3 July September 2011

Romanian Military Thinking

Military Theory and Science Journal

Published by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff

Founded in 1864 under the name "Military Romania"
- English edition, 7th year -

Romanian Military Thinking

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***Romanian Military Thinking** Journal is issued in March, June, September, December.*

ISSN 1841-4451 ~ Print
ISSN 1842-824X ~ Online

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HIGH ROYAL DECREE NO. 3663
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Issued in Bucharest on 8 December 1897

Romanian Military Thinking

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Edition accomplished with the support
of the Training and Doctrine Directorate
from the General Staff

Authors assume full intellectual responsibility
for the articles submitted to the editorial staff,
in keeping with Law no. 206, 27.05.2004

***Romanian Military Thinking** Journal*
is recognised
by the National University Research Council,
ranked in the "B+" category
and included in the Journal Master List
of the Index Copernicus International database

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

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Doctrine
Training
Operationalisation

Eternal peace, the ideal that humankind has never reached, has always fuelled the speeches of politicians willing to promise anything, even definitive solutions for... peace, yet, it has urged the military men to reflection, caution and that kind of pragmatic, objective attitude that arises from the actual substance of their profession. Acting more concretely and responsibly when the political, economic or humanitarian solutions have proved ineffective in regulating conflict-generating processes and the military intervention has become inevitable, the military men have had to take into account making the latter more effective with the purpose of achieving the desired effects with as reduced as possible human and material losses.

The strengthening of the competition for occupying a prominent place in the hierarchy of the current world power, the geostrategic changes, the attempts to increase the influence of certain emerging centres of power that ignore or even deny the principles of the Western democratic system determine the permanent instability of the international security environment, which could be eliminated only through a resolute political, economic and, last but not least, military response.

Although the essence of war has not changed, the forms and procedures of the military action, the armed fight included, have evolved depending on the characteristics of this security environment, as well as the forces, means, weapon systems, policies and action strategies.

The new strategic situations bring about new requirements and, why not, new mentalities, which require the need for the substantiation of certain new doctrinaire concepts regarding the modern conflict theory, transposed on the current physiognomy of the battlefield. A battlefield whose key features – multidimensionality, transparency, dynamism, discontinuity, multidirectionality, automation and, obviously, digitisation – call for a continuous assessment and modernisation of the courses of action in order to define an appropriate normative framework for these new requirements and mentalities.

Romania's National Security Strategy and the *National Strategy of Homeland Defence* are the strategic papers that legislate and mandate the Romanian Armed Forces to carry out missions outside the national territory as well, with the purpose of promoting regional and global stability and defending Romania and its allies. The participation

in collective defence operations, in crisis response operations outside NATO's area of responsibility, in crisis management operations under the aegis of the EU, in peacekeeping operations under UN mandate, as well as in operations carried out within the framework of coalitions of the willing, as stipulated in the current Doctrine of the Romanian Armed Forces, requires the preparation and operationalisation of forces that are compatible and interoperable with the ones of the NATO/EU member and partner states armed forces. This will not be achieved without considering several variables: the changes in the physiognomy of military conflicts and war, the demassification of forces and professionalisation of armed forces, the emergence of new weapon systems, the reduction of the time required for making decisions and the requirements of the transformation process in which the Romanian Armed Forces is engaged. A conceptual and architectural transformation in keeping with the transformation of the Alliance, yet, based on a national doctrine that is adapted to the concrete present and the foreseeable future.

The transition from the industrial age to the information age, the changes in the physiognomy and philosophy of waging war, the asymmetrical threats, the revolution in military affairs or, more briefly, the new operational needs of the military body also require the creation of a system of professional training of the military personnel that is flexible, efficient and economical, in accordance with the needs and requirements of its training and development. That is why the process of transforming and reshaping the military education should be compatible with national education and with the education in the Euro-Atlantic area, concomitantly with promoting own values and traditions.

The armed forces are more and more modern, equipped with armament and high performance equipment, having great mobility and firepower and highly trained personnel. Yet, this goal cannot be achieved unless special attention will be further paid to training, the process through which human, material and financial resources transform into operational capacity. It is a continuous process, which definitely uses important resources, and yet requires that an axiomatic condition is strictly respected: training in peacetime must meet the requirements of the missions to be fulfilled in crisis situations or at war.

The development of certain doctrinaire concepts meant to answer the questions regarding the future of military actions, the training focused on the essential requirements of the mission, as well as those of the military establishment philosophy and physiognomy, permanently linked to the objectives and imperatives of structures operationalisation, the capitalisation on the lessons learned and, last but not least, the promotion of national values and traditions will further provide the Romanian Armed Forces with those attributes of modernity with which they affirm and confirm the status of reliable ally in the relation with NATO partners.

Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE
English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

Doctrine instruction opérationnalisation

La paix éternelle, cet idéal jamais abouti par l'humanité, a toujours sustenté les discours des politiciens prêts à promettre n'importe quoi, même si des solutions irrévocables de… paix. Mais, la même paix a exhorté les militaires à penser, à être prudents, pragmatiques et objectives, cette-ci une attitude résultant de la substance réelle de leur profession. En agissant dans un registre plus concret et responsable lorsque des solutions politiques, économiques ou humanitaires sont avérées inefficaces dans la régularisation des processus générateurs de conflits, et l'intervention militaire est devenue inévitable, les militaires étaient obligés de prendre en considération l'efficacité de la paix, pour obtenir les effets attendus avec des pertes humaines et matérielles plus minimisés.

L'amplification de la concurrence pour occuper une place plus visible dans l'échelle de la pouvoir mondiale actuelle, les réinitialisations et les repositionnements au niveau géostratégique, les tentatives pour augmenter l'influence des centres émergents de pouvoir qui ignorent ou nient les principes de la démocratie occidentale, provoquent à l'environnement de sécurité internationale une instabilité permanente qui ne pourra pas être éloignée que par une réponse déterminée au plan politique, économique et, pas au dernière ligne, militaire.

Bien que l'essence de la guerre n'a pas changé, toutefois les formes et les procédures de l'action militaire, y compris la lutte armée, ont évolué en fonction des caractéristiques de cet environnement de sécurité, et aussi des forces, moyens, systèmes d'armes, des politiques et stratégies d'action.

Les neuves situations stratégiques génèrent de nouvelles exigences et, pourquoi pas, de nouvelles mentalités ce qui imposent au besoin de créer de nouveaux concepts doctrinaux sur la théorie du conflit moderne, convertis dans la physionomie actuelle du champ de bataille. Un champ de bataille dont ses principales caractéristiques – multi dimensionnalité, transparence, dynamisme, discontinuité, multi directionalité, automatisation et de toute évidence la numérisation – demandent une évaluation continue et une modernisation des indices d'action afin de définir un cadre réglementaire approprié de ces nouvelles exigences et mentalités.

La Stratégie de sécurité nationale de la Roumanie et *la Stratégie de défense nationale du Pays* sont des documents qui ont un plan bien établi et qui légifèrent et mandatent l'armée roumaine d'accomplir ses missions aussi au-dehors du territoire national,

pour promouvoir la stabilité régionale et mondiale, la bienséance de la Roumanie et de ses alliés. La participation à des opérations de défense collective, dans les opérations de réponse aux crises au-dehors de la région de l'OTAN de responsabilité, dans les opérations de gestion de crises sous l'égide de l'UE, aux celles de paix sous mandat de Nations Unies, aussi aux opérations réalisées dans les coalitions de volonté, comme il est stipulé dans la Doctrine actuelle des forces armées roumaines, requête la préparation et l'opérationnalisation des forces compatibles et interopérables avec lesquelles de l'armées des Etats membres de l'OTAN/UE et partenaires. Ce ne sera pas réalisé sans tenir compte de plusieurs variables: des changements dans la physionomie des conflits militaires et de la guerre, la demassification des forces et la professionnalisation des armées, l'émergence de nouveaux systèmes d'armes, la réduction du temps nécessaire de prendre les décisions et les exigences du processus de transformation dans lequel l'armée roumaine est engagée. Une transformation conceptuelle et architecturale en ligne avec la transformation de l'Alliance, mais fondée sur une doctrine nationale adaptée au présent concret et à l'avenir prévisible.

La transition de l'ère industrielle à l'ère de l'information, les changements dans la physionomie et la philosophie de mener la guerre, les menaces asymétriques, la révolution dans les affaires militaires ou, plus brièvement, les nouveaux besoins opérationnels de l'armée exigent aussi la création d'un système de formation du personnel militaire souple, efficace et économique, selon les besoins et les exigences de sa formation et développement. C'est pourquoi la transformation et la réorganisation de l'enseignement militaire doivent entièrement compatibles avec l'éducation nationale et celle de la région euro-atlantique, tout en promouvant les propres valeurs et traditions.

On souhaite des armées de plus en plus modernes, équipées de l'armement et technique de haute performance, avec une grande mobilité et puissance de feu, avec un personnel bien responsable. Toutefois, cet objectif ne peut être achevé si nous n'accordons toujours une attention particulière à l'instruction, ce processus par lequel les ressources humaines, matérielles et financières deviennent opérationnelles. Un processus constant, qui consomme, bien sur, d'en ressources importantes, qui exige d'être scrupuleusement respectée cette axiome: l'instruction en temps de paix répondre aux exigences des missions à remplir en situations de crise ou de guerre.

Le développement de concepts doctrinaux capables de répondre aux questions sur la future des actions militaires, la formation axée sur les exigences essentielles de la mission, mais aussi de la philosophie militaire et la physionomie de l'institution militaire, relié en permanence à des objectifs et impératifs de l'opérationnalisation des structures, l'application des leçons apprises et, pas du tout au dernier lieu, la promotion des valeurs et des traditions nationales, va fournir à l'armée roumaine ces attributs de la modernité avec elle affirme et témoigne son statut d'être un allié crédible dans sa relation avec les partenaires de l'OTAN.

Version française par
Alina PAPOI

CONTINUOUS WARFARE
Social Confrontation (V)

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAŢĂ

Human nature is conflict-oriented, that is why mankind is always caught in different types of crisis.

Social confrontation is composed of daily individual disputes, group and communities' conflicts.

Have against have-nots, workers against companies' owners, immigrants against locals and new against old generations are among the most common clashes that form permanent social confrontation.

The magnitude of the confrontation and its level of intensity depend on many factors, but the political and economic ones are the most prominent.

Education, good social cohesion and a decent living standard in every society contribute to avoiding high and large-scale social confrontations.

***Keywords**: emigration; poverty; permanent confrontation; conflicts between generations*

Generally speaking, confrontation pits people against each other because human beings have always desired more than they have – money, land, products, social positions etc. This feeling has put many people in the situation to take, by force, deception or a mix of these methods, all they desire from other humans. Analysing the motivations for confrontations between people, Thomas Hobbes identifies rivalry, distrust and pride as main causes. He explains that rivalry pushes people and communities to be involved in struggles for raising their profits. Also, distrust initiates offensive actions for improving security, whilst pride stimulates the desire to get reputation through social position or notoriety[1]. Prior to Hobbes, ancient thinkers such as Heraclitus of Ephesus say that war is part of the Universe[2].

Most of the time, social confrontation looks like *"all against all"* fight. It encompasses daily frictions and long-term conflicts as well, which occur between individuals, between interest groups and between different communities – ethnic, religious, states, organisations, associations etc. Also, the opposite parties change almost all the time and those that are opponents can become allies for a while and then change again their options according to the interests.

General (r.) Dr Mihail Orzeaţă – Associate Professor, *"Carol I"* National Defence University, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces.

[1] Thomas Hobbes, *Le Leviathan*, in *Antologie de la paix*, UNESCO, 1980, p. 49.

[2] Teodor Frunzeti, Mircea Mureşan, Gheorghe Văduva, *Război şi haos*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 21.

Social confrontation has two dimensions – internal and external one. The internal dimension consists of struggles between individuals, groups, associations and organisations belonging to the same community, usually a state. The external dimension opposes different communities – states, organisations and associations belonging to different states or group of states, even to different religions.

Therefore, social confrontation is a sum of all the disputes, different opinions and conflicts between human beings that occur in different places and ways, spontaneously or deliberately. Political, economic, financial, educational and cultural factors mostly influence the intensity and scope of social confrontation. People have been accustomed to taking into consideration the social domain especially at an extended community level. That is why it looks hazardous to include verbal disputes – no matter where they take place, in a public debate or in an exchange of unfriendly words – along with strikes, clashes between urban gangs or supporters of a sports team in social confrontation. The disappointment of certain individuals or social groups with some political decisions that cause negative changes in their lives lead to social contradictions like the ones already mentioned. A reduced level of education and a high level of unemployment stimulate antisocial behaviour like organised crime, smuggling, trafficking, money laundering and black market functioning. Several overlapping causes generate a maximum level of intensity and amplitude of social confrontation. Then it might be a real explosion of social conflicts and people could decide to sustain their rights including by violent means, as they currently do in many Arab countries. Thus, fighting for a certain cause, people may choose the legal way or the one that is supposed to lead to replacing the status quo with a better one – inside of a state or in the international arena.

Natural law against social Darwinism

According to Thomas Hobbes, *"every man acknowledges another for his equal"*[3]. This assertion is not always good enough for regulating human relations, as the author himself recognised. Although the principle of equality is the best way of setting human relations into society, it is also difficult or even impossible to apply given natural passions; people are aggressive towards each other in different ways and finally they will manage to establish their supremacy by force[4].

In principle, the democratic society based on competition is the best way to stimulate the creative energies of the society members, who will greatly contribute to the community progress in all domains. Unfortunately, some people decide to choose

[3] Thomas Hobbes, *Elementele dreptului natural şi politic*, Editura Humanitas Press, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 122.

[4] *Ibidem*, pp. 123, 125.

the biblical solution of the bigger fish that swallows the smaller one. That is to say they always want to be winners, by all means, and do not care too much about the other people. Thus, some sportsmen use illegal stimulants; businessmen corrupt the ones that lead different state agencies and are supposed to enforce the law; and *"smart people"* do not obey any rule, portraying themselves above all the written and unwritten rules of society. Perhaps these and some other similar situations inspired the author of some clever thoughts like *"People are divided into two groups: the righteous and the unrighteous. And the righteous do the dividing"*[5]. This thought could be interpreted in both ways – a positive and a negative one as well. The difference is made by the people that place themselves in one or another social group. On the other hand, the community or even the entire society may or may not validate the opinion about ourselves. I am referring to the situations involving officials, who are supposed to enforce the rule of law, and individuals belonging to the so-called underworld community, who impose their own rules inside the groups they lead.

Considering *"The law of progress"* – *"All progress is based upon a universal, innate desire on the part of every organism to live beyond its income"*[6] – it will be easier to understand the internal stimuli for those involved in illegal activities. Almost everybody wants to live better but some people decide to choose illegal activities to reach this goal and to create their own rules. These are criminals. The other people decide to obey the existing rules and to militate for updating them when they become obsolete. These are visionaries like scientists, inventors and revolutionaries. Visionaries have influenced and sometimes changed the destiny of some communities and even of the entire mankind. The discovery of the atom and of the way to utilise nuclear energy has had a beneficial effect on the society but it has also led to the development of nuclear weapons that could destroy the entire civilisation on Earth. The atomic scientists Arthur H. Compton, Enrico Fermi, Ernest O. Lawrence and Robert Oppenheimer along with former US President Harry Truman and former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill could be considered the moral authors of killing the most part of Hiroshima and Nagasaki population[7]. As many of us recall, the event took place when two nuclear bombs were launched against those Japanese cities on 6 and 8 August 1945[8], as a result of President Truman's decision, who was advised and encouraged by the aforementioned atomic scientists and Churchill.

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[5] ***, *Cohen's Second Law,* in *Murphy's Laws*, Editura Universal Dalsi, 1998, p. 27.

[6] ***, *Law of Progress – Butler*, in *Murphy's Laws*, p. 58.

[7] Bertrand Goldschmidt, *Complexul atomic. O istorie politică a energiei nucleare*, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1985, pp. 22-27.

[8] Gordon Thomas, Max Morgan Witts, *Enola Gay,* Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1983, pp. 281-295.

The great conquerors like Alexander of Macedon, Charles the Great (Charlemagne), Genghis Han, Mohammed II the Conqueror – Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, Napoleon Bonaparte and some others were somehow visionaries or the ones that opened some ways of thinking about the future of the world. They also contributed to spreading the civilisation they belonged to and changed some important parts of the societies they lived in. Charlemagne, for instance, imposed Christianity by sword in Western Europe, Napoleon ignited the hope inside the minds and hearts of ordinary people that *"liberty, equality and fraternity"* was not a slogan but a new reality of their time. On the other hand, all the great conquerors were considered dictators by some historians because the implementation of their visions caused the death of millions of people. Some other historians and authors were even harsher and called the same great conquerors criminals. For instance, Alexander of Macedon was portrayed as megalomaniac and bloodthirsty, Napoleon involved France in many wars that cost millions of lives and he used to crush everybody that was against him[9]. In turn, Genghis Han was a pitiless plunderer and a ferocious person who ordered the killing of millions of people that dared to fight against him, Charlemagne beheaded more than 4 500 prisoners after the Battle of Verden, in the year 782, and so on[10].

Most of the time, we declare that all people are equal. In reality, we are equal only before the law, unless some advocates convince the jury to interpret the law in favour of their clients. On the other hand, after birth, everybody evolves differently and it is easily noticed as time passes. The differences among people are both physical and psychological. This evidence has determined the authors of Social Darwinism to profess the *"law of the jungle"* for the society, meaning that the strongest has the right to impose his will on all the others. I think that competition, which is the foundation of the democratic society, is nothing more than a *"soft confrontation"*. As a matter of fact, using competition is a more acceptable way of establishing who the strongest is (meaning competitive, creative, intelligent, rapid, smart etc.) in a group of people or in an entire community. Acceptability is given by the rules and norms used for competition whilst social Darwinism uses a single rule – force. In democratic societies competition rules are supposed to be known by any citizen and they are meant to prevent fraud and any other type of illegal means and methods. One might be bothered

[9] Tom Ambrose, *Despoţi şi dictatori, de la Nero la Saddam Hussein,* Editura Litera, Bucureşti, 2009, pp. 10-11.

[10] ***, *Când, unde & cum s-a întâmplat*, Reader's Digest, Bucureşti, 2005, pp. 81, 91-92.

by the parallel between the *"law of the jungle"* and fair competition. Apparently it is inappropriate but in the ancient times people discovered that *"Life is a fight"*[11]. Later, some thinkers were more specific by saying that *"One has renounced the great life when one renounces war"*[12]. Therefore, there is a *"competition gene"* in every human being, which leads us to impose our ideas and even to subordinate other people. Stanley Bing describes this human behaviour very well saying that *"War (…) is the highest and at the same time the meanest expression of the beast in us (…) Hit early and hit often (…) History is written by winners"*[13]. Another thinker believes that the meanness of human nature could be better known by those who are in high ranking positions in society such as a Prime Minister who runs for another term in general elections[14].

Imposing will on other people is a reachable goal only by the most powerful people. Power could be based on brute force – namely hard power – or on the force of reason – namely soft power. Brute force is well known and it is represented by the club, sword, rifle, gun, bomb or missile. The force of reason is not easy to achieve because it needs a common understanding of values, principles, benefits as well as negative consequences of some decisions and attitudes. All these conditions need time and patience. The different levels of education cannot be harmonised at once. It takes time, longer than we may expect, for negotiations in order to conciliate opposing opinions and interests and to reach a common agreement. Everyone would like to win as much as possible from the opposing party in a dispute/conflict. Greed and the tendency to confrontation stimulate human beings to desire more and more from almost everything. Education is the one that makes us consider the other man and balance desires against needs and possibilities.

In a normal society man counts, with his native and other qualities gained through education. Some people have common sense and the power to evaluate themselves and to accept the social position they deserve. Some others do not want to recognise their real value and put desire above their possibilities. People from this category use all means to influence the way they are assessed by society. In other words, they consider themselves above the rules and want to impose their will by all means. One of the most known examples is former American President Nixon who wanted to keep political power by spying his political

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[11] Euripide, *Rugătoarele*, in *Dicţionar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre, op. cit.*, p. 344.

[12] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Amurgul idolilor*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 42.

[13] Stanley Bing, *Sun Tzu era un biet mototol. Subjugă-ţi adversarii, ţine-ţi aproape prietenii şi stăpâneşte adevărata artă a războiului*, Editura Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, 2009, pp. 170-171, 209.

[14] John A. Macdonald, quoted by Des MacHale, in *Vorbe de duh*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 176.

adversaries and was involved in the famous *"Watergate Affair"*[15]. The society's response was a strong veto that obliged Nixon to resign; otherwise he could risk being removed through the Congress's impeachment procedure.

In opposition to Nixon's case is the one of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He was physically sick[16] but mentally strong and a visionary. His *"New Deal"* convinced the Americans to engage in a national campaign that stopped economic recession and restarted social progress ending *"The Great Depression"* in 1929-1933.

The above-mentioned examples remind us that the most frequent confrontations among people belong to ethics, generally represented by good and evil. As society evolves, the general pattern of ethical confrontation diversifies into right and wrong, legal and illegal, honest and dishonest, clean and dirty, moral and immoral etc.

For some people, individual power is represented by money and material assets, whilst others believe that only physical qualities could generate superiority over all the other men. The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the best known thinkers who believe that the leaders of society have to be the strongest people who are able to be in the forefront and not along with all the others[17]. He promotes the will to power in his writings.

Assessing themselves less strong than others and trying to balance the others' power, people discovered the idea of association for protecting against the most powerful ones. Initially, the association was based on genealogical tables, ethnic features, religion, knowledge, professional competencies etc. Thus appeared families, tribes, union of tribes, political parties, states, alliances, organisations – legal and illegal etc.

Whilst communities diversified – numerically and by their fields of activity – along with an increasing number of members, the causes for new confrontations occurred as well. Living in a world dominated by interdependencies, one might be surprised to discover that a problem solved could be the ignition point of a new cause of confrontation. That is why solutions have to assess all the associated consequences for any decision; otherwise the causes of confrontations could be chained and multiplied, regenerating continuously.

Confrontation between employees and employers

The disputes, even fights between employees and their employers have ever existed. The ways employees sustain their rights have evolved from peaceful to violent ones. Usually the divergent positions start with negotiations, the so-called

[15] Jan-Luc Hees, *Istoria Casei Albe*, Editura Pro Editură şi Tipografie, Bucureşti, 2008, pp. 259-273.
[16] Cormac O' Brien, *Viețile secrete ale președinților americani*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2008, pp. 184-190.
[17] Friedrich Nietzsche, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

"Japanese strikes" and protest demonstrations. When the two parties do not come to a common agreement, the employees switch peaceful methods for violent ones like demonstrations followed by clashes, seizure of production facilities and even destruction of some devices, seizure of some official buildings, blockage of some important roads and railroads, revolts of agricultural workers[18] etc.

The causes of fighting between employees and employers reside in their divergent interests. Everyone wants to gain more but this is possible only by taking more from the other party. It is like the *"zero-sum game"*, used in strategic games theory: the gains for one party will be associated with an equivalent loss to the other party in competition [Thomas Schelling]. The so-called *"win-win solution"* is in fact a variant of the *"zero-sum game"* because each party agrees to reduce its pretensions (gains) by ceding to the other party's claims. The methods employed to protect interests depend on each party's situation – economic and financial – and on the state's rules regarding labour force and labour conflicts.

Employers – companies' owners and managers – have the objective to increase companies' profit as much as possible. One of the options to achieve this objective is to reduce all types of expenditures by better organising the production process and by reducing the number of employees and their salaries as well. Finding new ideas and more innovative solutions for increasing labour productivity is economically feasible and morally acceptable. Reducing workers' salaries despite the fact that their work generates competitive products, sometimes in difficult working conditions, is morally unacceptable and so the cause of social conflict appears.

In turn, employees want to work in better conditions – from professional safety to environmental ones – and to receive higher salaries or a payment that contributes to ensuring decent living conditions for them and their families. During economic crises employees may accept a reduction of their salaries and incentives, situation that could be considered a *"win-win solution"*. However, if the profits of companies are higher and higher and employees' salaries are stagnant or even reduced, then employers should expect protests and conflicts. Long time ago, workers decided to organise themselves in professional associations like guilds[19] and later in unions for having a greater power of influencing their employers.

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[18] Matei Ionescu, *Criza politică din martie 1907*, in *Studii şi referate privind răscoalele din 1907*, Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române, Bucureşti, 1957, p. 160, quoted by Petre Otu in *Mareşalul Alexandru Averescu, militarul, omul politic, legenda*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 47.

[19] Ştefan Pascu, *Meşteşugurile din Transilvania până în secolul XVI*, Editura Academiei R.S.R., Bucureşti, 1954, pp. 303-321.

Confrontation between generations

This component of the social confrontation could be included in the contradiction between old and new. The parties or competitors – parents and their children, grandparents and their grandchildren – may be to blame for not caring enough about understanding the other one. Each generation has a different education and understands in its particular way the majority of the political, social and cultural issues of the society or community they live in. The initial result is dispute and finally could be an open and amplified conflict as time passes. The intensity and amplitude of the conflict is greatly influenced by the particular interests of each party. Young people want to replace the older ones as soon as possible, especially in decision-making positions, whilst the older want to maintain their leading positions and resist changes.

In the period before the First World War, the amplitude of the contradictions between generations was unprecedented. Some young politicians and authors vehemently requested the replacement of the older ones who held leading positions in the German society. One of them was Arthur Moeller van den Bruck who wrote: *"The nation needs a change of blood, an insurrection of the sons against the fathers, a substitution of the old by the young"*[20].

Neglected and misunderstood by their parents and grandparents many times, the young will finally adopt a deviant behaviour consisting in drug, tobacco and alcohol consumption or even prostitution. This behaviour is influenced by their companions, who have a similar *"code of conduct"*, meaning that this is a condition to be accepted in such gangs or groups. All too often the gang leaders exploit them forcing to participate in illegal activities such as organised crime, extremist and terrorist attacks or to enrol in organisations that do not recognise the authority of the state and so on.

Taking into consideration the topic of the young people who become *"pilgrims to the West"* in a so-called *"initiation journey"*, in India, the French journalist Gavard-Perret concludes that *"Europe could renounce marginalised people that cannot be assimilated (...) and so they become easy prey for drug traffickers, and they also supply prostitution networks: white girls (boys too) are a highly sought-after merchandise"*[21].

The fight against drug trafficking and drug consumption is one of the first priorities of the majority of state governments because drugs affect mainly the young generation.

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[20] Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914,* London, 1980, p. 44, quoted by Paul Johnson in *O istorie a lumii moderne 1920-2000,* Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 26.

[21] J. P. Gavard-Perret, *Capcanele "călătoriilor iniţiatice"* in *Esprit*, November-December, 1980, quoted by Stelian Ţurlea in *Bomba drogurilor*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1991, pp. 74-75.

John Ralston Saul, one of the journalists that studied, at the origins, the drug production process and the initial phase of distribution is sceptical about the end of the war against drug producers and distributors. As a matter of fact he envisions a failure because many officials are corrupt and the farmers that cultivate plants for drugs do not have another attractive option. Their income is small but good enough to live; otherwise they would starve to death because they would not have money to buy rice[22].

The majority of the problems humankind faces come from morals. Too many people want liberty without any restrictions but this trend has led to awful clashes and genocide like the ones from Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. Assessing the situation of the world, from the moral point of view, the members of the World's Parliament of Religions adopted an official declaration in Chicago, in 1993, which concluded that *"The world is in agony"*[23]. The moral situation of today's world has led Gilles Lipovetsky to rephrase Malraux's famous declaration – *"The 21st century will be religious or it will not be at all"*[24] – as *"The 21st century will be ethical or it will not be at all"*[25].

Another type of conflict appears when the young do not want or cannot respect their parents and ancestors traditions. Situations become more complicated when religion is involved. In such cases, the young adopt a double existence to protect against unpleasant situations. In other words, they behave differently at home and inside the community they belong to from the attitude displayed at school[26], university or at work. These situations appear when teenagers and young people belong to a minority and they want to be accepted or at least not to be rejected by the people belonging to the majority of the population.

Contradictions between the poor and the rich

According to Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Amartya Sen, poverty deprives people of being free to make choices during their lives[27].

Sen was born in India and he emigrated in Great Britain where he managed to be promoted as Master of the prestigious Trinity College, Cambridge. He has studied

[22] John Ralston Saul, *Inside the Golden Triangle*, in *The Sunday Telegraph Magazine*, 18 May 1986.

[23] H. Kung (coordinator), *Yes to a Global Ethic*, New York, London, 1996, quoted by Vasile Boari in *Foreword* to Romanian edition of *A Companion to Ethics*, by Peter Singer (editor), Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2006, p. 14.

[24] François Bluche, *Dictionaire des mots historiques* (published in Romania as *De la Cezar la Churchill)*, pp. 254-255.

[25] Gilles Lipovetsky, *Amurgul datoriei*, Editura Babel, Bucureşti, 1996, p. 17.

[26] Dumitru Constantin, *Drama dezrădăcinaţilor*, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1987, p. 28.

[27] John Farndon, *India, ascensiunea unei noi puteri mondiale*, Editura Litera Internaţional, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 123.

poverty for years, written many books on this topic and he was empowered by the United Nations Organisation to develop the Human Development Index. One might say that he has an adequate field of activity because his native country is one of many contrasts: nuclear power since 1998 but having more than 40% of all malnourished children in the world; India is at the vanguard of some newest technologies and researches but there one could find some of the most conservative and less tolerant religious ideas[28].

Mark Twain said that India was a country of fabulous wealth and fabulous poverty as well. This situation is almost the same even nowadays because the fashion malls are placed in the vicinity of dirty, overpopulated streets and people are so poor that it is hard to see them without turning your sight. In this country, some people have so many privileges that allow them to beat even to death poor people who dare to disregard their privileges such as to take water or to go onto private properties. There are many discrepancies between poor and rich people but in India they are extreme[29].

Underdeveloped and developing countries have tried to find and implement different solutions to put an end to or at least to reduce the disparities between the poor and the rich. Some of them have decided to apply for financial credits. According to the rules established by international financial institutions, the interest rate is higher for the countries with high economic risks like the poor ones. The result is a gradually increasing debt because the economic performance of underdeveloped countries is not good enough to cover the initial debt and they have to ask for money again and again to reimburse previous debts. David Korten likens this situation to addiction to drugs – the more money a poor country asks for, the more money it will need[30].

Another way is the one adopted by China and called *"by ourselves"*. It is true that the investments were not exclusively from China itself. Initially, money came from ethnic Chinese who emigrated to Western countries, especially to the USA, and from Taiwanese businessmen. China's economic miracle was possible given its huge human capital and economic policy as well. The architect of China's current economic policy was Deng Xiaoping who, at the end of 1970s, told his countrymen *"Get rich!"* and they followed his advice[31]. The results of this policy are amazing: with an economic development between 8 and 10% per year, China is the second largest economic power in the world; the rural exodus is almost ended; pollution gradually reduces and the country is no longer a developing one. Yet, the living

[28] *Ibidem*, p. 12.
[29] *Ibidem*, pp. 14, 15, 116, 120.
[30] David Korten, *Corporaţiile conduc lumea*, Editura Samizdat, Filipeştii de Târg, Prahova, 1995, p. 191.
[31] Stephane Marchand, *Când China se va deştepta*, Editura Pro Editură şi Tipografie, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 23.

standard of most of the Chinese is impoverished by expensive programmes for armaments and for conquering space (launching astronauts, space shuttles, military satellites in space and so on).

Immigrants and refugees versus resident citizens

The world of 2004 counted 175 million immigrants and 20 million refugees[32], the most preferred destinations being Western Europe and the USA[33]. The figures were published in the official documents of the UN and the USA. The most important causes of emigration are overpopulation, followed by poverty. Practically, the two causes permanently influence each other. Some years ago former President of South-Africa – Nelson Mandela – declared in an interview that many of his countrymen were so poor that they had no other chance to entertain but to procreate. Obviously, we cannot assess this situation without considering the education level of the population. More people cannot live better with the same resources, whilst their available resources were already insufficient. Therefore, why do they grow the number of people in their families with new members? It is hard to understand how very poor people consider their future. Most of the time they are illiterate and do not have access to information related to family planning and subordinate themselves to certain religious dogmas that forbid abortion and other types of birth control. This situation is similar in the majority of overpopulated countries.

Overpopulation has become one of the most urgent problems of the world. Many solutions that have been studied and implemented failed. Family planning implemented in China and India – the most populated countries in the world – was not satisfactory. China decided to adopt the solution of birth control and to limit the number of children to one per family. India adopted the solution of sterilisation[34]. Despite such solutions, the population of the two countries continues to grow and nowadays it represents almost 40% of the world's population. Moreover, most people live in the poorest countries of the world[35]. Connecting overpopulation with poverty, some authors believe that *"the only solution for those populations would be death, war, to appropriate the neighbouring countries' wealth or, more simply,*

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[32] Moises Naim, *Illicit*, Anchor Books, New York, 2005, p. 89.

[33] Jean-Claude Berthelemy, Monica Beuran, Mathilde Maurel, *Aid and Migration: Substitute or Complements? Global Patterns and European Perspective,* in *The Romanian Economic Journal*, Editura ASE, București, 22-24 November 2007, p. 53.

[34] Thierry P. Millemann, *Fața ascunsă a lumii occidentale*, Editura Pro Editură și Tipografie, București, 2008, p. 19.

[35] David Bender, Bruno Leone – editors, *21st Century Earth, Opposing Viewpoints Collection*, Greenhaven Press Inc., San Diego, California, USA, 1996, pp. 21-22.

emigration to salvation zones like developed countries (…) which will be better than a certain death in a devastated country"[36]. These are pessimistic perspectives regarding the common future of humanity, which are kept alive by the world economic and financial crisis along with a subversive propaganda promoted by extremist organisations.

There have always been difficulties to integrate immigrants and they will continue to exist. It does not mean that fascist, Nazi, racist or neo-Nazi existing ideologies will help to overcome the integration of immigrants. These ideologies will surely stimulate the confrontation between newcomers and residents.

Unfortunately, the difficulties of integration multiply as long as the society evolves and the evolution process has different paces inside different communities. Evolving differently, communities will be separated by some gaps that will impede the smooth harmonisation between rural and urban population. The level of education and the existing relations between people that live in cities is slightly different from the ones from a village. That is why people born in the countryside will face problems to accommodate to the urban lifestyle.

Although globalisation helps us to communicate and to better know each other, the so-called *"local patriotism"* still exists and some people are tempted to be reluctant or even to reject strangers, especially immigrants. Immigrants are seen as unfair competitors for jobs and resources allotted from the central budgets of the states to local communities. Also, they and even countrymen from other regions may interfere with or even change local traditions, situation considered unacceptable, especially by some conservative communities.

Some politicians set themselves the goal of integrating immigrants into western societies. Other politicians sustain the expulsion of immigrants, invoking the high rate of unemployment and the devastating effects of the economic-financial crisis. However, the situation is controversial. In principle, I mean that considering fundamental human rights, any immigrant needs assistance from the other state's authorities. It is a principle recognised by all UN member states. On the other hand, the social situation of indigenous populations in all states, even in the developed ones, is rather difficult. Many people have lost their jobs; the economic recession has created problems in all domains and the resources available for social programmes have diminished dramatically. The need for internal and foreign assistance is increasing and the allotted resources cannot cover all needs. These and other motivations, stimulated by extreme right parties, have determined some ordinary citizens from European countries to sustain the idea of expelling illegal immigrants and refugees. Right now, the riots and clashes in North-African and some Arab states have caused waves of refugees in Europe. The sympathetic

[36] Thierry P. Millemann, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

attitude towards refugees is helpful but this is not a solution. Nobody knows when the struggles in North-African and Arab countries will come to an end. If one compares the situation in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) with the current one, then the possible conclusion is that the refugees could stay for some decades in their adoptive countries. All this time, a few of them will probably obtain jobs to take care of them and their families, the others will live at the expense of the adoptive countries. This situation will create tensions between locals and immigrants and the extreme right parties will take advantage to gain more supporters and votes for the Parliaments of the states. Although it is less probable, it might not be so surprising if some elections promote extreme right parties in leading positions in some European countries. The prognosis is based on the negative effects of the economic crisis; the apparently inefficient measures of the current governments; the ability of the extreme right parties to attract on their side the displeased citizens; the military intervention in Libya and the growing number of refugees from North-Africa and Arab countries that put a supplementary burden on European citizens.

All in all, immigrants will not be easily accepted because of the already mentioned reasons and also because of differences between their culture and the locals' one. Unity in diversity sounds good in principle but it takes time to be really accepted and implemented, maybe more than we expect.

Many immigrants are obliged to live between two cultures – the one they come with and the adoptive country's one. Sometimes they are rejected by both former countrymen and the ones from the adoptive country. Former countrymen consider them *"contaminated"* by foreign culture, which in some countries is unacceptable, because differences cause conflict. For instance, if a Muslim changes his religion he might be condemned to death by his former religion members. The citizens of the adoptive country may not accept immigrants because they are not fully accustomed to the new rules, language, traditions and so on. These problems could be speculated by organised crime and terrorist organisations that will stimulate immigrants to enrol in these organisations for gaining resources to live in better conditions and to revenge against those who do not accept them as equals inside the new societies.

The solution is not to accept and integrate numerous immigrants but to help them live in better conditions in their countries. That is to say to invest in developing and underdeveloped countries to create jobs, to increase the level of education and health care, and to democratise their societies.

The immigrants' situation and the refugees' one could be considered a *"social bomb"* for the entire humanity. Nobody knows when, where and how it will explode.

UNRESTRICTED WARFARE VERSUS COMBINATION WARFARE

Lieutenant Colonel (AF) Alfred VASILESCU

During the last two decades, a massive transformation has occurred in developing and carrying wars, especially regarding the unconventional means of aggression. Two concepts have stood out: Unrestricted Warfare (UW), the Chinese vision about that kind of conflict, and the American reaction to it, named Combination Warfare (CW). An analytical view regarding the connection between these theories is developed in this paper.

As far as Western theorists are concerned, the key principle of combination warfare is based on the following rule of engagement: mix and use as many forms of warfare as possible, changing their relative weight and importance as the circumstances of the conflict change, vertically and horizontally and in both ways to discourage the opponents or to overwhelm them with the ability to launch a large and changing number of attacks that are traditional and unconventional at the same time.

***Keywords**: unconventional aggressions; Chinese doctrine; Unrestricted Warfare; US doctrine; Combination Warfare*

Unlike Sun Tzu, who believed that the best general was the one who achieved his goal without fighting or with minimal losses, Carl von Clausewitz supported a completely different way of waging war, providing the solution of *Absolute Warfare*. Later, General Erich Ludendorff expanded the concept of *Absolute Warfare* (which he called *Total Warfare*), arguing that, in this situation, political order itself had to subordinate to the military. Nazi theorists amplified the concept to the one of *Continuous Warfare*, waged using not only military means but also in the political, economic, cultural or propagandistic field[1]. Practically, this type of warfare eliminated completely the distinction between military and civilian targets, all of them being this way legitimately attacked. Following the same logic, in an interview with the officials of the youth organisation of the Chinese Communist Party, Qiao Liang said, explaining the theory, that of *Unrestricted Warfare*: *"The first rule of* ***Unrestricted Warfare*** *is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden"*[2]. War, seen as a military

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[1] Alvin Toffler, *Război şi antirăzboi. Supravieţuirea în zorii secolului XXI*, translated by Mihnea Columbeanu, Editura Antet, Oradea, 1995, pp. 54-55.

[2] In Arthur Bruzzone, *Asymmetrical Warfare Cuts Both Ways*, American Daily, online edition, 1 March 2004, at http://www.americandaily.com/article/1837, retrieved on 12.11.2010.

confrontation, was considered only one aspect of the fight which, in fact, takes place on all fronts, touching all aspects of life.

In this type of conflict, *"hard"* military means are used, replaced or supplemented with different alternative methods: promoting false accusations against enemy atrocities, amplifying own troops combative desire, demonising adversary leaders, polarising actors (according to the communist principle *"those who are not with us are against us"*), recourse to divine punishment for *"unbelievers"* or metapropaganda (discrediting enemy propaganda). The convergence between the military and civilian system has become evident during Information Age, as conflict is not only a military affair. The military are more and more *"civilian"* and civilians are successfully integrated in national security structures. The similarities between these two organisational models, civilian and military, tend to increase. The military decision-making hierarchy aspires to become more condensed, more grounded in decisional autonomy, less pyramidal and more network-centred. Functional attributions follow the same pattern, able to manage the issues related to defence. For example, as in the case of civilian organisations, in the military structures there are the following types of personnel *"OUT – IN"* (collecting information, such as intelligence officers), *"IN – OUT"* (disseminating information, such as public affairs/public information officers), *"IN – IN"* (analysts and planners) and *"RELEE DUPLEX"* (liaison officers)[3]. It was a matter of time for great powers decision-makers and for military and civilian scientists to develop a theory able to harmonise the requirements related to non-lethality and a hedonistic world, with the need to integrally use defence resources, the explosive technological progress with the necessity to exceed international institutions and the rigid legal system, the millenary goal to impose democratic values at global level through globalisation vectors with the reality of post-*Cold War* international relations, based on the individualism of nation-states to the detriment of the classical forms of political and military cooperation (alliances, coalitions, global institutions).

To provide this type of conflict with identity, different schools of thought have used various syntagms. On the one hand, the Chinese inventors called it *Unrestricted Warfare – UW)* or *Beyond-limits Combination Warfare*, stressing moral and ethical aspects. On the other hand, the Americans proposed another concept – *Combination Warfare*, a more technical and amoral expression. However, experts in international relations or strategic and security studies also use other terms to define the same reality: *Continuous Warfare* or *Total Warfare*. Moreover, the American Armed Forces use other names for this type of confrontation, some of them being plastic or even commercial: *Lego Warfare* or *Polyphonic Warfare.*

[3] Alvin Toffler, *Powershift*, translated by Mihnea Columbeanu, Editura Antet, Oradea, 1995, p. 161.

In what follows, I will detail the two major perspectives on this theory, which I consider exceptionally important for understanding the mechanism of emergence and operation of unconventional aggression.

Chinese Perspective

In 1985, Shen Weiguang, a 25-year old Chinese officer, wrote a monography entitled *"Information Warfare"*. It seems to be the first time the syntagm has been used with the current meaning. Thereafter, writings on this subject have been published regularly by the Chinese Armed Forces[4]. In 1996, China had already established an ultra secret centre for *Irregular Warfare – IW*, having the mission to collect all the specific resources under the same authority (including *"white propaganda"*, economic warfare and special operations).

The history of these developments continued in China. On 2 May 1995, the journal of the People's Liberation Army/PLA *(Jie fang jun bao)* published an article signed by Hong Shan, from the National Defence University, with the title *"Structural Damage Warfare"*, in which it is stated: *"Why inferior forces defeat superior forces ? It is necessary to firmly follow a principle: you fight your way, I fight my way and so I keep my initiative"*[5].

The Chinese took note of not only the technological superiority of the United States but also of the extraordinary capability of joint operations, created through the synergy of the joint actions of the services, configured following the doctrinal principles of the *Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)*. Moreover, the Chinese realised that not only their military doctrine, the one of *Popular Warfare*, but also the structure of their armed forces was outdated[6].

In spite of the changes generated by modern types of conflicts, the Chinese military thinking kept its strong dialectical spirit, which considered the asymmetry of forces and means as a factor that made it possible for the opponent to be unbalanced. Their strategy tried to find the lost harmony and not only a unilateral victory. Crushing the opponent was not advisable, oppressing the population was condemned, and conquering based on the spirit and the force of mind was considered to successfully conclude a conflict. These characteristics have made it possible for the Chinese ancient military thinking and the Chinese communist military precepts to coagulate

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[4] James Adams, *Următorul – ultimul război mondial. Arme inteligente şi front pretutindeni*, Editura Antet, 1998, p. 298.

