Romanian Military Thinking

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Through the agency of this journal all officers, of all kinds of arms, who are in service, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces".

Carol - King of Romania
Issued in Bucharest on December 8, 1897

Romanian Military Thinking

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Contents   Contenu

Geopolitics • Geostrategy International Security

Géopolitique • Géostratégie Sécurité internationale

Opinions

Opinions

*International
Connections*

*Connexions
internationales*

Honour Guard

The Armed Forces have always been, from the very beginning, a vector of power, of the expression of political will, of the assertion of national identity and of the preservation of the innate mission of a state. The display of military power to discourage potential adversaries has become manifest in different ways, from exercises and shows of force to impressive military parades and ceremonials.

Since the beginning, those who have been able to invest profitably in equipping and training the military, as a necessary generator of the state security, have not hesitated to display this potential, to impress. In time, this military parade has also got the valences of expressing the maximum of politeness and courtesy, appreciation and special gratitude and thus the military honour – the very act of presenting arms to salute – has become a gesture of high esteem, honour and respect for the dignity or the particular status of a person. The recipients of the privilege to perform this solemn duty, to accomplish this ceremonial that has soon become a genuine ritual could not be but some elite units specially established or designated among those that have proved worthy of praise on the battlefield.

Considered, throughout time, the pride of any army, guard units have become prestigious and therefore they have enjoyed some advantages in terms of image. Let us remember the Roman Praetorian Guard, the Papal Swiss Guard in the Vatican, Napoleon's Imperial Guard – renowned not only for its victories but also for its elegance and especially for its privilege to wear their stylish uniforms during battle –, the Soviet Guard units – title by which many of them were honoured after they became glorious on the fronts of the Second World War – or, more recently, the US National Guard and, why not, the well-known Queen's Guard, in the UK.

It is a century and a half since the 30th Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* was established. On 1 July 1860, the ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza ordered the establishment of the 1st Mountain (Skirmishers) Battalion having the mission to train as a line unit but being assigned to *"guard the court of the prince and His Highness the Ruler of the Country, and to present arms at the palace of the ruler"*.

The battle flag of the unit has become famous not only by presenting arms and saluting very important persons from all over the world but also by being

victorious in the War of Independence, and in the First and the Second World Wars. It has continued its way in history, although it has not always been an ascendant one as there have also been obstacles, and now it has definitely become a model unit in the Romanian Armed Forces elite and certainly their first visiting card.

The uniform of the Guard Regiment, emblem of the national specific of the Romanian Armed Forces, combines the traditional spirit – the first uniform of Cuza's skirmishers – with the exigencies of modernity. A coat of arms that is cultivated with veneration and that is worn with pride during the military ceremonies, the national holidays of the Romanians or in salute to the heads of state and the high Romanian and foreign officials whose status of high ranking public officials entitles them to receive it.

Protocol troops ? Not at all. To guard the heads of state and the military ceremonials is only part of the extremely important missions of this unit, as it is assigned to get engaged, if needed, in fight. Moreover, the military police subunit carries out its duty day and night, that of guarding the Ministry of National Defence sites.

Above the show of the uniforms, besides the sound of the trumpets and the rhythm of the drums, the troops belonging to the 30th Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"* permanently prove their professionalism acquired through devotion and perseverance, as a result of the continuous efforts to improve their performance and, why not, to become perfect. Because *la noblesse oblige* !

I myself have not *served* in the Guard Regiment. However, I have always admired and envied those who have had this privilege, as they have been given the opportunity to represent the Romanian Armed Forces at the highest level, to be their glorious troops. And, even if I have sometimes felt compassion for them, as the way to perfection involves total devotion, hard work and many privations, I am still a little bit envious especially because when I was 22, and I graduated from the Officer Candidate School, I was within the *parameters* as far as height, weight and especially motivation are concerned. Who is the one that does not want, at that age, to be in the first line of the formation ?

Long live the 30th Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul" !

Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE
English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

La garde d'honneur

De ses débuts, l'armée a été un vecteur de pouvoir, de l'expression de la volonté politique, de l'affirmation de l'être national et de la préservation des implications naturelles d'un État. L'expression du pouvoir militaire dans la situation de dissuader les adversaires potentiels a connu diverses formes d'application et de la manifestation d'étonnantes parades et des cérémonies militaires.

Toujours, ceux qui savaient la manière d'investir avec profit dans l'équipement et l'instruction de l'armée, comme un besoin de sécurité de l'Etat, n'ont pas hésité à montrer ce potentiel et y impressionner. Au fil du temps, cette parade des armes a eu aussi les possibilités de l'expression maximale de la politesse et de la courtoisie, de l'appréciation et de la gratitude particulière et donc le salut militaire – présenter les armes en guise de salutation – est devenu un geste de très haute estime, d'honneur, pour prouver le respect à la dignité, le statut particulier d'une personne. Et l'honneur de commettre cette solennité, d'accomplir cette cérémonie, qui devint bientôt un réel rituel, ne pouvait pas revenir uniquement des unités d'élite, spécialement créées ou agréées de celles adoptées au champ de bataille.

Considérés, à tout moment, la fierté d'une armée, les unités de la garde ont été et sont entourés de prestige et, en tant que tels, elles sont, d'une perspective de l'image, les bénéficiaires des prérogatives. Ne pas oublier donc la Garde prétorienne romaine, la Garde suisse du Vatican, la Garde Impériale de Napoléon – pas seulement célèbre pour ses victoires, mais aussi pour sa courtoisie et, surtout, pour le privilège de combattre en habits de gala. N'oublions pas aussi les unités de gardes soviétiques – titre par que beaucoup d'entre eux ont été félicités après elles sont été couvertes par la grandeur sur les fronts de la Seconde Guerre mondiale – ou, plus près à nos jours, la garde nationale des Etats Unis et, pourquoi pas, de célèbre garde de la reine de la Grande Bretagne.

Le Régiment 30 de la Garde *"Mihai Viteazul"* célèbre un siècle et demi de son existence. Au 1er juillet 1860, le prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza ordonnait l'institution du Bataillon 1 chasseurs (tirailleurs), avec la mission de s'instruire comme une unité en ligne, mais destinée *"à défendre la Cour princière et son Eminence le Prince du Pays, à servir les honneurs pour le palais royal"*.

Le drapeau de lutte de cette unité a obtenu non seulement la réputation d'être présenté son salut et d'être accueilli par des personnalités de premier degré dans le monde, mais aussi par la gloire des victoires dans la Guerre d'indépendance, à la Première et la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Il a continué aussi à marcher tout avant, mais pas toujours à la hausse et non sans obstacles, parmi l'histoire, en présentant aujourd'hui comme une unité-modèle dans l'élite de l'Armée Roumaine et, certainement, comme sa première carte de visite.

La tenue du Régiment de la Garde, emblème de la spécificité nationale de l'Armée Roumaine, combine l'esprit de la tradition – la première uniforme des tirailleurs pendant le Prince Cuza – avec les exigences de la modernité. Un blason qui est cultivé avec respect et fierté de porter aux cérémonies militaires, aux grandes fêtes du peuple roumain ou rencontrer des chefs d'Etat et de hautes autorités roumains et étrangers qui ont bénéficié de cette honneur par leur dignité publique.

Soldats de protocole ? Pas du tout. Pour assurer la protection des chefs d'État et des cérémoniales militaires n'est qu'une partie des ses missions déterminantes pour cette unité. Le Régiment est conçu pour s'engager, s'il est nécessaire, aux actions en temps de guerre. La division de police militaire est, en outre, active, de jour comme de nuit, à garder et à protéger des objectifs importants du Ministère de la Défense Nationale.

Au-dessus du spectacle des uniformes, au-delà des sons de trompettes et le rythme des tambours, les militaires du Régiment 30 de la Garde *"Mihai Viteazul"* affichent avec assiduité leur professionnalisme dans leur formation, obtenu par le dévouement et la persévérance, avec une peine interrompue pour acquérir la performance et, pourquoi pas, pour atteindre la perfection. Pour cela, hein, *la noblesse oblige* !

Je n'ai pas *servi* dans le Régiment de la Garde. Mais j'ai admiré et envié ceux qui avaient cet avantage, car ils ont eu la chance de représenter l'Armée Roumaine au plus haut niveau de sa gloire, en tant que soldats. Et même si j'ai les compatis parfois, parce que le chemin de la perfection c'est un sacrifice total, c'est un effort intégral ou de nombreux privations, j'ai encore un reste d'envie qui me moudre, surtout qu'alors j'avais 22 ans, quand j'ai fini l'Ecole Militaire d'officiers, et je me trouvais aussi dans *les paramètres* de taille, du poids et notamment de la motivation. Qui pas désirait, à cet âge-là, d'être à la première rangée de cette formation militaire ?

Joyeuse anniversaire, le Régiment 30 de la Garde "Mihai Viteazul" !

Version française par Alina PAPOI

DEFENCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (III)
– Planning –

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAŢĂ

Planning is one of the most used yet less understood concepts. The big number of factors involved in every human activity requires planning for achieving the established objectives.

Progress or decline in every field of human activity depend on the mentality of the people as well as on their leaders' approach to the implementation of the planning process.

Planning and plans implementations without flexibility will always lead to failure. Without planning, the world could be a real Babel Tower.

Maintaining a proper correlation between plans, programmes and objectives is possible through the permanent monitoring of the way in which their implementation takes place and through the prompt intervention – whenever important changes of the "input data" occur – in order to adapt to the new situations.

Keywords: *planning process; defence planning; strategic planning; PPBS; programmes; coordination; synergy*

According to some experts in the field, strategic planning appeared in America in the '50-'60s[1], out of the need for establishing several conceptual and pragmatic aspects regarding production, distribution, financing, market evolution forecast, business expansion etc. Other authors believe that Henry Fayol's writings[2], in which he describes his expertise as a director of mines, in the 19th century, represent the beginning of planning. In his book, Fayol refers to *"decennial projections"* that change every five years. There has been written a lot on planning, in general, and on strategic planning, in particular, yet, it seems that the diversity of opinions has generated only confusions in the minds of some people claiming that the *"word planning is currently used in so many and various senses that it is in some danger of degenerating into an emotive noise"*[3].

Unfortunately, we, people, are imperfect and wrong when expressing opinions that we believe to be the best (authorised, exhaustive etc. ones).

General (r.) Professor Dr Mihail Orzeaţă – Associated-Invited Professor at the "Carol I" National Defence University in Bucharest and former Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

[1] A. D. Chamberlain Jr., *Enterprise and Environment*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1968, p. 151.

[2] Henri Fayol, *General and Industrial Management*, Pitman, Londra, 1949, pp. 43-53, published for the first time in 1916, in French.

[3] B. J. Loasby, *Long-Range Formal Planning in Perspective*, published in *The Journal of Management Studies*, IV, p. 300.

Many of our fellow men, driven by vanity, want to ensure their primacy (reputation) in a field and neglect details that may prove to be very important after they launch opinions, judgments, conclusions etc. The situation in the planning field does not differ from other segments of human activities. I do not believe that it is highly important to elucidate now the issue of the primacy in discovering and using the concept of planning. I assume that many of those who become familiar with the previously presented suppositions regarding the primacy in this field ask themselves how the Egyptians, the Maya, the Aztec, the Inca peoples and others were able to erect the megalithic constructions that have lasted so much. How where they able to coordinate the efforts of hundreds and thousands of people without having a clue about plans, forecast, synergy and scenarios ?

I am under no illusions that the point of view I will further submit in this article will shed light completely as far as the matter of the definition and the content of defence planning and strategic planning are concerned. I only hope that those who will have the curiosity and patience to read my article will feel bolstered to continue their own research, to compare these opinions with the ones of other authors and to find their own way of eliminating the worthless stuff from the writings in which this topic has been approached.

The purpose of this article is not a polemical one. Through my point of view, I wish to call for moderation and thorough analysis of the facts and data that are used in the planning process in order to reduce the probability to fail when we provide our decision-makers with documentation. Moreover, I hope I can pay my contribution to synthesising the opinions regarding planning and to approaching this domain from a point of view that is mostly pragmatic.

The Essence of Planning

An expert in the field of planning states that this field is so familiar to people, that it may seem bizarre to ask ourselves now what it is; yet, he also notices that opinions are so different, that *"barely anything written about planning or strategy provides considered answers to these"*[4].

The big diversity of opinions in almost all the domains of human activities makes us compare the debate on the issue of planning with the way the inhabitants of the Babel Tower used to communicate: each person writes (speaks) in their language, not only literally, but also in terms of content and everyone believes that only them are right. Hence, the impression that they do not get along with each other. This impression is strengthened when we go deep into the opinions

[4] Henry Minzberg, *Ascensiunea şi declinul planificării strategice*, Editura Publica, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 25.

that cover such a broad range. Thus, from a pessimistic perspective, Aaron Wildavsky concludes that *"planning protrudes in so many directions, the planner can no longer discern its shape...* [and] *the essence of his calling – planning – escapes him. He finds it everywhere in general and nowhere in particular"*[5]. From Wildavsky to Steiner it is only one step: *"If there is an intuitive genius at the helm, no formal planning is needed"*[6]. It may be so, but it was different for us before 1989, when we were led by some *"geniuses"*. It is possible that many of the heads of the socialist countries that were members of the Warsaw Treaty and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CAER) were inspired by Steiner's book and took into account only this statement, because the way in which they applied the planning theory brought about the collapse of the economies of their states. Mention should be made that the political, economic, social and military objectives established by the political leaderships of those countries were not usually correlated with the available and committed resources. Another characteristic of planning in socialism and communism was its rigidity, which did not make it possible for plans, programmes and objectives to be tailored to meet the changes in the environment, because the plan was considered a law and whoever did not respect it would risk being fined or even imprisoned. Factory or institution managers did not have too much freedom in choosing solutions for reaching objectives. The basic requirement of those years was the execution (accomplishment) of what was planned. One can say that socialist countries did not have ... luck[7] – another successful recipe suggested by the same Steiner, as a substitute for planning.

Such opinions might be amusing, if they did not belong to scientists. Certainly, genius and chance play an important part in any human activity, especially in those domains that use many variable inputs and whose evolution in time is usually difficult to predict. In order not to rely too much on chance, planning, in general, and defence planning, in particular, require teamwork and high competence on the part of the team members.

Even if there is no consensus on the definition and role of planning in human activities, we have noticed that most opinions converge towards understanding them as *"consisting in conceiving a desired future and the practical means of achieving it"*[8].

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[5] Aaron Wildavsky, *If Planning Is Everything Maybe It's Nothing*, article published in *Policy Science*, no. 4, 1973, p. 127.

[6] G. A. Steiner, *Strategic Planning: What Every Manager Must Know*, Free Press, New York, 1979, p. 44.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] R. I. Ackoff, *A Concept of Corporate Planning*, Wiley, New York, 1970, p. 1.

This projection of the future takes place within a process that is subordinated to an objective and for the accomplishment of which more stages must be covered. As far as the phases of the planning process are concerned, there are various opinions. Some authors believe that *"three steps"* are enough: *to decompose* (namely to analyse), *to articulate* (namely to correlate and intertwine the inputs of the process regarding: objectives, strengths and weaknesses, capabilities, available resources, risks, threats etc.) and *to define* (meaning to make the decision, to specify the directions of focusing the efforts and to establish measures to implement them), while the others suggest ten or more steps (phases).

Summing up the existing opinions and capitalising on own experience, I reckon that the planning process can take place according to the following steps:

a) *analysing* the strengths and weaknesses of the institution, organisation or community that initiates the planning process and of the real capabilities available; resources (human, material, financial and others[9]) one can rely on; opportunities; risks and threats; environmental factors (physical and psychological) that influence the evolution of the situation; strengths and weaknesses of potential enemies;

b) *drawing conclusions* from the situation analysis: the realism of the established objectives; the tendencies of evolution of the situation, especially the prognosis on the volume and quantity of resources that may be committed and own and enemy capabilities;

c) *drawing up solutions* to be followed for accomplishing objectives;

d) *testing the solutions* suggested (through simulation, scenarios or pilot projects) and *choosing the optimal solution*;

e) *developing plans and programmes* (objectives, activities, terms, committed resources, responsibilities);

f) *organising the activity of implementation* of plans and programmes for reaching objectives and controlling the way the implementation takes place.

The most important phase of planning is choosing the solution to be followed, which belongs to the leader. That is why some specialists in the field have found it appropriate to identify planning with *"integrated decision-making"*[10], organisation *("planning implies getting somewhat more organised …")*[11] or even with the managerial process.

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[9] ***, *Law no. 473 on 04.11.2004*, regarding defence planning, in *Monitorul Oficial al României* no. 1052, 12.11.2004, Part I.

[10] J. S. Schwendiman, *Strategic and Long-Range Planning for the Multi-National Corporation*, Praeger, New York, 1973, p. 2.

[11] H. R. Van Gunsteren, *The Quest of Control: A Critique of the Rational Control Rule Approach in Public Affairs*, Wiley, New York, 1976, p. 2.

Defence Planning

"Defence planning, an essential attribute and component of defence policy, is a complex of activities and measures aimed at promoting national interests, defining and reaching the objectives of Romania's national security in the field of defence"[12]. Under the law, in Romania, defence planning establishes: the volume, structure and way defence resources are committed, which are necessary for carrying out the fundamental objectives of national security and armed defence of the country. Basically, defence planning is a process through which the military body projects, builds and tailors itself permanently to meet the requirements of the security environment, providing its viable functioning nationally and internationally.

Defence planning takes place based on the political decisions of the Romanian President, Parliament and Government, as well as on the measures and actions taken by the other public institutions that have responsibilities in the field of defence[13]. Political decisions regarding defence planning are made within a process that includes:

- defining and establishing national interests;
- determining the objectives of security and national defence;
- the multi-criterion and permanent analysis of the security situations, at both national and international level, which ends up in a prognosis regarding: the existence and tendencies of evolution of the risks and threats to national security and security organisations Romania is part of; the own potential and capabilities that can be used in peacetime, crisis situations and conflict (war);
- the situation of national economy and its evolution prognosis, during the period plans and programmes are drawn up for (according to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System, defence planning takes place for a period of 6 years and is revised each year, therefore the prognosis must cover at least this interval, yet, in some situations, such as the one that comes before the development of the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, prognosis can be made on bigger periods);
- the political and social situation of the country; the government priorities, the population support for the government programme, the degree of social cohesion of the nation and its tendencies of evolution, the degree of political and social stability of the nation, the living standard of the population etc.;
- the security commitments made by our country to the international organisations Romania is part of – NATO, the EU, the UN, OSCE etc.

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[12] Parlamentul României, *Law no. 473 on 04.11.2004, op. cit.*, Art. 1.
[13] *Ibid*, Art. 3.

The fields of defence planning are[14]:
- force planning;
- armament planning;
- resource planning;
- logistic planning;
- command, control, communications planning;
- civil emergency planning.

The Planning Perspective (Why Should We Plan ?)

If we are to believe Henry Minzberg, then strategic planning is in decline, and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System is the greatest effort ever made by the American armed forces and government, ended in failure[15]. Reading this *"sentence"*, I reckon that every man, no matter how informed, may wonder how it has been possible for the USA to become the top economic power of the world with an ineffective planning system. We know that the economies of socialist states used planning, yet, they did not manage to obtain the *synergy* entailed by efficient planning. Quite the contrary, because of the rigid way of understanding and applying the planning process, they collapsed. The artisans and *"geniuses"* of this result are known, and I hope the experience of former socialist countries is carefully studied by all those interested in it, who are also invested with responsibilities in planning, so that the mistakes made back in those days not to repeat.

The failure in reaching the objectives of planning is an effect of the improper way in which the entire process is understood and implemented. More precisely, when the established objectives are not correlated with the committed resources and the capabilities of the structure that initiates planning, it is basically impossible for the planning process to be successful.

The psychological factor has a great impact on every human activity, especially on those that entail making long-term decisions. That is why it is necessary for the decision-makers and planners to know the way in which the planning principles and methods are mirrored in the mentality of the individuals that are employed in a structural entity, particularly the decisions to adapt the process to the environmental changes as compared to the data considered at the beginning of the planning process. Thus, some decision-makers with an oversized ego believe that the data from plans

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[14] *Ibid*, Art. 2.
[15] *Ibid.*

and programmes are only for *"guidelines"* and change objectives, terms, resources directions for focusing efforts etc. whenever they please or depending on their inspiration, generating, at the best, lack of correlation, and, at the worst, chaos, mistrust and lack of involvement on the part of the personnel belonging to all the levels of the organisation.

Other decision-makers fear to make decisions to correct plans and programmes because they do not wish to be considered incompetent or irresolute by the people they lead and by those who lead them. Another category of decision-makers is represented by those who fear not to be labelled as inflexible and react disproportionately to the changes of the inputs that are not too important, inducing supplementary disturbing factors in the process of implementing plans and programmes. In their turn, the execution personnel might feel disoriented if not informed on time regarding the changes that must be operated in plans and programmes or neglected when their opinions are not considered by decision-makers. Their reactions, in such cases, can be passive resistance to change, active uninvolvement or abandonment of the structural entity they are part of. Knowing these possible attitudes should lead to preventing the occurrence of their causes, in order to provide the normal development of the planning and the decision implementation process, which must be finalised with the accomplishment of the set objectives. Prevention can be obtained through the formation of leaders and managers – through permanent training at all hierarchical levels – so that they are flexible enough, but not overlook the firm pursuit of the objectives. To avoid unwanted situations, it is necessary for leaders and managers to possess not only the necessary psychological traits – courage to assume responsibilities, creative initiative, openness to the new, acknowledged professional competence etc. – but also enough leadership experience, in order to correctly asses unexpected situations and make proper decisions. Competent and experienced leaders and managers can tell the difference between flexibility and inconsistency, between firmness and inflexibility, they are aware of the tolerable limits of the parameters achieved as compared to the planned ones and do not let themselves tutored in order to conceal their fear of responsibility and their insufficient competence. Moreover, competent leaders prepare the people they lead to know what they have to do and to be motivated to get involved in the process of implementing plans and programmes, with all their intellectual and physical capabilities. In other words, successful leaders know how to team up with the ones they lead and get involved without reservations in what they do.

Planning, in general, and strategic planning, in particular, *are required* by the need for a view (vision) on the future we intend to build. Consequently, the planning process allows all those involved – decision-makers or execution personnel –

to correlate their efforts in order to achieve the *synergy* that is necessary for reaching the set objectives.

Having the objectives and available resources and knowing the capabilities of the structures they lead, decision-makers can establish courses of action, stages, terms and responsibilities, which are communicated to the entire personnel, so that they are informed with a view to the ensemble, the development of the implementation of the objectives and tasks they must fulfil. For a successful process of implementation of plans and programmes, which are drawn up for every phase and sub-objective, it is important for each member of the organisational structure to become actively involved in the process. The necessary and sufficient condition for achieving this involvement is that the personnel have freedom of initiative regarding the methods they use to fulfil the established tasks, at the planned performance parameters. In other words, each of them must feel *responsible and subject*, and not object of the process.

Planning makes it possible for top and not only decision-makers to *control permanently* the process through tests, evaluations of intermediary (partial) results and to *correlate* the activities so that the *synergy* of actions of individuals, means and procedures could be achieved. Should a problem occur (perturbing factors, which could not be identified during the analysis phase), decision-makers at different echelons can intervene to formulate and apply corrections. Moreover, in the case of the changes appeared in the size and quality of inputs, especially as the volume and types of planned resources are concerned, the decision implementation process must be tailored to *maintain the correlation between resources and objective.*

A complete and complex (based on multiple criteria) analysis, that takes place throughout the entire process, will point out to military planners and decision-makers the main elements necessary for adapting plans and programmes, so that the correlation between objective and resources could be maintained, at the same time with providing the coherence and efficiency of the decisions made during the implementation phase.

Maintaining a good correlation between plans, programmes and objectives is possible through the permanent monitoring of the way in which their implementation takes place and the prompt intervention – in the case of the occurrence of some important changes of the *"inputs"* – to adapt to the new situations.

Providing the flexibility of plans and programmes is possible only if the tendencies of evolution of all the factors that influence their implementation are considered. In this respect, it is necessary for certain events and – implicitly – their consequences to be anticipated so that the negative impact of surprise could be eliminated or at least reduced. This way of thinking and acting belongs to the modern planner, who has a *proactive mentality,* and whose spirit of initiative and responsibilities

are properly developed. The perpetuation of reactive mentality (in which most decisions are made post-factum) is detrimental to anyone, but for a planner, in any field he may work, it represents something cumbersome, which will eliminate him from the system when the time comes.

Planning has supporters and opponents, almost like any other human activity. Defence planning is, most of the time, the target of tendentious remarks, starting precisely from the need for predicting the future and avoiding surprise, which are considered *"searches of a reason d'être* [of the military], *which entails constantly reviewing existing plans, using new ones and replacing the old planning methods [with] others that are more sophisticated. All these plans try to consider all possibilities. That is an endless endeavour, because it is impossible to consider absolutely everything"*[16].

As far as I am concerned, I believe that, without planning, we will not be able to avoid surprise and achieve the necessary coherence for the actions meant to bring about the accomplishment of the missions established for the military in peacetime, crisis situations and at war. Moreover, I am convinced that, without planning, chaos will rise in any field of activity of any company, institution or community. Suggestively speaking, *without planning, the world will be a genuine Babel Tower.*

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

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[16] Claude Dube, *The Department of Defense and the Defense Strategies from 1945 to 1970,* MBA thesis, McGill University, 1973, pp. 71-72, quoted by Henry Minzberg in *Ascensiunea şi declinul planificării strategice*, p. 125.

LEVEL OF DOCTRINAL AND OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCEPT OF *IRREGULAR WARFARE*

Colonel Mihai RADU

The current global environment is much more interconnected and complex than the bipolar world, thus, the author reckons that the image of the environment in which war will take place for the next decades will be completely different from what we have learned so far. In this respect, the forces able to wage wars in which information is most important will prevail. The war of the beginning of this millennium will entail a much concentration of force, both military and civil, with an integrating potential at all levels – strategic, operative and tactical – and with manoeuvring capacity, especially at lower echelons, at the level of the combatant, who is transformed as well, alongside his/her professionalism also appearing the need for negotiation and the attitude towards the local population.

Keywords: *Cold War; irregular forces; psychological operations; unconventional warfare; military confrontation*

At the end of 2008, after more than a year of debates and analyses, the United States Department of Defense approved, through *Directive no. 3000.07/*01.12.2008[1], a document with a major politico-military impact for this stage. It is about the institutionalisation of a new type of warfare – *irregular warfare*, at strategic level, considering it as important as traditional warfare. Moreover, in March 2009, the same Department of Defense changed the strategy of conducting the war in Afghanistan. In the same context, one month later (04.04.2009), at the Strasbourg-Kehl NATO Summit, the heads of state and government also decided that a new integrated approach to the conflict in Afghanistan, and civil-military, not only military, involvement were necessary to achieve the set strategic objectives[2].

The integrated, *comprehensive approach* has also been developed within the European Union,

Colonel Mihai Radu – Strategic Planning Directorate, the General Staff.

[1] *Irregular Warfare – US Department of Defense no. 3000.07* on 01.12.2008, available on www.dtic.mil /whs /directives /corres/pdf/300007p.pdf.
[2] NATO expands its role in Afghanistan, 04 April 2009, article available on www.nato.int.

especially to enhance the effectiveness regarding the coordination of the instruments belonging to this institution and to develop the *Civil Military Coordination – CMCO*[3].

The United States Directive on *irregular warfare* is mainly intended to initiate the restructuring and even the transformation of the armed forces, as well as their training, preparation, equipment and education, so that they could meet the new types of threats and carry out the new types of conflicts. At the same time, through the implementation of this directive, it is desired that the mistakes made in the period that followed the Vietnam War should be avoided, through applying the lessons, sometimes very painful ones, learned in the recent conflicts. Likewise, through the institutionalisation of the concept of *irregular warfare*, considering it as important as the traditional warfare and establishing the responsibilities for conducting it at government level, operations and the related actions are funded from a budget that is different from the one allocated to the Ministry of Defence.

In this context, the US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, states, in a speech delivered in front of the students of the National Defense University in the United States: *"Think of where our forces have been sent and have been engaged over the last 40-plus years: Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and more. In fact, the first Gulf War stands alone in over two generations of constant military engagement as a more or less traditional conventional conflict from beginning to end"*[4].

The following question arises: Is a new approach and the institutionalisation of this new type of warfare necessary or is it enough the existent taxonomy – sometimes considered too developed as far as theory is concerned –, if enhanced through the implementation of some tactics, methods and procedures derived from the lessons learned ? This question is the starting point of our approach.

We can state that the current global environment is more interconnected and complex than the bipolar world that was characteristic of the *Cold War*. We consider that the environment in which warfare will be conducted in the future will be completely different from what we have learned so far. The forces that will be able to carry out wars in an environment in which information plays the dominant part will prevail. The warfare at the beginning of this millennium will be totally different and it will suppose a greater concentration of forces, both military and civilian, that have a potential for integration at all levels – strategic, operational and tactical – as well as a manoeuvre capability, especially

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[3] *EUMS FFT – Proposal for a Military Perspective on a Comprehensive Approach for EU-led Operations at Theatre Level*, 03.03.2009, available on www.european-security.info.

[4] Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1279.

at the level of small echelons and the fighter that is also transformed, alongside the fighter's professionalism arising the need for negotiation and the attitude towards the local population. The essence of all these changes is represented by the fact that the new conflicts are based on other political and strategic goals, new objectives, and they involve specific forces and methods of action, a different conception and intensity regarding conducting actions, another attitude towards the enemy, as well as more and more sophisticated and unexpected ways of violence manifestation.

At the same time, the evolutions in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 have emphasised the fact that security preservation exceeds the responsibility of only one country – the global or regional engagement of the international community being necessary – and that security cannot be guaranteed only by the strict involvement of the military actor, the engagement of civilian, governmental and non-governmental organisations being also necessary. We can state that this continuous change and diversification of the conflict physiognomy is mainly characterised by the replacement of the interest in occupying a territory with the interest in influencing events, by renouncing the idea that presence is necessary in favour of the exigency of controlling in order to influence and to intervene if necessary. As well, we notice the more and more pronounced character of avoiding, if possible, the direct armed confrontations and the change of the desideratum to cause substantial losses to the enemy with the desideratum to avoid them.

All these changes that have occurred especially after the end of the *Cold War* determine some of the military theorists to speak about the disappearance of the classical, traditional, destructive warfare. Nevertheless, it has been more and more often discussed the necessity for the integration of the new types of confrontation, asymmetrical ones – military interventions for reconstruction and stability assurance, military operations other than war, low-intensity conflicts, fight against terrorism and insurgency etc. –, in only one concept, called *irregular warfare* by some American theorists.

However, the nature of future wars is difficult to predict. Generically, we notice two trends that become more and more significantly manifested. The first one refers to the fact that all the states in the world equip themselves with more and more sophisticated armament, which opens the door to new conflicts or wars between well-trained forces, this being the variant of traditional, symmetrical warfare. The second trend refers to the confrontation between regular and irregular forces under the command of some economic, religious, ethnic, ideological etc. centres of power, this being the variant of asymmetrical, irregular, hybrid warfare, which is generically called *irregular warfare*.

