Romanian Military Thinking

Military Theory and Science Journal
Published by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff

HIGH ROYAL DECREE NO. 3663
THROUGH WHICH "MILITARY ROMANIA"
BECOMES THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL
OF THE GENERAL STAFF

"Art. I. - The official journal named "Military Romania" is founded at the General Staff, starting 1 January 1898, in which all officers within the Armed Forces will find military studies, which interest their training.

Through the agency of this journal all officers, belonging to all branches, who are in service, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces".

Carol - King of Romania
Issued in București on 8 December 1897

Order "Meritul Cultural"
in the rank of "Officer",
F Category – "Promotion of Culture"
(Presidential Decree no. 483 on 30.06.2014)

Romanian Military Thinking
Journal Awards

These awards are yearly bestowed,
by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff,
on the most valuable works
in the field of military science, published in the previous year.

Contents

Contenu

Geopolitics • Geostrategy International Security

Géopolitique • Géostratégie Sécurité internationale

Opinions

Opinions

Contents

Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_136053.htm?selectedLocale=en

History for the Future of Romania

This year it is 100 years since the Romanian Armed Forces large units were established, in August 1916, when the Romanian state chose to join the Entente and to fulfil the national ideal.

The three Romanian Armies path to glory – marked by resounding victories and, sometimes, unfortunately, by painful failures, was sprinkled with the blood of the heroes in the First and the Second World Wars, and, more recently, painful alike, in the contemporary theatres of operations. On the front, in exercises, in ranges, in the national economy sites, in natural disaster relief operations, wherever necessary for the country, the Romanian troops have promptly and unconditionally answered: Present!

Permanently concerned with providing solutions for an imperative present and especially for an unpredictable, sometimes ignored by political decision-makers, future, the military institution has been continually reconfigured, throughout time, trying to find, in a necessary equation of effectiveness, the *"golden ratio"* between goals and resources. The structural transformations and reorganisations it has undergone in time may result in certain difficulties related to identity recognition but they cannot move the current structures away from the central axis of their historical development.

At the beginning of the First World War, after triumphantly entering our Transylvania, the Romanian armed forces had to withdraw, for reasons that exceeded their ability to accept. In Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz, in the hot summer of 1917, the Romanian armed forces regained the dignity and respect they needed. Unfortunately, in the tumult of the events in the autumn of 1917, we were left alone in front of a still powerful enemy, and, in the great powers game, Romania was again doomed to defeat. However, the desire not to accept the enslaving peace in the spring of 1918 fuelled, as a bowstring stretched to the maximum, the flight like an arrow across the mountains and the liberation of Transylvania that was still haunted by the phantasms of some empires that failed the exam in history. It was the moment when, in the recently reorganised Romanian armed forces, it was adopted for the first time a novel operational formula – the Romanian Troops Command in Transylvania – with which they engaged in a successful military operation that resulted in the unification of the country.

Nevertheless, history and the evolution of the Romanian military body, in the new paradigm of national security in allied context, have required the reconfiguration of the 2nd Army Command and the establishment of the Joint

Operational Command, the structure that has led the Romanian detachments participating in missions in the theatres of operations outside the national territory. Moreover and certainly not accidentally, the 1st Infantry Division *Dacica*, which continued the 1st Army tradition, has been placed on the coordinates of modernity, being recently transformed into the Multinational Division Southeast, a structure that plays an important role in meeting the commitments made by Romania within NATO.

Dacica, Getica, Gemina are names that have maximum resonance in relation to the foundations of our national being. The fact that they were attached to the three large units – after a period when they were named after their first commanders in 1916 – comes to strengthen the connection, over time, with our identity reference points, and to nurture, in a determining manner, the winning mindset in each fighter. Alongside traditional or historically situational partners, in freely accepted or imposed alliances, the Romanian troops have always fulfilled their duty, fighting for a right cause – defence and integrity of the country. It is important for us to remember that great national achievements are, to a large extent, due to the military, as an indissoluble part of national being, and to pay pious homage to national heroes.

The grandiose events on the occasion of 100 years of history in the service of the country and the Romanian people – the long and glorious path to the affirmation and preservation of national identity and dignity – reinforced the oath of loyalty sworn to the Country. The earth of the country vibrated in the cadence of the parade march and under the tracks and wheels of the combat equipment, conveying the message of the lasting presence and steadfast determination of the Romanian armed forces to affirm their role and reason for being. Children and young people having faces enlightened with curiosity and happiness, old people with tears in their eyes, men proud of having served, in time, the country witnessed, with satisfaction, once more, the reaffirmation of the Romanian armed forces oath of loyalty. The decoration of the battle flags of the centenary-old large units came to certify the appreciation the armed forces enjoy and the trust they are continually invested with, as the armed arm of the people in a world increasingly torn by conflicts and threats.

Considering the past generates institutional pride and energy for future actions, the deployment of large units commands in places with strong historical resonance and the military presence in smaller garrisons of the country represent a chance to history, a reason for national pride, and an opportunity to ennoble the emblem of every citadel.

Bearers of the combat traditions of the armies established when the country entered the National Reunification War, the current divisions write their own history for the future of Romania.

Many Happy Returns!

✎ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*
English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

Histoire pour l'avenir de la Roumanie

Cette année on célèbre 100 ans depuis la constitution de grandes unités de l'Armée Roumaine, en août 1916, alors quand l'Etat roumain a choisi de joindre à l'Entente et d'accomplir son idéal national. La voie vers la gloire des trois armées roumaines – établie par des victoires vibrantes, mais parfois des échecs malheureusement douloureuses, a été trempée avec le sang des héros dans la Première et la Seconde Guerre mondiale et, plus récemment, mais aussi blessante, dans les théâtres d'opérations actuelles. Sur le front, dans les exercices, dans les polygones militaires, sur les chantiers de l'économie nationale, dans les interventions en cas de catastrophes naturelles, n'importe où le pays a eu besoin, c'est le soldat roumain qui a promptement répondu et sans condition: Présent!

L'institution militaire, constamment préoccupée de trouver des solutions pour un présent irrésistible, mais surtout pour un avenir imprévisible et quelquefois ignoré par les décideurs politiques, a modelé sans cesse, au fil de temps, sa configuration, en essayant de trouver, dans une relation nécessaire et efficiente, *„le rapport d'or"* entre les objectives et les ressources.

Les transformations et les réorganisations fonctionnelles au cours de temps peuvent créer des difficultés pour la reconnaissance identitaire, mais ne peuvent pas éloigner les structures actuelles du point central de leur existence historique.

Au début de la Première Guerre mondiale, les forces roumaines, après leur entrée triomphale dans notre Transylvanie, ont été forcées de se retirer, par des raisons au-delà de leur pouvoir d'en accepter. C'est Mărăști, Mărășești et Oituz de l'été en feu de 1917 qu'ont rendu à l'armée roumaine la dignité et le respect dont elle avait besoin. Malheureusement, dans l'agitation des événements à l'automne de 1917, nous restions seuls devant un ennemi encore supérieur. Dans le jeu de grandes puissances, pour la Roumanie l'avaient entrevu à nouveau un rôle de vaincu. Le désir de ne pas accepter la paix asservie du printemps 1918 a soutenu, comme une corde d'un arc tendu au maximum, le vol comme une flèche sur les montagnes et la libération de la Transylvanie toujours hante par des fantômes des empires qui n'on pas passé l'examen de l'histoire. Il était le moment où, dans la récente nouvelle armée roumaine, a été adoptée une formule opérationnelle en première et inédite – le Commandement des troupes roumaines de Transylvanie – avec laquelle a été engagée dans une opération militaire victorieuse, finalisée avec l'achèvement du pays.

Dans le nouveau paradigme de la sécurité nationale en contexte allié, quand même la marche de l'histoire et le progrès de l'organisme militaire roumaine ont imposé la reconfiguration du commandement de la 2ème Armée et la formation

du Commandement opérationnel conjoint, la structure qui a commandé les détachements roumaines participants aux missions dans les théâtres d'opérations en dehors du territoire nationale. Dans le même temps et pas du tout au hasard, bien sûr, la 1ère Division d'infanterie *Dacica*, celle qui a continué la tradition de la 1ère Armée, a été inscrite sur un nouvel itinéraire, étant récemment transformée dans la Division multinationale de Sud-Est, une structure avec un rôle important à accomplir les engagements de la Roumanie assumés au sein de l'OTAN.

Dacica, Getica, Gemina sont des noms avec résonance impressionnante dans les fondements de notre Etre nationale. L'attribution de ces noms à trois grandes unités – après que, pour un temps, elles portaient des noms de leurs anciens commandants de 1916 – vient de consolider la liaison sur le temps avec nos repères identitaires et de renforcer, essentiellement, la mentalité de vainqueur du chacun combattant. A côté des partenaires traditionnelles ou d'une conjecture historique, dans les alliances librement consenties ou imposées, les soldats roumains ont fait toujours leur devoir, sachant qu'ils luttent pour une cause juste – la défense et l'achèvement des frontières du pays. N'oublier que, dans une certaine mesure, les grandes réalisations nationales sont dues aux militaires, comme une partie indissoluble de l'Etre nationale, et nous nous inclinons avec dévotion sur les autels de nos héros!

Les événements solennels pour célébrer l'accomplissement de 100 ans d'histoire au service du pays et du peuple roumain – un long et glorieux chemin de lutte, pour affirmer et préserver l'identité et la dignité nationale – ont réaffirmé le serment confié à notre Patrie. Le sol du pays a vibré dans la cadence des pas à défiler et sous les chenilles et roues de la technique de combat et a transmis le message d'une ferme présence et d'une incontestable décision de l'armée roumaine à affirmer son but et sa raison d'être. Des enfants et jeunes avec des visages éclairés par la curiosité et de la joie, des hommes âgés avec des larmes aux yeux, des gens avec leur pointure fierté d'être servit, d'autrefois, aux drapeaux, tous ont assis, avec contentement, encore une fois, à réaffirmer le serment de fidélité pour l'armée roumaine. La décoration des Drapeaux de bataille de grandes unités centenaires a certifié l'appréciation dont l'armée se jouit et la confiance avec laquelle elle est investie constamment comme le bras armé du peuple, dans un monde de plus en plus brisé des conflits et des menaces.

Relever le passé nous génère une fierté institutionnelle et aussi l'énergie pour les futures actions. La dislocation des commandements de grandes unités en cités à une résonance forte historique et aussi la présence militaire dans les garnisons plus petites du pays représentent une chance à l'histoire, un plus de fierté nationale et une occasion d'ennoblir le blason de chaque ville.

Les actuelles divisions, qui ont une tradition de lutte des armées crées dans le moment d'entrée de la Roumanie dans la Guerre de réunification nationale, écrivent ses propres histoires pour l'avenir de la Roumanie.

Joyeux anniversaire!

<div align="right">

Version française par
Alina PAPOI

</div>

ACTIVE DEFENCE IN CHINESE MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS (I)

Brigadier General (r.) Dr Viorel BUŢA
Colonel Valentin VASILE

This article aims to capture some key milestones and significant features of recent developments in Chinese strategic military concepts. Taking as a starting point China's Military Strategy *adopted in May 2015, the authors try to summarise the principles of Chinese active defence, and to expose the comprehensive and hybrid characteristics of Chinese military concepts, such as the unrestricted warfare and the three warfares.*

The authors note that Chinese military theorists consider the need of integrating political, diplomatic, financial, economic, legal and informational activities to prevent the outbreak of military hostilities or to support the war effort.

Keywords: Chinese Military Strategy; active defence; unrestricted warfare; the three warfares

China's Military Strategy – 2015

Strategic concepts reflect the constant concern of the Chinese policy makers and military theorists to define, explain and justify how China relates to the risks and threats in the regional and global security environment, and the reasons underlying the Chinese armed forces modernisation programmes in accordance with the missions entrusted to them.

Starting from the premise that a country peace, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence can be guaranteed only by the existence of strong armed forces and the affiliation to a system of military bilateral/multilateral treaties under the right of each state to choose its own allies and alliances in compliance with international law, *China's Military Strategy* adopted in May 2015 states

Brigadier General (r.) Professor Dr Viorel Buţa – *"Carol I"* National Defence University, Bucureşti.
Colonel Valentin Vasile – Deputy Chief of the Information and Public Relations Directorate, the Ministry of National Defence.

that *"China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defence policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion"*[1].

Among the nine editions of China's *Defence White Paper* published by the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1998, it is for the first time when such an official paper brings to the fore the guidelines of the Chinese military strategy and the principles related to *active defence*. Based on them are defined the strategic objectives, missions, development programmes and combat preparations of the *People's Liberation Army (PLA)*, as well as the military cooperation objectives to improve the collective security mechanisms and implementat confidence-building measures between states.

The continuity elements were taken into *China's Military Srategy 2015* from previous similar documents – *China's National Defence* (2010) and *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces* (2013), being prefaced by a careful analysis of the current security environment. Among its features are mentioned *"the global trends toward multi-polarity and economic globalisation are intensifying, and an information society is rapidly coming into being (…), the historic changes in the balance of power, global governance structure, Asia-Pacific geostrategic landscape, and international competition in the economic, scientific and technological, and military fields"*[2]. What was also noticed were the influences exerted on the security environment by the intensifying *"international competition for the redistribution of power, rights and interests"*[3], amid the emergence of *"new threats from hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism"*[4], the increasing frequency of terrorist attacks and the growing numbers of victims of local wars, ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts.

Considering the nature of the new threats and the need for national security, *China's Military Strategy 2015* specifies that *"China's armed forces will adapt themselves to new changes in the national security environment (…) to build a strong military for the new situation, implement the military strategic guidelines of active defence in the new situation, accelerate the modernisation of national defence and armed forces, resolutely safeguard China's sovereignty, security and development interests"*[5].

---

[1] *China's Military Strategy – 2015*, USNI News, 26 May 2015, United States Naval Institute, see http://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy
[2] *Ibidem*.
[3] *Ibidem*.
[4] *Ibidem*.
[5] *Ibidem*.

As a novelty, *China's Military Strategy* announces that the authorities in Beijing are willing to assume a more active role in regional and global security issues, mentioning three main areas of action for achieving *"a new understanding of the political framework for military force, enhanced security partnerships, and global power projection capabilities for the People's Liberation Army"*[6].

The traditional elements of continuity – development of force structure, modernisation programmes, military cooperation and confidence-building measures – are integrated into a *"holistic approach"*[7] to national security that includes new, nontraditional elements. Among the new elements are considered the response modalities to different threats that may occur far from China's borders – piracy, terrorism, contribution to peacekeeping missions and intervention in case of natural disasters. The new holistic and integrative approach in the Chinese Military Strategy seeks increased power projection capacity, so that China's national interests and maritime access to energy and external resources can be protected both in territorial and international waters. In order to achieve this end, it is expected to see further development of Chinese naval forces' capabilities to deter and counter any threats by increasing their capacity to carry out manoeuvres and operations in support of maritime defence, independently or in cooperation with allies and partners.

Another novelty is the attention paid by *China's Military Strategy 2015* to the development of military partnerships. It reflects the concern of the Chinese authorities about taking steps to influence favourably the evolutions in the regional and global security environment through cooperation with Russia and the USA, with countries from Europe, Africa and Asia-Pacific in order to improve collective security by refining and implementing mutual confidence-building measures.

From this perspective, *China's Military Strategy 2015* states that *"China's armed forces will gradually intensify their participation in such operations as international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and do their utmost to shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations, provide more public security goods, and contribute more to world peace and common development"*[8].

Active Defence

Economic, financial, political and diplomatic resources consolidate the foundation of China's propensity to assume the role of and to act as a major global power, with the corollary of strengthening its military posture both regionally and globally

---

[6] Alexander Sullivan, Andrew S. Erickson, *The Big Story Behind China's New Military Strategy. China Is Becoming "More Willing and Able" to Stake and Defend Its Interests Overseas*, in *The Diplomat*, 5 June 2015, see http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-big-story-behind-chinas-new-military-strategy/

[7] *China's Military Strategy, op. cit.*

[8] *Ibidem.*

through the increase in defence spending and the modernisation of the armed forces. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, so far, although they have been reviewed successively, the Chinese military concepts retain a fundamental constant – *active defence*, which is clearly expressed by the following principle: *"We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked!"*[9].

Based on the inherent right of a state to individual and collective defence, internationally acknowledged in the UN Charter, the dimensions of Chinese *active defence* result from the unity and complementarity of the strategic defence and the offensive at operational and tactical levels. Correlated with developments in the security environment, with the technical and scientific progress, and with the impact of new weapon systems and military equipment on planning and conducting military operations, the Chinese strategic concepts make the objectives of *active defence* explicit. They provide the framework for the appropriate concentration of forces, and for the proper use of all the necessary power resources of the state – political, diplomatic, economic, financial, human and informational, and not in the least military, in order to deter and counter any aggression.

In line with international law, there are military and non-military preventive measures. Among them are listed warnings, cutting communications of any kind, economic sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, blockades, calls for the intervention of the international security organisations, reconfirmation of the Allied nations' support, reinforcement of the defensive positions, troops mobilisation and increase in the operational capacity of the armed forces, and shows of force. If the preventive measures intended for the aggressor deterrence, the security situation de-escalation and peacekeeping fail, new military measures are adopted for achieving the strategic defence necessary to repel the aggression. Among them are included the measures of *retaliation* – subsequent proportionate penalty counter strikes, amid the constant affirmation that China does not compete with any other state, being firmly resolute to refrain from using nuclear weapons first.

Active defence is conditioned by achieving long-term planning, by increasing the capacity for rapid response and multidimensional crisis management, and by adopting the appropriate strategic posture to deter adversaries and foster decisive actions for winning the war. Subsumed under the major goals of defending China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests, the objectives of *active defence* introduce the requirements of preparing the armed forces

---

[9] Anthony H. Cordesman, Steven Colley, Michael Wang, *Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis*, Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 2015, p. 31, http://csis.org/files/publication/151215_Cordesman_ChineseStrategyMilitaryMod_Web.pdf

for *"winning modern wars under the conditions of using modern technology, particularly high technology"*[10] or *"winning local wars under the conditions of using information technology"*[11] as they were formulated in 1993 and 2004 respectively.

Addressed in a separate chapter in the content of *China's Military Strategy 2015*, *Preparation for Military Struggle* underlines the need to train the armed forces in direct relation to the changes, ways and means of modern warfare, considering also the nature of the risks, threats and vulnerabilities that could affect China's national security. From this perspective, Chinese military theorists consider it essential to increase the armed forces readiness, their deterrent effect and their combat capacity, enabling them to win local wars under the conditions of information technologies and systems used against the enemy combat systems.

Another priority is to take action for developing the combat capabilities designed to operate effectively on land, at sea, in the air, and in cyber environment, and to counter highly effective multidirectional threats. There are also considered measures to increase the flexibility, mobility and sustainability of military units, their integration, and the development of capabilities needed to obtain the information superiority and to execute precision strikes anywhere in the depth of the space controlled by the enemy, as well as to conduct joint operations to *"effectively control major crises, properly handle possible chain reactions, and firmly safeguard the country's territorial sovereignty, integrity and security"*[12].

According to *China's Military Strategy 2015*, the **Preparation for Military Struggle** requires the armed forces regular training, carried out based on the following **active defence principles**:

- adopt a holistic approach to national security with the aim of preventing crises, deterring and winning wars;
- adopt a strategic posture that is favourable to China's peaceful development and corresponds to the defensive nature of the Chinese national defence policy in order to counter complex security threats by closely coordinating the political, diplomatic, economic and military activities;
- achieve the balance between the measures planned to protect China's rights and defend its national territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, while maintaining regional security and stability;
- undertake all the efforts to seize the strategic initiative and implement a proactive approach to forward overall planning of military struggle, using all the opportunities to strengthen the national military capabilities;

---

[10] *Ibidem*, p. 31.
[11] *Ibidem*.
[12] *Ibidem*, p. 32.

- use the most appropriate strategies and tactics that provide the flexibility and mobility needed to achieve the maximum effectiveness of joint operations through the concentration of forces and the integration of all the operational means and methods;
- prepare the armed forces under the most complex and difficult scenarios so as to stimulate creative thinking through all training aspects and to create the prerequisites for their optimal response anytime and in any case of emergency, crisis or war;
- capitalise on the advantages of political superiority of personnel and those of political leadership over the armed forces with the aim of enhancing fighting spirit, morale and discipline, professional development and combat capacity, while tightening the relations between the government, the military and the citizens;
- value the strengths of the concept of *people's war*[13] by using it as the most powerful weapon for achieving victory over the enemy, constantly enriching its contents, methods and means with a particular focus on making transition from the mobilisation of human resources for war to the mobilisation of scientific and technological resources;
- establish relations and enhance cooperation in military and security areas with major powers, neighbouring and developing countries in order to contribute to establishing and improving the regional framework for security and cooperation.

The Chinese experience of *people's war* facilitates the better understanding of the complementarities between the regular and irregular warfare, leaves its mark on the widespread acceptance of the need to integrate and synchronise the actions of the armed forces with the actions carried out not only by other types of forces (internal security, police, paramilitary), but also by civil institutions, both for defence and for military operations other than war. Moreover, PLA's theorists consider the civil-military integration as being decisive for the achievement of *active defence*, which is to be considered not only through military and informational measures (collection, processing, dissemination and exploitation of information,

---

[13] *People's war* concept was developed and first applied by the Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong during Chinese Civil War (1927-1950). The main political and military lines of action specific to *people's war* are aimed at obtaining and maintaining the support of the population, gaining control over parts of the territory, attracting the enemy forces deep into the territory controlled by the popular forces to be engaged through partisan and guerilla warfare military techniques.

electronic and cyber warfare, propaganda), but also through measures taken in the political, diplomatic and economic areas.

The integrative strategy of *active defence* has obvious points of contingency and fusion with the *comprehensive approach* and with the theory of *hybrid warfare*, concepts which are conveyed in the Western military literature in order to describe the polymorphism of contemporary military confrontations. The existence of reciprocal influences between Chinese and Western military theories about the nature of modern warfare is an assumption confirmed by the similarities highlighted by the Chinese concepts of *unrestricted warfare* and *three warfares*.

Unrestricted Warfare

The integration of military actions with the paramilitary, economic, diplomatic, legal and informational activities, which is the main feature of the *comprehensive approach* and of the *hybrid warfare* as they are defined in Western military literature, can be also identified in Chinese military literature. Therefore, Chinese military theorists take into account the possibilities of increasing the effects of military operations by the coordination and synchronisation of the various support activities carried out by paramilitary units, ministries, institutions and civil organisations, which can contribute effectively to supporting the war effort and to achieving the *active defence* specific objectives.

A reference book on Chinese modern warfare theory was published in Beijing in 1999 by senior colonels **Qiao Liang** and **Wang Xiangsui**. This book was translated into English under the name *Unrestricted Warfare*. Since it does not reflect very precisely the meaning of the original title *(Chao Xian Zhan)*, there is another suggested translation, *War beyond Rules*, which might reflect more accurately the content of the book's authors intentions.

Unrestricted Warfare has brought before the Chinese military theorists not only a new vision of the origins of modern warfare, but also the aims, ways and means. It proves to be an advocate for the amendment of the traditional conceptions according to which the main threat to the national security of a country is only the military power of an enemy or potential enemy.

Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui argue that the wars and major incidents that occurred in the last decade of the 20th century confirm that *"military threats are already often no longer the major factors affecting national security. Even though they are the same ancient territorial disputes, nationality conflicts, religious clashes, and the delineation of spheres of power in human history, and are still the several major agents of people waging war from opposite directions, these traditional factors*

are increasingly becoming more intertwined with grabbing resources, contending for markets, controlling capital, trade sanctions, and other economic factors, to the extent that they are even becoming secondary to these factors"[14].

Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui remark that *"as the arena of war has expanded, encompassing the political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and psychological spheres, in addition to the land, sea, air, space, and electronics spheres, the interactions among all factors have made it difficult for the military sphere to serve as the automatic dominant sphere in every war. War will be conducted in nonwar spheres… If we want to have victory in future wars, we must be fully prepared intellectually for this scenario, that is, to be ready to carry out a war which, affecting all areas of life of the countries involved, may be conducted in a sphere not dominated by military actions. It is now still unknown what weapons, means, and personnel such wars will use and in what direction and sphere such wars will be conducted"*[15].

The diversity of combatants and the involvement of non-state actors, another feature characterising both *unrestricted* and *hybrid warfare*, is mentioned by Qiao and Wang as follows: *"Non-state organisations, in this their first war without the use of military force, are using non-military means to engage sovereign nations"*[16].

The two Chinese authors reveal that the physiognomy of the contemporary armed conflicts is changed not only by the impact of new technologies, due to the increased range of action, speed and precision of the strikes, but also by the destructive power of modern weaponry, which determine the extension of the battlefield as a result of multiple possibilities to engage simultaneously relevant targets throughout all the enemy's territory. Consequently, modern warfare develops new features, which are caused by the blurring status of the participants in a war that is no longer carried out only by the members of the armed forces: *"Non-professional warriors and non-state organisations are posing a greater and greater threat to sovereign nations, making these warriors and organisations more and more serious adversaries for every professional army"*[17].

The development of new forms and means of warfare by combining the military and non-military actions meets the need to reduce the political and economic costs of the conventional war. At the same time, the integration of military actions with civilian ones allows the development of more options

---

[14] Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing, February 1999, p. 116, English translations made by CIA Foreign Broadcast Information Service – FBIS, see http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf

[15] *Ibidem*, p. 169.

[16] *Ibidem*, p. 51.

[17] *Ibidem*, p. 48.

and alternatives, increasing the chances of success in a confrontation with technologically superior armed forces of potential enemies. According to the two Chinese authors, the integrated approach provides an optimal response to the complex threats proper to the contemporary security environment because: *"Faced with warfare in the broad sense that will unfold on a borderless battlefield, it is no longer possible to rely on military forces and weapons alone to achieve national security in the larger strategic sense, nor is it possible to protect these stratified national interests. Obviously, warfare is in the process of transcending the domains of soldiers, military units, and military affairs, and is increasingly becoming a matter for politicians, scientists, and even bankers"*[18].

Asserting its own legitimacy and making use of it in the media and in international security organisations, invoking the provisions of the international law, using the economic levers to gain control over vital resources, and exploiting the advantages of holding some niche capabilities, all these are forms of civil action and might lead to avoiding or reducing as much as possible the risks and losses inherent in direct military actions.

To support their theory of *unrestricted warfare* with examples, Qiao and Wang state that *"financial war is a form of non-military warfare which is just as terribly destructive as a bloody war, but in which no blood is actually shed. Financial warfare has now officially come to war's centre stage, a stage that for thousands of years has been occupied only by soldiers and weapons, with blood and death everywhere"*[19], and *"Today, when nuclear weapons have already become frightening mantelpiece decorations that are losing their real operational value with each passing day, financial war has become a hyperstrategic weapon that is attracting the attention of the world. This is because financial war is easily manipulated and allows for concealed actions, and is also highly destructive"*[20].

In the theory of *unrestricted warfare* the main features of *hybrid warfare* can be easily recognised – the combined action of military and non-military factors, the convergence of military, economic, psychological dimensions of war, the blurred distinction between the conventional and the irregular forms and means of war, the duplication and synchronisation of the military kinetic actions with non-kinetic actions, which are carried out by ministries and civil institutions, governmental and non-governmental actors. So, the multiplication of actors participating in the war is obvious – conventional armed forces, paramilitary, civil structures and even private agencies.

---

[18] *Ibidem*, p. 221.
[19] *Ibidem*, p. 52.
[20] *Ibidem*, p. 53.

Moreover, this finding does reaffirm the long-standing traditions of *avant la lettre* hybridity in Chinese strategic military concepts, having Sun Tzu, a general, strategist and philosopher of ancient China, as a famous precursor. His fundamental work, *The Art of War*, contains all the ingredients of current theories on the hybridity of modern warfare. Sun Tzu outlined the *"hybrid"* ways and means whose coordinated and synchronised application could facilitate the victory over the enemy even without a fight. Among them are mentioned the skilful use of diplomacy to retain old allies and attract new ones, as well as diversion, corruption and betrayal, promises, pressures and threats with the aim of provoking conflicts between opponents so that they neutralise each other.

Sun Tzu emphasised the importance of cohesion between people and rulers, and the destructive impact that economic hardships and undue prolongation of war may have on the morale of the population and on the enemy troops, generating unmanageable desertions and revolts. *The Art of War* also mentions the manipulative use of information in order to deceive the enemy and defeat his will to fight, these ones being distinct objectives of contemporary information operations. Other features of *hybrid warfare*, which can be identified when reading *The Art of War*, are the combined use of regular and paramilitary forces, the alternation of direct and indirect actions, harassment and surprise, military operations being recommended as a last resort, only after obtaining maximum advantages in positioning – in terms of legitimacy, military, political, legal, moral, economic, informational readiness – relative to enemy's situation. *Nihil sub sole novum!*

*

In the second part of the paper the authors provide details regarding the concept of Three Warfares and the economic aspects of the integrative strategy.

CLAUSEWITZIANISM
AND POSTCLAUSEWITZIANISM
About the Need for a Paradigm Shift within the Romanian Military Thinking (I)

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Adrian LESENCIUC

This paper aims at analysing the role of General Clausewitz's theory within the strategic and doctrinary projection of the past two centuries. In essence, the nature of war has remained unchanged, even if substantial changes have occurred in terms of the means of warfare. Given this reality, the theorists who joined the Clausewitzian paradigm tried to expand the horizons of this paradigm beyond its limits; consequently, the different current Clausewitzian perspectives of his followers are more or less dissonant with the current security context. For an accurate argumentation of an appropriate positioning of the Romanian military thinking, we propose an episodic structuring of the entire issue, covering Clausewitz's work, the emergence of his ideas, the anti-Clausewitzian positioning, and the benchmarks of the Romanian military thinking related to Clausewitzian values.

Keywords: *On War; absolute war; Clausewitzian paradigm; Romanian military thinking*

1. Carl von Clausewitz – *"On War"*. Ideological Deformations

1.1. What is war? Major General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is the personality that fundamentally changed the physiognomy of war until the end of the Second World War. His name is directly linked to a paradigm that is characterised by the total change of the old perspective on war and of the relationships between war and politics. Enlisted at 12 years old in the Regiment of Postdam, Clausewitz studied the war his entire life. Being still young, Clausewitz wrote important articles (with a significant polemic character[1]). The Prussian theorist was captured in the disastrous Jena-Auerstädt campaign (1806). In his subsequent experience of war, he was a liaison officer between Russia and Prussia (1813-1814). He shortly became General, and his major experience of war was in the quality of the Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army Corps that prevented the advance of Marshal Grouchy's French forces

---

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Adrian Lesenciuc – Senior Lecturer, Department of Fundamental Sciences and Management, Faculty of Aeronautical Management, *"Henri Coandă"* Air Force Academy, Brașov.

[1] The criticism of the young Captain Carl von Clausewitz is well known, regarding the work of General Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow. In 1799, General von Bülow published a paper entitled *Geist des neueren Kriegssystems, hergeleitet aus dem Grundsatz einer Basis der Operationen, auch für Laien in der Kriegeskunst fasslich vorgetragen von einem ehemaligen preusschen Offizier*, where he conceptually

in Waterloo campaign. General Carl von Clausewitz is known especially for his quality of the Commandant of Preußische Kriegsakademie (Prussian War College), since 1818. During that period, he worked on his main book, *On War* (*Vom Kriege* in original), that remained unfinished.

On War is a work that deals with war theory or philosophy (that is, actually, the central concept of Clausewitz's work). War is a phenomenon that should be analysed with rational arguments. This is why, constantly scientifically approaching the war phenomenon and based on epistemic foundations, Carl von Clausewitz opens the first part of his work, *"On the Nature of War"*, with a first chapter entitled *"What is war?"*. Within it, he defines the phenomenon and its general framework, which led, in the simplified interpretations of Clausewitzian perspective, to understanding the Prussian thinker as an apologist of war: ***"War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will**. (...) Violence, that is to say physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate **object**"*[2].

With this general positioning within the war framework, which no longer requires the approach in the earlier conception – of the military action in case of urgent needs – Carl von Clausewitz centres his theory on the reality of hostile feeling and hostile intention, that requires inclusively the use of extreme violence: *"As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise. By such means the former dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed*

---

clarified a set of terms, including military operation, line of operation, strategy and tactics. Captain Carl von Clausewitz published in the journal *Neue Bellona* (vol. 9/1805) an article entitled *Comments on Mr. von Bülow's pure and applied strategy or the criticism of his opinions*, contradicting the general's perspective, who understood tactics as being the science of troops movement within the visual field, and strategy as being the science of troops movement beside the visual field. Commenting this episode, General Soare (Corneliu Soare, *Recitindu-l pe Clausewitz*, Editura Militară, București, 1993, p. 31) stated: *"Clausewitz argues that such a vision reduces the entire military activity to movements, but the distinction is based on an empirical criterion – the visual field or the cannon's projectiles maximum range – and not on an abstract feature; consequently, von Bülow's definitions do not lead to a satisfactory resolution in a rational perspective. The distinction between strategy and tactics should be based on the general and essential element that is the **armed fight**: <Strategy is nothing without battle, for battle is the material that it applies, the very means that it employs. Just as tactics is the employment of military forces in battle, so strategy is the employment of battles... to achieve the object of war>"* (*Neue Bellona*, vol. 9, 1805, p. 261, translated in English by Antulio J. Echevarria II). Clausewitz's idea, also resumed in *On War* (Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 110), was imposed to the detriment of General von Bülow's one.

  [2] Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

to extremities, to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on each side"[3].

Nevertheless, the utmost use of force helps to identify the coordinates of defining war phenomenon, as the main goal of war still remains that of disarming the enemy. Thus, Clausewitz uses two terms, *wehrlosmachen* – to make it void of defence, and *gänzliche Wehrlosigkeit* – total incapacity of defence, translated into Romanian (as well as in English) by *"to disarm"* and *"total disarmament"*. This is an important clue that confirms Clausewitz's proper understanding of war, but a unidirectional interpretation, transformed in ideology by his precursors, who extended the limits of so-called Clausewitzian paradigm.

It is important to mention that *On War* appears in the early 19th century, when the dominant ideas within military sciences were associated with the School of General Antoine, Baron of Jomini (1779-1869). Jomini highlighted the unalterable principles of fight, especially emphasising the role of communication lines[4] and the conception that asserts that the superior strategy is associated with superiority in human and material resources, especially in critical points. The most important contribution of Jomini is, however, that the school he is associated with, gave birth to military sciences, the principle of fight and the operative art (or the *"great tactics"*, in the French General's terms)[5]. The main feature of Jomini's School is the slipping of war science into the area of mathematics. Jomini and Clausewitz were contemporaries, they knew each other's works and reciprocally criticised

---

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 54.

[4] Analysing the dominant ideas regarding planning and conduct of military operations in the early 19th century, Larry H. Addington firstly associates to General Jomini's thinking the focus on the communication lines and the communicational fluidity: *"Jomini believed that the great art of war lay in seizing the communications of the enemy without exposing one's own"* (Larry. H. Addington, *The Patterns of War since the Eighteen Century,* Second Edition, Bloomington&Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 45).

[5] The central concept of the Baron of Jomini's work is the *art of war*, translated into Romanian by *"military art"*. At the basis of this concept there is a set of principles that, unfortunately, were not adequately studied (according to the author) and did not come to the light of theoretical analysis. These principles are added to the spirit and the morale of the masses, and the talent and character of commanders. The result is a dynamic environment of battle that is not proper for extracting general rules or axioms, for regulating the war evolution and the preparation for wars. The theoretical analysis of Jomini was considered unsatisfactory: *"All sciences have principles, war alone has yet none; the great captains who have written do not give us any; one must be profound to comprehend them"* (Antoine Henri de Jomini (1834), *The Art of War*, restored Edition. Introduction by John-Allen Price. Translated by G.H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill, Kingston, Legacy Books Press, 2009, chapter XXIV). The Swiss military thinker proposed the first classification of *military sciences: strategy, great tactics, logistics, engineering, tactics* and *diplomacy* (in relation to the war). In a structure more suitable to the contemporary understanding, *strategy, great tactics* (equivalent with the operative art) and *tactics* are curricular areas that correspond to the current levels of military art, while *logistics, engineering,* and *diplomacy* are military areas corresponding to the intersection between military sciences and economics, physics/mathematics and political sciences.

the lack of didacticism, namely the pure *geometrical perspective*. However, they still remain emblematic personalities of military thinking. The work of Jomini became important not only as it schematised a structure of military sciences but also because it *"was an attempt to find an intermediary area between tactics and strategy, interesting in both theoretical and practical perspective"*[6]. In this respect, *On War*, designed against the French School and focused on the utmost use of force and on the total victory, opened a new direction of study, absolutely necessary in a scientific area and period when theoretical works were absolutely necessary in order to strengthen the science of war.

Unfortunately, the collective mindset was penetrated by a rather summative phrase, insufficiently comprehensive for the social phenomenon called war: *"War is a mere continuation of policy by other means"*[7]. This phrase would later separate the schools of military thinking in Clausewitzian and non-Clausewitzian ones and would fuel ideological alignments, which in real struggle contexts led to unnecessary loss of lives. As regarding this positioning, there is another Clausewitz's definition of war that led to important strategic mutation and to numerous victims on the battlefield: *"(...) war is an act of violence, which in its application knows no bounds"*[8].

1.2. The absolute war *or* the good will of Clausewitz and the early deformations because of his followers inability to understand his ideas

Clausewitz defined the abstract concept of *absolute war*, understood as absolute violence, as utmost use of force, from which he substantiated the peculiarities of the *real war*. Defining absolute war, without any external action or influence, the purpose is extreme – the complete destruction of one of the groups involved in combat: *"We therefore repeat our proposition, that war is an act of violence, which in its application knows no bounds; as one dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which in the conception must lead to an extreme. This is the first reciprocal action, and the first extreme with which we meet (**first reciprocal action**)"*[9].

This paragraph projects one of the limits of Clausewitz's paradigm, which was extended by his followers and especially by the military strategists beyond

---

[6] Corneliu Soare, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[7] Those who have not read *On war*, usually appeal to adapted sentences of the famous quote from Carl von Clausewitz. In reality, Clausewitz stated in subchapter 24, entitled *"War is a mere continuation of policy by other means"*, included in chapter 1, *"What is war?"*, the following: *"We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means"*, in *On War*, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

[8] Carl von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[9] *Ibidem.*

the moral limitations imposed by the previous paradigm that can be simply called *Sun Tzu's one*. Within this paradigm, the absolute war did not exist. The main goal of military clashes was to defeat the enemy's will to fight[10]. Even if Clausewitz did not intend to design the extreme military action, but to design a real phenomenon starting from an abstract concept, Clausewitz's followers exaggerated by pushing military forces towards extreme actions. The result of this exaggeration is the finality of tragic unfulfilling of Clausewitz's paradigm: the atomic bombing in the Second World War. Going back to the Prussian military thinker, the real war is not conducted within the limits of the absolute war, because of a set of external factors, out of which the most important one is the political factor, responsible for the introduction of the elements of *"rationality"* into conflict, for clearly establishing the purposes and explicitly defining the implementation framework. Where policy slips towards conflict pathology, by abandoning the norms (see, for example, the Nazi ideology slipping towards this kind of pathology), the real war tends towards the absolute war. Extermination (in camps or in battlefields) is the horizon of Clausewitz's paradigm, extended therefore by some followers of the Prussian General's ideas. These followers cropped in Clausewitz's monumental work and were not able to understand its spirit.

The absolute war, the natural manifestation of extreme violence, happens due to the use of brute military forces[11], against whom the civilising/rational factor (expressed by policy) does act with the purpose of stopping or diminishing their effects. The result is the real war. On the whole, the policy makes use of war as an instrument for achieving its goals, but prevents the maximum possibilities of war manifestation within the limits of extreme violence initially designed. His perspective on war-policy relationships is as follows: *"We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible*

---

[10] In *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu demonstrates his dogmatic character, expressing his full confidence in the role of theoretical strategies and principles which guarantee victory on the battlefield. This character is diluted as long as the entire theoretical construct of the work is focused on a principle with great moral influence, attacking the enemy's strategy, and not the enemy destruction: *"In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to conquer the enemy's country wholly and intactly; to shatter and destroy it is not so good"* (Sun Tzu, *Arta războiului*, Editura Antet, București, 1999, translated from French by Raluca Pârvu, p. 22). This challenge leads to planning military actions in a three-step algorithm, as follows: 1. attacking the enemy's strategy; 2. breaking up the enemy alliances; 3. armed attacking.

[11] Moreover, anticipating a possible misinterpretation of the *natural tendency* of war towards extreme violence, Clausewitz tried a projective correction: *"But that the reader may not form any false conceptions, we must here observe that, by this natural tendency of war, we only mean the philosophical, the strictly logical, and by no means the tendency of forces actually engaged in conflict, by which would be supposed to be included all the emotions and passions of the combatants"* (Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 68).

with these means, the art of war in general and the commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one. But however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view is the object, war is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception"[12].

Clausewitz's perspective is correct, based on real premises, and, moreover, it permits a design of the future of war that, understood as a political action – and the policy refers not only to the intelligence, as external reason opposite to the conflict, but also to treacherous actions, always ready to use the mean named war –, may be slipping towards extreme.

1.3. Other deformities in interpretation based on the deontological and dialectical projections of von Clausewitz

Other further development of Clausewitz's work, meaning partial understanding, refers to the commander profile (Clausewitz dedicates him a separate chapter, entitled *Military Genius*). For Clausewitz, unlike Sun Tzu[13] and Mauricius[14] perspectives on military commander, he must be courageous, based on the indifference to danger and/or on ambition, patriotism, enthusiasm etc., where from the firmness derives. Moreover, the military commander should possess

---

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 67.

[13] The moral influence, Sun Tzu argues, *"4. (…) causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger"* (Sun Tzu, *op. cit.*, p. 9). To reach this purpose, the commander should have a certain psycho-moral profile, being mandatory features like wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness, that are directly correlated with the self-respect. These qualities are added, on the battlefield, to commander's clairvoyance, to the art of making reign the harmony among its own army, to the ability of strategic projection, to the proper interpretation of the military situation, to the use of climate factors and, especially, to the good knowledge of the human factor (Sun Tzu, *op. cit.*, p. 24). This commander profile is mandatory in terms of military art, as long as the success in military operations depends on the personal skills of commanders and troops.

[14] The commander moral profile is based on the openness towards soldiers, accompanied by the harshness in their mistakes analysis: *"the first responsibility of an army leader is to appear implacable and just before their soldiers"* (Mauricius, *Arta militară*, Foreword and Introduction by H. Mihăescu. Editura Academiei R.S.R., Bucureşti, 1970, p. 198). Moreover, the army leader must have as reference aspects the beauty of his facts. He must be prudent, firm and determined. In essence, the commander should choose the middle way, especially in the relationships with his subordinates: *"the leaders, too afraid and too lenient ones, are not proper for the army: fear begets hatred and indulgence leads to disobedience. The best thing is to choose the middle way"* (Mauricius, *op. cit.*, p. 209). This theoretical profile of commander, but with indirect references to the military operations during the previous millennium, is based on a practical model, that of the Carthaginian General Hannibal, whose perspective on the commander accompanies Mauricius' strategikon: *"An army of sheep led by a lion is better than an army of lions led by a sheep"*. The profile designed by the Byzantine Emperor has primarily pedagogical value, being useful in troops training. The commander, who should also encourage his army, has the task of identifying the role of the *"word"* in action, and of using it properly. But, in order to reach the effect, the commander should be a model and should base his *"word of encouraging"* (his speech) on his facts.

another key feature: *coup d'oeil*[15]: *"Now, if it is to get safely through this perpetual conflict with the unexpected, two qualities are indispensable:* **in the first place an understanding which, even in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces of inner light, which lead to the truth, and then the courage to follow this faint light**. *The first is figuratively expressed by the French phrase* **coup d'oeil**. *The other is resolution"*[16].