[5] Commentary of Roberto Bianconi on the Italian edition of *Unrestricted Warfare* (it. *Guerra senza limiti*), at http://www.clarissa.it/intervento_int.php?id=58&editoriale=Q.+Liang+e+W.+Xiangsui, +GUERRA+SENZA+LIMITI,+sintesi, retrieved on 20 02.2009.

[6] Arthur Bruzzone, *op. cit.*

in an integral theoretical system, not only consistent with contemporary requirements but also visionary.

The book *"Unrestricted Warfare"*, written by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui and published in China, in February 1999, represents the perfect expression of this development. The authors try to find a new methodology, able to use a way to order the thousands of changes of the future warfare and to provide the countries technologically disadvantaged, compared to the USA, with a tactic to compensate for the inferiority in the confrontations in the age of high technology, by using military and non-military means.

The two Chinese authors identify other emergent forms of conflict that produce effects comparable to the classical ones: *"while we are seeing a relative reduction in military violence, at the same time, we are definitely seeing an increase in political, economic, and technological violence"*[7]. Intending to provide all these phenomenological evolutions with a name, Colonels Qiao and Wang opt for the syntagm *Unrestricted Warfare*, namely that war that transcends all borders and limits, the one in which information is omnipresent and the battlefield is everywhere. Engaging both the military and non-military into conflict means that many of the current combat principles and rules have to be changed or rewritten[8]. In this context, Qiao and Wang identify three major strategic principles to conduct *Unrestricted Warfare*: *asymmetry, combination* and *optimisation*.

Since the principle of *asymmetry* is one largely debated today in the specialised literature, we will explain the authors' opinion regarding the other two principles. The principle of *combinations* is understood differently from the one in the Western military, which is aimed at combining various branches and services strictly in military operations, being largely considered. In the Chinese version, it includes not only the *supra-national* sphere (e.g. transnational organisations), *supra-domains* sphere (military and non-military), *supra-means* sphere (diplomatic, military, economic, cultural etc.), but also the *supra-tier* sphere (e.g. tactical strikes with a strategic impact of the special operations forces). The third principle, *optimisation*, namely efficiency enhancement, necessitates, in the view of the Chinese authors, the coordination of different domains and means, and the adjustment and control of the UW process, in its aggregate.

UW has had huge implications for the Chinese armed forces. In 1985, PLA started the strategic transition from the preparation for the total nuclear war to the preparation of local and limited wars. Since 1996, these conflicts have been prepared in the context of high technology and personnel highly-qualified in the field.

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[7] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February, 1999, at http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf, retrieved on 11.11.2009.

Unrestricted Warfare may be interpreted as the first genuine challenge of the school of high-tech local wars to the school of popular/the entire people's war. UW attacks the doctrine of popular warfare from two perspectives. Firstly, UW assumes the fact that civilians (the people), and not only military forces, will represent a main actor in future conflicts. Secondly, this type of conflict was not restricted by rules and limitations, and it would have been unconventional, compared to the classical one. Qiao and Wang do not completely reject the tradition of *people warfare*, but tailor it to the need to cope with great powers that are more technologically advanced and to compensate for the *"generation gap"* in the field of capabilities[9]. Victory in the conflicts in the 21st century, think Qiao and Wang, belongs to those that can effectively combine all the available conventional and unconventional instruments.

UW is based on the use of *"kinder weapons"*, whose existence is enforced by the technological progress that provides people with the possibility of accurately striking the enemy command centres, of wining victory by controlling (not by mass killing) and by the extensive use of information weapon and non-kinetic means. This paradigm shift influences not only the typology of aggressions and the way conflicts unfold but also the definition of the warrior and the battlefield, the nature, characteristics and configuration of war. The battlefield has extended, becoming more than three-dimensional, including in UW not only the virtual environment, the electromagnetic one, but also the psychological one, that of the inner world of the individuals[10]. In turn, combatants evidently contrast with the classical perception of the soldiers belonging to old generations, being more influenced by the pop culture and highly specialised technologically and professionally but less brutal or willing to violate human rights. In fact, today fighters are less cruel and more civilised than ever in the history of humanity[11].

Qiao and Wang consider necessary to introduce another term, that of *addition*, in essence a method to consolidate the idea of *combination* or what the Americans later call the *"tool box"*, the one out of which the most appropriate tools are chosen to win any specific conflict. *Addition* is executed separately: technology with technology,

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[8] *Ibidem*.

[9] *"Generation gap"* regarding armament and military forces is the reason why it is difficult for high-tech troops to simultaneously manage conventional warfare and the low-tech warfare and probably there is a rule or at least an interesting phenomenon here that deserves to be studied. According to Qiao and Wang, *op. cit.*, at http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf, retrieved on 11.11.2009.

[10] *Ibidem*.

[11] In his article – *"What the Revolution in Military Affairs is Bringing – The Form War Will Take in 2020"*, Shoichi Takama, Colonel in Japan Self-Defence Forces, stated that *civilisation* in war will be an important characteristic of the 21st century conflicts.

tactics with tactics, armament with armament and administrative measures with administrative measures. However, more importantly, there are added battlefield and non-battlefield, war and non-war, military and non-military aspects[12]. Qiao and Wang express plastically: *"we need only shake the kaleidoscope of addition to be able to combine into an inexhaustible variety of methods of operation"*[13]. The tools that could be added are, according to the two Chinese Colonels, extremely varied *(table 1)*.

Military	Trans-military	Non-military
Atomic warfare	Diplomatic warfare	Financial warfare
Conventional warfare	Network warfare	Trade warfare
Bio-chemical warfare	Intelligence warfare	Resources warfare
Ecological warfare	Psychological warfare	Economic aid warfare
Space warfare	Tactical warfare	Regulatory warfare
Electronic warfare	Smuggling warfare	Sanction warfare
Guerrilla warfare	Drug warfare	Media warfare
Terrorist warfare	Virtual warfare (deterrence)	Ideological warfare

Table 1: **Qiao and Wang table regarding the main components of Unrestricted Warfare**[14]

Any of these operational methods may be imaginatively combined with others to have a completely new method. For example, the combination used by the Americans against Bin Laden was: antiterrorist warfare + intelligence warfare + financial warfare + network warfare + regulatory warfare. Another example is NATO operation in Kosovo, in which the following were used: deterrence and the use of military force + diplomatic warfare (at the Alliance level) + regulatory warfare. Previously, the United Nations adopted, especially under the pressure of the United States of America, the following combination of methods against Iraq: conventional warfare + diplomatic warfare + sanctions warfare + media warfare + psychological warfare + intelligence warfare.

According to the Chinese theorists, the *military* type of warfare is always a traditional, classical one, which makes use of armament, the *non-military* one is as natural and biting, but conducted using new means, and the *trans-military* one is situated between the former two, making use of both acknowledged methods, such as psychological warfare or the intelligence one, and capabilities pertaining to new generations, such as network warfare or the warfare in virtual environment. The above-presented combination has already been used by many nations, under a so-called *"silence procedure"*, and not only in conflict circumstances but also in peacetime.

[12] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *op. cit.*
[13] *Ibidem.*
[14] *Ibidem.*

Another characteristic of UW is that it exceeds the limits of conflict, going beyond what has been defined as borders, constraints, regulations, laws or even taboos at physical, spiritual and technological level. The consequence of such a system of thought is especially the *ethical tolerance at national level*, as the ground for the conduct of *"soft"* and continuous conflicts.

Following these principles, the Chinese authors identify four main categories that, working as a mechanism, bring success at any level of the conflict[15].

Supra-national combinations: they combine the action of national, international and non-state organisations and are used whenever state interests or national security are threatened, because the response in such circumstances is not a simple matter of choosing the means of military confrontation with other nations but rather a matter of alleviating the crisis through engaging *supranational combinations*[16]. This is a mechanism related to the age of globalisation, in which global or regional organisations, such as the UN, the EU, ASEAN, OPEC, IMF or World Bank affect various states under various (political, diplomatic, economic etc.) aspects. Moreover, multinational or non-state organisations, such as corporate multinationals, the International Olympic Committee, religious or terrorist organisations also have an impact and an influence on the position of various countries, representing a variable system of power. On the one hand, the great powers play the leading part on the international scene. On the other hand, states try to make use of the power of the supranational and multinational levels to double or triple their influence, being aware of the fact that they cannot reach their objectives only through own forces.

Supra-domain combinations: these are combinations beyond the domains of combat, of the actions during the conflict. Qiao and Wang make an interesting analogy: just as a supersonic aircraft must break the sound barrier before they could fly at supersonic speeds, those who are engaged in a conflict must break out of the barriers of the field if they want to have the state of freedom in thinking about that conflict: *Breaking the boundaries of ideology is a prerequisite for breaking the boundaries of action*[17]. The great technological progress has determined the overlap of the borders of politics, economy, military domain, culture, diplomacy and religion. They already have a connection point, and the development trend is very clear, being conditioned by observing human rights and morality in belligerent situations, by avoiding bloody massacres, and by the emergence

[15] More information regarding different types of combinations is presented in the following sub-chapter of the paper, expressing the American view of this subject.

[16] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *op. cit.*

[17] *Ibidem*.

of unconventional aggressions. That is why the Chinese authors believe that any domain today can be used and integrated in the range of war efforts and can have offensive patterns. In fact, from the standpoint of *"thinking beyond limits"*, *supra-domain combinations* means combining battlefields and choosing the main domain of combination, the priority of the others, the optimal dosage necessary for reaching the sought objective. The decisive factor can be, depending on the case, the political, military, economic, cultural etc. one.

Supra-means combinations: these are the combinations of all military and non-military means to carry out operations. In order to demonstrate the need for and usefulness of this kind of approach, Qiao and Wang ask very uncomfortable rhetorical questions, such as: *Is it necessary to use special means to wage psychological war aimed at soldiers' families far back in the rear area? When protecting a country's financial security, can assassination be used to deal with financial speculators? Can "surgical" strikes be made without a declaration of war against areas which are sources of drugs or other smuggled goods? Can special funds be set up to exert greater influence on another country's government and legislature through lobbying? Could buying or gaining control of stocks be used to turn another country's newspapers and television stations into the tools of media warfare?* [18]. Beyond negotiating the rules of morality in carrying out the conflict, this combinatory form may imply, at a given moment, resorting to the first two categories *(supra-national* and/or *supra-domain)*. The (political, military, economic etc.) *domains* can be often interpreted as *means*. Moreover, domains can be subdivided (for instance, the military domain in: strategy and tactics, arms control, blockade, embargo etc.). Philosophical, technical, mathematical, scientific or artistic methods are used for peaceful purposes, yet, they can also be used as means in war. The Chinese authors write: *"This is why people often refer to military ideology, military theory, and military practice as military philosophy, military science, and military art"*[19].

Supra-tier combinations: they combine all levels of conflict into each campaign. They can develop at different levels, in various stages of the operation. A level can be seen as a border, as a restriction, similar to national boundaries, separation of domains or as a limit of a category of means. All these internal structural boundaries of the operation can be surpassed in the actual practice through applying the principles of unrestricted warfare[20]. In the opinion of the Chinese military officers, the levels of war are: *war policy, strategy, operational art* and *tactics* (grand strategy, war,

[18] *Ibidem*.
[19] *Ibidem*.
[20] As we will see, these views are basically identical with the ones of some American military analysts, differing only in their wording, and not in their content.

campaigns and battles, according to the American doctrine). These must be approached in an integrated manner, by integrated structures and combatants must be trained in the science of breaking down all these levels, at the same time with being trained to use them in a combined manner.

War policy comprises both military and non-military actions, the supranational level being its upper limit and the nation the lower limit. The second level, *strategy*, is considered the national level for military actions, yet, it also comprises non-military actions specific to this level. *Operational art*, also named art of war by the authors, refers to the actions lower than a war but higher than a battle. Ultimately, *tactics* are the most basic scale of the actions. Beyond limits *Combination Warfare*, even if it offers a new perspective on the essential principles of modern warfare (omnidirectionality, synchrony, limited objectives, unlimited measures, asymmetry, minimal consumption, multidimensional coordination, adjustment and control of the entire process), follows them entirely[21]. Moreover, Qiao and Wang try to demonstrate that their entire theory has mathematical and aesthetical features at the same time, in the great tradition of the Chinese philosophy, as an essential prerequisite for winning. The Chinese believe everything is a matter of numbers, as in Pythagoras' formulae, and that is why success depends on using the mysterious number 0,618 – the rule of the golden section[22], considered a deviation towards the side element, according to the *"side-principal structure"* theory[23].

Qiao and Wang emphasise the fact that UW is first of all a way of thinking and only afterwards a method to improve the chances of winning in a conflict.

American Reaction

If the First Gulf War, in 1991, meant the Chinese understood the significance and benefits derived from the use of high-technology and of the information weapon in conflicts, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks made the American military aware of the impact of asymmetrical aggressions. What had already alarmed many American analysts was the book of Qiao and Wang – *Unrestricted Warfare*,

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[21] As far as this aspect is concerned, the two PLA Colonels give a more thorough demonstration in a subsequent chapter of their book.

[22] The rule of the golden section is considered necessary because *"without understanding the secret of how to conduct combination, it will be useless to conduct combination 100 times incompetently"*, in Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *op. cit.*

[23] This method of using the strategy, by losing one (directing) element and winning two, in order to win the overall game (principal element), can be seen as a typical side-principal structure. The result of winning two of three games is in perfect agreement with the *golden ratio,* of 2:3. In support of this theory, Qiao and Wang provide numerous pieces of historical evidence. We can notice here a ternary principle, similar to the Hegelian or Marxist dialectic. This specific part of the Chinese military theory seems to be, at last explicitly, unintelligible, abandoned or neglected by the American defence specialists.

in which Bin Laden's name and the terrorist method of intentionally crashing airlines appeared together, three years before the 11 September attacks! Americans understood that this theory would sooner or later be inevitably applied by other international political actors. Major General Robert Scales stated: *"Dominance of the air will remain the sole nonnegotiable advantage of American military power. The fundamental premise of the American way of war is the assumption that the battlefield will always be safe from enemy aerial intrusions. (…) Our enemies have learned that our most vulnerable centre of gravity is on the ground. American killing power perfected by superior precision and aerial intelligence will in many cases be subordinated to the need to control people"*[24]. In the new context, the American defence was faced with two hindrances: the tendencies of financial extravagance in the field of national security and the will to satisfy the very critical internal public opinion regarding the sacrifice of human lives, in agreement with the theory of *"zero casualties"* in battle. The Second Gulf War served as a platform for overcoming these hindrances, but the surprising reality of ground warfare proved that the unconventional methods for waging wars were not assimilated and developed sufficiently to become decisive, hence a certain rebound of these non-kinetic specialities in the eyes of political and military decision-makers. Or, in terms of Chinese theory, one did not know how to *add* and *prioritise* effectively different types of combinations at different levels of conflict, especially because of doctrinal inadequacy and of the military structure that did not adapt to the new realities of the battlefield. Some military theorists have perceived the message and focused their efforts on studying, understanding, assimilating and adapting the *Unrestricted Warfare* theory to their needs, for the benefit of Western countries, in general, and the United States, in particular. They have tried to turn the flaws, identified in their defensive system by the Chinese theorists, in *"strengths"* in the asymmetric warfare. This new theory has been courageously promoted by some military men[25] as a possible doctrine in the medium- and long-term for NATO.

The main contribution of Western theorists to the development of this new doctrine, called the Combination Warfare or *"10 000 methods combined as one"*, refers to the use of the observation that conflicts are becoming more and more

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[24] Major General (r.) Robert Scales, *Fighting on the Edges: The Nature of War in 2020*, project associated to NIC 2020, National Intelligence Council, 2004, available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/ 2004_05_25_papers/edges.pdf retrieved on 12.04.2009.

[25] We point out here the major contributions of Colonel Peter Faber, USAF, US Air Force representative and associate researcher of the NATO Defence College in Rome, Pavel Necas and Jaroslav Niznansk, Slovak Armed Forces officers, and others, especially non-military ones or employees of the intelligence services of different countries.

"civilised", more unconventional. They have identified at least 29 different forms (tools), which may be used interchangeably and combined during conflicts *(table 2)*.

Above-military forms	Military forms	Non-military forms
Cultural warfare Ideological warfare Psychological warfare Resources warfare Social networks warfare Technological warfare Fictitious/fabrication warfare Agricultural warfare Black market warfare Global-level drug warfare	Nuclear warfare Conventional warfare Bio-chemical warfare Ecological warfare Space warfare Electronic/information/ ISR warfare Guerrilla warfare Terrorist warfare Air exclusion zones	Diplomatic warfare Economic/economic aid or policy warfare Financial warfare Trade warfare Legal/moral warfare Sanctions warfare Religious/holy warfare Media/propaganda/Internet warfare Intelligence warfare Forced population shifts/migrations

Table 2: **Peter Faber's table regarding the main forms of combination warfare**[26]

These 29 types of war, different in some ways from the ones identified by Qiao and Wang, are seen like LEGO pieces that political and military leaders can use to construct optimal versions of antiterrorist or counterterrorist actions. In this respect, *Combination Warfare* was also defined as *"LEGO Warfare"*. The level of importance given to each piece, its relative value, can be changed whenever is needed, in a planned manner, the structure of combinations being vital at some point, but completely inefficient when the context of the situation changes. That is why this way of conducting the conflicts requires, in addition to a complex and specific expertise, a continuous and adaptive management. Comparing the two versions of the theory, the Chinese and the American ones, it is interesting to notice the American preference for the syntagm *Combination Warfare*, to the detriment of the Chinese option for *Unrestricted Warfare*. The American version has more categories (29 instead of 24, in the Chinese version). After the tragic events of 11 September 2001, Americans included the *air exclusion zones* as a military form of leading a conflict. As for non-military forms of action, Faber strongly supports areas such as *Legal/Moral Warfare*, but adds three new categories to above-military forms: *Agricultural Warfare, Cultural Warfare* and *Black Market Warfare*.

[26] Peter Faber, *Combination Warfare: A New NATO Strategy for the Asymmetric Risks and Challenges of the 21st Century*, Essays by Senior Courses 100 and 101, Rome: NDC Press, 2003. Although, in a concise expression, by above-military forms of war, Faber understands leading *"the fight"* in human activity domains that are vast and unfamiliar from the military perspective, and by *non-military* forms of the war, he means more narrowly defined domains, through which military operations were carried out in the past.

For making *Combination Warfare* efficient, the types of combinations must be managed not only horizontally (namely mixing the at least 29 possibilities), but also vertically, aiming at the four levels Combination Warfare operates on *(figure 1)*.



Figure 1: **Vertical and Horizontal Structure of Combination Warfare**[27]

Summarising, in Combination Warfare we must establish what countries or organisations can be engaged in conflict, decide on what tools of war to use, and determine in what specific way we will engage each and develop the plan of attack in force[28].

Western theorists claim that these *Supra-national Combinations* will become the most important weapons in order to meet national security goals. Currently, the United States of America is the nation that uses most often and creatively *Supra-national Combinations* as a weapon. In the case of the Second War in Iraq, the US military operations were legitimised using the UN as a tool for imposing economic embargo and inspections of Iraqi nuclear weapons after 1998.

To conclude, for Western theorists, the essential principle of *Combination Warfare* is based on the following rule of engagement: mix and use as many forms of war as possible, changing their relative weight and importance as the circumstances

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[27] See in Peter Faber, *Combination Warfare, op. cit.*, in a graphic expression that is identical to the one of the Chinese version from Qiao and Wang, *op. cit.*

[28] Pavel Necas and Jaroslav Niznansk, *Towards NATO Political and Military Strategy for the 21st Century*, Institute for Security and Defence Studies, MoD Slovak Republik, Bratislava, 2004, p. 100.

of the conflict change, both vertically and horizontally, and together, to discourage the opponent or overwhelm them with the ability of leading a large and changing number of attacks that are traditional and unconventional at the same time[29]. The main proactive purpose of *Combination Warfare* is to exploit as many forms of conflicts employment as necessary.

I think this type of warfare, also accepted by Faber under the name of *Polyphonic Warfare*[30], is a type of confrontation with an important degree of probability in the future, a significant method of obtaining international success, of countering aggression and winning various conflicts. It may be used by great powers to impose their will in front of the international community, and it will be a chance for weak states to survive and a necessary way for ambitious countries to increase their potential, despite their international political, economic, military or cultural status quo.

English version by
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[29] *Ibidem*, p. 107.
[30] Peter Faber, *NATO in Countering Terrorism: Today and Tomorrow*, Rome, NATO Defence College, 2003.

PERMANENCIES OF THE ROMANIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE

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The need for Romania to define its policy, strategy and military doctrine in as clear as possible terms, based on its interests, is in line with the concern of the Romanian state to capitalise at the highest level on its geostrategic potential. Knowing and implementing doctrines as reference documents for planning and conducting military actions, especially at joint level, determine the understanding of the principles of employing the armed forces in relation to the regional, national and international context. Starting with the last decade of the 20th century, the evolution of the global security environment has determined fundamental transformations of armed forces mission configuration, in spite of the fact that, at the beginning of the '90s, the theories of political and military analysts victoriously proclaimed the relaxation of international relations and the final triumph of peace over war, pledging profound chances of success for the negotiations regarding the cease of arms race.

***Keywords**: Romanian military doctrine; theories; conceptions; the Middle Ages; the modern age; communism; post-December 1989 period; post-accession period; integration; military thinking*

Military Doctrines in the Middle Ages

The Romanian Middle Ages, especially the 14th-16th centuries, represent one of the most glorious and inspiring period in the development of Romanian military practice and thinking, in the strong affirmation of the military principles, concepts and experience that proved their everlasting character for a long time. It still remains in the memory of the Romanian people the glory of the battles fought under great Romanian armed forces commanders or rulers such as: Basarab I, Mircea cel Bătrân (Mircea the Elder), Vlad Ţepeş (Vlad the Impaler), Ştefan cel Mare (Stephen the Great), Ioan Vodă cel Viteaz (John the Brave), Mihai Viteazul (Michael the Brave) and others, who strongly fought against foreign domination, for defending the Romanian people's identity and being. Analysing the battles fought and the victories obtained by the Romanian armed forces in the Middle Ages, led by these great military commanders, Nicolae Bălcescu, the famous

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Romanian historian, pointed out that *"all these military geniuses, who permanently fought one against ten, must have had some fundamental principles of military art, which means nothing else but to defeat one great power by a small power"*[1].

The military history of the Romanian people brings into attention the fact that, in the Middle Ages, the military practice was far ahead theoretical developments, which does not mean that all of these were missing. In spite of a few written documents, a series of historical sources survived, showing us the high level of the military thinking, ideas, doctrinal concepts and theses. Among them there is one that stands out, *"Învăţăturile lui Neagoe Basarab către fiul său Teodosie/Neagoe Basarab's teachings to his son Theodosie"*, written at the beginning of the 16th century. *"A complex masterpiece, magnificent monument of literature, politics, philosophy and eloquence"*, as it was considered by B.P. Haşdeu, the document is, at the same time, a treatise on military doctrine, strategy and tactics, a book of extreme importance for knowing the military thinking and practice from the distant past of the Romanian people. Other important ideas that spring from *"The teachings"* refer to the use of peaceful means to avoid war, sheltering of civil population, armed forces mobilisation as well as to the way military command was exerted, the role of the commander in the battle, the importance of the moral factor as well as the fact that war should be waged with the highest intensity up to defeating the invaders and expelling them from the country. Other famous works that played an important role in knowing and continuing the fighting traditions of our people, the military thinking and practice, the doctrinal permanencies belong to Nicolae Olahus, Grigore Ureche, Miron Costin, Despot Vodă, Dimitrie Cantemir and Nicolae Cantacuzino.

All of these also comprise numerous references to the wars fought by Romanians, victories obtained, military structures, fighting methods and procedures, armaments etc.

The Romanian Military Doctrines in the Modern Period

In the second part of the 18th century, petitions were addressed to the great powers to establish a national military body. The reinstatement of national leadership in 1822 as a result of the 1821 Revolution led by Tudor Vladimirescu, and the Akkerman Convention (1826), between Russia and Turkey were the premises to achieve this aim. The Peace of Adrianople stipulated the establishment of *"armed soldiers guards"* designed to accomplish limited internal missions, such as: quarantine service, borders, customs safety, maintenance of public order in cities

[1] Nicolae Bălcescu, *Scrieri militare alese*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti 1957, p. 90.

and villages, and law enforcement. Later on, all these decisions were enforced through the Organic Regulations, in 1830.

The need for a military doctrine was highlighted in our country from the middle of last century by the ideologists of the Revolution of 1848 and the Unification Period. In the drawing up of doctrinaire orientations, it was started from the fundamental political-strategic objectives of the Romanian nation – gaining state independence, which implied the union of all popular forces at all levels, the military one included. Officially, the start of drawing up a national military doctrine can be situated during the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza.

The evolution of the Romanian military doctrine from the Union up to gaining state independence is marked by two stages: the first one, between 1859 and 1866, the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, and the second one, between 1866 and 1877, after the coming to power of Prince Carol. First of all, it was initiated and accomplished the process of organisation and development of the Romanian military power on new, modern bases and there were created the necessary conditions for the development of a planned activity in the armed forces. The military reform made through the *"Law on the organisation of military power in Romania"*, in November 1864, contributed to increasing the country's defence capacity and to modernising its military body. Among the initiatives from this stage, one can mention the beginnings of the official Romanian military doctrine, validated or amended during the Independence War. Drawing up the defence conception of the Romanian modern state was coordinated by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, a prominent military professional, outstanding diplomat and political-military personality of the time. The measures taken during his reign lie at the basis of the theses, ideas and general principles of a national military doctrine. The period 1866-1877 reflects the state's concern for the consolidation of the national military power. The main feature of this stage is the improvement of the organisational framework of the armed forces, materialised in the new military system adopted in 1868 through the new law on the organisation of the military power.

The basis of the Romanian doctrinaire edifice in this period was the concept of *"armed nation"* as a solution for military riposte, in the case of an aggression from abroad. In 1869, in his work, *"Consideraţii asupra tacticii infanteriei şi conferinţe militare/Considerations on infantry tactics and military conferences"*[2], Colonel Ioan Logadi used the term doctrine, defining it as being: *"our armed forces mechanism in different situations shows complications and the necessity to make it stop is too obvious. One must simplify, coordinate the rules and submit them to doctrinaire unification,*

[2] *Istoria gândirii militare româneşti*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1974, p. 106.

simplify and order the means and bring them to execution unification"[3]. Lieutenant Alexandru Averescu, the future Marshal, in his work *"Tactica. Teorii şi aplicaţiuni/ Tactics. Theories and Applications"*, defined military doctrine as being *"that knowledge indispensable to us in order to be active and intelligent part in all war stages"*; *"military doctrine shows us the most rational way to follow in gathering different force elements of the state"*[4].

Learning the lessons of the independence war and sending Romanian officers to study in famous military academies all over Europe (France, Germany, Italy and Belgium) may be considered starting points for the military scientific research in the Romanian military art domain. Studying the connections between the military theory and art was a qualitative jump in the evolution of the Romanian military science. Between the two world wars, some authors make clear distinction between the military science, which deals with drawing up the theoretical principles of war, and the military art, whose task is to apply these principles in the armed confrontation.

One of the first signs of the evolution of the Romanian military thinking in this period is the variety of themes approached and the affirmation of new military theoreticians such as: Mircea Tomescu, Constantin Hârjeu, Ioan Sichitiu and others, who became specialised in different domains of the military sciences. We point out Constantin Hârjeu studies dedicated to the military doctrine, in which appears for the first time a definition for military doctrine: *"the most disciplined troops cannot be led to victory if the rulers lack the ability to lead them, that is to say of the real military science, in accordance with the time and social status in which we are and which is* ***military doctrine****"*[5].

The Romanian military researchers did not limit just to study our own war, they tried to learn lessons from the other military conflicts of the time, such as: the Anglo-Boer War (1895-1905), the Japanese-Russian War (1904-1905), the Balkan War (1912) etc., being aware of the universality of the military science. Thus, the Romanian military thinking entered a new evolution stage, that of own and independent analyses and creations, only the aspect of adapting to the new realities remaining to be approached. The creation of the national unitary state in 1918 radically changed the Romanian geostrategic and geopolitical position and, implicitly, the way to address national defence.

Rapidly finding the most adequate solutions to defend Great Romania was necessary, a fact that required intense theoretical activity. The event of key importance, the experience of the First World War, the technical progress,

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[4] *Ibidem*.

[5] Constantin Hârjeu, *Rostul cuvintelor: disciplină, doctrină, iniţiativă*, Tipografia Socec, Bucureşti, 1907, p. 5.

as well as the positive evolution of society generated the rapid development of the Romanian military science. The adoption, in 1924, of the French doctrine was a temporary solution to the complex problems of the Romanian Armed Forces, but this fact will be fully reflected in the later Romanian military doctrine. The Romanian theoretical activity in the military domain was concentrated on the substantiation of principles and modalities of defending Romania as well as on the development of a national military doctrine. In the work named *"Ştiinţa militară şi doctrina românească/Military Science and Romanian Doctrine"*, published in 1937, Captain Mircea Tomescu made the connection between the universality of military science and the particularity of national military doctrine. The military doctrine was considered a particular case for the right application to the national specific of the military sciences theories.

Then was the time when it was considered the issue of drawing up a national military doctrine instead of the *"borrowed one"*, adopted in 1914. The situation in the summer of 1940, when Romania went under the German sphere of influence, marked the whole Romanian society and, implicitly, the military science. The Second World War diminished the theoretical activity, however, one can notice the scientific activity of some Romanian officers such as Ion Manolescu, Radu Rossetti, Axente Sever Baciu, Mircea Tomescu and others, who tried to draw some conclusions from the military campaigns conducted in the first part of the Second World War and to give advice and implement the right corrections during following operations. Turning to the allied side, on 23 August 1944, the instauration of the Soviet occupation in our country and the establishment of the communist society determined a regression in the autochthonous military science.

In spite of the significantly increasing Soviet influence on the entire politics, the military science kept its originality, the developed studies heading the military doctrine on Romanian routes. Within the Great General Staff, in other military command or military education structures, there were developed studies (*"Idei directoare pentru pregătirea Armatei/Guiding Ideas for Armed Forces Training"* – 1946, *Orientări spre o nouă doctrină/Guidelines for a New Doctrine* – 1947) and syntheses that influenced the Romanian military doctrine, in its content being reflected concrete measures for maintaining a proper defence capacity. In the study named *Orientări spre o nouă doctrină/Guidelines for a New Doctrine* – 1947, spread inside the Great General Staff, concrete solutions were proposed for counteracting the extremely hard military conditions imposed on Romania through the 1947 Peace Treaty.

In 1947, the Minister of Defence, General Mihail Lascăr, in his work entitled *"Metoda ştiinţifică şi arta militară/The Scientific Method and Military Art"*, stated: *"The complexity of modern reality does not allow us another path than the one of the edification*

of a ***Romanian military doctrine*** *that should use the most rigorous and surprising scientific method"*[6]. The affirmation of an own military doctrine, anchored in the Romanian realities and in the fundamental national interests promoted by patriot theorists, encountered the opposition of pro-Soviet factors, who responded ruthlessly, a fact that was part of the series of more and more virulent attacks launched especially after 1946. Romania's distancing from the Soviet Union, starting 1964, provided the opportunity of reconsidering the theme concerning the national military doctrine.

Significant scientific works, such as *"Pagini din gândirea militară românească/ Pages of Romanian Military Thinking"* encompassed texts from other specialised works written between the two world wars. Colonel Corneliu Soare, in his work named *"Cu privire la izvoarele tăriei forţelor armate/Regarding the Sources of Strength of the Armed Forces"*, made an important remark, which synthesised a truth that could finally be told after almost twenty years of Soviet domination, without fear of political or other nature reprisals, and namely: *"The military doctrine depends on the specific particularities of the country, capitalises on the national traditions and capabilities of the respective armed forces"*[7]. One year later, the idea was completed by the same theorists, as follows: *"The military doctrine completes the general specific principles with the knowledge of specific features, without which the military would be deprived of individuality, of their personality"*[8].

As a consequence, at the end of the seventh decade and the beginning of the next one, a strong trend was created for the stimulation of the scientific, creative spirit, a significant role in this respect belonging to the reunions organised by the Ministry of National Defence in collaboration with various national scientific forums. During these reunions, the theses of a conception regarding the military doctrine were underlined, a doctrine which, even if it was not entirely liberated from Moscow's ideas, Romania being a member of the Warsaw Treaty, represented an important step taken in developing the research in the military science and military doctrine domain, having a national specific, as much as it was possible at that time.

The establishment, in 1969, of Centrul de Studii şi Cercetări de Istorie şi Teorie Militară/The Military History and Theory Research and Studies Centre, the stimulation of new doctrinal works, the boost given to the theoretical activity in the Great General Staff, in the Military Academy and in other military institutions, all strengthened the doctrinal research, led to the reaffirmation of the Romanian character of the doctrine and the beginning of highly important ideas and doctrinal

[6] *Permanenţe istorice în doctrina militară românească*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1988, p. 247.
[7] Corneliu Soare, *Cu privire la izvoarele tăriei forţelor armate*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1967, p. 166.
[8] Corneliu Soare, *Corelaţia dialectică dintre ştiinţa militară şi doctrina militară*, in *Probleme de artă militară*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1969, p. 34.

principles, such as: *the **idea** of national system defence, the **thesis** of the inalienable right of Romanian constitutional bodies to make decisions in the defence domain, the **principle** of forbidding the acceptance or acknowledgment of any action of a foreign state or of any situation, indifferent of its nature, including general capitulation or national territory occupation, which in peacetime or at war would undermine in any way the sovereignty, national independence or territorial integrity of the country or would weaken in any way the country's defence capacity*. At the same time, there are reconsidered the theses and ideas initiated in the previous century or the interwar period: *the **defence** of the country by the entire nation, the **need** for a national powerful defence industry, the preparation of the population, economy and territory for defence* etc.

Certainly, the military doctrine, like other social disciplines, was not protected from a certain influence coming from the party ideology, yet, in its essence, the military doctrine responded not so much to party directives but to the national interests and the supreme state reasons, such as: defending the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Romania. We must mention some works of that time that have contributed to the renewal of the Romanian military thinking, such as: *"Probleme filosofice ale ştiinţei militare/ Philosophical Problems of the Military Science"*, published in several volumes starting 1971 under the coordination of General Dr Corneliu Soare; *"Teorii militare contemporane/Contemporary Military Theories", "Istoria gândirii militare româneşti/The History of the Romanian Military Thinking"* (1983), preceded by two important volumes of selected texts under the title *"Pagini din gândirea militară românească/Pages of the Romanian Military Thinking"*.

The Romanian Military Doctrines in the Post-December 1989 Period

The Romanian revolution of December 1989 determined the instauration of the new values of democracy and market economy, imposed the appropriate change of the place and role of the military body within the process of edifying a new social order and rethinking the doctrinaire framework of the country's defence in accordance with the new international security architecture. Thus, the first sign of reshaping the military doctrine appeared during the seminar regarding military doctrines, taking place under the aegis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Vienna, 1990).

In the document named *"Doctrina Militară a României/Romania's Military Doctrine"* it was defined the concept of military doctrine as representing *"the integrated conception adopted by state in problems related to the organisation, preparation, equipment and use of armed forces and population for the country's defence in keeping*

with the national interests, conditions and particularities"[9]. Later on, in 1991, the Supreme Council of National Defence approved *"Doctrina militară de apărare a României/ Romania's Military Defence Doctrine"* in which the new concept was defined as being *"the system of essential orientations and principles adopted by the Romanian state regarding the organisation, preparation, equipment and use of forces and means available for the society with the aim of national defence"*.

The core idea of this document was that, until the edification of a viable European security system, Romania must ensure, first of all, through its own forces, the national defence. Starting 2000, the fundamental document that guides the Romanian Armed Forces activity for the next years and comprised the fundamental options regarding the accomplishment, through military action means and ways, the defence policy of the Romanian state is *"Strategia militară a României/Romania's Military Strategy"*, a document drawn up by the Romanian General Staff and approved through the decision of the Romanian Government. Through this document, and particularly by means of the promoted strategic concepts, such as *"credible defence capacity", "restructuring and modernisation", "enhanced operational partnership", "progressive integration"*, the Romanian Armed Forces are prepared for crisis management and collective defence missions in the regional area. One must notice that, for the first time, the armed forces mission is extended at regional level. The terrorist threats and other transnational risks have led to the diversification of the procedures and ways of the preservation of national interests, fundamental by means of the mixture of national security elements with the international one, of global or regional level, capable of assuring stability and security through cooperation, globalisation and regionalisation of security and military relationships. *Romania's Security Strategy*, adopted in December 2001, presents in a comprehensive manner the concept of *national security* through the identification of new internal security resources as a result of the correlation and capitalisation on all dimensions – political, economic, military and social.

The Military Doctrines in the "Post-Accession" Period

Romania's security policy as a NATO member state, since 29 March 2004, and as an EU member, since 1 January 2007, corresponds to the Euro-Atlantic community security policy. At the same time with Romania's accession to North Atlantic structures, the military body has undergone radical transformations, which have led to rethinking the architecture of the doctrinaire system and to drawing up new documents in the field of defence, such as: strategies, doctrines, military manuals, regulations, techniques, tactics and standard operating procedures.

[9] Vasile Ionel, *Doctrina militară a României*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 1, 1990, pp. 5-10.

In accordance with the provisions of *Romania's National Security Strategy* and the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, the Romanian Armed Forces perform missions outside the national territory as an active part of implementing the global and regional stabilisation process. This requires the participation in collective defence operations, crisis response operations, EU-led crisis management operations, peacekeeping missions under UN mandate as well as operations performed in the framework of the coalitions of the willing.

The experience gained mainly in the Afghanistan and Iraq theatres of operations, but not only, in keeping with Romanian's security arrangements and the participation, after the accession, through representatives of the specialised structure from the Training and Doctrine Directorate, of the Romanian General Staff, in the Allied Joint Operation Doctrine Working Group have stimulated the process of the harmonisation of the contents of national joint-type doctrine.

During the NATO Lisbon Summit, the *New Strategic Concept* (which is in fact the Security Strategy of the Alliance for the next years) was adopted. This will lead to new doctrinaire transformations at allied level. As a direct consequence, the national joint doctrines content will be harmonised with the allied joint doctrines in accordance with the new structural and conceptual reality. It follows that the doctrinaire system cannot be static or immutable. Its evolution is characterised by the influences of the new tendencies of the military art and practice and the changes occurred at international level. In this respect, there are extremely significant the new courses of action and concepts developed in NATO's strategic documents and Comprehensive Operations Planning Directives, which, through the implications generated up to the level of strategic theorisations of member states, play a part in achieving the interoperability of forces and guaranteeing the success of their actions.

To conclude, the military doctrine began to affirm in our country a century and a half ago, being a traditional, extremely precious element of the Romanian military thinking and the Romanian spiritual heritage. In this respect, the Romanian military doctrinaire system should be developed and fully anchored in the realities of the new military confrontation environment, should guide the military commanders from all echelons in making the wisest decision regarding the procurement, training and command of armed forces, otherwise the success in battle cannot be guaranteed.

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TRAINING AND DOCTRINE DIRECTORATE
– Historical Milestones and Contemporary Redefinitions –

Colonel Olivian STĂNICĂ

The Training and Doctrine Directorate, as it is named and organised currently, has a recent history. We say "recent" because we believe that the statement according to which there cannot be armed forces without military training, doctrines or regulations, military tradition or culture and specialised education needs no demonstration.

NATO undergoes a new and comprehensive process of transformation aimed at enhancing mobility, deployment capacity and support of forces in theatres of operation, while increasing the readiness of military structures, all this process taking place under the imperative principle of "permanent change".

Adapting to the trends of the integrated battlespace means constantly changing the data on which concepts, plans and training programmes are developed and, implicitly, the need for partially or completely resuming the analysis and planning process.

***Keywords**: training; doctrine; education; standardisation; support operation; battlespace*

The Training and Doctrine Directorate, as it is named and organised currently, has a recent history. We say *"recent"* because we believe that the statement according to which there cannot be armed force without military training, doctrines or regulations, military tradition or culture, and specialised education needs no demonstration.

Thus, it can be said that the object of such a directorate has been in the Romanian Armed Forces for a long time, this being fulfilled by different structures whose name or subordination was often changed, depending on the historical period and the military reform process.

The key dates of our directorate, as a structure included in the General Staff, begin with the establishment of the *Doctrine and Training Directorate* on 01.05.1997. Then follows a series of reorganisations and restructurings in 1997, 2000, 2001, the last one marking the temporary closing down of the structure and the separation of the training component from the one responsible

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for the coordination of the military doctrines and regulations drawing up process, after only three years, in March 2004, the structure being restored as a structure of the General Staff, under the name of *Doctrine and Training Directorate*.

Going further with the restructuring process, in 2006, the Directorate makes a new evaluation of its organisational structure in keeping with the new responsibilities and changes its name to *Forces Operationalisation, Generation and Evaluation Directorate*. A new reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence, in 2009, determines some changes in the directorate's structure and statute, reduces the number of the personnel and changes the name into *Training and Doctrine Directorate*. In October 2010, two of its structures (*Military Traditions and Culture Section* and *Physical Education Section*) were re-subordinated to the General Staff and would further not be part of the Directorate but under its coordination. Currently this applies only for the first structure.

The successive reorganisations and restructurings experienced by our directorate have required rethinking *"on the fly"* the functions of the component structures, carefully analysing the areas of responsibility, duties and ways in which they are accomplished, in the complex circumstances generated by the extensive personnel fluctuations.

During the mentioned process, multiple reorganisations took place in terms of structures and functions, changes in the field of activity, promotions, as well as certain individual regressions, some circumstantial in nature or determined by the fact that certain people could not readjust quickly to the new requirements and did not meet the requirements necessary for fulfilling their functions.

Currently, the *Training and Doctrine Directorate* is the specialised structure of the General Staff with responsibilities as follows:

- to coordinate, guide and evaluate the forces training and operationalisation process;
- to provide expertise on artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, engineering/EOD, NBRC defence and radiolocation;
- to develop specific military regulations, doctrines, manuals, and to examine the military publications development process;
- to coordinate the process of developing *lessons learned*;
- to provide military education management;
- to coordinate military traditions and culture in the Romanian Armed Forces.

Training, as a process by which human, material and financial resources are turned into operational capacity, found under the responsibility of the *Training Service*, holds a central place in the organisation of any kind of armed forces capable of meeting the military and security requirements of a state. The armed

power depends on the quantity of its forces but especially on their quality, which is usually obtained through the training process.

The modernisation and improvement of training have as main purpose the increase in the level of readiness of the military units in order to carry out the assigned missions.

The training taking place in peacetime must meet the requirements of the missions to be carried out in crisis situations or at war.

The training process should be oriented towards performance. The units and subunits will be able to perform the specific tasks at a high level during military actions only if their execution is practiced along the training process.

The increase in the interoperability with the armed forces of NATO member states can be achieved only through adopting, adapting and implementing the Alliance standards in the field of training as well. The standardisation of training enables the correct evaluation of the performance level of the individual and collective training tasks determined for each mission requirement.

Through introducing the *Mission Training Programmes – MTP*, specific to each military unit/subunit, training standardisation acquires a higher dimension. The application of this concept is a qualitative leap, a step forward in the overall effort to transform and modernise the forces.

As their name suggests, these programmes make it possible for someone to easily determine which training activities should be carried out by a military structure in order to be able to fulfil the assigned mission. They are also helpful for commanders directly leading training because they contain documents already drawn up for training organisation and evaluation.

Mission Training Programmes, which address HQs and forces training, are completed with *Individual Training Programmes – ITP* and *Standard Training and Evaluation Activities – STEA*, which provide training standardisation up to individual level.

Training standardisation by ITP, MTP and STEA is necessary to be correlated with the change of the current format of documents regarding preparation within the military system. One must take into consideration that, depending on the transformations that take place in the operational area, training guidance and evaluation documents will have to be updated without affecting the principles in force at the moment they are drawn up.

The modernisation of the training process requires the use of advanced, computer-assisted simulation technologies, ensuring the HQs and forces training as similar as possible to current battlefield realities. The main goal of modelling and simulation is to reproduce as realistic as possible the battlefield conditions at the lowest costs possible.

