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- English edition, 8th year -**

Romanian Military Thinking



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Through the agency of this journal all officers, belonging to all branches, who are in service, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces".

*Carol - King of Romania
Issued in Bucharest on 8 December 1897*

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These awards are yearly bestowed,
by the Romanian Armed Forces
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in the field of military science,
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
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15 Years in the Nation's Service

The current security environment, increasingly complex and many times unpredictable, calls for major responsibility as far as guaranteeing the country's present and future is concerned. This is a fundamental responsibility, which transcends all other interests of the nation.

Romania's accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures, a national option that has proved to be necessary and correct, dictated by this need to guarantee its own security, has imposed the engagement and fastest possible adaptation to the speed of this complex mechanism.

The integration of the contribution of each NATO and EU member state to guaranteeing security and stability is a precondition for the success of the collective action, and Romania, security beneficiary and provider at the same time, had to abide by the operating rules of these political-military coalitions.

The relation between the Romanian Armed Forces and NATO has developed gradually, depending on the evolution of the process of integration and participation in common actions. In this respect, providing the interface between the Alliance's bodies and components has played an important part.

The General Staff – exponent of and catalyst for the accession and integration of the Romanian Armed Forces and of Romania in the Euro-Atlantic structures – has acted accordingly, creating its own specialised structure, invested with projecting the organisational and actional options of the military body, with clear responsibilities with regard to coordinating the national forces planning in the integration process and raising the interoperability level between NATO and Romania.

The **Strategic Planning Directorate**, this bridge built between the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff and the Euro-Atlantic structures, celebrates 15 years of existence in the service of the fundamental interests of the armed forces and of the country, in instrumenting our option of being part of the Euro-Atlantic bodies, guarantors of global and regional security and stability.

The planning of military capabilities and their use in missions, drawing up of strategies and scenarios, standardisation, doctrinaire regulations, operational

planning, relationship with international bodies are the main domains of action of this General Staff structure.

Being the result of Romania's firm engagement with a view to joining NATO and also in charge of preparing and enabling Romania's participation in the consultation and decision-making process, during the reunions of the committees and the subordinate work groups, the **Strategic Planning Directorate** has ensured, at the same time, its by-no-means easy role of synchronising the Romanian military body with the evolution of the security environment at regional and world level. The Romanian Armed Forces participation in international missions and the results achieved have benefited from the support of proper planning, and this structure has its substantial and significant contribution to this.

The coordination of the drawing up of the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* – a programmatic document that is essential to directing and coordinating the activities meant to contribute to achieving its necessary capacity – has also been a not-at-all easy test that the **Strategic Planning Directorate** has passed, being thus permanently ready to provide new solutions, in agreement with the North Atlantic Alliance transformation strategy.

Connecting with the Euro-Atlantic bodies has been a lasting and many-sided process, however, those meant to carry out this mission are first-class professionals, with experience gathered in complex international missions, permanently connected to the pulse of international military bodies, capable of providing any time the decision-makers with proper, rigorously developed and substantiated solutions and options.

On the occasion of the celebration of 15 years of existence and faithful service to the Nation, a warm and sincere **Happy Anniversary!**

✍ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

English version by

Iulia NĂSTASIE



15 ans dans le service de la Nation

L'actuel environnement de sécurité, de plus en plus complexe et souvent imprévisible, exige à la plus grande responsabilité pour assurer le présent et l'avenir du pays. Une responsabilité fondamentale qui transcende tous les autres intérêts de la nation.

L'adhésion de la Roumanie à structures euro-atlantiques, une option nationale qui s'est avérée nécessaire et appropriée, dictée de cette nécessité d'assurer leur propre sécurité, a imposé la connexion et l'adaptation plus rapide dans le régime de la vitesse du ce mécanisme complexe.

L'intégration de la contribution de chaque membre de l'OTAN et l'UE afin d'assurer la sécurité et la stabilité est une condition préalable pour le succès d'une action collective, et la Roumanie, à la fois bénéficiaire et fournisseur de la sécurité, a dû suivre les règles de fonctionnement de ces coalitions militaro-politiques.

Le rapport entre Roumanie et l'OTAN a eu lieu progressivement, selon l'évolution de l'intégration et la participation à des activités conjointes. A cet égard, un rôle important qu'elle a joué et continue à jouer c'est l'interface entre les organismes et les composants de l'Alliance.

L'Etat major général – promoteur et catalyseur pour l'adhésion et l'intégration de l'Armée Roumaine et de la Roumanie même dans les structures euro-atlantiques – a fait en conséquence, par la création de sa propre structure spécialisée et investie avec de la projection des options organisationnelles et actionnelles de l'organisme militaire, avec des responsabilités claires à l'égard de coordination de la planification des forces nationales dans le processus d'intégration et d'augmentation le niveau d'interopérabilité entre l'OTAN et la Roumanie.

La Direction de la planification stratégique, ce pont de l'Etat major général de l'Armée Roumaine avec les structures euro-atlantiques, fête 15 ans de son existence au service des intérêts fondamentaux de l'armée et du pays, à rendre la vie de notre option d'adhérer à des organismes euro-atlantiques, de préserver la sécurité et la stabilité mondiale et régionale.

La planification des capacités militaires, la planification de leur utilisation dans les missions, l'élaboration des stratégies et des scénarios, la normalisation, les réglementations doctrinales, la planification opérationnelle, le mise en réseau avec les organismes internationaux, voici les principaux domaines d'action de cette structure de l'Etat major général.

Résultat de l'engagement ferme de la Roumanie à son intégration de l'OTAN, assiégée pour préparer et faciliter la participation de la Roumanie dans le processus de consultation et de décision lors des réunions des comités et des groupes de travail subordonnés, c'est **la Direction de la planification stratégique** qui a fourni à la fois le rôle, pas facile, de synchroniser l'organisme militaire roumain avec l'évolution de l'environnement de sécurité régionale et mondiale. La participation de l'Armée Roumaine à des missions internationales et leurs résultats ont été soutenus par une planification adéquate, et cette structure a sa contribution, importante et significative.

La planification d'élaborer la *Stratégie de transformation de l'Armée Roumaine* – document programmatique essentiel pour diriger et coordonner les activités qui doivent contribuer à la réalisation de sa capacité nécessaire – a également été un examen pas facile, que **la Direction de la planification stratégique** a passé et elle est toujours prête à offrir de nouvelles situations, en pleine conformité avec la stratégie de transformation de l'Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord.

Le processus de connecter avec les organismes euro-atlantiques était et continue d'être un processus de longue durée et avec un caractère polyvalente, mais ceux qui sont destinés à atteindre ce but sont les premiers professionnels de la classe ayant une expérience dans des missions internationales complexes, reliés en permanence à l'impulsion des organisations internationales militaires, toujours prêts à offrir aux décideurs des solutions et d'options adéquates, rigoureusement élaborées et organisées.

À l'occasion de ceux 15 ans de son existence et de loyaux services pour la Nation, nous leur adressons une chaleureuse et sincère **Bon anniversaire!**

*Version française par
Alina PAPOI*



CHICAGO SUMMIT DECLARATION

*Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago
on 20 May 2012*

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Chicago to renew our commitment to our vital transatlantic bond; take stock of progress in, and reconfirm our commitment to, our operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere; ensure the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to deal with the full range of threats; and strengthen our wide range of partnerships.

2. Our nations are united in their commitment to the Washington Treaty and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion and the indivisibility of our security, NATO remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence

and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. Our 2010 Strategic Concept continues to guide us in fulfilling effectively, and always in accordance with international law, our three essential core tasks – collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security – all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members.

3. At a time of complex security challenges and financial difficulties, it is more important than ever to make the best use of our resources and to continue to adapt our forces and structures. We remain committed to our common values, and are determined to ensure NATO's ability to meet any challenges to our shared security.

4. We pay tribute to all the brave men and women from Allied and partner

* Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease

nations serving in NATO-led missions and operations. We commend them for their professionalism and dedication and acknowledge the invaluable support provided to them by their families and loved ones. We owe a special debt of gratitude to all those who have lost their lives or been injured during the course of their duties, and we extend our profound sympathy to their families and loved ones.

5. Today we have taken further important steps on the road to a stable and secure Afghanistan and to our goal of preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world. The irreversible transition of full security responsibility from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is on track for completion by the end of 2014, as agreed at our Lisbon Summit. We also recognise in this context the importance of a comprehensive approach and continued improvements in governance and development, as well as a political process involving successful reconciliation and reintegration. We welcome the announcement by President Karzai on the third tranche of provinces that will start transition. This third tranche means that 75% of Afghanistan's population will live in areas where the ANSF have taken the lead for security. By mid-2013, when the fifth and final tranche of provinces starts

transition, we will have reached an important milestone in our Lisbon roadmap, and the ANSF will be in the lead for security nationwide. At that milestone, as ISAF shifts from focusing primarily on combat increasingly to the provision of training, advice and assistance to the ANSF, ISAF will be able to ensure that the Afghans have the support they need as they adjust to their new increased responsibility. We are gradually and responsibly drawing down our forces to complete the ISAF mission by 31 December 2014.

6. By the end of 2014, when the Afghan Authorities will have full security responsibility, the NATO-led combat mission will end. We will, however, continue to provide strong and long-term political and practical support through our Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan. NATO is ready to work towards establishing, at the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, a new post-2014 mission of a different nature in Afghanistan, to train, advise and assist the ANSF, including the Afghan Special Operations Forces. This will not be a combat mission. We task the Council to begin immediately work on the military planning process for the post-ISAF mission.

7. At the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn in December 2011, the international community made a commitment

to support Afghanistan in its Transformation Decade beyond 2014. NATO will play its part alongside other actors in building sufficient and sustainable Afghan forces capable of providing security for their own country. In this context, Allies welcome contributions and reaffirm their strong commitment to contribute to the financial sustainment of the ANSF. We also call on the international community to commit to this long-term sustainment of the ANSF. Effective funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of the ANSF will build upon existing mechanisms, integrating the efforts of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and of the international community. They will be guided by the principles of flexibility, transparency, accountability, and cost effectiveness, and will include measures against corruption.

8. We reiterate the importance Allies attach to seeing tangible progress by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan regarding its commitments made at the Bonn Conference on 5 December 2011 to a democratic society, based on the rule of law and good governance, including progress in the fight against corruption, where the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, including the equality of men and women and the active participation of both in Afghan society, are respected. The forthcoming elections must be

conducted with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and in accordance with the Afghan Constitution. Their transparency, inclusivity and credibility will also be of paramount importance. Continued progress towards these goals will encourage NATO nations to further provide their support up to and beyond 2014.

9. We also underscore the importance of our shared understanding with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan regarding the full participation of all Afghan women in the reconstruction, political, peace and reconciliation processes in Afghanistan and the need to respect the institutional arrangements protecting their rights. We recognise also the need for the protection of children from the damaging effects of armed conflict.

10. We also recognise that security and stability in the *“Heart of Asia”* is interlinked across the region. The Istanbul Process on regional security and cooperation, which was launched in November 2011, reflects the commitment of Afghanistan and the countries in the region to jointly ensure security, stability and development in a regional context. The countries in the region, particularly Pakistan, have important roles in ensuring enduring peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and in facilitating the completion of the transition process.

We stand ready to continue dialogue and practical cooperation with relevant regional actors in this regard. We welcome the progress on transit arrangements with our Central Asian partners and Russia. NATO continues to work with Pakistan to reopen the ground lines of communication as soon as possible.

11. We look forward to our expanded ISAF meeting tomorrow.

12. The Alliance continues to be fully committed to the stability and security of the strategically important Balkans region. We reiterate our full support for KFOR, which continues to act carefully, firmly and impartially in accordance with its United Nations mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244. KFOR will continue to support the development of a peaceful, stable, and multi-ethnic Kosovo. KFOR will also continue to contribute to the maintenance of freedom of movement and ensuring a safe and secure environment for all people in Kosovo, in cooperation with all relevant actors, including the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the EU Special Representative, as agreed, and the Kosovo authorities. We will maintain KFOR's robust and credible capability to carry out its mission. We remain committed to moving towards a smaller, more flexible, deterrent presence, only once the security situation allows.

We welcome the progress made in developing the Kosovo Security Force, under NATO's supervision and commend it for its readiness and capability to implement its security tasks and responsibilities. We will continue to look for opportunities to develop NATO's ongoing role with the Kosovo Security Force.

13. Last year, through the UN-mandated Operation Unified Protector (OUP), and with the support of the League of Arab States, our Alliance played a crucial role in protecting the civilian population in Libya and in helping save thousands of lives. We commend the Libyan people for the progress achieved to date on their path towards building a new, free, democratic Libya that fully respects human rights and fundamental freedoms, and encourage them to build on that progress.

14. Our successful operation in Libya showed once more that the Alliance can quickly and effectively conduct complex operations in support of the broader international community. We have also learned a number of important lessons which we are incorporating into our plans and policies. With OUP, NATO set new standards of consultation and practical cooperation with partner countries who contributed to our operation, as well as with other international and regional organisations. In this context, we recognise the value of the Libya Contact Group.

15. The Alliance is also contributing to peace and security through other operations and missions:

- We welcome the extension of the mandate of our counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa, Operation Ocean Shield, for a further two years through to 2014. The decision to carry out enhanced actions at sea should allow us to be more effective in eroding the operational reach of pirates at sea. We remain committed to supporting international counter-piracy efforts, including through working together with the EU Operation Atalanta, as agreed, Combined Task Force 151 and other naval forces, and through our ongoing participation in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. We encourage the shipping industry to adopt Best Management Practices and other measures proven effective against piracy, in compliance with international law.

- Operation Active Endeavour is our Article 5 maritime operation in the Mediterranean which contributes to the fight against terrorism. We are reviewing strategic options for the future of this operation.

- We continue to provide the African Union (AU) with operational support,

at its request. We have agreed to extend strategic air and maritime lift support for the AU's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and support the development of the AU's long-term peacekeeping capabilities, including the African Stand-by Force. We stand ready to consider further AU requests for NATO training assistance.

- We have successfully concluded the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) which contributed to a more stable Iraq by assisting in the capacity building of Iraq's security institutions.

16. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations, the lack of effective institutional arrangements to protect women, and the continued under-representation of women in peace processes, remain serious impediments to building sustainable peace. We remain committed to the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related Resolutions which are aimed at protecting and promoting women's rights, role, and participation in preventing and ending conflict. In line with the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Policy, the Alliance, together with its partners, has made significant progress in implementing the goals

articulated in these Resolutions. In this regard, we have today endorsed a Strategic Progress Report on mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions into NATO-led Operations and Missions, and welcomed Norway's generous offer to provide a NATO Special Representative for these important issues. In this context, and to further advance this work, we have tasked the Council to: continue implementing the Policy and the Action Plan; undertake a review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO operations and missions; further integrate gender perspectives into Alliance activities; and submit a report for our next Summit.

17. We also remain committed to the implementation of UNSCR 1612 and related Resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict. We note with concern the growing range of threats to children in armed conflict and strongly condemn that they are increasingly subject to recruitment, sexual violence and targeted attacks. NATO-led operations, such as ISAF in Afghanistan, are taking an active role in preventing, monitoring and responding to violations against children, including through pre-deployment training and a violations alert mechanism. This approach, based on practical, field-oriented measures, demonstrates NATO's firm commitment on this issue, as does the recent appointment of a NATO Focal Point for Children and Armed

Conflict in charge of maintaining a close dialogue with the UN. NATO-UN cooperation in this field is creating a set of good practices to be integrated in NATO training modules and taken into account in possible future operations.

18. Our operational experiences have shown that military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. We reaffirm our Lisbon Summit decisions on a comprehensive approach. In order to fulfil these commitments, important work on NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach and on stabilisation and reconstruction is ongoing. An appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability has been established, both at the NATO Headquarters and within Allied Command Operations, in accordance with the principles and detailed political guidance we set out at our Summit in Lisbon.

19. We will continue to enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN in line with the UN-NATO Declaration of September 2008. We welcome the strengthened cooperation and enhanced liaison between NATO and the UN that has been achieved since our last Summit meeting in Lisbon in November 2010, and which also contributed to the success of OUP.

20. NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. Fully strengthening this strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations and enshrined in the Strategic Concept, is particularly important in the current environment of austerity; NATO and the EU should continue to work to enhance practical cooperation in operations, broaden political consultations, and cooperate more fully in capability development. NATO and the EU are working side by side in crisis management operations, in a spirit of mutual reinforcement, and in particular in Afghanistan, Kosovo and fighting piracy. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. NATO also recognises non-EU Allies' ongoing concerns and their significant contributions to strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies' fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. In this context, NATO will work closely with the EU, as agreed, to ensure that our *Smart Defence* and the EU's *Pooling and Sharing* initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing; we welcome the efforts of the EU, in particular in the areas of air-to-air refuelling, medical support, maritime surveillance and training. We also welcome the national efforts in these and other areas

by European Allies and Partners. We also encourage the Secretary General to continue his dialogue with the EU High Representative with a view to making our cooperation more effective, and to report to the Council in time for the next Summit.

21. We continue to work closely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in particular in areas such as conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation, and in addressing new security threats. We are committed to further enhancing our cooperation, both at the political and operational level, in all areas of common interest.

22. NATO has a wide network of partnership relations. We highly value all of NATO's partners and the contributions they make to the work of the Alliance as illustrated through several partnership meetings we are holding here in Chicago. Partnerships play a crucial role in the promotion of international peace and security. NATO's partnerships are a key element of Cooperative Security which is one of the core tasks of the Alliance, and the Alliance has developed effective policies in order to enhance its partnerships. Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, we have pursued cooperation with our Euro-Atlantic partners to build a Europe whole,

free and at peace. For twenty years, our partnerships have facilitated, and provided frameworks for, political dialogue and practical regional cooperation in the fields of security and defence, contribute to advancing our common values, allow us to share expertise and experience, and make a significant contribution to the success of many of our operations and missions. NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin in April 2011 approved a More Efficient and Flexible Partnership Policy to enhance the effectiveness of NATO's partnerships. We will continue to actively pursue its further implementation with a view to strengthening NATO's partnerships, including by: reinforcing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and our relationships with partners across the globe, while making full use of flexible formats; further developing our political and practical cooperation with partners, including in an operational context; and through increasing partner involvement in training, education, and exercises, including with the NATO Response Force. We will intensify our efforts to better engage with partners across the globe who can contribute significantly to security, and to reach out to partners concerned, including our newest partner Mongolia, to build trust, increase transparency, and develop political dialogue and practical cooperation. In this context, we welcome the Joint Political Declaration between Australia and NATO.

23. We appreciate our partners' significant contributions to our practical cooperation activities and to the different Trust Funds which support our partnership goals. We welcome the Status Report on Building Integrity and the progress achieved by NATO's Building Integrity Programme which has made important contributions to promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity in the defence sector of interested nations.

24. We welcome our meeting in Chicago with thirteen partners¹ who have recently made particular political, operational, and financial contributions to NATO-led operations. This is an example of the enhanced flexibility with which we are addressing partnership issues in a demand and substance-driven way. Our meeting in Chicago with partners provides us with a unique opportunity to discuss the lessons learned from our cooperation, and to exchange views on the common security challenges we face. Joint training and exercises will be essential in maintaining our interoperability and interconnectedness with partner forces, including when we are not engaged together in active operations. We will share ideas generated at this Chicago meeting with all our partners, within the appropriate frameworks, for additional discussion.

¹ Australia, Austria, Finland, Georgia, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, Qatar, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates.

25. In accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO's door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to security in the North Atlantic area. Based on these considerations, we will keep the progress of each of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance under active review, judging each on its own merits. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance in accordance with previous decisions taken at the Bucharest, Strasbourg-Kehl, and Lisbon Summits. We welcome progress made by these four partners and encourage them to continue to implement the necessary decisions and reforms to advance their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. For our part, we will continue to offer political and practical support to partners that aspire to join the Alliance. NATO's enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security continue to advance stability in Europe more broadly.

26. We reiterate the agreement at our 2008 Bucharest Summit, as we did at subsequent Summits, to extend

an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia² to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN, and strongly urge intensified efforts towards that end. An early solution, and subsequent membership, will contribute to security and stability in the region. We encourage the negotiations to be pursued without further delay and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible. We welcome, and continue to support, the ongoing reform efforts in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and encourage continued implementation. We also encourage its efforts to further build a multi-ethnic society. We appreciate the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's substantial contributions to our operations, as well as its active role in regional cooperation activities. We value the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's long-standing commitment to the NATO accession process.

27. We welcome the significant progress that Montenegro has made towards NATO membership and its contribution to security in the Western Balkans region and beyond, including through its active role in regional cooperation activities and its participation in ISAF. We also welcome the increasing public support for NATO membership in Montenegro,

² Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

and will continue to assist this process. Montenegro's active engagement in the MAP process demonstrates firm commitment to join the Alliance. Montenegro has successfully implemented significant political, economic and defence reforms, and we encourage it to continue on that path so it can draw even closer to the Alliance. We will keep Montenegro's progress towards membership under active review.

28. We continue to fully support the membership aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We welcome the significant progress that has been made in recent months, including the establishment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers, and the political agreement reached on 9 March 2012 on the registration of immovable defence property as state property. These developments are a sign of the political will in Bosnia and Herzegovina to move the reform process forward, and we encourage all political actors in the country to continue to work constructively to further implement the reforms necessary for its Euro-Atlantic integration. The political agreement on defence and state properties is an important step towards fulfilment of the condition set by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010 for full participation in the MAP process. We welcome the initial steps taken regarding implementation, and we urge the political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina

to further their efforts to work constructively to implement the agreement without delay in order to start its first MAP cycle as soon as possible. The Alliance will continue to follow progress in implementation and will provide assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina's reform efforts. We appreciate Bosnia and Herzegovina's contribution to NATO-led operations and commend its constructive role in regional and international security.

29. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. The NATO-Georgia Commission and Georgia's Annual National Programme (ANP) have a central role in supervising the process set in hand at the Bucharest Summit. We welcome Georgia's progress since the Bucharest Summit to meet its Euro-Atlantic aspirations through its reforms, implementation of its Annual National Programme, and active political engagement with the Alliance in the NATO-Georgia Commission. In that context, we have agreed to enhance Georgia's connectivity with the Alliance, including by further strengthening our political dialogue, practical cooperation, and interoperability with Georgia. We continue to encourage and actively support Georgia's ongoing implementation of all necessary reforms, including democratic, electoral, and judicial reforms, as well as security

and defence reforms. We stress the importance of conducting free, fair, and inclusive elections in 2012 and 2013. We appreciate Georgia's substantial contribution, in particular as the second largest non-NATO troop contributing nation to ISAF, to Euro-Atlantic security.

30. We reiterate our continued support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders. We welcome Georgia's full compliance with the EU-mediated cease-fire agreement and other unilateral measures to build confidence. We welcome Georgia's commitment not to use force and call on Russia to reciprocate. We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states. We encourage all participants in the Geneva talks to play a constructive role as well as to continue working closely with the OSCE, the UN, and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict resolution in the internationally-recognised territory of Georgia.

31. Here in Chicago, our Foreign Ministers are meeting with their counterparts from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia, in order to take stock of their individual progress, plan future cooperation, and exchange views with our partners, including on their participation in partnership activities and contributions

to operations. We are grateful to these partners that aspire to NATO membership for the important contributions they are making to NATO-led operations, and which demonstrate their commitment to our shared security goals.

32. In the strategically important Western Balkans region, democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are important for lasting peace and stability. We are encouraged by the progress being made, including in regional cooperation formats, and will continue to actively support Euro-Atlantic aspirations in this region. Together, Allies and partners of the region actively contribute to the maintenance of regional and international peace, including through regional cooperation formats.

33. We continue to support Serbia's Euro-Atlantic integration. We welcome Serbia's progress in building a stronger partnership with NATO and encourage Belgrade to continue on this path. NATO stands ready to continue to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with Serbia. We will continue assisting Serbia's reform efforts, and encourage further work.

34. We call upon Serbia to support further efforts towards the consolidation of peace and stability in Kosovo. We urge all parties concerned to cooperate fully with KFOR and EULEX in the execution of their respective mandates for which unconditional freedom of movement

is necessary. We urge Belgrade and Pristina to take full advantage of the opportunities offered to promote peace, security, and stability in the region, in particular by the European Union-facilitated dialogue. We welcome progress made in the European Union-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, including the Agreement on Regional Cooperation and the IBM technical protocol. Dialogue between them and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region are key for a sustained improvement in security and stability in the Western Balkans. We call on both parties to implement fully existing agreements, and to move forward on all outstanding issues, including on the conclusion of additional agreements on telecommunications and electricity. We welcome progress achieved and encourage further efforts aimed at consolidating the rule of law, and other reform efforts, in Kosovo.

35. An independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. Marking the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, we welcome Ukraine's commitment to enhancing political dialogue and interoperability with NATO, as well as its contributions to NATO-led operations and new offers made. We note the recent elimination of Ukraine's highly enriched uranium

in March 2012, which demonstrates a proven commitment to non-proliferation. Recalling our decisions in relation to Ukraine and our Open Door policy stated at the Bucharest and Lisbon Summits, NATO is ready to continue to develop its cooperation with Ukraine and assist with the implementation of reforms in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Annual National Programme (ANP). Noting the principles and commitments enshrined in the NATO-Ukraine Charter and the ANP, we are concerned by the selective application of justice and what appear to be politically motivated prosecutions, including of leading members of the opposition, and the conditions of their detention. We encourage Ukraine to address the existing shortcomings of its judicial system to ensure full compliance with the rule of law and the international agreements to which it is a party. We also encourage Ukraine to ensure free, fair and inclusive Parliamentary elections this autumn.

36. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. We remain determined to build a lasting and inclusive peace, together with Russia, in the Euro-Atlantic area, based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. We want

to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

37. This year, we mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. We welcome important progress in our cooperation with Russia over the years. At the same time, we differ on specific issues and there is a need to improve trust, reciprocal transparency, and predictability in order to realise the full potential of the NRC. In this context, we intend to raise with Russia in the NRC Allied concerns about Russia's stated intentions regarding military deployments close to Alliance borders. Mindful of the goals, principles and commitments which underpin the NRC, and on this firm basis, we urge Russia to meet its commitments with respect to Georgia, as mediated by the EU on 12 August and 8 September 2008³. We continue to be concerned by the build-up of Russia's military presence on Georgia's territory and continue to call on Russia to ensure free access for humanitarian assistance and international observers.

38. NATO and Russia share common security interests and face common challenges and our practical achievements

³ As complemented by the French President's letter dated 16 August 2008 and subsequent correspondence on this issue.

together reflect that reality. Today, we continue to value the important role of the NRC as a forum for frank and honest political dialogue – including on subjects where we disagree – and for promoting practical cooperation. Our cooperation with Russia on issues related to Afghanistan – notably the two-way transit arrangements offered by Russia in support of ISAF, our joint training of counter narcotics personnel from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan, and the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund in support of a key ANSF need – is a sign of our common determination to build peace and stability in that region. NATO-Russia counter-terrorism cooperation has expanded and all NRC nations will benefit from the lessons to be learned from the first civil-military NRC Counter-Terrorism exercise, and the capabilities available under the NRC aviation counter-terrorism programme which is now operational. We also note with satisfaction our growing counter-piracy cooperation off the Horn of Africa. We are committed to, and look forward to, further improving trust and reciprocal transparency in: defence matters; strategy; doctrines; military postures, including of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe; military exercises; arms control and disarmament; and we invite Russia to engage with the Alliance in discussing confidence-building measures covering these issues.

39. At a time of unprecedented change in the Mediterranean and broader Middle East, NATO is committed to strengthening and developing partnership relations with countries in the region, with whom we face common security challenges and share the same goals for peace, security and stability. NATO supports the aspirations of the people of the region for democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law – values which underpin the Alliance.

40. The Libya crisis illustrated the benefits of cooperation with partners from the region. It also showed the merit of regular consultations between the Alliance and regional organisations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States.

41. NATO is ready to consult more regularly on security issues of common concern, through the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), as well as bilateral consultations and 28+n formats. We recall our commitment to the MD and the ICI and to the principles that underpin them; the MD and ICI remain two complementary and yet distinct partnership frameworks. We are also ready to consider providing, upon request, support to our partners in the region in such areas as security institution building, defence modernisation, capacity development, and civil-military relations. Individualised programmes

will allow us to focus on agreed priorities for each partner country.

42. The MD helps to strengthen mutual understanding, political dialogue, practical cooperation and, as appropriate, interoperability. We welcome the Moroccan-led initiative to develop a new, political framework document for the MD, and look forward to developing it together soon with our MD partners. We encourage the MD partner countries to be proactive in exploiting the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO. The MD remains open to other countries in the region.

43. We welcome Libya's stated interest to deepen relations with the Alliance. We are ready to welcome Libya as a partner, if it so wishes. In that perspective, the MD is a natural framework for this partnership. We stand ready, if requested, and on a case-by-case basis, to consider providing assistance to Libya in areas where NATO can add value. NATO's activities would focus primarily on security and defence sector reform, while taking into account other international efforts.

44. We will strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation in the ICI. We warmly welcome the generous offer by the State of Kuwait to host an ICI Regional Centre, which will help us to better understand common security challenges, and discuss how to address them together. We encourage

our ICI partner countries to be proactive in exploiting the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO. We remain open to receiving new members in the ICI.

45. We are following the evolution of the Syrian crisis with growing concern and we strongly support the efforts of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, including full implementation of the six-point Annan plan, to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.

46. We welcome progress being made in Iraq. The NATO Transition Cell now established in Iraq is helping to develop our partnership.

47. With our vision of a Euro-Atlantic area at peace, the persistence of protracted regional conflicts in South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance. We welcome the constructive approach in the renewed dialogue on Transnistria in the 5+2 format, and encourage further efforts by all actors involved. With respect to all these conflicts, we urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, and to respect the current negotiation formats. We call on them all to avoid steps that undermine regional security and stability. We remain committed in our support of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova, and will also

continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act.

48. The Black Sea region continues to be important for Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the progress in consolidating regional cooperation and ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms, in the spirit of transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness. We will continue to support, as appropriate, efforts based on regional priorities and dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.

49. Cyber attacks continue to increase significantly in number and evolve in sophistication and complexity. We reaffirm the cyber defence commitments made at the Lisbon Summit. Following Lisbon, last year we adopted a Cyber Defence Concept, Policy, and Action Plan, which are now being implemented. Building on NATO's existing capabilities, the critical elements of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Full Operational Capability (FOC), including protection of most sites and users, will be in place by the end of 2012. We have committed to provide the resources and complete the necessary reforms to bring all NATO bodies under centralised cyber protection, to ensure that enhanced cyber defence

capabilities protect our collective investment in NATO. We will further integrate cyber defence measures into Alliance structures and procedures and, as individual nations, we remain committed to identifying and delivering national cyber defence capabilities that strengthen Alliance collaboration and interoperability, including through NATO defence planning processes. We will develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against, and recover from cyber attacks. To address the cyber security threats and to improve our common security, we are committed to engage with relevant partner nations on a case-by-case basis and with international organisations, inter alia the EU, as agreed, the Council of Europe, the UN and the OSCE, in order to increase concrete cooperation. We will also take full advantage of the expertise offered by the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia.

50. We continue to be deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery. Proliferation threatens our shared vision of creating the conditions necessary for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We share the United Nations Security Council's serious concern with Iran's nuclear programme and call upon Iran

to fully comply with all its international obligations, including all relevant Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors. We further call upon Iran to cooperate with the international community to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme in compliance with its NPT obligations. We support the immediate resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means and encourage a sustained process of engagement within the format of the P5+1 and Iran talks. We are deeply concerned by the proliferation activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and call on it to comply fully with all relevant UNSCRs and international obligations, especially by abandoning all activities related to its existing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. We strongly condemn the launch by the DPRK on 13 April 2012 using ballistic missile technology. We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the NPT and the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard Agreement, and call for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 and welcome further work under UNSCR 1977. We also call on all states to strengthen the security of nuclear materials within their borders, as called for at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. We will continue to implement

NATO's Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats. We will ensure NATO has the appropriate capabilities, including for planning efforts, training and exercises, to address and respond to CBRN attacks.

51. Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations can never be tolerated or justified. We deplore all loss of life from acts of terrorism and extend our sympathies to the victims. We reaffirm our commitment to fight terrorism with unwavering resolve in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter. Today we have endorsed NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism, and task the Council to prepare an Action Plan to further enhance NATO's ability to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism by identifying initiatives to enhance our threat awareness, capabilities, and engagement.

52. A stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations concerned, NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security. Today, we have noted a progress report which outlines the concrete steps taken since our last Summit and describes the way

forward to integrate, as appropriate, energy security considerations in NATO's policies and activities. We will continue to consult on energy security and further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. To this end, we will work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces; develop our competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and further develop our outreach activities in consultation with partners, on a case-by-case basis. We welcome the offer to establish a NATO-accredited Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania as a contribution to NATO's efforts in this area. We task the Council to continue to refine NATO's role in energy security in accordance with the principles and the guidelines agreed at the Bucharest Summit and the direction provided by the new Strategic Concept as well as the Lisbon decisions. We task the Council to produce a further progress report for our next Summit.

53. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

54. In Lisbon, we called for a review of NATO's overall posture in deterring

and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account the changes in the evolving international security environment. We have today approved, and made public, the results of our Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence to fulfil its commitments as set out in the Strategic Concept. Consistent with the Strategic Concept and their commitments under existing arms control treaties and frameworks, Allies will continue to support arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts.

55. We will ensure that the Alliance continues to have the capabilities needed to perform the essential core tasks to which we committed ourselves in the Strategic Concept. To that end, we have agreed a separate Chicago Defence Declaration and endorsed the Defence Package for the Chicago Summit, outlining a vision and a clear way forward towards our goal of *NATO Forces 2020*.

56. We welcome the recent Council decision to continue the NATO Air Policing Mission in the Baltic states, and appreciate the recent commitment by the Baltic states to enhance their host nation support to the participating Allies. Allies remain committed to contributing to this mission, which is also an example

of *Smart Defence* in practice. This peacetime mission and other Alliance air policing arrangements demonstrate the Alliance's continued and visible commitment to collective defence and solidarity.

57. The Alliance's recent operational experiences also show that the ability of NATO forces to act together seamlessly and rapidly is critical to success. We will, therefore, ensure that the Alliance's forces remain well connected through expanded education, training and exercises. In line with the Alliance's commitment to transparency, and in the expectation of reciprocity, these activities are open for partner participation and observation on a case-by-case basis. In this context, we attach particular importance to next year's "*Steadfast Jazz*" exercise for the NATO Response Force which, along with other exercises, will contribute to the ability of NATO forces to operate together anywhere on Alliance territory and in wider crisis management operations.

58. We continue to be concerned by the increasing threats to our Alliance posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. At our Summit in Lisbon we decided to develop a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to pursue our core task of collective defence. The aim of this capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing

threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can, and will, adapt accordingly.

59. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. This capability is purely defensive.

60. We are pleased today to declare that the Alliance has achieved an Interim NATO BMD Capability. It will provide with immediate effect an operationally significant first step, consistent with our Lisbon decision, offering the maximum coverage within available means, to defend our populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack. Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces, based on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting arrangements, and on the expansion of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability.

Only the command and control systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defence are eligible for common funding. Within the context of the NATO BMD capability, Turkey hosts a forward-based early-warning radar. We note the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defence, and encourage Allies to explore possible additional voluntary contributions, including through multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment.

61. As with all of NATO's operations, full political control by Allies over military actions undertaken pursuant to this Interim Capability will be ensured. Given the short flight times of ballistic missiles, the Council agrees the pre-arranged command and control rules and procedures including to take into account the consequences of intercept compatible with coverage and protection requirements. We have tasked the Council to regularly review the implementation of the NATO BMD capability, including before the Foreign and Defence Ministers' meetings, and prepare a comprehensive report on progress and issues to be addressed for its future development, for us by our next Summit.

62. The Alliance remains prepared to engage with third states, on a case by case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase ballistic

missile defence effectiveness. Given our shared security interests with Russia, we remain committed to cooperation on missile defence in the spirit of mutual trust and reciprocity, such as the recent NRC Theatre Missile Defence Exercise. Through ongoing efforts in the NATO-Russia Council, we seek to determine how independent NATO and Russian missile defence systems can work together to enhance European security. We look forward to establishing the proposed joint NATO-Russia Missile Data Fusion Centre and the joint Planning Operations Centre to cooperate on missile defence. We propose to develop a transparency regime based upon a regular exchange of information about the current respective missile defence capabilities of NATO and Russia. Such concrete missile defence cooperation is the best means to provide Russia with the assurances it seeks regarding NATO's missile defence plans and capabilities. In this regard, we today reaffirm that the NATO missile defence in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities. NATO missile defence is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. While regretting recurrent Russian statements on possible measures directed against NATO's missile defence system, we welcome Russia's willingness to continue dialogue with the purpose

of finding an agreement on the future framework for missile defence cooperation.

63. We remain committed to conventional arms control. NATO CFE Allies recall that the decisions taken in November 2011 to cease implementing certain CFE obligations with regard to the Russian Federation are reversible, should the Russian Federation return to full implementation. NATO CFE Allies continue to implement fully their CFE obligations with respect to all other CFE States Parties. Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen and modernise the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, and continue to explore ideas to this end.

64. At our Summit in Lisbon, we agreed on an ambitious reform programme. This package of reforms remains essential for guaranteeing the Alliance is responsive and effective in carrying out the ambitious tasks envisioned in our Strategic Concept, the Lisbon Declaration, as well as the Declaration on Defence Capabilities we have adopted today. To this end:

- **NATO Command Structure.** We are implementing a leaner, more effective and affordable NATO Command Structure with its first phase and its package elements being effective during 2012. The number of subordinate headquarters, as well as the peacetime staffing and establishment,

are being significantly reduced and implementation will be complete by 2015.

- NATO Headquarters. We have rationalised a number of services between the International Staff (IS) and the International Military Staff (IMS). The move to the new headquarters in 2016 provides a unique opportunity to achieve more efficient and effective support to the work of the Alliance. We welcome the ongoing review of the IS, and the forthcoming review of the IMS; we look forward to the continuation of these reforms in line with those being carried out by nations. An important part of this comprehensive reform will be a review of our priorities and IS and IMS spending to identify activities that are no longer needed, improve efficiency, and achieve savings. This review will take place with the appropriate involvement of the Military Committee.

- NATO Agencies. The consolidation and rationalization of the existing NATO Agencies' functions and services is underway with new NATO Agencies for Support, Communication & Information, and Procurement,

to be stood up on 1 July 2012. The new Agencies' executives will work to optimise savings and improvements in effectiveness as the new entities mature over the next two years.

- Resource Management. We have achieved solid progress in reforming the management of NATO's resources in the areas of programming, transparency, accountability, and information management. These reforms are making NATO resource and financial management more efficient, and are helping us to match resources to requirements. In this context, we will continue to reform our structures and procedures in order to seek greater efficiencies including from better use of our budgets.

We look forward to a further report on progress on these reforms by the time of our next Summit.

65. We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the Government of the United States as well as the people and City of Chicago. The decisions we have taken at our Summit in Chicago reinforce our common commitments, our capabilities and our cooperation, and will strengthen the Alliance for the years ahead.



CHICAGO SUMMIT DECLARATION ON AFGHANISTAN

***Issued by the Heads of State and Government
of Afghanistan and Nations
contributing to the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF)***

Preamble

1. We, the nations contributing to ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, met today in Chicago to renew our firm commitment to a sovereign, secure and democratic Afghanistan. In line with the strategy which we agreed at the Lisbon Summit, ISAF's mission will be concluded by the end of 2014. But thereafter Afghanistan will not stand alone: we reaffirm that our close partnership will continue beyond the end of the transition period.

2. In the ten years of our partnership the lives of Afghan men, women and children, have improved significantly in terms of security, education, health care, economic opportunity and the assurance of rights and freedoms. There is more to be done, but we are

resolved to work together to preserve the substantial progress we have made during the past decade. The nations contributing to ISAF will therefore continue to support Afghanistan on its path towards self-reliance in security, improved governance, and economic and social development. This will prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world. A secure and stable Afghanistan will make an important contribution to its region, in which security, stability and development are interlinked.

3. ISAF nations and Afghanistan join in honouring all those – civilian or military, Afghan or foreign – who have lost their lives or been injured in the fight for our common security and a prosperous, peaceful and stable

* Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D8C6FB8D-BC34BC71/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm

Afghanistan. We pay particular tribute to the courage of the armed forces of Afghanistan and ISAF countries who live, train and fight next to each other every day. We are determined that all our sacrifices will be justified by our strong long-term partnership, which will contribute to a better future for the people of Afghanistan.

General principles

4. Our efforts are part of the broader engagement of the International Community as outlined by the Kabul Conference in July 2010, the Istanbul Process on regional security and cooperation which was launched in November 2011 and the Bonn Conference in December 2011.

5. We recall the firm mutual commitments made at the Bonn Conference on 5 December 2011, which form the basis of our long-term partnership. In this context, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan confirms its resolve to deliver on its commitment to a democratic society, based on the rule of law and good governance, including progress in the fight against corruption, where the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, including the equality of men and women and the active participation of both in Afghan society, are respected. The forthcoming elections must be conducted with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and in accordance

with the Afghan Constitution. Their transparency, inclusivity and credibility will also be of paramount importance. In this context, continued progress towards these goals will encourage ISAF nations to further provide their support up to and beyond 2014.

6. We emphasise the importance of full participation of all Afghan women in the reconstruction, political, peace and reconciliation processes in Afghanistan and the need to respect the institutional arrangements protecting their rights. We remain committed to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security. We recognise also the need for the protection of children from the damaging effects of armed conflict as required in relevant UNSCRs.

Fulfilling the Lisbon Roadmap and building the Enduring Partnership

7. In Lisbon, in November 2010, we decided on the phased transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), in order to enable Afghans to take full responsibility for their own security. NATO/ISAF and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remain committed to this transition strategy which began in July 2011. Irreversible transition is on track and will be completed by the end of 2014.

We also recognise in this context the importance of a comprehensive approach and continued improvements in governance and development.

8. The third wave of provinces to enter the transition process was announced by President Karzai on 13 May 2012. This means that 75% of Afghanistan's population will soon be living in areas where the ANSF have taken the lead for security. By mid-2013, all parts of Afghanistan will have begun transition and the Afghan forces will be in the lead for security nation-wide. This will mark an important milestone in the Lisbon roadmap. ISAF is gradually and responsibly drawing down its forces to complete its mission by 31 December 2014.

9. The success of transition has been enabled by the substantial improvement of the ANSF since Lisbon in terms of capability and professionalism. Afghan soldiers are increasingly taking the lead in operations on Afghan soil. Afghan forces, both army and police, have proven able to maintain security in those areas which have already entered into transition.

10. The completion of transition, however, will not mean the end of the International Community's commitment to Afghanistan's stability and development. Afghanistan and NATO reaffirm their commitment to further develop the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership signed at Lisbon in 2010 in all its dimensions, up to 2014

and beyond, including through joint programmes to build capacity such as the Building Integrity Initiative. In this context, NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will now deepen their consultations towards shaping the Enduring Partnership.

11. Meanwhile, we welcome the fact that a number of ISAF countries have concluded, or are in the process of concluding, bilateral partnership agreements with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. These bilateral partnership frameworks will form the basis of cooperation and friendship between an independent, sovereign and democratic Afghanistan and those countries on the basis of equality and mutual interest.

Beyond 2014

12. In order to safeguard and build on the substantial progress and shared achievement, ISAF nations reaffirm their enduring commitment to Afghan security beyond 2014; the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continues to welcome that support.