Conceptual Delimitations.
Irregular Warfare Defining Elements

Before we try to analyse the new type of warfare, *irregular warfare*, it is necessary to clarify the terms that are to be used in our approach, defining them.

The concept of *irregular warfare* was defined as such in opposition with the term *regular* that is used especially when regular armed forces are engaged[5]. According to the Hague Convention (1899 and 1907), forces have to meet the following criteria to be considered as such: forces are commanded by a person who is responsible for the participants in the conflict; combatants have a fixed, stable emblem that may be recognised from distance; belligerents armament is easy to notice; military operations and actions are carried out in concordance with the warfare laws and principles.

On the other hand, the term *Irregular Forces* is used within the international humanitarian law referring to the category of combatants formed by individuals, participants in the armed conflict, that are not part of the regular armed forces of the party in conflict and that act from the inside or the outside of the territory of the party in conflict, even though that territory is under occupation. Thus, we can say that the syntagm *irregular warfare* is used to define a type of warfare in which most of the combatants of one party involved in the conflict are part of the irregular forces. From this standpoint, one can ask: Has the nature of warfare changed or not ? And, subsequently, if it has changed, what are the capabilities and types of forces that have to be prepared and involved to apply the new line of conduct to these particular conflicts ? As well: How can we adapt and use the already available assets and capabilities ?

The term *irregular warfare* has been used especially after 2006, in the United States, once the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* appeared.

Following numerous debates regarding the timeliness and utility of theoretical-doctrinal changes, the American experts have come to the conclusion that this term should be institutionalised. Therefore, *irregular warfare* is defined as *"a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favours indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will"*[6].

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[5] Regular armed forces – defined by the 3rd Geneva Convention in 1949 regarding war prisoners, available on the Internet, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hague_Conventions_(1899_and_1907)

[6] Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Chapter 2a, p. 6, DoD/USA, 11.09.2007.

In essence, *irregular warfare* represents the sum of the actions and operations that have been so far under the umbrella of *law intensity conflicts*, complemented with civilian actions for the reconstruction and development of a state or an area. It is not a completely new idea. It is rather an attempt to institutionalise and conceptualise a way to approach military operations that has been used throughout history: *"Irregular warfare is the oldest form of warfare, and it is a phenomenon that goes by many names, including tribal warfare, primitive warfare, "little wars", and low-intensity conflict. The term irregular warfare seems best to capture the wide variety of these "little wars"*[7].

In conclusion, the definition specifies who carries out the war (actors), establishes how it is carried out (methods) and why/strategic goal *(figure 1)*.

Figure 1

Although the nature of warfare in the 21st century is the same with the one in Ancient times – a violent conflict of interests among organised groups, characterised by the use of military force, we notice that currently it is less likely for most adversaries to choose traditional, conventional fight. Therefore, for relatively weak powers, non-state entities included, *irregular warfare* has become an option, maybe the single viable one. In this context, we can state that *irregular warfare* arises diverse challenges for the armed forces of a state.

We may also mention that *irregular warfare* is a complex social phenomenon, a kind of chaotic and ambiguous war, with many nuances, which does not allow an orderly, concise or precise definition. Instead of imposing social changes from outside, by decisively defeating the military and security forces, the followers of the concept of *irregular warfare* try to produce changes from inside, by delegitimizing the state institutions and ideologies and, ultimately, by winning the public support (or at least its subjection) for their cause.

According to American theorists[8], *irregular warfare* includes a variety of types of actions that are carried out during its specific stages. Among them we mention the following: insurgency, counterinsurgency (COIN), actions that are specific

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[7] Jeffrey B. White, *A Different Kind of Threat, Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare*, 1996, article available at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/iregular.htm; Nov. 2005.

[8] *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, DoD/USA, 2007. *Irregular warfare,* activities meant to ensure public order, focused on countering nonconventional adversaries.

to unconventional warfare (UW), terrorism, counterterrorism (CT), stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations (SSTRO), strategic communication actions, psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil-military operations (CMO), intelligence and counterintelligence activities, cross-national criminal activities, including drug trafficking, illicit arms trade and illegal financial transactions that support *irregular warfare,* activities meant to assure public order, focused on countering non-conventional adversaries.

Doing a brief analysis of these operations and activities to identify possible ways of influencing the specific objectives of *irregular warfare*, and particularly, the population, we can state that the actions specific to insurgency and counterinsurgency lie at the basis of *irregular warfare*. As it is known, the aim of insurgency is to topple and replace a government or an established social structure. Terrorism and counterterrorism are activities that are part of *irregular warfare* and they often represent insurgency and counterinsurgency sub-activities. However, there are situations in which terrorism can be an independent action, namely when its purpose is to constrain and to intimidate governments or societies, without abolishing them.

Having defined the main elements of *irregular warfare*, we can emphasise the *essential differences between it and traditional warfare (figure 2)*. Thus, traditional warfare is a direct military confrontation between states, coalitions, alliances. This confrontation usually involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace domain. The objective may be to convince or coerce key military or political decision-makers, defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policy.

The focus of traditional military operations is on the adversary's armed forces, having as objective to influence the government in office. This type of warfare generally assumes that indigenous populations in the operational area are not belligerent and they will accept the political solution that has been imposed, arbitrated or negotiated by belligerent governments. Moreover, a fundamental military characteristic is the minimisation of the civilian population interference in military operations.

Traditional warfare seeks a change in the policy and practices of a government, if not the change of the government, through constraining the government key-leaders or through defeating them militarily. On the contrary, *irregular warfare* is focused on influencing or controlling the populations, and not on controlling the adversary forces or a territory. It seeks to undermine a group, a government or an ideology through influencing the population that is often considered

Contrasting activities peace-crisis
Traditional warfare

| PEACE | CRISIS – WAR | | PEACE | CRISIS – WAR |
| (continuous activities) | (episodic activities) | | | |

Defence
of the national territory

Irregular Warfare

Traditional warfare

Force structure — Presence – deterrence — Manpower – initiative

Regional coop.
(training, exercises,
preparation for major operations)

Major
operation

Domination

Transfer
of authority – civilians — Stability

Traditional warfare

Contrasting activities peace-crisis
Irregular Warfare

| PEACE | CRISIS – WAR | PEACE | CRISIS – WAR |
| (continuous activities) | (episodic activities) | | |

Defence
of the national territory

Irregular Warfare

Traditional warfare

COUNTERINSURGENCY
COUNTERTERRORISM
COUNTERPIRACY
STABILITY OPERATIONS
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Irregular Warfare

Conflict may emerge
in both situations

Figure 2

the centre of gravity. Therefore, we can state that *irregular warfare* is a political fight that has violent and nonviolent components. The foundation of *irregular warfare* is represented by the centrality of the populations that are relevant for the nature of the conflict. Thus, the parties in conflict, be they states or armed groups, seek to undermine their adversary's legitimacy and credibility and to isolate them from the relevant populations and external supporters, both physically and psychologically. At the same time, each of the adversaries seeks to increase own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority on the same population *(figure 3)*.

Moreover, *irregular warfare* is not a simplified form of the traditional warfare but, on the contrary, it covers a range of fighting actions whose nature and characteristics are considerably different from the traditional warfare, a protracted conflict being inherent.

Traditional warfare and *irregular warfare* do not exclude each other. Both forms of warfare may be present in a conflict, taking into consideration that a war

Figure 3

often changes its characteristics. It is especially true for the *irregular warfare*, in which the conflict is often protracted, over the limit established by planners. Traditional warfare can rapidly transform into an *irregular warfare* and vice versa, which requires the adaptation of the military force to one form or another.

The goal of *irregular warfare*, similar to any form of warfare is to win, to achieve the strategically defined political objective, taking into consideration that victory and winning the operations and campaigns include the control of forces, populations and territory.

We should not mistake the traditional warfare for the conventional one, and *irregular warfare* for unconventional warfare, taking into account that the terms *conventional*[9] and *unconventional*[10] refer to the weapons and forces used in operations. Thus, *irregular warfare* may be conducted, depending on the circumstances and the operational environment, by conventional or unconventional forces only, as well as by both of them.

Unlike traditional conflicts, state versus state, *irregular warfare* brings to attention the government, hierarchically organised against some organisations that tend to function in network or that are loosely structured. Because of the secret character of the activities, especially during the initial phases of development, the leadership and active participants adopt a flat network structure, thus the identification

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[9] *Conventional Warfare* – a large spectrum of military operations conducted against an adversary by traditional military forces of by other governmental security forces, without making use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

[10] *Unconventional Warfare (UW)* – A large spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, often protracted ones, conducted preponderantly through or by indigenous forces or surrogate-forces that are organised, trained, equipped, supported and commanded, at different levels, by an external source. This type of warfare includes, although it is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversive forces, sabotage, information collection and unconventional recovery actions.

of leaders being difficult. We can state that the level of decentralisation as far as responsibility and authority are concerned dictates the structure of *irregular warfare* as well as the operational procedures.

We thus notice that *irregular warfare* differs from traditional warfare mainly with regard to the approach and to the strategy used to achieve the desired effects, including all types of asymmetrical operations, overcoming the perception according to which it is a less important form of conflict, under the level of war. The nature of *irregular warfare* requires that the common level of action should be achieved at government level, which is necessary for the integration of all the instruments available to the national force to meet the new types of threats. Being aware of the fact that in *irregular warfare*, besides capabilities, populations are also involved, the participants in this type of warfare should be patient and insistent people that have solid knowledge of the aspects related to civilisation so that they could build local relationships and partnerships that are essential to support the war. *Irregular warfare* depends not only on the military force but also on the acknowledgement of social dynamics, such as policy, social networks, religious influences and cultural aspects. To this end, a continuous and long-term presence is necessary to develop the adequate capability and to extend the operational impact, with a view to multiplying the available forces and to increasing the options to defeat the adversaries.

We can state that the majority of current and future wars and campaigns are hybrids of the operations included in traditional and *irregular warfare*, the predominant character of operations being given by the warfare main objective.

The first conclusion of this succinct analysis is that *irregular warfare* is a complex social phenomenon, a chaotic and ambiguous type of warfare that has many nuances. Instead of imposing major changes from the outside, through decisively defeating the military and security forces, *irregular warfare* attempts to generate changes from the inside, by delegitimizing the state institutions and ideologies to eventually gain the population support. The new concept, *irregular warfare,* represents the sum of the actions and operations that have been so far under the umbrella of *low-intensity conflicts* complemented with civilian actions for the reconstruction and development of a state or an area. Even if it is not a new idea, it is an attempt to institutionalise a way to approach military operations that has existed throughout history under different names: *tribal confrontation*, *little war, atypical warfare, low-intensity conflict, insurrection, indirect aggression.*

Having as a starting point the fact that the complex environment in which a future conflict, be it traditional or *irregular,* takes place is very different

from what we have been accustomed to so far, another conclusion refers to the fact that the approach to the new conflict should be integrated, comprehensive, civil-military, through engaging all the basic elements of the national power – diplomatic, informational, military and economic. In this regard, we consider beneficial to introduce the defining elements of the concept of *irregular warfare* in the national strategic documents. At the same time, we appreciate that this approach has to be based on a strategy and a general plan that should include responsibilities as well as the way to train all those involved in providing solutions not only for security measures and the development of military operations, but also for the political, social, economic, administrative measures, and in preserving the rule of law, through employing all the capabilities available to the institutions that participate in the conflict.

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

DJSE
– A New Concept regarding a Deployable Command and Control System at Operational Level –

Colonel Dr Crăişor-Constantin IONIŢĂ

The principle of using C2 in military operations includes making certain NATO command and control arrangements at all levels of command in NATO missions.

Considering the importance of the relations of coexistence, the multinational nature as well as the short time available for deployment, the author believes that the DJSE accomplished in the NCS may be one of the initial options that the Alliance has available in order to prove the effective use of NCS.

Once deployed in theatre, the DJSE does not represent a level of command per se, because the commanders of tactical components remain directly subordinated to the operational level commander.

Keywords: *transfer of authority; military operations; multinational character; command post; communications and informatics*

A new topic of further transformation of the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure in the coming years, namely the *NATO Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE)*, started to circulate among specialists from J5 and Transformation Directorates. This concept sets forth the requirement for NATO to evolve its operational command and control construct through the establishment of this command structure. Driven by current operations and the transition of NATO's missions from support actions against asymmetric and dynamic threats to humanitarian assistance missions, this concept represents a fundamental change for NATO.

The concept of *DJSE* is truly transformational and this transformation will maintain NATO's relevance throughout the 21st century by defining capabilities, concepts and methodologies to move from today into tomorrow and beyond. At the same time, the implementation of the *DJSE* concept is one of the Alliance's priorities in 2010 and beyond.

Colonel Dr Crăişor-Constantin Ioniţă – Operational Command Centre, the General Staff.

Being already in the experimentation phase, there is a lot of referential material which deals with the theory of the concept. Many of them are generic, related to other concepts, which are more or less supporting this concept, like *NATO's Level of Ambition (LoA)*, *Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)*, *NATO Response Force (NRF)*, *PE Review*, *Reach Back* etc. Other documents are strictly linked with *DJSE* and describe the concept itself, the way it is structured to support the future Allied Command Operations – ACO configuration for operations, the *Implementation Plan* and the development of *Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)* for JHQ Main, as well as JHQ Forward Element.

As it is outlined in the Ministerial Guidance 06, the worst case of NATO's level of ambition is to carry out, simultaneously, a greater number of smaller, demanding operations, while retaining the capability to conduct large-scale, high intensity operations. This is why, the NATO future structure must provide appropriate command and control arrangements to conduct multiple concurrent operations in, adjacent to and outside SACEUR's *Area of Responsibility – AOR*, with special emphasis on the most likely operations[1]. This increases the focus on deployable and expeditionary capabilities for ACO HQs.

While the chain of command for each operation will remain decided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), based on SACEUR recommendation and the Military Committee (MC) endorsement, ACO has already decided to have a flexible structure from which the most appropriate C2 arrangements can be selected on a case-by-case basis for the conduct of future operations: operational commands to conduct both MJO and SJOs. From all SJOs, one is envisaged to be Air heavy and one Maritime heavy.

To do so, NATO has foreseen two broad options for C2 arrangements, both with positive and negative aspects accordingly.

The first option was the *CJTF* concept, having been developed by NATO since 1994, to enable it to conduct operations up to corps size with the appropriate air and maritime support[2]. This concept envisaged that the JFC Commander within the *Joint Force Commands/Joint HQ-JFC/JHQ*, as the *Commander CJTF (COM CJTF)*, deploys into theatre, taking with him a mission tailored staff. The chain of command appoints him as operational commander, directly subordinated to SACEUR. Yet, the required capabilities to deploy a full CJTF HQ have never been resourced and the full implementation of capability packages has been delayed until 2018. The last years' economic crisis made the achievement of this concept almost impossible.

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[1] *NATO Ministerial Guidance 2006*, DPC-D (2006) 0004-AS1, 07.06.2006, p. 3.
[2] *MC Policy on NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)*, no. MC 389/2 (MILDEC), 4 May 2004, p. 5.

The second option was the *NRF* concept, developed to provide a JFC Commander with the possibility to reduce his footprint in theatre by developing a forward element of his headquarters, the *Deployed Joint Task Force (DJTF)*. In this option, he only deploys a forward element of his headquarters, the DJTF HQ. The staff for this element must be dedicated (not dual-hatted) and able to cover the J1 through J9 disciplines[3]. The NRF concept foresees per se the use of *Reach Back*. Additionally, the NRF could be used as a lead element in a major or small operation (MJO or SJO), or to conduct a SJO in its entirety.

For those reasons, to ensure appropriate command and control at the operational level, a new, innovative approach for operational level headquarters is required, in order to provide lean and effective C2 for all concurrent operations. Among these, six require the capacity to deploy a joint staff element at the operational level, whereas the air and maritime heavy SJOs do not envisage a separate forward operational level headquarters in theatre.

This is particularly the case during the initial phase. When engaged in sustained operations, deployed elements could be replaced through rotation among available DJSE or transitioned to other headquarters compositions, such as a composite headquarters or an augmented component headquarters as the situation warrants. According to the MCM-0001-2008, the Military Concept for NATO's Deployable Joint Staff Elements, *"DJSE is … an operational level HQ element, designed to be in theatre as the deployed joint staff for an operational level commander"*[4].

Each DJSE consists of a *Joint HQ Forward Element (JHQ FE)*, a *Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) HQ Element*, and a *Forward Support Element (FSE)*, tailored for specific operations and enabled with capability packages, *NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)* support, deployable communications and information systems units provided by NCSA and mission-enabling units, as required.

With the establishment of six DJSEs *(figure 1)*, SACEUR will have the capability to meet the level of ambition and the flexibility to determine the most suitable and efficient command and control arrangements for a specific operation.

Four DJSEs are to be provided by the *NATO Command Structure – NCS* and two by the *NATO Force Structure – NFS*, each of which must be a standing, combined joint staff, providing the same capabilities.

The two NATO Force Command headquarters (Heidelberg and Madrid) will be structured and manned to provide four trained and integrated NCS DJSEs

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[3] *Military Concept for the NATO Response Force*, no. MC 477, 18 June 2003, p. 7.

[4] *Military Concept for NATO's Deployable Joint Staff Elements*, no. MCM-0001-2008, 14 March 2008, p. 5.

Figure 1: C2 Arrangements for Future NATO-led Operations

(two from each NFC HQ), while maintaining a predominantly Land-heavy manning in order to tailor DJSEs for major operations and Land-heavy small operations. The new approved FC HQ PE is described in *figure 2*.

Figure 2: The New Peacetime Establishment of a FC HQ

The last two DJSEs will be provided by NATO Troop-Contributing Nations (NFS) and should be similar as possible to NCS DJSEs to enable seamless integration onto any required C2 arrangements. Nations must ensure availability through permanent arrangements such as *Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)* or technical arrangements covering C2 responsibilities and procedures, *Transfer of Authority (ToA)*; training, preparation, evaluation and operational planning in peacetime, crisis and operations and upon NAC decision; placing under NATO Command for operations. Any national caveats and restrictions should be minimised and defined in advance.

Each NCS and NFS DJSE will be affiliated with one JFC HQ as determined by SACEUR. This is why all DJSEs must be able to integrate with any JFC, having an integrated set of SOPs. The formal assignment of a DJSE would be for a specific operation and, upon recommendation by SACEUR, endorsement by the MC and approval by the NAC.

The principle of C2 in joint operations includes NATO C2 arrangements at the three levels of command (strategic, operational and component level), within the full range of NATO missions. Given the importance of habitual relationships, multinational, and deployability timelines, the NCS DJSEs could ordinarily constitute the initial C2 option to improve NCS usability. Once deployed into theatre, the DJSE does not represent a separate level of C2 as the component commanders will remain directly subordinated to the operational-level commander.

There is not a fixed template for C2 arrangements for operations. This may vary, depending on each operation type, scale, complexity, and location, being determined on a case-by-case basis as recommended by SACEUR, endorsed by the MC, and approved by the NAC. Nevertheless, the required deployable CIS manpower and equipment for NCS DJSEs and deployed NFS DJSEs will be provided by NATO (managed by the NATO Communications and Information Systems Service Agency – NCSA) in order to ensure interoperability with JFC HQs and the CC HQs during operations.

Moreover, the use of *Reach Back* by the Joint HQ Forward Element has to be mission-tailored to the specific demands and circumstances of a specific operation.

Given that SACEUR retains the flexibility to recommend the most appropriate C2 arrangements for a specific operation, this could require the use of the DJSE in a role adapted to concrete situational and operational requirements *(figure 3)*. This includes: small-scale, short duration SJO; Initial Entry Force or SJO; follow-on C2 arrangement or another SJO; MJO.

Figure 3: **The Role and Place of DJSE Elements in a NATO-led Operation**

As highlighted in the definition, each DJSE consists of a JHQ FE, a Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) HQ Element, and a Forward Support Element (FSE). These elements can be tailored for specific operations and will be enabled with capability packages, NAMSA support, deployable communications and information systems units provided by NCSA and mission-assigned enabling units, as required. One of them is the *Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT)*, a group of very high readiness personnel capable to contribute early, first-hand situational awareness in theatre.

The JHQ FE is designed to *form the core of the deployed staff of the Joint Operational HQ, complementing the operational-level Main HQ staff and facilitating the operational-level commander's ability to maintain operational C2 by performing those operational-level functions that must be conducted in-theatre*[5].

Again, the JHQ FE is structured to synchronise with and complement the Joint HQ Main staff, not duplicate it. They exchange products and services, thereby gaining synergy and unity of staff effort by using the *Reach Back* concept. Together, they form a single headquarters at the operational level of command, with two well-trained staff elements, synchronised structures and rehearsed standing operating procedures. This approach is to minimise the footprint in theatre, while enhancing operational efficiency.

The JHQ FE is organised in *multi-disciplinary functional centres*, each possessing the necessary staff disciplines and capability to conduct round-the-clock operations, as required. This headquarters does not have an autonomous C2 capability. The senior staff officer deployed from the DJSE will be the *Chief of Staff (Forward)*.

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[5] *Draft SOPs for JHQ Main/DJSE Concept*, no. 110/JCLCOM/305/08, 23 December 2008, p. 13.

He is responsible to the operational-level commander for the efficient and effective conduct of the Joint HQ Forward and its interaction with the JHQ Main[6].

Both Main and Forward Elements support the JHQ in its decision cycle and provide the appropriate battle rhythm, as demanded. There are three planning horizons but four event horizons. The most immediate event horizon, inside 24 hours and therefore within the short term, is principally managed by the Forward Element with its own planning capacity. The others, from 0-72 hours (short), 3-10 days (medium), and outside 10 days (long) are principally managed by the Main Element. The commander's decision process will be supported by a set of cycles based on the event horizons that maximises the added value of each part of the Joint HQ.

The second element is the *Joint Logistics Support Group HQ*, established on the basis of logistics set-up for a specific operation. Its mission is to *provide C2 for all theatre-wide logistics functions for the full range of Alliance operations* and includes *the capability to deploy, sustain and redeploy*. The JLSG HQ is task-organised to match the mission with functional logistics staff elements with a joint logistics posture established by the operational-level commander. It comprises a *core staff element* and significant *augmentees* (addressed in the relevant CJSOR)[7].

Having its own mission, roles and tasks, under the most challenging situations, the JLSG HQ may not be co-located with the JHQ FE[8]. Under these circumstances, the identification of separate, dedicated communications and information systems and life support assets is mandatory.

The last element represents the *Forward Support Element (FSE)*, whose mission is *to plan, organise and provide support to the JHQ FE (or both elements of a DJSE when co-located)*[9]. The support provided by FSE comprises three main areas: life support; CIS systems and force protection. Therefore, this element is staffed to provide the planning and direction of all three categories of support, but it is equipped to provide only limited life support without augmentation. This type of equipment is provided through pre-identified contracts and capability packages and locally contracted supplies and services. Moreover, CIS systems are provided by an operationally capable and deployable NCSA unit. If required, additional enabling units are identified and mission-tailored, depending on the operational environment. These units may be provided, through a force-generation process, by tasking components and/or through host-nation support.

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[6] *Initial SHAPE Guidance on Deployable Joint Staff Elements*, no. SH/DFCG/04/08 – 204444, 30 April 2008, p. 9.
[7] No. 110/JCLCOM/305/08, p. 19.
[8] *Development of Guiding Principles for DJSE SOPs*, no, SH/DFCG/06/08, 09 June 2008, p. 2.
[9] No. 110/JCLCOM/305/08, p. 22.

The concept was developed with many principles to be addressed, especially when DJSE is to be deployed. The most important one is that SACEUR must have the flexibility to recommend the most appropriate command and control arrangements, mission tailored and optimised for the specific operation. This includes: the nomination of the operation-level commander; which and how many HQs are required; and to what extend HQs should be deployed into theatre. Normally, one of the JFC commanders, the operational-level commander[10] will ordinarily command in theatre, especially for the initial phase of the operation.

This is a window of opportunity for the Romanian General Staff to participate in the DJSE concept, by offering one NFS DJSE in entirety or, at least, as one of the components (JHQ FE). Using the General Staff Operational Coordination Centre as a parent headquarters, the improvement of C2 deployability at the operational level of command would constitute a huge benefit for the transformation of our organisation and a step forward in ensuring the credibility of the Romanian Armed Forces and in establishing a strong position inside the Alliance. And the relation cost-benefit of such an endeavour will remain positive, because the total cost would not be higher than the cost established for the Framework Division, which seems not to be realised for ever. Negotiations should be conducted with SHAPE in order to exchange this Framework Division with a future DJSE.

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[10] *Configuring ACO for Operations*, No. 2500/SH/J5/PERT/08/017 – 204571, 24 April 2008, p. 3.

NATO AND ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES TRANSFORMATION IN THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Eugen MAVRIŞ

The 1999 Defence Capabilities Initiative mainly sought to develop the following capabilities: deployability and mobility, forces self-sustainment and logistic support, survival, efficient engagement and command, control systems and intelligence. In this respect, a coordination group was established, meant to supervise the evolution of the implementation of the eight main objectives, through which the domains of improving the Alliance capabilities were detailed.

During the 2002 NATO Prague Summit, the Capabilities Commitments radically changed the way of approaching the capabilities improvement process, established in 1999.

Keywords: military transformation; security environment; strategic concept; new capabilities; forces self-sustainment

The military concept of transformation evolved at the end of the '90s as a wide framework for the changes taking place in the doctrines and structures of the armed forces worldwide. At that moment, military experts began to outline a *"transformation process"* that started to separate itself from the *revolution in military affairs* towards a new transformation terminology.

One of the key leaders who launched the mentioned concept is the former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld. He stated that the transformation process included the generation of *"rapidly deployable, fully integrated forces, capable of working with air and sea forces to strike adversaries swiftly and with devastating effect"*[1].

In our opinion, the transformation process means a broader approach to military changes beyond the things that are slightly visible, such as military structures and technologies. Military transformation also means changes in the way of thinking the military action, in the way

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[1] Elinor Sloan, *Military Transformation and Modern Warfare*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008.

of fighting and in developing new strategies. The most recent approaches to transformation point out a more complex framework, in which the military transformation process itself undergoes transformations *(transforming transformation)* under the pressure of the experiences in the theatres of operations, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There are certain criteria based on which the transformation process can be evaluated qualitatively. Therefore, in the specialised literature there are mainly mentioned the following benchmarks in relation to which the measures in the field of transformation are assessed: *interoperability, degree of influence on the forms of combat and of efficiency in relation to the threats to the contemporary security environment.*

The presented criteria prove the fact that there can be situations in which the measures that have been adopted and implemented for the transformation of a system do not determine those qualitative changes that are expected at the level of the organisation.

NATO Transformation

The renewal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation started right after the fall of the communist regime in Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The need for change first became obvious in the Alliance political-military forums on the occasion of the 1990 London Summit, when the North Atlantic Council requested suggestions from the Military Committee regarding the way of restructuring NATO.

The decision of the former states subject to the Warsaw Treaty to make steps towards the North Atlantic security structures provided the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with the opportunity to expand to the North, Centre and South-East of Europe – areas of maximum geostrategic interest.

The new security strategic environment, characterised by the increase in multidimensional and transnational risks, became a reality and NATO had to adapt its strategic concept and the available instruments to meet all those threats. That new reality brought about a thorough analysis of NATO command structures and determined a decision, natural in the dynamic of events, for the Alliance to be transformed.

In the post-*Cold War* security environment, NATO took into account the possibility for carrying out military operations outside the territory of its member states – *"out of area"*, and in 1992, the Alliance representatives stated that the organisation would be prepared to support, whenever needed, the peacekeeping activities carried out under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and of the United Nations.

During the last decade of the 20th century, NATO radically changed its *strategic concept* and the way it was involved in managing the international security environment. While, in 1991, NATO needed forces for providing deterrence, in 1999, the Alliance admitted its need for new capabilities in order to carry out the entire range of NATO missions. In other words, the Alliance members decided to be prepared in order to contribute to preventing conflicts and to develop crisis response, non-article 5 operations[2].

There was huge debate on this topic, yet, eventually, in 2002, the Alliance foreign ministers agreed that *"NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time and achieve their objectives"*[3].

The mentioned hypothesis had huge impact on the content of various initiatives regarding NATO's military transformation. In this respect, the Alliance members decided to develop quickly deployable expeditionary forces. The NATO transformation process was mirrored in the 1999 Defence Capabilities Initiative, in the 2002 Summit's Prague Capabilities Commitment and, further on, in the commitments assumed in Istanbul, in 2004, Riga – 2006 and Bucharest, in 2008, as well as in the document consisting of the comprehensive political guidance, published in 2006.

The 1999 Defence Capabilities Initiative sought mainly to develop the following capabilities: deployability and mobility, forces self-sustainment and logistic support, survival, efficient engagement and command, control and information systems. A coordination group was created in order to oversee the evolution of the implementation of the eight main objectives through which the domains for the improvement of the Alliance capabilities were detailed.

During the 2002 Prague NATO Summit, the Capabilities Commitments radically changed the way of approaching the capabilities improvement process established in 1999 through the Defence Capabilities Initiative.

The heads of state and government of the Alliance member states decided to develop their military capabilities in one or several domains (niche capabilities) out of the eight identified at NATO level as requiring rapid improvement: defence against weapons of mass destruction, intelligence, air reconnaissance, command, control and communications, combat forces efficiency enhancement, air and maritime transport, aerial refuelling, and combat forces and support units mobility development. Essentially, for a specific domain, a certain nation assumes

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[2] *Ibid*, p. 77.
[3] Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Reykjavik, 14 May 2002.

the role of *"lead nation"* in order to increase the development of a certain capability that is necessary for the Alliance.

NATO has made significant progress acting this way and, in many domains, important multinational capabilities were achieved. The Prague Capabilities Commitments stimulated the multinational approach with regard to the Alliance military capabilities development process.

The 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance, a fundamental document for defence planning within the Alliance, established an efficient and realistic framework for the development of ten main capabilities for the next fifteen years. Among them, there are the following: the development of joint expeditionary operations outside the area of responsibility; the achievement of an increased level of combat capacity, the stabilisation, reconstruction, the development of reconciliation, reconstruction and humanitarian activities simultaneously, the provision of military support for stabilisation and reconstruction missions through the creation of a safe area, in which all organisations can fulfil their tasks.

The structural transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance followed the general direction of the process meant to accomplish deployable and expeditionary forces, capable of developing operations inside and outside the area of responsibility.

One of the first concepts launched at the Alliance level in the field of deployable structures was the *Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)*, meant to provide NATO's transition from collective defence capabilities to capabilities that are necessary for operations outside the area of operations. This change at the structural level continued with the *Deployable Joint Task Force* and, currently, the Alliance implements the concept of *Deployable Joint Staff Element*.

NATO's current and projected command structure as well as the way of developing capabilities is an eloquent proof of the desire of the Alliance members to support its transformation process.

Romanian Armed Forces Transformation

The dynamics of the global and regional security environment has had a major influence on the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process, on their structure as well as on the nature and content of their missions.

The events in December 1989 found the Romanian Armed Forces engaged in combat preparation, with a view to fulfilling the missions assigned for the country's defence, as well as in carrying out tasks in the national economy, in keeping with the requirements of the policy of the communist regime of that time.

With a strength of more that 250 000 troops and a broad structure at the level of the entire country, with the equipment and procurement level that met

the quantitative requirements, yet, mostly outdated in terms of technology and performance, the Romanian Armed Forces started, right after the events in 1989, a thorough process of reform.