An important role in simulating training activities belongs to the simulation centres established in the Romanian Armed Forces, whose missions are to provide planning, preparation and execution of exercises.

NATO undergoes a new and comprehensive process of transformation aimed at increasing mobility, deployment capacity and support of forces in theatres of operation, while increasing the readiness of military structures, all this process taking place under the imperative principle of *"permanent change"*.

Adapting to the trends of the integrated battlespace means constantly changing the data on which concepts, plans and training programmes are developed and, implicitly, the need for partially or completely taking up again the analysis and planning process.

In conclusion, the characteristics of the changes in the training conception may be expressed by the syntagm: *"individualisation of training through standardisation"*.

The substantial transformation in the Romanian Armed Forces is found in what we call the process of *"standardisation-interoperability"* with military structures of NATO/EU member states.

This is a complex process that requires a large amount of investment, in particular of a financial nature. Its difficulty amplifies when a logical and objective requirement is not met, namely that of full compatibility between the intended objectives and the necessary resources, in the case in which, to the resources chapter, we add a new conception, proper to the way of thinking and acting. We consider this means investment and effort in changing the mindset and achieving *"intellectual interoperability"* within the military alliance we belong to.

In this respect, the conception of the use, training and education of our armed forces has suffered major changes, resulted from analysing the evolution of the new security environment, the new physiognomy of conducting military actions as well as the participation with troops in military actions in theatres of operations, being at the same time a major objective in the activity of our directorate.

The lessons resulting from the participation in the missions mentioned, as well as in various other international exercises and missions facilitate the process of rethinking in a modern spirit the principles and methods of training processes, the content of military publications, providing an opportunity for conceptual clarification and fulfilment of *"intellectual compatibility"* of the military personnel, a mission in which our Directorate is deeply involved through the structure of *lessons learned*.

Moreover, organising and implementing a unitary *lessons learned* system in the Romanian Armed Forces, defined as priority objective in our Directorate, will allow, among others, for improving future military activities, collecting

information in specific databases and disseminating it to beneficiaries, processing a large number of reports and adapting and updating specific already developed doctrines, manuals, regulations and normative acts.

Coordinating the whole system of *reference documents* in domains that are specific to the General Staff as well as its subordinated structures, applying NATO hierarchy in the doctrinaire field, coordinating specialised committees regarding the drawing up of normative documents, doctrines and military manuals at the Romanian Armed Forces level, specific to the *Doctrine Service*, through its specialised structure, the *Doctrine and Regulations Section*, have required a sustained team effort, a serious documentation in areas often restrictive or less exploited, to which have contributed, in the spirit of the institutionalised cooperation in the armed forces, other structures with responsibilities for drawing up specific normative documents.

In the field of doctrines, manuals, regulations and normative documents, adapting the new military capabilities to be able to act in the current conflict requires the implementation of a system of rules, procedures, regulations and standards derived from both previous experience and the military actions carried out under NATO command or in certain missions.

The current conceptual system – doctrines, regulations –, although it provides a premise for a common approach with the Alliance, is adapted and continuously upgraded at the level of military services and HQs in order to carry out operations and combat actions quickly and effective in a joint and multinational framework.

The new operational concepts, provided in the military doctrines developed or evaluated by us, conduct towards developing the winning mentality of fighters, who must quickly adapt to the real conditions of operational situations, act independently in the frame of national or multinational structures, inside the country or abroad depending on the specifics and features of missions.

Applying the new doctrinaire concepts will substantially change the structure and functionality of the military organisation both on the whole and at the level of its components, will provide fully efficient management and synergy of military action, as well as optimised specific capabilities of the Romanian Armed Forces.

Harmonising the military documents with Alliance requirements will determine the uniform use of the same operational concepts and, therefore, the same method of reasoning at tactical, operational and strategic level as our partners. In this case, both Romanian military theory and practice will be made compatible with the Western ones in order to effectively solve the problems imposed by the nature of current conflicts, by the quality standards in the preparation of the Romanian Armed Forces for the participation in such conflicts, in any theatre of operations

and in any conditions (excessive climate, level of culture and civilisation etc.), methods, and rules of engagement in order to achieve success.

Our experts believe that the doctrinaire structure should be based on the modern conflictual theory generated by the evolution of psychological and media, technical, special, psycho-moral, visible and invisible, conventional and unconventional dimensions and must meet the physiognomy of the modern battlefield, whose essential attributes are: multidimensionality, transparency, dynamism, multidirectionality, discontinuity, automation and, last but not least, digitisation.

The continuous effort in the field of harmonising military documents in the Directorate has been oriented towards modernity and efficiency, the selective introduction of novelty and the complete exclusion of formalism and routine, thereby changing the mentality of military personnel and refocusing its largest part on the study and adoption of what is truly valuable.

We believe the effort to implement new and fully compatible doctrinaire concepts in the field as required by NATO will be a long and continuous process conducted in all structures of the Romanian Armed Forces.

The military education, under the responsibility of the *Education Section*, considered as a form of basic education, together with training and on the job training (accumulation of experience) is one of the three pillars that support the training system architecture and it has been treated likewise in the *"Romanian Armed Forces Training Doctrine"*.

The areas of competence of the *Education Section* are managing and coordinating the military high school, university, specialisation/improvement education process in developing and implementing the specific regulatory framework and in establishing specific performance indicators.

The same structure is responsible for carrying out the connection of military education with the national education system, the military education systems in NATO/EU member states and the countries with which we have cooperation agreements in this field.

In full accordance with that, the *Education Section* works to achieve a pragmatic and efficient education system, vector of the transformation process that is meant for the development of educated and trained fighters, possessors of a high managerial culture, able to operate in a joint multinational field, to take risks, to identify critical points or areas and to implement change.

Moreover, it is sought the establishment of a modern military education system, which is prospective, flexible and open, in accordance with the process of transformation and modernisation of the Romanian Armed Forces, the requirements of market economy and the individual options of self-assertion of pupils and students.

Another course of action is to continuously improve the quality of education in order to align to the good practices existing both nationally and internationally, to correlate the education process with the objectives and operational requirements of the Romanian Armed Forces units.

Starting from the responsibility of managing the education process of the Romanian Armed Forces, the *Education Section*, in cooperation with specialised structures from the Human Resources Management Directorate and the Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sports, develops and implements strategies, policies and regulations regarding the selection and training of military personnel, provides the interface between military education and national education and the military education in other countries, coordinates the process of developing the *Graduate Model* and the documents of educational curriculum at the military education level, in accordance with European/National Qualifications Framework.

Through this Section, the verification, endorsement and approval of curricula, documents and policy proposals aimed at institutional development of education units take place.

Moreover, the Section coordinates self-evaluation activities of military education units, controls and evaluates military education institutions in accordance with ARACIP standards (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Secondary Education) and ARACIS (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education), promotes the education offer of military education institutions, endorses foreign languages learning programmes by military and civil personnel of the Romanian Armed Forces and coordinates scientific research in military education institutions.

The main characteristic of the activities in the military education has been represented by the continuing process of structural and content reform, while fulfilling the plan of developing, improving and specialising the active and reserve military personnel.

The reform process of the military education system has taken place in the conceptual plane in order to meet the current training requirements in accordance with the evolution of structures and the requirements of the functions graduates will fulfil. The education plans have had a complex, and differentiated content depending on the needs of modern military, the ways and levels of personnel education and training.

The curricula of the *"Carol I" National Defence University*, the *Military Technical Academy*, the academies of all military services and application schools/training centres are being under review in keeping with the new Law on national education and the NATO/EU strategies, doctrines, procedures and standards, also in order

to improve the training of military and civilian personnel. In this process, first of all, we must focus on including all NATO standards which have been accepted and implemented through specific national publications.

The *Military Culture and Traditions Section*, placed under the coordination of our Directorate, is authorised to develop, in accordance with its competences, the regulatory specific framework in the military traditions and civic-moral education field, the strategy of the cultural-educational activities in the armed forces, to coordinate, evaluate and propose the necessary solutions and measures to be taken for an improved management of the spiritual life and to provide specialised assistance for the structures and personnel charge with military traditions in the Romanian Armed Forces.

In this context, the specialised structure, after several re-subordinations, redefined its tasks and objectives and acted with priority for:

- the cultivation of loyalty to nation, country and armed forces, camaraderie and esprit de corps, personnel liability for faithfully fulfilling the obligations and assignments on national territory and abroad;
- the creation of material and spiritual conditions specific to culture and traditions, as a dimension of military training, in order to conduct training and education programmes of personnel by highlighting the cultural potential that exists in the armed forces;
- the professionalisation of the institutionalised system of the cultural establishments of the armed forces in keeping with the standards and requirements of modern cultural management;
- the protection, conservation, restoration and highlighting of the military-historical heritage, cultivation of authentic, perennial values, thus creating higher substantiations and motivations towards the Romanian and universal military culture values;
- the development of the integration process of the Romanian Armed Forces in the cultural and spiritual life of the country, the interculturality within the North Atlantic Alliance and the maintenance of a high level of trust and public respect;
- the revival and extension of links of cultural collaboration with neighbouring and non-NATO member armed forces, especially for celebrating memory of the soldiers who died in the two world wars and, more recently, in theatres of operations.

The strategy of the education system management in the military tradition field has as a purpose to create, at the level of all military personnel, the availability for the access with equal chances and in social protection conditions to the heritage

and cultural values of the armed forces, continuation of cultural approaches, neutrality of the cultural activity towards any political party ideology, dogmas and doctrines, critical assumption of the cultural experience of civil institutions in the field and armed forces of other countries, diversification of cultural offers depending on the personnel category they address, formation of appropriate behaviour regarding the accumulation of new information and knowledge in order to become responsible citizens, committed to fundamental ethical moral, religious and military values, with a positive attitude towards the rule of law and the military institution, with a strong spirit of duty and military discipline, extended endurance to hostile psychological and ideological pressures.

Military traditions and civic education activities, together with the ones of religious assistance, developed under the auspices of the specialised structure and in cooperation with the National Office for Heroes Memory, National War Veterans Association, Heroes Memory Association, National Union of the Reserve and Retired Military Personnel, Religious Assistance Section, through the specific forms of expression (anniversaries, commemorations and military ceremonies, debates, symposiums, visits, scientific sessions, festivals, contests, exhibitions, demonstration exercises, books, journals and periodicals etc.), have set up and developed a new conceptual, structural and functional framework of the Romanian military culture, one that is flexible, consistent and adaptable to the changes of the Romanian society, and to the impact and Romania's status of a NATO and the European Union member country.

Other priority courses of action in the traditions and civic education field have been focused on: improving the legal functioning framework of the Commission of Heraldry and Names of the Ministry of National Defence, endorsing the proposals of military structures regarding battle flags, adopting heraldic signs and giving honorary names, adopting identification flags, coordinating the activities of distributing the demilitarised artillery weapons for some historical monuments sites, organising ceremonies for national or/and military events, coordinating museum activities, tradition halls, libraries and military circles, organising and improving staff training in military traditions, participating in applying international agreements signed by Romania regarding war graves and memorial war works, collaborating with local authorities on burial places, war memorials and commemorative works of Romanian soldiers in the country.

The cultural activities in the armed forces have been aimed at making known the milestones of our national history, the military traditions, developing a higher culture climate, which must provide strong motivation in the training process and feelings of confidence in the fundamental values of national and coalition

defence, a permanent, deep and diversified *"recycling of brains and mentalities"*, specific to the transition from one society to another, from one political system to another, through a beneficial openness and rapid assimilation of the values of the new Romanian culture as a process, amplified by the transformation and characteristics of modern armed forces, with the finality of the Romanian *"fighter model"*, adapted from all points of view, including culturally, to the requirements of the missions to be accomplished.

We have presented, in this editorial approach, only some of the historical and actional milestones of the Training and Doctrine Directorate, which have essentially marked the specific engagement of our structure in the operational organisation of the General Staff.

We strongly affirm that the above-mentioned facts are only the essence of what has been achieved so far in our collective, and the active engagement in affirming novelty, the competence, prospective and innovative thinking, based on the study and scientific interpretation of phenomena and processes that are specific to the military field, are just some of the character traits of the staff who has *"animated"* the Directorate along its short but fruitful history!

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THE DYNAMICS OF PLANNING THE EDUCATION PROCESS

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Professional education and training systems are currently undergoing the changes and transition towards the knowledge-based economy and society and that is why they must adapt permanently. Activities must be planned in order to become competitive and efficient. The new Military Education Transformation Strategy must provide the organisational and legal framework for institutionalised training in the Armed Forces. In this respect, the strategy in the field of military education is represented by the accomplishment of a flexible and effective education system, characterised by educational competition, meant to produce human resources that are compatible with the military resource similar to NATO member states and socio-professionally integrated in the EU.

***Keywords**: enduring development; competition; decision-making process; Bologna Process*

General elements concerning the military education system planning

The achievement of the architecture of the new military education system must be based on the answer to the following question: *What kind of training and education are necessary to officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers in order for them to manage, coordinate and ensure the maintenance of the technical and technological systems of the Romanian Armed Forces?*

Nowadays, but especially in the future, more than ever, the *officers' corps* must be able to think creatively, to have a critical point of view and to act decisively against ambiguity and incertitude. Firstly, the officers must have solid knowledge of the capacities, limits and operations of the forces within their own force service, as well as the related ones. They must have good technological abilities to successfully introspect, anticipate and use the wave of technological advancement that propels us forward. In addition, they must be profoundly and steadily aware of the role of joint education.

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The *non-commissioned officers' corps* must become that military entity which carries out the training of military volunteers and that represents the strong link between the top of the military pyramid, consisting of officers, and its basis, represented by the military volunteers.

The *warrant officers* represent the human support to manage the technical and technological systems and ensure the maintenance of a high professional level in real time.

General military references

In *NATO's New Strategic Concept*, *"The future military operations of the Alliance (including air force ones), as well as the operations in response to crisis will probably be lower in magnitude as opposed to those planned during the Cold War. They may last longer, be extended from the viewpoint of international cooperation and be concurrent with other operations. In many cases, operations in response to crises will include participation of partner nations and of other nations. Operations outside the Alliance may take place without any access or with limited access to the NATO infrastructure"*.

Another tendency is to reduce the difference between the operations specific to war and those in support of peace or for post-conflict reconstruction. Future developments may lead to the creation of permanent multinational forces, controlled by international political-military bodies. Of course, this would become operational on condition that an adequate international legislative system were promoted.

European courses of action in the education field

Concurrent with these military tendencies, in order to accomplish the Lisbon strategic objective, the European Union must become, starting 2010-2011, the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world, based on knowledge, capable of durable economic growth, with better and more numerous work places and a bigger social cohesion.

Starting from these premises, we will have to reanalyse and rethink a new military education system to ensure the training of the Romanian Armed Forces personnel so that, in the future, it could outrun, through knowledge, certain superior thinking structures and have an improved capacity to adapt to the real transformations that will take place successively and irreversibly in the armed forces operational field.

The present education and professional training systems are undergoing changes and transition towards a knowledge-based economy and society, and that is why

it is necessary to continuously update them. In this respect, the key messages of the European Commission Memorandum regarding lifelong learning are:

a) new basic competences for everybody;
b) achieving superior investments in human resources;
c) encouraging innovation in learning and teaching;
d) valuing learning;
e) rethinking orientation and counselling;
f) bringing learning closer to home.

By the *Copenhagen Declaration*, at the end of November 2002, there were established the priorities concerning the development of education and of initial and continuous professional training systems, materialised in: European dimension; transparency; information and counselling; recognition of competences and qualifications; quality assurance in training.

The medium and long-term strategy for continuous professional training aims at the following strategic objectives.

Strategic Objective no. 1: An increased participation in the continuous professional training and the facilitation of access for all personnel categories from the perspective of lifelong learning;

Strategic Objective no. 2: An increased quality and efficiency of the continuous professional training system through a result-oriented management.

The important contribution of higher education in making continuous training come true was discussed at the Berlin conference (2003).

Steps have been taken to standardise the national policies in order to achieve this goal and institutions of higher education have been encouraged to extend the possibility of continuous training to the level of higher education, including recognition of previous studies. Moreover, ministers have requested from those involved in developing norms of qualification for the European Space for Higher Education to outline several flexible ways for training, opportunities and techniques of learning, as well as to use efficiently the transferable credits of study.

The analysis of the multitude of aspects within the Bologna Process leads to one conclusion: there has been remarkable progress and there is a strong involvement at national, regional and institutional level – clearly stated at Bergen – to implement the necessary reforming measures and to continue beyond 2010.

The Bologna Process will not stop in 2011, or in 2025, it will continue as:

➪ *an important idea concerning unity,*
➪ *a large scale policy* and
➪ *a long-term strategy,*

that will lead the countries of the European Union towards an *enduring development* and will prepare them to face often unpredictable transformations and threats.

The new *Military Education Transformation Strategy* must provide the organisational and legal framework of manifestation of institutionalised training in the Romanian Armed Forces.

Given these considerations, the future strategy of the Romanian Armed Forces in the field of military education is represented by the development of a flexible and efficient education system, characterised by competition meant to produce human resources compatible with the similar military resources from NATO countries and integrated, both socially and professionally, within the European Union.

Broadly, the curriculum defines the system of decision-making, managerial or monitoring processes that precede, accompany and follow the design, development, implementation, evaluation and ongoing and dynamic review of the set of educational experiences provided by schools.

The curriculum offers a multi- and/or inter-disciplinary vision of the subjects. Romania's National Curriculum is divided into seven subject areas:

- language and communication;
- mathematics and natural sciences;
- man and society;
- arts;
- physical education and sport;
- technologies;
- counselling and guidance;

and it is focused on *eight fields of key competences* which determine the educational profile of the student:

a) competences for communicating in Romanian and in the mother tongue, in the case of national minorities;
b) competences for communicating in foreign languages;
c) mathematical competences and basic competences in science and technology;
d) digital competences for using the information technology as an instrument for learning and knowledge;
e) social and civic competences;
f) entrepreneurial competences;
g) competences for cultural awareness and expression;
h) the competency of learning how to learn.

Lately, however, the educational institution, in general, and the military one, in particular, must deal with other projective tendencies. It no longer functions as a self-sufficient, isolated institution that performs by itself. The school becomes a kind of court of law with its own social, cultural and productive features

that the community integrates within its specific projects. It will be linked to other projects, characteristic to other institutions, in order to ensure, at the community level, a functional correlation, a high-level development that will positively affect the functioning of the entire elements of the community assembly.

The projective nature of the education process meets another requirement as well: one has to concede that education means not just theory, but also practice. A lot has been written and widely believed regarding education, instruction and training. However, few concrete activities have been carried out. Therefore, in this field, practice lags behind theory. The reconsideration of the practical aspect is a sign of realism and pragmatism, so persistently claimed by the latest tendencies.

Thus, school is no longer a passive court, a resource consumer; it is compelled to identify and attract resources. The current mentality regarding resource distribution by means of the budgetary policies causes these entities to perform activities resulting in the generation of assets and financial resources. For this purpose, schools ought to participate in a series of projects and programmes (local, national, and European), which most of the time create enough comfort and material standard for the improvement of the specific activities.

Lifelong learning must focus on creating and developing the key competences and the competences specific to a certain field of activity or qualification.

In the case of the military personnel, the specific competences must be permanently updated according to the changes in the modern battlefield, as well as according to the asymmetrical development of military operations and the ascending spiral of the growth of military technologies and their degree of robotisation.

During various activities, including occasional discussions held with teaching staff and military trainers within various military education institutions, we have identified a number of general errors that we wish to present in terms of the strict personal analysis of the authors of this article.

General errors

1. Mathematical/Calculation Errors are manifested in the faulty division of the number of weeks for courses; when calculating the total number of course hours, sometimes it is not taken into consideration the number of hours for practical activities, camps, exams etc.; overlapping the hours when calculating the amount of hours per semester.

2. Cognitive errors consist in the faulty differentiation between mission and objectives, the empirical setting of the objectives, mixing the end of the course objectives for the individual specific objectives.

3. Decision-making errors: the curricula are not always developed on the basis and in conjunction with the graduate model; when establishing the written curricula,

there are redundancies between the education levels specific to the different force services and these redundancies can lead to great distortions in the educational content.

Specific errors

1. Errors in designing the curricula of the military higher education institutions: the existence of some *"overlaps"* between the contents of this type of education with certain subjects in the curriculum of training schools; the timeframe for which the education plans are designed *"covers"* all the period of study (3-4 years), which implies inevitable errors in the calculation algorithm and the impossibility of anticipating some extra-curricular activities which may affect the training process.

2. Errors in designing the curricula of the military institutions for post high school education: the ultimate goals have different degrees of generality as a consequence of introducing the indirect way education system; the teaching methodology is not desirable because it is not used efficiently; the existing teaching aids are not the most appropriate and accessible as they are not diversified; the operational plan (teaching strategy) is not rendered by a clear list of themes to be covered during a semester or a school year; the evaluation is still done by means of classical methods, specific to post high school military education of medium duration.

3. Errors in designing the curricula of the military education institutions for specialisation and training in a certain military branch: the aims, objectives, and, in general, the learning content of the subjects established within the curricula are insufficiently correlated with the requirements of the beneficiary, namely the operational units; representatives of the logistics branch play an insignificant part in the activity of designing the curricula, while they should be the ones to counsel the decision-makers in issues concerning the limitations of the allotted budget, financial restrictions etc.; there is not enough openness when it comes to replacing some subjects, learning contents etc., while this should be done to ensure the permanent updating of the curriculum; there is limited correspondence between the modification/ restructuring of the military organisation (implicitly, the military education system) and the legal provisions for the carrier progress of military personnel (e.g. planning career courses for privates while this category can attend indirect way courses in order to become NCOs); expressing intentions, goals and objectives that are unclear, too far away and are not mobilising enough; emphasising and applying inadequate control mechanisms; insufficient logistic and didactic basis for supporting the objectives established by the curricula; difficulties when putting into practice the essence and the content of the regulations issued by superior echelons, this being caused by insufficient allotted resources.

4. Errors in designing the curricula of foreign language centres (main centres, secondary centres and regional resource and learning centres): insufficient correlation between the goals and the objectives with the requirements of force-objectives related to foreign language learning; keeping inadequate proportions between specific language learning subjects and transversal subjects in the education plan; empirical correlation between the level of difficulty of the exam at the end of the course and the evaluation requirements of STANAG 6001; the planning of educational content that does not develop all four basic skills involved in language learning in a balanced way.

5. Errors in designing the curricula of military high schools: lack of positive prospects regarding the graduates' near future (the period subsequent to high school graduation), in order to be able to overcome an eventual failure to enter academies belonging to the various force services; lack of certain extracurricular elements that would considerably increase the students' interest and motivation; insufficient funds for developing programmes to enhance interest and motivation for a military career.

As a result of the study and the analysis conducted for knowing the origin of the above-mentioned errors and for understanding their effects as well as for identifying ways of preventing or correcting them, we have identified a series of recommendations and proposals that will be presented to the reader in the following lines.

❖ *Recommendations regarding the procedures for defining the operational objectives*

If the objectives specific to the subject or the didactic unit are not problematic from the point of view of their wording, *the operational objectives*, namely the ones that designate a specific aim of an educational circumstance (defined by a set of acts – material or intellectual – which require the development and the combination of some psycho-pedagogical means in order to obtain a determined outcome), cause serious difficulty to most of the teaching staff.

The operational objectives describe behaviours that can be observed and measured and that the student (pupil) will be capable of proving at the end of a training activity, lesson, educational sequence etc.

The operational objectives are strictly connected to the aims specific to the subject for they provide the pedagogical intention in the most concrete possible manner.

❖ *Defining the final behaviour*

The final behaviour is what the participant in the education process would be capable of doing if training was successful. It must be worded in terms of observable

and measurable behaviour so that one can conclude whether the student has acquired it or not.

When wording final behaviour, the vocabulary that can lead to misinterpretation or ambiguity must be avoided. The verbs that should be used are the ones which describe the actions that the student performs (actions that can be seen, heard, perceived), not the verbs that describe what happens in the mind of the participant in the training process.

In the specialised literature[1], it is suggested that it is better to use operational guidelines such as *"action-words"* or *"lists of allowed/banned terms"*. It is even expressed the opinion that, in defining an objective, the verb choice is a matter of decisive importance. We suggest that it is appropriate for every teacher in the subject they teach to make such a guide of action-words and a list of allowed terms in order to ease his/her work on formulation of objectives.

❖ *Conditions to produce behaviours*

The requirement to formulate conditions has to be understood in the sense that each teacher must state what materials and what framework for action they suggest to the learner in order to help him prove that he acquired certain behaviour.

The forms must include information, instructions on what is allowed or not.

To achieve the general objectives, once they were established, it is necessary to develop a biannual/course schedule, by chapters, detailed at the lesson level.

Each chapter sets a *general (final) goal,* which guides the *operational objectives* formulation for each lesson. These objectives are formulated taking into account the criteria of content (represented by the operational objectives) and the relative criteria (analysing the performance of a student/pupil compared to the performance of the class or other classes from the same institution or other similar institutions). Thus, optimising criteria aims at increasing performance in terms of content and in relative terms.

❖ *Specific recommendations for the design of the curricula of undergraduate institutions*

In the case of high schools, the structure based on local affiliation, profiles and specialisations, as well as the existence of several curricula result in the shaping of some high schools with their own identity, whose offer on the education market is specific, unlike the general education, which is relatively homogeneous in structure and offer.

The transition from a general education curriculum to several curricula does not mean a pure quantitative differentiation. It represents the transition

[1] R. Gagne, L. Briggs, *Principii de design ale instruirii*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, 1977.

from compulsory education (where the relatively similar offer to all students aims at ensuring equal opportunities) to an education relying on the students' option to continue their education (in which case their interests and aptitudes become a priority).

❖ *Specific recommendations for the design of the curricula in military specialty training institutions*

At the level of the military specialty training institutions, it is required that the curricula are formed of projects based on strictly directed actions in the form of optional subjects and compulsory courses/subjects.

These projects should have the following characteristics: title; motivation, under the form of an argument supporting the relevance of the respective course; objectives, more or less general, depending on the situation; target group, namely the category of personnel to which the course is destined; methodology, which should consist of teaching methods and aids, as well as diversified forms of organisation (if not mentioned in the curriculum, they have to be included in the syllabus); evaluation methods.

To conclude, it is our belief that we have attempted and succeeded in presenting, according to our own perspective, only a part of the experience and expertise that can most certainly be identified at the level of the education institutions and structures, which are, in our view, the depository of the most important databases that can be analysed in order to improve the quality of the military education.

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OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
– A Factor in Support of the Decision-Making Process in the Military Domain –

Colonel (AF) Ghiţă MILOIU

The application of Operational Analysis is not new in the military. In fact, military organisations were among the first to actively use analysis to assist the decision-making process and help improve their effectiveness. Analysis for this reason is historically referred to as Operational Research, Operations Research or Operational Analysis (OA).

The biggest challenge for military analysts is maintaining an analytical focus and not slipping into evaluation. It is very tempting when analysing an area the analyst is familiar with to begin critiquing the performances he/she witnesses during data collection – in other words, to do evaluation. The main point is to remember that evaluators are the key to helping people understand how well they are doing their actual work and analysts are the key to the successful identification of lessons that support decisions about the actions necessary to ensure problems are resolved, and best practice is spread throughout an area of expertise.

***Keywords**: analysis; operational analysis; evaluation; lessons identified; lessons learned; decision-making process*

In order to help clarify the meaning of the syntagm in the title of this article, the following definitions have been taken into account:

➢ Analysis: *"study of a whole by examining its parts and their interactions"*.

➢ Operational Analysis (OA): *"application of scientific methods to assist executive decision-makers"*.

➢ Decision Support: *"application of the best available analytical tools and/or techniques to support the decision-making process"*.

In broad terms, *analysis* is a process used to thoroughly understand areas of activity identified to have potential for improvement. The results of analysis are used to support decisions that will result in enduring improvements, thus leading to a *Lesson Learned*.

In this context, it is worth underlining two points: what distinguishes *analysis* from *evaluation* and what analysis involves as a process itself. We may notice that analysis involves taking something and looking at it in different ways to develop the understanding of essential features or meaning. At no point in the definitions

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and synonyms does the concept of attaching a rating or value come into it. This is in stark contrast to the definition of evaluation, where the act of ascertaining or fixing the value or worth of something is the basis of activity.

To help clarify this distinction, we may think about the gymnastics competition. As the gymnast finishes the exercise, a group of judges assign a value from one to ten based on the quality of the individual performance. This is a clear example of *evaluation*. On the other hand, the *analysis*, taking the same example of the gym exercise, but rather than judging the individual performance we would start to identify other factors to understand ***why*** and ***what*** contributed to the fact that the exercise was good or bad. For instance, we can collect data about the gymnast and find that there is actually a problem with the methods used for training, personal diet, health status etc.

Evaluating the exercise to find out whether it was good or bad does not tell us how to repeat or to avoid the same performance in the future; it tells us about the quality of that particular exercise. In contrast, analysing the exercise would give us an understanding of issues that may need to be addressed when we decide what to do to help improve the performance on future exercises.

Another important distinction between evaluation and analysis is what initiates each process. In the military, evaluation takes place at every exercise and is regularly carried out in ongoing operations. Analysis is conducted when a better understanding of an issue is needed to support decisions. To return to our gymnastics competition, evaluation takes place at every competition – it would not be much of a sport without a way to keep sport. But analysis would be initiated when it became desirable to know more about why things happened the way they did (quality of equipment, doping, inconsistent judging etc).

On the other hand, evaluation usually requires a certain degree of subject matter expertise in the area being evaluated to identify what is good or bad. In contrast, analysis can be conducted without the analyst being an expert, though analysts often call upon experts to help them better understand the data they collect. This is not to say that analysts are not subject matter experts, analysis just requires a different type of expertise. Their area of expertise is analysis, rather than a particular functional area (e.g. operation, logistics etc.). The biggest challenge for military analysts is maintaining an analytical focus and not slipping into evaluation. It is very tempting when analysing an area the analyst is familiar with to begin critiquing the performances he/she witnesses during data collection – in other words to do evaluation. The main point is to remember that evaluators are key to helping people understand how well they are doing their actual work

and analysts are key to the successful identification of lessons that support decisions about the actions necessary to ensure problems are resolved, and best practice is spread throughout an area of expertise.

The application of Operational Analysis (OA) is not new in the military. In fact, military organisations were among the first to actively use analysis to assist the decision-making processes and help improve their effectiveness. Analysis for this reason is historically referred to as Operational Research, Operations Research or Operational Analysis.

The origin of Operational Analysis lies in the run-up to World War Two (WW2). Operational Research carried out by civilian scientists and analysts led to the efficient deployment of new radar technology to form an integrated UK air defence system. Another well-known WW2 example of the application of analysis included advice given to commanders in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) to counter the German U-Boat threat. Following WW2, the UK continued to use OA to support commanders in the field, including an OA cell deployed to Singapore during the Communist Insurgency in Malaya. In addition, the US Army made considerable use of front line OA during Vietnam operations. Further examples of OA support to commanders were demonstrated by UK and US analysts in support of operations to liberate Kuwait (1991). The end of the *Cold War* brought about an increase in the use of OA in Crisis Response Operations. NATO introduced analysis capabilities within HQ to support decision-making in this complex environment. More recent developments in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) exhibit support provided to a wide range of missions including in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Operational Analysis contribution to support the decision-making process

❖ *OA position and role for supporting the decision-making process*

Operational Analysis is an integral part of the HQ decision-making process – bringing quantitative analysis with a clear audit trail to inform the decision. OA does not just answer questions as posed, but seeks to identify *"hidden"* concerns, branches and sequels. It may well be that the original question is modified as a result of this process. The analyst also needs to identify limitations of analytical efforts, particularly if it is not possible to fully meet the commander's intent. Finally, it is important to remember that analysts are not deployed to provide Information Technology (IT) support services.

Operational Analysis can be used to address a wide range of problems and assist in finding a solution through structuring, collating, and organising data.

OA can provide advice throughout the decision-making process. The typical question posed to an analyst will depend upon the situation under consideration. Generally the questions are quantified logical projections such as *"what if…?"*. Historically, the typical OA questions have related to assisting in warfighting operations, for example the course of action analysis and/or logistics planning. However, recent military operations have seen the deployment of military forces in roles such as peacekeeping. This has increased the breadth of concerns confronting the analyst, for example measures of normality and assessing data from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO).

Examples of the areas in which OA can make substantial contributions are:

• In *headquarters* to help support: contingency planning/course of action analysis; operational planning – logistics, deployment, engineer; information operations; support to exercise planning; liaison with other analysis and scientific communities; risk analysis.

• In *exercises*:

The OA team identifies among the players (for own and military staff training); analysts support the exercise design, process the outputs from the exercise, EXCON and demonstrate the OA capabilities as follows:

- part of HICON EXCON – use of OA techniques to ensure realism of exercise;
- as part of HQ testing OA tools/techniques to support HQ decision cycle;
- planning: evaluate operational options (war game/static map game);
- mission rehearsal: help the rehearsal, evaluate the rehearsal plan, plan revision, plan to reduce uncertainty.

• In *operations*:

Monitor progress, compare progress to the plan, address any arising problems, re-plan: operational/contingency planning; measurement of campaign success; synchronisation; optimisation of resource usage; data collection and analysis; lessons learned; post-ops – view of OA support, allied experiences; reconstruction; assess performance (plans, equipment, training, policy etc.); use objective data.

❖ *OA cells in the command chain*

Below it is presented the interaction between the operational *"cell/capability"* and the HQ or command chain that is to be supported. It is important that analysts make commanders aware of the range of their capabilities, as not all officers will have had prior exposure to direct analysis support. Analysts need to be proactive, have the ability to produce timely analysis and *"sell"* the analysis product. Wherever possible, the tasking process should be explicitly defined and there should be a clear understanding throughout the command chain of how the OA cell carries out its function.

There is a number of different templates as to the location of the OA cell within an HQ. OA can contribute to the planning and decision processes in all parts of the HQ and hence analysts need a degree of freedom to work across the HQ. In general, the OA should fall under a single senior individual as high up the command chain as possible. There are good examples of OA cells formally reporting to the Chief of Staff (COS) of an HQ, even if the specific tasks may have originated within branches (logistics, planning, engineers etc). OA cells have also successfully functioned from within an individual branch but the key to work being carried out in all branches is that the OA capability is seen as an HQ-wide asset.

It is important that analysts should be seen as an integral part of the HQ (even though in many instances they may be civilian); they should be involved in all the activities with the HQ. In the event of the HQ deploying in an operation, the analysts would also deploy. Thus they must be seen as a normal staff branch and should take part in all relevant training and exercises. OA to support HQ decision-making requires as much training and exercising as any other HQ branch function. It is through this day-to-day interaction with HQ staff that the value of OA can be routinely demonstrated and trust built up between the analysts and HQ staff.

❖ *How OA support is structured*

When considering the number of staff to be deployed, and the number required in a reach-back role, having a critical mass is extremely important and the number to achieve this depends on the HQ and the mission. The lessons identified from operations suggest a minimum of two on-site analysts with access to reach-back support.

Sometimes it is preferable to have an OA cell embedded within both peacetime and combat establishments. OA cells have been successfully embedded within a Command Group, under the Chief of Staff, but with direct access to the Assistant Chief of Staff or the J-heads when required. The inclusion of an OA cell in both peacetime and combat environments will allow a good working relationship to be established between the analysts and the military who will work closely together in areas such as exercise evaluations and identifying lessons learned.

Considerations on OA usage in operations

❖ *OA cell composition*

A deploying HQ may include in its standard Combat Establishment (CE) an OA cell. The OA team should be organised, equipped and trained to perform the tasks received from the commander. It is essential to have a single team leader who should be technically competent, know the reach-back organisation,

and have the confidence and competence to be able to make professional and safety decisions even when unable to contact the home establishment. The leader must be recognised by own commander, know the limits of his/her authority, and must be given the confidence that he/she will be supported after the event provided decisions are taken within that authority.

To make best use of the warning time, staff selection and as much staff training and exercises as practicable should be completed in peacetime as the flexibility for such activities reduces when an operation is about to be launched. Furthermore, conducting training and exercises during peacetime reinforces on the individuals the commitment they have made.

However, it should be noted that mixed teams where the military members also have analysis experience could have a different composition to that proposed. The OA team will almost certainly require administrative support. As such, the OA cell may contain up to eight members; that is between two to six analysts, a team leader and a staff officer. The staff officer should be staff trained and numerate, and hold an appropriate rank (approx. OF 3/4 or Maj to Lt Col). The staff officer should be able to offer advice on military issues and liaise with all involved military organisations and/or elements when required. The officer may wish to create a permanent network of named Points of Contact (POC) within the various branches of the HQ. Again, should the military members of the team have analysis experience, a different approach to that proposed could be used. In most cases, twenty-four hour manning of the OA cell is often not required. Twenty-four hour manning of the cell is provided when there are specific analysis tasks which must be provided throughout the day. Should the HQ operate for twenty-four hours a day, it will be necessary to provide some analytical support. It may be possible to provide a reduced manning level for the night shift.

❖ *Techniques and tools used by the OA cells*

For the present context, *technique* is a general description of the analyst's approach to solving a problem – the way he/she works to carry out the tasks at hand. Examples of common OA techniques are simulation, statistical analysis and spreadsheet modelling. To apply a specific technique, the analyst may need to use a variety of *tools* – devices used to carry out particular functions – to collect and analyse available data and to present the necessary information to the decision-makers. Some examples are spreadsheets (MS Excel), programming languages (Visual Basic) and system dynamics software (iThink). Embedded in the analyst's efforts is the need to collect, synthesise and analyse data.

❖ *Generic issues for OA in support of Military Operations*

Operational Analysis can assist the decision-makers during crisis and armed conflict conditions in the following areas as follows:

- *Peace Support Operations:*
  - cessation of hostilities (adherence to ceasefires, scale and extent of breaches);
  - location of forces (by number, ethnicity, scale of armament);
  - cooperation with UN/NATO forces;
  - cooperation with civil authority;
  - adherence to agreements, treaties etc.;
  - identification of minefields/IEDs;
  - clearance of minefields/IEDs;
  - attacks against UN/NATO forces;
  - attacks against individuals/groups;
  - intimidation against individual group;
  - attacks against property;
  - utilities (water, gas, electricity, drainage, health): state of repair of facilities, availability and cost of utilities by area, number of customers, ethnic/ origin/religion/affiliation of consumers;
  - commodities (availability and cost of basic foodstuffs (flour, rice, cooking oil, meet, coffee), location and accessibility of shops and markets, housing, transport, communal facilities);
  - communications (roads – condition, safety, public transport, telephone network – land line and mobile);
  - education (schools, colleges, universities: number open, student and teacher numbers (by ethnicity/religion) condition of buildings and facilities, subjects taught);
  - housing (quantity, location, state of repair, ownership, rental cost);
  - population (location, number, ethnic/religious groups);
  - farming (areas under cultivation, number of farm animals, state of harvest);
  - lessons identified.
- *Warfighting*
  - force ratio (Blue versus Red) (static scoring, nationality factors);
  - wargaming (Course of Action comparison);
  - casualty estimation (Course of Action comparison);
  - technical assessment of weapons and systems in campaign or in specific environmental conditions;
  - weapon system performance – during campaign and post campaign (accuracy, hit rate, warhead detonation, effectiveness against target, investigation of weapon failure);

- data collection (sorties flown, weapon consumption, fuel consumption, targets attacked);
- devising of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Success Indicators (SI) at Operational Objective, Tactical Objective and Tactical Task levels;
- application of MOE and SI to achieve Campaign Assessment (CA), i.e. timely and reliable measures of progress within the campaign;
- lessons identified.

OA products

Once the analysis process has been completed, the OA team makes recommendations based on the conclusions reached. Recommendations are given in terms of *"what to do"* and not just what effects need to be achieved. Moreover, the analysts should have learned enough from their analysis to be able to recommend the decision-maker one or more potential courses of action that will deal with the issue by addressing its fundamental causes. In some cases, they may be able to recommend an action body to take responsibility for completing the course of action.

Analysis products may take many forms, from detailed joint analysis reports to quick look briefs, immediate value reports or entries in a lessons learned database or spreadsheet.

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Operational Analysis is done to support decisions for improvement across the whole areas of the military field based on experience gained in time. Also, analysis is an essential supporting element of the military *lessons learned* process.

Analysis is fundamentally different from evaluation in that it involves gaining a thorough understanding of the factors affecting a situation and not just observing and reporting performance.

Analysis needs a toolkit and experience in using those tools. Military should employ professional analysts to help lessons learned staff officers with analysis.

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OPERATIONALISATION OF ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES STRUCTURES MADE AVAILABLE TO NATO/EU

Colonel Gheorghe CIULACU

The purpose of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation is represented by the fulfilment of full interoperability with the armed forces of the other NATO member states, in the field of forces training, deployment and command as well as in the one of logistic procurement and support.

The Romanian Armed Forces transformation's main objective is to accomplish a modern, entirely professional structure, which has a high degree of mobility and is efficient, flexible, deployable, sustainable, having the ability to act jointly and to be engaged in a full spectrum of missions, both at home and abroad.

Operationalisation/maintaining the level of operationalisation for the structures made available to NATO/the EU and implementing Force Goals represent one of the short- and medium-term objectives of the transformation process.

***Keywords**: readiness; joint level; transformation; professionalised structures; Force Goals; interoperability*

We are living in a complex, dynamic and contradictory/conflicting world, affected by the globalisation process. Therefore, the deep understanding of the major trends of international security is of outmost importance in finding the way in which each country has a chance to be an active part of this process, and it is also an essential condition to progress and prosperity. The knowledge, understanding and accurate assessment of internal processes, of the degree of social cohesion, of the ability to assemble the public will represent important conditions to achieve the national level projects.

National security is provided by own efforts and through cooperation with our allies and partners, according to the provisions of national programmes, of the strategic concepts of the North Atlantic Alliance and of the EU security strategy. It envisages the harmonisation of national efforts with international commitments, and the identification of the working modalities in order to prevent and counter the threats. These efforts also

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encompass the promotion of democracy, peace and stability in the region and in other strategic interest areas. The reduction of vulnerabilities, the development of national capabilities and the deep transformation of the security institutions are envisaged by these efforts too[1].

Romania's security as a European state can be defined and promoted only within the framework of NATO and EU by harmonising the national interests with the specific policies of both organisations. In addition, Romania promotes its national interests through its own military capabilities adapted to the needs of national defence and integration in the military structures of NATO/EU[2].

The last decade's fundamental political-military transformations at global level and NATO's ongoing reform have generated the conditions for important changes in Romania's national defence doctrine. This context has provided the necessary framework for the transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces as a natural need coming from the new strategy and transformation process of the Alliance. These aspects allow for widening the goals and processes spectrum encompassing now the forces restructuring and their preparation for collective defence, the improvement of the capabilities for the entire range of crisis management operations, for multinational operations and for countering terrorism.

The purpose of the Romanian Armed Forces' transformation is to achieve the full interoperability with the armed forces of the other NATO member states, not only in training, deploying and command and control (C2) areas, but in procurement and logistic support areas as well.

The transformation process is aimed at achieving an optimal force structure, able to perform missions under NATO's C2 in a combined/joint manner, as part of a multinational force or independently. The force structure will have an interoperable C2 system, able to provide a superior decision-making cycle and appropriate equipment in accordance with the current way to wage the war and the characteristics of the theatres of operations.

The focus of the Romanian Armed Forces' transformation efforts is to prepare modern structures, mobile, well trained and equipped, well supported in terms of logistics, able to perform wherever needed, inside or outside the national territory in order to address the entire spectrum of missions or anticipated scenarios. Resizing the Romanian Armed Forces and adopting NATO standards and procedures were the first steps towards achieving the interoperability with the armed forces of other NATO members.

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[1] See *Strategia de securitate naţională a României*, Bucureşti, 2007.
[2] *Carta Albă a securităţii şi apărării naţionale*, cap. 1, Guvernul României, Bucureşti, 2004.

