diversity within their own areas. European and American think tanks still face the challenge of maintaining independence and relevancy in a constantly evolving and increasingly competitive policy environment.

The continuous challenge for American think tanks is to produce timely and accessible policy-oriented research that effectively engages policymakers, the press, and the public on critical issues facing the United States. It should be noted that while the growth and total number of think tanks in North America has slowed since the 1980s, this does not correlate, however, to a decrease in the demand for the products and services they provide. Increased competition from for-profit consulting firms, cable news channels, government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOS) and lobbying and advocacy groups have forced think tanks to adapt to an increasingly competitive market. In order to remain relevant, think tanks must continue to adapt to the ongoing challenges of an ever changing world. Those who succeed in adapting will continue to play a critical role in bridging the gap between academic and policy communities, and between policymakers and the public.

Generally, think tanks in Europe and the US face many common challenges. In order to remain innovative and true to their purpose, they require a diversified base of financial support. They also need perhaps the rarest commodity of all – savvy people who can effectively analyze and communicate complex problems to the media and the public. They need to produce innovative ideas that challenge

older policies and programs that aren't working. To achieve this goal, however, they must understand how to influence and shape public policies, especially in an increasingly connected world¹⁰⁰.

In Europe, think tanks must continue to play an active role in the evolution of the EU as well as aid in the increased integration of the member states¹⁰¹. At the same time, they need to remain responsive to any structural changes within the EU so that they do not lose the ground that they have already gained. British, Western European, and Central and Eastern European think tanks all possess unique characteristics reflective of their differing environments. Most think tanks in Europe continue to be defined by political parties, national interests, and national policy agendas. A pan-European policy perspective and pan-European institutions are slowly beginning to appear on the political landscape. British think tanks share some characteristics with American ones, thanks in part to a parallel historical development of think tanks. They enjoy intimate engagement with both party politics and public interest research, a high public profile, and international influence. Western European think tanks are more likely to have affiliations to universities or political parties, which blunts their opportunities to effect broad change in the policy-making process. Purely academic research rarely commands the attention of politicians or the broader public, and partisan research automatically limits its own audience. Central and Eastern European think tanks have benefited from an infusion of foreign funds and ideas during the “*policy window*” that occurred in the 1990's, and can serve as an example of research organizations successfully engaging policymakers. While significant progress has been made in Central and Eastern Europe, the impact of the economic crisis is likely to have a greater adverse impact on these already fragile organizations.

Profiling Europe as a whole McGann has found:

All European think tanks do face common obstacles to successful transnational research as well. Despite the relative proliferation of think tanks in Europe in the latter decades of the twentieth century, the product quality of these institutes has been diminished by a variety of societal and discipline-specific obstacles.

These problems can be summarized as follows:

- The European Union is at a crossroads, which raises fundamental questions about the future role of think tanks in Europe and the value they will add to integration process.
- EU think tanks are limited by the current EU architecture as well as their own strategy and structure.

¹⁰⁰ Notre Europe, “*Think Tanks in Europe and America: Converging or Diverging?*”, pp. 2-3.

¹⁰¹ Notre Europe, “*Europe and its Think Tanks: A Promise to be Fulfilled*”, pp. 8-9.

- EU think tanks are nationally based and driven by national interest.
- Few EU think tanks or sets of think tanks currently focus on reaching and serving all the member states or the *vox populi* of Europe.
- Independent EU think tanks are underfunded, understaffed and underdeveloped.
- EU think tanks are unvalued and underutilized by policy-makers.
- EU tanks are not as policy-oriented as they should be.
- EU tanks have not exploited the potential of the web or the media to reach policymakers and the public.

As the EU policy environment matures, think tanks must seek a balance between national and regional interests. Already, there is a burgeoning think tank community within Brussels that is focused on EU-specific research. But all think tanks must balance their roles as independent academic institutions and as policy advocates, educate the public about their role in civil society, and utilize the media as a means to reach a larger audience. In short, they must strive for independence, relevance, and engagement.

For scholars studying think tanks, the question of being able to determine the influence of think tanks in the policy-making process is always very difficult to research, since it is difficult to remove the think tanks from their environment to create a controlled scientific experiment¹⁰². Nonetheless, through in-depth research, in some cases policy changes can be traced from the ideas of advisors in think tanks to bills and statements written by elected officials. It is clear, however, that respected independent think tanks with established credibility do play a critical role in civil society and the policy making process.

Independent think tanks will continue to play a critical role in the policy-making process. Clearly, there is no shortage of policy challenges at the national, regional and global levels. The world today can be characterized by “The Four Mores”. More issues, more actors, more competition and more conflict. Over the past decade, governments and civil society groups have come to rely on think tanks for ideas, evidence and advice to deal with pressing political issues. These issues will only increase in number and complexity in the future. Only by adapting to these changes will think tanks continue to bridge the gap between knowledge and policy-making in an ever-changing global environment. Specific steps need to be taken to help European think tanks fulfill their potential as critical actors in the policy-making process. The modest recommendations provided below are intended to help increase the capacity of think tanks in the region to provide sound evidence and analysis on the critical issues that Europe will face now and into the future.

¹⁰² Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, “*Influence Without Responsibility? Think-tanks in Britain*”.

Recommendations

The potential of European think tanks will not be fulfilled unless they are successfully managed. In order to overcome the political, social and economic challenges of integration, we suggest the execution of those recommendations detailed below. By conforming to these proposals, an objective forum will be constructed, in which European scholars may effectively aid in the formulation of transnational legislation and policies. The recommendations provided below are intended for public and private donors at the national and regional level who have a stake in increasing the quality and impact of public policy research and analysis. While the leadership and funding for these proposed initiatives would be best confined to private, independent sources they require a public private partnership. These recommendations are intended to strengthen think tanks at the national and regional level so they can better serve policymakers and the public.

1. A public-private partnership should be developed to provide the start up capital and an endowment for 1-2 pan-European public policy think tanks that would be independent of state and EU politics and funding. They should be designed to produce rigorous policy analysis and engage the public on the major issues facing the EU and its member states. Ideally these centers should be composed of multi-national staffs and be general purpose policy research organizations that have the staff and resources to address a full range of domestic and international issues. The centers should be located in a single location in Europe but would have the resources to conduct outreach programs throughout Europe.
2. A multinational group of think tanks should develop and implement a regional think tank policy forum and a related European think tank network. Seed money should be provided and small secretariat established to lead the launch and lead the effort. The initiative would be designed to encourage state-based think tanks to collaborate on a regional basis. To ensure that they are autonomous and able to transcend national affiliations, these two initiatives should be funded by private sources.
3. Private donors should work together to create independent funding mechanisms that are comprised exclusively of private sources to fund truly independent, high impact, multi-disciplinary, policy-oriented research throughout Europe. The grants should target the social, political and economic implications associated with EU and its 27 member countries.

The grants program should emphasize innovative and forward-looking policies and proposals that will address the ongoing challenges of integration in Europe.

4. Public and private donors should support training and capacity building programs that are designed to enhance the rigor, relevance, and impact of research at free-standing and university based think tanks. To do so, think tanks should exchange best practice techniques on policy research, impact assessments and performance evaluation methods with think tanks in Europe and elsewhere.
5. Think Tanks and donors should jointly develop a program that will encourage think tanks working at the national and EU level to make better use of the media and information technologies so that they can reach larger, transnational audiences.
6. A coalition of think tanks and civil society organization should be mobilized to reverse the troubling trend in Europe of classifying think tanks that operate in the public interest in the same category as private interest lobbying organizations. Such a practice threatens all civil society organizations and undermines the critical role that think tanks play in the policymaking process. A related educational effort should be undertaken to promote a greater understanding and appreciation of independent think tanks and the important role they play in the policymaking process.
7. The EU should develop a universal legal and tax structure for non-governmental organizations and private foundations in Europe.
8. A blue ribbon study group comprised of think tanks, donors, government officials and other civil society representatives should be constituted to develop recommendations for how to realize greater transparency in the finances and operations of non-governmental organizations. Ideally, the initiative should take the form of a self-regulated association of policy research institutes which creates standards that help assure the quality, independence and transparency of policy research.
9. Given that language is a significant impediment to meaningful policy debates, the European Commission, the Parliament and other organs of the EU should embrace a single common language for policy debates and provide financial incentives for think tanks and other policy related groups to produce and widely disseminate their analysis of key issues in the common language. Special programs should be developed to target

members of the media so they are comfortable and willing to use the common language. The EU should also explore information technologies that would translate policy documents in the languages of the 27 member countries.