The main determinations that lay at the basis of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation were: to join the general reform process of the Romanian society; to radically change the physiognomy of the security environment after the end of the *Cold War*; to deal with the occurrence of a dysfunction between the overstaffed structure of the Romanian Armed Forces, approximately 250 000 active troops, and the low economic-social potential for their support; to meet the limits imposed by international treaties regarding the manpower and conventional armament, respectively the Treaty of Vienna and the Treaty of Paris.

In our opinion, the timeline of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process in the last decade of the 20th century must be based on the major events that marked the existence of the military institution of that time.

Thus, a first phase in this process took place between 1990 and 1992 and it was one of transition and preparation for restructuring. In this phase, the main element of transformation was the renewal of the legislative-normative framework for the organisation of the Romanian Armed Forces. In this respect, the general regulations of the military institution were revised and depoliticised, new regulations were set up regarding the status of military professionals and measures were taken in order to establish a new way for the military career evolution.

Preparatory measures for reform were also taken in the force structure field, with the approval of the intermediary phases of the restructuring and the development of a first reform plan of the Romanian Armed Forces. In this phase, the Romanian Armed Forces professionalisation process began through the employment of the first contract soldiers.

The provisions of the *Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)*, which was signed by Romania in 1990, determined our country to assume the reduction of both the level of the force structure and the armament acquisition. As a result, between 17 July 1992, when the Treaty entered into force, and 19 November 1995, when the reduction phase ended, *"Romania reduced 5 065 pieces of armament and equipment, as follows: 1 591 combat tanks, 973 armoured combat vehicles, 2 423 artillery pieces and 78 combat fighters"*[4].

At the same time, the number of joint service forces was reduced from four to three, and the military staffs of the armed forces services, as well as brigades organised in battalions were established.

[4] General de brigadă Vasile Paul, colonel Teodor Frunzeti, *Constrângeri şi determinări ale contextului geopolitic şi geostrategic asupra reformei instituţiei militare naţionale*, in *Gândirea Militară Românească*, year XI, no. 5, September-October 2000.

Between 1996 and 1999, the reform of the Romanian Armed Forces was mainly marked by the effort to gain membership of the North Atlantic Alliance. The need for achieving interoperability with NATO member states entailed concrete measures for adapting at the conceptual, structural level, as well as at the one of the armed forces training.

Within the first cycle of the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP), between 1995 and 1997, Romania assumed 18 interoperability objectives, and during the second PARP cycle (1997-1999), their number was extended to 44, all these essentially representing conceptual and structural adaptations to meet the requirements of the North Atlantic Alliance.

We believe that the Romanian Armed Forces transformation began simultaneously with the process of renewal of the entire Romanian society, out of the natural need for conceptual and organisation modernisation, as well as out of the need for adapting to the level of the financial and material resources allocated by the society for this domain.

It is obvious that, during the last decade of the past century, the amount of resources allocated to the modernisation of the Romanian Armed Forces was not enough as compared to Romania's strategic objectives, that of gaining NATO and EU membership.

The budgets allocated for the armed forces in 1993, 1994 and 1995 were insufficient for promoting a constant modernisation programme, the country being economically impoverished following the transition period. The results of this reality were reflected in the delays or the annulment of the implementation of the programmes regarding procurement or interoperability with NATO member states armed forces.

Given the mentioned circumstances, assuming an extraordinary effort, the Romanian Armed Forces were able to prepare for the Prague Summit and, finally, Romania was invited to join the North Atlantic Alliance.

It is worth mentioning that, right after NATO invited Romania to become a member of the Alliance, the European Council reunited in Copenhagen declared that Romania and Bulgaria's accession, at the beginning of 2007, should be an objective for the European Union.

In our opinion, the two events, beneficial for Romania, are closely connected to the potential proved by our country to participate in managing the Euro-Atlantic security environment.

Shortly after the terrorist attacks on the United States of America, on 11 September 2001, Romania increased its contribution to the peacekeeping mission in the Balkans, fought against terrorism alongside the USA and provided significant support within the US-led coalition in Iraq.

In less than two decades, the Romanian Armed Forces assumed the effort of having overcome very rapidly a few reform phases, passing from a broad structure, of approximately 250 000 troops, at the end of 1989, to a numerically reduced structure, of approximately 90 000 troops, at the end of 2008, in most of this period of radical changes being involved in operations abroad.

At the end of the 20th century, we witnessed the implementation of the first multiannual planning cycle, which was mainly meant for correlating the military expenditure and the budgetary allocations. The mentioned document was essentially a reform plan, with a perspective of 8 years, which proposed a programme of reduction of the Romanian Armed Forces, completed with activities for the modernisation of the military institution procurement.

The second multiannual planning cycle, made public in 2000, established ambitious objectives in the process meant for restructuring the forces, which were mainly reached through the implementation of 2003 Objective Force.

After the appearance of the first Planning Guidance, developed and approved in keeping with Law 63/2000 on defence planning, the multiannual planning cycle was replaced by 2007 Objective Force, projected based on the new Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS).

The 2007 Objective Force outlined the benchmarks of a modern, deployable structure, ready to assume missions in the entire range of operations developed by the North Atlantic Alliance.

Romania's quality of a NATO and EU member, as well as the engagements assumed through the participation in the management of the contemporary security environment require that the Romanian Armed Forces have modernity and performance standards that are similar to the ones of the partners from the mentioned organisation.

English version by
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CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY MISSIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Lieutenant General Dr Sorin IOAN

The author analyses the characteristics of military missions in Afghanistan. Firstly, some milestones in the history of this country are presented: the Soviet invasion, the guerrilla warfare, the Taliban movement and the presence of the Coalition forces etc. Secondly, the economic, political-military, cultural and religious defining characteristics of Afghanistan are discussed. Thirdly, communication with the local population and the recognised tribal leaders is shown to play a decisive role in achieving the political-military goals.

In conclusion, the message the article intends to convey is resumed. Any approach to the issues related to Afghanistan and to the training of the troops that are deployed in this theatre of operations must be based on the thorough knowledge of the history, religion, and local traditions, so that mistakes could be avoided.

Keywords: *Afghanistan security; Soviet invasion; Taliban movement; social organisation; communication*

I think that, in modern times, it is a unique case for a state to experience more than 30 years of uninterrupted wars and conflicts. However, the warring parties have not always been the same throughout this period.

Briefly reviewing the milestones in history, we find out that, after several decades of relative stability, Daoud Khan's dictatorial attitude in 1978 and the invasion of the Soviet forces in 1979 marked the beginning of a prolonged period of conflict. The greater the resistance of the mujaheddin groups, conducting guerrilla warfare and igniting the war against the Soviet forces, the more extended both parties abuses were. During the years of war that followed, 870 000 Afghans were killed, three million – maimed or injured, one million – displaced within the territory and over five million were forced to leave the country.

The Soviet forces withdrew in 1989, leaving trustworthy militias to govern, to maintain control over the population. While many Afghans hoped that the withdrawal of Soviet forces should have brought peace, the country became increasingly unstable. In the early '90s, mujaheddin factions

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began to fight among themselves for power, through the bloody takeover of control in some areas; civilians were subject to arbitrary governance, violence and intimidation, being robbed, tortured, overwhelmed by the large number of rapes, and imprisoned. In these circumstances, the Taliban power flourished in the middle of the chaos created by the civil war, quickly captured territory and, under the promise of providing a population that experienced a too long war with security, imposed a repressive policy, which led to deepening poverty, human rights abuses, ethnic persecution, murder and the continuous expulsion to Pakistan, Iran and other neighbouring countries.

After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, many Afghans were again confident that violence would end and that their lives would improve. But, in 2006, the state of security deteriorated again and violence reached the highest level since 2001.

Someone who considers the implications of the conflict situation from distance might think, pertinently enough, of the wide range of consequences of human nature the population of the country has suffered. Not all the people are warriors. There are also people with families and children in Afghanistan.

Probably a series of normal questions would be the following: *What are the internal and external causes of the troubles in this country ?; Aren't the peaceful citizens, those who want peace, tired of so many battles ?; What about the day and night bombings or attacks that are not aimed at combatants only but at residential areas as well, haven't they psychically affected the people ?; Does the education of children, the generations that follow, work ?; Has anything remained intact after 30 years of war ?* Someone might say that too much has been written about Afghanistan. However, how many of these questions can we answer ? And if we do not know too much, it is because it is not easy to penetrate their space in the midst of suffering. And if you, nevertheless, get there, people are afraid to speak.

From a military perspective, the view of the situation changes and the subject is oriented towards the ways to engage in asymmetrical operations and the solutions to meet success against a typology of actions that is particular and difficult to predict. Of course, the solution to achieve peace and a stability and security environment is not only military but requires a joint effort with the civil society structures and organisations involved.

Therefore, I consider interesting, as someone who is accustomed to the history, culture, traditions, religion and ethnic plurality in Afghanistan, to also analyse the political-military characteristics at strategic and tactical level, which are probably particular to this area. It is true especially because we are engaged with a large number of troops and we may stay there for years.

In many circumstances or contexts of analysis and debate among experts, it used to be supported the idea of a similarity between the USA war in Vietnam and that of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This idea is still supported today by some experts. There are, of course, similarities that refer to guerrilla-type actions, insurgency, ambush attacks, but there are also differences, based on the culture, the tribal structure of local and regional administration having unwritten laws and, especially, the frequent suicide bombings that are specific to Afghanistan. Coming to the present, there is another question that arises, namely how much the international forces involved in the current operation have learned from the military experience of the Soviet Union or what counter methods are used today, after two and a half decades, considering the technological developments in the modern world, on the one hand, and the fact that the opposition forces principles of action have remained unchanged, on the other hand.

It is therefore natural to focus on the study of the grounds for the delay of the success of not only the external forces but also of the internal government to take the control and manage a social-economic normality in the country, which, we should accept, are to a large extent common to the Soviet invasion period and to the current foreign presence.

The *reasons for the failure in achieving the external forces political-military objectives* would be, from a personal standpoint, the following:

- the insufficiently accurate and precise evaluation of the system of socio-political, economic and religious relations within the Afghan society;
- the incorrect and unrealistic assessment of the opposition forces military potential;
- the lack of coordination of own military forces, in the context of a large territory, with a specific and difficult terrain. This deficiency, in particular, has led to the dispersion of forces and the inability to conduct major operations covering at least one region and, especially, the failure to maintain control over the region *"liberated"* from opposing forces; moreover, the continuation of the military presence in the extended area of operations does not allow the concomitant maintenance of the necessary forces in the already controlled areas;
- the difficulty to control the border, especially the one common with Pakistan, a distance of about 2 000 km – firstly because never in history has it been perceived as a border and the ethnic Pashtun families have been on each side of an imaginary boundary that they can cross every day without being controlled. Secondly, the terrain along the border with Pakistan is a rocky one, the mountains having heights that exceed 7 000 m, crossing the border on foot being thus almost impossible to control.

Mention should be made that the total length of the border is 5 600 km, out of which 2 180 with Pakistan, 820 with Iran, 120 in Jammu and Kashmir regions, 75 km with China and the rest of 2 405 with other Central Asian states.

The *causes for the failure in achieving the political-military goals related to the control exerted by the Afghan government* may be considered the following:

- the inability to achieve a unity of political, administrative and military leadership in Afghanistan, both horizontally and vertically, on a solid basis;
- the absence of the necessary mechanisms and tools to take the control of the territories liberated following the military operations at the political and economic level as well as at the one of tribal relations;
- reduced fighting capabilities in the national military forces;
- a non-existent or ineffective strategy of communication with tribal leaders and the population;
- the lack of economic alternatives and of a programme for the reintegration of fighters and national reconciliation. With no possibility of obtaining a paid job, men have always returned to what they know to do best – armed fight. Moreover, the absence of justice and compensation has prevented the families of the victims of repeated abuses from overcoming, psychologically and morally, the resentments accumulated during the years of war and bloody conflicts.

Cultural differences hamper the activity of collecting information, especially the HUMINT one, in an environment of hostility and intimidation, because of the state of fear generated by the numerous rival factions.

One of the consequences, regardless of the period of conflict, is to flee across the border, especially in the east and the south (Pakistan and Iran). It is true not only for the citizens whose houses and properties were destroyed so they try to find a safer place and a source of income, but also for the fighters that are logistically supported. They then come back to continue resistance as it is easy to cross the borders. The most important requirements as far as border control is concerned are the following:

- the establishment of an official number of checkpoints, taking into consideration that people have crossed the border freely for centuries;
- the Coalition forces should be represented at each checkpoint to prevent abuses and corruption;
- the distances between checkpoints should be covered by radar video surveillance, detection systems, air patrols in mountainous areas and ground patrols in desert ones. The human resource, technical and material effort is huge and very difficult to make; the uncontrolled penetration of the border is possible anytime;

- few opportunities to inform the population and the border traders about the consequences of weapon, explosive or drug smuggling; one of the causes is the absence of TV and radio-sets, the local culture, and especially the lack of electricity;
- the failure in providing protection guarantees against the gangs that attack the transport of commodities that are to be exchanged and for the transport of logistic support for international forces.

A contrast between the period of wars in the years of communism and the current period consists in the fighters' equipment that is currently diminished. During the Soviet invasion, there were 190 000 fighters that called themselves mujaheddin, 4 855 detachments and groups, and they had available 92 tanks, 160 armoured carriers, 550 cannons, 3 500 launchers, approximately 12 000 portable missile launchers and 5 000 machine guns of different types and calibres. Currently, the Taliban and insurgent fighters do not have transportation assets any more, and they own launchers, ammunition and explosive materials that have either remained in unidentified depots and in hiding places in the mountains or come from the countries that sponsor terrorist networks. The financial resources available to the opposition forces result, to a large extent, from the taxes required for the drug transit to Western Europe. The tactics used have been, of course, adapted to fit the equipment with fighting assets, to which the experience in fighting and grouping synthetically are added. Briefly, they are the following:

- ambushes and attacks on military convoys and patrols;
- attacks on convoys to rob them;
- fire executed from mountainous areas on military bases, airfields and other military targets;
- direct fire on planes and helicopters during takeoff or landing procedures;
- mining of all communications and the main military subunits manoeuvre routes;
- installation of *"surprise"* explosive devices in transit places that cannot be avoided to limit the military forces freedom of movement and to cause loss;
- transport of arms, ammunition and fighters' groups outside and inside the territory, from Pakistan and Iran, organised in caravans;
- adoption of pragmatic plans for anti-government propaganda and the intimidation of the population as well as the national regular security forces that have been urged to side with the opposition or to desert to avoid being killed.

Mention should be made that in the war against communism and the Soviet forces, suicide attacks were not resorted to. They have been prepared

and further used by al-Qaeda terrorist network with influence in Iran, where the military are trained, psychically included, for the supreme sacrifice to perform the given tasks. Certainly, the motivation force is also rooted in the religious belief, in specific forms of persuasion.

The most powerful weapon of the Radical Taliban Movement, the militant opposition forces and insurgents is represented by suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices, which block the free movement of the Afghan security forces, the Coalition forces and the logistics transport, generate fear and insecurity among the population and, most importantly, result in losses among both the military and the civilians. Such actions are inexpensive, easy to organise, plan and prepare, but the counter-measures are very expensive, given the scientific research process involved in producing detection and jamming equipment, highly armoured vehicles to protect the personnel, equipment to detect and destroy explosive materials etc. Certainly, no expense is too high when it comes to human life protection and, indeed, there has been success in thwarting a number of such attacks, but not in completely annihilating them, especially because of the specific characteristics of Afghanistan. Categorically, the measures should focus on prevention and rapid reaction to counter attacks, to diminish the effects when attacks occur. They could be as follows:

- the establishment of control networks in the most insecure areas and most vulnerable transit points;
- the contact, organised by specialists, with the local population in order to create agencies of collaborators on volunteer basis;
- the achievement of some arrangements with tribal leaders to prevent mining in the territory of responsibility, which may be obtained by offering or accepting certain conditions, such as material support, the obligation not to conduct combat operations and air strikes in the territory they manage etc.;
- the active search and destruction of the explosive devices in the stores and training bases in border areas and inside the country;
- measures to implement the safety rules strictly, which actually is not a novelty: changing of routes on each occasion, using irregular patrols schedule, checkpoints organisation and locations, flexible programme for the transport of logistic support;
- return to base on another route than the one used for departure;
- not use the same place twice to stop, rest or temporary observation posts and their staffing only after the place has been searched and cleared for mines;

- not act immediately to isolated fire, without the analysis of the context, to avoid trapping or being attracted in an area ready for ambush.

Preventive measures are mandatory and must be taken every time, overcoming any tendency to routine. However, we should not be naive and think it sufficient. The imagination of insurgents should not be underestimated, especially as it is difficult to predict. Their analysis mechanism after each attack studies our methods to counter the attack and they are continuously seeking new ways to surprise. If, at the beginning, the explosions were initiated by mobile phones from distance, after patrols were equipped with jamming devices, they switched to manual initiation by wire. Once vehicles specialised in detecting explosives on transit routes were introduced in the theatres of operations, they began to use fuels combined with chemicals, placed under the asphalt pavement, in a tunnel etc. Therefore, the most effective form of prevention is the cooperation with the local population to gather information on the existence of people or places of storage and manufacture of devices and thus to neutralise their networks before they install the improvised devices, combined with continuous surveillance of the routes to be used, with radars and helicopters, during the day and especially at night. Pending the completion of joint doctrines, which are being developed, to combat improvised explosive devices by the institutions in charge of collective defence, the military are prepared and act according to national doctrines, using all the pieces of information from all theatres of operations. However, any doctrine must be open, allowing flexibility and the possibility to adapt to the new tactics used by insurgents.

As it has been mentioned above, one particular feature of Afghanistan is the existence of a tribal-type social organisation. Communication with the local population is very difficult, if one neglects the contact and negotiation with the recognised tribal leaders. The mindset based on the principles of modern democracy overlapped with the system of tribal rules generates incompatibility. Some approaches to negotiations, in this case, may be the following:

- the identification of the leaders and the definition of hierarchy and limits in their living condition;
- the determination of the inhabitants income sources and amount; assistance for those who work, and alternatives for those involved in criminal activities;
- the detection of the difficulties in the way of living (water, electricity, fuel supply), of the priorities to meet their expectations and the establishment of some functional projects to provide them;
- not fuel the pressure on the Taliban that do not agree with the central government, as long as they do not fight against it; arrangements should be

based on peaceful means; any attempt to impose the control on the tribal organisation by force will lead to their transformation into hostile forces;

• any arrangement should guarantee their protection and security. Never should they be suggested that the international protection forces will soon leave the theatre of operations but, on the contrary, that their mission there is a long-term one; they have already had the experience with the Soviet troops that left them and, subsequently, other internal forces terrorised them and made them suffer because of their previous collaboration;

• any conflict, be it a minor one, or one that results in undesirable collateral losses among the civilians should be immediately resolved with the local leaders. Any delay in its resolution will lead to the cessation of any further cooperation.

Another particular aspect, especially through the very extensive ramifications as far as its manifestation is concerned, is represented by corruption. For reasons that are probably obvious, I will not go into the details related to the forms of manifestation, within the armed and police forces included, but I will merely mention the necessity for control and countermeasures in any relation of cooperation.

In the conclusion of this synthesis, that presents strictly personal opinions, I resume the message this paper intends to convey, namely that any approach to the issues related to Afghanistan and, especially, the training of the troops that are deployed in this theatre of operations must be based on the thorough knowledge of the history, religion, and local traditions, so that mistakes that may be irreparable could be avoided. Despite their precarious condition and the suffering they have had to endure for a long time, the Afghans have a sense of positive, exemplary and intangible pride and dignity. The vast majority want a reconciliation process and they do not necessarily expect material compensation for the victims of their families, but rather apologies from those who admit their guilt, as well as real and unbiased justice.

English version by
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NATO – RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

Colonel Nicu BEGANU

Both NATO observers and Russian foreign policy experts seem to agree that the relations between NATO and Russia have reached an important point. In this respect, the author takes an approach to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, which opened a new chapter in the NATO-Russia cooperation. In fact, Russia has expressed its solidarity with the Western countries against the threat of international terrorism, which has paved the way for a NATO-Russia strategic partnership, an improved and reformed one, directed against the common enemy – terrorism. Moreover, the NATO-Russia Council has been the basis of certain programmes of increasingly ambitious military cooperation, such as threat assessment, exchange of views on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, search-rescue operations meant for submarines, nuclear warheads storage and transportation, antimissile defence in theatres of operations and increased Russian participation in PfP activities, as well as in the NATO maritime surveillance and monitoring operation "Active Endeavour".

Keywords: *reconstruction of Afghanistan; fighting terrorism; global superpower; freedom of decision*

Russia's relations with NATO as an international organisation, as well as with the Alliance member states, as seen from the perspective of their particularities, has passed through several stages after the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, from euphoria and high expectations in the early '90s to discontent and mutual distrust in the late '90s[1].

The establishment of the *NATO-Russia Council (NRC)* in Rome in 2002, which should have marked a new stage in the relations with Russia, confirming the new reality by expanding the list of issues relevant to NATO-Russia relations, indeed deepened and consolidated this domain. The old restrictions gave way to new areas of cooperation (threat assessment, combating terrorism, theatre missile defence, airspace management, cooperation in emergencies, defence reform and so forth). Military cooperation, particularly in the Balkans, improved significantly until the conflicting views on various political issues like the war in Iraq, NATO enlargement, Kosovo independence

and the well-known US plans to locate a ballistic missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland generated a new stage in the NATO-Russia relations, one lacking in development, trust and transparency. Because of the particularities of the acceptance by Romania of the US offer to locate some of the elements of the shield on its territory, an approach in this regard will be presented separately.

Today, Russia is still able to influence and determine the governance process in some former Soviet states and not only. Although Russia's transformation began in 2000, once Vladimir Putin became president, most Western citizens still have a sceptical attitude towards Russia's democratic future, and the issue of its integration in the diplomatic and economic structures of the world raises profound questions, especially when it comes to energy market. The different answers to these questions and the various bilateral relations with Russia could overload and damage the Euro-Atlantic partnership[2].

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the need and political imperatives to promote and further develop the NATO-Russia relations, as a critical factor for the future of a strong Euro-Atlantic security structure, and to identify the consequences of a fruitful cooperation in this regard. Most of the presented issues are aspects arising from the lectures delivered during the transatlantic study trip made by the NATO College in Rome in October 2009.

Current Situation of NATO – Russia Security Relations

Not only the Alliance observers but also the Russian experts in foreign policy appear to agree that NATO-Russia relations have reached a critical point.

The tragic events on 11 September 2001 opened a new chapter in NATO-Russia cooperation. In fact, Russia expressed its solidarity with the Western countries against the international terrorism threat, which has paved the way for a NATO-Russia strategic partnership, improved and reformed, directed against the common enemy – terrorism. Moreover, the NATO-Russia Council has been the basis for more and more ambitious military cooperation programmes, such as threat assessments, exchange of views on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, search and rescue operations for submarines, safe storage and transport of nuclear warheads, theatre missile defence and increased Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace activities as well as in NATO's Operation *"Active Endeavour"* meant for maritime surveillance and monitoring.

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[2] Pierre Razoux, *What Future for Georgia ?*, NATO Defence College, Rome, Research Paper no. 47, June, 2009.

On the other hand, because of the differences of opinion regarding the operations conducted by the US in Iraq, the future of Kosovo and, ultimately, the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008, the atmosphere within the NRC changed dramatically, the military cooperation being blocked at that time. NATO-Russia relations froze. Lately, they have shown a return to what, by analogy, we can call *"business as usual"*.

NATO has treated the problem maturely and, as its former Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, declared at the NATO-Russia Council foreign ministers meeting in Corfu (June 2009), although there were differences of opinion regarding the conflict between Russia and Georgia, Russia needed NATO and NATO needed Russia[3].

During his visit to Moscow in July last year, the US President Barack Obama highlighted the common interests, mutual respect, as well as the commitment of two pragmatic presidents, he himself and President Medvedev, to a new treaty regarding strategic armament and further enhancement of bilateral relations. The *"reset button"* metaphor he used certainly does not mean the *"restart"* of the same *"old"* programme, but it is intended to describe a new beginning of NATO-Russia relations[4].

There have been a lot of quite unpleasant disputes regarding the *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the former US plans to place the missile defence sensors and interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland as well as the ballistic missile defence in Europe. Following the recent developments that have introduced Romania in the issue, these elements could be real challenges for the future cooperation.

Of course, there is still friction between NATO and Russia. Firstly, the potential NATO enlargement towards the East and the Russian criticism over Georgia and Ukraine's ambitions to join NATO, interpreted as a direct threat to what Russia perceives as a *"strategic balance"*. Russia has criticised the importance that is still attached to Article 5 by the Alliance in front of the new Eastern members, as well as the active pursuit of NATO air patrol programme in the airspace of the Baltic States. Moreover, there are similar concerns among NATO member states that Russia may want to recover the status of a great power to the detriment of its neighbours, as it was demonstrated by the resumption of patrol flights along the Russian border

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[3] *NATO, Russia to Resume Military Relationship*, CNN, 27 June 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/06/27/nato.russia/index.html?eref=ib_topstories

[4] Barack Obama speech in Moscow, the President addresses the New Economic School Graduation, July, 2009, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/July/20090707062839abretnuh3.549922e-02.html&distid=ucs

with NATO, in 2007, and by the announcement regarding the modernisation of its nuclear arsenal. Last but not least, there are opinions that Russia will make use of its *"energy weapon"*, artificially affecting the delivery of oil and gas supplies from its own exploitations, to intimidate its customers, thus seriously limiting the freedom of political movement of the European nations that are NATO member states.

Although the current situation in NATO-Russia relations (NATO-Russia Council) is not exactly the desired one, there are possibilities to use momentary opportunities having a constructive potential for the future of the relations between the two parties. That is why NATO and Russia, acknowledging the evidence that they individually are not able to cope with the wide range of future global and transnational challenges to their own security such as terrorism, Afghanistan reconstruction, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Iran's nuclear ambitions, climate change, financial crisis, energy security, global health, will revise their intentions, get reunited and revitalise the NATO-Russia Security Partnership in order to act jointly to encourage and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.

North American Perspective on Russia

As it has already been mentioned, in the USA and Canada there are many opinions of academic researchers and practitioners in international security that suspect the Russian authorities of seeking to regain the status of a great power to the detriment of the neighbours security. Russia is not perceived as a threat to the USA, Canada or NATO, and it is considered that it may become either a partner or rival in the context of an economy threatened by the lack of resources or of the energy, water and food reserves. A key question would be how reliable the Russian energy supplies are and how predictable the behaviour of the Russian officials regarding foreign policy is. NATO North American members are worried that the revival of a Russian economic and military superpower could lead to threatening NATO European member states with the severe reduction in energy supplies in order to force their governments to adopt decisions in the fields of security and national defence that could favour Russia.

A set of constructive ideas and declarations regarding NATO-Russia relations as well as the future role of Russia in Europe, which may be promoted in reviving the relations with it, could be presented as follows:

- Russia may be a precious partner in combating terrorism and drug trafficking, as well as in energy security and climate change management;

- the multitude of common interests offers good perspectives for NATO-Russia relations;
- Russia's motivation and engagement in the activities and actions initiated within the NRC;
- Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members only when they meet the Alliance standards, and its enlargement significantly contributes to the stabilisation of the region;
- Russia has not become a world superpower again, it is still a regional power, but, because of its largeness and available resources, it is a not only inevitable but also recommendable partner; reasonable European security architecture is possible only in close cooperation with Russia and if its security needs are understood;
- NATO-Russia cooperation in this domain may generate a security system for the benefit of both parties, the stimulation of Russia's desire to enhance own safety and security being necessary;
- the transit of non-military products through Russia to supply the ISAF forces is a first step towards a constructive cooperation and it is expected to continue this way;
- concomitantly with the transformation undergone by NATO from *"transatlantic"* and *"standby forces"* to *"global"* and *"expeditionary operations"*, Russia will become a necessary partner and it should be treated with respect;
- a new *Cold War* should not occur, although the debates regarding the conflict in Georgia and Kosovo independence will continue to trouble the cooperation between the two parties.

Finally, the Russian concerns over NATO enlargement should be viewed both in terms of the claimed objectives realism and of the often expressed possibility to limit NATO member states freedom of decision regarding opening the door to new members without any constraint. Russia reaffirms itself as a significant European economic and military power and has a say in European security issues, although it should not be translated or understood in terms that would amplify the European energy dependence on the Russian oil and gas reserves and supply, which will certainly become a trap in the near future.

NATO European Member States Perspectives on Russia

NATO European member states seem to have an ambivalent perception of Russia's role in the future. On the one hand, Russia is no longer considered a threat to most nations and the Alliance, except the Baltic States and Poland,

which remain suspicious in this regard. Is it rather a question related to the manner in which the giant Eurasian state, more or less democratic, stable and reliable, could be involved in the process of European integration ? Just as a consequence of its size and resources, Russia could become the most important trading partner and a facilitator of the European integration efforts. Today, many European nations are, to some extent, dependent on the stable and reliable gas supply from Russia, the examples of Poland, France and Germany[5] being well-known. The Europeans highlight the fact that trade, mostly money for oil and gas, will strengthen the strategic partnership with Russia and thus a conflict is unlikely to appear. Those observers who are confident in the democratic transformation of Russia believe that the European integration in the absence of this partner in trade and common security problems would be impossible. On the other hand, sceptics would argue that an overwhelming Russia, characterised by the behaviour proper to a superpower, by vast resources and questionable statements regarding the European affiliation, would not fit in the European integration efforts, which would lead to the establishment of new lines of confrontation, mutual distrust and containment in the middle of a fragmented Europe.

The key elements arising from the speeches delivered by the officials of the European NATO member countries referring to NATO-Russia relations and to the future role of Russia in Europe are more or less similar to those specific to the North American perspective, emphasising Russia's active role in the European security issues in a context of mutual respect and transparency. All actors – NATO, the EU and Russia – can productively collaborate in various strategic sectors, such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, drug trafficking, search and rescue naval operations, thus enhancing the level of military cooperation and, probably, reaching a certain degree of interoperability.

According to some officials at NATO Headquarters and SHAPE, missile defence, Kosovo's status, the CFE Treaty and NATO enlargement are issues of concern to Russia. The tone of Russian diplomats has changed lately because, in accordance with their precepts, more or less similar to those used by us, they feel threatened. But the NATO-Russia Council meetings should be considered inevitable for dialogue and talks, highlighting the willingness of both NATO members and Russia to cooperate. Open and frank exchange of views on enlargement,

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[5] Bernard Gwertzman, interview with Jeffrey Mankoff, *The Business and Politics Behind the Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute*, 9 January 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/18178/business_and_politics_behind_ the_russiaukraine_gas_dispute.html

Operation *"Enduring Freedom"*, missile defence, joint training for the fight against narcotics and many other issues is necessary. For the time being, these are some significant examples on which we can build a new cooperation philosophy and that can be called significant progress. The NRC nations can discuss in a constructive manner even about the matters on which NATO and Russia can hardly reach agreement. The Bucharest Summit, even if it took place a few months before the war in Georgia, showed the parties potential to engage in talks in an atmosphere of cooperation, not confrontation, and to provide solutions for common problems. Moreover, Russia's as well as Ukraine's participation with vessels in Operation *"Active Endeavour"* in the Mediterranean can be regarded as a good sign for finding a common denominator with regard to the European and Euro-Atlantic security issues.