Upgrading and acquisition of modern military materiel comparable with the other NATO armed forces is another direction of the process of achieving interoperability. This process began with joining NATO community and it is estimated to be completed in the next 12 to 15 years.

Romania, as a NATO full member, benefits from the advantages of collective defence. NATO membership implies also obligations such as the requirement to meet all the duties and obligations deriving from such a status. The current forces structure must accomplish the commitments to NATO, as well as missions within the national territory.

From this viewpoint, the transformation of the armed forces will have as a purpose the creation of fully professional large units and units, able to participate in a wide range of specific missions.

Only the combat ready structures, evaluated and certified according to NATO procedures and criteria, will be placed under NATO command. Among these structures there are also the structures made available for NATO Response Force (NRF).

Achieving the combat ready status and the certification of the forces assigned to NATO is a national prerogative, but their affirmation is performed together with NATO structures.

Planning and conducting the process of achieving and maintaining the combat ready status by the structures made available to NATO/EU

According to NATO, the military transformation represents an ongoing process of development and integration of new concepts, strategies, doctrines and capabilities aiming at increasing the level of interoperability and the efficiency of NATO forces. Simultaneously, these forces are to adapt to the new continuously changing security environment. These requirements highlight the need to re-evaluate the military factor as a main source of credibility.

The Allied Command Transformation envisages as the transformation goal the establishment of military forces able to provide:

- increased capability to act in joint, multinational operations, to implement new concepts, and to reach the interoperability status;
- achievement and exploitation of information superiority in overall assessment, surveillance and reconnaissance, and increased capability to interpret and disseminate information;
- use of the method of *"development of concepts and experimentation"* on the new capabilities and structures, coordinating training through simulation and through field exercises, focusing more on crisis management scenarios (civil emergency);

- transformation strategies at departmental level, by creating capabilities adaptable to the requirements of transformation[3].

In the framework of the future security environment, the North Atlantic Alliance will have to react to the emergence of any threat and challenge. In consequence, the development of the Alliance capabilities and the planning process will focus on modern capabilities and forces, deployable and sustainable, able to approach the entire spectrum of operations.

Romanian Armed Forces transformation is strongly related to the North Atlantic transformation process. The purpose of this process is to create new capabilities able to provide Romania with the ability to respond to the security environment current and future challenges. All these factors will create the conditions to meet the specific requirements as they are stated in the Constitution of Romania and to accomplish the commitments assumed by Romania towards NATO, the EU as well as in the framework of regional initiatives and coalitions[4].

The transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces is founded on the need to adapt the military to the changes in the international environment, to the new threats and risks to security.

The goal of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process is to achieve a modern, fully professional structure with a high degree of mobility, flexible, deployable and sustainable, being able to act in a joint manner and to be engaged in a broad spectrum of missions within the national territory and abroad.

Achieving and maintaining the combat ready status for the national structures assigned to NATO/EU and implementing the Force Goals are among the short- and medium-term objectives of the transformation process.

The integration of the Romanian Armed Forces into NATO started with the *"Accession and Integration Plan 2004"* designed by the Allied Joint Force Command Naples for three European countries that joined the North Atlantic community in 2004 – Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia. This process encompasses the achievement of the combat ready status for all the structures assigned to NATO, according to the plans. Since 2005, when the process started, these plans have been accomplished according to the schedules.

The operational framework for the evaluation of the structures that achieved the combat ready status was provided by the national joint exercises organised for this purpose such as *DEMEX 05, ROMEX 06, ROUEX 07, 08*, and *09*.

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[3] See *Strategia de securitate naţională a României*, Bucureşti, 2007.
[4] *Ibidem*.

If within *DEMEX 05* exercise the first military structures designed for NATO/EU were evaluated and certified, the year 2007 represented the peak of this evaluation process when a great number of structures were subject to NATO evaluation and certification. The *ROUEX 07* opportunity was a premiere not only for the national but also for NATO evaluators challenged to evaluate structures (mechanised and mountain brigades).

The preparation and conduct of these exercises represented an obvious qualitative advance because of the conceptual and organisational solutions adopted and the involvement of the personnel in achieving the exercises objectives.

It can be said that the goal, the main and the supporting objectives have been achieved, and the personnel involved in planning, organising and conducting phases proved more and more reliable and professional, highlighting the experience acquired in previous evaluation exercises. The participation of NATO HQs representatives in some of the main activities added quality and clarity to the planning and preparation of these exercises. The activities scheduled for reaching and maintaining the combat ready status were conducted thoroughly. All the structures scheduled for the years from 2005 to 2011 to reach this status have achieved it.

The process to achieve the combat ready status for the structures available to NATO/EU encompasses all the activities related to manning these structures, to equipping with modern interoperable military materiel and to training according to NATO standards requirements.

Maintaining the already achieved combat ready status means preserving the operational capability of the structures available for NATO/EU after their evaluation and the correction of all the deficiencies identified during evaluation.

The schedule to reach/maintain the combat ready status for all the structures available for NATO/EU is designed according to the target date set for each of these structures as they are agreed within the Force Goals/Headline Goal 2010 assumed by Romania. This schedule is periodically updated according to NATO Force Planning Process, detailed through the Force Proposals and Defence Requirement Review/Headline Goal 2010 cycles[5].

In order to manage/coordinate the process of achieving the combat ready status, each service staff (Land, Air and Naval) and the Joint Logistics Command issue annually their own plans for achieving this status for the subordinated

[5] *Dispoziţia privind operaţionalizarea, menţinerea nivelului de operaţionalizare şi evaluarea structurilor puse la dispoziţia NATO/UE*, Statul Major General, 2009.

structures, and for maintaining the status for the subordinated structures already marked with this status. Each of these structures – down to battalion level for the Land Forces Staff, down to airbase level for the Air Force Staff, and down to flotilla level for the Naval Staff – issues its own specific plans with the same purpose: achieving/maintaining the combat ready status.

All these plans are approved by the directly superior echelons of each of the structures subject to achieving/maintaining the combat ready status.

The annual training programmes take into account the operational capability requirements, the performance criteria as defined by the Allied Command Transformation standards and other NATO documents.

The training of the structures assigned to NATO/EU is scheduled according to the Mission Essential Task List (METL) and structured according to the Mission Training Programmes written by the subject structures, which conduct training.

Through the Training and Doctrine Directorate and other specialised structures, the General Staff coordinates and monitors the overall process of achieving and maintaining the combat ready status for the structures assigned to NATO/EU.

The services staffs and the Joint Logistics Command are fully responsible for creating the necessary conditions to achieve the combat ready status and for maintaining the combat ready status already achieved by their own structures, which are assigned to NATO/EU.

The structures assigned to NATO/EU are scheduled with priority to participate in multinational exercises, together with similar structures from other NATO member states with whom they are supposed to cooperate or to be integrated in future task forces for operational deployments. These structures will be placed under the authority of the component commands subordinated to Joint Force Command Naples or under the authority of other commands to which they are affiliated.

The evaluation of structures assigned to NATO/EU

The evaluation of the structures assigned to NATO/EU is a complex process testing their operational capability based on the North Atlantic Alliance standards and the specific reference documents issued by the EU. The evaluation will focus on the available resources and the achievement of the required performances as described in the documents mentioned above.

Referring to the evaluation of these structures, the distinction between two different evaluation processes has to be emphasised as follows: the evaluation as part of the accession and integration process, which is under the responsibility of the Joint Force Command Naples and the evaluation as part of NATO programmes – CREVAL, TACEVAL and MAREVAL.

During the accession and integration process, the evaluation of the structures assigned to NATO/EU comprises the initial evaluation, the certification evaluation and the affirmation evaluation.

This process is conducted only once for every type of the structures assigned to NATO/EU and after the affirmation[6], the structure is officially declared as being able to operate under NATO's authority. Therefore, the concept of re-affirmation does not exist.

After the affirmation, the structures assigned to NATO/EU are subject to NATO evaluation programmes according to the criteria for each readiness category. This evaluation is conducted in accordance with the provisions of the evaluation handbooks specific to different services – CREVAL for Land Forces, TACEVAL for Air Forces, and MAREVAL for Navy (AFS vol. VI, VII, and VIII).

Completion of the programme in support of the Romanian Armed Forces integration

Since 2004, during the integration phase of the Romanian Armed Forces within NATO structures, NATO strategic, operational and tactical commands have planned and conducted supporting activities to the benefit of the new NATO member nations. These activities have been focused in the area of education and training processes. NATO commands have provided their support in order to plan, organise and conduct the certification and affirmation events for the assigned structures. When the new NATO member nations have the structures assigned to NATO affirmed, another step follows – the affiliation of these structures to the NATO Force Structure ready to perform the missions of the Alliance.

The following requirements have to be taken into account when concluding the supporting programme: the implementation of NATO agreements and protocols; the implementation of NATO standards and procedures; the achievement of the interoperability status for the forces declared to NATO; the accomplishment of the individual and collective training requirements for the declared forces; the harmonisation of the operational planning procedures with the similar procedures of NATO; the certification/affirmation of the main elements of the forces declared to NATO; the capability to conduct the national certification in accordance with NATO procedures and standards; the contribution to NRF and to the Alliance operations; the capability to provide the host nation support.

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[6] Affirmation is the official recognition, by SHAPE through JFC Naples and component commands, of the fact that the structure made available to NATO meets the Alliance standards and is able to accomplish the assigned missions.

Having in mind that so far the Romanian Armed Forces have had no delays related to the accession and integration process and have fulfilled their specific commitments towards NATO, it has been expressed the intention to conclude the accession and integration programme in 2011. As a logical consequence, it has been agreed by both parties, Romanian Armed Forces and Joint Force Command Naples, to organise in Bucharest, in September 2011, the official ceremony of signing the common declaration related to the completion of the official support provided by Joint Force Command Naples to the accession and integration of Romanian Armed Forces into NATO community.

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The conduct of the transformation process has as consequence the building of military capabilities characterised by flexibility, increased speed of reaction and increased interoperability, characteristics which will provide the political-military decision-makers with a large number of opportunities to accomplish their objectives in accordance with the national interest.

The Romanian Armed Forces transformation process is not a process *per se* but the proper answer to the dynamics of the security environment, to NATO transformation and to the commitments assumed by Romania towards the European Union and other international commitments. In order to be efficient, the transformation has to be supported by the change of mentality and by the improvement of the Armed Forces professionals ability to adapt to novelty.

The Romanian Armed Forces transformation process is very complex and its success relies on a multitude of challenges and factors. Among these challenges and factors can be highlighted the need to change the mentality of decision and execution factors in relation to the way of approaching the transformation process, and the availability of the human and financial resources and of the logistic support needed for the sustainment of the transformation process.

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EVOLUTION OF MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED SOCIETY

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Considering Romania's new status, that of an EU and NATO member state, the professional training and development in support of economic growth and knowledge-based society development are the main factors that contribute to the country's competitiveness and prosperity.

The article presents the challenges posed to the world and European education systems at the beginning of the 21st century, the timeliness and importance of professional education and training in the Romanian education, as well as the major objectives of the military education institutions in this context.

Within the Romanian Armed Forces transformation and modernisation process, education and training are essential elements. Through a pragmatic and advanced education system, vector of the transformation process, the achievement of an educated and trained fighter is sought, one who has a superior managerial culture and is able to operate in a joint multinational environment.

***Keywords**: education; training; knowledge-based society; competitiveness*

The challenges of the international and European education systems at the beginning of the 21st century

As we speak, the *knowledge-based society* is being built. This requires changes in the strategies being used by international organisations in the realm of education. Whereas the main focus of these organisations was, in the '80s, the eradication of illiteracy and the development of primary and secondary school education, perceived as *"education for everyone"*, at the beginning of the 21st century, due to the influence of the IT revolution and to the changes in economic, political and social activities, the foundation of a knowledge-based society has taken precedence, UNESCO's last minute slogan being, *"Better education today for a better world tomorrow"*.

This change in attitude has been brought about by *the following fundamental trends occurring in international education systems:*

a) Expansion of higher education. Higher education is no longer elite education; it has

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gradually become mass education, exceeding public expenditure and reemphasising the problem of quality in education processes and products. The organisations tasked with managing public funds are more and more persistent in demanding to be notified of the following issues:

1. *Have education institutions drawn up the objectives that meet the requirements of society members?*
2. *Is the activity of such institutions efficient?*
3. *Is this activity effective?*

b) Globalisation of labour market and of pupil/student and teacher mobility. Quality-oriented education has highlighted a very valuable concept – *competence* and has reiterated the issue of mutual recognition of studies accomplished and qualifications got by students.

c) Continuity of human learning in a continuously changing world. The main function of the education system is no longer the transmissive one (transmitting values, knowledge etc.); the constructive function has taken precedence (building up values, knowledge, competences). *Teaching* steps back and allows *learning* to take the lead. Hence, there is a drastic change in the parts played by the teacher and the learner.

d) Democratisation of education both at system level (decentralisation, institutional autonomy etc.) *and at process level* (teacher autonomy, pupils/students' opportunity to attend courses of their own choice at their own pace etc.), aimed at establishing a democratic relationship between teacher and pupil/student, education institution/ministry of education, education institution/employers etc. Democratisation, together with the multiple choices one has with regard to getting higher education, means an increased responsibility of those involved in the education system and their awareness of the current teaching requirements. Concurrently, the issue of monitoring the quality of the education system and its products is to be considered.

e) Humanisation of the teaching process (ensuring pupils/students are free to develop their personality, allowing pupils/students to play an *active* part in learning etc.) means adjustment of the education system based on two perspectives: the need to ensure graduates meet education standards (control) and the need to adjust teaching methods to ensure pupils/students will be able to meet these requirements (facilitating learning).

Such an approach requires objectives cut out for the desired end state – changing the organisation and structure of the current education system, revolutionising the curricula from the quantitative and qualitative point of view, and fostering a more and more future-focused attitude.

The European Union is experiencing a phase of reshaping its identity and internal cohesion, in order to become a dynamic and competitive actor worldwide.

The goal of the European Union is to become "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of continuous economic growth, offering more and better jobs and being defined by social cohesion".

The challenges Europe is faced with at the beginning of the 21st century are as follows:

a) creating a qualification framework, tool which facilitates and promotes transparency, transfer and acknowledgement of qualifications and competences within the EU;
b) improving the quality and efficiency of education and professional formation systems in the EU;
c) facilitating everyone's access to education and professional formation systems;
d) ensuring openness of education and professional formation systems;
e) implementing the recommendations of the Bologna Process and developing the European Higher Education Area;
f) establishing the European research framework;
g) competing on the European education market for the best students, researchers, and curricula for master's, MBA, EMBA and doctor degrees;
h) competing to get European funds for research and integration into various networks;
i) competing with famous universities all over the world, eager to recruit their best students and which offer internationally accredited MBA and EMBA programmes;
j) implementing lifetime learning strategies, while emphasising the need to improve both the quality and the efficiency of formation and training systems and the level of public and private investments in human resource development;
k) establishing the European Common Quality Assurance Framework (CQAF), as a tool designed to support the development and reform of education and professional formation (EFP) at system and EFP provider level, while fully observing EU member states' responsibility and autonomy with regard to establishing their own strategy meant to ensure the quality of education.

These challenges require reforming the European education systems in order to make them more flexible, more coherent, and more open to the needs of the society; and capable of meeting the challenges of globalisation and the need for forming and reshaping the European workforce.

Professional formation and development opportunities in the Romanian education system

Considering Romania's current status – that of an EU and NATO member state – *professional formation and development in support of economic growth and development of a knowledge-based society* are the main factors that contribute to the country's competitiveness and prosperity.

This priority is designed as a contribution towards developing a flexible, lifelong learning path and towards facilitating access to education and formation, by providing modern and quality, initial and continuous education and formation, including higher education and research, by *restructuring and improving education and formation systems.*

Some major areas to be considered are:

1. Access to high quality initial education and professional formation.

This area is meant to support the activities aimed at restructuring and improving high school education so as to ensure everyone's increased access to high quality education and key and professional competences upon graduation.

The specific objectives of this major intervention area are:

a) making the levels of high school education compatible with the European Qualifications Framework and reorganising higher education in accordance with the provisions in the Bologna Process;
b) implementing a flexible curriculum, focused on competences required for personal development and knowledge economy;
c) speeding up school decentralisation and school repositioning within the community;
d) reforming human resource policies;
e) promoting continuous education through concrete measures;
f) promoting the entrepreneurial and active citizenship spirit in the education system and providing initial professional formation;
g) offering high school education quality assurance and management.

2. Quality in higher education

This area is meant to support the activities aimed at restructuring and improving the higher education system with a view to achieving the type of system able to make Romania a reference point in the knowledge economy and society.

The specific objectives of this major intervention area are:

a) differentiating one university from another and concentrating the resources available;
b) reforming human resource policies;
c) modernising university management and leadership;

d) differentiated and flexible financing;
e) establishing a national framework for higher education qualifications;
f) promoting entrepreneurial culture in the higher education system;
g) reorganising the research system;
h) developing and implementing the national higher education qualifications and quality assurance system;
i) improving university management and increasing universities' capability with regard to providing higher qualifications, adjusted to the continuous changes occurring on the labour market;
j) increasing the relevance of higher education for the labour market and for the knowledge-based society through better quality university education;
k) establishing and developing a national qualification system in higher education;
l) expanding learning opportunities and promoting innovation in the higher education system;
m) consolidating innovation, cooperation, and networks among universities, business environment and research centres;
n) developing and implementing the quality assurance system in universities, personnel development included;
o) increasing access to university education;
p) developing competence-based higher education (bachelor and master programmes).

3. Human resource development in professional formation and training

This area is aimed at improving initial and continuous formation, as well as the qualifications of teachers and teacher trainers.

The specific objectives of this major intervention area are:

a) improving qualifications of teachers, teacher trainers and other type of personnel involved in education and ensuring professional formation, including opportunities for career development;
b) improving the initial and continuous formation of the teaching personnel in order to ensure a high level of qualification for teachers.

4. Quality in continuous formation

This area is aimed at increasing the capacity of the system and of public and private continuing professional development (CPD) to offer quality professional formation programmes in order to increase participation in continuing professional development.

The specific objectives of this major intervention area are:

a) quality assurance and management at the CPD system level and CPD provider level;
b) development of the National Qualifications Framework, including improvement of the system used in validating professional qualifications;
c) structure and improvement of the system used for certification of prior studies;
d) development and implementation of quality assurance systems in CPD;
e) promoting the *"lifetime"* concept in education and formation.

5. Doctoral and post-doctoral programmes in support of research

This area is designed to support the activities aimed at restructuring and improving the national doctoral and post-doctoral system, which is to assure the quality of initial formation of researchers, and that of the research activities conducted within this system.

The specific objectives of this major intervention area are:

a) improving doctoral and post-doctoral programmes, including initiation and development of specific quality assurance and management systems in research.
b) encouraging post-graduates and researchers to take part in doctoral programmes and get involved in post-doctoral research activities;
c) consolidating the national doctoral and post-doctoral studies system and supporting the establishment of networks among universities, research centres and businesses;
d) drawing up and developing advanced doctoral programmes, in accordance with current community and national laws and with the Lisbon strategy;
e) diversifying types of training for post-graduates;
f) establishing and developing partnerships and other cooperation methods among universities, businesses, research centres at regional, national and European level;
g) promoting innovative – inter-regional and transnational – activities mainly aimed at supporting the interdisciplinary character of doctoral and post-doctoral formation/research programmes.

Professional formation and development – major objectives of the military education institutions

Romania's status as a NATO and EU member state has required the establishment of the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy which states that: *"The entire process of transforming and remodelling the military education system is aimed*

at achieving a flexible, efficient and economical system, in accordance with the requirements of all military personnel in the area of professional formation and development, as well as at making the Romanian military education system fully compatible with the national and Euro-Atlantic region education system, while promoting and developing the values and traditions of the Romanian Armed Forces".

Within this process of transformation and modernisation of the Armed Forces, education and training are key concepts.

Due to a pragmatic and efficient education system, vector of the transformation process, the final product will be an educated and well-trained fighter, who is very proficient in managerial issues, able to act in a combined multinational environment, to take chances, to identify critical elements or areas and to implement changes.

The constant concern of the Ministry of National Defence is establishing a modern, prospective, flexible and open military education system, appropriate for the process of transformation and modernisation of the Romanian Armed Forces, the requirements of the market economy, and pupils/students' sense of achievement through:

a) efficient management at the systemic, structural, methodological, technical levels, aimed at building an *"innovative school"* as a step marking the evolution in military education, in order to ensure interoperability with NATO and EU member states' armed forces in this area.

b) establishing a uniform education curriculum drawing up and developing system *in a uniform, integrated, phased and differentiated concept, based on various types of schools*, by adjusting the contents to basic training requirements and by implementing a system of transferable credits within the continuous formation and career development process;

c) projecting and implementing, at ministry level, an integrated, uniform, coherent and explicit education quality assurance management system, based on self-assessment and institutional development, able to ensure constant competitiveness of the military institution on the labour market;

d) establishing a teaching staff extremely competent and highly motivated for their professional development in the military education system, by integrating this staff into a coherent continuous formation system and promoting professionalism (loyalty, responsibility, integrity, respect, team spirit, communication and openness with regard to education quality management), in order to promote excellence at institutional level;

e) improving the system of teaching methodologies and types of education organisations, so that the entire teaching process can become practical/applied;

f) making the information flow and cooperative relationships at the level of the military education system, as well as with similar military and civilian institutions belonging to other NATO or EU member states more efficient;

g) developing and modernising teaching assets, the main focus being IT and implementing distance learning, made possible by cutting edge technologies;

h) finalising and implementing the provisions stipulated in NATO publications, standards and requirements with regard to organising and conducting teaching activities.

In the current context of reorientation of the Romanian education system towards a formative system, based on competences directly required on the labour market, in a Europe that integrates and harmonises its education systems, as well as in the context of the latest NATO policies with regard to training, the main concern of the military education institutions is to ensure a higher quality of education and training.

Actions taken in this respect by military education institutions are aimed at:

a) continuous improvement of education quality, so as to make it compatible with current national and international practice;

b) adjustment of the teaching process to the objectives and imperatives of making the Romanian Armed Forces' units fully operational, so that graduates are better trained, able to efficiently and competitively meet the requirements of the units they are assigned to, and to act professionally in multiple and complex situations;

c) involvement of the leadership of the military education institutions, as well as of each and every teacher, of all personnel – auxiliary and other types of personnel involved in the teaching process – in defining and ensuring education quality;

d) continuous formation of the Romanian Armed Forces personnel in tune with that of NATO and EU member states' armed forces, thus allowing the use of one of the most consistent integration means – integration through education.

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OPTIMISATION OF LEARNING METHODS OF PUPILS AND STUDENTS IN THE MILITARY EDUCATION THROUGH REAL/FICTIONAL ACTION

Colonel Dr BEng Gheorghe ŢUCUNETE

In methodological terms, if the future pays more and more importance to behavioural disciplines, it is natural for actional methods to gain a growing importance, being aimed at developing and improving psychomotor abilities, practical skills.

For developing practical skills, military education institutions must have available modern, special simulators, through which military pupils/students will be able to train in various types of activities related to learning how to use pieces of military equipment and techniques belonging to the Romanian Armed Forces.

The ease in thinking develops through repeated exercise of diverse problems solving; skilfulness and practical abilities are also acquired through exercise; attitude is developed always looking at a phenomenon from new perspectives etc. In all these cases, behavioural patterns are acquired directly through practice and exercise.

***Keywords**: operational methods; role-plays; combat disposition; military culture*

The didactic method between two exigencies – virtuosity and creativity

Given the circumstances in which military art becomes increasingly connected to practice, the military education must apply theoretical knowledge in practical activities and thus ensure the completion of a correct cycle of the education process.

To train military cadres for *an active, creative life* requires that school life itself should be active, manifest a large openness towards activities that attract the military personnel to the creation of material values.

"Learning through action" presents an overwhelming importance for the development of military cadres. *"The pedagogy of the future will be a pedagogy that will seek to capitalise profoundly on the solidarity between hand and brain, in the idea that the dexterity of one can often attract the development of the other"*[1].

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[1] I. Cerghit, *Metode de învăţământ,* Editura Polirom, 2006.

Military education must accomplish this dialectical unity between theory and practice, in the idea that aquiring culture, science does not represent an aim in itself and for itself, but serves to creating activity, and finds its embodiment in action, in practical behaviours. After all, as Henri Janne, former Belgian Minister of Education, states, from now on it will be about *"… less of learning for knowing, but learning for acting"*.

A true military culture does not establish in the life of a person unless it can find correspondence in practice, a capitalisation as absolute as possible in the field of material creation. To know means to do, to act, to achieve; learning for knowing is naturally completed by learning for acting.

In this view, the pupils/students will acquire not only scientific knowledge, but also skills of action, behaviours that are suitable for work, beneficial for all their life.

"Operational methods", which facilitate *the transfer* of knowledge between the theoretical and the practical plane, are used in military education institutions.

The current methodology must face the assimilation of some standardised behaviours that make possible the execution of action, which let room for *"own activity"* and *"spontaneity"*. This means that the methods, which present a simple practice and application of certain executive skills and knowledge, are completed by a large and nuanced variety of *practical works* that need searches, determinations, alternatives and personal experiences etc.

Some of them have a prolongation and a novel completion in the so-called *simulation methods* (based on simulated, fictive action – role-plays, learning through dramatisation, learning on simulators etc), also working in support of an authentic activity.

Methods based on real action

❖ *The method of exercise (practice)*

The ease in thinking develops itself through the repeated exercise of resolving diverse problems; dexterity and practical abilities are obtained through exercise as well; the attitude is also formed always watching a phenomenon from new perspectives etc. The behavioural models are obtained only through practice and exercise in all these cases.

The reality is that learning motor (manual) and mental (intellectual) skills is not done through *"verbal communication"*; they can be obtained neither through a verbal sentence nor through a simple mention.

A pupil/student will not be able to learn to represent graphically the main elements of a combat disposition only by watching the trainer who presents the action; he will not learn to explain and think by listening to a soldier who speaks

and thinks well; he will not learn to drive a combat vehicle by watching the others how they drive it. Often, the skills cannot be acquired through indications. For becoming accustomed to an action, the pupil/student must try, do, remake, repeat until he has the model of the respective action.

The method of learning through exercise[2] (practice) means the rehearsal of the execution of a movement, action, behavioural forms until the automatic control, until the formation of skills as automated reactions or answers to a well defined situation (standardised or closed situations).

The exercise has, therefore, the significance of development of some immediate and sure answers, of the type of some closed skills which are specific to closed/ standard situations; it imposes itself as a rapid and effective method to acquire such new skills and behaviours.

Time is saved in the preparation period through exercise; the immediately useful element is sought; the control of acquired knowledge is made easily through comparison with the behaviour model; the time of reaction can also be measured easily; thus, it is ensured the identity between the trained ones etc.

The method of practice through the execution of a direct action is part of the area of *"learning by doing"*.

However, although it seams paradoxical, exercise does not always and necessarily have a character of reproduction (repetition), it is not just a technique of repetition and transfer. In this hypostasis, the practical exercise is included in another conception – *learning by doing* – which is an active method that detaches the essential and raises the studied material at a higher understanding.

Practicing also means certain mental or motor (organic) functions going through a repeated effort, with a view to developing and keeping them fit. Thus, the practical exercise is part of the category of training techniques, but, and we underline this again, it must not be understood in the sense of mechanical repetition, of repeated actions.

The whole training and education activity has the significance of an exercise that ultimately seeks to endow the future graduates with skills, customs and general abilities of ordered and effective work, which should allow them to continue, on their way, the effort of a continuous self-improvement.

❖ *Project method*

It was inspired from the principle of learning through practical action, with a real finality (*learning by doing*), which will also ensure the necessary motivation or legitimacy.

In the initial stage, the project method represented a more comprehensive way of organising the education process, in keeping with which the education

[2] *Ibidem.*

discipline was divided into an ensemble of projects, closer to the centre of interest (and not into study objectives), which pupils/students would accomplish effectively, in a determined period.

The current orientations, arisen from the necessity of achieving a closer connection between theory and practice, between training and scientific research, provide fresh impetus to the promotion of the projects, while assigning them other significance, content and another place in the system of training activity.

The project method is used in combination with other methods; it loses its feature of predominant method claiming to cover all the tasks, even where it had the monopoly decades ago. Unlike other methods that regard the evocation, reconstitution, rendering, description or explication of a past activity, the project is aimed to accomplish an action in the future, it is a fragment of the creation activity of the individual. It places the subject (as an individual or as a team) in the middle of an action, assigning it an active and main role in its achievement, determining it not only to imagine, to built on the mental plane, but also to put into practice, to find the means and resources of translating into reality what they prefigured. The accomplishment of the project needs documentation, visits, formulation of hypotheses, lab, workshop, field etc. activities, finding solutions and checking them, drawing conclusions etc.

The confrontation with veridical situations unleashes effervescence on the mental plane, it encourages to exploration, and the project execution strengthens the own spirit of responsibility, it brings the pupil/student near to the complex world he/she meets in life, it contributes to the development of thinking.

Simulation methods based on fictional action

➢ *General aspects*

Simulating is similar to miming, imitating, reproducing in a fictional way actions, systems, phenomena etc. that are actually absent, but creating the impression that they exist or they are really happening[3].

The analogy relying on rigorous analyses of facts lies at the basis of simulation methods.

The as direct as possible implication of the participants (pupils or students) in simulated situations or circumstances can take varied forms, starting with *didactical games* and continuing with *simulation games, learning on simulators* etc. It is often hard to make a clear distinction between the enunciated variants. It is also possible the combination between the simulated and the unsimulated activities, for example role-play with case study and group debate.

[3] M. Ştefan, *Lexicon Pedagogic*, Editura Aramis, Bucureşti, 2006.

➢ *The method of role-play*

In a larger pedagogical perspective, there is the problem if the way education is organised can take the form of some actions with game feature. If the answer is yes, how much from the didactic activity can be dominated by game? And what exact consequences can such actions of learning have on development?

Different types of *didactic games* or *education games* were developed, which provide the connection and all spontaneous transitions possible between funny elements and those related to work, learning, in the idea that the serious study effort made will pay off.

Simulation games are conceived and recommended as methods of exploration and deformation, of the perception of dynamic relations in a system (originally, they were practiced in the military and economic domain). Essentially, this is about the simulation of a situation (sometimes conflictual, for making a decision) in relation to the given topic.

The method of simulation games experiences today a growing expansion, being surrounded by the mathematical theory of games, of probability calculus, decisions theory and role theory.

In varied and adequate forms, it can be applied everywhere where a situation of learning can be transposed in a game model.

➢ *The method of training on simulators*

Through the agency of a simulator, one seeks to create an ambiance as closer as possible to the one that is in the real action, based on the utilisation of the original technical system, in the framework of school activity.

For example, simulators that reproduce identically the devices and technique for manoeuvre that exist onboard the motor vehicle, ship, aircraft etc. are used for the development of some correct skills for driving military motor vehicles[4].

During the training period on such improved technique, the teacher/trainer has the possibility to vary as much as possible the circumstances that accompany the act of driving, navigation, piloting etc. He can vary the situations in which pupils/students will find immediate and adequate situations, such as: adjusting speed, recognising and respecting the road signs; various atmospheric disturbances; dangerous or difficult situations; different technical deficiencies.

In order to asses the accomplished performance, simulators are sometimes provided with devices that successively record and measure the deviation of pupils/students compared to the standard (reaction or execution time, number of attempts, useless, erroneous operations, nature of mistakes etc.).

[4] R. M. Gagné underlines that it is not necessary for the built simulator to reproduce the original one entirely: there can be simulated only some operations or tasks about its utilisation in activity.

Pupils/students can be then asked to examine their performance, assess the consequences of the errors made, to improve themselves in full security etc. The audiovisual lab for learning foreign languages can be considered a complex system that provides conditions for making some *exercises of simulated communication*, quickening the rhythm of acquiring some skills or structures of correct and operating speaking.

The possibilities of computer simulation have proved a high efficiency today. For example, with the help of some simulators that need some electronic computers (in which special parameters are introduced for every type of aircraft, ship etc.), the young men who are trained in these domains become familiarised with the necessary manoeuvres, handling the multitude of board and command instruments in diverse suggested conditions. An increased interest for building or adapting some devices that simulate the systems of the human body etc. can be noticed in the medical education. *"Electronic patients"* can notice promptly and correctly the wrong manoeuvres and explain the nature of the errors committed with a view to conscious self-correction. That means the simulator can become concomitantly an object (patient) on which students learn and a subject (teacher) correcting the mistakes.

Learning through simulation and on simulators has become extremely topical in the circumstances of an extremely special training of some teams that are to be assigned special missions in using modern technical pieces of equipment for the accomplishment of the mission.

Possible sources generating new methods

The question is*: "Eventually, where will new methods appear from?"*. Of course, it is hard to foresee, but considering things by making an analogy with what has happened lately in this respect, then, that question would find an explication in:

- *the transfer* of methods from the scientific research domain to didactic activity;
- *the acquirement and adaptation* of some specific methods: case study, role-play, tactical situation analysis, projects development based on orders etc.
- *the capitalisation on the education potential of the new information and communication technologies* of multimedia systems;
- *the scientific research* proper to education in combination with the *practical experience of school,* an inexhaustible source of new methodical procedures.

To conclude, we should underline that in education, like in any other domain of activity, the variety and combination rise from human creativity.

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LESSONS LEARNED
– An Appeal to History and Symbol –

Colonel Dănuţ VACARIU

History shows that "lessons learned" have represented a major concern of all historians from days of yore to the scientific steps taken today in different armed forces.

In order for us to understand the state of a certain system at a given moment, we can resort to history or discover the things on our own and, in this case, everything will seem extremely complicated.

The coat of arms of lessons learned is composed of the symbolic badge and the descriptive blazon, linked through a ring. This is also the logo of this field of activity of the lessons.

The symbolism of the two heraldic elements suggests the lessons learned resulted following the after-action analysis carried out after the fight.

Keywords: *lessons learned; history; after-action analysis; fight*

The approach initiated by the concept of *"lessons learned"* is by excellence focused on a pivot represented by actions, facts, past events that impacted an operational result at a given moment, but also on a pivot that reflects those lessons and parables into symbols.

If present approaches that try to conceptualise in a proper way the semantic field of *"lessons learned"* are laborious, history has proven that lessons learned have represented a main concern for all the historians starting the ancient times until the scientific approaches initiated nowadays in different armies. In order to understand the state of a system at a specific moment in time, we can initiate an appeal to history or we can discover those things by ourselves and in this case everything will be extremely difficult.

"In ancient times, every young man used to learn, starting the first years of life, according to the possibilities provided by the family state of wealth, from his father, uncle or grandfather to ride a horse, to shoot a bow, to throw a spear, to handle an axe or a mace. It can explain the battle mastery proven by Valachian, Moldavian or Transylvanian archers, pikemen or horsemen in several confrontations with the enemy. A great interest in learning military skills was shown by the young

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men chosen to take over leading positions in national military hierarchy, mainly by the young men in the ruling families. Regarding Vlad Ţepeş (Vlad the Impaler), for instance, ancient documents show that he was taught how to swim, ride, throw a mace and shoot a bow at the age of 6"[1].

"At royal courts contests were organised in order to create the possibility for young men endowed with fighting skills to be remarked by military leaders or even by the king. Some of those contests are mentioned in ancient documents. For example, the Italian chronicler Ciro Spontoni mentioned that, in Târgovişte Royal Court, the ruler Radu Şerban organised: knightly tournaments and hunting parties. Paul de Strasbourg – the Sweden envoy to the Ottoman Porte – visited our territory and, in 1692, mentioned that in Valachia «knightly tournaments» included «exercises with a lance, horse ridings, bow shootings, rifle firings and shootings»"[2].

Nicolae Iorga in *The History of the Romanian Army* illustrates two lessons learned from the time of *Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt (Stephen the Great and Holy)*, one lesson on victory and another on defeat.

The lesson on *defeat* records: *"The defeat cannot have a decisive significance. The king* «steps aside» *and waits for his time. That is why, Radu cel Frumos (Radu the Beautiful), a Laiotă, a Ţepeluş, when defeated, could come to light in a short while.* «Do gather as many as decided to stay with you, and withdraw with them, and do not flee from your country, but stay within your borders, in some hidden and secret places, where your true and good friends are; your enemies that come against you do not stay in your country for a long time, and they go back, and the ruler that brings those men to your country is left there alone, with no troops. Therefore, taking this fact into consideration and praying to Jesus for help, fight against that particular ruler».

In this way Ştefan acted, after the Valea Albă defeat"[3].

The lesson on *victory* records: *"If victory is obtained, then the enemy should be driven out of the country. Neagoe advises the winner not to be proud, but to act with humility.* «And, if you are the winner, do not praise yourself and say that you with your power have done that! But praise the Lord, with pray, mercy and sacrifice». *After that provide a religious service for the sacrificed ones, and help their families. Do distribute gifts with justice.* «The gifts and honour must be in accordance with the work provided; as they risk their life they must be rewarded, you should think this way», *share* «honours and goods for their work»*". Ştefan used*

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[1] Dumitru Atanasiu, *Contribuţii la istoria învăţământului militar din România. Perioada 1830-1900*, Editura Militară, 1972, p. 7.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 8.

[3] Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria armatei româneşti*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1970, p. 109.

to do so after his victories, as it is known. The Church for God, the feast for him and his military leaders, and sharing of lands"[4].

References to ancient parables are made in recent times, too: *"Indeed, regarding this issue, the Treaty of Adrianople stipulates: for quarantine service and for maintaining the safety of borders and for preserving a functional state of relations in towns, as well as for obeying laws and regulations, the administration of any principality must keep in duty a number of soldiers for such missions. The number and money for such militias must be within the ruler's competence and based on ancient parables regarding such matters"*[5].

The lessons learned from the battlefield are also invoked: *"In April 1833, the Chief of Militia in the Moldavian Principality, the army leader and the knight of Balş, recommended, among other measures, preparing the deployment in a training camp, as a duty promoted by army's cadets to know «the soldier codes of law as in the printed regulation» and, at the same time, to know the lessons learned from the battlefield"*[6].

Around the First World War, Colonel Teodor Georgescu, who completed each military hierarchy from Second Lieutenant, obtained in 1885, to Colonel, obtained in 1912, was invested in the following year the Commander of the Second Artillery Regiment *"General de Divizie Gheorghe Manu"* and recorded some lessons learned, out of which we quote: *"In personal orientation matters, as much curiosity as possible does not do any harm:*

Let us not be nervous during battles.

Let us promote tranquility and strength of character.

Officers are not allowed to complain among them, while soldiers assist, regarding different shortcomings or bad weather, because all of them have bad effects upon soldiers.

The infantry must be well trained in executing transient fortification work.

Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers must perfectly know how to use explosives.

For reconnaissance, during the current war, the services rendered by cavalry were quite small because these forces came across infantry troops that could not be pasassed by.

The Serbian field artillery tried hard to obtain great effects in short time.

In order to achieve those results, the Serbian artillery used to choose opened positions or little disguised ones behind peaks for executing direct fire; knew how to build cannon shelters and after that disguised them.

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[4] *Ibidem.*
[5] Dumitru Atanasiu, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
[6] *Ibidem.*

The artillery commander duty is to prevent the enemy commander intentions, by being in connection all the time with commanders and with forward fire lines. Commanders should mutually communicate the news regarding the enemy.

The French airplanes can release, among others, a projectile that contains liquid air that explodes when landing and destroys everything on a 5-6-metre area.

The airplanes will be shot down only when flying at low altitude and when they are proved to be enemy planes. When the engine noise is heard, all movements should be avoided and to do this the following actions should be initiated: 1. In training camps everyone should enter the houses; 2. Near a forest, everyone should enter the forest; 3. Near a slope, a fence or a wall, the troops should stick as much as possible where the shadow is bigger.

The use of asphyxiating gases in modern war is viewed as a triumph of engineers. This fact can easily compensate for the lack of explosives. During the testing period the use of gases on a battlefield has provided very good results so that in the near future the explosives will surely be replaced with gases.

It would be better to count only on second line resources, in conclusion, on an intensive organisation of supplies and transport from the country to the army.

There are causes that produce lulls during the battle, for instance fatigue, but the common one is the lack of ammunition and the impossibility for immediate supplies"[7].

For a satisfactory representation of the pivot illustrated by history related to the concept of *"lessons learned"*, in the next few lines, we will remind several foreign well-known expressions and a lesson learned from a German Order released on the Western Front that reflects situations as if they were *"…brand new"*[8].

How can we start the series of foreign well-known expressions if not with:

➢ *"Tre cose, sire: dinari, dinari, e poi dinari"*[9] (*"Three problems, sir: money, money and again money!"* – is the answer provided by Marshal Trivulzio to Louis XII to the question on the means of a possible war for the conquest of Milan/1499).

➢ *"Tout est perdu, hors l'honneur!"*[10] (*"Everything is lost besides honour!"* – Francis I, the King of France wrote these words to his mother, after the defeat at Pavia/1525), where he became a prisoner and was sent to Spain. He was referring to the fact that, defeated, the French people proved in battle their traditional bravery. The expression is used here, with a tinge of mockery, for those who comfort themselves with the remains of old prestige, after losing a brilliant position).

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[7] Colonel T. Georgescu, *Cele trei regulamente*, Institutul de Arte Grafice *"Carol Göbl"*, Bucureşti, 1916.
[8] Mihai Eminescu, *Poezii*, Editura Jurnalul Naţional, Bucureşti, 2010, p. 549.
[9] I. Berg, *Dicţionar de cuvinte, expresii şi citate celebre*, Editura Vestala, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 329.
[10] *Ibidem*.

➢ *The sword of Damocles*[11] – Damocles, a courtier at Dionysius the Elder, the Tyrant of Siracuse, who lived around 400 BC was the same as other courtiers... courteous and flatterer. He used to say that there was no other happiness than to be a tyrant. In order to teach him a *lesson*, Dionysius, during a feast, placed Damocles in his king chair and ordered to be honoured as a king used to be. When Damocles was in the middle of the feast, the tyrant ordered him to look up. On the ceiling, above Damocles head was a sword, with no scabbard, suspended on a horse hair. In this manner he wanted to show the dangers that lurk an oppressor every moment. The expression the *sword of Damocles* became famous for situations that reflect perpetual dangers that endanger a person. The image seduced Horatio, the poet, who referred to it in Ode I: Districtus ensis cui super impia Cervice pendet... *(The sword that hangs above the bad head...)*. The event, narrated by Cicero, gave birth to a well-known expression. *"The soldiers went to Paris. Their entry represented for the Republic the sword of Damocles"*. (A.I. Herzen, *Letters from France and Italy* – 1848).

➢ *"England expects that every man will do his duty!"*[12]. The fight order given by Admiral Horatio Nelson (1758-1805) to the English fleet during the Battle of Trafalgar (24 October 1805), when he defeated the united fleet of France and Spain. During the mentioned conflict the Admiral lost his life.

➢ *"A horse, a horse! My kingdom for a horse!"*[13], Shakespeare, Richard III, V, 4 (1529). This exclamation was uttered by Richard III (1483-1485) in the Battle of Bosworth (1485), where the king was killed. This quotation is used when someone wants to sacrifice everything he can in order to obtain a desired effect.

The lesson we can learn from a German order released on the Western Front is the following: *"How can be maintained at a high level the moral state of soldiers? To support an example of good internal state for accomplishing the mission, to take care of food, health, rest and recreation of the people, to recognise in time the men without force, upset, a little lonely, to talk to them in order to stop them to harm others. A good moral state is the most important factor that leads to victory"*[14].

Regarding victory and defeat we find lessons learned in military Chinese thinking, too. This literature was written by Sun Tzu, about 2 500 years ago and is known as *The Art of War*, or *The Thirteen Articles*. The lessons on defeat

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[11] *Ibidem*, p. 357.

[12] Marian Barbu, *Dicţionar de citate şi locuţiuni străine*, Editura Enciclopedică Română, Bucureşti, 1973, p. 288.

[13] *Ibidem*, p. 283.