13. ISAF, including the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, has played a key role in taking the ANSF to the levels they have now reached. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan reaffirms that NATO has a crucial part to play, with partners and alongside other actors, in training, advising and assisting the ANSF

and invites NATO to continue its support. As transition of security responsibility is completed at the end of 2014, NATO will have made the shift from a combat mission to a new training, advising and assistance mission, which will be of a different nature to the current ISAF mission.

14. We agree to work towards establishing such a new NATO-led mission. We will ensure that the new mission has a sound legal basis, such as a United Nations Security Council Resolution.

Sustaining the ANSF

15. With the support of ISAF nations, Afghanistan is committed to developing an ANSF which is governed by the Constitution and is capable of providing security to all Afghans. It will operate under effective civilian leadership, in accordance with the rule of law, and respecting human rights.

16. At the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn on 5 December 2011, the wider International Community decided to support the training, equipping, financing and capability development of the ANSF beyond the end of the transition period. NATO Allies and ISAF partners reaffirm their strong commitment to this process and will play their part in the financial sustainment of the ANSF. We also call on the International Community to commit to this long-term sustainment. The pace and the size of a gradual

managed force reduction from the ANSF surge peak to a sustainable level will be conditions-based and decided by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in consultation with the International Community. The preliminary model for a future total ANSF size, defined by the International Community and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, envisages a force of 228,500 with an estimated annual budget of US\$ 4.1 billion, and will be reviewed regularly against the developing security environment.

17. Sustaining a sufficient and capable ANSF is the responsibility of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan supported by the International Community. As part of the wider International Community, and building upon existing mechanisms, we will play our part in developing appropriate, coherent and effective funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of the ANSF. Such mechanisms will be flexible, transparent, accountable, cost-effective and will include measures against corruption. They will also distinguish between funding for the army and the police as well as for further capacity development within the relevant Afghan ministries and security institutions.

18. As the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan's yearly share will increase progressively from at least US \$500m in 2015,

with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. In the light of this, during the Transformation Decade, we expect international donors will reduce their financial contributions commensurate with the assumption by the Afghan government of increasing financial responsibility.

19. As the Afghan National Police further develop and professionalise, they will evolve towards a sustainable, credible, and accountable civilian law enforcement force that will shoulder the main responsibility for domestic security. This force should be capable of providing policing services to the Afghan population as part of the broader Afghan rule of law system. This will require an adequate plan to be developed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, supported as appropriate by the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) or its successor. Both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police will play a crucial role in ensuring security and stability, and in supporting legitimate governance and sustainable economic growth across the country.

Towards a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan

20. A political process involving successful reconciliation and reintegration is key to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. In this context, we reiterate the importance

of the principles decided at the Bonn Conference. These are that the process leading to reconciliation must be truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, and must be inclusive and representative of the legitimate interests of all Afghan people, regardless of gender or status. Reconciliation must also contain the reaffirmation of a sovereign, stable and united Afghanistan, the renunciation of violence, the breaking of ties to international terrorism, and compliance with the Afghan Constitution, including its human rights provisions, especially on the rights of women.

21. A peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan will positively contribute to economic and social development in the wider region, and deliver progress in the fight against narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism and crime. In this context, regional cooperation and support for stability in Afghanistan is key. There are two important events on the way to securing the future commitment of key regional and international partners. The upcoming Kabul Ministerial Conference on the Istanbul Process will launch an initial set of regional confidence-building measures while at the Tokyo Conference the International Community and Afghan leadership will discuss a framework for future development assistance.

22. Our task is not yet complete. But in the light of our substantial achievements, and building on our firm and shared commitment, we are confident that our strong partnership will lead Afghanistan towards a better future.



SUMMIT DECLARATION ON DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

TOWARD NATO FORCES 2020

1. As Alliance leaders, we are determined to ensure that NATO retains and develops the capabilities necessary to perform its essential core tasks collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security – and thereby to play an essential role promoting security in the world. We must meet this responsibility while dealing with an acute financial crisis and responding to evolving geo-strategic challenges. NATO allows us to achieve greater security than any one Ally could attain acting alone. We confirm the continued importance of a strong transatlantic link and Alliance solidarity as well as the significance of sharing responsibilities, roles, and risks to meet the challenges North-American and European Allies face together. We recognise the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence and welcome the efforts of the European Union to strengthen its capacities to address

common security challenges. These efforts are themselves an important contribution to the transatlantic link.

2. The strength of NATO has been Allies' forces – their training, equipment, interoperability and *experience* – drawn together and directed by our integrated command structure. The success of our forces in Libya, Afghanistan, the Balkans and in fighting piracy is a vivid illustration that NATO remains unmatched in its ability to deploy and sustain military power to safeguard the security of our populations and to contribute to international peace and security.

3. That success is the result of over six decades of close cooperation in defence. By working together through NATO, we are better able to ensure the security to our citizens – and to do so far more effectively and efficiently – than would be possible by acting alone.

* Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D8C6FB8D-BC34BC71/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm

4. We have already made concrete progress since our last Summit in Lisbon and the adoption there of the new Strategic Concept in ensuring NATO has the capabilities it needs to defend our citizens, conduct crisis management operations, and foster cooperative security. Among other important accomplishments:

- Today, we have declared an interim ballistic missile defence capability as an initial step to establish NATO's missile defence system, which will protect all NATO European territories, populations and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility.

- We are deploying a highly sophisticated Alliance Ground Surveillance system, so that our forces can better, and more safely, carry out the missions we give them; in this regard, a number of Allies have launched an important initiative to improve Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance more broadly.

- We have extended our air policing mission in the Baltic

states. This mission and other Alliance air policing arrangements in Europe, whereby Allies cooperate to provide security and reassurance, are visible signs of Alliance solidarity.

- We are putting in place a new, leaner and more effective command structure.

- We have made steady progress in developing a number of capabilities we identified in Lisbon as critical to the successful conduct of our operations, including: improving our defences against cyber attacks; extending NATO's air command and control system; and augmenting our capabilities in Afghanistan for exchanging intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data and countering improvised explosive devices.

5. In the light of this progress, we have confidently set ourselves the goal of NATO Forces 2020: modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment.

6. Fundamental to achieving this goal will be improvements in the way we develop and deliver the capabilities our missions require. In addition to essential national efforts and existing, proven forms of multinational cooperation such as in the areas of strategic airlift

and airborne warning and control, we must find new ways to cooperate more closely to acquire and maintain key capabilities, prioritise on what we need most and consult on changes to our defence plans. We should also deepen the connections among the Allies and between them and our partners on the basis of mutual benefit. Maintaining a strong defence industry in Europe and making the fullest possible use of the potential of defence industrial cooperation across the Alliance remain an essential condition for delivering the capabilities needed for 2020 and beyond.

7. Smart Defence is at the heart of this new approach. The development and deployment of defence capabilities is first and foremost a national responsibility. But as technology grows more expensive, and defence budgets are under pressure, there are key capabilities which many Allies can only obtain if they work together to develop and acquire them. We therefore welcome the decisions of Allies to take forward specific multinational projects, including for better protection of our forces, better surveillance and better training. These projects will deliver improved operational effectiveness, economies of scale, and closer connections between our forces. They will also provide experience for more such Smart Defence projects in future.

8. But Smart Defence is more than this. It represents a changed outlook, the opportunity for a renewed culture of cooperation in which multinational collaboration is given new prominence as an effective and efficient option for developing critical capabilities.

9. Developing greater European military capabilities will strengthen the transatlantic link, enhance the security of all Allies and foster an equitable sharing of the burdens, benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership. In this context, NATO will work closely with the European Union, as agreed, to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU's Pooling and Sharing Initiative are complementary and mutually reinforcing; we welcome the efforts of the EU, in particular in the areas of air-to-air refuelling, medical support, maritime surveillance and training. We also welcome the national efforts in these and other areas by European Allies and Partners. The success of our efforts will continue to depend on mutual transparency and openness between the two organisations.

10. We are also taking steps to enhance the linkages between our forces, and with partner countries as well. Our operation over Libya showed once again the importance of such connections; as soon as the political decision was taken to initiate the NATO mission, Alliance

pilots were flying wing to wing with each other, and with pilots from non-NATO European and Arab partner countries. That was essential to the military and political success of the mission.

11. We will build on that success through the Connected Forces Initiative. We will expand education and training of our personnel, complementing in this way essential national efforts. We will enhance our exercises. We will link our networks together even more. We will strengthen the bonds between NATO Command Structure, the NATO Force Structure, and our national headquarters. We will also enhance cooperation among our Special Operations Forces including through NATO's Special Operations Forces Headquarters. We will strengthen the use of the NATO Response Force, so that it can play a greater role in enhancing the ability of Alliance forces to operate together and to contribute to our deterrence

and defence posture. As much as possible, we will also step up our connections with Partners, so that when we wish to act together, we can.

12. While much has been accomplished since our last Summit to strengthen the Alliance, and recognising an increased reliance on the part of many Allies on multinational cooperation and capabilities, much remains to be done. To that end, we have adopted a Defence Package that will help us develop and deliver the capabilities our missions and operations require. We will continue to reform our structures and procedures in order to seek greater efficiencies, including from the better use of our budgets.

13. NATO's greatest strength is its unity. Through 2020 and beyond, stimulated by the requirement to use defence resources in the most efficient way, we will deepen that unity to maintain and upgrade NATO's military strength.





DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE POSTURE REVIEW

1. Introduction/Context

1. At the Lisbon Summit, the Heads of State and Government mandated a review of NATO's overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account the changes in the evolving international security environment. Over the past year, NATO has undertaken a rigorous analysis of its deterrence and defence posture. The results of this review are set out below.

2. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. NATO will ensure that it maintains the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.

Allies' goal is to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.

3. The review has reinforced Alliance cohesion and the continuing credibility of its posture. The review has also demonstrated anew the value of the Alliance's efforts to influence the international security environment in positive ways through cooperative security and the contribution that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation can play in achieving its security objectives, objectives that are fully in accord with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO will continue to seek security at the lowest possible level of forces.

4. NATO's Strategic Concept describes a *security environment* that contains a broad and evolving set of opportunities and challenges to the security of NATO territory and populations. While the threat of conventional attack against NATO

* Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-2F404073-7A790A9C/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm

is low, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. The persistence of regional conflicts continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance as are increasing defence spending in other parts of the world and the acquisition of increasingly advanced capabilities by some emerging powers. Globalisation, emerging security challenges, such as cyber threats, key environmental and resource constraints, including the risk of disruption to energy supplies, and the emergence of new technologies will continue shaping the future security environment in areas of interest to NATO. A number of vulnerable, weak and failed or failing states, together with the growing capabilities of non-state actors, will continue to be a source of instability and potential conflict. These factors, alongside existing threats and challenges such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, piracy, and terrorism, will continue to contribute to an unpredictable security environment.

5. The current *economic environment* is a challenging one, as evidenced by recent reductions in many Allies' defence budgets and the probability of further cuts. In particular, Allies recognise that the challenge of maintaining modern, effective conventional forces is especially acute in an era of limited budgets. Allies are committed to the maintenance of the full range of capabilities necessary to meet

the Alliance's level of ambition despite these financial difficulties, and are developing innovative approaches to cooperating in the development of our capabilities to help achieve this goal.

6. Developments in the strategic environment since the Lisbon Summit and the review itself have confirmed the validity of the three essential core tasks identified in the Strategic Concept. We reaffirm our commitment to *collective defence*, which remains the cornerstone of our Alliance, to *crisis management*, and to *cooperative security*.

7. A robust deterrence and defence posture strengthens Alliance cohesion, including the transatlantic link, through an equitable and sustainable distribution of roles, responsibilities, and burdens.

II. The Contribution of Nuclear Forces

8. Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defence alongside conventional and missile defence forces. The review has shown that the Alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture.

9. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear

alliance. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

10. Allies acknowledge the importance of the independent and unilateral negative security assurances offered by the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Those assurances guarantee, without prejudice to the separate conditions each State has attached to those assurances, including the inherent right to self-defence as recognised under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, that nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened to be used against Non-Nuclear Weapon States that are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Allies further recognise the value that these statements can have in seeking to discourage nuclear proliferation. Allies note that the states that have assigned nuclear weapons to NATO apply to these weapons the assurances they have each offered on a national basis, including the separate conditions each state has attached to these assurances.

11. While seeking to create the conditions and considering options for further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO, Allies concerned¹ will ensure that all components of NATO's nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance. That requires sustained leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission and planning guidance aligned with 21st century requirements.

12. Consistent with our commitment to remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist, Allies agree that the NAC will task the appropriate committees to develop concepts for how to ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies concerned¹ in their nuclear sharing arrangements, including in case NATO were to decide to reduce its reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe.

III. The Contribution of Conventional Forces

13. The Allies' conventional forces, their effectiveness amplified by the Alliance structures and procedures that unite them, make indispensable contributions to deterrence of a broad range of threats and to defence. By their nature, they can be employed in a flexible fashion and can provide the Alliance

¹ i.e. all members of the Nuclear Planning Group.

with a range of options with which to respond to unforeseen contingencies. They also contribute to providing visible assurance of NATO's cohesion as well as the Alliance's ability and commitment to respond to the security concerns of each and every Ally.

14. Among their key characteristics, the Allies' forces must be modern, flexible, and interoperable, capable of meeting a wide range of circumstances, including if necessary high-intensity combat operations. Such forces must be able to successfully conduct and sustain a range of operations for *collective defence* and *crisis response*, including at strategic distance. They must be rapidly deployable and sustainable; able to operate alongside other nations and organisations; and be adaptable enough to respond to unforeseen developments. They must also contribute to meeting future security challenges such as cyber attacks, terrorism, the disruption of critical supply lines, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Allies are committed to increasing the opportunities for their conventional forces, especially those in the NATO Response Force, to train and exercise together and in that way, among others, to strengthen their ability to operate in concert anywhere on Alliance territory and beyond.

15. The bulk of the conventional capabilities that are available now and will be available in the future

for Alliance operations are provided by the Allies individually; they must therefore provide *adequate resources* for their military forces so that they will have the required characteristics, notwithstanding current and probably continuing financial difficulties.

16. Nevertheless, fielding and maintaining the capabilities needed for the full range of Alliance missions in a period of severe *budgetary restrictions* requires a new conceptual approach, one that places a premium on the identification and pursuit of priorities, multinational cooperation, and specialisation as appropriate, and on increased efforts to ensure that the Allies' and, as appropriate, our partners forces are interoperable. The work underway to outline how the Alliance intends to meet its future capability requirements, referred to as NATO Forces 2020, will be key in this context. This package will continue the important work on *transformation and reform* of Alliance structures and procedures that are already underway, as part of an effective and financially responsible approach to the development of capabilities. This should include further developing cyber defence capacities and integrating them into Allied structures and procedures. As also stated in the Strategic Concept, it will be important for NATO and the European Union to cooperate more fully in capability

development as agreed, to avoid unnecessary duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

17. Allies' conventional forces have important roles to play in fostering *cooperative security*, including through cooperation and contacts with the armed forces of partner countries. Such activities can have broader stabilising effects by helping to shape and improve the Alliance's security environment, project stability, and prevent conflicts.

IV. The Contribution of Missile Defence

18. The proliferation of ballistic missiles is a growing concern for the Alliance and constitutes an increasing threat to Alliance security. NATO's ballistic missile defence capacity will be an important addition to the Alliance's capabilities for deterrence and defence. It will strengthen our collective defence commitment against 21st century threats. In Lisbon, Allies agreed on a missile defence capability that provides full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces, against the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account

the level of threat, affordability, and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Missile defence will become an integral part of the Alliance's overall defence posture, further strengthen the transatlantic link, and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.

19. In Chicago, Heads of State and Government announced that NATO has achieved an Interim Capability for its missile defence. The United States will contribute the European Phased Adaptive Approach to NATO missile defence. Alliance leaders also welcome decisions by individual Allies to contribute to the NATO missile defence mission, encourage calls for possible additional voluntary contributions by Allies, including through multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities. The Alliance will continue to implement the commitment made in the Lisbon package of the Alliance's most pressing capability needs to build a truly interoperable NATO missile defence capability based on the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence command and control network as the enabling backbone.

20. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. This capability is purely defensive and is being established in the light of threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. It is expected that NATO's missile

defence capabilities would complicate an adversary's planning, and provide damage mitigation. Effective missile defence could also provide valuable decision space in times of crisis. Like other weapons systems, missile defence capabilities cannot promise complete and enduring effectiveness. NATO missile defence capability, along with effective nuclear and conventional forces, will signal our determination to deter and defend against any threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area to the safety and security of our populations.

21. NATO missile defence is not oriented against Russia nor does it have the capability to undermine Russia's strategic deterrent. The Alliance, in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence, will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and, in accordance with NATO's policy of engagement with third states on ballistic missile defence, engage with other relevant states, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

V. The Contribution of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation

22. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation play *an important role* in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. Both the success

and failure of these efforts can have a direct impact on the threat environment of NATO and therefore affect NATO's deterrence and defence posture. When successful, they have contributed to more secure, stable and predictable international relations at lower levels of military forces and armaments, through effective and verifiable arms control agreements, and in the case of disarmament, through the elimination or prohibition of whole categories of armaments. Existing agreements cut across almost all aspects of the Alliance's work. However, they have not yet fully achieved their objectives and the world continues to face proliferation crises, force concentration problems, and lack of transparency.

23. NATO has been *involved in a variety of ways*, such as the coordination of positions on some conventional arms control issues, and serving as a forum for consultations and exchange of information, including with partners, on disarmament and non-proliferation. In conventional arms control the Alliance has taken a direct coordinating role in both negotiations and implementation. In other instances regarding disarmament and non-proliferation, NATO has contributed to raising international awareness.

24. The Alliance is resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the *conditions for a world without nuclear weapons* in accordance with the goals

of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

25. Allies look forward to continuing to develop and exchange transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Council, with the goal of developing detailed proposals on and increasing mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.

26. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number, types, and readiness of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. Against this background and considering the broader security environment, NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.

27. Allies agree that the NAC will task the appropriate committees to further consider, in the context of the broader security environment, what NATO would expect to see in the way of reciprocal Russian actions to allow for significant reductions in forward-based

non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.

28. In addition, Allies support and encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to continue their mutual efforts to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their nuclear weapons.

29. Reaffirming the importance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Allies remain committed to *conventional arms control* and to preserving, strengthening and modernizing the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments.

30. Allies believe that the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control and Disarmament Committee has played a useful role in the review and agree to establish a committee as a consultative and advisory forum, with its mandate to be agreed by the NAC following the Summit.

VI. Conclusions – Maintaining the “Appropriate Mix” of Capabilities

31. The review of NATO's deterrence and defence posture has confirmed that NATO must have the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against threats to the safety

of its populations and the security of its territory, which is the Alliance's greatest responsibility. As outlined above, NATO has determined that, in the current circumstances, the existing mix of capabilities and the plans for their development are sound.

32. NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence to fulfil its commitments as set out in the Strategic Concept. These capabilities, underpinned by NATO's integrated Command Structure, offer the strongest guarantee of the Alliance's security and will ensure that it is able to respond to a variety of challenges and unpredictable contingencies in a highly complex and evolving international security environment. Allies are resolved to developing ways to make their forces more effective by working creatively and adaptively together and with partners as appropriate to maximise value and strengthen interoperability, so that their forces are better able to respond to the full range of 21st century security threats, achieving greater security than any one Ally could attain acting alone.

33. Allies are committed to providing the resources needed to ensure that NATO's overall deterrence and defence posture remains credible, flexible, resilient, and adaptable, and to implementing the forward-looking package of defence capabilities, which will also be agreed in Chicago. In the course of normal Alliance processes, we will revise relevant Alliance policies and strategies to take into account the principles and judgements in this posture review.

34. NATO will continue to adjust its strategy, including with respect to the capabilities and other measures required for deterrence and defence, in line with trends in the security environment. In this context, Allies will keep under review the consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security of the acquisition of modern military capabilities in the regions and countries beyond NATO's borders. This posture review confirms that the Alliance is committed to maintaining the deterrence and defence capabilities necessary to ensure its security in an unpredictable world.





NATO'S POLICY GUIDELINES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM

*Aware, Capable and Engaged
for a Safer Future*

1. Introduction

1. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly and will remain a threat for the foreseeable future. Terrorists have demonstrated their ability to cross international borders, establish cells, reconnoitre targets and execute attacks. The threat is exacerbated by terrorist groups and individuals that continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, including Allies' own territory. Modern technology increases the potential impact of terrorist attacks employing conventional and unconventional means, particularly as terrorists seek to acquire chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) capabilities and cyber abilities. Instability or conflict can create an environment conducive to the spread

of terrorism, including by fostering extremist ideologies, intolerance and fundamentalism.

2. NATO's response to terrorism has been largely shaped by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, which prompted Allies to launch Operation Active Endeavour, to adopt the Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism (MC472) and to initiate various capability and institutional changes. In the past decade, NATO has made considerable progress in areas of importance to the Alliance such as operations, enhanced intelligence exchange and the development of technology solutions through the Defence against Terrorism Programme of Work and the Science for Peace and Security Programme.

3. Through the Alliance Strategic Concept, Allies reaffirmed that the Alliance

* Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-10FBE70C-F3064060/natolive/official_texts_87905.htm

must “*deter and defend against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole*”. Allies have, therefore, decided to review NATO’s approach to counter-terrorism and to enhance both the political and the military aspects of NATO’s contribution to national and international efforts.

4. Allies will do so by capitalising on NATO’s distinct cross-cutting strengths and by identifying the Alliance’s value-added contribution to the broad, UN-led international effort to combat terrorism. In defining NATO’s overarching approach to terrorism, Allies recognise that most counter terrorism tools remain primarily with national civilian and judicial authorities. Allies acknowledge that other International Organisations have mandates and capabilities that could enhance Allies’ efforts to counter terrorism. NATO will place particular emphasis on preventing terrorist attacks and enhancing resilience through contributing to national and international efforts while avoiding unnecessary duplication and respecting the principles of complementarity. Clear direction, enhanced coordination and greater consistency of efforts and activities will enable NATO to use its resources more effectively.

II. Aim

5. The aim of these policy guidelines is to:

- Provide strategic and risk-informed direction to the counter-terrorism activities ongoing across the Alliance as part of NATO’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.
- Identify the principles to which the Alliance adheres.
- Identify key areas in which the Alliance will undertake initiatives to enhance the prevention of and resilience to acts of terrorism with a focus on improved *awareness* of the threat, adequate *capabilities* to address it and *engagement* with partner countries and other international actors¹.

Following the adoption of these Policy Guidelines, an Action Plan for Implementation will be developed.

III. Principles

6. Compliance with International Law: NATO will continue to act in accordance with international law, the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human

¹ NATO will undertake all its activities related to partners and other international organisations in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the relevant decisions, including those taken at the Lisbon Summit.

Rights. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, International Conventions and Protocols against terrorism and relevant UN Resolutions provide the framework for all national and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism, including those conducted by the Alliance.

7. NATO's Support to Allies: Individual NATO members have primary responsibility for the protection of their populations and territories against terrorism. Cooperation through NATO can enhance Allies' efforts to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. NATO, upon request, may support these efforts.

8. Non-Duplication and Complementarity: NATO will promote complementarity with and avoid unnecessary duplication of existing efforts by individual nations or other International Organisations. NATO will seek to coordinate and leverage its expertise and resources and will focus on targeted programmes where it can contribute to and/or reinforce the actions of Allied nations and other international actors, as appropriate.

IV. Key Areas

9. NATO, as an international organisation, has unique assets and capabilities that can support Allied efforts in the fight against terrorism. As set out in the aim of these Policy Guidelines, NATO will contribute more effectively to the prevention

of terrorism and increase resilience to acts of terrorism. To this end, the Alliance will coordinate and consolidate its counter-terrorism efforts and focus on three main areas, awareness, capabilities and engagement.

10. Awareness: NATO will ensure shared awareness of the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities among Allies through consultations, enhanced sharing of intelligence, continuous strategic analysis and assessments in support of national authorities. This will enable Allies and the Alliance to prepare effectively and to take possible mitigating action in the prevention of and response to terrorist attacks. NATO will also promote common understanding of its counter-terrorism role as part of a broader international effort through engagement and strategic communications.

11. Capabilities: NATO has acquired much valuable expertise in countering asymmetric threats and in responding to terrorism. NATO's work on airspace security, air defence, maritime security, response to CBRN, non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and protection of critical infrastructure is well established. The Alliance will strive to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threats, based on the level of ambition as defined in the Political Guidance². It will do so by considering

² Any possible emerging requirements for NATO common funding will be considered in accordance with standard processes.

capability developments, innovative technologies and methods that address asymmetric threats in a more comprehensive and informed way, including through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work. NATO will also strive to maintain its operational capacity and capitalise on the lessons learned in operations, including experience gained through Special Operations Forces. Training, education and exercises based on different threat scenarios will continue to improve interoperability by assimilating lessons learned and best practices. These capabilities may also be offered to Allies in support of civil emergency planning and the protection of critical infrastructure, particularly as it may relate to counter-terrorism, as requested.

12. Engagement: The challenge of terrorism requires a holistic approach by the international community, involving a wide range of instruments. To enhance Allies' security, NATO will continue to engage with partner countries and other international actors in countering terrorism. The Alliance will strengthen its outreach to and cooperation with partner countries as well as international and regional organisations, in particular the UN, EU and OSCE, in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, to promote common understanding of the terrorist threat and to leverage the full potential of each stake-holder engaged in the global counter terrorism effort. NATO will enhance consultations and ensure a more systematic approach to practical cooperation with partner

countries³ using existing mechanisms, including scientific cooperation on technological innovation for improved security⁴. Particular emphasis will be placed on raising awareness, capacity building, civil-emergency planning and crisis management in order to respond to specific needs of partner countries and Allied interests. This will advance partners' preparedness and protection as well as their identification of vulnerabilities and gaps and help partner countries to fight terrorism more effectively themselves. Counter-terrorism training, education and support for capacity-building will be consistent with the objectives and priorities of NATO's policy on partnerships.

V. NATO's Response

13. The North Atlantic Council will guide NATO's counter-terrorism efforts and implementation of these Policy Guidelines. The Terrorism Task Force will report on an annual basis on the implementation of these Policy Guidelines.

14. NATO will maintain flexibility as to how to counter terrorism, playing a leading or supporting role as required. Allies' capabilities represent an essential component of a potential response to terrorism. Collective defence remains subject to decision by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

³ A good example is the Cooperative Airspace Initiative within the framework of the NRC.

⁴ One example of such cooperation is the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) multi-year NRC project on "*Programme for Stand-off Detection of Explosives (STANDEX)*".

STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTORATE – Vector of Euro-Atlantic Integration –

THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING

*Lieutenant General Dr Ștefan DĂNILĂ
– Chief of the General Staff –*

During the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders adopted a new strategic concept – “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”, defining the major benchmarks for the evolution and way of action of the Alliance for this decade.

The document mentioned provides the bases for an Alliance renewal process in order to deal with the challenges of the 21st century and to maintain its efficiency given the circumstances of the economic difficulties with which most member states confront.

In the author’s opinion, the allied policies in the domains of interest, the level of ambition, the basic doctrines and guidelines that establish the activity of the Alliance’s command and force structure derive from the NATO strategic concept.

Keywords: *enduring development; risks and threats; capability packages; smart defence*

Strategic planning is a vital component of the military system. It is the result of a complex process, in which there are analysed the phenomena and events that influence the national and international security environment, with the purpose of determining the real needs and priorities, identifying the best opportunities for the development of military capabilities and allocating with maximum efficiency the resources available in this respect.

The complex process of strategic planning, specific to the military domain, is aimed at establishing policies and procedures, developing strategies and plans, setting objectives and standards of performance, programmes and activities needed for the efficient functioning of the institution.

Throughout the years, there have been several approaches to the concept of *strategic planning*. Sometimes, “*strategic planning*” confused

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itself even with the “strategy” itself, with the “operations plan at strategic level” or the “campaign plan”.

Essentially, at strategic level, military planners focus their efforts to coherently and correctly answer the following questions: “Where are we?”, “How did we get here?” (it refers to the way in which the system works), “Where are we heading?”, “Where should we be?” (the desired end state) and “How will we get there?”. Giving proper answers to these simple questions requires, at both national and NATO level, the development of a complex process, whose results fundamentally determine the functioning of the military system.

Liddell Hart, British military man and historian, defines strategic planning as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy”.

Within NATO, the “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” is the key document for strategic planning.

The Strategic Concept is approved at the level of the North Atlantic Council and reflects the way in which the Alliance intends to provide the defence of its members in relation to the changes in the international security environment.

During the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders adopted a new strategic concept – “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”, defining the major benchmarks for the evolution and way of action of the Alliance for this decade. The document mentioned provides the bases for an Alliance renewal process, the planning domain included, in order to deal with the challenges of the 21st century and to maintain its efficiency.

The allied policies in the domains of interest, the level of ambition, the basic doctrines and guidelines that establish the activity of the Alliance’s command and force structure derive from the NATO strategic concept.

According to the new NATO Strategic Concept, allied strategic planning has the fundamental role of establishing the needed capabilities with a view to carrying out the politically undertaken missions corresponding to a certain level of ambition, approved by the North Atlantic Council.

Basically, in NATO’s vision, the capability represents an operation effect that can be achieved and supported for a period of time, which includes the procedures through which the desired effect can be attained.

The initiation of the planning process has at its basis the analysis of the international situation and of the possible evolutions in the international security environment. An important part is played by the acknowledgment/identification of threats, followed by the analysis of the risk potential depending on own vulnerabilities. Countering threats and achieving the desired effect are made based

on efficiency-related evaluations that take into account the possible opportunities. The process entails checking the inventory of existing capabilities and assessing their potential in countering threats and reducing to minimum the risk level. It is the role of allied strategic planning to identify the optimal solutions to respond to the new risks and threats that are specific to the contemporary international environment.

The process is conceived according to models of management that are specific to the development of a business, based on principles such as efficiency, optimisation, complementarity, continuous development, improvement etc.

At allied level, the planning process requires the involvement of all nations. The needed capabilities identified at allied level are provided mostly through the contribution of member states, which, following a complex process of analysis and negotiation with the representatives of the Alliance command structure, assume the tasks of achieving certain capabilities. A small part is provided through the development of capabilities packages with the common funds of the Alliance, within the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP).

The constant decrease in the resources meant for the member states defence budgets has a substantial influence on the strategic planning process at the level of the Alliance and has determined the promotion of the concept of “*smart defence*”. The emergence of this concept is based on two important premises: the decision of NATO member states leaders, expressed at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, to maintain the entire spectrum of missions of the Alliance, assuming the challenges associated with the process of generating the capabilities necessary for carrying out these missions, and the significant difficulties generated by the current economic crisis in carrying out the engagements of NATO member states and in reaching the goals of transforming own forces.

The concept of “*smart defence*” represents a response to the challenge of using with maximum efficiency the limited resources, is based on the multinational cooperation and establishes *three specific courses of action*:

➤ *Identification and prioritisation of critical capabilities requirements.* In this respect, it was identified a critical capabilities package and it was reviewed the defence planning process with the purpose of guiding it to cover the deficient areas, paying special attention to the use of the lessons learned during current operations in developing future capabilities. Moreover, a system of indicators was established in order to provide the Alliance strategic planners with the possibility of timely evaluating the results of the capabilities development process and of efficiently guiding the efforts towards deficient areas.

➤ *Promotion of an extensive cooperation in the field of defence.* This course of action aims to strengthen the cooperation between Alliance member states regarding defence programmes, using at maximum the NATO-EU cooperation relations and capitalising on the joint effort of relevant NATO committees (DPPC, CNAD, MC).

➤ *Exploitation of all opportunities for multinational cooperation.* The concept stipulates that NATO must assume an active role of catalyst for the relations between member nations, with the purpose of identifying and exploiting those opportunities that can contribute to achieving the capabilities.

There is a permanent connection between the structures responsible for strategic planning at Alliance level and those with responsibilities in this area belonging to the Romanian Armed Forces, reflected mainly in the coordination of the national transformation process with the allied one, the participation in the capabilities planning process, the implementation of the concepts promoted at Alliance level and the participation in initiatives developed in the multinational allied framework.

As far as the capabilities development process carried out within NATO are concerned, *a few* of the important initiatives in which the Romanian Armed Forces are involved are:

➤ *NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C)*, which ensures the fulfilment of Alliance missions in the field of air surveillance, early warning and weapons command and control.

➤ *Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)*, which consists in the acquisition and use in common by the states participating in this initiative of a number of C-17 aircraft to meet the strategic airlift requirements at NATO level.

➤ *Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)* is meant to ensure information superiority for the NATO forces that are deployable in the theatres of operations.

➤ *Air Command and Control System (ACCS)* ensures the planning and fulfilment of offensive and defensive air operations, as well as air support missions.

➤ *Deployable Communication Module (DCM)* is a capability established and operating on Romanian territory with most of the contribution coming from our country.

The participation in these initiatives is the expression and result of strategic planning carried out at NATO level as well as at the level of the specialised structures of the Romanian Armed Forces, which actively participate and add value to a complex process aimed at achieving the necessary conditions for the collective defence of NATO member states.

In keeping with the essence of the concept of “*smart defence*”, namely the *innovative multinational approach to capabilities development*, Romania considers the possibility of getting involved in achieving a wider range of capabilities projects, proposed to nations by the NATO political and military command structures. The NATO Summit held in Chicago on 20-21 May 2012 confirmed the engagement of the Alliance in carrying out the respective projects, our country supporting the identification of viable solutions that should contribute, given the current budgetary constraints, to strengthening NATO’s military capabilities.

It is an acknowledged fact that the multinational approach to NATO capabilities development can be applied only in close connection with a similar EU initiative, respectively *pooling and sharing* capabilities. Considering, on the one hand, that a significant number of NATO member states are also EU member states and, on the other hand, the need to avoid effort duplication, the close and permanent link between the two organisations becomes particularly important in the process of implementation of the concepts of “*smart defence*” and “*pooling and sharing*”.

Currently, the NATO command structure and force structure undergo a complex transformation process, which determines similar developments in the armed forces of the member states. The number of NATO operational commands was diminished substantially and the number of troops serving these commands decreased in the last decade, in a significant percentage. All these changes are based on a complex analysis of the dynamics of international relations, contemporary military phenomenon, available resources and, last but not least, a fluent strategic planning in keeping with NATO requirements.

National strategic planning is fundamentally determined by the Alliance’s transformation process, with the purpose of adjusting the structure, missions and way of action of the Romanian Armed Forces in the context of the contemporary and future international security environment.

Continuing the Romanian military institution transformation process, in close connection with the similar process carried out at allied level, is a viable guarantee that the military capabilities necessary to fulfil the national constitutional responsibilities and the engagements undertaken at international level will be developed.

In full accordance with the steps taken at the level of the North Atlantic Alliance, the efforts of the personnel of the *Strategic Planning Directorate*, the specialised structure of the General Staff, aim at continuing the transformation process at the level of the force structure, developing the capabilities necessary for carrying out specific missions and undertaken engagements, improving the operational planning process,

efficiently participating in the allied capabilities planning and managing the forces engaged in missions abroad.

The activity of the *Strategic Planning Directorate* materialises in the development of programmatic documents (scenarios, strategies, plans, concepts, syntheses) and studies, which contribute to substantiating the decisions of military leaders in the domains of competence in peacetime and to commanding military actions in crisis situations and/or at war.

Strategic planning should provide a qualitative leap in the processes meant to predict the evolution of the force structure and missions of the Romanian Armed Forces, taking into account, in a complex manner, the influences exerted by the current security environment, the fulfilment of the constitutional role of the military institution and the accomplishment of the obligations arising from Romania's status of NATO and EU member state.

Considering the dynamic, continuous and extremely complex nature of the military strategic planning, the *most effective use of human, material and financial resources* is necessary so that modern, rapidly deployable, flexible and efficient capabilities could be achieved in order to ensure the credibility of the national territory defence, the fulfilment of the engagements undertaken within the collective defence and the participation in international missions, in accordance with the priorities and requirements of Romania's foreign and security policy.

The achievement of this goal requires the allocation of proper financial resources, even in the current difficult economic conditions, in accordance with the imperatives arising from Romania's status as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. The efficient investment in the military domain, in the medium and long term, must be focused on concrete projects aimed to develop capabilities that are consistent with the requirements of the modern battlefield.

Also, strategic planning objectives must pursue the fulfilment of capabilities objectives that are or will be undertaken within NATO and the EU, removing the limitations identified in the process of the affirmation of operationalised structures so far and the development of acquisition programmes necessary for equipping the structures made available to the Alliance within the 2008-2018 planning cycle.


Special attention should be paid to achieving essential operational capabilities such as the command – control – communications – computers – intelligence – surveillance and reconnaissance system; forces meant to be engaged in military

actions; strategic lift means, force protection system and logistics support capabilities in the theatre of operations.

In this context, it is required the implementation of a system for assessing the operational capacity of military structures, which should enable, on the one hand, the accurate and continuous knowledge of the state of units, and, on the other hand, provide the guarantee of the allocation to a particular operation of the optimal capabilities able to perform the specific tasks.

This will allow the fulfilment of the major objective of the *transformation of the force structure*, namely to build modern, efficient, flexible and sustainable capabilities, with a high degree of mobility and having the capacity to act jointly and to be engaged in a wide range of missions within the multinational structures, under national or NATO command.

Strategic planning plays a key role in reaching this goal, and the permanent coordination with the similar process that takes place at allied level creates the premises of maintaining the efforts made by the Romanian military in keeping with the conceptual and actional trend developed at NATO level.

English version by
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**



STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTORATE – Vector of Euro-Atlantic Integration –

IN THE OUTPOSTS OF THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES TRANSFORMATION

Brigadier General Dr Ion COȘCODARU

The consolidation of Romania's strategic profile as a NATO and EU member state has represented a fundamental goal of Romania's foreign, security and defence policy. In this respect, in the author's opinion, in order to support our country's strategic priorities, one needs to develop armed forces that are capable of assuming a relevant role by becoming involved in international operations, from high intensity combat missions to stabilisation and reconstruction ones, as well as in the effort to counter terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

To project the capabilities that are needed in order to assume this role, it was necessary to adapt the legal framework of the defence planning process and the overall vision of Romania's political objectives in order to set a series of priorities regarding our country's foreign engagements, the forces to support these engagements and the resources needed in this respect.

Keywords: *military procurement; capabilities; interoperability; NRF; strategic planning*

Resizing and reconfiguring the security architecture at world level, as well as redefining the ways to manage multiple and complex crises require the continuous change and adjustment of specific policies and strategies. The disappearance of bipolarity has led to the unprecedented multiplication and diversification of the threats to state, regional and global security, especially the asymmetric ones, often having omnipresent and multidirectional manifestation. Against the background of the increasing risks and challenges characteristic to the current international environment, the vulnerabilities of the national and international security bodies become more and more obvious and preventing and countering them are absolute priorities.

The dynamics, amplitude and evolution of events point out that security, and, implicitly, defence exceed the area of responsibility of a single state,

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which determines the reevaluation of the concept of *international solidarity*, concomitantly with the increase in the role of global and regional security organisations such as the UN, OSCE, NATO and the EU.

Given these circumstances, NATO and the EU, the main organisations whose *raison d'être* is providing security, stability and/or economic prosperity, are based on the commitment freely taken by each member state to participate in meeting this objective and to develop proper mechanism to respond to these new challenges.

The mechanisms that are specific to these bodies are aimed at quantitatively diminishing individual efforts, concomitantly with qualitatively integrating the contribution of each member state, as a precondition to the success of the collective action. At the same time, the two bodies will further remain fora in which, basically, member/partner states participate in *consultations* that are followed by *decisions at institutional level and by assuming engagements*, as well *at actional level* (fulfilling engagements, participating in common training and operations).

Thus, for the Romanian Armed Forces – a NATO and EU member state –, the development of the *abilities to act coherently* with this bodies becomes, at the same time, a necessity and a desideratum and includes all the actions carried out for reshaping and adapting the capabilities in keeping with the institutional-functional and actional coordinates of the two bodies.

The harmonisation of the conceptual apparatus, the creation/improvement of national internal response mechanisms and the transformation of the own force structures, as well as the provision of the necessary military capabilities are objectives whose materialisation will allow and enable the efficient participation, alongside partners or allies, in managing the crises that are specific to the beginning of the millennium and in meeting common goals.

Carrying out these objectives in accordance with the set parameters has represented the most complex challenge that the General Staff has had to deal with as an exponent of, catalyst for and coordinator of the process of the Romanian Armed Forces accession and full integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures. The complexity of the challenge has been given by assuming the undertaken objectives, planning and organising the fulfilment of the requirements that are compulsory in the pre-accession period and of the post-accession engagements, at the same time with periodically shaping and reshaping the own force structure.

As a structure specialised in the analysis and assessment of military actions and, consequently, in their possible evolution, responsible for projecting the organisational and actional options of the military body, through the domains of competence and responsibilities it has been made in charge of, the Strategic Planning Directorate is known and acknowledged as the main gateway and interface

between the General Staff and the military components of NATO, the EU and other security and defence bodies.

Established through Governmental Decision no. 110 of 20 April 1997, consisting of, among others, the NATO Transition and Integration Section, the Strategic Planning and Weapons Control Directorate (J5) was made in charge of the coordination, within the General Staff, of the process of integration in NATO and consequently EU military structures. In this period, the first documents regarding defence planning according to the NATO model were designed, substantiated and drawn up. The development for the first time in the Romanian conceptual framework of the *National Security Strategy* and the *White Paper on Security and Defence* made it possible for the General Staff to create the first *Military Strategy of Romania*, followed by the *Strategic Vision – Romanian Armed Forces 2010*, documents relevant to establishing the options and directions in the military field in the short and medium run.

The broad transformation process launched at the level of the North Atlantic Alliance, in the spring of 2007, correlated with the new status of Romania of NATO and EU member, required a new restructuring of the national military institution. Thus, through the reorganisation of the General Staff, the domain of weapons control was moved to another central structure, and the Strategic Planning Directorate became a distinct entity, with responsibilities similar to the ones existing in the allied framework. In this context, the experts of the Directorate showed their professional and attitudinal competence by drawing up the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, a complex document with short-, medium- and long-term implication for the armed forces. Having as main objective coordinating the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process for the consolidation of the status of member in the two bodies, planning the force participation in NATO operations and in the military dimension of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, the Strategic Planning Directorate soon affirmed itself, through the propositions and options provided to decision-makers, as an important vector of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration and accomplishment of the defence policy objectives.

In order to meet this objective, the activity carried out by the Directorate personnel was based on a medium and long-term visionary approach, prognosis and predictability capacity, proactive and innovative, planned and creative attitude, pragmatism and efficiency – all of them based on establishing certain realistic analysis and evaluation criteria, in keeping with the allocated resources for obtaining measurable results, feedback and control, through maintaining an optimal and permanent connection with the central structures and the ones subordinated to the General Staff, as well as flexibility and permanent dialogue – in cooperation with all the factors involved at all levels, in order to identify, draw up, discuss and adopt the best solutions.

The Defence Planning Process at the General Staff

The consolidation of Romania's strategic profile as a NATO and EU member state has represented a fundamental goal of Romania's foreign, security and defence policy. In this respect, in order to support our country's strategic priorities one needs to develop armed forces that are capable of assuming a relevant role by becoming involved in international operations, from high intensity combat missions to stabilisation and reconstruction ones, as well as in the effort to counter terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

To project the capabilities that are needed in order to assume this role, it has been necessary to adapt the legal framework of the defence planning process and the overall vision of Romania's political objectives in order to set a series of priorities regarding Romania's foreign engagements, the forces to support these engagements and the resources needed in this respect.

