Romanian Military Thinking

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Romanian Military Thinking

HIGH ROYAL DECREE NO. 3663
THROUGH WHICH "MILITARY ROMANIA"
BECOMES THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL
OF THE GENERAL STAFF

"Art. I. - The official journal named "Military Romania" is founded at the General Staff, starting 1 January 1898, in which all officers within the Armed Forces will find military studies, which interest their training.

Through the agency of this journal all officers, belonging to all branches, who are in service, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces".

Carol - King of Romania
Issued in București on 8 December 1897

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Romanian Military Thinking
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These awards are yearly bestowed,
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"Army Corps General
Ioan Sichitiu"

Award
"Lieutenant Colonel
Mircea Tomescu"

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The Mission Continues

Though a little earlier than it would have been normal – in the normal and correct society that we are constantly invoking, but seems further and further away from our expectations –, I decided to hand over the helm of the journal, with the joy of concluding a rewarding career, but also with the sadness of saying farewell, in a certain way, to the military institution which I devotedly and passionately served for 37 years.

I took over the journal from a completely different position in the military architecture. I worked for many years as a signals officer and paratrooper instructor and it was only the ruthless reform of the system that broke my strong connection with the silk canopy, under which I used to float, for almost a quarter of a century, free of any boundaries, dogmatic ferocity and petty ego. Yet, because I had also tasted from the bittersweet cup of military journalism – considering that I led the *Paraşutiştii* magazine for over 10 years and I put my shoulder to the wheel of developing many other magazines as well – I dared to believe that I could undertake such activity, as the editor-in-chief of the military theory and science journal published by the General Staff.

There is no question that, beyond any other word to define this new status, the most appropriate one seemed to be the privilege to serve the military institution at its highest level.

It was not at all easy, but beyond the hesitation and uncertainty of the beginning, the fear of being compared with my predecessors or of being unable to meet the journal's standards in terms of value and reputation, the inherent obstacles along the way – some of which were meaningless and inexplicable! –, the regrets for the things left unaccomplished, which I honestly assume, I am now able to say it was wonderful. Because, from this day forward, what remains is only the joy of some accomplishments that truly matter and which I will include, in all modesty, in my track record.

I am one of those – fewer and fewer, unfortunately! – who appreciate the e-books, but passionately love the printed format. In my library – I still believe the bookshelf has a nobleness of its own – the 45 issues of *Gândirea militară românească* and the 45 issues of *Romanian Military Thinking* that were published during my tenure will be placed in the *treasury* category. Because, beyond the hard work of the editorial staff, between the pages of the journal one can find the fruits of the intellectual endeavours of hundreds of authors, many of whom are renowned in the Romanian scientific area and beyond, people who believe the word is instrumental in setting

up and delivering any enduring project. I am greatly indebted to all of them, for the entire edifice of the journal would have collapsed without them. As for the readers, those without whom the journal would lose its purpose, I am extremely grateful to them for the interest shown, for the words of appreciation, improvement and progress.

When I began, my intention was to succeed in keeping the journal connected to the ongoing present of the military institution and the national and international scientific network in order to maintain its position at the vanguard of the contemporary value system. These desiderata are truly amazing but rather demanding and they could not have been fulfilled without the professionalism, experience, effort and dedication of the Editorial Staff, which have shown, just as I thought when I got here – and I wrote in my first editorial! – that are capable of outstanding performance in conditions that have not always been favourable to the act of creation and the natural development of the journal.

In the same appreciative way, I must recognise the fact that the journal has continued to exist due to the responsible and unconditional support of those in charge of deciding and ensuring the fulfilment of its mission. The Command of the General Staff has endorsed, with its coat of arms and strategic altitude, this platform of the military elite, meant to express and deal with the most daring and equally valuable products of the national and international military thinking.

Analyses, reviews, predictions and, why not, comparisons can be made, but I will leave that to those who are really concerned about the fate of the journal and the strengthening of its purposes. I am sure that those who will follow will carry on this daring project that began over a century and a half ago, at the initiative of that group of young officers who dared to set up the *România Militară* journal, with the aim of *"working together and with all our hearts to the rise and consolidation of the edifice that is meant to secure the future of our Homeland"*.

I am deeply honoured that, for almost nine whole years, I was part of the team that carried this torch and I honestly believe that no one, under any pretext whatsoever, will dare to put it out. The Romanian Armed Forces will always need this space to express their intellectual potential, as a defining part of their existence as a whole.

At the time of this apparent separation, I cannot thank enough to all those who have supported me in this professional – and not only! – achievement and I hope to contribute, as much as I can, to keeping it where it has always been, at the vanguard of Romanian military journalism.

The mission of the journal continues. Let us believe in its purpose and carry it out, with the power of each of us, towards its beautiful and necessary fulfilment, for the benefit of the Romanian Armed Forces!

✍ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*
English version by
Iulia SINGER

La mission se poursuit

Bien qu'un peu plus tôt qu'il aurait été naturel – dans une naturelle et décente société que nous l'invoquons constamment, mais nous la voyons de plus en plus éloignée de nos attentes –, j'ai décidé de laisser à suivre les choses de la rédaction de la publication, avec la joie d'avait réalisé une carrière complète, mais aussi avec la tristesse que je me suis séparé, d'une certaine manière, de l'institution militaire, que j'ai servi avec conviction et passion pendant 37 ans.

Je suis venu dans la rédaction de la publication d'un poste complètement différent dans l'architecture militaire. J'ai travaillé pendant de nombreuses années comme officier de transmission et professeur militaire dans les troupes des parachutistes, mais la réforme impitoyable du système a rompu mon lien fort avec le voile de soie, sous les plis dont je flottais, sans solitudes, sans obstinations dogmatiques et vanités limitées, presque un quart de siècle. Mais, parce que j'avais goûté de la verre du miel et de l'amertume du journalisme militaire – j'ai conseillé et j'ai guidé plus de 10 ans la publication *Les Parachutistes* et j'ai soutenu la soulevée d'en autres –, j'ai osé à penser que je pourrais m'engager pour un tel travail, celle de rédacteur en chef de la publication de théorie et de science militaire éditée par l'Etat-major général.

Bien sûr, au-delà de tous les autres mots qui définissent ce nouveau statut, la chose la plus appropriée m'a semblé le privilège de servir l'institution militaire à son niveau le plus haut.

Ce n'était pas du tout facile, mais, au-delà de les hésitations et de la méfiance du ce début, de la peur des comparaisons et de l'incapacité que je ne serai pas monter à la hauteur des normes axiologiques et le palmarès de la publication, des obstacles inhérents au long du ce chemin – les uns sans sens et d'incompréhensible! –, des regrets pour les échecs que je me les approprié avec honnêteté, je peux dire, maintenant, qu'il était beau. Parce que, à partir de maintenant, il reste la joie de certaines réalisations qui sont importantes et que je me permets, sans le manque de modestie, de les écrire, moi aussi, dans le palmarès.

Je suis un de ces – de moins en moins, malheureusement! – qui apprécie le livre électronique, mais j'aime très bien le livre imprimé. Dans ma bibliothèque – je crois toujours dans la noblesse de la bibliothèque –, les 45 numéros de la publication *Gândirea militară românească* et les 45 de la *Romanian Military Thinking* qui ont été édités pendant mon mandat, elles seront placés dans la catégorie de la trésor. Parce que, au-delà de notre travail éditorial, de la rédaction, dans leurs pages c'est le fruit des efforts intellectuels de centaines d'auteurs, beaucoup d'entre eux noms avec résonance dans l'espace scientifique roumain

et au-delà, des gens qui croient dans le rôle constructif de la parole dans la fondation et le maintien de tout projet durable. Et à qui j'ai l'honneur de les remercier, parce que, sans eux, l'édifice de la publication aurait été gâté. Et pour les lecteurs, ceux sans lesquels la publication ne pouvait pas trouver son sens, je les exprime ma sincère gratitude pour leur intérêt, pour les mots d'appréciation, de corriger et de recommander vers le futur.

Au début de mon voyage, je me proposais à réussir de maintenir de la connexion de la publication à la présence continue de l'institution militaire et à sa connexion au réseau scientifique interne et internationale, en vue de sa position continue dans l'avant-garde du système des valeurs contemporaines. Beaux, mais lourds ces veux, que je n'aurais vu accomplis sans le professionnalisme, l'expérience, l'effort et le dévouement de l'Equipe rédactionnelle, qui a prouvé, comme j'ai été convaincu depuis mon arrivée ici – et j'ai aussi écrit dans mon premier éditorial! –, qu'elle est capable de performances exceptionnelles dans des conditions qui ne sont pas toujours favorables à l'acte de création et à la transformation naturelle de la publication.

De la même manière, je dois admettre que la publication a conservé son Etre avec le soutien responsable et sans conditions des personnes nommées pour décider et de veiller l'accomplissement de sa mission. Le commandement de l'Etat-major général a crédité et a assuré, avec son blason et son altitude stratégique, cette tribune de l'élite militaire, pour l'énonce et l'élaboration de plus audacieux et, tout aussi, précieux produits de la pensée militaire nationale et internationale.

On peut faire des analyses, bilans, prévisions et, pourquoi pas, des comparaisons, mais je les laisse à ceux qui sont vraiment préoccupés par le destin de la publication et le renforcement de ses missions. Je suis convaincu que ceux qui suivent ils continueront ce projet courageux qui a commencé plus d'un siècle et demi à l'appel de ce groupe de jeunes officiers qui ont osé a créer la publication *România Militară*, avec le but *„de venir pour travailler ensemble et avec tout notre cœur vers exalter et renforcer l'édifice destiné à assurer l'avenir de Notre Patrie",*

Je suis honoré que, depuis près de neuf ans, je fais partie de l'équipe qui a porté cette torche et je crois sincèrement que personne, sous aucun prétexte, n'osera éteignez-le. L'Armée Roumaine a toujours besoin de cet espace d'affirmer son potentiel intellectuel en tant qu'il est un part déterminante de l'ensemble existentiel.

Au moment de cette apparente séparation, je dois leur remercier à tous ceux qui m'ont soutenu dans cette performance professionnelle – et pas seulement! – et j'espère a pouvoir contribuer, autant qu'il sera possible et je pourrai être branché aux préoccupations de la publication, pour le maintenir là où il a toujours été, à l'avant-garde du journalisme militaire roumain.

La mission de la publication continue. Croyons à son but et le portons, avec nos pouvoirs, à chacun de nous, à son accomplissement magnifique et nécessaire, au bénéfice des forces armées roumaines!

Version française par
Alina PAPOI

CLAUSEWITZIANISM AND POSTCLAUSEWITZIANISM
About the Need for a Paradigm Shift within the Romanian Military Thinking (III)

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Adrian LESENCIUC

The article presents some post-Clausewitzian paradigms in relation to the evolution of the society and consequently of the security environment. Thus the author discusses the similarities and the differences between the age of Clausewitz and the current information age, citing some theorists and experts in the field, to analyse the level of adequacy of the Clausewitzian paradigm in the context of the grand strategy, the military strategy, the Revolution in Military Affairs, the hard and soft power, the information, technological and psychological warfare, as well as in that of the hybrid warfare. The conclusion is that the premises of each military theory depend on the global image of the world.

Keywords*: military science; grand strategy; military strategy; Information Age; Revolution in Military Affairs; security environment*

3. Postclausewitzianism. Anticlausewitzianism

3.1. The Postclausewitzian Conflicting Environment. The Clausewitzian theory is valid within the horizon of its homonymous paradigm, within the limits of the modern war and of the world that the Prussian General came to know. From the Clausewitzian perspective, war is tributary to the context in which the theory was established. Exceeding the strictly military issues (war did not only refer to the armed confrontation only, even for the military thinking of the early 19th century) the theory of Carl von Clausewitz should be revisited. Neoclausewitzianists exploit this very opportunity. From Neoclausewitzian perspectives (B.H. Liddell Hart's, for example), the focus is on the *grand* or *higher strategy*, whereas war becomes the study object of the *military strategy*.

The difference between the framework of the Clausewitzian design of early 19th century

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and the current one, in which the Clausewitzian theory is rejected or embraced from a historical perspective (regarding the role of the *grand strategy* and the state's role at war), is also underlined by Neoclausewitzianists. Moreover, the purpose of design differs. David J. Lonsdale, for example, points out that understanding the nature of war does not meet the purely academic purpose, but the pragmatic interest[41]. In line with Clausewitz's pragmatic openness, those who put his ideas into practice, starting with General von Moltke, used especially the terms *"primordial violence"* and *"game of chance and probability"*, while Neoclausewitzianists have abandoned this direction, focusing on the *"role of policy"* and on the relationship between war and policy. In accordance with the Neoclausewitzian perspective, the current context, named *"information age"*, is characterised by new motivations related to triggering the conflict, even if policy is not necessarily continued by the violence specific to the modern times war. Therefore, in the Neoclausewitzian perspective, the role of policy in limiting destruction has increased considerably in the information age, but war continues to change the role of policy: *"The information age may create new motivations for resorting to war, but it will not produce wars that are not the continuation of policy. [...] Policy is inexorably entwined with war"*[42]. Looking from a more neutral perspective, the Clausewitzian paradigm is useful for understanding the traditional wars between state-nations. The current changes, mainly those generated by the technological progress: the use of high precision ammunition, the transparency of battlefield etc., or by the teleological reasons: non-lethal operations, information operations etc., make the present conflicting environment incompatible with the Clausewitzian battlefield and war, as Robert J. Bunker[43] suggests. The *Clausewitzian lens*, a phrase first used by the theorist Joseph Nye Jr. and consecrated by Admiral William A. Owens[44], do not permit a proper understanding of contemporary conflicts and, most importantly, do not entail an immediate connection with the current concepts and strategic/doctrinaire

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[41] David J. Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*, London, New York: Frank Cass, 2004.

[42] *Ibidem*, p. 28.

[43] Robert J. Bunker, *Technology in a Neo-Clausewitzian Setting*. In G.C. de Nooy (ed.), *The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 1997, p. 137.

[44] After 1994, Admiral Owens changed his focus from the strategies and doctrines made under Clausewitz's thinking influence to those made beyond this paradigm. Supporter of the *Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)* concept, perceived by Neoclausewtizianists as utopian, William Owens also contributed to the subsequent implementation of another concept, *"system of systems"*, through *Network Centric Warfare (NCW)* within Iraqi Freedom Operation of 2003. In fact, the Clausewitzian response to the level of violence within a post-Clausewitzian challenge was given by insurgents and terrorists.

perspectives: *"Based on the Clausewitzian perspective, the most reasonable advice would be for the military not to be involved in peace keeping/enforcement operations"*[45].

3.2. Revolution in *Military Affairs*. The current war, hybrid in various aspects, including the mixture of lethal (mainly at tactical level) and nonlethal (at operational and strategic levels) actions, is the result of the configuration alteration due to the technological progress and to the consequent reflection of these changes in strategies and doctrines. From a historical perspective, the nodal point is the last military revolution or the *Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)*. The qualitative changes produced starting with the 5th and 6th decades of the 20th century contradict the Clausewitzian thinking that placed war under the mark of uncertainty. Accordingly, knowledge on the battlefield breaks not only a way of relating to the realities of current conflicts but also a modelling theoretical framework (Clausewitzian thinking) that does not correspond analytically to these realities.

In January 1961, the US President Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke about the technological changes that could lead to changes in doctrines and placed them under the sign of technological evolution of the 5th and 6th decades (*the technological revolution of recent decades*). In contrast with the significance of technology for the past century, nowadays, research has become fundamental in the military. Research progress has led to the scientific and technical foundation of the military domain, which signified, among other things, consolidating military sciences but also keeping the policy captive within this self-generated mechanism of continuous scientific and technological advancement: *"Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become a captive and scientific-technological elite"*[46].

Practically, Eisenhower had the ability to predict the rhythm of technological progress of the next three decades, which led first to the Cuban Missile Crises and ended with the bankruptcy of the Soviet Union. Obviously, these huge technological transformations entailed important changes in the war approach, different from the Clausewitzian perspective; among all concepts that radically changed the perspective on the military phenomenon, starting with the first confrontation from the Persian Gulf in 1991, the most important one was the previously mentioned *Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)*. The period that followed

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[45] Robert J. Bunker, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
[46] E. Mendelsohn, *Science, Scientist and the Military*. In John Krige&Dominique Pestre, *Science in the Twentieth Century*, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, Routledge, 1997/2013, p. 194.

after the *Cold War* was characterised by this important technological and doctrinaire revolution (one of the many military revolutions that have taken place throughout history, but a major one), generally translated *literally* in the Romanian scientific works by the phrase *"Revoluţia în afaceri militare"*. Sometimes, the phrase *"revoluţia militară"*[47] (*military revolution*) is preferred in political-military or diplomatic works, being a phrase more appropriate to its application in the Romanian school of military sciences.

The term *"military revolution"* is not new. It was first used in 1956 by Michael Roberts, in *The Military Revolution, 1560-1660*[48], a work that emphasised the role of artillery mobility as a result of the development of mobile cannons made of bronze (therefore, the overcoming of the positional war of that age) and, consequently, the development of a new type of fortification system. The subsequent military revolutions, from the industrialisation age and, especially, from the age of war mechanisation (1918-1945), have in turn produced profound changes in the military art, in doctrines and in troops training, and in the adequate use of forces and technology in military conflicts. The new confrontations engage the new military revolutions (technological, strategic, doctrinaire, in the field of training and using the forces and weapons on the battlefield)[49], as well as the new ways of analysing the concept of war. In addition, other concepts, such as the *"New War"*, have led to the emergence of a consistent literature, in which the most influential authors are Michael Ignatieff, with his *Virtual War – Kosovo and Beyond*[50], respectively Mary Kaldor, with *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in the Global Era*[51]. The inheritance of the new conflicts should not be understood as a legacy of conflict, but of the latent forms of the old military revolutions, producing new cumulative effects. This perspective actually justifies the preservation, in certain works pertaining to the old Clausewitzian

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[47] For example, in Nicolae Năstase's translation of Paul Hirst's work, *Război şi putere în secolul 21. Statul, conflictul militar şi sistemul internaţional*, Editura Antet, Bucureşti, 2001.

[48] The work was consulted in the version published in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Boulder, Colorado, Oxford: Westview Press, Michael Roberts, *The Military Revolution, 1560-1660*, 1995, pp. 13-36. There are, however, some points of view that highlight the phrase *"revolution in military affairs" (RMA)*, based on the phrase *"military technical revolution"*, due to the influence of some Soviet researchers' writings in the 1970s and 1980s, more specifically those of Marshal N.V. Ogarkov and General V.I. Slipchenko, Robert J. Bunker, *op. cit.*, p.137).

[49] The fields of RMA application are: technological (regarding the emergence of new technologies, especially of information); doctrinaire and operational (as a transposition of the effects of technology into concepts, principles, laws, actions) and organisational (both in military and civil-military areas) .

[50] Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*, Toronto, Viking, 2000.

[51] Mary Kaldor's work was translated into Romanian and published in 2001 under the title *Războaie vechi şi noi: violenţa organizată în era globală*, by the Antet Publishing House, in Paul Hirst, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

paradigm, but does not justify the lack of openness in understanding the new defining framework of the military confrontation, nor the engagement in *"New War"* conflicts with means, forces, strategies, and doctrines inherited from the previous military revolutions. The new revolution or the last military one – *RMA*, due to E.A. Cohen's perspective, in the article *"A Revolution in Warfare"*, published in issue 37 (March-April 1996) of the *Foreign Affairs* journal, later adapted in the US Army doctrine, consists of projecting war on new coordinates, where information is the most important asset.

Even though the horizon of the forthcoming military revolution cannot be predicted, the *RMA*, which has not yet reached its maximum potential and has produced effects only in its early stage, designs a new and clear direction of conflict evolution. It refers to an accelerated decrease in the battlefield density of forces, determined by the decreasing number of combatants and by the spatial (tridimensional) extension of the battlefield limits. The new technologies impose a *"post-heroic"* mark of the current conflicts, as Hirst named it. Within this new framework, the limitations and constraints of the old military revolutions are replaced by new limitations and constraints: *"The <post-heroic> army will eliminate one constraint, but it will impose another one, because war will no longer be a battle. Accurate information and the low risk of loss will eliminate <war> in its Clausewitzian meaning; there will be no longer moral fights and no <frictions> will be involved. The use of force will resemble the techniques of stopping the epidemics spread"*[52].

In the new context, concepts such information warfare, and others from the area of nonlethal forms of belligerence – *psychological warfare, media warfare* etc. can find their utmost use, even if the development of remote or purely virtual conflicts seems unlikely.

3.3. New Power Ratios. In the conflicting environment of the last decades, unlike the Clausewitzian paradigm characterising a reality of military confrontation based on quantitative parameters, the first effects of theoretical reconsideration took place. At the end of the 1980s, Joseph Nye Jr. identified this paradigm shift at the level of military power, equivalent in his studies with the concept of *hard power*, different from *soft power*, defined on similar coordinates like the art of war in Sun Tzu's work. Joseph Nye Jr.'s perspective *"Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others"*[53] does not differ in terms

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[52] Paul Hirst, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
[53] Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004.

of hermeneutical approach from the complexity of power ratios and from the design of war purpose in Sun Tzu's terms: *"In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them"*[54], but radically differs from the Clausewitzian perspective. Understanding military art in relation with the different types of *"power"* has determined a repositioning of the old relationships between the military and political dimensions of war. Taking into account the depth and the weight of the contents, power is the surface structure of deep-sea games, manifested as a set of rules of domination; domination is expressed by rules that circumscribe the power[55]. Policy is the ultimate substrate, the surface in relation to power. Power is its dynamic manifestation, relative to the dynamics of society, both in its manifest and latent forms. Using a suggestive formula, John Ferris considered power an *"alloy"* of material and administrative factors of a state: *"Power is an alloy, formed from the interaction of material factors (geography, demography and economy) and the administrative capacity and political structure of a state – its ability to command a people and tap these resources"*[56].