[14] Romanian Military Archive, The library fund, C file, ff. 636-647.

record: *"You must know that there are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:*

By commanding the army to advance or retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called «hobbling the army».

By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.

By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away"[15].

Regarding victory forecast, the same author reveals to us the following lesson: *"You must know that there are five cases that victory can be foreseen:*

He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.

He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.

He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign. You have just seen the five precise cases that describe the ways to victory"[16].

A lesson about militarism was mentioned over 2 500 years ago by Sun Bin, the strategist that overcame his master, the famous Sun Tzu:

"Those who enjoy militarism, however, will perish; and those who are ambitious for victory will be disgraced. War is not something to enjoy, victory is not an object of ambition"[17].

Moreover, from the reign of Lieutenant Colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza we chose for our approach the next lessons learned: *"He distinguished himself for the constant attention paid for the cultural life in general and especially for the learning process – starting with elementary school and finishing with the University – … establishing, by the law in 1864, compulsory and free of charge elementary education for both boys and girls, thus extending secondary education by establishing such schools in the most important towns of the country. He established two Universities,*

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[15] Sun Tzu, *Arta războiului*, Editura Militară, București, 1976, p. 40.

[16] *Ibidem,* p. 41.

[17] Thomas Cleary, *Sun Tzu II (The Strategist who Overcame his Master).The Noble Art of War*, Editura Incitatus, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 20.

one in Iaşi – bearing the name of the ruler, and another one in Bucureşti. He also established other special schools: a Conservatoire, a Fine Arts School and a Forestry School, replacing finally the Cyrillic alphabet with the ancestral Latin one"[18].

The importance of Education Law from 1864 is described as follows: *"Long and carefully elaborated, the law synthesised Cuza and his partners concept about school and refreshed the Romanian system of education for more than thirty years, exactly 34, being one of the most enduring laws of Romanian modern times"*[19].

During the period of Cuza reign a network of military institutes was also created in order to assure the personnel requirements of the army, mainly officers, based on prior education according to a targeted image of military man. Thus, *"an Officers School was founded by reorganising the Officers School from Valachia founded in 1847, which, until 1859, assured a small part of the officers in the Valachian army"*. This decision was based on *"the Regulation of the Military School in Bucureşti"* approved by the ruler on 30 March 1860[20], document that contributed, in our opinion, to the transformation of military lessons learned in organised education.

This document is a source of inspiration for us, lying at the basis of establishing the Lessons Learned Anniversary Day, every year, in June. According to the mentioned regulation, June was the month when the evaluating exams for lessons learned were sustained.

The Anniversary Day of Lessons Learned in the Romanian Armed Forces is established on 15 June. The significance of the pieces of advice regarding the importance of lessons learned and the necessity of having them in mind when we project the future are underlined by Mihai Eminescu in the following rhymes: *"What has been and what to be/Are but of a page each part,/Which the world do read is free/Yet who knows them off by heart;/All that was and is to come/Prospers in the present too,/But its narrow modicum/You image and construe"*[21].

In the final part of this paper dedicated to *military lessons learned* in order to improve permanently the army activities, we present to you the motto of the domain *Lessons Learned* in the Romanian Armed Forces:

"He will respond to the prayer of the destitute; he will not despise their plea;

Let this be written for a future generation, that a people not yet created may praise the Lord"[22].

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[18] Constantin C. Giurescu, *Alexandru Ioan Cuza*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1973, p. 89.
[19] *Ibidem*, p. 91.
[20] Dumitru Atanasiu, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
[21] Mihai Eminescu, *op. cit.*, p. 550.
[22] *Noul Testament, cu psalmii*, Editura Institutului biblic şi de misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, Bucureşti, Psalm 101, A prayer of one overwhelmed with trouble, 18-19 verses, p. 49.

Hoping that the pivot based on history from the Lessons Learned concept has been suggestively revealed through the presented examples, we will continue with the pivot based on symbol, by presenting the connections embedded in the *Lessons Learned* symbol in the Romanian Armed Forces.

Communication science underlines the fact that *"an image can value more than one thousand words"*; one of the lessons learned provided by this discipline is as follows: *"The organisational culture begins with symbols. The brand image of an organisation comprises a name, a logo and clothing elements of identification (the well-known uniform in the case of security and public order structures) etc. All mentioned elements must belong to a single organisation. In this way an organisation can define itself in relation with other organisations, and can be easily recognised by the public"*[23].

We conclude our approach by presenting the Lessons Learned coat of arms. The coat of arms is a military honorific distinction being in the same time the logo of Lessons Learned in the Romanian Armed Forces. The coat of arms consists of a symbolic badge and a descriptive blazon, connected through a ring. This is the logo of the lessons learned domain of activity.

The symbolism of the two mentioned heraldic elements suggests the lessons learned generated by after-action review.

The descriptive blazon, created on a heraldic shield, nominated in Latin, *Scuta Rhombata*, has a single partition that comprises the next elements:

- in the upper part, a red heraldic flower, symbolising the *"reward of the battle"*, is the flower given by the princess of the tournament at the end of it. The red colour symbolises the *"price of the battle"*, representing the blood spilt by the fighters and finally the *lesson learned* from the battle;
- in the central part, there are two medieval mounted knights, a white and a black one, having their tournament laces crossed, symbolising the battle. The horses symbolise the chess game and the strategies developed by each player;

[23] Gheorghe Boblea, *Comunicare şi ordine publică*, Societatea scriitorilor români, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 150.

- in the lower part, the white silhouette of *"the Hamangia thinker"* represents the after-action review as a generator of *lessons learned*. The white colour of the thinker symbolises the fair-play of the person that works in the domain of *Lessons Learned*, supported through transparency and impartiality. The silhouette of the thinker is designed after the clay statue embedded in Hamangia civilisation (5000 BC – 3000/2000 BC), considered by experts to be a masterpiece from the Neolithic Anthropomorphic Art with a worldwide value.

The symbolic badge reproduces the symbols from the describing blazon having as a central piece the *Thinker*, framed by two *"L"* letters, from the English words *lessons learned*, symbolised by the chess horse routes. The inclination of the letters symbolises the end of the battle and the start of the after-action review. The red colour of the heraldic flower from the descriptive blazon is transferred to the nomination of the domain of activity from the symbolic badge.

ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES CULTURAL SYSTEM
– A "Necessary Evil" in the Present and in the Future –

Colonel (AF) Ionel STOICA

The Armed Forces and the Romanian Orthodox Church are the institutions with the highest level of trust on the part of the population in these times of profound transformations. People are aware that the military have been the backbone of the nation and they support the idea of enhancing, renewing and integrating the country in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The main purpose of the military is to train and educate own personnel for defending the country, spiritual values, national and military traditions.

In the Ministry of National Defence, the specialised structure in the field of cultural management is the Military Traditions and Culture Section, *which draws up projects of orders, strategies, guidelines, methodologies, measures, concepts and programmes regarding military traditions and civic education in the armed forces, and provides specialised assistance to those in charge of military traditions.*

***Keywords**: cultural management; military culture system; military traditions; civic education*

The Romanian Armed Forces are a permanent factor of culture and education that analyse and spread systematically and selectively those values of the national and universal culture which represent interest to forming the own personnel and participate in the value exchange with the society. The vectors of national security and defence, participation in the abroad missions within the new context also depend decisively on the level of the cultural system. Transition and reform, the interests of other states to impose their culture – a feature of globalisation we unconditionally accept, have permanently removed the necessary time and preoccupation to issue the own enduring cultural model to be implemented in the military. Having always something to recover, we adapt some concepts and designs of education without analysing the way a soldier perceives emotionally and motivationally this lasting transition period and its cultural connotations.

The functionality of the military system management also means the interaction

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between the human factor and combat. This has been shaping to the desired models, mainly through culture and education that make the interest for the state, level and quality of the cultural management be *"a top priority"* of the military leadership.

Professional military require a new managerial design of the cultural system, in order to increase the effectiveness of this domain of the military activity. The themes and strategic coordinates of the cultural management elements have at their basis fundamental principles expressing the complexity and thoroughness of the spiritual transformation at the Romanian society level – the autonomy of the culture and art, freedom of creation – a Romanian spiritual and feeling succession. All of them rely on equality to the own culture and national identity within the international value circuit.

The goal of the Romanian Armed Forces cultural system

The Romanian Armed Forces cultural system has as a main goal the creation of the availabilities necessary for the access to the Romanian and universal spiritual values able to form and develop feelings, knowledge and skills to all the personnel categories of the military.

At the same time, this system provides the formation of an attitude proper to the cultural values and national symbols, facilitates the process of information and acquisition of new knowledge in order to become responsible citizens with an outstanding capacity of discrimination, attached to the fundamental ethical, moral, religious and military core values, with a positive attitude upon the rule of law and the military institution, responsible for their combat training, with a developed sense of duty and military discipline, resistant to a prolonged effort and the hostile psychological and ideological pressure.

The objectives of the Romanian Armed Forces cultural system

The military cultural system, conceptually, should promote the cultural interests of the military and prove the contributor (the civil society) that the military institution is incompatible with the party ideology and propaganda, being exclusively subordinated to its training interests and objectives, in accordance with the requirements of the constitution and the laws of our country.

The objectives of the cultural system in the military are:

- provision of a modern cultural environment in which one should stress the knowledge and respect for the fundamental values of the national and universal culture involved in the military life and activity;

- formation of military professionals with a high level of general, technical-scientific, civic and religious culture, and of personalities integrated in an education system strongly based on values and norms, able to fulfil the entrusted missions;
- formation of the military pupils and students as future military leaders, strong personalities, with high military qualities, and a strong professional and general cultural education with outstanding and adequate managerial and actional skills;
- forming up volunteer soldiers as fighters with a high level of professional and general culture according to the requirements of modern battlespace;
- preservation, among the reserve personnel, veterans and the family members of the militaries, of the motivational tonus with regard to the supreme values of national security;
- cultivation and transmission of the Romanian people combat traditions, preservation of the cult of national heroes;
- promotion of the military fundamental values, increase in the civic respect regarding the national and the military values and symbols;
- preservation and development of the military's cultural patrimony;
- preservation and development of the cultural relations of the Romanian Armed Forces with other states' armies.

The target personnel are: the military and civil personnel, volunteer soldiers and NCOs, military students, war vets, their families and the young generation.

The courses of action to achieve the objectives of the Romanian Armed Forces cultural system

The courses of action to achieve these objectives are the following:

- selection of the personnel who manage the activity of promoting the military traditions and civic education;
- training through courses, convocations and practical and methodical activities of the specialised personnel, in order to promote military traditions and civic education;
- issuing the regulations in this field and continuously updating the existing ones according to the country's legislation;
- provision of the human and financial resources necessary for the cultural activity at all the levels of the military hierarchy;

- achievement and reshaping of that infrastructure allowing the accomplishment of the established objectives in the military traditions, culture and civic education domain;
- adaptation of the material basis and improvement of the cultural products according to the proposed purposes and objectives, the beneficiary's requirements and training;
- structural and functional reshaping of the military's culture institutions in order to achieve compatibility with the civil society.

Predictable courses of action

The process of making fully professional military also imposes a new reform process in the field of cultural management with approaches in the following directions:

- creation in all the military structures of a stimulating cultural and social climate, based on the individual responsibility for own training, the enlargement of the manifestation and promotion horizon of the national and universal cultural values;
- diversification and enhancement of the military cultural institution activity in order to increase the forming effort and the integration of the military in the cultural life of the civil society;
- creation of the material and spiritual conditions necessary to promote the specific criteria of value and of selecting the military art and culture at national and garrison level;
- enhancement of the contribution of the military cultural activity to issuing and developing the social protection projects of the military personnel with forming effects for the youth involved in the cultural activities of the military institutions;
- initiation and gradual development, according to the economic and financial conditions, of the reform in the institution system of the military cultural establishments, upgrading of equipment and services of these institutions, in accordance with the standards and requirements at the European and NATO levels;
- increase in the cultural activity contribution to establishing the correct perception of the reality within the Romanian Armed Forces, in the civil society, and to promoting the fundamental interests of national security at national and international levels;
- establishment of an outstanding quality shift with regard to the management of military culture;

- assessment of procurement and establishment of the priorities regarding the fund allocation for the personnel education activity.

The cultural system in the military comprises specialised cultural institution, conduct and coordination structures, specialised personnel and participants in the support of the cultural system, the system legislation and normative framework, the infrastructure and financial-material resources and, last but not least, the relations among the system elements.

The main military cultural system forms of *"expression"* are the military traditions and the civic education. We will try, in a scholastic and concise manner, to present each domain, with its own forms of manifestation, without claiming that our appreciations are exhaustive and they do not accept improvement.

In our opinion, military traditions represent a set of concepts, customs, beliefs, manifestations, actions and symbols that – being accepted, assimilated and kept for a long time by society and having a direct connection to the specific feature of the military environment – become important means for developing the patriotic feelings, the military dignity and pride, the sacrifice spirit and the attachment for the permanent military values and esprit de corps.

Trying, in the same scholastic manner, to define the civic education, we conclude that this one represents a set of objectives, principles, individual and/or collective manifestations which have the purpose to transmit knowledge, to form reliable attitudes and to cultivate the national and international values. The civic education is a component part of the national education system, as well as the military education process, of forming and perfecting the military and civil personnel.

Continuing our approach, we consider that *the domain of military traditions* finds the following forms of manifestation:

a) anniversary and/or commemoration of the events with outstanding significance in the life and the history of the Romanian people and Armed Forces;
b) celebration of the Day of the Romanian Armed Forces, the days of services, branches;
c) adoption and use of the heraldic signs;
d) granting the honorary names to some large units, units and military education institutions, as well as to their graduates;
e) adoption of the identification banner;
f) adoption of the spiritual patrons;
g) medal awarding for units and veterans;
h) evocation of the unit's heroes;

i) marking the important events out of the life and activity of the military structures and their personnel, such as: setting up and disbanding some structures, handing over the combat colours, graduation of the military education institutions, giving and/or promotion in rank of the militaries, passing to reserve and retreat of the military personnel and to pension of the civil personnel in the military etc.

j) Romanian heroes and martyrs cult;

k) coordination of the activity of museums and tradition halls;

l) guidance for organising the galleries of portraits.

In this context, in our opinion, the specific forms of manifestation of the military tradition activities are anniversaries, commemorations and military ceremonies.

Anniversaries are organised on the occasion of celebrating a number of years from the date of an event that has beneficial consequences for the country and the military, from the birth of some military or civil personalities etc. Anniversaries usually take place at monuments, mausoleums, places with a special significance for the respective moment, at museums, tradition halls and military clubs, public squares, parks, showrooms etc. Anniversaries could be accompanied by concerts, sports competitions, fireworks etc.

Commemorations are organised on the occasion of a number of years from martyrdom, great individual or collective sacrifice events, as well as from the death of military heroes or personalities of the national history. Usually, commemorations are organised at heroes' graveyards, churches and chapels. Usually, commemorations also comprise speeches on the significance of the respective event. Within commemorations, one puts garlands or bunches of flowers, and presents arms and honour at the monument. In garrisons and units one can organise, on this occasion, torchlight processions and solemn calls. Within commemoration activities, religious services of remembrance usually take place.

Military ceremony represents the assembly of the activities conducted on the occasion of military or civil solemnities or celebrations, according to the rules of protocol, with contingents of the military units, accompained or not by combat assets, and wearing or not the individual weapons. In order to conduct the military ceremony, its coordinator establishes individual and collective rules of behaviour for both the military and civil personnel that participate in it. The military ceremony can take place at the initiative and under the military's organisation or at the request of the local/central public administration. Both situations are subject to the military regulations.

We continue our approach considering that the *civic education* has the following component parts:

a) the *affective* one, which consists in forming and/or consolidating the positive emotions, feelings, passions etc. based on recognised military, national and international values;
b) the *cognitive* one, which consists in transmitting those messages/knowledge necessary and defining for the modern soldier, fighter and citizen;
c) the *volitional* one, through including the self-responsibility to consciously adjust behaviour, inclusively through motivation and self-motivation.

Approaching the issue of the purpose and objectives of the civic education, we consider that they these are as follows:

a) knowledge of the values of the democratic society and of the modern democracy principles;
b) understanding the authority concept, the citizen's behaviour in democracy, the relationship between authorities and citizens, as well as the civil control upon the authorities;
c) awareness of the indestructible connection between freedom and responsibility, freedom and law, and of the citizen's rights and responsibilities within this context;
d) understanding the mechanism through which justice and equality become fundamental values of the society, as well as the justice and law role and the relationship between equality and democracy;
e) promotion and formation of the conviction regarding the respect for property and integration in the new human relations generated by respect for this constitutional right;
f) cultivation, among the personnel of the military, population and civil society, as well as the youth, of the patriotic feelings, of understanding the connections between national identity and patriotism, patriotism and European integration;
g) understanding the relations between the civil society and the military body, in the conditions of Romania's membership in a political and military alliance;
h) promotion of NATO's standards as regards the civilian-military relations at peace, crisis situations and/or at war.

We consider that the principles of the military culture activity are as follows:

a) the active participation of the personnel in the education activity;
b) unity between the sensorial and reasonable perceptions, between the concrete and abstract elements when presenting the notions and transmitting the knowledge in order to achieve the established objectives;

c) systematisation of the transmitted knowledge and continuity in the forms, methods and means of military culture;
d) the access and taking-into-consideration principle of the age particular features and of the individual differences of the militaries;
e) the realism principle and the connection between the social theory and practice, through the acceptance of individual differences as a gift of multi-culture.

From another point of view, the content of the civic education process supposes:

a) defining the following concepts: democratic society, democratic principle, authority, political regime and citizen, liberty and responsibility, law and justice, equality and democracy, property, patriotism, national symbol, loyalty etc.;
b) establishing the content selection criteria. In essence, these are as follows: motivation of the auditory to retain the message, flexibility of the pedagogue in transmitting knowledge, limitation to the essential elements of the content and its structuring in an interactive, formative and attractive manner;
c) planning the civic education activity which can be achieved through: education plans and programmes for the military education institutions; the programme of training the military personnel, public servants and civil personnel.

Through the civic education it follows the acquisition of new knowledge by the deductive/inductive/transductive way of lecture, seminary, case study and analysis. To these ones, one can add specific forms, such as: lectures, debates, visits, practical explanations etc. as collective forms, as well as individual forms such as movie watching, case study and lecture.

The methods of the civic education are the following:

- oral communication, which can be expositive – description, explanation etc. – and conversation – collective discussion, Socratic seminar, heuristic discussion etc.;
- written communication – independent lecture.

Coordination and management institutionalised structures in the Romanian Armed Forces cultural system

At the level of the Ministry of National Defence, the specialised structure in the domain of cultural management is the *Military Traditions and Culture Branch* which issues, according to the specific normative documents, projects of orders, strategies, handbooks, methodologies, dispositions, conceptions and programmes

regarding the military traditions and civic education, provides special assistance to the structures and persons that are responsible for the military tradition activity.

At the level of the armed forces services, branch headquarters, in the division HQs and education institutions, according to the organisational chart, the attributions in the military tradition and culture are achieved by compartments of military traditions and culture, and at the other units by plurality positions.

In the Romanian Armed Forces, the following cultural institutions perform this activity:

- *professional institutions*: the National Military Museum, the National Military Library, the Military Publishing House, the National Military Circle, the Armed Forces Artistic Assembly, the Arts Studio, and the Armed Forces Film Studio and the Military Music Service;
- *education institutions*: the Training Centre for the Military Music is the single cultural art form of education that provides specialised personnel for the *military music* domain;
- *at the level of the units and garrisons*: both in units and the military garrison circles (with some exceptions) an encyclopaedic library and a tradition hall are operational. The whole cultural activity is focused around the military circle. This institution operates with different organisational charts depending on its subordination. Within the Romanian Armed Forces there are more than 40 military circles.

Development, validation, and approval of the concept of organising and conducting the manifestations, commemorations and cultural-educational activities at the level of the Ministry of National Defence

Yearly, the specialised structure in the cultural domain, on the basis of the proposals of the military structures, issues for the next year, the concept of organising and conducting the manifestations, commemorations and cultural activities at the level of the Ministry of National Defence.

The project of the concept is submitted for analysis, improvement and endorsement by the chiefs of the involved structures. The final issued form is submitted for analysis and endorsement by the Chief of the General Staff. After endorsing, the concept is submitted for approval to the Minister of National Defence.

Since that moment, *the Concept of organising and conducting military traditions and culture activities* becomes an order that is respected accordingly.

The strategic concept of the cultural system in the military belongs to the ministry leadership. Its development will take into account the personnel, the material basis and the financial resources to be allocated. As a whole, the concept will not be developed in realistic terms but on personnel categories: military staff, students, NCOs, and civil personnel. Although the process of re-organising the armed forces is close to its completion, the other component parts of the military reform will become really and efficiently functional much later, in order to be interoperable with the Euro-Atlantic structures.

In the domain of educational management through culture, it is certain that the military personnel and the personnel upon whom the military has moral obligations – families, reserve militaries, pensioners, veterans etc. – *will consume* two types of values and services, as we mentioned before, paid or free of charge.

The paid services are not and cannot be imposed and limited. They offer the possibility to the beneficiaries of the educational activity of satisfying their spiritual interests as they want and where they want. The multiple options can be satisfied in the country's spiritual life, abroad and within the cultural system of the military. The content and the quality of such type of consumption are hard, almost impossible to estimate. Quantitatively, it can be reimbursed under two aspects.

The military personnel will not have enough money and time for cultural consumption. In conclusion, it is estimated that the culture accumulated output through personal expenses should be relatively small and, in this case, the cultural services will be the preferred ones.

In the small garrisons and military institutions it is predicted that there will be preferred the cultural services offered by the military, taking also into account the costs supported by the latter.

The values and services offered *"free of charge"* are paid from the military budget, therefore from the public money, and the costs should not be neglected.

*

If, for the moment, the functioning of the domain of military traditions and culture is relatively foreseeable within the guidelines mentioned before, *the production of values and services is hard to be predicted.* The difficulty comes from the personnel turnover on positions, the military priorities and the unfulfilled stage of re-structuring the military body.

The transmission and assimilation of those values that are necessary to the military personnel should be focused on the profound zones of the personal minds – intelligence, motivations, convictions etc.

Paradoxically, the cultural import from the armed forces of NATO member states, including the messages it contains, has led to a stress of the national feature of the educational activity in the domain of military traditions. The cultural-educational activities in NATO armed forces have a strong national significance and they take into account the tradition and religion of the country, the ethnic features of the people the armed forces serve.

NATO membership, as a cultural message, is directed from the view of humanitarian law, the respect and curiosity for the cultural values of the partner armed forces.

In Western armed forces, the education system does not seem to be affected by restructuring and other events. The most developed armed forces put a great price on creating a military environment at a high level of culture and civilisation.

No matter the conditions, in the future, it will be impossible for us to renounce the military culture and the professional management of the military traditions and culture.

ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF MILITARY LOGISTICS

Colonel (N) BEng Ciprian LUNGU

The improvement of logistics performance may require new technology and new information systems to ensure the optimal use of logistic assets and to optimise logistic flows but knowledge is what will transform logistic processes and will certainly allow the design and development of new operational concepts and capabilities.

Knowledge management contributes to the organisational effectiveness of logistics structures across the full range of logistic support from production to in-service and operational logistics by enhancing timely and effective decision-making processes, responsiveness to changes through the effective assessment of operational requirements based on complete knowledge.

The success of knowledge management in military organisations is measured through the contribution to the capacity of forces to sustain operations, coherence in defence and operational planning, development and use of new capabilities, improvement of working and operating methods.

Keywords: *knowledge areas; knowledge management; knowledge integration; allied logistics*

The new *"Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation"*, adopted by heads of state and government in Lisbon, 2010, defines a new framework for NATO evolution and provides guidance for reform and transformation of armed forces in order to be capable to *"maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO's usability targets; preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together; engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency"*[1].

The new concept demands for *"active engagement, modern defence"*, and commits *"the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union"*[2].

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[1] *Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, NATO HQ, Brussels, 2010, para 37.

[2] *Ibidem*, Preface.

In this context, the improvement of logistics performance aims to enhance the organisational processes focused on:

- concurrent sustainment of NATO major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
- service design models to maintain structures in multinational units;
- computerised analysis of distribution-based logistics in NATO-led operations;
- models for the ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover of logistics structures from cyber-attacks;
- inventory-routing operations under stochastic demand;
- optimisation of production nodes in supply chain systems;
- supply chain optimisation for expeditionary operations;
- ground transportation routing in hostile environment;
- supply and distribution with limited or lack of host nation support;
- maintenance and protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines.

All above-mentioned areas of performance improvement address significant and permanent changes of logistic organisations (structure, composition, role and responsibilities), functions and processes (planning, execution, evaluation).

Modularity, interoperability and rapid configuration and reconfiguration are preconditions for the integration of logistic structures in national and multinational large combat service support organisations able to support deployment and sustainment of forces across the full range of military operations from combat to humanitarian assistance.

Nevertheless, the improvement of logistics performance may require new technology and new information systems to ensure the optimal use of logistic assets and optimise logistic flows but knowledge is what will transform the logistic processes and allow the design and development of new operational concepts and capabilities.

Knowledge management contributes to the organisational effectiveness of logistics structures across the full range of logistic support from production to in-service and operational logistics by enhancing timely and effective decision-making processes, responsiveness to changes through effective assessment of operational requirements based on complete knowledge.

The forces driving the implementation of knowledge management in military logistics include increasing domain complexity, rapid advancement in technology, accelerating changes of security and operational environment, intensified demand for speed of responsiveness, increasing requirements regarding individual experience, strong connections with industrial base and commercial logistics etc.

Fundamentals of knowledge management

Knowledge derives from information and combines various pieces of information with an interpretation and meaning.

Karl Wiig defined the different forms of knowledge as factual (that found in books and data), conceptual (found in perspectives and concepts), expectational (knowledge to make judgments and hypotheses), and methodological (knowledge from reasoning and strategies)[3].

Knowledge management (KM) includes a complex combination of organisational processes, information technologies and creative human capacities. KM is a critical resource for military organisations and plays a key role in the organisational adaptation and transformation in response to environmental changes and operational requirements.

Literature offers several definitions for knowledge management but, for the purpose of this article, knowledge management is defined as that process established to capture and use knowledge in an organisation for the purpose of improving organisation performance[4].

Knowledge domains and knowledge areas in military logistics

Logistics, defined by NATO as *"the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces"*[5], is a key contributor to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of populations and to:

- *"Maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;*
- *Develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance's expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force"*[6].

In NATO community, logistics covers *"the aspects of military operations which deal with: design and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition*

[3] Karl M. Wiig, *Knowledge Management Foundations: Thinking about Thinking: How People and Organizations Create, Represent and Use Knowledge*, Schema Press, Arlington, 1993, p. 153.

[4] Yogish Malhotra, *Knowledge Management for the New World of Business*, Asian Strategy&Leadership Institute Review, August 1998, pp. 36-41.

[5] *NATO Logistics Handbook*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[6] *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, NATO HQ, Brussels, 2010, para 19.

or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health service support"[7].

Although logistics comprises a wide range of responsibilities, it can be divided in three main work domains spanning the life cycle of logistic resources: production, in-service support and consumption. Furthermore, logistic support encompasses a number of logistic functions (Supply, Materiel, Movement and Transportation etc.).

For the purpose of this article, we consider the *knowledge domains* of logistics associated with work domains as follows:

➢ *"Production/Acquisition Logistics" Knowledge Domain* – domain of knowledge related to research, design, development, manufacture and acceptance of materiel, which includes standardisation and interoperability, contracting, quality assurance, procurement of spares, reliability and defence analysis, safety standards for equipment, specifications and production processes, trials and testing (including provision of necessary facilities), codification, equipment documentation, configuration control and modifications;

➢ *"In-Service Logistics" Knowledge Domain* – domain of knowledge associated with procuring, receiving, storing, distributing and disposing of materiel, which is required to maintain the equipment and supply the force;

➢ *"Consumer/Operational Logistics" Knowledge Domain* – domain of knowledge concerning the reception of the initial product, storage, transport, maintenance (including repair and serviceability), operation and disposal of materiel, that includes stock control, provision or construction of facilities, movement control, reliability and defect reporting, safety standards for storage, transport and handling, and related training.

Subsequently, we also consider that *knowledge areas* are included in knowledge domains and associated with logistic functions. Accordingly, knowledge areas incorporate Supply, Materiel, Services, Logistic Information Management, Equipment Maintenance and Repair, Movement and Transportation (M&T), Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM), Petroleum Logistics, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Infrastructure Engineering for Logistics (IEL), Medical Support, Contracting, Host Nation Support (HNS).

A knowledge area belongs to a single or several knowledge domains (e.g. *"Materiel"* Knowledge Area includes knowledge related to specification, design and production that belong to *"Production/Acquisition Logistics"* Knowledge Domain and knowledge connected to reception of the equipment into service, its distribution and storage, repair, maintenance and disposal that belong to *"Consumer/Operational Logistics"* Knowledge Domain).

[7] *NATO Logistics Handbook*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Sources of knowledge

In logistics organisations, knowledge is embedded in documents or databases, in organisational processes, routines and norms, and is obtained from internal or external individuals, groups, or organisational routines either through structured transfer channels or through person-to-person contact.

External knowledge is brought into a logistics organisation from national and multinational environment, NATO logistic bodies and organisations (e.g. NATO Logistics Committee/LC, NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency/NAMSA), their policies and concepts, similar foreign logistics organisations (e.g. Defense Logistics Agency), best practices in industrial base, commercial distribution, supply chain management, private transportation companies etc. *(figure 1)*.



Figure 1: **Internal and external sources of knowledge for military logistics**

In NATO community, the *main sources of external knowledge* for national logistic units are NATO logistic policies and concepts[8].

NATO Logistic Policy documents are developed at the highest NATO levels and include: Policy for Cooperation in Logistics, Logistic Readiness and Sustainability Policy, Principles and Policies for Logistics, Medical Support Precepts and Guidance for NATO, Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support (HNS), Principles and Policies for Movement and Transportation, Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations, Logistics Support Concept for NATO Response Force Operations, Principles and Policies for the Maintenance of Equipment.

Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine documents are distributed as Allied Joint Publications (AJPs). The AJPs provide the foundational logistic doctrine, under which more detailed logistic techniques and procedures are established. The following AJPs are presently developed and promulgated: AJP-4(A) Allied Joint Logistics

[8] *Ibidem*, p. 80.

Doctrine, AJP-4.4 Allied Joint Movement & Transportation Doctrine, AJP-4.5 Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine & Procedures, AJP-4.6 Multinational Joint Logistic Centre, AJP-4.7 POL Doctrine, AJP-4.9 Modes of Multinational Logistic Support, and AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine.

Allied Logistic Publications describe supporting component/service contribution to Multinational Logistics Doctrine: ALP-4.1 Multinational Maritime Logistic Doctrine, ALP-4.2 Land Forces Logistic Doctrine, ALP-4.3 Air Forces Doctrine & Procedures, and Air Logistics.

Logistic Tactics, Techniques and Procedures constitute detailed procedural documents that are published primarily as Strategic Command Directives and NATO Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs).

Other relevant sources for knowledge within the NATO framework are:

- *Co-operative Logistics – "the totality of bilateral and multilateral consumer and production logistics arrangements to optimise, in a coordinated and rationalised way, logistics support to NATO forces"*[9];
- *Multinational Logistics – "provision of logistic support to operations through multinational means, such as lead nation, role specialisation and multinational integrated logistic support"*[10].

Transfer of national best practices, successful experiences and lessons learned in logistics cooperation aim to achieve cost savings through economies of scale, harmonised life cycle processes and increased efficiency in peacetime, crisis and wartime logistics support by using modern techniques in the field of materiel management and procurement.

Important external knowledge sources may be identified in the modes of multinational logistic support, such as National Logistics, National Support Elements (NSE), Host Nation Support (HNS), Resources in the JOA, Mutual Support Agreements (MSA), Lead Nation (LN), Role Specialist Nation (RSN), Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILUs) and Multinational Integrated Medical Units (MIMUs), Third Party Logistic Support Services (TPLSS).

Enablers of knowledge transfer and utilisation

Knowledge acquisition implies the involvement of both the source and the recipient of knowledge in three main processes:

- *Communication* – knowledge is acquired by talking to somebody;

[9] *Ibidem*, p. 5.
[10] *Ibidem*.

- *Transaction* – knowledge is acquired by buying a document, transferring of a certain form of property rights, such as patents or copyrights;
- *Cooperation* – knowledge is acquired by working together on a project[11].

NATO offers a productive environment for communication and knowledge exchange consisting of[12]:

➢ *Logistics Committee (LC)* – the overall mandate of the Strategic Command is to address consumer logistics matters with a view to enhancing the performance, efficiency, sustainability and combat effectiveness of the Alliance's forces and to exercise, on behalf of the Council, an overarching co-ordinating authority across the whole spectrum of logistics vis-à-vis the other logistic committees and bodies of NATO;

➢ *Logistic Staff Meeting (LSM)* – monitors and coordinates the implementation of logistic policies, programmes and initiatives through consultation and cooperation among nations, the Strategic Commands, and with other NATO logistic and logistic-related bodies and it provides a forum for addressing logistic concerns;

➢ *Movement and Transportation Group (M&TG)* – monitors and coordinates the implementation of M&T policies, programmes and initiatives through consultation and cooperation among nations, the Strategic Commands and other NATO transportation and transportation-related groups and agencies.

External knowledge transfer (e.g. best practices) in multinational environments contributes to the transformation of logistics into an effective force multiplier for multinational operations.

Yasar F. Jarrar and Prof. Mohamed Zairi identified two main components of the process of adopting and adapting the selected best practices[13]:

- Enabling – making the best practice adoption possible by creating a climate where willingness to identify, share and adopt best practices exits;



Figure 2: **Utilisation of external knowledge from NATO publications in national logistics**

[11] Jeroen Kraaijenbrink, Fons Wijnhoven, *External Knowledge Integration*, in David G. Schwartz, *Encyclopedia of Knowledge Management*, Idea Group Reference, London, 2006, p. 182.

[12] *NATO Logistics Handbook*, *op. cit*., p. 20.

[13] Yasar F. Jarrar, Mohamed Zairi, *Best Practice Transfer for Future Competitiveness: A Study of Best Practices*, European Centre for Best Practice Management, Keighley, 2010, p. 6.

- Transfer – identifying and learning from best practices and applying them in a new configuration or new location.

In this regard, an enabling organisation for knowledge management processes is Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC). Established in NATO-led operations, MJLC acts as a focal point for the identification, de-confliction, and coordination of major logistics requirements for both NATO Joint Force Headquarters and participating nations, as a tool to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of logistic support by providing external logistic knowledge and direction.

NATO Multinational Integrated Logistics Units (MILUs) are also excellent examples of knowledge acquisition and utilisation by working together on a project (e.g. Joint Theatre Movement Staff (JTMS) MILU performs theatre movement co-ordination duties in support of a NATO operation or exercise, Infrastructure Engineering for Logistics (IEL) MILU facilitates the logistic mission of opening lines of communication and constructing support facilities).

Knowledge utilisation is based on two primary internal mechanisms – direction and routinisation. *Direction* involves converting tacit knowledge into explicit rules and instructions that are communicated through the entire organisation. *Routinisation* is the development of a fixed response to defined stimuli in order to simplify choice[14]. In logistics, direction mechanisms are materialised in policies, visions, doctrines, strategies, concepts, terms of reference etc. Complementary, logistic plans and standard operating procedures implement routine and form the framework for execution and implementation in response to operational requirements.

A key enabler for knowledge utilisation is *Logistic Information Management* that couples available information technology with logistic processes and practices to meet the NATO Commander's and the nation's logistic information requirements. NATO logistic systems need to be interoperable with both existing and emerging national and NATO systems. Interfaces with industrial systems should also be considered where practical and cost effective[15]. Users form NATO and national command and force structures require executive, managerial and operational logistic information and knowledge. To be effective, logistic information systems must facilitate the delivery of the right information and knowledge to the right people at the right time with the right security protection.

The implementation of a successful knowledge management system in logistic organisations is mainly influenced by the following factors:

- ➢ *KM Strategies* (sources, users, knowledge representation, technology infrastructure etc.);
- ➢ *Key Managerial Influences* (management support through national and NATO leadership, allocation and management of project resources,

[14] Jeroen Kraaijenbrink, Fons Wijnhoven, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
[15] *NATO Logistics Handbook*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

oversight of the KMS through the coordination and control of resources and application of reform and transformation metrics for assessing KMS success);

➢ *Key Resource Influences* (financial resources and knowledge sources needed to build the KMS);

➢ *Key Environmental Influences* (security environment forces that drive the organisation to exploit its knowledge to maintain its relevance).

Key contributions of knowledge management to logistics performance

In essence, knowledge management in military logistics organisations is designed to support specific strategic, operational, or tactical decision-making processes, inter-organisational communications, cooperation, and interaction and mainly contributes to:

- improvement of decision-making processes based on complete knowledge;
- comprehensive logistic vision, common policies, uniform planning and execution actions through entire logistics organisations;
- transformation of logistics organisations into knowledge-based organisations;
- improvement of logistic support quality and responsiveness;
- improvement of efficiency and effectiveness of logistic support, cost saving.

Improvement of logistics performance could be accelerated by organisational processes that sustain the ability of individuals to create, transfer and apply knowledge and analysis on the identification and execution of new tasks, creation of new concepts and logistic capabilities, logistics modelling and providing logistic support in real-time *(figure 3)*.



Figure 3: **Impact of knowledge management processes on organisational processes and performance**

Knowledge management facilitates the flow of knowledge into and within the logistic organisations and acts as a catalyst for the transformation of logistics.

The processes of identification, acquisition and utilisation of external knowledge are key instruments in knowledge management and form the basis for the development of new logistic concepts and capabilities in response to security environment changes and operational requirements.

Valuable external knowledge and best practices transferred from NATO publications, procedures and techniques, and industrial base, commercial practices and academia bring to logistics innovative technological, informational and managerial ideas and solutions, models and standards.

A successful knowledge management shall have a positive impact and substantially contribute to maximise the deployability of NATO forces and their capacity to sustain operations in the field; ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication; develop and operate capabilities jointly; preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding; improve working methods and maximise efficiency.

Knowledge management has a major impact on interoperability by enabling an accurate and timely transfer and integration of knowledge among national and multinational logistics actors at all levels:

- ➢ *Information interoperability* (information sharing including technological and procedural aspects);
- ➢ *Cognitive interoperability* (doctrine, concepts, procedures and decision processes);
- ➢ *Behavioural interoperability* (performing the selected course of action);
- ➢ *Physical interoperability* (connexion and compatibility of equipment and systems.

The success of knowledge management in military organisations is measured through the contribution to the capacity of forces to sustain operations, coherence in defence and operational planning, development and use of new capabilities, improvement of working and operating methods.

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MULTILATERALISM AT WAR
– Defending "National Caveats" –

Colonel Daniel PETRESCU

The author approaches the issue of national caveats, their role and impact in coalition warfare as well as some suggestions regarding the way the latter could be mitigated by NATO.

First, he mentions some balanced official views and recommendations regarding the influence of the national caveats.

Then, he writes about some public statements and urges to eliminate national caveats.

The author considers that it is counterproductive to push towards elimination of national caveats, concluding that all the views presented can be criticised and mentioning that fair understanding shown to different contributor's caveats could help the strategic effort of the coalition and mean the difference between multilateralism and unilateralism.

***Keywords**: national caveats; sovereign nations; multinational forces; operational control*

The current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are probably among the most debated wars at the time of their development. Both military and civilians dissect the facts and come out with suggestions, criticism, and remedies. In this debate, amplified by the media, one of the most controversial issues discussed is *"national caveats"*. *"Caveats are NATO's operational cancer"*[1] proclaims General James Jones, ex-NATO commander and former National Security Adviser for President Obama. *"[N]ational caveats […] have seriously eroded the military credibility and operational flexibility of existing NATO resources in Afghanistan"*[2], claims the *Canadian Military Journal*.

"The NATO chain of command is riddled with what are called 'National Caveats'"[3] and *"[s]pecifically, the coalition effort* [in Aghanistan A./N.] *has been plagued by the problem of caveats"*[4]

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[1] Stefan Kornelius, *The Undeclared War. Germany's Self-Deceit in Afghanistan*, Korber Policy Paper no. 8, p. 28.

[2] Martin Shadwick, *The Riga Factor*, in *Canadian Military Journal*, 07/14/2008, at http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/commenta-eng.asp retrieved on 16 November 2010.

[3] Stuart Ford, *Germany to Amend 'National Caveat' NATO Rules for Afghanistan*, 5 February 2010, http://mydailyclarity.com/2010/02/germany-to-amend-%E2%80%98national-caveat%E2%80%99-nato-rules-for-afghanistan retrieved on 12 November 2010.

[4] David P. Auerswald, Stephen M. Saideman, *Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan*, reprint.

conclude two other studies on the issue, resonating with the views of the former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, a lead opponent of national caveats[5]. Countries who think they have a greater contribution to the Alliance's efforts are constantly pushing the rest to increase their efforts and eliminate national caveats.

In spite of the vocal character of the ongoing pressures, this article will argue that restrictions imposed by nations to their forces engaged in alliance or coalition warfare represent a logical manifestation of their sovereignty and they will continue to manifest in the future conflict. Too much emphasis on this aspect is not only counterproductive on the ground, but it is also a factor that weakens NATO's ability to carry out future missions outside the Alliance's traditional area of responsibility.

To prove that, we will concentrate the argument on the following issues: a short review of the problem, a critical interpretation of current views regarding the impact of national caveats in Afghanistan, and some arguments in support of the necessity for their acceptance. In the end, we will present some suggestions about how the operational impact of national caveats could be mitigated by NATO.

To start with, there is little academic analysis about the role and impact of national caveats in coalition warfare. The term has been consecrated by NATO Alliance, to define restrictions posed by troop contributing countries to a certain mission. In spite of the fact that the detailed situation of the troop-contributing countries' restriction in current operations is classified, every now and then, both the media and NATO officials touch the issue publicly.

There are balanced official views and recommendations regarding the influence of the national caveats, as those expressed by the group of experts who worked on the new strategic concept: *"Although ISAF has achieved much, its experience has led to concerns within the Alliance about unity of command, restrictions (or caveats) placed on the troops contributed by some Allies, and questions about tactics and goals"*[6]. […] *"Allies should minimise the national caveats that they attach when contributing troops to Alliance operations; any caveats that are imposed should be clearly and explicitly stated and their impact carefully evaluated during force generation and operational planning"*[7].

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[5] *"That's an issue that NATO has to think through very carefully.* […] *It's kind of like having a basketball team, and they practice and practice and practice for six months. When it comes to game time, one or two say, 'We're not going to play'. Well, that's fair enough. Everyone has a free choice. But you don't have a free choice if you've practiced for all those months…"* Quotation attributed to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in John D. Banusiewicz, *'National Caveats' Among Key Topics at NATO Meeting,* US Department of Defense News, at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25938 retrieved on 16 November 2010.

[6] *"NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO*, 17 May 2010, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm?selectedLocale=en retrieved on 18 November 2010.

[7] *Ibid*.

But there are also public statements and urges to eliminate national caveats. As David P. Awerswald and Stephen M. Saideman's article notices, regarding Afghanistan: *"In 2006, 71 of these reservations had to be respected and reconciled. Some nations were forbidden to engage the Taliban in an offensive manner, others were not permitted to protect school buildings, and others yet again were unable to help in preparations for the elections. Virtually every nation has insisted on registering caveats. Only the US operates in a largely unrestricted way"*[8].

The problem of differential burden-sharing not only puts the mission at risk, but threatens NATO itself, as *"[t]he ISAF caveat problem has revealed a deep and widening division between those who fight and bleed and those who do not"*[9].

In spite of some valid points of the above assessment, they require a better analysis of the situation on the ground, given their focus on the tactical need for better engagement, and a careful look at the strategic aspects of keeping the Alliance together in an operation outside NATO's traditional Area of Responsibility. There are several reasons to support this.