Thus, the Strategic Planning Directorate has paid increased attention to the coordination of the development of the proposals of the General Staff for the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defence Strategy* and the *Defence White Paper*, as well as to the study, analysis and evaluation of the political-military and military phenomena in Romania's area of strategic interest and to the adoption and implementation, at the level of the force structure, of the new operational principles and concepts used in the allied framework.

Under these circumstances, the main pragmatic defence planning document, under the responsibility of the General Staff, the Strategic Planning Directorate respectively, has been intended to develop and update the *Military Strategy of Romania*, which ensures the conceptual and actional coherence, establishes the national military goals and the Armed Forces missions, seeking to materialise the vision regarding the armed forces configuration, sizing, training and procurement.

The Military Strategy establishes, for the first time, the military ambition level, stipulates the Armed Forces missions and sets the conceptual framework and the premises for the transition to capabilities-based planning, adopting a realistic approach, in accordance with the status of the armed forces and the economic and financial context, which would ensure the best possible correlation between the set level of ambition and the available resources.

In the context of supporting security objectives established by the National Defence Strategy and the Defence White Paper, the Romanian Armed Forces will be able to deter and counter any eventual armed aggression on the national or allied territory. At the same time, Romania will preserve its national interests at the Black Sea and the Danube, independently, until the activation of the "Article 5"-type functioning mechanisms, as well as through the development of the cooperation with neighbouring

allies and the regional military cooperation initiatives, and, in other maritime areas, with allies and partners.

It will also help promote regional and global stability, through the participation in crisis response operations, under NATO, EU, UN and OSCE command and within coalitions. Last but not least, it will take part in providing internal security in peacetime and support local and in supporting central and local public administration bodies in civil emergency situation, in keeping with the law.

In this context, the Romanian Armed Forces will develop and sustain a wide range of capabilities, whose implementation will be prioritised in line with the available resources, with the purpose of improving the sustainability of military actions in the theatres of operations.

Fulfilling the Prerequisites of Capabilities-Based Planning

Undergoing the extensive transformation process in the military domain, at the same time with the similar one taking place within the North Atlantic Alliance, provides the Romanian Armed Forces with the opportunity not only to be connected to the joint efforts of Alliance members, but also to benefit from the lessons learned and the experience gathered from this process, as well as from the new policies, strategies, concepts and technologies that can be developed and materialised in common to achieve and deliver the capabilities necessary to fulfil the specific range of missions.

The **goal** of transformation is to create and maintain proper military capabilities able to provide collective defence, including against emerging security challenges; crisis management; cooperation in the field of security through arrangements with strategic partners, international organisations and active contribution to the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures.

In this respect, the transformation process has been aimed at creating certain military capabilities able to ensure:

- increased capacity to act in joint, combined and multinational operations;
- implementation of new concepts and achievement of interoperability goals;
- exploitation of information superiority;
- mobility and force protection, concomitantly with their adaptation to the current pace of the changes in the technological field.

Since Romania's accession to NATO and the EU, the Romanian Armed Forces have undergone significant developments in the transformation process. The transformation vectors consist in developing military capabilities, in accordance

with the missions assigned on the national territory, and in fulfilling the obligations undertaken within NATO, the European Union and other international bodies our country is part of.

The new concepts used within the two integrating bodies substantiate the solutions meant to carry out, in the medium or long term, the objectives set in the military domain, regarding the way to develop and use capabilities, fulfil specific national missions and international military engagements undertaken, with emphasis on collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

Romania's membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union requires the establishment of a coherent national process for the development of military capabilities in close correlation with those carried out in these organisations. Romania is committed to implementing the revised defence planning process, based on the development of capabilities in the medium and long term, approved in NATO, with the purpose of ensuring consistency in allocating resources to fulfil the assigned missions.

The national military capabilities development process will be aimed at meeting the Romanian Armed Forces missions. In this respect, in the first stage, efforts will focus on delivering critical capabilities for:

- preventing, deterring and rejecting an armed aggression against Romania, through developing early warning capacity, single situational picture, timely action;
- increasing the efficiency of the leadership, command and control system;
- aerial surveillance and defence of national and common Alliance airspace;
- monitoring, researching and defending national maritime and river waterway, defined by inner Danube, maritime Danube, lagoon area, territorial waters, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone and maritime lines of communication of interest, in accordance with the international law;
- preparing and sustaining forces in operations;
- preparing and participating in NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU Battlegroups;
- developing forces and capabilities that must be made available for the Alliance and the European Union, in accordance with *Force Goals 2008* and *Headline Goal 2010*.

In order to address the current and future challenges to and difficulties of the changing security environment, the Romanian Armed Forces force structure must meet the following requirements:

- high level of adaptability to the type of operation they participate in and the specifics of the assigned mission;

- information superiority and increased reaction speed, for a maximum effect with minimum costs in the full spectrum of missions;
- modular composition, high degree of deployment, able to act jointly, outside the national territory, with the necessary logistic support;
- ability to pursue low or high intensity combat missions simultaneously and consistently, within the same area of engagement.

In this context, efforts have been focused recently within the Strategic Planning Directorate on achieving the conceptual framework necessary for the development of military capabilities, the following documents being developed: “*Study on the Development of Military Capabilities in the Romanian Armed Forces*”, “*Conception of the Development of Military Capabilities in the Romanian Armed Forces*” and “*Sheet regarding the Existing Military Capabilities in the Romanian Armed Forces*”. Moreover, the “*Analysis regarding Capabilities Planning and Development*” has been completed, enabling the identification of the mechanism of inventorying and developing military capabilities, as well as of the deficit and minimum requirements of essential/critical military capabilities in the short, medium and long term.

On this basis, proposals have been initiated for prioritising the implementation of capabilities for:

- deployment, support and re-deployment of joint expeditionary forces;
- complete protection of own and/or NATO member states population, as well as of the territory and their forces against ballistic missile threat;
- support of forces with high *operational* capacity (including for reinforcements);
- establishment and preservation of information superiority;
- achievement of the ability to jointly address the procedures and power tools necessary for crisis management and settlement, as well as for cooperation/coordination with other participants/actors.

The establishment of the conceptual framework for developing military capabilities is reflected in the following steps:

- carrying out actions in common with other structures of the Ministry of National Defence in order to conduct the military capabilities development process in correlation with those carried out at NATO and the EU level;
- identifying at national level the capabilities that can be used for multinational cooperation within capabilities development and sharing initiatives;
- within NATO, out of 46 projects proposed for multinational cooperation, Romania submitted initial proposals for national participation in 28 projects;
- participating in the following initiatives with the EU: European Air Transport Fleet, making available satellite communications commercial services, combat equipment for disembarked land soldiers, marine mines

countermeasures as well as developing and deploying a deployable level 2 laboratory in the theatre of operations investigating the evidences resulted from the use of improvised explosive devices. There is also considerable potential for cooperation regarding personnel training, medical and logistic support, equipment testing and evaluation, unmanned aircraft, *Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)*, renewable energy, technological cooperation respectively.

As a corollary of these steps, we have set a priority for the coming period: to develop a new vision – “Romanian Armed Forces 2025”, a document that will present the evolution of the Romanian Armed Forces in the medium and long term in the conditions of achieving a force structure that is financed and equipped so that it can provide the capabilities needed for defending the interests and national and collective security, as well as for carrying out the international engagements Romania is part of, along with its allies and partners.

Force Planning and the Achievement of Undertaken International Engagements

The strategic concept of the North Atlantic Alliance, adopted at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, in 2010, revalidated the importance of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, advocating the need to promote stability and security beyond the Euro-Atlantic space. From this perspective, the continuation of the participation of the armed forces in missions abroad, for crisis management, stabilisation and reconstruction, is a way of promoting national interests and of strengthening the place and role of Romania within NATO and the EU.

In this context, the Strategic Planning Directorate has worked to coordinate, at the level of the General Staff and its subordinated structures, the activities associated with the force planning process in order to meet the requirements regarding the capabilities and forces undertaken by Romania through *Force Goals 2008*, in the planning period between 2009 and 2018. Special attention has been paid to activities aimed at:

- honouring the undertaken engagements and continuing the support to the international community in the fight against terrorism, by adding to and reconfiguring the forces participating in missions abroad, which successfully perform a wide range of missions under the command of NATO, the EU, UN and OSCE in the theatres of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Western Balkans and the Mediterranean;
- achieving initial operational capability for newly established structures and full operational capacity for the forces planned to reach

the operationalisation stage, with priority for the deployable forces and the ones meant for NATO Response Force and EU Battlegroups;

- continuing, within the process of implementing *Force Goals*, the effort to maintain the operational capacity of the structures developed in previous years, simultaneously with completing the operationalisation of the structures to be made available to NATO;
- continuing the process of joining the NATO force structure (army corps);
- preparing forces participating in the NRF, the reserve for theatres of operations and the forces meant for EU Battlegroups;
- training, at national level, the forces that are contributing to NRF/2012;
- maintaining the operationalisation of military intelligence structures available to the NATO Response Force Package IRF/NRF 2012;
- continuing to achieve the cooperation goals within regional initiatives: cooperation in the “*OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY*” and “*BLACKSEAFOR 11*”.

Achieving Interoperability

In order to increase the degree of interoperability of the Romanian armed forces with those of allied states, one will consider the evolution of concepts at NATO and EU level, pointing out those that contribute to the development of strategies and doctrines, as well as to the improvement of military-related processes and their full adoption.

Achieving interoperability in the Romanian Armed Forces in relation to the two bodies bears the temporary seal of Romania’s accession to them. Thus, while achieving interoperability with NATO is not something new, achieving interoperability with the EU is relatively recent.

However, since the two bodies are rather similar, the steps in achieving interoperability, although oriented towards NATO, are applicable to the EU as well.

Considering its two levels, achieving interoperability means, on the one hand, developing the ability to become involved/participate actively and competently in all activities and processes of the two bodies – as a basis for providing the opportunity in assuming the engagements and, on the other hand, for fulfilling the undertaken engagements in complete volume and in keeping with the quality parameters.

The first level, the *institutional-functional* one, is focused, in particular, on Romania’s participation in the consultation and decision-making process, reunions of committees and their subordinated working groups, activity of representation, positions assigned to commands etc. The second level, the *actional* one, which is the most important, is aimed at all aspects that are related to engaging national forces in missions of both bodies (planning, use, doctrine, training, procurement etc.).

Although conceptually they are delimited, in fact, the two levels of interoperability are intertwined, the actions carried out at one level having implications for the other one, influencing and conditioning each other and generating cumulative effects.

The process of achieving interoperability between the Romanian Armed Forces and Alliance forces has taken place gradually, according to the progress of the integration process and the participation in common actions, the responsibility for its planning and coordination belonging to the existing structures in various restructuring stages within the General Staff.

A particularly important role in achieving interoperability belongs to *standardisation*. Just as in NATO, in the Romanian Armed Forces, it has been considered, since the beginning, that the main means of achieving interoperability is *standardisation*. Thus, the steps taken regarding interoperability are closely connected and clearly represented by the ones taken in the field of standardisation and, at the same time, are determined by the various steps taken with a view to integration and partnership, pre-accession and accession respectively.

Since NATO integration process has been coordinated by the General Staff, one has decided that the responsibility regarding the drawing up of regulations should fall under the Strategic Planning Directorate. Since then, the Directorate has been directly and permanently involved in this issue and has set a new tempo in this field. This involvement has gained more strength with the approval of the regulations in the field¹, which have brought a new conceptual, structural and procedural reorganisation of the standardisation and interoperability in a coherent, rigorous regulatory framework, harmonised with NATO.

In keeping with these regulations, the essence of the *standardisation process* is the establishment and fulfilment of standardisation tasks, the *acceptance* and *implementation* of STANAGs² respectively. In short, *acceptance* requires the expression of the national stand towards the content of a STANAG and *implementation* integrates all the activities through which the content of the respective standard is “*put into practice*” in the Romanian Armed Forces.

The organisation and functioning of the *Standardisation and Interoperability Council (SIC)* has given authority to the standardisation activity, playing a genuine role of coordination and guidance of the standardisation activity at the level

¹ *Instructions regarding the Standardisation Activity in the Romanian Armed Forces* and the other orders, such as: *Regulations on the Organisation and Functioning of the Standardisation and Interoperability Council, Guide of the Responsible in the Field and the National Delegate to the NATO Working Group on Standardisation* and the procedures for the acceptance and implementation of NATO Standardisation Agreements (PLStd-1, PLStd-2).

² STANAG – NATO STANdardisation AGREEMENTS.

of the entire ministry. One should also mention the “*fora of experts*”, respectively the quarterly meetings of ComSI Secretaries³ and the *Interoperability Working Group (GLI)*⁴, in which the issues appeared in the current activity are addressed and solutions are identified to them, subsequently adopted by decision of the SIC, and thus enter into force. Through the specialised structure, the Strategic Planning Directorate provides all the specific staff-related functions for the organisation and conduct of biannual meetings of the SIC, the quarterly meetings of ComSI and, whenever necessary, of the GLI.

Moreover, mention should be made that the Strategic Planning Directorate, through the fields of competence, is directly or indirectly involved in the process of achieving interoperability both regarding the technical dimension (the equipment, weapon systems, hardware etc. the troops are provided with) and the operational dimension of interoperability (doctrine, tactics, procedures etc.). Thus, the Directorate experts endorse the MND and the ORD⁵ and the projects of specific military legislation, doctrines and manuals and intervene, whenever necessary, in specialised fora⁶ to ensure compliance with standards and engagements to NATO.

As far as training and exercises are concerned, they were carried out based on *Mission Training Programmes (MTI)* and *Individual Training Programmes (ITP)* specific to the military weapons and specialties, at “*levels*” that will enable the achievement of the level of preparedness needed for carrying out the undertaken international military commitments.

Furthermore, it should be noted that achieving interoperability is required to be addressed as part of the process of defence planning and of operational planning, domains in which our Directorate provides the needed expertise.

However, the “*litmus test*” of forces interoperability remains the area of engagement, namely the real missions. The Romanian Armed Forces participation in missions outside the Romanian territory, another area of responsibility of the Strategic Planning Directorate, but, above all, the results achieved by them in the missions

³ At the level of each structure in charge of standardisation tasks, a Committee of Standardisation and Interoperability (ComSI) is organised, having roles similar to SIC, but at the level of the respective structure.

⁴ Established under SIC authority, it provides the framework within which the specific aspects of interoperability are processed in order to approach the issue of interoperability at national level. Its activity takes place in accordance with the *terms of reference* approved by the president of SIC. In this group there were identified, debated and formulated the national responses to *Allied Interoperability Survey Questionnaire*, drawn up by the Executive Working Group. Moreover, it represents the structure that analyses the specific documents drawn up by the EU Working Group on Interoperability (HTFWGIO).

⁵ *MND* – *Mission Needs Document*; *ORD* – *Operational Requirements Document* – the key documents lying at the basis of procurement equipment and assets acquisition/modernisation.

⁶ *Requirements Supervisory Council* and the *General Staff/Ministry of National Defence Commission regarding Specific Legislation, Doctrines and Manuals*.

carried out under the aegis of NATO and within coalitions show, in addition to the image of trustworthy member and real contributor to collective security, that, at least in terms of operational interoperability, we share the same level with the other NATO member states.

Certainly, the new developments in the field will be reviewed and harmonised precisely for the efforts made in order to achieve a certain level of interoperability to be continuous and integrated in the processes for planning, developing and using national military capabilities.

Achieving International Military Cooperation

In line with creating and maintaining permanent relations between national and NATO and EU military structures, considerable progress has been made regarding to increasing the visibility of Romania as a member of NATO and the EU by firmly and consistently promoting national interests, increasing national forces and capabilities contributions to operations and missions conducted by the two organisations.

At the same time, the participation in the planning and preparation activities of regional initiatives to which Romania is part has continued. Thus, there has been planned and organised the participation in the reunions of command structures of regional initiatives with a view to supporting the national stand and there have been developed analyses and syntheses in order to substantiate the political-military decisions regarding the engagement of the Romanian side to joint initiatives with other countries that are member in regional cooperation initiatives.

Regarding bilateral military cooperation, it has mainly included summits, exchanges of delegations and exchanges of experience in areas aimed at: troops training, peace support exercises and operations, command and control, air defence and airspace management, logistics, communications and IT, military topography, regional security, education and personnel training.

At the same time with the creation of guidelines⁷ for developing mandates, an inventory of the major topics, issues and NATO working groups has been made, all of them being classified and prioritised according to the interest and importance they have for Romania, at the same time being identified all structures and even people with attributions in the field and punctually delineated the tasks and responsibilities for each. These issues have resulted

⁷ *“Instructions regarding Procedures for Drawing Up and Approving Mandates for the Ministry of National Defence Representation Structures to NATO, the EU, the UN and OSCE”*, approved by Order MS-49/05.05.2009.

⁸ It is still under approval. The General Staff drew up the final version, which was sent to the Department for Defence Planning for approval.

in the documentary with general and specific mandates⁸ which lies at the basis of the activity of the permanent military representations to NATO and the EU.

Coordinating the participation in NATO working groups reunions, as an important area of the achievement of the institutional-functional interoperability, has acquired greater consistency and rigour with the development and implementation of guidelines⁹ regulating the way in which participation and the proper preparation of the national delegates to the reunions of NATO working groups take place.


Through the specialised structures, the Directorate has contributed to the development in keeping with the highest standards of the activity of International Military Cooperation (IMC) in the General Staff and its subordinated structures, prepared and carried out the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the Balkan Countries Chiefs of Defence Conference, chairs and hosts *Exercise "Blonde Avalanche"* within the Initiative of the Multinational Battalion "TISA-2008/2012" and prepares the NATO Chiefs of Defence Conference that will take place in autumn.

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The issues presented in this article show that, throughout its 15 years of existence, the Strategic Planning Directorate has created a rigorous normative framework, based on a coherent conceptual apparatus, which has enabled the efficient development and coordination of certain important stages and specific activities with immediate, obvious and measurable results. Moreover, they point out that the Directorate "*manages the domain*", has the necessary resources and capabilities, is up to date with the current developments in the field and, moreover, has already set the way for further action.

This reality is both the premise and the guarantee that, by the end of 2025, as required by the *Transformation Strategy*, Romania will have available those advanced, deployable and sustainable military capabilities able to participate, with other NATO and EU member states forces, in the successful completion of the full range of missions necessary for reaching common security objectives.

Therefore, without fear of mistaking, it can be said that the ***Strategic Planning Directorate has always been in the outposts of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation!***

English version by
 ***Iulia NĂSTASIE***

⁹ General Staff 8/30.01.2009 – Order on the Coordination of the Activity of General Staff Delegates and their Subordinate Structures in the Reunions of the NATO and EU Work Groups, Committees and Subcommittees.

STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTORATE - Vector of Euro-Atlantic Integration -

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS IN THE NATO EVOLUTION

Lieutenant General Dr Sorin IOAN

The author writes that the changes in the current security environment required the development of a new NATO strategic concept. However, since the establishment of the organisation and up to the new strategic concept, NATO negotiated and adopted six concepts: four of them under the pressure and influences of the Cold War and two after the end of it.

To an extent that is not negligible at all, the Alliance owes its successes to the ability to formulate strategic concepts symbiotically adapted to the changing security conditions, providing them with legitimate value and credibility through the dynamics of the generated processes.

After a review of all of these strategic concepts, the author mentions that the holistic analysis of their history, the new strategic concept included, helps to draw some general conclusions and he points out a few of them.

Keywords: *strategic concept; Cold War; collective defence; massive retaliation; flexible response; security environment*

In April 2009, at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, it was decided, after talks that lasted many years, that a new NATO strategic concept, updated and adapted to the changes in the security environment, should be developed, to replace the document adopted in 1999.

The changes in the security environment required a new concept, significantly different from the existing one, with regard to not only its content but also its target audience and the way of writing it. The impact of the messages was important, taking into account the evolution of NATO operation in Afghanistan, at the core of the Islamic world and culture, with its influences, the relationship with Russia, prudently resumed after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, as well as the relationship with the other international organisations, which had to be clarified. The difficulties in cooperating openly and transparently to achieve a comprehensive approach between the actors participating in Afghanistan required for this effort

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to be a priority. The member nations' opinions were different ever since the issue regarding the necessity of a new strategic concept was launched.

Certainly, the environment for the debates related to the new concept and the road map to the project phase, as well as the talks that resulted in adjustments until the final form was adopted are interesting, supporting the thorough understanding of the messages. The concept itself deserves analysis with regard to not only the political guidance but also the military programmes that followed it, meant to translate it into reality, at least for the transformation process specific to our armed forces, as contributor to the Alliance collective defence.

The present article also intends to respond to a personal vibration or a reflex of someone who was in NATO internal environment when the problem of replacing the existing concept, considered outdated, arose: *What is the true history and the evolution of strategic concepts since the Alliance was established?* The generation I belong to had a certain perception, acquired through the academic studies in the period when there were two opposed military blocs. How real was it and how can it be seen now, from the other side of the Curtain?

Many of the readers may have studied it, as many others did not have the opportunity to discover it, among whom I found myself. I consider it not only legitimate but also interesting to study thoroughly the history of a collective defence system whose fully-fledged members we currently are.

Therefore, since its establishment and up to the *new strategic concept*, NATO has negotiated and adopted *six* concepts: *four* of them under the pressure and influences of the *Cold War* and *two* after the end of it. In all the cases, there were rather long periods of debate and controversy between the allied members, when the analytical talent, institutional mechanisms and consensus-building procedures were successfully proved, in order to achieve common understanding, providing medium-term visions, with only one exception, as we will see below.

It is certain that, once a strategic concept was adopted, it has played a critical part in enhancing NATO performance in the field of security policy and defence planning. To an extent that is not negligible at all, the Alliance owes its successes to the ability to formulate strategic concepts symbiotically adapted to the changing security environment, providing them with legitimate value and credibility through the dynamics of the generated processes. Therefore, let us briefly review them:

❖ *The first* document, DC 6/1, entitled "*Initial Strategy of Deterrence and Defence Specialisation*", the shortest-lasting one (1949-1951), called on the member states to cooperate to develop adequate forces for defending Europe and to create unique and coordinated plans to achieve this goal. In fact, it established a set

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of principles for coordinating efforts by member nations and defined an Alliance based on national specialisation, a division of labour rather than a uniform distribution of military missions. Let us remember that, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, at the beginning of 1949, the *Cold War* was already underway, and the Alliance had no organisational structure or defence strategy to guide common efforts. Military forces were weakened after the war; in Central Europe, there were only 8 ground divisions and 600 combat aircraft, most of them inadequate to defend against the numerous Soviet army stationed in Eastern Europe. Most probably, NATO forces would have been defeated quickly. Under those circumstances, defence ministers issued the *first strategic concept* in December 1949, approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in January 1950, but it could not work, beyond deterrence, as the ultimate goal. There were not plans to employ the forces in the event deterrence failed. Through nation specialisation, the USA and Great Britain were assigned the missions of strategic bombardment and maritime defence respectively. The two countries were also given the mission to provide the troops in the centre of Europe with air and ground support. Which troops? France did not have a large army, the Federal Republic of Germany had recently achieved sovereignty after the war, it was not a NATO member yet, and it was not permitted to re-establish an army of its own, while the other members had only few and poorly equipped forces available. Military experts could not plan more than a fragile resistance on the Rhine River, followed by a long-term mobilisation of the US and British military power, in a prolonged campaign to regain lost ground. This strategic concept did not succeed in fulfilling the collective defence clause (Art. 5) in the Treaty, but it was all that NATO could achieve. It proved to be a compromise document that survived less than two years. Under its auspices, *SACEUR (NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe)* and *SHAPE HQ (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe)* were established, inspiring collective defence measures, common military doctrines, combined exercises, military bases, standardisation of maintenance and repair, cooperation in research and development. Meanwhile, member countries enlarged their military forces, enhanced their readiness level and, starting 1952, launched major rearmament programmes.

❖ *The second one*, MC 14/1, entitled “*NATO Defence Building and Collective Defence*” was valid between 1951 and 1957. It abandoned the old concept, *defence specialisation*, in favour of collective defence, integrated large units under NATO commanders and created a broad perspective of a theatre of operations. It relied on the US strategic nuclear bombardment capabilities and on the Alliance wide mobilisation to achieve

victory in a possible war. It also included plans to enhance the continental forces capabilities. During this period, the *Cold War* intensified concomitantly with the development of the Korean War, and the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons and enhanced its combat capacity on land. There was thus an increase in the military threat to NATO. The USA launched important modern armament programmes and NATO allies followed this trend. Mention should be made that this concept was the first one drafted by the Military Committee with the substantial support of SHAPE's professional analyses, which included clear military requirements. In the event of a Soviet offensive, together with its allies, resistance on the Rhine was planned for a period of 5 years, until NATO forces, strengthened, could carry out offensive actions to regain the lost ground. There were planned (exaggeratedly/unrealistically) 54 divisions for *AFCENT* (*Allied Force Central Europe – NATO Central Region*), 21 divisions for *AFSOUTH* (*Allied Forces Southern Europe*) and 14 divisions for *AFNORTH* (*Allied Forces Northern Europe*), all mobilisable, with all that was necessary for their readiness, 9 000 combat aircraft and 700 warships. When these forces proved unaffordable, NATO commissioned a study by a *Temporary Council Committee*, led by three “wise men” (Averell Harriman – USA, Jean Monnet – France and Edwin Plowden – UK), that produced the “*The Lisbon Force Goals*”, establishing the time horizon for achieving a level of ambition, approved by the NAC in 1952. In the following six years, the North Atlantic Council was also established to include heads of state, defence spending tripled for the period between 1950 and 1954, new NATO commands were established, a balance between active and reserve forces was achieved, and in Central Europe active military manpower increased from 350 000 in 1949 to 600 000 in 1954. It was a period when the USA stationed 5 divisions in the FRG, Great Britain became responsible for the defence on the Rhine with 5 divisions, Belgium and the Netherlands decided to establish a common army corps, France increased its contribution and it was decided to rearm the FRG up to 12 land divisions and an air force equipped with 650 combat aircraft.

❖ *The third one*, MC 14/2, “*Strategy of Massive Retaliation*” (functional between 1957 and 1967), was a response to the progress made by the Soviet Union as far as armament, especially nuclear weapons, was concerned. It was another period when the *Cold War* deepened, characterised by nuclear deterrence. The Soviet Union deployed nuclear bombers and missiles in Warsaw Pact member countries. At NATO level, the Eisenhower Administration's defence policy, continued by Kennedy, made its mark. Following long debates and negotiations, the deployment of US nuclear weapons in some countries in Europe was approved. Germany modernised its armed forces and the defence line consolidated on the Rhine was moved

near the inter-German border. According to NATO analysis, this body still did not have enough forces, and the US participation in the Vietnam War prevented it from significantly contributing to it.

❖ *The fourth one*, MC 14/3, “*Strategy of Flexible Response*” (1967-1991), was drafted in a period of trust, motivated by the nuclear deterrent forces, which compensated for the more numerous conventional forces of the Soviet Union and its allies. In fact, this policy was generated by the famous and controversial declaration of the US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, at the meeting of NATO defence ministers in Athens, in 1962, who firmly called for bolstering conventional forces. A state of political uproar was created, France threatened to temporarily withdraw from NATO structures, which really happened, and Germany threatened to withdraw from the Alliance and to build a nuclear deterrent force of its own, but, subsequently, the decision was reviewed. After the difficult moment was overcome, a consensus was reached, which led to the flexible response strategy. It combined strong nuclear deterrence with more numerous and better equipped conventional forces for enhanced defence, and satisfied both parties – the USA and the Europeans. The *strategic concept* was accompanied by a study, entitled “*Future Tasks of the Alliance*”, also known as the *Harmel Report* (Harmel being the leader of a group of “*wise men*”), which had positive effects on NATO forces development. The acceleration of arming and modernising the Alliance forces, consistently supported by the Reagan Administration, finally led to the Soviet Union impossibility to keep up the pace, especially as far as economic support was concerned, and Moscow called, through the voice of Gorbachev, for an end to the *Cold War*. However, *MC 14/3 strategic concept* was considered successful as it overcame all the deficient aspects of the defence strategy and concentrated the efforts of member nations oriented towards building up modern military forces.

❖ *The fifth one – the strategic concept* adopted at the Rome Summit (1991-1999), was certainly focused on the risks facing the Alliance after the end of the *Cold War*, revealing the importance of a light and mobile military force to manage them, and affirming the fact that the Alliance continued to be useful and important. Although MC 14/3 proved to be the longest-lasting strategic concept, it became outdated after the end of the *Cold War*. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the reorientation of the states in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from the Eastern Europe and, finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in profound changes in the security strategy. Participants had different opinions, some of them no longer considering the need for NATO to remain a strictly defensive alliance, while others recommended

that it should be dissolved, as the USA and Europe no longer needed their transatlantic partnership. After a relatively short period of internal debate, an agreement on the content of the *strategic concept* of Rome was reached. For the first time, it became a public document and provided a synthetic analysis of the new security policy and the new defence strategy. Moreover, it firmly stated that the transatlantic link would be maintained, the traditional defence missions would be continued, and that NATO would prepare for new responsibilities concomitantly with establishing long-lasting peace in Europe through political as well as military means, based on three main elements: dialogue, cooperation and collective defence – dialogue with all the countries in Europe, including with Russia, cooperation with other European security institutions (EC, WEU, CSCE, as well as with other regional bodies from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea). The main missions were aimed at managing the identified risks: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and acts of terrorism and sabotage that could affect the interests of member states. NATO had to be prepared for new crisis response roles and requirements rather than for the collective defence of its borders with mobile, multinational and flexible forces. Although vague about future security challenges, the document established the main strategic directions correctly. There followed the Gulf War, then the one in the former SFR of Yugoslavia, the historic move eastward through the PfP and EAPC, the mission in Kosovo at the beginning of 1999, and the enlargement to the East with the three states – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, in 1999 too. The *Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)* and the *Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)* were established, and it was agreed to support the *EU/WEU European Security and Defence Identity*. Apart from Great Britain and France, the other European states remained mostly configured for continental missions, as they did not have the mobility and logistic support needed for expeditionary operations alongside the USA.

❖ *The sixth one – the strategic concept* adopted at the Washington Summit (1999-2010) – clearly marked NATO's shift from defence planning within borders towards multiple new missions, conducted under Article 4 of the Treaty. Member countries unanimously agreed that the changes in the security environment in the previous period, starting 1991, required a new concept. It was achieved, through the common study and analysis, by the International Military Staff, the Military Committee, and through the contribution of the commanders of Strategic Commands. It stipulated five fundamental tasks: security, consultation, deterrence, defence, crisis management and partnership. Cooperation with EU/WEU stipulated the principle of *separable but not separate forces and capabilities*. During its life span, the mission in Kosovo continued,

and it practically proved its utility with the dramatic terrorist events on 11 September 2001 and their aftermath. In the field of defence, the *Defence Capabilities Initiative – DCI* it generated did not succeed in achieving the initial objectives, and at the Prague Summit in 2002 new initiatives were adopted: establishment of the Allied Command Transformation – ACT, launch of the plan to create the Response Force – NRF and endorsement of the Prague Capabilities Commitment – PCC, which replaced the DCI. Finally, NATO adopted the decision to take command of ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which was not anticipated by those who contributed to the development of the *strategic concept* in 1999.

At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009, after a period of debates, it was agreed to conceive a new strategy to replace the existing concept adopted in 1999.

The necessity for change, initially supported in a stronger voice by the new member states, stemmed from the changes in the global security environment and from the experience acquired in the recent operations NATO led or participated in. The main issues referred to the crisis response operations planning and engagement system, their comprehensive approach, cyber defence and missile defence.

There were also other declared objectives that accompanied the motivation for change, namely to convey messages to address a larger audience than the population of member countries, to reorganise the partnership system, to open to a more realistic cooperation with the other international organisations with responsibilities in the field of defence and, last but not least, to internally reform and transform the North Atlantic Alliance. As far as the format was concerned, the *new strategic concept* was intended to be a guide comprising concise, coherent and clear political declarations, which was in fact achieved through the document adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010.

The holistic analysis of the history of NATO *strategic concepts*, the *new strategic concept* included, helps to draw some general conclusions.

Firstly, a strategic concept entails an outward dimension as well as an inward one. More precisely, it defines the new threats, dangers, challenges and opportunities, providing guidance for NATO to adapt and act, but it also achieves a large mobilisation of the member nations to reach consensus regarding the obligations, priorities and role of each nation, the missions and fair burden-sharing. Moreover, it establishes coherent relationships between security policy, defence strategy and military forces and provides arguments for new initiatives and methods to implement them.

Secondly, *strategic concepts* are flexible and adaptable, varying depending on the realities in the security environment. None is perfect, but they effectively contribute to NATO ability to achieve the main security goals.

Thirdly, no *strategic concept* emerges accidentally. It is developed as a response to the existing changing conditions. It does not inflexibly wait for the goals to be achieved but intervenes with changes in the road map when the situation requires it.

Fourthly, drafting it but especially reaching consensus are not facile processes, requiring long debates until all opinions are accommodated, based on the solidarity principle.

Finally, *strategic concepts* do not remain at the level of political declarations. They are followed by implementation guidance for the military structures that, in turn, develop plans to put them in practice, debated and approved by member nations as common, multinational plans.

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 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

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MILITARY CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING

– Major Challenge to the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Process –

Colonel (N) Vicențiu CĂTĂNEANU
Colonel Liviu BUMBĂCEA

Romania's capacity to use its military potential, in keeping with its policy meant to safeguard and promote national interests, gives the real dimension of the military power. As indicators, one may use: the personnel training level; the time of response to different requests; the capacity to protect and support forces in various theatres of operations, including outside the national territory; the level of discouragement it produces, as well as the result of the compared analysis between own weapon systems and the most important ones at world level.

In order to carry out the tasks and missions assigned to them, the Romanian Armed Forces have begun a complex transformation process, conceived and developed in close correlation with the similar process of the Alliance.

Keywords: *command and control; defence capabilities; logistic planning; missions*

At the beginning of the third millennium, Romania is developing in an international security environment marked by unprecedented changes, some of them being, unfortunately, capable of affecting it in a negative manner.

In this context, it is considered that the classic risks and threats to security remain at a minimum level, the asymmetrical and hybrid being the ones that are more obvious, such as: the terrorist phenomenon, transnational organised crime, competition for the control of strategic resources, political instability, ethnic and religious politicisation, corruption, export of instability, cyber warfare and natural environment degradation. Asymmetric risks diversify and increase in intensity and range of manifestation, and preventing and mitigating

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them prove to be extremely complex and costly, which implies a certain contribution and the common responsibility of all the states.

The extent of future conflicts will be influenced by the increasingly rapid transformation – from the technological point of view – of the pieces of equipment with military application, using new generations of “*smart weapons*” and maximising the effects of the specific use of information and psychological warfare components.

Although, in the near future, a major military threat to Romania’s national security is not anticipated, the status of NATO and EU member country on the eastern border and of Black Sea coastal state, combined with the new asymmetric risks and threats, requires the fulfilment of current and future engagements to the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, in the field of military security, that the Romanian Armed Forces has assumed or is about to.

In other words, if Romania’s national interests are threatened or the security of allied states is affected, the armed forces must be ready to act both against conventional threats and against asymmetric threats, independently or within the Alliance.

Therefore, the future forces of the Romanian Armed Forces will have to be able to meet the full spectrum of conflicts, to be deployable, to be able to sustain themselves in a hostile environment, lacking support, regardless of the duration and pace of operations, to be supported by multinational logistics, capable of operating in a network. They should also support NATO’s ambitions regarding stability projection, aid/humanitarian relief, enemy deterrence, aggression prevention and, if necessary, they should be able to defeat an opponent through a wide range of military operations and missions. Moreover, in special situations (collective defence on the national territory), Romania should be able to integrate the troops contributions from non-NATO states, the ability to interact at all levels with civil authorities and international and non-governmental organisations, as well as with other agencies.

The Correlation between the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation and NATO Transformation

Even though the use of military power is increasingly challenged in the international politics, it continues to be used to unlock strategic situations and plays a major role in shaping the international relations and the international security environment at global level.

The Romanian Armed Forces play an important role in the defence policy, representing our country’s ability, ensured by its military potential (budget,

personnel, infrastructure, weaponry, logistics, defence industry and specific research-development institutions etc.), for ensuring own security, allies security and the fulfilment of the national political-military objectives/interests.

Romania's capacity to use its military potential, in keeping with its policy meant to preserve and promote national interests, gives the actual dimension of military power. As indicators, there can be used: personnel training level; time of response to various requests; capacity to project and support forces in various theatres of operations, including outside the country; the deterrence level that it produces, as well as the result of the compared analysis between own weapon systems and the most important ones at world level.

In order to meet the assigned tasks and missions, the Romanian Armed Forces began a major transformation process, designed and developed in close correlation with the similar one within the Alliance. Given the circumstance of the transformation of forces, concepts and capabilities, the Romanian Armed Forces transformation is the medium- and long-term vision regarding the size, training and procurement of the armed forces in order to participate in future NATO operations.

The most relevant mechanisms for the correlation with the Alliance transformation are represented by the gradual increase of the Romanian Armed Forces participation in the NATO Response Force, the increase in the level of interoperability of the forces deployable in the domain of communications and information, as well as the significant actions meant to significantly improve the language proficiency of the personnel. Moreover, it was also initiated a complex process of reconfiguration of the command and control system at strategic and operational level, based on the accomplishment of the common joint strategic picture.

The nature of national constitutional responsibilities as well as the Alliance's requirement to face any threats require that the Romanian Armed Forces develop capabilities that should enable them to conduct operations on national territory, in NATO's area of responsibility, as well as in a wider strategic environment, permanently influenced by factors that require change.

At the same time, the transformation efforts to provide the Alliance's requirements regarding the achievement of the capabilities specified in the Force Goals for the structures meant for NATO are mainly concentrated on the aspects regarding interoperability and deployability, acquisition of new equipment, accomplishment of the correlation between their requirements and the NRF ones, the modernisation of the education and training process and the improvement of the specific normative framework.

Defence Capabilities Development Process

The Romanian Armed Forces transformation process is not an end in itself, it will have to ensure the development of military capabilities that enable an appropriate response to the current and future challenges to the international security environment, the fulfilment of the specific requirements provided in the Constitution, the engagements undertaken by Romania to NATO, the EU, as well as within the regional initiatives and coalitions. It aims to achieve a modern structure, fully professionalised, with a high degree of mobility, one that is efficient, flexible, deployable, sustainable, and has the capacity to act jointly and be engaged in a wide range of missions, both on the national territory and beyond.

In this context, planning must meet the current and future operational requirements, with special emphasis on the most likely operations, thus ensuring the ability to carry out the most demanding operations. In order to determine the required size of the force structure (the number and quality of the forces required to perform specific missions and tasks), planning *aims to achieve a balance of the forces, based not just on the size of the operations, but also on their type, distance and duration*. This should result in combat capabilities, combat support and logistics support capabilities, military and non-military deployable and air lift information and communication means associated to them, which should enable the achievement of the full spectrum of missions.

Moreover, the planning process will have to take into account the Alliance's scarce capabilities package, a package approved by the heads of states and governments in Lisbon. These capabilities were selected in order to meet the requirements of the ongoing operations, to face the emerging challenges and to get some critical capabilities, which would be incorporated into the general set of requirements, existing/planned capabilities and priorities to be developed in the future.

Normally, defence planning includes: force planning; weapons planning; civil emergency planning; human, material and financial resource planning; logistic planning and command, control and consultation planning. Together, they contribute to reaching the political-military level of ambition and their management by various bodies, without a concentrated effort towards the necessary capabilities, can lead to the fragmentation of the process and to the inefficient spending of available resources.

Currently, at the level of the North Atlantic Alliance, there are several ways to approach the defence planning process, the most popular being: *"step-by-step"* planning, risk avoidance-based planning, experience-based planning, threats-based

planning, “top-down” planning, budget-based planning, scenario-based planning and capabilities-based planning.

In order to meet the capabilities development requirements, one should undertake, at national level, certain measures to integrate the existing conceptual and operational approaches at NATO, EU level in the domain of capabilities-based planning to identify the minimum needs for military capabilities, to prioritise their implementation and to set the directions to develop them in the short, medium and long term.

This involves a functional analysis of operational requirements, the capabilities necessary to be developed being identified based on the missions to be fulfilled and performed in the absence of certain threats or specific conditions. The process involves prioritising the development of the needed capabilities¹, depending on the operational risks involved, providing the decision-makers with a more rational basis for decision-making regarding future defence procurement, and determines the planning process to respond better to uncertainty, economic constraints and risks.

In order to reduce the deficiencies identified during the planning processes, it is necessary that the implementation of the capabilities-based planning is done based on an algorithm that consists, in general, in:

- identifying military threats and determining the trends in the evolution of military technologies;
- formulating a general military level of ambition in relation to the specific tasks;
- determining the minimum military capabilities, on domains, necessary to achieve this level;
- assessing the existing capabilities and determining any deficits, on directions of development;
- identifying ways to cover the deficits and prioritising the development of military capabilities in keeping with available resources;
- achieving capabilities by implementing plans specific to the directions of development, which also include procurement programmes;
- periodically assessing implementation plans.

The purpose of this algorithm is to provide a complex picture of the possible solutions in the domain of capabilities development, to establish a balance between risks, priorities and necessary and available resources, a picture

¹ For instance, the issue of developing artillery systems is replaced by the question “*How to ensure fire support for land forces?*”, which offers a greater range of options for decision-makers. In this context, the capabilities planning and development process must be a directional element for all other defence processes and activities related to defence planning, being intended to contribute in reaching the main goal: the development of capabilities.

that can be used both by decision-makers in choosing the best solutions, as well as by planners to implement the decisions made in this domain. The implementation of identified solutions requires enforcing the solutions in the national programmes and engaging the resulted capabilities.

For this, the development of planning objectives should take into account the quality level required to carry out the undertaken objectives, the *potential effects of the access to vital communication, transit and transport routes, the supply of energy, the probability of cyber attacks on information systems* or other vital systems, the probability that some terrorist groups are capable of using more and more sophisticated means in order to reach their goals in the future, as well as the need for defending against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of use, and anti-missile defence.

In order to obtain some critical capabilities, multinational approach is a viable option. In this respect, developing multinational capabilities ensures, given the current financial crisis, cost-effectiveness, increased interoperability, experience, understanding and joint-type practices, essential for multinational operations.

The Implications of Military Capabilities Development for the Force Structure

The capabilities development process should be aimed at harmonising and integrating the activity of the defence planning domains given the circumstances of the change of working procedures and their implementation. The success of the capabilities development process involves the complementarity of national and allied efforts to harmonise and integrate defence planning activities in keeping with allocated resources. Operational requirements, engagements undertaken and lessons learned must enable, under these conditions, the prioritisation of the capabilities development process through the standardisation of the necessary capabilities in various domains and the increase in their management opportunities; the development of a unitary conception for capabilities development in order to avoid duplication and identify the needs; the correlation, in time, of the necessary capabilities with a view to focusing the resources on priorities; the materialisation of the capabilities architecture in a unified terminology: capabilities areas, capabilities groups, capabilities, sub-capabilities.

The development of national military capabilities, seen as a systemic, long-lasting process, taking place in close connection with the national military level of ambition, aims to create a set of effective forces to be used in missions meant to combat threats to national security and defend Romania's vital interests, within the collective

defence and in order to meet other military engagements undertaken at international level. This goal must be reached irrespective of the way in which the design, creation, modernisation and implementation of military capabilities take place.