10. Public and private donors should fund an exchange program that would enable policymakers and journalists to spend time at think tanks, and scholars from think tanks to spend time working in government and media. The purpose of the program would be to improve policy and increase the utilization of the research and analysis conducted by think tanks.
11. Public and private donors should consider providing a short-term infusion of capital required for think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe to enable them to develop strategies and programs that will help the countries and the region respond to the current economic crisis. The foundations, institutes, and individuals that supported post-communist political transition are ideally placed to provide or target grants. Within this framework, application, oversight, and evaluation of recipients should be streamlined in order to allow smaller think tanks access to funding.
12. A systemic assessment of the capacity and sustainability of think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe involving key stakeholders (policymakers, donors, think tanks) needs to be undertaken so that a vibrant and independent think tank community can continue to operate in the region. Reviewers should address how to promote philanthropy within the region. National legislation on non-profit organizations might be restructured to put think tanks on a more equal footing with for-profit, private institutions.

APPENDICES

Appendix I – Top 30 Think Tanks in the US*

Top 30 Think Tanks in the United States (Arranged Alphabetically)

Think Tank

American Enterprise Institute
Baker Institute for Public Policy
Brookings Institution
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carter Center
Cato Institute
Center for American Progress
Center for Global Development
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Center for Transatlantic Relations SAIS John Hopkins
Council on Foreign Relations
EastWest Institute
Henry L. Stimson Center
Heritage Foundation
Hoover Institution
Hudson Institute
Human Rights Watch
Independent Institute
International Peace Institute
Manhattan Institute
Mercatus Center
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA)
New America Foundation
Peterson Institute for International Economics
RAND Corporation
Resources for the Future (RFF)
United States Institute of Peace
Urban Institute
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
World Policy Institute

* Derived from "The 2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks" report

Appendix II – 2008 Top 50 European Think Tanks*

2008 Top 50 European Think Tanks <i>(Arranged Alphabetically)</i>	
Think Tank	Country
Adam Smith Institute	UK
Bruegel	Belgium
Center for Economic Research	UK
Center for European Reform	UK
Centre for European Policy Studies	Belgium
Center for Policy Studies	UK
Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich	Switzerland
Civitas	UK
Danish Institute for Institutional Studies	Denmark
Demos	UK
European Council on Foreign Relations	United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Bulgaria
European Policy Center	Belgium
European Union Institute for Security Studies	France
Foreign Policy Center	UK
Fraser Institute	UK
French Institute of International Relations	France
Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies/Fundación para el análisis y los estudios sociales	Spain
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)	Germany
German Development Institute	Germany
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)	Germany
Institute of Economic Affairs	UK
Institute of Development Studies	UK
Institute of International and European Affairs	Ireland
Institute for Economic Research	Germany
Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)	Russia
Institut Montaigne	France
Institute for International and Strategic Relations	France
International Affairs Institute	Italy
International Crisis Group	Belgium
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	Sweden
International Institute for Strategic Studies	UK
International Policy Network	UK
Kiel Institute for World Economy	Germany
Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael)	Netherlands
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs	Norway
Overseas Development Institute	UK
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo	Norway
Policy Network	UK
Polish Institute of International Affairs	Poland
Royal Institute Elcano/Real Instituto Elcano	Spain
Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House)	UK
Royal United Services Institute	UK
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	Sweden
Strategic Research Foundation	France
Transparency International	Germany

* Derived from "The 2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks" report

**Appendix III – Selected Profiles
for the Top 15 US Think Tanks***

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1) Brookings Institution
Location: Washington
Budget: \$60.7 million
Specialties: US foreign policy, Middle East, economic and social policy
Boldface names: Strobe Talbott, Kenneth Pollack, Alice Rivlin, Michael O’Hanlon | 5) Heritage Foundation
Location: Washington
Budget: \$48.4 million
Specialties: Tax policy, national defense, social policy
Boldface names: Edwin Meese, Peter Brookes, James Jay Carafano, Ariel Cohen |
| 2) Council on Foreign Relations
Location: New York
Budget: \$38.3 million
Specialties: US foreign policy, national security
Boldface names: Richard Haass, Michael Gerson, Walter Russell Mead, Angelina Jolie | 6) Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Location: Washington
Budget: \$34.5 million
Specialties: Regional studies, democracy promotion, international development
Boldface names: Lee Hamilton, Haleh Esfandiari |
| 3) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Location: Washington
Budget: \$22 million
Specialties: Nuclear nonproliferation, China
Boldface names: Jessica T. Mathews, Robert Kagan, Minxin Pei, Karim Sadjadpour | 7) Center for Strategic & International Studies
Location: Washington
Budget: \$29 million
Specialties: Defense policy, diplomacy, regional studies
Boldface names: John Hamre, Richard Armitage, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Anthony Cordesman |
| 4) Rand Corporation
Location: Santa Monica, Calif.
Budget: \$251 million
Specialties: Military strategy, political economy, health and education policy
Boldface names: James Dobbins, Gregory Treverton, William Overholt, Nicole Lurie | 8) American Enterprise Institute
Location: Washington
Budget: \$23.6 million (2006)
Specialties: Trade, defense, economic policy
Boldface names: Newt Gingrich, David Frum, Richard Perle |

- 9) Cato Institute
Location: Washington
Budget: \$19 million
Specialties: Libertarianism, deregulation, social policy and defense policy
Boldface names: David Boaz, Edward Crane, Christopher Preble
- 10) Hoover Institution
Location: Stanford, Calif.
Budget: \$34.1 million
Specialties: Defense policy, deregulation, US-Russian relations
Boldface names: Larry Diamond, Michael McFaul, Victor Davis Hanson
- 11) Human Rights Watch
Location: New York
Budget: \$35.5 million
Specialties: Human rights, international justice
Boldface names: Kenneth Roth
- 12) Peterson Institute for International Economics
Location: Washington
Budget: \$9.5 million
Specialties: Trade, globalization, international political economy
Boldface names: C. Fred Bergsten, Anders Åslund, William Cline, Aaron Posen
- 13) United States Institute of Peace
Location: Washington
Budget: \$24.7 million
Specialties: Conflict resolution, postconflict stability
Boldface names: Richard H. Solomon, Scott Lasensky, J. Alexander Thier
- 14) National Bureau of Economic Research
Location: Cambridge, Mass.
Budget: \$29.8 million
Specialties: Economic growth, economic analysis and forecasting
Boldface names: James Poterba, Robert Lipsey, Martin Feldstein
- 15) Center for Global Development
Location: Washington
Budget: \$9.8 million
Specialties: Globalization, international development, aid effectiveness
Boldface names: Nancy Birdsall, Steven Radelet, Todd Moss