In parallel with Joseph Nye Jr.'s classification, the British sociologist Michael Mann (1986) identifies four types of power: economic, political, coercive, and symbolic. By completing Bourdieu's *"theory of social fields"*, *"Mann's matrix"* of power states the dynamic balance of society in relationship with power flows, as power can be understood in consensus with Joseph Nye Jr.'s perspective, namely: *"one's ability to act for the pursuit of his goals and interests, the ability to intervene during the events to modify the results"*[57].

Through *"Mann's matrix"*, the hard/soft power distribution becomes a dynamic ratio in which only the symbolic pole is the fluctuating mark of soft power. Thus, there is a metabolic circuit of power, a balance of different forms of soft power manifestation (economic, political and symbolic) according to the principle of the communicating vessels. The hard/coercive power, understood as *ultima ratio* in relationship with the others is maintained, however, on the inferior level[58].

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[54] Sun Tzu, *Arta războiului*, Editura ANTETXXPRESS, București, 1999, p. 22.

[55] Fr. Chazel, *Mișcările sociale*, in Raymond Boudon (ed.), *Tratat de sociologie*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1997, pp. 237-238.

[56] John Ferris, *Conventional Power and Contemporary Warfare*. In John Baylis, James J. Wirtz &Colin S. Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World. An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 231.

[57] John B. Thompson, *Media și modernitatea. O teorie socială a mass-media*, Editura Antet, București, 1996, p. 17.

[58] Adrian Lesenciuc, *The End of Ideology and the Military Power*, in *Review of the Air Force Academy*, no. 2, 2007, p. 80.

This positioning of powers on different levels, of *soft* and *hard power*, with the limits of understanding and placement, leads, however, to interpretative limitations.

This paradigm shift overlapped with a fundamental change in the strategic plan, producing qualitative mutations in the military art of the last decades. Immediately after the use of a nuclear weapon during the armed conflict (the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in August 1945), but especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), generated by the physical presence of the Soviet nuclear warheads in the proximity of the US territory and by the unprecedented development of technology and armament industry, a strategic repositioning has taken place. Hence, compared to classical strategies, based on the use of force and enforcement of own will on the adversary, generically called *action strategies*, the term *deterrence strategies* emerged, based on the persuasion of the enemy not to act (under the fear of the insurmountable consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction). The deterrence strategy was imposed by Nixon Administration on NATO's agenda and it was discussed in 1967 at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels and later implemented within the alliance, on 1 January 1968, as a strategic concept named *"flexible response"*, based on the US proposal. This deterrence strategy replaced the strategy of *"massive retaliation"*. The concept of *"flexible response"*, launched by the US General and military thinker Maxwell Taylor[59] as a critical response to the defence policy of Eisenhower administration, called *New Look*, meant mutual discouragement from strategic to tactical levels, offering the United States the possibility to respond to aggression through the whole range of possible ways, without being limited to nuclear weapons. The concept was immediately included in the American Defense Strategy, in 1961, by President John F. Kennedy.

3.4. The Postclausewitzian War, a Postmodern War. Returning to the technological foundation of understanding war on new coordinates, *Revolution in Military Affairs* is a concept characterised by the battlefield transparency, quasi-instantaneous decision-making, real-time information and intelligent or *precision-guided munition (PGM)*. Although *RMA* cannot produce universal effects – *"The RMA did many things, but not everything.* **It has multiplied American strengths, but not reduced its weaknesses***"*[60], as John Ferris noted, the contemporary conflict is, in a strict connection with the previously described power distribution, a separation of *hard* power into two components: an actual *hard*

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[59] After retiring and the appearance of the work *The Uncertain Trumpet* (1960).
[60] John Ferris, *Conventional Power and Contemporary Warfare, op. cit.*, p. 236.

one and a *soft* one, present on the battlefield through *C4ISR* systems: *"In assessing power from air and sea, C4ISR matters as much as hardware"*[61]. In relation to these coordinates of the battlefield and to this redistribution of *hard* power into subcomponents, the Clausewitzian paradigm becomes anachronistic. In response to understanding Clausewitz's theory as inappropriate for the new coordinates of the battlefield, the Neoclausewitzianists propose focusing not on friction (chapter 7, part I, *On War*), but on the control of entropy: John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt *"suggest that the Clausewitzian emphasis on friction should be replaced by a vision of war in which the manipulation of entropy is the key"*[62]. In addition, from a Neoclausewitzian perspective, the battlefield transparency and abundance of information do not lead to less uncertainty. Moreover, even if the nature of the war may be affected by the technological and operational innovation, victory on the battlefield requires success at the strategic level, because RMA guarantees victory only at tactical level[63]. However, the Clausewitzian paradigm is a way of thinking about war[64], which corresponds only to the concept of modern warfare; its abandonment is natural as long as the conflict in the contemporary world takes on other forms[65], even if violence still exceeds aspects regarding the combatants, and massively involves the civil society through terrorist attacks. It is strange that even the terrorist attacks included under the conceptual umbrella of Jihad are a consequence of the influence of Clausewitzian theory, as it resulted from Thomas G. Mahnken statement[66] regarding the work of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaida, *"Fursan That Rayal al Nabi" (Knights Under the Prophet's Banner)*; al-Zawahiri puts the strategic rationality of the extremist Islamic actions (despite the broad meaning of terrorist irrationality) in the service of political ends. Thus, unlike the Neoclausewitzianists who try to adapt the theory of the Prussian General

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[61] *Ibidem.*

[62] David Lonsdale, *Clausewitz and Information Warfare*. In Hew Strachan&Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, Oxford University Press, 2007, ccxx.

[63] *Ibidem,* ccxvi-ccxxxiv.

[64] Hugh Smith, *On Clausewitz. A Study of Military and Political Ideas*, Hampshire&New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, p. 269.

[65] Michael Sheehan, *The Evolution of Modern Warfare*. The author distinguishes between modern war, designed on Clausewitzian coordinates, and the postmodern war, specific to Postclausewitzian world. In John Baylis, James J. Wirtz&Colin S. Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World. An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 33-51.

[66] Thomas G. Mahnken, *A Strategy for a Protracted War*. In Ronald R. Luman (ed.), *Unrestricted Warfare Symposium 2006*, Proceedings on Strategy, Analysis, and Technology, 14-15 March 2006, Maryland Laurel, The John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory/National Security Analysis Dept. 200635-64, p. 41.

to the realities of confrontations on the *soft* level of the current battlefield, many scholars distinguish between the modern war, the old one, designed on Clausewitzian coordinates, and the postmodern war, irregular, private, informal or new, in Mary Kaldor's[67] terms. The postmodern war, based on advanced technologies, emphasises its nonlethal dimension, the control of violence in transition from the state actors of the modern warfare (state-nation vs. state-nation) towards non-state ones. It also means the abandonment of the Clausewitzian theory and terminology, as Michael Sheehan argues in his analysis: *"This transition to postmodernity can be expected to influence war as a politico-cultural institution. 'Modern' war was conducted by the state. The postmodern era has seen a dispersal of control over organised violence to many forms of non-state actors. Modern wars were fought by formally organised, hierarchically structured, specialised armed forces of the state. Postmodern wars are fought by a disparate array of fighting forces, many of which are informal or private (i.e. non-state). These include guerrilla armies, criminal gangs, foreign mercenaries, kin/clan based irregular forces, paramilitary groups raised by local warlords, international peace-keepers, national armies, and de-territorialised terrorist networks. Some of these groups do not seek decisive battle in the Clausewitzian sense; in contrast, they avoid it in favour of protracted asymmetric conflict. The war objectives of such groups are usually as political as are those of states themselves, so that war has not lost its 'Clausewitzian' character indeed, where no such political rationale exists, it is arguable whether we can ever speak of such conflicts as 'war'*[68].

War becomes privatised – it is explicit that private organisations sponsor some military extremist actions (of al-Qaida or ISIS, for example) –, irregular in relation with the modern term of *"regular conflict"*, and hybrid, in Timothy McCulloh's perspective, meaning the manifestation of the following principles: uniqueness of structure, capabilities and effects, specificity of ideology, of perception of an existential threat by a potential adversary, of asymmetry between opponents, of use of both conventional and nonconventional elements in military actions, of justification by the necessity of defending one's own existence (of the entity involved in hybrid operations). In a nutshell, the hybrid combat structure is defined by McCulloh as follows: *"a hybrid force is a military organisation that employs a combination of conventional and unconventional organisations,*

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[67] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars, Organised Violence in a Global Era*, Standford, CA: Standford University Press, 1999, p. 2. The author admits that the term *"postmodern"* is the most appropriate for describing the new type of low-intensity, privatized and informal war.

[68] Michael Sheehan, *The Evolution of Modern Warfare, op. cit.*, pp. 48-49.

equipment, and techniques in a unique environment designed to achieve synergistic strategic effects[69].

The theoretical/pragmatic relationship in postmodern war radically changed due to the increasing role of policy (in Clausewitzian terms) or, more precisely, due to the triadic political-economic-symbolic structure, in Michael Mann's meaning. Basically, what was gradually developed since Maxwell Taylor's[70] design was a rebalancing of the relationships established between *hard* and *soft* power (where the political, economic and symbolic dimensions are included, to make a synthesis of Joseph Nye Jr.'s and Michael Mann's taxonomies). Meanwhile, the Neoclausewitzianists, using the Clausewitzian taxonomy, continued to persuade the decision-makers related to war-policy relationship projected nearly two hundred years ago: *"(...) politicians, who in practice exercise strategic responsibility, have been persuaded by neo-Clausewitzians that war really is the continuation of policy by other means. This is to elevate theory over actuality. Of course, ideally war and policy must relate to each other, but they are – as Clausewitz recognised – very different in their natures, to the point at times of being antithetical. The Clausewitzian norm has at times led politicians to see even armed conflict itself as little more than a form of enhanced diplomats signalling, separated from its destructive effects"*[71].

Nevertheless, recent years have also brought about changes both in strategic projection and military operations, on different coordinates, serving other purposes, such as *"the global war on terror"*, perceived as being astrategic[72], at least inappropriate in the Clausewitzian interpretation.

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[69] Timothy B. McCulloh, *The Inadequacy of Definition and the Utility of a Theory of Hybrid Conflict: Is the "Hybrid Threat" New?*, Timothy B. McCulloh&Richard Johnson, Document no. 2 – Hybrid Warfare. In Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., *Terrorism, Commentary on Security Documents*, vol. 141, *Hybrid Warfare and the Grey Zone Threat*, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 58. *("Within this monograph, hybrid organisations are those that engage in hybrid warfare and hybrid threats are hybrid organisations viewed as an adversary. Holistically these terms will be used somewhat interchangeably as they focus on the core concept of hybridity")*.

[70] Taylor's conception goes beyond the level of military strategy; it goes to a higher level, the political one, where judgments (in the absence of their corresponding social, political or economic fundamentals) are in opposition with the *'communist expansion'*. Starting from this level, of *'grand strategy'* in Liddell Hart's perspective, the American General sets military objectives within the political strategy (the *'grand strategy'*) regarding the possibility of maintaining military power at the level of dealing with a general war, of preventing/limiting war as much as possible, of providing defense against any aggression and, especially, of making *"provision for essential survival measures in the unhappy event that general war is not deterred or comes through miscalculation"*, Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960, p. 145.

[71] Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War. Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, 2013/2014, p. 6.

[72] The *"global war on terror was astrategic (if such a word exists)"*, Hew Strachan, *op. cit.*, 2014, p. 11.

The very term strategy has dramatically changed these years. Initially, strategy did not reflect policy, but the nature of war, serving the policy's goals. The war is different from the policy, but Clausewitz brought them closer through his famous phrase: *"War is merely a continuation of policy by other means"*[73], the most cited one from General von Clausewitz's work, even if it refers to the use of war for policy purposes and not to the nature of war. From this perspective, Clausewitz's sentence exceeds the strategic approach, in a work whose fundamental purpose was to focus on the study of war (the object of the strategy) and not on the political dimension (the object of the quoted sentence): *"Over the past thirty years, western military thought has been hoodwinked by the selective citation of the phrase from Carl von Clausewitz' own introduction to his unfinished text, **On War**, that <war is nothing but a continuation of policy with other means>. That is a statement about how governments might use war; it is not a statement about the nature of war, as a reading of what Clausewitz goes on to say makes clear. On War is a book, as its title self-evidently indicates, about war, not about policy"*[74].

Moreover, many of those who cite the continuation of policy by other means – Clausewitz's perspective that can be evaluated in terms of its timeliness and applicability in the postmodern age – do not accept the implications of this logic, or even contradict it by their own positions. Even if, at a rhetorical level, the invocation in postmodern times of the Clausewitzian *"total war"* through the phrase *"the global war on terror"*, predominantly used by the US President George W. Bush and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, is connected to Clausewitz's perspective, the two political leaders failed to understand the nature and essence of war[75].

3.5. The Anticlausewitzianism, or a Counter-Ideology. Even though Clausewitz was contradicted by the representatives of the French School of military science who, starting with the works of Jacques Antoine Hyppolite, Count Guibert[76], made mathematics susceptible of providing instruments for studying tactics and put a *"geometric"* mark on military sciences, these positions cannot be considered as being Anticlausewitzianist. Not even Antoine Henri Jomini, whose works are a synthesis of the Enlightenment thinking reflected by the Military

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[73] Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*. Foreword by Major General Dr Corneliu Soare, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 67.
[74] Hew Strachan, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[75] *Ibidem*, p. 16.
[76] His works, appeared at the end of the eighteenth century, had an important influence on Napoleon's education.

French School cannot be considered Anticlausewitzian. In Clausewitz's time, the confrontation was rather between the Enlightenment movement and its influence on the French and English schools (and, to some extent, on the Prussian one, if we take into account General von Bülow's works) and the Prussian Counter-Enlightenment of Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst or Gerhard Johann David Scharnhorst; Clausewitz was the disciple of the latter[77].

In essence, Clausewitz himself was the first major critic of Clausewitz's concept, as it was to be taken over by those who put it into practice following categorical interpretations. Clausewitz, advancing in his study *On War*, understood that his initial perspective of defining the war in relation with an absolute concept, was relative: *"(…) the real war is not a consistent extreme-oriented endeavour, as it should be according to its notion, but a* **hybrid**[78] *phenomenon, a contradiction in itself; thus, it cannot obey its own laws, but it must be considered as a part of a whole – and this whole is policy"*[79].

Those who have made categorical interpretations – and have spoiled most of the Clausewitzian ideas: *"Much of Clausewitz's reputation as a profound thinker has therefore resulted from the confusion among his interpreters. In a sense, Clausewitz could never have been wrong or less than profound because no one could be quite sure that he understood the true meaning of Clausewitz's ideas"*[80] – have taken the Clausewitzian perspective on war as a phenomenon of extreme violence, while the Neoclausewitzianists have exaggerated the role of political ensemble, which can be interpreted in the horizon of the new power relationships, namely in the meaning of *soft* power. Anticlausewitzianism did not manifest itself as an ideology directed against Clausewitz's ideas (in their non-categorical, relative meaning), or against Neoclausewitzian ideas that ignore the qualitative changes in the practice of war. It has manifested as an ideology aiming principally at putting into practice categorical meanings and serving the interests of opposing ideologies.

The referential critical Anticlausewitzian position appeared due to the British historian Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895-1970). Starting with 1927, Liddell Hart positioned himself on different coordinates than those set up by Clausewitz, proposing a way of overcoming the paradigm drawn up by the Prussian thinker.

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[77] Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought. From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 143-170.

[78] War, understood as a hybrid phenomenon in essence since the early 19th century, could hassle the theorists of the *"hybrid warfare"* concept, previously analysed, a theoretical construction with an important tautological connotation.

[79] Carl von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 611.

[80] Azar Gat, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-255.

He considered that the inappropriate application of the rule based on which *"the added purpose of the war consists of destroying the main forces of the enemy on the battlefield"*[81], starting with the actions coordinated by General Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, led to exacerbation. This is due to, on the one hand, Clausewitz's disciples pushing these ideas towards extreme, *"to an extreme which their master had not intended"*[82] – Liddell Hart had in mind, for his printable edition, both the devastating effects of the 1945 atomic bombing[83], and the effects of the hydrogen bomb tests; on the other hand, the exacerbation is due to the unclear expression of ideas of the Prussian General, in a manner that allows their misinterpretation. Misinterpretation has been the common fate of most prophets and thinkers in every sphere. Devout but uncomprehending disciples have been more damaging to the original conception than even its prejudiced and purblind opponents. It must be admitted, however, that Clausewitz invited misinterpretation more than most[84].

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[81] B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategia. Acțiunile indirecte.* Translated by Colonel L. Cojoc, Lieutenant-Colonel S. Pitea, Foreword by Major General (r.) Dr I. Cupșa, Editura Militară, București, 1973, p. 351.

[82] *Ibidem.*

[83] However, in 1925, in a work considered to be immature, entitled *Paris, or the Future of the War,* Liddell Hart supported the Italian General Giulio Douhet's concept regarding the bombing of cities for battlefield effects. Giulio Douhet believed that air power is the most effective and secure way to get victory on the battlefield, which is why he proposed a completely antidemocratic and antihumanitarian way of bombing civilians in major urban centers. His argument, as inhuman as the measure itself, was to punish the *"accomplices"* of the politics of the enemy governments: *"Those who voted had the power to topple regimes which behaved in illegitimate ways, and so were complicit in the crimes of their governments. In Douhet's eyes, the best way to punish them was to bomb them"* (Hew Strachan, *op. cit.*, p. 180). Douhet's principle, based on the Clausewitzian extreme violence, interpreted the Prussian General's thinking close to the limits of the absolute war; in his work from 1921, *The Command of the Air*, Giulio Douhet argued that the bombing targets should be huge in order to lead to expected effect occurrence. The exacerbation of the Italian General, assuming the terrorising of the civilian population by bombardment, continued with calculations published in the articles of the following years. For example, in an article of 1928 published in *Rivista aeronautica*, Douhet considered that 300 tons of bombs were enough to end a war in less than a month. The calculations made by Italian General turned out to be wrong after World War II. The British Marshal Arthur Harris, for example, wanted to test Douhet's principle, bombing the German cities without achieving the desired effect. If we take into account another inhuman exaggeration of Giulio Douhet, regarding the attack where the resistance (including the moral one) is minimal, the air offensive is necessary on such objectives: *"We should always keep in mind that aerial offensives can be directed against objectives of least physical resistance, but against those of least moral resistance as well"* (Douhet, *apud* Strachan, *op. cit.*, p. 180), the intended moral effect by Americans after unconventional bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is covered in this theoretical foundation. Regarding Liddell Hart, his support for Douhet's principle was aimed at modifying the behaviour of the bombed population and hurrying the revolution against the enemy government: *"In 1925 Liddell Hart followed Giulio Douhet in arguing that bombing cities would precipitate first revolution and then a speedy overthrow of the enemy's government"* (Strachan, *op. cit.*, p. 148).

[84] B.H. Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 351-352.

Liddell Hart, considering Clausewitz rather a systematic than a creative thinker, was the first that took into account that not the revolutionary influence of his teaching is important in configuring the Clausewitzian paradigm, but the permissiveness to violence, sufficiently exciting for the less profound theorists and for often superficial applicants. Under these circumstances, the Neoclausewitzianist perspective can be understood not as a deepening of a set of issues that entailed a revolutionary influence, but only as a return to the violent, destructive spirit of war. Liddell Hart misinterpreted the Clausewitzian perspective on defining the purpose of the war, and the proof results from his understanding of the concept of absolute war: *"Clausewitz' exposure and exhilaration of the idea of absolute war exerted a much more detrimental influence on the development of military art. In his opinion, the road to success consists of the unlimited use of forces. That is why the doctrine that opens with the definition of war only as a continuation of policy by other means has led to a contradiction, making policy a slave of strategy, and yet of a bad strategy.*

This trend was primarily stimulated by Clausewitz's statement: <introduction to the philosophy of war, to a principle of moderation would be an absurdity… War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds>"[85].

Despite the fact that Liddell Hart's reading of Clausewitz's work is slightly distorted by the stress on some problematic issues, such as the previously described ones, the British thinker is the first that leaves the Clausewitzian paradigm and the first one to have set up a new paradigmatic horizon. Liddell Hart does not forget to emphasise the exaggerations of Clausewitz's disciples, but his assessments are somewhat unfair regarding the Prussian thinker. The translators of the Romanian edition of Liddell Hart's fundamental work *The Strategy of Indirect Approach (Strategia. Acţiunile indirecte)* of 1973, underlined the aspect previously mentioned, in a footnote in which they amended his assessments[86]. Interesting enough, Liddell Hart's main work was indirectly influenced by the book *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911) of Julian Corbett, a Clausewitzian who managed to overcome the paradigm by emphasising the role of communications in war, and who designed the limited war for geographical, not political reasons.

However, in order to properly understand Clausewitz's and Liddell Hart's works, it would be necessary to understand the contextual framework of each

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[85] *Ibidem*, p. 355.
[86] *"Liddell Hart's appraisals on Clausewitz's theoretical work do not follow the wise dictum <sine ira et studio>, but contain notes of defamation, despite the eulogies that continue to be made in the world of political scientists and military theorists"* (translator's note), B. H. Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

of them correctly: *"the theoretical premises of every conception of military theory cannot but depend on some overall (albeit unconscious) picture of the world"*[87]; for Liddell Hart, it is enough to try to appropriately position within the post-war contextual framework for understanding what determined the 'rupture' of the previous paradigm, given the failure of applying the Clausewitzian violent way of war in the second world conflagration.