NATO – Russia Relations. Perspectives

All these pressing security challenges – ranging from Iran's nuclear ambitions to the deterioration of security in Afghanistan – require resources and the influence of both parties. How can NATO, in particular, and the West, in general, revive a relationship with Russia, in the light of recent events ?

As history has shown, cooperation tends to take root when both parties are focused on the transition from tactical differences to the broader framework of strategic objectives and primary problems. This means that Georgia and the future relation of Ukraine with NATO should not be the initial point for the renewed NATO-Russia dialogue. Undoubtedly, the enlargement issue is important and cannot be excluded, particularly in the light of commitments made by the Alliance at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. However, in the short run, as long as NATO and Russia seek ways to reconnect, the two parties should initiate an in-depth discussion about the future of their relation, starting from aspects whose approach does not result in offending old sensibilities. The immediate challenge is to agree on a desired final result that should include the commonly accepted goals.

Taking into consideration the fact that the new US Administration is really prepared for a strategic approach to Russia with a view to maintaining peace in Europe and the Middle East, it should be consistent. Consistency should be ensured by creating a *"roadmap"* regarding missile defence.

The achievement of a common missile defence shield is one of the acute issues in NATO-Russia relations. In this context, we consider a potential beginning

may be represented by the proposal of Russia's Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador Dmitry Rogozyn. According to him, at the first stage, the experts from Russia, America and Europe should work jointly on the assessment of missile threats. At the second stage, they should develop a set of common political, diplomatic and economic measures with relevance for those that do not obey the existent non-proliferation regime and *"Only at the third stage, when we are fully convinced that all the actions earlier undertaken by us failed, it makes sense to build a collective system of military and technical efforts to create missile defence with the US, Russia and NATO involved. Trust among superpowers is unthinkable without a common cause. This common cause can and should become a joint Ballistic Missile Defence –BMD"*[6].

NATO Secretary General A. Rasmussen clearly affirmed the new perspectives regarding the cooperation in the theatre missile defence in his first major public speech on 18 September 2009, in Brussels: *"We should explore the potential for linking the US, NATO and Russia missile defence systems at an appropriate time. And I believe the work that we have already done on Theatre Missile Defence under the aegis of the NATO-Russia Council, including joint exercises, clearly demonstrates the potential for cooperation in this area".*

Moreover, the USA has had several rounds of detailed consultations with Russia on missile defence plans after President Barack Obama announced, on 17 September 2009, that the system would be changed, and the participation in the system is open to Russia, if it wishes, this area being considered one of mutual interest by the USA. The aspect was also highlighted by the American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a recent speech delivered in Paris: *"Missile defense, we believe, will make this continent a safer place. That safety could extend to Russia, if Russia decides to cooperate with us. It is an extraordinary opportunity for us to work together to build our mutual security"*[7].

For this reason, we believe that the decision of the US President, Barack Obama, to abandon the plans to install a radar in the Czech Republic and to deploy interceptor missiles in Poland, considering the solution that incorporates Romania, reflects the US view on the way to achieve a missile defence system in Europe, and Russia's response could be a critical strategic factor for its relations with the United States and, by extension, with NATO. Mention should be made that, however, in this paper

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[6] Dmitry Rogozyn, *Missile Defence as a Common Cause for All*, in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 23 October 2009, http://natomission.ru/en/security/article/security/artnews/52
[7] http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/138554.htm

NATO-Russia relations are discussed, and not those of NATO member states with it, although the latter is the type of approach Russia desires in developing the new architecture of its international relations, as it can derive more advantages from the status of *"re-becoming"* a great power.

Another effective area to begin would be that of examining the common challenges for the West and Russia, such as radical extremism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, global health, financial crisis and energy security. This process could include a number of common risk assessments and provide solutions regarding the types of advantageous partnerships that can be developed on short and medium term, and the identification of the type of relations Russia may have with the Baltic States or the states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe in a given time horizon. Such forums should be aimed at proposing ambitious and innovative ideas that may currently seem absurd.

The two parties will be able to focus on specific policies and common threats only after a strategic goal, a reference one for the future of NATO-Russia relationship, has been established. Somehow ironically, the least contentious issue on the list is Afghanistan. Despite the failed guerrilla war waged by the Soviet Union against the mujaheddin during the *Cold War* period, Russia has found surprising ways to contribute positively to the future of Afghanistan. In addition to the transit agreement, signed in Bucharest in December 2005, NATO and Russia have conducted a successful programme of training for the fight against narcotics, addressed to the personnel in Afghanistan and Central Asia. NATO and Russia should also continue with the Framework Agreement on Air Transport, which would make the Russian air transportation capability available to the joint effort.

The most controversial aspect of the NATO-Russia relationship remains the potential enlargement of the Alliance by offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to both Georgia and Ukraine, an issue that was discussed and unaccepted during the summit in Bucharest, and then during the one in Strasbourg-Kehl, in April 2009. Since then, some of the European NATO members (France, Germany) have shown reluctance to the crisis management ability and responsibility of the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili in the conflict with Russia in August 2008. In addition, the increasing political instability in Ukraine and the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over the gas transit to Europe in January 2009

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[8] *EU and NATO Keep Eastern Countries at Bay*, at http://www.euractiv.com/en/east-mediterranean/ eu-nato-keep-eastern-countries-bay/article-177760

have reinforced the reluctance of many NATO members to grant Ukraine the MAP. The consultative solution was the establishment of the *Annual National Programme* for both countries, focusing on the reforms in the political, military and security sectors, the aspects regarding MAP being relegated. Clearly, NATO allies would not wish and will not *"rock the boat"* after a new beginning with Russia[8].

Another challenge in the relations between NATO and Russia is represented by the fact that the Alliance has reaffirmed in front of its new members that the commitment to comply with Article 5 remains unchanged and solid. This strategy should be implemented through diplomatic channels, using official statements and high-level visits to send clear signals with regard to NATO determination.

The Alliance and the West should find creative methods to balance the often contradictory goals regarding the support offered to the new or potential members and the maintenance of a constructive relationship with Russia.

The USA, Europe and Russia must also extend the limits of their relationship, including non-traditional threats such as energy security, climate change and global health. Climate change could be the easiest choice to start, since President Obama promised to re-involve the USA in the global efforts to combat this problem, while Russia is expected to suffer some cataclysmic consequences. Climate change will pose serious security and economic problems, and it will represent a political challenge to Russia and the surrounding areas. Therefore, it is necessary a long-term dialogue regarding the consequences of climate change in order to develop not only a post-Kyoto framework agreement before 2012 but also innovative adaptation capabilities and mitigation measures. The melting of the Arctic ice cap will open new transport corridors, facilitating at the same time the massive exploitation of the hydrocarbons previously located under the ice.

Whether it comes to climate change, radical extremism or the management of Iran's nuclear ambitions, there is no doubt that the Obama Administration has to review the US policy towards Russia, applying a pragmatic strategy, which will allow the USA to enhance cooperation with Russia and also to occasionally raise objections to Russia's behaviour, particularly against the European NATO member countries or its neighbours. Fortunately, there are some domains that could serve as ideal starting points for a cooperation programme, including arms control and global economic crisis.

The NATO-Russia Council is another forum that should be used to foster dialogue, regardless of this dialogue degree of adversity. However, the activation of the *"reset"* button in the USA relationship with Russia, as well as in NATO relations

with Russia are two important elements on a long list of pressing challenges the US President will have to address.

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In the periods of conflict, the main reaction of both Russia and NATO has often consisted in detachment or estrangement one from the other, to devalue the relationship and to be in a position of confrontation. While this strategy appears to be sufficient in the short run, it can rarely be to the benefit of both parties in the long run. Whether they admit it or not, the United States, Europe and Russia need each other for the economic stability, safety and security of their citizens. Certainly, the United States is the only superpower, but the recent operations in the Middle East have shown the limits of a world military power when it is not supported by allies. On the other hand, Europe is the main promoter of *"soft"* power, but stopping Iran's nuclear ambitions has proved an almost unparalleled challenge, even for the most sophisticated European diplomats. Finally, Russia, although it is one of the world's energy giants, seems to lack the broad ideological allure and the ability to project power. Briefly, none of the current complex challenges can be solved if the strengths of the three powers are not put together. This is why the *new strategic concept* should clarify the framework of reference and the relations NATO is going to develop with Russia, the main courses of action, as well as the role they will play in the future of the Alliance.

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PIRACY
– A Threat to National and International Security –

Captain Dr Constantin CIOROBEA

Naval forces actions against piracy in international waters are not an unusual mission; these actions have almost never stopped. Moreover, piracy is nothing but an act of robbery in the marine environment and, like any other criminal act, has gained strength in places where law enforcement is more difficult to achieve and where criminals believe they can successfully avoid the law.

The first major action against piracy is recorded in 67 BC, when the Roman Senate decided to clear the Imperial waters of pirates and gave dictatorial powers to General Pompey in order to carry out that mission. The campaign was financed with a huge budget, and over 500 ships and 120 000 soldiers were involved in operation, as a result, 1 300 pirate ships being sunk.

***Keywords:** illegal trade; patrol actions; theatre of operations; counter-piracy operations; chain of command*

Piracy is a phenomenon that has affected shipping since antiquity and has become in modern times a very dangerous phenomenon, almost out of control. Swords, giving piracy a facade of romance, have been replaced with automatic weapons and instead of the peaceful and lovely parrot, the pirates now bear a rocket propelled grenades on their shoulder.

The term *piracy* comes from the sailor language, meaning plundering and robbing at sea and those who practice such activities are called *pirates*. Historically, the term comes from the Greek – *peiratés*, meaning *"aggressor"*. The Explanatory Dictionary of Romanian Language defines *piracy* as *"the action carried out by the crew of a vessel, using threats and violence, resulting in kidnapping another vessel or the goods or persons onboard; an offence committed by the authors of this action"*.

International Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines piracy as *"the act of kidnapping or attempted kidnapping of a vessel with intent to commit a theft or other criminal activity by using violence"*. This definition is much closer to the present situations in relation to the *UN Convention on Maritime Law* (1982), which limited piracy

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only to acts carried out by a vessel on the high seas. This situation is not in accordance with the reality of present days, when the majority of piracy acts are run by pirates onboard of fast boats in the territorial waters close to the coastline.

The naval forces actions against piracy in international waters do not represent an unusual mission, these actions almost never stopped from antiquity to the present time. Moreover, piracy is nothing but an act of robbery in the marine environment and, like any criminal act, it has gained strength in places where law enforcement is more difficult to achieve and where criminals believe they can successfully avoid the law.

The first major action against piracy is recorded in 67 BC, when the Roman Senate decided to clear the waters of pirates and gave dictatorial powers to General Pompey in order to carry out this mission. The campaign was financed with a huge budget, over 500 ships and 120 000 soldiers were involved in operation and, as a result, 1 300 pirate ships were sunk.

Another major campaign against piracy was organised by the Royal Navy from the middle of the 17th century until the Second World War. In 1718, the UK Government, alarmed by the numerous pirate attacks in the Caribbean Sea, West Africa and the American coasts of the Atlantic ordered the Royal Navy to patrol in these areas in order to reduce the effects of the pirates actions.

Other actions against pirates, this time on a smaller scale, took place in different areas such as: Cuba's coast, in 1820, near Singapore, in 1830 and in the Hong Kong area, in 1840. In the early 19th century, piracy became a widespread phenomenon in the Far East and for almost 100 years, the UK committed naval forces to seize pirates.

Modern Piracy

Currently, according to the International Maritime Bureau reports, most attacks, around 21% of all global incidents, take place in Southeast Asia, in the archipelago of Indonesia, including the Straits of Malacca. Other high-risk areas are considered the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Somalia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Peru, Bangladesh and Malaysia. In the period 2003-2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau records, a total of 1 845 acts or attempts of piracy took place, this representing an annual average of 352 incidents. *"According to the International Maritime Organisation/IMO reports, in the Somali region there have been 440 acts of piracy since 1984, when the organisation began to keep records of such acts. In 2008, there were reported more than 120 attacks, a total of 35 ships were seized by pirates and about 600 sailors were kidnapped. In January 2009, 14 ships and 280 sailors*

from 25 countries were held hostage in Somalia, and two sailors were killed during the attacks carried out by pirates"[1].

The captured ships and kidnapped people provided large amounts of money paid as ransom, which encouraged such actions, therefore, in early 2009, a ransom of 3 million dollars was given for the release of an oil tanker belonging to Saudi Arabia. One third of the attacks carried out by Somali pirates in 2008 were successful and it is estimated that these attacks generated a benefit between 50 million and 300 million USD. At the end of 2008, a Ukrainian flagged ship was seized, carrying 33 Russian armoured vehicles with weapons and ammunition. This deeply concerned the entire world about the pirates' possibility to catch more sensitive cargo ships such as radioactive materials. These figures do not represent the actual extent of the phenomenon, many ship-owners do not report all acts of piracy, because the investigation of these cases takes a lot of time and any delay may cause around 20 000-30 000 USD losses per day. To this delay adds the increase in the insurance price, because the insurance companies penalise the owner because he has not applied appropriate security measures (such as maintaining a permanent surveillance post against pirates).

➣ **Causes for Piracy Expansion**

This great increase in the piracy phenomenon has been amplified by a series of factors. The commercial maritime traffic growth across the whole globe is the main factor that ensures the pirates an almost unlimited range of action and many valuable targets. Globalisation and access to modern technology including GPS and satellite phone can support the tracking and selection of these targets.

Another factor is represented by the great increase in the traffic through certain areas, generically called *"narrow areas or chokepoints"*, where vessels have to reduce their speed significantly in order to transit these areas safely. This allows the planning and execution of attacks with very high probability of success.

The global financial crisis has also contributed to the expansion of piracy, given that more and more people, in some regions even members of law enforcement forces, are tempted to act in this way to survive the crisis.

Unsatisfactory maritime area surveillance near the coasts of some countries or even the complete lack of it in ungovernable countries encourages this phenomenon. The lack of security measures within ports allows theft of goods onboard.

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[1] Merle D. Kellerhals Jr., *UN Forms Group to Coordinate Actions against Maritime Piracy*, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2471&blog=all

Corruption, in turn, favoured the breaching of legal provisions and even encouraged the involvement of official bodies and the emergence of particular phenomenon of piracy, like the *"ghost ships"*.

Unlimited proliferation of small weapons facilitates pirates to purchase weapons and ammunition and, therefore, diversifies their way of action. Some sources include among the causes that have encouraged piracy even some agreements between ship-owners, pirates and insurance companies in order to achieve substantial gains in the international framework created by the actions of pirates, but this has not been proven yet.

➢ How Pirates Operate

Most pirates are aged between 20-35 and come mainly from the northeastern part of Somalia. The number of these pirates is estimated at 1 000, coming from local fishermen, who are considered an essential factor in the operation, given the talent to work at sea. Former militia members, some former fighters of the various Somali tribes, or employees of local clan leaders are part of attack teams. Along with them, we can find high-tech device experts who can operate with GPS and other cutting-edge equipment. The fact that the Somali state fails to control this phenomenon has allowed the pirates to develop real bases ashore and, on the coast of Somalia, piracy has thus become the main source of income for young people.

The pirates actions have been analysed by the International Maritime Bureau, which has made a classification of these actions into three distinct categories. The first and simplest course of action is the *attack of ships at anchor or in harbours*. This way of action is encouraged by poor security measures put in place in some ports. Such acts are considered soft piracy actions, executed randomly by small fast vessels on board of which there are robbers armed with knives. Such actions are aimed at crewmembers money and valuable things and make gains from 5 000 to 15 000 USD per year.

Another method of action is represented by *attacking ships in international waters and especially in the territorial waters*. Such attacks are considered moderate and are executed by well-organised pirates, who usually launch their attacks from a ship generically called *"mother ship"* and are equipped with small weapons. Such attacks can seriously affect the safety of navigation, because the ships sail without control once the crew is kidnapped, detained or throw overboard.

The most dangerous actions are those followed by taking *control of the vessel and using it for illegal trade*. Such vessels are generically called *"ghost ships"*. In these actions, pirates follow specific procedures, take control of the ship and the cargo is transferred to another vessel, then the ship is renamed

and re-registered under the flag of convenience. In this way, the ship will obtain false documents based on which it can start shipping. The cargo taken over will never be transported to destination, but it will be unloaded in a specific harbour and taken by a buyer, which usually is part of the business. Such attacks are considered the most dangerous, are well financed and meticulously planned. People involved in these actions are well trained, equipped with modern weapons and work in cooperation with shore-based operators in important positions in various ports.

During their attacks, pirates use the most ingenious ways; thus they simulate that they are on sea for a long time and need water and, when they are brought onboard, they take control of the ship using their weapons. Pirates can also use small and fast vessels; in this case, the reduced number of crewmembers onboard of the modern vessels represents a real advantage in their action. Another way is represented by the intimidation of the crew by firing with automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades during their approach with small ships, action followed by formal notice of the crew to direct the ship in an area controlled by pirates. Pirates can lunch their actions from covered positions using a commercial ship that does not look suspicious. When the two vessels are at a distance that allows the execution of the attack, the pirates approach with fast boats and climb onboard, without giving time for sailors to respond. A more complex way of action is the use of fishing ships as *"mother ships"* onboard of which there are small boats used in the execution of the attacks. This way of action creates conditions for the extension of the action area to hundreds of nautical miles offshore.

I want to emphasise the fact that pirates' actions are not isolated, in fact behind them there is a true industry, which was very well presented by Mary Harper (BBC Africa analyst): *"Even if the number of pirates involved in the seizure of vessels is relatively small, whole modern industry of piracy involves many more people. The attack is executed by a small team, normally between 7 and 10. After seizing the vessel, about 50 people remain onboard to control the ship and crew and another 50 watch from the shore. Alongside them, in order to complete the whole picture of the economy in the region, we can add those who feed hostages"*[2]. Places where vessels are moored are very well defended and the entire population of these regions supports and even encourages pirates. In these conditions, the action designated to release hostages is difficult to achieve.

The money received as ransom for seized ships or captured crewmembers facilitates the actions to influence the local community to support pirates and the modernisation of their arms, equipment and vessels. This has allowed

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[2] Mary Harper, *Life in Somalia's Pirate Town*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7623329.stm

the extension of the range of actions in the high seas, which was highlighted by the attempt to capture the British cruise vessel *"Oceania Nautica"* in November 2008, which carried around 700 tourists and the attack, in November 2009, of the Norwegian frigate *"Fridtjof Nansen"*, which was engaged in an exchange of fire while performing the inspection of a vessel.

International Community Reactions

The unprecedented expansion of the piracy phenomenon in the Gulf of Aden, Somalia and the Arabian Sea coast, an area of 2 million square miles (5,2 million km²), caused some reactions worldwide regarding the achievement of the security of the sea lines of communication in the region.

In the initial phase, when the extent of piracy acts was smaller, the *Combined Task Force – CTF 150*, operating at that time, from December 2002, in the area enclosed by the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, with the mission to create a safe and security environment in the region, was engaged in a supplementary task, namely to monitor and protect the sea lines of communication against piracy. Ships from different countries like Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, the UK and the US, but not only, are part of this CTG[3]. When the piracy acts in the region became very numerous, it was necessary to establish a new task force CTF-151, situation which allowed CTF-150 to focus its effort on own objectives. Separating the two CTF missions was necessary given that some ships in the CTF-150 did not have any mandate from their countries to be engaged in action against pirates. As a result, the countries that wish to assign forces in operations designated to prevent and reduce acts of piracy in the region can send forces to the CTF-151.

Starting December 2008, NATO launched, at UN's request, *"Operation Allied Provider"*, whose mission is to patrol, keep under surveillance and escort ships carrying humanitarian aid in Somalia, together with ships belonging to Italy, Greece, Turkey and the UK. It is important to note that, in this mission, ships were authorised by the Security Council mandate to use force in order to protect the humanitarian aid.

The multinational effort to combat piracy has been joined lately by vessels belonging to Russia, India, Japan and China, but they operate under national command and, in order to achieve cohesion with the naval groups in the region, coordination actions plans have been negotiated. The European Union, in turn, with the approval of the EU Council on 8 December 2008, authorised the execution

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[3] http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2008/019.html

of *"Operation ATALANTA"* and deployed in the region the operational naval group *EU NAVFOR*. This is the first major deployment of forces in a theatre of operations made by the European Union.

Along with deployment of forces in the region, the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) was created, which provides assistance for sailors in Gulf of Aden, Somalia and the Horn of Africa region. This centre coordinates the shipping in the region and ensures the safe transit of the region through a safety corridor. The forces in the region operate under UN Security Council resolutions no. 1814, 1816 and 1838 (2008).

The naval forces in the region operate under a common concept of operation. Some forces are deployed near the coast to deter pirates from leaving shore. Other forces are situated near the sea lines of communications to be able to intervene soon, considering that the pirates can capture a ship in just 20 minutes. In early February 2009, international forces established an International Recommended Transit Corridor – IRTC, through which commercial vessels are advised to transit area in order to reduce the time of naval forces intervention. This corridor is crossed through the centre of the Gulf of Aden.

The forces deployed in the region do not act under the same chain of command, yet, using the coordination actions, an informal division of tasks has been achieved. Thus, EU forces focus their actions in the area of Somalia, NATO operating in the Gulf of Aden, and while the forces belonging to Western European countries do not provide escort for vessels in convoy, those from China, India and Japan support such missions.

Along with these activities, in which a large number of forces are engaged in so-called *"kinetic actions"*, for solving problems in the region, we have to change the way we conduct operation, to include more non-kinetic actions. Information operations in the maritime environment with the forces involved in such actions represent an important line of action to support the fight against piracy. The presence of Alliance forces in regions with a high degree of instability creates a strong impact on the population in the region and on those that intend to conduct illegal activities.

On the other hand, all actions against pirates need a proper legal framework, especially for ships operating in international waters, because national responsibilities are limited only to territorial waters and the intervention to provide maritime security in international waters is restricted by a series of international conventions. The actions against piracy are under the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, which provides that *"On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons*

and seize the property on board"[4]. But, these terms restrict the actions only against a pirate ship or aircraft.

The efforts to combat piracy are affected by the restriction to pursue the pirates on the coast and in territorial waters. There are cases in which the patrol ships capture pirates and then release them on the territory of Somalia and, in other situations, they identify the captured ships, but avoid acting in force to protect the life of the ship's captured crew. In 2008, the UN Security Council, following the explosion of the phenomenon of piracy, especially close to the coast of Somalia, adopted various resolutions on piracy. Each of them increased the authority of action, such as resolution 1851 from December 2008, which authorised states to use armed forces on shore for dismantling piracy.

A new form of action against piracy is the establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy in New York, based on the UN Security Council resolution no. 1851. The Contact Group consists of 24 countries and 5 international organisations and has as main objective to strengthen efforts to prevent piracy off the coast of Somalia. This group authorises countries and regional security organisations to take *"all appropriate measures"* in Somalia and near the coast to prohibit the actions of those who plan and lead acts of piracy.

The presence of warships in the region has resulted in the change of the ways pirates act. Lately, they have been using ships from which they launch attacks. This manner of action has allowed the extension of their range of actions even off the ocean, which further complicates counter piracy actions. In these circumstances, the naval forces effort must be completed with protective measures taken onboard merchant ships, action encouraged by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).

The pirates actions are facilitated by surprise, speed of actions and the fear induced to crews regarding violent actions. If the crews manage to avoid surprise, pirates will lose one of the most important advantages in their actions. In these circumstances, an active employment of the crew to detect and prevent attacks, combined with an appropriate capacity for response may increase the protection of merchant ships. David Kellerman points out in his book how ships can act in such situations, *"to prevent the actions of pirates and maintain an appropriate state of alert on board, it is very important to change the crew's mentality of a <perfect victim>. In these conditions, programmes must be initiated and developed to combat piracy and to train crews for crisis management in order to reduce the vulnerability of ships"*[5].

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[4] *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1982.

[5] David N. Kellerman, *Worldwide Maritime Piracy Report: June 1999*, www.maritimesecurity.com

It is well known that pirates go onboard secretly and quietly, use ropes and ladders with hooks to climb on the ships in various points, especially in places where the freeboard is small. Given this mode of action, an effective first step may consist in the installation of observation stations in highly visible places on the deck. This can be an important factor to prevent and deter attacks.

Another way of action is the placement of wire fences and use of special solutions to create slippery areas on board. Fences with electric power placed on the deck or water cannons can be used against pirates. Some ships have been equipped with audio systems with powerful speakers, which allow the transmission of clear warnings and, in some cases, can affect the attackers. Ship owners have diversified protection measures and they have lately created the so-called *"panic rooms"*, where the crew can hide until the end of the attack.

Other additional measures of protection may consist of hiring security teams belonging to private companies, which can reduce the insurance worth for vessels transiting the region. For example, the protection and security company *"Blackwater Worldwide"* has leased vessels, helicopters and personnel that are ready for action against pirates. The chief executive of the firm *"Hollowpoint Protective Services"*, John Harris, said to the Associated Press news agency, in October 2008, that his company *"was ready to conduct negotiations with the pirates for the release of hostages and the captured ships, or to execute direct interventions if negotiations did not succeed"*[6]. The employment of these security teams, which are sometimes armed, is not encouraged by NATO because their actions may cause an increase in the violence of pirate actions during capture of ships.

The troops presence on board is less viable given that the military presence aboard may cause it to be considered a military vessel and lose some of the rights of civilian vessels on transit in some areas and entry in ports.

Even if the use of weapons by ship crews looks like a simple solution, it is a very controversial issue. As Mr. Will Geddes, Director of International Protection Group, pointed out, arming crews could lead to the escalation of the conflict between the ship and pirates. Another issue of arming the crew is the fact that, currently, ship crews are made up primarily of sailors from developing countries, whose training on the use of firearms is almost nonexistent.

Small arms can be used by the crew on board the vessel without gaining the status of military vessels, but there are several reasons that have determined owners not to arm crews. So far, in their actions, pirates have avoided killing unarmed

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[6] Jacquelyn S. Porth, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa Threatens Relief Efforts, Trade U.S., NATO, European Union and Partners Step up Anti-piracy Missions*, http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/October/20081031163831sjhtrop0.1492273.html

hostages during their attack. The open conflict between pirates and sailors may cause the death of seamen, and this can have a great psychological effect on families and may represent an unfavourable media event for the company involved. Many of the pirate targets are tankers or gas or chemicals ships and, in these conditions, during an armed confrontation, a rocket-propelled grenade or a bullet can cause a real ecological catastrophe and the death of the whole crew. Such action may result in the loss of the ship and cargo, which does not happen when the ship is captured if the ship and goods onboard have insurance and, thus, the owner will suffer fewer losses. Pirates are armed with rocket-propelled grenades and weapons more powerful and more expensive than the weapons that can be purchased at reasonable prices and used without special training by ship crews.

Another factor that affects the efficiency of the fight against piracy is represented by the *Rules of Engagement – ROE*, and an important example is the situation of US ships deployed in the Gulf of Aden, which, at the end of 2008, had ROE that allowed that the mission would be defined as follows: *"preventing and stopping pirates actions"*, an insufficient provision, given the scale of pirate actions. In those circumstances, the US Naval Forces said that ongoing negotiations are carried with a country in the region (Kenya), which wants to accept captured pirates on its territory, who will subsequently be judged here. The EU itself negotiates with Seychelles in this respect.

In the conditions in which the USA gets permission from Kenya for detention and trial of captured pirates in this country, other countries that have forces in the region are invited to complete arrangements for detention of pirates, so that new ROE could be included and the mission could be renamed: *"preventing and stopping illegal actions and detaining the persons captured during piracy actions against shipping vessels"*[7].

Romanian Naval Forces Place in Actions against Piracy

Today, we can say that the piracy phenomenon is not manifest in the Black Sea, but we have to maintain the regional initiatives designated to achieve and maintain security in the region, especially as the overall situation after the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008, with the strengthening autonomy of the Abkhazia region, can facilitate such actions in the future.

Romania has and will continue to have responsibilities in countering security risks in the maritime environment, as any European Union and NATO member state does. Our country has to contribute forces and resources to the collective

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[7] Lauren Gelfand, *Piracy in Gulf of Aden Spurs US to Amend Rules of Engagement*, in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 28 January 2009.

defence effort. To do this, we have to maintain interoperability and expeditionary capabilities and the ability to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The full integration of Romania into NATO and the EU will overlap the national solutions to solve crises with the organisational and operational requirements of the organisations we take part in. A proper engagement in this kind of action needs a full interoperability with allies, and in order to achieve this we need some changes in equipping and training our forces.

In this context, our ships must have non-kinetic equipment to allow a gradual response for asymmetric threats. Moreover, it is necessary for ships to activate in the operation area for a long period of time at lower costs.

The force protection requires, in addition to classic weapons, the 12,7 mm or 14,5 mm machines, such weapons allowing the crew to act appropriately against asymmetric threats in the vicinity of the vessel and to support the boarding team. Actions against pirates and especially the boarding missions require support from helicopters and, for such activities, they should be equipped with machine guns and have snipers on board.

For example, the UK helicopters on board of frigates operating in the region in addition to classical equipment are equipped with two automatic rifles 12,7 mm and 7,62 mm, and on board of helicopters there are snipers who fought in Afghanistan. During the mission, the crew of the helicopter is armed with light weapons and has a few thousand dollars with it, to defend itself or to buy its freedom if the helicopter is shot down by a lucky fire.

Moreover, ships can be equipped with water cannons to allow the force protection measures, but they must be able to operate at greater distances than the fire extinguishing systems that are usually onboard of the ships. High power projectors and speakers for directional lighting and warning of any attack may also facilitate the action of the ship to address asymmetric threats. Optical systems will ensure maritime space monitoring around the ship or in the area of responsibility, to complete the Maritime Recognised Picture. Achieving and maintaining this Picture is essential in modern operations, in which the traditional threats in the maritime environment are intertwined with the asymmetric threats. At the same time, we must ensure freedom of navigation of all vessels not involved in the conflict.

The vessels engaged in such operations should facilitate operations with helicopters, special forces engagement and, where needed, they should provide all facilities necessary to carry out a CTG or CTF mission in good conditions. The CTG or CTF HQ spaces must be properly equipped with command and control systems, the spaces must be specially designed not to affect daily activities onboard ships. If there are Special Forces on board, it is necessary to have spaces for training, places to store weapons and ammunition must be provided so that activities

of maintaining their level of physical training and readiness of action could not interfere with the ships programme.

Ships actions against piracy require a change in the way crews are trained; a special attention should be given to low intensity operations mainly characterised by law enforcement actions. This should not affect the ready for action position and the ships fighting capabilities to defend the country. The specific training programme, required by the participation in actions against pirates, can start at least two months before the mission. Preparation should include the appropriate use at maximum capacity and in a perfect synchronisation of boats, boarding teams, weapons systems and helicopters in action against piracy. Moreover, special attention is necessary for the training and verification of standard operating procedures when a boarding team is captured during mission.

The Romanian Naval Forces engagement in actions against piracy should be considered in the context of the need to develop a maritime security strategy in different levels from the open sea, territorial waters, including coastal areas and port facilities. This concept involves a commitment to maritime security measures outside its maritime space, as well as the continuous participation of naval forces in monitoring its maritime space and the exercise of Romania's sovereign right in this area of responsibility.