**Derived from "The 2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks" report*

**Appendix IV – Selected Profiles
for Top 10 European Think Tanks**

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1) Chatham House
Location: London
Budget: \$12.4 million
Specialties: Energy, environment, economics and regional and security studies | 6) Transparency International
Location: Berlin
Budget: \$13.3 million
Specialties: Electoral reform, anticorruption in public and private sectors |
| 2) International Institute for Strategic Studies
Location: London
Budget: \$15.3 million
Specialties: Nonproliferation, counterterrorism | 7) German Council on Foreign Relations
Location: Berlin
Budget: \$6.4 million
Specialties: German foreign policy, international relations |
| 3) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Location: Solna, Sweden
Budget: \$5.3 million
Specialties: Arms control, conflict management | 8) German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Location: Berlin
Budget: \$16.4 million
Specialties: German foreign policy and security |
| 4) Overseas Development Institute
Location: London
Budget: \$25.9 million
Specialties: International development, humanitarian issues | 9) French Institute of International Relations
Location: Paris
Budget: \$8.1 million
Specialties: Trans-Atlantic relations, European affairs |
| 5) Centre for European Policy Studies
Location: Brussels
Budget: \$8.6 million
Specialties: EU integration, citizenship, political economy | 10) Adam Smith Institute
Location: London
Budget: \$500,000
Specialties: Free market and social policies |

**Derived from "The 2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks" report*

2008 THINK TANK FACT SHEET

- Nearly 75% of all foreign investment that comes into the United States comes from Europe, and half of all investment from the United States goes to Europe. This shows the vital links the two areas have and points to the vested interest each one has in the policy of the other.
- The United States has 1,817 think tanks, including 388 based in Washington, DC.
 - 182 devote substantial resources to security and international affairs
 - 109 to environmental policy
 - And 35 to energy policy
- The European Union (as of its 1 January 2008 size) has 1,386 think tanks, with 50 based in Brussels.
 - 445 devote substantial resources to security and international affairs
 - 74 to environmental policy, and 33 to energy policy (all of Western Europe)
- There are 1,734 think tanks in Eastern and Western Europe.
- The Western European countries with the most think tanks are the UK (285), Germany (188) France (167), Italy (88), Switzerland (72) and Sweden (68).
- Most think tanks in the United States and Europe have a budget of between \$1 and \$5 million per year and employ 10 or less people.

Challenges and Opportunities Facing United States

Think tanks in the United States face a complex process in getting their policy recommendations heard. The sheer number of non-government organizations in the United States, especially in Washington, DC causes a cacophony, rendering those in power unable to choose to whom they should listen.

American universities are also producing increasing numbers of students holding PhD degrees every year. As a result, there are far more people holding these advanced degrees than there are jobs in the university sector alone. While this provides think tanks with a large amount of people from which to hire new research fellows, it also leads to increased competition among scholars to join institutes and among organizations to get the best scholars¹⁰³. Scholars with the “publish-or-perish mentality” may produce reports for their own sake, and not to better the dialogue about certain issues.

¹⁰³ McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US*, pp. 36-37.

Summary of Major Trends – US Think Tanks

Positive Consequences

Negative Consequences

Funding Changes: Short-term, project specific and results driven grants

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Has forced TTs to be more efficient and required them to demonstrate effectiveness. | 1. Lack of long run, general institutional support tends to distort the mission and research agenda of many TTs |
| 2. Increased policy orientation and focus on current issues and legislative agendas | 2. Limits the depth of analysis and innovation within TTs |
| 3. Greater focus on dissemination | 3. Increases the influence of donors on research design and outcomes |
| 4. Gives donors greater control over how their gifts and grants are used | 4. Limited ability to attract and retain the best scholars |

Increased Number of Think Tanks (TTs) & NGOs

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Virtually every interest or issue has a think tank | 1. Increased competition for funding |
| 2. Increased collaboration between TTs and other NGOs at state, local, and international levels (more vertical and horizontal integration) | 2. Increased competition for the attention of policymakers and the media to utilize output |
| 3. Greater competition increases output and sharpens focus | 3. The rise of advocacy organizations that have been labeled TTs results in a confusion between lobbying and promoting sound public policy via research |
| 4. New energy and talented new players have entered the scene | 4. Increased competition for scholars |

Emergence of 24/7 Media

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Higher level of media demand for output of TTs | 1. Media's focus on the provocative and sensational distorts policy debate |
| 2. Provides TTs with a larger audience | 2. Lure of media limelight forces TTs to go for the sound bite rather than sound analysis |
| 3. Connects TTs and other policy elites with the public | 3. Increased focus on op-eds and pithy reports rather than in-depth analysis |
| 4. Makes TTs more visible and relevant | 4. Shift in focus to the big picture and key points rather than on the details |
| 5. Engages an apathetic electorate on issues of national and international importance | |

Dominance of the Internet/Technological Advancements

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Reduced costs of disseminating information2. Allows for TTs to reach a wider audience3. Facilitated rapid and inexpensive coordination and collaboration between think tanks and other non-governmental organizations4. Increased the visibility of think tanks, which may lead to greater influence | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Diminished the quality of dialogue on certain issues2. Pressure for TTs to stay on the cutting edge of technology and expand staff to include professionals in the field3. Loss of control over the intellectual assets and research on the part of TTs as the immediacy of the Internet places demands on organizations to demonstrate their influence on policy |
|--|--|

Increased Partisan Politics

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Policy debate in Washington has greater openness and variation in ideas, allowing for output from all TTs to be heard2. Partisan politics has forced some TTs to conduct more focused research and analysis and to be increasingly cautious of how and when to disseminate ideas | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Increased polarization within the TTs community2. Increased pressure to politically align/difficulty to remain nonpartisan3. Decrease in the number of centrist organizations |
|--|--|

Globalization: Increased connectedness of issues, people and ideas

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Increased interest in foreign policy, public policy, and international issues (they have emerged as hot topics)2. Complexities/interrelationships of globalization have caused policy makers to increasingly turn to non-governmental sources, like TTs, for research and analysis. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Has facilitated the proliferation of TTs, creating a more crowded and competitive environment2. There has been a disproportionate focus on Iraq, the war on terror, and homeland security, while other important international issues have been ignored. |
|---|--|

The rise of the Internet in the 1990's caused the majority of think tanks to try and develop engaging websites for the public to browse. No longer are scholarly articles confined to library journals. The public, if they so wish, can choose to read many of the reports and papers produced. However, the negative side of the rise

of the Internet is the increased ease in creating unverified facts that the public may read. Some believe that there has been a dilution in the quality of work produced, as it is harder to filter out works of poor quality from the public view¹⁰⁴.

The increase of the availability and prominence of the Internet has also facilitated the collaboration of think tanks with other civil society organizations. Think tanks can work with lobby and interest groups as well as other organizations in both discussions of the issues and in gaining the attention of policy makers¹⁰⁵.

One problem currently affecting many US think tanks stems from their reliance on donor sources for funding of their research. Having been given money to research and develop policy recommendations on specific subjects, some American think tanks have lost the innovative edge that they held in the past. Often, scholars become forced to concentrate in one area of research and cannot follow implications of their research toward another topic. Most importantly, the recent economic downturn and credit crisis have made it less favorable for organizations or philanthropists to give out the large sums of money which think tanks require. Indeed, many companies are seeking to keep their businesses profitable and continuing to fund think tanks often does not coincide with their financial interests. Moreover, funding has become much more short-term than it had been in the past. Think tanks must produce more concrete results than ever before in order to keep their funding¹⁰⁶.

Think tanks have also begun to engage in other activities and strategies to reach their target audience. Many think tanks publish their own books and different types of media. Additionally, some host conferences and seminars to facilitate a better discourse about issues.

The media has also begun to rely more on think tanks for their information and ideas. The 1990's saw the rise of around the clock reporting and non-stop news media leading to an increasing desire to have the leading story and cutting edge news. While they do turn to think tanks, this can lead to a warped interpretation of research, as media outlets often look for a sound bite to catch attention instead of a full and thorough understanding of the work of a think tank¹⁰⁷.

The polarization of American politics has also played a significant role in the realm in which think tanks operate. As the red-state/ blue-state divide seems to increase, American think tanks have had to choose sides in their advocacy and research. It is quite difficult for recommendations by a centrist organization to be taken under fair consideration by both political parties in the US¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 64-66; 69.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 61-62.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 58-60; 68.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 62-64.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 69.