Besides these fundamental qualities, Clausewitz takes into account others such as energy, perseverance, strength of temperament and character, tenacity (the latter meaning strength of mind and fortitude, till stubbornness, seen as a positive feature), self-control, practical intelligence[17] and so on. Clausewitz's commander profile, different from those of previous military thinkers, made possible the incorrect subsequent extension of the associated meanings, like in the case of the concept *"general war"*.

Defeating the enemy's will to fight still remains the fundamental objective of the war. To achieve this, it is not enough the *"destruction of the enemy forces, the conquest of enemy's provinces, their mere occupation, their mere invasion"*[18]. The armed confrontation ways are duplicated by other ways, mainly political ways that contribute to a broad understanding of war phenomenon, as a social phenomenon in its entirety. Therefore, war, the central concept of Clausewitz's work, is viewed as a complex social phenomenon, the author aiming at "*supporting a dialectic of warfare and a scientific method in studying wars, at cultivating the intelligence and moral virtues of those who command troops. Incidentally, this philosophical-military substance is the most consistent part of Clausewitz's creation, and it is very interesting in current affairs"*[19].

With this substantiation of the war philosophy understood as a rational system of laws, as a general theory, Carl von Clausewitz can be considered the *father*

---

[15] For terminological clarification, we will use the note of the Romanian translator of Clausewitz's work: *"In French, in the original; in military area, it names the commander's talent or experience in seizing* **"at a glance"** all the possibilities provided by the configuration of a territory, of a position for a future action. Romanian equivalent expression – *"ochiul câmpului / the eye of the field"* (Tr.N.) (Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 84).

[16] *Ibidem*, p. 67.

[17] The meaning of the intellectual qualities of the commander, in the spirit of the debate launched by Clausewitz, is topical: *"As we consider distinguished talents requisite for those who are to attain distinction, even in inferior positions, it naturally follows that we think highly of those who fill with renown the place of second rank in command of an army; and their seeming simplicity of character as compared with a polyhistor, with ready men of business, or with Councillors of State, must not lead us astray as to the superior nature of their intellectual activity. It happens, sometimes, that men import the fame gained in an inferior position into a higher one, without, in reality, deserving it in the new position: and then if they are not much employed, and therefore not much exposed to the risk of showing their weak points, the judgment does not distinguish very exactly what degree of fame is really due to them; and thus such men are often the occasion of too low an estimate being formed of the characteristics required to shine in certain situations"* (Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 95).

[18] *Ibidem*, p. 75.

[19] Corneliu Soare, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

of military sciences. However, he refuses such a positioning, considering that his research is rather in the art of military art as it provides knowledge for optimal use to achieve the purpose (the victory on the battlefield), *"where the object is creation and production, there is the province of art; where the object is investigation and knowledge science holds sway. After all this it results of itself that it is more fitting to say art of war than science of war"*[20].

The *"separation"* from military sciences[21] is due, in fact, to the outlook of that period, to the manner in which the military sciences were defined at the beginning of the 19th century. These sciences were associated, on the one hand, with some rigorous concepts (but not rigorously correct defined, as in the case of General von Bülow) and, on the other hand, with calculations, mathematical formulas and geometric figures (as in the French School of Baron Jomini). Maintaining Clausewitz's work in the vicinity of the military art leads, after all, to the first definition of the pragmatic dimension of the military art, which was removed both by those who consider the laws and principles of war as being immutable, and by those who consider it as a war craft, learned on the battlefield.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century*. Second Edition. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*. Foreword and notes by Major General Dr Corneliu Soare, Editura Militară, București, 1982.
3. Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War*. Restored Edition. Foreword by John-Allen Price. Translated by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill. Kingston, Legacy Books Press, 2009.
4. Mauricius, *Arta militară*. Translation and Foreword by H. Mihăescu, Editura Academiei RSR, București, 1970.
5. Corneliu Soare, *Recitindu-l pe Clausewitz*, Editura Militară, București, 1993.
6. Sun Tzî, *Arta războiului*. Translated from French by Raluca Pârvu, Editura Antet, București, 1999.

---

[20] Clausewitz, *op. cit*., p. 133.

[21] General Corneliu Soare considers this refusal of Clausewitz to accept his work in the vicinity of military science (which is categorically rejected) as a limit of his thinking: *"He is erroneous when he identifies military science with sciences such as physics or mathematics, and rejects it based on this reason; he does not realise that social phenomena can be also subject for scientific research and, especially, he does not understand that the theory of action is situated within science research sphere, and not outside it"* (C. Soare, *op. cit.*, p. 46). This limit of Clausewitz's vision can be easily understood as *On War* strictly deals with issues that are subject to military sciences, but the term *"military science"* was deformed at that time, involving a forced association with mathematics and physics, according to the French School of war, that of Jomini.

CONCEPTUAL DELIMITATIONS REGARDING THE STUDY OF WAR FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND MILITARY SCIENCE

Lieutenant Colonel Constantin VASILE

Although war is immutable in terms of its nature, we consider that its waging is determined by the evolution of human society. Military science, political science, international relations and sociology are the main academic areas that theorise the phenomenon of war and design its doctrinal basis.

From our scientific research on war and its causes we deduce that war is a complex phenomenon whose causation and prevention should be motivated multidisciplinary. Thus, in our view, restricting research to only one academic discipline, for example to the military science, might lead to incomplete results, unsynchronised with the international practice.

***Keywords**: military science; international relations; modern warfare; liberalism; realism*

Introduction

Throughout the existence of human society war has represented a frequent way for the manifestation of the interplay between the social and political units in which people are organised at a particular moment in time. Because war kills people, destroys resources, stagnates and even inhibits economic development, contributes to environmental degradation and pandemics, produces personal and collective trauma that lasts even for generations, we can consider war as *the most destructive manifestation* of the human behaviour.

However, we cannot forget the primary contribution of war to shaping the international system, the institutional and cultural structures of states and, not least, the global order. Thus the phrase *"war made the state and the state made war"*[1] represents a reality hard to dispute for the way in which, at least the Euro-Atlantic (Europe and later North America) civilisation, in terms of state and international system architecture, has developed since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) until now.

Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Vasile – the Ministry of National Defence.

[1] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 990-1992*, Blackwell Publishers Inc., Massachusetts, 1992, p. 67.

The emergence of new states in the contemporary world continues to be influenced by the war, as it was the case, in the '90s, of the states resulting from the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo – unrecognised by Romania). Currently, an example in this regard is in the Middle East where the Muslim fundamentalist insurgency actions are intended to the destruction of the Arab national states created at the beginning of the 20th century following the Westphalian model (Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan) in order to establish a Universal Muslim Caliphate based on the religious law of Islam (Sharia).

In the same positive register, we can include the motivation that the arms race for war has caused science to progress, the most revolutionary scientific discoveries being thus made in military research programmes: the steam engine, the modern steel structure of vessels, the dynamite, the jet airplane, the nuclear power, the space flight and technology, and so on. Moreover, medicine and social sciences have found fertile ground for progress in wartime, troops constituting a significant sample for the practice and study of these sciences.

The Relevance of Defining the War-Warfare Relationship

From the brief motivation set out above we can infer that the study of war is a fundamental concern of man, representing the main object of study for academic disciplines such as international relations and military science. In addition, sociologists and economists find an attractive field for research regarding the war, making their contribution to the study of this phenomenon and being involved in the development of the liberalist and the Marxist-Leninist theories, which have mainly economic motivations, apart from the considerations that are purely related to the ideological class struggle.

International Relations is an independent academic discipline, relatively new, its beginnings being correlated with the establishment in 1919 of the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, UK. Of course, the research is much older. Among the first studies on the war and its causes we can mention Thucydides' monograph (460-398 BC) on the Peloponnesian War as well as the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

Through the scientific study of international relations researchers seek to find the *causes* for the main political issues of humanity and provide *solutions* to politicians so that war can be prevented.

Currently, several names for this academic discipline are used: *International Relations (IR), International Politics (IP)* and the newest *World Politics (WP)*[2]. Without designating significant conceptual differences, the diversity of terms, especially the latter, emphasises the increasing importance of international organisations (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – NATO, the United Nations – UN, the World Trade Organisation – WTO) and multinational corporations (Apple Inc., Microsoft Corporation, General Electric, Citigroup etc.) within the global system of international relations to the detriment of the importance attached to the sovereign national state. So, it is suggested the *irreversible alteration of the Westphalian system*, even questioning the validity and effectiveness of the Westphalian state. Of course, this approach is questionable and it does not meet the unanimity of scholars. In fact, the discussion is not new, this controversy appeared in the '60s, and since then, theorists like Kenneth Waltz have expressed reservations regarding the validity of this theory[3]. Therefore, in this paper we use the acknowledged name – *International Relations*.

As we have previously stated, war is the main object of study for two distinct academic disciplines: *International Relations* and *Military Science*. Due to ideological constraints, in a certain period, especially between 1945 and 1989, the two areas seemed disjointed, with hesitating conceptual interference, especially in Eastern European communist countries. For the experts from these countries, including from Romania, the access and the reference to the work of the chief contemporary theorists of the main schools of thought in international relations were almost impossible, available being mainly the theses supporting Marxist-Leninist theories, of course quite interesting and yet intensely circulated nowadays – see the theses on imperialism or the great powers' fight for resources – however totally irrelevant to military science, due to a stressed economic content. For these reasons Romanian military scholars have preferred to treat the concept of *warfare* as a distinct phase of *war: "War. Politico-military phenomenon which represents the most violent manifestation of conflicting relations existing at a given time between large groups of people (peoples, nations, states, coalitions of states, social, ethnic or religious communities) militarily organised, using warfare to achieve desired goals, which gives this phenomenon a strong destructive feature"*[4].

---

[2] John Baylis, Steve Smith, *The Globalisation of World Politics*, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, p. 4.

[3] Kenneth Waltz, *Teoria politicii internaţionale*, Editura Polirom, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 208.

[4] Stelian Staicu, *Lexicon militar*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1980, p. 563.

Thus, the *warfare* becomes the main object of study for the *military science*, as defined in the mentioned *Lexicon militar/Military Lexicon*: *"Military Science. The totality of knowledge about the laws and principles of the warfare, about the forms of organisation, preparation and use of armed forces, about the methods and procedures of military operations"*[5], thereby a functional independence for the military scientific research being ensured. This manner of addressing the problem on distinct phases – *politics* and *warfare* is also found in *Clausewitz* work, when he says that *"war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means"*[6] and that war is *"a somewhat stronger form of diplomacy, a more forceful method of negotiation"*[7].

Of course, there are also scholars in the West who emphasise the difference between *war* and *warfare*, as does Colin S. Gray arguing that the war is *"a legal concept, a social institution and a complex idea that totally includes the relationship between the belligerents... by contrast, the warfare relates to the conduct of war..."*[8]. Certainly, we understand the semantic difference but we argue that *warfare* is an integral part of *war*, and its study should be done in the context of theories of war. Otherwise, it is faced at least the ambiguous situation of explaining *war, peace* and *international relations*, as does Colin S. Gray, only through the *strategic thinking*, that is, only through an approach based solely on the military terminology.

It is also interesting to note the vision of the US military scholars regarding the relationship between *war* and *warfare,* expressed formally in J.P. 1 – *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States: "... warfare is the mechanism, method, or modality of armed conflict against an enemy. It is <the how> of waging war. Warfare continues to change and be transformed by society, diplomacy, politics, and technology..."*[9].

They resume the thesis of the *immutable war,* whose nature does not change, a fact supported by Clausewitz and other theorists who opted for the validity of *the nine principles of war,* principles which can be found in most military doctrines and manuals of the modern armies since 1947: *Objective, Offensive, Mass, Manoeuvre, Economy of force, Unity of command, Security, Surprise,* and *Simplicity* to which were added subsequently, due to the experience gained from the irregular

---

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 647.

[6] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1976, p. 28.

[7] *Ibidem*, p. 235.

[8] Colin S. Gray, *Războiul, pacea și relațiile internaționale – o introducere în istoria strategică*, Editura Polirom, București, 2010, p. 22.

[9] Joint Publication 1 – *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, US DoD, 25 March 2013, p. I-4.

warfare (counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan), three: *Prevention, Perseverance* and *Legitimacy*[10]. In this context, Gheorghe Văduva has identified 13 principles of war, some of them different, stating that *"... generally, the principles of warfare are identical to those of war ..."*[11].

The Complexity of War in the Current Security Environment

As it can be seen from the US doctrine definition, the method of warfare is in a mutual relationship with society, diplomacy and politics, implicitly with theories of international relations.

These theories are representative for liberal and realist schools, representing the substance of inspiration for international treaties (UN), NATO strategic concepts, national strategies (Grand Strategy) or military strategies. Thus, war can be analysed in a coherent manner beginning with the study of its causes and continuing with its unfolding, giving up the artificial boundaries between *international relations* and *military science* theories. This approach is fully justified by the practice in the field of developing cooperation between military and civilian (policymakers, representatives of institutions/international organisations or NGOs) for military operations (combat, stability, reconstruction or peacekeeping operations).

Analysing the definition of war from the cited *Lexicon militar/Military Lexicon*, we remark not only several features that are generally accepted by most theorists as essential in defining the term but also some formulations that are ambiguous, thus the effort of extrapolation in defining certain types of war being significant.

Clearly the defining, widely used, feature of war is *"violence"*, war being an *"act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that act of force"*[12]. Moreover, Clausewitz identifies *primordial violence* as the first element of the triad *"primordial violence, hatred, and enmity"*[13].

With this perspective agrees also Jack Levy when he defines war as *"sustained, coordinated violence between political organisations"*[14]. According to the principle of *violence*, the *Cold War* between the US and the USSR was just a *rivalry* that did not escalate into *war*, some authors calling it just the *Long Peace*, a title also used by John Lewis Caddis for his book[15].

---

[10] Joint Publication 3-0 – *Joint Operations*, US DoD, 11 August 2011, p. I-2.
[11] Gheorghe Văduva, *Principii ale războiului şi luptei armate – realităţi şi tendinţe*, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 21.
[12] Carl von Clausewitz, *op. cit.,* p. 15.
[13] *Ibidem*, p. 30.
[14] J.S. Levy, W. Thompson, *Causes of War*, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2010, p. 5.
[15] See John Lewis Caddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 1989.

Before analysing the attributes of *sustained* and *coordinated* for the term *violence* from Levy's definition, it is important to emphasise the role of the conjunction *between*. This term indicates that violence should be *mutual* in order to talk of war. Thus the Hungarian army opposed the Soviet army during the Soviet invasion in 1956, the experts referring to the event as the *Russo-Hungarian War*, while the event in 1968 when the Czechoslovak army did not resist is referred to as the *Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia*.

An advantage of Levy's definition in comparison to the definition of war from the cited *Lexicon militar/Military Lexicon* is represented by the manner in which the involved actors are defined. The wording in the lexicon *"large groups of people"* can be confusing, even if the author provides details by specifying them as *"... (peoples, nations, states, coalitions of states, social, ethnic or religious communities) militarily organised..."*[16]. We believe that the wording *"between political organisations"* by Levy is comprehensive and can be used to describe all types of war, including the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, the use of *"warfare"* can induce confusion among less savvy readers regarding its reference to only the war between states, a situation favoured by the tendency of historians to analyse in detail just the wars between the armed forces of the great powers, as it is the case of Clausewitz.

In addition to interstate wars, states are faced with internal challengers in civil wars, named in accordance with the rules of international law *"internal armed conflict"* (Art. 3 of the Geneva Convention, 1949). States can also fight non-state political entities outside their territory. Examples in this respect can be the US war against al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and the frequent armed conflicts between Israel and the Palestinian Authority or other non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas.

All these forms can be carried out separately, as space and temporality, but there are times when they are performed consecutively or simultaneously in the same geographical area, involving nearly the same players. Representative of this situation is the case of the Iraq War that began as *an interstate war* between the USA and Iraq led by Saddam Hussein and, after the defeat of the latter, in the area of Iraq took place *simultaneously* an internal Muslim *insurgency* against the USA, a *civil war* between Shia and Sunni for the control of Iraq and a *war of secession* of the Kurds in the north.

Just reviewing these non-state actors, we see that the definition of actors as *"political organisations"* corresponds to the current reality and is preferable

---

[16] Stelian Staicu, *op. cit.*, p. 563.

to that of *"large groups... organised militarily"*, as the latter does not fully describe the importance of the political agenda that presents objectives, predominantly political, in return highlighting means sometimes military but more specifically related to terrorism.

Another important element of the definition of Levy is the attribute *sustained* associated with *violence*. Its role is to differentiate *war* from *organised violence*, which is much smaller in magnitude or impact[17]. Thus, a minor clash at the border, involving two opposing forces could result in casualties on both sides but without exceeding a certain limit. Examples in this regard may be the clashes between India and China in 1962 called *Sino-Indian War* because of escalating fighting at the border, and the events in 1969 on the Soviet-Chinese border for the control of areas around the Ussuri River that were resolved through negotiations without reaching a critical threshold.

As for the question related to the critical threshold beyond which *armed clashes* become war, a possible answer, in fact accepted by most scholars, was proposed in 1972 by Singer and Small, initiators of the project *"Correlates of War"* (COW, 1963), in the article *"The Wages of War"*, where they proposed the threshold of 1,000 deaths from causes directly attributable to the battle[18]. Experts consider this criterion as reasonable for the study and analysis of the wars of the past two centuries.

At the end of our analysis on the definition of war, we note that Levy and Thompson avoid introducing in their definition explicit references regarding the objectives, political or military, of war. This contrasts with the approach of other theoreticians who specify distinctly that the parties *"using warfare to achieve desired goals"*[19] or that *"war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will"*[20]. They argue that their definition is based on the *behaviour* of the two warring political organisations and not on their *motives*, these having importance in explaining the causes of a particular war and not for *a general theory of war*[21].

In this logic, certainly any political organisation, which is represented by its leadership, has its objectives and sometimes the adopted strategies to achieve those objectives require the use of force – *"the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose"*[22].

---

[17] J.S. Levy, W. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[18] See http://www.correlatesofwar.org/history, retrieved on 5.07.2016.
[19] Stelian Staicu*, op. cit.*, p. 538.
[20] C. von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[21] J.S. Levy, W. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[22] C. von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

In fact, Levi and Thomson approach to avoid the explicit reference to objectives proves to be quite inspired because they manage to prevent such difficulties and controversies concerning the definition of the nature of objectives – *political-diplomatic* and *military* – as well as their relationships. Thus, a classic example of inconsistency is the situation of Egypt which came out of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 in a stronger than the initial politico-diplomatic position, even if Egypt was about to suffer a significant military defeat, being saved by the US intervention that forced Israel to withdraw its forces that encircled the Egyptian armed forces and were about to destroy them.

Of course, in most cases, political leaders prefer to achieve their goals through non-violent means, including diplomacy and economic constraints, but still using the threat of force to underscore the firmness of their positions or to discourage their opponent and force it to change behaviour in a more concessive one. In this regard it is remarkable the aphorism attributed to King Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia (1712-1786) *"diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments"*.

The argument regarding the coercive effect of the military force applies to all political organisations, including terrorist ones. Terrorism against Israel is motivated by the objective of causing to Israel casualties, material losses and collective psychological trauma in order to induce to Israeli leaders the conviction that the benefits of the occupation of Arab lands are outweighed by the costs involved. A similar logic can be also identified in the case of the political purposes stated by *al-Qaeda* before and after the attacks on the World Trade Centre (11 September 2001), in an effort to determine the USA to reduce its political and economic influence in the Arab States, with direct reference to US support for traditionalist monarchies such as the Saudi one.

Although the war is immutable in terms of its nature, we consider that its waging is closely connected with the society evolution. Military science, political science, international relations and sociology are the main academic areas that theorise the phenomenon of war and design its doctrinal basis.

The lack of consensus among the scholars regarding the definition of war is not likely to adversely affect its study. On the contrary, it serves to highlight the very *complex nature of war*.

Conclusions

Speaking about war, Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France between 1906-1909 and 1917-1920, said that *"War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men"*, the retort being given later, in the same register

by General Charles De Gaulle with *"I have come to the conclusion that politics is too serious a matter to be left to the politicians"*. We note that both positions reflect the importance and interdependence between *war* and *politics*, which allows us to consider that both military and politicians should contribute to their study.

From our scientific research on war and its causes, we deduce that war is a complex phenomenon whose cause and prevention must be justified in a multidisciplinary way by considering the international relations theory, military science and sociology. Thus, in our view, restricting the research to only one academic area, for example the military science, can lead to incomplete results, unsynchronised with the international practice.

Thus, the realist theories related to the *balance of power* have been and continue to be those that contain most elements of military strategy. The calculation of power resources and the objective assessment of the geopolitical situation at a given moment justify the military propensity for these theories, evidenced by the frequent citation of Hans Morgenthau and John Mearsheimer by military scholars in their works.

The systemic approach of Kenneth Waltz, identifying the causes of war at the level of the international system, and his conviction that the international system proves an *emergent behaviour* which is not the sum of the behaviours of the system units create the premises for the treatment of war from the perspective of the theory of complex systems with direct applicability for the *network centric warfare*.

In addition, the liberal contribution through the doctrine of *democratic peace* may be an ideological trigger of the *modern warfare*, because both of the desire of the Western culture to *universalise* its values and of the reaction of resistance, or even counter-offensive, of the other cultures.

Selective Bibliography

1. Kirsten Ainley, Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd Edition, New York, 2005.

2. I.M. Handel, *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared*, US Army War College, Pennsylvania, 1991.

3. Immanuel Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History*, Yale University Press, London, 2006.

4. H.J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations – the Struggle for Power and Peace*, published by Alfred A. Knopff (1948), and McGraw Hill (1971, 2005), New York.

5. J.S. Nye, *Descifrarea conflictelor internaționale – teorie și istorie*, Editura Antet XX Press, Filipeștii de Târg (Prahova), 2005.

6. Simona Țuțuianu, *Apusul Westphaliei? – statul național în sistemul relațiilor internaționale în anii post Război Rece*, Editura Militară, București, 2011.

IMPORTANCE OF DEFINING TERRORISM

General (ret.) Dr Mihail ORZEAŢĂ

Terrorism has not been provided a definition unanimously accepted by the international community. In fact, there are more than 200 definitions of this scourge formulated by the UN, the EU, NATO, the Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement international organisation, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, states, prestigious universities and so on.

Defining terrorism would be helpful not only for the international community but also for the states to coordinate their efforts aimed at eliminating the organisations that promote their interests through killing innocent people and destroying important infrastructure.

The lack of a universally accepted definition of terrorism leads to an absurd situation in which "one's terrorist is another's freedom fighter".

Keywords: *terrorism; UN; state interests; international laws; freedom fighters*

1. Necessity of Defining Terrorism

To define terrorism was, is and will be not only important but also difficult. There are unfortunately different opinions and interests of states and national and international organisations that have not been harmonised so far.

How could the different points of view contained in more than 100 (or even 200, according to other authors) definitions of terrorism be harmonised? How could the contradictions between the interests of states be diminished, considering that one's terrorist is another's freedom fighter? How could *"human targets"* be divided into legitimate and illegitimate ones? How could one distinguish between terrorism, mass murder and genocide? How could one convince the states that consider that the actions of some groups or organisations labelled as terrorist are just to accept that there are not *"bad terrorists"* and *"good terrorists"*?

How could the states in the world adopt a common point of view when experts and politicians in the same country, as in the case of the United States of America and India, have not reached to consensus on defining terrorism?

The dilemmas generated by the states different interests are amplified by the conceptual ones, posed by experts, and by the operational ones, posed

General (ret.) Professor Dr Mihail Orzeaţă – former Deputy Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff.

by the leaders of the structural entities of the states that have to combat terrorism. Some experts do not manage to identify enough distinctive elements between terrorism and violent revolutions, namely guerrilla warfare, insurgency, national liberation movements, while others consider that terrorist actions are conducted during violent revolutions, insurgency or wars. Dictionaries may also generate confusion, as the above-mentioned notions and syntagms are defined using the other ones or are considered synonymous.

The controversies and dilemmas associated with defining and combating terrorism have determined Jacqueline S. Hodgson and Victor Tadros, from the School of Law, University of Warwick, to conclude that *terrorism cannot be defined*.

Studying the history of the international community attempts to define and eradicate terrorism, Vappala Balachandran from India believes that it would be a miracle if states could reach consensus on defining terrorism.

2. Short History of the Initiatives to Define Terrorism

The first attempt at international level to define terrorism was in 1934. At that time, the League of Nations, following the French proposal, mandated a working group to define terrorism, after the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou, in Marseille, by a Bulgarian citizen who was a member of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation. Historians say that the murderer was part of a plot in which Croatian and Macedonian separatists were involved[1]. The League completed the project for the Convention related to terrorism on 16 November 1937. It defined the increasing threat to individual and collective security as *"criminal actions directed against the state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public"*[2]. The project of the convention was submitted to the member states for ratification. However, most of them did not accept it, and the French initiative did not enter into effect[3].

---

[1] Richard Cavendish, *Alexander I of Yugoslavia Assassinated*, in *History Today*, see http://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/alexander-i-yugoslavia-assassinated, retrieved on 06.12.2015.

[2] *Convention pour la prévention et la répression du terrorisme*, *League of Nations – Official Journal*, Genève, 16 November 1937, Série de publications: 1937. V. ro, Doc. C. 546. M. 383. 1937. V., see http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/RM/LoN_Convention_on_Terrorism.pdf, retrieved on 07.01.2016; see also Sinan Fidanci, *Definition of Terrorism in International Law*, in *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 5 February 2006, see http://www.turkishweekly.net/2006/02/05/article/definition-of-terrorism-in-international-law/, retrieved on 07.01.2016.

[3] Vappala Balachandran, *Why It Is Not Easy for the United Nations to Define Terrorism*, in *The Quint*, India, 30.09.2015, see http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2015/09/30/why-it-is-not-easy-for-the-united-nations-to-define-terrorism, retrieved on 05.12.2015.

After the League of Nations was *de jure* disbanded – on 18 April 1946[4] – and the United Nations Organisation (UN) was established[5], the mission of consensus building regarding terrorism eradication by the members of the international community was taken over by the new world organisation. Starting in 1963, the UN developed 14 international legal instruments and 4 amendments meant to combat terrorism[6]. However, so far, it has not succeeded in convincing all its members to accept the suggestions related to defining the scourge made by different working groups having a mandate for this purpose. The UN firstly attempted to define terrorism in the '80s, but the formula suggested by the working group mandated by the General Assembly was not accepted by several member states because of the *"decolonisation policy and the Cold War"*[7].

The recrudescence of terrorism, especially of state-sponsored one, compelled the UN to undertake new measures to define it and to unify the efforts of the world states to eliminate it from the practice of interhuman and intercommunity relations. To that end, the General Assembly adopted resolution 49/60 on 9 December 1994[8], which, as in the case of the previous one, was ratified only by a part of the member states. The Security Council introduced resolution 1566 in 2004, but, although the body has responsibilities and authority in the field of international security[9], its resolution was not ratified by several states in the world[10].

Defining terrorism is necessary and important for not only theoretical but also practical reasons. Given the organisations considered as terrorist act globally, the effort to eradicate the scourge should commensurate with the threats posed and the actions conducted under its *"patronage"*.

Currently, it seems impossible to achieve the unity of the efforts made by the states in the world to combat terrorism, as many of them have divergent

---

[4] *The New World Encyclopaedia*, *The League of Nations*, see http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/League_of_Nations, retrieved on 02.04.2016.

[5] Karen Mingst, *United Nations (UN), International Organization*, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, updated on 30.11.2015, see http://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations, retrieved on 02.06.2016.

[6] *United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism, International Legal Instruments*, United Nations Department of Public Information, see http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/instruments.shtml, retrieved on 04.06.2016.

[7] Ben Saul, *The Challenge of Defining Terrorism*, ISN (The International Relations and Security Network), ETH (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology), Zürich, 17.09.2012, see http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lang=en&id=152677, retrieved on 12.12.2015.

[8] *Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism*, United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/49/6084th Plenary Meeting, 9 December 1994, see http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm, retrieved on 27.11.2015.

[9] *United Nations Security Council Functions and Powers*, *UN.org*, see http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml, retrieved 12.12.2015.

[10] *There Is No UN Definition of Terrorism*, Human Rights Voices, see http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/eyeontheun/un_101/facts/?p=61, retrieved on 05.12.2015.

opinions and interests. When the majority of states fight against this scourge that affects the world, other states directly or indirectly sponsor the organisations labelled as terrorist or even conduct actions of this kind, which explains their attitude to decline the responsibility to directly participate or to politically support antiterrorist and counterterrorist actions[11].

The first and most important argument in favour of reaching consensus in defining terrorism is the legal one. Justice cannot take the necessary measures to sanction the actions labelled as terrorist, and state and international institutions cannot develop and implement measure plans to prevent and if necessary combat terrorism in the absence of legal instruments to allow the conduct of actions[12].

The definition of terrorism as well as the acceptance of the definition by all the world states is also imperative for political reasons, because the lack of consensus among the UN member states alters its image and undermines the moral authority of the organisation[13], although it has developed several antiterrorist resolutions and conventions[14], and even a strategy in the field[15]. The fact that too many states have not ratified them and, therefore, they have not harmonised national legislation with the particular conventions and resolutions[16] has been promptly speculated by the terrorist, extremist and organised crime organisations that have found out not only ways to finance their illegal activities but also *"sanctuaries"* to hide without fear of being incriminated, disbanded or destroyed by the coordinated actions of the international community.

A US Army study in 1988 identified 109 definitions of terrorism[17], in which can be found *"22 different elements that lay at the basis of their development"*, as stated by Walter Laqueur. He analysed the mentioned definitions and came

---

[11] Professor Ganor Boaz, *Defining Terrorism – Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?*, International Institute for Counter-terrorism, Israel, 01.01.2010, see https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1123/Defining-Terrorism-Is-One-Mans-Terrorist-Another-Mans-Freedom-Fighter, retrieved on 12.12.2015.

[12] Ben Saul, *The Challenge of Defining Terrorism*, *loc. cit.*

[13] *Terrorism*, The United Nations Organisation, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/sg%20high-level%20panel%20report-terrorism.htm, retrieved on 26.11.2015.

[14] *United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism, International Legal Instruments*, United Nations Department of Public Information, see http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/instruments.shtml, retrieved on 04.06.2016.

[15] *With Consensus Resolution, General Assembly Reiterates Unequivocal Condemnation of Terrorism, Reaffirms Support for 2006 UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy*, UN General Assembly Meetings Coverage, 8 September 2010, see http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/ga10977.doc.htm, retrieved on 04.06.2016.

[16] *Terrorism*, The United Nations Organization, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/sg%20high-level%20panel%20report-terrorism.htm, retrieved on 26.11.2015.

[17] Derek Freedlund, *Government Response to Terrorism*, see https://www.uwlax.edu/urc/JUR-online/PDF/2007/freedlund.pdf (*"A study released in 1988 by the U.S. Army identified 109 different definitions of terrorism"*), retrieved on 06.01.2016.

to the conclusion that the only common elements were *"violence and threat of using violence, the reason why some bibliographical references avoid using the notion* (of terrorism, A.N.) *and opt for words and syntagms that are less accusatory such as bombs, militants etc."*[18]. The same author states that none of the analysed definitions *"is fully satisfactory"*[19]. Chris Jan Geugies considers that there are over 200 definitions (!)[20] of terrorism suggested by important governmental organisations such as the UN (through the General Assembly and the Security Council), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Organisation of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as by states, prestigious universities, think thanks, non-governmental organisations and notorious experts. Godwin wrote, in 2006, that, since the attacks on the twin towers in New York and on the Pentagon, over 100 books and studies have been written having terrorism as theme, but they are *"descriptive and have not addressed the problem of terrorism political economy and have not acknowledged the importance of ideology in defining and labelling terrorism"*[21].

A definition of terrorism, agreed by all the world states, would be the reference element based on which national strategies and laws could be developed, meant to prevent and combat it by measures coordinated at national and international level to reduce the possibilities of the organisations of this type to finance, recruit and influence supporters, members as well as potential members and supporters.

Following the automatic firearms attacks on the offices of *Charlie Hebdo* located in Paris, on 13 November 2015, the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, restated the necessity to reach consensus regarding the definition of terrorism, quoting Mahatma Gandhi: *"One cannot get justice if one does not know what injustice is"*[22]. In other words, we need to know who terrorists are and who helps

[18] *Terrorism*, New World Encyclopaedia, updated on 25.11.2015, see http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Terrorism, retrieved on 26.11.2015.

[19] Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism: A Brief History, International Information Programs (IIP Digital)*, USA, Department of State Publications, 11 May 2007, see http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2008/05/20080522172730srenod0.6634027.html#axzz3ydI7a24r, retrieved on 06.01.2016.

[20] Chris Jan Geugies, *The Origins of Terrorism: A Comparison between the International Anti-terrorism Strategies of the USA and the Netherlands*, Bachelor Thesis, University of Twente, the Netherlands, 2007, p. 15, see http://essay.utwente.nl/58007/1/scriptie_Geugies.pdf, retrieved on 25.11.2015.

[21] Jeff Goodwin, *A Theory of Categorical Terrorism. Social Forces, 2027-2046*, 2006, p. 84, apud Asafa Jalata, *Terrorism from Above and Below in the Age of Globalization*, in *Sociology Mind*, 2011, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-15, see http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?paperID=3688, retrieved on 04.04.2016.

[22] Shubhajit Roy, *United with France…must define terror to know who promotes it, who its victims are: Modi*, The Indian Express, 15.11.2015, see http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pm-narendra-modi-condemns-deadly-terrorist-attacks-in-france/, retrieved on 10.12.2015.

them in order to know who we fight against. On the same occasion, former Prime Minister of the UK, David Cameron, declared that terrorism had spread so much that it could not be prevented by barriers like frontiers. He also stated that new groups of terrorists emerged every day, being permanently equipped. That is why the fight against this scourge is not the responsibility of some states only, but of each human being who believes in humanism[23].

3. Conclusions

To reach consensus in defining terrorism, the world states and the organisations they are part of should harmonise their interests.

The almost diametrically opposed points of view of the actors on the international arena make me think that a long period of time and sustained negotiations are necessary so that states and international organisations could eliminate disagreements on:

- defining violence and those who are legally entitled to employ it (against who and in what context);
- defining the concepts of: democracy, tyranny, dictatorship and authoritarian regime; legitimate and illegitimate armed intervention; legality of using force; human rights and community rights.

Terrorism acts globally and that is why it has to be combated legally and globally, namely the *"sanctuaries"* and states that support and sponsor the organisations that employ extreme violence to meet their objectives should be eliminated.

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

---

[23] *Ibidem.*

FROM THE *ARAB SPRING* TO THE ISLAMIC STATE
– Responsibility to Protect and Combating Terrorism – (I)

Iuliana-Simona ȚUȚUIANU
Nelu BÎRLĂ

The aim of the present study is to faithfully and realistically capture the most significant security evolutions associated with the phenomena known as "Arab Spring" and "Islamic State", which have generated significant political changes and new foreign policy orientations as far as the states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are concerned. In the analysis, the authors apply an algorithm that includes numerous historical, political, cultural, economic, geopolitical and strategic determinants for the proper understanding of the Arab revolts, the mechanism that triggered them and helped their development, as well as of the "success" with which the extremist profiteers met, seizing the opportunity to exploit the confusion and the power vacuum generated by the popular uprising.

Keywords*: mindset; totalitarian states; al-Qaeda; civil war; armed conflict*

Introduction

The terrorist attacks in the heart of Europe, from Paris and Brussels to Nice, as well as those in the United States, such as the recent bloody attack in Orlando (Florida), have shaken the conscience of Western leaders, who seem to finally understand that an integrated strategy is required, one that firmly responds to violent religious extremism and strengthens prevention measures. The question that arises is how it has been possible for ISIS to accumulate huge amounts of cash and territories and become the most feared terrorist organisation in history, with thousands of followers and European volunteers.

The present study examines the most significant international events associated with the phenomenon known as the *"Arab Spring"*, which has generated political changes and new foreign policy orientations not only in the states located in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) but also in the countries

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Iuliana-Simona Țuțuianu – Senior Researcher, the Ministry of National Defence.
Brigadier General Nelu Bîrlă – Deputy Chief of the Training and Doctrine Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

interested in this region. The security developments occurred so far and the possible future scenarios are matters of strategic interest in order to understand how the distribution of power is changing the region and, consequently, how international relations are restructuring.

Following the outbreak of the *"Arab Spring"*, the visibility of the security complex called MENA has increased exponentially with the interests of the great international actors, who realise that without securing this area it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to control and eliminate the existing instability outbreaks. The fight against totalitarian regimes has been frequently associated with the concerns for the region's oil resources, as international public opinion and politicians have shown an increasingly large interest in this geographical and geopolitical area. The Middle East and North Africa cannot be analysed and understood without an analytic algorithm including numerous historical, political, cultural, economic, geopolitical and strategic determinants.

The determinants of all the developments in MENA have been recorded and reinterpreted according to key concepts and issues such as national sovereignty, human rights, humanitarian intervention or the *"responsibility to protect"* doctrine. There is also the resurgence of classical or non-conventional risks and threats, among which terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are central. For a proper understanding of the Arab revolts, it is necessary to analyse the context in which these events occurred. This context includes: demographic factors; the nature of the political regimes in the countries covered by the events; socio-economic conditions; non-violent actions by protesters and the military's role during and after the riots; the role of new technologies and the media; the place of Islam and women in the Arab uprisings etc. As a result of a configuration of power factors highly sensitive to any disturbance in the global balance of power and having also an important role in determining that balance through its impact on some categories of essential resources to support societal development (e.g. energy resources), the Middle East region itself is a primordial factor in the understanding and especially in the proper functioning of the system of international relations and international security environment. In this context, changes in the political regimes in the region, instability and armed conflicts generate turmoil that has an impact far beyond the regional security environment. Changing the form and content of political regimes in the region thus brings into question the whole range of interdependences, trade, economic, military, and political relations of the states in the region, both intraregionally and internationally.

The substantial changes occurred in the Middle East and North Africa in the context of the *"Arab Spring"*, even involving the abandonment of a model

of social development with a strong secular and secularised component, bring into discussion the issue of a new model of society, that of a political and religious ideology seeming to substantiate the new political regimes imposed by revolutions. Such an evolving course requires a comparison between what a societal development model based on the Shiite religious justification (Iran of ayatollahs) has meant and means at the moment and what a model structured on the Sunni political and religious ideology could represent in the future. Another component of this field of debate is the question of reconsidering, restructuring and reformulating a system of alliances and political, economic and other nature dependencies at regional level. Is it possible for the process of reinvention to focus on a sustainable model of societal development? Will the balance of power and the regional security environment include a single axis of power, or will we witness the structuring of two or more axes of power? Is the religious component of the emerging political power so strong as to massively influence the political and military action of the states in the region and, consequently, the evolution of the entire regional security environment? These are just some of the questions that currently concern political analysts and experts on security issues and international relations.

This paper also seeks to provide a realistic and objective interpretation of the degree to which people of the MENA currently support (or mimic the acceptance of) the imperative of respecting international law. In an optimistic approach, it is all about a mindset that tends to become part of the global consciousness and reveals a genuine new doctrine of the international community, based on active involvement in the conflicts of other nations and on the eradication of crimes against humanity and genocide. The phenomenon is visible and, although worrying, due to its unpredictable strategic and military consequences, it is both optimistic and constructive, judging from the perspective of the legality and morality of actions aimed at helping to strengthen regional and international stability and security. The *"Arab Spring"* has refreshed this mindset by trying to promote democracy in the Arab world and strengthen the states in the region by immunising them against harmful yet still appealing to the Muslim masses political myths.

In the context of globalisation, the dynamic of international relations has imposed and further imposes a decline in the inherent constraints of the Westphalian system of states. As demonstrated by MENA revolutionary movements and by the global war against terrorism, international security exigencies – the systemic reliability prerequisite – have led to significant progress in terms of strengthening the *"responsibility to protect"* doctrine. From the legal point of view, we are witnessing

the crystallisation of a new *jus cogens* – humanitarian interference – norm, which amends and even replaces the classic rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. This trend is likely to make the leaders of totalitarian states more responsible, by discouraging them from committing crimes against humanity and genocide. The *"revolutionary"* bursts in MENA are a proof that no head of state can claim *"total"* sovereignty to harm own people. Riots to oust dictatorial leaders from power have generated therefore considerable legal consequences, the most important ones referring not only to the intervention of international community for humanitarian purposes but also to the related use of force scenario.

On the other hand, the events involving the liquidation of leaders of terrorist organisations, such as Osama bin Laden, show another direction of exceeding the classic non-intervention in domestic affairs of states: when the exigency of an international effort applied to the system's benefit calls for intervention on the territory of a sovereign state, the possible complicity of the leadership of the latter with the systemic disruptor (in this case the leader of a terrorist organisation) legitimises the action of the international community on that state's territory. Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour died in southwestern Pakistan in May 2016, President Barack Obama himself authorising the mission to kill him by a drone attack. The use of drones by invoking the right to self-defence to crush the militants of the Islamic State, particularly by the USA and the UK, in cooperation with France, Turkey and their allies in the Arab world, marks a significant change of security paradigm and military practice, often justified by increased military effects and accelerated progress towards a better future for marginalised peoples[1].

The Middle East has been severely shaken, not just because of the *"Arab Spring"*, but certainly in connection with this huge transforming movement. Everything seems to be interconnected in this volatile region, from the controversial electoral processes to the Iranian nuclear programme, from Turkey's activism to Israel's legitimate fears due to the accelerated transformation of the regional security environment. The events of early of 2013 in Mali and southern Algeria marked an unwelcome departure from the lofty causes of the *"Arab Spring"*. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has become more aggressive than ever, confident in the project of a Maghreb governed by radical Islam, i.e. Salafist, and pursuing especially criminal goals, more apparent than the well known ideological and political ones. Algeria had resisted successfully to the challenges posed

---

[1] Memorandum of Prime Minister David Cameron on the extension of offensive British military operation to Syria. See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/480073/PM_Response_to_FAC.pdf, retrieved on 15 May 2016.

by the *"Arab Spring"* and therefore it had no interest in being engaged in an armed conflict to destabilise the area. The attack at Tigantourine gas site and the seizure of 41 foreigners forced it, however, to abandon its self-imposed neutrality. Refusing negotiations with terrorists, on 17 January, the Algerian troops started the fight to regain control over the facility occupied by terrorists, in an operation with a tragic end and numerous deaths.

Islamists of all kinds have benefited and continue to benefit from the *"Arab Spring"*, the chaos produced by the revolution in Libya being the fertile ground for promoting their destabilising goals. Bashar Al-Assad remains in power, while Russia and China still refuse to abandon the dictator of Syria, letting the world understand that Assad's regime is preferable to a Salafist Islamic republic. In Egypt, the overthrow of Mubarak was followed by democratic elections, which unfortunately brought to power for a while a real threat to peace in the Middle East, namely the Muslim Brotherhood (until September 2013, when the Egyptian justice banned its activities and ordered the confiscation of its belongings). Iraq has plunged into anarchy and the withdrawal of most US troops seems to fuel the installed chaos. All these aspects have prepared the ground for the radicalisation of those who currently constitute the Islamic State. The political solutions backed by military force, which were applied in this region, appear now ineffective, causing further casualties, and the rhetoric about how new regimes can be installed following the Western democracy pattern after foreign military intervention is not anymore recalled without embarrassment. Although the overthrow of dictators is a reason for optimism, as it means a democratic order or, in any case, better alternatives than a despotic regime, the realities of the past decade have shown that more harmful developments than lack of freedom may arise, namely the civil war, installation of chaos and terrorist attacks.

Who are the main moral culprits who facilitated the arming of Islamist guerrillas to install democracy in countries run by secular dictators? Can the waves of immigrants that currently suffocate Europe and make the European Union fragile be explained as a result of inefficient and destabilising policies in MENA, on the background of the *"Arab Spring"*, which indirectly brought the Islamic State to power? The *"Arab Spring"* has been most frequently described as a political revolt of the masses demanding democratic reform, arguing in unison that this uprising backed by the Western democracies will generate a positive political change in the Arab world. The reasons that led to the extension of riots as the subsequent onset of chaos as well as the terrifying *"efficiency"* of extremist groups extend beyond the Arab world.