The force structure of modern armed forces, capable of meeting the current and future challenges and difficulties of a changing international security environment, with actors that do not respect the rules of traditional war, must meet the following requirements:

- to increase the level of adaptability in order to carry out deployment for contingency missions. Such situations may mean changes of the security environment, multinational and multi-agency operations, the impact of new technologies and the evolving nature of the types of conflict;
- to create new functions regarding the organisation and operation meant to enable the use of the latest developments regarding information superiority and digitisation of engagement space, with emphasis on the effective and timely situational warning and on the increase in the speed of action/reaction, tending towards obtaining a maximum effect on a wide range of missions, given the circumstances of a minimum cost;
- to implement a structure capable of adapting rapidly depending on the mission and with high levels of flexibility in peacetime, multiple roles for basic capabilities and appropriate levels of the operational status;
- to have modular forces that are ready for mission, rapidly deployable, with adaptable use and sustainability, capable of acting in operations that do not have a predictable structure;
- to revalue the functions at all levels as a result of the growing need for basic structures of military organisations to carry out jointly and multinationally the missions that have so far been accomplished by other institutions and agencies (reconstruction, law and order reinforcement etc.);
- to increase the number of deployable forces able to conduct at the same time and in a supported manner the combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions within the same engagement space and without visible/identifiable delimitations between these types of missions.

Considering the fact that there is no major military threat to Romania and/or its allies, that the foreseeable risks to security require the promotion and protection of Romania and its allies' interests preponderantly outside the national territory, at long distances, with self-sustainment capacity, including outside the NATO area of responsibility, the development of capabilities must ensure: the rapid deployment of forces and means (where and when necessary); self-sustainment capacity in the theatre for a determined period; multidimensional protection of own forces against all threats, including the Chemical, Biological,

Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) domain; interoperability with allied forces; optimisation of capabilities based on the analysis of possibilities in time.

Consequently, at national level, one should consider the following courses of development: the creation of forces and capabilities ready for any assigned mission; improvement of the ability to participate in military operations undertaken by NATO and the EU; development of robust, modern, interoperable and reliable forces and capabilities, which can carry out collective defence operations and deter risk factors.

The accomplishment of capabilities to meet NATO and EU standards will influence the Romanian Armed Forces transformation through: changing the way to approach the development of the new force structure; allocating resources for the establishment, equipment and procurement of these category of forces; adapting modernisation programmes to the capabilities requirements; creating/reviewing command structures so that they are capable of managing forces both at home and in the theatres of operations; improving the personnel selection and training programme; developing cooperation with other NATO and EU member states' armed forces.

Thus, future capabilities will focus on key programs in the field of forces projection (air-naval strategic and tactical transport capabilities, aircraft in-flight refuelling), in space (observation and surveillance), in the maritime domain, for crisis management (especially for coordinating the evacuation capacities of Europeans), as well as on creating a common database, regarding the common joint operational situation, including the potential threats in theatres, the security situation, the troops movements (security, police, justice, armed forces) etc.

Moreover, there will be required forces capable of performing multiple missions, equipped with multi-role systems, capable of being divided into units sufficiently flexible to be reconfigured according to the purpose and assigned mission, as well as the integration of military forces with other instruments of power, in order to attain the desired purpose. In this respect, the following aspects will be considered:

- to create capabilities for defending and countering on a large scale information operations and cyber attacks of a potential enemy;
- to use a combination of strategic deterrence, terrorist groups counter measures and WMD counter-proliferation measures;
- to use the highest technologies to counter asymmetric threats and strategies of groups that will be difficult to identify and separate (combatant forces from non-combatant forces), especially in urban areas;

- to create and rapidly deploy teams of civilian and military experts to identify and counter urgent emerging needs that arise in the initial phase of a crisis;
- to increase the capability of early determining intervention requirements and disaster assistance needs (through joint teams of military and civilian experts), negotiations and to set the objectives/criteria for transition towards military forces of the command and control of actions where civil authorities are overwhelmed by the situation.

*


Transformation will represent a direct response to the new requirements of the security environment, accelerate the modernisation and redefine the generation and use of force and provide the framework necessary for developing capabilities. Being a continuous process, which requires substantial resources and efforts, transformation is a process aimed at maintaining an organisation – the Romanian Armed Forces – relevant and viable.

In this respect, we cannot set a deadline for completing the transformation process. The transformation is just a series of leaps, each time towards a new temporary state, in which capabilities-based planning is only an instrument that enables us to reach the objectives and goals we have set and setting a target and achieving it could be risk.

Romania's status of NATO and EU member state requires an important role in maintaining stability, with direct implications on the way of planning the defence and strategies meant to promote national interests.

The Romanian Armed Forces are the key tool in implementing and promoting Romania's defence policy. This will help increase confidence, stability and security at sub-regional, regional and European level, through promoting defence diplomacy and participating in arrangements and processes of military cooperation.

Moreover, they will further carry out specific activities in order to meet the international engagements in the field of security and defence Romania is part of, participate actively in operations conducted by international organisations or coalitions of will for combating or preventing terrorism, contribute to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and support stabilisation and reconstruction operations.

English version by
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STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTORATE – Vector of Euro-Atlantic Integration –

TRANSFORMATION – A Vital Condition for the Affirmation of the North-Atlantic Alliance –

Colonel (AF) Dr Eugen MAVRIŞ

In 2002, during the Prague Summit, when Romania was asked to join the Alliance, NATO member states decided to take concrete actions in order to transform the Alliance. The pillars of this transformation were the establishment of a new smaller command structure and the creation of a NATO Response Force, capable of intervening in crisis management inside or outside the Alliance area of interest.

Currently, at the Alliance level, one has noticed that, even though significant changes have taken place at the level of the command structure, for various political, resource-related etc. reasons, they have not entirely reached the objectives set in 2002 and, consequently, a new complex process meant to review NATO's command structure is in full swing.

Keywords: *command structure; battlefield; Cold War; sustainability*

Transformation is a continuous process, carried out in order to create or support an advantage in a certain field, when the incremental changes are not enough to deal with a new challenge. The process seeks to enhance existing capabilities or to create new capabilities, through the synchronised innovation of the processes, personnel organisations and technologies.

In the new security environment, in which multidimensional and transnational risks have become a reality, NATO must adapt its conception regarding security in the transatlantic area, as well as in the near or far away areas, and the instruments available to meet these threats. This new reality has brought about thorough analyses at the level of the political-military command structures of the North Atlantic Alliance and has generated a natural decision in the dynamics of the events, namely the thorough transformation of NATO.

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The Coordinates of NATO Transformation Process

The main objective of the Alliance transformation is defined in close connection with the undertaken level of ambition and consists in creating military capabilities that can make it possible for the allied forces to carry out operations in the area of responsibility and outside this area in order to accomplish the entire range of missions, thus meeting the current challenges of the international security environment.

The Alliance transformation process is a natural need that derives from both the fundamental changes of the security context and the new strategic orientations adopted at NATO level.

Currently, the political-military transformation process of the Alliance is in full swing, the organisation being engaged, at the same time, in an unprecedented operational effort. The participation of the Alliances in a big number of missions, many of them other than the Article 5-type ones (collective mission), has required NATO to reinvent itself, a process that covers a broad spectrum, starting from the conceptual and doctrinaire dimension to the Alliance military capabilities.

NATO transformation is not possible without the member states armed forces transformation itself. From this perspective, one must mention that the Romanian Armed Forces transformation takes place in keeping with the similar process carried out at Alliance level, concomitantly the objective being to accomplish those capabilities that are needed to fulfil both basic military missions and those missions the Alliance needs in the new international security context.

In relation to the results of the evaluation of the asymmetric dangers and threats that characterise the dynamics of international security, the identified and undertaken vulnerabilities and risks, the North Atlantic Alliance has launched a complex process, meant to revive the command and force structure and to prepare a coherent and efficient response to the challenges of the 21st century.

Currently, NATO carries out actions in the *following directions of transformation*:

- to modernise capabilities, update missions and streamline the command structures functioning;
- to adopt capabilities-based planning, as a solution to optimise the force generation process and the common funding;
- to implement the provisions of the new NATO strategic concept – “*Active Engagement, Modern Defence*”, which has led to promoting the concept of “*smart defence*”.

The development of military capabilities, which, put together, determine the level of the military power of the North Atlantic Alliance, requires that the member

state allocate important financial resources, and some states have these resources while other do not have them, causing a situation that generates a technological gap between the military tools these states have. Consequently, the military power of a state largely depends on the economic-financial power of that state, on the investment in intelligence and research, on the technological and human acquisitions.

The level of development of military capabilities can be evaluated based on a variable number of indicators, such as the number of military men in each armed force service, the types of units and large units; the number and quality of important weapon systems – aircraft, helicopters, surface combatants and submarines, tanks, cannons etc.; the number and quality of communication and information systems; the diversity and quality of infrastructure elements; the size of the defence budget and its distribution on types of expenses – especially those for modernisation and procurement.

In 2002, during the Prague Summit, when Romania was invited to join the Alliance, NATO member states decided upon concrete actions to transform the Alliance. The pillars of this transformation were achieving a new and smaller command structure and creating a NATO response force, capable of intervening in crisis management inside or outside the Alliance area of interest. Moreover, it was decided the establishment of a strategic command form managing the transformation process so that NATO could reaffirm itself and better define its role in the current geopolitical area.

Currently, at the level of the Alliance, one has noticed that, even there have been made certain significant changes at the level of the command structure, for various political, resource-related etc. reasons, these changes have not reached entirely the objectives set in 2002 and, as a consequence, a new broad process meant to review NATO's command structure is in full swing.

However, the implementation of the "*Prague agenda*" went well so far and led to the creation of the *NATO Response Force (NRF)*, and to a substantial reorganisation of the Alliance command structure. The results in the field of capabilities are less spectacular, as the Alliance has had some serious difficulties in the process of generating the forces needed for *NRF* and for the ongoing operations, at the level set initially or required by the mission.

NATO's Political-Military Transformation

Alongside the military dimension, the North Atlantic Alliance also represents the necessary political framework in which the European states and the United States of America address their common security interests and decide upon their military behaviour in relation to the challenges and the dynamics of the events in the international environment.

In this context, NATO's transformation takes place as a two-dimensional process, which reflects the dual role of this organisation, of defensive military alliance and proactive political organisation.

The outline of a political transformation strategy is highlighted by the content of the military reforms made at the level of the Alliance. NATO has moved from a static and defensive posture to more flexible, deployable and expeditionary forces, which prefigures assuming a variety of missions outside its borders in order to respond efficiently to the changes in the contemporary security environment. The Afghanistan experience has provided the Alliance with the dimension of the new challenges NATO would have to face in the future and acted as a catalyst for ongoing reforms in the capabilities field.

The agenda of the political-military transformation has not always managed to overcome the division of allies, but the materialisation of a transformative strategy at the level of the Alliance's command and force structure is a consistent response to external developments.

Today, NATO must take into account the fact that military power means more than weapons and number of military men, and the *"hard power"* behaviour means more than fight and use of force. The analysis of forms of manifestation of the military power in the current era reveals that it is used to build areas of stability and to create prerequisites for their economic development. Such a non-coercive use of military resources can be an important source of *"soft power"* (political, diplomatic, non-coercive) behaviour, aimed at setting agendas, persuading other governments and attracting support at the level of world politics.

The new NATO command and forces structure undergoing a process of consolidation is the tangible proof of the Alliance's transformation and the expression of the political will for change.

The Dimension of Transformation at Operational Level

NATO's relevance is assessed more and more through the perspective of its ability to carry out crisis response operations and to participate in managing the security environment in areas outside the territory of its member states. Consequently, the Alliance continuously seeks to improve its operational effectiveness. NATO's transformation is also an expression of the need to harmonise the political engagements undertaken for launching the operations with the provision

of the capabilities needed in order to carry out these operations. At the moment, efforts are made with a view to improving NATO forces generation process and increasing the use of allied forces. The Alliance pays special attention to the development of its future capabilities, to the planning process and to the intelligence activity within NATO.

The complexity and fluidity of the post-*Cold War* security environment, which includes the threat of cross-border and non-state competitors, has determined the allies to decide upon the need to have rapidly deployable, integrated and sustainable forces.

In NATO's conception, the military transformation at operational level is a continuous process meant to develop and integrate new concepts, strategies, doctrines and capabilities with the purpose of improving the forces interoperability and of increasing their efficiency during operations.

The directions of the Alliance's transformation at operational level are aimed at synchronising the capabilities made available to NATO, the responsibilities regarding collective defence and the engagements undertaken in managing the international security environment. After the first Gulf War, NATO has permanently sought to transform its military forces so that they *could become rapidly deployable, interoperable and sustainable*, according to the American principles. The progress has been slow, and today only part of the NATO forces are deployable outside Alliance borders and even inside them.

The emergence of atypical threats after the end of the *Cold War* made it more difficult for the allies to reach a consensus regarding a common vision on NATO's transformation at strategic level. At the same time, addressing these threats requires more flexibility in developing the capabilities at the level of Alliance's member states. Thus, the *ISAF mission* has provided the NATO forces with the experience of new challenges with which they may have to deal in the future and has acted as a catalyst for the ongoing reforms in the capability field.

At operational level, NATO has adopted a dual approach to transformation, through which it has sought to develop rapidly deployable forces and to promote stability and transparency in crisis regions.

For some military analysts, transformation has become synonymous with a military reform based on systems, which is expensive and mainly takes place in accordance with the American model and is not worth the effort and the investment. Others see "*transformation*" as having an even more threatening meaning, seeing this process as a hidden attempt to open European markets for American exports.

Starting with 2004, the North Atlantic Alliance has made a significant step in making the transformation process more dynamic through connecting the reforms in the capability field with the political revival of the Alliance, and, based on this, a new impetus has been given to NATO's military transformation.

Following the experiences gathered by the American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the stress of the Alliance's transformation has shifted at the operational level towards a broader vision regarding the missions and the way they are carried out on the modern battlefield.

Obtaining the desired end state in carrying out modern military actions is sometimes more difficult than conducting classic offensive and defensive operations. The enemy can be represented by a series of ambiguous threats or potential enemies, which happens frequently in the war launched against terrorism in which NATO takes part. The mission can change if the situation becomes more or less stable. Thus, a mission can evolve from simple reconnaissance to complex combat actions. Moreover, the forces that represent the enemy can be untraditional and can employ the most diverse and modern combat means.

The *time* factor differs substantially in contemporary operations. Meeting certain strategic objectives can last for years. In turn, daily operation can trigger rapid responses and strategic changes.

The main transformation tendencies at operational level are part of NATO assuming an increased role in the political, economic, social, humanitarian, information, cultural etc. domains. In this context, the following evolutions can be noticed:

- increasing high proportions military anti-terrorist actions, countering cross-border crime, controlling the border, re-establishing internal order, countering drug trafficking etc.;
- increasing the importance of missions in *operations other than war*: stability, humanitarian assistance operations, search-rescue missions, interventions in catastrophes and civil disasters, support in the reconstruction of state structures in difficulty etc.;
- increasing the responsibilities in the field of countering information threats and protecting critical national infrastructures in the digital space, such as information and antiterrorist operations in cyberspace;
- equipping the armed forces with a view to creating an integrated model of technique and equipment capable of providing the capabilities required by the new types of missions.


Changing the content of missions brings about essential changes at the operational level as well as at the one of generating, equipping and supplying the forces.

With the purpose of increasing the interoperability level, the strategic mobility and the operational efficiency, NATO member states have developed and sought to improve the NATO Response Force as a modern means to meet the new threats of the beginning of this century.

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The determination of the transatlantic community to get involved in managing the security environment outside the Euro-Atlantic area and in assuming certain responsibilities at the operational level beyond the Alliance traditional space have required a complex transformation of the capabilities and the way they are employed.

Romania is involved in carrying out the responsibilities that devolve upon it as a fully-fledged NATO member, participating in promoting security and stability together with the partners from the Euro-Atlantic area, and develops its military capabilities in full agreement with the terms of reference of the Alliance transformation.

English version by
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STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTORATE – Vector of Euro-Atlantic Integration –

NATO CONCEPT – JOINT FORCE 2020 –

Colonel Dr Crăişor-Constantin IONIȚĂ

At the Lisbon Summit of 2010, the heads of states and governments adopted the new NATO Strategic Concept, the Alliance's main security strategy for the next decade or so, which should express, in a clear and concise manner, the ways of countering possible threats and risks that NATO would directly face in the future.

The proposal was integrated, together with the concept of "smart defence", launched a year ago, by the Norwegian idea to connect the new NATO command structure to the existing national commands and the recent initiative of the Secretary General on "connected forces", in a document entitled "NATO: Towards 2020 and Beyond".

***Keywords:** Joint Vision; long-term key initiatives; Joint Force; conceptual approach; strategic projects; Lisbon package of critical capabilities*

Motto:

"We must look beyond our current requirements – to 2020 – and develop Joint Force 2020 to provide the greatest possible number of options for our nation's leaders and to ensure our nation remains immune from coercion".

General Martin E. Dempsey,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The end and the beginning of the millennium have been marked by a long series of events that have caused significant changes, with major implications, in all areas of social existence, including at the security level. These changes, all marked by globalisation, have led to the development of contradictory aspects, among which the instability and deterioration of the state of security, on the one hand, and the integration and increase in the measures of trust, on the other hand. Consequently, the change in the architecture of global and regional security, the rise of new actors on the world stage and the transition to outlining different relationships in international relations,

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concomitantly with managing more and more diversified crises, are the emblematic features of the current international environment, the primary factor of the national strategic context in which planners operate.

From the analysis of the evolution of the international security environment, one can point out today that we find ourselves in a situation of transition in terms of organising the world and building a new security architecture. The transformations taking place in the international environment occur with speed and depth unprecedented in history. Referring to this aspect, the well-known theorist and analyst of international relations A.D. Smith stated: *“We are always reminded that the globe we live on is becoming smaller and more integrated. Everywhere (...) previously independent states and nations are linked through a network of interstate organisations and regulations in a true international community. Anywhere in the world, the ethnic background is rekindled and old cultures are fragmented and reshaped”*¹.

Any state, in all his undertakings, *seeks to defend, protect, preserve and promote its national interests*. Through their variety and multidimensionality, they determine domestic and international actions of the state in all fields of activity. They are reflected by the constant concern of preserving the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, ensuring the security of its inhabitants, establishing, testing and maintaining useful and necessary relations with the other countries and with the international organisations, as well as with the regional civil society.

Since the basic feature of the international system at the beginning of this millennium is the *reorganisation, reform or expansion of political, economic and security organisations and institutions*, the military domain has also begun to take action in order to *adapt its structures, capabilities and decision-making process* so that they can meet the national security needs and the ones within alliances, as well as the future possible risks and threats.

Strategic Visions regarding the World in 2020 and Beyond

In the modern, complex, dynamic and conflicting world we live in, the main confrontation takes place between fundamentally different values, between democracy and totalitarianism, and is determined by the major aggression of international terrorism of extremist religious origin, structured in cross-border networks, against democratic states and rational political forces of the states

¹ Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*, Cambridge Ltd., London, 2009, p. 23.

engaged in the process of democratisation. The major trends that govern the global developments in the post-bipolar age create justified concerns, pose new challenges, give opportunities and carry risks to national values and interests.

As a consequence of these major trends, the security architecture acquires new aspects, and the role of management devolves not only upon the directly involved actors, but also upon the international security organisations. A special role is also played by the new centres of power that are capable of managing the crisis or conflict situations in the proximity of borders or areas of (political, economic, ethnic, religious, cultural or otherwise) interest.

In order to understand where the world is heading, certain international organisations and developed states have found it necessary to use *prediction* as a basic function of leadership, to interpret the current trends in the possible future developments of the international security environment, especially regarding certain potential risks and future threats and the ways to counter them, either through personal, national effort or within some new concepts, such as collective security, collective defence or cooperative security.

Thus, the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) developed a visionary document called “*Global Trends 2025. A Transformed World*”, through which it was stimulated the strategic thinking about the future, identifying the major trends in the evolution of the international security environment, the factors that generated them and their place, as well as their potential interactions. These trends mainly refer to: globalisation, demography, emergence of new state powers, disintegration of international organisations, climate changes and energy geopolitics².

The document was amended by the world financial and economic crisis of early 2008, forcing the Pentagon to launch, in January 2012, the national defence policy guidelines, entitled “*Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*”, a document that changed the American national effort towards long-term economic revival and internal fiscal control³.

The North Atlantic Alliance, not to remain behind, being under US pressure, developed a study similar to the global trends 2025, named “*Multiple Futures Project. Navigating towards 2030*”, through which it examined the emerging challenges to collective security in order to enhance the understanding, by the allied leaders

² “*Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*”, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 2000, p. 4.

³ “*Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*”, Department of Defense, Washington DC, January 2012, p. 3.

and the Euro-Atlantic population, of the future risks and threats that NATO would face in 2030. The four *futures* analysed in the study – the dark side of exclusivity⁴, deceptive stability⁵, clash of modernities⁶, new power politics⁷ – presented the security implications of future risks for allied forces preparation for 2030, and how they would influence the transformation of the force structure⁸.

The European Union started later the process of noticing the future risks and threats, namely when it passed to the development of military and civilian capabilities to fulfil the *Petersberg tasks*. In 2006, the newly established *European Defence Agency (EDA)* conducted a study entitled “*An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*”, through which it evaluated the future nature and context of possible operations that would take place under the aegis of the *European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)*. Through the spectrum of this vision, the future Europe was analysed within a sober global context, starting from the central predictions regarding the European demography and economic development over the next 20 years, in which its prosperity would decrease and it would be surrounded by African and Asian countries that would struggle to deal with the consequences of globalisation⁹.

All these visions are focused on regional or local imbalances and on the overlapping of the effects of globalisation, with enclavisation and fragmentation trends, which generate new risk factors and dangers, exacerbated by the increasing social unrest, natural disasters, global demographic evolution, resource depletion, global warming as well as proliferation of weapons, especially those of mass destruction, cyber attacks, structured terrorism, violent extremism, cross-border organised crime and illegal immigration.

⁴ Future one – *Dark Side of Exclusivity* – describes how globalisation, climate change and the misallocation of resources significantly affect the capacity of states to maintain sovereignty.

⁵ Future two – *Deceptive Stability* – underlines the way in which asymmetry, demographics, resource allocation and competing ideologies hinder developed states to react to instability and geopolitical risk.

⁶ Future three – *Clash of Modernities* – consists in the ability of developed states (characterised through competing ideologies, demographics and the use of technology) to keep the destabilised regions under control.

⁷ Future four – *New Power Politics* – consists in the emergence of new powerful actors, which bring about not only economic growth, but also the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as a consequence of the frictions in international decision-making, competing ideologies, conflicts over resource allocation and lack of economic integration.

⁸ At http://www.iris-france.org/docs/pdf/up_docs_bdd/20090511-112315.pdf, “*Multiple Futures Project. Navigating towards 2030*”, Final Report, April 2009, pp. 17-23.

⁹ At www.eda.europa.eu/.../downloadfile.aspx?..., “*An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*”, adopted by EDA on 3 October 2006, p. 5.

Under these conditions, although the danger of a classical war, of a conventional military aggression is highly unlikely, overlooking such risks might bring about major vulnerabilities to own security and to the ability to act to fulfil the international commitments undertaken. There are also included in this category the risks that concern border security and defence, given that important segments of the Romanian borders also represent the eastern border of the two organisations.

Global economic recession and the domestic crisis in the states of North Africa and the Middle East create additional pressure to security and stability, through the increase in the price of resources, the possibility of broadening the recruitment of terrorist organisations, the violation of nonaggression treaties and intensification of migration flows of persons towards EU countries, aggravating the social problems associated with them (rising unemployment, integration difficulties, delinquency etc.).

The global economic competition, which is more and more intense, can lead to the dilution of the solidarity required to manage certain sources of conflict in the multinational framework, especially those outside the area of responsibility of the North Atlantic Alliance, strengthening, in turn, the trends of unilateral approach.

For the countries that challenge the current rules of international crisis management, the possibility of using force is still an important option. Moreover, one can notice the manifestation of provocative tendencies, reflected especially in cyber attacks on networks and information systems, or deliberate actions that may cause technological accidents and environmental disasters. Simultaneously, there are increased the tendencies to restrict or prohibit the access of certain states to regional resources and opportunities, relevant to achieving national interests. In some areas in the vicinity of the integrated NATO and EU area, it has been noticed, in recent years, a degradation of the state of security, due to the failure to respect the weapons control regime, the re-emergence of inter- and intrastate military conventional conflicts, and the failure to respect certain principles of international law, especially those concerning state sovereignty and borders inviolability.

The complexity of the situation in Romania's area of vicinity is the result of the combination of the effects of separatist conflicts, illegal weapons, drugs and human trafficking, as well as of other cross-border crime forms. This state of fact, combined with the inefficiency of certain authorities in managing tense situations, provides the premises for the occurrence of actions generating insecurity and regional imbalances.

Possible Developments of Future Forces and Capabilities

The outbreak, in 2008, of the most complex economic crisis in the last two decades, has marked the entire international community. The implications of this phenomenon have geostrategic proportions, influencing the hierarchies of power and the countries' ability to assume international responsibilities.

However, at the same time, a series of new asymmetric, military or non-military threats, including those that manifest under the form of cyber or information aggressions, generated mainly from the international environment, as well as, to some extent, by the internal one, are likely to increase in terms of the danger degree and occurrence probability and may seriously affect the security situation of Romanian citizens, the Romanian state or organisations Romania is part of. The danger posed by such negative developments can be substantially increased if they combine, especially given the circumstances in which the borders between global and regional threats, as well as between foreign and domestic ones tend to become more diffuse.

The harmful effects of globalisation, influenced by the “*globalisation*” of certain asymmetric risks and threats, have shown that the traditional way of providing security, under the form of increasing national military power, alters the security climate, generating precisely insecurity. The result is the emergence of new concepts, such as: collective defence, common security or cooperative security. These concepts are the main feature of international security institutions and organisations of the 21st century.

The military dimension of security cannot play a secondary role, even if the redefinition of security emphasises its non-military aspects. Although the number of intra- and interstate conflicts has decreased in recent years, regional conflicts remain a defining feature of the current security environment. As a consequence, the main purpose of the actions specific to the *military dimension* of security should permanently be the *establishment of joint forces/military capabilities* that are the best led, trained and equipped in order to meet all the goals of the security policy and to deal with the challenges of the 2020s, in a new and quite difficult tax environment.

The technological advantage, information supremacy and network-centric warfare, expeditionary forces and super-specialised means are the new elements that should characterise the joint forces of the 2020s. Their development and implementation require considerable financial resources, resources that some have and others do not, and that give the actual dimension

of the technological gap between the countries of the world. Consequently, the implementation of such joint forces depends, to a very large extent, on the economic-financial power of that state, investments in intelligence and research, technological and human procurements.

The US Armed Forces elaborated on the old *Joint Vision 2010* and adapted it in a new vision, called “*Joint Vision 2020. America’s Military – Preparing for Tomorrow*”, a document approved on 30 May 2000 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton. The document does not change the US’s mission entrusted to the American military by the US Constitution, but it points out the emphasis that must be placed by decision-makers in order to achieve total domination of the modern battlespace, along with the allies, in order to defeat or destroy any enemy and control any situation in the entire range of military operations, from nuclear/classic war to a smaller scale contingencies, including peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. If total domination is the ultimate goal – it can be achieved by: dominant manoeuvre, precise engagement, focused logistics and protection in all the dimensions of space combat – the way to get there is to continue “... *to invest in and develop new military capabilities. To build the most effective force for 2020, one must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organisationally, doctrinally and technically*”¹⁰.

The Joint Force of the future will have to be able to win in the entire range of conflicts, to be prepared to work with allies and cooperate with other national institutions and international organisations. Since it does not expect to meet opponents remained in the *industrial age*, as before, the advantage of such forces must come “... *from leaders, people, doctrine, organisation and training*”¹¹ in order to benefit from the advantages provided by technology in order to achieve a superior warfighting effectiveness, especially when the adversaries will use asymmetric means, such as long-range ballistic missiles and other direct threats to the population and national territory.

A fundamental requirement of the future *Joint Force 2020* is *decision superiority*, namely “... *translating information superiority into better decisions arrived at and implemented faster than an enemy can react*”¹². Thus, the development of a global information system, at the same time with cultivating the native talent of leaders, will provide the proper environment to achieve decision superiority.

¹⁰ Jim Garamone, “*Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-Spectrum Dominance*”, article published at <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45289> on 2 June 2000, p. 1.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 2.

¹² *Ibid*.

This environment will also be supported by the liberty of professionals and experts to create new concepts and develop new ideas that will lead to future capabilities and technologies, processes experimented through innovative processes. Moreover, the meaning of the term *interoperability*, which became famous in the '70s, when it was considered that some allies could not work together with others, will be expanded to include the *joint doctrine* and *information exchange*.

The US proposal to create a *NATO Force 2020* was presented to the allies at the beginning of this year, with the desire to accelerate the implementation of the *new NATO strategic concept*, launched at the Lisbon Summit (2010), in terms of achieving an European strong component, as part of the transatlantic link, which should contain a force developed and trained so that it could counter NATO's security concerns and equally share the tasks and contributions of each ally to approaching these concerns in the future.

The proposal was integrated, together with the concept of "*smart defence*", launched a year ago, by the Norwegian idea to connect the new NATO command structure to the existing national commands and the recent initiative of the Secretary General on "*connected forces*", in a document entitled "*NATO: Towards 2020 and Beyond*", through which the allied leaders explained the way in which they would maintain the capabilities necessary to reach the level of ambition of the Alliance in a period of declining defence budgets, and the conception needed to achieve those forces and capabilities necessary for the next decade¹³.

The document draws attention to the uncontrolled structures and troops cuts, made lately by the member states, as a consequence of the fiscal imperativeness and stresses the fact that there is a risk of widening the gaps between the allied capabilities projected and the NATO level of ambition. As a result, *NATO Force 2020*, just as its American counterpart (*Joint Task Force 2020*), should be lighter, but more flexible, while maintaining its ability to remain agile, flexible, ready for action and technologically advanced – with cutting-edge capabilities meant to exploit the technological, joint and network advantages provided by the Alliance – and to be led by professionals of the highest quality, tested in operations. The need to include in this new force the lessons learned in NATO-led operations is just as important.

The main elements of *NATO Force 2020* would be:

- *to reform the NATO Command Structure (NCS)*, particularly its implementation in keeping with the documents approved at the Lisbon Summit (2010)

¹³ "*Food for Thought Paper on a Defence Package for the Chicago Summit*", AC/281-N(2012)0032 on 15 February 2012 at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_78600.htm

and the growing importance of the more efficient use of national commands and units with specialised role;


- to achieve *Lisbon critical capabilities (LCCC)* in the next decade;
- *smart defence*, which should go beyond LCCC, through multinational projects of missing capabilities, each having an already established leading nation;
- *a list of vital projects*, which should include those realistic and possible programmes addressed and agreed upon by the allies to take place based on joint funds, such as: the Baltic Air Policing mission, Coalition Shared Data Server, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Research (JISR) from Sigonella, building a radar/interceptor for sea-based anti-missile defence, increase in the forces capabilities for NATO special operations (FOS) and the achievement of a fleet of oil tankers in cooperation with the EU;
- to identify and protect *essential operational capabilities* in an improved allied defence planning process which should coordinate the national decisions regarding budget allocations and structural reductions based on recently set *Capability Targets*;
- to support the *NATO Response Force (NRF)*, through the approval of new organisational, operational and financing principles, among which there must be included the engagement of nations to use *NRF* for joint preparation (Article 5) and other capabilities and missions;
- *training and exercises*, which should increase the effectiveness of training and combat readiness and include multinational training with key partners;
- a new *Alliance intelligence architecture*, created as a result of the reform of intelligence structures in order to exchange information with key partners at all levels required from the strategic to the tactical one.

The Romanian Armed Forces have not developed a document regarding their vision in this respect since 1995, when the *Joint Vision 2010* was drawn up. The aspects regarding the analysis of international and regional security environment in order to define the potential risks and threats to national security were addressed through the security and defence strategies, which are valid for 4-5 years, therefore in the medium, and not the long term.

The first document in which such a long-term analysis was highlighted was the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, drawn up in 2006 and revised in 2007, with a perspective of 17 years (2008-2025), which provided the basis for the creation of the Romanian Armed Forces 2008. Therefore, forces that are necessary

for the present and not as a result of long-term predictions, as the current developments of the Alliance or of modern states require.

Romania will continue to play an important role in the equation of European and Euro-Atlantic stability and security and its role and place is given by the geostrategic position it has in Southeastern Europe, the position at the confluence of at least three areas of interest (US, European and Russian), the need to impose a stable and secure climate in this region ravaged by conflict, prejudice, trauma and desires of revenge, as well as by the undertaking of the political and military responsibilities within regional and international security organisations. As a result, it is obvious the need to develop forces and capabilities in order to deal with the geographical position and support the role and place the policymakers want for Romania in the future European and Euro-Atlantic framework. These forces/capabilities that should be called “*Romanian Armed Forces 2030*” will have to be really joint, flexible, deployable, sustainable and mobile, equipped and procured at the level of the other NATO and EU member states and ensure the accomplishment of the entire spectrum of missions, including those taking place in theatres of operations far from the national territory.

English version by
 ***Iulia NĂSTASIE***



STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTORATE - Vector of Euro-Atlantic Integration -

IMPLICATIONS OF THE LISBON TREATY FOR THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES IN EU-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS

Colonel (AF) Liviu POPEL

The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, on 1 December 2009, confirms the rising trend of the community development in the field of foreign action, regarding security and defence, and will bring about the increase in the coherence and efficiency of the Union actions in these domains. The new types of EU missions and operations stipulated by the Treaty of Lisbon determine, at least for the forces committed to the EU, changing the procurement of troops and adapting the forces training programme for them to meet the requirements specific to these operations.

The participation with forces and capabilities in operations in 2012 and in the future will continue the efforts towards the fulfilment of certain engagements and responsibilities that devolve upon us as a member of the Alliance, within the EU Common Security Defence and Policy as well as in the context of other international security organisations (UN and OSCE).

Keywords: *crisis management; humanitarian and rescue missions; strategic planning; Lisbon Treaty; Athena mechanism*

For the last 50 years, Europe has changed in order to deal with new challenges: economy globalisation, demographic revolution, climate change, energy supply or emergence of new threats to security.

After 1990, when the bipolar structure of the world disappeared and the *Cold War* ended, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty collapsed, the framework of the conventional conflict and threats changed significantly. The new threats worldwide have comprised a broad range of tensions and risks, such as interethnic tensions, redistribution of areas of influence, cross-border organised crime, increased political instability in certain areas, transfer of weapons and radioactive substances, drugs and human beings, proliferation of certain weak state entities, the so-called “*failed states*”, characterised by inefficient and corrupt administration, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical,

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bacteriological ones). At European level, the threats to peace and security have mainly become manifest according to the same dimensions: disintegration of multinational states (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union), intensification of interethnic conflicts, international terrorism, in which Europe is both a target and a base for launching attacks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, emergence of certain weak states, especially in Western Balkans and the former Soviet area and the continent's increased energy dependence (Europe is the biggest importer of oil and natural gas and most of its energy providers are in instable areas, such as the Middle East, Northern Africa, Russia and Caucasian states).

In order to find efficient solutions to these challenges, Europe must modernise itself, have efficient and consistent instruments, adapted not only to the functioning of a Union enlarged to 27 member states but also to the rapid transformation the world is currently undergoing.

In this respect, the Lisbon Treaty, signed on 13 December 2007 by the EU member states and entered into force on 1 December 2009, after its ratification by the 27 member states, takes into account the political, economic and social developments and meets the aspirations of the EU citizens, provides new rules regarding the complexity and modalities of the future action of the Union, makes it possible for the European institutions and their working methods to be adapted, as well as for the democratic legitimacy and its fundamental values to be consolidated.

The treaty positively influences the EU capacity to manifest as a global actor in two domains that are important for crisis management, such as:

- harmonising the general institutional framework of the Union, by enabling and streamlining the relations between the structures of the Council and the ones of the Commission in crisis situations management;
- increasing the EU role in the international system by improving the *Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)* and with direct implications for the *Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)*, the former *European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)*.

The Lisbon Treaty brings some important innovations for the future of the European Union, the following being relevant to the *CSDP*:

- designating a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to replace the current High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The new High Representative will be, at the same time, one of the vice-presidents of the European Commission;
- the vote with qualified majority will become the usual way to vote within the EU Council. Thus, the right to veto will not be used in many domains of the EU action, strengthening the capacity of community action;

- the importance of the neighbourhood relations of the Union is established at the Treaty level, as an integrated policy.

EU Priorities in the CSDP

The goals of the *Common Foreign and Security Policy*, as they were defined in the Maastricht Treaty regarding the European Union, are:

- safeguarding the mutual values and fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union;
- strengthening the security of the Union and its member states under all aspects;
- maintaining peace and enhancing international security in keeping with the principles of the Charter of the UN, the Helsinki Final Act and the goals of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe;
- promoting international cooperation;
- developing and strengthening democracy and rule of law, observing human rights and fundamental liberties.

The means of action for reaching these goals imply three ways:

- gradually providing a foreign and security policy of the Union;
- defining a common security and defence policy, which may lead, in time, to common defence;
- establishing systematic cooperation between member states in order to achieve their foreign and security policy.

The Provisions of the Lisbon Treaty regarding Forces Engagement in EU Operations and Missions

❖ *Types of Operations*

The Lisbon Treaty innovates considerably the field of the *Common Security and Defence Policy*, seeking the goal to enhance the EU security dimension. The reforms put forward in this field are aimed at promoting *CSDP* in a sustained manner, which may lead in time to the progressive appearance of a common defence, but only a consensus is reached in this respect at the level of the European Council.

According to the provisions of the Treaty, progressively achieving common defence at EU level must take place in keeping with the engagements undertaken by some EU member states at NATO level.

The Treaty has direct implications for defence, being mainly focused on increasing the Union's level of ambition through the expansion of the range of missions (Art. 27 and 28), solidarity clause, mutual assistance clause and permanent structured cooperation.

The Lisbon Treaty reconfirms the engagements undertaken through the EU Amsterdam Treaty for common defence, extending, at the same time, the scale and range of *Petersberg tasks*. These missions were introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty and refer to *“humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, crisis management operations, including peace enforcement missions”*. With the approval of the European Council, in June 2004, in light of the *EU Headline Goal 2010 (Headline Goal Questionnaire 2010)*, the type of these mission expanded to *“joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform”*.

To these, the Lisbon Treaty, according to Art. 28 B, adds *“military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilisation”*, mentioning that *“all these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories”*. The same article (28 B 2) reiterates that all these specific tasks must be defined and implemented by the European Council decision, under the supervision of the High Representative, who will ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.

Regarding the mutual assistance clause, the text of the article of the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 28 A 7) states the following: *“If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”*. However, these actions will not harm the specific nature of the defence and security policy of the assisted member state. The engagements and cooperation in this field will be consistent with the engagements to NATO, which, for its member states, remain at the basis of their collective defence, and with the structure for their implementation. Thus, the mutual assistance clause applies to all situations of aggression under the UN Charter, while ensuring the right to apply national specific policies in the field of defence and enables, at the same time, the use, where appropriate, of the engagements to NATO of member states and of this organisation. This article is even broader than Art. 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty (1948): *“If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”*.

The solidarity clause refers to the event a situation occurs which is either a terrorist attack on one of the member states or a natural and man-made disaster. The Lisbon Treaty (Article 188 R), regarding the solidarity clause, writes: The Union and its member states shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a member state is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.

Thus, the Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the member states in order to:

- a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the member states;
- b) protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
- c) assist to a member state in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;
- d) assist a member state in its territory, at the request of its political authorities in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

The European Council will regularly assess the threats facing the Union, in order for it and its member states to act effectively.

❖ *EU Procedures for Crisis Management and Decision-Making Process*

The decision-making process at the level of the European Union, as established through the Lisbon Treaty, entered into force on 01.12.2009, covers the following steps:

- The European Council defines the directions and general political priorities of the European Union. At this level, the most important decisions are made during summits.
- The Council of the European Union manages the Common Foreign and Security Policy of member states, within which the CSDP is developed.
- The High Representative manages the CSDP domain and is, at the same time, Head of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Vice-President of the European Commission.
- The Political and Security Committee (PSC or COPS) assists in defining the policies within the CSDP and prepares the EU response to crises. It exerts political and strategic control during crisis.
- The EU Military Committee (EUMS), the highest military structure within the Council of the European Union, provides military counselling and expertise, and military recommendations, respectively, for the documents for planning and commanding the operations/missions, at the COPS request, and gives general military direction for EUMS.
- The EU Military Staff (EUMS)/EEAS is the structure that supports the EUMC and the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate – CMPD/EEAS and provides military expertise for developing documents for planning and commanding the EU-led operations/missions.

Basically, for crisis situations management, the relations, responsibilities and key documents are the following:

1. The High Representative and Head of EEAS makes recommendations to the EU Council, which, through the General Secretariat of the Council, draws up and sends to the member states the documents with the options for a possible future EU mission.

2. The crisis management concept is analysed by COPS and approved by the General Affairs and External Relations Affairs (CAGRE).

3. The strategic military options are designed by EUMS and approved by EUMC, with the support of COPS.

4. COPS approves the proposals of EUMC for the Operation Commander (OpCdr.) and Force Commander (FCdr.). COPS approves the name of the mission and CAGRE adopts the joint action, which represents the key document for launching a EU-led operation/mission, authorises the establishment of the mission, nominates the OHQ and the Mission Commander, which, in turn, nominates the FHQ and the Force Commander.

5. EUMS supports the Mission Commander in the planning process. There are drawn up the documents specific to launching the missions (Initiating Military Directive, the Concept of Operations – CONOPS, conferences for force generation).

6. At the same time, it must be adopted by the UN a Resolution of the Security Council and, based on this, the mandate of the mission is set.

7. The Initiating Military Directive comprises political goals and strategic military goals.

8. OpCdr. designs the Operation Plan (OPLAN), the Rules of Engagements (ROE) and all consequent reviews. All these documents are debated and authorised at the level of the EUMS and member states and, again, authorised through military recommendations by the EUMC, and, finally, they are submitted for approval by the High Representative and COPS. After OPLAN and ROE are approved, the mission is considered to be launched officially.

9. Once with the official launch of the mission, IOC (Initial Operating Capability) and FOC (Full Operating Capability) are declared. CEUMC acts as primary POC (Point of Contact) with the Operation Commander and provides the connection between the latter and COPS, which is in charge of the strategic control of the operation/mission.

The EU planning process at strategic level also includes, depending on the military or civilian option chosen for crisis management, similar to the operational planning process for military structures, an operational planning process for EU civilian structures, under the command of the Crisis Management and Planning




Figure 1

Directorate (CMPD). In this respect, at the level of the EEAS, there are military and civilian structures for operations planning, respectively EUMS and CMPD. In line with the provisions of the new concept regarding the comprehensive approach to operations (OICA), currently there is a concern at EU level for increasing civil-military synergy in all areas and especially in crisis management operations.

There are also concerns at EU level for improving civil-military synergy in the field of developing military and civilian capabilities needed to achieve the level of ambition of the EU. In the military domain, the new initiatives meant to stimulate capabilities development are the “Pooling and Sharing” initiative (pooling and sharing responsibilities in the development of capabilities), permanent structured cooperation, NATO-EU cooperation and cooperation within strategic partnerships.

National Provisions regarding Forces Engagement in EU Operations and Missions

According to Law no. 42/15.04.2004 regarding the armed forces participation in missions outside the national territory, the missions the Romanian Armed Force can carry out are: collective defence; peace support; humanitarian assistance; coalition-type; joint exercises; individual; ceremonial ones.

Participation in operations is carried out under resolutions of the UN Security Council, decisions of EU, NATO international organisations and policymaking and legislative structures in Romania, pointing out our country's firm option for integration, as soon as possible, in the European and Euro-Atlantic political-economic and security structures.