The 1990's and the 2000's have seen an increase in globalization. Global economies are more connected than they were ever before. As a result, think tanks have become more interested in foreign policy as they realize that foreign affairs can affect policy at home. There is also heightened interest in think tanks in the developing world, as think tanks have helped many nations transition to free market democracy¹⁰⁹. However, certain international issues such as the war in Iraq and the "war on terror" have occupied most of the attention of think tanks, leaving other issues behind. Facts pertaining to America's globalization can be found in the fact sheet at the end of this study.

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List of European Think Tanks

Albania (11)

Albanian Center for Economic Research (ACER)

Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS)

Albanian Liberal Institute

Albanian Socio-Economic Think Tank (ASET)

Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS)

EUREKA – Independent Sociological Center
Institute for Contemporary Studies (ISB)

Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)

Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA)

Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS)

Sustainable Economic Development Agency (SEDA)

Andorra (1)

Institute of Andorran Studies/Institut d'Estudis Andorrans

Austria (35)

Austrian Association for Foreign Policy and International Relations (OEGA)

Austrian Institute for European Security Policy (AIES)/Österreichisches Institut für Europäische Sicherheitspolitik (ÖIES)

Austrian Institute for International Affairs/
Österreichische Institut für Internationale Politik (ÖIIP)

Austrian Institute for Regional Studies and Spatial Planning (ÖIR)/Österreichisches Institut für Raumplanung

Austrian Institute of East and Southeast European Studies (OSI)/Österreichische Ost- und Südosteuropa-Institut (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ost)

Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)/Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung

Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)

Center for Applied Political Research (ZAP)/
Zentrum für Angewandte Politikforschung (ZAP)

Dr. Karl Kummer-Institut

Europainstitut

European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research/Europäisches Zentrum für Wohlfahrtspolitik und Sozialforschung

Grüne Bildungswerkstatt

Hayek Institute/Friedrich A. v. Hayek Institut

Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)/Institut für Höhere Studien

Institute for European Integration Research (EIF)/Forschungsstelle für institutionellen Wandel & europäische Integration (IWE)

Institute for Human and Social Sciences
at the National Defence Academy

Institute for International Cooperation/Institut
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (IIZ)

Institute for the Danube Region and Central
Europe (IDM)

Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative
Research in the Social Sciences (ICCR)

International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA)

International Institute for Peace (IIP)

International Research Center on Science
for People at Mönchsberg/Internationale
Forschungszentrum Wissenschaft für Menschen
am Mönchsberg

Julius Raab Stiftung

Karl Renner Institute/Karl Renner Institut
Liberales Institut

Modern Politics, Politische Akademie der ÖVP

Österreichische Forschungsstiftung
für Entwicklungshilfe

Österreichische Lateinamerika-Institut (LAI)

Projektzentrum für Internationale
und Interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZIIS)

Society for Political Enlightenment (SPE)/
Gesellschaft für Politische Aufklärung

Sustainable Europe Research Institute (SERI)

University Center for Peace Research/
Universitätszentrum für Friedensforschung

Vienna Circle Institute

Vienna Institute for Development
and Cooperation (VIDC)/Wiener Institut
für Entwicklungsfragen und Zusammenarbeit

Vienna Institute for International Economic
Studies (VIIW)/Wiener Institut für Internationale
Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW)

Belarus (12)

Center for International Studies (CENTIS)

EUROFORUM Center for European Studies
and Cultural Initiatives

Independent Institute of Socio-Economic
and Political Studies (IISEPS)

Independent Society for Legal Research

International Institute for Policy Studies (IIPS)

IPM Research Center

National Centre for Strategic Initiatives

NOVAK Laboratory of Axiometrical Research

Project Wider Europe

Research Center of Institute for Privatization
and Management – CASE

Scientific Research Mises Center,
CAPITALISM

Support Center for Associations
and Foundations (SCAF)

Belgium (51)

Academy Avignon

Bruegel

Carnegie Europe

Catholic European Study and Information
Centre (OCIPE)/Office catholique d'information
sur les problèmes européens (OCIPE)

Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

Center of International Conflicts and Crises
Studies (CECRI)/Centre d'Études des Crises
et des Conflits Internationaux (CECRI)

Center for Political, Economic, and Social
Studies (CEPESS)/Centre d'Études Politiques,
Économiques et Sociales (CEPESS)

Centre Européen de Recherches
Internationales et Stratégiques (CERIS)/
European Center for International and Strategic
Research

Centre for Defence Studies/Royal High
Institute for Defense/Centre d'Études de Défense

Centre for European Security and Disarmament

Centre for Peace Research and Strategic
Studies

Centre for the New Europe (CNE)

Cerisis

Development Office

East West Institute

European Center for International Political
Economy (ECIPE)

European Enterprise Institute

European Ideas Network

European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)

European Institute for Research
on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation
(MEDEA)

- European Network of Economic Policy
Research Institutes (ENEPRI)
European Policy Centre (EPC)
European Trade Union Institute for Research,
Education and Health and Safety (ETUI-REHS)
Forum Europe
Foundation for European Progressive Studies
(FEPS)
Friends of Europe (FoE)
Group for Research and Information on Peace
and Security (GRIP)/Groupe de Recherche
et d'Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité
Groupe d'Études Politiques Européennes/
Group of European Political Studies (GEPE)
Institute for European Studies (IEE)
Institut d'Études Européennes (IEE)
Molinari Economic Institute/Institut
économique Molinari (IEM)
Institut Hayek
Institute for European Studies (IES)
Institute for International and European
Policy
International & European Research Unit
(IERU)
International Center for Caspian Studies
(ICCS)
International Crisis Group (ICG)
International Peace Information Service
(IPIS)
International Peace Research Association
International Security Information
Service, Europe (ISIS Europe)
Liberales
The Lisbon Council for Economic
Competitiveness and Social Renewal
Ludwig von Mises Institute Europe/Ludwig
von Mises Instituut
Nova Civitas
Observatoire Social Européen
Réseau Multidisciplinaire en Etudes
Stratégiques (RMES)
Royal Academy of Overseas Sciences/
Académie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer (ASOM)
Royal Institute for International Relations
(IRRI-KIIB)/Institut Royal des Relations
Internationales (EGMONT)
- Security & Defence Agenda
Trans European Policy Studies Association
(TEPSA)
WorkForAll
- Bosnia & Herzegovina (10)**
ACIPS Center for Policy Research
Association of Citizens "Forum of Tuzla
Citizens"
Center for Policy Research and Development
Center for Policy Studies (CEPOS)
Centre for Security Studies
Centre for Socio-Economic Research "Populari"
Civil Society Promotion Centre
Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues
(IBHI)
Institute for Strengthening Democracy
Mozaik Community Development Foundation
- Bulgaria (33)**
ACCESS – Sofia Foundation
Access to Information Programme Foundation
Agency for Social Analyses
Agency for Social Research and Analyses
(ASSA – M)
Association for Middle Class Development
(AMCD)
Atlantic Club of Bulgaria
Balkan Center for Regional Development
(BCRD)
Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute
Bulgarian European Community Studies
Association (BECSA)
Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation
Bulgarian Society for Individual Liberty
Center for Economic Development (CED)
Center for Research, Information, Social
and Economic Documentation (CRID)
Center for Social Practices (CSP)
Center for Strategic Studies-21st Century
Foundation
Center for the Study of Democracy
Centre for Economic and Strategic Research
Centre for Liberal Strategies
Club "Economika 2000"
Common Good Project Foundation

Economic Policy Institute (EPI)
European Institute Foundation
Institute for Market Economics
Institute for Political and Legal Studies
Institute for Regional and International Studies
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Institute for Social Integration
Institute for Social and Political Studies
Institute of Economics
International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations
Municipality of Zlatica
Research Center for Direct Democracy
School of Politics Association

Croatia (10)