The Napoleonic wars and World Wars I and II testify the aberrant interpretation of Clausewitz's paradigm, which Liddell Hart denounced since 1937. The British military thinker is the one that contributed to the reconfiguration of the contemporary conflict, on the one hand, and to the reorientation towards the study of the military art as a source of the indirect experience accumulation, on the other hand.

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[47] Azar Gat, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA IN THE CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL, STRATEGIC, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT (IV)

Brigadier General Dr Virgil-Ovidiu POP

The status of Romania as a NATO member state not only provides security and stability guarantee but also entails new responsibilities and missions. Our country actively and effectively participates in the Alliance and the EU missions outside the national territory, as the functions and attributions of national defence significantly extend in the global environment of crisis and conflict management.

Taking part in these actions as well as in combating terrorism means, as the author mentions, taking part in war prevention, conflict control, regional and global stability, thus creating the security environment able to allow for progress.

Keywords*: collective engagement; responsibilities; collective defence; diplomacy*

3. Romania's Involvement in Ensuring Stability in the Region

Romania's position in the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, as well as at the crossroads of areas characterised by high security risks, highlights the fact that defence and security exceed the responsibility of a single state. In this context, it is necessary to redefine some concepts and to take some measures that ensure predictability and consensus regarding the employment of national instruments independently as well as in an allied and Community framework, the *Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe* being an important element in the European security system.

The European security architecture is increasingly menaced by ongoing crises and conflicts in its near vicinity, in the east and in the south, able to affect, directly or indirectly, Romania's national security interests. The developments in the eastern vicinity, the Middle East, and Northern Africa generate a multitude

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of challenges to the Community area security, thus the necessity to review and strengthen the European Union policies in the field of security, common defence and internal affairs being increasingly evident[36].

3.1. Diplomatic Involvement

Diplomacy is considered a special branch of the social fields of activity due to the knowledge and methods employed by national states in their foreign policy in order to meet their interests and to regulate the conflicts that can emerge in establishing interstate relations. Because of the geopolitical fluctuations occurred, especially in the past years, diplomacy has undergone, in turn, changes resulting in transforming the involved branches and juridical instruments.

Defence diplomacy, a concept that emerged at the end of the 20th century, determined the reconfiguration of the missions both the diplomat and the military have to carry out in the field of foreign policy. Moreover, the changes in the concept of *"security"* as well as the increasingly close relations between the political field, one that is predominantly *"civilian"*, and the military field have resulted in acknowledging military diplomacy as a component of defence diplomacy.

Therefore, *military diplomacy* has become a distinct part of diplomacy, involved in accomplishing the foreign policy goals and missions to defend the state interests in its relations with the other subjects of international law.

The study of defence diplomacy development throughout time has shown that the military have been always employed in order to gain advantages on the battlefield. Their role, in the historic evolution, will certainly diversify and strengthen. The increasing diplomatic relations between states and the complexity of the issues related to the existence as a nation have resulted in the military becoming advisers to the official representatives of a state in matters of conflict prevention and resolution, peace keeping, state image promotion, aspects that are very important for the balance of power.

Currently, defence diplomacy has diversified and acquired cultural, economic and other dimensions. The new threats and vulnerabilities that have emerged especially after the end of the *Cold War* have led to the reconfiguration of national strategies, foreign policy and defence diplomacy.

If we analyse the case of Romania, the national strategy goals are related to consolidating the country position within NATO and developing the national contribution to the European security policy as a EU member state.

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[36] *Strategia naţională de apărare a ţării pentru perioada 2015-2019*, Presidential Administration, Bucureşti, 2015, p. 12.

The consolidation of the national framework by the country membership of an international security organisation is a very important step in guaranteeing national security due to security guarantees themselves, collective defence included.

Romania is especially interested in developing the relations with NATO considering the organisation importance and capabilities to ensure sustainable security at international level.

The new types of risks and threats have resulted in the complementarity between the national defence system and the collective defence one, therefore the efforts to harmonise the national security and defence policy with that of NATO.

Through its policy, Romania has promoted good neighbourhood relations with the declared goal of respecting the neighbouring states integrity, identity and dignity. The geostrategic, geopolitical and geoeconomic changes have resulted in the need for transformation within the European Union. Romania, as a member state of this organisation, has proved to be an extremely active nation through its adaptability in the institutional domain, in the field of defence. Moreover, its participation in the *European Security and Defence Policy – ESDP* and in the *Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP* has demonstrated that the transformation process in the field of defence is conducted considering a well-established strategic vision, which has led to strengthening Romania's profile as a European and global actor within the international security architecture. The complementarity and compatibility between the *European security strategy* and the *national security strategy* have demonstrated that Romania's interests and values are compliant with the European values.

Romania's participation in regional security initiatives and organisations has once more demonstrated its contribution to ensuring regional and global stability and security. The involvement in the decision-making processes is aimed at reducing and eliminating the current threats and risks to regional, international as well as national security.

OSCE is one of the organisations with tradition in the field of regional and global security. Even if there are tendencies, at inter-organisational level, to minimise the role of this forum in the process of transformation at global level, the fact that this framework reunites countries that are not NATO or EU members results in the foreign policy goals being included in other paradigms, thus having a broader scope. The development of defence diplomacy, considering all its components, from the preventive to coercive diplomacy, has generated an extremely complex and sensitive mechanism, based on the correlation of international law with the interpretation of international juridical documents

and the strict regulations in the military field. The image of a state is not promoted by the civilian environment only, becoming a true *"puzzle"*, in which promoters become all those involved in the state social life. Effectiveness, coordination, complementarity, transparency become vectors for the achievement of a stable international environment, and civilians and military men are those who have to cooperate, the goal being to promote national interests and values.

Another important fact is that, besides military aspects, defence diplomacy becomes a powerful instrument for managing the non-military components of internal and international security, for balancing the social, economic, energy and other dimensions.

The involvement in strategic projects having European or Euro-Atlantic vocation represents a priority in relation to managing the image and perception of a state at global level. In this regard, Romania, through its actions, has aimed to consolidate democratic stability, to diversify the infrastructure that links the EU and other states in the region. The acknowledgement of the Black Sea region as a European space that has strategic importance for NATO and the EU can be considered an example of action. The support for some politico-diplomatic initiatives to promote the Black Sea synergy is one of the major goals of the Romanian foreign policy in the region. In this context, any military man on the national territory or on the territory of another state who conducts military activities aimed at avoiding conflicts or promoting international cooperation is practically a military diplomat.

The courses of action supported by active diplomacy are:
- to strengthen the strategic dialogue within the European Union, NATO, or other international cooperation formats;
- to deepen strategic partnerships by extending cooperation in the economic field;
- to enhance cooperation with states in the eastern flank of NATO in tri- and bilateral formats;
- to promote the strategic characteristics of the Black Sea and the cooperation formats in this area;
- to involve Romania in the process of reflection regarding the future of OSCE;
- to support some actions pertaining to public diplomacy to promote the national security interests in order to meet the commitments, in cooperation with other public or private institutions[37].

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[37] *Ibidem*, p. 21.

Defence diplomacy has become, especially during the past decades, one of the most important instruments of a state in promoting national interests and values.

3.2. Domestic Security

The national security interests and goals represent the foundation for the development of the courses of action and the ways to ensure national security under the circumstances of a dynamic and complex international security environment. Moreover, the courses of action are subsumed under the obligation to prevent, combat and respond, in a credible manner, based on the constitutional principle of unitary coordination, the potential threats, risks and vulnerabilities Romania can face in the next five years and in the long term.

Romania has to focus its strategic efforts on defending and providing security for its citizens and the national territory as well as on providing support for the allied and partner countries, in keeping with the commitments made under international treaties. In this regard, it is necessary not only to develop the capabilities to respond to the new challenges in the security environment but also to prepare the population and the territory for defence.

The geopolitical and geostrategic trends and perspectives increasingly extend the notion of *"national security"* over the economic, information technology and communication, diplomatic and ecological components. Thus it has become necessary for the information and military resources to be used to solve the problems generated by poverty, famine, water crisis or pollution, as well as information isolation before they result in violent conflicts.

The perspectives of the security environment that is extremely complex, continually changing, and marked by challenges and phenomena that are often unpredictable related to the national, regional and international security require for the information activity in the field of security to be deeply and comprehensively anticipatory-preventive.

The need to know the challenges to democracy and security as well as to maintain the intrinsic relation between them requires for the Romanian state to adapt its information capabilities and to identify the responses and solutions that are necessary to ensure the security of the citizens, communities and the state, in consonance with the allies security needs.

Knowledge provides the ability to identify the trends in the evolution of the phenomena that disturb democracy and the rule of law, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the actors of organised crime, terrorism, and the vectors that generate and conduct actions pertaining to information warfare

intended against the Romanian state and its allies. The need to anticipate the types of existing or predictable risks as well as to prevent damages to the citizen, the nation, the state and its allies determines the information community to conduct a preponderantly analytical activity, to establish structures and train specialised personnel in this respect.

Prevention is the defence reaction through which the sources of risk to national security are reduced or annihilated. Countering is the defence action through which a threat is stopped from materialising.

Due to the fact that it enables knowing, anticipating, preventing and countering the threats to national security, security information acquires social, economic, political or other type of value, which is integrated by the Romanian state in its strategic patrimony and is protected according to the legal norms and international regulations.

In ensuring the state of security, a fundamental role is played by knowing the dysfunctions, vulnerabilities, risk factors, threats and dangers to it, which is achieved by searching and obtaining the security information and by transmitting it to the legal factors able to make decisions to prevent and counter them. This objective is achieved by the specific and effective operational measures taken by the information structures, institutions of the rule of law, organically integrated in the aggregate of the state administration, based on the appropriate legal support, the full responsibility of the political authority, and the effective parliamentary control.

3.3. Relationship between *"National Defence"* and *"Collective Defence"*

Starting from global notions, we have found necessary to emphasise the relationship between *"national defence"* and *"collective defence"* as the foundation of any approach related to the main role of the Romanian Armed Forces. It will help us to highlight the main doctrinal aspects in the field that support the study of the general framework in which one of their main components perform their activity – the Land Forces.

Defence is seen as one of the most complex human activities. The evolution of the concept of *defence* is obviously constant. It covers more and more diverse fields. In a general approach, the term *defence* is the *"aggregate of the measures and provisions of any nature aimed at ensuring not only security and territorial integrity but also the life of the population, whenever and wherever it is necessary"*[38].

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[38] *Glosar de termeni şi expresii privind angajarea operaţională a forţelor*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 21.

Complexity, as an attribute characterising defence, derives from its interaction with the society in which it is constantly and systematically put in practice. This aspect is revealed by the fact that, on the one hand, an ensemble of factors that are different in nature and content (social, cultural, economic, political) act on defence, while, on the other hand, defence influences the important fields of activity in the society. Defence is understood as an essential attribute of national sovereignty. Moreover, to reduce it to its military component makes it difficult to accept, by the majority of people, defence as mobilisation of all citizens and means to preserve the values of democracy, to organise and conduct humanitarian or other types of actions.

The military component is more evident within defence, one the one hand, as it is often referred to in films, history books, magazines etc. On the other hand, the existence of conscription has made the military institution known to many young people who were provided with military training and patriotic education, mainly based on the deeds of the forefathers. Probably, once conscription was abolished, the training-educational role of the military has not influenced all the young people apt for the military service, but only the ones that have opted for the military profession. It is possible for the spirit of sacrifice, the sense of duty, discipline etc., values permanently promoted by the military institution, to reduce their impact on the young generation, as the military service is not compulsory any more. In this context, it is necessary for the formative role of the school and family to be enhanced regarding the positive attitude of the young generation, in particular, and of all the citizens, in general, towards defending the country and promoting the fundamental national interests.

Finally, defence entails the *moral and physical engagement of the population*. Therefore, it needs the civic support. Citizens must know who they fight for and the motives for which they engage in fight up to the supreme sacrifice, if necessary. The defence of the country, in the form of armed fight, has been conducted under the colours of the country, in the name of defending the national territory, the traditions, the population life and property. In other words, there has always been a superior motivation for the people engaged in defending the country. The motivation has been based on a strong emotional support (patriotic attitudes and sentiments, national pride etc.) as well as on a rational support (logical demonstration, material proofs etc.).

The defence of the country as an attribute of national sovereignty that is expressed through the interpersonal and collective attitudes and behaviours of the citizens has two important dimensions: a *subjective dimension* and an *objective dimension*.

The *subjective dimension* highlights the intensity of the citizens patriotic feelings and attitudes. It is definitely influenced by the individual and collective experiences that are related to the citizens and human communities feelings and attitudes of love for the country. This way the evolution of the individual and group behaviour related to the defence of the country in certain moments is explained, regardless of the general economic, social, political and military conditions.

The *objective dimension* is categorised in relation to the parameters of individual and collective behaviours assessed with adequate measurement instruments. It expresses an assessment of the patriotic feelings and attitudes as well as of the collective behaviours related to the defence of the country. That is why the objective dimension may differ from the subjective one, which is based on the manner in which individuals and human groups perceive defence, in general, and national defence, in particular.

The two dimensions depend on and influence each other. Consequently, the timely and correct information of the population on the national defence may influence its perception. In turn, the population perception on the national defence may act on its official image, correcting it in one way or another. Out of the *"confrontation"* of the two dimensions appropriate and flexible measures may result to optimise this extremely important field of human activity. The dynamics of these two dimensions may suggest not only the level of analysis but also the nature of the solutions to be adopted in the field of national defence[39].

National defence is defined as *"the defence of the country through comprehensively using the availabilities in the military, civilian, economic and psychological field, in order to ensure resistance when facing danger"*[40] and comprises the aggregate measures and activities adopted and conducted by a state in order to guarantee national independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, to protect the population life and property, as well as to support the fundamental interests of the country. It entails adopting, by the state specialised institutions, the wide range of measures and activities in the economic, political, military, juridical, diplomatic, cultural, demographic and other fields, not only in peacetime but also at war, to promote and support national interests.

The state defence policy is the form taken by the measures and activities that are systematically and constantly employed to preserve independence,

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[39] Dr Constantin Moștoflei, Dr Petre Duțu, *Apărarea colectivă și apărarea națională*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2004, pp. 13-14.

[40] Brigadier General (r.) Professor Dr Constantin Onișor, *Teoria strategiei militare*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 1999, p. 324.

sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity as well as the population life and property whenever necessary and under any circumstances.

National defence as the state attribute is conceived and planned considering: the fundamental national interests; the specific risks and threats to them; the nature of social, economic, demographic and other vulnerabilities; the characteristics of the national territory; the geopolitical situation and the trends in its evolution; the national legislation and international law; the provisions of the Constitution and the other laws of the country; the provisions of the international treaties and conventions the country is party to. Moreover, the particular state takes into consideration its economic, military, demographic potential when establishing the dimensions and coordinates of national defence. A state can usually choose one of the following variants to ensure national defence: alone or in alliance with other states. However, currently, there are few states that voluntarily opt for the first solution. If this solution has been chosen, the particular state adopts either neutrality or the fight of the entire people doctrine. History has demonstrated that both variants are prone to many vulnerabilities and, when needed, they are not as effective as those who adopt them expect.

National defence is one of the essential fields of a state security and an inalienable attribute of the state. Therefore, it is one of the major interests of the political-military decision-makers in any independent and sovereign state. That is why the constant concern of the responsible institutions of the state to develop a coherent defence policy, appropriate to the concrete situation in the national and international security environment, as well as flexible in relation to the requirements of the political-military alliance the country is party to.

The option of a state regarding its national defence policy is usually presented in a document called *"The White Paper on National Defence and Security"*. Here there are data and information related to: security policy; defence policy; components of the national security system; trends in the evolution of the national security system.

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In the last part of the paper the author will present the main missions of the Land Forces within collective defence operations.

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
– Conceptual and Evolutionary Landmarks – (I)

Colonel Valentin VASILE

Motto: *"We need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate".*

Admiral Michael G. Mullen

Strategic Communication (StratCom) is recognised by NATO as a concept that brings to the same denominator all the civilian and military activities carried out to significantly impact on the information environment. NATO StratCom gathers under its umbrella public diplomacy, public affairs, information and psychological operations, assuming support, integration and coordination functions.

The paper analyses the theoretical and practical StratCom approaches applied to facilitate the achievement of national and allied objectives, emphasising the communication policies in support of NATO's objectives, and the procedures developed by the allies to clarify the role of military and civilian agencies.

Keywords: *public diplomacy; strategic communication; public affairs; information operations*

Introduction

Strategic communications (StratCom) is theorised in NATO policies and doctrines as a function aimed to coordinate and synchronise all the organisational communication as well as all the communication-relevant activities (special events, exercises, operations e.g.) deliberately conducted by the Alliance and the allies to shape the informational environment in support of the fulfilment of own political and military objectives.

In NATO's view, StratCom embodies the features of an integrating concept, which brings together under its umbrella mainly Public Diplomacy, military and civilian Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations. By integrating and synchronising the activities of its contributors, StratCom proves to be a process

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and a coordination function designed to support the achievement of the Alliance's objectives.

The theorisation and institutionalisation of StratCom[1] can be considered as a response to the challenges of the current informational environment, characterised by the development of mass communication technologies and the widespread use of social networks. Thus, media coverage can have a considerable impact on the conduct of military operations, either positive or negative. And not only, if we refer to the current *fake news* phenomenon or the deliberate alteration of the informational content disseminated by the media, even or especially during electoral campaigns, with the well-defined purpose to facilitate the achievement of certain political objectives.

Communication – A Few Conceptual Features

There are many definitions of *communication*. The most significant 126 ones are analysed by US researchers Frank E.X. Dance and Carl E. Larson in their research paper *The Theory of Human Communications: A Theoretical Approach*, published in New York in 1976. These definitions reveal a wide field of circumstances in which the communication is happening. They describe the typology and specificity of communication processes, as well as the elements which are common to the communication interactions within the human society and not only. Thus, as a phenomenon, a process and an interaction, the communication characterises the entire living world, but also the functioning of the automated, technical, informational and computer systems, based on algorithms for transmitting, receiving, processing and interpreting signals, data and information. Depending on the focus placed by these definitions on the communication as a process of transmitting messages or assigning and exchanging meanings, two major approaches or schools have been identified in the study of communication.

In the first case, the communication is analysed from a psychosocial perspective and is defined as being *"social interaction through messages"*[2] or *"a process by which one person affects the behaviour or state of mind of another"*[3].

In the second case, the communication is analysed from a semiotic perspective, inspired by linguistics, mathematics, code theory and cryptography, with an emphasis

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[1] Although there is a common understanding of strategic communications in the USA, the UK, NATO and EU, the syntagmas and acronyms describing the concept are still slightly different: *strategic communication* – USA & UK; *strategic communications* – NATO; *strategic communication & strategic communications* – EU; *SC* – USA; *StratCom* – NATO & UK; *StratComms* – EU.

[2] John Fiske – *Introduction to Communication Studies*, 2nd Edition, Routledge, London, 1990, p. 2.

[3] *Ibid.*

on coding, decoding and interpreting the transmitted messages, including artworks, which are equated with acts of communication. The communication analysis focuses on *"how messages, or texts, interact with people in order to produce meanings"*[4], the communication itself being *"production and exchange of meanings"*[5].

No matter how many adjectives will be added to it – public, internal, external, interpersonal, media, international – the communication is always based on the process of transmitting information (signs, symbols, messages) from a source (person/group) to target audiences (people/groups) in order to obtain certain effects.

The main elements of this process can be identified in all types of communication, being similarly described by renowned scholars of the communication sciences. To mention just a few of them, let us name Aristotle, the author of the first linear model of communication, centred on the orator (source) and unilateral verbal communication. This model described the speech delivery by the speaker on a certain occasion to passive audiences in order to achieve certain effects. Among the authors of the most famous theories and modern models of communication are Harold Laswell, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, George Gerbner, Bruce Westley and Malcolm S. MacLean, Wilbur Schramm, David Berlo, Sam Becker, Roman Jakobson, Dean Barnlund and Frank Dance.

Centred on action, the model proposed by Harold Lasswell (1902-1978) is simple and applicable in all communication contexts. He defined the communication process through a famous interrogative formula: *Who?* (source); *Says what?* (message) *In which channel?* (medium); *To whom?* (audience); *With what effect?* (communication objectives).

Capitalising on their Second World War research on military fire-control systems, telecommunication and cryptography, Claude Shannon (1916-2001) and Warren Weaver (1894-1978) developed in 1949 a mathematical theory of communication, aimed to explain all phenomena in the spectrum of human communication. Shannon and Weaver's model of communication is one of the most representative ones for defining communication as a process, its authors trying to elucidate the problem of *"how to send a maximum amount of information along a given channel, and how to measure the capacity of any one channel to carry information"*[6].

We note that all theoretical communication models applied to any community in any historical context and regardless of its level of technological development identify the same common elements of any communication process: sources,

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[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid*, p. 6.

audiences, messages, channels, noise, coding and decoding, desired effects, feedback, reactions, monitoring, interpretation. At the same time, the assignment of meanings and the interpretation of the messages transmitted during the communication process reveal both declared and actual purposes of communication – to inform, to influence or to manipulate the audiences so that they acquire certain opinions, take certain actions, and behave according to the intentions sought by the source.

The success of linear communication cannot be guaranteed, much less in a competitive information environment, where both the audiences and the sources are equally exposed to many contextual constraints. Thus, the communication processes may experience interruptions and interferences that alter the meanings of transmitted messages. If they are aware of this possibility, the audiences might select, compare, and verify messages intended for them and estimate their credibility before acting in accordance with, or contrary to the intentions of the initiator of the communication process.