The state system in the Arab space was in visible decline even before the *"Arab Spring"* uprisings. It is therefore wrong to invoke foreign conspiracies when speaking about the slippages that shook old regimes. Such approaches confuse cause with effect, without delimitating the emancipatory moment from the contentious and violent transition, still ongoing, and also project a linear and easy vision of change by excluding the constituent elements of change, such as violence, chaos and digression. The accusations about the *"Arab Spring"* failures are, however, premature, because the historical developments cannot be measured in a short time. In reality, the *"Arab Spring"* was sabotaged by a variety of factors, including autocratic leaders and their regional allies, military and security apparatus in each country concerned and Salafist jihadists of the Islamic State. Neither ISIS nor Al-Qaeda in Syria (Jabhat al-Nusra) would have escalated without close cooperation between the leaders of authoritarian regimes and their regional and global *"patrons"* interested in maintaining the *status quo* by any means. Since the beginning of hostilities in Syria and Iraq, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra have indirectly obtained money, weapons and a religious coverage from the Sunni neighbouring countries. This precious social and material capital has been decisive in the development and *"success"* of these Salafist-jihadist organisations.

Consequently, we do not witness just a spring season of change, but rather a long-term revolutionary process that will continue for many years before the MENA region achieves lasting stability[2]. Smart and progressive forces must be mobilised to produce a radical change, and if it does not happen, we will witness increasingly violent clashes and unprecedented barbarisms. Syria is the best example of this tumultuous present, with violent tensions between the Syrian regime, on the one hand, and ISIS and Al-Qaeda, on the other hand. ISIS enjoys *"success"* in blurring the revolutionary fervour in MENA, formerly associated with the idea of freedom. It has managed to restore the old polarisations between Sunnis and Shiites, Kurds, Turks, Persians and Arabs. It has further marginalised the Palestinians in their ambitions, helping Netanyahu to be reelected. Furthermore, it has strengthened the old order dictated by corrupt sheikhs in their business with oil and warlords in power and, especially, it has deepened the divide between secularists and Islamists in the Arab world. Visible progress can be achieved in the region only after the identification of a concrete way to accommodate its Islamic-rooted identity with its highly contested presence.

The corrupt Arab leaders and the intervention by Western governments to normalise the situation on the ground have traumatised and destabilised

---

[2] See the article *"The Arab Spring: Has It Failed?"*, in *The Economist,* 13 July 2013.

the Arab masses, encouraging terrorist groups that imagine they can speak and act by violent means in the name of Islam. The actors involved in the events of the *"Arab Spring"* have acted in a sort of complicity that has deprived the *"Arab Spring"* from a happy end. Those who claim to empathise with the sacrifice of thousands of martyrs who died dreaming of *"hurriyya"* should not remain indifferent. The current strategy of containment promoted by the West, encumbered by its elite *"political correctness"* in the name of defending the legitimate interests of the international community in the region, should be reviewed. The situation is complicated by the new geopolitics and the growing tensions between China, Russia and the West, which prevent the articulation of a coherent political strategy within the UN Security Council. Maintaining the *status quo* is not therefore an option, and the West must understand that the situation in the Middle East can destabilise the entire world. Civil wars have caused millions of refugees, a bitter reality that can destabilise Europe economically and socially, with a strong negative impact on the world economy.

1. ISIS Phenomenon in the Vortex of Chaos Left by the *"Arab Spring"*: Current and Future Legal Actions

The *"Arab Spring"* began in December 2010, when a Tunisian vendor committed suicide in protest against the confiscation of his cart by the local police. The police action was part of a series of arbitrary arrests and seizures of property initiated by dictatorial governments, not only in Tunis, but across the region. In Tunis, protesters took to the streets in a show of solidarity and praise of martyrdom, a situation which was also inflamed by the information on endemic corruption of President Ben Ali and his family contained in the US Embassy's files published by Wikileaks. It became bloodshed when the police and military authorities intervened to annihilate the protests, and thereafter the uprisings increased to the point where authorities were unable to control them and many officers sympathised with the protesters. Ben Ali and his family fled from the country, unsuccessfully requested political asylum in France, and finally reached Saudi Arabia, a country that is the favourite shelter of former tyrants under the Muslim hospitality prerogative (Idi Amin was *"hosted"* here until his death).

This was just the beginning. Soon, Tahrir Square in Egypt was filled by tens of thousands of protesters against the repressive regime of Hosni Mubarak. Security troops fired on protesters and 850 people died before President Mubarak's forced resignation on 11 February 2011. After just two weeks, Resolution 1970 was issued, by which the UN Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court – a prelude to Resolution 1973, which mobilised

NATO against Colonel Gaddafi's forces and generated the political regime change in this country. Meanwhile, the *"Arab Spring"* hit also the President of Yemen. Pro-democracy protests started in Yemen in February, and in June, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was wounded in an attack with rockets and forced to leave to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. In November of the same year, Saleh signed an agreement to resign in exchange for his immunity from criminal jurisdiction, at least on the territory of Yemen. In Bahrain, about 35 pro-democracy protesters were killed by the King's troops. He responded to the events in a unique and intelligent manner: he agreed to establish an independent panel of foreign experts in human rights, which issued recommendations for immediate reform that the King promised to implement. In Syria, violent demonstrations have led to the death of tens of thousands of civilians. The Arab League and the United Nations have repeatedly and unsuccessfully put pressure on President Assad to give up power.

Justice has been achieved in different ways in this transition period. International intervention in some situations has been justified to strengthen democracy. However, the consequence has been a significant increase in power of the Islamic political parties. Ben Ali was tried in absentia by the Tunisian High Court and sentenced to 35 years in prison. Only six hours of hearings were needed by the judges before deciding on the verdict. The Tunisian dictator was convicted for possession of weapons, drugs and stolen artefacts and for public funds misuse. Neither the Tunisian citizens nor the international community could be satisfied with this verdict, which was not credible since there was no defence. It is also questionable whether Ben Ali should have been tried in absentia, although Saudi Arabia was adamant in its refusal to extradite him. The verdict sent nevertheless an important message, given that Ben Ali often boasted that the justice system in his country was *"his right hand"*. That time, the willingness of judges to reject any governmental meddling was obvious. Later on, in Tunisia, free and fair elections were held, and a moderate Muslim government was appointed.

In Egypt, Mubarak retired to his palace in Sharm El Sheikh, where he waited for his fate to be decided by the court. A televised trial followed, where the dictator was portrayed, humiliatingly, on a hospital stretcher in a wire cage, along with his sons who were co-defendants. The former Egyptian dictator was accused not only of corruption but also of ordering the execution of 850 protesters. On Saturday, 2 June 2012, Hosni Mubarak was sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in killing the protesters during the revolution that removed him from power. His trial was perceived as a fair one, but in parallel, several protesters were tried by military courts and convicted, ironically, for their democratic aspirations

and for insulting the army. The Egyptian revolution was a genuine national uprising, although instrumented by cosmopolitan forces that were financed to some extent by the USA and Europe. A crucial factor in Mubarak's decision to resign was the very fact that the USA had lost confidence in him and even asked him to leave power. The verdict in the case of Hosni Mubarak represented a historic opportunity for Egypt to hold accountable its former leader and his followers for the crimes committed during the dictatorial regime. Mubarak, aged 87 and having frail health, spent most of the last 5 years in bed in a military hospital located in Cairo, being brought on a stretcher before the judges several times. After his 2012 conviction, which was annulled by the Court of Cassation, the former president is at time of writing still on trial with multiple delays in various cases, being theoretically free.

Five years after the bloody events in Egypt, violent deaths, arbitrary arrests and disappearances of opponents happen again, these facts being denounced by human rights defenders, who consider the regime of President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi as more repressive than the one led by Mubarak.

The Libya crisis broke out in the context of the *"Arab Spring"* and produced an immediate reaction by the international society. The wave of protests in February 2011 led to escalation, police units using force against the protesters in Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata. On 3 March 2011, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced the initiation of an investigation targeting Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam and the head of Libyan intelligence services, Abdullah al-Senoussi. This happened after the issue of a United Nations Security Council resolution on 26 February, through which the situation in this country was referred to the Office of the ICC Prosecutor, *"considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity"*[3]. According to the UN, the riots in Libya have resulted in thousands of deaths, involving nearly 650,000 people fleeing abroad and internal displacements of 243,000[4].

On 27 June 2011, the ICC issued arrest warrants for three officials accused of crimes against humanity committed between 15 and 28 February 2011.

---

[3] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) on the situation in Libya.
[4] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): Situation Report no. 46, 23 June 2011. See http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rev2OCHA%20Situation%20 Report%20No%2046%20%20Libyan%20Arab%20Jamahiriya%2016%20to%2023%20June%202011%20%20% 20FINAL%20FIELD%20DRAFT.pdf, retrieved on 12 June 2016.

On 22 November, the case of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was closed since he was killed by vengeful rebels. Regarding the other two defendants who were arrested after the killing of Colonel Gaddafi, the situation is controversial in terms of the applicability of the principle of complementarity of the International Criminal Court, the court acting only where national courts are unable to engage criminal proceedings on their national territory. In the case of Abdullah al-Senoussi, the Court assumed that he was subject to a trial already under way in national forum and that Libya was both willing and able to fairly try the case on its national territory. However, some inconsistencies related to art. 17 of the Rome Statute were evident in the case of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. Initially, without a thorough assessment of the real capacity of the Libyan justice system to conduct an impartial and independent trial, the ICC prosecutor at the time, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, announced that Libya could also try this case. Subsequently, the ICC judges questioned the capacity of the authorities in Tripoli to engage such a trial, especially since Saif was held in Zenten by a powerful militia that refused to surrender him (later, Saif appeared before Libyan judges through videoconference). The ICC has tried, in vain, to obtain the extradition of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, rejecting, on 31 May 2013, Libya's challenge on the case admissibility to the ICC. On 28 July 2015, a court in Tripoli sentenced to death Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senoussi, a decision following the pattern of Saddam Hussein that shows the need for preventive measures regarding the use in national courts of the death penalty for reasons of political revenge. The Rome Statute does not list capital punishment as a factor the ICC should take into account although it should be *"a crucial factor"*[5] because it is the very sentence that international courts are required to abjure.

Yemen was a special case of the *"Arab Spring"*. Here, the transition was carried out by international diplomacy, especially by the USA and its right wing allies in the Arab world, through the traditional mechanism of amnesty. Unfortunately, no positive effects were recorded in the aftermath of the amnesty decrees concerning those responsible for triggering the crisis, and the situation deteriorated gradually to civil war in 2015. Currently, European diplomats condemn the air strikes and the naval blockade imposed on Yemen by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and also the unilateral destabilising actions carried out by Houthi organisation and the military units loyal to former President Saleh. All these aspects further weaken Yemen and the region as a whole, creating fertile conditions for the expansion of terrorist and extremist organisations such as the Islamic State

---

[5] Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice,* Penguin, 2012, p. 559.

and the local wing of al-Qaeda, and exacerbating an already critical humanitarian situation. Since the beginning of the conflict, at least 5,979 people have been killed and 28,208 have been injured, among them hundreds of women and children[6]. As recently as March 2016, the Islamic State claimed three suicide bombings that led to 22 deaths in Aden in southern Yemen.

"Arab Spring" revolts had huge echoes in sub-Saharan Africa, being regarded with great enthusiasm by young people and with concern by the petrified postcolonial elites. In Côte d'Ivoire, a remarkable military intervention for humanitarian purposes took place. France, acting under a UN mandate, together with the organisation's forces, overthrew Laurent Gbagbo's regime in April 2011. On 3 October 2011, the ICC Prosecutor's request was admitted as to start *proprio motu* investigations in Côte d'Ivoire. The trial of former Ivorian President began at the International Criminal Court on Thursday, 28 January 2016, and five years after the post-election violence occurred in Ivory Coast, he pleaded not guilty to charges of crimes against humanity. Laurent Gbagbo is the first former head of state tried by the ICC and, along with co-defendant Charles Blé Goudé, the former head of the Ivorian militia, must answer for his role in the crisis caused by the refusal to cede power to Alassane Ouattara, who was recognised, especially by the USA and the EU, as the winner of the presidential elections at the end of 2010. According to UN estimates, the post-election violence in Ivory Coast led to the death of over 3,000 people, transforming some areas of the country into real battlefields[7]. Laurent Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011 in the presidential palace in Abidjan, after several days of bombing carried out by the French Licorne force.

The regional security environment does not change only by the actions of external actors but mostly because of the internal dynamics of human societies. Considered for long obedient, the Arabs have tried to shake the existing stereotypes by peaceful revolutions and to regain their wounded pride after decades of oppression. After the fall of despotic leaders, thousands of people, from Tunis to Sanaa, proclaimed their enthusiasm for belonging to the Arab world. Internet pages, under slogans such as *"proud to be Arab"* or *"a united Arab world"* became the place of expressing the feelings of solidarity and fraternity among Arab nations.

---

[6] European Parliament resolution of 25 February 2016 on the humanitarian situation in Yemen (2016/2515(RSP)). See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+B8-2016-0155+0+DOC+XML+V0//RO, retrieved on 16 June 2016.

[7] Report of the independent, international commission of inquiry on Côte d'Ivoire, Human Rights Council Seventeenth session, 6 June 2011. See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.48_Extract.pdf, retrieved on 25 February 2016.

We have witnessed an unprecedented transition from a silent Arab nation, described as apathetic and humble, to a nation whose revolutions have been discussed around the world, maybe even the beginning of a social and cultural revolution. Freed from fear and aspiring to freedom and democracy, many have dared to dream again of an Arab unity, even though the Islamisation of the region – considered a reservoir of extremism – has continued to represent a dangerous future scenario.

While it is too early to announce the end of impunity in MENA, we might say that we are witnessing an encouraging justice cascade phenomenon. The legal actions in courts demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of wealth, power and apparent immunity. This is the main message of the *"Arab Spring"* uprisings, which will surely contribute to the enhancement of the rule of law and human rights and to the end of the omnipresent impunity traditions of the region. National governments in transition continue to make efforts to condemn the old regimes, in the awareness that it is their duty to hold accountable those responsible for serious violation of human rights and corruption offences recorded on their national territory, with or without international assistance. A viable alternative is designated by international courts, when some states recognise their inability to handle serious abuses committed on their national territory. In a relatively short time, there has been a massive increase in prosecutions having as subjects those who undermined the afore-mentioned values. This development is not just cosmetic and it cannot be explained by invoking hegemonic pressures or instrumental political calculations. There is a much larger phenomenon, most prominently articulated in Europe and Latin America, whose trends and echoes have been sent beyond these regions, reaching in MENA, where the rule of law, anti-corruption and human rights are weaker.

However, far from moving towards the building of a democratic political regime in the European sense of the term (a result prematurely expected by many analysts and observers of the *"Arab Spring"*), the events in the Arab space rather lead to a long transition from an authoritarian political regime with strong secularised components to another form of government which, given the current political and security developments, is not necessarily different in forms and means of expression, but in its content, which indicates a strong Islamic and Islamist component. The transition involves the emergence of new political forces having various orientations, from moderate to extreme (i.e. Salafist and Jihadist). A main feature of the elections held in the *"Arab Spring"* countries is that these societies are not monolithic entities, but vibrate under a wide range of political orientations, from secularists of various nuances to moderate and extremist Islamists.

Eloquent in this regard are the results of the two elections in the summer of 2012: the presidential in Egypt and the legislative in Libya.

There are also secular orientations in the Arab societies, but they seem to be in the minority compared with the Islamist ones, and the real trend of the future is not the confrontation between secularism and Islamism, but the struggle within the latter between moderates and religious exclusivists. If we take into account the militaries' ambitions (especially in Egypt) and the powerful external influences, especially of the major actors of the Islamic world (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran) and of the international system (the USA, first of all, and the European Union, Russia and China), we have the picture of the Arab political space in the post-*"Arab Spring"* era (an incomplete picture, of course). To be complete, such a picture should consider, among other things, what these societies understand by democracy and human rights. Surveys show that some of them encourage economic performance and others insist on strengthening the democratic attributes of the society. One of the main trends manifested during the transition of Arab societies, which solved the problem of authoritarian leaderships, is the prominent role of the army, especially in Egypt (even though the existence of rival militias in Libya, for example, raises the same issue).

To what kind of Islam are these post-dictatorship Arab societies moving? Here is an important question, given the existence of a very large scale of nuances within the political movements. The landscape is complicated by the presence of the army, which receives external support for ensuring some predictability to the political process of selecting between various Islamist nuances, provided they do not fall prey to dictatorial temptations. The Middle East region presents high geopolitical volatility indices, given the position of religious forces that have entered the political arena on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, more generally, on the issue of the relations with the West, and the secular orientations of their own societies.

The events in the Arab world reveal a revolt for democracy and freedom, as well as for independence and human rights, for the first time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. All Arab countries were born practically from the disintegration of the empire. Some have a distinctive history as a nation-state such as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, but the colonial period had a huge impact on the local policies. Authoritarian entities and regimes have emerged, the new states trying to promote the idea of belonging to the Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian state, and so on. The popular uprisings are rooted precisely in these entities, a new policy being needed for national and regional stabilisation. In short, in order to understand the phenomenon of authoritarianism in the region, we must realise that these countries are successors of a violent colonial period and, later, of a post-colonial resistance.

In Europe, countries have evolved over the centuries, an example being the gradual emergence of the British and French states since the fifteenth century. Then, there were the French Revolution, two world wars, the wars of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco. Civil societies in Europe have developed very slowly and have matured into solid and reliable democracy. The Arab world has not had the luxury of such a lucky history. As soon as the decolonisation process became effective, the new ruling elite managed to build only weak and fragmented states. Now sub-state forces based on fanatical loyalties rise against the state itself and its sovereignty.

There are many sensitive issues related to the articulation of security strategies in a continuously changing territory. First, the governments that are in the process of redefining and strengthening will take into account more and more the voice of the street. Moreover, there are societies that will require a foreign policy independent from that of the West. The European Union and the United States of America must be prepared to reduce their control in the region, as we anticipate some similarities with Latin America, where past regimes were more than docile in their relations with the West. As the *"imperialist"* interventions in the domestic affairs of states are not possible at present in Latin America, it will perhaps happen in MENA case.

If most analysts agree on the motivations for the wave of protests in the Arab world – dictatorship, repeated violations of human rights, endemic corruption, poverty, high unemployment and lack of prospects for young people, inflation, Wikileaks about the autocratic regimes that have asphyxiated the countries in the region –, their opinions differ when it comes to the outcome of revolutions. We have reviewed a number of positive legal developments, which further revolutionise the international criminal law and the international relations system. But there is also the perception that the *"Arab Spring"* has gone into hibernation[8]. Elections have resulted in huge surprises in some countries, violence continues in others and we look further to see how the new governments will reform.

---

[8] Paul Toohey, *"Arab Spring Has Turned into a Winter of Discontent. So Where Did It All Go Wrong"*, *News Corp Australia Network,* 1 April 2016, see http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/real-life/news-life/the-arab-spring-has-turned-into-a-winter-of-discontent-so-where-did-it-all-go-wrong/news-story/dbf1bdcf8d746e474d5eb0e6a0176b44, retrieved on 19 June 2016; Mohamed Elshinnawi, *"Arab Spring Became Brutal Winter, Analysts Say"*, *VOANews.com,* 19 January 2016, see http://www.voanews.com/content/arab-spring-brutal-winter-analysts-say/3153382.html, retrieved on 19 June 2016; David Schenker, *"Arab Spring or Islamist Winter?"*, *World Affairs Journal,* January/February 2012; Rebecca Ellsworth, *"The Arab Spring Democratization Failure"*, 15 May 2014, see https://prezi.com/x6yulswegdb-/the-arab-spring-democratization-failure/, retrieved on 19 June 2016.

Civil war is a reality of the area and the security developments involving terrorist organisations are extremely complex, with a risk that, in the absence of massive structural reforms, the *"Arab Spring"* might prove to be less than successful.

Richard Gowan, an expert on security issues in the European Council on Foreign Relations, believes that the assessment according to which the *"Arab Spring"* has failed due to the problems listed above is erroneous. He believes that the outpouring of public emotion in early 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya was a remarkable manifestation of people's power, and the courage of the Syrian demonstrators who risked their lives to defy the totalitarian regime was amazing.

Several Israeli experts on the Middle East (among them Ehud Yaari) believe that the *"Arab Spring"* has taken the form of an Islamist sandstorm, stressing that we cannot talk about a repeat of the democratisation that occurred in Eastern Europe, since the power goes to the Islamist parties that are essentially anti-democratic[9]. These parties cannot meet the basic criteria of genuine democracy, being impregnated by an anti-Western doctrine and an anti-Israel position, with an increased risk of confrontation. In short, the new Islamic regimes will have a questionable commitment to democratic values. The real challenges will be those of strengthening the rule of law – in particular to eliminate corruption, which is deeply rooted in Arab societies – and respect for human rights, which are not protected satisfactorily by the Islamic *sharia* law.

The democratisation process in less fortunate countries in the region could not be a success, because it had no tradition. While the state failed to meet the expectations of citizens, the powers claiming to be authorities seized gradually more responsibilities and money. Terrorists realised the opportunity of exploiting the confusion and power vacuum created by the protests; few anticipated that such exploitation could reach a new dimension, wider and more dangerous than the one designated by al-Qaeda. Although, initially, ISIS was a rebel group in the war, their most important goal was not the fight against the Assad regime, but the conquest of new territories and possessions, occupying towns under rebel authority for years. ISIS also exploited the weaknesses of Iraq. The first branch of ISIS in Iraq emerged after the fall of Saddam Hussein, putting increased pressure on the US forces, hence the criticism of the fight against the regime of Iraqi dictator and his execution. These biased voices, though aware that the *"Arab Spring"* was inevitable, claim that Hussein's iron hand could have at least moderated the rise of terrorist groups in the region.

---

[9] Simona Țuțuianu, *Towards Global Justice: Sovereignty in an Interdependent World,* Springer, 2013, p. 241.

A balanced assessment of the events in the aftermath of the *"Arab Spring"* revolutions indicates that the dawn of democracy in a region dominated by a history full of autocracy has gradually and obviously faded. The end result in many Arab countries has been the opposite, namely the emergence of a new wave of violence, repression and civil war. Egypt is a state ruled under the army boot; Libya has sunk into chaos and terror after the death of Gaddafi; in Bahrain there have been sustained struggles between the Shiite majority and the Sunni monarchy; in Yemen people rebelling because of poverty have been hit by the civil war; in Syria there are still rebellion, refugees, ISIS, civil war and the Assad regime...

Following the *"Arab Spring"* revolutions, in most countries in the Middle East other oppressive regimes have emerged to fill the gap left behind by those banished by the popular uprisings. The only exception is Syria, where the *"Arab Spring"* was turned into a sectarian war that allowed the rise of the most feared terrorist group in the world. The Islamic State's extremists proclaimed a medieval-style so-called caliphate occupying significant territories of Syria and Iraq. Over a quarter of a million Syrian people have died during this war that has also generated the largest movement of refugees since the end of the Second World War.

A special case is that of Tunisia, a country that quickly adopted a democratic constitution after the popular uprisings. However, statistics compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague show that the country ranks first in the number of combatants who have joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria[10]. According to the estimates drawn up by *Soufan Group* – an organisation that provides strategic security and information services to the interested governments and multinational organisations – at a global level, between 27,000 and 31,000 fighters have gone to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State and other extremist groups in the region. Of these, 6,000 people come from Europe, especially from France, Germany and Britain. However, the countries with most fighters in the conflict are Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Russia, 6,500 people being recorded in the fighting in Iraq and Syria as coming from Tunisia[11]. So, the country where the *"Arab Spring"*

---

[10] Alex P. Schmid, *"Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates: Conceptual and Data Issues"*, *International Centre for Counter Terrorism Policy Brief*, The Hague, October 2015. See http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/10/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighter-Estimates-Conceptual-and-Data-Issues-October20152.pdf, retrieved on 20 June 2016.

[11] An *Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*, made by *Soufan Group*, December 2015. See http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFighters Update3.pdf , retrieved on 19 June 2016.

started in 2011 and, at the same time, the only one where this reformist movement in the Middle East has been successful, is paradoxically the main source of fighters for the Islamic State's jihadists[12].

Below, there is the distribution of foreign fighters by region, highlighting the countries that are the leading providers of belligerent human capital[13].

Foreign Fighters by Region

- Western Europe (5,000)
- Former Soviet Republics (4,700)
- North America (280)
- The Balkans (875)
- The Maghreb (8 000)
- The Middle East (8,240)
- Southeast Asia (900)

Top Foreign Fighters Nationalities

Nationality	
Tunisia	6,000
Saudi Arabia	2,500
Russia	2,400
Turkey	2,100
Jordan	2,000

Regarding the legal actions to punish ISIS militants that could be anticipated, there are many opinions, realities and possible implications for peace and regional and international security that need to be considered. Currently, there are numerous quests substantiated in laborious studies[14] to try ISIS leaders at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, supports this course of action, together with numerous practitioners in international law, considering that *"such a request would not only register international opposition to the atrocities; it would also help lay the groundwork for future prosecutions"*[15]. The ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, considered the issue, arguing that, while the ISIS commits crimes of indescribable cruelty, the jurisdiction of International Criminal Court is too narrow to launch the series of prosecutions, given that Iraq and Syria, where the majority of atrocities

---

[12] For an explanation for such development, see David D. Kirkpatrick, *"New Freedoms in Tunisia Drive Support for ISIS"*, *The New York Times*, October 2014. See http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/world/africa/new-freedoms-in-tunisia-drive-support-for-isis.html?_r=0, retrieved on 20 June 2016.

[13] Assessment by *Soufan Group*, December 2015 (see above).

[14] Harmen G. Van der Wilt, Inez L. Braber, *"The Case for Inclusion of Terrorism in the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court"*, *Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper*, no. 2014-26.

[15] John Bellinger, *"Make ISIS' Leaders Face Justice"*, *The New York Times*, 2 April 2015.

take place, are not parties to the Rome Statute and the ISIS leaders come mostly from these regions. The Prosecutor's position is criticised by many analysts[16], who argue that the court's budget of 150 million dollars for 2015 in conjunction with the lack of criminal convictions and slow cases qualify the International Criminal Court as one of the most useless international organisations in human history.

ICC involvement in the ISIS case is indeed controversial in many respects. On the one hand, it needs the support of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, particularly Russia and China, that are not precisely the fans of the Court and strongly condemn the violation of national sovereignty in the name of human rights. In 2011, the two major powers agreed with the referral of the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, but subsequently they found that NATO military intervention in the African state was *"inefficient"*. It is therefore unlikely that they will endorse a similar measure in the near future. Also, as Kevin Jon Heller, Professor of International Criminal Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, points out, the Security Council cannot argue that the court has jurisdiction only for the crimes committed by ISIS. The court must consider the conflict as a whole and the crimes committed by all parties to the conflict[17]. Both the Assad regime and the rebel forces in Syria have been accused of serious and repeated breaches of human rights[18]. The Shiite militias fighting ISIS in Iraq have also been accused of serious retaliatory violence against Sunni civilians, bordering on ethnic cleansing[19].

ISIS is a distinct non-state actor, which does not enjoy the support of any state, and most of its offences would only be punishable through national criminal justice mechanisms. Foreign policy analyst Joshua Keating, former chief editor of *Foreign Policy*, argued that *"If the United Kingdom captured Jihadi John, it is perfectly capable of prosecuting him. France and Germany could prosecute members of ISIS, so could the United States under its laws. So I am not sure why you would need the ICC to step in and do what states can already do. The ICC should be limited to those situations*

---

[16] Jonathan Levy, *"The ICC's Failure against ISIS: Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda Must Go"*, *InSerbia Network Foundation,* 4 February 2016, see http://inserbia.info/today/2016/02/the-iccs-failure-against-isis-chief-prosecutor-fatou-bensouda-must-go/, retrieved on 16 February 2016.

[17] Katie Worth, *"ISIS Victims Find Maze of Challenges in Appeals for Justice"*, *FRONTLINE/Columbia Journalism School Fellowships*, 1 October 2015, see http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/isis-victims-find-maze-of-challenges-in-appeals-for-justice/, retrieved on 16 February 2016.

[18] Human Rights Watch, *"Open Letter to the Leaders of the Syrian Opposition Regarding Human Rights Abuses by Armed Opposition Members"*, 20 March 2012, see https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/20/open-letter-leaders-syrian-opposition, retrieved on 16 February 2016.

[19] Joshua Keating*, "Are America's Allies Committing Ethnic Cleansing in the Fight against ISIS?"*, *The Slate*, 18 March 2015.

where states are not willing to prosecute"[20]. Meanwhile, the Islamic State's *Dabiq* magazine published in January 2016, an obituary that pays tribute to Jihadi John, the terrorist who became notorious through video recordings of some hostages' executions and who would have achieved martyrdom for the cause of Allah in a drone air strike in the town of Rakka.

Certainly, for international public opinion, prosecuting the ISIS leaders – rather than orchestrating new military incursions or using drones – would be a great victory for international justice. However, in addition to the considerations of ICC limited jurisdiction, Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda also invoked in her statements the precondition for referral of the case by the United Nations Security Council. However, how useful would it be the Council's intervention in terms of the ICC' reputation and the prospects for building and consolidating peace in the region?

Regarding the first issue, the real danger of undermining the legitimacy and independence of the International Criminal Court should not be neglected. This is due to the many criticisms of selective jurisdiction of the court in handling its cases (predominantly from African countries) and its propensity to sentencing only one party to the conflict. The case of Uganda, where only the opponents of Museveni's government were accused (the Lord's Resistance Army/LRA) is suggestive in this regard, fuelling much debate on the legality of restricting the ICC jurisdiction to organisations such as LRA or ISIS. At present, the primary objective of international justice is to develop visible gains, evidenced in surrendering suspects and conduct of fair trials. An exclusive focus on a single terrorist group, fuelling accusations of selectivity and the widespread belief that only *"the enemies"* of the Security Council are investigated and tried would definitively undermine this goal[21].

Moreover, states should assess carefully the option of the UN Security Council intervention in terms of possible implications on regional and international peace and security. According to recent analyses[22], the members of the Council are confused in this regard. Thus, at a meeting on 27 March 2015, which analysed the situation

---

[20] Joshua Keating, *"Why It's So Hard to Prosecute ISIS for War Crimes"*, The Slate, 8 April 2015.

[21] Mark Kersten, *"The ICC and ISIS: Be Careful What You Wish For"*, *Justice in Conflict,* 11 June 2015, see http://justiceinconflict.org/2015/06/11/the-icc-and-isis-be-careful-what-you-wish-for/, retrieved on 16 February 2016.

[22] Alexandre Skander Galand, *"The Situation Concerning the Islamic State: Carte Blanche for the ICC If the Security Council Refers?"*, *Blog of the European Journal of International Law,* 27 May 2015, see http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-situation-concerning-isis-carte-blanche-for-the-icc-if-the-security-council-refers/#comments, retrieved on 15 February 2016.

in the Middle East, there were major discrepancies on a possible ICC intervention in the case of ISIS: if most of the participants inclined to a referral of the situation in Syria to the ICC, there were also positions favouring the referral of the situation in Iraq, or the referral of the situation in both countries and, not least, there were uncertain approaches to investigate the *"situation"*, *"matter"* or registered *"cases"*[23]. The only clear thing during the event was the main basis for the involvement of the International Criminal Court, namely the need to hold accountable the members of the terrorist group.

Undoubtedly, the referral of the ISIS case to the ICC would disrupt peace prospects in the region. First, such a measure could be labelled as a miscarriage of justice, which would send an encouraging message to other terrorist groups and factions prone to conflict that commit mass atrocities, by encouraging them to perpetuate violence in the belief that they may be exempted from criminal liability in the future. Secondly, rather than a deterrent, the measure fuels the risk of legitimising ISIS brutality and increasing the opportunities to strengthen its ability to recruit militants by false ideological mechanisms. There is therefore a huge risk of escalation of major conflicts, jihadists being increasingly convinced that a modern crusade aimed at exterminating the Muslims is conducted against them[24].

Of course, the above does not suggest that ISIS militants should not be punished. Iraq and Syria could join the Rome Statute and, even if the prospects of such a development are now diminished, states and international organisations can take encouraging measures. The United Nations Security Council can contribute to making the regional actors more responsible and to strengthening justice, focusing on the overall security situation in Syria and Iraq, in view of avoiding the limitation of ICC competencies exclusively to crimes committed by ISIS. So far, encouraging developments are revealed by the efforts of ICC Prosecutor, who has already signalled a willingness to investigate the ISIS militants in Libya[25]. Meanwhile, the Commission for International Justice and Accountability has been investigating the crimes committed in Syria for years and has expanded its mandate

---

[23] Conclusions of the United Nations Security Council 7419th meeting, 27 March 2015. See http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7419, retrieved on 16 February 2016.

[24] Massimo Introvigne, *"Western Military Intervention Is What ISIS Wants"*, *Vatican Insider*, 26 August 2014, see http://www.lastampa.it/2014/08/26/vaticaninsider/eng/inquiries-and-interviews/introvigne-on-iraq-western-military-intervention-is-what-isis-wants-Hb8W3o1wFDA3KBM9zrmatN/pagina.html, retrieved on 17 February 2016.

[25] Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011). See https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-stat-12-05-2015.aspx, retrieved on 15 March 2016.

to include atrocities committed by ISIS[26]. In the future, such initiatives may contribute to collecting evidence that could be used in court.

In an ideal world, terrorist organisations such as ISIS face the day of judgment, if not in national courts, then by recourse to international justice mechanisms. The promoters of international criminal justice hope that in the future the International Criminal Court will have the resources and political support to prosecute effectively, independently and impartially the cases involving large-scale terrorist actions. The policies in the Greater Middle East region and the position of international community on Syria adopted for half a decade make difficult, however, the prosecution of those guilty of atrocities committed by the Islamic State. The United Nations Security Council must carefully reconsider its intervention and non-intervention strategies in the region before the externalisation to the ICC of any mission to bring guilty people to justice.

*

In the second part of the article, the authors will approach new dimensions of the concept of "responsibility to protect" in the current international security context.

---

[26] Julian Borger, *"Syria's Truth Smugglers"*, *The Guardian*, 12 May 2015.

STRATEGIC MILITARY PARTNERS CONFERENCE
– *"Partnership: A Pillar of Success, Innovation and Stability in a World of Change"* – Bucharest, 19-21 October 2016

Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel PURICE
Diana Cristiana LUPU

NATO Strategic Military Partners Conference (SMPC) is an annual diamond event organised by the *Allied Command Transformation (ACT)*. It is a Chief of Defence level event to discuss issues in areas of common interest and concern related to military partnership. The conference is alternatively hosted by a NATO member state and a NATO partner state. The calendar of similar events organised so far is as follows: 2005 – NATO's Allied Command Transformation first hosted a seminar that brought senior military representatives from Allied and partner nations together outside of political frameworks; 2006 – Skopje, FYROM; 2007 – Tromsø, Norway; 2008 – Tirana, Albania; 2009 – no conference was organised; 2010 – Helsinki, Finland; 2011 – Belgrade, Serbia; 2012 – Zagreb, Croatia; 2013 – Stockholm, Sweden; 2014 – Sofia, Bulgaria; 2015 – Tbilisi, Georgia.

Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Purice – Strategic Planning Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

Diana Cristiana Lupu – *Gândirea militară românească/Romanian Military Thinking*, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

Source: http://www.act.nato.int/2016-strategic-military-partner-conference

In 2016, the conference, having as theme *"Partnership: A Pillar of Success, Innovation and Stability in a World of Change"* was organised in Bucharest, Romania, between 19 and 21 October. The main objectives of the conference were to deliver project objectives within time, resource and budget constraints; to align discussion topics and outputs to concurrent efforts taking place in ACT, Allied Command Operations (ACO), International Staff (IS)/International Military

Source: http://www.act.nato.int/2016-strategic-military-partner-conference

Staff (IMS), and the major Combatant Commands; to establish a baseline awareness of core partnership activities taking place in the Alliance, with focus on areas of work carried out by ACT; to identify innovative solutions and challenges pertaining to partnership[1].

It was a two-day conference that synthesised the latest thinking regarding the transformation of partnerships in the military domain. During the first day – *Subject Matter Expert (SME) Day*, the discussions focused on the domains in which the forces of allied and partner states are likely to operate together – maritime, air/space, land, cyber, as well as on Individually Tailored Roadmaps. During the second day – *Chiefs of Defence Plenary Day*, the focus was on partnership in the Global Commons of sea, air, space, cyber, and land domains, including defence innovation, autonomous systems, and special operations.

The target audience consisted of the Chiefs of Defence of NATO, Partnership for Peace nations, Mediterranean Dialogue nations, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative nations, and the Partners across the Globe countries, NATO (ACT, IMS, IS, JFC, LANDCOM, AIRCOM, NCIA, SHAPE/ACO), EUMC, ICRC high-level representatives, and subject matter experts.

The conference in Bucharest brought together 203 participants from Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Columbia, Croatia, the Check Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Macedonia (FYROM), Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, UK, as well as the participants from Romania.

The event in Bucharest was preceded by four planning workshops (Maritime, Air/Space, Land and Cyber) that were held to generate sound ideas related to the thematic areas at the political-military level. Working with acknowledged experts across the military-civilian domain, the workshops aimed to merge and orient discussions and ideas in the short, medium, and long term. The workshops were as follows: *"NATO Partnership in the Maritime Domain – On, Above and Below the Seas"*, held in Singapore between 15 and 16 September 2015; *"Practical Cooperation in the Air and Space Domains: Partnership in the Skies and Beyond"*, held in Essen, Germany, on 23 November 2015; *"NATO Partnership on Land – amidst Terrorism, Instability, and Humanitarian Crises"*, held in Izmir, Turkey, between 13 and 14 January 2016; *"Partnership in the Cyber Domain: Reinforcing*

---

[1] See http://www.act.nato.int/smpc-homepage, published on 5 October 2016, retrieved on 3 November 2016.

the Resilience of Allies and Partners", held in the Hague, the Netherlands, between 18 and 19 May 2016[2].

At the beginning of Chiefs of Defence Plenary Day, Rear Admiral Peter Gumataotao, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy, Supreme Allied Command Transformation, briefly presented the outcomes of the syndicate sessions related to the above-mentioned domains. Reappraisal of the Alliance Maritime Strategy, the fact that partnership is a two-way street, the importance of the core mission of NATO, interoperability and inter-regionality were among the main ideas in the maritime domain, which is therefore considered a rich opportunity for partnership. As for the air/space domain, it was highlighted that it must be linked to other domains for strategic and capability development. Moreover, it was presented the importance of air and space resilience as the military contribution to civilian resilience, of defence planning alignment, interoperability, including information sharing and standardisation in general, as well as that of training and education considering human capital is the greatest asset. With regard to the land domain, it was shown that harmonisation of the NATO three core tasks in the land domain along with other capabilities (military, strategic and situational awareness, human factor, private sector) will lead to better comprehensiveness and resilience. The partners' participation in NATO exercises is crucial and Article 5 must allow for the inclusion of partners. Funding for partners

Source: http://www.act.nato.int/2016-strategic-military-partner-conference

[2] The final reports of the workshops are available on ACT page, see http://www.act.nato.int/smpc-homepage, published on 5 October 2016, retrieved on 3 November 2016.

must be expanded to include the execution phase. Building mutual trust with partners is the key for capability sharing and implementation in the land domain. Trust is a two-way street and information sharing with partners must be significantly improved. As far as cyber domain is concerned, the importance of the ability to understand and share risks, to create resilient systems with partners, to share information and to build trust and trustworthy systems was highlighted. The necessity for continuous investment on people, processes and technology was also mentioned. The ways to respond, the proportionality of response, innovative solutions to the challenges and joint and agile cyber procurement strategies were among the ideas expressed as well. In addition to the above-mentioned domains, the outcomes related to Individually Tailored Roadmaps (ITR) such as tasking, ambition, roles, the importance of the Military Committee direction and guidance were also presented.

Source: http://www.act.nato.int/2016-strategic-military-partner-conference

The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Général d'armée aérienne Denis MERCIER, Keynote Speech to SMPC
"Partnerships: A Pillar of Success, Innovation, and Stability in a World of Change"
Bucharest, 21 October 2016
It is a real pleasure and a privilege for me to take part in this year's Strategic Military Partners Conference that brings together representatives and experts from NATO's broadening partnership community.

Thank you General Nicolae CIUCĂ for your kind welcome words and for your country hosting this event in the beautiful city of Bucharest, in partnership with NATO Allied Command Transformation.

It is also an opportunity for me to thank Colonel Gabriel PURICE from the Romanian Ministry of Defence for the superb support contributing to the organization of this event. Your very efficient help and collaboration are highly appreciated, and contribute directly to the success of the conference.

Thank you to all subject matter experts for participating in yesterday's syndicate sessions focussed on partnerships in the Global Commons of Maritime, Air, Space, Land, and Cyber domains.

We just heard from Rear Admiral Peter Gumataotao that these sessions were highly successful and delivered very relevant findings that will inform and further contribute to today's plenary discussions.

But first, allow me to share some thoughts with you.

The changed and evolving security environment demands the ability to meet challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction. Indeed, the increasingly complex and evolving security environment has a 360-degree dimension, not only geographically speaking but also in terms of the wide range of actors and threats involved in potential crises.

The lines between peacetime, crisis and conflict are progressively blurred. Crises can mix state and non-state actors, including terrorist groups or organized crime. External factors such as the easy access to new technologies, climate change or economic instability deepen the uncertainty and complexity of our security environment.

We can no longer imagine an isolated crisis in one region that doesn't impact the same actors in another region, so crises are becoming increasingly interrelated.

As no single Nation nor organization has all the abilities required to manage these crises on its own, the complexity of this environment requires the involvement of a wider variety of actors and organizations that can work together.

At the Warsaw Summit, this new security environment triggered the Alliance to further adapt its Defence and Deterrence posture.

To remain politically and militarily credible this posture, based on the right mix of conventional, nuclear and missile-defence forces, requires new levels of readiness and responsiveness, to deliver the effects to meet NATO's three core tasks (Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security), laid out in the Strategic Concept.

Indeed, in the context of this new and continuously evolving environment, the interrelation of crises will generate an overlapping of these three core tasks.

Responsiveness is a key factor for the credibility of the Alliance's posture. It will result from decision making processes, top-down from the highest political level to the tactical level, our ability to deploy and sustain forces, increase interoperability through training and exercises, leverage partnerships with a wide range of actors, invest in the right capabilities and develop our human capital.

It is within these 6 key areas that we need to identify the potential game changing elements and technological breakthroughs for NATO to maintain its military edge to meet challenges and threats of any kind, and from any direction.

This reflects the importance of Partnerships for the credibility of the posture and it clearly affirms Partnerships as an integral part of NATO's transformation.

To translate this into facts, NATO must be ambitious regarding partnerships. Many initiatives are already ongoing like Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Partners Across the Globe, Partnership Interoperability Initiative or Defence Capacity Building initiative. These initiatives have their own structures and internal procedures and are pursuing their goals through agreed practical arrangements.

The Individually Tailored Roadmaps is the first step for a more tailor-made, individual and flexible approach to partnerships. They are designed to Simplify, Optimize and Synchronize military partnerships with a longer-term planning horizon. The bottom line is to make the tools for partnerships easier to use.

But beyond existing initiatives, we must recognize that our peace and security increasingly depends on NATO's success in maintaining, expanding and being receptive for a responsive and adaptable network of most divergent partners.

As we live in an era of constant accelerative change in many aspects, including technology, policy and human factors, NATO's advocacy to connect to a full spectrum of partners as part of a large community of likeminded entities will require a massive network of a yet unseen order of magnitude.

The game changing feature of NATO's partnership community in the future is undoubtedly scale.

Whilst adopting a more tailored approach to current NATO partners, efforts must be made to expand the partnership community, consisting of both traditional and non-traditional partners. This would build on the already existing networks with Nations, Partners and Organizations through their structures in place, enlarged with non-traditional entities such as academia and industries.

Such a wide network of partners would contribute to the Alliance's global situational awareness.

Situational awareness is an essential building block of NATO's collective security.