Adriatic Institute for Public Policy
Center for Educational Research and Development
Croatian Center for Strategic Studies
Erasmus Guild-Institute for the Culture of Democracy in Croatia
Institute for International Relations
Institute of Economics
Institute of Public Finance
National Competitiveness Council
Political Science Research Centre
SMEs and Entrepreneurship Policy Center – CEPOR

Czech Republic (27)

Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
Association for International Affairs (AMO)
Center for Democracy and Free Enterprise (CDFE)
Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and the Economics Institute
Center for Economics and Politics (CEP)
Center for Liberal Studies
Center for Social and Economic Strategies (CESES)
Centre for Nonprofit Sector Research
Civic Institute/Občanský institut
Czech Institute of Applied Economics, Ltd (CIAE, Ltd)

Democracy and Culture Studies Centre
East West Institute
Economy and Society Trust
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
Health Reform
Institute for Labour and Social Affairs (RILSA)
Institute of Economic Studies
Institute of International Relations (IIR)
Institute of State and Law
International Institute for Political Science of Masaryk University (IIPS)
Jan Masaryk Centre
Liberalni Institut
Patriae Foundation
Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS)
Policy Center for the Promotion of Democracy
Prague Security Studies Institute
Program of Atlantic Security Studies (PASS)

Denmark (34)

Asia Research Centre (ARC)
Center for East European Studies (CEES)
Center for Health Management (CHM)
Center for Research on IT in Policy Settings (CIPS)
Center for the Study of Europe (CES)
Center for the Study of the Americas (CSA)
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS)
Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR)
Cevea
Copenhagen Consensus Center (CCC)
Copenhagen Institute
Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies
Danish Center for Political Studies/Center for Politiske Studier (CEPOS)
Danish Council of Ethics
Danish Foreign Policy Society (DUS)/Dansk Udenrigspolitiske Selskab (DUS)
Danish Institute for Human Rights/Institut for Menneskerettigheder
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)

Danish Institute of Border Region Studies (IFG)/Institutet for Graenseregionsforskning (IFG)

Danish Institute of International Affairs

Danish National Centre for Social Research (SFI) (Formerly the Danish National Institute of Social Research)

Danish Research Centre on Gender Equality (CeLi)

Development, Innovation and International Political Economy Research (DIIPER)

Economic Council of the Labour Movement/AErådet-Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd

Environmental Assessment Institute (EAI)/Institut for Miljøvurdering

Global Development Studies (GDS)

Institute of Local Government Studies (AKF)

International Center for Business and Politics (CBP)

Libertas

Monday Morning

Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS)

Progressive Center/Progressivt Centrum

Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR)

Royal Danish Defense College (RDDC)

– Institute for Strategy

Think Tank on Integration in Denmark

Estonia (15)

Baltic Defense College

Connect Estonia

Estonian European Communities Studies Association (EECSA)

Estonian Foreign Policy Institute

Estonian Institute for Future Studies

Estonian Institute of Economic Research (EKI)

European Movement in Estonia (EME)

Institute for European Studies at Audentes University (Audentese Ulikooli Euroopa Instituut)

Institute for International and Social Studies

Jaan Tonisson Institute (JTI)

Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (LICHR)

Open Estonia Foundation (OEF)

Praxis Center for Policy Studies

Research Centre Free Europe (UKVE)

Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI)

– Tallinn Center

Finland (26)

Åland Islands Peace Institute

Aleksanteri Institute

Anders Chydenius Foundation

Bank of Finland Institute for Economics in Transition (BOFIT)

Business Research and Development Centre (BRDC)

Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations and Nationalism (CEREN)

Crisis Management Initiative

Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA)

Finnish Institute for Russian and East European Studies

Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)

FO-RUM – Centre for Administration and Organisational, Regional and Environmental Studies

Institute for Competition Policy Studies

Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University

Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki

Labour Institute for Economic Research

Media Group

National Institute for Health and Welfare

Pan-European Institute (PEI)

Pellervo Economic Research Centre (PTT)

Research Group for Science, Technology and Innovation Studies (TaSTI)

Research Institute for the Finnish Economy

Small Business Institute (SBI)

Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI)

Thule Institute

Work Research Centre

World Institute for Development

Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER)

France (168)

- A Gauche, en Europe
- Académie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer
- Afidora
- Ami Public
- Association Nationale des Directeurs des Partenariats (ADALEC)
- Association pour la Démocratie et l'Éducation Locale et Sociale (ADELS)
- Association pour la Liberté Économique et le Progrès Social (ALEPS)
- Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST)
- Center of International Economics and Finance (Centre d'Économie et de Finances Internationales)
- Centre d'Analyse Économique (CAE)
- Centre d'Analyse sur la Sécurité Européenne (CASE)
- Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur la Paix et les Conflits
- Centre de GéoStratégie
- Centre de Recherche en Économie et Droit de l'Énergie (CREDEN)
- Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur l'Amérique Latine (CREDAL)
- Centre de Recherche pour l'Étude et l'Observation des Conditions de Vie (CREDOC)
- Centre de Recherche sur la Paix
- Centre de Recherche sur les Dynamiques et Politiques Économiques et l'Économie des Ressources (CEDERS)
- Centre de Recherche sur l'Europe et le Monde Contemporain (CREMOC)
- Centre de Recherche sur l'Industrie, les Institutions, et les Systèmes Économiques d'Amiens (CRIISEA)
- Centre Sécurité et Défense (Formerly le Centre Droit et Défense)
- Centre de Recherches et d'Études sur les Droits de l'Homme et le Droit Humanitaire (CREDHO)
- Centre de Recherches Politiques de la Sorbonne (CRIS)
- Centre de Réflexions et d'Études sur les Problèmes Internationaux
- Le Centre d'études en sciences sociales de la défense (C2SD) [formerly Centre de Sociologie de la Défense Nationale (CSDN)]
- Centre d'Économie des Besoins Sociaux
- Centre d'Économie du Développement
- Centre d'Économie et d'Éthique pour l'Environnement et le Développement (C3ED)
- Centre d'Économie Industrielle (CERNA)
- Centre d'Étude d'Afrique Noire (CEAN)
- Centre d'Étude de la Vie Politique Française (CEVIPOF)
- Centre d'Études de l'Emploi
- Centre d'Étude et de Documentation sur l'Afrique et l'Outre-Mer
- Centre d'Études des Modes d'Industrialisation (CEMI)
- Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques
- Centre d'Études du Développement International et des Mouvements Économiques et Sociaux
- Centre d'Études et de Recherche sur les Relations Inter-Ethniques et les Minorités (CERIEEM)
- Centre d'Études et de Recherches Appliquées à la Gestion
- Centre d'Études et de Recherches de Science Administrative (CERSA)
- Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales
- Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales de Montpellier (CERIM)
- Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI)
- Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Information Internationale (CEPII)
- Centre d'Études sur la Sécurité Internationale et les Coopérations Européennes (CECISE)
- Centre d'Études, de Documentation et de Recherches Européennes (CEDRE)
- Centre d'Histoire de Sciences Po
- Centre d'Information et de Recherche sur l'Allemagne Contemporaine (CIRAC)

- Centre d'Information et d'Études sur les Migrations Internationales (CIEMI)
Centre for Administrative Research [Centre de Recherches Administratives (CRA)]
Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement
Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche sur la Paix et d'Études Stratégiques (CIRPES)
Centre International de Formation Européenne (CIFE)
Centre Lillois d'Études et de Recherches Sociologiques et Économiques (CLERSÉ)
Centre Morris Janowitz: Forces Armées et Sécurité
Centre Population et Développement/ Population and Development Center (CEPED)
Centre pour la Recherche Economique et ses Applications/Center for Economic Research and its Applications (CEPREMAP)
Centre Universitaire de Recherche Européenne et Internationale
Cercle Alexis de Tocqueville/ Alexis de Tocqueville Circle
Cercles Libéraux/Liberal Circles
Choiseul Institute (Institut Choiseul)
Club 89
Club Citoyens
Club des Vigilants
Cofrimi
Confrontations Europe
Convaincre
Croissance Plus
Développement Institutions & Analyses de Long Terme (DIAL)
Ecole de la Paix/Peace School
En Temps Réel
Entreprise et Progrès
Equipe de Recherche sur la Politique Criminelle (ERPC)
Espace Europe
Esprits d'Entreprises
Eurolibnetwork
Europartenaires
European Information Network on International Relations and Area Studies
European Institute of Interdisciplinary Research
European Union Institute for Security Studies
European Professional Women's Network (EuropeanPWN)
Fondation Concorde
Fondation Méditerranéenne d'Études Stratégiques
Fondation pour la Recherche Sociale (FORS)
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
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In the final part of the study, the author will continue the list of European Think Tanks.