Communication and Intentionality

The elements and characteristics of the communication processes are identical, but the same cannot be said about the goals of communication. They are distinguished according to the intent of the one who initiates and controls the communication process to inform, influence or deceive. Depending on its intentionality, the communication process develops fundamental features that allow us to differentiate between the types of communication. Therefore, the particularisation of communication by reference to its purpose and goals, to the characteristics of the communication channels and the specific features of selected audiences made it possible for the communication processes carried out to be defined distinctly with the purpose of informing, influencing or misleading the target audiences.

From this standpoint, the communication processes aimed at *informing* the audiences fall into the generic category of public communication. In its sphere the concepts of public information, internal information, external communication etc. are included, which specifically refer to informing certain categories of audience – general, internal, local, national, international.

In democratic states, the public information is a constitutional and legal obligation of all public institutions to ensure the transparency of decision-making processes, to inform the public opinion on all aspects of general interest and to ensure citizens' unhindered access to information of public interest.

The decisive importance of communication is given by its contribution to substantiate the legitimacy of public interest decisions, to obtain the consent and support of the population for their implementation, all these aspects being at the basis of the development of policies, doctrines and structures in charge of the public information. In general, the communication activities carried out by public and private, state or multinational institutions, including military, are covered by concepts derived from mass communication theories.

The two main components of communication established by the institutions are *public information* (characterised by omni-directional transmission of messages, usually addressed to general audiences) and *internal information* (messages addressed to its own staff, usually transmitted through the communication channels used within the institution). In fulfilling the public information objectives, we note the importance given by the public institutions to the relationship with the media, considered as being *"the fourth power in the state"* and the *"watchdog of democracy"*. We recalled these famous phrases that underline the roles of media in democracies in order to emphasise the importance of the free press in guaranteeing the citizens' rights to be informed and their fundamental freedoms of conscience, opinion and expression set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The communication processes aimed at *influencing* certain selected audiences benefit not only from distinct definitions, such as propaganda, psychological operations, information operations, but also from specialised structures to plan and apply them. Their aim is to purposely and deliberately inspire opinions, strengthen motivations, determine desirable changes in the attitudes, and ultimately, in the behaviour of the selected audiences in order to support the achievement of military objectives.

In accordance with their well established definitions, *public relations* can be mentioned here as a management function exercised to obtain and maintain the acceptance and support of audiences through communication activities planned and carried out on the basis of general ethical and deontological principles so as the interests of audiences as well as of public or private organisations to be represented, respected and harmonised.

In the military field, depending on the influence objectives that are pursued to support the general objectives of military operations, the audiences are selected on the basis of different criteria related to the region (area of operations, area of interest), ethnicity, age, profession, education e.g.

Doctrinally, from the perspective of objectives and modalities of realisation, the influencing activities are circumscribed to the generic theories on propaganda and advertising, as well as to those specific to the military domain, defined

as psychological operations or military information support operations (USA), a component of the information operations.

The use of influencing activities, which characterises psychological operations, is subject to limitations and restrictions from legal as well as from operational point of view. They can only be used to support humanitarian or military interventions by conveying messages to audiences in the theatre of operations, being specified that under no circumstances will own soldiers and nationals, or those of allied and partner states be included among the audiences.

The communication processes directed at different audiences to *deceive* them are particularly associated with the political-military crises and the war situations, being primarily intended to affect the quality of the opponent's decision-making processes. Deception is usually directed at narrow and well-defined audiences (decision-makers, intelligence analysis centres), press institutions, but also through them at larger audiences – ethnic groups, the general population, the international public opinion, being clearly defined as disinformation, deception, manipulation. Depending on the type of mission, misleading activities may contribute to the achievement of the military objectives by supporting or undermining the legitimacy of the enemy leaders, formations or military interventions, by blocking or affecting the enemy's ability to properly assess the situation and, implicitly, to act or to react appropriately for protecting his own interests.

From ancient times, there have been identified many applications of deception in military art, which, as Sun Tzu has said, is based on deception. The experience of the wars led to the theorisation of the modalities to deceive the enemies at strategic, operational and tactical levels. These modalities have been embodied in doctrines, techniques, tactics and procedures for carrying out *military deception*, *concealment*, *masking* and *camouflage*, as well as extensions that concern *disinformation* and *manipulation*, from which the media are not exempt.

We note that, although they follow the same scheme of the communication process, the activities meant for informing, influencing or deceiving audiences differ significantly from the point of view of objectives pursued, drafting rules, content of messages, and last but not least, intentionality of disseminating products through the common or specific channels and modalities. It is worth mentioning that, in turn, the source is also exposed to various types of feedback, to the positive, neutral or negative reactions of audiences, as well as to the messages coming from other sources, becoming itself an audience. This finding confirms the bilateral, reciprocal and transactional nature of the relationship between sources and audiences, the multidirectionality of communication, the alternation and even the simultaneity

of the roles played by the actors of the communication process as sources and audiences at the same time.

The great secret of successful communication is not hidden nor is really so great, it is simply understanding and respecting the audiences, matching the messages to their expectations and needs, followed by fulfilling the promises that have been made. This approach to communication is supported by Admiral Michael G. Mullen, who wrote that *"we've come to believe that messages are something we can launch downrange like a rocket, something we can fire for effect. They are not. Good communication runs both ways. It's not about telling our story. We must also be better listeners"*[7].

Without any intention to address here the evolution of concepts corresponding to the communication processes that have an impact on the informational environment, we observe that they were successively named, after the end of the Second World War, *political warfare*, *propaganda* and *psychological warfare*, *subversion*, *disinformation*, *special warfare*, *command and control warfare*, *information warfare*. In the early 1990s, after the death of the *Cold War* was officially declared (still not sure if properly certified!), various consequences emerged not only in the field of international relations but also in the content of military doctrines by alleviating the aggressiveness of their terminology. In that historical context, the preference for the more neutral definitions became obvious, the military communication processes addressed to external audiences being renamed *psychological defence*, *psychological operations*, *perception management*, *operational communication*, *non-kinetic operations*, *information operations*, *military information support operations*.

Increasing tensions in the international security environment, especially after the Russian intervention in Ukraine by annexing Crimea and supporting the self-proclaimed separatist republics of Donetsk and Lugansk, have prompted NATO, the EU, allied and member states to begin to adapt their military structures and to revise their cooperation procedures. This adaptation process by which the NATO allies and their partners prepare together to meet the current security challenges also includes the coordination of the allied and national responses to the information-based threats – *fake news*, disinformation campaigns, hostile propaganda.

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[7] Michael G. Mullen, *Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics*, in *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 55, 4th Quarter 2009, p. 4.

Military Implications
of the Communication: *The Action Is the Message!*

Managing the relationship with media during military conflicts has resulted over the years in many lessons to be learned about how public communication should be handled in order to cover several dimensions at the same time. These dimensions include public information on political-military objectives and results of military operations, external communication, with allied and neutral countries, internal information, with their own military personnel, local communication, with the population in the area of operations and even with the enemy.

Media coverage of the unfortunate consequences resulting, intentionally or not, from tactical combat actions (bombarding civilian targets, collateral victims, violation of cultural and religious traditions of the population in the area of operations) can seriously disrupt or even block the political-military decision-making processes. Observing the recent military conflicts facilitates the identification of such situations that have led to a change in the course of action or even to the sudden withdrawal of the intervention force as a result of losing the legitimacy of its actions, increasing hostility of the local population to the foreign military presence, decreasing the international support and the public acceptance of the military intervention.

The progress of media technologies has simultaneously increased both the relevance of virtues and the threat of vulnerabilities that are specific to public communication, even more so in times of war when, as US Senator Hiram Warren Johnson said in 1918: *"the first casualty of war is truth"*. A subject for reflection and action that is equally important for politicians, military and journalists, as well as for consumers of media products! Accepting this axiom is the starting point of the self-learning effort by exercising the reflex action to always check the consistency, objectivity, accuracy, authority and currency of the information we were provided with by comparing and contrasting multiple sources. By doing so, relying on our discernment and making a habit of separating the information from opinions, we walk the path that is getting us closer to the truth.

Understanding the possibilities offered by modern public communication in support of the war effort has as a starting point the Crimean War (1853-1856), which was covered in the written press of the epoch. This was possible due to the press agencies operating at that time, the telegraph and the press reports sent directly from the battlefield by one of the world's first war correspondents, William Howard Russell. The first photographic war reportages in the history of photojournalism were pioneered by Carol Popp of Szathmáry, who made the world's first war pictures in the Crimean War in 1854, followed by Roger Fenton in 1855.

The following wars provided even more arguments to be taken into consideration – during operational planning, before, during and after military operations – the options of modelling the informational and operational environments, provided by the appropriate communication with target audiences (population groups, personnel and leaders of military organisations) in areas of operations and interest, from neutral and allied countries, as well as from their own country. At the same time, the support function of communication and its positive role as a force multiplier and a facilitator of the success of military operations were noted.

Both perspectives on communication – as a process of transmitting messages or as a process of assigning meanings to the messages – are relevant for studying the military implications of communication in shaping the public perception of actions, interventions and operations carried out by the armed forces, as well as for conducting the decision-making processes associated with these actions.

As a process of transmitting messages, which are understood as information and data sets, the study of communication is of interest for optimising the information flows during decision-making processes, for the efficient exploitation and improvement of the architecture of military communications systems.

At the same time, the routine functioning of any military organisation is conditioned by preparing, running, controlling and evaluating the processes of transmitting messages to different types of audiences. However, these processes gain more relevance during operational planning, before, during and after the execution of humanitarian and military interventions or operations. The importance of considering the aspects of communication during the military operational planning is supported by its products (coordination instructions, synchronisation matrices, support plans) which are specific to the various functional areas circumscribed to Strategic Communications – Public Diplomacy (PD), Public Affairs (PA), Information Operations (InfoOps), Psychological Operations (PsyOps), Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP), Key Leaders Engagement (KLE), military deception. These areas overlap with specific communication processes that aim to produce a certain impact on the informational environment and on the different audiences by addressing them through different channels and products in order to achieve different effects: information, influence or deception.

The assignment of meanings to communication acts has obvious military implications for information coding and decoding processes, as well as for public information messages concerning national and multinational exercises and missions correlated to the objectives of military and naval diplomacy.

It follows that the achievement of political and military objectives can be sustained by military force deployments and demonstrative military actions, to which a communication value is attributed and which are used predominantly for deterrence. This situation allows the paraphrasing of Marshall McLuhan's memorable quote *"The Medium is the Message!"*[8] in a form that reflects the considerable importance of actions and their valorisation through strategic communications – *The Action is the Message!*

When and *How* Does Communication Become *Strategic?*

The experience gained over the years has led to the development of models and procedures for linking public institutions and military organisations with the media during peace, crisis and war. By completing this succession of models and procedures, Strategic Communication aims to make the most of the potential of communication with audiences, including through the media exploitation of the activities that are relevant from the communication point of view, thus supporting the achievement of national and allied strategic political and military objectives.

StratCom is a new concept, but not so new, through which its apologists are trying to describe the ways of organising, synchronising and coordinating public communication to better align the facts with the words. However, similar approaches can be found under other names in the near or distant past. Even if the political context was different, the analysis and comparison of the different definitions used in the StratCom area reveal the overlaps between them. Common elements become evident if we investigate the methods, means, and goals pursued by the communication enrolled in supporting the fulfilment of political or military objectives by informing and influencing target audiences in accordance with their requirements.

StratCom has emerged to bring some order in the inflation of concepts that have been grafted over the years on the communication processes designed for targeting internal and external, allied, neutral and adversary audiences by matching messages and communication channels to their particularities, and by integrating and synchronising all communication activities with the actions and phases of military operations to support the achievement of political and military objectives.

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[8] Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, Chapter 1, p. 1, http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/mcluhan.mediummessage.pdf.

From the perspective of aggregating the effects of informing and influencing target audiences, communication becomes strategic when it is explicitly subordinated to the highest decision-making authorities in the state to contribute to the fulfilment of political and military goals. In other words, the communication becomes strategic when it is applied strategically, and in a planned and coordinated way in such a manner that all ways and means are synchronised to support the achievement of political and military objectives, national and allied ones. Therefore, at national level, communication becomes strategic when it exceeds the limits of institutional public communication to actively support the state policies and the achievement of their objectives in several fields – political, diplomatic, economic, educational, informational, cultural, and military.

From the perspective of practical implementation, communication becomes strategic by assuming the role of integrator of all the communication activities, all the actions impacting on the information environment and consequently on the target audiences, as well as the use of all channels, methods and resources for achieving the effects pursued by the political and military leadership. Thus, StratCom implies the synchronised and complementary application of several types of activities and communication processes – mainly PD, PA, PsyOps and InfoOps, including also relevant public events and large-scale military exercises.

The diversity of the activities and stakeholders involved (ministries, government agencies, cultural institutions, mass media) highlights the StratCom key functions: integrating and coordinating all activities with an impact on the informational environment that are conducted by using the resources of several ministries and state agencies. It becomes clear that StratCom implementation cannot be the responsibility of a single institution. It requires the interagency coordination both at national and allied levels of all the activities carried out by the components under the umbrella of strategic communication in support of the fulfilment of national and allied political and military objectives.

Consequently, StratCom is equivalent to a comprehensive approach to communication with different audiences. However, it calls for a careful analysis of the circumstances, purpose and objectives for which its implementation is pursued, without exceeding the limits of the specific legal framework for civilian and military institutions that contribute to its achievement, in full respect of the rights of citizens to be properly informed and to access the information of public interest.

Strategic Communications
– Theoretical Approaches

Initially theorised in the USA and the UK, StratCom officially entered NATO terminology in 2008. So far, it has generated numerous articles, analyses, polemics and a lot of institutional effort to bring the activities carried out by the Alliance and the allies influencing significantly the informational environment to a common denominator. The results of these descriptive and normative approaches are reflected in a set of StratCom documents, policies, doctrines, guidelines, manuals and framework concepts which are currently developed by the allied HQs in support of various field operations or crisis management, taken in a similar way also by the EU.

There are several definitions of StratCom. Most of them share entirely the family of concepts describing the communication processes (PD, PA, InfoOps, PsyOps) as well as the enhancement of communication by capitalising on the actions undertaken by ministries and state agencies in various fields – political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and military.

◆ United States of America

From the very beginning, the US military and civilian publications have paid a special attention to the strategic communication and to the concepts associated with it. A pragmatic approach of the subject belongs to Richard Halloran, who proposed the following definition in an article published in 2007 by *Parameters Magazine*, the US Army War College Quarterly: *"Strategic communication is a way of persuading other people to accept one's ideas, policies, or courses of action"*[9].

For Halloran, the definitions of strategic communication are of little importance. Much more important is building the institutional capacity that is needed to support the achievement of strategic communication objectives. They result from the broad concept of strategic communication, which *"means persuading allies and friends to stand with you. It means persuading neutrals to come over to your side or at least stay neutral. In the best of all worlds, it means persuading adversaries that you have the power and the will to prevail over them. Vitally important, strategic communication means persuading the nation's citizens to support the policies of their leaders so that a national will is forged to accomplish national objectives. In this context, strategic communication is an essential element of national leadership"*[10].

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[9] Richard Halloran, *Strategic Communication,* in *Parameters*, The US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 2007, p. 6.
[10] *Ibid.*

Although we can find many research papers published over the past 20 years on strategic communication, the concept has been extracted from the area of academic debate to be introduced into official programmatic documents for the first time in the *United States National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*, published by the Department of State in June 2007. The *Strategy* formulated the US Government's communication objectives, key audiences, public diplomacy priorities, interagency coordination requirements, ways of monitoring and evaluation of implementation, communication channels and necessary resources, examples of plans, themes and messages.

The increasing popularity of strategic communication, hand in hand with its inappropriate use likely to generate confusion and unrealistic expectations, has led to the adoption of a new document in 2010 – the *National Framework for Strategic Communication*. This one proposed a delineation of the action fields of strategic communication, understood as follows: *"(a) the synchronisation of words and deeds and how they will be perceived by selected audiences, as well as (b) programs and activities deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended audiences, including those implemented by public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations professionals"*[11].

Such a perspective on strategic communication as a support, coordination and synchronisation function is expressed by *"a recognition that what we do is often more important than what we say because actions have communicative value and send messages"*[12]. The *National Framework for Strategic Communication* stressed *"the importance of synchronising words and deeds while simultaneously establishing coordination mechanisms and processes to improve the United States Government's ability to deliberately communicate and engage with intended audiences"*[13], stating explicitly that it does not plead for *"the creation of new terms, concepts, organizations, or capabilities"*[14].

Strategic communication can be seen as a process developed through mechanisms, programmes and activities carried out by the US Government *"on understanding, engaging, informing, influencing, and communicating with people through public affairs, public diplomacy, information operations and other efforts"*[15].

The *National Framework for Strategic Communication* argued the importance of considering also the value of messages expressed by other means

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[11] *National Framework for Strategic Communications*, The White House, Washington, 2010, p. 2.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.*

than those of verbal or written communication, more precisely through a wide range of cultural, educational, sport events, as well as through military events, deployments and redeployments, military exercises and wargames, firing exercises, *show of flag* and *show of force* demonstrations. Their value and impact should be taken into account at all levels during the decision-making cycles or military operational planning as elements that can add relevant content to strategic communication.

In the light of such a comprehensive approach of communication, the responsibility for synchronising words with deeds ceases to be attributed to Public Affairs structures only, whose authority and possibilities of action are often limited to their own means. Hence the need for strategic communication to be assumed from higher decision-making levels that have a full insight into planned and ongoing operations as well as on the information support requirements of the actors who can interact effectively with audiences in meeting the goals of state policies.

In the *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, re-edited by the US Department of Defense in March 2017, strategic communication is defined as follows: *"Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favourable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power"*[16].

The US-style strategic communication emerges as the result of synchronised and coordinated individual contributions of several governmental, civilian and military organizations and agencies, whose activities span the fields of Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, Information Operations, Civil Affairs, but not limited to them. The diversity of actors involved and their specific planning procedures underline the importance of interagency coordination for analysing the information environment, formulating priorities and objectives, planning, developing and evaluating the activities encompassed by the strategic communication.

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In the second part of the article, the author will further present the theoretical and functional models of the UK, NATO, European Union, the national trends as well as legal and practical aspects of applying strategic communication.

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[16] *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, US DoD, March 2017, p. 223.

THE EUROPEAN UNION IS ACTUALLY THERE TO THE BENEFIT OF ITS CITIZENS!

Interview with Mr. Dirk DUBOIS,
Head of the European Security and Defence College

Colonel Valentin Vasile (Deputy Chief of Information and Public Relations Directorate, the Ministry of National Defence) interviewed Dirk Dubois on 17 May 2017, on the occasion of the *Common Security Defence Policy Orientation Course* (16-17/3/3), hosted by the Romanian National Defence College under the auspices of the European Security and Defence College, Brussels, 15 to 19 May 2017.

At the age of 18, Mr. Dirk Dubois joins the Belgian Army in 1981. He graduates from the *Royal Military Academy* after 4.5 years with a Master degree in Social and Military Sciences. He spends the first part of his career in operational units as a field artillery officer and as an instructor and staff officer at the *Belgian Artillery School*.

During this part of his career, he is deployed abroad on several occasions. During one of his operational deployments, he serves as a liaison officer with UN, EU and local civilian authorities. He learns first-hand how civilian and military efforts can supplement each other to achieve a better result than when they each operate independently.

In 2004, Mr. Dirk Dubois starts a second phase in his career as he joins

Colonel Valentin VASILE: The success of the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy depends on the support given to it by the citizens of the member states. In this sense, what is the role of the European security culture?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: If you look at the position of different member states and towards foreign policy from EU perspective, you can easily understand that countries like Estonia, Latvia do not have the same security concerns as countries like Portugal and Spain. However, harmonising the positions of the member states on the EU's common policies – external, security and defence

the *Belgian Defence Headquarters* and becomes a member of the team responsible for the development and follow-up of the strategic management objectives for the Belgian Defence.

When this team is reorganised in 2007, he seizes the opportunity to apply for a position as training manager of the *European Security and Defence College*. During this time, he organises numerous courses and is actively engaged in the launching of the European initiative for the exchange of young officers, better known as *"Erasmus militaire"*.

He occupies this function until 2012, when he returns to the *Belgian Defence Headquarters* in the Directorate-General for Education as head of the division responsible for external relations in the field of education, both on a national side and with relevant partner countries. This position allows him to take up the job of chairperson of the *Implementation Group for the European initiative for the exchange of young officers*, inspired by Erasmus in the summer of 2013. The experience gained with the initiative also enables him to further develop the recognition of the qualifications of the military personnel by the civilian authorities at a national level.

In 2014 he applies for the position of Head of the *European Security and Defence College* and is appointed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to take up this position on 1 April 2015.

Mr. Dubois lives in Antwerp together with his wife Sabine, who teaches biology at high-school level and is an assistant professor at the University of Antwerp's professional training for future teachers. They have two daughters.