First, it is the fact that national restrictions have always been imposed by sovereign nations when they committed their troops in coalition warfare. Some may recall the Australian restraint of placing forces under British command, after the disaster at Gallipoli in the First World War. Or the US late involvement in the same conflict, which came under national terms regarding the deployment of forces on the battlefield, slightly different from what the allies initially wanted.

One way or another, throughout the wars of the 20th century, the placing of troops under national command seemed to be the most important caveat in carrying on coalition operations. This went almost unnoticed until the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, which was probably the first operation where the issues of national restrictions came under military and media scrutiny. Being an allied operation, this example leads us to the second part of the argument.

In the case of NATO, this is the way the Alliance is designed. NATO commanders in the field wield less authority over subordinate forces than, let us say, their American counterparts. As nations transfer their forces to NATO command, usually placing them under operational control (OPCON) status, it is worth noticing the significant difference between the US Department of Defense definition of OPCON[10]

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[8] Stefan Kornelius, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[9] David P. Auerswald, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[10] US OPCOM – *"The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission"*. – Joint Publication 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 12 April 2001, as amended through 31 August 2005, p. 385.

and the NATO definition[11], which is more restrictive, particularly with regard to task organisation.

Third, even though the opponents of caveats are vocal, the issue is not particularly addressed at the strategic levels of command. Obama's current strategy for Afghanistan, released in 2009, does not mention the issue of national caveats as a problem for the common effort on the field. Even though *"[t]his new strategy* […] *will require immediate action, sustained commitment, and substantial resources"*[12], the President claims that *"In approaching allies we should emphasize that our new approach is integrated between civilian and military elements and in looking at Afghanistan and Pakistan as one theater for diplomacy"*[13].

Moreover, the alternative strategy, released on 16 August 2010 by the Afghanistan study group, advocates that *"[t]he more promising path for the US in the Af/Pak region would reverse the recent escalation and move away from a counterinsurgency effort that is neither necessary nor likely to succeed"*[14]. Again, neither strategy mentions the need for a greater combat engagement of NATO allies. Neither does that the new counterinsurgency manual[15].

And fourth, because the reality on the ground shows that all NATO countries are involved. All have different number of soldiers deployed, different capabilities, different command arrangements and, yes, different restrictions. These restrictions are stemmed from the way laws of different nations reflect targeting, collateral damages, sharing intelligence, counter narcotics, house searching, detainees, and so on. Thus, most of these restrictions are objective by nature. There are constitutional limitations in some countries about what the military can or cannot do. There are also operational limitations given by the pre-deployment training and equipping of the forces. There are national laws that prevent certain forces from carrying out certain actions (i.e. riot control, biometrics, cash payment in advance).

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[11] NATO OPCOM – *"The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander might accomplish specific missions or tasks, which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned"* – NATO, Allied Administrative Publication 6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, NATO Publication, Brussels, 2003, 2-0-2.

[12] The White House, *"White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on US Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan"*, 27 March 2009, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_final.pdf retrieved on 9 October 2010.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Afghanistan Study Group, *"A New Way Forward. Rethinking US Strategy in Afghanistan"*, report, at http://www.afghanistanstudygroup.org/NewWayForward_report.pdf retrieved on 9 October 2010.

[15] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf retrieved on 8 October 2010.

These caveats do influence tactical actions in Afghanistan, but the issue should be regarded not at the operational, but at the strategic level. Some cannot expect that countries with no experience in COIN could contribute at the same efficiency level with more experienced, better equipped and better trained armies. The parts worried now with the impact of the national caveats should not forget the context. When operations are carried out outside NATO traditional Area of Responsibility, troop-contributing countries have a different type of attitude. There are many imponderables that could impact on the international community willingness to engage in Afghanistan or on its ability to contribute financially. In such circumstances, it is highly dangerous to base a strategy on a formula of greater combat engagement and no national restrictions.

Under these circumstances, it is counterproductive to push towards elimination of national caveats. One reason is that national caveats serve a strategic purpose. In spite of their impact in the mission area, some caveats reflect also political sensitivities in the contributing countries and help to keep those nations on board, avoiding difficult situations that might determine the public at home to request immediate withdrawal of forces. Another reason is the fact that pushing countries to renounce the caveats would have little success. A good example here is the placebo of German Tornadoes in Afghanistan, detailed by Stefan Cornelius in his study[16].

However, the above views can be criticised. One critique may address the fact that national caveats question the solidarity within NATO. Another may be that, even considering the situation only at the strategic level, the tactical impact of national caveats will determine, in the end, strategic failure. Moreover, some may argue that *"the self-imposed reticence actually endangers the soldiers more than it protects them"*[17]. The soldiers are the ones who have been betrayed. They are in fact the real victims of self-deceit on a grand scale[18]: *"If there is something more dangerous than this war, it would be a decision not to fight it"*[19]. *"This defensive strategy endangers the soldiers, makes them feel it at ease, and does not help to protect them. The need to exercise caution is so deeply ingrained in the minds of soldiers that they prefer to make a detour around a risk instead of demonstrating their superiority, which they actually possess as a result of their equipment, informational advantage and tactical training"*[20].

[16] Stefan Kornelius, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[17] *Ibid*, p. 5.
[18] *Ibid*.
[19] *Ibid*, p. 6.
[20] *Ibid*, p. 33.

Nevertheless, these views can be, in turn, countered. First, because every NATO state has the right to subject a mandate to a national legal review and a political feasibility test[21]. In Clausewitz's terms, the first act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish *"the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature"*[22].

It is a fact that *"The burdens of Alliance have always been distributed unevenly"*[23] and the Article 5 in the Washington Treaty stipulates that in case of attack on one member of the alliance, other members *"will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties,* ***such action as it deems necessary****, including the use of armed force"* (emphasis added)[24], which implies a certain liberty in assessing the measures in accordance to their capabilities to react.

There are practical reasons for this different answer that may apply to Afghanistan: the lack of the equipment needed for the difficult conditions of a guerrilla war, suitable armoured vehicles, lack of helicopters, or the unavailability of a modern reconnaissance system, that is the so-called third level consisting of drones and satellites, which provide the Americans such an inestimable tactical advantage[25]. The issue of solidarity is about contribution, not restrictions. There are criteria developed that assess the participation of NATO nations in Afghanistan. This can be refined to include, for example different weighing criteria for casualties or the danger of the area of responsibility.

Many aspects of this Afghanistan mission remain unsaid, half-baked, untrue and indeed hypocritical[26]. As we speak, there is no agreed COIN doctrine within NATO. As one author recommends, *"US officers must remain aware of the constraints under which most European member nations operate, particularly those who are European Union (EU) members or member-aspirants. The EU prohibits member nations or potential member nations from deficit spending, so the United States*

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[21] Stefan Kornelius, *op. cit.*, p. 28 – quoting Jim Jones, former NATO commander and security adviser to President Obama.

[22] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Indexed Edition, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984.

[23] Stefan Kornelius, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[24] *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington DC, 4 April 1949, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm retrieved on 29 November 2010, Art. 5.

[25] Stefan Kornelius, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

[26] *Ibid*, p. 11.

cannot expect its allies to match its fiscal flexibility. In most respects, with regard to NATO's newer member nations, one must not confuse a lack of ability with a lack of willingness"[27].

When the issue of war and peace can decide the outcome of elections[28], ruling parties are sometimes reluctant to put their military forces in harm's way, and this should be acknowledged.

In the end, what can be done to limit the operational impact of the national caveats and is it worth the effort? In the case of NATO, the biggest danger national caveats could pose it is not Afghanistan, but the *NATO Response Force (NRF)*, because the caveats for that force cannot be determined in advance. This is why the issue needs to be addressed. Here are some ways we can envision:

a. think about national caveats before the mission starts; include them in planning and the operational design;
b. develop knowledge about troop-contributing countries and their legal process of establishing national caveats;
c. create an environment of trust and understanding in the mission area so that undeclared caveats should not manifest;
d. help NATO members and partners reform the training and equipping system so that it influences the operational capabilities and thus limits their restrictions in the mission area;
e. provide specialisation – leave NATO nations options for certain capabilities. This will ease the process of participating to Alliance missions and increase their efficiency;
f. once the mission has started, do not push beyond limits for eliminating national caveats. Keep focused on the long run, do not be blind by current tactical requirements. Observe the fact that most of the caveats reflect different national positions towards the most debatable issues – detainees, riot control, biometrics. In some countries, restrictions to use the military for crowd control are a result of decades of struggling of not involving the armed forces in domestic debates. It is not worth reversing this.

All in all, let us not forget: rescuing Afghanistan from the failed state condition is not an end, but a mean to an end – defeating al-Qaeda and terrorism. Disproportionate

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[27] David M. Toczek, *Knowing the Rules: Planning Consideration for NATO Operations,* in *Military Review*, Jan-Feb 2006, at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_1_86/ai_n16346159/pg_4/?tag=content;col1, retrieved on 12 November 2010.

[28] Stefan Kornelius, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

drain of resources towards this target may have consequences on the amount of resources for other targets, given the global character of the terrorist network. The national caveats issue for Afghanistan should be abandoned for a better formula: *"Legitimacy of ends, sustained by greater local capacity building, international support over a prolonged period of time, and winning of the battle of perceptions"*.

Troop-contributing countries know that a precipitate withdrawal of national caveats cannot be easily reversed. Nevertheless, without accepted caveats, the US intervention in Afghanistan would have been just another Iraq in terms of international support and acceptance. Fair understanding shown to different contributor's caveats could help the strategic effort of the coalition and mean the difference between multilateralism and unilateralism. Eventually, as popular wisdom teaches us, sometimes, better is the enemy of good.

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND SSI-ABWEHR COOPERATION

Dr Tiberiu TĂNASE

Due to the strategic position of Romanian territories, they have always been a genuine "magnet" for both the great powers and the neighbouring countries.

Besides the bloody armed confrontations we had to face, we must not forget a different type of war, the one carried out on the secret front. The Habsburg Empire, the German Empire and later Germany showed, against the background of expansionist tendencies and global conflicts, a particular interest towards the political, economic, social, military, cultural, ethnic aspects of the United Principalities/Romania, interests which were put into practice, on the one hand, through well-established activities of total espionage, and, on the other hand, through setting up a prosperous collaboration between our intelligence services.

***Keywords**: German Secret Service; Second World War; total espionage; Abwehr; SSI; diversionist-terrorist actions*

The first contacts in the prospect of an ulterior collaboration, between the *Romanian Armed Forces Intelligence Service (SSI)* and the *Abwehr*, took place in February 1937, after a visit paid by Major Constantin Gh. Ionescu Micandru and Nicolae Ştefănescu (Head of Department in the Detectives' Corps and SSI). Among the objectives of this collaboration, acquiring viable information about the expansionist plans of the USSR in Oriental Europe as well as uncovering details concerning the military potential this power possessed can be mentioned. The ties between the Abwehr and SSI were strengthened after the signing of the Romanian-German economic agreement in March 1939 and, even more so, after the start of the Second World War, later that year, in early September, as Berlin became increasingly preoccupied with securing oil refineries located in the Prahova Valley.

It is a well-known fact that, after the Second World War was launched, in September 1939, the Romanian-German informative collaboration began to see new developments. Because of the international context shaped by the war,

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but more importantly, by the mounting threat posed by the revisionist policy of Hungary, Bulgaria and USSR, the Romanian Secret Service led by Mihail Moruzov intensified – with the approval of King Carol II – contacts with the Military Intelligence Service of the German Armed Forces, the primary goal sought after by the Romanian side being the identification of an ally capable of ensuring the country's territorial integrity against the multiple dangers it was imperilled by. On the other hand, the Abwehr led by Vice-Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was equally interested in consolidating the relations with the Romanian Secret Service for at least two major reasons: *1. Romania bordered the USSR, which favoured obtaining, through the Romanian Intelligence Services, firsthand information regarding the military and economic potential of the Soviets. 2. A significant amount of the oil needed by the German war machinery was ensured by Romania, the Reich being highly preoccupied with sabotage prevention in the extraction regions or transport routes (the Danube River) so as to have an uninterrupted flow of oil.*

The collaboration between the two services had as a result, among others, hindering the plans of the British intelligence services that aimed to block navigation on the Danube, the establishment of Abwehr agencies in oil-bearing areas and some river ports as well as sending special detachments such as the famous battalion 800 *"Brandeburg"* to prevent acts of sabotage[1].

Taking into account the prosperous Romanian Secret Service-Abwehr collaboration, on the one side, and the fierce rivalry between the intelligence service run by Wilhelm Canaris and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), on the other, it was not impossible therefore for Heinrich Himmler and Richard Heydrich, through dispatching a *"special envoy of the Safety Police"* to Bucharest, to have tried to set up an information network of their own under the SD in order to recapture the ground they lost in Romania to the Abwehr.

There are however historiographical opinions that credit the idea according to which the appointment of Kurt Geißler and the increasing presence of SD in Romania starting with 1940 can be explained through the failures suffered by Abwehr on Romanian territory, especially in the timeframe December 1939-April 1940, which aroused distrust in the competence of the service led by Wilhelm Canaris to cope with the situation created by British Intelligence disruptions on Romanian soil. In this respect, we will quote the opinion of historian Jaroslav Kokoska, who, in a writing with biographical profile dedicated to Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, stated that the in extremis dismantling of the British sabotage plan of April 1940

[1] Cristian Troncotă, *Mihail Moruzov şi Serviciul Secret de Informaţii al Armatei*, Editura Evenimentul Românesc, Bucureşti, 1997, p. 75.

was a failure, as it had become obvious that *"western intelligence services had sprung into action and that the German-Romanian defence organisation was incapable of stopping them"*, which determined Hitler *"to decide throwing into battle, to help the Abwehr and fulfil the same mission, the Reich Security Head Office (RSHA) run by Heydrich. This measure resembled a no confidence vote for Abwehr as, up until that moment, the two secret services had independent missions and the spheres of their activities were delimited in such a manner as not to overlap. Therefore, Canaris had to make peace with the thought of sharing his assignments with Heydrich"*[2]. This opinion, although extremely interesting, is not supported by documentary evidence, fact which questions its accuracy and spares us of any additional commentaries. In return, it can be confirmed with certainty that RSHA constantly followed, even since the first months of 1940, the *"revival"* of SD in Romania. To this context belongs the delegation of Untersturmfuhrer SS Otto Albrecht von Bolschwing (spring of 1940) as representative of SD to Romania, where he would function under the official cover of Legation attaché, respectively Hauptstumfuhrer SS Kurt Geißler (July 1940). These measures emphasised, on Romanian territory included, the intense rivalry between Abwehr and RSHA, which would later be skilfully speculated in Romania's favour by the SSI and Romanian authorities.

In what concerns the activities developed by Kurt Geißler and his intelligence network on Romanian territory, a primary aspect that can be observed, based on archive documents, is represented by the official mission he was entrusted with by RSHA, that of collaborating with Romanian authorities in order to neutralise the sabotage acts planned in the oil producing region by British secret services. After hindering the British agenda of stopping navigation on the Danube and in the context of an increasingly pro-German climate sustained by Bucharest, and also as the collaboration in the intelligence field intensified, Berlin pressured authorities to banish British or French citizens that were involved in the oil industry because they were suspected of being undercover agents for allied information services.

In a note of the 2nd Department of the Information Secret Service within the Romanian General Staff, Mihail Moruzov outlined the fact that the measures taken by Romanian authorities in order to protect the oil-bearing area and to ensure the necessary supplies for the Reich *"prevented the execution of direct sabotage activities"*. Furthermore, after surveying the behaviour of *"the British and the French within the oil industry, it was established that certain elements involved themselves*

[2] *Ibid*, p. 78.

in concealed actions in the eventuality of sabotage operations"[3], hence *"to put a stop to any disturbance in the oil rich area and to reduce to a minimum their chances of success"*, Moruzov demanded the expulsion of 30 British partisans. In the immediate period, the Romanian government delayed taking the measures put forward by the head of the Secret Services due to various reasons and, as a consequence, Berlin decided to firmly intervene by ordering the immediate expulsion of those in question.

On 24 July 1940, the Abwehr delegate to Bucharest, Major Dr Hans Wagner, informed Moruzov that in order to *"create a favourable atmosphere"* for Romania during the Romanian-German talks that would take place in Salzburg, it was a priority to *"expel immediately from Romania each person mentioned in the documents below; a vast and urgent publicity through press and radio"*[4]. Because of the international context and the ultimatum-like nature of the last request, Romanian decision-makers were coerced to comply with the German order and banish 32 English and 10 French citizens by the end of July 1940 if they were suspected or proven to have been involved in operations of sabotage in the oil-producing region. Although, through this measure, Berlin hit hard the allied secret services, their network of agents in Romania was far from being totally annihilated. On the contrary, it remained active.

Based on the evidence gathered by German agents on the field, the Abwehr intervened once more, on 12 September 1940, demanding the expulsion of a contingent comprised of 23 British in the region of Ploieşti. The situation would worsen even more for the British intelligence service after the instauration of the national-legionary state, in the first half of September 1940. Besides the drastic limitation of freedom of action and constant surveillance by the Abwehr, respectively the SD, Special Operation Executive (SOE) British agents in Romania had to cope with what the Plenipotentiary Minister Sir Reginald Hoare characterised, without exaggerating, as being *"a terrorist campaign"* launched by the gruesome Legionary Police.

The change that took place in the Romanian political regime influenced the activity of the SD and of the *"special envoy of the Safety Police"* within the German Legation to Bucharest, Hauptsturmfuhrer SS Kurt Geißler. Up until that moment, the Romanian Secret Service had collaborated mainly with the Abwehr, the SD having rather a decorative role for the activities developed by Germans on Romanian territory against combating attempts of sabotage. Consequently, it was fully understandable that the relations between Mihail Moruzov and SD

[3] *Ibid*, p. 76.

[4] Ottmar Trașcă, *Istoria unei colaborări SSI-Abwehr*, in *"Magazin Istoric"*, s.n. July 1994, p. 14, www.history-cluj.ro/Istorie/anuare/AnuarBaritHistorica2007/22OTrasca.pdf.

had been cold, if not quite tensed, the leader of the Secret Service being – according to Eugen Cristescu's opinion – *"badly thought of by Geißler"*.

Moruzov's removal from office, the Safety Police's shift under the command of the Legion and, even more importantly, the creation of the Legionary Police – with German support and consultancy – constituted favourable premises for growing the influence exercised by the SD in the framework of the Romanian-German informative collaboration as well as for the evolution of Romania's political life. Consequences soon started to appear. Firstly, as a result of the *"terrorist campaign"* launched by the Legionary Police in the second half of September 1940 against alleged British secret agents from the oil-bearing region, a significant number of them were forced to leave the country. Furthermore, five British citizens were accused of sabotaging German oil tankers – some of them were indeed agents of the SOE – and arrested on 24-25 September by the Legionary Police, because they were members – according to the reports filed to Berlin by the German Legation to Bucharest – of an espionage organisation led by British military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel E.A.C. Macnab. The arrests and interrogations were executed by the Legionary Police in collaboration with representatives of the Gestapo in Romania, Kurt Geißler also being personally involved in these actions.

During the interrogation, those arrested were abused in such a manner that, when the British diplomats found them in the custody of the Legionary Police, *"none of the prisoners could stand on their feet"*[5]. As a result of the vigorous intervention of the British Legation to Bucharest, General Ion Antonescu ordered the release of the five, who finally left the country in early October 1940. The measures applied by Romanian authorities did not stop there. By the end of the same month, approximately 400 British workers, engineers or simple citizens were either expulsed or coerced into leaving Romania, which signified the annihilation of the English informative network in the oil-bearing region as well as the definite failure of the plans that targeted Germany's oil supply system by sabotaging the petrol industry. Foreseeing the failure, British diplomat Robin Hankey – at that time, head of British Legation Chancellery – noted, in September 1940, that *"in the future, our only hope of cutting the oil supply (of Germany* – A./N.*) seems to be embodied entirely by air operations, which could be complemented by any other manoeuvre with a less regular character"*.

For the time being, Germany had won the battle against the British intelligence service in the backstage of the secret Romanian front, and the official mission entrusted by the RSHA Hauptsturmfuhrer SS Kurt Geißler, respectively collaborating

[5] Cristian Troncotă, *Omul de taină al mareşalului*, Editura Elion, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 62.

with Romanian police authorities in combating sabotage in the oil region, seemed to have been successful. However, even from a brief overview of the operations developed by the German intelligence services in cooperation with the Romanian Safety Police, it could be concluded that the primary artisan of the results obtained by the German side in the informative collaboration with the Romanians was, without doubt, the Abwehr, the SD's merits in this matter being insignificant.

In conclusion, we cannot but express our admiration for the way in which Romanian intelligence services chose to fight on the secret front with a far more superior adversary, in terms of procurement, tradition in the field of information and institutionalised structures rigorously organised long before the Romanian ones, with branches that covered all significant aspects of our society. Adapting on the fly to events, Moruzov's Secret Service and, later, Eugen Cristescu's SSI successfully faced challenges coming from allies or enemies, including those of German origins, and had accomplishments which, although they were not always properly exploited, managed to earn everyone's respect.

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TYPES OF COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES

Dr Ioana Valeria ALEXE

According to the way in which communication takes place in the armed forces, one can notice the following types of communication: verbal and nonverbal communication. Verbal communication takes place through linguistic signs. These signs provide a corpus called language or, more generally, speech, but linguists distinguish between language and speech. Writing, the language of signs, voice are media, means of communication. Nonverbal communication is the communication based on an implicit understanding of signs non-expressed through speech: arts, music, kinaesthesia, colours, even clothing or smells. These signs, putting them together and understanding or interpreting them, are mostly dependent on culture. This distinction verbal – nonverbal is not always easy to make.

Keywords: *verbal communication; formal and informal; socialisation; communicational abilities*

Human communication, as a fundamental way of psychosocial interaction of people, taking place through the social-generalised symbols and meanings of reality, in order to achieve stability or to change individual and collective behaviour, is accomplished within the armed forces in a variety of types. Of course, these types of communication are established with respect to one criterion or another. Thus, according to the criterion *"the nature of communication"*, we have *official communication* (formal, institutionalised one) and *unofficial communication* (informal one).

The *first type* is organised and conducted according to the legal documents that govern the life and work of the armed forces. Here, we consider the general military regulations, orders of the Minister of National Defence, directives and instructions on how soldiers communicate with each other in an institutional framework. In turn, official communication is organised and conducted both vertically and horizontally. This is what is known as *upward communication* and *downward communication*.

Vertically, official communication is done through various forms. Thus, *upward communication* is accomplished by verbal or written reports submitted by a commander/chief to his superior in the chain of command.

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Frequently, the report is done in writing as well and submitted through the chain of command to the commander/chief who is authorised to receive it and decide on its message. The content of written reports is very diversified. Such reports may refer to: various requests from subordinates to the unit or large unit commander – from changing the period of the leave to approving the move to another garrison; informing the unit commander etc. about the execution of an order received previously; informing the commander directly on a particular event occurred while executing a mission or simply on how the mission received took place; suggestions and proposals to improve subordinates' living and work conditions.

Vertical institutionalised communication can also be done through the *"analysis of the state of structures in a military unit"*. Annually, each structure of the unit/large unit presents the main achievements, the problems encountered – from equipping with various materials to staffing vacancies, requests to the unit commander or the higher echelon. At the same time, official upward communication can take the form of information reports and not only, made by both the unit commander and various military and civilian personnel during controls and inspections carried out by the higher echelon or the control group of the Minister of National Defence.

At the same time, according to some directives that regulate the activity in some sectors of the armed forces (for example, *"The order regarding the armed forces personnel feeding during peacetime and at war"*) periodically, quarterly and annually, military units must submit to certain echelons of the Ministry of National Defence and/or the General Staff information about the existing stocks of materials, the personnel's medical condition etc.

Official downward communication is done through: verbal orders and/or written orders by a commander to his subordinates; directives and instructions issued by various authorities in their field of activity.

In carrying out official communication, an important role belongs to military publications and radio and television broadcasts on military activity.

It should be noted that the language and vocabulary used in official communication are subject to regulatory rigours and are elevated. Typically, the content of communication is well structured, concise and clearly expressed. In fact, in the armed forces, there are documents that regulate how to prepare a report, an analysis, a chief information or the results of an inspection or control of the upper echelon.

It is also strictly established who can address directly the Minister of National Defence, the Chief of the General Staff, the chief of staff of a force service etc. and which is the form in which this is done. At the same time, all official correspondence in the armed forces is carried out in keeping with regulations and norms that are clearly defined in normative documents – orders of the Minister of National Defence,

general regulations, directives and instructions. In addition, the official communication in the armed forces, whether written or verbal, completely complies with all norms on classified information protection in the Romanian Armed Forces.

Unofficial communication is done, by unwritten rules and norms, in any military structure. It takes place both vertically and horizontally. Its main purpose is to compensate for the limits of institutionalised communication requiring concise, clear expressions and strictly formalised language, as well as a relatively standard formulation. If this informal communication is free, without restrictions of hierarchical position or membership of a personnel body or another, formal (official) communication is stricter in this regard. There are very clear and precise rules on to whom and how may a unit, large unit commander etc. address.

In terms of the *"nature of communication"* criterion, we have: *communication made in the interest of the service* and *consumer communication*. The first type, as shown, in fact, by its name, is made with the declared aim to achieve a goal related to the specific activities and general interests of the military and private ones of their members. The second type is made without a specific purpose or one that is related to the activity of the unit or subunit, but *"for spending time"* more easily and conveniently.

According to the way in which communication takes place in the armed forces, one can notice the following types of communication: verbal and nonverbal communication. Verbal communication takes place through linguistic signs. These signs provide a corpus called language or, more generally, speech, but linguists distinguish between language and speech. Writing, the language of signs, voice are media, means of communication. Nonverbal communication is the communication based on an implicit understanding of signs non-expressed through speech: arts, music, kinaesthesia, colours, even clothing or smells. These signs, putting them together and understanding or interpreting them, are things that mostly depend on culture. This distinction verbal – nonverbal is not easy to make.

In addition, the word *verbal* can be understood as expressed through a voice. One will then speak of oral communication, as opposed to written communication. Both ways of communication can be met in the armed forces when it comes to formal communication as well as informal communication. For example, nonverbal communication is used in the conduct of military activities, including in theatres of operations. It is done for reasons that range from secrecy of the operation to assurance of speed of transmission of a concise, succinct and clear message in crisis situations. Moreover, in specific military regulations, there are conventional signs that are drawn, for example, on the maps containing different decisions of the commander and light signals or flags for leading, for instance, infantry weapons firings.

In consensus with the *"who is the messages' receiver"* criterion, we have *external communication* and *internal communication*. The first type is addressed by the armed forces to the other state institutions, the private sector and the civil society. Its aim is to raise awareness about the military activity and to obtain the legitimacy of its existence and functioning in the rule of law. The second type refers to communication carried out within the military institution both in peacetime and in crisis, war situations.

All types of communication analysed so far are dependent on the qualities, development and professional training, life experience etc. of the military personnel, on the one hand, and on the knowledge, learning and internalisation of the principles, norms and rules of establishing communication relationships both within the military institution and outside it, on the other hand.

The concept of internal communication

The armed forces and their components, services, commands, military units and large units – can be considered organisations, as they meet the criteria that define such entities[1]. Therefore, we consider that the references in the specialised literature regarding internal organisational communication also concern this state institution.

Internal organisational communication represents the communication and interactions between the employees or members of an organisation[2]. In other words, internal communication is that exchange of messages between group members and of the interactions that involve receiving and understanding them, as well as adapting individual and collective behaviour to the content received in this way. Another perspective on internal communication belongs to S. Deetz, who describes two ways to perceive and define internal communication. He first defines internal communication as *"a phenomenon that exists in organisations"*. In this approach, the organisation is a *"box"* in which communication takes place.

A second perspective sees internal communication as being *"a way to describe and explain organisations"*[3]. Here, communication is the main process through which employees exchange information, create relationships, build meanings, values and an organisational culture. This process is a combination

[1] *Dicţionar de psihologie socială*, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1982, pp. 160-162.

[2] Dr Bruce K. Berger, *Employee/Organizational Communications*, at http://www.instituteforpr.org/essential_ knowledge/detail/employee_organizational_communications/, retrieved on 20.02.2011.

[3] S. Deetz, *Conceptual Foundations*, in F.M. Jablin&L.L. Putnam (Eds.), *The New Handbook of Organizational Communication: Advances in Theory, Research and Methods*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 3-46.

of people, messages, meanings, senses, practices and goals and is the basis of modern organisations.

The first approach has been dominant until now, but the second perspective is gaining followers as organisations understand the crucial role of communication in solving complex problems and adapting to sudden changes in the external environment dominated by globalisation.

In turn, for other authors communication is one of the most important activities of an organisation[4]. Fundamentally, the relationships grow as a consequence of communication, and the functioning and survival of organisations is based on effective relationships between individuals and groups. Moreover, organisational capabilities are adopted and developed through *"intense communication and social processes"*[5]. Communication helps individuals and groups to coordinate their activities to achieve goals and is vital in processes of socialisation, decision-making, problem-solving and management change.

Internal communication also provides important information to employees about the position they occupy, the organisation they work for, the external and internal environment. At the same time, communication can help motivate employees, build trust, create a common identity or increase personal involvement. Moreover, it offers individuals a way to express feelings, to share hopes, ambitions and achievements, and to celebrate and remember accomplishments. In addition, communication is the way through which individuals and groups understand their organisation, what it is and what it represents, thus facilitating the (formal and informal) integration of employees in its structures.

On the other hand, internal communication is a complex and dynamic process whose development takes place through models[6]. These ones, earlier to the ones today, focused on sending messages in a single direction. For example, the Shannon-Weaver model (1949), related to the distribution of information, is a classic example. In the S-M-C-R model, a source of information (S) encodes a message (M) and sends it through a channel (C) to a receiver (R), which decodes it. In later versions of the model it is added a feedback loop from receiver to transmitter (source). However, the Shannon-Weaver model suggests that all meanings are contained in the message and the message would be understood once it is received. It is a model centred on the transmitter. In our opinion, the messages are not always understood by the receiver as they were designed and issued by the source.

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[4] T.E. Harris, M.D. Nelson, *Applied Organizational Communication* (3rd edition), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New York, 2008, p. 244.

[5] Elizabeth Jones, Bernadette Watson, John Gardner, Cindy Gallois, *Organizational Communication: Challenges for the New Century*, Journal of Communication, vol. 54, Issue 4, December 2004, pp. 722-750.

[6] *Modèle de Shannon et Weaver/Modèle de Lasswell/Modèle de Riley&Riley*/feedback/Jakobson, at http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/m273156/Modeles_Com.pdf.

Berlo's S-M-C-R Model (1960) provided an enhanced perspective in interaction terms. He stressed the relationship between source and receiver and suggested the following fact: the more the communication knowledge and skills of sources and receivers increased, the more the message could be encoded and decoded efficiently. Berlo also realised the importance of the culture in which the communication takes place, of the attitudes of the transmitters and receivers and of choosing the communication channel.

The following models stress the transactional nature of the process and the way in which individuals, groups and organisations build meanings and purposes.

Today, the model is more complex due to new IT and communication technologies, which allows multi-targeted communication and at high speeds. However, the central components persist especially in formal communication. Organisational leaders and experts in communication first develop strategies to meet the objectives, then build the relevant messages that are sent through various channels to encourage communication with employees and members of the organisation. Formal communication is becoming more focused on the needs and problems of receivers.

In fact, any type of communication includes: the *communication levels*, *networks* and *channels* as structural elements absolutely required for messages to arrive from the transmitter (source) to the receiver. Of course, in psychosocial terms, the receiver is not a passive but an active component that interacts with the source, giving what in cybernetics is called the *feedback relationship* through which one can tell if the message has been understood and if the receiver has other information needs.

A significant element of internal communication in the armed forces, as in any organisation, is that it takes place on *several levels*. A first form of communication is the interpersonal or *"face-to-face"* (F-T-F) one, and organisations have been trying for years to develop presentation, communication and writing skills of leaders, managers and supervisors in this regard. Group communication takes place through the teams, units and interest groups of employees. This level focuses on sharing information, discussing issues, coordinating tasks, solving problems and building consensus. Organisational communication is centred on vision and mission, management policies, initiatives and organisational knowledge and performance. These forms of formal communication sometimes follow a cascade-type approach, in which the leaders of hierarchical levels communicate with their subordinates.

A final level is the interorganisational communication, which, even though it seems to be the external communication of the armed forces/services/large units, however, its content concerns the entire staff of that institutionalised structure.

Hence, the need for knowing its essential content by all the military and civilian personnel from the armed forces.

Communication networks are another essential element of any communication. A network is the way in which communication takes place within the organisation. Networks can be both formal and informal. In a formal communication network, messages flow through official channels (e.g. orders, provisions, guidance) reflecting the organisational hierarchy. Informal communication takes place through unofficial channels (unofficial channels through which rumours are transmitted today are faster and multidirectional) and includes rumours, opinions, aspirations and expressions of emotions. Informal communication is usually interpersonal and carried out horizontally and employees consider it to be more sincere than the formal one. Employees and members of organisations use both networks to understand their organisation and reach their personal and group goals.

Communication may take place on the vertical of the organisation and vice versa, on the horizontal (between the same hierarchical levels). In terms of vertical communication, it can be directed from top to down – following the hierarchical course of an organisation, or from bottom to up, i.e. from the lower to the upper levels of the hierarchy. Horizontal communication takes place at the level of the people among whom there is no hierarchical difference, for example, three supervisors in three different departments. Omni-directional or diagonal communication takes place between employees of different hierarchical levels, occupying different positions within the organisation, for example between a supervisor in charge of quality control and a systems analyst. The evolving organisational structures and technologies create opportunities for new types of communication flows.

Studies on the effectiveness of communication flows often reveal dissatisfaction with the communication staff regarding top-down or bottom-up communication. Research conducted by *Opinion Research Corporation*, an institution that has been examining the perceptions of employees on internal communication for over 50 years, indicates that, generally, more than half of employees are dissatisfied with top-down or bottom-up communication[7]. And even less is known about the effectiveness of horizontal or diagonal communication.

Communication channels are used to send messages from the transmitter to the receiver. A communication channel is the medium through which messages are sent and received. There are three types of channels: printed, electronic

[7] S.M. Cutlip, A.H. Center & G.M. Broom, *Effective Public Relations* (9th Ed.), Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006, p. 238.

and interpersonal ones. Printed channels include regulations, orders, stipulations, instructions, brochures, newsletters, reports, manuals. Thanks to new technologies, electronic channels are increasingly used, such as the e-mail and voice mail, intranet networks, blogs, chat rooms, TV business channels, podcasts, videoconferences, instant messaging systems, wiki-encyclopaedias and electronic meetings. *"Face-to-face"* channels include speeches, team meetings, focus groups, business lunches and social events or meetings.

According to consultants Harris and Nelson, the most used channel is *"listening"*, which consumes about half of our communication time. Effective listening is crucial for learning, understanding, conflict resolution and productive teamwork. It helps leaders and, in the armed forces, it helps commanders/chiefs at all levels to improve the morale of their subordinates, to discover and solve problems. However, many studies indicate that most people are not good listeners and few organisations use their resources to develop the listening skills of their managers and leaders[8].

Internal communication continues to evolve in this dynamic world, characterised by the explosion of new technologies, intense competition globally and sudden changes in all areas. Today, most people would agree with the statement by Harris and Nelson: internal communication is an essential aspect of organisational change – it is *"the key variable in almost all change efforts, diversity initiatives and motivation"*[9]. Some authors would argue that the very internal communication is *"the most important driver of business performance"*[10].

Increasingly more evidence shows that efficient internal communication helps to increase employees satisfaction at work, their morale, productivity, commitment, trust and learning, improves communication climate and relationships with audiences and increases quality and profits. In military units and subunits, represented as human groups, effective internal communication is in a bi-univocal relationship with psychosocial properties – cohesion, organisational climate consensus, integration, effectiveness, morale – as, in fact, has already been mentioned in the brief presentation of the psychosocial perspective on the military. A number of studies cited by Bruce Berger[11] come to support this assertion. In this regard, here are some examples:

- Disloyal employees or those who do not involve in achieving the objectives of the organisation can cause losses of over 50 billion dollars annually

[8] Alessandra & Hunsaker, *Communicating at Work*, Fireside, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1993, p. 3.
[9] T.E. Harris, M.D. Nelson, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
[10] C. Gay, M. Mahoney, & J. Graves, *Best Practices in Employee Communication: A Study of Global Challenges and Approaches*, IABC Research Foundation, San Francisco, 2005, p. 11.
[11] Cf. Bruce K. Berger, *op. cit.*

by quality defects, rework and repair costs, absenteeism from work and reduced productivity, according to Alvie Smith, former director of corporate communications at General Motors.

- Improving the information employees receive about customers, their organisation or work, in terms of quality, timeliness and adequacy, can improve their individual performance by 20 to 50%.
- More than 80% of employees surveyed in the US and UK said that internal communication affected their decision to stay with the organisation or to leave. Almost a third said communication was a great influence on their decision.
- Top 200 *"most admired companies"* spend on communication with employees three times more than the 200 *"least admired companies"*.
- Employee satisfaction regarding communication in their organisations is related to the organisation's commitment to them, productivity, job performance and satisfaction at the workplace and other important effects.
- Organisations with involved and committed employees were 50% more productive than those organisations where employees were not involved. Moreover, the ability to assimilate and keep employees was 44% higher in organisations with involved and committed employees.
- Positive communication climate and effective employees communication strengthen employees' identification with their organisations, which contributes to financial performance and sustained success.
- An important improvement in the effectiveness of organisational communication led to an increase in market value of 29,5%.
- Effective communication facilitates engagement and builds trust, which is a vital ingredient in strong, viable organisations. Involved employees increase organisational performance because they influence customer behaviour, which has direct effect on increasing profits.

Assuming that the armed forces and their structural components are in fact organisations, then we consider that many of the conclusions mentioned in the studies summarised above have validity in terms of communication within the military.

Studies have addressed the internal communication in organisations from different perspectives. Internal communication has always been an attribute of leadership. It is made essentially through the chain of command and its various echelons. The conception of internal communication in the military has evolved with the evolution of mentalities and the media revolution of the society

through its many technological supports. This translates into four phenomena, according to the quoted source[12]:

- increased professionalisation and specialisation of the internal communication mission in support of the command. This phenomenon is global in the ensemble of the armed forces, in all forces services, large units and units, subunits. In each unit, there are people specialised in internal communication;
- establishment of internal communication networks with functional and not just strictly hierarchical nature. Today, the military exchanges of information are increasingly made in keeping with the horizontal functional schemes and not only the vertical ones. The exchange of information is a matrix with various correspondents for the same person, without these correspondents being required to be *a priori* connected to each other;
- subordinate echelons increasing expression towards the upper echelons: it expresses a strong need to communicate from the basis of military structures.

In carrying out internal communication, a wide range of processes are resorted to. These include[13]: command meetings, disseminating information through messages, colloquia on personnel categories, information forums for all categories of staff with discussions. Moreover, there is a regular system of communication in the armed forces called *"annual report on the morale"*, conducted at all levels, which gives rise to an information feedback between the various echelons of the armed forces, information commissions at various subordinate levels – regiment, battalion/division. The same feedback role is played by structure analysis (annual activity) and non-agenda meetings, held monthly, in each unit on staff categories.

In practice, internal communication uses various media – from paper to cyberspace. Today, the Romanian Armed Forces have institutional digitised networks, via *intranet* and *milnet*, which function at various levels. Also, in the internal communication in the military, besides digitised networks, there are used films and video documents easily to consult and which serve to internal information, press reviews redistributed to subordinate echelons. Internal communication of the Romanian Armed Forces conveys different contents. The written publications mentioned above are made first of all to communicate to the outside. However, they have a strong internal impact because they provide an image of the military institution that is acknowledged by the Ministry of National Defence. Therefore, the content of published materials should be chosen in such a way that each force service, branch etc. could find itself in it. In addition, these publications also

[12] *L'Armée et communication interne*, at http://www.ujjef.com/index.php?idRubrique=9&Action=LireArticle&idArticle=647, p. 1.

[13] *Ibid*, p. 2.

contain the opinions of different military personnel categories. At the same time, the information in these publications concern defence, armed forces and their missions. Military and civilian personnel need to know which the current missions are, where they are carried out, with whom, under what circumstances and why. Moreover, they include information about career moves, retirement and conversion.

Finally, information on the Romanian realities, especially for the military men in theatres of operations, are constantly spread through official channels.

Therefore, one can say that, in the internal communication, the editorial objectives and tasks of the contents made available to those interested are considered. Thus, the personnel of the Ministry of National Defence must know what the level of effectiveness of the armed forces is and why they must accomplish those missions. Namely, it is considered the activity of military units and large units in the country, as well as that of the military structures in missions in various theatres of operations. This must be done in such a way that the military and civilian personnel to have confidence in the institution in which they work after reading these pieces of information.

Another objective is the loyalty of armed forces employees. Today, the Romanian Armed Forces gave up conscription during peacetime and started to use the volunteer recruitment method. Hence, the need to attract young people to weapons, on the one hand, and to maintain in the system those people that are already employed, as volunteers, on the other hand.

Internal communication must consider all the personnel in the military. Therefore, the content of communication must be simultaneously global and aimed at specific groups of staff.

Given the assertions about internal communication, we can sustain that it has a stable future in the armed forces. As a result, a permanent concern of internal communication will remain the need for command structures to provide continuous information centred on the mission. It seems that today internal communication is oriented towards interaction and concentration: a stronger exchange of information, in keeping with the *"question and answer"*-type schema, in both directions, vertically. In fact, there is a constant concern to bring coherence between the external image of the armed forces in the eyes of the public and the internal image as it is perceived by their personnel. The two images should naturally be the same.

In conclusion, today and tomorrow, communication within the armed forces has and will have to play a significant role in the military institution accomplishing its constitutional missions.

REDUCING THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CRISES BY INFLOW OF INTELLIGENCE

Valeriu IVAN

It is obvious that, in the medium to long term, one of the main problems that needs to be solved by mankind is the one of sharing natural resources between increasingly hungry economies. The constant increase in prices, in recent years, shows a reduction of resources in relation to the needs of economies and, consequently, indicates future conflicts for easy access to them.

Promoting national interests, in the current geopolitical context, requires a paradigm transformation in Romanian strategic thinking and practice, in the policies of reform and modernisation of Romania. One of the basic directions of this transformation implies adopting a proactive political behaviour by promoting an integrated management of risks and opportunities associated with national interests and by using multi-source analysis tools, simulation/ modelling and decision support. At governmental level, a key role in supporting these informational roles is held by dedicated information systems and the integrated information system of the economy as a whole.

Keywords: *intelligence, economic policies, business intelligence, competitiveness, national strategy, early warning*

Motto:

"The truth is everywhere, but only those who seek it recognise it".

Nicolae Iorga

The promotion of national interests in the current geopolitical context requires a change of paradigm in the Romanian thinking and strategic practice, as part of Romania's reform and modernisation policies. One of the fundamental consequences of this transformation is the embracement of a proactive political behaviour in order to promote an integrated management of the risks and opportunities associated with national interests and the use of multi-source instruments of data analysis, of simulation/modelling and decision-making support.

Economy, a fundamental domain for survival in the global competition of nations, is the *"battlefield"* on which contemporary wars are won and lost. The access to resources, technological progress, the control of the volume of products needed by the market, the leadership exerted on some markets, are objectives – not seldom national –

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which, once they are fulfilled, trigger a competitive advantage and enrich nations that understand the realities of the present and foresee the perspectives of the future.

The majority of standard macroeconomic surveys and forecasts were not very helpful in the early approach of recent economic crises, although relevant signals surfaced in certain environments, mainly in academic ones. Unfortunately, data about loans and expenses in the private sector are less accessible than capital flow data in the public domain, and in a world in which private capital flows are highly significant, their monitoring and supervision are expensive and yield inaccurate results.