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
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
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
Signal, USA, vol. 64, no. 11, July 2010

Army Examines Network Parts Before They Become the Whole • Air Defense System to Forge



Many Platforms Into One Network • Moving Power Closer to the Edge • Information Technology Patterns May Guide Army Acquisition Reform • Fiber Enables Battlefield Radio Transmissions • Pond Scum Powers New Research •

Flexible Batteries Unfold Technical Possibilities • Marine Goes Green • Fuel Cell Power Military Bases • Great Green Fleet Prepares to Set Sail



Truppendienst, Austria, no. 3(315), June 2010

The Paramilitary Units of the First Republic • The Forgotten Army (Part 2) • The 12 Prioritised Capabilities of the Common Security and Defence Policy • Evaluation of Austria’s Stand-by Forces for First Missions • The 14th Tank Battalion – The Mechanised Unit in the 21st Century • Operations Preparations under Changed Preconditions: KFOR Force Reduction • Corporate Identity Process in the 4th Mechanised Infantry Brigade • Information Security in the AAF • Psychology in Operations – The NATO Workgroup • The Austrian Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina: From the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia to the Operation EUFOR “Althea” • From Congo to Chad • 11 Years Combat-Ready.

Selection and Translation

Ioana MANAFU, Delia PETRACHE,

Dr Mihai POPESCU, Cătălina ROJIȘTEANU

National Military Library



EDITORIAL EVENTS


 **Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE**

The 90th anniversary of the *Centre for Studies and Preservation of Historical Archives Pitești* and the celebration, on 26 July, of the *Military Archives Day* provided the military archivists with the chance of taking part in a wonderful event, marked by some distinguished scientific actions. Among them, we mention the appearance of ***Ghidul Arhivelor Militare Române (Guide to the Romanian Military Archives)***, an approach that adds to a long line of editorial accomplishments they have delighted us with lately.


Therefore, historians, researchers, archivists, teachers and students, as well as numerous persons interested in gaining access to certain documents are provided with a new and very useful working tool, meant to inform them and give them access to the research and capitalisation, for scientific or administrative purposes, of the rich archival fund of the Romanian Armed Forces.

Researchers are thus familiarised with the main archive-creating entities, as well as with the evolution of the organisation, the profile and area of competence of the Armed Forces Historical Service and the Centre for Studies and Preservation of Historical Military Archives. Moreover, the book presents 6 200 archive funds, from the ones open for research, that exist in the original at the Centre for Studies and Preservation of Historical Military Archives or in a copy, on microfilm, at the Armed Forces Historical Service, to the ones created by structures of the Romanian Armed Forces and stored by the National Archives or created by military personalities, kept at the Romanian National Library.

A special place in this book is held by the *Historical Notes of the Archival Funds Created by Regiments* (76 regiments of dorobantzes and infantry), in fact, a short history and a succinct presentation of the content of the archival fund of each of them, extremely useful information for researchers and not only.



Therefore, this is a remarkable initiative of the *Armed Forces Historical Service* and the *Centre for Studies and Preservation of Military Archives Pitești*, coordinated by the *Training and Doctrine Directorate of the General Staff*, an exceptional scientific accomplishment materialised by the *Armed Forces Technical-Editorial Centre* in a volume with exquisite graphics. It is a book for which the authors – **Major General Dr Mihai Chiriță** – coordinator, **Captain Dr Marian Moșneagu**, **Lieutenant Colonel Dr Petrișor Florea**, **Dr Cornel Țucă**, **Lucian Drăghici** and **Manuel Stănescu** –, together with specialised consultants and scientific reviewers, deserve the entire appreciation and gratitude on the part of the scientific community and the other readers, interested in and passionate about military history.




The book *Armata Română și patrimoniul național (The Romanian Armed Forces and the National Heritage)*, published by the *Armed Forces Historical Service* and the *Centre for Studies and Preservation of Historical Military Archives*, brings together studies and articles presented at the scientific session with international participation entitled “*The Romanian Military Archive in the Service of National Historiography*”, dedicated to the *Military Archives Day* and to the celebration of 90 years since the establishment of the *Centre for the Study and Preservation of Historical Military Archives*.

Considerable, both in physical size as well as in thematic diversity, the volume comprises, in the 530 pages, nearly 80 articles and studies signed by some “*heavyweights*” of the contemporary Romanian historiography, by scholars and specialists from the prestigious specialised institutions, as well as academics and students in Bucharest, Constanța, Curtea de Argeș, Oradea, Pitești, Suceava. We also noted the existence of three representatives of *Nicolaus Copernic University* in Torun, Poland.

Coordinated by **Major General Dr Mihai Chiriță**, **Captain Dr Marian Moșneagu**, **Lieutenant Colonel Dr Petrișor Florea** and **Dr Cornel Țucă**, the book appeared, with special graphics, at the *Publishing House of the Armed Forces Technical-Editorial Centre*.

“Since the ’50s, two connected themes have been introduced in Western societies, which have permanently been at the centre of debates and following evolutions: on the one hand, the desire of European states to advance on the path of political integration at continental level, the military domain included, and the acknowledgement of the indispensability of the American strategic engagement, of the American military power and of the alliance led by Americans (NATO) for European security, on the other hand. These inseparable themes have been more or less compatible in the post-war evolution and, in certain periods, just as at present, have represented the source of important tensions between the two parts of the North Atlantic community”. Starting from this leitmotif, **Dr Ioan Codruț Lucinescu** and **Marian Curelaru** present, in *Politica Europeană de Securitate și Apărare (European Security and Defence Policy)*, the origins and evolution of the security and defence policy of the European Union, EU strategies in the security field, decision-making process within ESDP, military and civil capabilities of ESDP, its military missions, crisis management operations. In the final part, the authors approach the connections of the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership, pointing out, in this respect, the statements of US Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, within a speech delivered in Paris, in 2008: “Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs a stronger, more capable European defence capacity. An ESDP with only soft power is not enough”.

Published at the “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy Publishing House, the book is a real and consistent benchmark for understanding ESDP and what one can expect from this global player. In this context, EU High Representative for the CFSP pointed out, a year ago, six “lessons for the future”, derived from the experience of the first decade of ESDP: “1. The strength of the ESDP derives from its consensual basis. 2. Nothing can be achieved without the means to do the job. 3. The distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management has proved its validity. 4. Our ESDP actions have to be firmly anchored in political strategies. 5. Partnerships become more and more important every day. 6. Adaptability is a key strength”.



Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence (Romanian Review of Intelligence Studies), no. 1-2/December 2009, published at the *Scientific Research Centre of the “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy*, gathers a series of approaches in the field of intelligence, resulted from years of research, which provide this new academic discipline with coherence and viability today. In his editorial, **Dr George Cristian Maior** points out that the review “is open to all the people interested in intelligence..., academic, media and political circles..., as well as to those involved in the intelligence cycle, from intelligence officers to beneficiaries of their product”.



Here are a few titles: “*On Intelligence*”; “*Why Intelligence ?*”; “*An Attempt to Define the Term Intelligence*”; “*The National Interest – A Theoretical Approach*”; “*Governance, Economy and Security. Challenges to National States*”; “*Changes in the International System. Continuity and Change in Intelligence Activities*”; “*Transformation of Intelligence in the Context of the New Challenges of the 21st Century*”; “*National Intelligence Community – Superior Intelligence Management Structure for National Security*”.