The Romanian Armed Forces personnel participation in these types of operations was made until 2011 on a voluntary basis, the soldiers being sent on a mission after passing certain medical, psychological, capacity and foreign language proficiency tests. Since 2011, the participation in foreign missions has not been voluntary anymore but mandatory, according to the changes in the military cadres' statute.

The funds necessary for the smooth development of these missions are supported by the Ministry of National Defence budget. In the even of the participation in EU operations and missions, the joint costs (operating costs) are supported, partially or entirely, by the EU budget by activating the *Athena* mechanism. They are the costs derived from the functioning of the operational and force headquarters (OHQ and FHQ) and the support elements (administrative costs, transportation of headquarters staff to and from the theatre of operations, public information, staff hospitalisation, barracks costs, communications). The other costs, regarding per diems, meals, accommodation, means and forces transportation to and from the theatre of operations, ammunition, maintenance and fuel costs devolve upon the participating nation.

After the decision is made at EU level (having the prior political agreement of Romania included) to launch a military operation, at national level, it is initiated the analysis of the way in which the participation will take place. The Ministry of National Defence is responsible for establishing the level of participation. For this, there are requested proposals from subordinate structures of the Department for Defence Planning, Department for Parliament Liaisons and Legal Assistance, Armament Department, Financial-Accounting Directorate, General Staff, armed forces services etc.

The key documents and strategic planning documents used in the decision-making process regarding the participation in operations under the aegis of the EU are presented in *table 1*.

The external factor that triggers the participation in EU operations and missions is the Decision of the Council of the European Union. The Internal factors that determine the participation in EU operations and missions are: Law no. 42/15 April 2004 regarding the armed forces participation in missions outside the Romanian territory;

| INPUTS | OUTPUTS |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law no. 42/15 April 2004 regarding the armed forces participation in missions outside the national territory; • Strategy for Force Employment in missions outside the national territory; • the forces contribution to NATO and the EU, in keeping with Force Goals; • technical agreements with NATO, EU member or third party states regarding joint participation in various missions; • EU Battlegroup Concept; • requests from structures, commands, organisations etc. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Memorandum with the Romanian Armed Forces troops and means that can be made available for participation in missions outside the Romanian territory the following year; • Memorandum with the Romanian Armed Forces troops and means that are sent in missions outside the Romanian territory the following year; • Memorandum with the Romanian Armed Forces troops and means that can be made available for participation in missions outside the Romanian territory in line with Romania undertaking certain international engagements (NRF, EUBG, participation in UN, OSCE missions). |

Table 1

requests from national political-military authorities; engagements assumed by Romania with the international bodies it is part of.

At the level of the General Staff, it is initiated the analysis process by assessing all the implications by all the subordinate directorate. Within the meetings of the Command Group and the Working Group for operations it is established an Action Plan with measures, responsibilities and deadlines for preparing the participation in the EU mission. Usually, during the initial phase of operational planning, the Strategic Planning Directorate is the coordinator of the analysis process that is completed with proposals or options for action that are to be submitted hierarchically to the Minister of National Defence and with preliminary orders to prepare participating forces. In this phase, the General Staff will review the EU request just in military terms, specifying only the requirements and the budgetary implications. Based on the planning documents, the level of participation is set, the possible structures to carry out the mission are prefigured and the preliminary orders are prepared accordingly.

Following the decision of the Minister of National Defence to participate in the EU mission, at the level of the General Staff it is developed the *Strategic Planning Directive* based on which there are developed subsequently the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Operation Plan (OPLAN), Rules of Engagement (ROE) and order of mission preparation and execution by subordinate combat structures, which will thus initiate specific activities. Among these, one can mention internal training, national certification exercises, international evaluations in the event of the activation under multinational command, asset and equipment training for deployment etc.

The Priorities of the Romanian Armed Forces regarding the Participation in EU Operations and Missions

In keeping with the *“Directive of the Chief of the General Staff regarding the priority goals of the General Staff and its subordinated structures for 2012”*, no. SMG(S) 97 of 02.12.2011, for the unitary application of the provisions of the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, approved by the Decision of the Supreme Council of National Defence no. 38 of 29.03.2007 and the *Directive no. 1 regarding the priorities and courses of action of the Ministry of National Defence for 2010-2012* at the level of the General Staff and its subordinated structures, the primary goal of the General Staff is to maintain a credible military capability, able to ensure Romania’s security and territorial integrity and to carry out the military engagements undertaken internationally in accordance with the available resources.

In order to reach its primary goal, one of the priority goals is to fulfil the engagements assumed by the Romanian state within NATO, the EU and other international organisations.

In this context, the participation of forces and capabilities in operations in 2012 and in the future will continue the efforts towards the fulfilment of certain engagements and responsibilities that devolve upon us as a member of the Alliance, within the EU Common Security Defence and Policy as well as in the context of other international security organisations (UN and OSCE).

The continuity, flexibility and provision of resources will be essential elements of planning the armed forces participation in missions outside the Romanian territory in 2012. Thus, within the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU, continuity will be the basic element of planning as far as the theatres of operations in the Western Balkans are concerned, maintaining a presence, as far as possible, at the level of the current one, depending on the operational requirements. Moreover, it is planned the participation of a frigate, a helicopter and a special operations group in combating the actions of maritime piracy in the Somali Gulf. The participation with staff officers in individual missions will remain at the level of the current participation. The participation in EU Battlegroups will remain within the limits already committed to the EU and in accordance with national plans.

Implications of the Lisbon Treaty Provisions for the Decision-Making Process regarding the Participation in EU-Led Military Operations

The implications of the Lisbon Treaty provisions for the decision-making process have effects that are found in every stage of making the decision of participation, namely the EU request analysis, command of own troops training to participate in EU operations and conduct of actions of own troops during EU-led operations.

In general, depending on these steps, the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty for the Romanian Armed Forces have procedural implications for the internal decision-making process, and they produce implications that require the review of the development plan and capabilities provision (forces and means), forces preparation, and, last but not least, influence the assurance and allocation of funds for participation in EU operations and missions.

Thus, the main implication of the Lisbon Treaty for the internal decision-making process needed in order to make a decision regarding EU commitments is represented by the need to change or adapt this process, meaning that the decisions at the level of the ministry leadership will have to be adopted more rapidly in accordance with the available or planned human and financial resources. We mean that one will have to act directly on the functional relationships between the structures that are involved in the decision-making process as well as on the precise definition of their responsibility in order to have an effective response to the EU request. In order to adapt the functional relationships among structures with responsibility for operational planning, one will have to act to accelerate the flow of documents between them and to eliminate or optimise the number of structures whose approval is requested. For instance, the decision will be made knowingly by the political-military structures (defence policies, financial structures etc.), military (operations, strategic planning) structures and will not be involved for approval, at this stage of assuming the participation in the EU operation, structures such as training, logistics or communications etc. Any link of the approval process should lead to its efficiency, and not to hindrances or ambiguity. Many of the things that seem important for a certain stage can be resolved in time, after beginning to carry out the order of participation in the EU operation. In addition, in order to streamline the decision-making process, we believe one will have to act in order to accommodate legislative provisions, meaning that one will have to define clear and simpler procedures to allow the approval of a rapid response to EU requests to engage in operations (for example, meeting the 5-10 days period, in the event of the request to participate in EU BG missions). Simultaneously, one will also have to provide the physical support needed for the rapid transfer of pieces of information.

The new CSDP dimension stipulated by the Lisbon Treaty involves, at least at the level of potentially possible situation, new types of missions in which the EU can engage and, perhaps, their growth and diversification. The EU operations and missions are financed, with the agreement and the contribution of member states, from a joint budget mainly meant for common operating costs which, as noted above, may regard to settle the transportation to the theatre of operations, communications for operations, rental for equipment, hospitals support, protocol costs, office support, services expenses etc. This budget is managed by the *Athena* mechanism. The contribution to this is made in keeping with rules that ensure

a balance between member states and is based on the estimates made by the Operation Commander. The joint budget is approved by COPS. From the position of contributors, we will have the right to benefit from or use these funds for own forces, therefore, a complete analysis of the effects of the participation or non-participation in EU operations and missions can make sure that the degree of use of funds is effective or not, at least the use of the national contribution for own purposes. From this perspective, during the decision-making process, one should consider, among other issues, the implication for the participation with funds in the joint budget of the operation versus the funds that may be settled by the *Athena mechanism* in the event of engaging personnel and combat assets in the operation.

The EU membership implies actions throughout the entire EU spectrum of interest, namely the economic, financial, legal, environmental, military etc. dimensions. Regarding the participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy (EU operations and missions), Romania will have to act to implement the decisions of the Council of the European Union and the Political and Security Committee in accordance with the expectations of the other member states and the national level of ambition. From this perspective, due to the increasing EU level of ambition, in the future, Romania will have to act in order to increase the national contribution to the EU military dimension as well as to raise the visibility within the Union. In order to prevent the development of an unfavourable image of Romania towards the level of participation and involvement, one will have to seek to achieve a level of involvement that is similar to the one of certain member states that have at least the same size. From this perspective, we believe that resources will have to be found to increase the national contribution at the level of the representation in the political-military and military bodies as well as at the level of combat structures, employment of forces and means.


The new types of EU operations and missions stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty determine, at least for the forces assumed to the EU, a change in equipping troops and an adjustment of the forces training programme in order to meet the demands specific of these operations – humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, crisis management operations, peace enforcement missions included, joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and in reforming the security sector, military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilisation. These adjustments or changes in equipping and training can be achieved in a relatively short period of time, through the reorganisation of what already exists, in accordance with the new concept, allowing the development and completion of a proper capabilities acquisition programme and a training programme, according to a schedule tailored to the time, human and financial resources estimated until 2015.

The capabilities needed for the EU mission types correspond to the structures of Light Infantry (off-road vehicles, weapons etc.) and to structures meant for CIMIC and response to disasters: tents, rescue boats, disasters intervention trucks (bulldozers, cranes, other rescue equipment), MEDEVAC helicopters, improvised explosive devices (EOD) detection equipment, ROL-type deployable medical assurance structure, stocks of food, air and sea transport means, inter- and intra-theatre of operations, of average and high capacity. Moreover, in order to cope with the EU requests, it is necessary to build up, at the level of the Ministry of National Defence, stocks and funds to meet the EU requirements to participate in all types of missions, especially those of non-combat type. In addition, to meet the full spectrum of missions, the Armed Forces will have to achieve structures and trained personnel able to provide assistance and support to third countries for a wide range of activities, other than the military ones (for instance: reconstruction, anti-terrorism, legal assistance, police and security forces training, education etc.).

However, special attention will have to be paid to improving communication between all structures involved, in the country and abroad, in order to increase the efficiency of the decision-making process within the appropriate national structures. In this respect, we appreciate that, in the military domain, one will have to get involved in improving the means of communication, enlarging the EU computer network, and the access to classified information to eliminate certain restrictive provisions will have to be improved as well.

One of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty was the establishment of the *EEAS*, among whose implications there are those regarding the place and role of the EUMC, EUMS respectively. Currently, at the level of the member states, there are carried out analyses, discussions and plans regarding the definition and increase in the role and missions of the EUMC in the new structure of the CSDP. In addition, another concern that will influence the European decision-making process, as well as the national one, in the field of the defence policy, is the tendency to simplify the operational process of conducting the forces, at the level of the EU structures involved, and therefore the EUMC, as a body with advisory functions in the military field. This measure is sought to eliminate the structures with uncalled-for tasks, to ensure decision-making suppleness, to decrease the response time of the Union for crises.

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 confirms the ascending trend of the community developments in the field of external action, regarding security and defence, and will lead to the increase in the consistency and effectiveness of EU actions in these domains. The institutional foundations established by the Treaty may have a positive impact on the EU's capacity to influence international developments, given that, in the perspective of 2020, the Union will still rely on the institutional framework established by this document.

English version by
 **Iulia NASTASIE**

STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTORATE - Vector of Euro-Atlantic Integration -

INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDISATION IN THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES AT THE CONFLUENCE OF NATO AND EU REQUIREMENTS

Lieutenant Colonel Avram-Florian IANCU

Romania became NATO member on 29 March 2004, and EU member three years later, on 1 January 2007. The actions taken at national level to ensure the interoperability between the Romanian Armed Forces and the NATO/EU member states armed forces have included a broad range of conceptual and operational steps mainly taken in order to achieve the wide restructuring and modernisation of the military body, a complex process aimed at acquiring an institution with high standards in terms of modernity and efficiency.

In the author's opinion, the standardisation development and implementation process in the Ministry of National Defence is the main means of achieving interoperability. The implementation of operational standards has led to the development of numerous specific normative documents, doctrines and manuals that support forces training.

Keywords: *European Council; sustainability; NATO standardisation; interoperability; guidelines; partnership*

The end of the *Cold War* provided the Euro-Atlantic area and its close vicinity with the possibility of a new geopolitical and geostrategic configuration, of the establishment of a new more complex and stable security architecture.

At that time, for Romania, the most favourable option with a view to providing its security and stability climate necessary for the consolidation of democracy and economic prosperity was represented by the accession to the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Together with the need for finding the optimal solution for preserving its security interests, the accession was also justified by the natural return of Romania to the great family of European peoples, from which it had been removed so brutally in 1945.

Through the very reason for their existence and the roles undertaken accordingly, NATO

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and the EU are inextricably linked by the assurance of global and regional security as a purpose and by the measures/actions necessary for preventing and managing security crises using all instruments available, the military one included, namely, implicitly, military operations. Because the forces that will be employed in these operations come from member nations, the concern of these bodies for achieving interoperability in establishing the related requirements becomes more than obvious.

In this article, we intend to point out the evolution of interoperability requirements in NATO and the EU and to grasp the essential steps taken by the Romanian Armed Forces in order to properly respond to them in the wider context of the efforts made to join the two security bodies, as well as the steps constantly taken after gaining membership. Special attention has been paid to the activities carried out in the field of standardisation, because this is rightfully considered as the *main means of achieving interoperability*.

NATO and EU's Interoperability Requirements

❖ Allied Interoperability Requirements

Shortly after the establishment of NATO, it became clear that the coordinated development/creation of the policies, procedures and pieces of equipment by member states represented an important potential for the improvement of the Alliance's military efficiency and effectiveness. On 15 January 1951, the *Military Standardisation Agency* – MSA was established in London, with the declared purpose of encouraging the standardisation of operational and administrative practices, as well as of the combat material/equipment.

In the next 20 years, during the so-called *Cold War*, MSA coordinated continuously the efforts of the Alliance in the field of standardisation and interoperability. The approach to interoperability evolved significantly at the same time with the other major developments within the Alliance that marked the '90s – the change of the strategic concept (1991, 1999), the initiation of *Partnerships for Peace* (PfP/1994) and the enlargement process, the first operations outside the area of responsibility (Bosnia, 1992) etc.

PfP is the main mechanism for establishing practical security connections and for improving interoperability between the Alliance and its partners. In the analysis report of the *Partnership for Peace* in 2002 it was mentioned that “*Since PfP's inception in 1994 interoperability has been a core element in NATO's cooperation with Partners. The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP),*

which was introduced in 1994 and considerably strengthened in 1997, is one of the most important vehicles for development of interoperability”¹.

Moreover, alongside the objectives set within the *PARP*, the Alliance launched another essential initiative for the accession to NATO, on the occasion of the 1999 Washington Summit, respectively the *Membership Action Plan – MAP*, in which it was stipulated that upon accession, the aspirants were expected, among others, “to pursue standardisation and interoperability”².

On 21 August 2000, the *North Atlantic Council* made the following statement regarding standardisation: “In order to strengthen the Alliance defence capabilities, it is Alliance policy that nations and NATO Authorities will enhance interoperability inter alia through standardisation”³, and the definition of standardisation was revised precisely in order to express its clear relation with interoperability: “The development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs in order to achieve and maintain the compatibility, interchangeability or commonality which are necessary to attain the **required level of interoperability**, or to optimise the use of resources, in the fields of operations, materiel and administration”⁴.

In response to the increasing need for defining the concept of interoperability, NATO drew up the “*NATO Policy for Interoperability*”, which provided the first definition for the interoperability within the Alliance, respectively “the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks”⁵ and set the key objectives, the principles and responsibilities nations should consider in identifying and meeting the Alliance interoperability requirements.

The Bucharest NATO Summit (April 2008) restated the importance of interoperability, and, in the Summit declaration, the heads of states and governments stressed the need for the continuation of and increase in the efforts “to promote greater interoperability between our forces and those of partner nations; to further enhance information sharing and consultations with nations contributing to NATO led operations”⁶ and expressed their determination to “enhance

¹ *Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace*, 21.11.2002, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_1_vb_9548.htm?selectedLocale=en – para 5.2.

² *Membership Action Plan (MAP)* – subtitle Defence/Military Issues para 2. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27444.htm

³ *Introduction to NATO* – available at www.db.niss.gov.ua/docs/nato/nato/sco68.html

⁴ *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions of Military Significance for Use in NATO*, 2011, available at <http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/zPublic/ap/aap6/AAP-6.pdf> – p. 2–S–10.

⁵ *NATO Policy for Interoperability*, *CM(2005)0016/07.03.2005*, internal document – p. 1.

⁶ *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, available at http://www.summitbucharest.ro/ro/doc_201.html – para 31.

the efforts to develop and field the right capabilities and forces, with the greatest practicable interoperability and standardisation”.

As a consequence, among other measures taken at Alliance level, a series of new documents were drawn up in this field. These are *NATO Interoperability Policy* and *NATO Strategy for Enhancing Interoperability*, which were approved by NAC in December 2009.

The new policy provided a new definition to interoperability, namely “the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve the Alliance tactical, operational and strategic objectives”⁸, while the *Strategy* pointed out the role of standardisation as the main method to reach and maintain interoperability⁹. Thus, NATO nations and bodies would further draw up, accept and implement allied standards.

Among other methods that can be applied at the same time, there are the following: to establish a closer connection between the operational certification of forces and interoperability testing; to use more efficiently common funds and multinational and civil-military approaches; to enhance national engagements in the exchange of information and in the process of lessons learned from operations; to encourage nations to commit time and resources for the improvement of interoperability through implementing standards also in order to continue this process¹⁰.

Moreover, standardisation is the first instrument mentioned by the *Strategy* in achieving interoperability individually or in combination with the other instruments, respectively; training, exercises and evaluation; lessons learned; cooperation programmes (multinational ones or financed from NATO joint funds); demonstrations, tests and experiments¹¹.

❖ *The Defence Component and the EU Need for Interoperability*

Unlike in the case of NATO, the EU accession was conditioned by economic, institutional and social criteria rather than by aspects regarding the achievement of interoperability of national forces, especially considering that the EU “defence” component was developed relatively recently.

In the context of the tragic events in the Balkans, during the French-British Summit in Saint-Malo (December 1998) it arose the idea of creating an EU enhanced security and defence dimension through own capacities.

⁷ *Ibid*, para 45.

⁸ *NATO Interoperability Policy*, annexe 1 to C-M(2009)0145/09.12.2009 – internal document – p. 1.

⁹ *NATO Strategy for Enhancing Interoperability*, annexe 2 to C-M(2009)0145/09.12.2009, internal document – p. 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid*.

¹¹ *Ibid*.

The idea succeeded in winning the support of EU member states, therefore, the European Council in June 1999, in Koln, adopted the political platform for action as the “*European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and the readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO*”.

Under Finish presidency, the European Council in Helsinki adopted, in December 1999, the primordial goal of the *European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)*¹² (better known as *HLG 2003 – Headline Goal*). This goal essentially sought to place at the EU’s disposal a package of forces and capabilities capable of enabling the development of *Petersberg Missions*¹³. From this perspective, the member states committed themselves to create, by 2003, an *EU Rapid Response Force* of army corps level (approximately 50-60 000 troops), equipped with the necessary capabilities for the C2 domain, logistics, combat support, naval and air elements. This force had to be capable of being deployed within 60 days and sustainable in the theatre for at least one year¹⁴.

Following the 11 September 2001 events, the way the EU response to such threats was formulated took a different turn. In this respect, the European Council held in Seville (June 2002) decided to broaden the range of *Petersberg Missions* in order to include countering terrorism.

The Summit held in December 2003 marked a new stage in the process of developing the European identity in the field of security and defence through adopting the *European Union Security Strategy (A Secure Europe in a Better World)*, which set the strategic goals of the European Union from the perspective of assuming a much powerful role in the global approach to the management of the new types of risks and threats.

The security strategy mentioned that “*to transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary. Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium term, increase capabilities*”¹⁵. In keeping with the mandate transmitted through the *Security Strategy*,

¹² After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, on 1 December 2009, the European Defence and Security Policy became the *Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)*. In order to maintain the chronology, where it is the case, the document is mentioned with its initial title.

¹³ *Petersberg Missions* refer to: humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping missions, as well as missions of combat forces during crisis management operations.

¹⁴ *Development of European Military Capabilities*, November 2006, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/91707.pdf – p. 1.

¹⁵ *A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12.12.2003, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

member states decided, during the European Council in June 2004, to adopt a new *EU Global Headline Goal (HLG 2010)*, aimed at a “systemic approach” to developing the necessary military capabilities, seeking to achieve synergy between the forces of the member states with the purpose of improving the EU ability to respond more rapidly and efficiently to crises.

Consequently, “*interoperability, but also deployability and sustainability will be at the core of member states efforts and will be driving factors of this goal 2010. The Union will thus need forces, which are more flexible, mobile and interoperable...*”¹⁶.

HLG 2010 also provides a broader definition of interoperability, seeing it as “*the ability of our armed forces to work together and to interact with other civilian troops. It is an instrument to enhance the effective use of military capabilities as a key enabler in achieving EU’s ambition in Crisis Management Operations (CMO)*”¹⁷.

The prerequisite for these *EU Battlegroups – EUBG* to carry out their missions is their certification. They must meet military capability standards that are commonly defined and agreed: “*These overarching standards and criteria concern: availability, employability and deployability, readiness, flexibility, connectivity, sustainability, survivability, medical force protection and interoperability*”¹⁸.

EU planners recommend that the nations contributing with forces to the *EUBG*, in order to evaluate these forces, should use the already existing NATO standards and criteria, to encourage interoperability and avoid duplications. This is connected to the fact that several member states have only one set of forces that must carry out missions both within NATO and within the EU. That is why it is important that, when possible, one should try to become compatible with NATO regulations and procedures.

Within *EDA*, interoperability and standardisation are regarded as key elements of defence capabilities development in the context of *ESDP*¹⁹. Acknowledging standardisation as a voluntary and consensus-based process, *EDA* policy in the field intends to *contribute to the implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy* through supporting, coordinating and harmonising technical standardisation in the field of defence, with the final goal of increasing interoperability, cutting acquisition costs and improving technological competitiveness.

¹⁶ *Headline Goal 2010* approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004 endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004 – available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf> – para 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Declaration on European Military Capabilities*, Brussels, 22.11.2004, at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/MILITARY%20CAPABILITY%20COMMITMENT%20CONFERENCE%2022.11.04.pdf#search=%22november%202004%20capability%20commitments%20conference%22>

¹⁹ *Defence Standardisation Roadmap*, available at <http://www.eda.europa.eu/Otheractivities/Standardization/Defencestandardizationroadmap>

Although it is believed that standardisation has two components – operational and technical –, within the EU it is obvious that standardisation is oriented towards the latter. Standardisation in the defence sector is a strategic tool meant to improve armament cooperation. Moreover, standardisation is the most efficient way to improve and maintain interoperability cost-wise, and, at the same time, it is a catalyst for reflecting the defence needs in civil standardisation. For the operational component of standardisation, the EU relies exclusively on NATO, which has a privileged position in this respect, because “*NATO standardisation through the Standardisation Agreements continues to provide the operational and technical-operational standards for the interoperability of defence systems*”²⁰.

National Response Measures for Interoperability Requirements

Romania became NATO member on 29 March 2004, and EU member three years later, on 1 January 2007, but “*achieving interoperability... represented a challenge, a core goal within the national effort of Romania’s integration into NATO, ever since 1994, when the Framework-Document of the Partnership for Peace was signed*”²¹.

The actions undertaken at national level to provide interoperability of Romanian Armed Forces with the armed forces of NATO/EU member states comprised a broad range of conceptual and actional measures that were mainly focused on restructuring on the whole and modernising the military body, a complex process meant to acquire an institution at the level of the Western standards regarding modernity and efficiency.

Meeting interoperability requirements is difficult to be differentiated in relation to the organisation for which it is intended, because the results obtained regarding NATO, even if they were started earlier, can also be considered progresses in the relation with the EU. And this is enabled by the fact that Romania has only one force package made available to both organisation.

Moreover, we do not intend to go into details or review everything the Romanian Armed Forces have designed and implemented in order to properly

²⁰ *EDA Defence Standardisation Policy*, available at http://www.google.ro/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=eda%20defence%20standardization%20policy&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CCsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.eda.europa.eu%2FWebUtils%2Fdownloadfile.aspx%3FFileID%3D821&ei=K_5dT4DqKabb4QTL7uSvDw&usg=AFQjCNFdL3wzMqayIdjPcjmH3PvlopZTxQ

²¹ Colonel (r.) dr. Constantin Moștofleu (coord.), *ROMÂNIA – NATO. 1990 – 2002*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 2002, p. 72, at http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_carti/romania-nato_ro.pdf, retrieved on 11.03.2012.

address interoperability requirements. In turn, we want to give an overview of them by mentioning those domains/areas that we consider to be relevant for interoperability.

❖ *Training and Education. Modernisation and Acquisitions*

Forces training and education has been a priority domain to achieve the desired interoperability and compatibility. Thus, in the Romanian Armed Forces, there have been taken constant actions with a view to “*changing the training system, improving the personal training system and restructuring the education process*”²².

As a result, a large number of officers have attended the courses of the NATO/SHAPE school or the NATO Defence College in Rome and other courses organised by NATO or PFP member states, whose curricula have been focused on learning the procedures and standards specific to the armed forces in NATO member countries.

A notable result is putting into practice the institutional mechanisms that have enabled the process of learning the English language by the personnel filling “*key positions*”, so that they can have the linguistic competence necessary for working in NATO structures, alongside other armed forces.

Another important domain in which constant measures have been taken in order to achieve interoperability, especially regarding its technical component, is the one of the modernisation and acquisition of combat equipment. The starting point of any procurement concept has been finding the optimal responses to NATO and EU interoperability requirements. Among the first concrete activities carried out regarding weapons interoperability, one can mention: connecting the main command point of the ASOC air surveillance system to the NATO integrated system; implementing the NATO air reconnaissance systems on Mig-21 LANCER aircraft; completing the procurement programme regarding FPS-117 radar systems and related automated data sending equipment etc.

The national participation in multinational capabilities development projects initiated/carried out currently in the two organisations such as *Alliance Ground Surveillance* or *Strategic Airlift Capability*, to name only a couple of them, are just as many examples of measures/actions and sustained efforts meant to increase the interoperability level of national forces with the one of the NATO and EU member states.

❖ *Operational Contribution and Participation in Defence Planning*

An important element in achieving interoperability and, even more, in testing it has always been the participation in NATO and EU-led operations/missions.

²² *Ibid*, p. 9.

Under the aegis of NATO, Romanian contingents participated in the *Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR)*, *Kosovo Force (KFOR)*, *United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)* and in the deployment in theatre of the battalion from the *SFOR/KFOR* strategic reserve, as well as in operation “*ENDURING FREEDOM*” in Afghanistan. Moreover, Romania has supported and participated ever since the beginning (14 August 2004) in *NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I)*. Currently, our country is one of the most important contributors to the *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)*, maintains its commitments towards *KFOR* and further participates in patrolling the Mediterranean within *Operation Active Endeavour (OAE)* since 2005.

As far as the EU is concerned, the Romanian presence is mentioned ever since the first EU military operation – *CONCORDIA* (31.03-15.12.2003 – FYROM). Consequently, Romania contributed to military operation *ALTHEA* (02.12.2004 – Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the one in Chad and the Central African Republic²³. Moreover, the Romanian participation in the EU operations has not been only military, it has also been aimed at the non-military component. In this respect, Romania participated, between 2003 and 2005, in *Operation Proxima* (3 police officers), *EUPM Kosovo* (1 police officer), the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (9 police officers), the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (2 police officers), *EUPOL R.D. Congo* (1 police officer), *EULEX Kosovo* (11 police officers), *EUPOL AFGHANISTAN* (5 police officers).

Without going into further details, we wish to bring to attention the force contribution both to *EUBG* and *NATO Response Force – NRF*, as an important dimension of achieving the interoperability of national forces with the other member states. This is possible through the integration and practice mechanisms that are compatible/similar and especially due to certification/evaluation standards that are common to both organisations as a result of the constant efforts made in order to avoid unnecessary duplication. This aspect is mainly related to the fact that most of the member states in both organisations have only one set of forces that must carry out missions within NATO as well as the EU.

In June 2004, Romania took the first commitments to NATO as a fully-fledged member, which marked the debut of the effective participation of Romania to *NATO Defence Planning Process – NDPP*, aimed at achieving the capabilities needed to reach the level of ambition of the Alliance. Although they represented in fact a continuation of the PGs from the partnership period, the Force Goals brought new elements and more responsibility for their achievement, necessary

²³ *European Security and Defence Policy*, at <http://www.mapn.ro/diepa/>, p. 43.

in order to confirm Romania's status of real contributor to the Alliance defence efforts. In accordance with subsequent cycles of *NDPP*, in 2006 and 2008, Romania assumed new packages of Force Goals, most of them continuing the previous ones (*FG04* and *FG06*), but also new requirements to meet in keeping with the developments and evolutions in the NATO defence planning process. Through the current package of *Force Goals 2008 (FG 08)*, the operational requirements have increased in terms of quality, entailing greater financial and technological efforts.

For the EU, Romania made the first offer of military forces and capabilities to be used in the *Petersberg tasks*, on the occasion of the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference (Brussels, 20-21 November 2000), in the context of *HLG 2004*²⁴. After reconsidering the relation between Romania's contributions to NATO and the EU, Romania's offer was improved in order to achieve convergence between the forces and capabilities made available to the two organisations. Romania participated in the entire set of activities conducted for the adoption, at the EU' level, of the *Requirements Catalogue 2005 (RC 05)*, defining the defence capabilities necessary for the Union in order to meet the objectives of the *European Security Strategy* and *Headline Goal 2010 (HLG 2010)*. In this context, Romanian experts participated in working groups meant for developing the Requirements Catalogue 2005, the Headline Goal Questionnaire, as well as the process of *Scrutinising, Analysing, Evaluating – SAE* the contributions from member states and acceding countries.

❖ *Standardisation – The Main Means to Achieve Interoperability*

The bases of the process of drawing up and implementing standards in the Ministry of National Defence were laid in 1977. The standardisation activity at that time covered mostly the technical domain (documentations, product specification, state standards etc.) and was managed by the Weapons Department.

With the signing by Romania of the *Partnership for Peace*, the “operational” and “administrative” components of standardisation became very important. To cover the two new components, the *Standardisation Office* was established within the *Section for the Transition to and Integration in NATO* of the General Staff. Moreover, to cover the technical side of this domain, the structure of the Weapons Department became the *Military Agency for Standardisation*.

The military standards drawing up activity in the Romanian Armed Forces was held based on the order M.62/1998 for the approval of the “*Guidelines on the standardisation activity in the Ministry of National Defence and the implementation*”

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 42.

of military standards” and “Military operational and administrative standards drawing up methodology based on the standardisation agreements and allied publications with the purpose of providing the Romanian Armed Forces interoperability with NATO military structures”.

In accordance with these regulations and in order to meet the interoperability requirements of the Alliance, and based on *NATO STANAGs (STANdardisation AGreement)*, military operational (MOS), technical (MTS) and administrative (MAS) standards were developed. These standards were used by the units engaged in the Partnership in order to prepare for the participation in PnP operations in the allied context.

After the invitation in November 2002 in Prague, NATO asked the states invited to submit a formal *“statement of intent”* which should include the national engagement with the view to the status of future NATO member. In Chapter VIII of this statement, presented by Romania to the Alliance leadership in December 2002, it was stipulated that *“Romania remains committed to pursuing in good faith the standardisation and interoperability with NATO”.*

In this context, it became clear the need for standardisation regulations to be reconsidered from a new perspective – the NATO member one. Therefore, specific procedures have been initiated to develop new regulations. Without going into further details about the evolution of the steps made for drawing up these regulations, we must mention that, in November 2004, there were approved *“SMG/Std.1 – Guidelines for the standardisation activity in the Romanian Armed Forces”* and *“Regulations regarding the organisation and functioning of the Standardisation and Interoperability Council”*. We will further refer to them as *Std-1 Guidelines* and *SIC Regulations*.

Std-1 Guidelines have brought a new approach to standardisation in the Romanian Armed Forces from the perspective of the new status acquired by Romania primarily by defining standardisation in terms that are similar to that of NATO and emphasising its role as the chief means to achieve interoperability.

Also, *Std-1 Guidelines* have established and defined the standardisation tasks as well the relationships between them. Thus, the *development* of standards by the Romanian Armed Forces, as a specialised body, is possible only if there are no other standards identified developed by other (national, European and international) standardisation bodies applicable in the military field that can be *accepted/ratified*. Moreover, the specified guidelines stipulated that the first two standardisation tasks, *development* and *acceptance*, are inseparably and necessarily related

to the third one, the *implementation of developed/accepted standards*. Thus, implementation becomes the crucial element, in the absence of which the ultimate goal of standardisation, interoperability, cannot be achieved.

That is why *Std-1 Guidelines* stipulated very clearly the concrete ways to implement standards, as well as the criteria for confirmation/validation depending on the type of standards – operational, administrative and technical. Thus, the implementation of all operational and administrative standards, as well as the technical ones with procedural aspects and engineer specifications was achieved by incorporating the provisions of these standards in specific military legislation, doctrines and manuals. Thus, it was established, from the very nature of the documents that incorporated them, the obligation to apply those provisions of the standards. The implementation of these types of standards was considered completed and confirmed when all those to whom the specific military legislation, doctrines and manuals were addressed used them as such in the specific activity. For technical content standards, the implementation was achieved by integrating their provisions in documents regarding equipment or combat technique modernisation/acquisition process. The conclusion and confirmation of the implementation were considered to take place when the units concerned were equipped with the proper procurement/technique, and the staff used it regularly in keeping with the design parameters.

SIC Regulations established the *Standardisation and Interoperability Council* as the standardisation authority in the military domain, giving it the right and responsibility for directing and coordinating all standardisation activities of the Ministry of National Defence, also establishing the ways and procedures for their exercise/implementation. In addition, the SIC Chairman was given the power to sign *National Responses for the Acceptance and Implementation of NATO Standards*²⁵.

Moreover, when Romania became a NATO member, a series of organisational changes were made at the General Staff to respond more effectively to the new conditions. Thus, in 2005, the *Section for the Transition to and Integration in NATO* was named the *Force Planning Section* and was included in the Strategic Planning Directorate (J5), which was thus made in charge of the standardisation and interoperability issues.

Based on the new regulatory framework, the Standardisation Office, included in the organisation chart of J5, planned, coordinated/led and carried out specific activities aimed primarily at accepting and implementing NATO Standardisation Agreements (STANAG). The process of accepting the STANAGs was conducted

²⁵ Specific documents through which NATO member states communicate their national stand on accepting a STANAG and pieces of information regarding “*when and how*” they intend to implement it.

on two components: the *unplanned component*, involving the acceptance of new standards developed by NATO with the purpose of connecting and synchronising with the ongoing allied standardisation process; the *planned component*, which involved the acceptance of STANAGs developed previously to the accession to the Alliance and was meant to narrow the gap between that stage and the NATO standardisation stage.

Given the impressive number of existing STANAGs upon the accession to NATO (over 2000), it was necessary to establish certain priorities in accepting them. Thus, *first priority* was given to STANAGs correlated with the *Force Goals (FG)* undertaken through the *NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)*. These standards had to be accepted and implemented until the deadlines when the assumed forces had to be made available to NATO. In order to prevent potential situations that adversely affected the evaluation of forces for NATO, *Std-1 Guidelines* stipulated that, if the implementation of STANAGs in the way stipulated by regulations was not possible (eg, insufficient time etc.), they could be used during specific training and for exercises conducted jointly with the other members of the Alliance by completing the *Standing Operating Procedures – SOPs*, applicable and valid only at the level of the structures involved.

For the *second priority*, there were standards that accompanied the essential NATO doctrines (from the *Allied Joint Publications – AJP* series) and whose acceptance was essential in order to achieve doctrinaire interoperability.

Of *third priority* there were considered the standards that were previously used as a basis for developing *MOS/MTS/MAS*, starting from the idea that they were already known and could be easily analysed and accepted according to the new regulations. However, this approach was extremely difficult and did not yield the expected results for various reasons: most specialists who initially analysed these STANAGs could not be found (they left the system, were promoted to other positions etc.); the responsible structures did not have their exact situation etc. Moreover, it appeared that the initial analysis and implementation made according to the old regulations were only partial and in the content of *MOS/MTS/MAS* there were included, most times, only certain provisions and not necessarily in the STANAG order, making it almost impossible to identify what and how much of a STANAG was accepted and implemented. In addition, things were complicated even more in the situation in which new editions of the STANAGs appeared, which were many times different from the previous ones.

Even though a consistent and rigorous conceptual and actional framework was created for the standardisation activity, it was not always carried out in satisfactory conditions. There were some weaknesses in accepting and implementing NATO

standards, caused by a complex of objective and subjective factors. The deficiencies took various forms, corresponding to the areas in which they occurred. Thus, sometimes, the analysis of standards content was flawed, failing to express a national position corresponding to it. Many times, to avoid further involvement in implementation, it was preferred not to accept the standards, but the arguments offered could not justify the position. The reservations about the provisions of STANAG were not properly formulated. The ways of implementing the standards were not always the best chosen ones, because there were not taken into account all the relations and implications. The implementation deadlines were far away from the time of acceptance (even 10 years), disregarding the current needs. The inadequate incorporation of STANAG provisions in specific regulations, the flawed translation and inadequacy of the text in English made the text in Romania to be unintelligible.

The difficulties inherent in any beginning, the poor familiarisation with the new procedures, dynamics of the staff involved in the standardisation activity, organisational transformations and redistributions of competences, institutional communication and correspondence procedures, limited access to modern communication and information means, excessive combination of tasks, limited knowledge of English and many others can be considered as objective causes of the deficiencies.

On the other hand, among the subjective causes, one can mention: the inefficient general, specialised and especially interdisciplinary preparation, reduced experience, un-familiarisation with regulations, their personal interpretation, reluctance and resistance to change and even indifference to the tasks and responsibilities.

Despite these shortcomings, one must not overlook the good results yielded in the standardisation activity. The accepted standards portfolio has gradually increased from year to year, ranking Romania among the top countries of the second wave of NATO enlargement.

The implementation of operational standards has led to the development of a number of specific regulations, doctrines and textbooks which lie today at the basis of force preparation. On the other hand, the implementation of numerous technical standards has led to the incorporation of their provisions in the product specifications of pieces of equipment and systems intended for purchase/upgrade.

*

As shown above, the national efforts to achieve interoperability have joined the two coordinates given by the integration in the two Euro-Atlantic bodies (NATO and EU) and, respectively, by the membership status.

Given the similar elements, we can say that, in general, one cannot draw a clear demarcation line between the efforts to meet NATO requirements

and the ones made to meet the EU ones. This is more difficult and untimely, especially because, even if they have been specifically dedicated to a particular organisation, finally, the effects of the measures, by their nature, cannot but benefit the other organisation. This is enabled by the fact that the two organisations have 21 common members, and the nations have a single forces package that is made available to both organisations.

As far as the North-Atlantic organisation is concerned, the interoperability requirements have been very precisely formulated, and the recommendations and support provided have been directed in this respect. As for the EU, one cannot explicitly discuss about a requirement for achieving interoperability from this body, this is more obvious at the declarative level and its implementation is left to the nations. For this reason, and through the constant references to the Alliance (e.g. the use of NATO operational standards, EUBG assessment similar to the NRF one), one can see interoperability with the EU more as an extension or as an avatar of the interoperability with NATO rather than as an independent, autonomous effort. This approach is also supported by the fact that Romania provides both bodies with the same package of forces, meaning that national forces/capabilities required by the *NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP)* are also made available for the EU and taken into account as such in the EU's Progress Catalogue.

Although presented in an “*abridged*” manner, the national efforts show that Romania has engaged seriously and decisively on the line of achieving interoperability. The active participation in the political dialogue with NATO and the EU, in the missions under the command of these bodies, the undertaking and initial implementation of Partnership Goals, and consequently of the Force Goals, together with all other measures institutional and organisational actions of restructuring, training and educating the staff, as well as of purchasing and modernising the equipment and technology have resulted in obtaining visible results in the field of interoperability. The consistency of these results is supported by the coherent and rigorous development of standardisation in the conceptual and actional framework created by the regulations in the field. These results were mainly obtained in the operational and administrative field and less in the technical one. That is because of the fact that technology and equipment interoperability requires significant financial resources.

In the *standardisation strategy*, goals are ambitious. *By 2015*, all STANAGs must be accepted and, moreover, the standards with operational and administrative content will also have to be implemented. If this objective will be achieved, then most of the national portfolio of specific regulations regarding the preparation

and use of force, if not all of it, will be “renewed” and the doctrines, military manuals, tactics and procedures will be similar to those of other NATO member states. At the same time, one will also be able to consider that *operational interoperability* of national forces has been achieved. Also, by 2025, technical content standards will have to be implemented through the acquisitions/modernisations of technique and equipment. Thus, the procurement and equipment of national forces will be similar to those of other NATO member states and, therefore, the *technical interoperability* of national forces will also be achieved.

In particular, the achievement of the interoperability of *forces earmarked for NATO/EU* is a priority for standardisation, meaning that the STANAGs applicable to them, operational, administrative or technical alike, must be implemented until the dates on which these forces must be made available to NATO/EU. Whatever the objectives of achieving interoperability, one should bear in mind what follows after they are fulfilled. Thus, one must not forget that, once a level of interoperability is attained, maintaining it can be a challenge as great as its achievement.

Although achieving *Force Goals* and, implicitly, achieving interoperability of these forces has always been a priority, “*the continued reduction of the defence budget has caused delays in their implementation*”²⁶. Also because of the financial resources, maintaining the operational capacity of already operationalised forces is very difficult. Considering that, since 2008, the financial situation has not seen any positive or at least constant developments, but, on the contrary, it has worsened considering the world economic crisis, currently, Romania experiences delays and high deficits in meeting most goals assumed towards NATO and, in consequence, in meeting the interoperability requirements of the two bodies.

In conclusion, we can say that the imperative of achieving interoperability of the Romanian Armed Forces with NATO structures remains valid, even if important steps have been made in this field.

The objective of the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, according to which, in 2025, the full integration of the Romanian Armed Forces in NATO structures will be achieved, can be reached if constant efforts are made in order to provide the necessary resources and, furthermore, if ways of maximising the degree of utilisation of available resources are identified. In this respect, we see a great opportunity in the multinational cooperation projects that are promoted in the context of recent initiatives launched by NATO and the EU, i.e. *Smart Defence*, respectively *Pooling & Sharing*. The advantages derived from the participation


²⁶ *Report on the Activity of the Ministry of National Defence in 2008*, para 3, at http://www.mapn.ro/legislatie/raport_activitate_MAPN_2008.doc

in such projects consist in the possibility that the nations involved could have capabilities that they do not afford individually in terms of costs, but especially in terms of the high degree of interoperability of the capabilities developed multinationally.