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One of the important aspects regarding the action against pirates is that the modern world looks at piracy with romanticism, and the image of a pirate is rather associated with the *"Black Beard"* pirate, who sailed in the wind near the coast of America, than to a criminal who uses an AK-47 or a rocket-propelled grenade. The threat of piracy is complex and takes various shapes, given the attack itself is an immediate danger to life and wellbeing in different countries and affects the economy by cargo theft and delayed shipments that can reduce a state's maritime trade. In political terms, piracy affects the government's legitimacy by encouraging corruption in state institutions and can produce major disasters during the attacks carried out in areas with heavy traffic of oil and gas tankers.

The international community is concerned about the extent of terrorism in the Somali coast region and, in those circumstances, a very large number of ships were sent in this area. In this region, about 40-50 ships under different flags operate permanently. However, the increasing acts of piracy have shown that these cannot be stopped only by employing naval forces, given that the source of these actions is on the territory of some independent states. An important direction of action should be the support of state institutions and the strengthening of their authority.

NEW HORIZONS
FOR UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Commander Dr Gheorghe-Cristian BOGDAN

UN peacekeeping operations require stable and solid capabilities in order to face the current and future challenges. To obtain such capabilities and to maintain an instrument capable of serving global peace and security, an efficient partnership is needed.

This partnership can be enhanced through: a projection of the objectives in conditions of uncertainty regarding the precise identification of the available resources; a capability-based approach, characterised by a high level of specialisation and mobility of the military, police and civil capabilities; a broader peacekeeping partnership; a new strategy to support peace missions in the field, in the circumstances of a rapid and complex change in the nature of peacekeeping operations.

Keywords: *peace missions; interoperability; global partnership; crisis management; Integrated Operational Terms*

In the report[1] presented to the UN Generally Assembly, on 24 February 2006, with regard to the peacekeeping operations funding, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan outlined, among others, a reform strategy entitled *Peace Operations 2010* setting out the policies and procedures to enable the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which is part of the UN Secretariat, to support peacekeeping operations in the following years.

It is four years since then and peacekeeping operations have undertaken an ample and critical process of analysis, reassessment and transformation, and I will make a general presentation of the written milestones that are characteristic of this process, without attempting to be exhaustive. In what follows, it is presented the approach of a modest former international servant who, together with other several thousands of DPKO employees, directly took part in the implementation of a reform that is currently in development.

Comander Dr Gheorghe-Cristian Bogdan – Operations Directorate, the General Staff.

[1] Report A/60/696, *Overview of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Budget Performance for the Period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and Budget for the Period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007* may be accessed on http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20A60696.pdf

Peace Operations 2010

I do not think it wrong to regard peacekeeping operations in their evolution, making an analogy with the division of periods in history: *BC* and *AD*. Therefore, I consider there are operations *before Brahimi* and *after Brahimi*[2]. The report of the experts led by the famous Algerian diplomat, presented to the public in the second half of 2000, mentions the minimum requirements for a mission to be successful. Following the report, the United Nations and the member states have taken some measures to enhance peacekeeping operations. The materialisation of these efforts has sometimes been wan and tardy as, alongside the restructuring, the current and more and more complex tasks have had to be achieved.

The reform strategy appeared six years after Brahimi and stipulated that the process had to be controlled by the Change Management Office that had been recently established within DPKO, focusing on the following domains: human resources, doctrines, partnership, resources and organisational structure. The proposed measures were aimed at the establishment of some working groups that were to develop detailed plans for each of the proposed domains. The working groups were to promote courses of action that were submitted to the major decision-makers. Following the choice of the optimal course of action, the working groups were to monitor its implementation. An operational team was to engage DPKO and the developing peacekeeping missions in the reform process, preventing the current activity from being dysfunctional.

In the *human resources* domain, the following were stipulated:
- recruitment and maintenance of the highly qualified personnel through providing the structures and the necessary support for a clear career evolution;
- conversion of key positions, integrated personnel management, development of leadership skills, improvement of the expertise level and professionalism;
- perfection of leadership and managerial standards through providing clear indications regarding policies, discipline and action procedures;
- establishment of career counselling for the personnel deployed in peacekeeping missions;
- establishment of workshops and training to support career evolution;
- establishment of distance learning modules to increase the number of those who have access to various courses;
- creation of some web pages dedicated to career evolution that provide updated information about the novelties in the field;
- establishment of career resource centres in peacekeeping missions.

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[2] In March 2000, the UN Secretary-General asked a group of international experts led by Lakhdar Brahimi (former Algerian minister for foreign affairs) to analyse peacekeeping operations and to identify where, how and when they could have been more effective. The experts report is known under the name of *Brahimi Report*.

The *doctrinal domain* was to extend in the following directions:
- development of a system able to collect and analyse permanently the experience acquired not only in peacekeeping missions but also in the activity carried out within DPKO; subsequently, this system will provide content elements for the guiding materials meant to the enhancement of managerial practices regarding the information dissemination;
- standardisation of the practices and procedures meant to facilitate the interaction between the workers who come from different cultural environments and have extremely diverse education and expertise;
- development of new doctrines regarding planning, training and the management of the missions in the field, able to be adapted to the challenges generated by the current operational environment;
- concentration of the analysis of the lessons learned regarding the UN multidimensional missions integration, operational centres, cells of integrated analysis at the mission level.

In the *partnership domain*, the main priorities in establishing an interactive work environment were:
- enhancement of planning coherence in the entire system of structures that cooperate in peace operations and an increased involvement of different agencies, funds and programmes that have a great capacity to operate in the field;
- improvement of the process of integrated planning for peace missions not only initially, at the beginning of a new mission, but also during the entire lifecycle of each mission;
- establishment of a framework for effective cooperation with regional organisations, which should include common standards, coordinating procedures and even the exercise of procedures in common to validate them;
- extension and deepening the relations with international financial institutions, especially with the World Bank.

Providing what is necessary for the execution of peace operations involves, in the *domain of resources*, a greater attention paid to the DPKO police structure that lagged behind regarding the development of some capabilities that were so necessary for the mission, as follows:
- establishment of a component, as a permanent structure in the Police Division, able to deploy rapidly everywhere in the world to provide expertise in the field;
- improvement of the equipment with information technology, especially with administration software packages;
- improvement of the strategic communications capabilities;
- establishment of some Conduct and Discipline Units not only at DPKO level, but also at the level of the peace missions in the field;
- establishment of the arrangements necessary for the achievement of a rapid deployment capability to support the missions in crisis situations.

The fifth domain, the one of the *structure*, was oriented towards:
- establishment of some flexible integrated structures, at the level of DPKO and of the missions in the field, able to develop according to the phases of the missions, providing, at the same time, efficient and timely support to conduct the activities;

- development of new fundaments for the structures of the missions in the field;
- creation, at DPKO level, of the Integrated Operational Teams – IOT, incorporating personnel with expertise in domains such as: political, military, policy, civilian, logistical, financial and personnel management;
- establishment of the functional support elements for IOT by other structures such as: conduct and discipline, integrated training, policies and doctrines, legality, disarming-demobilisation-reintegration;
- establishment of a structure meant to engage relations with DPKO external partners.

Although all these elements were established during the mandate of Kofi Annan, the new UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, has continued and developed these programmes.

New Horizon – Reconsidering Global Partnership in the UN Peacekeeping Operations

The new approach to peacekeeping operations, in the light of a common study undertaken by DPKO and DFS (Department of Field Support), entitled *NEW HORIZON*[3], is integrated in the framework created by *Peace Operations 2010*. The recent study deserves special attention and that is the reason why I have decided to treat it separately, even if not exhaustively.

New Horizon is an internal document of the two departments and reflects their point of view regarding a new agenda for the UN peacekeeping operations. The study has been distributed to the UN member countries and to different partners in the discussions and actions of the organisation, with a view to relaunching the dialogue regarding a new policy in the field, able to illustrate the views of all the actors of this global partnership.

New Horizon is neither a document that renders the UN official policy nor one that presents a set of solutions having a definitive character. It is not intended to present the absolute truth as far as peacekeeping operations are concerned, and it does not replace the reform efforts made previously by the organisation. The document only identifies, based on the achievements, important issues that have to be thoroughly approached to continually perfect the way peacekeeping operations are conceived and developed. The ideas contained in *New Horizon* are briefly presented below.

Having as a starting point the fact that peacekeeping operations provide the conditions for the achievement of a global partnership between governmental and non-governmental structures, local, regional and international organisations, partnership that makes the actions ample, legitimate and viable, *New Horizon* focuses on and develops the idea of international collaboration in relation to three types of partnerships. These types of *partnership* are to create an integrated, common vision,

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[3] For further details, visit http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/newhorizon.shtml

based on understanding and cooperation, between *those who authorise* the development of peacekeeping operations, those who *execute* them, those who financially *contribute*, providing material and human resources, those who directly *benefit* from the help of the *"blue helmets"* and those who, in a way or another, *enter collaboration* with peacekeeping forces during their mandate.

These are the recommendations made by DPKO and DFS in a common effort:

➢ *Partnership in purpose*

A common vision, unanimously agreed upon by the participants, regarding the purpose of peacekeeping operations is the foundation of the effectiveness of actions in the field. To enhance the capacity to direct, plan and administrate the UN peacekeeping missions, it is necessary a partnership based on unity and cohesion, strengthened by:

a) *Transparent political strategy having precise directions*, as peacekeeping is a component of a political solution and not an alternative to it. Peacekeeping operations are but one of the multiple instruments that are available to preserve peace and international security, instruments that should be carefully examined before the solution of deploying peacekeeping forces is resorted to. Peacekeeping operations can demonstrate their potential only if there is an active political strategy. If, following the conducted analyses, the conclusion is that a peacekeeping operation is the best solution, the efforts have to be directed towards the creation of a consensual support, through a gradual consultative process, which aligns the UN mandate with the established objectives and the available resources. The establishment of an informal coalition of the organisation member states for the beginning of a certain peacekeeping operation may bring unity regarding the purpose and the necessary support for any mission of this type.

b) *Cohesive peacekeeping mission planning and management*, based on sustained dialogue and permanent exchange of information between the UN Secretariat and member states, between DPKO and missions in the field. The consultations and consultative mechanisms created during planning and management have to rely on the mutual recognition of the role, responsibilities and accountability of each of them. At the same time, the impartiality of Secretariat planning must be retained, as must the integrity of UN command and control. Management and monitoring of peacekeeping missions deployed in one area will be improved if relevant milestones and stages of the actions are established even in their primary phases.

➢ *Partnership in action*

The success of a peacekeeping operation depends on its capacity to provide outcomes that are practical, visible and opportune for the parties that benefit from it. To enhance trust in the capacity of an operation to fulfil its role, the following are needed:

a) *Rapid deployment* of the peacekeeping forces to establish security in the area and increase the actions credibility as a proof of an international firm political will. The speed and efficacy of deployment can, however, be enhanced by focusing on the early establishment of mission Headquarters, a sequenced roll-out and prioritisation of tasks that take into consideration the immediate needs identified on the ground.

b) *Clarity of the roles and their consistent fulfilment*, which develops the capacity of the participants in operations to cope with a volatile environment characterised by many threats, providing the local population with continuous support and creating the foundations for long-lasting peace. Reaching consensus with regard to the policies and requirements of a robust peacekeeping operation, permanently protecting the citizens, is in the centre of the efforts meant to successfully fulfil the mission assigned through the mandate. It is also required to clarify the role played by peacekeeping operations in building peace subsequently and in identifying the transition and completion strategies for the mission. In this regard, even since the initial phases of the actions, the host country has to be supported to fulfil the reform in the security sector.

c) *Improvement of crisis management during operations*, which allows an appropriate response in the event such situations occur. Precise, timely and detailed risk and threat assessments may enable early warning even in the incipient phases of the crisis so measures to protect the mission and the participating personnel can be taken. It is desirable for the response planning to be based on correctly identified scenarios, and for the reserve forces and assets to be ready for action, objective that has not been accomplished in an appropriate manner yet.

➢ *Partnership for the future*

UN peacekeeping operations need stable and solid capabilities to cope with the current and future challenges. To achieve such capabilities and maintain an instrument that serves global peace and security, a partnership for the future is really necessary. This partnership may be consolidated through:

a) *Projecting future needs* in the context of unknown future demands and uncertainty about the available resources. Peacekeeping operations remain inexpensive compared to other means to provide a country with post-conflict security. However, critical shortages have already manifested across many UN missions. Therefore, future requirements have to be considered taking into account the more and more evident financial constraints, situation that entails a coherent approach to resource generation and the necessary incentives to execute activities in the field.

b) *A capability-driven approach*, characterised by a high degree of specialisation and mobility of the military, police and civil capabilities. Currently, the identification, recruitment and maintenance of experts able to meet the requirements imposed by peacekeeping are difficult to achieve. In order to match the personnel and equipment to the tasks, and to provide appropriate incentives that make the participation in the mission attractive, there should be a shift from quantity to quality as far as the generation of capabilities is concerned. All these result in the need to develop adequate standards regarding training, equipment and operation.

c) *Expanding the peacekeeping partnership* that cannot be limited to a small number of contributors that provide the majority of the resources for operations. An expanded base of troop- and police-contributing countries is required to enhance collective burden-sharing and to meet future requirements. The support for building capabilities, as it is the one provided by the UN to the African Union, has to be a priority, an emphasis being put on achieving interoperability with partners such as the European Union, to concentrate available resources, otherwise rather limited, for peacekeeping operations.

d) *A new field support strategy*, in the context of a rapid and complex change in the nature of peacekeeping operations, which currently requires a new approach characterised by innovation, flexibility and responsibility in choosing support systems. The new strategy should generate results at global, regional and local level for each and every mission. It is based on the shared use of assets through establishing regional service centres, better using technology to support the more agile and less difficult deployment in the field, as well as through improving financial arrangements for a greater operational flexibility. These approaches may be successful only if all partners get actively and constantly involved. The UN member countries will have to be in the vanguard of many actions, assuming their organisation and leadership, while others will have to develop their capabilities with the support of the UN Secretariat.

With this study, DPKO and DFS try to offer a vision of the way in which the Secretariat can contribute to the global peacekeeping partnership. The two departments reaffirm their commitment to cooperating with the UN member states and other regional or local partners.

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The strategic context of the UN peacekeeping operations has undergone dramatic changes, determining the organisation to change the way to address the missions, shifting from the so-called *"traditional"* operations that involve the execution of operations having a strictly military character, to complex, *"multidimensional"* operations meant to assure not only the implementation of correct peace agreements but also the foundations for long-lasting peace. Currently, the ones that are involved in peacekeeping operations in different countries carry out a multitude of activities, from providing the support for the establishment of the institutions that are necessary for good governance, monitoring the observance of fundamental human rights, reforming the security sector to disarming, demobilising and reintegrating former combatants into the civilian life.

The nature of conflict has also changed in time. If, initially, peacekeeping operations were conceived and used as instruments to address interstate conflicts, they have come to be more and more used in intrastate conflicts and civil wars to provide the favourable circumstances to find a political solution for the existent situation.

Although the military component remains the backbone of most of peacekeeping operations, the multi-faceted actions more and more require the presence of experts in management and governance, economists, police officers and experts in law, mine clearance experts, electoral observers and observers in the field of human rights, workers in the field of humanitarian aid, experts in communication and mass-media.

The UN peacekeeping operations continue to evolve regarding both concepts and operations to meet the requirements related to the new political realities and challenges. Confronted with an increasing demand in the more and more complex domain of operations, the United Nations are more solicited than ever in their existence. The UN continues to make efforts to enhance their capacity to manage and sustain missions in the field and to thus contribute to the achievement of the most important objective of the organisation: to maintain international peace and security.

Editor's Note: *Following the results obtained at the UN international selection examination, Commander Dr Gheorghe-Cristian Bogdan was made available, with the approval of the Ministry of National Defence, to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the UN Secretariat in New York, between 2006 and 2009. During this period, he filled, in turn, the following positions: officer in charge of force generation planning for the UN Missions in the Middle East, administrator of the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) and liaison officer in the Office of Military Affairs next to the political component of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations – Operations Office – as a member in the integrated operational team for Asia and the Middle East. He is the recipient of the UN Headquarters Medal with Numeral 6.*

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

THE GLOBALISATION OF POLITICAL, JURIDICAL AND MILITARY APPROACHES WITH THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH CRISIS MANAGEMENT (II)

University Assistant Anelis-Vanina ISTRĂTESCU

Maintaining international security can be possible only through the association of states within powerful union structures, with the accomplishment of an effective judicial system and the enhancement of cooperation in the juridical field as main objectives.

That was precisely the intention at the moment the European Union was established: among others, to apply a unitary law – community law – through an impartial and independent jurisdiction in relation to the Union states, as well as to obtain a closer collaboration of states legislatively and institutionally in the fight against crime, terror, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as real threats to global security.

Keywords: *crime; Council of Europe; international crises; Treaty of Lisbon; public order*

In addition to developing and promoting a coherent and consistent international policy, creating an effective legal framework is the prerequisite for preserving a minimum background of world order and peace, considering that the proliferation of anti-social phenomena in the field of crime is a source of insecurity for social life and, at the same time, a real aggression against the rule of law. Providing security through law requires, on the one hand, the adoption of legal rules in order to discipline the conduct of individuals or states and, on the other hand, it involves the establishment of judicial mechanisms able to ensure the direct and immediate enforcement of the laws and the punishment of those guilty of violating them.

Juridical Cooperation

As in the field of politics, we consider that the legal steps undertaken by states to ensure security should be analysed from a dual perspective: *1) national*, meaning all instruments used by each state entity internally to ensure an environment free of dangers, threats and risks, and *2) international,*

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meaning the enforcement of common rules and the use of collective means of coercion with the purpose of maintaining regional or universal stability.

Internally, the state fully exercises the prerogatives of national sovereignty by creating a suitable legal and institutional system to meet own economic, political, social and cultural realities and in full compliance with its rules of social life, precepts, customs, habits. In performing these duties, the state exercised various functions, which are divided by some authors[1] as follows: *the legislative function* – which establishes rules of conduct for all citizens, *the executive function* – the pursuit of the activity of organising the execution and enforcement of laws, *the judicial function* – through which there are solved the legal disputes arising between different state institutions, as well as between citizens or between citizens and the state, based on court decisions.

The regulation of internal juridical relations between individuals or between individuals and the state is made by normative documents – written sources of law – which may take the form of constitutions, laws, ordinances, decisions, decrees, orders, statutes, regulations and other similar acts. Moreover, the domestic juridical order of the state is supplemented by normative contracts, customs, judicial precedents or specialised doctrine, all contributing, to a greater or lesser extent, to *"polishing"* the judiciary system and even improving it.

States first develop domestic juridical rules, which are essential to maintaining security, by preventing and penalising acts against the state security, the country's defence capacity, peace and humanity, the facts that affect fundamental rights and freedoms, by fighting and seriously punishing organised crime, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as by creating internal judicial mechanisms capable of monitoring, judging and bringing to justice the authors of such acts in order to ensure overall prevention and minimisation of socially dangerous results.

Domestic juridical order cannot disregard the international juridical order, in which it must be integrated and with which it needs to relate; this is precisely the reason for which states pool their efforts at the juridical level in order to create a normative and institutional framework, able to provide effective common goals of safeguarding world security and stability. In this respect, states sign and ratify agreements, treaties, conventions, which, once assumed, have to be respected. We should mention here, for example, the *1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism*, the *1987 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*, the *1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data*, the *2005 Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings* etc.

[1] I. Muraru, S. Tănăsescu, *Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice*, the ninth edition, reviewed and completed, Editura Lumina Lex, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 341.

Analysing the relation domestic juridical order – international juridical order, some authors have argued that *"state is a partial law order, directly rooted in international law and relatively centralised, with a limited area of territorial and temporal validity from the point of view of international law and with a limited claim of totality from the viewpoint of the area of material validity only by the restrictions of international law"*[2]. We embrace this view, considering that between the two components there must be a symbiotic relationship in nature, likely to secure organised society and to effectively protect the rule of law, an indispensable condition for the survival of humanity and the acceleration of social progress.

As a result of this synergy, the international norm, once ratified by the state, is incorporated into domestic law, becoming part of it. We really embrace the *monistic concept* outlined in terms of doctrine, according to which the application of a norm of international law in the domestic law is made simply through its acceptance by the state concerned, without being prior subjected to some special documents to ensure its applicability[3]. Moreover, in case of conflict between the domestic and international juridical norm, the latter will prevail, whenever it better ensures the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms[4], a principle expressly enshrined even in art. 20, par. 2 of the present Constitution of Romania[5]. The same principle is found as far as the application of community law norms is concerned, as stated in an unequivocal manner by the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC) in its rich case law[6]. Moreover, the direct applicability of the community norm[7] in domestic law and the principle of priority are the two pillars of the community juridical order[8], subject to a constant process of reform and reconfiguration.

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[2] For more comments, I. Dragoman, *Protecția juridică a drepturilor omului*, Editura Fundației *România de Mâine*, București, 2008, pp. 114-115.

[3] The most fervent supporter of this theory is the renowned Austrian-American jurist Hans Kelsen, creator of *"Pure Theory of Law"*; his theory is based on the existence of a framework-norm (Grundnorm), a hypothetical norm, on which all the other levels of the juridical system are based; in *"Théorie pure de droit"*, Dalloz, Paris, 1962.

[4] Such a priority document is the *European Convention on Human Rights*, on 4 November 1950, ratified by Romania on 20 June 1994.

[5] According to this constitutional provision: *If there are discrepancies between the pacts and treaties regarding the fundamental rights of the human being, in which Romania is part, and the domestic laws, then international regulations have priority, except when the Constitution or the domestic laws comprise more favourable dispositions.*

[6] Let us remember only the CJEC decision in the *Costa Case* on 15.07.1964; on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.inm-lex.ro/fișiere/pag_34

[7] We should nevertheless distinguish between community documents with compulsory juridical force (regulations, decision, directive) and the community documents that states can choose but are not forced to respect (recommendation, notification).

[8] For a broader approach to the issue, see A. Fuerea, *Drept comunitar european. Partea generală*, Editura All Beck, București, 2003, pp. 155-166.

The solution to prevent such conflicts is to harmonise national domestic juridical norms with international law, of course, respecting the economic, social, cultural and religious realities specific to the state, under the right of peoples to decide their own fate[9]. *Per a contrario*, it would be violated the national sovereignty and identity conferred to the nation, as a distinct entity with own rights and obligations within the international community.

Maintaining international security would be possible only by the association of states in strong union structures, having as primary objectives the achievement of an efficient judicial system and the consolidation of judicial cooperation. This is what was considered when the European Union was established, when the following goals were proposed, among others: the application of a uniform law – the community law – by an impartial and independent jurisdiction towards the Union states, as well as a closer cooperation of states at the legislative and institutional level, in the fight against crime, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which are real threats to global security. One of the constant concerns of EU member states was to create a space of security, through the development of judicial cooperation, as well as a place of justice, which implies the existence of an independent judiciary power and of competent magistrates.

Before 1 December 2009, the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the *Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)* was included in the system based on three community pillars of the EU. With this new treaty, which abolished the pillar structure, changes were made in terms of both jurisdiction and regulations.

Thus, the Union's jurisdictional system is presently administered by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which consists of three categories of courts: the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal; in the new community order, in which the European Union acquires legal personality, there are significant changes in the procedure for establishing specialised courts, which currently uses the system of co-decision with qualified majority[10].

It is also provided the extension of the competencies of the Union Court, which is the only jurisdiction able to determine the way in which member states comply with the European Union law. The same court has acquired, as a result of recent changes, general jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings in the area of freedom,

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[9] For a thorough analysis, see Gr. Geamănu, *Principiile fundamentale ale dreptului internaţional contemporan*, Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1967, pp. 110-166.
[10] In the previous system, the creation of tribunals was conditioned by achieving the requirement of unanimity.

security and justice, as well as competence to give preliminary rulings on police and judicial cooperation in criminal issues. Salutary changes were made as far as taking someone to the EU Court, attribute that belongs, at present, to any national court, not just the high ones, in the domain regarding police and criminal justice, as well as in the civil sphere, right of asylum, immigration or free movement of persons. Consequently, the Community Court may take measures of public order within border controls, can clarify and control documents issued by the bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, may decide on the legality of an act adopted by the European Council. However, the Court has competence to control the provisions regarding common foreign and security policy in only two limiting cases: 1. in case of delimitation between the competences of the Union and the CFSP; 2. for actions for annulment against the decisions that stipulate restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council.

We should particularly note that the Treaty of Lisbon[11] caused a revival of the application of community rules, since, on the one hand, it expressly regulated the primacy of community law – previously acknowledged only through jurisprudence – in relation to the domestic legislations of union states, and secondly, in that it gave the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* the value of a treaty, thus becoming legally binding.

A particular implication of the Treaty of Lisbon on the new community juridical order occurred through the specific accession of the EU, now endowed with legal personality, to the *European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, which was an unquestionable proof of the acknowledgement of the primacy of individual fundamental rights at the EU level, as well as a huge step in strengthening protection mechanisms outlined around the mentioned convention. In fact, by the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights and the establishment of the court that monitors its enforcement – the European Court of Human Rights, a supranational jurisdictional system was established to verify how the states-parties to the mentioned treaty understand to respect and guarantee individual fundamental rights, a premise of the rule of law, democracy and security of organised societies. In this context, we should also stress the major contribution of the *Council of Europe* to solving international crises and mitigating humanitarian disasters, through activities of preventing violations of human dignity, as well as of promoting the culture of human rights, democracy and rule of law, enhancing European citizens' security,

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[11] The ratification procedure of the Treaty of Lisbon by Romania ended on 4 February 2008.

increasing cooperation with other international organisations and institutions. The development of close cooperation of the Council of Europe with the European Union in these areas is currently a priority[12].

The juridical efforts of states would be purposeless without the reform and continuous modernisation of the institutional system created with the purpose of applying the law. The range of actions undertaken in the field of security and justice is completed with the ones regarding the coordination of border crime investigation and prosecution in the field of organised crime, for which the member states created the structures called *Eurojust*, which, together with the *European Judicial Network*, provides the analysis and rapid settlement of cases regarding cross-border crime, through the urgent settlement of extradition and mutual assistance requests in criminal issues. The role of this structure in preserving security by combating crime is greater because *Eurojust*[13] can support investigations and prosecutions carried out even by a state that is not part of the European Union, for crimes against the financial interests of the European Community. *Eurojust* efficiently cooperates with *Europol* (the European Union Police Office)[14], focused on the development of the cooperation of the competent authorities of member states in preventing and combating serious forms of terrorism and international crime. The cooperation of these judicial bodies with the *Interpol*[15], the world's largest police organisation, whose primary mission is to combat organised crime, is also included in the ensemble of collective measures taken by states with a view to maintaining international security.

Also in order to preserve the international juridical order, specialised institutions were established in judging extremely serious crimes, such as *The Hague International Criminal Court*, having the jurisdiction to rule on genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Designed to meet the institutional needs of global justice, this court is entrusted with solving the cases with deep reverberations in the international community, such as, for example, those concerning the situation in Uganda, Congo or Sudan, reason for which a huge responsibility lies on it, its perception as a planetary body of jurisdiction depending on its management.

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[12] For instance, on 18 November 2009, the Council of Europe and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights requested the governments to intensify their efforts in order to observe and protect child's rights against violence, poverty and discrimination.

[13] Consisting of 27 national members, from each EU member state, *Eurojust* was established in 2002, through the Decision of the Council of the European Union no. JHA/187/2002, at http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/

[14] *Europol* became fully functional on 1 July 1999, at http://www.europol.europa.eu/

[15] Established in 1923, the organisation now has 188 member states.

The jurisdiction for settling the disputes between UN member states regarding the application or interpretation of conventions adopted within the organisation belongs to the *International Court of Justice*, the main judicial body of the UN, which, together with the Security Council of the same organisation, contributes substantially to the preservation of world peace and security.

All these partnerships between states demonstrate that humanity has fully understood the need for cooperation, including in the juridical domain, which will significantly contribute to relieving conflictual relations, reducing crime, and restoring the juridical order violated by committing illegal acts. Implementing all established goals will be hindered by the unpredictable future geopolitical mutations, as well as by the constant metamorphosis of the international security environment.

Military Cooperation

At the military level, the concept of *globalisation* has acquired a specific connotation, meaning the process of establishment and development of military relations between the political communities of the world system. In the specialised literature, it is often perceived as a process that includes both the extension and the intensity of military connections that are established between political units of the international system[16]. In theory, the term *military globalisation* has been analysed in close connection with that of *global militarisation*, respectively that of *global militarism*. It has been stated that, while the global militarisation process means the establishment and manifestation of specific military processes at world level, global militarism represents all strategies pursued by states or groups of states to meet own interests[17].

Above all, we notice that the orientation and redefinition of military strategies to combat future security challenges will tremendously depend on the political decisions made, which will be reflected in the operating mode, tactics and tools used to eliminate any disparities and the identification of a unified programme of action to preserve world peace.

The synergy between political and military action is, in our opinion, best illustrated in Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, whose reflections remained alive in the consciousness

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[16] See Gh. Nicolaescu, *Fenomenul globalizării în domeniul militar – Cât de lung e drumul şi unde am ajuns ?*, in vol. *Stabilitate şi securitate regională*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare *"Carol I"*, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 757.

[17] For more details, M. Cosma, *Dimensiunea militară a securităţii în era globalizării*, in vol. *Surse de instabilitate la nivel global şi regional. Implicaţii pentru România*, the fourth annual session of scientific papers, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 221-222.

of humanity and will endure for eternity. He believed that *"humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern a state, but not an army. Opportunism and flexibility are military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of an army to that of a state"*. The quintessence of what Sun Tzu wrote is translated through a causal relation between the two elements, starting from the idea that military actions are directly determined and influenced by the political factor or, in other words, that politics dictates the use of armed force. Such a conclusion is restated later by Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote: *"We therefore see that war is not a mere act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means"*[18].

Modern views on this subject are more nuanced. It has been said even about the military phenomenon that it is a hybrid of the political, economic, technological and information phenomena and that it takes place on three important levels: the vision and requirements of parliaments, governments, international organisations and bodies; the dynamics of systems and processes specific to the military institution; a dynamic and complex civil-military synthesis, interdisciplinarity and confluence space[19].

As far as I am concerned, I consider that the approach to security solely in terms of the military factor is not sufficient anymore, it must be equally related to the political vectors that determine the policies and limits of military operations, the opportunity of armed interventions and the purposes of launching military actions. I also believe that the improvement of military approaches involves a stronger political cooperation between states, a greater flexibility in the acceptance of mutual concessions, as well as a larger capacity to anticipate the developments in the geopolitical environment in the following decades, essential for preparing and adapting the means of retaliation against new threats, dangers or risks. The accomplishment of this *"work"* first involves the revival of military-technical capabilities of each state, so that strong, efficient and sustainable alliances can be established, able to cope with the scourges of the modern world.

The imperative of restructuring its military system was understood by Romania as well, which planned the creation of a national military strategy with the purpose of providing security, in accordance with its human, material, and informational

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[18] Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 67.