“*Starting 2010, training takes place on levels of capabilities*” – this is the title of the interview given to *Revista Fortelor Terestre (Land Forces Review)*, no. 4/2009, by the Chief of Land Forces Training and Doctrine, **Brigadier General Mihai Ciungu**: “*There are three levels of capabilities, so that, throughout three years, depending on the operational capacity, destination and mission, each of them can entirely fulfil the mission essential tasks list*”.

These are some of the titles of the articles: “*ROUEX – ’09. Special Fire Event in the Cincu Range*”; “*The Romanian-English Exercise Romanian Express 2009*”; “*Riding at the Only Horse-drawn*

Transport Company in the Armed Forces”; “*A Lesson of Public Relations Made in UK*”; “*The First Steps of OMLT-3*”; “*Black Scorpions Have Taken One More Step towards Freedom*”; “*The Romanian Artillery after Two Decades of Transformations*”

– an interview with the Commander of the 8th Mixed Artillery Brigade, **Brigadier General Dr Florinel Damian**: *“I believe that, given the current circumstances, the branch of land artillery is a complex system of systems. It is not easy, but extremely inciting and gives the satisfaction of the accomplished work”.*

The review **Document** – an issue dedicated to the Romanian aviation centennial: *“On 17 June 2010, we celebrate one hundred years of military aviation in Romania. Exactly a century ago, on this day, on the flight field of Cotroceni, on the outskirts of pre-war Bucharest, took place the flight of <Vlaicu no. 1 – model 1910> airplane, creation of engineer Aurel Vlaicu. It was a historic moment and it was given proper consideration by the press of the time. For the first time, in Romania, someone flew a plane designed and built by a Romanian. This marked the beginning of the history of the Romanian Military Aviation, because the <Vlaicu> plane was owned by the Ministry of War. In the autumn of the same year, Romania became one of the first countries to use aviation for military purposes”* – **Major General Dr Ion-Aurel Stanciu**, Air Force Chief of Staff, writes in the editorial of the review.



We propose reading some titles from this issue: *“In the Nature and Spirit of Times”*; *“Aspects of Tense Diplomatic Relations between Romania and the Great Powers in the Spring of 1939”*; *“General Gheorghe Garoescu”*; *“1st Armoured Division <România Mare> in the Battle for Defending Moldova – August 1944”*; *“Military Personalities in the Service of Rural Gendarmerie (1893-1949)”*; *“The Third International and the Red Empire Expansion Tendency. Case Study – Tatar-Bunar, a Communist Diversion to Conquer Basarabia”.*

English version by
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

Résumés

Une neuve porte vers la connaissance

L'Université Nationale de Défense "Carol I", ce porte-drapeau et le générateur de tonalité de l'enseignement militaire roumaine, a-t-il dit, une fois de plus, sa capacité de percuter aux besoins réels de l'armée et il est engagé de fournir ses qualifications plus élevées adaptées aux nécessités réels de l'Armée Roumaine. En ce sens, le Département pour l'enseignement distribué avancé à distance est une structure dont sa porte virtuelle, ouverte à la connaissance il y a cinq ans, ils sont allés jusqu'à présent vers trois mille d'étudiants. Beaucoup d'entre eux, présents aux théâtres d'opérations ou d'autres missions internationales, ont directement visité les pages électroniques depuis leurs postes de combat et ont trouvé des solutions appropriées pour leurs tâches.

Entre transition et transformation

Après six années de coopération de la République de Slovénie et les Forces armées slovènes à l'OTAN et les structures de l'Union européenne, de nombreux indicateurs montrent à la conclusion que la politique ainsi que la défense et la sécurité de transition ont achevée avec succès. Ils sont achevés aussi la transition militaire et le plan d'action quinquennal pour l'intégration dans l'Alliance. En dépit de la conviction que l'Alliance est avant tout coûteuse, il est un fait que les dépenses de défense, de la structure de la défense

et des forces de défense sont beaucoup plus petites que dans le cas de la construction d'un système d'auto-entretenu. L'intégration dans l'Alliance a créé les conditions pour modifier la stratégie de sécurité nationale et, par conséquent, la doctrine militaire.

Les caractéristiques des conflits futurs

La plupart des sources actuelles de conflits existeront pendant cinq ans, 15 et même plus. En ce contexte, l'auteur exprime l'avis qui sera d'importants changements dans le régime de bataille. En outre, aucune armée ne peut pas prévoir comment un adversaire avenir peut utiliser tout la technique pour capturer l'imagination et, par conséquent, de se préparer pour ce genre de bataille. La seule façon de penser est susceptible de s'adapter rapidement à tout changement dans la conduite d'un futur conflit à la fois le plan technique et des ressources humaines.

La guerre continue - comment être la guerre du futur (I)

Le catalyseur le plus puissant des relations internationales a été, est et sera l'intérêt pour lequel la confrontation entre les États semble ne disparaîtra jamais. En ce sens, l'auteur met l'accent sur ses composantes non militaires. La guerre du futur est continue et ce que l'on appelle les nouveaux types

de guerre sont en fait ses composantes qui pourraient être décrites comme de nouvelles façons d'atteindre le même objectif: imposer sa volonté l'un à d'autres composés d'attraper plus de puissance, la saisie de nouveaux territoires ou des marchés, d'accroître l'influence politique et économique, etc.

Le niveau d'ambition – entre désir et but

La réalité socio-économique, ou plus exactement, les ressources limitées qui diminuent les possibilités des démocraties, ont causé des évolutions intéressantes au niveau politique. L'un d'eux concerne la manière dont les finales aspirations des efforts de défense sont définies par les États et les organisations multinationales. Ces aspirations sont définitivement connues, dans la plupart des cas, comme le niveau d'ambition. À cette fin, de définir le niveau d'ambition des États-Unis peut être considéré comme un modèle théorique complète qui comprend tout ce qui est nécessaire pour calibrage et pour perfectionner un outil de sécurité extrêmement complexe et vaste.

La sécurité des systèmes informationnelles pour la commande et contrôle de grandes unités et unités qui participent aux actions militaires multinationales

La sécurité des systèmes d'information de commandement et de contrôle utilisés dans les opérations militaires modernes est une question particulièrement importante, car ils sont la cible principale des informations sur les attaques ennemies, à obtenir la supériorité dans le commandement et le contrôle. L'utilisation croissante des systèmes d'information pour le commandement et le contrôle est dictée

par le ministère de la Défense, aussi l'évolution du centre de gravité du strict contrôle des documents classifiés du circuit de protection et sécurité de l'information à tous les stades de leur existence en vertu des règlements actuels, généralement admis dans l'OTAN.

La transformation des organisations militaires – facteurs qui génèrent le changement, étapes et finalité (I)

Comme un organisme spécialisé pour mener la guerre, l'armée est un groupe avec une organisation spécifique, qui fonctionne sur la base des règles et règlements spécifiques découlant de la vie militaire, des exigences de la lutte armée. Organisation des structures militaires est un processus continu qui se déroule en plusieurs étapes, plus lente ou dynamique, en fonction de l'évolution d'un complexe de facteurs qui déterminent les changements dans l'organisation et le fonctionnement de la sécurité et la défense des États ou des coalitions d'États.

L'année 2010 – entre prévisions et confirmations

En ce qui concerne la défense des États-Unis que l'action mondiale pour maintenir la capacité des militaires américains et de revitaliser les liens avec les alliés et partenaires sont mis en évidence dans le rapport de réexaminations de la défense quadriennal en 2010, qui est le principal document de politique du ministère américain de la Défense pour la programmation de sous-jacent activités de défense à long terme. Selon elle, l'une des priorités que les États-Unis adaptent son architecture militaire de la région pour les cinq prochaines années est de réaffirmer l'engagement de l'Europe et l'OTAN par le maintien d'une solide présence sur le continent européen et le développement des capacités de défense antimissile.