Furthermore, we consider that it should be considered the development of an integrated approach to interoperability, which would define the conceptual and practical-applicative benchmarks and assure the required accuracy and consistency. We refer, at first, to the ability to accurately evaluate whether a capability/force is interoperable or not. We also refer to the possibility of determining with certainty, based on clear criteria, to what extent an action/initiative contributes to achieving or maintaining interoperability. For instance, is the operational capacity evaluation and certification (*combat readiness*) of a unit also an evaluation of the interoperability of that unit? What are the elements of equivalence?

In the absence of a conceptual instrument to make these clarifications, we will continue to talk about interoperability in the abstract way, without knowing *concretely* whether it has been done or not, or without knowing whether the efforts made have achieved the desired effect or not. Without this information, one cannot fundamentally decide on corrective or preventive measures that would actually increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the efforts made to achieve interoperability.

It is clear that we cannot have a purely national solution to these issues as long as the interoperability of national forces must be achieved with the forces of the other NATO and EU member states. Even if recent developments on the issue of interoperability from these two organisations are important steps towards a possible solution, we believe that there are more things to be done. We therefore consider that the national experience gained in the field is sufficiently robust to support an active and substantial national participation in developing the mentioned solution in the context of NATO and the EU.

English version by
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

CONTINUOUS WARFARE

Psychological Confrontation (VIII)

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ

What is psychological confrontation?

Psychological confrontation is part of the total warfare and it is permanent. It consists of clashes between the will of warriors as well as of non-combatant populations, who sustain combatants during armed confrontations.

Influence, disinformation, deception and manipulation are among the most known techniques employed by psychological operations.

Mass-media is one of the best and most preferred vectors of psychological confrontations.

Politicians, country leaders, company managers and religious leaders used and most probably will continue to use manipulation and other psychological techniques in order to achieve their goals.

Keywords: *total warfare; permanent confrontation; psychological operations; manipulation; deception; disinformation; mass-media*

The well-known French expert Roger Mucchielli says that psychological confrontation is a strange war that uses subversion as main weapon. Subversion agents are specially trained to start a process of disintegrating the society of the adversary, whilst small groups of partisans will engage in a battle against the legal authorities of the target state. It is an unconventional war, which does not respect international war laws, confusing lawmakers and jurists as well¹.

The psychological component of the total confrontation named war is known as will or moral strength. It is the second most important dimension of the state's power, after the political one, because victory in any confrontation is gained when the opponent **loses its will to fight**. I would say that psychological confrontation consists in "*clashes of will*" that take place inside the human mind. Like many other "*weapons*", the moral component has a multidirectional action: against combatants and non-combatants – belonging to own community

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¹ Roger Mucchielli quoted by Costel Susanu in the essay *Riscurile vulnerabilității informaționale*, published in Horia Pitariu and Filaret Sîntion (coordinators), *Psihologia luptătorului*, Editura Militară, București, 2003, p. 225.

and to adversary as well – but also to international public opinion. The aim of influencing own community is to foster cohesion and national interests. At the same time, the psychological component aims to protect own community against the adversary's attempt to influence it. This aim is accomplished by the special state agencies in close cooperation with other state institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and citizens. The influence, manipulation and misinformation of public opinion in the states of the world represent a continuous activity whose intensity varies depending on the objectives and the reaction of the “*target community*”. International public opinion is a permanent target because nobody wants it to support the adversary. Everyone wants international public opinion to support or, if this objective is not reachable, to be neutral. The worst case is the disbandment of an alliance because of the successful psychological influence of the adversary.

One of the Romanian experts in this domain – Bogdan Teodorescu – says that “*man has been manipulated in his entire social existence, without technology, without psychology, without advertising. When all these appeared, manipulation had already existed and its principles had already been accepted by both the subject of manipulation and the manipulator*”².

In order to see how manipulation and influence work it is useful to analyse some news in the media consisting of different scenarios concerning the future of the world, of a region or of a certain state. Some of these scenarios are meant to test the public opinion reaction, which will be used for setting real psychological operations – objectives, phases, tactics, means of influencing etc.

Other scenarios aim to influence public opinion following an existing psychological operation plan (PSYOPS OPLAN). Such a scenario is written by Al Hidell, who assumes that the war against terror is a smokescreen to hide the USA interests in controlling Central Asia and its existing energy resources³. This scenario and many others are released to the public “*from trustworthy sources that want to preserve their anonymity*”. The label of “*trustworthy sources*” is designated to manipulate public opinion towards the set objective. That is to say to draw people's attention and to increase the credibility of the released data.

Usually, the successful influence on public opinion and on the adversaries' armed forces is the result of PSYOPS. These kinds of operations are sometimes considered “*black art*”, practised by masters of lies and deception. That is why

² Bogdan Teodorescu, cited by Călin Hentea in *Noile haine ale propagandei*, Editura Paralela 45, București, 2008, p. 47.

³ Al Hidell, *Mutând țintele: strategiile reale din spatele războiului împotriva terorismului* in Al Hidell and Joan D'Arc (coordinators), *Marile conspirații ale lumii*, Editura Antet XX Press, Filipeștii de Târg, Prahova, 2006, p. 11.

some decision-makers feel disgust at manipulating people and tend to suppress the psychological dimension of military operations⁴.

Psychological confrontation has always been an important component of all the wars from ancient times to the present day. Its role will most probably be increased in the future war, which is, more than ever, based on influencing the mind of the adversary to suggest or even impose a certain type of behaviour. For instance, during the so-called “*silent war*”, usually known as peacetime, one of the objectives is to make the target state (community) accept some unfavourable decisions such as to cede some territories or to renounce to claim its rights at the International Court of Justice etc. During an armed confrontation, the suggested attitude for the adversary is fear or losing the will to fight. The desired objective is accomplished by using different strategies for influencing, discouraging, frightening, diverting attention. The most preferred vectors for implementing psychological confrontation strategies are television and the Internet because of their major impact on public opinion. The other means such as radio, journals and written publications are also used. Confrontation is permanent and aims to cover all areas of the adversary social life. In peacetime, PSYOPS focus on non-combatants whilst in an armed confrontation they aim mainly at the adversary’s armed forces.

Lately, many experts have tended to include psychological confrontation in the information confrontation. In my opinion, it is difficult if not impossible to draw a sharp divide between psychological and information confrontation. As many of us know, war is a multidimensional confrontation and all its components influence each other. It is also well known that the mass media have become the most important weapon for both information and psychological confrontation. Although there are commonalities regarding both components of war, each component has some distinct objectives, strategies, tactics and means.

In the beginning, psychological aggressions were aimed at generating social disorder in target states, which was supposed to be followed by toppling the government, blocking the decision-making structures and even the state functioning in order to justify foreign military intervention. In other words, psychological aggression was more or less a secondary component of military confrontation. Current and very likely future wars rely more on psychological confrontation, because the mind is the most important battlefield of the future.

The importance of psychological confrontation comes from the “*basic security*”, which encompasses the feeling of own existence and personal identity, the relation

⁴ Lt Col Steven Collins, *Alianța Nord-Atlantică și operațiunile psihologice strategice: domeniu proscris sau în plină dezvoltare?*, article in *Infocom* review, published by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff, October 2004, pp. 6-7.

of every man with the world to find out satisfaction in their life⁵. Sigmund Freud used to appreciate individual security in close connection to confidence in life and in the lucky star⁶. The Romans acknowledged security as the peace of mind, the absence of worries, and harmless rest⁷. At the beginning of the 20th century the security concept meant trust, peace of the mind resulted from the absence of any danger that could make man fear⁸.

Psychological influence through the mass media

It is widespread the truth that the mass media can not only build but also demolish, can inform and misinform as well, can participate in any type of confrontation – political, economic, psychological or military one – or they can be independent.

People that work in the media have managed to inoculate into the mind of most of the citizens in democratic states the idea that the mass media represent the fourth estate. This claimed position is not officially recognised but it is tacitly accepted by the majority of politicians. Despite this perception, some new and old events highlight the status of “*democracy watchdog*” for the media, which means a vector of power. This status gives the mass media an important role in keeping the balance among all the forces in democratic states. Both positions – informal state power and “*democracy watchdog*” – require the media to be independent. The media under censorship or the media enrolled into different groups of interests cannot be informal power or vector of power at society level. If the media are not independent then they become “*watchdogs*” for certain interests or if they accept censorship then they will become subservient to the official power.

The power of the mass media to influence people is based on the individuals’ tendency to let themselves be subjugated by images, by whatever is seen and tangible⁹ or by the power of the word¹⁰, proved since the ancient fight between David and Goliath. Let us remember the image of an American soldier dragged by the car of Somali rebels along the streets of Mogadishu and the immediate reaction of the American public opinion that forced the White House to withdraw the US troops from Somalia

⁵ Ronald Doron, Françoise Parot, *Dicționar de psihologie*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2006, p. 700.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ Marius Lungu, Mariana Lungu, *Dicționar român-latin, Dicționar latin-român*, Editura Steaua Nordului Grup SRL, Constanța, p. 699.

⁸ Collective, *Petit Larousse illustré, Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopédique*, publié sous la direction de Claude Augé, Paris, Librairie Larousse, 1912, p. 908.

⁹ Sigmund Freud, *Introducere în psihanaliză. Prelegeri de psihanaliză. Psihopatologia vieții cotidiene*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1992, pp. 68-69.

¹⁰ Adam Schaff, *Introducere în semantică*, Editura Științifică, București, 1966, p. 129.

in 1990. That event, along with the terrifying images from Vietnam, has mostly contributed to the emergence of a new component of the total confrontation called “*perception warfare*”, which completes the means used for psychological influence. Using the lessons learned from all the confrontations in history, many military and political decision-makers have acknowledged the importance of image for approaching victory in any total confrontation, no matter the component – whether a silent or violent one, whether it is waged in a battlefield or in international debates arena.

The eyes are the gateway to the mind and soul of the man. Moreover, they represent the mirror of human nature. Our eyes collect the majority of information about the environment, which has a great importance to the human psychic. On this basis, experts in psychological confrontation build their techniques for deceiving the adversaries on false images¹¹ launched in the media. This is the most used and the easiest way to influence people. Usually, most of our fellow men do not think too much about the trustworthiness of the images, because they tend to believe what they see and do not process the information.

Misleading through tricky images was, is and most probably will be largely used by the PSYOPS via the mass media. CNN became famous during the First Gulf War through “*live transmissions*” from the battlefield. During war preparations, PSYOPS had two main objectives. The first one was to portray Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein as a cruel dictator and assassin, thirsty for gaining more power among Arab states and in the world. The second was to convince more states, especially Arab and Muslim, to join the Multinational Coalition, led by the USA, under the UN mandate, to liberate Kuwait. The media used many tricky images and movies to accomplish these objectives. Among them, I can count the testimony of a so-called nurse from a hospital in Kuwait, who pretended that she was an eyewitness when the Iraqi soldiers killed thousands of innocent civilians, including newborn babies. This testimony was a fake, because the pretended nurse was the daughter of Kuwaiti Ambassador in the USA and she did not witness the facts she told about in front of the television cameras. The scenario of the testimony was made by the Hill & Knowlton Agency, registered in the USA¹². Using this kind of scenarios, public opinion worldwide and even the UN Security Council were convinced to support a military intervention in Iraq in order to prevent Saddam Hussein’s soldiers from continuing their atrocities.

¹¹ ****, DEX '98, *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române*, at <http://dexonline.ro/search.php?cuv=inselet>.

¹² Ion Juncu, *Agresiunea psihologică – vector înaintat al conflictelor militare*, in *Agresiune și apărare psihologică*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 1994, p. 44.

Apparently, all the transmissions related to the First Gulf War were live. In reality, all the pieces of information were censored¹³ in order to avoid displaying all the horrible images of the fights and maybe to avoid incrimination of the warriors that made mistakes like “*collateral damage*” or unintended victims among civilians.

The First Gulf War was among the first military confrontations in which some live images were projected via television in the American citizens’ homes. The most impressive ones were those received from cruise missile video cameras that showed the impact with the target. The intent was to demonstrate that war could be less destructive using the so-called “*surgical bombs*” that hit only the target and did not affect the neighbourhood that much.

People that work in the mass media use manipulation for different reasons. Some of them want their products to be easily sold and the companies they work for to make more money. In return, they hope the managers of the companies give them some incentives such as a better salary or a promotion. Some others would like more money and celebrity as well. They compete for different prizes or they want to get rich as soon as possible. The third category is composed of people that use the media to gain notoriety and to become politicians.

The people that manipulate have neither regrets about their actions nor morality. They are guided by their own interests and they could use all means to achieve their objectives. Manipulators count on the people’s tendency to trust in the mass media instead of official agencies. Thus, the media could deceive public opinion by promoting insignificant humans to the status of “*personality*”, especially in showbiz and politics, almost overnight. This is the case of Russian Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Italian Silvio Berlusconi. They were promoted in a few weeks from the status of ordinary people to the one of party leaders¹⁴.

A minor fact could be perceived as great depending on the way it is released to the public. In other words, the mass media could not only make a mosquito be seen as a stallion but also diminish the importance of a certain event, work of art etc. through the way information and additional comments are delivered.

In 1999, international public opinion was influenced in a similar way with the one from 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. That time, television channels worldwide released a photo showing a Muslim child passed through a barbed wire fence by his parents in order to save him from being killed by the Serbs¹⁵. The image produced the expected effect and facilitated NATO’s decision to start the war against Serbia on 24 March 1999.

¹³ Mihai Ungheanu, *Un război civil regizat*, Editura Romcartexim, București, p. 19.

¹⁴ Ion Juncu, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

¹⁵ CNN, *Focus on Kosovo* (Timeline; Damage Assessment) at <http://kosova.org/allied-force/cnn/index.asp>.

“*The Romanian Revolution live*”¹⁶ is one of the most eloquent examples of influencing public opinion in Romania and worldwide. The announcement of the pretended “60 000 dead”¹⁷ made by the public television served to initiate a mass revolt against Ceaușescu regime in December 1989. Right after the events, it was revealed that the figures related to the so-called mass killing were exaggerated. In reality, there were dozens of dead bodies discovered at the morgue, belonging to people killed during the initial riots in the city of Timișoara. The crimes have no excuses and the truth about all those killings has not been fully revealed and proved yet.

There are other similar situations of influencing public opinion. One with great impact on foreigners was the movie revealing ethnic clashes between Hungarians and Romanians that occurred in the city of Târgu-Mureș, in March 1990. Then, some foreign televisions pretended that the Romanians cruelly beat an ethnic Hungarian. A few days after that event, we discovered that the cruelly beaten individual was a Romanian. Unfortunately, the foreign televisions that blamed Romanians did not make the necessary correction and the Romanians remained with the initial blame¹⁸. This kind of situations formed by stereotypical images and erroneous representations, artificially nurtured into peoples’ minds, are very dangerous because they can stimulate clashes between communities.

After the terrorist attacks against the USA on 11 September 2001, followed by the ones in Moscow, Madrid and London, some experts connected all those events with the media globalisation, which made possible the rapid transmission of the images of those barbarian actions all over the world¹⁹. It is not fair to incriminate the mass media for promoting terrorism. It is true that the journalists’ desire to be famous could be exploited by terrorists. I do mean that journalists are interested in providing the public with the most important news and terrorist actions are among those events that attract their and the public opinion attention. The result could be perceived as a sort of common interest of both journalists and terrorists. That is to say, delivering horrible images with terrorist attacks effects, journalists have the attention of the public and terrorists meet their purposes of inoculating fear, anxiety and even horror in public opinion. Another argument for not blaming the mass media is the fact that it has a positive role in educating people for understanding

¹⁶ Mihai Tatulici, *Revoluția română în direct*, quoted by Mihai Ungheanu in *Un război civil regizat*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹⁷ Ion Juncu, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

¹⁸ Klaus Heitmann, *Imagina românilor în spațiul lingvistic german*, Editura Univers, București, 1991, p. 6.

¹⁹ Petre Duțu, *Terorismul internațional și mass-media*, in *Strategic Impact* review, no. 4/2007, Editura Universității de Apărare “Carol I”, București, p. 88.

and promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law, along with their contribution to peacefully solving conflicts. Moreover, the mass media correctly inform the public and thus contribute to countering hostile propaganda and misinformation launched by the adversaries, no matter if they are states, NGOs or interest groups.

The most dangerous form of psychological influence consists in subliminal messages. The mechanism of producing and delivering these messages is based on addressing some stimuli towards a zone that is placed between the physiological and perceptive limits of the human brain. In such a way, the manipulator furnishes more information than the brain could process and the information cannot come to the human conscience²⁰. This kind of influencing people is very dangerous because it is very difficult to identify its messages and to protect people against them.

Knowing the negative effects of manipulation, misinformation and deception on public opinion, some political leaders decided to apply censorship to the mass media in order to avoid these kinds of effects. The results were not the expected ones and democratic states decided to renounce censorship.

The mass media involvement in any type of confrontation has led them in the position of power multiplier for anybody that uses them. When the mass media are divided among different interests, under the guise of the freedom of expression and association principles, public opinion is under the crossfire and finally it will be divided and influenced by the media. In this case, the mass media affect national security through diminishing the social cohesion of the population.

Psychological influence and policy

Politicians are the first who use psychological influence in order to shape their relation with public opinion. Practically, they want to gain as many as possible supporters and followers no matter if they have charisma or not, or if their human value is the appropriate one for a leader or not. As the Romanian expert, Călin Hentea, points out *“the mass media represent both a mirror of the masses will and a propaganda vehicle heading towards masses of people”*²¹. Thus, the mass media could be a subtle instrument for sustaining a dominant ideology in society as well as for imposing the hegemony of a group over all the other members of the society. Therefore, the mass media are seen as docile instruments of leading masses, used by politicians to create the mass support for their policies and to make masses

²⁰ Ion Ciofu, *Stimularea subliminală*, article published in *Psihologia*, no. 1-2/1994, quoted by Ion Juncu, in *Agresiunea psihologică...*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

²¹ Călin Hentea, *Propagandă și operații informaționale în crizele și conflictele post-război rece*, Doctoral Thesis, Editura U.N.Ap., București, 2008, pp. 52-53.

of people be dissatisfied with opponent politicians. It is a very complex process of shaping opinions inside which political analysts, politicians and journalists feed each other with words and images. Then, they process images and words and after that deliver the new words and images to the public in order to achieve the desired effects.

One of the most known examples of politicians able to impose control over the masses of people is that of Paul Joseph Goebbels – the Nazi minister of propaganda. Using written press, radio and cinema, he managed to touch the highest peaks of manoeuvring Germany’s population until then. Nazis’ propaganda machine functioned at the highest performance, having as spearhead Field Marshal Erwin Rommel²², nicknamed “*Desert Fox*”. The psychological influence of Rommel’s image was huge and recognised by the British Prime Minister himself – Sir Winston Churchill – who considered him a military genius. Moreover, British soldiers believed that Rommel was invincible²³.

In totalitarian regimes, no matter they are secular or religious ones, the risk for gross manipulation of the population is high because the regimes have monopoly over the media. Monopoly usually leads to abuses and the political power could afford to do everything without fear of being punished. Thus, people become victim of certain play on words that could transform reality in such a way that citizens cannot make distinction between justice and injustice²⁴.

Political leadership and political class, in general, have to develop strategies to provide the society with multidimensional security. To that end, citizens’ needs, state’s possibilities and the international security environment have to be known. Based on these pieces of information and the conclusions drawn from their analysis, the security strategy has to be communicated to the public, via the media, in order to start a public debate to make it known, understood, accepted, and to improve its provisions.

Citizens will accept and sustain the strategies developed by the political leadership if they are convincing and supposed to produce the desired effects. Any member of the society wants to know in due time WHAT he has to do and WHY. Moreover, people have to know WHY the plans and programmes for implementing strategies have not produced the expected effects, otherwise suspicions may appear and political leadership could lose its credibility. Any gap between political leadership and people could be exploited by the adversary in order to increase it till

²² Guido Knopp, *Războinicii lui Hitler*, Editura Litera, București, 2010, p. 33.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

²⁴ C. M. Wieland, quoted by Jurgen Habermas in *Sfera publică și transformarea ei structurală*, Editura Comunicare.ro, București, 2005, p. 331.

the dimension of a rupture that will diminish the nation's morale and its will to sustain political decisions and military actions. Thus, psychological confrontation is lost.

History provides numerous examples of changing the population's attitude, which led to losing the military confrontation because of losing the confrontation on the psychological battlefield. One of these examples refers to the First World War. At that time, allied propaganda managed to diminish the German population's support for its political leadership and the armed fights launching slogans that speculated the existing problems such as food insufficiency and the hidden objectives of the war²⁵. The results were spectacular because, on 09.11.1918, the population decided to set up what was called the Weimar Republic and a socialist government. Two days later, Germany decided to accept the armistice proposed by American President Woodrow Wilson – the famous fourteen-point proposal²⁶ – although the German Armed Forces were fighting outside the German territory.

The attempts to psychologically influence are not always successful. Alex Mucchielli believes that successful manipulation has to start from knowing the interests – both individual and collective – of the target community, followed by hidden actions, because the profound nature of manipulation is based on unconscious processes. It means that people should not know the intents of the manipulator²⁷.

There are many examples of unsuccessful attempts to manipulate but the American experience in Vietnam is one of the most important. Experts say that the intent to influence the Vietnamese population and the Viet Cong fighters failed because the messages for sustaining South Vietnamese regime were not related to the reality. The Vietnamese people knew that the regime was corrupt and unfair and the messages for sustaining such regime were most of the time followed by an opposite reaction consisting in sustaining the Viet Cong forces. The failure was also caused by the numerous losses among the American Armed Forces as well as by the fact that the mass media revealed the atrocities produced by both parties during fights. The American population was terrified seeing photos with own soldiers cut in pieces and put in sacks or with Vietnamese children burning alive because of napalm bombs launched by the American aircraft²⁸.

²⁵ Martin L. Fracker, *Conquest and Cohesion. The Psychological Nature of War*, essay published in Dr Karl P. Magyar (coordinator) *Challenge and Response*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, 1994, p. 176, at <http://www.aupress.maxwell.af.mil>

²⁶ E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, vol. I, pp. 156-157, quoted by Paul Johnson in *O istorie a lumii moderne, 1920-2000*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2003, p. 30.

²⁷ Alex Mucchielli, *Arta de a influența*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2002, pp. 20, 193.

²⁸ Gerald S. Venanzi *Democracy and Protracted War: The Impact of Television*, in *Air University Review* 34, 1983, pp. 58-71, quoted by Martin L. Fracker, *op. cit.*, p.178.

Then, the American population opposition to the Vietnam War increased gradually until President Nixon promised, during presidential elections, to withdraw troops and stop the American involvement in Indochina.

The Soviets faced a similar situation during their intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1988). Although the USSR superiority was unquestionable in military and economic terms, it seemed that the Afghan morale was above the Soviet soldiers and that was the most important factor that made Gorbachev withdraw his troops from Afghanistan. It is true that the Afghans were supported – politically, economically and militarily – by the Western and most of the Muslim countries²⁹ but their moral strength was the decisive factor for the final result of the confrontation.

One of the most recent and largest psychological manipulation is related to the Second Gulf War in 2003. Psychological confrontation consisted in the fight between the supporters and opponents of initiating a new war against Iraq and lasted between 2001 and 2003. According to Tyler Drumheller – a former CIA senior employee – the supporters of war were mostly senior officials in George Bush Jr. Administration³⁰. They managed to convince public opinion in the USA and worldwide that Saddam Hussein continued his program for producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) despite the UN official request to stop it. Although the supporters of war achieved their objective of launching a new war against Saddam Hussein, their victory was not complete because the UN Security Council did not approve the war under its auspices. Not long after the Multinational Military Coalition, led by the USA, claimed victory against Iraqi forces, the accusation of the continuation of the programme to produce WMD proved false. Unfortunately, the worst scenario has not ended and many people die because of the insurgency installed on the territory of Iraq.

Another recent case of large-scale psychological confrontation is the one between Georgia and South Ossetia, backed up by Russia. The military confrontation lasted for about five days (between 7/8 and 13 August 2008), but the psychological confrontation started long time ago, in 1991, when South Ossetia and Abkhazia – two of the Georgian provinces started war to become independent from Georgia, taking advantage from the Soviet Union disbandment. Although they were not officially (*de jure*) independent, they were really (*de facto*) independent, with less or no more interference from Tbilisi, but with great support from Russia that wanted to preserve its influence on all former Soviet republics. The intensity of psychological influence varied in accordance with the developments in the international security environment. For instance, right after NATO started

²⁹ Tim Weiner, *CIA: o istorie secretă*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2009, pp. 270-271.

³⁰ Tyler Drumheller, Elaine Monaghan, *Pe marginea prăpastiei*, Editura Minerva, București, 2008, pp. 12-13.

the war against Serbia, in 1999, South Ossetia and Adjara claimed independence in the UN Security Council and the official recognition from Russia. Georgia's intent to join NATO and its official address to the North Atlantic Council at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, in 2008, worsened the relations with Russia on multiple planes, and the intensity of the "silent war" increased gradually. Once the Serbian province of Kosovo declared independence unilaterally, at the beginning of 2008, and many Western countries recognised it, then Russia intensified all types of preparations for waging a total war against Georgia. Most of the world focused on Kosovo case and did not pay enough attention to Georgia-South Ossetia conflict that was warming up at a high pace. The initial phase of psychological confrontation was gained by Russia because of its greater experience and better capabilities. After the military confrontation broke out, by Georgia's attack on Tskhinvali, the capital of Ossetia, the Russian troops intervened and occupied South Ossetia, Adjara and a part of the Georgian territory. Then, the Occident turned its attention to the Caucasus conflict and the EU officials negotiated the armistice agreement. Commenting on the events in the Caucasus and their potential consequences over the region and the world, Andrei Popov – Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova – appreciated that Russia felt strong enough to impose its conditions without negotiations despite NATO and the EU opposition³¹. Thus, using military power, Russia warned NATO, the EU and other international security organisations that former Soviet states would remain inside its sphere of influence and nobody could intervene there without its agreement.

Modifying perceptions in the collective consciousness

"Public image" defines the way public opinion perceives an institution, an organisation or an official person. By analogy, the public image of official persons is usually extended to the institution or even the country they represent. The evaluation of the perception could be positive, negative or neutral. The desirable image for official persons and institutions (organisations, companies, countries) is the positive one, which is similar to or attracts public opinion's sympathy.

The world today is dominated by perceptions and many times experts in psychological confrontation act to modify perceptions from negative to positive or from positive to negative ones. This action is called reversing the image. The technique has two main ways of accomplishing objectives. The first one consists in the demonisation of an individual or a community, no matter how they really are.

³¹ Andrei Popov, *Rusia va impune planul Kozak după recunoaşterea Abhaziei și Osetiei*, in *NewsIn*, București, 20 August 2008.

The second could be associated with a “*cosmetic treatment*” for improving a negative perception about a person or a community.

For Romania and Romanians, the most spectacular case of reversing the image was the one related to former General Ion Mihai Pacepa. He was deputy chief of the Romanian Foreign Information Department and personal advisor to the communist President Nicolae Ceaușescu. Pacepa decided to leave Romania and ask for political asylum in the USA, in 1978. After this event, General Pacepa was tried for betraying his country. According to the Romanian Penal Code at that time, he was convicted to death in absentia. In 1988, the American government appreciated General Pacepa’s activity as unique and important for the USA³². After Ceaușescu regime was toppled, General Pacepa was rehabilitated and even decorated for his exceptional role in revealing the criminal nature of the communist regime and its political police called “*Securitate*”³³. Despite this conclusion, some people consider I.M. Pacepa’s decision a betrayal that “*caused huge damages, almost impossible to assess in figures, to our country and the Romanian people*”³⁴.

Former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was the one who contributed more than others to the successful negotiation and conclusion of “*Dayton Agreement*”, in 1996. The agreement was the most important point for ending the clashes between the Bosniacs and the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then, Milosevic was positively appreciated by many journalists and politicians from Western countries. His image began to change from positive to negative once he refused to accept the Serbian province of Kosovo request to be independent. His decision was followed by interethnic violence between the Serbs and the Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo and by the Serbian policy intervention. The clashes between the Albanian population of Kosovo and the Serbian policy generated mass refugee of the locals, especially Albanians, in neighbouring countries. Violence and Milosevic’s resistance to accept Kosovo’s independence attracted harsh comments from Occidental leaders. Joshka Fisher – German Minister of Foreign Affairs – considered the Serbian President guilty for all rapes, murders and refugees. Moreover, he compared Milosevic attitude with the German Nazis³⁵.

³² Letter of the CIA Deputy Director for Operations, Richard F. Stolz, on 28 July 1988, published in the article “*Generalul Pacepa, o prostituată fericită a spionajului*”, in *Gardianul* journal, 26 June 2009, at <http://www.gardianul.ro/%E%80%9EGeneralul-Pacepa,-o-prostituata-fericita-a-spionajului%E2%80%9D-s137768.html>

³³ ***, *Raportul Final al Comisiei Prezidențiale pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România*, Editura Humanitas, 2008, p. 628, at http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf

³⁴ Filip Teodorescu, *Un risc asumat*, Editura Viitorul românesc, București, 1992, p. 13.

³⁵ Madeleine Albright, *Doamna secretar de stat. Memorii*, Editura Rao, București, 2008, p. 579.

After NATO's 1999 war against Serbia ended, Milosevic was tried at the International Criminal Court in the Hague, for the accusations of war crimes and genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo and breach of Geneva Convention. He died in prison prior to the end of the process.

Psychological influence through religion

Karl Marx disdained religion, Sigmund Freud considered it a fantasy and Lenin hated it. Lenin was mostly afraid of the devoted priests that were able to influence people against his ideas and his strategy to build a secular society. He appreciated that devoted priests were more dangerous than the corrupt and selfish ones that were supposed to be easily defeated³⁶.

Recently, Bruce Hoffman has said that religion functions as a legitimising force specifically sanctioning wide-scale violence against any type of opponents³⁷.

Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini is credited with one of the most eloquent and relevant accomplishments of using religion for manipulating people, which led to installing the Islamic regime in Iran. The clerical opposition to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi started after his decision to confiscate most of the land belonging to clergy and to give it to peasants. The clergy utilised the moral authority to instigate people to revolt against Shah Pahlavi pretending that he was a slave to the USA and the Occident³⁸. Unfortunately for the Shah, his secret policy – SAVAK – was very dour and did not inform him correctly about the level of opposition against his leadership. On the other hand, after his exile in France, Khomeini recorded his speeches against Shah Pahlavi on audiotapes urging people to revolt and the Armed Forces to desert. All the cassettes were transported in East Berlin, at the Headquarters of the Iranian Communist Party – Tudeh – where the audio cassettes were multiplied and sent to Iran and delivered to the people, especially in Ispahan and other cities and towns, in mailboxes or simply thrown in their yards³⁹.

Shah Reza Pahlavi left Iran on 16 January 1979 and right after that, on 1 February the same year, Khomeini arrived triumphantly in Tehran. Although the ayatollah was triumphantly received in Iran, his regime was not sustained by the majority

³⁶ Paul Johnson, *O istorie a lumii moderne. 1920-2000*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2003, pp.54-57.

³⁷ Bruce Hoffman, *Special Operations and the Intelligence System*, in *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, vol. 18, no. 4, winter 2005-2006, quoted by Sergiu Medar in *Informațiile militare în contextul de securitate actual*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2006, p. 53.

³⁸ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Random House Publishing Group, New York, 2003, p. 104.

³⁹ Constantin Corneanu, *Teheran '79*, essay published in *Arma de care aveți nevoie*, Editura Militară, București, 2004, p. 83.

of the population. It may seem paradoxically but the Islamic regime was psychologically legitimised firstly and then politically by those states that wanted to overthrow it. The first event that mostly contributed to foster the credibility of Khomeini regime was the US attempt to liberate the American hostages held by the ayatollah supporters, captured when they attacked the American Embassy in Tehran, in November 1979. The ayatollah strove to convince the Iranian population about the American interventionism but he did not have too many pieces of evidence in his country. The US operation to liberate hostages, planned and executed in 1980, proved Khomeini's claims regarding the US interventionist policy. The operation failed because the CIA did not furnish all the details about the geography, climate and disposition of Iranian forces in the territory. The debarkation point of the American task force was chosen too close to an important road and, unfortunately, one helicopter crashed into a car right after debarkation, causing the operation abortion⁴⁰.

The second event that "*confirmed the fairness*" of the ayatollah appreciation about "*the Arabian regimes in the Middle East that were corrupt and enslaved by the Americans*" was the Iraqi attack against Iran on 22 September 1980. Facing the peril of being occupied by their neighbour, the Iranian population supported the regime to protect the country against Iraqi forces.

Lebanon invasion by Israel, in June 1982, (Operation *Peace for Galilee*) was the third event that contributed to strengthen Khomeini's credibility. Many times he accused Israel aggressive policy against the Arab countries, sustained by the Occident complicity, recalling Egyptian President Nasser slogan of disbanding Israel because it was illegally settled on the territory of Palestine⁴¹. The same policy is promoted by the current Iranian President – Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – who wants to wipe Israel off the map.

The current situation in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and other Muslim states in North Africa and the Middle East could lead to an unwanted process of installing a new "*Iron Curtain*" between two of the most important religions of the world – Christianity and Islam.

What has to be done?

How to protect and how to psychologically prepare ourselves for being less vulnerable to hostile influences? Vladimir Volkoff, one of the experts in manipulation, misinformation and psychological influence recommends the cultural and human antidote, along with eliminating television intoxication,

⁴⁰ Tim Weiner, *CIA: o istorie secretă*, op. cit., pp. 273-275.

⁴¹ Bernard Lewis, op. cit., p. 150.

thinking clearly and doubting⁴². He believes that culture allows us to resist lies and manipulation by offering strong points of support that can hardly be demolished. The “*human antidote*” means to increase man-to-man relations in order to better know each other and to reduce the number of man-to-things relations. “*Eliminating television intoxication*” means to avoid watching television programmes for a while because they could be part of a manipulation operation. “*Thinking clearly and doubting*” suggests checking all the pieces of information we receive, especially those furnished by the mass media, politicians and some other potential agents of misinformation.

Life was and certainly will continue to be a permanent fight. At the beginning of his existence, man was obliged to fight for survival with Mother Nature and against his fellow men. Currently, man’s fight has entered a new phase – the one characterised by the fight against own weaknesses, indolence and temptations. Those individuals that will defeat their weaknesses will be able to defeat their enemies as well. It is well known that God helps individuals that are able to help themselves and gods help the most powerful. Every man should understand that power comes from his inner strength, from his will to overcome his limits and to refuse indolence and negligence. A winner is the individual that fights till his solutions and ideas will convince decision-makers and fellow men as well to implement them.

Moral strength cannot be measured yet, although many experts have tried to do it. As a Pope said, men are like wine. While wine becomes old and older some sorts transform in champagne and others transform into vinegar. The process of transforming people is similar. While individuals become old and older, some accumulate knowledge, experience and skills while others accumulate just years. Thus, some people become highly effective and better prepared for life while others face a process of stagnation or even of decreasing their physical and psychological capabilities.

As Colin Powell says, people win victories, and if they are not inspired and capable, if discipline and morale are low, then the most elegant strategic plan and the most rational organisational designs will not make much difference⁴³. Therefore, people were, are and will continue to be the most important element of strategies, plans and programmes in peacetime, in crisis situations as well as at war. Man’s mind is his strength as well as his weakness, depending on everybody’s way of living and acting over the body and mind. As Daniel Sevigny says, thinking makes man imperfect⁴⁴.

⁴² Vladimir Volkoff, *Dezinformarea văzută din Est*, Editura Pro Editură și Tipografie, București, 2007, pp. 88-90.

⁴³ Oren Harari, *Secretele lui Colin Powell*, Editura Tritonic, București, 2006, pp. 114-116.

⁴⁴ Daniel Sevigny, *Secretul autovindecării*, Editura Nicol, București, 2011, p. 15.

I envision that future wars will most probably be highly integrated and total. That is why commanders and fighters have to be well prepared in any dimension of the confrontation. This is a compulsory condition for winning fights and battles, which will be a mix between physical, mental and virtual clashes. Being well prepared means: trust in own capabilities; trust in comrades and allies; excellent professional skills; high level of self-control to avoid fear and panic; pragmatic and efficient standard operating procedures; ability to rapidly adapt to any type of situation, especially to difficult ones. The accomplishment of this objective requires appropriate strategies as well as programmes and plans for implementing them and adequate resources. Moreover, both decision-makers and fighters have to efficiently use available time and to be patient, tenacious, firm, open-minded, dedicated to their country and work. In turn, internal public opinion has to be well prepared to resist the “*psychological bombardment*” launched against it by known and unknown adversaries through multiple channels, especially through the mass media.

If a country is internally strong then it should not be afraid of potential enemies. Wisdom is required in any difficult situation. A wise policy will prepare population and state institutions to face any type of difficult situation. If decision-makers are afraid of taking difficult measures such as the ones of preventing or countering unfriendly actions against the country they lead, then their attitude will be promptly exploited by the adversaries of the country. A bellicose attitude in a state-to-state dispute will stimulate escalation of tensions and harsh reactions from a potential adversary. The wise attitude is the openness to a constructive dialogue on the basis of firmness to protect national interests. This attitude has to be the result of a national consensus of both population and political parties. A strong national cohesion will have an important psychological effect over any adversary and will temper its tendencies towards confrontation. On the contrary, if a nation is divided and its cohesion is weak, then the adversaries will use psychological methods to break political leadership from population and to make impossible a political decision to counter “*silent aggression*” and armed aggression as well.

A wise and successful policy has to be aimed at shaping a good level of morale for the nation and the Armed Forces as well. It means to eliminate the lack of credibility of political leadership from the population’s mind and to promote national values and interests, then to prevent and, if necessary, to counter hostile actions especially in the psychological field of confrontation.

GENERAL ISSUES ON POST-CONFLICT MILITARY OPERATIONS

Colonel (r.) Dr Lucian STĂNCILĂ
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Post-conflict operations are among the most difficult ones to plan, prepare and conduct, even in the best circumstances. The expectations regarding to which, during post-conflict operations, the activities will be standard, uncomplicated, taking place in a calm environment, without conflicts and non-violence, are unrealistic, this assumptions causing serious errors of policy or strategy.

This article points out the complexity of post-conflict operations, which requires the redefinition and understanding of certain operational terms, concepts and factors meant to enable the efficient, direct and indirect, approach to this operations.

To apply the lessons learned means to follow some rules and principles, as well as a certain conduct in organising and carrying out post-conflict operations. The methods and models sought after will eventually bring about the safe and stable environment needed for providing the desired end state, in which an efficient and stable government should act, one that is capable of managing a functional economy.

Keywords: *irregular; stability; asymmetric; post-conflict; ontological; counter-insurgency; teleological; nomological*

Military forces have become more and more involved in post-conflict operations under the aegis of the UN, NATO, the EU and other international organisations, performing extremely complex tasks. Military actions carried out in post-conflict operations have begun to be frequently characterised by adjectives such as “*irregular*”, “*unconventional*” and/or “*asymmetric*”, situations becoming more and more complicated.

If, in the last decades, military thinking was focused on the remarkable technological advances that impact on the military, the complexity of present and future post-conflict operations requires the redefinition of operational concepts and factors related to the people involved and affected by these operations. As a consequence, we consider that, in approaching post-conflict military operations, one must seek effective methods and models that should bring about consensus among the population by applying, first of all, the principles of intercultural communication.

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To listen, understand and communicate means to interact with the local population in order to meet their demands. To effectively address post-conflict operations, it is important that military forces should keep in mind three key points: “*respect*”, “*consensus*”, and “*hearts and minds*”.

An important conclusion that has emerged from the study of lessons learned is that, to generate political and strategic success in managing a conflict, one needs to win the *hearts and minds* of civilians and help them restore adequate living conditions. The success of post-conflict operations requires the change of the organisational culture, better relations between partners and agencies, as well as the right people for their jobs.

Another idea that we wish to express further is generated by the anarchic international environment from outside Europe and North America. It is impossible to understand post-conflict military operations without understanding the power factors in the dynamics of the anarchic international environment and, particularly, the internal anarchic environment where these operations take place. In front of the dangerous and predatory elements (terrorist, insurgent ones) that threaten stability, in a power vacuum, military forces must be prepared to carry out effective actions. Pacts of understanding and economic sanctions are rarely effective and productive. Under these conditions, for the most complex situations, an effective action ultimately requires a credible threat of the use of force, in close connection with political, economic and information efforts.

Moreover, achieving an acceptable finality in post-conflict military operations requires an effective, direct and indirect approach, in which the indirect forms are dominant. For each tactic there is a counter-tactic, for each combination of elements of power in the operational design there is a complement that can deny this combination¹.

We appreciate that military actions in post-conflict operations require a comprehensive approach on how the enemy thinks, acts and is organised. This includes unconventional (irregular, asymmetric) warfare. The enemy seeks to discover and exploit the links between our efforts, which are either physical (for example, political and operational borders in Afghanistan) or conceptual (for example, links within political alliances with various national reserves etc.). The enemy seeks to create strategic “*ambiguity*” for us, in order to maintain his strategic vision. To this end, the enemy uses lethal and non-lethal means in an indirect approach, which are presented to us through information operations

¹ Cf. Christopher M. Schnaubelt, *Complex Operations: NATO at War and on the Margins of War*, Forum Paper 14, NATO Defense College, Rome, July 2010, p. 51.

as political and operational dilemmas, distorting the perception of reality and, especially, of those who are responsible for ethical dilemmas. Their objective is to deny the strength of the interventionist military force through a false propaganda technique. The best counterattack, in such cases, consist in, first of all, credibility, ethics, responsible personnel on the ground, and techniques used in the media to counter false propaganda. In front of such an enemy, adaptability is paramount and no action is routine.

Understanding counterinsurgency is very important and should be given all the attention. In counterinsurgency, the “*key terrain*” and centre of gravity is represented by the people. The simplistic understanding of the needs of the population, the cultural and political issues does not make a successful post-conflict military operation. Given the need for legitimacy of any successful counterinsurgency operation, one of the specific objectives must be the protection of civilians. Credible and lasting protection is important in order to develop and maintain popular support, which is the best foundation for credibility.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the armed forces of NATO member countries have begun the process of their transformation in order to meet current challenges. Following the confrontations between the presented views, one has reached to the conclusion that modular, expeditionary, more agile armed forces are needed, which have faster response time to Alliance requests. It has been fostered the culture of transformation of the thinking about a new kind of armed forces, designed around agile units, with modular structures, whose capabilities are available for employment in a variety of operational situations, based on *brigade-type command structures (Brigade Command Team)*. This modular conception meets the requirements of post-conflict operations.

In post-conflict operations, military organisations should expect a continuous interaction between their forces and multinational partners, adversaries, civil authorities, agencies and civil institutions. In an area of operations, civil authorities may include all kinds of religious, tribal, provincial leaders and businesspersons. The focus is on helping people. The link between stabilisation, reconstruction and development, able to counter terrorist sanctuaries, can only be achieved through effective civil-military cooperation. This is a key goal of post-conflict operations and is reflected in simultaneously applying the physical, psychological and ideological/intellectual capacity contributing to the intoxication of the opponent².

² Cf. Mark Gerner, *Building a Nexus for Stability Operations*, 3 March 2010, in *PKSOI Perspectives*, at <http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/perspective/perspectivereview>

When war ends, countries face multiple components of transition. Violence must give way to population security; lawless and political exclusion must give way to the rule of law and participation in governance; ethnically, religiously polarised classes/castes must make concessions to national reconciliation, and economies ruined by war must be transformed into functioning market economies. These multiple tasks cause the economic reconstruction to be different from normal development. To succeed, the transition from war to peace requires demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, reconstruction and rehabilitation of services and infrastructure.