[19] For a broader approach to the military-political relation, see Gh. Văduva, *Posibile coordonate ale unui mediu strategic*, in *Impact Strategic*, no. 3/2008, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare *"Carol I"*, București, 2008, pp. 106-115.

resources. This is proven by the commitments made with a view to respecting the strategic foundations stipulated in the *NATO Strategic Concept*, adopted at the 1999 Washington Summit, supplemented with the *Capabilities Commitment*, adopted at the 2002 Prague Summit. In the same line, Romania adopted the *EU Security Strategy* and the participation in the European Security and Defence Policy – ESDP, thus asserting its substantial contribution to the collective work of managing the new global and regional challenges.

We should emphasise the major role played in this process by *strategic planning*, the foundation of correlating the political and military strategic objectives with the resources provided through the government programmes and the Defence Planning Guidance, based on the operational planning process and finalised through developing strategic guidance for future programmes. The strategic planning system, characterised by flexibility and interactivity, led to the creation of *Romania's Military Strategy*, *Defence Planning Guidance*, *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, *Strategy of Using the Romanian Armed Forces beyond National Borders* and *Romanian Armed Forces Procurement Strategy*. Thus, through the *Decision no. 30 on 4 November 2008*[20] *regarding the Approval of the National Strategy for Homeland Defence*, the national defence strategic objectives were expressly regulated, among which: countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, engaging in the fight against terrorism, strengthening Romania's profile within NATO, developing Romania's contribution to the European Security and Defence Policy created by the EU, increasing the contribution to regional security and stability, as well as transforming the country's defence capacity.

The active participation of states, including Romania, in the collective approach to create military structures capable of meeting collective defence needs is subsumed under the current imperatives to preserve security. Against this background, the EU initiated a firm policy, which has been developed and implemented in the military domain[21], especially after the launch of the cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance on countering any form of aggression and restoring peace in areas affected by conflicts. In turn, NATO has the potential necessary to launch and successfully complete major military operations in which take part countries from both sides of the Atlantic and around the world as well. Its objectives

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[20] The decision was published in *Monitorul Oficial*, Part. I, no. 799/28.11.2008, being created based on Law 473/2004 regarding national defence planning.
[21] The EU military missions took place in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chad, Congo. A recent intervention is mission *"Atalanta"* against piracy off the Somali coasts.

are subject to a constant process of reconfiguration and adaptation to new realities: if, in its first years of existence, NATO focused primarily on the collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic area, gradually, it expanded its area of interest, culminating in the development of a new strategic concept, with cross-border effects, which could be achieved only through modern, deployable, sustainable forces, which are available in any situation. The numerous missions undertaken so far are proof of NATO capabilities[22].

Identifying common solutions and finding the most appropriate ways for assistance will crucially depend on the availability of decision-makers to sit at the negotiation table, to act jointly and to have a constructive dialogue, in which pride and egocentrism should be abandoned. Once with the signing of the joint declaration on ESDP[23], a strategic partnership was established founded on the principles of: *joint action; equality and respect of the EU and NATO decision-making autonomy; respect for the interests of EU and NATO member states; respect for the United Nations Charter principles; coherent, transparent and mutually supported development of joint military capabilities.*

We believe that the recent changes to EU policy through the Treaty of Lisbon, which expressly establishes the need for EU-NATO cooperation and the expansion of cooperation between the two structures, will have a positive impact on the configuration of the future global order, thus endowed with a further guarantee of peace and stability.

In an objective analysis of the mutual US-European relations it is fairly highlighted that only the cooperation of the two forces could reconcile the conflicting interests of democratic states, could prevent the negative phenomena and trends occurring in the international environment and could influence the events in the transatlantic relations not only at European level, but also in processes that generate the contemporary reality[24]. The same author suggests that the implementation of cooperation should be achieved, among others, through the reconstruction of the existing transatlantic architecture, the common understanding of the current and future security environment, and by the establishment of the roles the EU and NATO will play in security worldwide.

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[22] Let us remember only the *ISAF Mission* in Afghanistan (2003-onwards) and *NATO Training Mission* in Iraq (2004-onwards).

[23] The NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP was signed on 16 December 2002.

[24] J. Gryz, *Provocări şi tendinţe în cooperarea transatlantică,* in *Exigenţe ale PESA asupra securităţii şi apărării României* (volume of international seminar)*,* Bucureşti, 24 May 2007, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare *"Carol I"*, pp. 38-40.

The EU-NATO partnership requires the active promotion of a European and Euro-Atlantic strategy in which the EU will expand its responsibilities for the reconstruction and stabilisation of the regions affected by crisis, and the North Atlantic Alliance will increase its presence and enhance its contribution to the process of promoting security, peace and democracy[25]. Moreover, both forces should focus on strengthening capabilities, enhancing interoperability and coordinating doctrines, planning technologies, equipment and training, elements without which their assertion as factors of international stability and security would not be possible.

From our point of view, sharing the attributions of the two power structures will tend to the predominant involvement of NATO in the collective actions to use military force, while the EU will focus on preventive diplomacy and humanitarian assistance. Mention should be made that following the 2008 summit, the EU has reconsidered its position, expressing its manifest intention to strengthen the military capabilities of the community bloc and to directly engage in risky missions of conflict intervention on land, water and in air.

We cannot ignore in our scientific approach the tasks that have been conferred on the EU by the Treaty of Lisbon with a view to military crisis management, the EU thus having full approval to take action to disarm, to conduct humanitarian and rescue missions, to provide assistance and advice in military issues, to restore peace and to conduct stabilisation operations during the postconflict period.

On the other hand, the EU-Russia strategic cooperation is vital for maintaining regional stability in the Eastern European and South Caucasus area, so that the timid steps taken so far to bring the two powers together to the negotiating table could be implemented in firm assistance and support, cohesion and cooperation measures.

In terms of the slogan under which the relations of power in the 21st century have developed – *"European security equals networked security structures"* – the actions taken by the OSCE in preserving world order in affected areas are equally important, because this organisation, as I have mentioned before, focuses on conflict prevention, crisis management and postconflict reconstruction. Moreover, the very act based on which the organisation was founded established the obligation of signatory states to solve the problems regarding the political-military aspects of security in Europe, which resulted in the involvement of the OSCE

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[25] See Teodor Frunzeti, *Rolul instrumentului militar în creşterea stabilităţii şi securităţii regionale*, in vol. *Stabilitate şi securitate regională*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare *"Carol I"*, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 17.

and its critical contribution to international security by support actions to restore peace and national reconciliation of affected members, humanitarian assistance for the civilian population, protection and promotion of fundamental human rights, facilitation of the implementation of peace agreements, assistance for authorities in reforming national security institutions, including training of new armed forces and policemen, monitoring the ceasefire, keeping areas free of conflict etc.

We therefore conclude by stating that, whatever the nature or size of operations conducted, the provision of international security through military structures represents an exercise of force, whose success depends on the professionalism and continuous regeneration of troops, the equipment and technology used, the efficiency of operational capacity and information systems, in other words, the optimisation of the human and material factor, in keeping with the new risks and challenges.

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English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

MODELLING
AND SIMULATION
– Modern Tools for Military Leaders Management Training –

Colonel Dr Florin LĂPUŞNEANU

The complexity of asymmetric warfare at the beginning of the 21st century has highlighted many changes in the way war is fought. A great diversity of forces confront, showing a large diversity of doctrines, military or paramilitary structures with different weapon systems and technologies, adopting more and more ingenious tactics, techniques and procedures, and having the according support of intelligence and logistics. These new realities request a new training environment for military operations, involving modern training technologies and facilities, in accordance with NATO and EU standards.

Most of the armed forces of the NATO member states carry out simulation training, at all echelons, from the individual level to the theatre of military operations level.

***Keywords:** military operations; forces interoperability; defence policy; combat disposition; crisis situation*

The complexity of the asymmetrical conflicts manifested at the beginning of the 21st century have pointed out a few changes in the way war is waged, within which there are confronted forces that have a broad diversity of strategies and doctrines, technologies and means, military or paramilitary structures with a different degree of equipment, which adopt more and more ingenious tactics, techniques and procedures and benefit from a proper information and logistic support. These determine the need for the establishment of a new framework and new training conditions with a view to conducting military actions. In the current context, of the transformation of armed forces, the change and improvement of the training system are expected. These involve the promotion of modern technologies and their use in the process of training the forces with the intention of participating in carrying out the missions in keeping with NATO standards.

The current transformation efforts of the military organisation consider as timely and feasible the initiation of the proper development

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of the *modelling-simulation* domain in the Romanian Armed Forces. Its development can provide, with medium financial efforts, a foundation for and a consistent efficiency of all the military processes and activities. *Modelling and Simulation – M&S* is a broad discipline, widely used in all the domains of science, economic and social life, in administration and even in politics or culture.

In the military domain, simulation is used in support of a variety of activities, comprising training, analysis, procurement, rehearsal for the mission (as part of the operational planning process), operational research, tests and evaluations. We will therefore focus on the use of simulation for training, even if many of the following aspects apply to each of these missions.

Acknowledging the general belief that simulation saves financial resources but uses advanced technology, in the latest decade, there has been noticed an amplification and diversification of the use of simulation in the training process, in the preparation of military operations, as well as in analyses and operational research (testing and evaluation). Research in the simulation domain is an ongoing process in all countries, which is an aspect that causes a competition of performance and of the ways it is used.

The armed forces of NATO member states carry out training through simulation in a large proportion, at all echelons, from the individual level to the one of the theatre of military operations. In general, through the participation of our armed forces in common training activities, exercises and international missions, visits and working groups etc., an opinion that is favourable to understanding the need for widely using simulation in the training process has developed.

Global war on terror has changed the way war is waged, the way in which troops carry out the fight and, as a direct consequence, the way in which troops train for this war.

The Romanian Armed Forces are not an exception. In full process of modernisation, the Romanian Armed Forces tend to transform into a military force with a doctrine and an advanced technology. The domain of military training is only a part of this broad process. Modernising and raising the training standards of troops are essential for the improvement of the way in which they carry out military actions. Currently, it is more important than ever for us to train as we fight in combat actions. That is why, in the conditions in which the traditional methods do not fully meet the training needs, the simulation environments are the ones that allow us to best achieve this objective.

Training through simulation, one of the great *"challenges"* that commanders must face, is already an indisputable reality. It does not replace classic training, quite the contrary, it supports it and widens its coverage. Given that classic training

is an activity that wastes huge resources, many of its segments can take place based on simulation, the condition being to keep a close connection with the reality of the combat and of the training in the field.

For the Romanian Armed Forces, the short- and medium-term *advantages* of the broader use of simulation in the training process are highlighted from three distinct points of view:

• *politico-managerial:* it determines the integration in the general conception of the C4ISR systems, from the tactical level to the strategic one; it triggers the redesign of preparation and training of military staffs in the circumstances of a strict management of the costs and of the military and economic efficiency; it provides a theoretic framework and a realistic environment for planning, preparing and organising military actions; it entails the integration of national concepts, of methods and scenarios established in keeping with the defence policy; it tests the interoperability of the forces required to act jointly; it favours international cooperation and experience exchanges with allied or partner military forces;

• *operational:* it provides the improvement of own capacity to make decisions, through optimising the concepts, structures and combat dispositions; it enables the definition of the ways of action of dispositions and means in crisis situations, as well as the continuous improvement of operation procedures;

• *technical:* it determines the integration in the functional structure of C4ISR systems; it leads to the increase in the capacity of optimisation of future force structures and means; it entails a good capacity of viably defining the elements of a virtual or synthetic battlefield.

It is widely acknowledged that, even though land tactical exercises represent the favourite method of training and of validation of the *mission essential task list*[1], these can be influenced by significant limitations and are prohibitive cost-wise. Land exercises at large scale, which require the forces planning, command and control, are expensive, require a big area for manoeuvre, a lot of time and influence the working time of lower echelons, meant for execution. For instance, the tactical exercises of units and subunits can be limited, sometimes drastically, by the cost of the fuel, munitions meant for training, lack of space, safety and environmental reasons and, moreover, the limited time necessary for preparing this kind of exercises.

In some cases, these limitations can be countered through the use of simulations. Training through simulation provides the military men and units with the possibility of practicing techniques and procedures, of improving their skills, before and after land exercises. Yet, we must mention that training

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[1] Colonel Florin Berea, *Simularea constructivă în dezvoltarea planului de operaţie*, thesis developed with the purpose of becoming a Doctor of Military Sciences, 2006, p. 198.

through simulation should not be understood as something that entirely replaces other resource-consuming training methods, but computer simulations provide a special opportunity for training possibilities that, at land exercises, are not always accepted or possible.

Simulations represent a useful way of deriving the best advantages from the training objectives, especially when resources are limited. The training through simulation can prepare the unit in order to subsequently benefit at maximum from the exercises in the field. In order to do so, simulations must be comprised in the own training strategy at all levels, irrespective of the limits of the resources. Based on the experience of certain allied armed forces, belonging to certain more developed technologically states, it is expected that, once with the wider access to simulation systems, units will develop their training programmes, in order to optimise the benefit gained through simulation.

The development of the unit's training strategy is influenced by a few actors, among which: doctrinaire provisions, unit's essential tasks, mission, enemy, land, time and training results evaluation. We also believe that the following ides may contribute to the development of the training strategy: the commander can also be a trainer; training must be carried out as if the mission would really take place; the maintenance of the training level, the orientation of training towards performance and the use of proper doctrinaire provisions must be sought; training can take place simultaneously, at multiple echelons.

After the unit has identified the mission and the training needs, the type of simulation that meets the mentioned requirements must be determined. The instruments or means of training through simulation refer to both the cheapest tools – the sand box – and the very expensive, computerised ones. Technology provides the solution: computer simulations gain importance as training means, because they add realism to training and reduce its costs substantially.

Simulations can be classified based on several criteria, one of them being the purpose or use, which determine five categories: for test and evaluation; for research and development; for production and logistics; for analysis; for education and training.

A different classification[2], much more used for training in the military field, divides them, depending on the degree of realism of operations and systems used, in real, virtual and constructive simulation.

Real simulation refers to the effective involvement of the people who operate

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[2] Ernest H. Page, Roger Smith, *Introduction to Military Training Simulation: A Guide for Discrete Event Simulations*, in *Proceedings of the 1998 Winter Simulation Conference,* Washington DC.

real systems, with simulated results. Real simulations are training means through which the soldiers, commanders, unit and military staff take real action against an enemy, using the available armament, equipped with simulators, in order to replicate certain aspects of the combat (for instance, firings in shooting ranges or exercises with troops in the field). Real simulation can take place in any available manoeuvring area.

Virtual simulation involves real people who operate simulated systems (simulators). Virtual simulations place the individual in a central position through the exercise of control motor skills (for instance, to fly an aircraft), decision-making skills (to engage in action the firing control resources) or the communication skills (as members of a C4I2 team). Virtual simulations are meant to train the military men, individually or with teams (crews), for fulfilling common training tasks. Virtual simulations are often associated with the weapon systems teams, and training is focused on the familiarisation, development and practice of needed skills. These simulations use simulators that are the total or partial copy of weapon systems (tanks, carriers etc.). Virtual simulation requires trained military men to enter the simulated battlefield.

Constructive simulation refers to the involvement of certain simulated persons that operate simulated systems. In such simulations, real people (often named *"players"* or *"participants"* in training) stimulate (send orders that are carried out by) simulated people, operating simulated systems. Constructive simulation, which is based on computer-run programmes, is associated with exercises at the level of battalion, brigade, division and armed corps (similar). The audience that must be trained (the target of the training) is represented by the commanders, the subordinated commanders and the military staffs that are associated to the represented structures and echelons.

The classification of simulation as real, virtual and constructive raises an issue, because there is no clear cut between these categories, the degree of human participation in simulation being infinitely variable, such is the case of the degree of realism of the equipment used. This classification of simulations also suffers from the exclusion of the category of simulated people who work on real equipment (smart vehicles). Essentially, virtual simulation refers to using simulators, the real one refers to the practice on *"go-to-war"* systems (real technique, the one that is used in combat), and the constructive simulation involves the classic computer simulation models.

Virtual and constructive simulations used in training are the essence and the effect of field exercises (tasks, conditions and standards), through providing

the answers that determine the unit to fulfil its tasks, and these tasks can be then transferred in real simulation. The effects of training and the attitude accurately reflect the results of training, which can be compared with the results obtained through field exercises.

A special advantage in training through simulation is the possibility of using scenarios (exercises) prepared beforehand, through which the execution conditions are controlled and guarantees are provided so that the objectives will be reached, with the possibility of recording and re-watching the events as they happened.

Training through simulation is a complex, dynamic and integrating form of training. Constructive simulation is an efficient, flexible, exact and challenging tool, whose objectives are to train the commanders and personnel of the military staffs for planning and conducting the actions of the subordinated forces with a view to accomplishing the missions and essential tasks, developing the knowledge and individual and collective skills of the personnel from the command structures, increasing the teamwork, as well as improving the knowledge of the NATO doctrines and standards that are specific to the own structure and to the subordinated forces.

Constructive simulation replicates reality rather accurately, so that the actions and behaviour of participants could be similar to the ones resulted from their transposition into a real situation, on the battlefield. Constructive simulation uses a database for representing the field, initial situation, scenario, forces involved and their free action.

Constructive simulation, used in our activity, challenges us to conduct a research of the models. The questions come from the application of doctrinal provisions and the answers must be found in ourselves. The simulation system does not give answers, yet, it provides the possibility of creating certain realist tactical situations for the assessment of the tactical competence of all participants.

The *simulation of military actions (operations)* is the technique that is used to experimentally study a model of the operation with the purpose of obtaining relevant results regarding the original, through simulating the operation with the assistance of the model and the observance, collection, recording and processing of the data obtained through this process. The use, in this case, of simulation is a direct consequence of the particularities of the model.

The model of the operation is an operative differential game, namely an object with a complex structure, in which there are combined traits that are specific to the modelling of operations that do not allow the complete study of the model, in analytical terms. The main result of the analytical study of the model consists in the optimisation of operative plans. It must be necessarily completed

with the reassessment of the optimal solution, through its simulation with the help of the detailed, initial, model of the operation.

War games are simulations of military operations. Simulation can be used to review certain military operations before execution, for trainings, studies and analyses meant to provide a better understanding of armed combat or for a better evaluation of the forces combat capacity, military doctrine and strategy development, as well as the improvement of the troops education and training methods. These involve the presence of the personnel with information, processing and decision tasks within a hypothetical tactical situation and the use of rules, data and procedures for coordinating the actions. The *"game"* feature of a war game consists in the fact that the participants *("gamers")* do not know the future actions of the enemy, so that, when adopting their own actions, they rely only on the acknowledgement of own and enemy capabilities. In the war game, constructive simulation support two ore more sides, in which each one makes decisions independently, based on the perception of the battlefield. When possible, C4I systems are used in the information flow between the audience that must be trained and role gamers.

The simulation used in military staff training provides the implementation of the war game through computers, thus being created the electronic or virtual battlefield. Generally, simulation integrates all the action environments at the level of the represented area, the participating echelons and all the types of weapons, as well as combat or other-than-war actions. The resolution level is variable, depending on the participants and training objectives. Simulation enables the representation of combat actions in any circumstances regarding landscape, season, time and weather condition, as well as the description of the characteristics related to infrastructure and the area represented on the electronic map, the real-time or accelerated representation and the intervention of participants (gamers) in order to influence the simulated action. It makes it possible for the actions to be recorded and replayed for analysis.

Simulated Exercises (SIMEX) represent an efficient method for completing the training process, capable of making more efficient all the military processes and activities with low material and financial efforts. The exercise of training through simulation is carried out by the big units and units headquarters, as well as by operational headquarters and its objective is to train these headquarters in order to accomplish specific missions. *SIMEX* requires the tactical analysis and the use of means of simulation and war games as superior and sophisticated working tools[3] for settling computer-simulated operational or tactical situations.

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[3] General de brigadă dr. Teodor Frunzeti, *Asimetria tactică în conflictele contemporane*, in *Impact strategic*, no. 1/2004, p. 94.

Moreover, it provides the training of commanders and military staffs for planning and leading military actions. The experience of the exercises of training through constructive simulation carried out at the *Simulation Training Centre* proves that, even if they are time-consuming, these exercises are strongly recommended.

Constructive simulation is a training and education tool meant to support a wide assistance that needs training, focusing on the command and control procedures, the combat and operation operational planning process, as well as the actions synchronisation. The exercise of training through constructive simulation accomplishes all these in a training environment that is specific to command exercises in command points, through: lowering the costs and resources meant for training; exercising the unit standard operating procedures and assessing the personnel training; evaluating written and verbal communications between commanders and with (between) the compartments of military staff, with the subordinated commanders, with the ones of neighbour units (conational or international) and with the superior structures (echelons); providing feedback for evaluating the responses to different situations and the ability of military staffs to develop courses of action; work stations are used by gamers and the exercise control cell in order to introduce orders, extract information or simulate actions during combat.

Constructive simulation does not provide answers, it makes it possible for databases and realistic scenarios and tactical situations to be created for assessing the training level of commanders and headquarters within exercises of training through simulation. Mention should be once more made that there can be no standard response for simulation exercises, the responses being for tests. The only *"response"* to a tactical situation is the blue force, which carries out an action, reacts or counteracts to the action of the red force.

As military budgets have reduced, the possibilities of training and educating the personnel with troops in the field have diminished, their objectives being transferred more and more to computer-assisted exercises. Besides the drastic cost cut, it is noticed that the reduction of the cost of the information technology, used in computer simulations, associated with the constant increase in the possibilities of modelling a more realistic representation of conflicts, has experienced an obvious progress.

The field of simulation for training in the military systems is full of challenges. Relatively new for the Romanian armed forces, the constructive simulation has already proved its efficiency. We can state that the exercises of training through simulation are the standard-bearer, the driving force in the field.

The integration of real, virtual and constructive simulations in the units' training programme will gain a credible dimension only if these assets are ensured. When the Romanian Armed Forces benefit from the technologies that provide the possibility of training forces in real, virtual or constructive simulation environments, then the entire capacity and synergy of simulated combat systems will support the training process. In our opinion, a good training management requires increased efficiency, and the training through simulation contributes both to increased efficiency and cost reduction.

The experience we have in preparing and conducting exercises of training through simulation allows us to draw some conclusions:

- simulation provides a balance between the individual and the technique, assisting the former in having a better knowledge of the various models (the correlation between research and striking means, the importance of the speed of information and its analysis and use within the process of operational planning or decision-making during combat, the vision of the joint action, the effects of mobility etc.);
- simulation enables us to better understand the effects of own decisions, it entails the acknowledgement of the shortcomings of one's own plan and their correction;
- the accomplishment of the exercises of training through simulation has led us to better understand the fact that the tactical action, reaction and counteraction stimulate the art of command; through the simulation of real missions, we have drawn certain conclusions regarding the exploitation of the characteristics of combat means, the cooperation with support means, the force protection, the improvement of procedures, the reduction of the response time, the positioning of the intervention subunit etc.;
- decisions are and remain human and not technical in nature; where there is a void, it is not replaced by simulation, but by the appearance of the leader – trained, competent, motivated.

That is why we believe that it is necessary for programmes to be created with a view to forming and developing the culture through simulation of the military personnel, through training the didactic personnel for knowing the simulation programmes and expanding this training form into all military education establishments that shape military leaders.

English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Captain Constantin IFRIM

The current and future challenges to national and international security put a considerable pressure on the need for change. More than ever and more than in many other areas of military activity, the decision-making process at the top of the armed forces and of the defence intelligence structures requires relevant reviewing procedures, based on appropriate advanced studies on modern leadership and the right mix of it with more traditional managerial methods.

The current article envisages this complex process by pinpointing a few elements of leadership history and evolution, by trying to link it with emotional intelligence, by proposing a definition promoted by Professor Kristan J. Wheaton from the Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies, Boston, Massachusetts as a base for future debates and by advancing a few hypothetical examples of the leadership-management relationships.

Keywords: *command and control; military competency; management and leadership; emotional intelligence*

Motto:
"The sole advantage of power is that you can do more good".

Baltasar Gracián

Among the many components of the complex history of human society, the evolution of its leadership subsystem is one of particular interest through its significant and often overwhelming mark and the decisive influence it has had on the development of all human relations, structured from the micro-group to the global level. Reflected in all areas of human action, leadership arouses especially the interest of the military, as experts in a certain type of leadership that has distinct characteristics and decisive consequences for the achievement of *"those objectives and perceived conditions, which, if assured, contribute to the state benefit and welfare"*[1]. The accelerated evolution of the challenges to national security, their diversification and dispersion, the increasing interdependence of the components of each state *"grand strategy"*[2], as well as the complexity involved

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by the development of the military component of the state policy[3] require a careful study of the particularities of the decision-making process in modern armed forces and the implementation of most appropriate methods to enhance the efficiency of the act of command. In this context, an important role is played by the deep study of command styles, among which leadership holds the most important position.

For an effective initial approach to this issue, I consider relevant to highlight the main moments related to the emergence and development of leadership and its connections with emotional intelligence, the attempt to define strategic military leadership and some of the significant relationships with management.

Brief History

The history of leadership is, in essence, the history of the distribution of power or, more precisely, of the relationships between different types of power to lead communities and human organisations[4]. Defining power as the *"ability to control people or things"*[5], we find out that it is not a new phenomenon, as it is at the foundation of governance, sociology, psychology, history, religion and many other disciplines that study the way people live and work together. In relation to power, people either have it or are subject to it. All of us want power. If we overestimate our power, we will generate conflicts and antagonism. But if we assess it correctly, we will succeed in enhancing it in a real way and in doing more good. In everyday life, there are many people who consider that power is the critical factor that influences the leader's effectiveness. In reality, things are different. Aristotle advised his contemporaries (as well as their heirs): *"Do not confuse leadership with power. Leadership gives power but power does not bring leadership"*[6].

Concerns regarding the study of power relations and the types of leadership, as well as regarding the foundation of some reliable models to structure society and to design (rank) powers have existed since the beginning of human society organisation. Throughout history, each type of civilisation[7] has had a specific type of leadership. These types have overlapping features even if they occur at very large distances in space and time. Therefore, we can find characteristics specific

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[3] *"Art of government and state development in a system directed by interests and principles", ibidem.*

[4] The types of power acknowledged in the specialised literature vary according to the author, the ones that are most often used being *coercive* power, *reward* power, *legitimate* power, *expert* and *referent* power (Desmond Martin and Richard Shell, *"Managing Professionals: Insights for Increasing Cooperation"*, in Kristan J. Wheaton, *"Introduction to Leadership"*, www.sourcesandmethods.blogspot.com).

[5] *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, London, 2000

[6] Aristotle, *Politics*, on http://www.scribd.com/doc/3046109/Aristotel-Politica, accessed on 02.09.2009.

[7] Johan Galtung mentions five main types of civilisation in his studies: *Occidental – in contraction* and *in expansion, Hindu, Oriental – Chinese* and *Japanese*, as well as the *African, Amerindian – North* and *South* and *from the Pacific – Polynesian, Micronesian* and *Malaysian*.

to leadership (a current concept of the Western civilisation) in works that appeared in the Orient in ancient times[8].

A general overview of the types of leaders that have existed in history would be as follows:

    a. primitive society: alpha male/female – tribe chief, shaman, the ruling clan;

    b. slavery: emperor/king, camarilla, generals, high priest, slave masters;

    c. feudalism: emperor/king/prince, nobles, clergy, military commanders;

    d. capitalism: president/emperor/king, administration, oligarchy (big landlords, industrialists etc.), clergy, military commanders and so on.

There are two constants that should be mentioned, considering the impact on the current relationship of the armed forces with modern societies. Firstly, the evolution of power in history has been marked by the transition from its absolute form to the gradual diffusion in masses and the gradual shift to the *"soft"* forms of power. Currently, the best approach has proved to be the application of the concept of *"smart power"*, an appropriate combination of *"hard"* and *"soft"* power[9]. The reflection of this process within the military body has been seriously limited by the command and control particularities of leadership, fact that has required the identification of some appropriate ways and methods of adaptation as well as the establishment of some consultative bodies at different hierarchical levels, the introduction of the institution of counselling, the establishment of some professional associations or the debate of issues of interest in the military publications. A second important remark refers to the top positioning of the military component of any society leadership, which can often become a dominant.

The latter two styles recorded by the history of leading the human society are management and leadership. Traditionally, leadership is considered to be the prerogative of those born noble, possessors of a *"gift from God"* and charisma (kings, nobles, high clergy etc.), while management is the attribute of those authorised by the former ones and other leaders, possessors of wealth and control, to manage finances, armies, properties of nobles and monasteries of the Church.

Bourgeois revolutions led to the first major distribution of power by restricting the power of monarchs, establishing parliaments and other institutions to co-participate in exercising power. The Industrial Revolution that followed emphasised the need

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[8] One example is Confucius who noticed two fundamental aspects of the interdependency between the leader and his followers:

a. individuals that can express the best in them through leadership encourage and influence the others to do the same;

b. education is a transformation process inside the individual with the help of the others.

[9] Josef Nye, *The Power to Lead*, in Kristan J. Wheaton, *Introduction to Leadership*, www.sourcesandmethods. blogspot.com, accessed on 12.04.2009.

for further modernisation of management styles, as, on the one hand, the powerful people became dependent on industry and on the taxation system (thus acknowledging the importance of management) and, on the other hand, managers needed new tools to plan, organise, direct and control, able to compensate for the loss of absolute power which they had held previously.

All these changes led, at the end of the 19th century, to the appearance in the English newspapers of some articles devoted to outlining a *"new discipline"*, namely management, and to the establishment of the first American business schools (Warton – 1881, Chicago – 1898). The first management text acknowledged as such appeared in 1911 under the title *"Principles of Scientific Management"*, bearing the signature of Frederick W. Taylor. Subsequently, two trends (*"schools"*) in the management theory and research developed: the *"organisational"* school (based on time studies, operational scales, regular assessment and new concepts to implement) and the *"behaviourist"* one (enhancement of efficiency and productivity by satisfying the basic needs of workers).

The studies undertaken in this period on leaders do not find any significant difference between leaders and other people, invalidating the psychologists premise that the former have some specific qualities since they are born. An essential contribution to understanding the concept of leadership, however, has been made by politologists who have grasped its defining elements in a more realistic manner[10].

The paper that is closest to the current leadership theory appeared in 1938 under the title *"The Functions of the Executive"*, in which Chester Barnard describes strategic planning, the necessary steps in influencing employees to accept directives etc.

In the military field, as a result of the above-mentioned particular features of command and control, the first specialised paper appears a little bit later, around the middle of the last century. The main idea drawn from the manual *"Leadership for American Army Leaders"* of Colonel Edward L. Munson is the ability to become a leader through education, training, mentoring and on-job training. Another important contribution in the field is the establishment, in about the same period, of a model of developing leadership skills in the military, focused on action, by John Adair, from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, United Kingdom. Subsequently, the *"Myers Briggs Type Indicator"* was used in the army (almost limited). It is a psychometric instrument launched by Carl Jung, in the '70s, explaining differences in personality, although it is not able to explain leadership effectiveness.

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[10] In the 2nd and 3rd decades of the last century, politologist Mary Parker Follett criticised the interpretation of leadership as aggression and domination (psychologists approach), showing that leadership may appear everywhere, referring to the full control of situations and to the capacity to organise people to achieve a common goal, requiring a pioneering spirit, *"group power"* replacing personal power.