The wide-scale use of financial derivatives obscures monitoring operations while the interpretation of available data grows increasingly difficult. We draw attention here on a major characteristic of market economy, namely that it entails that the dispersed information is aggregated with prices and that information allows a certain predictability which encourages economic activity. Furthermore, we should not get our hopes high that the improvement of information flow is enough for financial markets of raw materials or of any other kind to operate well. In the pre-crisis period in Eastern Asia[1] much of the information was available but it was not assessed, interpreted or integrated to create a protection shield for what was to come.

How can the economy be prepared to withstand a major financial crisis which can later trigger an economic crisis? The answer may be... with a vaccine! However, in order to give a vaccine you must have a thorough knowledge of the patient's state of health, the possible allergies, the illness for which the vaccine is given, the type of vaccine, the adequate dose, the technique of inoculation, possible complications, possible repercussions, and side-effects. In other words, knowledge and information correlated with a systematic apprehension of the patient, in our case the economic branches or the overall economy.

The systematic apprehension allows a complete and unified approach of the specific phenomena and processes of the domains approached, by highlighting the quality of the system.

[1] On 2 July 1997, the stock market crashed in Thailand. Furthermore, the Thai Central Bank deregulated the exchange rate of its national currency, the *baht* – which until then was coupled with the exchange rate of the American dollar. As an immediate reaction, the value of the national Thai currency lost 25% in only one day. The crisis in Thailand had a domino effect and swallowed all Southeast Asian countries, also known as *"economic tigers"*.

Although the capital flow data can be identified, collected, processed and integrated through effective computerised information systems, ultimately, it has been proved that it is less likely that the entire complexity of the interactions that might affect, at a certain time, the entire system, can be accommodated. Nevertheless, good information seems to be the most important enhancement that can be added to the architecture of protection structures within the national economy and with the aim of increasing competitiveness.

At the level of the government, dedicated information systems and the overall integrated information system of the economic organisation have a decisive role in supporting these informational roles. Making decisions in conditions of minimum uncertainty is the purpose of information system development, which supplies precise or specific aggregated information, as well as the context in which the decision is made.

The competitiveness/economic force of Romania also lies in the formation and development of the economic *"intelligence"* of economic leaders/decision-makers. A practical step for professionalising decision-making, which will allow a rapid processing of cues concerning economic deviations, would be to initiate a national *Competitive Intelligence* programme.

The concept of *competitive intelligence*, which has a mature development in the European and American business environment, involves the distinct existence, at multiple levels (company, economic branch, economy) of experts, processes and specialised instruments, with a double role: to collect and to ethically and legally process information about the market and competitors and to simultaneously protect its own information patrimony. The purpose of this approach must be restricted exclusively to the increase in the overall economy competitiveness, by strictly avoiding situations whereby some companies are favoured to the detriment of others.

Public-private intelligence

Whether we are talking about sensitive technical domains or technologies, the interests of states, as players on various markets, are obvious. The start-up of economic intelligence actually originates from the collaboration between the state and private players, in which the state possesses more means than the private players. The most liberal countries are not the ones less aware of the imperative role of the state that promotes national economic interests abroad and the surveillance of foreign economic activities on their territory. In the USA and Europe, but also in Asian states with an accelerated development, public authorities are highly involved in this activity.

In this respect, ever since 1975, the Americans have created a *Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States*[2], managed by the Treasury Secretary, a committee which refused, for instance, the merger between the companies ALCATEL and LUCENT, or the scheduled merger between EUTELSAT and the main US operator of satellites. The Clinton Administration proved a great urge in strengthening the economic intelligence means: in 1993, the *National Economic Council*[3] was created, a council responsible for the supply of economic information to the President of the USA, and, in 1996, the *Economic Espionage Act*[4] was voted, a document that strengthened the protection of business secrecy. Two years later, *American Presence Posts* were founded worldwide, entities responsible for collecting economic information on behalf of US embassies.

In the mid '90s, the French authorities started to focus on the coordination of the public and private actions in the economy, a situation in relation to which the French government drafted, at that time, a report called *Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises*[5]. In April 1995, the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, subordinated to the Prime Minister, decided to establish a National Committee for Competitiveness and Economic Security, made of the main representatives of large French public and private enterprises. Nevertheless, this structure was soon side-tracked. Several cases in which businesses with high added value were taken over by the foreign capital had to occur before the French authorities asked themselves again about the state's role in protecting national economic interests.

The GEMPLUS business seems to have played an important role from this point of view. This French private enterprise, which was the first international company manufacturing microchip cards, had spent more than EUR 100 million of state grants since its establishment. In 2000, American companies – which seemed to be way behind with research in the field – invested and progressively bought GEMPLUS through Texas Pacific Group, and afterwards, subsequent to taking control, in 2002, relocated it in the USA. The company was integrated in 2006 in AXALTO, and the GEMALTO conglomerate was born.

Nevertheless, France is not totally disarmed in front of the *"free operation"* of markets. Thus, it can rely on monetary and financial codes, whose provisions allow the Ministry of Economy and Finances to express their *veto* right with respect to the transactions that affect national defence, public security and health.

[2] http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Pages/Committee-on-Foreign-Investment-in-US.aspx

[3] http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/

[4] http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/eea.html

[5] http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/074000410/index.shtml

These terms, fairly general, allowed the ministry to intervene, in November 2003, when the French company ARISEM, specialised in information processing software, announced that it was about to be bought by a Canadian investment fund. The Ministry of Finance had a rapid response, ARISEM announcing in January 2004 that the transaction was no longer valid.

At the request of the Prime Minister, deputy Bernard Carayon drafted, in June 2003, a report called *Intelligence économique, compétitivité et cohésion sociale*[6], clearly defining the role that the state should play in creating an environment that favours a culture of economic intelligence.

This shows that the most liberal countries are not necessarily the most reluctant to enforce a firm cooperation between the private and public sector in the field of identifying, processing and effectively using information that may sustain the competitiveness of their own economies.

Competitiveness through information

Competitiveness through information starts from the premise that companies can develop valid competitive strategies using, to a large extent, the intelligence obtained from the internal development of specific capabilities: analyses, multi-criteria assessment, multiple estimates on alternative scenarios etc. From this point of view, competitive intelligence programmes, which can be developed at the level of Romanian companies, ensure a new understanding and approach to the challenge of competitiveness, in the context in which 80% of medium and large European companies run such programmes, and more than 55% are supported by *competitive intelligence* software applications, integrated with *business intelligence* and *knowledge management* systems.

What is the role that the state, the government can assume in business intelligence? The example of other European countries – Sweden, Germany, Austria etc. – reveals a few courses of action which require a debate and political decision:

- opinion formation and awareness;
- creation of capabilities;
- development of capabilities;
- establishment of a public-private strategic partnership;
- consultancy and support.

For instance, by creating a nodal point, as a coordination structure and an interface between information services and the economic environment, which integrates the five possible responsibilities, the governmental environment can support

[6] http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/034000484/index.shtml

the use of human resources who are trained in information processing and assessment. The performance of such programmes, with state support, is grounded on an irrefutable reality: *the quasi-totality of Romanian companies lack the competencies, abilities and resources required for the performance of competitive intelligence operations and activities.*

This reality must be understood as a vulnerability which affects national security. That is why the development of the information capability in the business environment – focussing on the competitive intelligence area – must be turned into a priority in the national security strategy for Romania to fulfil the objectives set by the economic security policy and, implicitly, the objectives set by the national security policy.

Progressive programmes for the development of information capabilities represent a potential solution for enhancing the performance of Romanian companies and, consequently, of the overall economy. These programmes, through the significant enhancement of the abilities to obtain and effectively use economic information and intelligence, could provide a competitive mix of capabilities to Romanian companies and also ensure a player attitude, aware of its own potential, of the value of its competitors, of the rules of the game and of the strategies and the tactics on the market.

Effective organisations know that, in order to be competitive, they must anticipate the changes that appear in their field of activity or the general context in which the economy functions. Furthermore, they also know that in order to obtain this competitive advantage they need a transformation plan for the data and information issued by the intelligence – surveys, summaries, assessments – used as grounds for making decisions in low uncertainty conditions.

By avoiding surprises through early warning and management of risks and of opportunities generated by the dynamics of the business environment, the practices and instruments mentioned enable actions, instead of reactions on the market, like a player who is aware of the rules of the game, of its own capabilities and of those of its competitors. By using such practices at government level, it is less likely that the economy will be *"caught by surprise"* by the external waves of economic crises.

In fact, through a better and more systematic understanding of what is happening on the market and through a proper assessment of the strategic/tactical impact of these actions, the system supports the continuous calibration of its competitive strategies and tactics for companies and economic branches.

The project of transformation of the economy in an information- and knowledge-based economy does not reside only in adopting these new instruments and concepts, but also in creating/using a complex institutional framework

of employment thereof, activities which can be materialised in structures such as virtual community of experts, decision-making information structures and virtual information community.

The virtual community of experts means using different elite communities of the Romanian society (academic, business, cultural, information etc.) for counselling and preparing national projects. The level that information technology has reached allows experts to work together irrespective of where they are or of the time allotted to joint projects.

The decision-making information infrastructure is based on the development of information and communication platforms, which require a shift of focus on content (software and database) and on their degree of interconnection. Information networks, with content and without redundancies, are the grounds for an effective development of infrastructures. The applications implemented require common/ related databases at private-public level and at the level of the central and local administrative infrastructure.

The virtual information community, based on the general effort of implementing the *Information Society Strategy*[7], presupposes the development of an economic security culture at social level, and the focus on the dissemination of information and exchange of knowledge. The virtual information community is useful as long as it operates within the *"need to share"* and not the *"need to know"* paradigm.

The technological level contains four main databases which incorporate the results of the processes from the previously mentioned levels and which generate support for these processes. These databases are: the map of interests and of objectives, the matrix of threats, the map of vulnerabilities and the map of risks.

The building of the map of interests and objectives is a process aimed at a more accurate identification of the conditions and circumstances which allow us to reach the target level in the military, economic, social, political and other domains. National interests represent a major factor in the equation of development of the risk management processes which need to be quantified. Each element from such a map is characterised by a series of indicators, such as: the priority level (associated to a time horizon) which will be taken into account during the stage of planning, the degree of influence of a certain interest over the others etc.

The process of building a vulnerability map aims at identifying the flaws inside the systems and processes involved in the achievement of national interests and objectives. This map contains the totality of systems and processes that support

[7] *The National Strategy for the Promotion of the New Economy and the Implementation of the Information Society* is adopted as of October 2002. After its adoption, it was virtually ignored.

national economic interests, the degree to which these systems and processes interfere, the level at which these systems and processes compete in an effective way etc.

The development of the matrix of threats is a process of identifying the competences and abilities of partners and competitors from various markets. The purpose is to obtain as many pieces of information as possible about each friend/enemy and about the competences and reasons for interfering with their own interests and objectives.

The map of risks is a direct result of the processes running at a functional level, which contains not only the selected indicators for characterising the risk (probability, impact, priority, timeframe etc.) but also references to areas from the matrix of threats and the map of vulnerabilities which are very connected with the risk and interest affected.

In conclusion, an integrated risk management system at national level is set for the economic component, being an effective instrument aimed at helping the political decision factor to make the right decisions that enable the mitigation and avoidance of risks, depending on the significance of the risk and in relation to national interests. Such a system engenders an easier selection of the optimal action plan and sets the limits for the acceptance of the consequences of assumed risks.

The identification and management of risks is ultimately a question of attitude, which can reset the problem of decision-making upon new grounds.

Early warning

Generally, surprise is the result of ignoring risk factors or of the prevalence of internal convictions of decision factors over reality. When the vision/assumptions of decision factors are not grounded on realities, the phenomenon of dissonance appears, therefore the decision made in such conditions reduces the system's performance rate.

Drawing a parallel with the theory of reliability, where for any technical system the aim is to obtain an intermediate time as long as possible between two breakdowns, it can be affirmed that one of the objectives of the system is to increase the average time between two consecutive unpleasant surprises.

At the level of the state, the duty of fulfilling this objective rests, to a large extent, upon the intelligence community[8], based on the early warning function available to this community. The warning function can be regarded both as one of the working processes at the intelligence community level and at the level of each component

[8] We understand to introduce in this expression all national or state department services whose object of activity is the collection, corroboration, processing and dissemination of relevant information for national interests and objectives.

intelligence service and as a system comprising the technical architecture and the sum of required policies and procedures.

The utility of this intelligence function rests not only in its self-defining title, but also in the fact that if the necessary distinction is made between risk management and crisis management, it can be said that, without early warning and crisis avoiding measures, crisis management will undoubtedly come about.

Ignoring warning is a failure for the issuer of such warning and for the decision factor who receives it. The vulnerabilities and threats do not come about ad-hoc, they are usually discovered after the crisis is initiated. There are always signs of its evolution. Consequently, the institutionalisation of the early warning process – meaning both a structure and a methodology – is a requirement for the decision factors to be aware of the risks to which the national economic interests are exposed.

To be effective, the warning must be relevant for some decisions for preventing and stopping the occurrence of crises. The warning is not complete, in the absence of a decision made as a response to it, even if the decision is not to take any action. Nevertheless, the actions taken as a result of warning must have an impact on the preventive options of response measures in case of crisis, by counteracting surprise or an attack.

Warning is not an event but a process in the intelligence activity. This process has four stages.

In the first stage, the potential threat must be identified and defined. This definition of the problem (scenario) which requires warning must be very precise so that it clearly describes the situation that needs to be prevented and avoided.

In the next stage, a limited number of crucial indicators are identified. These indicators are events or quantitative/qualitative expressions which describe a reality or entities (social, economic or governmental). When triggering events appear or when indicators exceed certain threshold values, we can conclude, based on experience or previous simulations, that reality follows that scenario.

In the third stage, data are collected, information is generated, which is integrated to generate high added value information and knowledge materialised in models explained in terms of structure and operation. Finally, the actual warning is issued, if the *"threshold value"* is exceeded for one or several indicators or in case of occurrence of the *"triggering event"*.

The warning process is cyclic, continuing even after the development of the warning, through a constant monitoring and adjustment of the problem/scenario subject to warning and by identifying the triggering events or the related indicators (threshold values).

The precise identification of warning problems allows the participants in these four stages to focus more the limited resources of collection and analysis.

The success of an early warning process depends on the analysts' capacity to identify, monitor and report crucial indicators, on their capacity to identify the pattern of the monitored phenomenon. An analyst involved in the early warning process must be able to distinguish the relevant information from the *"noise"* of reality, and, at the same time, to avoid being negatively influenced by the options and fundamental needs of beneficiaries. Thus, the indicators used must truly describe the crucial points of change in the evolution of the situation, be reliable (trustworthy) and observable in time, as well as distinctive and quantifiable (as unambiguous as possible).

As a conclusive observation, the implementation of integrated risk and opportunity management system implies the development of an early warning architecture at the level of a community, with standardised interfaces and procedures. Such a system would allow a decision factor to understand that, at a certain time, in agreement with its interests and objectives, it must manage a number of risks and exploit a number of opportunities. The management of such risks can limit the occurrence of some crises and it is the expression of a proactive political behaviour based on intelligence and knowledge.

Intelligence-based national economic policies

Building a competitive economic system in this space is a desideratum for the political class and for field specialists. The key success factor, generically formulated, is information power – as a tangible, quantifiable component of national power – translated in information capabilities and in the *"ability"* to use information as a national strategic resource.

In this framework, it is convenient and feasible to shift the focus, the vision and the resources towards the operationalisation of concepts and solutions that provide specificity and concreteness to information power. Furthermore, the change of paradigm must be accompanied by a pragmatic constructivism and by an accelerated transformation of the decision-making system at a strategic level in the economy.

One of the main directions of transformation is the promotion of a proactive political behaviour through an integrated management of risks and opportunities associated with national interests, using multi-source instruments of analysis, simulation and decision-making support and developing capabilities specific to *information operations*.

The transformation implies a simultaneous repositioning of direct strategy (in which the armed force plays a central role) and of indirect strategy (in which, without being excluded, the armed force has a secondary role). This aspect paves the way for a wide range of operational fields in which the future commitments of Romania can operate – conceptual, geopolitical, sociological, economic, decision and information systems fields.

Focusing on the aspect and on the informational stake of current competition implicitly triggers the need for a unitary and coherent exploitation of information, through the specific mechanisms of perception management – strategic information operations. These become an important option in the field of diplomatic, economic, social action/reaction and require a joint approach, because the effective coordination and synchronisation of disparate players ensures operational effectiveness.

The integrated risk and opportunity management implies the identification, assessment and generation of options related to the treatment (reduction, removal, monitoring, ignoring) of the risks/opportunities which affect/lead to the fulfilment of national objectives.

The national economic environment in competition with foreign competitors should generalise the concepts of intelligence (business intelligence, marketing intelligence, competitive intelligence etc.) and operations (of promotion, of purchase), develop information capabilities which integrate IT practices with information management practices and the behaviour and attitudes of human resources towards the information exploited in knowledge.

The accession to the European Union does not reduce competition at the level of companies, but, on the contrary, expands both competition and markets. An economic environment structured on market principles and a decision-making support based on the mentioned concepts can be a crucial advantage in the process of achieving capitalist maturity within the Romanian society.

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A coherent early warning system of shocks in various domains, mainly in the financial domain, correlated with a proper risk management can significantly reduce the impact of crises, like the one that is currently affecting Romania. Looking helplessly at the crash of economy and not learning anything from the loss of the battle with the crisis from 2008-2009 can be the premise for a propagation of errors and for the degradation of the ability to react in front of similar or other types of challenges.

The entire system can be managed only from outside the political system, the interferences from this field being premises for the destruction of the entire construction. The management can be provided by a council in which representatives of the governmental, business, union, academic environments take part.

Naturally, the enhancement of information capabilities and the supply of high-level information products cannot be very helpful in the absence of a proper training of the decision factors with respect to the employment of such capabilities. The overcoming of dilettantism in decision-making at political level must begin with the understanding of the society functioning paradigm and with the removal of dysfunctions affecting social and economic progress.

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PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF TERROR
– From Terrorist Profile to Antiterrorist Fighter Selection Management –

Dr Nicolae RADU

The need to know as many details as possible regarding terrorists' psychological, physical and specialised training that is generated by terrorist groups' intention of brain washing the new recruits and religiously indoctrinating based on models inspired by The Big Encyclopaedia of Jihad, The letter from an al-Qaeda member *and* How to withstand and to confront special services' investigators *requires now, more than ever, a special focus on understanding terrorist groups re-configuration and a new approach to antiterrorist fighters' training. Al-Qaeda ("Qaidat al-Jihad"), after merging, in June 2001, with al-Jihad (the Egyptian Islamic Jihad), holds training bases spread over the South, South-East Asia and Middle East. Beside these bases, it is a well-known fact that the terrorist group is very active through its European cells called White al-Qaeda or "the terrorists with white skin". This group reunites around 800 Bosnian Mujaheddin and its purpose is to expand al-Qaeda in Europe with the final aim of accomplishing the "Pan-Islamic Caliphate" worldwide.*

***Keywords**: terrorism; fight; terrorist profiles; terror; suicide*

Terrorism world

The definitions and lines of demarcation are still controversial. Fully subscribing to the assessment of well-known writers such as Mark Burgess and Eva-Ildiko Delcea[1], according to whom, to define terrorism is now an exercise so complex and objective so that we can say it is rather an artistic approach than a scientific one, through our research, we restrict ourselves only to consider a series of valences, one of them with historical value, in order to grasp the importance of the Islamic civilisation and of the common wish of the Muslim world, marked by Islamic Jihad *("the holy war")*. Terrorism is essentially a theatre play[2] performed for an audience, designed to draw the attention of a numerous audience on a common situation, without direct connection with the violence act, gambling on shocking audience.

In this context, it can be said that Islam is the one that legitimates the open game practiced by terrorism. There is no divine order in Islam

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[1] M. Burgess, E.I. Delcea, *Problematica definirii terorismului*, in *Terorismul Azi*, vol. IV–VI, year I, 2006.

[2] D. Dragomir, *Profilul şi personalitatea teroristului*, Academia de Poliţie "Alexandru Ioan Cuza", Bucureşti.

in order to force Muslims to commit terrorist acts[3]. According to Islam, these acts are dangerous, with notorious consequences. Committing such acts is a sin and a sign of oppression against the human being. The Islamic religion commands that everything should be healthy and beneficial to humanity. Anyone who is researching the two main sources of revealing Islam – the Koran and Prophet Mohammed tradition – will not find any evidence to support the idea according to which it is a divine commandment for Muslims to commit violence and terrorist acts.

Those devoid of pity

Social sciences researchers[4] conclude that terrorist acts are not related to psychopathological and personality disorders. Terrorism, consequence of the group or organisational pathology, gives a meaning for the individuals tempted by these groups[5]. Analysing the American militaries abuses against the Iraqi prisoners from Abu Ghraib (Iraq), the American military prison, a military psychiatrist says that it is about the military acts done in a dangerous environment and without any supervision[6].

According to the *"novinite.com"* site citing the Bulgarian magazine *"24 Ceasa"*, al-Qaeda enrols Bulgarian students for religious Jordan Universities and also tries to involve young people from Romania, Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo[7]. Mosques, cafeterias, bookshops or prisons are radicalism *"incubators"*, where young Muslims are enrolled[8]. A confidential report, analysed by *"Associated Press"*, shows that the method started up right after the attacks on 11 September 2001, when it became difficult for the Muslims outside the American or European borders to break the security counterterrorism system. According to the above-mentioned report, more than once, terrorists consider that their duties within these territories should be undertaken by local organisations[9]. The 19 year-old Swedish citizen,

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[5] I. Mansdorf, *op. cit.*

[6] J. Taguba, *Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade* in V. Poponete, *Terorismul, aspecte psihosociale*, at http://www.presamil.ro/SMM/2005/3/25-29.htm, 2005.

[7] http://www.adevarul.ro

[8] http://www.realitatea.net

[9] http:// indexmedia.ro

Bosnian descent, Mirsad Bektasevic, also surnamed Maximus, is one of those choosing terrorism. The Bosnian police found in his house a real explosive arsenal, as well as a self-murder belt. The Police declared that the Swedish citizen intended to plot an attack at one of the European embassies from Sarajevo. This is just one of the examples from the cases referred to by the American and Bosnian intelligent services as: *"an ample enrolment campaign for the terrorist within Balkan states"*. *"The Washington Times"* wrote in 2007: *"Al-Qaeda has begun an ample volunteers enrolment campaign in order to involve them in the terrorist organisation's war against America and its Western allies in Iraq, Central Asia and Middle West"*. Currently, according to the *"International Institute for Strategic Studies"* from the UK, the terrorist network al-Qaeda has more than 18 000 militants ready to fight, the Iraq invasion by the US-led coalition accelerating the volunteers enrolment process for the actions developed by the group.

The British institute estimates that about 2 000 members and more than half of al-Qaeda's 30 leaders have been killed or captured and almost 1 000 of the organisation's militants are in Iraq. *"A rump leadership is still intact and over 18 000 potential terrorists are at large with recruitment accelerating on account of Iraq"*, the IISS said, without any references to the source. The American officials[10] from the security area state that they have detected over 20 Muslim youth groups in Northeast of the United States which are about to form terrorist centres. Any group could commit a terrorist act generating victims. Rebel youngsters are the first to be oriented towards terrorist organisations[11].

Placed at the periphery of the community, being born into a disadvantaged environment, haunted by an inferiority complex and feeling unfulfilled, psychopaths of terror try to take revenge on a society in which they could not fit, on a way of life incompatible with their deviant psychology. A survey performed on 250 terrorists from Germany revealed that 25% of the enquired people had lost one parent before reaching 14 years, 79% had had arguments with their parents and 33% had described their fathers in a hostile manner[12]. Unacceptability of the established order, secretly considered as a form of disguised oppression, represents the most frequent type of profile for the psychopathic terrorist. The strange or psychopathological behaviours[13], noticeable in a series of terrorists from groups such as the Japanese AUM *(The Supreme Truth)* or ANO *(Abu Nidal Organisation)*, amplify violence, their actions lacking any form of compassion for their victims. It results from the same research that 33% had been formerly convicted by a juvenile court.

[10] http://www.adevarul.ro

[11] T. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970.

[12] C. Brad, *Terorismul – cancerul mileniului III*, in *Spirit Militar Modern*, no. 5, 2005, at http://www.presamil.ro/SMM/2004/05/pag%207-9.htm.

[13] C. Delcea, *Psihopatologia teroristului,* in *Terorismul azi*, vol. 1, year 1, July 2006.

How important is personnel selection for special forces?

It is demonstrated that scientific selection can lead to an at least 6% increase in labour productivity. However, there have been spectacular increases of 20%. The cost of research to implement a personnel selection system can range from a few tens of dollars to several hundred thousand dollars, which is conditioned by the size of the institution, the number of personnel that will be selected, and other specific factors.

Personnel selection can be defined as an organisational activity, conducted with the purpose of choosing candidates to meet specific work activities[14]. In this respect, personnel selection and psychological evaluation are also important for prospective employers from at least three perspectives:

- *first*, they must know what type of an employee they will have;
- *second*, they must know whether the potential candidate's personality is compatible with the profile and requirements to apply for the respective type of job and if there are certain features such as stability, courage, self-control;
- *third*, they also need to know if the values are compatible with the candidate in relation to the type of organisational culture to which he aspires, because, otherwise, the person will not achieve the desired performance.
- in reference to these efforts, the natural question is: what follows after the psychological selection? Selection and recruitment of personnel for an organisation is a prime objective, while the decision to change a job or function within the organisation is the second objective. The major objective of personnel selection and evaluation consists of making the best match between the people and the work activities so that performance can be high.

❖ *In what consists the selection of personnel?*

Selection systems, particularly through their diversity, resemble a scientific approach. Thus, we find a variety of tools used in the selection work. In most countries, certain predictors of professional efficiency are preferred. The US Armed Forces use such a system analysis, the KSAO (knowledge, skills, abilities and other individual features), which is an indicator of performance standards. However, work analysis is a starting point in defining future training content[15].

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[14] R.A. Roe, *Personnel Selection: Principles, Methods and Techniques*, in P.J.D. Drenth, Ch.J. de Wolff and Hk. Thierry (Eds.), *Handbook of Work and Organizational Psychology*, vol. 3, Psychology Press, Hove, 1998, pp. 5-32.

[15] H. Pitariu, *Psihologia selecţiei şi formării profesionale*, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1983.

❖ *A possible model selection*

Both improving the existing methodologies and ensuring methodological consistency can be considered major objectives in the selection work and psychological evaluation of personnel for special missions. Selection is based on various models. Validation of selection strategies, psychological testing instruments represent a constant concern of this model. The model consists of six steps, as follows:

Step 1: Review of psychological military specialty intended for making selections.

Step 2: Selection criteria for performance and predictors, the criterion for defining attributes and complex professional success must meet the following requirements: loyalty; realism; understanding; relevance; sensitiveness; predictability; inexpensiveness. Predictors include: psychological tests and questionnaires, interviews, biographical information, letters of recommendation, *"mixed methods"* (handwriting analysis, lie detector) etc.

Step 3: Performance measurement, after the establishment of criteria and predictors is necessary to be tested in practice, on a representative sample of people working in that job. Performance measurement is done by applying the predictive tests and other techniques, and measuring the performance criteria by collecting data on the results obtained in work, according to criteria.

Step 4: The assessment of the validity of predictors is determined only if the differences in predictor scores correspond to differences in criterion scores. It follows the existence or nonexistence of a relationship between instruments and criterion prediction. This is done by statistical analysis in most cases, calculating the *"correlation coefficient"*. A selection process is considered successful only if there is a significant relationship between the predictor and the criterion.

Step 5: Determination of predictors usefulness, as a predictor is confirmed by the validity of the selection, the performance achieved, as well as the cost.

Step 6: Reassessment of programme selection should be periodically made to determine if relations were altered between predictor and criterion. Fixing scales to predict performance, calibration and expectation of success building tables are the final steps taken to the validation of psychological testing instruments. It should be noted that, if co-psychological test validity is not confirmed, then it has no diagnostic value.

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The need for deep knowledge of the aspects of *"organised crime"* and *"crime organisation"* in terms of criminal personality and of the psychology of terrorists, in the context of *"brainwashing"*, requires, more than ever, increased attention to the selection criteria for special missions personnel.

The coordination of human resources is seen as a defining part of the effort to achieve the goals of the organisation, knowledge of psychological personnel

and to know the personnel psychology. Anti-terrorist fighters, from the Israeli SAYERET MAK TAL or Unit 269, Air Forces, or SPETNAZ troops of the Russian Federation to US commando Air Force special operations, specialised in terrorism response, prove the fact that increasingly more attention is given to special people who tend to become fighters. In the national security system, the Ministry of Administration and Interior (the old unit ACVILA), the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), and the Protection and Guard Service (SPP) are examples of structures that fight against terrorism.

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ROMANIA AND WESTERN BALKANS THROUGH THE PERSPECTIVE OF ECONOMIC SECURITY AND COOPERATION (II)

Cristina GĂLUŞCĂ

In the second part of the article, the author continues to present the main aspects regarding trade and commercial cooperation between Romania and FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia. In this context, Romania, together with Serbia, participates in many formats of trilateral cooperation with Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

The Romania-Bulgaria-Serbia trilateral is very active in the field of justice and internal affairs. In Belgrade, three years ago, a Protocol for the enhanced trilateral cooperation in combating crime, especially trans-border crime, between the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Serbia was signed.

***Keywords**: development strategy; bilateral relations; investments; exports; FYROM*

❖ Romania – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

Commercial trades and economic cooperation take place in keeping with the Agreement between the Romanian Government and the Macedonian Government regarding trade and economic cooperation. Liberalisation of bilateral trade – through applying the free trade bilateral agreement and, consequently, through the FYROM joining CEFTA – have contributed to the substantial rise in the Romanian-Macedonian trade and especially in the Romanian exports on this market.

Starting 1 January 2007, in agreement with the provisions of the EU common commercial policy, the Romanian-Macedonian economic and commercial relations are regulated through the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Macedonia. This stipulates the gradual liberalisation of trade with the EU until the abolishment of customs duties between the two parts, in 2011.

Thus, since 1 January 2001, the customs duties on Macedonian imports of industrial products from the entire European Economic Area – EEA are zero, being maintained only for certain protected agricultural products. Consequently,

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the measures of full liberalisation of foreign commercial changes also apply to products from Romania.

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
TOTAL	**13,4**	**8,7**	**15,0**	**116,8**	**69,1**	**112,5**	**101,9**	**164,0**	**137,2**	**186,9**
Exports	11,6	7,4	12,7	115,3	64,9	97,8	79,1	129,3	115,9	132,4
Imports	1,8	1,3	2,3	1,5	4,2	14,7	22,8	34,7	21,3	54,5
Trade surplus	9,8	6,1	12,4	113,8	60,7	83,1	56,3	94,6	94,5	77,9

Source: http://www.dce.gov.ro/

***Table 5*: Evolution of merchandise trade (million USD)**

In 2010, the total volume of commercial exchanges between Romania and FYROM was of 187 million USD, out of which the exports were of 132 million USD and the imports of 55 million USD, the trade surplus being of 77 million USD for Romania. At the end of 2010, the volume of bilateral trade rose with 36% (out of which the exports rose with 14%, and the imports with 116%) as compared with the same period of the previous year.

At the end of December 2010, Romania ranked 13 among the first 20 trade partners of FYROM, with a total volume of 180 million USD, representing 2,1% of the Macedonian trade. In the bilateral relations, its exports to Romania were of 54 million USD (1,6% of the total export), while imports from our country were of 126 million USD (2,3% from the total import). The degree of covering the imports through exports in the bilateral relation was of 43%.

In 2010, the main categories of exported merchandise from Romania to FYROM were: common metals and metallic products (84 million USD), chemical industry products (detergents, cleaning products, cosmetics and others/13 million USD), plastic materials, rubber and related articles (especially tyres/6 million USD), electric machines, devices and equipment (6 million USD), vehicles (Dacia/ 4 million USD), wooden paste, paper, cardboard (4 million USD).

Romania imported mainly common metals and metallic products (36 million USD), foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco (3 million USD), plastic products, rubber and related products (3 million USD), vegetables, fruits (3 million USD). At the end of 2010, in our country, there were 80 Romanian-Macedonian trade societies (as compared to 60 one year earlier), the total value of the invested Macedonian capital being of 558,8 thousand USD as compared to 442 thousand USD, meaning an increase of 26%. Macedonia also improved its position among foreign investors, ranking 93 in 2009 and 90 in 2010.

❖ **Romania – Montenegro**

In certain domains, the bilateral relations still develop based on the legal framework agreed upon between Romania and the former FSR of Yugoslavia. The two states began procedures for signing a Protocol between governments with a view to assessing the bilateral legal framework.

In 2010, Montenegrin investments were represented by three joint ventures with a subscribed capital of 0,2 thousand USD. As compared to the same period of 2009, in 2010, the increase in exchanges was of 29,2%. Exports grew with 25,3%, and imports with 79,3%. Montenegro undergoes a continuous process of liberalisation, privatisation and restructuring of the economy, of promotion of foreign investment in production and tourism, a process whose goal is the European integration. The representative sectors are the industrial ones, namely steel and aluminium production, electricity, wood industry, coal, tobacco and textile industry.

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
TOTAL	10,93	22,19	14,93	45,67	22,80	26,25
Export	10,75	20,86	14,81	40,57	21,20	23,61
Import	0,17	1,33	0,12	5,10	1,60	2,63
Trade surplus	10,58	19,53	14,69	35,46	19,60	20,98

Source: http://www.dce.gov.ro/

***Table 6*: Dynamics of trade (million USD)**

Maritime transports, agriculture and services also contribute to the development of economy. For the officials in Podgorica, tourism represents the most important economic branch, being the basis of the development strategy. One of the priorities of the current policy is aimed at diversifying the economic basis, simplifying the economic legislation with a view to creating a business environment that is more attractive for foreign investors. Montenegro has the most competitive unique tax for European companies, the current level being of 9%.

Montenegro's main trade partners are the EU, with which approximately 40% of its foreign trade takes place, Serbia and UNMIX-Kosovo, with 35% and the Southeastern European countries, with 5%. The volume of its trade with Serbia has lowered, being of 36,8% of the total exports, as compared with 42,6%, in 2009, yet, the share of its exports in Italy has grown to 27,3%, followed by Greece (9,1%), Slovenia (6,8%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (5,3%). As far as the imports in Montenegro are concerned, they mainly come from Serbia and UNMIK (34,8%).

After the entry into force of CEFTA, one can notice a faster growth of trade with the countries that are member of this agreement, especially with Croatia,

BiH, Serbia, as well as with Albania. In the total trade of the Republic of Montenegro, Romania has a little over 1%.

Romania exports both industrial products (electricity, steel products, chemical products – fertilisers, solvents, mineral oils, detergents, vehicles, spare parts for locomotives and railroad equipment, refrigerators, electric motors, limited quantities of textiles etc.), as well as processed agricultural products (sweets, snacks etc.). Romanian exports of basic agricultural products, processed agricultural products, fish or fish products were insignificant.

❖ **Romania – Serbia**

At the end of 2009, trades between Romania and Serbia totalled 818,3 million USD, of which exports rose to 558,1 million USD and imports to 260,2 million USD, resulting in a trade surplus of 297,9 million USD for Romania. Serbia ranked 16 of the total exports of Romania at the end of 2009, with a share of 1,4%, and in terms of imports, it ranked 29 with 0,5%. Romanian investments were of 51,5 million USD.

There are 765 companies with Serbian capital registered in Romania, the worth of invested capital being of 8,83 million USD. The levels of the GDP of the border area are close to the national GDP per capita for Romania and Serbia, but considerably lower than the one in the EU. Sector distribution of the GDP shows that, on the Romanian border, industry is the main field of activity. There are common resources and challenges/opportunities for the communities from both sides of the border. Cross-border cooperation is extremely important.

In 2010, the total trade volume increased with 21,80%, of which the export with 21,2% and import with 23,0% as compared to 2009. On 31 December 2009, there were 765 Romanian-Serbian joint ventures registered in Romania with a total capital invested of 8,83 million USD. Serbia ranks 59 among foreign investors. There are mixed Romanian-Serb committees in the following domains: economy, protection of minorities, environment.

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
TOTAL	423,6	659,5	762,8	1043,5	818,3	864,7
Export	317,3	493,9	423,4	683,8	558,1	604,6
Import	106,3	165,6	329,4	359,7	260,2	260,2
Trade surplus	211,0	328,3	94,0	324	297,8	344,4

Source: http://www.dce.gov.ro/

***Table 7*: Evolution of Romanian-Serbian trade (million USD)**

Romania, together with Serbia, participates in several formats of trilateral cooperation with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria. The Romania-Bulgaria-Serbia trilateral

is very active as far as justice and home affairs are concerned. In Belgrade, on 29 September 2008, a Protocol was signed for the enhanced trilateral cooperation in combating crime, especially trans-border crime, between the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Serbia.

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English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

NEW THREATS: THE CYBER-DIMENSION

Dr Olaf THEILER

11 September 2001 has often been called the day that changed everything. This might not be true for our day-to-day life, but in security, it really marked a new era. Together with the Twin Towers, our traditional perceptions of threats collapsed. The Cold War scenario that had dominated for over 50 years was radically and irrevocably altered. Worms and viruses have transformed from mere nuisances to serious security challenges and perfect instruments of cyber espionage, the latter becoming an almost constant threat.

In line with NATO's new Strategic Concept, the revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence *defines cyber threats as a potential source for collective defence in accordance with NATO's Article 5. It provides NATO nations with clear guidelines and an agreed list of priorities on how to bring the Alliance's cyber defence forward, including enhanced coordination within NATO as well as with its partners.*

***Keywords**: information warfare; cyber threats; electronic communication; spy software; Stuxnet worm; NATO Policy on Cyber Defence*

The threat did not have a clear (national) sender's address anymore. Territorial boundaries became meaningless, as did the military rules of space and time. Using civil airplanes as tools for a terrorist attack showed that almost everything could be turned into a weapon, anytime. Suddenly nothing seemed to be impossible or unthinkable anymore.

This is also almost the same description of cyber threats.

Over the past 20 years, information technology has developed greatly. From an administrative tool for helping optimise office processes, it is now a strategic instrument of industry, administration, and the military. Before 9/11, cyberspace risks and security challenges were only discussed within small groups of technical experts. But, from that day it became evident that the cyber world entails serious vulnerabilities for increasingly interdependent societies.

Evolution of the Cyber Threat

The *world-wide-web*, invented just a couple of decades before, has evolved. But so have its threats. Worms and viruses have transformed

The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, no. 6, 2011, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/11-september/Cyber-Threads/EN/index.htm

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from mere nuisances to serious security challenges and perfect instruments of cyber espionage.

Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks, so far basically seen as nothing more than the online form of *"sit-in blockages"*, have become a tool in information warfare.

And finally, in June 2010, the malware *"Stuxnet"* became public, something like a *"digital bunker buster"* attacking the Iranian nuclear programme. With this, the early warnings of experts since 2001 have become reality, suggesting that the cyber dimension might sooner or later be used for serious attacks with deadly consequences in the physical world.

A three-week wave of massive cyber-attacks showed that NATO member's societies, highly dependent on electronic communication, were also extremely vulnerable on the cyber-front.

During the Kosovo Crisis, NATO faced its first serious incidents of cyber-attacks. This led, among other things, to the Alliance's e-mail account being blocked for several days for external visitors, and repeated disruption of NATO's website.

Typical for that time, however, the cyber dimension of the conflict was merely seen as hampering NATO's information campaign. Cyber-attacks were seen as a risk, but a limited one in scope and damage potential, calling only for limited technical responses accompanied by low scale public information efforts.

It took the events of 9/11 to change that perception. And it still needed the incidents in Estonia in summer 2007 to finally draw full political attention to this growing source of threats to public safety and state stability. A three-week wave of massive cyber-attacks showed that NATO member's societies were also exceedingly vulnerable on the cyber-front.



The growing awareness of the seriousness of the cyber-threat was further enhanced by incidents in the following years.

In 2008, one of the most serious attacks to date was launched against American military computer systems. Via a simple USB-stick connected to a military-owned laptop computer at a military base in the Middle East, spy software spread undetected on both classified and unclassified

systems. This established what amounted to a digital beachhead, from which thousands of data files had been transferred to servers under foreign control.

Since then, cyber-espionage has become an almost constant threat. Similar incidents occurred in almost all NATO nations and – most prominent – recently again in the United States. This time, more than 72 companies including 22 government offices and 13 defence contractors were affected.

These numerous incidents over the past five to six years amount to a historically unprecedented transfer of wealth and closely guarded national secrets into basically anonymous and most likely malicious hands.

Stuxnet showed the potential risk of malware affecting critical computer systems managing energy supplies

Massive attacks on government websites and servers in Georgia took place during the Georgia-Russia conflict, giving the term of cyber-war a more concrete form. These actions did no actual physical damage. They did, however, weaken the Georgian government during a critical phase of the conflict. They also impacted on its ability to communicate with a very shocked national and global public.

As if such reports were not threatening enough, the Stuxnet worm that appeared in 2010 pointed to a further qualitative quantum leap in destructive cyber war capabilities. In the summer of 2010, news spread that approximately 45 000 industrial Siemens control systems worldwide had been infected by a tailored Trojan virus that could manipulate technical processes critical to nuclear power plants in Iran. Although the damage assessment still remains unclear, this showed the potential risk of malware affecting critical computer systems managing energy supplies or traffic networks. For the first time, here was proof of cyber attacks potentially causing real physical damage and risking human lives.

A Balanced Threat Assessment

These incidents make two things clear:

• So far, the most dangerous actors in the cyber-domain are still nation states. Despite a growing availability of offensive capabilities in criminal networks that might in future be used also by non-state actors like terrorists, highly sophisticated espionage and sabotage in the cyber-domain still needs the capabilities, determination and cost-benefit-rationale of a nation state.

• Physical damage and real kinetic cyber-terrorism has not taken place yet. But the technology of cyber-attacks is clearly evolving from a mere nuisance to a serious threat against information security and even critical national infrastructure.

There can be no doubt that some nations are already investing massively in cyber capabilities that can be used for military purposes. At first glance, the digital arms race is based on clear and inescapable logic, since the cyber warfare domain offers numerous advantages: It is asymmetrical, enticingly inexpensive, and all the advantages are initially on the attacker's side.

Furthermore, there is virtually no effective deterrence in cyber warfare since even identifying the attacker is extremely difficult and, adhering to international law, probably nearly impossible. Under these circumstances, any form of military retaliation would be highly problematic, in both legal and political terms.

The cyber-defence capabilities are equally evolving and most Western nations have considerably stepped up their defences in recent years

On the other hand, however, the cyber-defence capabilities are equally evolving and most Western nations have considerably stepped up their defences in recent years. Good cyber defence does make these threats manageable, to the extent that residual risks seem largely acceptable, similar to classic threats.

But instead of speaking of cyber war as a war in itself – portraying digital first strikes as a *"Digital Pearl Harbour"* or the *"9/11 of the cyber world"* – it would be far more appropriate to describe cyber-attacks as one of many means of warfare. The risks of cyber-attacks are very real and growing bigger. At the same time, there is no reason to panic, since for the foreseeable future these threats will neither be apocalyptic nor completely unmanageable.

Facing the Challenge

NATO is adapting to this new kind of security challenge.

Already one year after 9/11, NATO issued an important call to improve its *"capabilities to defend against cyber attacks"* as part of the Prague capabilities commitment agreed in November 2002. In the years following 2002 however, the Alliance concentrated primarily on implementing the passive protection measures that had been called for by the military side.

Only the events in Estonia in the spring of 2007 prompted the Alliance to radically rethink its need for a cyber defence policy and to push its counter-measures to a new level. The Alliance therefore drew up for the first time ever a formal *"NATO Policy on Cyber Defence"*, adopted in January 2008, that established three core pillars of Alliance cyberspace policy.

- **Subsidiarity**, i.e. assistance is provided only upon request; otherwise, the principle of sovereign states' own responsibility applies;

• **Non-duplication**, i.e. avoiding unnecessary duplication of structures or capabilities – at international, regional, and national levels; and

• **Security**, i.e. cooperation based on trust, taking into account the sensitivity of the system-related information that must be made accessible, and possible vulnerabilities.