Within the scope of hybrid scenarios it is crystal clear that we need to detect and identify early signs of emerging crisis, and timely attribute responsibilities

in the response we will give. This is why we need an extended situational network that goes beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

Indeed, NATO's intelligence process is based on a sharing of information in a formalised and secured network environment. Classified information cannot be shared with partners or other organizations without approval of the North Atlantic Council.

To mitigate this problem, we are working on the possibility to develop an early warning system based on open source and publicly available information. This would allow continuous sharing with a wide range of actors and make the maximum use of the Partnership network.

How to ensure this extended situational awareness against the future threats will be discussed more in detail in the 2nd panel.

A wider network of partners would also contribute to the capacity and responsiveness across the spectrum of operations if mutually shared, flexible and adaptable concepts of interoperability could be established.

To meet the challenges posed by the future operating environment, NATO must establish broader Command and Control networks, integrating people, proficiencies and technologies at all levels, from NATO to nations, partners and other organizations.

To do this we must build an agile, secure and resilient network that supports political-military decision-making to deliver timely effects with an enhanced 360-degree perspective and an effective *"day-zero"* mission readiness.

To achieve this, the interoperability of systems is a key factor. The Federated Mission Networking is a standard designed to enable a wide range of actors to be connected together, so that the operational effect of each organization or nation will be greater than the sum of its composing parts.

Panel 1 will further expand on this issue.

So before concluding, let me come back to the ongoing work that is already shaping the conditions for further improvement and development of the way NATO works with Partners.

As mentioned earlier, we have started to work on mechanisms and practices for a more tailored cooperation. NATO is developing a Capstone Concept that will define mechanisms and practices to produce Individually Tailored Roadmaps.

The aim is to streamline the administration of partnerships in NATO, and offer partners an easier way to plan military related activities with the Alliance. The desired outcome is to make the requirements understandable, modular, joint owned, adaptable and measurable, with a commonly agreed baseline that is scalable and affordable.

The development phase of the Capstone Concept for Individually Tailored Roadmaps, is supported by executing and assessing three pilot projects, in partnership with Finland, Georgia and Jordan, that are already offering very valuable lessons for the future.

The desired outcome is the development of a 3 to 5 years comprehensive plan with these partners.

But from my perspective, we could be more ambitious and analyse how we could – through a broader framework – better integrate Defence Capacity Building with Individually Tailored Roadmaps, as well as other Partnership initiatives, in a more comprehensive approach.

It is important that we continue to streamline as much as we can all partnership activities using a modular structure that can assemble all areas of cooperation with Partner nations in a *"win-win"* configuration.

This would be particularly relevant for nations such as Afghanistan or Iraq, to offer longer-term perspectives through a robust partnership with NATO.

I would also propose that this comprehensive approach could form the basis for further exchange with other international organizations with the aim to share the same modules and avoid duplication of efforts when dealing with the same partners.

Despite the complexity of the strategic environment, the remaining uncertainties and the high pace of technological innovation both present challenges as well as new opportunities. So we can use these new opportunities offered by Partnership activities to build on common grounds, and to enhance connectivity and improve continuous awareness.

To conclude.

We live in a moment of profound accelerative change in every sector of human endeavour. This is an era when no single nation or actor dominates the sphere of international security. In response, nations and international organizations, or NATO must foster partnerships that both reflect the scope of emerging security challenges and are capable of sustaining political and operational advantages amidst change and uncertainty.

Our peace and security increasingly depend on NATO's success in maintaining, expanding and being receptive for a responsive and adaptable network of most divergent partners[3].

More details related to the goals of the 2016 Strategic Military Partners Conference held in Bucharest, which brought together representatives and experts from NATO's broadening partnership community, were provided during the press

---

[3] See http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/speeches/161021_smpc.pdf, published on 20 October 2016, retrieved on 3 November 2016.

conference. SACT restated the main goals, namely to enhance and to strengthen the links of the Alliance with its Partners, to build on NATO Cooperative Security network to foster constructive relationships beyond the borders and thus contribute to stability and security across the regions, to ensure Peace and Stability, Partnerships continuing to be essential for NATO to face challenges and threats, now and in the future, to develop those partnerships, including with Nations that are not generally partners of the Alliance. Noting again that no single nation, organisation nor actor dominates the sphere of international security, SACT highlighted that NATO must foster partnerships that both reflect the scope of emerging security challenges and are capable of sustaining advantages amidst change and uncertainty, which affirms Partnerships as an integral part of NATO's transformation. In addition, the main topics for discussion in relation to the above-mentioned goals were presented as follows: the importance of networking and the development of tools to connect a broad range of partners; how partners are essential components for the Alliance's continuous strategic awareness; how planning processes can be improved to conduct holistic long-term planning with partners.

The 2016 Strategic Military Partners Conference *"Partnership: A Pillar of Success, Innovation, and Stability in a World of Change"* held in Bucharest concluded on 21 October. In the concluding section, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Général d'armée aérienne Denis MERCIER, thanked the participants for making the SMPC a successful and meaningful event, appreciating the effort made by the Romanian officials, excellent ambassadors for Romania, and by the whole organising team. He also thanked all Subject Matter Experts, keynote speakers and Panellists during the first day sessions and during the second day panels, whose contributions made the conference. Among SACT's closing remarks, the following can be mentioned:

- Partnership is based on mutual agreement and dialogue, which the nations clearly expressed. Therefore, individual partnerships, although being more complex, would be the most efficient way to keep going.
- Partnerships contribute to proficiency, readiness and responsiveness across the full spectrum of operations.
- They contribute to NATO's core tasks and to regional security.
- Partnerships have diverse development status.
- Partnerships have to remain flexible and adaptable for Allies and Partners alike.
- Partners ideas will contribute to reaching this goal.
- The larger vision to simplify, optimise and synchronise partnership efforts and to broaden them should be achieved.

- A large community of likeminded entities connected to NATO based on the partner's level of ambition should be achieved.
- Partners should be more ambitious with ITR, especially as the Alliance and its members consider stability projection as a major objective. Such a tool could enable longer-term, sustainable strategies for partners like Afghanistan and Iraq. It could also allow for a better coordination with other international partners such as the EU, the ICRC and others.
- The Partnership programmes will transform into a global network of partners. NATO and partners will become more robust and sustainable.
- Nations may use NATO tools and act as a framework nation to execute partnering.
- NATO will be able to concentrate on enhancing mutual Command and Control to provide dynamic and improved decision making.
- Here we have a concept. The Federated Mission Networking (FMN) approach points in the right direction. We have to realise it as a facilitator. And we have to overcome the today mentioned obstacles of connectivity, just to mention one.
- NATO and partners will be able to push forward mutual capability development to offset gaps and vulnerabilities.
- NATO and partners will be able to train and exercise together to gain the readiness and the responsiveness needed for today's security challenges.
- NATO and partners will gain improved situational awareness regionally and globally. Hence the discussions on systems that could enable us to leverage and share unclassified, publicly available information, while allowing them to be fed by classified information.
- The inspiration from Bucharest should help us to realise the steps needed to achieve our goals and contribute to a more secure and safe world.
- NATO and partners will keep in touch to facilitate military partnership for the well-being of our nations and our fellow countrywomen and countrymen.

All in all, NATO Strategic Military Partners Conference held in Bucharest between 19 and 21 October was considered a real success.

With regard to Romania's contribution, as a host country, there are some aspects that are worth mentioning. Romania provided support in ensuring all the participants internal transportation, security and necessary medical services. Romania offered an official dinner to all SMPC participants; Romanian Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and Chief of the General Staff were the hosts of the social event. Moreover, it provided the IT and logistic support for the ACT team that arrived in Romania 7 days before the conference commenced. The Strategic Planning

Source: http://www.act.nato.int/2016-strategic-military-partner-conference

Directorate (SPD) was the General Staff structure responsible for the event organisation. It was a sustained effort considering that the ACT and SPD team (Colonel Liviu Bumbăcea, Colonel (AF) Ionel Rizea, and Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Purice) worked for one year to plan and organise the conference in Bucharest. During this period the ACT and SPD team conducted three reconnaissance activities in Romania, all the efforts being backed by intense communication between the planners and the members of the team. That is why a Technical Secretariat was established between 1 September and 11 November 2016 within the Strategic Planning Directorate, cooperating with experts in security, transport, protocol and administration. The Romanian team that worked for the 2016 SMPC was led by the Chief of the General Staff. In addition, Romanian land, cyber, maritime and air/space experts as well as 30 lecturers and students from *"Carol I"* National Defence University participated in the workshops and the conference per se.

THE UPDATED RUSSIAN FEDERATION NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

General Dr Ştefan DĂNILĂ

In Russia's National Security Strategy *(2015) there are mentioned 6 national interests of which strengthening the defence of the country and consolidating national accord and political and social stability are primordial. Although it was preceded by the adoption of the* Military Doctrine *(2014) and the* Maritime Doctrine *(2015), the 2015* Strategy *is, according to the author, the legal basis for continuing authoritarian leadership, strengthening the role of the state in all sectors, developing the Armed Forces procurement programmes, extending the competencies of intelligence services, intensifying propaganda, more actively involving the Russian Orthodox Church and other denominations as the state policy propaganda instruments.*

Keywords: military doctrine; the Kremlin; military potential; NATO; national security

President Yanukovych decision in November 2013 not to sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement, a clear sign of the fact that the Ukrainian Administration maintained its pro-Russian orientation, led to major developments in international relations, having an undesirable dynamics that had been difficult to predict few months before. In this context, it is also important to consider that Poland and the Baltic Countries advanced the idea of strengthening the Eastern Partnership during the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second semester of 2013. The European Union Council on 28-29 November was marked by the failure to accomplish it. The pro-European Ukrainians reaction was prompt and, for three months, they protested against this decision, generating the *Euromaidan revolution*, which led to Yanukovich flee from the country on 22 February 2014[1]. His flee to the Russian Federation and the rhetoric of *overthrowing by force a democratically elected*

General Dr Ştefan Dănilă **–** Military Adviser to the Minister of National Defence.

[1] See http://www.paginaderusia.ro/tag/fuga-lui-ianukovici/

president represented the premise, more or less expected, for the Russian Federation to return in force in the balance of power equation by violating the international agreements, which culminated in the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014.

The end of the *Cold War* was perceived in the countries of Eastern Europe as the end of Russian domination with its communist ideology and hence the freedom to decide the orientation towards Western democracy values, which got materialised in the establishment and enlargement of the European Union. The victory of Russia's independence supporters under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin was interpreted by the West as the democracy supremacy, and the new state path to democracy was encouraged, *burying* the Soviet Union. Thus, in 1997 the new format of cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation got formal by the validation of the agreement that stipulated the establishment of the *NATO-Russia Council*.

The first signs of possible doctrinal changes and strategic orientations of the Russian Federation were given before Vladimir Putin returned to the position of president when he was aggressively presented as the absolute leader with qualities and skills in all areas. The game of image and the show of power were visible in 2008, in Bucharest, when the Russian leader attended the NATO Summit. The uncertainty related to his arrival, the false information on the arrival time, the masking with other aircraft scheduled to arrive at different times, having or not him on board, the way to the hotel and Vladimir Putin's attitude during both official and informal talks were clear signals of a new attitude of the Russian Federation in international relations.

The little castling with Prime Minister Medvedev was only a brief, misleading, transition of Putin in the shadow in order to turn out in force. Simultaneously with building the image of the *new Tsar*, the Russian armed forces underwent a comprehensive reform process[2]. It happened in the context of increasing loss of influence in the former Soviet space, coupled with expressing clearly, by some states, the desire to follow a European path. The failure in diplomacy and in the socio-economic offer was counterbalanced by an aggressive attitude based on force, on the military might. The increasingly visible association of the leader of the state with the leadership of the armed forces – by participating in exercises, alerts and unannounced inspections, the President daily exercises, presenting

---

[2] Gustav Gressel, *Russia's Quiet Military Revolution, and What It Means for Europe*, 12 October 2015, see http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/russias_quiet_military_revolution_and_what_it_means_for_europe4045

him as a good fighter – show that the main instrument of the Kremlin policy, both externally and internally, is force, to deter any opposition.

The National Security Strategy to 2020, adopted in 2009, symbolically marked the end of the official manifestations dedicated to the Victory Day and sanctioned the desire of the Federation to ascend to the status of an important global power. The document was based on some conclusions emerged from the analysis of the trends in the international security developments in terms of: *"extending the effects of globalisation in all areas of international relations; deepening interstate differences related to uneven development and increasing rift between their levels of well-being; increasing vulnerability to all members of the international community in relation to the new challenges and threats; increasing inconsistency of regional and global architecture, particularly concentrated in the Euro-Atlantic region, exclusively on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which generate threats to international security"*[3].

Starting from the argument that, in the long run, the international policy focus will be on the energy resources control, the *Strategy* sets as national goal the *"transformation of the Russian Federation in a global power"* aiming to ensure strategic stability at international level. In this context, it is important to note that the *"list of threats to national security"* in the previous strategy did not contain references to *classical* threats such as military aggression, border violation or interference in internal affairs, but mentioned the *"policy of some states focused on ensuring military supremacy"*. It nevertheless emphasised that the *"North Atlantic Alliance plans to enlarge to the frontiers of Russia are clearly unacceptable"*[4] and warned that *"the Russian Federation national interests will be affected by the unilateral actions to use force and by the divergences between the most important states in the world"*[5]. The 2009 *Russian Federation Security Strategy* stated that the Russian Federation authorities were sure that a military aggression to Russia was unlikely at that moment and in the predictable future, and no state or organisation had any hypothetical intention to violate the Russian Federation territory. The authorities in the Kremlin din not expect to use the armed forces to defend against the aggressive action of a state or a coalition of states, but to use

---

[3] *Rusia lui Alexandr Dughin, Doctrina noului imperiu, Strategia securităţii naţionale a Federaţiei Ruse*, pp. 17-19, see https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/43/43713_Rusia%20lui%20A.Dughin.Doctrina%20 noului%20imperiu.pdf, accesat în 18.01.2016.
[4] *Ibidem*.
[5] *Ibidem*.

them to ensure the Russian Federation transformation into a global power, which entailed its armed forces conducting mainly actions outside its national territory. It did not prevent planning large-scale exercises, together with its partners (Ukraine and Belarus), having as main goal the *defence against a NATO attack*[6].

Mention should be made that the armed forces reform had many points in common with their reform in many NATO member countries, the similarities being also evident in the training process reform. Accepting being counselled by some European experts coming from non-NATO states but having strong ties with the Alliance resulted in reviewing certain procedures and tactics, changing the assessment standards, and making the institution more effective. The modernisation of the command and control structures was aimed at both establishing modern infrastructure, new equipment with appropriate software, and training the personnel (in many cases their replacement).

As those who are experts in the field know, defence planning, an important component of national security, is achieved following an almost universal algorithm. Therefore, the change in the international security environment, the international relations, the domestic reality, as well as other factors, may trigger a process that is generically called *Strategic Defence Review*. The finality of this process is to tailor the armed forces (force structure) and the defence resources (first of all, the budget) to meet the requirements related to threats, which may be high, medium or low, in the context of the current and future opportunities and vulnerabilities. The documents that are developed are the *National Defence Strategy* and the *Military Strategy*. Some states develop the so-called *"White Papers"*, which present, in a detailed manner, the government programme, and identify the resources that are to be employed. The content of these documents is broadly similar. Although it can be noticed that the Russian Federation uses more and more terms that are similar to those used in Western countries, in the field of defence, the syntagm *military doctrine*, specific to the Soviet period to define the *military strategy*, is maintained. Russian military theorists provide a simple argument: it is only one strategy, and it is developed by the supreme commander. Mention should be made that the difference between the *defence* and *security strategy* is that security also includes, besides defence, the system of international relations that correspond to the state geopolitical interests, namely the foreign policy goals and the ways to meet them. The established strategic goals and directions represent tasks

---

[6] For example, *"Zapad 2013"* multinational exercise to which NATO high officials were invited. (A.N.)

and directions for the armed forces, diplomacy, and intelligence and counterintelligence services. Contrary to the opinion of certain analysts, the security strategy should not establish directives in areas such as: economy, finance, education, health, environment, culture, demography, social policy, as they are the topics of other documents, especially the government programmes. There are some differences depending on the provisions contained in the constitution of each state regarding the organisation of the state executive power. Where the president is also the chief of the government/administration, he/she can develop a vision/strategy to include all sectors of activity, and the security or defence strategies are distinct.

I have provided these explanations to better understand why the *Russian Federation National Security Strategy*, made public at the end of 2015, should be regarded from a different perspective. Firstly, as an argument for those presented above, the *National Security Strategy* in 2009 was followed by the *Russian Federation Military Doctrine*, adopted by the President of Russia on 5 February 2010. The Doctrine was the third document of this kind of post-Soviet Russia, ensuring the continuity of the military doctrines in 1993 and in 2000, but it provided an updated perspective on the way Russia addressed military conflicts and used nuclear force. This document, consistent with the *National Security Strategy*, was the first at this level that raised the issue of reconsidering, based on competition, the regained status of *global power*, and certified the efforts made, at international level, to restore the Russian Federation sphere of influence to regain its prestige, as well as to permanently modernise its armed forces. The trust put by the population in the Russian Federation military capabilities, specific to the *post-construction era*, is another objective in the document: *"the Russian armed forces are able to maintain influence in the region and the world as well as to impose the Russian policy at global level"*[7]. The doctrine also defined and updated the threats and challenges to the Federation, established the possible ways to employ the armed forces and, for the first time, included the reform of the armed forces. As for procurement, it made possible the contract for *Mistral* class ships, which demonstrated the Medvedev-Putin administration concern for the technological modernisation and the return of defence industry to the level of competitiveness existing in the *Cold War* period. It was the recognition of backwardness as well as a step towards the assimilation of new technologies. The nuclear capability was treated with the utmost concern, important financial and research resources being allocated

---

[7] *The Russian Federation Military Doctrine*, retrieved from Google, January 2015.

in this respect. The main requirement the armed forces had to meet was deployability, and the efforts made in this direction were evident in the spring of 2014, in Ukraine. The document is the continuation of the *Strategy*, being based on the theories presented by the renowned geopolitician Alexander Dughin in *"Foundations of Geopolitics"*. He supported the necessity to reinvigorate the Russian Euro-Asian *heartland*, in an imperialist vision, wishing the restoration of the Russian Empire space and the acknowledgement of Russia as a global power. If the *US National Security Strategy* starts from the necessity to defend the citizens individual rights, the Russian Administration documents stipulate the limitation of these rights by legitimising the state intervention wherever its interests require it. The two documents were approved by President Medvedev, being made public immediately after the *reset* button was pressed by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Russian Foreign Minister Serghei Lavrov in March 2009[8]. In this context, it is easy to understand why NATO or the USA were not defined as *threats*, the main threats being taken and adapted from the register defined by the USA in its own security strategy.

The events in 2014, especially those in Ukraine, the *EuroMaidan revolution* and the fact that it was not under the Russian Federation control changed the ratio of forces within the Russian state leadership to favour the military. The ascendant of General Valery Gherasimov over the political advisers within the administration, especially over the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Nikolai Patruşev[9], as well as the emphasis on President Putin position of supreme commander of the armed forces are visible in the new documents of strategic importance. If the intervention in Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea were conceived and developed so that some of the provisions of the international law could be avoided or even employed, the trenchant positions adopted by the Alliance and by the European Union, the condemnation of the actions, and the imposition of sanctions, the suspension of the dialogue within NATO-Russia Council, the acknowledgement of the Russian Federation as a threat to the states in the eastern flank of NATO were arguments for the Putin Administration to urgently change the above-mentioned documents. Mention should be made that the *Russian Federation National Security Strategy* has the Russian state

---

[8] *Federaţia Rusă – Noua Doctrină militară, o schimbare de paradigmă?*, see http://powerpolitics.ro/federatia-rusa-noua-doctrina-militara-o-schimbare-de-paradigma/

[9] *"Patruşev a condus timp de aproape 10 ani FSB, succesorul KGB"*, see http://stiri.tvr.ro/patrusev_31783.html

and people in the centre and mainly addresses the infiltrated enemy (2009 approach), while the *Military Doctrine* focuses on the external enemy and on the riposte capabilities. It could be an argument for the fact that, this time, the *Military Doctrine* was reviewed before the *Strategy*, being adopted in 2014. In the new *Doctrine*, the North Atlantic Alliance was included among threats, although not directly, as an adversary, but indirectly, by *continuing to develop its military potential* and by *positioning its military disposition near the Federation borders*. The Russian Federation Military Doctrine was changed in compliance with the decision of the Russian Federation Security Council on 5 July 2013, and the final form of the document was adopted in the Council Meeting on 19 December 2014. President Putin signed the document on 26 December 2014. It was intended to be the first message transmitted to the USA and NATO, but in a document considered of less importance, from the perspective of the Allied states.

Subsequently, as the sanctions were maintained and their effects were felt by the population, and as there were major differences between the *Strategy* in force and the new *Doctrine*, it was developed the *National Security Strategy in 2015*, which maintains the structure of the one in 2009, but has a slightly different content. However, it reaffirms the Russian foreign policy stance that has a strong anti-Western character (against the USA, NATO, EU), as it was transmitted through the *Military Doctrine*. The propagandistic character of the document was decrypted by analysts even since it was made public[10]. Declaratively, the amendments to the 2009 edition of the *Strategy* were generated by the recent developments in the regional and international politico-military situation, by the decisions of the political and military leaders in the Kremlin, as a response to the developments, as well as by the emergence of new threats and challenges to the Russian Federation. The content of the current edition of the *National Security Strategy* clearly defines the threats to the Russian state security at global and regional level, with regard to the political, economic, military-securitary, informational and cultural-spiritual dimensions. According to the *National Security Strategy*, among the main threats to the Russian Federation, there are the consolidation of NATO military potential, the strengthening of the Allied military disposition, and the development of military infrastructure at the border with the Russian Federation, by the implementation of the US missile defence system in Europe and the Middle East. As the previous strategy, the current one sets as main goal, this time explicitly and consistently,

---

[10] Iulian Chifu, Conflict Prevention Centre & Early Warning, *Buletin de analiză privind decizia strategică în politica externă*, no. 293, 4-10 January 2016.

the *consolidation of the power status in a multipolar world*, and this goal will be *sustained, mainly, by its military potential*. The approach is in compliance with the *Military Doctrine* but, in addition, the *Strategy* considers there is a close connection between national security and social-economic and cultural development. The general impression it intends to convey is that it is developed from the perspective of a *besieged fortress*. Moreover, it is obvious the desire to enhance the population confidence in the current administration, having a clearly propagandistic character. After the main threat – the consolidation of NATO military disposition near the borders –, it follows the precarious security situation in Ukraine and its proximity, where an *illegally constituted power* is supported by the West and the USA. To strengthen the arguments regarding the main threats, it is stated that the emergence of the Islamic State is based on the practice of *"toppling legitimate political regimes"*.

The document emphasises the completion of the Russian Federation revival to the great power status, and highlights the idea of national unity, interethnic and interdenominational concord, as well as the return to the traditionally Russian spiritual and moral values. The main foreign policy directions are the consolidation and affirmation of the *Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)* and its transformation into an international organisation capable of combating regional challenges and politico-military and military-strategic challenges in the Asia-Pacific area, followed by the consolidation of *BRICS*, of the *Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)*, of the *Eurasian Economic Union*, of *ASEAN* and of *G.20*. The development of the relations with the EU, the USA and NATO is the last of priorities, mention being made that the partnership with the USA should be established based on common interests. A special place is held by the Arctic Region potential for development.

We can say that, by the order of appearance and by its content, the document reverses the previous model, as the *Strategy* ensures the framework for the new *Military Doctrine* (2014) to be implemented. Well structured, pragmatic and concrete regarding the place and role of the Russian Federation in international relations, it emphasises the change of paradigm in the relations with the USA, the EU and NATO. The idea of national unity is highlighted, promoting interethnic and interdenominational harmony, and the need to return to the traditionally Russian spiritual and moral values. It was intended to transmit the Russian people the message of the Russian cultural values superiority and their promotion, values that can be defended only by the current Administration against the Western, decadent, threat, any opposition becoming automatically an enemy of the people.

Reading this message, we remember the images from the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, which were so close to the spirit of those in 1936, in Nazi Germany. The document suggests abandoning the idea that the world moves towards globalisation, highlighting the need to focus on establishing a new multipolar world order. It is emphasised the role of force in international relations as well as the role Russia should play in making important decisions.

In 2009, there were stipulated 3 national interests, in the current *National Security Strategy* there are 6, of which the primordial ones are to strengthen the country defence and to consolidate national harmony and political and social stability. The strategic priorities express the Administration determination to do its best to preserve the current authoritarian and pseudo-democratic political system in the Russian Federation in the long run. Although it was preceded by the adoption of the *Military Doctrine* (2014) and of the *Maritime Doctrine* (2015), the Russian Federation *National Security Strategy* in 2015 maintains the level of application. It can be said that the current strategy is the legal basis for sustaining the authoritarian leadership style, strengthening the role of the state in all sectors of activity, developing the Armed Forces procurement programmes, extending the intelligence services competences, actively involving the Russian Orthodox Church and other denominations as propaganda instruments for the state policy.

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

TRENDS IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEMS SPECIFIC TO THE INITIAL TRAINING OF THE HUMAN RESOURCE WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Colonel BEng Vasile PETCU

The analysis of the contemporary military phenomenon, the local military conflicts included, highlights the role of the human resource that is required to be professional and adaptable to the evolution of the battlefield. Thus, the author considers that the development of the education systems specific to the initial formation within the Ministry of National Defence should be compliant not only with the European education policies but also with the necessities resulted from the type of the particular actions that are to be conducted. In this regard, the analysis is intended to provide some directions for the transformation of the education systems specific to the initial formation of the human resource in the Ministry of National Defence.

***Keywords**: strategy; competence; transformation; professional formation; occupational standard*

In the new military context, determined by the geopolitical circumstances, characterised by new threats and risks to the security of the European states, it becomes necessary to take into account some changes of the military doctrine and strategy fields, as well as, derived from these, some methods of perfecting both the force training and the organisational structure. It makes possible the enlargement of the variety of objectives and processes that encompass the organisation and training of the forces, in order to contribute to the collective defence and the improvement of the capabilities required for taking part in crisis management and common security assurance multinational operations. It results in a permanent need, not only for the continuous improvement of the different armed forces structures, but also for the finesse and adaptability of their actions, which could be accomplished through the use

Colonel BEng Vasile Petcu – the Land Forces Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

of modern principles in the design of the force training, thus leading to the existence of truly professional armed forces.

In this context, the future process of military education transformation is aimed at the establishment of a flexible and efficient system, in accordance with the Armed Forces personnel initial training and professional development requirements, as well as at *"the full harmonisation of the Romanian military education with the national and Euro-Atlantic education"*[1]. Therefore, *"the military education transformation is intended to the consolidation of an integrated, performant, competitive, flexible and proficient system, adapted to the armed forces operational requirements, able to provide highly qualified human resource, which could convert the educational capital into a knowledge source and competitive advantages"*[2]. The main objectives, established through the *Defence White Paper*, derived in what concerns the modernisation of military training, entail:

- redefining the concepts, curricular norms and systematic function of the military training;
- permanently updating the military education, in accordance with the continuous dynamic of the contemporary security environment threats and challenges;
- redefining the military training specific framework, according to the national, European and Euro-Atlantic requirements;
- developing and applying online training programmes, preparing the teaching staff and frequently organising mobile courses;
- imposing and increasing the education quality;
- developing relations of cooperation with similar educational structures from NATO and EU member states, using their experience in certain fields.

Therefore, it is obvious that in order to define proposals regarding the action specific directions, the development priorities and evolution tendencies of the legal framework specific to the education systems and professional development, at national and European level, are to be used as a starting point. Currently they are as follows:

A. *The lifelong learning strategy 2015-2020*, in Romania, proposes, for the previously mentioned period of time, the following three strategic pillars of actions:
- access and incentives for participation;
- **quality and relevance**;
- **partnerships** for better information.

---

[1] See http://www.mapn.ro/programe_strategii/strategie_transformare_2007_.doc, retrieved on 25.05.2016, p. 17.

[2] Ministry of National Defence, *Defence White Paper*, București, 2016, p. 27.

B. *The education and professional development strategy in Romania for the period 2014-2020* is built on the next key concepts: **"relevance"**, *"access and participation"*, **"quality"** and *"innovation and **cooperation**"*. It establishes the following strategic objectives:

- **the professional training systems relevance improvement** for the work force;
- **the professional training quality improvement**;
- **the national and international innovation and cooperation development** in the field of professional training;
- the participation and facilitation of access to professional training programmes.

In order to accomplish the defined objectives, the Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research deems necessary a definition paradigm change of the action plans in the field of education and professional training, thus making them able to plan their own development, based on the socio-economic requirements predicted for the future.

C. *The National Authority for Qualifications 2015 – in perspective 2020* establishes the following courses of action in the lifelong learning:

- **reinitiating the social partnership** and the involvement of all the interested actors in the professional development of adults;
- developing and implementing a quality assurance system in the professional development of adults;
- recognising qualifications etc.

At the same time, in order to define several transformation proposals for the education systems specific to the initial training education of the human resource within the Ministry of National Defence, it should be taken into consideration the fact that, at present, the basic training of non-commissioned officers, warrant officers and officers relates to qualifications and occupations specific to the civilian environment. Therefore, the specific curricula, according to the training programmes authorisation procedures, determine the resource allocation to acquire the professional aptitudes particular to these occupations. From this perspective, these processes are ineffective and with a limited relevance to the environment in which the future graduates will perform. In this context, developing and perfecting professional military competencies is accomplishable by organising complementary specific training programmes that require supplementary resources.

Furthermore, in 2015, through the order of the Minister of National Defence, the specific occupations of the major group 0 *"Armed Forces"* in the Ministry

of National Defence, comprised in the Classification of Occupations in Romania (COR), were approved. As a result, the general opinion is that, starting in 2016, it is possible to redesign the human resource initial training programmes for the Ministry of National Defence, considering the occupations established through the previously mentioned order.

Possible Strategic Objectives of the Education System Transformation Processes Specific to the Initial Professional Training in the Ministry of National Defence

1. *Increasing the initial professional training system relevance according to the future graduates work environment.*

From this point of view, the main courses of action could be:

1.1. *Redefining the documents for the educational purposes centralisation and their development in accordance with the national and European requirements and tendencies in the field.* The current document that structures the purposes specific to the education systems in the Ministry of National Defence is the **graduate model**. The role of the document and the responsibility for its development are detailed in the *Romanian Armed Forces Training Doctrine – S.M.G./I.F.-7* in 2006, although a structural model has never been defined. As a result, there are different versions of the same document developed at the level of each military structure involved in the education process, being either too detailed or too general. Moreover, this document exists only within the Ministry of Defence, the national education systems operating with ***occupational standards, professional training standards or aptitude based criteria grid.***

Taking into account the fact that, as shown above, occupations specific to the Ministry of National Defence were introduced in the COR, it would be appropriate to develop a new set of occupational standards, correlated with the methodology operating at national level. On the other hand, it would be advisable to continue using the graduate model for the *niche* area specialisation courses that were not defined as military specific occupations. In this case, it is necessary to issue a new development procedure for the document and structure it according with the elements comprised within the occupational standard.

1.2. Delegating the Ministry of National Defence specialists with competencies for the verification, validation and endorsement of the occupational standards through the development and signature of a collaboration protocol between the Ministry of National Defence and the National Authority for Qualifications (NAQ). According to the Government Decision no. 1352 in 2010, regarding the approval of the COR–base level group, *"the occupations specific to the major group 0, named "Armed Forces", are approved within the boundary of the Law no. 182/2002 regulations concerning the classified information protection, with further modifications and completions"*[3]. Consequently, the details referring to these occupations are considered as classified. In this case the following question arises: *Does the NAQ have specialists that could analyse, verify and validate the occupational standards derived from these occupations, and that are authorised to work with such sensitive information?*

From this point of view, the optimal course of action consists in signing a protocol of collaboration between the Ministry of National Defence and the NAQ, through which the responsibilities of checking and validating the mentioned occupational standards are assigned to the armed forces.

The protocol is not the only one of a kind in the field, since, at this moment, there are similar protocols operating between the NAQ and the State Inspection for the Control of Boilers, Pressurised Recipients and Lifting Installations/Equipment no. 1620/3656 from 23.04.2015, the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situation no. 3169/165447 from 11.09.2015, or the National Authority for the Regulation and Monitoring of the Public Acquisitions – NARMPA no. 1482/9153 from 08.04.2015. Through the above-mentioned protocols, the NAQ gives the mentioned institutions exclusive rights to endorse the occupational standards for the occupations within their area of responsibility. In addition, the institutions certify and sanction specialists for the endorsement as well as the assessment commissions, without the need of approval from the regional Committees or other institutions in this field. Moreover, through these protocols, the mentioned institutions are given the task of managing and updating the list of assessment specialists.

Under the argument of the information classification specific to the military field occupations, the general opinion is that, through a similar protocol, the Ministry of National Defence could be delegated the responsibility of authorising and validating the military occupational standards.

It can be noted that this course of action is of a reactive type, of promoting and adopting the specific pieces of legislation (*collaboration protocol*) in accordance with the existent legal framework. At the current moment, an advisory Council,

---

[3] The Government Decision no. 1352/2010, concerning the approval of the COR structure, published in *Monitorul Oficial* no. 300 on 24.04.2014, art. 7.

which endorses legislation projects and implementation methodologies for the national framework of qualifications and continuous professional development, is organised and functional at the NAQ level[4]. According to the Order of the Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research no. 3614 in 2015, it is composed of:

- **the NAQ president and vice-president;**
- 4 representatives of the Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research;
- 2 representatives of the Ministry of Work, Family, Social Protection and Elderly People;
- 1 representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the secondary education institutions, the higher education institutions, the students, the professional associations, the associations of employers and of the confederations of unions;
- 14 representatives of the regional committees.

For the transition from a reactive to a proactive attitude concerning the implementation of a course of action in the field of its own resource qualification and specialisation, the Ministry of National Defence should mediate the completion of the NAQ Council with a representative of its own. This envoy would actively participate in the development and endorsement of the adult professional training specific regulations, having the opportunity of bringing the armed forces specific to the NAQ attention and directing the specific legislation content in the best interest of the Ministry of National Defence.

1.3. *The instruction and certification of specialists with responsibilities in the development, verification, validation and endorsement of the occupational standards.*

Once the endorsement and validation responsibility is delegated to the Ministry of National Defence, along the main task, that of developing the occupational standards, the core structures with responsibilities in the coordination of the educational processes also have to undertake the task of organising the instruction of the specialists with future responsibilities in the development, assessment, validation and endorsement of the occupational standards. In designing the subsequent or cumulative specific instructional processes, the main competencies that should be acquired are:

- **the collection of information about the occupational area:** collecting the preliminary information concerning the analysed occupation practical contexts;

---

[4] HG 556/2011, concerning the organisation and function of the National Authority for Qualifications, with further modifications and completions.

- **the organisation of the activities for the occupational analysis execution:** selecting the target organisations and establishing the source specialists (dialogue partners), based on the relevance of their professional experience in the analysed occupational area;
- **the development of the occupational analysis form:** defining the professional competencies (the major functions specific to the analysed occupation), establishing the knowledge, abilities/skills and attitudes, related to the competencies, and describing the development contexts for the activities within the major analysed function;
- **the development of the occupational standard:** defining the occupational standard content elements and drafting the document according to the model standardised at national level;
- **the development of the occupational standard professional qualifications;**
- **the verification and validation of the occupational standard and corresponding professional qualifications**: the occupational analysis results, as well as the final form of the occupational standard and qualification are verified.

1.4. *The development of a legal framework (or system procedure) regarding the establishment of structures, stages and responsibilities, Occupational Standard (OS) validation and endorsement.* The main stages and responsibilities in developing the Ministry of National Defence specific occupational standards are:
- **the occupational standard development –** by the armed forces branch research and regulation structures from the application schools/instruction centres/bases, as principal action agents, in collaboration with battalions or brigades, established through the order of the Armed Force Service Staff chief/similar;
- **the occupational standard verification and endorsement –** by the Armed Force Service Staff/similar, through the education structure, from the point of view of following the structural patterns established at national level, as well as through the army branch office, from the point of view of the centralised information relevance;
- **the validation of the occupational standard –** by the General Staff through the Training and Doctrine Directorate.

1.5. *The completion of the List of Qualifications (LQ) with the Ministry of National Defence armed forces specific qualifications.* The course of action, in this case, should be developed according to the Order no. 35/3112 in 2004 of the Minister of Work, Family, Social Protection and Elderly People and the Minister of National Education and Scientific Research. Therefore, to update the LQ, the Ministry of National Defence must forward to the Ministry of Work, Family, Social Protection and Elderly People a file containing: an application, **the approved occupational standard** (pointing out the need for the previous development of the occupational standard) according to the legal framework, and the address of both the NAQ and the Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research, which states their agreement with the initiative.

2. *The quality improvement of the initial professional training in the Ministry of National Defence*

We consider the main courses of action as follows:

2.1. *The development, testing, revision and implementation of a uniform application methodology, at the Ministry of National Defence level, of a legislation concerning the education quality assurance, mainly for the non-academic professional development.* At this moment, the Emergency Ordinance of the Government no.75/2005 regarding the education quality assurance is in effect at the level of the application schools/instruction centres/bases, however not standardised, each military education institution applying it according to its own interpretation and experience in this area.

2.2. *The design and implementation of a coherent system of acquired professional abilities certification in the formal and informal professional development, relevant to the environment of military action. "Permanent education represents the total amount of learning activities performed by each person over the period of his/her lifetime in formal and informal contexts, with the purpose of shaping or developing abilities from a multiple perspective: personal, civic, social or occupational"*[5]. As a result, the learning needs of a group could be accomplished within other contexts than those of the education systems, through partnerships between facilitators and participants, during some conferences, training sessions or round tables (see the training for the mission execution in theatres of operations). Usually,

---

[5] *National Education Law* no. 1/2011, art. 328, pct. (2).

they do not end with the award of graduation certificates. Therefore, there are situations in which a soldier acquires certain skills, including as a result of a well-developed self-educational spirit, however without having the possibility of exploiting them, due to the lack of an official document that acknowledges this aspect.

In this context, through *"The recommendation proposal of the European Parliament and Council concerning the establishment of a European Credit System for the Professional Education and Development (ECVET) from the 9 April 2008"* the concept of **competency certification**[6] is defined, emphasising the fact that the object of certification is represented by the acquired abilities (what a person can do), and not by the educational content, curricula or subjects.

It can be noted that 8 years from the regulation of this initiative at the Ministry of National Defence level a solid specific methodology for the recognition of the professional competencies acquired outside the education systems still does not exist. Even more so, when several military structures train in theatres of operations, as well as in NATO fire ranges, to operate military equipment or to work with different categories of military techniques.

2.3. *The improvement of professional abilities for the people with responsibilities in the organisation and development of professional military training programmes, especially of the military instructors.* In this case, the priority should be an increase in the motivation to occupy the instructor available positions, fact that would determine the enticement of proficient and study oriented personnel. At the same time, a set of professional development norms could be developed for them, not only in the psycho-pedagogical field, but also in the military specialty area. At present, at the Ministry of National Defence level, a military instructor specific occupational standard is not defined. Moreover, the methodical and scientific reference points in this regard are still unclear. Thus, it is stated in the Order no. M58/2013 – *Instructions regarding the military instructor corps* that the military instructors have the obligation to prove, **within 2 years after filling the position** (not before), that they have graduated a psycho-pedagogical development programme, in order to certify their abilities for the educational profession. However, these aspects are not defined through a specific legal framework.

---

[6] The certification of competencies represents the official validation process, from a competent institution, of the correspondence between the acquired learning results and the specific results required for the acknowledgement of the units or the qualifications.

In addition, there is no Ministry of National Defence internal structure to homogeneously manage the initial training and development processes of the military instructors, both officers and NCOs. That is why it becomes necessary to create a structure (department etc.) with the mission of organising the continuous education of the instructors and managers within the institutions/units responsible for the human resource professional development in the Ministry of National Defence, thus guaranteeing a systematic improvement of the psycho-pedagogical abilities of the people involved.

3. *Consolidating a partnership between the educational structure and the operational unit, with the purpose of joint involvement in the initial (and continuous) professional training of the human resource in the Ministry of National Defence.*

The main objective of the proposed *partnership* is to contribute, through a direct and continuous relationship, as well as through the collective responsibility of those involved, to the harmonisation of the strategies and, especially, of the tangible actions in the professional development field with the complex requirements of the military actions specific to the branch/specialty. This partnership could be based on an order of a central structure and would target the following objectives:

- identifying the final educational objectives for the branch initial (and continuous) professional development training;
- correlating the educational offer with the branch mission essential requirements and the personal development needs of the direct beneficiaries (pupils/students/trainees);
- creating learning situations, necessary for the development of professional abilities;
- optimising the educational processes concerning the human, material and financial resources used in the professional development, by combining the practical sessions with the exercises and applications of the operational units;
- favouring the learners (pupils/students/trainees) transition from *school* to active professional action, by organising practical sessions in an environment as close as possible to the real conditions or by mediating the execution of the practical/on demand training stages.

*

Taking into account that the structure of the military aptitudes and abilities requires continuous and thorough adaptability to the ever changing modern battlefield, as well as in the context of lifelong learning, the military education system, in general, and the initial professional training, in particular, should be capable of undergoing changes in order to guarantee the development of a truly professional human resource. Because thinking strategically is one of the characteristics of the military environment, all the aforementioned proposals could be integrated, gradually, in a future strategy of military education transformation. The anticipated result is the increase in the performance level of the military education graduates, in all the dimensions of their professional roles as fighters, specialists and leaders.

Web Resources

• http://www.anc.edu.ro/index.php?page=metodologie-so, *Ghid de elaborare a standardului ocupaţional pentru educaţie şi formare profesională (Guidelines for the development of occupational standard for education and professional development)*.
• http://www.mapn.ro/programe_strategii/strategie_transformare_2007_.doc.

NEW TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETING
– Strategic Options in the Field of Recruitment –

Valentina AGULESCU

Today, all-volunteer armies face lesser or greater difficulties in attracting human resources. In this context, innovative view on military recruitment is required.

Combining marketing with technology offers the solutions suited to the lifestyle and concerns of young people. More and more, people looking for a career or a job use the Internet, mobile devices and social media platforms. Virtual space – cyberspace – has become the favourite of youngsters and the most used information means by them. Consequently, the battle for human resources has moved on recruitment websites and social networks.

Using the online environment as a preferred promoting environment, especially for sending army messages and for communicating with potential candidates, represents the main course of action established in the Strategy to promote the military profession in the period 2016-2020.

Keywords: *technology; cyberspace; social media; recruitment; promotion of military profession; promotion strategy*

Introduction

Technology has significantly changed the way people interact and devices such as smartphone, tablet, notebook and laptop have increasingly replaced the need for real contact with friends and family. The fact that we feel more attached to our gadgets than to the presence of our peers has become a sort of Polichinelle's secret. Maybe it is hard for us to admit it, but it is as true as the fact that promotion, advertising and recruitment have moved in the online zone, where opportunities are virtually unlimited.

In a world in which the game of demand and offer on the labour market has become complicated and unpredictable, and the expectations of those who seek do not always meet the expectations of those who offer, recruitment has turned to more effective and less expensive methods. The more difficult is to attract suitable staff, the more sophisticated methods are used.

From the classic ad in the newspaper to the use of high technology, the road has been neither

Valentina Agulescu – Human Resource Management Directorate, the Ministry of National Defence.

too long nor too difficult, and the cyber infrastructure development has led to the creation of a new universe, where anything is possible in terms of communication and data sharing. Using this advantage, not only the recruiter and the recruitment process itself but also the image of the employer institution/company has won.

Marketing and Recruitment

Innovation is the ability to see change as an opportunity, not as a threat[1] – are words attributed to Steve Jobs, an *"icon"* of the IT. Even a conservative institution by definition, which enjoys wide acceptance and trust from the population, such as the military institution, needs refresh and update strategies and means to carry out its mission, in other words, it should accept change.