In the eighth decade, the concept of scientific and motivational incentive (schemes like *"pay-for-performance"*, bonuses, job guarantee, improved pensions and so forth), derived from the precept *"employees are our most important resource"*, proves unworkable. In 1977, Professor Abraham Zaleznik from Harvard Business School publishes the article *"Managers and Leaders: Are They Different ?"*, which causes serious controversy in business schools, resulting in a broad recognition of the clear separation between leadership and management as leading styles. On 15 July 1979, President Carter speaks about the *"crisis of confidence"* at national level (the *"Malaise"* Speech), a sense of pessimism generated by the economic stagnation, the decrease of the US influence in the Middle East, the withdrawal from Vietnam, the failure of Operation *"Desert One"*, the establishment of the Soviet control over Afghanistan, the rise of the Soviet power, many ethical and management problems in intelligence services (the Church-Pike committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities) etc. Thus, it appears as a widely recognised need to reform government, military and business structures in order to rejuvenate them. The next two decades are characterised by a special fervour regarding the appearance of books and other papers with great impact, which make a clear distinction between the two leading styles[11] and become a coherent and persuasive pleading to widely promote the ways and methods specific to leadership while some essential elements belonging to management are preserved. A significant part of these innovations belongs to the military, and in some countries there have been taken measures to introduce a distinct discipline to prepare future commanders at all levels.

In the armed forces of our country there have also been preoccupations regarding the improvement of leading troops, which resulted, in the interwar period, in some theoretical contributions of military authors to the study of command and to the design of a commander model at different echelons. We may also mention the introduction of the discipline the *science of leading in training the future cadres*. Mention should be made that although it was based on some correct leading precepts, its content was strongly influenced as far as ideology was concerned, counterproductive distortions being introduced in the act of command. In the same vein, one can mention the preoccupation of the armed forces psychological support structures that have conducted various studies on the psychological traits involved in the act of command, based on a large number of specialised systematic investigations. An example in this context

[11] For details: Constantin Ifrim, *Manageri şi lideri în intelligence: sunt ei diferiţi ?*, in *Infosfera*, no. 2, March 2009, www.mapn.ro

is the rhythmical testing of the crew in the air and naval forces that make available to the military psychologists relevant data regarding the potential to fulfil command functions.

Connection between Emotional Intelligence and Leadership

What really marked the leadership theory development in a fundamental way was the appearance, in 1995, of the American journalist Daniel Goleman's work *"Emotional Intelligence"*. In this work, the author scientifically substantiates the concept in question (generated by the reality that man is primarily an emotional and then a rational being), deciphers the internal motivational mechanisms, identifies a number of five domains and 25 competences[12] of this type of intelligence, thus providing leaders with a complete set of maximum effective leading tools.

In essence, the theory is based on three distinct functional components of the human brain, the so-called *primary, limbic and rational "brains"*. The decision-making process involves the latter two ones and consists in the fact that the impulses transmitted by the limbic brain (the centre of emotions) are normally transmitted to the rational brain (the centre of decisions), where they are processed (together with the impulses transmitted by other parts of the brain), decisions being thus substantiated. The process takes mere seconds. When emotional impulses exceed a certain threshold of intensity considered *"dangerous"*, the limbic brain bypasses the rational brain, transmitting them directly to the centre of execution[13]. The process takes only milliseconds, 80-100 times less. The causes of this *"emotional hijacking"* lie in the connection between this component that appeared long before the rational brain and human survival during the evolution. This explains why man is, in fact, a predominantly emotional being. Emotion is stronger than values or intentions, the rational foundations of the decision-making process. In addition, the existence of some stereotypical signals of the limbic brain that are related to risks or dangers, having nothing to do with survival (the cry of the baby to signal a need, the *"silence"* of most participants during meetings due to the signal from the limbic *"brain"* to stay hidden, without making any noise, until the *"danger"* is over etc.).

Daniel Goleman's subsequent research covers to a far greater extent the indissoluble links between emotional intelligence and leadership[14], the content

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[12] Subsequently, based on the latest research regarding the dynamics of the human brain functioning, Goleman writes *Primal Leadership*, in 2002, adjusting the model of emotional intelligence to four domains and 18 competences.

[13] The commands given by the limbic brain in this situation may be *"fight"*, *"run"* or *"freeze"*.

[14] One of his reference works is published together with Richard Boyatzis in 2005.

of the latter consisting 90% in the application of the former. Studies in the field have been conducted by other specialists, among whom we can mention Reuven Bar-On and Adele Lynn, authors of some models of emotional intelligence that have many similarities with that of Goleman[15]. Moreover, the opinions related to leadership may be grouped around some *"schools"* with relatively distinct features[16]. A comparison highlighting the commonalities and differences between the three mentioned models is shown in *figure 1*.

BAR-ON MODEL								GOLEMAN MODEL
	GENERAL MOOD	*Happiness*	*Optimism*	*Ambition*	*Initiative*	SELF-CONTROL	PERSONAL COMPETENCIES	
	STRESS MANAGEMENT	*Stress tolerance*	*Self-control*	*Transparency*	*Adaptability**			
	INTRA-PERSONAL	*-*	*Self-awareness*	*Self-assessment*	*Self-confidence*	SELF-AWARENESS		
		Independence	*Influence*	*Inspiration*	*Mentoring*	RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT	SOCIAL COMPETENCIES	
		Self-esteem		*Change facilitation*	*Conflict management*			
		Self-actualisation		*Team spirit*	*Collaboration*			
	INTER-PERSONAL	*Social responsibility*	*Empathy*	*Organisational awareness*	*Solicitude*	SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS		
		Interpersonal relationship						
	ADAPTABILITY*	*Reality testing*	*Social ability*					
		Flexibility	*Management of the sense of the purpose and vision*					
		Problem solving	**LYNN MODDEL**					

LEGEND:
YELLOW – BAR-ON MODEL;
ORANGE – GOLEMAN MODEL;
BLUE – LYNN MODEL;
GREEN – COMPONENTS THAT ARE COMMON TO ALL MODELS;
*ADAPTABILITY – COMMON ELEMENT OF BAR-ON AND GOLEMAN MODELS

Figure 1

It is essential to understand that in order to become a genuine leader a person does not need to meet all the qualities of one or more components of the presented models. The true and fair way is to identify the potential personal traits and the ones that the actual situation (domain, mission, tasks, environmental conditions etc.) requires and to select, on this basis, two or three essential components that person has to focus on in order to develop them.

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[15] Among the most representative authors we mention Abraham Zaleznik, John Kotter, Jim Collins, Tom Davenport, Daniel Goleman, Adele Lynn, Stephen Covey, John Maxwell, Graham Lee, Manfred Kets de Vries, Hilarie Owen etc.

[16] Some examples in this context could be: Harvard Business School, a leader within the American School, the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development – www.cipd.co.uk and the Institute of Leadership – www.iofl.org or www.instituteofleadership.com for the British School, INSEAD Fontainbleau for the French School etc.

Instead, it is certain that a leader needs both the brain (rationale) and the soul (emotions). Napoleon said that *"A leader is a merchant of hope"*.

The junior and direct leaders of the small organisations/components (equivalent to tactical echelons) have a level of professional competence that is similar to that of the other members of the organisation. The higher the organisational level is, the more the competence of the leader becomes a mix of the general competence in major aspects of the profession and the competence in working with people.

To a more precise definition of the relationship between emotional intelligence and leadership contributes the content different authors associate with emotional intelligence as the ability to understand own emotions and their contribution to the enhancement of the energy and motivation level, as well as to strengthen the relations with the ones around (or the ability of self-government, both ours and our relations with others). A famous witticism attributed to Joseph Heller illustrates the importance of interaction with others: *"He was a self-made man who owed his lack of success to nobody"*. Mention should be made that the success of the team measures the success of the leader and not vice versa.

The importance of teamwork is derived from its decisive influence on the work outcome. This is equally reflected both in the small teams (office, department, workgroup, commission, committee etc.), as well as in the permanent or temporary working bodies, be they small or large, at the interdepartmental level (working structures associated with the Supreme Defence Council, parliamentary committees, intelligence communities etc.). More than reorganisations (reform) and managerial processes are always needed to ensure cooperation and coordination between different autonomous structures or components (between and within organisations), a situation that applies to military structures, too. Thus, a natural question arises regarding what has to be done to obtain and maintain that organisational standard that allows for the whole process to be more efficient. The universally accepted answer today comes from the companies whose success they have validated: *leadership*, *talent* and *culture*. For the rest of their careers, the current junior and direct leaders will become increasingly involved in coordinating their work with that of others, both as members and leaders of various groups, called *"working group"*, *"special project"*, *"planning group"*, *"task force/mission"*, *"committees"*, *"councils"*, *"conferences"*, *"boards"* etc. Emotional intelligence will enable them to discover the ideal *"self"* that does and says what, when and how it has to be done and said, that is balanced and self-confident, to lead a healthy and intelligent emotional life not only at work but also in society. The emotional responsibility of the leader is twice fundamental, as it is both the basic and the most important function of leadership.

Leadership Definition
and Its Relations with Management

Any attempt at defining leadership encounters the insurmountable difficulty that it is an art, not a science. Different authors have tried to explore the roots of this difficulty, among their findings being the following:

- *"FM 22-103: Leadership for Senior Leaders"* defines leadership as *"The art of…"*, which means that it cannot be reduced to a doctrine, with the associated tactics, techniques and procedures or checklists;
- as, when assessing a piece of art, *"Beauty is in the eye of the beholder"*, it can be stated that *"Leadership is in the eye of the follower"*[17];
- many try to define a leadership universal model, when, in fact, there is not only one model; others try to define a certain model among the existent ones (national, political, military, moral, business etc. leader).

Currently, there is no accepted definition, occurring *"almost as many different definitions of leadership as the people that have tried to define this concept are"*[18], *"a few dozen new definitions appearing each month"*[19].

Defining leadership for defence becomes an even more difficult task, as the criteria for developing such a definition have to take into account some key features of the military profession. The personnel in the armed forces are primarily dedicated to the public service, and not to other forms of activity. They are specialised in a type of activity that has distinct characteristics, governed by a code of ethics that goes beyond the personal or the organisation interests. They carry out high or very high risk activities. They have a strictly controlled professional development, limitations of civil rights and of the autonomy and independence of own actions etc.

Considering all the associated criteria that lie at the basis of a definition of leadership in the military field, I appreciate that we can accept as a basis for discussion the proposal made by Professor Kristan J. Wheaton from Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies, Boston, Massachusetts, to define intelligence leadership as follows: *"Leadership is the art of inspiring people to accept change and improvement to achieve the goals that best meet their interests, the ones of the organisation, and of the ones the organisation supports"*.

The nature of the relationship between leadership and management is given by the way in which the two styles solved the three fundamental tasks (functions)

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[17] James M. Kouzes, Barry Z. Posner, *The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organization*, in Kristan J. Wheaton, *Introduction to Leadership*, www.sourcesandmethods. blogspot.com, accessed on 12.04.2009.

[18] Bernard M. Bass, *The Meaning of Leadership*, in *The Leader's Companion*, Chapter 7, *ibidem.*

[19] Warren Bennis, *The Artform of Leadership*, in *The Leader's Companion*, Chapter 48, *ibidem.*

of any fundamental act of leading. The specific tasks and solutions are presented in *table 1*.

It is important to understand that neither of the two distinct styles exists in a pure form. That is why the requirements of effective leadership trigger the adoption of an appropriate combination of the methods that are specific to each of the styles. The balance

LEADERSHIP SOLUTIONS

LEADERSHIP FUNCTION	MANAGER	LEADER
Goal setting	*Planning Budgeting*	*Providing direction*
Organisation establishment	*Organising Position filling*	*Aligning personnel*
Organisation functioning	*Controlling and problem solving*	*Motivating people*

Table 1

achieved between these methods will incline to one of the outcomes shown in *figure 2*.

INFLUENCE OF BALANCING LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

LEADER	VISION	PERFORMANCE
Strategic effectiveness	CONFUSION	USELESS AGITATION

Operational effectiveness
MANAGER

Figure 2

The effectiveness of the act of leading depends on many determinants *(figure 3)*, the leading style (the combination leadership – management) being at their crossroads.

An example of such combination is the integration of the *"strategic*

INTERACTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE LEADERSHIP STYLE EFFECTIVENESS

LEADER – character traits, values, position, experience, attitudes, mindset

Leadership style

SUBORDINATES: character traits, values, mindset, attitudes, group cohesion

SITUATION: type of activity, variables, culture, social, political, economic environment

Figure 3

positioning" and *"competitive advantage"* management principles in an efficient leading style. *Figure 4* illustrates this integration for one of the core components

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST DEFINITION
"strategic information integration"
and "targeted delivery"

Figure 4

of the armed forces, the defence intelligence information system, seen in interaction with other actors on the information market for the national security in the national intelligence communities. In this complex interaction, defence intelligence contributes to the *"strategic information integration"*, the area where the own offer of information products and the one of other bidders overlap with the area of interest of the beneficiaries. Leadership will seek here the application of the policies related to the principle of *"competitive advantage"* (better quality products at the same costs and/or products in the same class at a lower cost).

The area of *"targeted delivery"* represents the materialisation of the *"strategic positioning"* principle, in which the bidder has identified and occupied an area of interest of the beneficiary needs that it is the only one able to meet. The major concern of the leadership of the defence intelligence structure will thus be the adjustment of the information products to meet the beneficiary real needs, as well as the effective interaction with it.

I appreciate that the review of the elements related to the emergence and evolution of the concept of leadership, of its close relationship with emotional intelligence, and of some of the relevant connections with management can create a sound basis for further valuable developments regarding not only the understanding of the concept and its implications but also the identification of new courses of action for its effective implementation.

English version by
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NATO CODIFICATION SYSTEM
– A Bridge to Global Logistics Knowledge –

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This article seeks to present the NATO Codification System and the National Codification Bureau of Romania.

The NATO Codification System is managed and run by a NATO Cadre Group consisting of the National Directors on Codification Allied Committee 135 (AC/135). It is a uniform and common system for the identification, classification and stock numbering of Items of Supply of user nations. It is meant to achieve maximum effectiveness in logistics support and to facilitate materiel data management. The System has been agreed upon by all signatories of the Alliance and sponsored non-NATO nations for use in identifying equipment and supplies and must: provide accurate data on all items of supply to all participating nations in peacetime or at war; allow prompt access to data; provide a common language understandable by all.

Keywords: codification; NATO Codification System; National Codification Bureau; item of supply; identification; economic entity

T he *NATO Codification System (NCS)* has been in place since the mid-1950s, and provides standards for the use of a common stock identification system throughout the North Atlantic Alliance. It is based on the *US Federal Catalog System (FCS)*, which is operated by the *Defense Logistics Information Service (DLIS)* located in Battle Creek, Michigan, a field activity of the *Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)*.

The foundation for this system within NATO rests in two *NATO Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs): STANAG 3150, "Uniform System of Supply Classification"*, and *STANAG 3151, "Uniform System of Item Identification"*.

The NATO Codification System is governed by the Allied Committee 135 (AC/135 – NATO Group of National Directors on Codification, and it is implemented by the National Codification Bureau from each user nation.

Objectives of the NATO Codification System

The NATO Codification System (NCS) provides NATO countries with a uniform and common system for the identification, classification,

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and stock numbering of items of supply, and it is designed to achieve maximum effectiveness in logistics support and to facilitate materiel data management. This system has been agreed by all signatories of the Alliance and sponsored non-NATO nations for use in identifying items of supply.

The principal objectives of the system are:
- to facilitate interoperability between user nations;
- to increase the effectiveness of user nations logistics systems;
- to facilitate data handling;
- to minimise logistics costs of user nations;
- to increase efficiency in user nations logistics operations.

To achieve these objectives, the System provides for each item of supply to be assigned with: *a unique Item Name, a unique classification, a unique identification, a unique NATO Stock Number*.

The basic principle used by the NATO Codification System establishes that the producer country is responsible for the codification of each produced item of supply although the particular item is not used in that country. The National Codification Bureau (NCB) in each country that implements the NATO Codification System represents the central operational structure that manages the codification activity for items of supply in the defence domain at national level.

National Codification Bureau of Romania

The NATO Codification System has been implemented in the Romanian military since 2003 and it is based on the above-mentioned standardisation agreements: *STANAG 3150* and *STANAG 3151*.

The National Codification Bureau (NCB) was established under the direction of the Romanian Ministry of Defence in order to implement and maintain the NATO Codification System in Romania. It represents a communication interface between the national armed forces, NATO member countries or the ones affiliated to NCS, NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) and the national industry. Moreover, it is responsible for the codification policy and for assigning the NATO Commercial and Governmental Entity (NCAGE) Codes for the Romanian economic entities as well as for assigning the NATO Stock Number (NSN) for items of supply produced in Romania or in non-NATO or agreed nations. NCB works under the direction of the Joint Logistics Command. It has a military

director and it is organised in two modules (the management and the codification module respectively).

The National Codification Bureau represents Romania in the Allied Committee 135 (AC/135) that is under the authority of the Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD), composed of military directors from NATO member countries, which acts as a responsible group for the development, implementation and maintenance of the NATO Codification System.

Identification of Items of Supply

The NCS identification process is based on the *"Item of Supply"* concept, and claims a unique identification for every item of supply. An item of supply is *an item of production required by a responsible management authority to meet a specific logistics need.*

Each identification must be applied to one item of supply, and mutually each item of supply must have one identification (unique identification).

The basic rule is each item of supply will have a single unique number.

ONE ITEM OF SUPPLY = ONE NATO STOCK NUMBER

The item of supply identification consists of the minimum data required to establish clearly the essential characteristics of the item of supply, those characteristics that give it a unique character and differentiate it from all others. Once decided that an item of supply is unique, its identification is determined by assigning a *NATO Stock Number (NSN)* by the National Codification Bureau.

The NATO Stock Number (NSN) is the basic entity for the NATO Codification System, and it is the key of identification by logisticians within logistics management systems. The NCS is an *invisible partner* in the day-to-day business of logistics.

The NATO Stock Number (NSN) associated to the item of supply is a 13-digit number that is divided into 3 parts, as follows:
- *the first 4 digits* represent the NATO Supply Classification Code and relate the item of supply to the group and class of similar items of supply;
- *the next 2 digits* indicate the National Codification Bureau assigning the NATO Stock Number; for Romania, it is 39;
- *the final 7 digits* of a NSN are computer allocated and have no inherent significance other than to uniquely identify the item of supply which they are allocated to.

The last 9 digits mean the *National Item Identification Number (NIIN)*, which is the fixed part of the NSN, and it remains associated with the item of supply concept throughout its lifecycle, in contradistinction to the NSC

(first 4 digits), which may change if there is a revision of the item of supply classification structure.

An example of a NATO Stock Number for an item of supply of Romanian production and related terms is shown below:

8	4	3	0		3	9		0	0	0	5	8	9	7

NATO Supply Classification Code (NSC) NATO Code Code for National Codification Bureau (NCB) Non-Significant Number

8	4		3	0		3	9	0	0	0	5	8	9	7

Group Class National Item Identification Number (NIIN)

8	4	3	0	3	9	0	0	0	5	8	9	7

The NATO Stock Number (NSN) for *"Boots unique of training"*

The principal benefits of the NATO Stock Number are:
- *uniformity* – it is uniform in composition, length, structure and use;
- *adaptability* – it supports the varied requirements of logistics management in a supply system, both nationally and internationally, from initial procurement to final disposal of the item of supply;
- *simplicity* – it is applicable without modification to all items of supply, it is unique, easy to assign, it is flexible to maintain and it is readily recognised throughout the user nations of the world;
- *stability* – NIIN is associated with only one item of supply in perpetuity, it is never re-allocated to another item of supply even if the original item of supply is no longer in use;
- *compatibility* – NSN and its related data can be recorded and communicated manually or by all types of ADP systems (there are no two user nations to have the same hardware/software configuration). It provides, through the fixed keyed format rules of the NATO Data Exchange (NADEX) system, elegant solutions to the communications problems raised by the use of diverse operating, communication and supply systems within the current user nations.

NATO Commercial and Governmental Entity (NCAGE) Code

According to the Provision of Government no. 445 on 10 April 2003, art. 10, *"to conclude a procurement contract with the Ministry of National Defence, the provider must obtain preliminarily the NATO Commercial and Governmental Entity (NCAGE) Code keyed by the National Codification Bureau"*.

The *NATO Commercial and Governmental Entity (NCAGE) Code* is an alphanumeric code made of 5 characters that reflects the source and the location of the technical documentation for the item of supply. All requests for NATO Commercial and Governmental Entity (NCAGE) Codes are to be sent to the National Codification Bureau. For an economic entity in Romania, the NATO Commercial and Governmental Entity Code is made of 5 characters: the first 4 digits are alphanumerical and do not contain *I* or *O* letter, and the last character is *L*. An example of a NATO Commercial and Governmental Entity (NCAGE) Code is: *1C45L*.

The economic entities which have NATO Commercial and Governmental Entity (NCAGE) Codes can be found in the *NATO Master Catalogue of References for Logistics (NMCRL)*, a product of the Allied Committee AC/135, which contains identification data of the items of supply in the national military that use the NATO Codification System, and data about providers in more than 30 countries.

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The NATO Codification has been utilised by the armed forces of NATO member countries to promote national and international interoperability.

The main objective of the NATO Codification System is to become a *bridge to global logistics knowledge*, and to provide a uniform identification language to be used in national activities (e.g. supply management, standardisation etc.) and among member nations, including non-NATO nations that sponsor the NCS.

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NRF
– An Essential Contribution to the Romanian Land Forces Development –

Lieutenant Colonel Ştefan PREDA

Defence Capabilities Initiative has sought to narrow the differences between the European allies and the USA, through focusing the European defence procurement, efforts and budgets on five main critical directions: mobility and deployment; sustainment; effective (efficient) engagement; survival and communications interoperability.

In this context, in the allies' vision, the accomplishment of the NRF is the main effort in the transformation process, the way in which a nation itself can participate meaning the transformation of the entire national armed forces. The main missions NRF can fulfil are: embargo operations; consequence management; non-combatants evacuation; show of force; antiterrorist operations; crisis response operations; initial entry operations.

Keywords: multinational force; expeditionary character; leading nation; common training exercise; communications systems

The concept of *NATO Response Force – NRF* should be approached in the context of the failure of the *Defence Capabilities Initiative – DCI* to fill the gap between the European and the US military technologies and capabilities.

The *Defence Capabilities Initiative* was launched in September 1999 during the NATO Washington Summit to ensure that the allies not only remain interoperable, but they also improve and update their capabilities to face the new security challenges. *DCI* set a course of action to fill the gap between the European allies and the USA by focusing the European defence acquisition efforts and budgets on five key shortfalls:

• *Mobility and deployment*: represents the ability to deploy forces quickly where they are needed, outside the Alliance territory included.

• *Sustainability*: synthesises the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their permanent bases and to ensure sufficient fresh forces for long-lasting operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Ştefan Preda – Land Forces Staff.

• *Effective engagement*: is the ability to engage against any adversary in all types of operations, from high to low intensity ones.

• *Survivability*: materialised in the ability to protect own forces and infrastructure against current and future threats, not only in a favourable environment but also in a hostile one, under containment conditions.

• *Interoperable communications*: presupposes the achievement of similar conceptions regarding the command and control systems, by using some compatible information and communications systems that enable the armed forces in member states to work together efficiently.

In the months that preceded the Prague Summit (2002), it became clear that the *Defence Capabilities Initiative* was not moving ahead to improve and optimise the initial performances. In this context, the *Initiative* was discreetly withdrawn and replaced by the *Prague Capabilities Commitment – PCC*. The change of the name had three general purposes: to start a new clock to identify and materialise the purpose achievement level, having Prague as the initiation point; to keep the focus on the efforts to make effective the results in the field of specific capabilities, and to emphasise the Alliance commitment.

At the Prague Summit, the foundations for the establishment of a more manoeuvrable and rapid force were laid. The force should be deployable and able to act in a short time interval, far from the deployment bases, in agreement with the operational requirements. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts, we can state that NATO Response Force represents the materialisation of this initiative.

The first *Force Generation Conference* took place at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, being a reference point in establishing *NRF*. The force generation conference is the first step in all the Alliance operations, its goal being to harmonise the force requirements and the offer and possibilities of the participant, contributing countries, so that the operational objectives could be fully achieved.

NRF represents a powerful military force, able to conduct actions independently, for 30 days or even more if resupplied, having land, air and naval command elements. An important fact as far as Europe is concerned is that *NRF* is conceived to have joint intelligence, planning and command and control capabilities that are the true discriminator between the European and the US forces. Organised, equipped and trained properly, this joint multinational force will be NATO's capability to respond to crises, especially in the areas where the European Union efforts and fighting capabilities fall short.

NRF was established in October 2003 and it is planned not only to ensure a joint force that could react rapidly anywhere in the world, prepared to conduct the full range of missions, but also to catalyse the promotion and enhancement

of the Alliance military capabilities, in close relation to the national and multinational aspects of Prague commitments, as well as to the process of establishing NATO force plan. Therefore, *NRF* is an essential element on the Alliance transformation agenda.

In the allies view, the achievement of this force represents the main effort in the transformation process, as the way in which a nation engages to participate in *NRF* – the military level of training – is the transformation element of the national armed forces in their entirety.

To take part in *NRF*, the forces of the allied states have to meet certain standards, expressed by the Alliance through the agency of the Allied Command Transformation – ACT and the Operational Command. After being trained in a multinational environment, the manpower of the Response Force may be deployed in conflict areas. At the end of the mission, the military go back to their countries of origin having enhanced experience they share with the military belonging to other services. This is one of the reasons why *NRF* is one of the key-points for the Alliance transformation in the operational field. Nations contribute military structures to the *Response Force*, structures that have to be equipped with high technology to meet the minimum military requirements (MMR) established by the Alliance. Once they are provided with all this equipment, the forces are rotated in the *NRF* system and, after completing the stage, they share the acquired knowledge with the national forces, activity that results in the enhancement of the Alliance military culture.

NRF was designed to allow the Alliance to meet many challenges such as:
- to be able to deploy rapidly (within five days) and to operate self-sustainingly for at least one month;
- to prepare the ground to facilitate the arrival of follow-up forces or as a stabilisation force, or as one involved in show of presence or evacuation – therefore a multitask force.

The emergence of NATO Response Force was determined by the Alliance transformations subsequent to some political-military evolutions such as the end of the *Cold War*, the disappearance of the geopolitical bipolarity, the success of the measures taken to enhance mutual trust (i.e.: Partnership for Peace – PfP). In this context, NATO member nations had to adapt the armed forces, conceptually and structurally, to be able to meet the new international circumstances through the movement of the centre of gravity to rapid reaction forces, logistically autonomous, able to urgently intervene to manage crisis situations, and to prepare the introduction of the main forces in the theatre of operations.

The concept of *NATO Response Force* was developed after the NATO summit in 2002 and reached its initial operational capability in October 2004. The force

was declared fully operational at Riga, in 2006. It was preceded by the exercise *"Steadfast Jaguar"*, in the Cape Verde Islands, in June-July 2006.

NATO Response Force may execute: embargo operations; consequence management; non-combatants evacuation; show of force; antiterrorist operations; crisis response operations; initial entry operations.

The structure of *NATO Response Force* encompasses a central command element, the Deployable Joint Task Force – DJTF headquarters, that subordinates the operational headquarters in subordinated services and units, as follows: land forces, brigade-size (about 10 000 military), air force (some squadrons – about 5 000 military), naval forces (some types of vessels – about 5 000 military), special forces (about 400 military), plus psychological operations support elements (about 100 military). *NRF* manpower, for a rotation, is foreseen to be about 25 000 military, provided by the Alliance member countries during the force generation conferences.

A *NRF* rotation lasts for 18 months and the training has two phases – *national training* and *multinational training*. During the national training phase, the structures committed to *NRF* execute a readiness programme in conformity with the requirements of the NATO Headquarters that lead the *NRF* rotation. An important aspect is that NATO confirmed forces are committed to *NRF*. At the end of the national training phase, the structures are assessed as far as readiness is concerned, in conformity with *CREVAL*[1] requirements, the structures that meet the requirements are certified by the specialised national headquarters and then the assessment report is prepared and handed in to the commander that exercises the *NRF* command.

NATO or multinational assessment period is coordinated by the *lead nation* for each *NRF* component and is concluded with a multinational exercise whose aim is to verify the interoperability between component structures. During the expectation period, in the countries of origin, the structures execute a training programme to maintain the readiness level, being able to be deployed in a potential conflict area in the period established in the *Notice to Move – NTM*.

As for the participation of the Romanian Land Forces in *NRF*, the first structure assigned was the Decontamination Platoon RBC Ro/B.49Ap.NBC that participated in the 3rd *NRF* rotation. Other assigned structures were: B.285Art., Cp.289Cc., B.280 I.Mc., B.300 I.Mc./Bg.282 I.Mc., Cp.1 P.M./B.265 P.M. As it can be noticed, in the circumstances in which the structures committed to NATO have been company or battalion level, the requirements of NATO headquarters to assign forces

[1] Evaluation instructions specific to NATO: for Land Forces – CREVAL (Combat Readiness Evaluation); for Air Force – TACEVAL (Tactical Evaluation) and for Naval Forces – MAREVAL (Maritime Evaluation).

to *NRF* have been greater. All the Romanian structures committed to *NRF* have participated with manpower and assets in the multinational exercises for certification organised by the *lead nation* or by NATO headquarters in charge of the rotation of *NRF* contingents. Among these exercises we can mention: *"GOLDEN MASK 04", "GOLDEN MASK 05", "GOLDEN MASK 08", "WHITE CLOUD 08", "NOBLE LIGHT", "LOYAL LEDGER"*. The participation in these exercises has contributed to the enhancement of the knowledge and experience of not only the headquarters but also the units and subunits assigned to *NRF*.

The joint training, in a multinational environment, has proved necessary to test the deployment capabilities, to assess the reliability of the communication systems, as well as to clearly establish the dimensions of the logistic support and to evaluate the total budget necessary to maintain this force in a possible conflict area. Each exercise was preceded by the conduct, demonstratively and didactically, of the operational planning process, based on scenarios more or less inspired by the lessons learned following the participation in NATO-led operations in the theatres of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq or Western Balkans.

During the participation in *NRF*, the Land Forces structures have proved their professionalism, competency, solid skills as far as working within staff, capacity to adapt, interoperability with partner manpower participating in the coalition.

The logistic support is a national responsibility and one of the major requirements that discourage the *NRF* activation. With regard to the logistic support, a still unsolved problem at the Alliance level is to ensure the necessary means of strategic transportation in the event *NRF* is deployed.

NATO Response Force has not been used in a mission in a theatre of operations yet, maybe because of the financial efforts the contributing countries should have made. However, by participating in the certification and confirmation exercises, the structures taking part in *NATO Response Force* have proved to be interoperable and ready to exercise C2 not only at the level of headquarters but also at the one of the manoeuvre units.

As other concepts of the Alliance, the one of *NATO Response Force* is subject to the process of transformation in order to find solutions to attract nations to provide *NRF* with the proper forces.