– requires the development of a European security culture, whose role is to contribute to common understanding of our interest as European Union and the common threats we must face. A good example of that is the security of our maritime lines of communication, which is exemplified by Operation ATALANTA, where the member states understood quite quickly that it was extremely important for our trade that the shipping lines remained open and free of piracy. And therefore, it is important that we share a culture of security, we share understanding of what our common interests are, what our common threats are, and what we can do together to help secure what we do.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: And what is the role of national security and defence colleges in developing the EU's security culture?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: If we are talking purely military colleges, or mostly dedicated to military training, they have a role to play contributing to the bigger picture, but there is also a role to play by diplomatic academies, police academies and institutes that already have this civilian-military vocation themselves. For instance, in France – *Institut des hautes études de défense nationale* – IHEDN and, in Germany, the BAKS – *Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik*. These already have the two parts together, which are parts that we, as the ESDC, also want to promote. Therefore, in this case, the ESDC contributes to that by explaining to all EU member states' participants, course participants and the people from the structures here what the different issues are, why they are of concern to all member states, as well as the fact that we have common interests. Even if some

of the interests may be particular to certain countries, we do have common interests. One of these common interests is the defence. It is true, this is absolutely the case as far as the territorial defence is concerned and the EU recognises that NATO has a predominant role in that case, it is not an issue. But we, as EU, can play a role with more difficulties to overcome on a lot of other subjects. Thus, we can see security as larger than being defence alone. It includes aspects like diplomacy, development, trade and so forth, all of which can play a role that is more important than the hard defence that is provided by NATO.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: Is there any connection between the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003, the first of its kind in EU's history, and the establishment of the ESDC two years later?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: It is no coincidence that they were created one after the other so soon. The first head of ESDC secretariat at that time was working in Javier Solana's team when the strategy was written. Then, quite soon after that, there was an initiative by a number of member states to create a course, an orientation course, a course that is still predominantly visible within the ESDC's portfolio. That was in 2003-2004, when we had one or two orientation courses already. Then we started with the high-level course, which has remained our flagship course. Before the creation of ESDC, in the academic year 2004-2005, together with the creation of the Security Strategy in 2003, we had the so-called *"chocolate summit"* here, actually in Tervuren, close to Brussels, where four countries came together: France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, to try to establish a number of things. And one of them was the creation of the *European Security and Defence College*. The negotiation took a while, there was also some criticism on that summit, from certain member states, which felt left out. However, in 2005, the member states agreed under the Luxembourg presidency to create the European Security and Defence College. Therefore, there definitely is a link between the Security Strategy and, as a result of its implementation, the creation of the European Security and Defence College.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: What are the main milestones in the evolution of the ESDC from its establishment to the present?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: First of all, as far as the establishment is concerned, the official Council Decision dates back to 18 July 2005. It was the first big step, followed by the recruitment of permanent staff and seconded national experts.

This made the next steps possible, the functional ones, beginning with the creation of the e-learning platform, called interned-based distance learning at the time. And, at the same time, in 2008, under the French presidency, there was an initiative for exchanging young officers, in short *Military Erasmus*, which was then given as a task to the college.

Then, the next big step was a new Council Decision in 2013, on 22 April, when the College was finally also given its budget, coming from the CFSP budget. What is also important is that, in 2013, for the first time, it was stipulated that the ESDC must support the management of civilian training aspects in CSDP and fulfill a task regarding civilian training. The next step came with the revision of the Council Decision leading to a new Council Decision of 21 September 2016, which made it possible for the College to work more flexibly, namely making a number of minor changes, which made a big difference in terms of practical implementation. Therefore, the college is growing in importance and number of activities. Nowadays, we have one hundred activities for this budgetary year, compared to thirty activities, in 2012. The number of activities is really increasing a lot, and more and more tasks are being given to the College. Looking a little bit in the future, one of the things of this kind being discussed or studied currently is if it will be possible for the college to become a cyber defence platform for the European Union or at least in the field of training. This is a possible next step, but it is currently being studied by EDA and EUMS.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: Is the ESDC different from institutions such as George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and NATO Defence College from Rome?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: Well, the ESDC is completely different from those institutes in terms of size, set-up, and cost efficiency. If we are to compare it with NATO Defence College in Rome, which has a building, permanent staff, a library, a budget that is well above what we have, there is just no comparison between the two. The ESDC is first and foremost a network. It is not a college with classrooms, permanent staff, and teachers working full time to organise courses. You only have six people, training managers, who are actively involved together with the training institutes from the member states to set up courses. Therefore, and that is the important part, most of the work and most of the costs are actually born by the member states and by the more than one hundred training institutes, which are our network that forms the college. Thus, the part played here in Brussels is basically supporting this huge network.

Another big difference is given by what we do here at the ESDC, namely that we always try to use, as much as possible, a mix between an academic input and an input from specialists, from the structures. Especially if the courses take place here in Brussels, we will always try to get involved the persons who are working on a specific file and who are capable of giving the latest details on what is happening. Our lecturers work on a day-to-day basis on these documents, really doing the hard work and knowing all the details. If you ask the people who have come here to give lectures any questions related to the topic addressed, they will know the latest details. And I think this is the reason for the big success of the College and for the fact that the member states are very supportive.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: How does the ESDC fulfil its mission and objectives?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: In a nutshell, what the ESDC is supposed to do is to create a common understanding of the security and defence policy, the CSDP of the EU, within the larger framework of the common foreign and security policy, amongst both civilian and military personnel coming from the member states and from the European Union institutions. Other than that we have a full range of tasks – I want to mention just a few of them – namely to provide training for the CSDP missions and operations as well, to support civilian training, Military Erasmus, networking, in order to create a network of experts and people trained on CSDP issues. Just to give you some examples, in terms of facts and figures: in the academic year 2015-2016, we trained 3,750 course participants in our residential courses, other 550 in e-learning alone (those participants did not come to residential courses) and we reached over one thousand young military students in Military Erasmus. Thus, in total, the training of a little bit over 5,000 people in one year was facilitated by the ESDC, which is quite a success. Every year we organise meetings of our alumni, with people from the majority of our modular courses, especially from high-level courses, from the political advisers' course. In Eastern Partnership countries and in the Western Balkans countries, we organise specific meetings for these two regions. What we consider also very important is the exchange of know-how between the training institutes in our network. At first, which was also the case of Romania when it joined the European Union, the activities of the institutes coming from the newer member states are assisted by stronger members in our network, so that they could build up their own capacity to teach further on the European Union. This was quite fruitful in the case of Romania, because your country is very active in the ESDC network currently, providing quite a lot of training to those who are interested.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: To what kind of participants are the ESDC's courses addressed?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: If we have a look at the courses, we have 47 in total, but only 35 are still active, due to the fact that some of them have been merged or placed on a dormant basis, but let us say we have 35 courses that are currently running. Depending on the course, in terms of the level of people, they go from the desk officer to the highest decision-maker. The orientation courses are intended for desk officers and staff officers. The high-level courses are meant for people with the potential to take up leadership positions within institutions and ministries in different member states. The senior mission leadership course is intended for senior mission leaders, heads of mission, force commanders and, in some of the activities, we had senior leadership seminars that actually address the top level in political decision-making. We also address the experts' level in a number of our courses, for instance, the security sector reform, the political adviser course, the legal adviser course. Thus, we address more people who are in a niche of ability and looking for expertise, especially on the European Union.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: In fulfilling its objectives, what is the role played by the interaction with the national security and defence colleges in the EU member states?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: This role is absolutely crucial, due to the fact that ESDC is a network. Therefore, we could not live without the inputs from the different institutions, foreign institutions within our network. This is absolutely crucial also in terms of commitment by the member states to the resources there. We need to continually provide the highest quality training in order for member states to continue to send their participants, and commit to delivering the courses under the network. Therefore, the role of these institutes within the ESDC network is absolutely crucial in guaranteeing the quality of the courses, delivering the courses, convincing own authorities to send participants to our courses. I would say this is absolutely what the college is built on.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: How do you see, from the ESDC in Brussels, the Romanian National Defence College, which marks its 25th anniversary in August this year?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: Congratulations on this anniversary! Again, I think we have a good working relationship. It is a crucial part of our network and we absolutely try to provide support as much as possible in even further building up the capacity

to deliver the courses of the Defence College. In April 2010, the Romanian National Defence College organised for the first time the high-level seminar, which actually retained me longer in Bucharest. The Romanian National Defence College is one of the active members of the network. On an annual basis, they organise an orientation course with their own participants and half of them international or from European Union member states. The Romanian National Defence College has definitely become, over the past years, a very active member of the ESDC network and is very much appreciated. Again, and coming back to what I said before, it is crucial that we continue to share best practices in the network. Therefore, it is absolutely important that the people from the National Defence College, too, get the opportunity not only to organise courses themselves, but also to come, from time to time, as much as possible, to the executive academic board, where discussions are held, and also, from time to time, to go and attend courses organised by other people, so that they can continue to monitor the evolutions in terms of pedagogy and content that are run by the other colleges or member states. In conclusion, that is absolutely a good thing, and I think that the Romanian National Defence College has been very much open to such an approach and has really embraced this attitude of learning from others and taking investments.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: What can you tell us about the relations with the other Romanian structures in the ESDC network, namely the National College for Home Affairs and the National Defence University "Carol I"?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: In the last couple of years, the College for Home Affairs has also become quite an active player focusing more on policy aspects as well as integrating a civilian-military approach. From our perspective, I would suggest that Romania should also enable better coordination and cooperation between the National Defence College and the College of Home Affairs to promote best practices at inter-agency level, improve the quality of both institutes, and jointly provide courses under the ESDC because, as I have said, all of our courses are civilian-military ones. Or, it could make sense that the College of Home Affairs and the National Defence College would work together to offer the best possible quality courses under the Romanian flag. I would like to stress the special relationship that we have with the National Defence University in terms of our e-learning system. Since 2009 we have already migrated the e-learning system from the Belgian platform to the Romanian platform. Since then Romania has hosted through the National Defence University the ESDC e-learning,

first of all on their own servers, until 2015, when a change in your national legislation no longer made it possible for your servers to be used. However, they still provide maintenance to our servers, they provide all the manpower needed in order to put the e-learning on the servers and to do all the maintenance for what they provided for the servers. That is extremely appreciated and their work is extremely well done, well performed. Again, for the future, we are looking forward to cooperating, especially considering your upcoming presidency of the European Council in 2019, when you will again be offering a module of the high-level course. And I think, at least that is what I was informed, that the intention is to do exactly as I proposed, namely in cooperation between the National Defence College and the College for Home Affairs. Therefore, I think that is a message that has to be taken for the future, and that can only contribute to improved quality of the training.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: What can you tell us about Romanian contributions to the Military Erasmus programme?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: I would like to say again that the Romanian participants have become actively engaged in Military Erasmus from the very beginning, not only in terms of participations, but also in terms of offering courses. A module on maritime security will be hosted soon in Constanța. Moreover, in terms of the participation in the International Military Academic Forum, which is not a part of Military Erasmus, but has dedicated its activity in support of the initiative for a number of years, Romania has been very actively involved and organised, amongst others the 2nd IMA meeting in Sibiu, in June 2015. Therefore, also due to its involvement in the Military Erasmus, Romania is definitely an active and very much appreciated member of the ESDC network.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: Taking into account the historical experience in the development of the European project, in what kind of EU will we be 10 years from now? And what will the role of ESDC be?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: I will get my crystal bowl from somewhere! What we can say is that, at this time, we live in a very uncertain volatile world. If you compare it with what the European *Security Strategy* said in 2003, Europe was never so secure, so free and also so prosperous. I think this has changed. If you look at the leadership in some of the countries around us, you cannot but question how or what the future of Europe will look like, especially due to the fact that it is closely connected to the evolution of transatlantic relations. Then, taking

a different line, what will the role played by Vladimir Putin be in all these crises, the Ukrainian, the Syrian ones, … and what will the role played by Recep Tayyip Erdogan be in all these …? China is becoming more and more influential and important. So, we are living in a challenging world at the time. Another number of aspects will certainly play a role – the demographic evolution in Africa, for instance. It is estimated that the African population will double in 30 to 40 years. Apparently, Africa does not currently have all the resources to feed its people, so how will this situation end up? Where will these people like to travel? Probably to Europe… This is part of what the Commission, the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development and other entities in the Commission are looking at in the long term, and what they are trying to do is actually create conditions for the African continent to be able to support its own population for another 30 to 40 years. And CSDP missions and operations are only trying to set the conditions, the security conditions to do exactly that. It is extremely important to understand that the EU is actually doing far more than only crisis management. We are doing what is called comprehensive approach, and now, with the new *Global strategy* from June 2016, we are moving a little bit further towards an integrated approach, but, basically, they both cover the same topic. Namely, that we use all of the tools and instruments of the European Union and of its member states to achieve the common foreign policy objectives. Building up the security in our neighbourhood ensures our security!

In ten years? Very difficult to predict! I mean, if you considered, in 1986, the probability that the Wall would fall in 1989, well, very few people would have believed you. If you had said in 2002 that America would no longer be the sole superpower in the world by 2013, no one would have believed you. Yet, history always proves us wrong! Therefore, I will refrain myself from big predictions in what the European Union will look like. I could only say, from my personal point of view, that we, as European Union member states, have two choices. One of the choices is to stay together. Today, together, we are the biggest trade block in the world, we still represent approximately ten percent of the world population, we are the richest region in the world, next to America, in terms of GDP, before China. If we separate, if we allow certain great powers to play us as a part and treat with individual member states, we will become insecure, and this is the case even for big member states, like Germany and France.

I regret the BREXIT very much, but that was a choice of the British people. I am pretty sure that the UK will continue to play a big role in the field of security, together with the European Union. In terms of hard security, certainly, as it remains in NATO, nothing will change. In terms of the CSDP operations, that remains

to be negotiated. However, the UK has indicated that they continue to be interested to play a role in that aspect.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: What will the role of the ESDC be in ten years?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: In my view, in ten years, the ESDC will probably have become bigger, running more courses. So, if you look at the trend, I have already said, the trend is increasing, from thirty courses in 2012, to approximately one hundred training activities this year. Every year they come with new pilot activities, new ideas, new roles for the college. Why? Well, because they see that we are flexible, and cost-efficient. These are the two things that I think we should underline, and this confirms me in my belief that the college will still exist in ten years from now.

Colonel Valentin VASILE: Are the concepts of enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation the indicators of development of a multi-speed European Union?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: Yes, I hope so, and I will explain why. If you look at what the Treaty on European Union says, in its Article 42 (6) and Article 46, on permanent structured cooperation, it says that it is for those member states with higher capabilities, higher level of capabilities, and that are willing to do more. Therefore, basically, what is in the text, in my understanding of the text, is that a permanent structured cooperation with all the member states does not make sense to me. Well, it could make sense with all the member states in the long term, but let us start with those that are willing to do something, with those that can actually contribute something in terms of unique capabilities, size, political will, and maybe the most important is the political will. It does not make sense for me to create a permanent structured cooperation where you include countries that say *"I want to be part of PESCO – Permanent Structured Cooperation to break it!"* I know that many do not agree with what I am saying, but this is my personal view, it is not the official view of the structure.

We have to create a multi-speed Europe because it is difficult to move together efficiently when we have 28 members and with the current decision-making procedures we have. The multi-speed Europe already exists, anyhow! As an example, let us look at the Schengen Agreement or at the fact we have the Euro zone, and there are others… Multi-speed Europe is a reality… and I would say it is a good thing. Where does it end up? Well, on the Euro zone,

it is clear that, except for those member states that have actually opted out, normally all of the member states, in time, should move towards Euro. Is that the same with permanent structured cooperation, will it end up in creating a European Army? Well, may be not in the next ten years, but maybe in the long term, why not, it would make sense. If you translate that into a political system, the European Union now is a very much *sui generis* organisation, where power is shared based on the Treaty between the EU institutions, the member states, and their regions. Given that basically we have already given part of our foreign policy to the European Union, what will happen if we now give our defence to the European Union? Would that make a confederate state of Europe or a federal state or Europe? That is for the next generation of politicians to decide! I do not dare to make a prediction on where it will end up and by which agenda, but I think there is progress and it is good!

Colonel Valentin VASILE: What do you consider we may add to this interview as final remarks?

Mr. Dirk DUBOIS: As a final conclusion, well, I think, for me there is one basic message that should be made clear to the population. The European Union contributes more than you think in extremely important areas to our lives. The European Union does not always make it clear to the population. So, Europe is actually defending the interests of its populations in terms of economics, trade, freedom of movement and support. I think it is important that people understand the real role of the European Union in providing a buffer between the population and the players on the international scene, including big companies. It might happen that individual member states cannot do nothing against big multinationals. But the European Union can and has. I think it is important to understand and underline that the European Union is actually there to the benefit of its citizens, nations, and member states. And in terms of security and defence, the Common Security and Defence Policy plays its role in supporting that and, in turn, it is supported by the European Security and Defense College!

Colonel Valentin VASILE: Thank you for the interview!

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(II)

Resilience and Civil Preparedness

Having the resilience to withstand shocks like natural disasters, failure of critical infrastructure, and military and terrorist attacks is crucial to security and stability. Resilience is the combination of civil preparedness and military capacity – a society's ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from these shocks through a combination of civilian, economic, commercial and military factors.

In 2016, Allies continued to improve civil preparedness, reducing vulnerabilities in their critical infrastructure and essential services and ensuring that NATO military forces can be supported with civilian resources.

In February 2016, Defence Ministers assessed the Alliance-wide state of civil preparedness and agreed seven baseline requirements for national resilience. They cover sectors essential for Alliance security: continuity of government, energy, population movements, food and water resources, ability to cope with mass casualties, civil communications, and civil transportation.

At the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allied Heads of State and Government made a historic commitment to enhancing resilience and to embedding agreed standards in these seven sectors. The Warsaw Resilience Commitment was adopted in the spirit of Article 3 of NATO's founding treaty, which obliges every Ally to do what is necessary, individually and collectively, to be able to resist armed attack. Allies are implementing this commitment.

NATO also reviewed and improved its tools to help Allies increase their resilience and measure progress more accurately. These include guidelines, evaluation criteria, tailored advisory support teams of civil experts, and updated crisis response measures. The state of civil preparedness will be reassessed by NATO Defence Ministers in early 2018.

NATO has also been engaging the private sector, as well as counterparts in the European Union (EU), in its efforts to build resilience. Bolstering resilience is one of the key areas identified for cooperation between NATO and the EU on countering hybrid threats.

The Alliance also continued to engage with partners in addressing vulnerabilities in their countries in order to make NATO's neighbourhood, and therefore the Alliance itself, more secure. Partner countries Finland and Sweden have cooperated closely with NATO in developing plans to improve their resilience.

Energy Security

The availability of energy, including supply disruptions or volatile energy prices, can have far-reaching security implications. In this context, NATO is working to raise its collective awareness in this area and develop its competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure.

NATO works to enhance energy efficiency in the military, both with a view to making its armed forces less dependent on fossil fuels and to reducing its environmental footprint. NATO's renewed focus on collective defence, through its forward presence, for example, has focused attention on the availability of sustainable and resilient energy supplies. As a result, NATO is supporting efforts to improve interoperability, provide new means of mobile power generation, and offer new energy-related training courses for the military. Through military exercises, NATO is helping to ensure that individual technologies can work

seamlessly together in a contested environment where conventional energy supplies may be disrupted.

NATO's activities in 2016 focused on the way energy and security are increasingly interlinked.

- After the successful demonstration of the operational relevance of energy-efficient equipment (for instance solar and wind power, smart grids, advanced insulation) at a multinational exercise in 2015, NATO began to integrate energy efficiency into its policies and standards.

- The North Atlantic Council discussed global energy developments and their security implications with prominent energy experts, including EU Commission Vice President Maros Sefcovic.

- NATO conducted its second course on building strategic awareness in relation to energy security at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany with participants from Allied and partner countries.

- NATO worked with the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius, Lithuania to organise a table-top exercise on protecting critical energy infrastructure, focusing on the impact of electricity supply disruption in the Baltic region for national security and defence. The Centre also published several studies on Ukraine's energy challenges after Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and developed a *"Green Book"* which provides advice on critical infrastructure protection.

Transparency and Risk Reduction

Transparency in relation to military activities is a crucial practice for reducing risks and avoiding accidents and incidents. NATO continues to seek ways to avoid misunderstanding, miscalculation, accidents and military escalation. Constructive engagement on reciprocal military transparency and risk reduction can contribute to improved stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

This is especially important in light of Russia's behaviour in recent years, in particular its increased military activities and rhetoric, which reduces stability and predictability. In line with decisions taken at the Warsaw Summit, NATO remains open to discussion with Russia on transparency and risk reduction, including in the framework of the NATO Russia Council.

Conventional Arms Control in Europe

Arms control is a valuable means of building security and predictability. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Allies reaffirmed their strong support for arms control and their commitment to preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control in Europe. They agreed to do this based on key principles including reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent. NATO members continue to implement their arms control obligations in full. However, they remain concerned by Russia's selective implementation of its key international commitments, including the Vienna Document, the Open Skies Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Helsinki Final Act.

Modernising the Vienna Document

In 2016, NATO redoubled its efforts on risk reduction and transparency. This followed a call by the NATO Secretary General at the end of 2015 for Allies and Russia to work together to improve European security – including by modernising the Vienna Document. The Vienna Document – which contains commitments among the participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – is considered one of the key foundations of the European security system. If implemented in letter and in spirit, the measures it outlines can increase military transparency and predictability, improve mutual trust, and help to avoid unnecessary or provocative military build-ups. Given changes in the security environment, Allies have put forward several proposals to modernise the Vienna Document including:

- lowering the thresholds for notification and observation of military exercises

- closing loopholes that allow countries to avoid notification and observation of exercises, including no-notice or "snap" exercise loopholes

- strengthening verification by improving inspections and evaluations and providing additional quotas for all states

- bolstering the mechanism to address concerns about unusual military activities

- enhancing military-to-military lines of communication

- further clarifying and fully implementing the hazardous incidents notification provision

Throughout 2016, the Alliance intensified discussions on the Vienna Document. While Russia has opposed the proposed changes, Allies will continue their efforts in 2017 to strengthen the Vienna Document.

Relations with Russia

Prior to 2014, NATO and Russia had worked to build a partnership, developing dialogue and practical cooperation in areas of common interest. Following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO suspended practical cooperation programmes with Russia. However, political and military channels of communication remain open and efforts to reduce risk and increase transparency are ongoing.