The opposition to near the military to marketing, particularly advertising (commercials), has always existed, even in the armed forces with tradition in recruitment marketing. The origin of the expression *"to sell the war as a soap"* then becoming *"to sell the military profession as a soap"* is in the USA, dating back during the First World War, when the first posters related to the armed forces appeared[2].

Even later not everyone agreed to opening the military towards the use of modern means of communication with the public, as not everyone looked giving up conscription as a beneficial aspect. However, following the Vietnam War, when war became increasingly unpopular among Americans, in 1973, the political decision was taken to shift to joining the armed forces on all-volunteer basis.

In 1987, in an article in *Media&Values*, it was suggested that the armed forces used marketing techniques and advertising to show the young people a distorted reality of the military service and that the methods used were not suitable for presenting military career to teenagers[3].

The same to us, since the early 2000s, long before the transition to voluntary military service in 2007, there were indignant voices considering the military profession *"was put on the counter"*. It was the time when, based on *lessons learned*, the Ministry of Defence was preparing to face competition coming from the civilian area, since then being obvious that for the effort of attracting and retaining the human resource necessary for defence it is important to have a strategy to promote own professional offer as well as recruitment programmes tailored

---

[1] See www.azquotes.com/quote/1059252

[2] Paul N. Herbert, *God Knows All Your Names – Stories in American History*, Author House, 2009, p. 321.

[3] Daniel Buford, *Marketing the Military: Should Soldiering Be Sold Like Soap*, in *Media&Values* no. 56 (Spring, 1987), see https://www.medialit.org/reading.room/marketing-military-should-soldiering-be-sold-soap

to meet the requirements in the new economic and social context. Their absence entails not only losing valuable candidates but also wasting financial resources, rising costs and altering the organisation's image.

With the transition to all-volunteer based armed forces and the confrontation with the laws of demand and offer on the labour market, the ability of the armed forces to attract personnel is put to test because of the increasing competition and the diversification and refinement of professional and educational offers. To them it adds the young people tendency to move away from soldierly lifestyle, the change of the attitudes towards institutions and authority as well as the decreasing interest in civic and patriotic values.

Over the past 15-20 years, in the USA, Europe and lately in our country too, there are concerns of various intensity related to the low attractiveness of the military profession and the ability of recruitment systems to bring enough recruits/candidates to fill the necessary positions, especially the technical ones. If the reasons are quite similar and usually related to economic, demographic and socio-cultural developments, the solutions are almost similar too, essentially being a combination of financial incentives and image actions often costly. In extreme cases it was resorted to easing aptitude selection scales, the latest example being the Czech armed forces that announced in 2016 a series of measures[4] for the relaxation of selection standards – medical and physical criteria, in order to counteract the difficulties faced in attracting candidates for the military profession.

When recruitment goals are not achieved, there are affected the number and quality of staff, combat training and morale of the troops. Therefore, many professional armies, after exhausting conventional means (intensively used for a long time), have resorted to exploiting cyberspace. The combination between marketing and technology offers the solutions suited to the lifestyle and concerns of young people.

Regarding the Romanian armed forces, although we are far from using the full potential of traditional means of promotion, we are moving in the same direction due to the necessity to maximise the impact of transmitted messages, with lower costs, and to penetrate the recruitment environments that are difficult if not even impossible to be reached through the direct contact between the recruiter and the candidate (direct promotion).

With the increasing difficulties in attracting fit candidates it becomes necessary to widen the pool of recruitment, to orient to the mass of potential passive candidates,

---

[4] *Observatorul Militar*, no. 31/10-16 August 2016, p. 14.

i.e. those potential candidates who are not looking for a job or have not thought about the military as a possible option but might refocus on this area if they knew more about it and if it could provide new opportunities for professional and personal development. Of course, for them, a simple *"Choose a military career!"* would be completely irrelevant. To meet and persuade them, the intelligent use of cyberspace involves a more complex and costly approach, in terms of communication, than it would seem at first glance, because such potential candidates do not attend sites of jobs and, therefore they would not be interested in the sites and pages specific to armed forces recruitment. In this case, ads or banner advertisements would be more suitable, for example. Instead, to capture the interest of recent graduates, of those who are already informed or of those already active in seeking a profession or a job, Facebook or LinkedIn facilities would be a pretty good solution.

The promotion of the military profession is linked not only to the developments in technology and means of communication, but also to the development and diversification of advertising. It seems that nothing is too much when it comes to marketing and communication. Today, the programmes to promote the military profession have become more nuanced and surprising regarding format and content, continuing to rely on marketing techniques that work very well, in both the real and the virtual world.

To support the human resource recruitment, the Ministry of National Defence has developed the *Strategy to Promote the Military Profession in the Period 2016 - 2020*. It has as benchmarks the provisions of the *National Defence Strategy for the Years 2015 - 2019* and the *White Paper (2015 - 2019)*, and the detailed analysis of the armed forces internal and external factors that influence the attractiveness of the military profession and the conditions of unfolding the promotion activities.

Not incidentally, the main course of action established by the Strategy refers to the use of cyberspace, online environment, as main promotional environment, especially for sending the armed forces messages and communicating with potential candidates, by building an attractive and dynamic information website, and by exploiting the facilities offered by social media platforms.

As a result, a new website was launched to inform the young people interested in a career in the Romanian Armed Forces as well as their families – **recrutare.mapn.ro** – that in 7 months of operation has had over 215,000 visitors.

Among the novelties brought by this website are included creating the possibility to identify on the map the information-recruitment office to which the potential candidate belongs, viewing the building (using Google Maps

and Street View) and directly communicating via e-mail (between those interested in the military profession and recruiters from the information-recruiting office).

It should be stressed that the launch of the website was accompanied by opening profile pages on Facebook and Twitter, called **Recrutare MApN**.

All of these actions mark a change in the Romanian Armed Forces attitude regarding recruitment to meet the trends in recent years in the professional armed forces of partner countries, according to which cyberspace is extensively used to attract young people to the military profession.

Recruitment between High-Tech and Cyberspace[5]

Information technology has opened the gates of cyberspace (virtual environment where the exchange of ideas and information is fast, regardless of the distance between computers) or, more accurately, it has thrown us directly in it, despite some natural resistance to the change generated by giving up the comfort of administrative bureaucracy.

When we speak of technology in recruitment we should remember that landline phones, mobile phones, computers, video-projectors and generally all technical devices used by a recruiter in his job and the knowledge related to their use belong to the recruiter's arsenal. However, they are, compared to cyberspace, as a submachine gun compared to the intercontinental ballistic missiles. Today it is inconceivable a recruiter that does not have as the main working tools a powerful computer or laptop, connected to the Internet, and a smartphone.

More and more institutions/companies recruit their staff in *cyberspace*, which has become an ideal recruiting environment, inexhaustible and controllable, using marketing methods and fulfilling some rules on information security.

From directing the message to the target audience to checking, even testing and interviewing potential candidates, cyberspace is increasingly frequented by recruiters. The young people today have a parallel life in the virtual world. There they feel comfortable, there they should be looked for and approached. Paradoxically, it is easier to communicate in the online environment, not to mention the speed and comfort.

In human resource management, as in other strategic areas, there is a *"technological transition"* whose results are most visible in the area of recruitment, which is the most exposed to direct competition.

---

[5] *Cyberspace* = The Internet seen as an imaginary space without limits, where people can meet, work, play, learn and discover information about any topic. The concept was launched by William Gibson in his science fiction novel *Neuromancer* (1984). The main feature of cyberspace is communication in new and different forms, see https://www.starcourse.org/cybernauts/whatiscyberspace.htm

The important institutions and companies have never ever paid more attention to staff recruitment as currently, focusing on innovative methods based on information technology.

Whether it is about own recruiting structures, within the human resource department (as in the case of the military institution), or specialised agencies that offer services to those interested, the challenge lies in their ability to *"reinvent"* themselves to become attractive and competitive.

The battle for the human resource moved to recruitment websites and social media. The armed forces should align to this trend, otherwise they will quickly lose what they have gained in the past 15 years by entering the labour market.

The armed forces professionalisation managed to near, till identification, the military recruitment and the civilian recruitment. Basically, the used (potentially used) means are the same. However, the strategies are different, being more or less aggressive, guerrilla or headhunting, proactive or reactive, oriented towards internal or external sources of recruitment etc.

Trends and Benefits
of Using Technology in Recruitment

The recruitment procedures, methods, techniques and tools are all aimed at finding and attracting potential candidates, according to job specifications, choosing those who correspond to the desired profile and maintaining motivation, their interest in the jobs and in the institution.

Each organisation uses those recruitment methods that will ensure attracting the best candidates able to contribute, once employed, to successfully fulfil its mission. However, regardless of the methods chosen, all entail including the new technology, both in the early stages of the recruitment process and later in the selection of candidates.

The most common way of using the new technology is represented by the companies' websites and by the recruitment portals.

The **websites** of the institutions/organisations/companies have become key drivers for sending messages and creating the employer *brand*. Potential candidates can send directly their CVs or ask for additional information. Recruitment advertisements placed in the *Careers* section are often highly sought, as well as the information about the organisation – activities, results, culture, working conditions etc. The image of the institution or company concerned is very important for attracting *"talents"*.

Regarding **specialised recruitment websites**, they can belong to a particular organisation, such as the military organisation, or they can be general *jobs websites*

open to all employers and to those who are looking for a job. In the second case, the recruitment websites successfully replace the human resource agencies, the costs being greatly reduced for both candidates and employers. Furthermore, it is a good source of information regarding the professional offer, and the CV placement is much easier than through post or the submission to the employer's office.

It is a fact that more and more people looking for a job use the Internet. The access to large databases, the search of the most convenient offer or of the most suitable candidates, the time and resources saving have led to the success of recruitment sites. In Romania, the most visited[6] (according to the ranking of August 2016 conducted by *www.trafic.ro*) are the following: *www.myjob.ro*, *www.hipo.ro* followed away by *www.folderjobs.ro* (search engine) *www.ofertelocuridemunca.ro* and *www.jobsbynet.ro*.

The most interesting phenomenon regarding the recruitment is now known as **social media**. I do not know if it is fair to say that the development of the online environment has led to the development of social media or vice versa, the popularity and spread of the applications embedded in social media have led to unprecedented extension of the online environment. The phrase *"social media"* includes social networks, blogs, forums, online media, email, file sharing applications, mobile applications etc.

If the global number of Internet users[7] exceeded 3.4 billion (46% of world population), social media users are over 2.3 billion, mobile phone users are about 3.8 billion. Facebook seems to be the absolute leader, with over 1.5 billion users. Other successful social platforms are: Twitter, Instagram, Google and LinkedIn ++.

In Romania[8] there are currently over 8.5 million Facebook accounts (estimate 9 million by the end of 2016), 1.8 million LinkedIn accounts (network specialised in recruitment), about 820,000 YouTube accounts 380,000 Twitter accounts and about 89,000 blogs. Most users are young (but no age limit), and 59.7% of the Facebook[9] users are aged between 13-34 years, in that falling the recruitment main target group for military career.

All this represents a huge potential for recruitment, and particularly in the case of the military recruitment, a *"territory"* still little explored and exploited, although beginning with 2012, the Ministry of National Defence holds several Facebook

---

[6] See http://www.trafic.ro/vizitatori/top-siteuri-locuri-de-munca-recrutare-online-between 22.08.2016-28.08.2016.

[7] See http://wearesocial.com/uk/special-reports/digital-in-2016

[8] See https://manafu.ro/02/facebook-romania

[9] See https://facebrands.ro.demografice.html

pages and Twitter accounts and YouTube that belong to the structures of various echelons, to the education military institutions, and to some public figures from the MoD leadership. Among these pages there are also the pages called **Recrutare MApN** on Facebook and Twitter, operational since February 2016.

Social media is a medium of promotion that cannot be ignored by military recruiters, especially since many social networks are interconnected, which means that a message posted on Facebook, for instance, may be sent on Twitter. From the promotion of organisations websites and recruitment ads to posters, photos and videos, video presentations (via YouTube), anything may be used in recruitment.

Moreover, the Internet in general is an area where technology and imagination meet happily to support marketing strategies and advertising organisations. Although advertising on the Internet is not costless, the advantages of an advertising campaign in the virtual environment are significant if we consider the numerous audience, the large amount of information conveyed, the rapid spread of the message, the impact over the youth, the real-time feedback and the possibility of transmitting the message to the selected audience anywhere, anytime, 24/7.

Although **electronic mail** is an ordinary form of using the Internet, it can be considered a valuable aid in recruitment. By e-mail newsletters can be transmitted, recruiter-candidate connection is ensured, and various notifications such as the data scheduled for the interview/selection or for the results can be sent.

In recent years increasingly sophisticated **mobile phones** have been used so that the Internet access using mobile phones has increased exponentially. Smartphone (iPhone variant) and **tablet** are currently true computers and all major websites have a mobile version. In the street, at work, on the bus, at home, everyone seems absorbed by the small screen.

Mobile devices have become dominant in the digital world as the price has dropped and the availability of mobile data connection has increased. Over 51% of the world's population own mobile phones and nearly 2.7 billion of them have active accounts on social media platforms for mobile. A study by GlobalWebIndex shows that by 2019 mobile phones will become the main devices that will access the Internet[10]. **Mobile messaging apps** such as WhatsApp have become increasingly popular among users.

---

[10] See http://wearesocial.com/uk/special-reports/digital-in-2016/04/mobile-to-become-dominant-device-by-2019

All these existing global trends are manifest, of course, in our country, too. Young people are inclined to use mobile technologies when looking for a job or want to contact recruiters, while it is more difficult for recruiters to adapt to these new challenges, sometimes for purely bureaucratic reasons. However, as long as it is not necessary to sit in front of a personal computer connected to the Internet to get informed and to communicate quickly, recruiters must take into account the advantages and the spread of mobile devices, because any new potential candidate matters.

In recruitment, **video technology** seems to have a say. One of the newest trends is the *"video recruitment"*, namely the publication of a vacancy is accompanied by a small film about the company, job, about the work that the prospective employees will actually do, so that candidates make informed choices. In other words, a kind of *"sample"* available to those interested. For an employer as the military organisation it is not very difficult. The film can also be uploaded to YouTube and accessed through a link, or even posted on its website.

The experience that we have in administrating the page **Recrutare MApN** shows that the most popular photos and videos are the genuine ones, even a little striking, showing the military profession in essence, rough sometimes, spectacular other times, which suggests danger, courage, adventure, the use of modern, sophisticated combat techniques. Against this background, the *"soft"* materials, portraying charismatic military women or soldiers with their families, for example, are capable of arousing vivid emotion. Certainly, 10,000 leaflets would not have the same effect as a video presentation or video clip containing well-chosen and filmed images, placed on YouTube, Facebook or other sites.

Video interviews and **online tests** are practices used by some employers to reduce the list of potential candidates and to keep those who meet the requirements. Finally, it will reach to the classical face-to-face meeting, but with a reasonable number of candidates or, anyway, with the best of them.

This method of filtration saves time and money for candidates and employers. However, it can be currently applied in recruiting military personnel only in pre-computerised testing, namely a placement test conducted at the information-recruitment office, in order to achieve professional orientation and decrease the number of candidates who will be tested for selection in the evaluation centres.

Of course, the impact of technology as well as the trend of its application in recruitment is a subject that can be dealt with in a much more complex manner and in several respects.

In fact, the recruitment process itself has not changed, but the incorporation of new technology is an objective and irreversible process, which requires openness and a greater adaptation effort from organisations and, in particular, more efforts from recruiters than from candidates.

Foresights – Half Jokingly, Half Seriously

For military recruitment that means to provide a large number of candidates for a particular military branch, as well as to verify the fulfilment of complex conditions and to maintain the motivation of candidates, technology is essential but, ironically, not enough.

The military recruitment, although it should take advantage as more as possible from technological innovations, cannot abandon the classic system (promotion, verification, assessment, interviewing etc.) or the conventional methods, such as visits to schools and colleges, direct contact with candidates, events, participation in job fairs etc.

The direct, face-to-face contact will continue to be necessary and it will be possible to be replaced only in part by on-line contact, in the early phases of the recruitment process. The registrations and dossiers of candidates will be made face-to-face, while informing and attracting candidates can benefit most from the advantages of high technology. Everything related to marketing and advertising involves using cutting-edge technology.

Also, processing of information and files, pre-testing of candidates for professional orientation can benefit from everything that IT has made available to us in order to make our work more efficient and much easier.

Being a social recruitment guaranteed by the government, having a major impact on national security, we cannot rely on excuses such as lack of the military profession attractiveness, or socio-economic, demographic and political unfriendly conditions. As long as we do not use in a targeted and intelligent manner all the means made available by technology, we will not know if we have or not a sufficient number of candidates and we cannot say that the military profession has become really unattractive. The world is changing, strategies are changing, recruitment has become an industry, so an innovative vision on military recruitment is not only recommended, it is even mandatory.

Although recruitment and technology are topics that inspire much seriousness, I would end up with a joke: how long will it take until we seek the candidates with GPS? Or, who knows, even a future version of Google glasses (who are now in the second generation) will be part of the standard equipment designed for recruiters. Perhaps the dream of any serious and pretentious employer

(as the military institution is) is a kind of *"RoboRec"* (a *RoboCop* specialised in recruitment) able to quickly locate skilled candidates and, dispelling any competition, retain them for the benefit of their organisation, in this way saving significant human and financial resources. Perhaps not after a long time, we will open the first virtual recruitment office, through which will be pre-selected and counselled thousands of candidates simultaneously.

Until then, all we have to do is to use what technology and, in particular, information technology provides us in order to make from the promotional and recruitment activities an occupation that is efficient, pleasant and emblematic for the current image of the military institution.

Not candidates have to come after us, but we must go where they are, and now most of them are on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, Google+, blogs and forums, sites of jobs. Otherwise, waiting for candidates will resemble more and more... waiting for Godot.

Rapid technological development has taken us quite often by surprise, not due to its spectacular character, but because of the speed at which it permanently installs in our lives, forcing us to rapidly adapt, changing our way of thinking and lifestyle. This obliges us to continually use our creativity and keep looking in the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. ***, *Concepția sistemului de promovare a profesiei militare, recrutare și selecție a personalului militar profesionalizat, pe timp de pace*, Human Resource Management Directorate, București, 2010.

2. ***, *Strategia de promovare a profesiei militare în perioada 2016 – 2020*, Human Resource Management Directorate, București, 2016.

Web Resources

- https://business.linkedin.com/talent-solution/resourcess/job-trends
- www.cariereonline.ro
- www.humanresources.com
- www.markmedia.ro
- www.recruitingtrends.com/REC/
- www.redorbit.com/news/technology
- www.toprecruitersecret.com

THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES CAMPAIGN IN 1916
– Controversial Decisions in the First Month of the War –

Colonel (r.) Dr Ion GIURCĂ

The Romanian Armed Forces painful defeat in the 1916 Campaign was rooted in the decision taken in Periş, on 2/15 September 1916. However, the Romanian soldier bravery, heroism, and spirit of self-sacrifice, the firmness of some commanders of regiments, divisions, army corps, and armed forces, of the staff officers, as well as the material and military support provided by the allies, all contributed to the stabilisation of the situation on the Romanian front in December 1916. Most of the armed forces were concentrated in Moldova, where the difficult process of reorganisation had to start. According to the author, in Periş there were not discussed aspects of military command but of political and military decision. Morally, the Prime Minister of Romania had the obligation and the necessary levers to impose his point of view.

***Keywords**: offensive; Bulgaria; command structures; campaign plan; Turtucaia*

Romania entered the First World War following the political and military initiative that had as a decisive moment the signing, on 4/17 August 1916, of the political and military agreements with the Entente states, documents that, considering their provisions, generated the hope that they could ensure the conditions to successfully conduct the military operations provided in the campaign plan, known as *Hypothesis Z*, an old project of operations, updated in the summer of 1916, as issues appeared regarding the collaboration and the military cooperation with Russia concerning the actions in Dobruja, as well as with England and France on the matter of the expeditionary corps in Thessalonica. In the campaign plan completed and implemented in the summer of 1916 it was stipulated that the goal of the war in which Romania was to participate was *"to fulfil our national ideal, namely the nation unification. The conquest of the territories inhabited by Romanians, which are today incorporated*

Colonel (r.) Dr Ion Giurcă – Adjunct Professor, *"Carol I"* National Defence University, Bucureşti.

in the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, must be the fruit of war. To achieve this goal, the majority of our forces, the 1st, the 2nd Armies as well as the Army North will operate in Transylvania, Banat and Hungary, attacking Budapest in the general direction. The Army South (the 3rd) will ensure freedom of action for the majority of the forces, defending the national territory and rejecting the attacks which the Bulgarians would undertake from the South"[1].

The analysis of the 1916 Romanian Armed Forces campaign, in terms of the achievements and failures in the operations and battles carried out, should consider the political and military goals of the war in which our country was involved; otherwise, it starts from premises that may result in conclusions and assessments dominated by subjectivism.

Simultaneously with the declaration of war sent to Vienna through diplomatic channels, King Ferdinand I sent the Proclamation to the Romanian people and the High Order of the Day no. 1 to the armed forces, in which it was revealed: *"I have called you to carry your flags over the borders where our brothers are expecting you with eagerness and with the heart filled with hope. The spirits of our important leaders, Michael the Brave and Stephen the Great, whose remains lie in the earth that you will liberate, lead you to victory, as worthy descendants of the soldiers who won victories in Războieni, Călugăreni and Plevna. You will fight alongside the great nations we joined. A fierce battle will await you. Let us manfully endure its hardships and, with God's help, the victory will be ours. Show that you are worthy of ancient glory. Over the centuries, a whole nation will bless and glorify you"[2].*

The Mobilisation of the Headquarters

On the same day, in compliance with the High Decree no. 2784, it was ordered the military mobilisation, starting at 12 o'clock, on the night of 14/15 August 1916, the order of battle being determined by the mobilisation plan[3]. The transition of the armed forces from peace to war is generally a complex, complicated, difficult activity and action, especially when it must be conducted simultaneously with some operations and battles. Given the situation in the summer of 1916, mobilisation was organised under specific conditions determined by previous measures meant to gradually raise the combat readiness of some units and large units forming cover groups that received offensive missions in Transylvania

---

[1] *România în războiul mondial 1916-1919, Documente-anexe*, vol. I, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Națională, București, 1934, p. 111.

[2] Apud Neculai Moghior, Ion Dănilă, Leonida Moise, *Ferdinand I, cuvânt pentru întregirea neamului românesc*, Editura Metropol, București, 1994, p. 35.

[3] *Monitorul Oficial*, no. 107 on 14 August 1916, p. 5401.

and defensive ones on the Danube and in southern Dobruja. The cover groups that were established in the direction of the passes in the Eastern and Southern Carpathians (119 battalions and 77 batteries with 135,000 people) represented 1/3 of the troops provided in the mobilisation plan of the units and large units that had to pass to offensive in Transylvania, while in the south, in early August 1916, 31 battalions, 10 squadrons and 25 batteries, about 40,000 people, were in the disposition. Specific to the south of the country, given the presence of the 3rd Bulgarian Army near Dobruja border, in the first days of August 1916, the 17th and 9th Infantry Divisions were secretly mobilised to defend Turtucaia and Silistra bridgeheads.

If regarding the mobilisation of the units and large units the activities were conducted according to the plans, the human and material resources being received in due time, it is important to analyse how such actions were conducted in the case of the Great General Headquarters, the army commands, the army corps and divisions.

The mobilisation of these structures along with the whole army, in the conditions of the transition to the offensive in Transylvania and of a predictable attack of the Central Powers from the territory of Bulgaria, was an error that should be considered when analysing the Romanian armed forces operations and battles in the first month of the war.

The mobilisation of the Great General Headquarters, which was *"the concept and management body of the operations depending directly and immediately on the Romanian Operations Army Command"*[4], was executed in accordance with the provisions included in the *Instructions on the mobilisation of the Armed Forces General Headquarters*[5], which stipulated the establishment of a management structure at strategic level (the active and the sedentary part) as well as of the armed forces commands.

The duration of the Great General Headquarters mobilisation was 10 days, a long period of time if we consider the pace of the military actions in the First World War and the necessity to conduct not only the offensive operations started during the night of 14/15-27/28 August 1916 but also the defensive ones to respond to the 3rd Bulgarian Army offensive in southern Dobruja launched during the night of 18/19 August-31 August/1 September 1919, although the 1st Echelon (operations, transport and secretariat sections, headquarters and telegraph-post services) was mobilised in the evening of 15/28 August and installed in Periș, in the building

---

[4] Romanian Military Archives (AMR), *Marele Stat Major Collection,* file no. 1041, p. 239.
[5] *Idem*, *Marele Stat Major Collection - Section 3 Operations*, file no. 471, pp. 116-120.

of the Crown Domains Administration. The 2nd Echelon of the Great General Headquarters mobilisation ended on 25 August/6 September 1916, fact which aggravated the planning and conduct of the operations which had not been included in the campaign plan. The situation in August 1916 demonstrated that the management structure had to be mobilised in secret, and at the date of the war declaration it should have had all the elements deployed and connected in the established places, which would have ensured a better fulfilment of the tasks that emerged from the development of the military operations. The mobilisation of the Great General Headquarters in secret required the same action for the telephony, telegraphy and radio subunits, found in the composition of the Specialities Battalion, which served the structure.

The above mentioned aspect is true in the case of the armed forces commands, new structures in the Romanian military body, which had as mobilisation term 6 days. The mobilisation of the armed forces commands in Bucharest (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Armies) and Bacău (the Army North) was executed with unacceptable delay, given that they had to conduct the military operations the moment they received the order to launch the offensive in Transylvania.

The relative simple structure of the armed forces command (commander, staff service–chief of staff, under chief staff, operations–intelligence office, communications office, secretariat office, armament and ammunition services, administration, health, telegraph-postal, headquarters services), the reduced number of the personnel, the materials and means of transport required for the mobilisation term to have a short time, and for the campaign plan to establish the first location for the headquarters deployment. However, the aspects as they were planned had a negative development. On the day the mobilisation plan had to be implemented, the headquarters organisational chart was not established. Therefore, only on the evening of 15/28 August was the armed forces order of battle completed, including the name of some generals and officers to be appointed as commanders of staff officers. It was also necessary a period of time, which was considered long for the existing situation, to issue and transmit the orders to those concerned. The worst was that the established order of battle determined the movement of a large number of generals and officers in different positions the moment when the armed forces mobilisation was executed and the first military operations started. On this issue, over years, General Radu R. Rosetti wrote about the consequences of such decisions: *"It was a shame that the constant changes made among the commanders of the regiments and divisions resulted in the fact that the moment the hostilities started almost no commander from those who had built the fortifications in different sectors and who knew well the place*

topography was in that sector. Thus, for instance, General Gheorghe Văleanu, who had worked in the Danube Valley, had at mobilisation a command in Bucharest region, General I. Dragalina, from the Prahova Valley, was moved to Turnu Severin; and General Paraschiv Vasilescu, who had built admirable fortifications in Bran region, was moved to Moldova. The movements had two bad consequences. The first was that the new commanders of cover groups did not know as well as their predecessors the sector topography hesitating and advancing too slowly when they received the order to cross the border on the night of 14/15 August 1916. The second was that when withdrawing from Transylvania, the commanders of some divisions (the Câmpulung case), not knowing the location of the fortifications made in the years 1915-1916, did not use them"[6].

The armed forces commanders were appointed late, thus being present at the headquarters, taking command and understanding the situation only a few days after entering the war. The case of the 2nd Army, the one of General Alexandru Averescu is known and presented even in his memoirs. Notified of his appointment on 17/30 August 1916, he had to take the command of the troops the next day, but because the command mobilisation was scheduled for 20 August/2 September, according to his own confession, *"I left Craiova only when I knew that at least a part of my army headquarters could function"*[7]. It is a proof that it was either an act of indiscipline or one of comfortableness, or concern for solving some personal matters first and then the ones related to the development of the military operations.

The commander of the 2nd Army arrived in Ploieşti, the place established for the headquarters, on 21 August/3 September, where he met General Dimitrie Cotescu, newly appointed Commander of the 2nd Army Corps, who knew nothing about the situation of the subordinate troops, and who had to go to Sinaia, where it was the headquarters of his great unit. Only on 22 August/4 September 1916, General Alexandru Averescu practically took the command of the 2nd Army and organised the command activity.

After two days of actual exercise of the command of the 2nd Army he was asked to come to the Great General Headquarters and appointed Commander of the 3rd Army, given the Turtucaia defeat had generated great concern at political and military level. General Alexandru Averescu replaced General Mihai Aslan, who reached a high position in the military hierarchy without graduating from the Superior

---

[6] General Radu R. Rosetti, *Mărturisiri (1914-1919)*, Editura Modelism, Bucureşti, 1997, p. 69.
[7] Marshal Alexandru Averescu, *Notiţe zilnice din război*, vol. 2, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 11.

War School, his place to the 2nd Army command being taken by General Grigore Crăiniceanu, who was called among the active personnel after he had been put in reserve in 1913. Moreover, when he was moved to the 3rd Army command, General Alexandru Averescu required and obtained that General Constantin Cristescu to be appointed as Chief of Staff at this structure, and General George Mărdărescu to be sent in the same position for the 2nd Army. Therefore, the complete change of the 2nd and 3rd Armies command had as a result the fact that the commanders and chiefs of staff knew the situation of the troops they took in subordination only partially, did not know the field in detail, were not emotionally connected with the structures they had to lead. It is one of many negative examples related to the appointment to positions of great responsibility of some superior officers and generals.

However, it was a very well managed case, the one at the Army North. Since the period of neutrality, General Constantin Prezan, the commander of the 4th Corps from Iaşi, decided to install his headquarters in Bacău, in order to be closer to the troops that had become cover groups for the passes in the Eastern Carpathians. He constituted his lead team having as Chief of Staff Colonel Iacob Zadik, starting on 1/14 October 1914, and as Chief of Operations Office Captain Ion Antonescu, from the day of 1/14 April 1915. They remained in the same positions after the establishment of the Army North. This army situation can be considered a model for solving a problem of command at the entry into war, thus being explained the successes of this structure in the autumn of 1916, in both offensive and defensive phases of the campaign.

The historians of the 1916 campaign have revealed the errors in conception and execution regarding the armed forces transition from peace to war. Analysing the appointment to the positions in the armed forces commands, General G.A. Dabija pointed out that *"the only one who was in the right place was the commander of the Army North, and the one whose situation was most critical was the commander of the 3rd Army"*[8].

Realistically, the good theoretician having experience in war, General G.A. Dabija considered, correctly, that *"The best organisation is the one in which the transition from peace to war is made without convulsions without big changes. Only the one who prepares the armed forces in peacetime, therefore knowing them, will be able to command them, to lead them well to war. This principle has been neglected by the organiser"*[9].

---

[8] General G.A. Dabija, *Armata română în războiul mondial 1916-1918*, vol. I, Editura I.G. Hertz, Bucureşti, p. 161.

[9] *Ibidem.*

General G.A. Dabija plea, without generalising, was for ensuring command continuity since peacetime, indicating the place and the role of commanders in ensuring a good morale of the units: *"The transition to war would have found them in the midst of their own units, so they would not have been separated, once with the mobilisation, from those spiritual, intangible ties, which should not be deprived of their importance in the life of the entire military body; moreover, if this point of view had been that of the organiser and if he had applied it in time, meaning that future armed forces commanders had been appointed at least a few months before, they would have had the time to display those qualities, and it would not have happened the strangeness that a future armed forces commander would not be allowed, not even a few days before the war, to visit a reinforced point that he would have to defend in the war, because, through this visit, he could offend the army corps commander in whose territory that point was found"*[10].

Therefore, the conception of the mobilisation execution was partially in disagreement with the operations project that was implemented, showing that between the structures of the Great General Staff was not a collaboration and cooperation in order to ensure a unified conception, under all aspects, on the way that armed forces would be engaged in military operations. The result was visible in just a few days.

Loss of Strategic Initiative

On the night of 14/15-27/28 August 1916, in accordance with the provisions of Directive no. 1 for the implementation of the campaign plan, the 18 cover groups established along the border of the Eastern and Southern Carpathians started the offensive along the passes, which provided a rapid penetration in the depressions Bilbor, Gurghiului, Ciuc, Braşov, Sibiu and Haţeg, where it had to take place the concentration of the mobilised large units and then, from these areas, to begin the offensive in the set directions. In the south of the country, the 3rd Army had a mission that *"is of great importance because, in addition to defending the national territory, the 3rd Army operations will help indirectly the ones of the armies which will operate in Transylvania, backing them and helping their communications with the country"*[11].

Despite the inherent difficulties in any beginning, the units and large units established to operate in Transylvania fulfilled most of their tasks, developed offensive in the territory defended by the enemy and occupied successively

---

[10] *Ibidem*, p. 162.
[11] Apud *România în războiul mondial 1916-1919. Documente-anexe*, vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 514.

alignments that were a good starting base for offensive or, if necessary, for transition to defence.

The Bulgarian 3rd Army transition to offensive in southern Dobruja, concentrating its efforts on the bridgehead from Turtucaia, had as a result the defeat of our troops, which generated a great concern in Bucharest and at the Romanian Great General Headquarters[*]. Starting on 24 August/ 6 September 1916, the day when the bridgehead from Turtucaia was lost, with almost the entire 17th Infantry Division, the problem of the development of the operations and the battles, in accordance with the campaign plan implemented, became uncertain.

The vigorous offensive of the Bulgarian 3rd Army imposed emergency measures on strengthening the Romanian 3rd Army as well as on obtaining support from the allies, especially the Russian Army.

A first step was to replace General Mihai Aslan with General Alexandru Averescu at the command of the 3rd Army, on 25 August/7 September, context in which, in a discussion with General Dumitru Iliescu and King Ferdinand I, the latter expressed the opinion that *"as long as we have troops in Dobruja able to fight, such an undertaking made by the Bulgarians* (to cross the Danube and to get closer to Bucharest, A.N.) *seems unlikely and in any case very risky and hence less dangerous for us"*[12].

However, on the day Turtucaia was conquered by the Bulgarian troops, King Ferdinand I sent to Emperor Nicolae II, through General Constantin Coandă, a telegram that read: *"I have engaged with all my forces against the enemies of the Entente, under the promise that I will be supported on all fronts. I am attacked in Dobruja by important superior artillery forces and I am pretty sure that they will be considerably backed and that, consequently, the Bulgarians are willing if needed to sacrifice something on their South front. I ask Your Majesty to support me on the trans-Danubian front and to cause offensive on other fronts, as agreed, in order to ease the pressure exerted on me"*[13].

The telegram on 24 August/6 September 1916, signed by King Ferdinand I, marked the beginning of an extensive correspondence between the Romanian political and military authorities and the Russian ones on the situation on the Romanian

---

[*] The Battle of Turtucaia and the military operations in Dobruja in 1916 have been the theme of many papers and studies since the First World War period. We consider the following as the most important and pertinent of them: *România în Războiul Mondial 1916-1919*, vol. 1, Imprimeriile Naţionale, Bucureşti, 1934, Chapter VII, pp. 409-672; General G.A. Dabija, *Armata română în războiul mondial 1916-1918*, vol. I, Editura I.G. Hertz, Bucureşti, f.a., pp. 165-459.

[12] Marshal Alexandru Averescu, *Notiţe zilnice din război*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[13] AMR, *949/1916 Collection*, file no. 719, p. 6.

front, in general, and on the one in Dobruja, in particular. The next day, General Mihail Vasilievici Alekseev, the Chief of the Great General Headquarters of Russia, sent to the Romanian party, through Colonel A. Tatarinov, a message inviting to peace and calm, underlining that Turtucaia defeat was not a serious threat to the general situation on the Romanian front. The Romanian Great General Headquarters was alerted about the fact that *"maybe it will even be necessary to change the present action plan"*[14], being suggested the idea of concentrating in the area of Silistra units and large units from Transylvania armies, thus forming a group of forces that could launch offensive against the Bulgarians. In such circumstances, estimating that the enemy could not concentrate powerful forces at short notice to attack the Romanian troops in Transylvania, it was necessary to adopt some measures for the transition to defence on a favourable alignment. Furthermore, it was suggested that, in order to resume the offensive in Transylvania, the centre of gravity of the military operations should be moved northward so that by a closer cooperation between Russian and Romanian troops the Sighet-Sibiu alignment could be conquered. It was quite clear that the Russian Great General Headquarters considered that the situation in Dobruja could be solved by the existing forces of the Romanian and Russian armies with the help of the forces transferred from the three armies from Ardeal, and the offensive in Transylvania could be resumed by concentrating the efforts of Romanian and Russian troops towards the Someş Gate, suggesting that there was no possibility to send new Russian troops in the area between the Danube and the Sea, as wished by the Romanian part.

General M.V. Alekseev, by the telegram sent to Periş, drew attention to the impossibility for the Thessalonica forces, which were under General Maurice Sarrail command, to influence the actions of the Bulgarian troops on the Danube, insisting on his requirement to form a group of Romanian forces in the area of Silistra: *"I repeat: the concentration in this area of powerful forces (having high potential to strike) belonging to the troops capable of performing a manoeuvre is the imperative solution dictated by the circumstances"*[15].

The next day, General Constantin Coandă transmitted at the Romanian Great General Headquarters a report regarding the discussions he had had with General M.V. Alekseev, which revealed an alternative action in Transylvania: *"In my opinion, one division, an active unit, should be taken from the 1st Army and from the Army North and two divisions from the 2nd Army, which, concentrated with the troops in Dobruja, are eight divisions for manoeuvre in the area of Silistra, Dobrici. The offensive*

---

[14] Apud *România în războiul mondial, 1916-1919*, vol. II, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Națională, București, 1936, p. 9.

[15] *Ibidem*, p. 10.

in Transylvania should be maintained. However, as the Austrians are not concentrated, fact which could happen only in 2-3 weeks, we will see what to do then. The offensive in Transylvania will continue on the front Dorna Vatra-Braşov with the Army North. A part of the 2nd Army could help the 1st Army offensive, covering the passes and the communications towards the Olt"[16].

The message of the Chief of the Russian Great General Headquarters was intended to inspire peace and trust, and to promote the idea of attacking the Bulgarian troops in Dobruja, considering that *"The passages from Silistra and Cernavodă make manoeuvre possible. Once 8 divisions are concentrated in Dobruja, in ten days everything can be covered and the offensive can be launched. Pending troops should fortify and the offensive will be conducted with 8 divisions"*[17]. Until 2/15 September 1916, the intense correspondence of the Romanian authorities with the Russian[18] ones was focused on the Romanian party requests to sent Russian troops on the front in Dobruja to restore the situation in this part of the country so that the offensive in Transylvania can continue. The Russian party response was favourable and encouraging, promising the deployment of a division in the shortest time possible and providing explanations related to the impossibility of removing forces from the front in Galicia, where a major offensive was expected.

The talks that General Constantin Coandă had with the military representatives of Russia and France led him to the conclusion, transmitted to I.I.C. Brătianu on 27 August/9 September: *"I believe that for the moment it is necessary to rely only on our own forces"*[19].

On 30 August/12 September 1916, a telegram from General Josef Joffre, written on 27 August/9 September, arrived at Periş, through which the Romanian party was informed that *"the Army of the Orient, which currently executes the necessary concentrations, will take, without delay, a vigorous offensive against the Bulgarians. However, it would be a mistake to believe that these attacks will necessarily result in decreasing the Bulgarian forces concentrated in the Danube Valley or even in preventing the Bulgarians from moving a few troops from the Greek border, if they decide to face any risk on this front. The only way to cover the southern border of Romania seems to be that of concentrating the majority of the forces on the southern front as quickly as possible in order to launch a vigorous offensive against the Bulgarian divisions, still few in number. The offensives in concordance of the Thessalonica Army*

---

[16] AMR, *949/1916 Collection*, file no. 716, p. 2.
[17] *România în războiul mondial 1916-1919*, vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[18] For details see also Vasile Popa, *Misiunea generalului Coandă la Stavka (1916-1917)*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2010, pp. 132-143.
[19] AMR, *949/1916 Collection*, file no. 716, p. 9.

and the ones of the Russian-Romanian forces will deprive the enemy of its freedom of action and will ensure success. I do not stop from animating in the same way the General who commands the Army of the Orient"[20]. The idea was resumed two days later when another telegram from General Joseph Joffre was received in Periș, imperatively requesting that the Romanian Great General Headquarters should provide a solution for the situation in Dobruja, pointing out that: *"Under the current circumstances it is a necessity for the Romanian armed forces to consolidate the situation in Dobruja. To achieve this result, it seems necessary to concentrate powerful units in sufficient number on the right bank of the Danube as soon as possible, in order to suddenly achieve undeniable numerical superiority. Backing the Romanian troops in Dobruja will probably result in temporarily slowing the offensives in Transylvania. However, in my opinion, the initial plan should be resumed with all the intensity as soon as the situation will be restored in Dobruja"*[21].

The advance of the Central Powers troops in Bulgaria worried the Romanian Great General Headquarters, and the message sent by General Constantin Coandă was clear enough to adopt immediate measures. Therefore, under the circumstances of removing some forces from the composition of the armies in Transylvania, on 27 August/9 September, it was transmitted the Order of Operations no. 451, which stated: *"The situation on the Southern front got serious after the Turtucaia fall and after the enemy was backed, so the general offensive in Transylvania is postponed for the time being until further dispositions"*[22].

Having the responsibility for solving the situation in Dobruja, on 28 August/ 10 September 1916, General Alexandru Averescu sent a memoir to the command, in which he revealed that *"The Romanian armed forces being called to fight on two fronts they should adopt the defensive form on one of them and take an energetic and vigorous offensive action on the other front as soon as possible. The front chosen for the defensive attitude was the one in the North"*[23]. In the memoir the arguments for the transition to defensive in Transylvania and to offensive on the Southern front were presented. *"Fixed on the attitude on the two borders, it is necessary to take action accordingly, in perfect order as well as in a very short period of time: because the success of the plan that will be adopted will largely depend on the promptness with which it will be managed. Any delay in making the decision as well as in its implementation could lead to negative results that can be fatal. The conditions in which the armed forces are today make difficult a vigorous offensive action in any direction"*[24].

---

[20] *România în războiul mondial 1916-1919*, vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[21] *Ibidem.*
[22] Apud Generalul G.A. Dabija, *Armata română în războiul mondial (1916-1918)*, vol. I, *op. cit.*, p. 359.
[23] Marshal Alexandru Averescu, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[24] *Ibidem.*

The point of view expressed by General Alexandru Averescu in his memoir sent to the Great General Headquarters was contrary to the one from 25 August/ 7 September, but perhaps it should not have been a surprise. Full of ambitions, proud, haloed with the position of Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and the success obtained south of the Danube during the campaign in 1913, General Alexandru Averescu wanted to prepare in his area of responsibility a decisive offensive action, on condition to stop the offensive from Transylvania, where *"only the necessary resources to deal with the current situation"*[25] should have remained.

The evolution of the military situation in Dobruja, and the messages coming from Russian and French allies generated new concerns for the Romanian Great General Headquarters that immediately sent to the armies in Transylvania the *"Order of Operations no. 4"*, which indicated that *"The situation on the Southern front now requires that the armies on the Northern and North-Western front should remain in defensive. For the defensive to be as strong as possible, it is necessary for the current front to be shortened and for the 1st and 2nd Armies and the Army North to be closely connected. To achieve it, the 2nd Army will advance and will conquer the Olt Valley and the Homorod one between Făgăraş and Homorod Almaş, being then intensively backed"*[26].

General Alexandru Averescu report as well as some interventions and assessments of the allies representatives at the Romanian Great General Headquarters resulted in a War Council meeting on 2/15 September 1916 in Periş, where the Romanian Great General Headquarters was deployed, which was attended by political and military decision-making factors (King Ferdinand I, Prime Minister I.I.C. Brătianu, Generals Dumitru Iliescu, Alexandru Averescu, Ioan Culcer and Constantin Prezan). After analysing the military situation under the influence of the requirements and the suggestions made by the French and Russian strategic management structures, it was decided to stop the offensive on the front in Transylvania *(figure 1)* and to establish a powerful group of forces in Southern Muntenia to execute *"grand style"* action south of the Danube in order to remove the threat from the south by defeating the Bulgarian 3rd Army. The War Council had a complex course as opposing viewpoints were expressed and considered by the allies and the Romanian generals.