La liaison transatlantique et la Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Commune

Compte tenu de l'écart croissant entre les capacités militaires des États-Unis et les pays européens et les budgets baisses de défense des états européens, les fonctionnaires européens ont souvent insisté sur la puissance douce des outils des États membres et la gestion des crises comme un moyen de couvrir une partie plus d'obligations sur la fourniture de niveau de sécurité souhaité dans les différentes régions du monde. À cet égard, certains responsables européens ont déjà saisi que le danger peut être présent et ne pas être complaisant avec ce que nous percevons comme une tendance aux États-Unis, ce qui est de laisser à l'Europe "salle boulot" pour la reconstruction et l'entretien de la paix, tandis que les interventions militaires américaines ne traitant que de la haute technologie, l'exécution rapide de la mission accomplie.

Le fondamentalisme islamique – une inconnue dans l'équation de la sécurité européenne ?

Il y a des spécialistes dans la sécurité européenne qui soutiennent que le fondamentalisme islamique pourrait créer des problèmes pour la sécurité européenne dans les prochaines décennies. Phrases qui comprennent "l'islamisation de l'Europe" sont de plus en plus communes dans les médias d'aujourd'hui. En ce qui concerne la Bosnie-Herzégovine, les communautés musulmanes de l'Ouest et la Turquie, nous pensons que certaines conclusions sur les évolutions possibles de l'Europe au sujet de fondamentalistes islamiques peuvent avoir un bon résultat.

Le nouveau visage du terrorisme aérien et les vulnérabilités des systèmes de défense aérienne

La réaction efficace et efficace du système de défense aérienne à la menace du terrorisme

aérien dépend de l'existence de certains plans crédibles pour la coordination des efforts pour la commande-contrôle des forces y impliquées, en partant de l'identification de l'avion jusqu'à la solution définitive d'un incident de trafic aérien. Lors du sommet de Prague, l'OTAN a défini la menace de "RENEGADE" que l'utilisation d'avions civils détournés comme armes pour commettre un attentat terroriste. Alliance a développé le concept de "RENEGADE" et a défini les responsabilités de toutes les structures impliquées dans la lutte contre cette menace et à mettre en œuvre les mesures nécessaires, y compris les procédures d'utilisation normalisées au sein du système de défense aérienne intégrée de l'OTAN (NATINADS).

Le rôle et l'utilisation des officiers en réserve dans les pays membres de l'OTAN

À la suite de menaces à la sécurité des dernières années, de nouvelles politiques ont été mises en œuvre que sont les pilons de la nécessité de la transformation et à la suite il y a de nouveaux rôles et les responsabilités des forces de l'OTAN et en particulier les Forces de réserve. Bien que la force régulière construit rapidement de plus en plus des structures de forces déployables, un système entièrement intégré, la Force de réserve est le seul moyen pour les pays de l'OTAN d'être en mesure d'apporter un nombre suffisant de ressources pour corriger les différents types d'opérations.

Certaines opinions à l'égard d'un possible système intégré de management de renseignements qui se réfèrent à l'instruction dans le domaine des communications et de l'informatique (I)

Les données de SIMIRI fournies par l'exécution synchronisée de la formation peuvent conduire à l'instruction multi échelon de tir et de qualité supérieure. Le système

proposé fournit des renseignements importants sur la formation à la pratique, les fonctions professionnelles du passé après avoir assisté à la formation institutionnelle, sur l'expérience par la participation régulière à des activités dans le théâtre. L'auteur estime que les données fournies par le système d'information proposé peuvent être interchangeables avec le système d'éducation militaire et d'optimiser chaque militaire de carrière par la conception, organisation et tenue de cette formation.

Règles d'engagement pour les compagnies privées de sécurité en Iraq – le cas Blackwater

Ce document est une étude de cas sur les règles d'engagement et d'emploi de la force (RAFF) que Blackwater Worldwide, une entreprise de sécurité privée qui est aujourd'hui connue sous le nom Services Xe et qui ont été suivis lors d'incidents spécifiques dans lesquelles les impliqués en Irak, à savoir: Fallujah 2004, Niso Najaf 2004 et 2007. Le document définit le nouvel environnement de sécurité, les sociétés militaires privées et la spécificité de la guerre en Irak. Il traite également de la législation existante pour les entrepreneurs RAFF.

Comment est assuré le maintien de la sécurité en Méditerranée

L'auteur écrit qu'il n'y a pas eu un seul incident lié à l'arrestation de terroristes en Méditerranée depuis qu'y ont débuté les opérations de lutte contre le terrorisme, en 2001. Un membre de l'opération explique comment est assuré le maintien de la sécurité dans cette zone. Tout d'abord, il mentionne sa mission fondamentale, l'opération "*Active Endeavour*", qui est de décourager et de perturber l'utilisation de la Méditerranée

à des fins terroristes, et d'assurer la défense contre une telle utilisation. Depuis le lancement, à la fin de 2001, en tant que première et seule opération menée au titre de l'article 5, le défi fondamental consiste à repérer parmi une myriade d'activités maritimes celles qui sont liées au terrorisme.

L'Asie, l'OTAN et ses partenaires: des relations compliquées ?

L'auteur écrit à propos de l'OTAN et de ses nouveaux partenaires, qui proviennent de, dans ou autour de l'Asie et sur la façon dont chaque voit l'autre côté, et quel est le moyen à assurer à la fois bénéficier du travail en ensemble. À cet égard, il se rapproche OTAN: comme un partenaire politique, comme un moyen de la coopération avec les Etats Unis, comme une école multilatérale, en citant le rôle joué par l'Alliance dans la coopération opérationnelle et en notant que, dans le monde plus grand et plus capable, l'alliance politico-militaire exerce un certain – à la fois destiné et involontaire – poids internationale des affaires de sécurité.

European Think Tanks: Regional and Trans-Atlantic Trends – report of The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program 2009 (III)

Cette étude se propose d'examiner tous les groupes de réflexion au sein de l'Union européenne de Juin 2009, en présentant quelques-unes des principales tendances et défis auxquels ils sont confrontés.

L'auteur estime que leurs rôles dans la société civile n'ont peut-être jamais été aussi grands, compte tenu de la crise économique actuelle, quand leurs idées et leurs recommandations sont le plus nécessaires.

Version française par Alina PAPOI

FOR THE ATTENTION OF THOSE INTERESTED IN SUBMITTING ARTICLES TO “RMT”

Manuscripts submitted to the editorial staff should be either accompanied by the magnetic support or sent by email. They should be edited in *Microsoft Word*, *Times New Roman*, size 14, justify, and they should have no more than 8 pages. The **graphic illustration** – schemes, figures, tables should be designed using *CorelDraw*, and maps and images – in *JPEG* format.

Manuscripts should be written in accordance with the academic standards and adopting the norms in the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, available at www.ldoceonline.com. Abbreviations and acronyms should be either avoided or explained.

To optimise our collaboration, submissions should be accompanied by the following: name, phone/fax number, email, address of the institution and other relevant information.

RMT Editorial Staff reserves the right to make editorial changes regarding the style, grammar and length of the manuscripts. Authors will be consulted, in case the changes could affect the form or the content of the manuscript.

We expect You, with interest and hope, to submit your articles for publication, mentioning that manuscripts and relating materials are not given back to authors. Thank you for your understanding !

The Editorial Staff

The editorial and layout process
was completed on 29 September 2010.



General Alexandru Averescu among the 2nd Army Command officers

Source: The National Military Museum, by courtesy of Professor Neculai MOGHIOR

Cover 1: "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, September 2010. Photo – Colonel Dr Mircea TÂNASE
Cover 4: The monument in Carei, from www.amfostacolo.ro



<http://www.defense.ro/gmr>