In response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea as well as increasingly assertive Russian behaviour, NATO has increased its rotational military presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. NATO's measures are defensive, proportionate and in line with international commitments, including the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

At the Summit in Warsaw, NATO leaders reaffirmed that the nature of the Alliance's relations with Russia and aspirations for partnership will be contingent on a clear, constructive change in Russia's actions – demonstrating compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities. Allies also agreed that deterrence and defence should be complemented by periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NATO-Russia Council. This is important in order to avoid misunderstanding, miscalculation and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability.

The NATO-Russia Council met three times in 2016: in April, in July and in December. At each meeting, the group discussed the conflict in and around Ukraine including the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements; issues related to military activities, transparency and risk reduction; and the security situation in Afghanistan, including the regional terrorist threat.

The Secretary General met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in February and September. The Deputy Secretary General maintained regular contact with the Russian Ambassador to NATO throughout the year, as well as with other Russian officials. NATO's military leaders have also continued to seek discussion with their Russian counterparts through existing military channels of communication.

Exercises

In 2016, NATO Allies continued to strictly adhere to the letter and spirit of the Vienna Document. This included regularly notifying OSCE participating states of exercises, including those below the required threshold of 9,000 troops. Notification of Allied exercises throughout the year allowed Russian observers to visit ten Allied military exercises, including Cold Response (March, Norway), Joint Warrior (April, United Kingdom), Anakonda (June, Poland) and Parmenion (October, Greece).

Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and CBRN Defence

Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation have been an important aspect of NATO's agenda since the Cold War. As part of the 1967 Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, NATO Allies formally recognised the importance of negotiations to improve the climate of East-West relations, including talks on disarmament. At the same time, Allies agreed to develop the necessary military capabilities to deter aggression.

NATO's Role

NATO attaches great importance to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation as tools that enhance security; NATO serves as an essential consultative and decision-making forum for its members on all aspects of these topics. At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, Allies reaffirmed their concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery by state and non-state actors.

Small Arms, Light Weapons, Mine Action

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons can have an immediate impact on security while antipersonnel mines and explosive remnants of war can kill and maim both people and livestock long after the end of hostilities. Both can have destabilising effects on social and economic development and can represent major challenges to regional and national security.

In 2016, NATO continued to work with partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to address small arms and light weapons as well as mine action.

The EAPC Ad Hoc Working Group – in which implementing organisations like the UN, the EU, the OSCE, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency can share information – met six times in 2016 to coordinate projects and discuss common approaches.

Within NATO, there are a number of forums in which discussions on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation take place:

- the High-Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control sets arms control policy

- the Committee on Proliferation meets in political-military and defence formats to discuss WMD non-proliferation efforts and defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats

- the Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee is a forum for discussion of strategic stability and nuclear transparency

During 2016, NATO met in the High-Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control format four times, and 15 times in subordinate committees. These discussions were not always limited to NATO members: in 2016, NATO also consulted partners such as Finland, Georgia and Sweden on arms control matters.

In 2016, the NATO Committee on Proliferation met more than ten times in various formats to discuss WMD/CBRN risks and threats, the implementation of the 2009 NATO comprehensive strategic-level policy on WMD/CBRN and to develop policy guidance for NATO's responses to proliferation. The Committee also held partner meetings with Finland, Israel and Sweden on WMD proliferation issues and on recent developments in the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament field in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly framework.

NATO is increasingly contributing to international efforts in the area of small arms and light weapons and mine action. Information on all ongoing projects is publicly accessible on the NATO website, helping to improve coordination. This includes continued efforts to incorporate UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in small arms and light weapons/mine action and in arms control. To this end, NATO drafted guidelines in 2016 and convened

a major workshop of experts from Allied and partner countries and international organisations.

Although Allies have different approaches to the Arms Trade Treaty, the Ottawa Convention on antipersonnel mines and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, they all fully support strengthening global norms in these areas.

Part of NATO's contribution involves destruction of surplus or dangerous materiel. To date, NATO has helped to destroy 5.2 million anti-personnel landmines, 44,500 tonnes of various munitions, 2 million hand grenades, 15.9 million cluster sub-munitions, 1,540 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), 626,000 small arms and light weapons, 164 million rounds of ammunition, 642,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance, 94,500 surface-to-air missiles and rockets, 3,530 tonnes of chemicals, including rocket fuel oxidiser *("melange")*, and cleared more than 4,120 hectares of land.

Over the years, NATO has also trained thousands of explosive ordnance disposal experts. In 2016, NATO conducted nine training courses on small arms and light weapons, arms control and non-proliferation. NATO has also given assistance to more than 12,000 former military personnel through the defence reform trust fund project.

All these activities contribute to a more secure environment, enhance cooperation between NATO and partner countries, and integrate individual, national and regional security.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and CBRN

NATO is committed to working with Allies, partners, and other international organisations to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and defend against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. In May, NATO held its annual conference on these issues, gathering over 100 participants from 44 countries, as well as high-level representatives from the UN, the EU, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Organisation (CTBTO) in Ljubljana, Slovenia.

NATO has a Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force designed to perform a full range of CBRN defence missions. The task force is led by an individual Ally on a 12-month rotational basis. In 2016, Poland took over the lead-nation function and presented for the first time the new Multirole Exploitation Reconnaissance

Team, composed of Special Operations Forces and CBRN experts that provide CBRN reconnaissance as well as sensitive site exploitation.

In July, Allies agreed on a concept that helps to facilitate the provision and generation of specialised, sustainable CBRN defence forces for NATO operations and missions. The overall goal of this initiative is to create a platform to help maintain, consolidate and improve current capabilities of European Allies. NATO is also engaged in helping to build capacity for members and partners in the area of CBRN defence. In 2016, 11 different training courses on CBRN defence and WMD non-proliferation were held at the NATO School in Oberammergau. In addition, NATO's CBRN capability development community under the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and the Military Committee Joint Standardization Board continued to provide fundamental interoperability to the Alliance and adapt CBRN defence capabilities to the changed security environment.

Centres of Excellence

NATO Centres of Excellence are international military organisations that train and educate leaders and specialists from NATO member and partner countries. These Centres are nationally or multinationally funded. They are not NATO bodies and are not part of the NATO Command Structure. They assist in doctrine development, identify lessons learned, improve interoperability and capabilities, and test and validate concepts through experimentation. They offer recognised expertise and experience that is of benefit to the Alliance, and support the transformation of NATO, while avoiding the duplication of assets, resources and capabilities already present within the Alliance.

NATO's work in relation to arms control and non-proliferation is supported by a number of these NATO-accredited national entities. The Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in Vyskov in the Czech Republic has a new coordination element that ensures the availability of expert information and fused CBRN technical and scientific expertise to support NATO commanders and their staffs.

In 2016, the Centre organised nine residential courses for participants from NATO and partner countries, supported by speakers from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the World Health Organization (WHO), among others. A live-agent training funded by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme took place in October for first responders from Egypt, Jordan

and Tunisia. It was organised in cooperation with the Centre and reinforced by OPCW trainers.

The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre in Crete, Greece conducted three training courses in May, July and September related to illicit trafficking of CBRN material at sea and WMD in maritime interdiction operations.

In October, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence in Trenèin, Slovakia hosted the first staff officer training for CBRN explosive ordnance disposal incident management, as well as a course on the safe handling and elimination of explosives with a chemical payload, including staff procedures and safety considerations for the disposal of chemical weapons.

Cyber Defence

Cyber threats and attacks are becoming more common, sophisticated, and damaging. These attacks can shut down infrastructure, undermine democratic systems, and affect military operations. In light of this changing security environment, cyber defence has become a key priority. It has evolved from being seen as a technical enabler to an operational domain in which NATO has to be able to act as effectively as on land, in the air or at sea.

Like other organisations, NATO is facing a fast-changing cyber landscape where specific and targeted attacks are increasingly common. Detecting such attacks amid the enormous volume of conventional online activity requires sophisticated capabilities and expertise. In 2016, NATO dealt with an average of 500 incidents per month, a nearly 60% increase on 2015. Two hundred experts defend NATO's networks around the clock, and the Alliance has established rapid reaction teams to respond to attacks against NATO networks and to assist Allies, if necessary.

At the Warsaw Summit, Allies took two important decisions to respond to the changing cyber threat landscape. First, Allies recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea. This will enable NATO's military structures to devote specific attention to protecting missions and operations from cyber threats and increase their focus on cyber-related training and military planning for operations conducted in a contested and degraded cyber environment. It will also allow for the streamlining of cyber defence into operations across the other domains of air, land and sea and for achieving joint operational effects.

This does not change NATO's mission or mandate, which remains entirely defensive and is conducted in accordance with international law.

In Warsaw, Allies also pledged to strengthen and enhance their own cyber defences – including of national infrastructure and networks – as a matter of priority. Allies committed to seven key objectives as part of a Cyber Defence Pledge, including developing the fullest range of cyber defence capabilities and fostering better education, training and exercises. Allies' work to implement the Cyber Defence Pledge will be reviewed on an annual basis.

Important achievements in 2016 include:

- Nineteen Allies have updated their Memoranda of Understanding with NATO on cyber defence cooperation and information-sharing to support the rapid and effective exchange of relevant information to strengthen Allied cyber defences.

- The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) ensured coverage for six of NATO's Force Integration Units.

- In February, an agreement for exchanging information and sharing best practice was signed between NATO's incident response team and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the European Union. Further cooperation with the EU on cyber defence is among the areas in the Joint Declaration signed at the Warsaw Summit by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, President Donald Tusk and President Jean-Claude Juncker.

- NATO continued to strengthen its cooperation with partner countries in relation to cyber defence including through exercises and a dedicated trust fund for Ukraine.

- In November, Cyber Coalition 2016 took place in Estonia involving numerous NATO Allies and partners, in addition to cyber defence staff elements of the EU and industry representatives.

-- After a successful pilot, the industry Malware Information Sharing Portal was inaugurated. It facilitates the sharing of unclassified technical cyber information between NATO and industry representatives.

NATO is committed to defending its nearly one billion citizens in Europe and North America. Fulfilling this commitment requires that Allies understand the changing security environment, agree on policies for how to address the challenges and threats, develop and invest in the capabilities required to implement those policies, and resolve to use their capabilities when required. Each of these elements is essential for NATO to fulfil its purpose of safeguarding the freedom and security of all its members.

In 2016, the United States accounted for 46% of the Allies' combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 68% of combined defence expenditure. While recognising that the US' status as a global power means its defence spending is not directly comparable to that of other NATO members, Allies accept the need for a better balance[1].

To ensure that the Alliance has the resources it requires, NATO Heads of State and Government made a Defence Investment Pledge at the 2014 Summit in Wales.

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[1] For all the graphs in this chapter of the report, it should be noted that Iceland has no armed forces.
Note: The figures presented at aggregate level may differ from the sum of their components due to rounding.

Share of Alliance GDP 2016 / Share of Alliance defence expenditure 2016

The pledge calls for all Allies that do not already meet the NATO-agreed guideline of spending 2% of GDP on defence to stop the cuts, gradually increase spending as GDP grows, and aim to move towards spending 2% of GDP on defence within a decade. They also agreed that those not meeting the NATO-agreed guideline of spending at least 20% of annual defence expenditure on major new equipment, including related research and development, would aim to do so within a decade. The overall goal is to meet NATO's capability priorities, including the NATO-agreed guidelines for deployability and sustainability. This will ensure that Allies' forces can operate together effectively, including through the implementation of NATO standards and doctrines.

NATO Europe and Canada – defence expenditure (annual real change)

Based on constant 2010 prices and exchange rates. Figures for 2016 are estimates.

In 2015, the first year after Allies made the Defence Investment Pledge, defence cuts stopped in NATO Europe as a whole. Updated 2015 figures show that while some Allies continued to decrease defence spending, 15 Allies not only stopped the cuts but increased their defence spending in real terms. In 2016, progress continued, with 23 Allies increasing their national expenditure on defence in real terms. When measured as a share of GDP, 16 Allies raised defence expenditure in 2016.

Defence expenditure as share of GDP (%)
2009 and 2016

Equipment expenditure as share of defence expenditure (%)
2009 and 2016

Based on 2010 prices. Figures for 2016 are estimates.
* Defence expenditure does not include pensions.

In 2016, five Allies met the goal of spending 2% or more of GDP on defence. Many others have put in place national plans to reach 2% by 2024. This is important progress. Compared to 2015, defence spending among European Allies and Canada increased by 3.8% in real terms – roughly USD 10 billion.

When it comes to the commitment to invest at least 20% of defence expenditure in major new equipment, there was also progress in 2016. Eighteen NATO countries spent more in real terms on major equipment than they did in 2015. Ten Allies met the NATO-agreed guideline of spending 20% or more of their defence expenditure on major equipment, up from eight in 2015.

The gains achieved in 2016 are a clear demonstration of Allies' commitment to sharing the costs of Euro-Atlantic security. However, in 2016 only three NATO countries met both the 2% and 20% guidelines to which all NATO members have agreed. All Allies reconfirmed their commitment to the pledge at the NATO Summit in Warsaw and will review progress annually. The challenges faced by the Alliance are many, and continued investment in defence will be required to address them.

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In the third part of the article, the Secretary General writes about the need for projecting stability, cultivating partnerships, fighting terrorism and managing security challenges through science.

AUTONOMOUS MILITARY DRONES
– No Longer Science Fiction –

Colonel Dr Gjert Lage DYNDAL
Lieutenant Colonel Dr Tor Arne BERNTSEN
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The article addresses the increasing degree of autonomy of machines not under the direct control of humans and the opportunities and potential benefits, as well as the inherently immoral aspect of using such technology.

First, the authors write about the concept of autonomous drones and the benefits autonomous technology can bring to military forces.

Then, the legal and ethical perspectives are presented, stressing that the (potential) absence of human interference with the weapon or weapon system, during attacks, raises the question of when and where the law requires human presence in the decision cycle and that limiting the risk to soldiers by removing them from the battlefield altogether could make war too "easy", reducing it to a low-cost technological enterprise that no longer requires any public or moral commitment.

Keywords: autonomous military drones; artificial intelligence; Law of Armed Conflict

The possibility of life-or-death decisions someday being taken by machines not under the direct control of humans needs to be taken seriously. Over the last few years we have seen a rapid development in the field of drone technology, with an ever-increasing degree of autonomy. While no approved autonomous drone systems are operational, as far as we know, the technology is being tested and developed. Some see the new opportunities and potential benefits of using autonomous drones, others consider the development and use of such technology as inherently immoral.

Influential people like Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and Steve Wozniak have already urged a ban on warfare using autonomous weapons or artificial intelligence. So, where do we stand, and what are the main legal and ethical issues?

Towards autonomous drones

As yet, there is no agreed or legal definition of the term *"autonomous drones"*. Industry uses the *"autonomy"* label extensively, as it gives an impression of very modern and advanced technology. However, several nations have a more stringent definition of what should be called autonomous drones, for example, the United Kingdom describes them as *"...capable of understanding higher level intent and direction"* (UK MoD, *The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems*, 2011). Generally, most military and aviation authorities call unmanned aerial vehicles *"Remotely Piloted Aircraft"* (RPAs) to stress that they fly under the direct control of human operators.

The "BAT" by Northrop Grumman (formerly "KillerBee" by Raytheon) is a medium-altitude drone able to operate at extended ranges with a variety of sensors and payloads, and probably at least electronic warfare capabilities. (Courtesy of Northrop Grumman)

Most people would probably understand the concept of *"autonomous drones"* as something sophisticated, for instance, drones that can act based on their own choice of options (what is commonly defined as *"system initiative"* and *"full autonomy"* in military terminology). Such drones are programmed with a large number of alternative responses to the different challenges they may meet in performing their mission. This is not science fiction – the technology is largely developed though, to our knowledge, no approved autonomous drone systems are yet operational.

The limiting factor is not the technology but rather the *political will* to develop or admit to having such politically sensitive technology, which would allow lethal machines to operate without being under the direct control of humans.

One of the greatest challenges for the development and approval of aircraft with such technology is that it is extremely difficult to develop satisfactory validation systems, which would ensure that the technology is safe and acts like humans would. In practice, such sophisticated drones would involve programming for an incredible number of combinations of alternative courses of action, making it impossible to verify and test them to the level we are used to for manned aircraft. There are also those who think of autonomy meaning *"artificial intelligence"* – systems that learn and even self-develop possible courses of action to new challenges. We have no knowledge that we are close to a breakthrough on such technology, but many fear that we actually might be.

Autonomous drones – meaning advanced drones programmed with algorithms for countless human-defined courses of action to meet emerging challenges – are already being tested by a number of civilian universities and military research institutions. We see testing of *"swarms of drones"* (drones which follow and take tasks from other drones) that, of course, are entirely dependent on autonomous processing. We also see testing of autonomous drones that operate with manned aircraft, all from what the US Air Force calls (unmanned) *"Loyal Wingman"* aircraft, to the already well tested Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) system of Poseidon P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and unmanned TRITON aircraft. We also see the further development of unmanned systems to be dispatched from manned aircraft, to work independently or in extension of the *"mother aircraft"*, for instance, the recently tested PERDIX nano drones[1], of which 100 drones were dropped from an F-18 *"mother aircraft"*. Such drones would necessarily operate with a high degree of autonomy. These many developments and aspirations are well described in, for example, the US planning document *USAF RPA Vector – Vision and Enabling Concepts 2013-2038*[2] published in 2014, and other documentation and even videos of such research are widely available. The prospects of autonomous technology, be it flying drones, underwater vehicles or other lethal weapon systems, clearly bring new opportunities for military forces.

In the case of flying aircraft, we have learned that there are long lead times in educating pilots and operators. One of the greatest changes that will come from the development of autonomous drones is that military forces in the (near)

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[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ndFKUKHfuM0

[2] http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPAVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts 2013-2038.pdf

The "PERDIX" is a micro-drone swarm system developed for the US DoD/Naval Air Systems Command together with MIT Lincoln Laboratory. (WarLeaks) Check out this video[3] of a test launch of a 100-drone swarm from a US F-18 "mother aircraft".

future could develop great fighting power in much shorter timeframes than previously. It is important to note – and many have – that creating the infrastructure and educating ground crew for operating drones is no cheaper or easier than it is to educate aircrew. However, once in place, the drone crew and operation centres would be able to operate large numbers of drones. Similarly, legacy manned aircraft would be at the centre of a local combat or intelligence system extended with drones serving, for example, in supportive roles for jamming, as weapons-delivery platforms or as a system of multi-sensor platforms. Moving beyond the past limitations of one pilot flying one aircraft or one crew flying one drone to a situation where one crew could control large amounts of drones would quite simply be groundbreaking.

These perspectives for new types of high-tech weapon systems – and the fears they raise – are the background for the research we conducted on autonomous drones and weapon systems. It is almost impossible to assess when these technologies will become widespread – this will depend on the situation and the need of states. However, the technologies are becoming available and are maturing and we would argue that the difficult discussions on legal and ethical challenges should be dealt with sooner, rather than later.

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[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ndFKUKHfuM0

The legal perspectives

• *General rules apply but it is not that simple*

Autonomous drones, if and when they are used during armed conflict, would be subject to the general principles and rules of the Law of Armed Conflict. In this respect autonomous drones are not to be distinguished from any other weapons, weapon systems or weapon platforms. As with any *"means of warfare"*, autonomous drones must only be directed at lawful targets (military objectives and combatants) and attacks must not be expected to cause excessive collateral damage.

The X-47B Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAS),
developed by Northrop Grumman in cooperation with DARPA,
is popularly referred to as "semiautonomous". (Courtesy of Northrop Grumman)

Some particular features of autonomous drones may, however, challenge the application of the Law of Armed Conflict. Autonomous drones, regardless of how one ultimately chooses to define them, would be able to operate on their own to a certain degree in time and space. This (potential) absence of human interference with the weapon or weapon system, during attacks, raises the question of when and where the law requires human presence in the decision cycle. Before providing some tentative answers to this question, we need to highlight some aspects of the legal requirements incumbent upon commanders during attack decisions.

• *The law requires a reasonable commander acting in good faith*

Several of the legal obligations applicable during armed conflict are made to fit the *"fog of war"*. Some of these legal rules contain flexible expressions leaving military commanders with some leeway for discretion when interpreting and deciding upon, for example, what amounts to a *"military advantage"* and how important this advantage is for the attack as a whole. Furthermore, they have to weigh up the relative importance of this advantage compared to the collateral damage anticipated (the principle of proportionality).

This leeway for discretion is matched with an expectation that the military commander is acting in good faith and assessing the military advantage (as well as the collateral damage) based on the information reasonably available to him or her at the time. During attack decisions, military commanders engaged in the planning or execution of the attack must take all *"feasible precautions"* to *"verify"* that the attack is not directed at a protected person or protected object and that the attack is not expected to violate the principle of proportionality. How do these discretionary notions apply to the use of autonomous drones?

This article is based on research which resulted in a book published in Norwegian in 2016: "Nå r dronene vå kner: Autonome vå pensystemer og robotisering av krig" (Oslo; CappelenDamm, 2016)

• *How much human touch is required?*

Autonomous drones are not capable of reasoning in the human sense. They do not possess human consciousness. So far, autonomous drones (or any autonomous system) cannot replace the human being within the law. The requirements set out above appear to presume a *"human in the loop"* of the decision cycle. At some point during attack decisions, a human being must decide upon what to attack and how important the target is. The key question revolves around how wide a decision cycle is.

Obviously, human operators can be assisted by autonomous machines (as well as *"autonomous"* animals) limited in time and space – but where are limitations required? As with any legal question concerning warfare, the answer is bound to be circumstantial. If the environment is densely populated (such as urban areas) the limitations must necessarily be tighter than in less populated areas (such as on the high seas or under water). Here, as elsewhere, the devil is buried in the details: in some circumstances an autonomous weapons system may (lawfully) be *"left alone"* to operate for hours or days, while in other circumstances all autonomy ought to be shut off to rely on human judgment – or error.