Before the War Council meeting, Colonel Ioan Răşcanu, Chief of the Operations Section, developed a *"Memoir on the war situation and the provisions that are to be implemented on 2 September 1916"*[27], in which were presented: the probable future

---

[25] *Ibidem.*
[26] General G.A. Dabija, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

Figure 1: The offensive of the Romanian Armies in Transylvania (15 August – 13 September 1916)

attitude of the Bulgarian troops in Dobruja, the forces available to the Romanian 3rd Army, the development of the battles in Dobruja in the next 7-8 days (active defensive), the requests to formulate to the Russian Great General Headquarters, the actions of the 3rd Army and of the Danube Division on the river, the conception of the future actions on the front in Transylvania and the missions of the 1st, the 2nd Armies as well as of the Army North, the troops logistics situation, the measures for the mobilisation of the 1917 military contingent and the previously dispensed ones and their preparation.

For the first time it was required *"to ask the French to send us 40-50 troop officers (infantry, field and heavy artillery and pioneers), experienced in the practice of modern warfare, in order to conduct, in its general alignments, the training of the recruits according to the new demands of war"*[28]. I have not found information indicating that the memoir was known by the participants in the meeting. It is possible that only General Dumitru Iliescu and King Ferdinand I knew its content, given that they were the only ones who took note of the internal documents of the Great General Headquarters.

The meeting started with the exposure of the military situation on the fronts in Transylvania and Dobruja, continuing with the presentation of the Russian and French allies' points of view, made by General Dumitru Iliescu, followed by the expression of ideas against the situation created by some participants. The protagonists of the debates were Generals Alexandru Averescu and Constantin Prezan, who presented different points of view, with military arguments, referring also to the cooperation with Russian troops in Dobruja, Bukovina and Galicia.

The point of view expressed by General Alexandru Averescu was almost identical with the one of Generals Joseph Joffrre and M.V. Alekseev, so it was difficult to appreciate whether those proposed were the result of a personal analysis or the appropriation of the two ideas. The fact is that the idea sustained was to the advantage of the proud General, who then, and not only, argued that solving the *"strategic problem"* where he commanded the forces was vital for the country's fate. In a more emotional than reasonable discourse, from the perspective of political and military strategic vision, General Alexandru Averescu argued insistently for the emergency of a major action on the Southern front, *"...by which the entire lost territory will be regained, making the enemy to suffer a defeat at least as painful as the one we suffered in Turtucaia"*[29].

---

[27] *România în războiul mondial 1916-1919, Documente-anexe*, vol. II, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-6.

[28] *Ibidem*, p. 5.

[29] Apud Petre Otu, *Mareşalul Alexandru Averescu. Militarul, omul politic, legenda*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 141.

So, for the one who was in command of the 3rd Army, the main objective was to defeat the enemy task force from Dobruja, in an action which, if successful, could have a positive moral effect for the troops from that geographical area and for the people from Bucharest who were concerned because of a possible action of the Bulgarians towards the Capital. It would have offered a success without finality for the general purpose of the war in which the country had been engaged.

In contrast, General Constantin Prezan expressed a different point of view, starting precisely from the political and military purpose provided in the campaign plan, from the favourable situation in which the Romanian Army troops in Transylvania found at that time to continue the offensive, and from the risks they had to face if they did not succeed in conquering some alignments to ensure the cooperation link till tactical level of the three armies, the shortening of the front line and the achievement of an adequate density of forces and means on the front and in its depth, for the first echelon divisions. There should be considered that at the moment when it was ordered to temporarily stop the offensive in Transylvania and it was prefigured a movement of the effort on the secondary action direction, the divisions had a complete combat capacity, as their mobilisation and concentration in the set districts was completed several days before, thus being created the premises for their offensive to develop at a higher pace than the previous one. In the War Council, General Constantin Prezan *"suggested that the offensive in Transylvania should be continued with energy in order to achieve the first goal set by the Great General Headquarters in the operations plan: the concentration of forces on the Middle Mureş. Dobruja had to be kept and measures should be taken to create immediately our base of operations in Moldova"*[30].

His arguments for the view expressed at Periş on 2/15 September 1916 were presented, later, in a *"Memoir"*, published also in Nicolae Iorga newspaper – *"Neamul Românesc"*: *"For the enemy it was created an unfavourable situation in Transylvania, because it had no longer the possibility to concentrate its forces in that region and to attack with them, one by one, the three Romanian Armies; the Romanian Armies front shortened significantly, which, on 2 September, was on the general line: lower valley of the Cerna, superior valleys of the Jiu and the Strei, middle and superior valley of the Olt and the Upper Mureş; if the front was pushed on the middle valley of the Mureş, there could be easy and quick manoeuvres in all directions, because once the Transylvanian plateau was in our possession, the three armies could support each other, in due time and in a useful manner;*

---

[30] *România în războiul mondial 1916-1919*, vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

it was sustained and made more easily possible the advance of Brusilov armies in the Hungarian plain"[31].

An important proposal of General Constantin Prezan, accepted by the participants at the War Council was the one regarding the beginning of the human and material resources evacuation from the areas where there were our armies in their way towards Moldova. The idea expressed by General Constantin Prezan was strictly related to his predictive thinking on a possible course of military operations on the Romanian front: *"The isolation in which we found ourselves, the unfavourable strategic situation resulting from this isolation and the lack of space for the troops which operated between the Danube and the Carpathians were sufficiently strong arguments which required us to think that a defeat was possible and therefore, our duty was to seek to improve our situation as quickly as possible, expanding space and taking measures to establish, in time, our base where the logic imposed it, namely in Moldova"*[32].

If, regarding the conception of conducting future operations, General Constantin Prezan point of view was well argued, yet his suggestions related to the rapid establishment of a new base of operations in Moldova was questionable; in the end it was demonstrated that the idea was well received and its implementation helped saving. The ideas expressed in the War Council by the Army North Commander in the context of continuing the offensive in Transylvania, some of the arguments being presented later, highlighted, somehow like General Alexandru Averescu, the place and the role of the military structure that he commanded: *"If the offensive continued in Transylvania, it would be necessary to increase the forces of this army because: it should cross the mountainous region, a very difficult one, west of the Mureş and the Superior Olt* (the Gurghiu and Harghita Mountains – A.N.)*, should contribute to the necessary operations in the Căliman massif to turn the enemy's resistance on Cârlibaba-Iacobeni front and thus ease the way of the 9th Russian Army towards the Hungarian plain, to cover our operations to the north; and finally, the region where this army should arrive was the only one in which the enemy could concentrate many forces quickly, in the event the guiding idea of the Great General Headquarters operations plan was followed and executed, namely to push the front to the Middle Mureş"*[33].

But the difference was obvious. General Constantin Prezan approach, even if it had elements of subjectivity, was in agreement with the political and military goal of the war in which we were engaged, it was the solution that could lead

---

[31] *Ibidem*, p. 16.
[32] *Ibidem*.
[33] *Ibidem*.

to its achievement, while General Alexandru Averescu supported an idea that was closer to the ones of our Russian and French allies. The French requirements were understandable, intending a significant activation of the Thessalonica front, a vain illusion if we consider the distance between the alignment from Dobruja and the one in Northern Greece as well as the fact that the lines of action on West-East axis were about 400 km far from each other, so no manoeuvre on exterior directions was expected against the Central Powers troops from the Balkans. Moreover, it is quite obvious that if the offensive in Thessalonica had been resumed towards north, the main attack would have been executed in the direction Thessalonica, Skopje, Beograd, which made impossible to achieve a surprising idea recorded by General Alexandru Averescu in his memoirs on 17/30 September 1916: *"After pushing the Mackensen army in Dobruja southward, the ultimate objective should be making contact with the Army in Thessalonica. Through this contact, the whole situation in the Balkans would be radically changed, with serious repercussions on the entire theatre of war"*[34]. A quick look at the theatre of operations in the Balkans clearly led to the conclusion that such a contact could take place after the Allied troops from Thessalonica had crossed by fighting the Rhodope and the Balkan Mountains, which, in the conditions of 1916 was impossible, if we also consider the fact that the armies of the Entente states had no initiative in the theatres of operations where they were engaged. Did the one who had taught a military geography course at the Superior War School forget what he had written in his lessons? Or was he overconfident in the English and French actions in Thessalonica and in the success of the manoeuvre at strategic level he had developed?

The Russians requirements probably had a connotation that was more political than military. We do not exclude from the analysis the possibility that the Russian political and military leadership was not interested in the success of the Romanian army, all the suggestions, promises and commitments being only formal. The assessment is based on the attitudes in October and November 1916 when the Russian troops called to intervene in support of the Romanian ones in the actions in Bran-Rucăr pass and in the battle on the Neajlov-Argeş were not engaged in combat, providing unreliable justifications, and instead they took over, at the end of November, most of the Romanian front, with the 9th, the 4th and the 6th armies, thus ensuring the implementation of an idea promoted by General M.V. Alekseev, namely to shorten the front on the Eastern Carpathians, the lower Siret, the maritime Danube alignment. The second argument

---

[34] Marshal Alexandru Averescu, *Notiţe zilnice din război, op. cit.*, p. 38.

is the position of an official of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Petrograd, someone called Polivanov, who, at the beginning of November 1916, seemed satisfied with the difficult situation in which the Romanian army was, stating: *"If the forces had been conducted in the way specified in the 1916 political and military agreement with Romania, there would have been completely established a most powerful state in the Balkans, consisting of Moldova, Muntenia, Dobruja (current Romania), Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina (acquisitions under the Treaty of 1916), with a population of nearly 13 million people. In the future, hardly had this state had any friendly feelings regarding Russia and it would have had the ambition to accomplish its national dreams in Bessarabia and in the Balkans. Consequently, the destruction of Romania's plans to become a great power, in the proportions specified, is not in opposition with the political interests of Russia"*[35]. If we corroborate the aspects mentioned in the secret French-Russian agreement from 29 July/11 August 1916, by which the two countries agree on some decisions that will be made at the peace conference to the detriment of Romania, including the territory which had to be given to our country, it can be appreciated that all the suggestions that were transmitted to Bucharest and Periș were meant to ensure the accomplishment of the two powers plans, not our urgent political and military needs.

Certainly, the offensive continuation in Transylvania and the cooperation with the 9th Russian Army troops, in the way described by General Constantin Prezan, was an advantageous solution for the two allied armies. The reality of those days demonstrated that our French and Russian allies were concerned about their political and military interests, and Romania as well as its army was only one piece in the mechanism put into operation.

The decision on the future course of action was taken, naturally, by King Ferdinand I, who showed that in the situation created after Turtucaia fall he agreed with the views expressed by the participants, which corresponded with the ones of the allies (totally those of Alexandru Averescu, partly those of Constantin Prezan), so he decided *"to create a group of armies South in order to ensure a closer unity of action between the troops south of Bucharest and those in Dobruja"*[36].

Immediately, it was issued *"Order no. 666"* of the Great General Headquarters, by Highest Order, signed by General Dumitru Iliescu, sent to General Alexandru Averescu, by which it was communicated: *"I assigned you with coordinating the actions of the 3rd Army and Army Dobruja, so you are named the Commander of Southern Army Group"*[37].

---

[35] Apud R. Seișanu, Al. Rațiu, *România în timpul războiului, 1916-1918*, fascicle 6, December 1919, p. 124.
[36] *România în războiul mondial, 1916-1919*, vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[37] *Ibidem*, p. 21.

The establishment of a new command structure – army group – was an improvisation that proved ineffective and, in some cases, generated discontents and disputes among various army commanders. In the case of Army Group "South", General Alexandru Averescu directly subordinated Russian General Andrei Medardovitovici Zaioncikowsky and General Gheorghe Văleanu, Commander of the 6th Army Corps, who was entrusted with the command of the 3rd Army but he did not have the forces and the means necessary to exercise the leadership. Therefore, the establishment of such structure generated provisional appointments in function of generals and senior officers, and the formation of a commission *"composed of Colonel Vernescu* (Commander of the 1st Heavy Artillery Brigade, A.N.), *Colonel Limburg* (Commander of the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment, A.N.), *Colonel* (Captain (N), A.N.) *Niculescu Rizea* (Commander of Underwater Defence, A.N.), *Colonel Popovici* (Commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade, A.N.), *Major Sava, Lieutenent Eng Teodorescu, chaired by General Văitoianu* (Commander of the 10th Infantry Division, A.N.), *commission that had to prepare the Danube crossing, perfecting all the operations required for the passage in eight to ten days"*[38]. Even General Alexandru Averescu had to admit that *"I have to lead, of the 21 Romanian divisions, 11, plus three Allied divisions, one Serb and two Russian, plus two cavalry divisions, one Romanian and one Russian, a total of 16 divisions, with one administrative apparatus, that of the 3rd Army, behind the whole front. For the rest of the Romanian army, consisting of 10 divisions and a cavalry division, totalling only 11 divisions, we have three military commands, each army with its own administrative apparatus. How well can the Great General Headquarters balance the works"*[39].

Leaving aside General Alexandru Averescu tendency to victimise himself, to overevaluate his place and role at that time in solving the critical situation in which the Romanian army was, the observation was real. An army command had to solve conception problems, to develop and transmit orders from a large number of units. The 3rd Army Command in Bucharest was further deployed in 22 Dr. Leuger Street (today, Constantin D. Stahi Street) near the Great General Headquarters, but in a disadvantageous position in all respects, in terms of ensuring the command liaisons and the movements execution in field, in its area of responsibility, otherwise, overloading the staff sent on ground. The improvisation with the establishment of the so-called army group extended to smaller echelons so that, temporarily,

---

[38] *Ibidem*, p. 12.
[39] Marshal Alexandru Averescu, *Notiţe zilnice din război, op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

there were created structures like *"division group"*, commanded by one of the commanders of the component divisions, usually the one in the highest rank, and in case of equal degrees, the oldest in rank.

Immediately after the Council of War, the Great General Headquarters decided that Army Group *"South"* should take offensive against the enemy troops from Dobruja to destroy them, for this purpose being reinforced with the 21st and 22nd divisions taken from the 2nd Army and with the 10th Infantry Division of the Great General Headquarters reserve. Regarding the front in Transylvania, it was ordered the troops transition to defence on the alignment they were at that moment, every army having to organise three positions of defence: the first on the alignment occupied by their forces, the second position on the alignment occupied by the coverage troops after leaving the exit of the Eastern and Southern Carpathian passes, the third on the former border. The campaign fortifications in positions 2 and 3 were to be executed, under the command of stage headquarters, with the civilian population from the liberated territory or from the national territory.

Appropriating General Constantin Prezan suggestion on 3/16 September 1916, the Great General Headquarters ordered the Stages General Command that, in agreement with army commanders, to evacuate gradually in Moldova the deposits of subsistence, ammunition and equipment that were placed in Oltenia and Muntenia.

The decision of creating the Army Group *"South"* and the transition to offensive against the enemy troops in Dobruja had as effect a massive transfer of troops from the front in Transylvania to the one in the south, where a large amount of force concentrated (*table 1*).

Table 1

Armies	Large units, units and sub-units				Deployment
	I.D.	Cv.D.	Bg.	Artillery	
3rd Army	5	1		10th Bt. A.G.	South Muntenia
Army Dobruja	9	1	1	7th Bt. A.G.	Dobruja
Total	14	2	1	17th Bt. A.G.	

Thus, in terms of concept and groups of forces, after 3/16 September 1916, the Army Group *"South"* had 10 infantry divisions, one cavalry division and one horsemen brigade, representing nearly 50% of all Romanian troops, which led to a radical change in the distribution of forces and means and therefore the impossibility to speak of the existence of a main action direction. Such a situation theoretically and practically made it impossible to maintain the strategic initiative on the front in Transylvania, and no element ensured the possibility to win it on the southern front.

After completing the Army Group *"South"* order of battle, it was developed the conception of future actions, which, on 4/17 September 1916, was presented to the Great General Headquarters and approved. Therefore, the preparations for the operation that remained in history with the name *Flămânda Manoeuvre (figure 2)* began. The manoeuvre is one of the most publicised military actions in the history of the Romanian Armed Forces participation in the First World War.

Undoubtedly, the study and the critical analysis of the operation preparation, between 5-17 September/18 September-1 October 1916, should be a subject to be studied by staff officers even nowadays, the activities conducted at that time providing many lessons learned.

During that period, on the Transylvanian front, things took a predictable course: the Central Powers made an ample manoeuvre of forces and means on other fronts, concentrating the 9th German Army south of the Târnavelor Plateau and the 1st Austrian-Hungarian Army in the Târnavelor Plateau and the Transylvanian Plain, triggering offensive actions, initially low-scale ones, starting on 31 August/ 13 September 1916. Interesting to note, the 9th German Army was intended to act on the direction Sebeş, Sibiu, Făgăraş, Braşov, into an area that was inhabited at that time by a large population of German origin, and the 1st Austrian-Hungarian Army in an area with Hungarian population.

By the date of starting the operations within the Flămânda Maneuver, the 9th German Army rejected our troops along the Jiu pass, defeated the 1st Army Corps in the battle of Sibiu (12-15/25-28 September) so that, on 19 September/ 2 October, it could take offensive in the direction Sibiu, Făgăraş, Braşov at a high pace. On 20 September/3 October, the offensive of the 9th German Army and the 1st Austrian-Hungarian Army prefigured gaining strategic initiative on this front, while in the south, in extreme weather conditions, crossing the Danube was stopped temporarily, and the planned offensive of the Army in Dobruja was eventually delayed.

Considering the situation correctly, realising the danger that the 9th German Army represented for the future evolution of the military operations on the Romanian front, on 20 September/3 October 1916, the Great General Headquarters sent *Order no. 1453* to General Alexandru Averescu, providing the withdrawal of the 10th Infantry Division on the north bank of the Danube, the deployment of the 21st and 22nd Infantry Divisions to the established railway stations because *"These divisions will be transported starting the night of 21/22 September as follows: the 22nd Division to the 1st Army and the 21st Division to the 2nd Army"*[40].

---

[40] Apud *România în războiul mondial 1916-1919*, vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

Figure 2: Flămînda operation (18 September – 22 September 1916)

Source: *Course in the History of Military Art, ibidem,* p. 251.

The great operation proposed by General Alexandru Averescu, who wanted to become Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, approved by the Great General Headquarters, prepared with material and financial costs that have never been evaluated, partly executed with important consumption of already scarce ammunition, which overburdened the commands and troops, turned into a minor action on 22 September/5 October 1916: *"Until further orders the 3rd Army will remain in cantonments, with the mission to guard the Danube sector between Mostiştea and the Olt mouth"*[41].

The failure of the plan proposed in Periş on 2/15 September 1916 was evident and the ulterior consequences were extremely serious. Once lost, at the beginning of September, the strategic initiative could not be gained, though, on 23 September/ 6 October, the Great General Headquarters, as if unrealistic about the situation in Transylvania, transmitted to the 3rd Army Commander that *"The enemy forces being fixed in Dobruja, we decided to go back to the original plan: the offensive on the Northern and the Northern-Western front, creating, for this purpose, the space for a new manoeuvre, in the superior valleys of the Olt and the Mureş. Up to its creation, the 1st and the 2nd Armies as well as the Army North remain in active defensive, being ready to repel any possible attack of the enemy and keeping the positions occupied"*[42].

In time and in space, the achievement of such a mass of manoeuvre was, practically, impossible, under the circumstances of the pace of the German and Austrian-Hungarian troops offensive. Moreover, it entailed removing a large number of divisions from Dobruja and from the newly established Danube Defence Group, whose Commander was appointed General Constantin Cristescu, divisions that could be transported by rail only up to Oneşti, given that the artworks from the pass Ghimeş-Făget had been destroyed by the enemy during the withdrawal in August.

The serious situation of the 2nd Army, where General Grigore Crăiniceanu was completely overwhelmed, required for General Alexandru Averescu to be appointed again Commander of this important unit. Starting 25 September/8 October, he and his Chief of Staff, General Gheorghe Mărdărescu, managed to save from an imminent disaster the units attacked by the German troops, and to organise in good conditions the defence in the Curvature Carpathians.

---

[41] *Ibidem*, p. 113.
[42] *Ibidem*, p. 189.

The period 2/15 September-25 September/8 October 1916 was fatal regarding the political and military decisions taken involving the King, the Prime Minister I.I.C. Brătianu, the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and the commanders of the three armies who participated at the Council of War. The decision on 2/15 September was the acknowledgment of some measures taken since 28 August/10 September 1916, relying too much on the suggestions of the allies, the result of misunderstanding and inconsistency in following the political and military goal of the war in which we engaged with great enthusiasm and hope for victory.

The brief presentation of the events that changed the course of actions after the first days of the war is not meant to assign blame to or to accuse someone. Wars are dominated by errors caused by objective and subjective factors, and what happened at the beginning of September 1916, even if it seemed unacceptable, was normal regarding the military errors during the First World War.

We should emphasise, if we were to believe I.G. Duca, that I.I.C. Brătianu correctly predicted the result of the decision taken in Periș: *"You will see what will happen! The attempt is bold, and it may be either a failure or a success. I think it will be successful but for a short period of time. I have precise information from the Allies that the Germans concentrate large forces against us in Transylvania. If there is any move on neither the Russian nor the French front, it is expected to be so. Soon it will begin a powerful attack against us and, meanwhile, we weaken this front to run in Bulgaria after chimeras and personal glory. Barely will we cross the Danube when we will have to withdraw to save the situation over the mountains and to protect ourselves from the danger of an invasion"*[43].

Historical sources record no opposition of the Prime Minister to the proposal of General Alexandru Averescu or to the King's decision, explaining to his political ally that *"...before going into action, I decided not to get involved in military operations. It is a responsibility that I do not have the technical competence to take and therefore my conscience requires me not to take it. Whatever happens, from my decision I will not deviate. I formulated my objections, I expressed my fears, they did not take them into consideration, I cannot do anything about it"*[44].

Apparently, the Prime Minister was right. But the issues discussed in Periș were not aspects of military command; they were political and military decisions.

---

[43] I.G. Duca, *Memorii*, vol. 3, Editura Machiavelli, București, 1994, p. 42.
[44] *Ibidem.*

To change the campaign plan, to give up practically the political goal, even temporarily, for which I.I.C. Brătianu engaged the country in the war, was not a matter of purely military decision. Morally, the Prime Minister had the obligation to impose his point of view. He had the possibility and the necessary levers to do it. He could ask for the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff support. Moreover, he had, considering his ideas, General Constantin Prezan support and he could also obtain General Ioan Culcer assistance. He did not do it because of a principle we consider misunderstood and wrongly applied. The result: for a month, part of the troops, about 5 divisions, were constantly deployed from one front to another, the strategic initiative was lost on the front in Transylvania, and the second failure was recorded on the Southern front.

The Romanian Armed Forces painful defeat in the 1916 Campaign began with the decision taken in Periș on 2/15 September 1916. It was only the bravery, heroism, and self-sacrifice of the Romanian soldier, the determination of some commanders of regiments, divisions, army corps and armies, of staff officers, the material and military allies support in some cases, that finally led to the stabilisation of the situation on the Romanian front in December 1916, the most important part of the armed forces being concentrated in Moldova, where the difficult process of reorganisation was to start.

English version by
✍ *Dr Teodora GIURGIU*
The Armed Forces Historical Service

THE GUARD REGIMENT *"MIHAI VITEAZUL"* IN THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE LIBERATION OF BESSARABIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Lieutenant Daniel PÎSLARIU

The author presents the actions of the Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul" during the Second World War, in the military campaign for the liberation of Bessarabia. The entry into the war along with the Axis represented a necessity for Romania, considering the Soviet ultimatum on the evening of 26 June 1940, by which Romania was obliged to cede the territory between the Prut and the Dniester, known as Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Thus, shortly after those military actions, General Ion Antonescu notified, on 22 June 1941, the famous attack order as follows: "Soldiers, to you I order: Cross the Prut!". During the military campaign for the liberation of Bessarabia the soldiers and officers from the Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul" had a clear and crucial mission: to recover the territories unjustly taken away even at the cost of their lives.

Keywords: Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul"; Second World War; Bessarabia; military campaign for liberation

1860 – The Birth Certificate of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*

Before we begin to highlight and describe the main military actions undertaken by the military personnel of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* during the campaign for the liberation of Bessarabia in the Second World War, we consider necessary to briefly review the main significant moments in the history of the guard units, in general, and in the history of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*, in particular.

Thus, we begin, not incidentally, with 1860, the year that marks the moment of establishment of the first military unit that, besides carrying out basic missions in the operational plan that were aimed at defending the country at any time, was also assigned security and guard missions in relation to the head of state[1].

The 1st Tirailleur Battalion was established on 1 July 1860, in Iași, following Order no. 63 given by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza. Because of the special

---

status the recently established military unit enjoyed, it was directly subordinated to the Ministry of War. The special status was highlighted by the mission of the military unit *"to defend the princely court and His Highness, the Ruler of the Country, to serve the honours that are given at the royal palace"*[2].

At the time of its establishment, the 1st Tirailleur Battalion had in its organisational chart 32 officers and NCOs, and 886 soldiers, strength that was to be completed in less than a year[3].

Only a year after its establishment, the Battalion was brought from Iași garrison to București garrison. On this occasion, in 1861, the name of the military unit, the *"1st Tirailleur Battalion"*, was changed into the *"1st Hunter Battalion"*. This milestone was recorded in the historical register of the military unit, mentioning that the unit became *"the guard corps of the Romanian Army"*[4].

On 1 March 1866, through the Decree no. 384 of the regency instituted after the abdication of Cuza, two military units with special security and guard missions were established. These two military units would join the 1st Hunter Battalion by the name of 2nd and 3rd Hunter Battalions. The Decree provided the following: *"Art.1. Other two battalions are established. Art. 2. The battalions will be the 2nd and the 3rd and their organisation will be similar to the 1st one ..."*[5]. The establishment of the two guard units would not bring at that point any changes to the missions of the 1st Hunter Battalion that continued to have the same dual role, being both operating military unit ready to defend the country and guard corps securing and guarding the Royal Palace.

However, in time, some issues relating to security and guard missions were to change. By establishing the 2 new battalions, especially the 2nd Hunter Battalion, the 1st Hunter Battalion was to play a secondary role. Thus, the 2nd Hunter Battalion was to receive the missions of the 1st Hunter Battalion, especially those related to security and guard.

It is required to highlight the date of 1 July 1873, the moment when the 6th Infantry Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* was established, following the Law on the Organisation of the Army in 1872[6]. From the very beginning, the Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* proved successful, distinguishing itself from the other military units. The major difference was made in the battles in Rahova during the War of Independence and in the battles during the First World War when the Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*

---

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 30.
[3] *Ibidem*, p. 32.
[4] *Ibidem*, p. 33.
[5] *Ibidem*, p. 45.
[6] *Ibidem*, p. 134.

fought especially in Vlădeni, Perişani, Porumbacu and Şinca Veche between 1916 and 1918[7].

After the end of the First World War, in the courtyard of the Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*, it was erected a monument to honour the heroes who fell on the battlefields[8]. Moreover, the battle flag of the military unit was decorated for the first time with the Order *"Mihai Viteazul"*[9].

The year 1930 marked a new stage in the history of the military units that had to accomplish guard and military ceremonial missions. Starting in that year, it was established a new designation of such units, namely *"Guard Units"*, designation granted by Royal Decree to some of the regiments, after a rigorous selection of the staff and the level of training[10].

The new stage in the history of the guard units came in the context of the reorganisation of the Romanian Armed Forces that took place in 1930,

---

[7] *Ibidem*, pp. 134-136.

[8] The monument can be currently seen in the barracks of the 30th Guard Brigade *"Mihai Viteazul"*.

[9] General-maior Gheorghe Cernat, colonel (r.) Stelian Dragnea, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138.

[10] *Ibidem*, p. 66.

following the Report of the Great General Staff no. 1951 on 18 July 1930 and the High Royal Decree no. 2192 on 19 June 1930[11].

During that year, the 6th Infantry Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* was renamed the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*. The unit was among the first military units that received the name of the guard unit. With good reason, a unit that enjoyed the honour of receiving such symbol should be placed in the elite of the military. Thus, the units that received such designation distinguished themselves by exemplary organisation and conduct of the training process as well as by the high quality training and valuable officers.

The new name would be maintained up to 1949, when, on 1 February, the unit ceased to fulfil guard missions, receiving back the name of the 6th Infantry Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* and that of the 148th Infantry Regiment starting on 1 December 1950[12].

General Framework

1 September 1939 was the date that marked the beginning of the Second World War, considering the German offensive launched against Poland. Under mutual assistance treaties, France and Great Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939. In the same year, Poland was the victim of an aggression that came from the USSR Armed Forces as well.

The collapse of Poland following the German-Soviet attacks raised disturbing problems to Romania, its diplomatic efforts being exclusively directed toward defending the territorial integrity. It is important to highlight the position that Romania adopted in the context of the mentioned events. The outbreak of the Second World War surprised Romania in a state of neutrality, which was officially declared. The decision proved to stem from the fair assessment of the international developments, being the most responsible position that our state could adopt in compliance with the interests of the country. The decision on Romania's neutrality was adopted by the Romanian government on 4 September and approved in the Privy Council held on 6 September 1939[13].

The events that took place between 1939 and the summer of 1940 led to continuously worsening the external situation of Romania. The dissolution of Poland, a country with which Romania had solid cooperation and neighbourhood relations, and the successive occupations of Norway, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium

---

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 133.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 153.

[13] General-maior Ion Safta, colonel dr. Nicolae Ciobanu, *Istoria militară a românilor – Culegere de lecţii*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 185.

and Denmark by the Wehrmacht, as well as the fall of France in June 1940, resulted in our country enjoying less and less of the expected external support.

For Romania, the worst news would appear soon. Therefore, on 26 June 1940, in the evening hours, V.M. Molotov, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR[14], issued an *Ultimatum* to the Romanian Minister in Moscow by which our country was ordered to cede the territory between the Prut and the Dniester – Bessarabia – and the north of Bukovina *"at all costs"*[15] under the false pretext that Bessarabia would be populated by Ukrainians and that the surrender of Northern Bukovina would be a means of compensation for the 22 year of Romanian domination over Bessarabia[16]. Thus, this was the first tragic blow of dismantling Romania[17].

The Soviet pressures over the Romanian leaders had to be intensified on the night of 27/28 June 1940, when the Soviet government lodged a new *Ultimatum* which stipulated: *"within four days, from 14 o'clock Moscow time, on 28 June, the territory of Bessarabia and (north of) Bukovina should be evacuated by Romanian troops. In the same time, Soviet troops will occupy the territory of Bessarabia and the north of Bukovina"*[18]. Given the pressures from Moscow, cities with special economic and military importance like Chişinău, Cetatea Albă and Chernivtsi were to pass under Soviet administration exactly on 28 June.

The requests of the Soviets contained in the two *Ultimatum Notes* fell hard on the Romanian people. Concentric pressure over the decision-makers in Romania grew up every moment, (the liberation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina had to be accomplished within only 24 hours[19]). Shortly after, the Minister of Nazi Germany in Bucharest, Wilhelm Fabricius, communicated immediately to the Romanian government a verbal note coming from the German Foreign Ministry, J. Ribbentrop, by which the Foreign Affairs Minister of Romania, I. Gigurtu was told that *"the acceptance of the ultimatum given by the government of the USSR is the only thing that remains to be done"*, issue that also the fascist Italy brought to the attention of the leading factors of the Romanian state[20].

---

[14] Alexandru V. Boldur, *Istoria Basarabiei*, Editura Victor Frunză, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 522.

[15] *Ibidem*, p. 523.

[16] Dr. Mircea Muşat, *1940. Drama României Mari*, Editura Fundaţiei ROMÂNIA MARE, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 64.

[17] General de brigadă (r.) Constantin Ispas, *Nemuritorii, Generali Gorjeni – Bărbaţi ai datoriei*, vol. 4, Editura Centrului judeţean pentru conservarea şi promovarea culturii tradiţionale Gorj, Târgu-Jiu, 2007, p. 316.

[18] General-maior Ion Safta, colonel dr. Nicolae Ciobanu, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

[19] Dr. Mircea Muşat, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[20] *Ibidem*, p. 68.

In order not to lose everything, Romania was in a position where it had to accept the dictate of the Soviet *Ultimatum*. Under the impulse of the dramatic situation, King Carol II was forced to convene, on the evening of 27 June 1940, the Crown Council meeting, which had to reach a decision relating to the Soviet *Ultimatum*[21]. Following the meeting of the Privy Council, the decision would be taken under the external political-military factors pressure and momentum: to accept the *Ultimatum*.

The withdrawal of the Romanian civil authorities and armed forces to the western side of the Prut was conducted with great difficulty because of the Soviet occupation forces that, although had imposed some clear perspective over how the ceding of the territories on the eastern side of the Prut would be conducted, did not respect the schedule, even though they were the ones that had imposed it. Most Romanian military units were denied to evacuate the deposits or to carry in Romania the individual weapons supplied, and the industrial equipment purchased by the Romanian state was captured[22]. This exemplary neglect of the Romanian people pride was impossible to tolerate[23].

The loss of Bessarabia was *"recorded"* through signing the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact on 23 August 1939, pact that was agreed between Germany and the USSR, describing the way that Europe would be divided[24]. As regards Romania, the German-Russian understanding mentioned among others *"the consideration of returning Bessarabia to the Soviet Union"*[25].

In April 1941, Yugoslavia was dealing with a sensitive situation. Then, Romania refused to participate in the invasion of this state, invasion committed by the German, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Italian troops. The leaders in Bucharest were aware that the neutrality status of Romania had to end soon, because of the pressure made by both Germany and the Soviet Union. The issue was noted by General Ion Antonescu starting on 5 September 1940 when he was appointed, by the Royal Decree, the President of the Council of Ministers *"enjoying full power to lead the Romanian state"*[26]. He pointed out that Romania would be unable to remain neutral if the Yugoslavian Banat were occupied by Hungarian troops.

Because of the aggressive policy promoted by Germany during the Second World War, in 1941, the Germans implemented the operation plan called *"Barbarossa"*

---

[21] *Ibidem*, p. 75.
[22] General-maior Ion Safta, colonel dr. Nicolae Ciobanu, *op. cit.*, p. 191.
[23] Alexandru V. Boldur, *op. cit.*, p. 523.
[24] Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, Ion Patroiu, *Anglia şi România între anii 1939-1944*, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 7.
[25] Ion Gherman, *Istoria tragică a Bucovinei, Basarabiei şi Ţinutului Herţa*, Editura ALL, Bucureşti, 1993, p. 65.
[26] General-maior Ion Safta, colonel dr. Nicolae Ciobanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-198.

that included Romania on the list of the Reich *"likely allies"*. The decision to initiate the military operation was officially and personally presented to Marshal Ion Antonescu by Hitler on 12 June 1941 in Munich. The President of Romania's Council of Ministers agreed to join the Third Reich, accepting at the same time, on 18 June, a second proposal from the German leader, namely to command the Romanian and German troops that were to launch the offensive against the Soviets in Romania.

Thus, 22 June 1941 represented a crucial moment, with a real historical significance to our country, the moment when Romania joined the Axis war against the Soviet Union. Heady to note in this context is the fact that at that time, under the external pressure, by entering the war, Romania only pursued to gather within national borders *"the ancestral land of Bessarabia and the princely woods of Bukovina"*[27] as well as the other Romanian territories.

The Actions of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* during the Liberation of Bessarabia

Given the tragic and unfortunate events that included Romania, events exposed in the previous paragraphs, in June 1941, the soldiers of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* were in Moldavia, disposed on the left bank of the Prut, in the sector Antoneşti-Lăteşti (Fălciu area). The troops of the military unit were well homogenised and trained and had generally good equipment and unshakable morale. Considering these issues, we mention and present the records in the Operation Journal of the Regiment at the beginning of the campaign in the East: *"We are to approach the river Prut at Bogdăneşti and at Fălciu at 3:15 o'clock, without any artillery preparation, in order to conquer and maintain the two bridges ..."*[28].

The campaign to liberate Bessarabia from the Soviet control, in which the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* was employed, began on 22 June 1941 at 03:00-03:30 o'clock. At that time came into effect the Decree no. 1798, which was signed by General Ion Antonescu, the Head of the Romanian state, as follows: *"Art. I. All the land, air and naval forces get mobilised. Art. II. The first day of mobilisation begins on the night of 21/22 June 1941 at 24 a.m. Art. III. At the military units only the people who are individually called shall present. Art. IV. The Minister of National Defence is in charge of the execution of this decree"*[29].

---

[27] *Ibidem*, p. 203.
[28] Collection 1027, Regiment Archive, Year 1941, File 2, p. 19.
[29] Locotenent-colonel Alesandru D. Duţu, Mihai Retegan, *Ostaşi, Vă ordon: Treceţi Prutul!*, Editura Globus, p. 27.

During the campaign for the liberation of Bessarabia the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* would carry its military actions under the command of the 1ˢᵗ Guard Division, military unit that was established by the High Royal Decree no. 627 on 1 April 1933. In its turn, the 1ˢᵗ Guard Division would be subordinated to the 5ᵗʰ Army Corps[30]. In *figure 1* it is presented the disposition of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*[31].


Figure 1: Actions of the Romanian and German troops for the liberation of Bessarabia, northen Bukovina and Hertza region, 22 June-26 July 1941

The Romanian armed forces actions initiated against the USSR received support from all politicians in our country. For example, Iuliu Maniu, leader of the NPP, in his memoir addressed to the Romanian leader on 18 July 1941, stated: *"The Romanian*

---

[30] General-maior Ion Safta, colonel dr. Nicolae Ciobanu, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
[31] General de corp de armată (r.) Vasile Bărboi, general de brigadă Gheorghe Ioniţă, colonel dr. Alexandru Duţu, *Veteranii pe drumul onoarei şi jertfei (1941-1945) – Spre cetăţile de pe Nistru*, Editura Vasile Cârlova, Bucureşti 1996, appendices.

public follows with great enthusiasm the military actions led by yourself in order to liberate the provinces invaded by enemies and with tense attention all the measures taken in relation to this historical progress"[32].

The day of 23 June 1941 found the soldiers of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* under a powerful artillery bombardment. The bombardment took place *"at about 01:30-02:00 o'clock"* in the sector Bogdăneşti, the sector where the regiment was deployed[33].

The most important events on the Eastern Front in the following day occurred south of Iaşi. In the sector of activity of the 1st Guard Division the hardest battles took the place in Bogdăneşti area, the area of responsibility of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*, due to the enemy intention to annihilate the bridgehead. The operational summary prepared by the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* Operations Bureau recorded at the time that: *"At Bogdăneşti, the artillery bombardment starts at 2 o'clock and lasts up to 20 o'clock, with a break for three hours (12-15 o'clock); there are three attacks, but they are rejected by the enemy first line of resistance ... throughout the day, the enemy artillery is very active; hunting aviation released bombs in all sectors of our troops"*[34].

On 25 June, in the war diary of the guard unit were recorded the attacks that the enemy troops executed against the soldiers of the regiment. Starting with 1:30 o'clock the enemy artillery began to bombard the guard troops that were positioned in the area Fălciu. Those bombardments would later move to Bogdăneşti. After this artillery bombardment, the Soviet troops attacked the 3rd Battalion of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*, offensive that lasted until 05:00-06:00 o'clock. In the afternoon of that day were to be exchanged artillery and infantry fire between the regiment units and the Soviet units. Moreover, along the enemy offensive, the Soviet troops enjoyed the aviation support. Enemy artillery continued to bombard continuously the area of responsibility of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*, especially the bridge from Bogdăneşti. The war diary of the guard unit recorded as follows: *"... It's a hard day. We are continuously subjected to a terrible artillery bombardment and attacked by the enemy ..."*.

Towards the end of the day of 25 June, the 1st Guard Division ordered the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* to start the offensive and to take possession

---

[32] Constantin Hilhor, *Armata Roşie în România – adversar, aliat, ocupant 1940-1948*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, Bucureşti,1966, p. 25.

[33] Locotenent-colonel Alesandru D. Duţu, Mihai Retegan, *op. cit.* p. 43.

[34] *Ibidem*, p. 49.

of the railway bridge at Bogdanesti during the night of 25/26 June. The commander of the Guard Regiment, Colonel Ioan Stratulat, who had just arrived from an inspection in Fălciu, requested the commander of the 1ˢᵗ Guard Division to postpone the operation because the bridge at Bogdănești presented significant damage caused by the explosives placed by an enemy patrol, as well as because of the insufficient number of boats required for crossing the Prut. Colonel Stratulat request was rejected and he was replaced from the command of the regiment with Lieutenant Colonel Iliescu. However, the 1ˢᵗ Guard Division ordered the postponement of the operation of crossing the Prut and starting the offensive to a later date[35].

On 30 June, in Fălciu and Bogdănești areas, as well as in other sectors such as Foltești or Huși, the enemy heavy artillery executed fire. Due to the very good cooperation between the German and the Romanian forces, bridgeheads were achieved at Stanca and Lingurari, thus the enemy withdrawing from that and counterattacking unsuccessfully in the sector of activity of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* at Bogdănești[36].

On 2 July 1941 the Guard Division Operations Bureau finalised the plan on forcing the crossing of the Prut. Among the main objectives of the plan were included the *"preparation of the artillery"*. Its aim was *"to neutralise the enemy battery (heavy artillery), to destroy the pillboxes and neutralise the defensive organisations of the enemy. Duration: 60 minutes, of which 30 minutes for adjustments and 30 minutes for the actual preparation"*. The purpose of the plan was a reserved one due to the ammunition allocated: *"maximum 1/2 fire unit"*. This aspect had negative influence resulting in tragic consequences in some sectors of the front line of the infantry troops because they had to face an enemy protected by strong fortifications, having a slightly diminished operational capacity. In order to facilitate the general offensive, a company from the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* was appointed the mission to cross the Prut at Bogdănești in order to preserve the bridgehead[37].

Although the large units and the units that were located on the west bank of the Prut considered forcing the river, the day of 5 July would bring new challenges and difficulties for our troops in this regard. This fact appeared because of the river Prut whose waters were swollen after heavy rains at the time, because of the inaccessible terrain, as well as because the abundant vegetation (reeds) that considerably

---

[35] *Ibidem*, p. 57.
[36] *Ibidem*, p. 83.
[37] *Ibidem*, p. 105.

reduced the Romanian troops field of vision[38]. Even if there were substantial problems in crossing the Prut, the Romanian troops could not be stopped but slowed from continuing the offensive against the Soviets. In order to cross the Prut improvised means were used[39].

Thus, because of the impressive military actions and special efforts, the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* was able to form and open a crossing area in order to allow the 1st Guard Division troops to advance, during that day most of them managing to cross the Prut[40]. The only problem that remained unsolved was the achievement of a bridgehead having the width ordered by the 5th Army Corps.

The forces of the 1st Guard Division were halted from advancing by the powerful fire shots executed by the Soviet artillery units that were installed in well-concealed positions on the western slope of the Epureni hill and on the skirts of Ţiganca and Stoieneşti villages. Besides those hardships caused by the enemy, the units in the 1st Guard Division, including the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*, had to face another series of geo-climatic problems. Here we can recall the inaccessible land due to the marshes and reeds: *"weather – shows the synthesis forecast of the day – is still rainy and chilly"*[41].

Following the order of the commander of the 5th Army Corps, which referred to broadening the offensive area, the 1st Guard Division disposed at 05:30 o'clock, on 6 July, that the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* should start the offensive in its sector of action. The attack was organised in two echelons as follows: two battalions in the first echelon and a battalion in the second echelon. The Regiment offensive was preceded by a powerful bombardment executed by the heavy artillery belonging to the 1st Guard Division. The end of the day would bring to the soldiers of the Guard Regiment the conquest of the Cania hill, a dominant position in the pedestrian troops sector of attack[42].

The day of 8 July marked a decisive step in terms of the fights for the liberation of the central part of Bessarabia. Within the large-scale offensive, the conquering of the massive Corneşti and the overcoming of Cania – Epureni – Stoeneşti – Ţiganca alignment were essential[43].