This constituted a qualitative step forward. It also paved the way for the basic decision taken in Lisbon to continuously pursue cyber defence as an independent item on NATO's agenda.

Initiated by events like Kosovo in 1999 and Estonia in 2007 and profoundly influenced by the dramatic changes in international threat perception since September 2001, NATO had laid out the foundations for building a *"Cyber Defence 1.0"*. It had developed its first cyber defence mechanisms and capabilities, and drawn up an initial Cyber Defence Policy.

With the Lisbon decisions in November 2010, the Alliance then successfully laid the foundations for a self-directed, factual examination of the issue. In doing so, NATO is not only giving existing structures like the *NATO Computer Incident Response Capability* a much-needed update, but also beginning to jointly, as an alliance, face up to very real and growing cyber defence challenges.

In line with NATO's new *Strategic Concept*, the revised *NATO Policy on Cyber Defence* defines cyber threats as a potential source for collective defence in accordance with NATO's Article 5. Furthermore, the new policy – and the Action Plan for its implementation – provides NATO nations with clear guidelines and an agreed list of priorities on how to bring the Alliance's cyber defence forward, including enhanced coordination within NATO as well as with its partners.

Once the Lisbon decisions have been fully implemented, the Alliance will have built up an upgraded *"Cyber Defence 2.0"*. By doing so, the Alliance is proving again that it is up to the task.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Antonella REMIA

This article points out the need for choosing multinationality when carrying out military interventions to restore peace and democracy in areas that are sometimes far away from the motherland.

In this respect, the author presents the pros and cons of such a choice, at the military, political, economic, cultural religious etc. levels, given the circumstances in which today, more than ever, security has become a priority for any country, which has urged nations to further enhance the multinational military intervention tool.

To conclude, she reckons that the renewed political decision allows for the consolidation of an area of peace and security through partnership, improving trust between governments, enabling a deepening of the ties of friendship and permitting the sharing of goals that are to be reached, prerequisite for the success of military interventions.

***Keywords**: multinationality; variable geometry; coalitions of the willing; military tool; political will*

At the beginning of the last decade of the past century, many claimed that the fall of the *Berlin Wall* and the end of the *Cold War* would have ensured a future of peace ever more widespread, with the consequence of a reduced need for military intervention. The events of September 2001 and the spread of international terrorism have brought the more developed countries back to the sad reality of a world that continues to pose deadly threats to their security and democracy. The need for military intervention to restore peace and democracy in areas that are sometimes far away from the motherland and the need to continue to protect their populations against possible terrorist aggressions and attacks have urged nations to further enhance the multinational military intervention tool. The reasons for choosing multinationality are mainly two: political and economic. The main political reasons for choosing multinational military interventions are the sharing of responsibilities between the participating countries and the international legitimacy that results from their stated solidarity. Multinationality is also

This article and the pictures were featured in *"Informazioni della Difesa"*, the review of the Italian Defence General Staff, no. 4/2010, pp. 44-51.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is conducting a patrolling exercise at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC) led by ISAF

a means to deliver a very strong political message to both the peoples whose leaders have decided the participation of military units and those (either organisations or countries) which have caused (by their aggressive and/or criminal behaviour) the need for the Multinational Force, the message being the same *"... I am ready to react as firmly as possible to preserve the safety and freedom of my people ..."*: reassuring for the former, much less for the latter.

Multinationality also involves the need to carry out consultations, both at the *"internal"* level and with potential allies, in order to reach the consensus necessary for initiating the intervention. Further to that, it is more and more often the need to obtain a mandate from *"competent"* International/Regional Organisations, first of all the United Nations. Because of such consultations, which are essential elements of democracy, the intervention has sometimes been delayed although the preparation and the hierarchical organisation of the military would have made it possible in a short time. Of course, the detractors of a particular intervention have immediately seized the opportunity to accuse this or that organisation of faltering and of not knowing how to face a crisis. In general, we can say that this is not true, but the delays in the intervention are generally caused by the need to build a political consensus around the specific intervention. In the past, in order to materialise the concept of multinationality, alliances whose member countries had signed for an establishing treaty outlining and setting the common goals were preferred. These multinational alliances made

it possible, through the exchange of personnel, the conduct of joint exercises and the development of common operational procedures, for mutual understanding to be deepened and for confidence to be developed in order to present themselves to the rest of the world as one big and organised military instrument. NATO is one example. In line with the extreme mutability that has characterised the latest years, the translation into reality of the concept of multinationality has evolved in a way that does not affect the political value represented by *"consolidated"* alliances. Given the current political phase, characterised by a certain mutability and globality, countries now tend to prefer alliances with *"variable geometry"*. The *"coalitions of the willing"* are not a historical novelty (the way of participating in UN operations is substantially related to that) but today they represent the fastest response to the changing global political conditions.

Italian "Carabinieri" during the training of local police

Multinationality is therefore the best way to allow all those states that have something to say or want to say something to be able to express themselves in an active way, standing in the field as players. Thus, what is important for individual nations is even more important for the whole, because an international nature significantly enhances the respectability of the military tool. To operate on the basis of a mandate of a highly recognised organisation as the United Nations further enhances the authority, providing the entire initiative with the necessary legal framework. In economic terms, multinationality has a reason to exist due to cost sharing. In other words, the number of nations that are part of the multinational force is inversely proportional to the financial commitment of each participating nation. Apart from the extreme synthesis of the concept, whose motives may appear trivial, the fact remains that the issue of costs related to the conduct of military operations has always been of great importance for the democratic governments and, in the current world situation, takes a further relevance. The resources

A French ISAF soldier speaks with children at a school in Kabul, Afghanistan

were already scarce in 1991 and, since then, things have unfortunately not improved so much, therefore, *"screams of pain"* continue to be heard in more countries over the continuous cuts that are made in the defence budget. Thus, in a general sense, in a time when resources are increasingly reduced, multinationality has become an indispensable *"operative"* approach, because it is the only way to generate enough force in order to ensure the necessary presence wherever policy requires it. Given the recent global financial crisis and future prospects, it is not far from the truth now to argue that no country can ever afford to conduct unilateral military interventions on a large scale or for extended periods. Some schools of thought believe that multinationality is expensive and involves not only high costs and low efficiency, but also a reduction in the operating efficiency. Here, the logic used is that if an operation is conducted by a single nation, it should be more effective and also cheaper because the *"outside interference"* is significantly reduced. On the other hand, one must recognise that today no nation wants (unless it is absolutely necessary) to conduct long-lasting operations on their own, such as IFOR, ISAF, Sharp Guard, Active Endeavour, Ocean Shield or Atalanta, both for the high related costs and for the wide political exposure that this fact would imply. The main strengths of multinationality are therefore multi-representativeness, burden sharing, demonstration of solidarity and economy.

Task Force Uruzgan, Afghanistan, Kamp Holland. A C-17 Dutch, shortly after takeoff

However, the political will, solidarity and relatively low cost are not enough to ensure the successful outcome of the intervention for, above all, multinational forces should have credibility from the military point of view. And the credibility is directly linked to the operational effectiveness. Here we enter a very difficult field. Making certain elements, sometimes very different ones, work effectively requires a thorough knowledge of the specific features that distinguish them. The difficulties, never-insurmountable, can be substantially related to the need for standardisation, retention of control over the forces provided by individual nations, information sharing and the different cultural and religious backgrounds. All those have an impact on operational efficiency. First, it must be stressed the fact that standardisation in the broadest sense of the term (including, therefore, all sectors that contribute to the success of the operation, such as the training, procedural, logistic fields, but not only) is crucial in allowing the conduct of a multinational operation. Let us imagine, in fact, the negative consequences of the inclusion of elements not properly trained in a various military disposition. Either it involves men, ships or airplanes, confusion would prevail, orders would not be accepted and carried out consistently, resulting in benefits for the opponent, probably the failure of the operation and certainly casualties among own troops. The topic is, therefore, very sensitive. The fact that many countries, thanks to the alliances practiced in the past, have now reached a very high degree of standardisation is a solid basis for more diversified coalitions to be built upon, with the inclusion of new elements, enhancing their experience but assimilating, at the same time, the operating procedures in force. The work on standardisation is huge and absorbs a lot of energy and resources, but the effort is rewarded by the fact that, for example, the operational procedures and logistics are becoming more standardised, enabling a *"variable geometry"* of forces that was just unthinkable a while ago. The retention of the level of control over the forces allocated by the individual nations is another *"troublemaker"* for multinationality. If, for example, a naval asset would withdraw from the disposition at very short notice for *"domestic reasons"*, this would create significant – if not insurmountable – difficulties because the role of each unit or department is carefully designed to enhance the operational capabilities and to assist in achieving the best possible effect in the operation. The lack of an asset in the disposition may require reconsidering the objectives and replanning the activity.

The desire of every nation not to contribute own forces unconditionally to the coalition is certainly understandable and legitimate, but we should not ignore that this represents an element that must be taken into account in planning the intervention. Also, intelligence sharing is an important sector in the conduct of multinational operations. Let us be honest, the information is a valuable *"commodity"* and the nations

guard it carefully. In fact, information is part of the *"family treasure"* and is shared only on a reciprocal basis and when the stakes are high enough. Therefore, one of the problems to be addressed before launching a multinational operation is to examine the mechanisms by which national intelligence is made available to Commanders in the *"field"* as quick as possible so that the multinational force should be effective and, therefore, credible. In addition to the difficulties already mentioned, there are other sources of possible *"problems"* for the multinational force that are not less important, because they are potentially capable of derailing the process. They can be gathered into a single group, namely the *"cultural"* one, but, in particular, attention should be drawn to the linguistic and religious aspects. Military history is full of examples of disasters caused by misunderstanding of orders given in the own language, just imagine when they are expressed in another language than the own one. Certainly, because of misunderstandings, over the centuries, the artillery fired at allied units, the ships of the fleet found themselves involved in spectacular collisions or bombardments on areas under allied control occurred. Multinational operations themselves are quite complicated on their own and having to *"translate"* all in one single language also complicates things. In fact, by using another language the possibilities that lead to confusion increase. The training and deep knowledge of the *"working"* language makes it possible to overcome many difficulties and to reduce the chances of failure. This requires a lot of work and resources, but results in terms of operational efficiency and reduction of human casualties are extremely significant. A quick reference, finally, to religious aspect. Quick not because this is an aspect to be undervalued, but because the way to deal with and value religious differences is a topic discussed daily at all levels/sectors of our society that is quickly becoming multi-ethnic and multi-religious.

The elements of different religions are, in an increasingly evident manner, part of several multinational forces, only to think of the coalition of the two Gulf Wars. Again, in this case it is not a novelty, if not for the frequency and dimensions at which this happens now. The end of (political, ideological and/or religious) blocs has made it possible, since the first Gulf War, for alliances to be build and for extremely varied multinational forces to be established, from all points of view. Religion also means a way of life, customs, understanding others and ourselves. In this respect, people have shown varying sensitivities, but it is not unusual to demonstrate a remarkable sensitivity, transforming simple things into incredible equivocal ones, sometimes with frightening effects. Those who do not *"understand"* it are criticised and marginalised. Needless to say, all these aspects have repercussions on the way to intervene militarily and thus on operational effectiveness.

From all the above, beyond the technical-operative aspects, it is clear that the establishment of a multinational force is primarily a political response to a particular need/crisis. In an increasingly globalised world, it is more and more obvious the importance of sharing the responsibilities of interventions, with a view to extended participation. It is also clear that the profound changes that have affected both the military tool and the international situation, in response to the demanding security needs, have given new impetus and meaning to multinational choices. The renewed political decision allows for the consolidation of an area of peace and security through partnership, improving trust between governments, enabling a deepening of the ties of friendship and permitting the sharing of goals that are to be reached, prerequisite for the success of military interventions. The policy-maker is now aware of the value that is added by multinational forces to the national military tool, in the perspective of complementarity and participation. Today more than ever, security has become a priority for any country. It is a requirement that politicians are called upon to give clear answers and to make certain choices and, given that the concept/meaning of security has not got a unique value but it is changeable depending on the context, the political responses must continue to be flexible and shared in order to maintain the solid framework within which the objectives of protecting the populations should be met.

English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

UNIFORMS ARE GETTING GREENER

David SHUKMAN

The author recounts how climate has become part of defence planning, writing that compared to winning a war, saving the planet used to be too woolly a concept to merit attention, too vague to factor into planning, but this is not the case today, as the potential implications of a shifting climate are gradually working their way onto the security agenda.

In this respect, he presents a series of facts highlighting the potential implications of a shifting climate and of warming, as well as the steps taken by the international community as it struggles to make progress in tackling the problem.

The author concludes by mentioning a stark warning belonging to Professor Sir David King: climate change could ultimately prove more dangerous than terrorism.

Keywords: *climate change; global warming; greenhouse gases; emissions cuts; security threats*

Until recently, if you were the sort of person who worried about the environment – and particularly about climate change – it would be highly unlikely that you would also be wearing a military uniform. Global warming was something to trouble Greenpeace. Compared to winning a war, saving the planet was too woolly a concept to merit attention, too vague to factor into planning.

No longer.

The potential implications of a shifting climate are gradually working their way onto the security agenda – from the threat of rising seas swamping low-lying island bases like Diego Garcia to extreme weather disasters requiring massive rescue or relief operations to mass migrations heightening tensions and even triggering conflicts. Though hedged with huge uncertainties and unclear timings, these scenarios could involve armed forces.

Most immediate are the implications of a changing map. The Arctic, warming faster than the global average, is seeing its geography altered as the ice retreats. Suddenly, its natural resources are more accessible and border disputes, long

The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, no. 1, 2011, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Climate-Action/Uniform-Green/EN/index.htm

David Shukman – Environment & Science Correspondent for BBC News. As Defence Correspondent from 1987-1995 and then as Europe Correspondent from 1995-1999, he regularly reported on NATO. His latest book, *Reporting Live from the End of the World*, was published last year.

forgotten beneath the ice, are now relevant. The US Coast Guard was among those to receive an Arctic wake-up call when it found itself having to patrol stretches of sea which had usually remained frozen.

On a C-130 flight over Alaska in September 2008, the region's Coast Guard commander, Rear Admiral Gene Brooks, told me: *"My job is to patrol the waters around the United States and there's now a lot of water where there used to be ice, simple as that. I don't care how it's happening or why it's happening but what I can tell you is that the ice is going and we've got to move in".*

Admiral Brooks described the Arctic as a new frontier. And to bolster the Coast Guard's presence, he dispatched pioneering vessels and aircraft and established a forward position at Barrow. Challenges included maintaining logistics and communications over vast distances and deploying craft in unfamiliar waters – and all on an accelerated timetable. For some years scientists have observed a steady decline in ice cover with most researchers predicting ice-free conditions in the summertime by the end of the century. But then in 2007 the annual melt reduced the ice to the extent forecast for 2055. Admiral Brooks described himself as stunned by the fact that great tracts of ice vanished so quickly.

In 2007, the European Space Agency detected that the fabled Northwest Passage, the sea-route connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific, was briefly ice-free.

One reason for his concern was the likelihood of increased shipping in America's polar waters. In 2007, the European Space Agency detected that the fabled Northwest Passage, the sea-route connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific, was briefly ice-free. This raised the prospect of a new shipping-lane. Cruise ships and yachts were starting to use the passage and, if they ran into trouble, it would be the Coast Guard's job to help them. The melt also raised tensions over control. The Northwest Passage twists between the islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and is regarded by the Canadian Government as part of its sovereign territory. The United States and many European countries argue that the waterway is wide enough to qualify as international.

Other polar disputes flared into the open as well. A Russian parliamentarian used mini-submarines to plant a Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole to support his country's claims. Danish and Canadian ministers scrambled North to do their own flag-waving. And Admiral Brooks warned that these disagreements between the Arctic nations were a recipe for disaster.

In 2007 the annual melt reduced the ice to the extent forecast for 2055

"With undetermined boundaries and great wealth", he said, *"the potential is there for conflict or competition. There's always a risk of conflict where you do not have established, delineated, agreed-upon borders"*.

So the melting is the equivalent of lifting a rock and discovering threats underneath. But the implications of warming reach far beyond the Arctic and were explored in a landmark study by the Washington-based consultancy CNA in 2007. Guided by a panel of retired senior officers, it argued that climate change would not cause specific crises, more than it would act as *"a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world"*. This is a key observation.

While some environmental campaigners claim that global warming will mean – or already means – massive and instantaneous catastrophe, the fine print of the science is more nuanced. It suggests that the shifting weather patterns, brought about by climate change, could over time make tough situations worse.

"We will pay for this one way or another. We will pay to reduce greenhouse gas emissions today and we'll have to take an economic hit of some kind. Or we will pay the price later in military terms. And that will involve human lives".

As the CNA report put it, the changes would exacerbate *"already marginal living standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations, causing widespread political instability and the likelihood of failed states"*. In other words, regions becoming hotter or drier or stormier will experience an additional burden on existing strains. *"Unlike most conventional security threats that involve a single entity, acting in specific ways and points in time, climate change has the potential to result in multiple chronic conditions, occurring globally within the same time frame"*.

In his contribution to the report, General Anthony Zinni, former head of Central Command, spelled out a stark choice: *"We will pay for this one way or another. We will pay to reduce greenhouse gas emissions today and we'll have to take an economic hit of some kind. Or we will pay the price later in military terms. And that will involve human lives"*.

Deliberately blunt, those words highlight the dilemma faced by the international community as it struggles to make progress in tackling the problem. For nearly



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two decades the *UN Framework Convention on Climate Change*, born at the Earth Summit in Rio, in 1992, has hosted negotiations. Usually these are held at the level of environment ministers, though the talks in Copenhagen in December 2009 attracted dozens of heads of state and government including President Obama of the United States and Premier Wen of China. That event was described as the best chance for a generation to reach agreement. But it was marked by fractiousness and ended inconclusively.

The objective of this process has been deceptively simple: to draw up a binding global treaty to cut the greenhouse gases which scientists say are behind most of the recent warming. And the key facts are relatively straightforward too: last year was one of the hottest on record and was also the 34th consecutive year to be warmer than the global average temperature for the 20th century. At the same time, the levels of carbon dioxide, the key greenhouse gas, have risen every single year since the most accurate measurements began in 1958. And it is well-established that carbon dioxide traps heat in the atmosphere.

China, the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, regards itself as a developing country and argues that the developed world should lead the way in emissions cuts, itself refusing to be bound by international treaty.

Most governments accept these basic tenets of the science and the core conclusion – that manmade emissions are behind most of the recent warming. And almost without exception, they call for urgent action in response. But the disputes in Copenhagen revealed the limitations of what they were prepared to do, and little has changed since then. China, the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, regards itself as a developing country and argues that the developed world should lead the way in emissions cuts, itself refusing to be bound by international treaty. And the United States, the second biggest polluter, is unbending too. Despite President Obama's expressed aim of joining a global effort, plans for a domestic climate bill failed in the Senate last year, making US participation in an international deal highly unlikely for the foreseeable future.

As a result, the most recent UN talks, at Cancun, in Mexico, in last December, only made modest advances on relatively minor issues. Meanwhile, the long years

of talking have produced only one firm agreement to date: the *Kyoto Protocol* of 1997. At the time, that was a triumph of negotiation but it is due to expire in 2012 and anyway does not include China and the United States. The countries bound by its provisions – including the EU, Japan, Russia and Australia – are in no mood to continue beyond 2012 unless others join too. So, the prospects are poor for negotiating a new, more comprehensive treaty.

In the meantime, emissions keep rising. And climate scientists warn that with every passing year the chances of avoiding dangerous impacts later are reduced. There is nothing certain about this; further warming does not mean instant trouble. Instead it is more a question of probabilities: the higher the concentrations of greenhouse gas, the greater the likelihood of dangerous weather patterns in the decades ahead.

One of the first to frame global warming as a security issue was the former chief scientific adviser to the UK Government, Professor Sir David King. He issued a stark warning: that climate change could ultimately prove more dangerous than terrorism. It is too early to judge. The most hazardous impacts of warming are not forecast till the second half of this century or beyond. But, if the scientists are right, as time goes by the odds keep getting worse.

A FORGOTTEN GENDARME
Army Corps General (r.) Constantin (Piki) Z. Vasiliu (II)

Lieutenant Colonel Ion LĂCĂTUŞ

The author continues to present the key dates of Constantin Z. Vasiliu's personal life and professional activity, starting from the moment he was promoted to Brigadier General and called in activity, then reviewing the period he was appointed Inspector General of the Romanian Gendarmerie and Undersecretary of State for police and security in the Ministry of Interior.

Special attention is paid to General Vasiliu's activity in office during the Second World War, his conflicts with the German Abwehr and the allegations of extermination of Jews.

In the end, the author writes about the final period of General Vasiliu's life, after 23 August 1944, when he was arrested, placed in detention and trialled in the so-called "Trial of the great national betrayal", which condemned him to death penalty four times.

***Keywords**: Second World War; Romanian Gendarmerie; Transnistria; People's Tribunal; Jilava prison*

Through the High Decree no. 1292 on 22 March 1938, it was approved the cancelation of Colonel Vasiliu's retirement ex officio, and through the High Decree no. 1293/1938 he was promoted to Brigadier General on 10 May 1934. Moreover, by the High Decree no. 1296/1938, his resignation from the active cadres of the Romanian Army was approved[23].

Between September 1938 and September 1940, Brigadier General (r.) Constantin Z. Vasiliu was mayor of Craiova.

On 19 September 1940, Constantin Z. Vasiliu was called temporarily in activity, promoted to Major General from 25 October 1939 and appointed Commander of the Corps of Gendarmes[24]. From the beginning, General Constantin Z. Vasiliu inspected the gendarmes units in the country and noticed serious irregularities and deficiencies that would hasten to correct in a short time. Following the inspection in Caracal, he visited the political internment camp, where there were,

Lieutenant Colonel Ion Lăcătuş – Gendarmerie Vrancea County Inspectorate.

[23] From 16.01.1938 to 20.07.1940, the Romanian Gendarmerie was led by General Ioan Bengliu.

[24] As a result of the deteriorating international situation and the increasing threats from Romania's neighbours, on 3 June 1939 it was voted a new *Law on the organisation and functioning of the Gendarmerie, published in the Official Gazette no. 126 on 5 June 1939*. The *Law of 3 June 1939* stated: *"The Rural Gendarmerie is a military body set up to ensure the state's safety in the rural area, the public peace and order*

among others, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and Petre Constantinescu-Iasi. Promoting the applications of the internees, 1 200 of them will be freed, while the remaining 800 will be transferred to Târgu-Jiu.

Under the command of General Vasiliu, the Romanian Gendarmerie continued throughout 1940 to protect the Polish refugees in Romania[25].

During the legionary massacres of 26/27 November 1940, General Vasiliu participated, along with Colonel Alexandru Rioşanu, in saving some politicians, such as Mihai Ghelmegeanu, Constantin Argetoianu, Gheorghe Tătărescu and others. On the morning of 27 November 1940, Vasiliu was already in the office of the Capital's Prefect of Police, Colonel Stefan Zăvoianu.

The fact that he was Inspector General of the Romanian Gendarmerie did not allow him to participate in government meetings, but General Vasiliu took part, when he was convoked, in five Councils of Cabinet, four meetings of the Council of Ministers and a meeting of the Economic Council, all up to 22 June 1941.

Starting 10 June 1941, in accordance with the General Staff Order no. 124000/1941 and Orders of the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie no. 11280/1941 and 34063/1941, 12 days before Romania entered the war, the Gendarmerie concentrated its forces[26].

With the start of the Eastern Campaign for the liberation of Basarabia and Northern Bucovina, the Romanian Gendarmerie was divided in two: *Territorial Gendarmerie* (inoperative, from the inner area), which remained under the command of Major General Vasiliu and *Campaign Gendarmerie* (operative, in the theatre of operations), subordinated to the General Headquarters and commanded by the High Praetor, General Gendarme Ioan R. Topor[27].

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and the enforcement of laws and regulations, both in peacetime and in time of war". Rural Gendarmerie depended on the Ministry of Interior, for the ordinary and extraordinary service, and, in terms of position, discipline and promotions (generals, officers, NCOs and gendarmes), it was subordinated to the Ministry of War, obeying its military regulations. For the first time, in a law of the gendarmerie, its necessity was mentioned *"in time of war"*. With this law, the name of *"General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie"* was replaced again with the one of *"Gendarmerie Corps"*. The organisation based on regiments was reinstated, replacing inspectorates. Gendarmerie legions, departments and posts were maintained. According to Article 57 of the law, the role of the commander of gendarme post in the preparation and execution of mobilisation was increased.

[25] See Romanian Military Archives (AMR), fund no. 822, file no. 1, ff. 10-13, Central Historical National Archives (ANIC), the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie fund, file no. 16/1939, ff. 47-48. See also general de brigadă (r.) Vasile Mihalache, general de brigadă (r.) Ioan P. Suciu, *Din istoria legislaţiei Jandarmeriri Române,* Editura Ministerului de Interne, Bucureşti, pp. 114-119.

[26] General de brigadă (r.) Vasile D. Mihalache, general de brigadă (r.) Ioan P. Suciu, *Istoria Jandarmeriei Române (1850-2000),* Editura Sylvi, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 197.

[27] General Ioan R. Topor led the Romanian Gendarmerie between 24.07 and 19.09.1940. Subsequently he served as an assistant to the General Inspector of the Gendarmerie until 23 August 1944. From 22.07 to 01.09.1941 and from 20.09 to 09.11.1942 he was High Praetor of the Operations Army Groups Headquarters Command. On 29 August 1944 he was placed under the Ministry of War's disposal and on 14.12.1944 he was discharged.

In the fights for liberating Bucovina and Basarabia, the Gendarmerie fulfilled specific police missions, ensuring peace and order, traffic police, surveillance and control of the civilians authorised to accompany the army, battlefield sanitation etc. as well as other missions under the *"Regulations of the Campaign Gendarmerie Service"*[28]. In addition, the Gendarmerie fulfilled other missions, such as reconnaissance, incursions, vanguards, rearguards or flank guards[29]. Its formations (battalions and operative police companies) were employed in offensive or defence actions whenever the tactical situation in the area of operations required[30]. Gendarmes units and subunits were always present in the organisation of troops responsible for guarding and protecting the large units' command posts and defending targets in the combat zone[31].

At the end of 1941, General Ioan (Jake) Şt. Popescu, Undersecretary of State for police and security in the Ministry of Interior, died, and on 3 January 1942, General Constantin Z. Vasiliu was appointed in his place. The same day with the appointment of Vasiliu, as Undersecretary of State for public safety and order in the Ministry of Interior[32], it was announced the other Undersecretary of State for administrative affairs (public administration) in the Ministry of Interior, Professor P. Strihan. General Vasiliu attributed his appointment as Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Interior to the fact that he was the highest in rank in the Ministry of Interior. On the other hand, Radu Lecca considered himself the author of Vasiliu's appointment to the Ministry of Interior, through his intervention to Von Killinger. Lecca's explanation was that Vasiliu had conflicts with the German Abwehr. The cohabitation between the two positions of Undersecretary of State and Commander of the Romanian Gendarmerie was relatively simple: the orders concerning the Gendarmerie were first discussed with Brigadier General Constantin Tobescu[33], his deputy[34], were signed by Vasiliu

[28] General de brigadă (r.) Vasile D. Mihalache et al, *op. cit.,* p. 197.
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] From 1941 until the abolition of the Gendarmerie, in 1949, and even after that, the Ministry of Interior would bear a new name, the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
[33] Constantin Tobescu was promoted Brigadier General on 20 March 1943 (Decree nr. 765/1943) and, after the passing of *Law on the organisation and functioning of the Gendarmerie in 1943*, he was assigned as Director of the Public Order and Safety Directorate of the Gendarmerie Inspectorate. In 1943, in his professional records, Vasiliu wrote about General Tobescu as being *"the future General Inspector of the Gendarmerie"*, and General Macici, commander of the 1st Army, characterised him as *"a trustworthy superior officer of the Gendarmerie Corps"*. Considering that, since 22 January 1941, General Ioan R. Topor, the assistant to the GIG General Inspector was promoted High Praetor, leading the Operational Gendarmerie, attached to the army, General Tobescu virtually became the second person in the Inspectorate, being the oldest in rank, but it was only on 10 May 1944 (Order of the Day. no. 22/944) that he was officially named *"assistant"* and that *"only during the time of the separation of the GIG"* (Gendarmerie of the Interior Area and Operational or Campaign Gendarmerie).
[34] Tudor Stomff, Alexandru-Alin Spânu, *op. cit.,* pp. 270-274.

only as Chief of the Gendarmerie, and the orders regarding police (Police and Police Security) were signed as Undersecretary of State.

On 18 July 1942, due to its merits, Vasiliu was promoted to Army Corps General in reserve, because the Gendarmerie, by law, could be led only by active Brigadier or Major Generals.

Aspects regarding General Vasiliu's work as Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Inspector General of the Romanian Gendarmerie, between 3 January 1942 and 23 August 1944

It was known, ever since his appointment on 3 January 1942 as Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Interior, that General Vasiliu had conflicts with the German Abwehr.

Despite allegations of extermination of Jews, General Constantin Z. Vasiliu spoke with Marshal Antonescu to stop the deportations and, on 14 October 1942, Gendarmerie Inspectorates and Legions were given the order to stop evacuations to Transnistria.

On 31 December 1942, Vasiliu submitted a report to Marshal Antonescu regarding the transiting of our country, towards Palestine, by a train with 500 Jewish children from Budapest. In fact, his business partners were generally Jewish: R. Bonneth, F. Franckel, E. Grosz, F. Horwitz, Bichmann, Anhauer and Epstein handled his affairs at *"Lugoj Textile Industry"*, where General Vasiliu had 30% stake since 1939. When W. Filderman, the Head of the Jewish Community in Romania, was sent to Moghilev by Antonescu, General Vasiliu and Mihai Antonescu spoke in his favour, and transport and security measures were personally taken by Vasiliu.

Starting 1943, the Romanian Gendarmerie institution, under the leadership of General Vasiliu, functioned in keeping with a new law on the organisation and functioning[35]. Under that legislation, the Gendarmerie belonged to the Ministry

[35] Given Romania's engagement in the Eastern Campaign, it turned out that many provisions of the Gendarmerie Law of 1929 were outdated, prompting political military decision-makers to draft a new law, improving the Rural Gendarmerie. Through *Decree-Law no. 264 on 23 April 1943 on organisation and functioning of the Gendarmerie (published in the Official Gazette no. 98 of 29 April 1943)*, a number of provisions of the old laws, considered viable, were kept and new ones were added. According to *Law no. 264 of 22 April 1943 on the organisation and functioning of the Romanian Gendarmerie*: *"The gendarmerie is a military body set up to oversee the implementation of the rural general and military police service. An active*

of War and was placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for fulfilling police tasks. As soldiers, gendarmes were subject to the regulations of the Ministry of War. The issues regarding logistic and financial provisions, personnel policy, training were incumbent on the Ministry of War.

On 31 January 1944, the Special Intelligence Service (SSI) reported the outrage of German officials following a report of the SS to Von Killinger, entitled *"Novel Evidence on the Protection and Aid given by General Piki Vasiliu to Jews"*[36].

It seems that, starting November 1943, General Vasiliu was in contact with Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, but, in May 1944, the Security Police[37] received an order from him to *"close their eyes"*[38] to the trips made by the communist leader between Poiana Ţapului (where Pătrăşcanu had been placed under house arrest) and Bucureşti.

Also in the spring of 1944, General Vasiliu made possible the meeting between Alfred de Chastelain[39] and Iuliu Maniu, in the Andronache Forest, the former being brought by General Tobescu[40] and the latter by himself, from the position of Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Interior and Inspector General of the Romanian Gendarmerie.

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and continuous surveillance and a preventive and repressive action are its main duties. It can support police operations in urban areas and whenever order and security require it". At the central level, there was the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie, commanded by a general entitled General Inspector, based in Bucureşti. The territorial formations were: general sub-inspectorates, inspectorates, legions, departments and posts. Under this law, the Gendarmerie would work until the spring of 1947.

[36] Apud general de corp de armată dr. Tudor Cearapin et al, *op. cit.,* p. 231.

[37] Also known as the *"Security"* or *"Police Security"*.

[38] Apud general de corp de armată dr. Tudor Cearapin, et al, *op. cit.,* p. 231.

[39] His name is linked to Operation *"AUTONOMOUS"* during the Second World War, carried out by allied (English) intelligence services in Romania, in 1943. The operation consisted of parachuting in Romania – at that time, Germany's ally – three agents: Alfred de Chastelain, experienced officer of the SOE (Special Operations Executive) and operation commander, Ivor Porter, who consequently wrote some memoirs about Romania and the Romanian Royal Family and Captain Silviu Meţianu, Romanian immigrant in the UK. The operation was aimed: 1. to contact political parties in Romania (especially Iuliu Maniu) and find a way for truce and shorten the war, 2. if caught by authorities loyal to Antonescu, they should convince the intelligence services that an allied landing was being prepared in the Balkans and thus determine the German troops to move towards East – in preparation of the allied offensive in Normandy. The three parachuted agents were immediately arrested by the Romanian Gendarmerie near village Plosca, Teleorman county, during the Christmas of 1943. Being treated as prisoners of war, they were brought in Bucureşti and hosted in an apartment in the headquarters of the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie (in its location on Ştefan cel Mare Avenue, in Bucureşti) in the direct custody of Brigadier General Constantin Tobescu and Major Constantin C. Roşescu. The three officers lived there until shortly after the events of August 1944, when they were released and left Romania with destination Ankara.

[40] The deputy of General Vasiliu at the command of the Gendarmerie.

On 20 August 1944, General Vasiliu visited Timişoara, where, following secret meetings, it seems that he planned to flee the country between 22 and 23 August 1944. In this respect, he had previous talks in the city with the widow of H. Franckel, lawyer J.V. Hiott, F. Horwitz and Marina Ghiţulescu. He was also helped by some information received from Pamfil Şeicaru. Vasiliu never left, hoping that Ion Antonescu would break the alliance with Germany and made a truce with the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition of the United Nations.

The arrest, detention, trial and execution of General Vasiliu

After the Council of Ministers meeting in Snagov on 23 August 1944, Marshal Antonescu told Eugen Cristescu, Director of the SSI, and General Vasiliu, Undersecretary of State for public order and safety in the Ministry of the Interior and Inspector General of the Romanian Gendarmerie, that he decided to conclude an armistice with anti-Hitler coalition states[41]. It was too late. At the Royal Palace, after Mihai and Ion Antonescu were arrested, the first called and arrested was General Vasiliu, regarded, as Colonel E. Ionescu said, as *"the most dangerous (...) enemy"*[42].

After his arrest, he was transferred by Romanian Communists to the Soviets, along with the entire Antonescu group. During the detention in the Soviet Union, General Vasiliu kept his discernment and dignity of military man during interrogations. He was the first to discover the Marshal's suicide attempt and saved him.

In early April 1946, General Vasiliu was brought into the country from the detention in the Soviet Union, in Lubyanka, with the whole Antonescu group, and incarcerated in Jilava prison under a maximum-security regime. Mihai Antonescu, General Constantin Pantazi, Colonel Mircea Elefterescu, Eugen Cristescu, Radu Lecca and George Alexianu were also part of the group. In May 1946, the Antonescu enlarged group (meanwhile other defendants were added to the initial group) was brought before the communist *People's Tribunal*, its members being trialled in the so-called *"Trial of the great national betrayal"*.

The trial of the 24 detainees took place quickly, between 6 and 17 May 1946, in the building of the 8th Urban Court located on 15 Ştirbei Vodă Street. The legal basis consisted in the *Decree-Law for the prosecution and punishment of those guilty*

[41] The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

[42] Apud general de corp de armată dr. Tudor Cearapin et al, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

of the country's disaster and war crimes, on 21 April 1945, published in the Official Gazette no. 64 on 24 April 1945. The indictment was presented on 6 May, until 12 May inclusive, the witnesses were heard and, on 17 May 1946, the sentences were read.

Throughout the period of these trials, the Education, Culture Propaganda (CPE) Apparatus from the Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie ordered all subordinated structures *"to hold rallies in solidarity with the ruling of the People's Court concerning the major war criminals, after which the officers, NCOs and the troops would sign motions requiring the immediate execution of the sentence"*[43]. Informative documents of the 2nd Intelligence-Counterintelligence Division of the Great General Staff indicate that the entire Romanian armed forces, including gendarmerie structures, rejected the sentence, urging that the death penalty should be commuted to penal servitude for life (almost unanimous request)[44].

During this trial staged by Romanian Communists supported by the Soviet occupant, General C. Z. Vasiliu was mistaken (perhaps intentionally) for General Engineer D. Vasiliu (who died in 1942 in the Donetsk basin) but W. Filderman, the Head of the Jewish Community in Romania, testified in his favour.

On 17 May 1946, the People's Tribunal condemned General Vasiliu to death penalty four times and four times to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment[45].

During an interrogation, General Vasiliu was asked by the investigator if he had a political role in the Antonescu government, to which the *"man of arms"*[46] replied: *"I could not have considered the political issue, because it was not a political government"*[47]. Then the same prosecutor told him that some generals refused to enter the Antonescu government, and General Vasiliu, with dignity and sincerity, answered: *"At war, when the martial law is in force, I can pretend to be ill, but I cannot refuse"*[48].

On 31 May, 1946, the appeals of the defendants sentenced to death, regarding Ion Antonescu, former Head of State, Mihai Antonescu, former Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, General C. Z. Vasiliu, former Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and General

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[43] AMR, Microfilme, box. II I.1594, frame136.

[44] AMR, fund Marele Stat Major, 2nd Intelligence-Counterintelligence Division, file no. 1586, f. 15.

[45] See AMR, Depozit Central, file 16.726/1974. See also Arhivele Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității, penal fund, file no. 40 000, vol 1:59 and file no. 17.597, vol. 1, 7.

[46] It derives from the syntagm attributed to the French Gendarmerie, *"gens d'armes"*, which in translation means *"men of arms"*.

[47] Apud general de corp de armată dr. Tudor Cearapin et al, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

[48] *Ibid.*

Inspector of the Romanian Gendarmerie, and Gheorghe Alexianu, former governor of Transnistria, were rejected by King Mihai, who consented only to the appeals of defendants Eugen Cristescu, former director of SSI (Special Intelligence Service) and Radu Pantazi, former Minister of War, whose death sentence was commuted to penal servitude for life.

The close friendship with Marshal Ion Antonescu, the involvement in anti-Communist actions, but especially the attitude related to the anti-Soviet front were the main charges for which General Vasiliu was sentenced to death.

On 1 June 1946, General Vasiliu was executed by the firing squad, along with the other members of the Antonescu group, led by Marshal Ion Antonescu. The site chosen was Peach Trees' Valley, near the Jilava prison.

General Vasiliu absolutely and without doubt also made mistakes and had his flaws that can be analysed or discussed, but only in the context of the period he lived in and in comparison with the decisions of the other leaders and actors of that historical moment, internally and externally.

EDITORIAL EVENTS

Alexandru-Mihail TĂNASE



The recent past is a forgotten country. The Cold War now seems a period as remote as the Thirty Years War. We now know the so-called satellites of the USSR were very much actors following their own scripts. Often, the supposed puppets were pulling the strings. Kim Il Sung manipulated Stalin into supporting his attack on South Korea and Ho Chi Minh inveigled Russia into enabling him to defeat the South Vietnamese. Now Larry Watts' groundbreaking, enjoyable and meticulously researched book, which deserves to find a wide audience, shows that Ceauşescu's Romania posed a threat to the USSR greater than Tito did and comparable with the 1956 *Hungarian uprising*, the *Prague Spring* in 1968 and the *Solidarity Movement* in Poland.

Eastern Europe was not the story of quislings ruling subject people on instructions from the Kremlin. The men and the women (of whom Romanians Anna Pauker and Elena Ceaușescu were the most significant) who ran the Communist Empire were believers who had risked death and imprisonment on the part of their enemies and their Communist friends because of their beliefs. In power, they combined as all politicians do the desire for power, love of manipulation and genuine idealism, to which they added a ruthless devotion to their grim cause and a fanatical conviction that they understood the direction of history that seemed to them scientific but we clearly see to be essentially religious.

Mutual antipathy between Russians and Romanians (the *Mamalizhniki (mămăligă)* or polenta eaters) has long roots in conflict over territory. Russian troops occupied Romania for nearly forty years in the beginning of the 19th century and on several more occasions between 1877 and 1919. Communism only exacerbated things. Engels, whose works had the status of Holy Scripture for Marxist-Leninists,

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Presentation and comments based on the book of Larry Watts, *Fereşte-mă, Doamne, de prieteni – Războiul clandestin al blocului sovietic cu România (With friends like these – the Soviet bloc's clandestine war against Romania)*, foreword by Ioan Talpeş, Editura Rao, Bucureşti, 2011.

had written that the Romanians were a *"degenerate"* people, *"a people without history"*. The revolution, said Engels, would *"annihilate"* the Romanians, wiping them *"from the face of the earth. And that too, would be a step forward"*. Engels wrote this in 1849, angry at the Romanians for fighting for the Emperor against the *"progressive"* forces of the Hungarian nationalist Lajos Kossuth.

Gheorghiu-Dej, the Communist leader of Romania from 1948 until his death, in 1965, was unique among Stalin's satraps in not being a *"Muscovite"*, a Communist trained during the '30s in Russia. He won favour with Moscow for his support in helping the Soviet Union in taking control over Hungary after the 1956 Revolution and succeeded in persuading the USSR to withdraw troops from Romania by 1958. Crucially, the Romanians also managed to roll up very extensive KGB and Hungarian spy networks (very often the two were combined). These included a series of Hungarian irredentist secret societies operating in Transylvania run by the Communist government in Hungary with KGB knowledge.

Ceauşescu's famous speech from the balcony of the Central Committee building on 23 August 1968 had won him national support but Nagy and Dubcek had had equal popular backing. Why did the Russians and their allies not invade? For a number of reasons; because in Romania, unlike in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, they no longer had a sufficiently extensive intelligence network enabling them to know what was going on in the party or the armed forces or clients in top positions who could request a Soviet intervention, because Ceauşescu and his colleagues unlike the Czechs would have fought and because they had assumed national control over their armed forces that were prepared for a military response against an invader from any direction. The fact that the US, Britain, and perhaps, most explicitly, socialist giant China had weighed in to deter a Soviet move no doubt played their role. According to Watts, Ceauşescu was courted by the Carter Administration in the late '70s and also was free in the late '70s to lead Romania into a non-aligned position similar to that of Yugoslavia and to compete with Tito for American favours. Instead, he decided to create an autarchic national Communist state, independent of Moscow and Washington, a path that led him to the firing squad near Târgovişte on Christmas Day, 1989.

I personally believe Watts' work is a masterpiece because it includes more information than any other book on this theme. The author uses information from sources that were unexplored before, and that is why this book is so interesting and fascinating to be studied by everyone who wants to know another opinion about the relationship between Romania and its Eastern neighbours during the past 150 years, the main purpose of this book being to study the transformation of Romania from an ally to an enemy of Soviet Russia and its efforts to come out from the Soviet domination during the Cold War.

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Manuscripts submitted to the editorial staff should be sent by mail or email, edited in *Microsoft Word*, *Times New Roman*, *size 14*, *justify*, and they should have no more than *8 pages*. The **graphic illustration** – schemes, figures, tables should be designed using *CorelDraw*, and maps and images – in *JPEG* format.

Manuscripts should be written in accordance with the academic standards and adopting the norms in the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, available at www.ldoceonline.com. Abbreviations and acronyms should be either avoided or explained.

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The Editorial Staff

The editorial and layout process
was completed on 23 September 2011.

General Alexandru Averescu in Rome, after having laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier

Source: The National Military Museum, by courtesy of Professor Neculai MOGHIOR

Cover 1: Missile launch in Capu Midia Range. Photo: Ștefan CIOCAN

Cover 4: Firing with the armament in the inventory in Cincu Range. Photo: Valentin CIOBÎRCĂ

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