From law to ethics

We must also recognise the relevance of ethics in debates on autonomous drones. Compliance with the law is central to any military and political policymaking, including the development and use of autonomous drones. Although law and ethics often overlap, there may be important ethical issues at stake, particularly in the case of emerging military technologies, not properly addressed by current law. Ethical reflection may, in other words, complement the law by providing normative guidance in these *"grey areas"*. It may also be important in emphasising when ethical obligations should exceed legal duties in the interest of good political governance.

• *Ethical perspectives on autonomous drones*

The delegation of life-and-death decisions to nonhuman agents is a recurring concern of those who oppose autonomous weapons systems. A primary concern is that allowing a machine to *"decide"* to kill a human being undermines the value of human life. From this perspective, human life is of such significant value that it is inappropriate for a machine ever to decide to end a life – in other words, there is something inherently immoral about developing and using autonomous drones.

It may be difficult to argue that autonomous drones can possibly satisfy the *jus in bello* criterion of discrimination in the *"just war tradition"*. To make moral judgments about who may legitimately be targeted in the *"fog of war"* is difficult even for human soldiers. The fear is that allowing autonomous drones to make such distinctions would most likely result in civilian casualties and unacceptable collateral damage. Even if such weapon systems would be able to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, it is still a question whether an autonomous drone would be able to assess whether an attack is proportionate or not – that is, whether the attack would cause unnecessary suffering. However, beyond the uncertainty

of what technological capabilities autonomous drones will possess in the future to make such distinctions, one can also argue that if these weapon systems are unable to operate within the requirements of *jus in bello* it is unlikely that they will be deployed, at least in operational environments where the risk of causing excessive harm on civilians is high.

On the other hand, it could also be argued that using autonomous drones is not just acceptable from a moral perspective but even morally preferable to human soldiers. Autonomous drones would be able to process more incoming sensory information than human soldiers and could therefore make more well-informed decisions. And since the judgments of machines would not be clouded by emotions such as fear and rage, it could possibly reduce the risk of war crimes that may otherwise have been committed by human soldiers.

Using autonomous drones may also improve certain aspects of humanitarian missions, benefiting the civilians who are being assisted and reducing risks to soldiers. Using autonomous systems to search dangerous areas or perform high-risk tasks, such as bomb disposal or clearing a house, would eliminate the risk of human soldiers being injured or killed.

The "TRITON" – under development by Northrop Grumman for the US Navy to be part of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) programme – is an advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions system, which may operate under control or autonomously.
(Courtesy of Northrop Grumman)

Then again, such developments may have implications for the *jus ad bellum* criteria of the *"just war tradition"*. Limiting the risk to soldiers by removing them from the battlefield altogether could make war too *"easy"*, reducing it to a low-cost technological enterprise that no longer requires any public or moral commitment.

Where do we stand – and where should we go?

It is difficult to predict the future but the technological potential of autonomous drones is already being tested and developed. To what extent they will become important military technologies will depend on what the needs of nations will be, which in turn will be determined by the future security situation. It would be better to develop a legal and ethical framework before we come to such a situation.

Clearly, autonomous drones raise important judicial and ethical issues about responsibility for unintentional harm. The technologies create some moral accountability gaps. When autonomous military systems are deployed, it becomes less clear how to apportion responsibility. And such potential responsibility gaps must be addressed properly through technical solutions and legal regulations. NATO and allies should therefore engage in international discussions on these topics. At the same time, technological evolution will continue and an autonomous drone – no matter how technologically sophisticated it is designed – remains a product, a tool in the hands of humans. Our fundamental responsibility for war and how wars are fought can never be morally *"outsourced"*, least of all to machines.

NATO-UKRAINE DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIP TURNS TWENTY – Lessons to Take Forward –

James GREENE

The author addresses the NATO-Ukraine Partnership on its 20th anniversary.

First, he writes about Ukraine's contribution to Euro-Atlantic security. By late 2004, over 20,000 servicemen had participated in NATO-led or UN peacekeeping operations, had worked side-by-side with NATO counterparts, and felt themselves a part of a professional community in which attacking one's own citizens was anathema. The figure today is nearly double that.

Then, he mentions four major lessons that stand out as being particularly relevant for building the relationship today.

To conclude, he mentions that this time of renewal the Partnership is going through currently represents an opportunity to build a more satisfying relationship: one that builds on strengths, avoids dissatisfactions and provides real results for Ukraine's two most pressing needs – preserving its independence and modernising its state institutions.

Keywords: *NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership; Revolution of Dignity; Partnership for Peace; Orange Revolution*

Anniversaries invite retrospection of the rosy-hued variety. As the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership marks its 20th anniversary on 9 July, there are certainly successes to highlight. Ukraine's contributions to Euro-Atlantic security – including substantial participation in NATO-led operations in the Western Balkans – have made a major difference in a difficult region. And NATO and Ukraine have built an impressive toolbox capable of supporting a broad set of reforms.

In several important areas, however, the Distinctive Partnership has fallen short of expectations. Prior to the 2014 Russian invasion, whenever Ukraine sought NATO support

in addressing its biggest existential threat – increasing pressure from Putin's Russia – it frequently found the Alliance reluctant to even discuss the issue.

Ukraine's reaction, a hyper-focus on joining NATO's Membership Action Plan, has been counterproductive, wasting precious political capital and distracting attention from implementing important reforms for nearly a decade. This prioritisation of symbolic steps over substantive reform by Ukraine, along with a corresponding resilience of that country's legacy institutions and practices, has been frustrating for allies.

As the Distinctive Partnership turns twenty, it is in the midst of reinvigoration and renewal. The 2014 *Revolution of Dignity* ended the period of neglect that characterised the ill-fated presidency of Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014). The Alliance has mobilised substantial resources to support Ukraine in its defence against Russian aggression – and to rebuild defence institutions that were badly eroded during the Yanukovych years.

This renewal represents an opportunity to build a more satisfying relationship: one that builds on strengths, avoids dissatisfactions and provides real results for Ukraine's two most pressing needs – preserving its independence and modernising its state institutions.

Four lessons

Looking back across two decades of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership, and considering my own official role for ten years of that, four major lessons stand out as being particularly relevant for building the relationship today.

First: Give Ukraine – and the Distinctive Partnership – credit where it is due.

At the time the Charter was signed in 1997, NATO's *Partnership for Peace (PfP)* had successfully engaged former Warsaw Pact, newly independent states and non-aligned Western European countries in a common framework of dialogue and cooperation.

Yet PfP was far from a stable end state. Central European and Baltic countries were clamouring for membership in the Alliance. Three – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – had been invited to start accession talks. Russia, by contrast, looked to develop a privileged *"Special Relationship"* with NATO as a tool to help preserve its *"historical"* sphere of influence and keep NATO's policies in check. For NATO members, the burden of Europe's history still loomed large – the fear that without active efforts to *"win the peace"*, horrors like the breakup of Yugoslavia or the instability of Eastern Europe's Interwar Period could easily return.

***On 9 July 1997 NATO and Ukraine signed a Charter
on a Distinctive Partnership[1] at the NATO Summit in Madrid. © NATO***

Ukraine deserves substantial credit for its consistently constructive role in this complex region. Ukraine's commitment to the principles for inter-state relations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has been an important factor in ensuring stability on NATO's borders and in the Black Sea region. Its full participation in PfP, and consistent, substantial contributions to NATO operations have set a high standard for partnership and provided a welcome contrast to Russian behaviour. And Ukraine – faced in 1997 with an economy in a seven-year contraction, a declining population and unpredictable politics – has made incremental progress (albeit often haltingly) on the economic, political, and national security reforms needed to avoid disaster.

The Distinctive Partnership's regular dialogue has encouraged and facilitated Ukraine's constructive regional contribution. Where there have been strains, joint consultations have worked as an important stabiliser: in one notable example, during the 2001 dispute over Ukraine's arms sales to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[2], information on operational realities in that country, shared at a joint expert meeting, helped Ukrainian officials to better understand the context of allied concerns and modify their policy.

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[1] http://www.nato.int/cps/in/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm
[2] Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Second: Make best use of current mechanisms and initiatives.

NATO and Ukraine have developed a tremendous toolkit, mostly during the Distinctive Partnership's first five years. These range from tools providing strategic planning and advice across a broad agenda of reforms and institution building with targets set and reviewed annually, through joint working groups in specific areas such as defence reform, economic security and technical cooperation, down to practical programmes and projects focused on issues such as professional development or the destruction of small arms and light weapons.

NATO's in-country offices – the NATO Liaison Office, which facilitates Ukraine's participation in the PfP programme and supports its defence and security sector reform efforts, and the NATO Information and Documentation Centre – have boosted NATO-Ukraine work significantly by building direct relationships with the myriad of stakeholders involved in a given issue and helping to harmonise their combined efforts. The recent amalgamation of the two offices into a common NATO Representation was a positive step to reduce organisational friction; further re-configuration, however, should carefully consider the functional impact on these essential stakeholder relationships.

To those considering new initiatives, the saga of Ukraine's efforts to enter the *Membership Action Plan (MAP)* – and the Alliance's struggles in responding – should serve as a cautionary tale. In December 2001, Ukraine suggested a choreographed move to MAP, to counterbalance increased Russian pressure. Allies, sceptical of Ukrainian President Kuchma's sincerity, crafted a compromise: an *"Action Plan"* adopted at the Prague summit in November 2002 that would allow for intensive consultation, cooperation, and assessment across the political, economic, and national security areas necessary to meet NATO membership standards – in essence, MAP without the *"M"*.

Lacking the magic letter, however, this powerful new tool was grossly underused. And *"joining MAP"* became the holy grail of Ukrainian diplomacy. The result was an Alliance divided, perceptions of failure from major NATO-Ukraine meetings and serious opportunity costs. On at least two occasions, in 2005 and again in 2007-2008, the quest for MAP crowded out practical initiatives designed to focus political attention and resources on Ukraine's real-world vulnerabilities. Those were missed opportunities of historical proportions.

Third: Institutions are the glue that makes reform stick.

Ukraine's formal institutions have frequently proven a weak vessel for carrying forward the knowledge and know-how gained from work with the Alliance. Ukrainian units would train to PfP standards, but their core manuals would remain unchanged. A unit would be put together for deployment to an operation,

only to have its members sent back to home units on their return. Officers would go for training abroad, only to find their new-found experience was valued more by civilian think tanks than the Armed Forces.

In response, on the fifth anniversary of the Distinctive Partnership in 2002, the frank assessment of those of us managing NATO-Ukraine military cooperation was along the lines of *"substantial success in specific activities, but with limited systemic impact"*. That Ukraine's Military Representative in Brussels agreed with this assessment, against political pressure, was a testament to the openness of the military relationship. It was also his chance to criticise the Ukrainian Armed Forces' tendency to treat experience gained through NATO events as something alien to core doctrine and procedures.

The weakness of formal institutions within the Ukrainian context is an unfortunate reality, though, and projects and programmes that fail to understand and mitigate that reality will naturally produce disappointing results. Conversely, those projects that have been most successful and enduring have developed their own institutional basis. The *Professional Development Programme (PDP)*, for example, included a project-specific joint committee. And to coordinate the plethora of defence advisory efforts underway in 2007-2009, a joint coordinating committee was created within the Ministry of Defence, chaired by the MOD policy director, with the NATO Liaison Office supporting.

The principles for success in these joint management efforts were straightforward: transparency of information, adherence to standards and procedures, and joint responsibility to higher authorities. Working-level projects like the PDP would report to the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform and, through that, to the NATO-Ukraine Commission, which directs cooperative activities and provides a forum for consultation between the allies and Ukraine. There is little that better serves to focus the mind of one's counterpart than the prospect of a joint presentation in Brussels – with the results included in a report to defence ministers.

In contrast to the weakness of Ukraine's formal institutions, that country's informal institutions and personal connections are strong. These are the mechanisms that Ukrainians have relied on for centuries to get things done – often in spite of the formal institutions. In recent years, these informal institutions have been a driving force for social change, most recently in the remarkable volunteer efforts that successfully filled in major gaps in the defence system – logistics, training, medical support, maintenance, procurement, and others – to mobilise and deploy Ukrainian combat units to Ukraine's east in 2014. Where NATO-Ukraine cooperation can harness the energy and persistence of these informal institutions, they will be a powerful force for lasting change.

Fourth: Remember Values.

While the *"frank"* assessment mentioned above was accurate, it was also woefully incomplete – a fact I discovered in the spring of 2004, as the recently-arrived head of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine. On the occasion of a visit to a unit recently assigned to work in PfP, the commander took the opportunity publicly to introduce me to a number of former unit commanders who were also visiting – Soviet colonels and generals – and openly told them: *"We work with NATO now; it's our future"*.

The importance of that simple act of courage was driven home a few months later, on the 22 November 2004, when that unit – with thousands of men and hundreds of armoured vehicles – received orders to take up blocking positions around the capital, Kyiv, in preparation for crushing protests against election fraud that had broken out in the centre. The commander, at considerable personal and professional risk, refused.

That principled stand, echoed multiple times by his fellow commanders, had a profound impact on Ukraine's history, directly contributing to the success of the Orange Revolution, which peacefully overturned a falsified election. It also put the armed forces squarely on the side of democracy in the longer term – a fact that again played an important role in the 2014 Revolution of Dignity.

In the wake of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity (known as Euromaidan) and the fall of President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia deliberately destabilised eastern Ukraine and illegally annexed Crimea. In response, the Alliance has mobilised substantial resources to enhance Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security.

In the face of the 2002 *"limited systemic impact"* assessment, this was a humbling lesson: the dynamics at play in the NATO-Ukraine relationship go far deeper than the metrics of project assessment. Ukraine's military professionals see their service to their country and its people, not a political regime. By late 2004, over 20,000 servicemen had participated in NATO-led or UN peacekeeping operations, had worked side-by-side with NATO counterparts, and felt themselves a part of a professional community in which attacking one's own citizens was anathema. The figure today is nearly double that.

Ukrainians have served in NATO-led peace-support operations, working side-by-side with NATO counterparts, first deploying to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, to Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2007.

This sense of affinity is widespread in the armed forces: as one Ukrainian Chief of Defence shared: *"My Russian counterpart and I have a common language, so it is easy for me to talk with him. But I have far more to talk about with my Spanish colleague"*. This affinity is also shared by the overwhelming majority of Ukraine's strategic thinkers, both in and out of government, who have strong relationships with Western colleagues, openly seek their advice in drafting policy proposals, and – frankly – see no other viable options for their country.

Looking forward from twenty

After years of relative quiet, the combination of Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity and Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas has impelled the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership into another period of intense activity. In responding to this aggression, NATO has played an important role in strategic communications in both the public and inter-governmental contexts, clarifying the facts of Russian aggression and debunking disinformation. The Alliance – NATO and individual allies – has also mobilised substantial resources to support Ukrainian operations and build badly needed capabilities.

The challenge looking forward will be using those resources effectively to achieve lasting results. The tools of the Distinctive Partnership have proven themselves capable of doing this in the post-Orange Revolution period. The NATO-Ukraine Commission and the network of committees and programmatic tools under it can ensure clear information flow, provide joint management, and keep political dialogue and practical work linked. NATO's in-country representation has a natural role in harmonising the activity of the various actors – NATO programmes, allies, and Ukrainian institutions – a process essential for success. The Trust Fund mechanism can ensure that practical projects are sustainably supported – if allies allocate sufficient support from national budgets.

In the press of practical projects, it will be important to not ignore the policy and political levels – and their link with discussion in wider society. Strategic communications have an important role to play, as do efforts to strengthen links between strategic thinkers in the Alliance and Ukraine, and empower their voice in policy and reform dialogue.

Finally, and most importantly, the Alliance should remember that one of the greatest successes of the Distinctive Partnership has been to build affinity at the human level – affinity built on common work in support of common values. For the armed forces, much of the day-to-day, shoulder-to-shoulder work has been in the context of PfP and NATO operations. With the centre of gravity for Ukrainian operations now in the East, where there are restrictions on the activity of NATO and allied personnel, there is a risk that this regular contact will be diminished.

There is another risk to this affinity: lingering resentment caused by what is seen in Ukraine – with some substantial justification – as an inadequate initial Western response to Ukraine's requests for defence assistance following Russia's invasion in early 2014. This resentment damages the Alliance's moral authority and political capital with Ukrainian counterparts, hampering efforts to address problem areas.

This damage is serious; if left unaddressed, it could lead to a cycle of frustration, disillusionment, and disengagement. But it is not irreparable – if the Alliance

collectively (or sufficient allies individually) acknowledges the shortfall and takes stronger action to live up to its commitments to support Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as set out in Article 14 of the NATO-Ukraine Charter[3].

To be even minimally credible, I believe this must include the long-overdue provision of defensive weapons to Ukraine (together with the associated training, support, and introduction of new operational methods). By focusing on countering advantages that Russia would rely on in a wider war – in areas like armour, air power, electronic warfare, and strategic intelligence – such assistance would support deterrence and increase strategic stability. More regular presence of allied personnel in and around Ukraine (outside the combat zone) and increased operational cooperation in areas like airspace control, air defence, and host nation support would also substantially increase deterrence – and give allies more political capital in encouraging Ukrainian reforms.

(Left to Right) President Petro Poroshenko, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Petr Pavel greet each other at the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Warsaw, where allied leaders pledged further support to Ukraine – 9 July 2016. © NATO

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[3] http://www.nato.int/cps/in/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm

Ukraine, too, has a responsibility to acknowledge the Alliance's lingering frustrations, and act to address them. At a minimum, Ukraine should ensure that NATO and allies see results from the resources they commit, by fully incorporating cooperation and reform programmes into national plans and more transparently managing and assessing them. Ukraine's military leadership could also provide an example of patriotic moral courage by proactively planning a generational transition, identifying personnel with experience both in combat and in cooperation with the Alliance as the next generation of leaders, grooming them with relevant experience, including leadership in the field and education abroad, and moving them into senior leadership positions.

Three toasts

As officials and well-wishers gather in Kyiv and Brussels on 9 July to mark the 20th anniversary the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership, they will have every right to raise their glass to success – but with caveats.

Ukraine is more firmly within the Euro-Atlantic security space than it has ever been before – but short of where it could be. The breath and depth of cooperation programmes and advisory missions is the greatest that Kyiv has ever seen, although the assessment of *"limited systemic impact"* all too often still applies. Tens of thousands of soldiers, officials, experts, journalists, parliamentarians and regular citizens share an affinity through the Partnership, and we will have every right to join in raising a glass to our small share in that success.

We will also have a solemn responsibility to remember the souls of the thousands of Ukrainians who have lost their lives from Russian aggression in the past three years, the struggles of millions who have been forced from their homes, and the daily sacrifice of the hundreds of thousands of professionals – military and civilian – who stand guard to deter a wider war, protect against a growing wave of cyber attacks, and counter disinformation targeted at our core democratic institutions. It is into this more dangerous world that the Distinctive Partnership is travelling – a world where the stakes are higher then they have ever been.

We should save a third toast for those entrusted to lead the Distinctive Partnership today: that they have the wisdom to carry forward the lessons of the past, the courage to put to rest lingering disappointments and resentments, and the energy and imagination to successfully carry the NATO-Ukraine relationship forward into this dangerous new world.

"Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest

"Strategies XXI"
International Scientific Conference

Technologies – Military Applications, Simulation and Resources

The Command and Staff Faculty and the Doctoral School within *"Carol I"* National Defence University organised, between 27 and 29 April 2017, the 13th edition of **"Strategies XXI" International Scientific Conference**, called **Technologies – Military Applications, Simulation and Resources**.

At the opening session of the Conference, the following personalities were invited to speak:

- Brigadier General Dr Dorin Blaiu, Chief of Training and Doctrine Directorate in the General Staff;

- Colonel (AF) Dr Gabriel Răducanu, Director of the Air Force Staff;

- Major General (r.) Dr Victor Strîmbeanu, MSc, key-note speaker;

- Colonel Professor Dr Gheorghe Calopăreanu, Commandant (Rector) of *"Carol I"* National Defence University;

- Colonel Senior Lecturer Dr Ioana Enache, Dean of the Command and Staff Faculty (*"Carol I"* National Defence University);
- Colonel Professor Dr Sorin Pînzariu, Director of the Doctoral School (*"Carol I"* National Defence University);
- Adrian Pandea, Director of Military Publishing House;
- Grigore Arsene, Director of Curtea Veche Publishing House;
- BEng Alexandru Bartoc, President of Bartoc Cultural Foundation.

The conference was attended by didactical staff, master and doctoral students from the Command and Staff Faculty, Doctoral School, *"Alexandru cel Bun"* Armed Forces Military Academy in Chişinău, the Republic of Moldova, *"Mihai Viteazul"* National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, *"Alexandru Ioan Cuza"* Police Academy, Bucharest, Economic Science Academy, Bucharest, *"Spiru Haret"* University, Bucharest, *"Titu Maiorescu"* University, Bucharest, *"Dimitrie Cantemir"* Christian University, Bucharest, as well as by experts within the Ministry of National Defence, the General Staff, and the Romanian Armed Forces Services.

Major General (r.) Dr Victor Strîmbeanu, the conference key-note speaker, delivered a very interesting speech, called NATO Air Power – *Challenges and Perspectives. The Place and Role of the Romanian Armed Forces.*

In addition, several books were released:

– *"Strategie pentru viitorul României"*/*"Strategy for the Future of Romania"*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2015, and *"Un război ciudat – Afganistan"*/*"A Strange War – Afghanistan"*, Editura Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, 2014, author Major General (r.) Dr Victor Strîmbeanu;

– *"Avionul IAR-93. Oameni şi fapte"*/*"IAR-93 Aircraft. Men and Deeds"*, author Major (AF) (r.) Gheorghe Ion Vaida;

– *"Steaua destinului"*/*"The Star of Destiny"*, author Cecilia Crăciun-Bendea.