For example, effective demobilisation and reconciliation in El Salvador ensured the consolidation of peace after a brutal civil war in the '80s. In other situations, the transition from war to peace had tragic consequences. Failure of demobilisation and reconciliation of factions in Lebanon, where Hezbollah remained armed, despite its transformation into a political party, meant a surface belligerence. Moreover, the collapse of peace processes in Angola and Haiti, as well as the obstacles encountered in Cambodia and Nicaragua, in the '90s, reflected the failure of demobilisation and integration.

Apparently, the UN seems the ideal organisation to lead reconstruction efforts, because, unlike development institutions, such as the World Bank, it can integrate political and economic objectives, which are equal parts in a transition to peace. However, sometimes, even the UN has proved its inability to cope with this role. In Kosovo, for example, the transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army into a force for peace caused much uncertainty over the years. Treating the transition from conflict to peace as a common development led to new violence in East Timor, a country where UN intervention was considered a success story.

Iraq provides numerous examples of dangers created because of wrongly chosen priorities. The first efforts to privatise the Iraqi oil industry proved disastrous, confirming for many Iraqis that the American occupation was determined by the control of oil extraction, which kindled the flame of a violent resistance³.

Despite its failures, the UN remains probably the best placed organisation to oversee such efforts. Yet, the complexity of tasks faced by the countries during the post-conflict period emphasises the urgent challenge to the UN of having the capacity necessary to solve them.

³ Cf. Graciana del Castillo, *The Rules of Reconstruction*, 10 August 2006, at <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/delcastillo>

Ontological status and teleological foundation of post-conflict operations

The studied publications have shown that several terms on post-conflict military operations are not clearly defined in the national and foreign publications, and they are used interchangeably and imprecise – post-conflict military operations for nation building, post-conflict military operations for stabilisation and reconstruction etc. Foreign military and national publications refer instead to military operations other than war, peace building, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacemaking. Thus, we see that most of the listed terms refer to some form of post-conflict operations.

The definition of nation building – “*use of armed force, after a conflict, to support a transition to a lasting democracy*” is the closest to defining post-conflict operations⁴. In these circumstances, we consider that post-conflict military operations represent a component of military operations other than war, which have the general purposes of war and conflict prevention, peace promotion and support of civil authorities. In the period immediately following a conflict, the post-conflict military operation initiates the main activities of security and public order such as disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, demining, training and restructuring of the police and armed forces. Depending on the term, post-conflict military operations can also play an important catalytic role in the reconstruction efforts of the judiciary system, the strengthening of the capability of support for the rule of law in accordance with the international human rights standards. Post-conflict military operations often play a central role in elections by providing advice, logistic support and other forms of assistance.

The concept of “*post-conflict military operations*” is used to describe military stability and support operations conducted after the major military actions with the strategic policy objectives regarding peace, without which the armed forces cannot claim or pretend that they have obtained success.

The concept of “*stability operations*” is a general term for various military missions, tasks and activities in an occupied country, in cooperation with other instruments of national power to restore or maintain a safe and secure environment, and ensure government essential services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian aid⁵.

⁴ Cf. James Dobbins, *Nation Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower*, Rand Corporation, Washington DC, summer 2003, at www.rand.org/publications/randreview

⁵ *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2008, p. GL-25.

In the phased model of planning a campaign, Phase IV – post-conflict stabilisation – is required when legitimate civil governance of the failed state is limited or dysfunctional and is required the intervention of a joint multinational military force to enforce a short-term local government⁶. The intervention of military force assisting the opposing armed forces disarmament and demobilisation begins the process of building effective security forces and providing security to civilian agencies and organisations engaged in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Some analysts describe nation building as involving the “*use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbours*”⁷. Francis Fukuyama adds that we will achieve this by “*creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and education systems etc. This institutional infrastructure allows a weak state to govern and therefore to ensure security, opportunities and services for the population*”⁸.

In addition, post-conflict intervention is the most efficient way to reduce violence and human suffering resulting from civil wars and post-conflict society, as well as to prevent the return to violence.

Another concept commonly used in post-conflict operations is “*counterinsurgency*”. Counterinsurgency represents the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions undertaken by a government to defeat insurgency. Counterinsurgency operations are military offensive, defensive and stability operations in pursuit of the desired end-state, depending on the security situation. Stability operations are carried out under the protection of counterinsurgency, or conversely, counterinsurgency contributes to nation building in a violent environment. Large-scale violence in a counterinsurgency environment requires additional techniques – offensive and defensive operations – but does not change the nature of the objective – to promote the development of effective governance.

We conclude by saying that post-conflict activities usually begin with significant military involvement, followed by an increase in civilian dominance with the disappearance of the threat and restoration of civil infrastructure.

⁴ Cf. James Dobbins, *Nation Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower*, Rand Corporation, Washington DC, summer 2003, at www.rand.org/publications/randreview

⁵ *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2008, p. GL-25.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. IV-28.

⁷ Cf. James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, p. XVII.

⁸ Cf. Francis Fukuyama, *Nation Building 101*, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, January-February 2004, p. 4, at <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200401/fukuyama>

Nomological fundamentals of post-conflict operations

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the countries that have participated in the Coalition forces and especially the US have re-learned painful lessons about how to win peace. The institutionalisation of these lessons requires the establishment of a strategic concept of post-conflict operations.

Post-conflict operations are among the most difficult to plan, prepare and carry out, even under the best circumstances. The expectations according to which, in post-conflict operations, activities will be regular, uncomplicated, conducted in a calm environment, free from conflict and nonviolent are unrealistic assumptions causing errors of policy or strategy.

By applying lessons learned from recent post-conflict operations, we must break away from old habits, which seek to transform each occupation into an ad hoc affair. This means to comply with certain rules and principles underlying the preparation and post-conflict operations, which refer, in our opinion, on the one hand, to ensuring force packages, training, fair conduct and effective management, and, on the other hand, to legitimacy, clear policy objectives, unity of effort, understanding of the environment, restricted use of military force, perseverance and security under the rule of law⁹.

In recent years, the Security Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter (which contains stipulations relating the actions of breach of peace and aggression) in order to authorise the development of peacekeeping operations in changing post-conflict situations, in which that state has been unable to maintain security and public order. The mandate obtained from the Security Council has represented the legitimacy of the action. Based on the tasks of the Security Council mandate, the concept of operations and rules of engagement (ROE) and the Directive on the Use of Force, the nature of the post-conflict operation, the force package and the conduct necessary to sustain such an operation can be evaluated.

The interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were the moments of shock and awe in front of the overwhelming forces employed. The military operations that followed were counterinsurgency operation, and excessive military force proved to be counterproductive to the legitimacy and success of the mission. In the violent, ambiguous and unforgiving environments in Iraq and Afghanistan, tribal traditions and religious values produced conflicting concepts of legitimacy that threatened the success of the mission.

⁹ Cf. Rudolph C. Barnes, Jr., *The Rule of Law and Civil Affairs in the Battle for Legitimacy*, in *Military Legitimacy and Leadership Journal*, no. 1, March 2009, pp. 2-8, at <http://militarylegitimacyreview.com>

The first rule in post-conflict military operations is to be perceived as legitimate in order to draw broad international and local support on the peacebuilding process. In addition to demonstrating that there is sufficient legal authority for post-conflict activities, the actors must show that their actions, undertaken for political and moral reasons, are consistent with international law and state and public interests. Promoting the rule of law, democracy and human rights are the main policy objectives of post-conflict strategy and a prerequisite of legitimacy, which is also a post-conflict operations principle. On the other hand, it is necessary to create, as soon as possible, the conditions of transparency and integration to enable local and international stakeholders to participate actively in the process of building peace. We also consider that transparency, internationalisation, impartiality and existence of a common agreement are rules of post-conflict military operations.

Field activities should be incorporated in an appropriate international framework. The internationalisation of the peacebuilding process may be significantly affected by the way in which it is perceived as impartial. Moreover, such a multilateral approach is at the basis of credibility on establishing certain universal values in the post-conflict period. The internationalisation of peacebuilding helps on the equitable sharing of tasks and makes the reintegration of war-torn states in the international community much easier.

Foreign assistance on peacebuilding must be supported by the existence of a peace agreement on the status of the mission, containing technical terms and conditions relating to the status of the international presence in a country. If a conflict is formally ended by a peace treaty, parties may also set specific aspects of post-conflict phase.

Legitimacy, clear objectives, unity of effort, restricted use of force, perseverance and adaptability, primacy of political factors, understanding of the environment, intelligence-led operations, security under the rule of law, long-term commitment: we suggest that all of them are included on the list of principles of post-conflict military operations, covering also counterinsurgency operations (*figure 1*)¹⁰.

These principles were first developed as low intensity conflict imperatives (LIC), then they were found as principles of military operations were other than war (OOTW) and were later included in the US counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual).

Legitimacy should be seen as the most important principle. In today's world, it has been confirmed many times that power has the advantages of legitimacy.

¹⁰ Cf. Christian Schaller, *Towards an International Legal Framework for Post-conflict Peacebuilding*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs, February 2009, Berlin, p. 7.




Figure 1: Similarity between the principles of counterinsurgency operations and military operations other than war. Low intensity conflict imperatives

So far, no one has wanted to change the UN Charter or ignore it. Problems on legal issues tend to arise rather from the interpretation of Security Council resolutions or the lack of clear authority for a specific post-conflict operation. It is essential that the political decision to be taken on post-conflict operation should gain legitimacy by persuasion and by the support from the international public opinion. Ignoring national and international public reaction can lead to serious risks for the post-conflict operation success. We note that the mission objectives in counterinsurgency operations are more political than military, and thus legitimacy is the centre of gravity to achieve these policy objectives. More than the development and success of stabilisation, the economic reconstruction and reconciliation creates legitimacy through results. Legitimacy is reinforced by the respect shown to the culture and history of local actors, the achievement of reconciliation between the warring parties. Moreover, legitimacy is given by the government's moral authority, and legitimacy standards are required by law¹¹.

We believe that establishing clear objectives based on the general political guidelines is the most difficult task for post-conflict operations. Carl von Clausewitz's ideas in relation to this principle are telling: *"No one starts a war without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it"*¹². It is clear that during a post-conflict operation, civil organisations will assume more responsibility for the civil functions and military assistance in this direction will decrease. Military forces will be the source of stability in the area of operations (AOR – Area of Responsibility), and the main objective will always be a swift transition to the civilian control of the AOR. Without security, the local economy fails. A functioning economy provides jobs and reduces population

¹¹ Cf. *The Practical Implication of Post-conflict Peacebuilding for the International Community*, The Ditchley Foundation Conference, 2004/08, at <http://www.ditchley.co.uk>

¹² Cf. Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 67.

dependence on the military. Security and economic stability precede an effective and stable government.

The principle of unity of effort is more difficult in post-conflict operations because, in addition to the military forces, numerous governmental agencies and non-governmental organisations are involved, and military commanders often have a civilian chief. The application of control regulations can be loosely defined and often does not involve command authority as it is understood in the military. Failure to achieve a viable end-state is often caused by lack of unity of effort in interagency planning¹³. Ideally, a single commander should have authority over all agencies, governmental and non-governmental organisations, necessary for the synchronisation and coordination of effort.

If the military presence is limited, a civil-military operations centre may be more effective in achieving unity of effort. At the same time, when discussing large-scale operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)* can achieve interagency integration activities. In conclusion, we appreciate that, to achieve unity of effort, close cooperation at the joint, interagency, multinational and host nation organisations level is required.

The restricted use of force is a principle that characterises the post-conflict operations environment. The excessive use of military force may affect the efforts to gain and maintain legitimacy and to reach objectives. The restrictions on the use of weapons, tactics and levels of violence are clearly specified in the rules of engagement (ROE). The reason for which the restricted use is often needed must be very well understood by the military, because a single act could cause significant political consequences. This principle does not preclude the application of sufficient force when necessary in order to resolve the commitment for peace, protection of their soldiers, civilians and property, or to achieve other important objectives¹⁴.

The principle of perseverance refers to the prolonged use of military capabilities in post-conflict operations. Most post-conflict operations carried out so far lasted longer than originally planned to achieve the desired results. The causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution. It is important to first assess the crisis response options facing the long-term objectives¹⁵.

The principle of adaptability is the key to success in post-conflict operations. An organisational culture that assimilates the lessons learned from previous

¹³ Cf. William Flavin, *Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success*, in *Parameters*, no. 33, autumn 2003, p. 102.

¹⁴ Cf. *FM 3-07 (FM 100-20) Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 20 February 2003, pp. 4-16.

¹⁵ Cf. *JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 1 February 1995, p. V-3.

international conflicts and has a comprehensive approach to post-conflict operations can determine the efficiency of military actions in post-conflict operations. Military forces must be able to engage all the activities required in post-conflict situations, to expand relationships with agencies and governmental and non-governmental organisations and to adapt to the local culture.

To explain the principle of primacy of political factors, one must start from at least three main hypotheses. The first hypothesis is based on the fact that the post-conflict purpose is set at the political level of international organisations. A second hypothesis is based on the fact that any intervention in post-conflict situations is essentially a political process in accordance with the interests of key actors. When we deal with counterinsurgency operations, the military actions undertaken without a proper analysis of the political effects they can produce will be ineffective and, in the worst possible situation, will benefit the enemy. Finally, even if a strategic plan to coordinate post-conflict operation is drawn up, the third hypothesis implies the existence of a high-level working group – on threats, challenges and change – consisting of representatives of key stakeholders, the only ones able to attract important international resources and influence key actors¹⁶.

The principle of understanding the environment means understanding the society and culture where the post-conflict operations take place. Soldiers must know demographics, history and causes of conflict, local actors and their motivation, ideologies, goals, capabilities, weaknesses and strength of the insurgents. Without understanding the environment, no one can properly apply the information¹⁷.

Intelligence-led operations are a principle influencing post-campaign effectiveness and success. The pieces of information are meant to permanently keep commanders informed, identify, define and nominate objectives, support planning and fulfilment of operations, mislead insurgents and counter their actions. They must be collected and analysed at all levels, and then disseminated within the Joint Multinational Force¹⁸.

The principle of security, according to the rule of law, is the cornerstone of any post-conflict operations. Without security, no reforms can be implemented, and instability can be extended. To have legitimacy, security operations must take into account the law enforcement domain. If criminals and murderers

¹⁶ Cf. Robert C. Orr, *Winning the Peace. An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 21.

¹⁷ Cf. Eliot Cohen, Lt. Col. Conrad Crane, Lt. Col. Jan Horvath, Lt. Col. John Nagl, US Army, *Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency*, in *Military Review*, March-April 2006, p. 50, at <http://findarticles.com>

¹⁸ Cf. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, 5 October 2009, p. XV.

are treated by a legal system established in accordance with practices and local culture, local government's legitimacy will be enhanced. Military forces can contribute to the establishment of local institutions (police forces, courts and penal facilities) thereby supporting the legal system.

Long-term commitment is a specific principle of post-conflict operations. The implications of failed states for the international security are profound. The experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown that rapid military victories obtained on hostile regimes do not lead necessarily to the success of long-term post-conflict stabilisation. To meet the requirements of stability, it is required the international community's commitment to rebuild failed states and to avoid a return to conflict.

In conclusion, military missions in post-conflict operations have limitations in the use of force, and require the allocation of a large number of military personnel for security and reconstruction activities of state institutions.

Safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable governance, sustainable economic and social welfare characterise the strategic framework that is sought to be achieved and provide a comprehensive view of the complexity of post-conflict missions, objectives and conditions necessary to achieve them.

Because of the differences between conventional operations and post-conflict operations, the latter ones can produce different sorts of doctrines, employment, training, equipment, management, education and facilities. The success of post-conflict operations requires a long-term civil-military commitment, with considerable resources from both the donor states and the international organisations such as, for example, the UN and the World Bank.

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VIOLENCE AND TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

– Threats to Human Security –

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Regardless of the approach – individual, national, regional or international, security is a normal state of peace required for the successful performance of activities, development and progress. Security is a fundamental human right, for personal and professional development; it is not wrong if we add to this a sense of wellbeing, comfort and lack of fear of tomorrow that each individual needs.

The current security environment, expressed through nature, quality and size of the relationships that develop in various areas (political, diplomatic, economic, military, social, environmental, legal, information), is changing, because of the fluid and unpredictable threats that appear. The effects of these threats have an impact on the individual. Violence, in any of its forms of manifestation, and traffic accidents are, in our view, serious threats to human security.

Keywords: *internal security; human security; violence; threats; traffic accidents*

Motto:

“We are human. So we should all act like humans”.

Euripides, Greek tragic poet

General considerations regarding human security

Starting from the fact that the concept of security has long been interpreted narrowly: *“as security of territory from external aggression or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust”*¹, in 1994, the *Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme* introduces a new concept related to security: *human security*.

Human security, a relatively new concept, regards the security of individuals and the security of communities, combining human rights with human development. According to the *Report*, the concept of human security includes the following elements: *economic security*,

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¹ *Human Development Report* 1994, New York: UNDP and Oxford University Press, 1994 apud Mary Kaldor, *Securitatea umană*, Editura CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, p. 214.

food security, health security, environmental security, personal security and political security.

After that, the concept of human security has developed in two directions:

1. the Canadian direction or approach, reflected in the *Human Security Report 2005*, which emphasises the security of individuals in opposition to the security of states and the focus on security in front of political violence;
2. the *Nations Development Programme* direction or approach, reflected in the work of High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of the United Nations and in the UN Secretary General's response "*In Larger Freedom*", which focuses on interlinking different types of security and on the importance of development.

The concept of human security is in the attention of NATO. Thus, the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, in 2006, affirms that the key prerogative of the approach that promotes human security is to protect civilians from violence and from the fear that this will occur and to place the individual and his needs in the centre of any military operation. Civilian losses because of military operations require the development of some *lessons learned* in terms of human security, not only for future operations, but especially for the theatres of operations where there still are civilian losses².

The concept of human security has been addressed in the European Union as well; *Barcelona Report* is an example, published in 2004, at the initiative of Javier Solana, in which the need for rethinking the European approach to the concept of security in the sense of the orientation towards human security, as being the most realistic security policy for Europe, is emphasised.

Regarding the concept of human security, it is important to keep in mind several *principles*³:

- *supremacy of human rights*, with reference to economic, social, political and civilian rights and primacy of human development as opposed to national economies;
- *legitimate political authority*, consisting of local or regional governments or international political arrangements (protectorates or transitional administrations). The principle refers to the limitations of the use of military

² Dr. Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Operații de stabilitate și securitatea umană*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2008, p. 6.

³ Mary Kaldor, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-223.

force, whose purpose is to stabilise the situation so that the bases for a peaceful political process can be created, through various instruments (diplomacy, sanctions, aid, links with civil society etc.);

- *multilateralism*, which entails a trio: 1. commitment to work together with international institutions and through multinational institutions procedures (within the framework of the UN action, but also with or sharing tasks with other regional organisations such as OSCE and NATO in Europe, SADC/Southern African Development Community and ECOWAS/Economic Community of West African States in Africa, or OAS/Organisation of American States in the Western hemisphere); 2. commitment to create rules and common regulations, settlement of issues through cooperation and rules enforcement; 3. coordination between intelligence services, foreign policy, economic and political development exchanges, and security policies initiatives of member states, the Commission and the Council of the European Union and other multilateral actors such as the UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and regional institutions;
- *bottom-up approach*, through communication, consultation and dialogue to gain knowledge and understanding; this principle refers to the involvement of women groups, seen as a key approach to human security;
- *regional focus*, important in restoring and/or supporting legitimate economic cooperation and trade. Interruption of transport connections and commercial exchanges, associated with war, is often the main cause for decreases in production and unemployment, leading to poverty, development of illegal/informal economy and insecurity.

Human security remains an ideal state in which humanity feels secure and protected every day against various threats (disease, hunger, unemployment, conflicts, natural disasters etc.). Even if it is a relatively new concept, human security encourages both political leaders and scientists to understand international security as something more than military defence of state interests and territory⁴.

Nowadays, special attention is given to *human security operations*, appreciated as a type of response required by the international community under severe human insecurity. Human security operations, a natural consequence of the responsibility to protect, are defined as a new type of multinational civil-military operations supporting the continuous exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens belonging to countries that are unable or unwilling to protect them. The essential

⁴ Roland Paris, *Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?*, at <http://www.securitateumana.com/articole/3.rom.pdf>, retrieved on 8 March 2012.

objective of these operations is to promote and guarantee freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom of action of individuals⁵.

Human security should be seen as an indicator of a developed, strong society with solid, appropriate institutions that work against destabilising factors.

Threats that harm human security: violence and traffic accidents

Security is an essential condition in obtaining a high quality of life. The idea of security for each individual should lead to a sense of real security, by nurturing and developing a sense of safety as the most lasting support of the current implementation of security at any level⁶.

Internal security is a major EU priority. The concept of internal security, stipulated in the *Internal Security Strategy* of March 2010, may be understood as a broad and comprehensive concept, covering many sectors and addressing threats with a direct impact on the lives, safety and welfare of citizens.

From our point of view, the internal security core is given by human security. Individual security is faced with threats of different nature. Among these threats, the EU *Internal Security Strategy* lists *violence itself*, such as youth violence or hooligans violence at sports events, and *traffic accidents*, which take the lives of thousands of European citizens, as internal security threats⁷.

Human violence has various manifestations. Individual security may be threatened in different places and different circumstances: at home or in other places, at school or at work, on the street, during sporting events etc. The purpose of the individual's security is their physical integrity against any form of violence and the existence of economic, social, cultural welfare etc.

Violence is understood as physical and mental violence. One of the most complete definitions of violence is given by the World Health Organisation, in the document entitled *World Report on Violence and Health* (Geneva, 2002), in which it is shown that violence is the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation⁸.

⁵ Marius Pricopi, *Fundamente ale operațiilor de securitate umană*, at <http://www.cssp.ro/analize/2011/10/17/fundamente-ale-operatiilor-de-securitate-umana/>, retrieved on 8 March 2012.

⁶ Constantin-Gheorghe Balaban, *Securitatea și dreptul internațional, provocări la început de secol XXI*, Editura C.H. Beck, București, 2006, p. 60.

⁷ *Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. Towards a European Security Model*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2010, pp. 14-15.

⁸ *World Report on Violence and Health*, Geneva, 2002, p. 5 apud Corneliu Sirbu, Cornel-Darmasco Dincă, *Sindromul marii violențe*, Editura Universitaria, Craiova, 2009, p. 16.

The analysis of youth violence, subsumed under the social security dimension, points out the degradation of the education environment, due to the negative effects of globalisation and the consequences of bad governance, poverty and exacerbation of social gaps. In terms of violence in the school environment, there were identified a variety of aspects of deviant behaviour, which describe, in terms of intensity: *subjective violence* – visual confrontation, nicknaming, teasing, irony, imitation with denigrating purposes and *objective violence* – refusal to help, bullying, hitting with objects, pushing, stabbing or shooting.

Mass media, researches and official statistics have highlighted the escalation of this deviant conduct, whose visibility in the field of formal education has acquired a pronounced importance. “*The UN Study regarding Violence on Children*”, launched on 11 October 2006, in New York, shows that, at the global level, 40 million children under 15 years are victims of violence every year, yet despite this, 97% of them do not benefit from the same legal protection as adults. At international level, only 17 countries have prohibited the violence against children: Sweden (1979), Finland (1983), Norway (1987), Austria (1989), Cyprus (1994), Italy (1996), Denmark (1997), Latvia (1998), Croatia (1999), Germany (2000), Bulgaria (2000), Iceland (2003), Romania (2004), Ukraine (2004), Hungary (2004), Greece (2006), the Netherlands (2007). There are still many countries (153) in which physical punishment is allowed, which means that more than 1,5 billion children live in countries where this phenomenon is legal⁹.

Deviant behaviour in school can be generated by factors that are external to the learning system:

- *family factors*: interfamilial violence, alcohol abuse, child abuse, neglect, educational deficiency (lack of dialogue, lack of affection, use of violence methods).
- *social factors*: the economic situation, the inconsistency of social control mechanisms, social inequality, crisis of the moral values, mass media, lack of cooperation of institutions involved in education;
- *individual factors*: they can be recognised either in constitutional factors, depending on the heredity and the neuro-psychical structure (mental debility, autism or aggressive tendencies), or in some peculiarities of the personality (different disorders of character or negative attitudes formed under the influence of unfavourable environment factors).

To these factors we can add internal factors related to the education system, such as: poor management of classrooms, lack of adaptation of educational practices,

⁹ At http://www.educatiefaraviolenta.ro/Ce_este_violenta_si_efectele_violentei_asupra_copilului/Statistici, retrieved on 4 March 2012.

lack of communication or a flawed student-teacher communication, subjective or arbitrary evaluation, students intimidation, teachers anger, irony, offenses, using a high tone etc.

Violence in school is considered a complex social phenomenon, its forms of manifestation evolving once with social norms. Also, more and more psychologists and sociologists emphasise the fact that the mass media, through the inappropriate content it promotes sometimes, induces antisocial attitudes among the young people.

A widespread form of violence is the domestic violence, an important issue in social and health terms, with negative effects on the safety of family members or the community they belong to. Both women and children can be victims of this form of violence.

Regarding the equality between men and women, since 1957, through the Treaty of Rome, the world was given an example by introducing the principle *equal pay for equal work*. For capitalising on women's potential, in March 2010, the European Commission published *The Women Charter*, in order to promote: equal chances on the labour market and equal economic independence between women and men, in particular through the strategy "*Europe 2020*"; equal pay for equal work, as well as equality in making decision through EU stimulus measures; dignity, integrity and eradication of violence in the relationships between women and men through a comprehensive policy framework; equality of chances between women and men outside the EU by addressing this issue in the external relations with international organisations.

In September 2010, the European Commission presented the *Strategy for Equality between Women and Men*, in order to observe the women's potential, thereby contributing to reaching the social and economic goals of the Union, by: attracting more women on the labour market and contributing to achieving the employment target stipulated by the "*Europe 2020*" strategy, namely 75% in total for men and women; promoting women's entrepreneurship and independent activities carried out by women; working with member states to combat violence against women, particularly through the eradication of genital mutilation in Europe and in the world; organising each year a European Equal Pay Day to raise awareness of the public opinion about the fact that women are still paid about 18 % less than men in the European Union¹⁰.

Children who live in violent homes develop a deviant behaviour, manifested by various problems: physical conditions, unexplained illnesses, exposure to accidents inside and outside the house, slower physical development; emotional and mental problems: increased anxiety, feeling of guilt, fear of being abandoned, isolation,

¹⁰ At http://ec.europa.eu/romania/news/strategie_egalitate_de_sanse_ro.htm retrieved on 5 March 2012.

anger, fear of injury and death; psychological issues: depression, comparison with the happier life of colleagues, behaviour issues: aggressiveness or passivity to the aggression of others, sleep disorder, enuresis, running away from home, young pregnancy, mutilation, drug and alcohol addiction, defensive behaviour: school problems – low confidence, elimination, lack of concentration, lack of social manners.

Violence of hooligans at stadiums has grown in recent years, becoming a threat to the security of individuals that perform sports activities and of supporters, as well as of various material goods. To combat and reduce the effects of this form of violence, *The White Paper on Sport* of the European Union, in 2007, stipulates the promotion of a multidisciplinary approach to prevent anti-social behaviour, focusing on socio-educational actions, such as preparing fans (long-term activity to develop a positive and non-violent attitude among fans).

We cannot omit in our approach to present certain issues regarding the political violence, which ultimately affects all individuals. The specialists in this domain have identified four types of *political violence*¹¹ affecting the individual security:

- *revolutionary wars*, designating episodes of violent conflict between governments and politically organised opponents, which seek to remove the central government, replace leaders or conquer power in a region. Here are some examples: Columbia – 1984, Algeria – 1991, and Tajikistan, 1992-1998;
- *ethnic wars*, episodes of violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious or communal minorities challenge governments in the pursuit of a major status change. For instance: Philippines, 1972, Sri Lanka, 1983; Chechnya, 1994 or the ones in South African towns, 1976-1977;
- *violent regime changes* involve major and sudden transformations in the way of government, including the collapse of the state, periods of severe instability of the regime or the elites and changes from the democratic leadership to the authoritarian one. Examples: Cuba, 1959, and Liberia, 1990;
- *genocides and politicicides*, constant policies of states and their agencies or following civil wars, by the new authorities, which result in the death of an important segment of a communal or political group. Examples: Rwanda, 1994, Sudan, 1970; Chile, 1973-1976; Argentina, 1976-1980 and El Salvador, 1980-1989.

One must not neglect the manifestation of violence generated by the terrorist phenomenon, the violent confrontations inside the phenomenon of organised crime

¹¹ Claudiu Crăciun, *Stat, violență și suveranitate*, Editura Tritonic, București, 2007, pp. 86-87.

or between the forces of order and crime groups, which are increasingly growing and affect the human security.

Between development and violence there is a complex bond, explained by the fact that violence appears less in the more advanced and stable societies than in less modernised societies. Economic development increases the aspirations of the society, which reduces the social frustrations, since it creates opportunities for new services, business etc. However, economic development is accompanied by negative phenomena, such as: the appearance of fraudulently enriched persons, incorrectly adapted and assimilated by the existing order in society, increased dissatisfaction towards the existing order, aggravation of regional and ethnic conflicts regarding the distribution of investment and consumption, increased number of people with a lower standard of life and increasing gap between the rich and the poor etc.

Traffic accidents are a permanent threat to the individuals and the community to which they belong. The injuries caused by traffic accidents represent a major problem for public health and a main cause for injuries worldwide. Besides the enormous costs for individuals, families and communities, injuries caused by accidents add a tough burden on health services and national economies.

Since the first traffic accident produced on 17 August 1896 (when Bridget Driscoll, aged 44, became the first person killed, while crossing the fields of the palace in London, by a motor vehicle having an enormous speed!), the number of traffic accidents has increased. Statistics show that annually in the world road traffic crashes kill 1,3 million people and injure between 20 and 50 million more people¹².

The World Health Organisation mentions that worldwide, in 2002, traffic accidents were the third major cause of death among children aged between five and nine years, after respiratory failure and AIDS. The large number of accidents and their consequences on individual security have determined this organisation to dedicate World Health Day for the first time on 7 April 2004 to the world safety issue: *“road traffic injuries can be prevented if they are recognised as a serious public health problem and if governments and others take the necessary actions to prevent them”*¹³.

Based on the harsh reality of statistics (90% of road fatalities occur in developing countries, about 50 million people are injured in such crashes, and many remain

¹² *La sécurité routière dans le monde* [archive] – OMS, June 2009 apud Gheorghe Văduva, *Intervenții guvernamentale ale comunităților locale și prin intermediul unor parteneriate privat-public în caz de accident aviatic, rutier, naval*, p. 1, article published in *Colocviu Strategic*, no. 11, 2011.

¹³ *World Health Day Brochure*, 7 April 2004, p. 2, at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2004/WHO_NMH_VIP_03.4_rum.pdf

permanently injured), the United Nations launched a programme in 2011, “*A Decade of Action for Road Safety*”, which aims to reduce road accidents.

Road safety has become a societal problem of major importance for the European Union. In April 2004, at the European Commission’s initiative, the European Road Safety Charter is drawn up, aiming to support all types of initiatives that are or will be taken by EU member states to increase road safety.

Statistics show that over 35 000 people were killed on EU roads in 2009 (the equivalent of a medium-sized city population), and no less than 1 500 000 people were injured; the costs for society were huge, representing about 130 billion Euros in 2009¹⁴.

To reduce traffic accidents, the European Union has developed a set of guidelines on road safety, in order to reduce the number of deaths on European roads by 50%, by 2020, stipulating that, to ensure greater safety for users, vehicles and infrastructure, the following measures are necessary¹⁵:

- to draw up a European strategy for education and training in road safety, to encourage road users to drive carefully;
- to implement rules applicable to European road safety, so that all citizens must be treated the same when they violate traffic regulations;
- to encourage EU countries to apply to the rural roads the same safety regulations that have already been applied to main roads and tunnels;
- to recognise technical inspections in all EU countries (e.g. if your car has been the subject of periodic technical inspections in Romania, they will automatically be valid in other member states);
- to ensure a higher degree of safety for vulnerable road users, especially motorcyclists, by improving communication between them and the authorities and by introducing periodical inspections for motorcycles and mopeds etc.;
- to improve the accidents data collection and analysis means, in order to better monitor the progress of EU countries in road safety and to provide accurate data necessary for new measures.

Road accidents are not the only major challenge for individual security, one must also mention railway or airplane accidents. Whether they are due to objective reasons or human error, such crashes affect life, health, and produce significant damage. Unlike traffic accidents, the frequency of railway or aviation accidents

¹⁴ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *Towards a European Road Safety Area: Policy Orientations on Road Safety 2011-2020*, p. 2, at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/pdf/road_safety_citizen/road_safety_citizen_100924_ro.pdf.

¹⁵ At http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/pdf/road_safety_citizen/road_safety_citizen_100924_ro.pdf retrieved on 4 March 2012.

is more reduced. In India, for example, 15 000 people die annually in railway accidents¹⁶. Recent railway accidents (February 2012 – Buenos Aires, 50 dead and 675 injured; March 2012 – Poland, 15 people dead and another 60 injured) draw attention to the negative effects these accidents have on individual security, and, furthermore, on the national community security.

As for aviation accidents, in the US, according to statistics, in 2008 there were 0,2 fatal aviation accidents per 1 million flights, compared with 1,4 in the same number of flights in 1989, which demonstrates that the situation is visibly improved. In Romania, the worst aviation accident occurred in 1995, when an Airbus A310 aircraft from Tarom, which was flying on the București-Brussels route, crashed in Balotești; all 51 passengers plus 10 crew members died¹⁷.

According to statistics, Romania does not look good in terms of traffic accidents, the numbers placing Romania once again at the end of the European chart regarding victims of traffic accidents. According to officials of the Traffic Accident Victims Association (TAVA), in 2009, on the roads in Romania, there were 9 213 accidents, in which 2 363 people were killed and 8 477 were injured¹⁸.

Therefore, *improving citizen safety* has become one of the strategic objectives included in the *National Strategy for Public Order (2010-2013)*, achievable by performing the main areas of intervention subsumed under this goal: street safety and safety of public transportation, traffic safety and safety in rural areas. It is also taken into account the convergence of the actions of institutions to increase the safety of people and improve the traffic conditions. According to the 2010 *National Defence Strategy*, the enhancement of citizen safety requires: the reduction of the number of people killed in road accidents, as a result of improving road traffic safety; the reduction of the number of street crimes; the increase in the firmness in law enforcement etc.

Circulation on public roads is a complex activity with deep implications for people's lives. Therefore, traffic accidents are a real threat to security, which is why one should act always, by all means, so that the circulation, especially the road one, should take place in completely safe conditions both for the life of individuals, regardless of age, and for the integrity of material assets. As for the effects that an accident has on an affected person, they are aimed not only at the personal sphere, but also at the occupational-professional one.

¹⁶ At <http://www.ziare.com/international/india/15-000-de-oameni-mor-anual-in-india-in-accidente-feroviare-1152266> retrieved on 4 March 2012.

¹⁷ At <http://stirileprotv.ro/exclusiv/exclusiv-online/ai-aceleasi-sanse-sa-mori-in-accident-aviatic-sau-sa-castigi-la-loto.html> retrieved on 4 March 2012.

¹⁸ At <http://www.automarket.ro/stiri/statistica-neagra-in-2010-sase-romani-au-murit-zilnic-in-accidente-rutiere-37140.html> retrieved on 5 March 2012.

An accident can cause a chronic disability, which may affect the person's ability to earn a living and lead an independent life. In addition, people's education may be ended or interrupted, their families taking the burden with which the victims confront.

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Human security is, at the same time, the condition and expression of sustainable development; its requirements are closely connected to ensuring a balance, a stability between socio-economic systems and elements of natural capital. Sustainable development and security have become *"complementary notions and they even condition each other"*¹⁹.

The human being, in their quest, should not forget something that Greek tragic poet Euripides said many years ago: *"We clearly are madly in love with this, whatever this is that shines on earth, because of inexperience of another life"*. Violence is a phenomenon that cannot be denied, with serious effects. The one guilty of violence, of the gaps it creates between themselves and the world, between themselves and the environment, is the human being. To fight against violence, in any of its forms of manifestation, means, above all, self-education and better quality of relationships and communication between people. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the European Parliament Resolution of 11 June 1986, which stipulates that *"... the respect of human rights must be part of the global education and human dignity, and all aspects of physical or mental violence against the human being are a violation of their rights"*.

Car crashes are really considered a real scourge of our modern civilisation, widely accepted and recognised paradox of the civilisation that is undergoing a continuous development, they are topic of debate and study, involving, in their approach, technical and organisational, medical and social factors. Safer roads, drivers and pedestrians more careful about enforcing traffic rules and encouragement of walking or cycling, measures to reduce deaths and injuries through making traffic participants more aware of these aspects etc. are several possible solutions to prevent traffic accidents.

The non-military aspects of security must be fully analysed and understood in order to prevent and reduce the negative effects of various threats, including violence and road traffic accidents.

¹⁹ Teodor Frunzeti, *Globalizarea securităţii*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 9.

THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE, DEFENCE INDUSTRY, PARTNERSHIPS AND ALLIANCES IN INCREASING MILITARY POWER

Lieutenant Colonel Viorel ȘTEFANCU

Partnerships and alliances not only entail engagements of jointly countering external threats, they also pave the way for common modernisation projects, capitalise on opportunities for investments, create the premises for establishing a close cooperation between the research-development sectors, between the companies involved in the defence industry.

In addition to the state of security represented by being a member of partnerships and alliances, the states that are less powerful can benefit from military training assistance, from access, even if it is limited, to the new technologies, agreements and preferential contracts regarding the provision of military equipment, from common investments in military facilities.

Keywords: *hard power; alliance; partnership; training assistance; Smart Defence; Pooling and Sharing*

Military power is the oldest and most effective form of power. More recently labelled “*hard-power*”, it can be defined as the ability of states to “*reach superior purposes through the threat of war or through war*”¹. The configuration of today’s world is a result of the violence exerted by the military power in a long succession of wars, originating in the dawn of civilisation. The borders have been drawn by the strong, who, based on their military force and the technological advance, have expanded their territories to the detriment of the weak, who have been dominated permanently by the former. Morgenthau wrote that “*military strength is the obvious measure of a nation’s power*”, the most important factor of a state’s political power and, consequently, the increase in the military power equates to an increase in a state’s political power.

Being already a truism that human action is triggered by a certain interest, the signing of partnerships and alliances is no exception

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¹ Teodor Frunzeti, *Putere națională și putere militară*, in *Lumea 2011. Enciclopedie politică și militară. Studii strategice și militare*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2011, p. 21.

to this rule. Alliances are formed around the same purpose² – defending certain areas and interests against a common adversary, by means of the promise of providing mutual military assistance. Some experts believe that partnerships are established during the period of the interest that has led to them, or, moreover, if the partners share common values³.

The interdependencies specific to the era of globalisation suggest the idea that any regional or global conflagration will take place either between groups of states forming certain alliances and partnerships and other groups of partner countries or between them and the not included or unaligned ones.

The ally status implies distributing the efforts between alliance partners, as well as these partners assuming the security risk they would not have been faced with otherwise. However, the benefits of joining alliances are clearly higher than the costs involved. Military partnerships and alliances are usually accompanied by investments in various economic sectors, driven by the increase in the climate of trust and security. For instance, Romania's accession to NATO was accompanied by increased foreign investments. According to analysts⁴, in the first five years after the invitation to join the Alliance, foreign investments were eight times higher than in the past. Attracting a new member into an alliance or partnership may have other economic fundamentals. The Alliance leader hopes that through the inclusion of this new member in the new "*club*" it will be easier to influence the purchasing decisions and will thus turn it into a new market for its military technology.

In partnerships, the relationship is mutually beneficial as each part contributes elements that complement each other. Thus, in partnerships between the US, on the one hand, and Poland and Romania, on the other hand, based on which the anti-missile shield has been developed and whose common interest is the protection of their territories through early intercepting possible missiles launched on them, the United States provides technical systems and the host countries provide the necessary installation and servicing facilities.

Partnerships and alliances not only involve joint commitments to counter external threats, but also open the way for joint modernisation projects, capitalise on investment opportunities, create the potential of establishing close cooperation between research and development sectors, between companies in the defence industry. However, it must be noticed that the cooperation process between states

² At <http://www.jstor.org/pss/3233250>, retrieved on 07.02.2012.

³ Mircea Mureşan, Gheorghe Văduva, *Strategia de parteneriat, parteneriatul strategic*, Editura UNAp, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 11.

⁴ At <http://www.ziare.com/economie/stiri-economice/aderarea-romaniei-la-nato-a-adus-de-opt-ori-mai-multe-investitii-straine-279457>, retrieved on 25.01.2012.

is limited by the disproportion of the earnings obtained and the desire to avoid economic dependence on other states regarding trade in goods and services⁵.

In addition to the state of security that is represented by the membership in partnerships and alliances, the less powerful states can receive military training assistance, access, although limited, to new technologies, preferential agreements and contracts to provide military technique, common investments in military facilities. Certainly, one should not ignore the importance of alliances for coming out of isolation and avoiding the buffer status between different military blocs, a status that, as demonstrated many times in history, does not guarantee territorial integrity and independence.

For the countries that cannot provide an adequate military capability through their own efforts, alliances acquire major importance. In extreme situations, the establishment of alliances is so important for the survival of a state that one resorts to any means to secure the membership to them.

Nevertheless, the guarantee offered by military alliances should be viewed with some circumspection. The reality of the 21st century brings to attention Clausewitz's statement according to which, in alliances, states assist each other, but this assistance consists in forces that are "*usually very modest, independent of the targets of war and enemy efforts*"⁶. This conclusion also results from the analysis of how the allies have fulfilled their undertaken obligations in different conflicts, perhaps the most relevant example being the fact that the treaty concluded between France and Britain, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other hand, was not honoured when the latter was attacked by Germany in the Second World War.

There are also disadvantages of the ally status, such as those related to the possibility of the allied states being part of conflicts that are not in their interests, when vital interests are not at stake or in which the profits are much lower than the participation costs, a certain subordination of own foreign policy to the hegemonic state. It is not less true that, under certain circumstances, there are some disadvantages for the hegemonic state as well. The most important ones refer to the disproportion between the costs of participation in alliances and the benefits derived under the conditions in which the imposition of own interest could be ensured only by the great power status, the difficulties of carrying out joint actions, as a consequence to limited interoperability generated by the technological discrepancies, the limitations and constraints arising from the collective decision-making process.

⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Teoria politicii internațională*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2006, p. 152.

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 609.

This conclusion is particularly true given the circumstances in which the position of the hegemonic actor is not threatened by other potential hegemonic actors because of the existing power gaps, as it was the case in the US after the end of the *Cold War*. No longer having a competitor to the status of a superpower, the US was able to shape the geopolitical environment in its favour, including through military interventions, on its own, without needing support from allies.

Seen in terms of economic but also political dimension, one can assume that these facts will help to reconsider the status of member of alliances and the “*migration*” to solutions that are most appropriate to the current context, such as bilateral strategic partnerships or homogeneous, situational or temporary alliances.

In terms of the taxonomy of partnerships and alliances, it is given, among others, by the geographical scope, objectives, number of participating countries, relative power of allies, functions and duration. It is interesting the classification from the perspective of relative power, according to which alliances may be symmetrical, in which member states have approximately equal powers, as well as equal commitments and asymmetrical, between weak states and much powerful states, with unequal commitments⁷.