---

[38] Interview with Major General (r.) Professor Constantin Ispas, on 13.04.2016, at Turcineşti, Judeţul Gorj.
[39] Locotenent-colonel Alesandru D. Duţu, Mihai Retegan, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
[40] *Onoare şi Jertfă*, no. 33, October 2015, Târgu-Jiu, p. 29.
[41] Locotenent-colonel Alesandru D. Duţu, Mihai Retegan, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
[42] *Ibidem*, p. 123.
[43] *Ibidem*, p. 137.

Thus, on 8 July, the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* was found in the area on the eastern bank of the Prut, on the Cania hill[44] *(figure 2)*. In the early hours of that morning, the Regiment soldiers were attacked by Soviet troops.

We learn from the unit's war diary that at 05:30 o'clock the Soviet troops from the area of responsibility of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* started the counterattack, aiming the regimental command post. In that action, the enemy troops succeeded in infiltrating in the regiment area through the existing space between the 1st and the 3rd Battalions of the guard unit. The first troops that found about the action of the enemy were those from the Command Company

Figure 2: The disposition of the 6th Infantry Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul", on 8 July 1941

[44] The position of the Guard Regiment troops *"Mihai Viteazul"* can be observed on this inserted map. It was designed by Major General (r.) Professor Dr Constantin Ispas, one of the few surviving military men who fought in the Second World War. The map was included in a unique material that was handed to the 30th Guard Brigade *"Mihai Viteazul"* on the anniversary of 155 years since the establishment of the first guard unit on duty in the history of the Romanian Armed Forces.

and from the 3rd Battalion, who barely woke and, under the command of the officers, started the offensive in order to reject the enemy counterattack[45].

It cannot be accurately predicted the intensity of the fight at the time, but considering the aspects recorded in the war diary of the unit: *"... after a few fire shots, frightened, they began to withdraw..."* (Soviet troops), the losses, although few, were dramatic. In those short fire shots, an officer from the unit command was injured, and, unfortunately, the Commander of the Guard Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel George Iliescu, was fatally wounded[46].

The following morning, around 06:30 o'clock, after they resumed the offensive, the Romanian troops from the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* captured about 100 prisoners and caused numerous losses to the Soviet army on the battlefield. Starting that time, the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* had a new commander, Colonel Alexandru Idieru. During that day, the troops of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* were diminished due to losses registered as follows: 20 dead, five missing and 156 injured[47].

On the evening of 9 July the Guard Division was surprised in defence on the alignment quota 120 – the Toceni hill – west of Cania, defence that intended to help the forces of the division to regroup on the directions Antoneşti and Cania, maintaining thus the conquered areas.

Starting that day, the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* ceded a battalion, the 1st Battalion, to the Army Corps reserve, which had to intervene in the action area of the 21st Infantry Division in order to restore its position. This aspect is captured in the war diary of the unit, which records: *"Towards 11:30 o'clock ..., we received an order from Colonel Romulus Dimitriu, the Commander of the Army Corps reserve, that the Guard Regiment should intervene with a battalion (1st Battalion, Captain Cazacu, in the direction of the control command point of the 21st Division) in order to restore a critical situation, because the 11th Regiment Siret attacked towards Ţiganca and its offensive was rejected. The 1st Battalion immediately entered into position, being ready to attack at order..."*[48].

On 16 July 1941, Romania gained a huge victory against the Red Army: the capital of Bessarabia, Chişinău, was released, while the Soviet units that remained in the area withdrew across the Dniester to avoid being encircled[49].

---

[45] Locotenent-colonel Alesandru D. Duţu, Mihai Retegan, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

[46] *Ibidem.*

[47] *Ibidem.*

[48] *Ibidem*, p. 155.

[49] Călin Hentea, *Armata şi luptele românilor – Breviar de istorie militară*, Editura Nemira Media, Bucureşti, 2002, pp. 190-191.

In order to liberate southeastern Bessarabia, on 23 July, General Ion Antonescu ordered the continuation of the offensive. In turn, General Nicolae Șova, Commander of the 1st Guard Division, a unit the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* belonged to, issued the order of the day no. 261 including a brief presentation of the military actions undertaken: *"After heavy battles, which continuously lasted for 27 days (22 June-19 July), the Guard Division succeeded in: breaking the enemy front on 6 July, allowing the 21st Infantry Division to enter the front without bloody sacrifices, broadening and consolidating the bridgehead on the days of 7-11 July; resisting all enemy counterattacks between 12 and 14 July; crushing the entire enemy defence between the Leova and Eagle hills, 16-19 July; causing heavy losses to the enemy. For the heroism and the spirit of sacrifice demonstrated by the units of the Guard Division, managing to note in the nation's history a page of everlasting glory, I thank the officers, NCOs and troops, urging them that, in future operations, they should successfully fulfil the duties to the nation, homeland, king and ruler, as well as to the memory of those who died"*[50].

On 25 July 1941, the Romanian-German Command communicated: *"The fight for the liberation of the eastern Romanian territory is over. From the Carpathians to the Sea we are again rulers over the ancient boundaries. The fight for ensuring our development, for saving our faith, for order and for civilisation will continue. The German and Romanian troops advanced deeply across the Dniester"*. Towards the evening of 25 July, General Ion Antonescu ordered crossing the Dniester by the 4th Army and creating a detachment to include the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*, being subordinated to the 1st Guard Division, which was then subordinated to the 3rd Army Corps and which was to act in the areas of Ciuborici and Slobozia[51].

Following the fierce battles in which the Romanian troops were involved, and thanks to their courage and their patriotism, on 26 July 1941 Bessarabia was again completely liberated[52]. On the same day, following the order given by General Antonescu, the 4th Army Commander issued the operational order no. 27 to prepare the crossing of the Dniester. This order provided that crossing should be executed *"by surprise on 29 or 30 July; maybe even before those dates if the enemy withdrew over the Dniester"*[53]. The Soviet troops were thus pushed

---

[50] Locotenent-colonel Alesandru D. Duțu, *op. cit.*, p. 229.
[51] *Ibidem*, p. 234.
[52] General-maior Ion Safta, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
[53] Locotenent-colonel Alesandru D. Duțu, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

eastwards by the offensive of the Romanian and German forces and they had to accept the situation withdrawing east of the Dniester.

Following the campaign for the liberation of Bessarabia, the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* suffered numerous losses. Many of them were of material nature, but the losses that should be mentioned are those that refer to the brave soldiers who fought for the liberation of the Romanian land. Those losses amounted to 33 officers, 11 NCOs, 620 troops dead, and 118 combatants missing in action. To them, the 350 disabled and mutilated combatants are added[54].

*

In the Second World War, Romania participated for 1 421 days of which 1 159 days between 22 June 1941-23 August 1944 along with the Axis powers, and then 262 days, until 12 May 1945, in the United Nations coalition.

The Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* participated in the campaign for the liberation of Bessarabia from the domination forcedly imposed by the USSR for a total number of 35 days, from 22 June to 26 July 1941. After about five weeks of fierce battles, the Romanian and German troops managed to reach the Dniester, forcing the Red Army to withdraw. The success of the campaign for the liberation of Bessarabia was largely due to the skill, heroism and bravery demonstrated by the Romanian military of all ranks[55].

During that period, the troops of the guard unit made their ultimate sacrifice, paving the way for their comrades and joining them to reunify the Romanian land. Throughout the campaign for the liberation of Bessarabia the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* distinguished itself positively every time and in every situation, regardless of its severity. Even if this flagship unit of the Romanian Armed Forces suffered numerous losses, it heroically resisted the enemy pressure, so that it could later ensure the resumption of the offensive[56].

Not infrequently in the campaign for the liberation of the national territory the guard unit troops were required as the main support force. Not infrequently there were times when in the military units orders of the day or in the Royal Decrees the name of the guard unit was mentioned, crowned with words of praise.

---

[54] General-maior Gheorghe Cernat, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
[55] General de brigadă (r.) Constantin Ispas, *Nemuritorii, Vitejii Gorjului – Cavaleri ai Ordinului "Mihai Viteazul"*, vol. 3, Editura Centrului Județean al Creației Gorj, Târgu-Jiu, 2004, p. 87.
[56] Interview with Major General (r.) Professor Constantin Ispas, *loc. cit.*

All these aspects represent clear and solid evidence describing and especially certifying the deeds of heroism and courage that the unit troops performed throughout the campaign for the liberation of Bessarabia.

The heroism and the bravery of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* troops were officially acknowledged on 7 November 1941 when the battle flag of the Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* was decorated for the second time in its existence with the Order *"Mihai Viteazul"*. Thus, on 7 November 1941, by the Royal Decree no. 3091/1941 it was communicated: *"It is conferred the Military Order "Mihai Viteazul", the 3rd Class to the flag of the Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul" for the heroism and the sacrifice demonstrated by the officers, non-commissioned officers and the regiment troops in battles on 6 July 1941, in the Prut river meadow, where they managed to crush the resistance of the enemy pillboxes and seize the heights of West-Cania, forming the first bridgehead from Fălciu and maintaining it to serve as the departure base of the attacks to repel the enemy from Bessarabia"*[57].

---

[57] General-maior Gheorghe Cernat, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

MILESTONES IN THE PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY CONDUCTED BY OFFICER VASILE STOICA IN THE USA IN FAVOUR OF THE GREAT UNIFICATION IN 1918

Dragoş-Mircea PĂUN

The Romanian armed forces have always contributed to the achievement of national ideals. The Romanian military forces have continually fulfilled their duties to promote the interests of the nation also by consolidating the relations between the country and its citizens in the diaspora. An example in this regard is Vasile Stoica, key figure in the accomplishment of the Great Unification, a patriot who succeeded in bringing together the Romanian diaspora in the USA in support of the Romanian people cause and the establishment of Greater Romania. Mention should be made that the Romanian military forces have always been present not only on the visible but also on the invisible – intelligence – front to promote the national interests.

Keywords: *diaspora, emigration; Great Unification; propaganda; security; Vasile Stoica*

The Romanian armed forces, from soldiers and officers up to commanders, have been always concerned with the unity of all the Romanians, supporting the Romanian interests.

An example for every soldier and officer was Vasile Stoica, a figure who, in the turmoil at the beginning of the 20th century, took his place next to the personalities who played a major part in the event on 1 December 1918.

Although a lot has been discussed in recent years about the ways in which the Romanian state should handle the issue of the Romanian diaspora – whether we speak of the Romanian nationals who live in the regions close to the Romanian borders – a historically and ethnically Romanian space – or of the Romanian exile or Romanian citizens who make up the economic migration after the '90s, the role they should have in promoting Romania abroad – the attempts to bring together

Dragoş-Mircea Păun – *"Mihai Viteazul"* National Intelligence Academy.

all the forces and resources of the Romanian society are still far from the accomplishment of this desideratum.

In this paper, I approach two pillars of crucial interest for both the Romanian armed forces, if we are to analyse the place and role played by officer Vasile Stoica in the achievement of the Great Unification on 1 December 1918, and for the Romanian state, if we analyse the national and unionist propaganda activity carried out on the territory of the United States of America (USA) by the great patriot who was Vasile Stoica, before and after the conclusion of the Treaty of Buftea-Bucureşti, Romania, on 7 May 1918, with Germany and Austria-Hungary, during the First World War. In that context, officer Vasile Stoica managed to bring together the entire Romanian emigration from America in support of the Romanian cause.

The Romanian Armed Forces, the Diaspora and the Great Unification

Maybe in history books more should be written about the merits and achievements of the Romanian armed forces on the unseen front of the intelligence activities and of the role played by their officers in supporting the national interests when nothing more could be done on the battlefield.

In this context, I consider we should not forget the way in which the officers of the Romanian armed forces organised and led the Romanian military propaganda, including the secret diplomacy during the First World War, the Romanian soldiers being in the first line of the actions that led to the achievement and recognition of the Great Unification.

One of the artisans of this historical triumph was Captain Vasile Stoica, who succeeded, through the propaganda actions led in the USA, to bring together, at the beginning of the 20th century, the entire Romanian diaspora in the USA who supported the national cause and the achievement of the century-long desire of all the Romanians – Greater Romania.

Officer Vasile Stoica ranked among the illustrious patriots of the Romanian armed forces with a fate that was both glorious, as a first-hand participant and witness of the establishment of Greater Romania, and tragic, as he assisted helplessly at the instauration of the Communist regime and the separation of Bessarabia from Romania.

Unfortunately, his deeds and merits were faded into obscurity not only during the communist period but also after 1990, people forgetting many times to speak of the great services he rendered to Romania, of how he managed to promote

the Romanian cause in the USA and in the world, of how much he suffered for his beliefs in the communist prisons where he eventually died for his immense patriotism.

I will try to bring once more to the attention of researchers and specialists several historical milestones very little spoken of nowadays, related to both the personality of officer Vasile Stoica and the role he played in the coagulation of the Romanian emigration in the USA to contribute to the achievement of the Great Unification on 1 December 1918. I consider that this is the first aspect one should take into consideration and the departure point for the *"fight"* of the Romanian state for winning over the diaspora, for the recognition of the role played by the Romanian armed forces and by the diaspora in the history of Romania.

We must not forget that officer Vasile Stoica, next to other personalities history books should probably speak more of, succeeded in mobilising the Romanian emigration from the USA to support the propaganda which preceded and led to the achievement of the Great Unification of 1918, emigration that was in its early days, whose roots did not go deeper than one generation on the American land and that, as stated by our protagonist in his writings, helped him in his attempts to convince the American decision-makers to persuade President Woodrow Wilson declare that all the Romanians would be united in one state at the end of the First World War.

The Departure for America
in Support of the Romanian Cause

As I have already stated, maybe one of the most important accomplishers of the Great Unification was Vasile Stoica, a Romanian patriot, born in 1889, in Avrig, Sibiu County, who studied at the Faculty of Letters of Budapest and attended apprenticeships both in Bucureşti and Paris as a scholarship beneficiary of *"Gojdu"* Foundation.

He was one of the leaders of the students of Transylvania and Banat universities between 1912 and 1913, while he was a student in Budapest and the President of *"Petru Maior"* Society.

Between 1913 and 1914, Vasile Stoica worked as a teacher for the Girls School of Astra, Sibiu, and then, between August and September 1914, as an editor for *Românul* journal in Arad.

At the beginning of the First World War he was the editor-in-chief of *Românul* journal in Arad, the main newspaper of the Romanians from Transylvania and Banat.

Wanting to play an active part in supporting the Romanian cause, he moved, in the same year, from Transylvania to the Old Kingdom to *"fulfil his duty in the liberation war"*[1].

After moving to the Kingdom of Romania, he did everything in his power to present to the public opinion the real side of the Transylvanian issue, delivering conferences in Bucureşti and in the country, presiding over two students' congresses on this topic in Galaţi and in Bucureşti, writing articles in the newspapers of the time – *Adevărul, Flacăra, Naţionalul, Universul*, supporting the achievement of the Great Unification in his writings.

Immediately after Romania joined the war on the side of the Allies, on 20 August 1916, Vasile Stoica enrolled as a volunteer in the Romanian armed forces, with the rank of second lieutenant, in the information activity, being detached to the 11th Infantry Division[2]. He participated in the battles in Petroşani and Sibiu, being wounded twice and promoted gradually to the rank of lieutenant and then captain.

Photo 1: Page 10 in the first passport belonging to Vasile Stoica (the one used to travel to America in April 1917)[3]

The second time he was wounded, on 12 November 1916, in Piteşti, Vasile Stoica underwent several surgeries and required medical care for over two months.

After he left the hospital, in March 1917, the Armed Forces Great General Headquarters placed him at the disposal of the Government, upon his request, Ion I.C Brătianu deciding to send him to America on a double mission – political as well as military.

Therefore, through the order of the Great General Headquarters in Iaşi no. 1082 on 18 April 1917, the delegation

---

[1] V. Stoica, *În America pentru cauza românească*, Editura Universul, Bucureşti, 1926, p. II.

[2] Vasilica Manea, Nineta Nicolae, *Pledoarie pentru cauza României în America – Vasile Stoica în Armata română şi unitatea naţională. Studii şi comunicări*, Editura Delta Cart Educaţional, Piteşti, 2008, p. 71, on-line on http://smg.mapn.ro/SIA/13_Armata_unitatea_nationala.pdf, retrieved on 24.04.2016, p. 75.

[3] Central Historical National Archives, 1771 Collection – Stoica Vasile, File no. I/6, p. 47.

known as the Romanian Patriotic Mission was established and Captain Vasile Stoica, along with the Greek-Catholic priests, Vasile Lucaciu and Ion Moța, were sent to America with two clear goals – one was political – the promotion of the historical rights of the Romanians over Transylvania and the need to unify all the Romanians in only one state, and one was military – to organise a volunteers' unit made of Transylvanian Romanians who had emigrated to America, which was to fight on the French front and which would be part of the French or US armed forces.

The idea of establishing a Romanian military unit on the territory of the United States of America, which was to fight in Europe, was promoted among the leaders of the national movement of Transylvania who had taken refuge in București before Romania entered the war.

As the journey could not be made towards the West, the area being under the control of Austria-Hungary, the members of the delegation left towards the East, on a route starting from Kiev, crossing Russia and Japan, reaching the United States of America on 29 June 1917.

An important aspect of the journey, which should be kept in mind for the subsequent evolution of the steps taken in support of the Romanian cause, is the fact that once they arrived in Kiev, the members of the delegation received from the headquarters of the Transylvanian Romanian Volunteers' Corps a copy of the famous *"Darnița Statement-Manifesto"* a document in which the Romanian soldiers from Transylvania and Banat who were on the territory of Russia restated their desire to be united with the Kingdom of Romania[4].

In 1917, thousands of Transylvanians, including former prisoners of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, who were in a camp in Darnița, near Kiev, signed the manifesto, considered to be the first declaration of the Romanians from Transylvania unification with the Kingdom of Romania. *"We, the Romanian officers, sergeants and soldiers swear that we wish to fight in the Romanian Armed Forces for the liberation of our Romanian land from the domination of Austria-Hungary and for its unification with Romania (…) For this goal, we employ everything we have, our life and our fortune, our women and children, the life and happiness of our successors. And we will not stop, not until we succeed or perish"[5]*, was stated in the mentioned document.

---

[4] Mention should be made that the idea of the Great Unification, which was animating the Romanians from Transylvania, led to the establishment of the Transylvanian and Bukovinan Volunteers' Corps in 1916, made of almost 2,000 fighters. They joined the Romanian armed forces in order to liberate Transylvania and unite it with the mother-country.

[5] V. Stoica, *În America pentru cauza românească*, Editura Universul, București, 1926, p. 8.

Because the mission in which Captain Vasile Stoica, as leader of the delegation, and priests Vasile Lucaciu and Ion Moța were sent was unofficial, they were carrying *"recommendation letters from the chargé d'affaires of the USA in Iaşi, Andrews, to the US Department of State, as well as from the Minister of France in Iaşi to the Ambassador of France in Washington"*[6].

After a journey of almost 2 months through Russia and Japan, on 2 July 1917, three days after having arrived in the USA, the three were received in Washington, following the recommendation of the ambassador of France – Jules J. Jusserand, by the American Minister of Foreign Affairs – Robert Lansing, who promised to give his full support to the Kingdom of Romania for the fulfilment of the unification ideal.

At the meeting held on 6 July 1917, the American Minister of Defence, Newton Baker, and the Minister of Interior, William Phillips, declined the proposal of the Romanian delegation to establish a unit of Transylvanian Romanians for the French front due to the internal policy of the USA that required the American armed forces to be unitary. However, Newton Baker asked Captain Vasile Stoica to urge all the Romanians in America, including the Romanian immigrants who had not yet had American citizenship and whose families were in Banat or Transylvania to enrol in the American armed forces.

Subsequently, on 3 August 1917, at the meeting with the Ambassador of France in Washington – Jules J. Jusserand, Captain Vasile Stoica suggested the establishment of a unit of Transylvanian Romanians, idea that was also rejected, as the costs for equipment and transport were extremely high.

Under these circumstances, the actions of Captain Vasile Stoica focused mainly on informing the American public opinion about the Romanian nation, about the issue of Transylvania, the three members of the Romanian delegation realising that not even the rulers of the American political world had the least clue about the fate and problems of the Romanian people, about the Romanians' ambitions and our unionist ideals.

Moreover, the members of the Romanian delegation found that the American press did not support the Romanian cause, as Vasile Stoica said: *"Hearst Consortium had depicted us in the least favourable colours, New York Tribune were criticising us harshly, New York Times did not even notice us"*[7], all of these in steep contrast

---

[6] Boris Rangheţ, *Relaţiile româno-americane în perioada Primului Război Mondial (1916-1920)*, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1975, p. 30, *apud* Vasilica Manea, Nineta Nicolae – *Pledoarie pentru cauza României în America*, *op. cit.*, p. 71, on-line on http://smg.mapn.ro/SIA/13_Armata_unitatea_nationala.pdf, retrieved on 24.04.2016, p. 75.

[7] V. Stoica, *În America pentru cauza românească*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

with the favourable position of the American press towards Austria-Hungary, an Empire that had succeeded in creating itself a favourable image amongst the American public opinion and the US decision-makers.

Additionally, Hungary was aware that the end of the war was near; therefore, it was carrying out a huge propaganda in America, claiming it was being oppressed by Austria and the German Empire, and asking the USA to be released from such *"tyranny"* and *"to remain whole, within its old borders"*[8].

Consequently, without any intelligence training, Captain Vasile Stoica understood that, in order to promote the Romanians' cause, he had to try to get in touch with the journalists and with the press from the East Coast of America and, with the help of Captain Luke C. Doyle – officer in the American army, he managed to open the doors to the great newspapers and to publish himself in the capacity of collaborator or through the American journalists' articles that supported the cause of the Transylvanian Romanians. Thus, Captain Vasile Stoica, having won the trust of the manager of *Washington Post*, Ira F. Bennett, turned this daily into a promoter of the Romanian battle, aspirations and cause.

With the support of the American Captain, Luke C. Doyle, Captain Vasile Stoica managed to win over historian Frank H. Simonds, collaborator of *New York Tribune* and *National Review*, publications which would reveal to the American public opinion the real situation of the Romanians from Austria-Hungary, the oppressions and limitations they were forced to bear.

Later on, *New York Times* also became a promoter of the Romanian cause.

One after the other, *Washington Post* and *New York Tribune* became supporters of the Romanian cause, owing to the propaganda carried out by Captain Vasile Stoica.

The Greek-Catholic priest, Epaminonda Lucaciu[9], was of great assistance: he had emigrated to the USA in 1905 and had laid down the foundations of the Romanian-American newspaper *Românul (The Romanian)*, trying to promote the Romanian culture, instilling at the same time the idea of the unification of all the Romanians in one state.

In 1916, at a reunion of the American Romanians, which was held in Alliance, Ohio, Epaminonda Lucaciu established the Romanian National Committee in America, being elected president of this organisation and, with the support of the Greek-Catholic communities already created in the USA, he was carrying out a pro-Romanian propaganda among the American public, including lobby attempts in the Congress and at the White House.

---

[8] *Ibidem*, p. 12.
[9] The son of priest Vasile Lucaciu, member of the Romanian delegation.

Thus, when the US Minister of Foreign Affairs requested clarifications concerning the Transylvanian Romanians, Captain Vasile Stoica presented to Minister Robert Lansing, on 31 December 1917, a memorandum along with a copy of the declaration and call of the Transylvanian volunteer soldiers from Darnița (Kiev), document which was to have a powerful impact on the American decision-makers.

Of utmost importance was the meeting of 28 August 1917 between Captain Vasile Stoica and Theodore Roosevelt – the former President of the United States of America, following which the Romanian officer won the trust of the latter for the support of the cause of the Transylvanian Romanians, meeting which had a decisive role in the success of the propaganda and promotion of the unionist ideals.

Thus, about two weeks after the meeting, Theodore Roosevelt declared in a speech he gave in New York that *"peace cannot be accomplished until the small nations are freed and united with their mother countries"*[10].

Three months after the arrival of Captain Vasile Stoica in America, realising the significance of the Romanian propaganda in the USA in support of the Romanian interests, on 1 October 1917, the Romanian Government decided to establish an Official Agency in the USA, which would be led by Dr Constantin Angelescu, with the help of Nicolae H. Lahovary, journalist A. Rubin and Major Livius Teiușanu, the latter in the capacity of military attaché[11].

Thus, starting in January 1918, Ion I. C. Brătianu appointed Vasile Stoica attaché to the new legation of the Kingdom of Romania, benefiting in his propaganda from the support of the Romanian legation in the USA, led by Dr C. Angelescu who came to America on 1 January 1918.

Captain Vasile Stoica and the members of the legation of the Kingdom of Romania in Washington also had an important role at the Church Congress held on 10 March 1918 in Youngstown, Ohio, under the command of priest Ioan Podea, where, in the presence of all the members of the Romanian legation in the USA, of a great number of American politicians and journalists, the Orthodox parishes of the Transylvanian emigrants of America declared themselves united with the Metropolitan Church of București, with the Kingdom of Romania and signed a *Charter of devotion and faith*[12].

───────────────

[10] V. Stoica, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[11] Alexandru Oșca, *Doi ofițeri români pe pământ american, în sprijinul marii uniri*, în *Armata română și unitatea națională. Studii și comunicări*, Editura Delta Cart Educațional, Pitești, 2008, p. 71, on-line on http://smg.mapn.ro/SIA/13_Armata_unitatea_nationala.pdf, retrieved on 24.04.2016.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 22.

Unfortunately, this was one of the few actions for the assertion of national identity under the direction of the Romanian legation in America as on 7 May Romania was forced to sign the Treaty of Bucharest with the Central Powers and the legation of Washington was led by N.H. Lahovary after C. Angelescu left for Romania.

Captain Vasile Stoica was thus deprived of all material support and help from the country, the peace treaty concluded with the Central Powers forbidding the propaganda against the German Empire and Austria-Hungary.

The Romanian Diaspora in the USA and Its Role in the Establishment of Greater Romania

The efforts made by Captain Vasile Stoica were saved by the Romanians who had immigrated to the USA, about 150,000 - 200,000, most of them coming from Transylvania and Banat[13].

They had already established powerful Romanian centres in some of the cities in the USA, among which Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Youngstown, Chicago, and Indiana-Harbour.

In New York, a Romanian Relief Committee had been established, coordinated by Mrs. Stănculeanu and C. Orghidan family, with the support of some pro-Romanian Americans.

All these associations were supporting the cause of the Transylvanian Romanians, however, in small groups. That is why the actions did not have the required strength, and Captain Vasile Stoica realised that the promotion of the unionist ideals had to become more intense in the American cities where the public opinion weighed a lot in the US politics (Washington, Boston, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia).

As I have already mentioned, as the Treaty concluded in București by Romania and the Central Powers forbade the propaganda against the latter, Captain Vasile Stoica resigned on 3 July 1918 both from the position of attaché of the Romanian legation in Washington and from the Romanian armed forces, in order to be able to continue the propaganda behind the scene, on the unseen front of the intelligence activity, without affecting in any way the image of Romania through his actions.

Thus, Captain Vasile Stoica set up a new Romanian organisation in the USA – the Romanian National League of America, established on 5 July 1918, and he was elected President of the league.

---

[13] *Ibidem*, p. 28.

Under the command of officer Vasile Stoica, the Romanian National League of America set a political information office in Washington, using also, according to his documents, the relationships created by Professor Ludovic Mrazek in America, who was enjoying a lot of fame among the scientific groups.

Apart from the many conferences held in the American cities and the articles published in the press of the time in the USA, Captain Vasile Stoica sought to inform the US politicians and the American government about the Romanian nation, the origin and identity of the Romanian people.

For correctly informing the Americans and for making the Romanian cause known, Captain Vasile Stoica printed a collection of about 20 brochures in America, *The Romanians and Their Lands*, in which he presented the Romanian issue – a collection that appeared between 1918 and 1920.

Another crucial moment of the propaganda carried out by Captain Vasile Stoica in America was the meeting on 2 September 1918 with Colonel Edward Mandell House[14] and with the members of the Committee chaired by the latter, among whom geographer S. Mezes (to whom Vasile Stoica had sent the materials of Prof. Ludovic Mrazek) and with the university professors Isaiah Bowman, Douglas Johnson, Stephen Pierce Hayden Duggan, Robert Jos. Kerner[15], who had been charged by President Woodrow Wilson with studying the Austro-Hungarian and the Balkan problem.

As the committee had no other information about the Romanians from Austria-Hungary apart from the official Austrian or Hungarian sources, and in order to preserve equidistance and historical truth, Vasile Stoica reprinted in America the ethnographic map of the Hungarian Professor Paul Balogh, based on the statistical data of 1900, data which were also sent to the French and English delegations that attended the Paris Peace Conference.

Moreover, not only during a discussion with Theodore Roosevelt, but also, on 2 September 1918[16], in a discussion with colonel E.M. House at his house in Magnolia (Massachusetts), Captain Vasile Stoica pledged, on behalf of the Romanian State, that the union of all the Romanians in one state would not affect the rights of the minorities from Transylvania, Romania separating itself from the Austro-Hungarian policy towards the minorities, guaranteeing

[14] Friend and confident of President Woodrow Wilson.
[15] Subsequently, members of the American delegations at the Paris Peace Conference.
[16] All these discussions took place when Austria-Hungary was attempting separate peace with America and its allies.

that both the Magyar and the Székely minority would have the right to religious, educational and administrative autonomy.

Additionally, Vasile Stoica informed the American government about these issues both through memoranda and through personal meetings with Newton Baker – the Minister of War, Franklin Lane – Minister of Interior, Robert Lansing – Minister of Foreign Affairs, William Phillips – Secretary of State and William Bullitt – attaché at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On 19 October 1918, after a meeting with Franklin Lane – the Minister of Interior, obtaining the promise that the Romanian problem would be presented and submitted to the cabinet, on which occasion he also presented a short memorandum to the Minister, Captain Vasile Stoica made an appeal for cohesion to all the Romanian societies and associations in order to send a series of telegrams asking for the acknowledgment of the unification.

In order to make sure that his action would have the desired effect, Captain Vasile Stoica wrote the telegrams himself and sent them to the leaders of the mentioned organisations – leaders who were no so accustomed to the English language and to the diplomatic protocols – to be filled in and signed by them. As a consequence of this action, the US President and Government received over 300 telegrams in a single week.

On 24 October 1918, after a meeting with William Phillips, to whom Vasile Stoica handed a new memorandum, the two analysed the Romanian issue, based on the already prepared maps and statistics. At the same time, Captain Vasile Stoica appealed to him for a meeting with President Woodrow Wilson.

The good relationships Captain Vasile Stoica had with the other nations that were fighting for the emancipation from the Austro-Hungarian occupation made it possible that, in the meeting held in Philadelphia on 25 October 1918, the Middle-European Union, the collective organisation of those nations, due to the persuasive actions of Vasile Stoica, addressed a motion to the American Government, asking for the *liberation from the Hungarian and Austrian domination and the unification with their free brothers from Romania*[17] of the 4 million Romanians from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

On 31 October 1918, upon presenting a new memorandum to Robert Lansing – the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vasile Stoica restated his request

---

[17] *Ibidem*, p. 47.

that the United States should adopt a trenchant position, which would be expressed before the end of the peace negotiations between the USA and Germany.

After the meeting of the American Cabinet on 4 November 1918, which also concerned the position of the United States towards Romania, Vasile Stoica was invited by William Bullitt at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to write together a note, to be presented in the meeting of the American Cabinet on 5 November 1918 – it was approved and transmitted to the Romanian Government from Iaşi, through the American legation, and it was also disclosed to the entire American press.

Thus, the official declaration of America in favour of the unification of all the Romanians with the Old Kingdom was issued on 5 November 1918, as a result of the intense efforts made by Captain Vasile Stoica.

After this declaration, all the Romanian forces joined together to organise in Alba Iulia, on 18 November/1 December 1918, the National Assembly of all the Romanians, when they supported, once more, the unification with the Kingdom of Romania.

After the Great Assembly of Alba Iulia, the Paris Peace Conference opened on 18 January 1919, meant to establish new political and territorial configurations in Europe, and to develop and sign peace treaties.

Captain Vasile Stoica was again at the lead of the Romanian diaspora in America and continued his efforts to support the Romanian cause so as to ensure the accomplishment of the long-wished goal and, at a meeting of the Romanian organisations on the East Coast of the United States, held on 13 February 1919 in Youngstown, Ohio, the following motion was adopted[18]:

"Motion of the Romanians from America

We, the undersigned representatives of the 180,000 Romanians in the United States, emigrants from Transylvania, from the Neighbouring Counties of Banat and Bukovina, reunited on this 13th day of February 1919 in the "Ploughman" Room of Youngstown (Ohio), after a long deliberation upon the difficulties of this time and the needs of the Romanian people from the Dniester to the Tisza, have unanimously adopted the following motion:

I. The Romanians from America address to the Government of the United States, to the Royal Government of Romania and to the Allied Governments, as well as

---

[18] The Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Problem 18, vol. 10, SUA, 1919-1929, unpaged.

to their armies, the expression of their deep gratitude for their sacrifices for the liberation of humanity from oppression and for the priceless help given to the Romanian People, liberated after harsh battles for freedom and national unity.

II. Relying on the principle of people's self-determination, the Romanians from America wish the Romanian people, whose armed forces and legions, incorporated in the Allied Armies, expressed their unanimous desire through blood shedding sacrifices, were reunited in one State, under one government. Also, they wish all the neighbouring peoples were freely organised as National States, within their ethnographic borders.

III. Considering that the geographic situation calls for reciprocal territorial concessions, the Romanians from America energetically state the need for the following natural borders: Romania and Ukraine must be separated by the Dniester; Romania and Yugoslavia must be separated by the Tisza from the flow of the Mureş to the Danube, and by the latter up to the limits of the old Kingdom of Romania.

Furthermore, they support that the 600,000 Romanians from Ukraine, the 274,000 Romanians who live in Serbia, between the Timoc and the Danube,

as well as the Romanians from Macedonia, from Tesalia and Epir, have, from now on, the possibility to evolve freely. In exchange, the same liberties shall be guaranteed to the 280,000 Serbs of Banat, to the 200,000 Ukrainians of Bessarabia, as well as to the other national minorities who live on the territory of Romania.

IV. The Romanians from America wish that all the foreign or domestic affairs of the New Romania – allotting land to the peasants, protecting trade and industry workers, granting political rights to the Jews, full (absolute) confessional equality on the entire Romanian territory, the issue of administrative autonomy – could be solved along the principles of modern democracy, in the most liberal and democratic spirit, by a Constitutional Assembly elected through a universal, equal and secret suffrage for men and women. The Romanians from America express their wish that the Constitution of the United States of America serve as a model, as far as possible, for the future Romanian State, stating at the same time that a majority of three quarters of the votes of the citizens is required (has the power) for revising the Constitution.

**Photo 2: Page 10
in the Diplomatic Passport belonging
to Captain Vasile Stoica
(Passport issued on 1 May 1920)[19]**

We, the undersigned, give full powers to Captain Vasile (Basil) Stoica, President of the National League of the Romanians in America to communicate our wish to all the peace delegations of the Allies (Allied States) responsible for laying, at Paris and Versailles Conference, the foundations for a better order of the future humanity".

The motion was signed at the end, over 11 pages, by several hundreds of participants, giving, once more, the necessary strength to the written words and expressing the patriotic feelings of the Romanian emigrants from the USA. Thus, on 19 February 1919, Ion I.C. Brătianu appointed Captain Vasile Stoica as a member of the Romanian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, being a liaison officer between the English and American delegations.

---

[19] Central Historical National Archives, *loc. cit.*, p. 2.

Conclusions

The assertion and support of the Romanian cause before the American public opinion and decision-makers, activity which had a decisive contribution to the achievement of the Great Unification, was a remarkable success of the Romanian state, first of all due to the intelligence efforts and activities carried out by the Romanian armed forces, through Captain Vasile Stoica, with the support and direct involvement of the Romanian diaspora from America.

In the context in which the Romanian state had concluded the Peace Treaty from Buftea-București with the Central Powers, and it could no longer support the unionist propaganda, the actions undertaken by Captain Vasile Stoica were crucial for the acknowledgement by the USA of the need for the Romanians to be united in one state, owing to his connection with the Romanian emigration from America.

We should not forget that Vasile Stoica supported the Romanian cause mainly with the help of the Romanians from Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina who had immigrated to the USA and who contributed directly to the propaganda developed by the Romanian officer.

Perhaps the merits of Captain Vasile Stoica and the way in which he succeeded, even for a little while, in bringing together the entire Romanian emigration from the USA in support of the national interest should be analysed more in order to be able to rebuild those bridges between the Romanian diaspora – Romanians from all around the world and the Romanian State, promoting at the same time the role of the Romanian armed forces and of its soldiers in the achievement of the policy of the Romanian state.

We should keep in mind that Vasile Stoica, before being an information officer of the Romanian armed forces and a great diplomat, was a true Romanian, a great patriot and his activity played a crucial role not as much on the battlefield as on the unseen front of the information services.

At the same time, we should give credit to the Romanian diaspora for its merits and contribution to the establishment of the Romanian state, for the accomplishment of the Great Unification. Both the armed forces and the diaspora should become national priorities of the Romanian state and the policies of the Romanian state in relation to the armed forces and the Romanian diaspora should be linked to the nowadays international and geopolitical realities, both being matters of national interest.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Sever Bocu, *Les Légions Roumaines de Transylvanie – L'irrédentisme roumain*, Imprimerie Paul Dupont, Paris, 4, 1918.

2. Gheorghe Buzatu, *Din Istoria secretă a celui de-Al Doilea Război Mondial*, vol. II., Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1995.

3. Mihai Chiriță, *Statul Major General în arhitectura organismului militar românesc: 1859-2009*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2009, see http://smg.mapn.ro/SIA/15_SMG_in_arhitectura_omr_1859-2009.pdf.

4. Eugenia Irina Crișan, Constantin I. Stan, *Activitatea lui Ghiță Popp pentru înfăptuirea, consolidarea și apărarea României Mari*, in *Angustia*, no. 3, 1998, see www.cimec.ro / www.mncr.ro.

5. Mihai-Octavian Groza, *Proiecte privind crearea "Legiunii române din America" și propaganda în favoarea unirii Transilvaniei cu Regatul României (1917-1918)*, in *Caiete Silvane*, no. 105, 2013.

6. Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria contemporană de la 1904 la 1930*, București, 1932.

7. Crisanta Podăreanu, *Fondul personal Vasile Stoica*, in *"Revista Arhivelor"*, no. 1, 1993.

8. Boris Rangheț, *Relațiile româno-americane în perioada primului război mondial (1916-1920)*, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1975.

9. Vasile Stoica, *În America pentru cauza românească*, Editura Universul, București, 1926.

10. Paul Ștefănescu, *Istoria serviciilor secrete românești*, București, 1994.

Web Sources

- www.greco-catolica.org
- www.dacoromania-alba.ro/nr. 58/ambasadorul_vasile_stoica.htm

# EUROPE FROM DIVISION TO REUNIFICATION (1947-2004). THE STORY AND THE SUB-TEXT

Gérard-François DUMONT
Pierre VERLUISE

What have been the major stages in the unification of part of geographical Europe? After four decades of division, the opening of the iron curtain in the second half of 1989 marked a break in the strategic order. In fifteen years, NATO, and then the EU, took in three former Soviet Republics and USSR satellites. The USA won the Cold War and the post-Cold War, leaving the EU to carry part of the burden from the victory by taking on board countries impoverished by communism.

Travelling along the banks of the Rhine, Victor Hugo realised back in 1840 how much this divided river also had the potential to bring peoples together. As early as 1849 he even imagined the creation of the *"United States of Europe"*. This did not prevent Europe from being subsequently twice ravaged by World Wars.

In the aftermath of WWII, the USA and the USSR, though former allies against Nazi Germany, soon saw their relations sour. As early as summer 1944, Joseph Stalin put off

Gérard-François Dumont, Pierre Verluise, «The Geopolitics of Europe. From the Atlantic to the Urals», (translation Alan Fell), Diploweb.com 2016-2017. ISBN: 979-10-92676-09-9. Chap. 2 – Europe from Division to Reunification (1947-2004). The story and the sub-text.

for 63 days the agreed advance on Berlin while the German army crushed the resistance in Warsaw. Historians have since established that the Polish insurrection was encouraged by the Allies and its failure knowingly organised by Moscow in an implicit renewal of the German-Soviet Pact initially signed on 23 August 1939. Stalin could not tolerate the renaissance of an independent Poland. Little was made of this alliance with Nazi Germany when the USSR regained the territories abandoned by the signature of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (1918) and had the full intention of staying in the countries *"freed"* by its troops. In 1945-1946, the British statesman Sir Winston Churchill coined the term *"iron curtain"* in reference to the migration-proof border that Stalin was erecting between Eastern and Western Europe. The start of the Cold War is more usually dated to 1947, when the United States decided on its containment policy, which involved standing up to the USSR to thwart its revolutionary project, and even bringing its rival to change from within. Europe had been the centre of the world until 1913 but, in the aftermath of WWII, now found itself at stake in a face-off between two superpowers. Yet, in 2004, former Soviet Republics and satellite countries of Moscow joined the EU.

So what were the main stages in this unification of part of geographical Europe?

I. Europe Divided by the Cold War

Before examining the main features of Eastern and Western Europe let us first take a look at the international context.

Europe Divided by More than Forty Years of East-West Tension

In 1947, the American financier Bernard Baruch coined the term Cold War to qualify the nascent confrontation between the USA and the USSR. The formula was soon popularised by the American editorialist Walter Lippmann who published a series of articles and then a book under the title.

Georges-Henri Soutou offered this definition: *"The Cold War was a global, ideological, political, geopolitical, and military conflict with very strong repercussions in a wide range of domains: the arts, the economy and science"*. François Géré saw it as a *"high-intensity balance of power between two States or two alliances that is not solved by a direct armed confrontation"*. This was notably the result of nuclear firepower, in the hands of the USA since 1945 and then the Soviet Union as from 1949. The whole period was marked by the balance of terror and the arms race.

The Cold War was explained by the incompatibility between two forms of ideological messianism. The United States set themselves up as champions of parliamentary democracy and free enterprise. The Soviet mantra revolved around a monopoly of power to the benefit of the Communist Party and central

economic planning. The Cold War thus opposed powers upholding contrary values and organised according to different principles.

If the Cold War did not involve direct confrontation, it did use the full contemporary arsenal, including indirect warfare, economic weapons and misinformation. Intellectuals and journalists sometimes became mediators instrumentalised to convince public opinion.

Though there are different ways of analysing the Cold War timeline, there were three clearly delineated phases: the development of the bipolar system (1947-1962); the détente years (1963-1979) and the end of the Cold War (1979-1990). It is important to consider that for four decades, geographical Europe found itself transformed into a strategic arena for East-West tension. Though it may seem paradoxical, tension was also a binder, since exclusion produces its corollary: inclusion. Fear of the *"enemy"* effectively causes the formation of political, strategic and economic groups. In each crisis, camps close ranks. Yet these groupings should not be placed on a par, if only because of the nature of the underlying constraints. That the US supported the construction of the European Community is beyond doubt, but the pressure was not of the same magnitude as that exerted by the Soviet Union on its satellites.

Life in the East during the Communist Era

On 12 March 1947, the doctrine of US President Harry Truman made it publicly clear that the Soviet Union embodied a threat.

On 5 June 1947, the Marshall Plan for the economic rebuilding of Europe was published. Joseph Stalin rejected it and forbade Czechoslovakia and Poland from accepting American aid. On 5 October 1947, the head of Soviet propaganda, Andreï Jdanov, declared that the world was divided into two irreducible camps: an Imperialist camp led by the United States and an anti-Imperialist camp under the authority of the USSR. The latter created a centralised organisation of the international communist movement, the Comintern, enabling greater cohesion within the USSR. The following year, the *"Prague coup"* (February 1948) was the final stage in Moscow's successful bid to take control over the Eastern European countries. Stalin's methods included forcing each country's Communist Party to toe the line, banning other parties, eliminating resistance, dismantling churches and shredding national identity. Politics aside, the regimentation process also used economic and social channels and acculturation.