In what follows the speech delivered by **Brigadier General Dr Dorin Blaiu**, Chief of Training and Doctrine Directorate, is presented:

Secretary of State,
Commandant/Rector of "Carol I" National Defence University,
Ladies and Gentlemen, didactical staff and military trainers,
Dear guests,
Distinguished attendees,

I am here today as a representative of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff.
It is a privilege and a great honour for me to participate in the opening session of the **"Strategies XXI" International Scientific Conference – Technologies – Military Applications, Simulation and Resources**, *organised by the Command and Staff Faculty within "Carol I" National Defence University, the representative institution of higher military education.*

The theme of the scientific conference challenges us to comprehensively analyse the situation and denotes the major involvement of the faculty in the cutting edge domains in which the military science and art, and implicitly the military body get manifest.

Key representatives of the military higher education as well as of the scientific research, able to provide the educational products with both value and added value, thus benefiting not only the General Staff but also all central structures, commands, and subordinate forces, as well as the other institutions having responsibilities in the field within the national system of defence, public order and national security are present.

During the past years, the General Staff has provided a series of topics, themes for scientific research, according to responsibility domains, which have become challenges for the didactical staff and the scientific research structures in the institution, in order to achieve some sustainable scientific products that have significantly contributed to the enhancement of the operations planning and conduct, as well as of the resource management and the armed forces modernisation.

Starting in the academic year 2017-2018, we intend to bring to your attention a series of scientific challenges to be assumed and transformed into the foundations of the new operational-strategic approaches to military capabilities relating to the armed forces configuration. In this regard, we consider that, through a pragmatic and high-performance education system, a vector of the transformation process, through applied scientific research, we can meet the future security challenges and thus, in a joint effort, we can achieve the objectives at all levels.

The new way to address conflicts has moved the centre of gravity from exclusively military planning to extensive, flexible, inter-institutional and inter-agency planning, able to generate the capabilities that are necessary to accomplish the missions that are specific to each stage of the conflict.

*The new **Military Strategy of Romania** expresses the fundamental guidelines and options regarding the armed forces planning, building and employment to meet the defence planning objectives of the Romanian state, in national and allied context.*

*The **Programme of the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation, Development and Procurement up to 2016 and beyond** is in full progress, its update depending on the evolution of the security situation in Europe and especially in Romania's area of strategic interest as well as on the real situation of the Romanian Armed Forces combat capacity.*

The development of the **Romanian Armed Forces Procurement Plan for the period 2017-2026**, *correlated and supported by the allocation of 2% of the GDP for defence, creates the premises for the Romanian Armed Forces modernisation to meet the standards imposed by the Allies in 10 years.*

The completion of the **Concept for the Transformation of the Special Operations Forces in the Romanian Armed Forces** *and of the* **General Plan to Implement and Develop ISR Capabilities in the Romanian Armed Forces** *are major challenges in the following period.*

As elements of novelty, I reiterate the development of the new **Cyber Defence Concept** *against the background of the reorientation of the missions and responsibilities of the designated structures in peacetime and in crisis situations or in the event of an armed conflict, as well as the initiation of a new procurement programme for the development of cyber defence capabilities.*

The ongoing major procurement programmes urge us to doctrinally review the employment of command and control, manoeuvre, combat support and logistic support in combat.

As for bilateral training, Exercise **NOBLE JUMP 17**, *organised by JFC Naples, is intended to test the operational capacity of the elements of NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and of the implementation of the capabilities of NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP) in Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, Exercise* **SABER GUARDIAN 17** *is a multinational exercise, led by the US Army Europe (USAREUR), in cooperation with the land forces in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, conducted on the territory of Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, between 08 and 22.07.2017, in order to assure the Allied countries of the enduring US commitment to their collective defence and prosperity, enable the command chain and reinforce deterrence measures agreed by NATO Allies.*

The **Integrated National Programme of Exercises "Histria"** *is in full progress. It is aimed at connecting some relevant exercises, at strategic, operational, tactical and inter-institutional level, according to distinct operational stages, by common training objectives, in their disposition locations in peacetime and in ranges, to test and validate the stages in engaging the armed forces, depending on the phases/measures specific to the amplification and degradation curve of a situation from the normal situation to the state of war. The exercise started in February 2016 and it will be completed in October 2018.*

We continue, within the **National Research, Development and Innovation Programme**, *the conduct of 29 projects that are worth 19 million RON. Moreover,*

182 projects have been introduced in the Sectoral Research-Development Plan, projects developed by the scientific research centres having as final beneficiaries the armed forces services and the Ministry of National Defence central structures.

Establishing two NATO commands on the territory of Romania, namely the Multinational Division Southeast Headquarters (MND SE HQ) and the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs); establishing the multinational brigade on the structure of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Craiova; declaring the operational capability of the missile defence elements in Deveselu; optimising the command and control system functioning, enhancing the command capacity at tactical level, as well as ensuring the conditions that are necessary for the Romanian Armed Forces structures to accomplish the specific missions; meeting the international commitments; continuing the process to achieve interoperability with NATO member states armed forces and the standardisation of organisational charts on types of structures, depending on their operational capacity, represent milestones and challenges in the Romanian Armed Forces.

*NATO Summit in Warsaw, in 2016, represented a crucial moment for us. Following the summit, cyberspace was acknowledged as an operational domain. At national level, the commitment is aimed at strengthening the efforts in the field of cyber defence, integrating cyber defence in the military operations planning and conduct. The main topic at the summit was strengthening the Allies defence and deterrence posture. The **tailored Forward Presence (tFP)** in the southern area of the Allied eastern flank is one of the elements that contribute to strengthening. The **Combined Joint Enhanced Training Initiative (CJET)** is a coherent multinational training framework in order to ensure a combined joint approach to the Allies participating in the **tailored Forward Presence (tFP)** and to efficiently use NATO capabilities.*

*The concept of **Combined Joint Enhanced Training Initiative** was completed and submitted to NATO military authorities to be validated.*

The tailored Forward Presence (tFP) is complemented by measures in the maritime and air domain. In the air domain, it is strengthened cooperation in combined air training, including by air policing operations, which allow for rapid transition to air defence missions. Allies such as UK, Canada, Portugal and Poland will contribute to this initiative in the following period. Currently, a British detachment is deployed at Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, executing air policing missions.

*In the maritime dimension, it was decided the establishment of a NATO framework for strengthening the Allied presence in the Black Sea – **NATO Combined Maritime Framework** – as well as the establishment of a coordination function within **MARCOM***

– Regional Maritime Coordination Function. *They will ensure NATO enhanced and more visible presence in the Black Sea.*

All these initiatives within the tailored forward presence (tFP) represent Romania's concrete contributions to ensuring the Alliance enhanced deterrence and defence posture to strengthen security in NATO eastern flank.

As for the **level of ambition**, *the Romanian Armed Forces should be able: to conduct, by own effort, a set of inter-institutionally integrated actions, up to the intervention of the main Allied and/or EU forces, in order to deter a potential aggression towards the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Romanian state, to execute a strategic operation to defend the national territory to counter aggressive actions, be they conventional, unconventional and/or hybrid, as well as to enable the rapid deployment and facilitate the Allied forces or the very high readiness joint task force entry into combat in the area of joint operations, on the territory of Romania or in its vicinity; to participate, in multinational context, in the country defence operations, after NATO or EU authorities take the operational responsibility regarding collective defence; based on the Romanian state commitments, to take part in an article 5 collective defence major joint operation led by NATO, or in a high-scale operation conducted by the EU based on the mutual assistance clause.*

The **Romanian Armed Forces** *take into account the accomplishment of* **general tasks** *associated with the institutional concepts in the field of defence, among which the most important ones refer to:* **strategic credibility** *– the Romanian Armed Forces can do what they say, do what they plan!* **inter-institutional approach to defence** *– harmonised comprehensive planning; intelligent decentralised implementation!* **resilience in the defence of the country** *– robust and flexible military capabilities; sufficient and integrated civilian capabilities!* **structure modularity** *– specified mission; tailored organisational configuration!*

In these contexts, "Carol I" National Defence University should be proactive, resilient and involved in creating and adding value to the Romanian Armed Forces strategic missions.

We express our hope that the Command and Staff Faculty alongside the newly established Security and Defence Faculty can become the fundamental pillars in multidisciplinarily approaching scientific research as well as in bringing novelty in the contemporary military actuality.

May the debates and the scientific paper conference be fruitful and because the academic year is about to finish soon I congratulate you on the positive results and I wish you academic accomplishments, achievements and success!

Conference Panels

By courtesy of the plenary session moderator, **Colonel (N) Senior Lecturer Dr Marius Șerbeszki**, Deputy Dean for Scientific Research of the Command and Staff Faculty, who has made available the programme of the event, we present the Conference sessions:

PANEL I
TRENDS IN THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY ART IN THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVAL FORCES

AREAS OF INTEREST:

• *Operational art and tactics in the Air Force and the Naval Forces – past, present and future*

• *Airspace and naval power in contemporary military actions*

• *Complex operational concepts associated with the air/maritime dimension of the hybrid warfare*

• *Influence of the hybrid warfare characteristics on the evolution of the air force and the naval forces combat tactics*

• *Ballistic missile defence*

• *Trends in the evolution of air surveillance systems in the new international security paradigm*

• *Use of unmanned aerial systems in the future air/maritime battlespace*

PANEL II
EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE ARMED FORCES

AREAS OF INTEREST:

• *Military education enhancement*

• *Combatant resilience – from evaluation to training and education*

• *Military operational concepts in foreign languages to cooperate jointly*

• *Foreign languages teaching methods – military terminology*

• *Modern techniques and methods to test and evaluate linguistic competency*

• *Physical education and sports as social activities – particularities and evolution trends in the military field*

• *Modern psychotherapeutic approaches to posttraumatic stress disorders*

PANEL III
TRENDS IN THE EVOLUTION OF MLILITARY ART
IN THE LAND FORCES

AREAS OF INTEREST:

• *Land forces operational art and tactics – past, present and future*

• *Complex operational concepts associated with the land dimension of the hybrid warfare*

• *Physiognomy of military actions at tactical level in the context of hybrid warfare*

• *Use of armament systems and combat assets specific to the land forces in the future battlespace*

• *Use of unmanned aerial systems in the future battlespace*

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

AREAS OF INTEREST:

• *Information systems and applications for intelligence*

• *Military actions cyber security*

• *Critical information infrastructure protection*

TECHNOLOGIES – MILITARY APPLICATIONS,
ACTION SIMULATION AND MODELLING

AREAS OF INTEREST:

• *Integratory software solutions for military exercises to plan and assist exercises at strategic level*

• *Information systems and computer-assisted methods in the military actions decision-making process*

• *Military actions modelling, simulation and conduct*

• *Impact of new technologies on the military actions planning and conduct*

PANEL IV
LOGISTICS, FINANCIAL-ACCOUNTING MANAGEMENT AND DEFENCE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

AREAS OF INTEREST:

• *Theoretical approaches to logistics and financial-accounting management in the context of hybrid warfare*

• *Logistic and marketing management in the context of new global military and economic challenges*

• *Logistic management*

• *Financial-accounting management*

• *Internal audit and corporate governance*

• *Accounting system modern architectures*

• *Public finance and fiscality*

• *Conceptual and functional elements of maintaining the equipment of tactical-operational structures in joint operations*

• *Defence resources mobilisation*

During the conference, in the National Defence University hall of honour a book exhibition was organised with the participation of the Military Publishing House, Curtea Veche Publishing House and *"Carol I"* National Defence University Publishing House.

✎ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*
English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

"Henri Coandă"
Air Force Academy

SYSTEMS FOR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY

Dr BEng Liliana MIRON

Systems for Aerial Surveillance and Security *is an ERASMUS+ Project, within Strategic Partnerships – K Action 2*[*]

Why is the Project?

1. To meet the training standards in the field

The **Systems for Aerial Surveillance and Security** project emerged following the identification of a problem in the field of *defence*, *aviation* specialty, at European level and even worldwide. The problem resides in the fact that the curricula of the universities in Europe are not harmonised for the existing specialisations in the field. For example, pilots and air traffic controllers can specialise in *management* or *engineering*, studying for 3, 4 or even 5 years, depending on the country and the education system.

2. To meet the need for specialisation, other than that required for the licence studies, for the workers in the field of military aviation, to harmonise it with the civilian environment. It is necessary considering not only the possible restructuring in the military system but also the extension of the educational offer to include the civilian environment.

On the other hand, in the context of globalisation and the need for cooperation at all levels, regardless of the categories of population involved in this system, their professional development is a priority, considering the following aspects:

- *all activity programmes are increasingly internationalised;*
- *technical progress is accelerated and information systems are integral part of daily life;*
- *there are more and more people who want to pursue higher education;*
- *the European Union is increasingly involved in updating the curricula to meet the labour market requirements.*

That is why the higher education institutions that prepare graduates in the field of *aerial security* have to join their efforts to develop common competences that are absolutely necessary for graduates.

Therefore, *"Henri Coandă"* Air Force Academy, alongside its partners, has decided to develop a joint study module – *"Systems for Aerial Surveillance and Security"*, to equip the graduates with all the competences and skills that are necessary to provide quality services on a labour market that has very strict norms and rules.

The goals are intended to reach the following target groups:

- **students and academic staff in partner universities;**
- **beneficiaries of academies graduates, employers;**
- **decision-making factors, ministries, educational institutions, national and international agencies in the field of education quality.**

The project will include:

- periods of study to meet the module study plan;
- intensive periods of teaching/learning;
- periods of mobility for students/academic staff.

Through its curriculum, the module is intended to provide the graduates with a wide range of competences, from the technical to the risk management ones. All of them will be developed at a high and modern level, employing the IT systems and the new approaches in teaching/learning.

The project activities meant to implement a joint module, which is taught in English and lasts for 3 months, fall into 3 categories:

- *planning*
- *implementation and verification*
- *dissemination.*

For the *planning* stage it was conducted the analysis of the courses included in the module, considering their various dimensions and multiple criteria.

Following the analysis, it resulted a list of compulsory and optional courses to be included in the joint module. It contains 6 courses, each of them being developed during teaching, seminar, and practical application classes.

The module courses are: *Air Force Safety and Security, Safety Management, Aviation Law, Meteorology, Basic Principles of Navigation, Aviation English*.

There will be several implementation stages in which 4 military or civilian students, as well as academic staff belonging to each of the partner universities will participate.

➢ **Project partners:**

Project coordinator: *"Henri Coandă"* Air Force Academy, Romania

Partners: *"Vasil Levski"* National Military University, Bulgaria, and War Study University, Poland.

Project Manager: Assistant Professor Dr BEng Ecaterina Liliana Miron

Project goal: harmonise the curricula in the military academies in Europe having responsibilities in the education and training of aviation officers

Objectives: the development of a 3-month study module

Results

- **(outcomes)**: competences acquired by students
- **(output)**: curriculum, course units, e-learning platform

Current stage

1. In November 2016, *"Henri Coandă"* Air Force Academy hosted the first meeting of the coordinating teams belonging to the three universities. The project activities and schedule were established.

2. Activities were developed, in each university, to define the competences necessary to be acquired by pilots and air traffic controllers.

3. Between 4 and 12 May 2017, in Bulgaria, the following activities were conducted:

    a. The second meeting of the coordinating teams in the three universities;

    b. The first meeting (the first academic staff training – 4 representatives from each university) of the academic staff involved in the project. The defined competences were discussed, the plan was developed, and the way the courses were to be approached as well as the number of classes allocated for each course were established;

Photo 1: Transnational meeting (steering committees)

    c. The first international event to disseminate the project (multiplication event), during which target groups were informed about the project-related activities of the three academies. Moreover, the current stage of the project and its development directions were presented.

    This project is intended to demonstrate that it is possible for the graduates from military academies in Europe to be open to internationalisation and to acquire common competences. Through its impact on the staff in these educational

Photo 2: Dissemination event

Photo 3: Short-term Joint Staff Training Event

institutions, the ***project intends to provide military academies with a new horizon, by openness to aerial security not only from the military point of view but also from the civilian defence perspective***.

English version by
✎ Diana Cristiana LUPU

EDITORIAL EVENTS

✒ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

Recently published by *Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei.* **Anne Jugănaru**'s book **– Relaţiile publice în armatele contemporane (Public Relations in Contemporary Armed Forces) –** has, as Professor Dr Constantin Hlihor emphasises, *"gone to the core of the theory of public relations and has underlined many aspects regarding the theory and practice of public relations in the contemporary armed forces of the Western world"*.

The armed forces, which represent an institution of vital importance for making the society secure, need support, trust and legitimacy, which cannot be obtained unless a coherent, correct and transparent communication process takes place. That is why, the public relations activity in the armed forces is a special activity as compared to the one taking place in any other sort of organisation that exists today in the contemporary society. The tension between the two necessities that are apparently not very compatible – the need to keep the secret, out of strategic reasons, and the increasing need to provide transparency of the activities that are carried out – is a specific, even defining characteristic of the activity of public relations in modern armed forces.

Focused on the analysis of the place and the role of public relations structures in contemporary post-Cold War armed forces, especially the American ones, presenting experiences from the theatres of military operations, as well as conducting a critical analysis of the role and missions carried out by the PR structures in recent conflicts, the book leads us towards a daring, yet pertinent (due to the arguments presented) conclusion: there have been many ways in which the relationship the armed forces-the media has been handled, depending on the balance between the right to be informed and the security reasons.

One of the most special topics in the book is the presentation the author has made regarding the public relations structures in the Romanian Armed Forces, which have been required to keep pace with the process of transition and reform

the military institution underwent after 1989 and have followed the path of our country's accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures.

In the words of the author in the foreword written for this book, *"people need information in order to take action in the field of social practice, irrespective of the nature of their activity. In some situations, such as crisis or conflicts, the value of information is given not by money or products, but by human lives saved or lost. […] The latest conflicts, no matter if they were on the European continent (the Yugoslavian crisis), in the Persian Gulf, in the Wider Black Sea area or in Afghanistan, have shown that the success in the theatres of military operations, but most of all the support of the internal and international public opinion have been closely linked to the efficiency of the communication process and the ways through which this has taken place. In this equation, public relations/public affairs have a privileged place. Senior US military officials have acknowledged that communication between belligerents and the public opinion has played a special role in the fight carried by the USA against terrorism".*

We believe this books is as useful to specialists in the field as it is for other readers that are willing to become familiar with the evolution of this phenomenon – communication, with all the forms it has taken: propaganda, disinformation, manipulation etc. – in the history of international conflicts starting from the First World War to post-Cold War conflicts. Today, the communication strategy has the same importance as in ancient history, and this book can be a valuable instrument for anyone interested in knowing this field.

English version by
✎ *Iulia SINGER*

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✎ **Alina PAPOI**

We signal the appearance of the book ***Romanian military art during the second Balkan war (1913)***, written by the collaborator of our journal, a doctoral student at *"Carol I"* National Defence University – **Daniel Silviu Niculae**. The author is an enthusiast researcher in the field of the Balkan wars, which is also the theme of his doctoral thesis!

The book that was published at *Lambert Academic Publishing*, is dedicated to the memory of his grandfather who advised the author to learn something every day!

Lambert Academic Publishing is an institution specialised in publishing articles, studies, doctoral theses or academic papers. It is an associate member

of the American Booksellers Association, the Booksellers Association in the UK, and the Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels, the Booksellers Association in Germany. *Lambert Academic Publishing* is part of *Omniscriptum Publishing Group*, which is a German editorial group based in Saarbrücken having branches in Argentina, Latvia, Mauritius and Moldova.

Romanian military art during the second Balkan war (1913) discusses the relations between Romania and Bulgaria in the 1908-1913 period, during which Bulgaria became an independent country, as well as the consequences of independence for the relations with the other countries in the Balkans, especially with Romania, in the context of the alliances existing at that moment.

The author briefly presents aspects related to the political, military and diplomatic relations between Romania and Bulgaria during the Balkan wars. Moreover, the significant lessons learned in the military campaign in 1913 are presented. As for the two Balkan wars, Romania remained neutral in the first one and won victory against Bulgaria in the second one. After the Second Balkan War the Treaty of Bucharest was signed.

With regard to the chapter dedicated to the lessons learned, the author concludes that they represented the element that generated the development of the Romanian military system. Military art means the way someone fights, the way the symbiosis between political and military fields is put in practice. Marshal Ferdinand Foch, in the *Principles of War*, emphasised that *"the art of war, as any other art, has its principles; otherwise it would not be an art"*. The war objective, according to the campaign plan developed by the Great General Staff in 1913, was the main attack against the strategic centre of the adversary forces and the junction with the Serbian army, depending on the geostrategic context in the Balkans. Moreover, crossing the Danube was perceived as a decisive element in the conclusion of the war, the event illustrating a real show of force performed by the Romanian troops, motivated by abnegation and the desire to win, as the books of the time mentioned.

The author makes a thorough description of the situation in Romania in the years that preceded the First World War, referring not only to the economic situation (agriculture, industry) but also to the socio-political one. In this regard the portrait of Carol I describes him as *"one of the most successful monarchs in Europe"*, really preoccupied with the way the government functioned and the national interests were supported abroad.

We consider the book, being written in English, will be internationally acknowledged. *Enjoy reading it!*

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

1st Cover: *Meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Brussels, Belgium, 25 May 2017* (NATO's New Headquarters)
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_143984.htm
3th Cover: *Flag-raising ceremony marking the accession of Montenegro to NATO, 7 June 2017.* http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_144743.htm
4th Cover: *Getica Saber 17 Exercise in Cincu Training Range.*
Photo: Petrică Mihalache. http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/album66

http://www.smg.mapn.ro/gmr