The signing of asymmetric partnerships and alliances is apparently against stronger allies, which provide the security umbrella and the largest share of common expenses. It is clear that, in the absence of a constraint, no state will assume the burden of expenses required for the alliances to function, except for the situations in which their vital interests are at stake. The contribution of allies that lack military power can be reflected in other ways, such as providing the territory that can ensure the control of strategic positions or corridors to certain strategic resources at war.

In practice, it was noticed that small and medium powers tend to adopt the role of “*free rider*”, where most of the costs is left to the leader state. This is obvious in NATO, in which the US funds most of the Alliance expenses⁸, the contribution of Europeans being maintained at low levels, while the number of NATO-led operations has increased. For example, a brief analysis of NATO member countries budgets reveals that most of them do not fulfil their commitment to allocate a minimum of 2% of the GDP for defence, which is noticed in reduced military capabilities, widened gaps as far as emerging powers are concerned, with significant discrepancies between the European allies and the US military technologies.

⁷ Andrei Miroiu, Simona Soare, *Balanța de putere*, in *Manual de relații internaționale*, Editura Polirom, Iași, p. 220.

⁸ At http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_67655.htm, retrieved on 05.02.2012.

The NATO dependence on US capabilities is dramatic, especially in the field of research, surveillance, strategic lift and high-precision weapons. This dependence, shown first in the war in former Yugoslavia and, more recently, during the campaign in Libya, should be more alarming considering that the US interests currently target more Asia than Europe. In fact, the United States has signalled that it is no longer willing to bear alone the full burden of NATO operation costs⁹. Bringing allied military capabilities at the same technological level continues to be an ambitious and difficult-to-reach goal, considering the different level of economic development as well as the different levels of ambition.

For the USA, the *revolution in the military affairs* has brought to the forefront high-precision weapons, new research and fire control systems, sensor networks, invisible aircraft, nuclear aircraft carriers, anti-missile systems, which incorporate the latest scientific discoveries. Technological superiority is translated in information and decision-making superiority, in the ability to develop and apply innovative doctrines and concepts, such as *Network-Centric Warfare*. However, the developments related to the forms and procedures specific to low-intensity war question the usefulness of the new types of weapons, considering the irrelevance of technology in front of the combat tactics of terrorists and guerrilla fighters.

One of the advantages of NATO membership is gaining access to joint investment funds within programmes such as *NSIP – NATO Security Investment Programme*. The member countries can receive financial support, through *NSIP* funds, for projects conducted on their territory, which include facilities meant for the support of command structures, C4I systems, airfields, logistic support elements¹⁰. *NSIP* funds come from the contributions from all members to NATO's joint budget, and to this it may be added the national contribution of each country to finance a specific project on its territory. However, this depends upon the ability of each member to raise funds for such projects; otherwise, the respective state will be only a contributor to the military and civilian budget of the Alliance.

NATO member countries budgets have been affected by large cuts because of the fact that budget allocations were directed towards other areas considered a priority, as well as because of the economic crisis. However, once again, the economic crisis seems to be the best advocate for the change in the field of cooperation. In order to limit the effects of the constant reduction of military budgets on the defence capacity of the Alliance, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen launched, in 2011, the concept of *Smart Defence*, which is based on the following three principles:

- *prioritisation of expenses* – making only those investments that are strictly necessary and cannot be delayed;

⁹ At <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30150.pdf>, retrieved on 16.01.2012.

¹⁰ At http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_67655.htm, retrieved on 16.12.2011.

- *specialisation* – the member countries developing only those capabilities that were more improved than those developed by the allies and their joint use when needed;
- *cooperation* – acting together to develop joint programmes and share resources.

The implementation of the concept of *Smart Defence* became the responsibility of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which “*seeks to find the economic and military solutions in order to get NATO out of the deadlock of the world crisis*”¹¹.

Here are a few recent examples for the joint use of resources within NATO:

- *SAC programme – Strategic Airlift Capability*, through the capabilities made available to the allies in the NATO transport airbase in Papa, Hungary;
- *MAJII programme – Multi-Intelligence All-Source Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition*¹², a multinational programme in which the USA, Germany, Italy, France, Norway, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK take part in order to accomplish certain sensors systems to gather information and send it rapidly to the users connected in a data network;
- *AGS programme – Allied Ground Surveillance* is intended for purchasing 5 UAVs for aerial radar surveillance of the areas of interest; the systems will be purchased by 13 states, Romania included, and will be used jointly by all the members of the Alliance¹³.

Another solution identified by NATO for reducing costs, this time the acquisition ones, especially in the field of software, training and simulation programmes is the signing of contracts with small and medium companies, whose production costs are lower than the ones of big corporations, because of greater flexibility and lack of bureaucracy¹⁴. Through a process of continuous consultation within NATO, there are identified the areas in which the cooperation process can achieve maximum efficiency, common projects, financing arrangements.

Another example of partnership, signed in order to increase economic power, but not only, can be found in the EU. The idea of a federation of states, towards which the European Union is inclined, in which the relations of cooperation and not of confrontation prevail, is launched by Kant in the 18th century, in “*Perpetual Peace*”. In it, member states are animated by common economic, as well as military interests, considering the need to counter traditional threats coming from the east of the continent, but also the most recent ones, such as the fight against terrorism.

¹¹ At http://www.sfin.ro/articol_24795/nato_infrunta_criza_cu_%E2%80%9Esmart_defence%E2%80%9D.html#ixzz1jS5eoxPQ, retrieved on 16.12.2011.

¹² At http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71562.htm, retrieved on 23.01.2012.

¹³ At http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48892.htm, retrieved on 23.01.2012.

¹⁴ At www.sfin.ro/articol_24795/nato_infrunta_criza_cu_%E2%80%9Esmart_defence%E2%80%9D.html#ixzz1jS5eoxPQ.

Economic integration around a dominant power may provide the latter with political control through the dependency relationships that are established around it.

Although, unlike the US, the EU's perception on the way to solve global issues is different, one can say, based on arguments related to the objectives of the EU – achieving deployable and rapid response capabilities, taking part in peacekeeping and crisis management missions – that, sooner or later, it will become a global alliance, whose main drive will be economic power. The EU is in full process of redefining its identity and of projecting its new vision and roles in the current geopolitical context that will include, among others, the completion of the stage of economic integration and the implementation of a military integration in order to create European armed forces with a single command. As stated by Kenneth Waltz, the fact that the European countries have lost the role of main military powers has determined them to coalesce for greater cooperation¹⁵. The agreements signed in 2010 between France and the UK, aimed at initiating joint defence projects, paved the way towards achieving such kind of armed forces, being, at the same time, a signal of the concerns for rationalising defence spending.

The development in common of military capabilities is only one of the possibilities placed at the disposal of allied or partner states. Modern combat equipment, which is very expensive, will not be available to all states and the perpetuation of structures equipped for the wars of the second millennium will not make it possible for them to act as a guarantor of security. The difficult world economic environment is an additional argument for streamlining military expenditure through new reorganisations of the military forces of the European nations, but without affecting the region's defence capacity.

One of the EU's responses to the new realities of the economic and security environment is the concept of "*Pooling and Sharing*". This concept, based on a joint initiative of Germany and Sweden, called the *GHEENT initiative*¹⁶, and discussed for the first time during the meeting of EU defence ministers in 2011 (Belgium), takes into account the fact that, in the future, member states will be able to share certain military capabilities. The implementation of this concept will benefit especially those countries that do not have high financial power, as they will gain access to capabilities otherwise unaffordable through their own efforts because of the prohibitive costs.

The main areas identified in which joint projects can be accomplished in order to streamline costs and increase interoperability are¹⁷:

- *helicopter pilots training programmes;*

¹⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

¹⁶ At <http://www.european-defence.com/Reviews/binarywriterservlet?imgUid=6c840d83-f8c1-b331-76b8-d77407b988f2&uBasVariant=11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111>, retrieved on 15.01.2012.

¹⁷ At http://www.eda.europa.eu/Libraries/Procurement/factsheet_-_pooling_sharing_-_301111_1.sflb.ashx, retrieved on 22.12.2011.

- *maritime surveillance networks;*
- *air refuelling;*
- *military satellite communications;*
- *air transport fleet;*
- *smart ammunitions.*


It is estimated that these joint projects, coordinated by the *European Defence Agency – EDA*, will contribute substantially to the development of military capabilities, more efficient use of available funds, increase in the interoperability between European armed forces. The high degree of interoperability of combat technique and military equipment is required by the multinational character of the forces participating in operations carried out under the aegis of any alliance.

EDA officials highlight that one of the obstacles to achieve efficiency similar to that of US is the fragmentation of the EU weapons market. The issue of eliminating the duplication of efforts in the European Union is still far from finding a solution, as long as the big national companies that produce military equipment will continue to compete with each other and will not find solutions for merging and cooperating closely through *joint venture*-type agreements.

For Romania, which is both member of NATO and the EU, it is essential that the need for coordination of military programmes of the two structures is affirmed and multinational programmes packages are developed in order to optimise expenses and avoid duplication of efforts in the field.

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THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS

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The state of siege and the state of emergency regard crisis situations generated by the emergence of serious threats to the country's defence and national security, constitutional democracy or by the need to prevent, limit or remove the consequences of disasters.

State bodies can appreciate, depending on circumstances, to what extent they will apply the rule of law when there is a state of necessity, because, in such exceptional circumstances, the competent bodies may ask for the necessary measures, even if the law would be violated for this purpose. The measure ordered by the authorities must be in direct proportion with the situation that caused it and be applied indiscriminately, without causing prejudice to the existence of the law or to freedom. The Constitution, in Art. 92 par 3 and Art. 93, regulates two situations in which the state of siege or the state of emergency, as state of necessity, would justify such measures being taken.

Keywords: state of necessity; emergency; siege; decree

The principle formulated by the Romans – “*Salus rei publicae, supreme lex*”¹ – leads to the conclusion that, in the event a state of emergency occurs, state institutions can appreciate, according to circumstances, to what extent they will apply the laws². In such exceptional circumstances, which could endanger the very existence of the state, the competent bodies may order the required measures, even if it would mean to violate the law³. These exceptional circumstances justified, in the interwar period, the practice of issuing law-decrees by which the government exercised some constitutional

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¹T. Drăganu, *Introducere în teoria și practica statului de drept*, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1992, p. 212.

²Before the principle of “*saving the state is the supreme law*”, all other laws must yield – T. Drăganu, *Drept constituțional și instituții politice*, vol. II, Editura Lumina Lex, 1998, p. 128.

³The 1866 and 1923 Constitutions of Romania did not include provisions to enable the Parliament to delegate, in a state of emergency, some of its prerogatives to the executive power, but state practice recognised the right of this power to take measures to save the state in case of necessity, provided they are subsequently ratified by the Parliament – S. Murgu, N.M. Stoicu, *Drept constituțional și instituții politice*, Editura Cordial Lex, Cluj-Napoca, 2008, p. 188.

prerogatives instead of the Parliament, including the restriction of citizen rights and freedoms⁴.

The Romanian Constitution stipulates, in Art. 53, the general principle according to which the exercise of some rights and freedoms may be limited only by law and only if required by the situation, for: safeguarding national security, public order, health or morals, citizen rights and liberties; conducting criminal investigation; preventing consequences of natural disasters or of an extremely severe catastrophe.

Restriction of rights and freedoms can be ordered only if it is necessary in a democratic society. The decision ordering the limitation of a right or fundamental freedom should mark the exact relation between requirements and options, between the requirements and means being used, or between means and purpose⁵.

The measure ordered by the authorities must be proportional with the situation that caused it and must be applied without discrimination or prejudice to the existence of that right or to freedom. The *principle of proportionality* is a constitutional principle⁶, being designed as a just relation between the factual situation, the means for limiting the exercise of some rights and the legitimate aim pursued⁷, but, in the absence of legal predeterminations of proportionality⁸, the latter must be tested and evaluated *in concreto* by the authority before which it was invoked⁹.

⁴ C.G. Raricescu, *Contenciosul administrativ român*, Editura Universală Alcaz and co., București, 1937, p. 24.

⁵ There is, in practice, the possibility that a certain disaster – earthquake, flood, fire, epidemic, epizootic – could have a lower gravity that does not impose the institution of the state of emergency by the President, but it requires exceptional measures by local government bodies, restricting the exercise of some rights and freedoms, in order to prevent, remove or minimise the consequences of the disaster – D. Big, *Restrângerea exercițiului libertăților publice*, Hamangiu, București, 2008, p. 142 et seq.

⁶ *Decizia Curții Constituționale nr. 139 din 1994 cu privire la constituționalitatea Legii pentru aprobarea Ordonanței Guvernului nr. 50 din 12 august 1994 privind instituirea unei taxe de trecere a frontierei în vederea constituirii unor resurse destinate protecției sociale*, published in *Monitorul oficial al României* no. 353 of 21 December 1994; *Decizia Curții Constituționale nr. 157 din 1998, cu privire la excepția de neconstituționalitate a art. IV pct. 7 din Ordonanța Guvernului nr. 18/1994 privind măsuri pentru întărirea disciplinei financiare a agenților economici, aprobată și modificată prin Legea nr. 12/1995*, published in *Monitorul oficial al României* no. 3 of 11 January 1999.

⁷ In ECHR jurisprudence, proportionality determines the legitimacy of the contracting states' interference in the exercise of rights protected by the Convention.

⁸ The Constitutional Court ruled, in several cases, the need to establish, by law, objective criteria reflecting the requirements of proportionality (*Decizia Curții Constituționale nr. 71/1996 referitoare la excepția de neconstituționalitate a dispozițiilor art. 16 lit. a) din Decretul-lege nr. 10/1990 privind regimul pașapoartelor și al călătorilor în străinătate*, published in *Monitorul oficial al României* no. 131 of 25 June 1996).

⁹ I. Deleanu, *Instituții și proceduri constituționale*, Editura Servo-Sat, Arad, 1998, p. 123.

After regulating this general principle, the Constitution, in Art. 92 par 3 and in Art. 93, covers two situations in which the state of siege or emergency would justify taking such measures¹⁰. First, in the event of armed aggression against the country, the President of Romania is authorised to take measures to repel aggression, of which he must immediately notify the Parliament. In the second case, the President of Romania institutes the state of siege or state of emergency throughout the country or in some administrative units, under the law, and requires the Parliament's approval for the measure within no more than five days after taking it.

The provisions of Art. 92 par 3 of the Constitution establish the obligation for the President of Romania to immediately notify the Parliament of the measures that have been ordered in order to repel armed aggression against the country.

In order to take all necessary measures, the President will convene the Supreme Council of National Defence, and, after debating this situation, make the decisions that are necessary to repel the aggression¹¹. These measures are ordered by the President of Romania, through decrees countersigned by the Prime Minister, and are notified to the Parliament.

The President's notification informing the Parliament of the measures ordered for repelling armed aggression against the Romanian state is mandatory, unlike the notification regulated by Art. 88 in the Constitution, which is optional, the head of state being required to appear before the Parliament in order to explain the reasons for the measures he ordered to reject aggression. Constitutional norms do not stipulate a period within which the President is obliged to send this notification to the Parliament, but they do establish that the measures must be notified to the Parliament "*without delay*"¹².

¹⁰ We embrace the view expressed in the doctrine regarding the fact that, under the generic name of state of emergency, the Constitution includes both situations in which state of siege and state of emergency can be instituted, without specifying the consequences of their institution – T. Drăganu, *Introducecere în teoria și practica statului de drept*, op. cit., p. 212.

¹¹ The Supreme Council of National Defence is a public authority, independent of the Government, chaired by the President of Romania and subject to parliamentary control, with responsibilities in the defence and national security (Article 1 of *Legea nr. 415/2002 privind organizarea și funcționarea Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Țării*, published in *Monitorul oficial al României*, part I, no. 494/2002 states that it is "[...] the autonomous administrative authority vested, under the Constitution, with the organisation and coordination of activities concerning defence and national security").

¹² This obligation of the President of Romania concerns both the measures that were ordered by the Romanian President to repel armed aggression against the country, and the measures to be taken in this regard (Șt. Deaconu in I. Muraru, E.S. Tănăsescu, D. Apostol-Tofan, F. Baias, V.M. Ciobanu, V. Cioclei, I. Condor, A. Crișu, A. Popescu, S. Popescu, B. Sălăjan-Guțan, M. Tomescu, V. Vedinaș, I. Vida, C. Zamșa, *Constituția României – Comentariu pe articole*, Editura C.H. Beck, București, 2008).

The notification is discussed in joint session of the two Houses of Parliament, which will then rule on the measures taken by the President. If the Parliament is not in session, it is convened within 24 hours from the onset of armed aggression. The convocation of Parliament in special session and its operation throughout the war period is explained by taking into account, on the one hand, the need for approval of the measures taken by the President, and on the other hand, the appointment, replacement or approval of the appointment of heads of services or institutions assigned to the country defence.

The provisions of Art. 93 of the Constitution concern exceptional situations that can occur internally and that can lead to the *state of siege* or *state of emergency* being declared¹³.

The state of siege and the state of emergency concern crisis situations, generated by the emergence of serious threats to the defence and national security, constitutional democracy, or to the prevention, limitation or removal of consequences of disasters. The state of siege and the state of emergency are instituted by the President of Romania on the basis of special powers granted by the original constituent power, as provided in the Constitution itself, and not pursuant to a legislative delegation¹⁴.

The *state of siege*¹⁵ and the *state of emergency*¹⁶ presuppose a delegation of powers within the limits necessary to prevent and combat the threats they pose, from the central public administration and local government to military and other public authorities, expressly provided for in the presidential decree. Military or civil authorities issue, during a state of siege or emergency, military

¹³ V. Duculescu, C. Călinoiu, G. Duculescu, *Constituția României – comentată și adnotată*, Editura Lumina Lex, București, 1997, p. 283.

¹⁴ In the doctrine, a view was also expressed according to which, in the case of institution of the state of siege and the state of emergency, a “*constitutional legislative delegation to the President of Romania*” would operate, the presidential decrees issued in this situation intervening in the legislative field through primary legal rules – I. Vida, *Logistica formală. Introducere în tehnica și procedura legislativă*, Editura Lumina Lex, București, 2010, pp. 259-261.

¹⁵ The *state of siege* is a set of exceptional political, military, economic, social and other measures, applicable throughout the country or in some administrative units, instituted for the country’s defence capacity adjustment to serious dangers, actual or imminent, which threaten the sovereignty, independence, unity or territorial integrity of the state, according to Art. 2 of *Ordonanța de urgență a Guvernului nr. 1/1999 privind regimul stării de asediu și regimul stării de urgență*, published in *Monitorul oficial al României*, part I, no. 22/1999, approved by *Legea nr. 453 din 1 noiembrie 2004*, published in *Monitorul oficial al României*, part I, no. 1052 of 12 November 2004.

¹⁶ The *state of emergency* is a set of exceptional political, economic and public order measures, applicable throughout the country or in some administrative units, which is instituted in the following situations: a) the existence of present or imminent serious danger to national security or to constitutional democracy; b) the imminence or occurrence of disasters that require the prevention, restriction or removal, as appropriate, of the consequences of these disasters, according to Art. 3 of *Ordonanța de urgență a Guvernului nr. 1/1999 privind regimul stării de asediu și regimul stării de urgență*, *op. cit.*

ordinances or orders, as appropriate, within the limits and conditions established by presidential decree¹⁷.

The declaration of the *state of emergency* is a situation that can be ordered by the President of Romania throughout the country or only in some local government units. The *state of siege* or the *state of emergency* will be notified to the Parliament within five days after having been ordered. If the Parliament is not in session, it will be convened within 48 hours and will operate throughout this situation. The *state of siege* and the *state of emergency* can be established and maintained only to the extent required by the circumstances that have caused them and only in compliance with the obligations assumed by Romania under international law.

During a *state of siege* or *stage of emergency*, the exercise of some rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution may be limited, in proportion to the seriousness of the situation that caused their institution and only if necessary, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 53 in the Constitution.

The interest in protecting national security justifies the restriction of some rights, by limitation imposed by the legislator, the restriction being consistent with the constitutional provisions of Art. 53 par (1) of the Romanian Constitution, according to which: “*The exercise of some rights or freedoms may be restricted only by law and only if necessary, as appropriate, for: safeguarding national security, public order, health or morals, citizen rights and freedoms; conducting a criminal investigation; preventing the consequences of natural disasters, or an extremely severe catastrophe*”¹⁸.

National security involves not only military security, namely it is not only applicable to the military, but also a social and economic element. Thus, it is not only the existence of *manu militari* situation that entails the applicability of the “*national security*” notion, but also other aspects of state life, such as the economic, financial or social ones, which might affect the state itself by the scale and gravity of the phenomenon¹⁹. The situation of global financial crisis could affect the country’s economic stability, and thereby its national security²⁰.

¹⁷ We embrace the view according to which the delegation of powers is purely administrative, unable to have legislative connotations – T. Oniga, *Delegarea legislativă*, Universul juridic, București, 2009, p. 60 et seq.

¹⁸ *Decizia Curții Constituționale nr. 37 din 2004 referitoare la excepția de neconstituționalitate a dispozițiilor art. 10 și 11 din Legea nr. 51/1991 privind siguranța națională a României*, published in *Monitorul oficial al României* no. 183 of 3 March 2004.

¹⁹ In the same vein, the Romanian Constitutional Court ruled that a situation of world financial crisis could affect, in the absence of adequate measures, the country’s economic stability and thus national security (*Decizia Curții Constituționale nr. 1414 din 4 noiembrie 2009 referitoare la obiecția de neconstituționalitate a Legii privind reorganizarea unor autorități și instituții publice, raționalizarea cheltuielilor publice, susținerea mediului de afaceri și respectarea acordurilor-cadru cu Comisia Europeană și Fondul Monetar Internațional*, published in *Monitorul oficial al României* part I, no. 796 of 23 noiembrie 1996.

²⁰ T. Toader, *Constituția României reflectată în jurisprudența constituțională*, Hamangiu, 2011, p. 178 et seq.

Even if the institution of a *state of emergency* or *stage of siege* may have the effect of limiting some rights and freedoms, the scope of Art. 53 is not restricted only as provided in Art. 93 of the Constitution, but can provide a basis for justifying the measures taken by the executive in times of crisis²¹.

The following are prohibited during a *state of siege* or a *state of emergency*: limiting the right to life, except when death is the result of lawful acts of war; torture and inhuman or degrading punishment; conviction for crimes that are not stipulated as such in national or international legislation; and restricting free access to justice.

The *state of siege* may be instituted for a period not exceeding 60 days, and the *state of emergency* for a period not exceeding 30 days. Depending on the evolution of the threatening situation, the President of Romania may lengthen, with the approval of the Parliament, the duration of this state, and may expand or restrict its scope. Measures that form the content of these presidential prerogatives are ordered by presidential decrees that are subject to countersignature by the Prime Minister, in order to produce legal effects and are published immediately in the *Official Gazette of Romania (Monitorul Oficial al României)*.

The decree instituting the *state of siege* or *state of emergency* shall provide the following: the reasons for ordering the institution of this state; the area in which it is instituted; the period for which it is instituted; the urgent measures that need to be taken; the rights and fundamental freedoms whose exercise is restricted; the military and civil authorities designated for executing the provisions of the decree, and their competences and other provisions, if deemed necessary.

The presidential decree that institutes the *state of siege* and the *state of emergency* shall be immediately notified to the public through mass media, together with the application of urgent measures, which take effect immediately. The decree is broadcast on the radio and on television, within two hours of the signature, and is transmitted repeatedly within 24 hours after instituting the *state of siege* or *state of emergency*.

The Parliament is to determine whether the measures ordered by the President are justified or not. Approval of the measure means that it can be enforced without any problem. If the Parliament does not approve of the institution of this state, the President of Romania shall revoke the decree, and the ordered measures shall cease to apply.

²¹ *Decizia Curții Constituționale nr. 872 din 25 iunie 2010 referitoare la obiecția de neconstituționalitate a dispozițiilor Legii privind măsuri necesare în vederea restabilirii echilibrului bugetar*, published in *Monitorul oficial al României*, no. 433 of 28 June 2010.

LEGITIMACY OF PURPOSE AND LEGALITY OF MEANS IN CURRENT ARMED CONFLICTS (II)

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In the second part of the article, the author deals with the issue of war in opposition to peace from the perspective of the second most important school in the theory of international relations – liberalism, noting that those who advocate this trend have avoided considering war as a means to regulate the issues between states that are liberal democracies.

Then, he approaches the same issue from the standpoint of the sociological school, mentioning that, in the context of the development of social-humanistic sciences, sociological explanations have gained more and more importance.

In the end of this part, the author writes about the Romanian contribution to the issue of peace and war, pointing out the work of Dimitrie Gusti, more precisely two of his excellent studies on war sociology.

Keywords: *liberalism; sociological school; structural violence; war and peace; interdependence theory*

Liberalism

The second largest school of international relations theory – *liberalism*³⁰ – has addressed the issue of war in opposition to the state of peace. It is considered that war, as a political phenomenon, can be eliminated if the conditions for the establishment of lasting peace are met. The modern origin of studies on peace (irenology) is placed at the end of the 18th century in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In 1795, he publishes the work *Zum ewigen Frieden*, which provides a basis for all disputes and controversies on ways and means of establishing a lasting peace in human society³¹. According to Kant, democratic societies do not fight each other. Analyst Ionel Nicu Sava identifies the main theses of Kant's thinking, which, applied to the international environment, will create the prerequisites for obtaining what the German philosopher called *perpetual peace*³²: no independent, large or small, state should be under the domination of another state;

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³⁰ Apud Constantin Hlihor, Elena Hlihor, *Comunicarea în conflictele internaționale. Secolul XX și începutul secolului XXI, op. cit.* pp. 36-51.

³¹ Benjamin Solomon, *Kant's Perpetual Peace: A New Look at this Centuries-Old Quest*, in *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*.

³² Ionel Nicu Sava, *Studii de securitate*, Centrul Român de Studii Regionale, București, 2005, p. 90.

³³ *Ibid.*

permanent armed forces should be abolished in time; no state should intervene by force in the constitution or government of other states; civil constitution of all states must be republican; the law of nations must be based on a federation of free states.

The instruments through which such an ideal can be reached in the international community are also identified with the *“freedom within the state and arbitration (law) in the relation between states”*³³. In other words, Kant believes that the evolution of society under the rule of law will create preconditions for a state of morality and equity in relationships between human beings. No government under the control of the people will go to war unless it is forced to do so. The political experience of the international relations system shatters this view.

Mention should be made that Immanuel Kant³⁴ is realistic enough when he notices that the 18th century society is not ready nor able to achieve such a peace³⁵, but he believes that the times to come will be better suited for such a security system. The famous German thinker is right in this regard, considering that, consequently, his view is the basis of several schools of thought within the liberal trend. His philosophy will influence the thinking and practice of international relations in the following period.

The followers of this trend have avoided seeing war as a means to regulate the problems between states with liberal democratic regimes. They consider war a disease: *“A serious disease, a cancer of politics. It is a product of the aggressive instincts of unrepresentative elites”*³⁶. This does not mean that the representatives of this trend have automatically denied the possibility of the appearance of such a phenomenon even in the regulation of relations between democratic states, but, in their belief, this is a phenomenon that occurs rarely³⁷. Norman Angell, for instance, says that *“war, though sometimes necessary, is always an irrational and inhumane way to solve disputes and that its prevention should always be an over-riding political priority”*³⁸. Moreover, Tom Paine is not far from this belief: *“A conspiracy designed to preserve the power and occupation of princes, statesmen, soldiers, diplomats and weapons manufacturers to tighten the noose of tyranny around the neck of the people”*³⁹.

³⁴ A. Franceschet, *Popular Sovereignty or Cosmopolitan Democracy? Liberalism, Kant and International Reform*, in *European Journal of International Relations*, no. 6, 2000, pp. 277-302.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Mircea Malița, *Între război și pace*, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

³⁷ Bruce Russett, *Counterfactuals about War and Its Absence*, in vol. Philip Tetlock, Aaron Belkin (ed.), *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, pp. 169-178.

³⁸ Apud Martin Griffith, *Școli, curente, gânditori*, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

³⁹ Apud Mircea Malița, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

The elimination of war from the international life, according to the followers of the liberal trend, can be achieved by building democratic regimes, promoting the benefits of international trade and creating international institutional mechanisms in order to manage peace and prosperity. Security should not be left to secret bilateral negotiations and to the faith in the balance of power. Politicians and diplomats are endowed with reason and act rationally in the diplomatic practice. This makes them united by the fundamental interest of creating a global community, based on a system of peace, which can be achieved under certain conditions.

Revealing this fundamental truth and establishing and making functional institutions that will put order into international anarchy are essential. Education will eliminate ignorance and prejudice, democracy will prevent the outbreak of wars, and the institutions that prevent manifestations of violence at national level can be expanded at global level in order to peacefully solve disputes. The increasing economic interdependence and the benefits of international trade will make war threaten the prosperity of both sides engaged in a conflict/war⁴⁰. This vision inspired by the liberal paradigm and adopted by major politicians and diplomats has marked a turning point in international relations.

The optimistic vision of liberalism on international policy is based on three fundamental beliefs that are common to almost all theories of this paradigm⁴¹. First, liberals believe that it is not the states that should be the main actors of the international scene, but the peace and security-related institutions and organisations. Second, they argue that, in the behaviour of states in relations with other actors, an important role is played by the internal political organisation. From this perspective, there are “good” and democratic states whose behaviour will be dictated by the rule of law and moral principles and “bad” states, which are authoritarian or dictatorial and will promote force and the policy of force in the relations with other actors. Last but not least, they claim that peace and security can be achieved if the world is populated with “good” states.

This idea is promoted, among others, by Woodrow Wilson, but it is shared by a whole range of scientists, who set the two courses of action: *knowing the past*, in order to prevent mistakes from repeating, and creating *institutions and norms*, basic requirements for an era of peace. Security in world politics, according to W. Wilson’s vision, will be achieved if the states promoting imperialist-type policies disappear. His idea is based on respecting human rights – the right to self-governance being considered a fundamental one – as well as on the lack

⁴⁰ Stephen M. Walt, *International Relations: One World, Many Theories*, in *Foreign Policy*, Issue 110, spring 1998, p. 29.

⁴¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *Tragedia politicii de forță. Realismul ofensiv și lupta pentru putere*, Editura Antet, 2003, p. 16.

of legitimacy of the empire as a form of state organisation. His reputation as a promoter of the liberal vision is built on the model he proposes at the Paris Peace Conference that ended the First World War, drafted even before the end of the war in his famous *Fourteen Points*⁴².

The instrument meant to achieve and maintain collective security is, according to the founders of this concept, the League of Nations. It has functioned based on a pact negotiated by Allied and Associated Powers in Paris and adopted by the Peace Conference on 28 April 1919, with recommendation to be reproduced as a preamble to the system of peace treaties. The pact contains 26 articles and an annex with the list of the 32 founding states and other 13 countries invited to join it⁴³. This document defines the goal of the League of Nations, which, in essence, is to develop cooperation between nations, to guarantee peace and safety, as well as to eliminate war. Article 8 stipulates that, in order to maintain peace, member states recognise the need to reduce national armaments, according to "*the geographical situation and the specific conditions of each country up to the minimum necessary to defend the internal order*"⁴⁴.

The advocates for the League, among whom Alfred Zimmern, believe that it could maintain security by promoting political mechanisms such as conferences regarding disarmament and mediation of conflicts between states or by establishing a system of institutions meant to develop norms and rules of behaviour for all actors in the international environment, as well as control tools to enforce compliance with rules and regulations⁴⁵. These regulations are useful in the peaceful resolution of minor disagreements between states, such as border disputes, but they are minor compared to the great dangers that appear on the horizon⁴⁶. The ideas promoted by advocates of liberalism remain stuck in the diplomatic practice of the period between the two world wars, and the League of Nations has failed to pass the test of reality⁴⁷. Mircea Malița thinks the beginning of the end of this institution is marked by the failure of the disarmament conference in 1932⁴⁸.

⁴² Constantin Hlihor, *Istoria secolului XX*, Editura Comunicare.ro, București, 2003, pp. 37-39.

⁴³ For details, see J.B. Duroselle, *Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours*, 7e édition, 1978, p. 58; Mihai Iacobescu, *România și Societatea Națiunilor. 1919-1929*, Editura Academiei, București, 1988, pp. 113-116, Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Bușe, Zorin Zamfir, Gh. Bădescu, *Relații internaționale în acte și documente, vol. I. 1917-1939*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1974, pp. 17-25.

⁴⁴ Constantin Hlihor, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁴⁵ Apud Martin Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁴⁶ Mircea Malița, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

⁴⁷ For details, see Mircea Malița, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-209; Mihai Iacobescu, *op. cit.*; J.B. Duroselle, *op. cit.*; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomația*, București, 1998; Hedley Bull, *The Theory of International Politics, 1919-1969*, in Martin Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

⁴⁸ Mircea Malița, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

Germany, dissatisfied with the terms to be met, withdraws from the conference and, later, from the League. The League is dissolved when it becomes obvious that the outbreak of the Second World War II cannot be prevented. The consequence is the emergence of a profound crisis in the theory of liberalism and the decrease in confidence in the practical value of this thesis promoted by this trend of thought. It is remarkable that such consequences have not had an effect on all those who study the issues of peace and war from the liberal perspective. Therefore, not everyone feels that liberalism is, as a theory, an *“inadequate perspective for the study and practice of international politics”* and its advocates are *“unable to distinguish between aspiration and reality”*⁴⁹.

After the Second World War, advocates of peace made through institutions with universal vocation consider the flaws of construction of the League of Nations should be urgently corrected. Thus, the UN appears on the international scene, an institution that incorporates all the hopes and illusions of the liberal school. Once again, it is confirmed that, in building a world security architecture, the actors required to construct it are not primarily motivated by theoretical requirements of a particular model or ideology, but by their short- or long-term state interests and the historical experience through which one actor or another succeeds in promoting these interests. Henry Kissinger acutely captures this when analysing the positions of the victorious great powers regarding the future world order and, therefore, the mechanisms they consider viable to sustain it. He concludes that *“each of the victors was speaking in terms of his own nation’s historical experiences. Churchill wanted to reconstruct the traditional balance of power in Europe. This meant rebuilding Great Britain, France, and even defeated Germany, so that, along with the United States, these countries could counterbalance the Soviet colossus to the east. Roosevelt envisaged a postwar order in which three victors, along with China, would act as a board of directors of the world, enforcing the peace against any potential miscreant which he thought would most likely be Germany – a vision that was to become known as the “Four Policemen”. Stalin’s approach reflected both his communist ideology and traditional Russian foreign policy. He strove to cash in on his country’s victory by extending Russian influence into Central Europe. And he intended to turn the countries conquered by Soviet armies into buffer zones to protect Russia against any future German aggression”*⁵⁰.

A host of theorists and also good connoisseurs of the developments in the international environment of the 20th century, from Norman Angell

⁴⁹ Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis*, New York, Harper and Row, 1939 apud Martin Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁵⁰ Henry Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

and John Hobson⁵¹ to Francis Fukuyama and David Held⁵², to name only the best known to the academic environment, each in his time continuing to promote the ideas and values of liberalism, have caused all sort of controversies and appreciations regarding the phenomenon and practice of security.

Sociological School⁵³

In the context of social-humanistic sciences development, respectively of the resumption of the concepts of *asymmetric conflict*, *conflict of interest*, *latent conflict vs. manifest conflict*, the sociological explanations have gained increasing importance. This extension of the paradigms has founded expression especially in the concept of *structural violence*, developed by sociologist Johan Galtung⁵⁴. The concept has been quickly adopted by analysts and experts followers of the liberal and even socialist trends from the West, who have begun to draw attention to the need to reform the contemporary international relations. Peace, in Galtung's vision, is defined as the opposite of violence. However, we must note that it does not consist simply in the controlled use of violence by people, but "*anything avoidable that hinders human self-realisation*"⁵⁵. For understanding contemporary conflicts, Johan Galtung's theory offers four types of violence in world politics. *Classic* violence is what in the specialised literature is defined through war, torture or degrading human punishments. Another type of violence that may occur in the international environment, in Galtung's opinion, is the one *generated by poverty*, by the lack of material living conditions that can cause the same amount of suffering to humans. The third is the *repression*, generated by the loss of individual's freedom to choose and express their own beliefs. Finally, Galtung treats *alienation* as a form of structural violence generated by the loss of individual identity and the deterioration of the conditions of modern man to live in a cohesive community and establish relationships with other peers⁵⁶. Therefore, in order to know the types of conflicts in the history of the 20th century, we need to know the structure of violence in modern society. Galtung believes that, in order for a conflict to appear in the international relations system, it is necessary

⁵¹ John Hobson, *Democracy and a Changing Civilisation*, London, 1934; *idem*, *The Crisis of Liberalism: New Issues of Democracy*, Harvester Press Brighton, 1974.

⁵² David Held, *Political Theory Today*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991; *idem*, *Models of Democracy*, Polity Press Cambridge, 1987.

⁵³ Constantin Hlihor, Elena Hlihor, *Comunicarea în conflictele internaționale*, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ Apud Ionel Nicu Sava, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

⁵⁵ Johan Galtung, *Transarmament and Cold War: Peace Research and the Peace Movement*, Christian Eljers, Copenhagen, 1988, p. 272 apud Martin Griffith, *Relații internaționale...*, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

⁵⁶ Apud Martin Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

that two or more countries have incompatible interests. He distinguishes between conflict, conflict attitude and conflict behaviour⁵⁷. According to the types of needs the human being has in society, Galtung identifies two types of violence: *direct*, which is reflected in killings, poverty, sanctions, alienation, repression, detention, expulsion, deportation and *structural*, which consists in exploitation and marginalisation⁵⁸. The diffuse nature of the concept of *structural violence* has greatly expanded the field of peace research, meaning that this area is overloaded, experiencing an almost unlimited increase and taking the proportions of a universal science. In the '70s, this expansion is felt as liberating, especially because the old approaches, applied to modern problems such as the international development of human society, of its system of states and of its surrounding environment, are not at all suitable. Traditionally, in the centre of classical studies about violence is unquestionably placed the predominant actor in the 20th century, the state that famous sociologist Max Weber defines in fact in relation to violence⁵⁹. Michel Wievorka, starting from the finding of Raymond Aaron regarding on the role of the state after the Second World War⁶⁰, notes that the current role of the state in the international relations has decreased a lot and, therefore, does not play the same important role in the emergence of violence in international relations, as it is more and more left without the monopoly of legitimate violence, as Max Weber has seen it. In the seventh and eighth decades, it is no longer a legitimate source in the centre of the struggle for national, social liberation or as revolutionary projects. On the other hand, it has also decreased the number of states that promote violence by the existence of totalitarian and dictatorship regimes. Today, violence is, according to Pierre Hassner, more related to the absence of a strong and democratic state within society⁶¹. From this perspective, violence is manifested on two levels: *an infrapolitical level*, which lies within society and involves the most various groups, and *a metapolitical one*, including transnational groups linked to organised crime, terrorist and religious networks⁶².

Another perspective for understanding violence and conflict is the one that defines *war* as something that “*occurs only between distinct political communities*”⁶³.

⁵⁷ J.M.G. van der Dennen and V.S.E. Falger (Eds.), *The Sociobiology of Conflict*, London, Chapman&Hall, 1990, p. 2.

⁵⁸ Apud Ionel Nicu Sava, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

⁵⁹ For details, see Cătălin Bordeianu, Doru Tompea, *Weber astăzi, Weber ieri*, Editura Institutului Național pentru Societatea și Cultura Română, Iași, 1999, pp. 97-116.

⁶⁰ Michel Wievorka, *Le nouveau paradigme de la violence* (Partie2), in *Cultures & Conflicts, Sociologie politique de l'international*, at <http://www.conflicts.org/document726.html#ftn12>

⁶¹ Pierre Hassner, *Par de là guerre et la paix. Violence et intervention après la guerre froide*, in *Etudes*, September 1996, p. 153 apud Michel Wievorka, *op. cit.*

⁶² Michel Wievorka, *op. cit.*

⁶³ *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, at <http://plato.stanford.edu/>

For one of the main founders of sociological theory, Herbert Spencer, conflict is a permanent principle “that animates every society and establishes a precarious balance between it and its environment; the uncertainties of survival as well as the fear they trigger however give birth to a religious control that transforms into political power organised under a military form; social integration than favours the differentiation of functions and roles, allowing, at the end of this development, the creation of an industrial society, peaceful at last”⁶⁴. The conflict according to this vision is peaceful and therefore does not produce unintended consequences for the human society. Other authors place the conflict in a fierce struggle for the space and survival of the “superior races” with the “inferior” ones. Arthur de Gobineau and Vacher de Lapouge in France, with H.S. Chamberlain or Francis Galton in the UK, and Wagner and Marr in Germany, joined this view along with other theorists who were used by Nazi propaganda and ideology in order to justify genocide and murder in the years preceding and during the Second World War⁶⁵.

In the Romanian thinking, the issue of peace and war is addressed, among others, by Dimitrie Gusti in two excellent studies of war sociology, published in the interwar period⁶⁶. According to the Romanian sociologist, “war is a social reality (...), one of the most complex social phenomena”⁶⁷. Gusti’s vision of war is an integrating one, because, in his opinion, it comprises the entire economy, culture, technique of one time. Nature and the specific way of manifestation of war are, according to Gusti, directly influenced by the *framework* in which it takes place. This framework has *four* dimensions: *cosmic* (land/geography and climate); *biological* (given by race and selection); *historical* (causes) and *psychological*. From this perspective, for D. Gusti, the manifestations of war are discernible at the economic, spiritual (the moral aspect), political (power) and legal (the law) levels⁶⁸. The reasons for which a nation resorts to war have an historical nature and depend on the social and political context in which that particular human community lives. For the Romanian sociologist, the purpose of the war determines the type of war that a human community could be subjected to. In keeping with the *defence/conquest criterion*, he distinguishes between two categories of conflicts: *liberation* (national) and *conquest* (imperial); by the *type of actors*

⁶⁴ Apud Pierre Birnbaum, *Conflictetele*, in Raymond Boudon (coord.), *Tratat de sociologie*, Editura Humanitas, 1997, p. 258.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 259.

⁶⁶ Dimitrie Gusti, *Sociologia războiului*, Editura L. Sfetea, București, 1913; *idem*, *Societatea Națiunilor. Originea și ființa ei*, in vol. *Sociologia Militans*, Institutul Social Român, București, 1934, apud Ionel Nicu Sava, *op. cit.*, p. 94, footnote 5.

⁶⁷ Ionel Nicu Sava, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 95.

involved in conflict, wars are: civil wars, interstate revolutions and those that take place inside a state, between a part of society and the state, and, finally, between states as sovereign entities⁶⁹.

In Dimitrie Gusti's opinion, every human community in the international system of states is linked to another one by common interests that can lead to cooperation between them, as well as to disputes and conflicts. Consequently, he advocates the establishment of a science to study not only the state of nations, but also their aspirations in order to become aware of the features of the international environment. The knowledge of these international realities could lead to lowering the probability of war, and the achievement of a better understanding between nations would lead to better cooperation between them, in other words, to the increase in the degree of socialisation. *"Increasing socialisation, as D. Gusti states in 1913, is a necessary condition for transforming war in cultural competition"*⁷⁰. Ionel Nicu Sava has noticed for good reason that this vision of the Romanian scientist announced at the beginning of the 20th century would impose in the '70s as one of the most modern theory of international relations: *the theory of increasing interdependence in the international environment*.

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In the next issue of the journal, the author will address the main changes and trends in modern military operations, pointing out the issue of the use of force in the current world order.

English version by
✍️ **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 96.

⁷⁰ Dimitrie Gusti, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

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King Ferdinand I, at the oath ceremony for recruits from Basarabia, București, 2 July 1920

Source: Neculai MOGHIOR, Dana-Irina VOICU, *Ferdinand I. Regele întregitor de țară - istorie militară în imagini*, Editura Militară, București, 2011.

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