Divided into four geographical zones, controlled by the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the USSR, the defeated Germany became the theatre of a major Cold War crisis, when the USSR blocked all access on the ground to West Berlin from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949. The Western nations stood up

to the blackmail and organised an airlift with nearly 300,000 flights. The crisis split Germany into two States: on the West, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), with a free market economy and on the East, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), communist.

On 25 January 1949, after the political break between the USSR and Yugoslavia (28 June 1948), Moscow proceeded to set up the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) between Eastern bloc countries.

In June 1953, a few weeks after the death of Stalin, worker demonstrations sprung up in GDR, the popular slogan being *"We are not slaves!"*. The Soviets joined in the repression that resulted in 51 deaths, numerous injured and over 13,000 arrests.

As from 14 May 1955, the Warsaw Pact, dominated by the Soviet Union, faced off against NATO. Conceived as a way of retaliating against the FRG's joining NATO, the Pact was made up of Eastern European countries: USSR, Poland, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, the latter pulling out a few years later.

In February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev's *"Secret Speech"* was the cue for a destalinization process that became known as the Khrushchev thaw. The relaxation of cultural constraints nonetheless had limits.

The Hungarian uprising, centred in Budapest, took place from October to November 1956. When Imre Nàgy, the Hungarian Prime Minister, proclaimed Hungary's neutrality and the decision to pull out of the Warsaw Pact, a Soviet military intervention put a brutal end to the revolt, with a death toll of 25,000. The notorious event was eloquent proof of how bonds between the popular democracies and the USSR actually worked.

A decade later, in January 1968, Czechoslovakia uncorked its own set of liberal reforms: abolition of censorship, release of prisoners of conscience, and a more conciliatory attitude towards the Church. On 21 August 1968, the *"Prague Spring"* was quashed by joint armed forces from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and East Germany. Thus, Leonid Brezhnev's USSR spelt out its right to *"safeguard socialism"* in countries with *"limited sovereignty"*.

On 16 October 1978, a Pole became Pope John Paul II. Over the coming years he was to play a very big role in the unravelling of the Cold War, notably by not opposing the United States' strategy of leading the USSR to asphyxia by ramping up the arms race.

On 4 May 1980, Marshal Tito, the artisan of Yugoslav unity, died. On 11 November 1980, a group of Polish workers founded *Solidarnosc* (Solidarity), an unofficial trade union, the first in the socialist countries not to be under Communist Party control. The union was headed by Lech Walesa. With support from the USA

and John Paul II, Walesa helped to make Poland the centre of Eastern Europe's protest movements.

In the early 1980s, economic growth in the USSR was closing in on zero, life expectancy was falling and shortages, notably in food, were becoming commonplace.

On 11 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He embarked on a bold strategy to change the image of the USSR to attract West European credit while secretly organising the flight of Soviet capital. Internal forces were now weakening the USSR, including the crisis of nationalities, notably in the three Soviet Republics in Caucasia (pogroms perpetrated on Armenians in Azerbaijan, preludes to the Nagorno-Karabakh War) and in the Baltic countries.

On 6 February 1989, the Polish government agreed to open negotiations with *Solidarnosc*, leading to the Round Table agreements. Protests continued to develop in the Eastern European nations, notably in GDR. On 2 May 1989, as the flow of East Germans hoping to escape to the West via Hungary built up at the Austro-Hungarian border, Hungary decided to open the floodgates.

On 9 November 1989, with the iron curtain now already breached, Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to open the Berlin Wall. As a result, the countries that had fallen under the thumb of Moscow in the aftermath of WWII ceased to be satellites, and the Baltic nations gained their independence in 1990-1991. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav Federation had also started to break up, a process that gathered speed in June 1991. The intervention of the Yugoslavian federal army triggered war, followed by the disintegration of the Federation, as Slovenia and Croatia both declared their independence.

In six months, the symbols of Soviet power crumbled. On 28 June 1991, the COMECON dissolved. On 1 July 1991, the Warsaw Pact followed suit. On 8 December 1991, the USSR imploded as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) came into existence. On 25 December 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned from the Presidency of a country that no longer existed.

Life in the West during the Cold War

On 5 June 1947, in an address at Harvard University, the US Secretary of State George C. Marshall put forward the plan that would bear his name. Its aim was to speed up the reconstruction of the European countries to prevent the communist parties instrumentalised by Moscow from taking advantage of the crisis to foment revolution. On 16 April 1948, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was set up to help distribute this American aid. The aim was also to strengthen economic relations between members and promote free trade.

On 4 April 1949, a North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington (DC). As from the end of the following year, the decision to create an *"integrated Atlantic army"* reflected the shift from containment in the economic and financial domains towards the strategic terrain. This was both a mutual defence agreement and a military alliance. There were twelve original member nations: the USA, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands and Portugal.

On 5 May 1949, the Council of Europe was born. This was a pan-European cooperation organisation. It is important not to confuse this with the EEC or the later EU. On 4 November 1950, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

As from 26 October 1950, a plan put together by René Pleven, the French Prime Minister, envisioned a European army and a European Defence Community (EDC). This would enable the rearmament of Germany, kept in check by the joint authority of the member States.

On 18 April 1951, following an initiative by Frenchmen Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, a treaty established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), with its founder members being the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The treaty entered into force on 23 July 1952.

On 18 February 1952, Greece and Turkey joined NATO.

On 30 August 1954, in Paris, a combination of communists and Gaullists scuppered the French parliament's ratification of the EDC. The first result of this was that the Paris and London agreements of autumn 1954 enabled the FRG to rebuild an independent army within the framework of NATO as from 5 May 1955, bolstering the role of NATO in Western Europe's security architecture. The second result was that the prospect of an integrated European defence was shelved until the end of the Cold War and the negotiations that would lead to the Treaty of Maastricht.

On 25 March 1957, the six member countries of ECSC signed the treaties of Rome that founded the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Committee (EURATOM). These Treaties of Rome entered into force on 1 January 1958.

On 20 November 1959, seven countries – Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom – founded the European Free Trade Association (EAFT). The setting up of EAFT was indicative of divergences in economic policy between the Western European nations. A factor underlying the decision to form EAFT was its members' need for collective bargaining power with the EEC.

On 13 January 1960, the OEEC was superseded by the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD), the aim of which was to promote the greatest possible expansion of the economy and employment.

In January 1962, the EEC launched the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with the aim of securing food supplies. This was to be for long the European Community's number one budget item.

On 14 January 1963, General de Gaulle rejected the US President John F. Kennedy's *"Grand Design"* to politically weld Europe and integrate the command of atomic weapons. France had been in possession of the atomic bomb since 13 February 1960 and its president was not about to share the button. De Gaulle refused the unification of NATO's strategic forces and played the French veto to obstruct Britain's admission to the EEC.

In 1965-1966, France walked away from the Common Market negotiations and the ensuing *"Empty Chair Crisis"* lasted until the Luxembourg compromise of January 1966: thenceforth, unanimity was a requisite for decisions on the most important issues, a principle that would slow down the integration of the States in a common system.

On 7 March 1966, President Charles de Gaulle wrote to the US President, Lyndon B. Johnson, informing him of France's withdrawal from the integrated military command of NATO. On 26 October 1966, the headquarters of NATO were transferred from Paris to Brussels. Thereafter, the Belgian capital thus hosted the institutions of both the European Community and NATO, geographically reflecting the institutional proximity between the two organisations.

General de Gaulle resigned in 1969. His successor at the *Élysée*, Georges Pompidou (1969-1974), lifted the French veto on the opening of membership negotiations with London. The first EEC enlargement was signed on 1 January 1973, with the admission of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Norway, however, by referendum, refused to join.

On 13 March 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) entered into force with the European Currency Unit (ECU) becoming a unit of account.

On 10 June 1979 the first elections for the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage were held.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979 put an end to the years of East-West détente. The United States feared that Moscow had designs on taking control of hydrocarbons in the Persian Gulf. This led President Jimmy Carter to officially call time on détente. In January 1981 a Republican who depicted the USSR as the *"Evil Empire"* was elected to the White House: enter Ronald Reagan.

He quickly introduced a strategy to asphyxiate the USSR: the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), more commonly known as *"star wars"*. Gradually, Washington started to occupy the high ground.

The second enlargement of the EEC took place on 1 January 1981, the beneficiaries being a Southern European nation, Greece. In November 1983 NATO began to install its first Pershing missiles in Belgium, the Netherlands and the FRG. This opened the Euromissiles crisis that would last until 1987, date of the signature of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).

On 14 June 1985, the Schengen Agreement kicked off a process of intergovernmental European cooperation that became effective in 1995 with a view to abolishing the internal borders between the signatory countries, while setting up a common external border.

The third enlargement of the EEC in 1986 opened the doors to two new Southern European countries: Spain and Portugal. The European Community then had 12 member countries, a population of 320 million, and covered an area of 2 million km^2.

On 12 March 1986, Spain joined NATO after a referendum. The Alliance had 16 members until 1999.

The *"Single European Act"* entered into force in July 1987. It amended the Treaty of Rome, and thus the EEC. The aim was to complete the creation of a single interior market with a target date of December 1992. To do this it strengthened the powers of the European institutions (Council, Parliament, and Commission) and extended their areas of competence.

In May 1990, the European summit at La Baule confirmed the link between aid and democratisation for the former communist countries of Eastern Europe. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was created to achieve this, undertaking to support the Central and Eastern European nations.

The unification of Germany became a reality on 3 October 1990. The united Germany stayed in NATO, thus effectively producing an enlargement in everything but name with the addition of the former GDR territory, while the USSR would have preferred neutral status for its erstwhile satellite. The Cold War came to an end on 19 November 1990 when the 20th century's great debate tipped in favour of liberal democracy, as clearly spelt out by the second summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the Charter of Paris for a new Europe. The Eastern European countries and NATO declared that they were no longer rivals and offered each other mutual friendship.

On 7 and 8 November 1991, at a summit meeting in Rome, NATO confirmed that it would be strengthening its ties with Central and Eastern Europe. This was the epilogue of four decades during which the Iron Curtain had been the symbol of the division of Europe.

II. The Life and Death of the Iron Curtain

So how exactly did the relationship between Iron Curtain and Berlin Wall actually work?

The Iron Curtain Predated the Berlin Wall …

The British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, borrowed the term *"iron curtain"* from the proscenium theatre where it is a device that traditionally separates the stage from the auditorium. He used it to refer to the hermetic frontier that was in the process of appearing between Eastern Europe and Western Europe, at the initiative of the USSR. He used it for the first time on 12 May 1945 in a secret telegram to the US President, Harry Truman: *"an iron curtain is drawn down upon their* [the Soviet] *front. We do not know what is going on behind"*. On 5 March 1946, Churchill used the formula again in a public speech given at *Westminster College*, Fulton, Missouri. *"From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic"*, he warned, *"an iron curtain has descended on the continent"*. The image became iconic in representations of the Cold War. So what actually was it?

The iron curtain spanned a total distance of over 8,500 km, separated into sections of 2,500 km each, the first in Northern Europe, separating Finland from the USSR, the second from the Baltic to Trieste. Its form varied from State to State and from one period of its history to another. In the GDR, specialists distinguish four generations, with SM 70 anti-personnel mines laid in the third generation, backed up by automatic firing guns. In Hungary, the 260 km border with Austria took the form of a double barbed and electrified wire fence.

It was because of its permeability in Berlin that, in 1961, the GDR built the *"Berlin Wall"*, another major symbol of the Cold War. Since the creation of the GDR emigration had accounted for 2.6 to 3.6 million people who had taken the U-bahn to leave East Berlin for West Berlin, or the rail link to cross the border, casting serious political discredit on the East German regime.

The first signs of the Wall, the full meaning of which was not immediately seized upon by the West, began on 12 June 1961 with the laying of mesh fences and barbed wire around West Berlin; there was nothing the West could do about this, short of declaring war. The aim was to separate the Soviet occupied

zone from the French, British and American occupied zones. The Soviets then chose a strategic date to start building the wall proper: the night of 12 to 13 August 1961, during a long summer weekend when many western heads of state were holidaying. The West soon coined the term *"Wall of Shame"*.

The Berlin Wall, over 43 km long, was thus built to fill a gap in the iron curtain. In reality, it was more than just a wall, for five reasons. Other measures were implemented to prevent the population from getting near it.

Rail links between East and West Berlin were closed. The number of crossing points was divided by eight.

Windows of buildings and houses in East Berlin close to the wall were bricked up.

It came to symbolise the Cold War and the division of the world into two rival blocs.

The Wall completely stemmed the tide of people crossing from East to West. Nonetheless, between 1961 and 8 March 1989, 5,075 people succeeded in escaping from the East to West Berlin by every possible means: some climbed, others tunnelled, customised cars, or swam the River Spree... An estimated 136 to over 600 people died making the attempt.

The iron curtain did not, however, prevent all communications between the two blocs. Diplomats and journalists, even tourists, crossed it. As from 1972, West Germany's *Ostpolitik* significantly stepped up exchanges between the two sides.

Also, the United States used the powerful transmitters of *Radio Free Europe* and *Radio Liberty* to broadcast information, anti-propaganda and cultural programmes to Eastern Europe and even as far as the USSR.

... but Their Dismantling Was Closely Interconnected

Refusing to attempt to stem the migratory pressure to the West, Hungary started to dismantle the iron curtain between 2 May and 26 June 1989, along its Austrian border. On 27 June 1989, the Hungarian Prime Minister and his Austrian counterpart took wire cutters to the barbed wire separating the two countries. A complex series of events, including the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, led to the complete dismantling of the iron curtain during the second half of 1989. This was a remarkable game of three-cushion billiards, or a strategy with two moves planned in advance, in which one player sought to obtain a result in two stages ... though it is always hard to establish with certainty who made which move and the level of complicity between players. Jean-François Soulet distinguishes three patterns in the process by which countries ceased to be satellites: top-down (Poland, Hungary); bottom-up (GDR, Czechoslovakia) and inspired (Bulgaria, Romania).

So what had been afoot in East Germany before the opening of the Berlin Wall? Since spring 1987 and, above all 1988, dissent had been fermenting among part of East German civil society. In spite of the omnipresence and brutality of the political police (Stasi), pacifist and feminist groups were becoming increasingly active. Opposition crystallised around a number of key issues, including fraud during the municipal elections of spring 1989. Steering clear of demanding the abolition of the communist regime or German reunification, the opposition minorities demanded respect for citizens' rights, the legalisation of opposition and freedom of movement.

During a visit to GDR on 6 and 7 October 1989, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev refrained from condemning the demonstrations, criticised the behaviour of the East German leaders and urged reforms. On 18 October 1989, the Politburo axed the General Secretary of the East German Communist Party, Erich Honecker, replacing him by Egon Krenz, in an attempt to save the regime… to no avail as the demonstrations continued. The spokesperson for the East German government, Günter Schabowski, declared on the afternoon of 9 November 1989 at a press conference: *"Private travel into foreign countries can be requested without conditions (passports or family connections). Permission will be granted instantly. Permanent relocations can be done through all border checkpoints between the GDR and the FRG"*.

The news spread like wildfire but when thousands of East Germans converged on the Wall checkpoints, they found them closed. After a few hours' wait in a climate of uncertainty, the *Bornholmer Straße* checkpoint opened at 9:20 p.m. and tens of thousands of Berliners swarmed through to West Berlin.

It would nonetheless be an over-simplification to consider 9 November 1989 as the day the iron curtain fell, powerful though the symbol may be. If we are looking for a single date, it would appear historically judicious to prefer 25 December 1989, with the execution of the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife, Elena. According to research by Catherine Durandin, this episode was preceded by the intervention of special Soviet forces to expedite the change. This sheds a strange light on the whole process of the dismantling of the Iron Curtain. That is why, rather than the concept of *"fall"* of the Iron Curtain or the Berlin Wall, there is a case to be made for the terms *"opening"* or *"dismantling"*, that more clearly point to something intentional.

VACLAV HAVEL (1936-2011). FROM DISSIDENT TO PRESIDENT

This is the story of a major figure in Central European history, a committed intellectual thrust by the most singular circumstances to a centre stage role in the national and then European political arenas.

Vaclav Havel was born on 5 October 1936 into the Czech bourgeoisie, a social origin that would not serve him well in the wake of the 1948 Czech coup. There was to be no question of allowing him to study literature and film.

Theatre and Dissidence

Havel nonetheless found his way into literature and more particularly playwriting, where his influences were Kafka, Beckett and Ionesco. Joining the *Theatre on the Balustrade* as a stagehand he drew attention as an author with *The Garden Party* (1963), *The Memorandum* (1965) and *The Increased Difficulty of Concentration* (1968). The plays decrypt the mechanisms whereby power manipulates language, while making fun of Communist doggerel. Resistance to censorship is a constant theme of his work.

After the Soviet repression of the Prague spring in 1968, Havel gradually became an emblematic figure of dissidence. After his works were banned as from 1969, he became an active dissident. Two years after the 1975 Helsinki Accords, he published the *Charter 77* manifesto for human rights demanding that the precepts of the Accord's *"third basket"* be respected. In 1978, he wrote and clandestinely distributed – as a *samizdat* – *The Power of the Powerless*, advancing the premise that all politics should be based on an ethic, insisting on the need for all to share responsibility, and rejecting institutional lies. The way out of communism was via the construction of a free and independent civil society. His work gained worldwide fame. However, his commitment earned him several months' imprisonment, notably in 1978, 1979-1983 and 1989. It was from prison that he wrote to his wife the *Letters to Olga*, published covertly in 1984.

"Havel President !"

This is why, during the *"velvet revolution"* of November-December 1989 that sealed the fate of communism in Czechoslovakia, the crowd chanted: *"Havel president!"*. As interim president he led the country to the first free legislative elections in June 1990. Parliament chose him as President in July 1990. In 1992, he resigned to avoid being associated with the – peaceful – division of Czechoslovakia effective as from 1 January 1993. He subsequently became President of the Czech Republic from January 1993 to February 2003. He was instrumental in the Czech Republic's admission to NATO in 1999. He also played a part in the country's EU membership bid fulfilled on 1 May 2004, after his resignation from the presidency. Throughout these years, he firmly supported the USA – even signing the January 2003 *Letter of the Eight* in which eight European countries called for a united front against Iraq. Havel also strove to smooth over relations with Germany and inspired regional cooperation *via* the Visegrad Group or V4, made up of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

His was one of the names mentioned when a statesman of European stature was sought to become the first [stable] president of the EU as from 2009. He turned down the proposal for health reasons. After demonstrating that it is possible for a dissident to become president – with no sacrifice of principle –he died on 18 December 2011.

III. The NATO Enlargements Set the Pace for EU Expansion

1991 was the year in which the Warsaw Pact pulled the plug on itself while the Soviet Union imploded.

A Must-read Text: Article 17 of the Treaty of Maastricht

On 1 November 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force. It notably addressed the desire to anchor the reunified Germany within the construction of Europe via a common currency. It also created European citizenship and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Article 17 states the following:

"The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy. […] The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework".

Put simply: no way was the CFSP going to be incompatible with NATO interests! On 20 September 1992, the French accepted Maastricht, a referendum returning a majority of 51.04% *"yes"* votes.

On 1 January 1995 the European Community was enlarged for the fourth time, the new members being Austria, Finland and Sweden. This was the first post-Cold War enlargement, since the USSR would probably not have allowed Finland to join. For the second time, Norway opted, by referendum, to stay out. By now, the procedures to strengthen the bonds between NATO and the former satellites or members of the USSR were already in motion, a development that was not without consequence for the EU.

A Constant Thread: NATO First, then the EU…

With the Cold War over, it became legitimate to reconsider the future of NATO. Some American strategists felt that this onerous, constraining and costly military

alliance might now be dissolved. Having put an end to the military alliance of their own (the Warsaw Pact), the Russians of course expected the Americans to follow suite with NATO. The French – who secretly regretted the end of a strategic situation that enabled them to do something different – put forward a Cartesian logic. *"NATO was the result of the Cold War. The Cold War was finished. NATO no longer had a reason to be".* Paris secretly hoped to contribute to a new configuration of the architecture of European security that would be to its own advantage, even if that meant bringing back into play a Russia that was on its knees through the 1990s. This could explain why French proposals failed. Finally, NATO, with its force of inertia, its ability to reinvent itself, and its appeal in the eyes of countries that Russia still scared, won the day. In 1993-1994, when the plan to admit former Soviet bloc countries into NATO was unveiled, Russia protested vehemently. On 10 and 11 January 1994, NATO nonetheless launched its Partnership for Peace (PfP), a programme for military cooperation with the Eastern European countries. Moscow accused Washington of returning to a Cold War posture. This, however, did not prevent NATO and the EU from pushing ahead with their enlargements.

Thus Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic became members of NATO on 12 March 1999, before joining the EU on 1 May 2004 with the fifth enlargement. At the same time, it is worth noting that, from January 1999 to January 2002, the final phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was taking place as the conversion rates of the national currencies of the eleven original member states were set in stone. Greece was to join the movement on 1 January 2001. The euro jingled for the first time in the pockets of consumers of the twelve countries on 1 January 2002.

On 29 March 2004, NATO then opened its doors to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, offspring of the 1991-1992 breakdown of Yugoslavia. These countries also joined the EU on 1 May 2004, just four weeks later, along with Malta and the Republic of Cyprus.

THE SPECIAL CASES OF CYPRUS AND MALTA

The Republic of Cyprus and Malta were never USSR satellites. So what are their relations with NATO? The Republic of Cyprus (South) declares itself to be neutral and, as such, is not part of NATO's Partnership for Peace. Malta became a member of the PfP in April 1995 before suspending its participation in October 1996. In 2008, it asked the Allies to reactivate its participation in the PfP. In early 2015, Malta was not a member of NATO.

Five nations were thus beneficiaries of the fifth enlargement. With a total area of 738,300 km², they account for a population of 74 million. It is worth noting

that at that time the strategic context was such that not only could former USSR satellites join NATO, but also three former Soviet Republics: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Treaty of Nice, signed in February 2001, entered into force to enable a significantly expanding EU to function institutionally: it modified the distribution of powers at the expense of the most populated countries, notably by stripping them of their second Commissioner. Note that the Republic of Cyprus joined as a divided entity, the north of the island being occupied by Turkey. Whether a paradox or a sign of impotence, the 2004 enlargement was closely linked to the outcome of the German unification process, yet the EU accepted to accommodate a divided country… A decade later, the island of Cyprus is still divided, a state of affairs that smacks of impotence in Brussels.

Again, on 29 March 2004, NATO opened its doors to Romania and Bulgaria, but the two countries had to wait nearly three years before joining the EU on 1 January 2007 as part of the sixth enlargement.

Thus, the enlargements of NATO and the EU between 1999 and 2004 seem to point to a sort of procedure: the first step is to join NATO, and the second is to apply for – or finalise – an application for EU membership. Beyond our chronological framework, the *"procedure"* continues. Croatia and Albania became members of NATO on 1 April 2009. Within a month, Albania had applied for EU candidature. Croatia became the 28th member of the EU on 1 July 2013, with the seventh enlargement. At this time, the EU continued to consider Albania as a *"potential candidate country"*.

…. the Real Connection between the NATO and EU Enlargements Slips under the Radar

Twenty-two of the twenty-eight members of the EU are also members of NATO, and the slated enlargements would bring other NATO members into the EU. Relations between NATO and the EU are more important than the media would suggest, notably when it comes to enlargements. A senior officer in the French military admitted this in a confidential interview in 2003: *"NATO sets the tempo. The EU runs along behind"*. So why is this so?

Firstly, this process reflects a scale of priorities. The population of the European Baltic, Central and Eastern states have already heard Soviet tanks rumbling through their streets. They have no desire to relive the nightmare. Their *"hunger for security"* plays into the hands of the US and NATO. True, gaining membership of NATO remains a complex process, but the political dimension here outweighs the regulatory red tape. Worse however is the finalisation of an application to join the EU as this means wading through 80,000 pages of community *acquis*.

Secondly, the magnetism of NATO feeds on the weaknesses of the common defence policy envisioned by the Treaty of Maastricht. In other words, the Baltic, Central and Eastern European countries, witnessing, in the 1990s, Europe's collective inability to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia, have figured that it is best not to count too much on the EU.

Thirdly, the process is part of a strategic context that is, by nature, temporary. Put differently, faced with a weakened Russia, the US are pushing their advantage for as long as they can, even if this means giving the impression of attaching little importance to the interests of Russia, for example in the Balkans, and offering the Kremlin symbolic compensation via the creation of relatively formal structures. Thus, on 27 May 1997, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on relations, cooperation and mutual security. Only a few weeks later, preliminary negotiations began for the membership of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic… and from 23 March to 11 June 1999, NATO dropped bombs on Serbians as part of Operation Allied Force, before deploying in Kosovo. Further formal compensation was offered and accepted on 28 May 2002, when NATO and the Russian Federation – presided over since 2000 by Vladimir Putin – signed the Rome Declaration instating the Russia-NATO Council.

Thus the connection between the enlargements of NATO and the EU is as close as it is unhyped. With the United States having won the Cold War, it has been time to squarely face a new strategic configuration of geographical Europe. What is to be made of the former USSR satellites and the former Soviet Baltic Republics that aspire to leaving the Russian sphere of influence? What is to be made of the countries spawned by the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia? The answer is there to be seen in a timeline of the decision-making process: NATO takes charge of security – even at the cost of weakening *de facto* the chances of the EU common defence policy – leaving the EU to do the housekeeping. The necessary logistic support, dispensed via the funds earmarked for pre-accession, and then by the regional and agricultural policies – and this is not all – can span more than three decades. This is something that was not fully explained to taxpayers in the older member countries.

This is the parameter that is often missing when it comes to explaining why, since 2004, the countries that have joined the EU have always been poorer than the EU average. The aim was not to economically enrich the EU but to make a contribution to an overall solution to the major strategic question that had arisen in the aftermath of the Cold War: how to address the new geopolitical configuration of geographical Europe? NATO and the EU have each taken on board the satellites of the former USSR and the former Baltic Republics

aspiring to leave the sphere of Russian influence. Though this move was not clearly explained – even less debated – it has changed the nature of NATO and the EU. It would have been more in keeping with democratic values to have dared the debate.

<p style="text-align:center">*</p>

So what have been the major stages in the unification of part of geographical Europe? After four decades of division, the opening of the iron curtain in the second half of 1989 marked a break in the strategic order. In fifteen years, NATO, and then the EU, took in three former Soviet Republics and USSR satellites. The USA won the Cold War and the post-Cold War, leaving the EU to carry part of the burden from the victory by taking on board countries impoverished by communism. The question now is to make this responsibility into a success and to handle, as best as possible, relations with Russia and the former Soviet Republics, now in suspension between two worlds. For all this, to talk in 2015 about a *"reunified Europe"* would be wishful thinking as there is residual resentment – not, for that matter without ambiguity – among the new members of NATO and EU towards Russia. The latter is quick to point out that – at least its Western part – is as European as the EU countries, even though it does not share their values. Whatever, Russia is doing its utmost to re-join the circle of geopolitical big-hitters.

All of this shows the extent to which the word *"Europe"* remains so ambiguous. Diplomats use it abundantly when they criticise *"Europe"*, without specifying that they are actually complaining about the EU. Those who are under no pressure to resort to this pirouette have much to gain from specifying whether they are talking about geographical Europe, the European Economic Community, or – since the implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht – the EU. It is worth noting that the Treaties themselves refer simply to the *"Union"* as though the planet had only one!

THE 2015
GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ
JOURNAL AWARDS
THE 18ᵀᴴ EDITION – 10 November 2016

On 10 November 2016, at the Ministry of National Defence headquarters, the 18th edition of the *Gândirea militară românească Journal Awards* ceremony took place, once again part of the events dedicated to the General Staff Day. The *Journal Awards Selection, Evaluation and Nomination Commission*, chaired by Lieutenant General Dr Adrian Tonea, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chairman of the journal Editorial Board, had the mission to designate the winners out of the 36 books that participated in the competition, while thanking the members of the Commission for the objectivity and promptitude they demonstrated: Major General Dr BEng Ovidiu Ionel Tărpescu, Rear Admiral (LH) Tiberiu Frățilă, Major General (r.) Dr Florian Răpan, Colonel Dr Ion Puricel, and Colonel Dr Mircea Tănase. This year the ceremony

The photos were taken by Valentin Ciobîrcă – the Romanian Armed Forces Press Trust.

was also subsumed under the activities intended to mark 100 years since Romania entred the First World War following which Greater Romania came into being.

The awards were presented by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Dr Adrian Tonea.

Here are the laureates and nominees of the *Journal Awards* for this year:

• **The Award** *"Marshal Alexandru Averescu"*
was presented
to **Major General Dr Victor STRÎMBEANU**
for the book
"Strategie pentru viitorul Românieĩ"/
"Strategy for the Future of Romania".

For the Award *"Marshal Alexandru Averescu"*:
"Afganistan – istorie, guvernare şi actualitate"/
"Afghanistan – History, Governance and Topicality",
author **Lieutenant General Dr Dumitru SCARLAT**,
and *"Aserţiuni euroatlantice"/"Euro-Atlantic Assertions"*,
author **Major General (r.) Dr Visarion NEAGOE**.

• The Award *"Division General Ștefan Fălcoianu"*
was presented
to **Mariana PĂVĂLOIU** and **Marian SÂRBU**
for the book
*"Forțele Navale Române. 155 de ani de istorie
modernă"/"The Romanian Naval Forces.
155 Years of Modern History"*.

For the Award *"Division General Ștefan Fălcoianu"*:
"Luptele Wehrmachtului în România – 1944"/"The Wehrmacht Fights in Romania – 1944",
author **Klaus SCHÖNHERR**,
and *"Bucureștiul sub bombardamente. 1941-1944"/"Bucharest under Bombardment. 1941-1944"*,
author **Alexandru ARMĂ**.

• **The Award** *"Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu"*
was presented
to **Constantin MANOLACHE**
for the book
"Organismul militar al Republicii Moldova.
Construcția militară și securitatea statului"/
"The Military Body of the Republic of Moldova.
The Military Construct and the State Security".

For the Award *"Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu"*:
"Crearea unei Armate Populare. O perspectivă franceză asupra evoluției forțelor armate române
de la 23 august 1944 până în 1975"/"The Establishment of a Popular Army. A French Perspective
on the Evolution of the Romanian Armed Forces between 23 August 1944 and 1975",
author **Christophe MIDAN**,
and *"Românii în «Marele Război». Anul 1915. Documente, impresii, mărturii"/*
"Romanians in the «Great War». 1915. Documents, Impressions, Testimonials",
coordinator **Major General (r.) Dr Mihail E. IONESCU**.

• **The Award** *"Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu"*
was presented
to **Dr Maria GEORGESCU**
for the book
"Cavaleriști români la Saumur"/
"Romanian Cavalry Cadets in Saumur".

For the Award *"Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu"*:
"Școala aripilor românești de la Tecuci – o instituţie de învăţământ aeronautic
în umbra secolului XX"/"Romanian Wings School in Tecuci – An Aeronautical Educational
Institution in the Shadow of the 20th Century",
authors **Colonel (AF) Dr Jănel TĂNASE, Colonel (AF) (r.) Dorel CHIȘ,**
Major (AF) Daniel STAN,
and *"Comandorul aviator Lazăr Munteanu – cavaler al Ordinului «Mihai Viteazul».*
Biografie de război"/"Colonel (AF) Lazăr Munteanu – Knight of «Mihai Viteazul» Order.
War Biography",
authors **Radu THEODORU** and **Marian MOȘNEAGU**.

• **The Award** *"Lieutenant Colonel Mircea TOMESCU"*
was presented
to **Călin HENTEA**
for the book
*"Propaganda și rudele sale.
Mic dicționar enciclopedic"/
"Propaganda and Its Relatives.
Concise Encyclopaedic Dictionary"*.

For the Award *"Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu"*:
*"O viață sub cupola de mătase. Generalul parașutist Grigore Baștan"/
"A Life under the Silk Canopy. Paratrooper General Grigore Baștan"*,
author **Eugen Dorin SPĂTARU**,
and *"Cazacii din Dobrogea. O istorie uitată"/"The Kazakhs in Dobruja. A Forgotten History"*,
author **Mihai TIULIUMEANU**.

The Special Award

was presented to the following articles published
in *Gândirea militară românească/*
Romanian Military Thinking Journal in 2015:

➢ *"Cartografierea spaţiului cibernetic"/"Cyberspace Cartography"*,
authors **BEng Alexandra DINULESCU** and **BEng Gheorghe URSULEAN**.

(*Gândirea militară românească* no. 2/2015,
pp. 103-116/*Romanian Military Thinking* no. 3/
2015, pp. 95-107)

CARTOGRAFIEREA SPAŢIULUI CIBERNETIC

Ing. Alexandra DINULESCU
Ing. Gheorghe URSULEAN

The information technology development and its use in everyday life have led to a mainly virtual artificial environment, called cyberspace. According to one of the widely accepted definitions, cyberspace comprises all the elements that store, transport and process information, as well as all the procedures associated to them. Apart from the fact that the processes that are carried out within this environment have changed the lifestyle drastically, cyberspace is also considered a strategic field. Moreover, it is a place where both offensive and defensive cyber operations able to reach the extent of cyber wars can occur. Taking decisions related to cyber defence requires maps for the area of responsibility or the locations where operations could take place. Although some key features belonging to traditional operational maps are preserved, cyber maps are more complex and have more dynamic representations. The article presents the methods and tendencies in cyberspace cartography.

Keywords: cyberspace; map; cartography; Internet; technology

I. Referinţe istorice privind cartografierea

Cartografia reprezintă arta, ştiinţa şi tehnologia întocmirii hărţilor, precum şi studiul acestora ca documente ştiinţifice sau lucrări de artă. *Harta*, elementul central al cartografiei, este o reprezentare grafică sau un model, la scală, al conceptelor spaţiale, care facilitează înţelegerea lucrurilor, conceptelor, condiţiilor, proceselor sau evenimentelor în contextul spaţial, constituind, totodată, un mediu universal de comunicare. Istoria cartografiei a început cu primele indicaţii de navigare terestră transmise pe cale orală sau desenate în nisip. Încă de atunci, omul a încercat să reprezinte cât mai bine felul în care înţelege lumea înconjurătoare. Cele mai vechi exemple de hărţi provin din Paleolitic, aproximativ 25 000 î.H. Acestea sunt o formă rudimentară de a reprezenta caracteristici topografice şi geografice precum dealurile, râurile şi aşezările umane. Hărţile primitive reprezentau suprafeţe mici de teren, locale şi erau folosite, în principal, pentru a ilustra zone de vânătoare sau zone în care existau surse de apă şi hrană. În jurul anului 6 200 î.H., egiptenii efectuau măsurători de teren şi le reprezentau pe hartă pentru a putea reconstitui graniţele locale după inundaţii.

Ing. Alexandra Dinulescu, ing. Gheorghe Ursulean – Ministerul Apărării Naţionale.

➢ *"Răspunsul Alianței Atlanticului de Nord la noile riscuri și amenințări din vecinătatea estică a spațiului euroatlantic"/ "The North Atlantic Alliance's Response to the New Risks and Threats to the Euro-Atlantic Area in the Eastern Neighbourhood"*, author **Lieutenant General Dr BEng Gheorghe SAVU**.

RĂSPUNSUL ALIANȚEI ATLANTICULUI DE NORD LA NOILE RISCURI ȘI AMENINȚĂRI DIN VECINĂTATEA ESTICĂ A SPAȚIULUI EUROATLANTIC

General-locotenent dr. ing. Gheorghe SAVU

As a NATO member state, Romania continues to be, according to the author, a dynamic factor in the process of implementing the assurance and adaptation measures adopted at the summit in 2014, organising national military exercises and hosting numerous Allied naval, land and air exercises. Romania is among the six countries on the Eastern flank of the Alliance that will have its own NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) operational up to the NATO Summit in July 2016, which will be a major contribution to the Alliance potential to deploy the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) on the Eastern flank, to organise large-scale exercises and to pre-position equipment, military assets and logistics support elements.

Keywords: strategic partnership; the Russian Federation; collective defence; partner states

1. Principalele riscuri și amenințări din vecinătatea estică a Alianței Atlanticului de Nord

Anexarea Crimeei, în 2014, și ocupația *de facto* a unor importante părți din sud-estul Ucrainei, coroborate cu războiul ruso-georgian din 2008 și măsurile concrete ce au urmat privind anexarea *de facto* și, ulterior, demersurile pentru anexarea *de jure* a Abhaziei și Osetiei de Sud de către Federația Rusă, scot în evidență obiectivul strategic al acestui stat: menținerea și extinderea sferei de influență rusă asupra fostelor state sovietice, mai puțin cele baltice. Pentru realizarea controlului asupra a ceea ce se numește *vecinătatea apropiată*, Kremlinul utilizează un complex de factori diplomatici, informaționali, economici, politici și militari, cu încălcarea gravă a dreptului internațional referitor la suveranitatea, integritatea teritorială și independența statelor și prin nerespectarea acordurilor și tratatelor internaționale la care Federația Rusă este parte. Dacă, până în 2008, Moscova apela cu predilecție la mijloace mai puțin intruzive (mass-media prorusă, instrumentul energetic, cultivarea clasei

General-locotenent dr.ing. Gheorghe Savu – reprezentantul militar al României la NATO și UE.

➢ **"Perspective asupra evoluției și influenței conceptului de război hibrid"/"Perspectives on the Evolution and Influence of the Hybrid Warfare Concept"**, authors **Brigadier General (r.) Dr Viorel BUȚA** and **Colonel Valentin VASILE**.

(*Gândirea militară românească* no. 3 and 4/2015, pp. 11-22 and 11-21/*Romanian Military Thinking* no. 3/2015, pp. 11-32)

PERSPECTIVE ASUPRA EVOLUȚIEI ȘI INFLUENȚEI CONCEPTULUI DE *RĂZBOI HIBRID* (I)

General de brigadă (r.) dr. Viorel BUȚA
Colonel Valentin VASILE

The aim of this article is to summarise the main features of the concept of hybrid warfare, its evolution and influence on national and allied military doctrines, as they are described by several military theorists from the United States, the United Kingdom and Sweden. The authors note that the hybridity of contemporary conflicts confirms the ever-changing nature of war ... in the human hi... adapts not only ... and legal cir... to the level of tec... The authors c... the evolution of ... may be particul... understanding ... warfare in orde... impact on the ... of military ope...

Keywor... Wales; hybrid ... countering hyb...

„Der Krieg ist also ein wahres Chamäleon, weil er in jedem konkreten Falle seine Natur etwas ändert"[1].
Carl von Clausewitz

Introducere
Eforturile de teoretizare a hibridității conflictelor contemporane confirmă natura poliformă și mereu schimbătoare a războiului, o prezentă constantă în istoria umanitătii.

PERSPECTIVE ASUPRA EVOLUȚIEI ȘI INFLUENȚEI CONCEPTULUI DE *RĂZBOI HIBRID* (II)

General de brigadă (r.) dr. Viorel BUȚA
Colonel Valentin VASILE

General de ...
Colonel Va...
[1] „Războiul...
traducere în e...
1965, p. 69.

The authors show that the multiple dimensions and facets of hybrid warfare determine the North Atlantic Alliance to undertake efforts to ensure the member states security. The flexibility of the command and control structures, the reconfiguration of operative units, the increase in the expeditionary force projection and rapid reaction capabilities, the equipment, ammunition and military assets pre-positioning are all necessary but not sufficient measures. In addition to these measures, NATO and member states have to develop and implement integrated strategies to allow counteracting hybrid warfare, which exceed the sphere of competence of the military commands, having a political, economic, diplomatic, informational, cultural and humanitarian nature.

Keywords: hybrid warfare; asymmetrical threat; regular and irregular warfare; crisis management

„Der Krieg ist also ein wahres Chamäleon, weil er in jedem konkreten Falle seine Natur etwas ändert"[25].
Carl von Clausewitz

### Perspectiva britanică asupra războiului hibrid
Centrul pentru Doctrine, Concepte și Dezvoltare al Ministerului britanic al Apărării estima, în studiul *Future Character of Conflict*, publicat în anul 2010, evoluțiile caracteristicilor războiului până în anul 2029, precum și posibilele consecințe ale acestora. Instabilitatea regională generată de statele eșuate, accentuarea divergențelor interetnice și interconfesionale, acțiunile grupărilor extremiste, terorismul, intensificarea competiției pentru resurse și modificarea echilibrului de putere la nivel internațional sunt motivele care ar putea conduce la apariția unor conflicte.

Deși tipologia viitoarelor conflicte nu poate fi anticipată cu precizie, este posibil ca, în viitor,

General de brigadă (r.) prof.univ.dr. Viorel Buța – Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I", București.
Colonel Valentin Vasile – locțiitorul șefului Direcției informare și relații publice, Ministerul Apărării Naționale.
[25] *„Războiul este deci un adevărat cameleon, pentru că, în fiecare caz concret, își schimbă un ceva natura"*, traducere în ediția în limba română, Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*, Editura Militară, București, 1965, p. 69.

11

➢ **"About Military Transformation – A Pledge for the HQ SACT"**, author **Colonel Dr Daniel Petrescu**.

(*Romanian Military Thinking* no. 4/2015, pp. 138-148)

ABOUT MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
– A PLEDGE FOR THE *HQ SACT* –

Colonel Dr Daniel PETRESCU

The current crisis and security events have increased the importance of the Allied Command Transformation – ACT as a NATO strategic headquarters, underlining the need for military transformation and revitalising the strategic planning process. Under these circumstances, an enhanced and more active national posture in the relationship with the ACT remains essential in achieving the following goals: (1) leading the military transformation and capability development; (2) enhancing operational commanders' ability to lead future operations in accordance with the level of ambition; (3) supporting the allied effort to influence the security environment; (4) strengthening the national resilience, in connection with strengthening the allied resilience.

Keywords: transformation; adaptation; strategic HQ; Connected Forces Initiative; NATO Defence Planning Process; command; Alliance

At strategic level, the military command of the Alliance is exercised through the *Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT)* and the *Allied Command Operations (ACO/SHAPE)* – two commands subordinated to the *Military Committee (MC)* and to *NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ)*. While *ACO* commands and controls current NATO operations, *HQ SACT* acts for the enhancement of military capabilities and training, military effectiveness and interoperability of *NATO Command Structure (NCS)* and *NATO Force Structure (NFS)*. The two strategic commands are responsible to the *MC* for directing and conducting Alliance's military operations, within their assigned areas of competency and responsibility.

Twelve years after its establishment, *HQ SACT* is still insufficiently known and presented beyond the *NATO Command Structure* and the community of subject matter experts working in Capitals, in the strategic planning domain[1].

Colonel Dr Daniel Petrescu – National Liaison Representative for Romania to the Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation (NLR HQ SACT).

[1] An Internet search using the ACT and ACO key words revealed a significant disparity in the number of returns regarding the two strategic commands, and in the mentions dedicated to the activity of the two strategic commanders (*SACT* and *SACEUR*) – on 6 November 2015, such a Google search returned 10 references to *SACT* in the first 10 pages, as opposed to 34 references to *SACEUR* in the first 5 pages.

The Gândirea militară românească Journal Certificate of Excellence
was awarded to:

➢ *"Relațiile politice*
și militare româno-germane.
Septembrie 1940 – august 1944"/
"Romanian-German Political and Military
Relations. September 1940 – August 1944",
author **Ottmar TRAȘCĂ**.

English version by
🖎 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

Cover 1: *Romanian Flag Day celebrated in Kandahar, Afghanistan, 26 June 2016.*
Photo: Iulian CADULENCU. Source: www.mapn.ro.

Cover 3: *The Flag Day, the Tricolour Square (outside the Palace of the National*
Military Circle), 26 June 2016. Photo: Cristian LENGA.
Source: http://rft.forter.ro/eveniment/3658/ziua-drapelului-na%C5%A3ional

Cover 4: *Paratrooper exercises within the "Strategic Airlift Capability",*
Câmpia Turzii, 25 March 2016. Photo: Mircea TĂNASE

http://www.smg.mapn.ro/gmr