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KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
– A Requirement for the Armed Forces –

Commander Claudiu GROSU

Information systems for knowledge management represent the concrete application of the technology in this field. Usually, these are designed to make work easier and to allow the efficient allocation of the resources of an organisation. In order to support both explicit and tacit knowledge, the author believes that an information system for knowledge management must be based, on the one hand, on technologies for content management and, on the other hand, on collaborative technologies. Data technologies are numerically structured and oriented; collaborative technologies mostly process texts, in an unstructured form, such as phrases, paragraphs or even whole pages. Therefore, it is necessary that these are implemented so that users should benefit from an interactive and iterative environment.

Keywords: social role; information society; virtual environment; culture creator; computer system

The concept of *Knowledge Management – KM* can be approached from a variety of perspectives. The main effort of this study will focus on the understanding of the way the knowledge and its management influence the successful operation of an organisation. To acknowledge the complexity of the domain, some aspects regarding the technological and sociological approaches will be presented.

Knowledge from a sociological perspective

Human beings could be considered the only living creatures that have the capacity to create culture[1] and transmit it to the next generations. Moreover, only humans need years of education and training in order to become capable of performing their adult roles, due to the fact that only humans have enough intelligence to create and accumulate

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[1] Culture represents the lifestyle complex system consisting of the customs, values, technology and other elements that members have created and transmitted from generation to generation.

knowledge, and develop technology. Knowledge is an important element of culture and its evolution significantly impacts on cultural changes. Culture makes people akin or different on the basis of what they know, what and how they do things and what they believe. Nevertheless, the material part of culture should also be mentioned as an expression of the way humans have learned to use different materials throughout generations. Finally, knowledge is the ingredient that turns two sticks and a string into a bow with arrow.

Culture includes a set of values[2] and norms[3] specific to each society that affect the evolution of all the members and groups within the society as well the relations that are established with members and groups belonging to other societies. A relevant example is offered by the history of the immigration in the United States and Canada where, at the beginning of the 20th century, some groups were discriminated on ethnic grounds, being regarded as races that could negatively affect the development of the two countries in different ways. In some situations, the issue was related to certain financial *"habits"* as money lending and the excessive desire to accumulate capital; in others, the problem was perceived as an inappropriate tendency towards criminality. Both social groups had to adapt to the new environment and during this process the values and norms specific to each group played an extremely important role.

Some sociologists are of the opinion that the rapid success of the first group was based on the enormous respect for education and scholars as well as on the strong desire for scholar success. The strong attachment to the family and the central role of the father within a family, for the second group, led to a slower move of the young toward the school. One can finally emphasise that the difference in the knowledge of the young individuals belonging to the two distinct social groups led to significant dissimilarities concerning the social success of the first generations of immigrants in the two groups.

In any society, a person's status and prestige largely depend on his or her social role[4]. There is no surprise that a physician, a lawyer, notary or architect have superior social status in comparison to a person that stayed in school a smaller number of years. It is a reality that performing the social roles mentioned above requires a long and rigorous education and training process aimed at acquiring

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[2] Values are ideals or fundamental goals, as well as general standards to assess what we desire.

[3] Norms are the rules that define the desired, necessary or acceptable behaviour in different situations.

[4] The social role is the desired behaviour of an individual that has a certain position in society for which general accepted norms are prescribed. Each society may be conceived as a collection of correlated roles.

a remarkable volume of knowledge specific to an activity domain. *Sciencia potencia est*, Francis Bacon once said and we frequently say nowadays *Knowledge is power*. There is no doubt that education and culture increase the abilities of an individual as well as his or her capacity to move upward the social system.

Another essential element of the cultural development is the person that creates culture. Not long ago, we were convinced that all the members of the socialist society, in its evolution to communism, had an equal contribution to the cultural development, on the basis of an exacerbated importance given to the material aspects of culture. To better understand the specific social position of the individual that creates culture, we should consider the situation in the agrarian and industrial societies. The farmer who spent the entire day in the fields or the lathe worker, who had to produce a certain number of pieces per day, had little chances to afford the time and to develop the abilities for study and meditation, for composing poems and songs or for designing new tools. These functions were initially assumed by the elites and eventually became distinct social roles that required, once more, extensive knowledge in multiple related domains gained during long periods of time, depending on personal abilities.

Throughout the centuries, the knowledge and the ability of the individuals or groups to exploit them have significantly contributed to the emergence of elites and servants, masters and slaves, the rich and the poor, and even more relevant, to the delimitation between defeaters and defeated.

Knowledge from a technological perspective

If you talk to an information technology (IT) expert and you are so uninspired to bring to discussion notions like information, knowledge, management or sharing, there will be real chances to find out that all this aspects are already known and aligned in virtual companies, battalions, and brigades of bites … It is obvious that the binary format offered by the current information technology represents the most efficient way to store, analyse, distribute and present a large variety of knowledge, but not all of it.

In the information society, knowledge and IT are practically inseparable, but the simple application of technology in the knowledge domain does not solve all the management aspects related to knowledge. Technology plays a central role in knowledge management – KM, even though KM does not include technology management.

Technology facilitates, in a revolutionary manner, the transmission and exchange of knowledge, offering to the members of an organisation communication solutions

enabled by networking, as the electronic mail and the video teleconference. A key technology related to KM is represented by the collaborative means and tools that allow the staff to work together in a virtual environment, irrespective of the geographical location of individual members. The *"web"* technology makes it possible for organisations to design and use websites and knowledge portals that can manage significant quantities of information that is made continuously available to users in any point of the network. The proper application of the above-mentioned tools sustains the continuity and coherence of projects, especially of those with functions distributed across different locations of the organisation.

The information systems for knowledge management represent the concrete application of technology in this sphere. Usually, these are designed to facilitate work and to allow for an efficient allocation of resources within the organisation. In order to sustain the different types of processes related to knowledge, an IT system for knowledge management should be based on content management technologies as well as on collaborative ones. Data technology (for content management) is structured and usually binary oriented; collaborative technologies mainly process text, therefore unstructured information, in the form of sentences, paragraphs, or even entire pages. Hence, there appears a requirement that the information technology should be implemented in such a manner as the users enjoy the advantages of an interactive and iterative environment.

It is important to emphasise the fact that the information systems are a subset of the knowledge management systems. The information systems allow the organisation to generate, access, store, and analyse binary data, but they are not able to address the context complexity and the value of knowledge.

Only by integrating the means for content management (databases, portals, document management applications etc.) and the collaborative tools (chat, e-mail, socialising networks etc.) an organisation can be successful in implementing an effective knowledge management system.

Knowledge from an organisational perspective

In order to understand the context of knowledge emergence and improvement, one has to bear in mind the relationship between data, information, and knowledge: data, distinct elements that lack an individual connotation meaning, interrelate to generate information that, in turn, is structured in specific patterns to create knowledge. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is valuable mentioning that the association of knowledge and the recognition of governing principles will allow for the elevation to the level of wisdom. While they can be considered

separately, the relationship between data, information, knowledge, and wisdom is a continuous one and, generally, it is partially perceived by the human subject, depending on his or her intellectual abilities.

Knowledge is defined as the internal state of a system as a result of processing a certain volume of information. Nowadays, the systems could be seen as human subjects or information systems. The knowledge associated to the humans has two major components: the explicit and the tacit knowledge.

The explicit knowledge consists of formal elements that, in the military domain, for example, are the strategies, policies, doctrines, techniques, and procedures existing in a specific operational area of expertise. The explicit knowledge exists at the organisational level, has a rather significant stability and is managed in accordance with well established rules.

The tacit knowledge is present at the level of individuals and groups in an organisation and consists of practical experience, interpersonal relationships, and common values. It plays an important role in the exploitation and enhancement of the explicit knowledge, has an important dynamics – especially within the military organisations where the staffs rotate or advance periodically – and is difficult to manage because it is hard to be adequately represented. Tacit knowledge must be discovered, interpreted, and converted into explicit knowledge to be stored and subsequently used at organisational level. Best practices represent a relevant case of knowledge that depends on context, appears as tacit knowledge and migrates, when properly managed, to the explicit knowledge category.

Knowledge management embodies the process in place at organisational level aimed at creating value from the intellectual capital, hence by employing the knowledge in the organisation. It is important to recall that KM is facilitated by IT, but the utilisation of technology does not equal the management of knowledge.

One has to avoid making KM an end in itself, because this is only a way organisations can improve the efficiency of their activities. The leverage of knowledge means this is exchanged in order to support a collaboration base among the members of the organisation, as part of a process oriented towards the achievement of the major objectives.

There naturally appear a number of questions: *Why should we invest in implementing a KM system ? Who should be involved and who will control the system ? How are we going to asses the effectiveness of the system ?*

Some possible answers, focused on the military organisation specifics, are outlined in the following paragraphs.

◆ Threats for the organisation

Knowledge management systems do not develop spontaneously within complex organisations. Assuming that the KM is neglected or incorrectly applied in an organisation as the armed forces, the following threats could materialise:

• the emergence of an organisational *Alzheimer*-type syndrome, the main cause being the significant fluctuation of personnel as a result of rotations, promotions, retirements and resignations. For example, the same day the head of the office becomes head of the section, the subordinate who temporarily or purposely replaces him, in search of various information, starts *"digging"* in the office folders, in the computers, or in the stickers spread on his new office-head-desk. Or he keeps the phone close to the ear until the person at the other end, his former boss, alludes to other pressing commitments. And one should not be surprised if our protagonist decides to slowly and patiently build a proper store for his relevant knowledge;

• the suboptimal use of the intellectual capital (knowledge, ideas, experience). The staff have difficulties to access the relevant explicit knowledge and the tacit knowledge drift erratically within the organisation. For example, Major X, point of contact for the development of a specific plan at an operational structure, forwards in time to Colonel Y at strategic level the final draft of the document he is responsible for. And just when he feels relieved of an important task, the phone rings. At the other end of the wire, Colonel Y expresses his indignation at the fact that the plan was structured based on a template that is no longer in use. Major X respectfully reports that he carefully followed the provisions of the directive received almost one year ago, but Colonel Y informs him that the said directive is no longer valid since a NATO compatible new one is being issued and was sent to all the interested structures a week ago ... The major eventually finds out that the draft of the new directive has just arrived at the registry and it will be immediately sent to him in order to urgently rearrange the document !

• the atrophy of the organisations' intellectual capital (the brain), as a result of the excessive increase of the *"battle rhythm"* to the detriment of the organisational learning processes;

• the *"re-invention of the wheel"*, due to the fact that the knowledge is not shared or due to the lack of capacity to learn from the experience of others;

• the informational inflation that can be caused by organisational changes or by the introduction of new concepts or technologies. The Romanian Armed Forces are transforming; all armed forces are transforming; NATO prepares a new Strategic Concept; the Treaty of Lisbon is implemented in the EU; the USA and Russia have agreed a new START; at national level, there are some strategic acquisition programmes to be soon initiated; definitely we witness the creation of *"an information tsunami"*;

• the *"cannibalisation"* of concepts and ideas. The causes of this undesired phenomenon could be manifold: the resistance or reluctance to novelty, a situation when the new ideas and concepts could be discarded in the intention phase; a limited adaptation and learning capacity that can invalidate the effective implementation of the new concepts even if these are formally agreed; imperfect foundation of the new concepts, when they become obsolete soon after publication or it is impossible to completely implement them due to the contradictions or incompatibility with other concepts in related domains; the competition between the groups of interest that lead to an a priori support for the concepts proposed by the most influent group;

• the difficulties in outsourcing services, due to the complicated transfer of the essential organisational knowledge to the provider.

◆ **Challenges and obstacles to the implementation of KM systems**

Assuming that the above-mentioned threats have been accurately identified and there is the aspiration to avoid their possible negative impact, one has to take into account that trying to implement a KM system would mean facing some challenges and overcoming some obstacles, out of which the following are highlighted:

• the individuals' apprehension or reluctance with regard to sharing knowledge. The knowledge, mainly the tacit one that is accumulated by a person while performing a specific role in an organisation, is regarded as an assurance for keeping that role and a major advantage for promotion; we actually witness a misinterpretation of the phrase *knowledge is power* that can be eliminated through the efforts of managers and of the personnel not having this negative attitude;

• the insufficiency of time needed to identify, analyse, and record the knowledge. Despite the good intentions, a conflict can appear between these activities and carrying out the daily business. The leadership of the organisation must allocate adequate resources, especially time, for the specific KM activities, which should not become an additional task with barely noticeable benefits, mainly during the implementation period;

• the limited capacity of the human being who faces an ocean of information and is not able to access it in time. This situation may occur when information flows are incorrectly dimensioned, the formats to present information are inadequate, or effective communication rules are not set up or are not observed.

All these shortcomings should be removed in the design phase of the KM system;

• the existence within the organisation of an unfavourable (read *unhealthy*) environment that affects the unrestricted sharing of experience, ideas, and concepts. There are always quite many members of the organisation, including in the military one, who limit their activity to performing the traditional tasks and refuse the new and the implied changes. Usually, this attitude and its supporters cannot be completely wiped out but the respective individuals can be influenced by the quick wins of the new system and persuaded by the fact that their work may become easier and more efficient;

• the limited perception of value and, consequently, of the need to implement a KM system in the organisation. An improved access to databases and an uncomplicated contact with other members could be appreciated by some persons as satisfactory for a superior performance. Undeniably, the two developments are necessary but not sufficient to implement a system able to support the management of one of the most important resources – the knowledge.

Knowledge management from a strategic perspective

From the analysis of threats, challenges, and obstacles, even if this effort is by far not complete, a key conclusion could be drawn: the threats materialise at the level of the whole organisation while the challenges and obstacles appear at individual and, sometimes, group level. As a consequence, an effective KM system should be aimed at eliminating or minimising the consequences of the existing

and emerging threats to the organisation and its implementation should start by surmounting the obstacles related to the human element and by favouring a correct perception of the advantages offered by the new system.

The formulation of the objectives is the attribute of the decision-makers and managers at strategic level, including in the situation when a new KM system is to be implemented within the organisation. The obstacles could be removed through a fair task sharing, the facilitation of communication, the favouring of innovative attitude as well as through an appropriate advertising campaign regarding the new KM system. It is obvious that the managers at all levels have an essential role in the supervision and implementation of these actions and, taking also into account the role of the strategic management regarding the formulation of objectives, one can translate these remarks into the military domain and identify the key role of the commanders in the development of a KM system. In other words, as long as they are part of the organisation's capital like the human and financial resources, the knowledge must be managed in a similar manner. The delegation of this responsibility is not recommended, but specific duties could be included in the job descriptions of the personnel in lower positions.

In the information age, we should not question the need for a KM system but try to identify which system is more suitable for our organisation. This system will be fully integrated into the strategy of the organisation, into its objectives, structures and processes and not only added to these ones.

Knowledge management must deliver measurable results, both from a qualitative and a quantitative perspective. As already mentioned, KM requires resources and control at strategic level. A superficial approach can actually exacerbate the threats to the organisation and the perception of the obstacles by the individuals who will find themselves unable to understand the reason why a system declared implemented and effective by the leadership does not produce any benefits for them, but on the contrary.

What should be done ?

The ideas presented so far have recalled the importance of knowledge as an organisation resource, informed us on the risks that can emerge when KM is inadequate, identified the obstacles that must be overcome in the endeavour to implement an effective KM system, and stressed the commanders' critical role in the development of the system. Once the leaders of an organisation decide

to explore the opportunity to implement a KM system, the following prerequisites must be considered:

• knowledge management must be explicitly included in the strategy of the organisation, as an essential objective aimed at improving the organisation's learning capacity;

• the KM system implementation should be regarded as a major project, requiring a dedicated project team[5] whose composition covers all the domains in which the project will have a major impact and that is led by a project manager. The project team may include external advisers and should provide advice and support for the decision-making on KM-related aspects while coordinating the implementation of the KM system. Once the KM system implemented, the project team could be tailored in accordance to the complexity of the KM system in place and transformed into a permanent structure responsible for the coordination of the KM processes across the organisation;

• the project team should be subordinated to a KM steering committee that comprises leaders and managers at the strategic level. The committee will formulate proposals regarding the critical decisions implementation and, following the implementation, will decide on daily KM management aspects;

• the implementation process end state must include a full and smooth integration of KM among the essential processes of the organisation. Its members must deliberately contribute to the accomplishment of this function and to recognise positive changes like the following: the establishment of well organised storage areas for the organisation's explicit knowledge as well as the acknowledgment of some more experienced colleagues as experts and custodians of tacit knowledge that can be easily accessed; the fair assessment by colleagues and superiors of an individual's efforts and results in KM area; the development of an attitude of trust and collaboration throughout the organisation; the establishment of a transparent coordination and evaluation process in the KM area; the maintenance of a balance between the operational rhythm and the learning processes with a special focus, when possible, on the learning aspects; the recognition and appreciation of the quality of knowledge and of the innovative manner this is applied;

• managers at all levels should be positive examples for knowledge sharing;

• the establishment and management of the relationships and networks, including the IT networks, must be done by specialists; consequently, dedicated positions could be required at operational level (additional to those resulting from the project team);

• the KM-related aspects will be explicitly included in the managers and dedicated personnel responsibilities;

• a precondition for the successful implementation of KM systems is the identification of the custodians of expertise and relevant experience as well as of those apt to become promoters and models of trust, integrity, and excellence (normally, these would not exceed 20% of the personnel). These champions as well as their supporters who are actively involved in advancing the novelty must be motivated and their attitude must be encouraged. At the same time, the rest of the personnel must easily get in contact with these persons;

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[5] A project team should be a temporary structure strictly dedicated to the KM system implementation opposed to an ad-hoc working group whose efficiency does not meet the requirements generated by the respective task.

• noticeable achievements must be advertised and the initiatives supported;

• a careful and timely approach of all the concerns related to the KM system and mentality should always be considered by managers and experts. Change causes anxiety and this must be dealt with in a professional manner, explaining the fact that knowledge sharing has no negative impact on someone's authority or career success.

If the list of these preconditions does not cause the loss of interest in the development of an effective KM system, it is necessary to know that the first practical step is the involvement of a KM consulting company that should assess the status of the KM-related aspects within the organisation, identify the suitable KM system to be set up, recommend short, medium and long term actions, issue the implementation plans, train the key personnel, and provide assistance during the implementation phase.

Knowledge management and lessons learned

An individual carrying out a role within an organisation does a recurring job for a specific period. However, due to the conflict caused by the new features of the organisation's environment, performing these repetitive tasks could at times require to adapt some processes and procedures. In other words, if you have just got new tools and try to do things the same old way, you are prone to make mistakes. If you are smart enough to predict this unpleasant possibility, you have just identified a *"lesson"*. Moreover, if you are able to adapt your manner to do your job in order to avoid the error or not to repeat it, you have just learned a *"lesson"*. Translated into academic language, a certain quantity of tacit knowledge has been created within the organisation. By sharing this specific experience with all performing similar jobs, you actually contribute to the transformation of this tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge that will probably be adequately recorded and remain a best practice as part of the organisation's intellectual capital. Most probably, you will not tell others about your mistake but proudly display your abilities in using the new tools. Do not blame yourself, most would do the same. It is for this reason that one should share the best practices and not necessarily the lessons learned. Anyway, *errare humanum est*.

It is interesting to mention that lessons could be learned not from mistakes only. Nevertheless, learning lessons from your own inaccuracies is the most painful way to do it; it is advised to attempt to learn from others' mistakes or, if you are sufficiently wise, to carefully reflect on the matter before making a decision to act, in order to prevent anybody making a mistake.

Lessons identification and learning most likely represent the commonly available element of KM. We are all involved in these activities since we are experts

in our job. Even so, it also holds true that the more general lessons could and must be identified and analysed by the KM experts. Once again the question arises: *Do we need more than lessons learned ?*

Knowledge as an essential element of the military capabilities

A nation's armed forces perform assigned missions through the application of certain abilities developed by organised military personnel using specific materiel in accordance with well defined doctrines and concepts. These abilities, succinctly described, represent the military capabilities. Their development entails complex management and development processes set up at national as well as at multinational level, within organisations as NATO and the EU.

With regard to the NATO defence planning, its main purpose is the harmonisation of the similar national processes in order to develop the capabilities required by the successful accomplishment of the Alliance missions. From a national perspective, a country's defence planning exists and is considerably related to the defence planning of NATO and of the other allies. Consequently, it is anticipated a national process that should enable the collection, analysis, and dissemination of an important volume of information and, implicitly, knowledge. One can already foresee the relevance of an adequate management of this significant volume of knowledge. In addition, the present tendency is to migrate towards a capability-based planning that requires an increased conceptual effort, mainly due to: a high level of uncertainty in the assessment of future security threats and risks; the need to generate a large spectrum of capabilities; the focus on broad-spectrum effects, and not only on kinetic ones; the consideration of non-military capabilities in line with a comprehensive approach to crisis management.

The analysis goes on with the military domains or specialties involved in the planning and, more important, in the development and the employment of military capabilities. In order to identify these domains, it is useful to underline the elements of a capability, as defined in NATO: doctrines, organisation, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and interoperability. All those who find themselves among the ones involved in the development and employment of military capabilities should realise that all the knowledge used in our daily work is part of the huge portfolio of knowledge of the military organisation.

It is interesting to find out the contribution of knowledge to a capability consisting of the elements already defined. One can easily notice that doctrines, training, leadership, and interoperability are essentially non-material elements

based on specific knowledge. These allow the military personnel to train and to use the materiel and the facilities while obeying specific directives, together with elements from other services or foreign armed forces. Undoubtedly, the acquisition and the operation of new equipment require, on the one hand, the assimilation of specific knowledge and, on the other hand, the major adaptation of the knowledge related to the employment of the respective assets in military actions. A similar judgment is valid for the infrastructure elements.

Knowledge certainly is a relevant ingredient of the military capabilities and a key resource of any military structure; hence their management should be adapted to the realities of the information age. As a final rationale, it is worth mentioning that some NATO bodies have already implemented an organisational structure that includes KM functions and, as a result, dedicated entities with unambiguous responsibilities.

CENTRAL ASIA
– Where Power, Politics and Economics Collide –

Dr Tamara MAKARENKO

The author writes about the growing interest in Central Asian countries' increasingly important resources, location and allegiances and about how this interest has played out. First, she mentions that Central Asia is continuously recognised as an important stakeholder in the Caspian energy game, a conduit to Chinese energy security, a playground of Russian power politics, and a transit area for criminal activity and religious fervour that is played out to its extreme in Afghanistan.

Then, she points out that the heightened importance of the region in the post-9/11 environment has created an altered reality; however, one in which the fundamental games have not changed, merely the ways in which they are played. Although the immediate impact of this slight twist in context is not obvious, there is a danger that in building an economic house of cards, Central Asia will be in a position to affect regional instability more directly.

She concludes by writing that as long as the US, Russia and China continue to play geo-economic games in the region, there will remain a semblance of stability. It is in their interests to ensure that this is the case.

***Keywords:** Caspian energy game; commercial interests; soft power; market mechanisms; investment opportunities; geo-economic games*

Having been involved with Central Asia since 1998 on both an academic and professional level, I have concluded that the region provides exhaustive case studies of how relations between international interests, the legitimate economy, criminality and political violence collide and/or converge.

This view originally resulted from my academic research on the crime-terror nexus – deducing in 2000 that the *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan* gained momentum because Juma Namanganiy was able to weave (the façade of) legitimate business dealings with narcotics trafficking.

Examples evolved into more sophisticated operations over the years as business, criminal and political interests increasingly converged. For example, evidence in Kyrgyzstan suggests that although key economic sectors are often intertwined with illegal activities, they are given

carte blanche access to the banking system and attract foreign investment.

Instead of adopting Western espoused and supported democratic ideals and market mechanisms as the a priori ways through which economic growth and political stability could be achieved, Central Asia has found its development constrained by the power amassed by authoritarian regimes, oligarchs, and criminal networks.

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In an increasingly energy hungry world, Central Asia's resources are attracting

Furthermore, despite regularly admonishing the region for their lack of democratic progress or their inability to establish control over criminality and rising extremism, the actions of external actors perpetuate autocratic rule and corruption, which subsequently feeds into a climate of economic, political and social instability.

Central Asia is part of several struggles that intermittently see external actors compete for attention and ultimately for access to resources

Geo-economics as the New Geopolitics

Historically, Central Asia has been referred to in the context of its position at the crossroads of East and West, nestled between empires and bordering zones of conflict and insecurity (e.g. Afghanistan, China's Xinjiang province, and Iran). Although the region was largely ignored throughout the *Cold War*, its vitality and importance was quickly rediscovered.

Central Asia is continuously recognised as an important stakeholder in the Caspian energy game, a conduit to Chinese energy security, a playground of Russian power politics, and a transit area for criminal activity and religious fervour that is played out to its extreme in Afghanistan.

Given these regional realities, Central Asia is part of several struggles that intermittently see external actors compete for attention and ultimately for access to resources. The competition for control over regional resources is often exemplified in bilateral and multilateral economic and military agreements that are negotiated with the Central Asian states.

Although there is no illusion that external states are in a position to dictate terms of engagement, regional elites have recognised that they can leverage competing interests to their (often personal) advantage. As a result, concepts such as the rule of law, corporate governance, and transparency in commercial operations are often considered to be expendable in the national interest.

Plays of power politics are no longer isolated to state actions alone, but incorporate the ability of states to use commercial interests and circumvent criminal control over economic spheres without creating greater short-term instability. Isolating the activities of China, Russia and the US, it may be argued that – in doing so – each of these states have helped sustain the status quo of the Central Asian republics. Access to resources and infrastructure has become prioritised as soft power tools through which they perceive to be able to incrementally increase their regional influence.

China's Extended Africa Strategy

Involved in the region since the 1990s, the Chinese strategy in Central Asia is undoubtedly multifaceted. A key driver of China's policy in the region, however, appears to be mirroring its Africa policy. In other words, China is steadily increasing its regional presence through the acquisition of stakes in energy and infrastructure assets, and by providing *"no-strings attached"* loans. For example, Beijing recently agreed to provide Astana with a US $10 billion loan to be used exclusively for the development of the oil and gas industry: a move likely to be used to expand its energy links in the region.

Although several bilateral agreements have been finalised between Beijing and Dushanbe, Tashkent, Almaty and Bishkek respectively and Beijing has attained a balanced position with Russia in the *Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*, its strongest foothold has been gained through a carefully targeted investment strategy. This is evident in Tajikistan, with Chinese participation in the aluminium industry and in Kazakhstan, with key commercial agreements signed with *KazMunaiGaz* and *Kazatomprom*. Europe has begun to note with concern China's investment patterns, with Chinese foreign direct investment and long-term loans equalling an estimated US $13 billion in the region.

Russia's Oligarch Power Plays

Russia has also successfully managed to use the commercial sphere to consolidate its influence and power in Central Asia. This has been especially evident in Kazakhstan – arguably Russia's only direct link to the other republics. Russia has made its initial inroads in the Kazakh banking system through state-owned banks – both through the direct and indirect acquisition of shares. In theory, this policy will allow Moscow to exert influence on the Kazakh economy by controlling access to loans, and decisions on commercial debt. *Vnesheconombank*, for example, gave Astana a US $3,5 billion loan to be used solely to purchase Russian products. It is also likely that *Kazakh BTA Bank* will follow a restructuring path that involves a possible sale to Russia's *Sberbank*.

Despite a focus on cornering the financial market, Russia is also gaining influence in the energy and mining sectors. Companies including *Polyus Gold* and *Polymetal* have gained considerable leverage over gold and copper deposits; and *LUKoil* continues to expand its presence. For example, Moscow offered capital at a time of crisis to ensure that *LUKoil* could purchase *BP*'s stake in the *Caspian Pipeline Consortium* project. It is also worth noting that *LUKoil* was invited to sit on Kazakhstan's *Foreign Investments Council* in 2003 by President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

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Leaders of countries in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at a SCO meeting

Both China and Russia, in following commercial strategies to gain influence in the region, have inadvertently contributed to securing the current political status quo. Investigating various business deals that have included Chinese or Russian interests has confirmed that in many instances the rule of law, corporate governance, and transparency of beneficial ownership are considered to be luxuries and thus dispensable. State involvement in commercial transactions thus has little to do with contributing to the creation of sustainable economic growth. In fact, several commercial transactions have merely worked to sustain the *"shadow state"*, ensuring that income generation is not tied to economic development but to securing regime survival.

US Focus on Security Priorities

Unlike China and Russia whose engagement with Central Asia has not been constrained or driven by security considerations, much of US involvement in the region post-9/11 has been focused on securing and managing military base agreements. It is in these commercial agreements that the US has mirrored the actions of China and Russia – circumventing market mechanisms cherished in the West to secure its own national priorities.

The example of Manas base in Kyrgyzstan is a well-documented case in point. In 2005 the FBI initiated an investigation that uncovered the embezzlement of millions of dollars from fuel contracts the Pentagon awarded to companies controlled by the then-President's son and son-in-law. This trend merely continued after Bakiev replaced Akayev, with lucrative fuel contracts now going to companies allegedly controlled by the current President's son. Not only did the US pay a high financial price to secure access (commercial agreements combined with increased aid), but some also accused Washington of turning a blind eye to the many reported anomalies associated with the last Kyrgyz presidential elections.

Geo-economic Power
Plays & Central Asian Security

Security in Central Asia has most readily fallen under the rubric of geopolitics, territorially used as a stage upon which external actors could engage in games of power politics. The heightened importance of the region in the post-9/11 environment has created an altered reality; however, one in which the fundamental games have not changed, merely the ways in which they are played. Although the immediate impact of this slight twist in context is not obvious, there is a danger that in building an economic house of cards, Central Asia will be in a position to affect regional instability more directly.

The emergence of legitimate business interests and investment opportunities will undoubtedly continue to contribute to some form of widespread economic stability, as it has throughout Central Asia since independence. However, at the same time this commercial environment is being built on an unstable foundation – one layered with corruption, competing political interests, civil unrest and disappointment, and criminally induced instability. Affluence is still the domain of the influential, capital continues to be sent to offshore accounts (often facilitating the movement of illicitly gained money), and civil society is left watching internal and external political actors pursue contradictory policies.

For as long as the US, Russia and China continue to play geo-economic games in the region, there will remain a semblance of stability. It is in their interests to ensure that this is the case. However, one must question the longevity of this policy, and recognise that any slight withdrawal of interests – for whatever reason – may act as the catalyst that leads the region to slide back into more overt instability.

CHINA'S ECONOMY
– Its Greatest Weapon or Weak Point ? –

David SNOWDON

The author looks at how China's increasing economic activity is inextricably linked to its security outlook.

First, he reviews China's real GDP growth during the past 20 years.

Then, he writes about the fact that China has increasingly targeted investment in emerging markets, particularly Central Asia (and area of interest for China on a geopolitical rather than economic basis) and Sub-Saharan Africa.

However, he mentions that China's investment in emerging markets does not preclude investment in developed markets, writing that there are two main ways in which China can access Western markets: through "dollar diplomacy" or through simply purchasing Western assets.

In the end, the author concludes that while China does not yet possess major force projection capabilities, it clearly has increasing aspirations in this direction and that, in financial terms, there is likely to be little barrier to China realising its ambitions given the country's limited defence spending at present.

Keywords: GDP; investments; Central Asia; dollar diplomacy; economic growth; defence spending

Over the past 20 years, China's real GDP growth has averaged 9,9%. This has lifted its economy from being only marginally relevant to being one of the biggest drivers of global growth. Between 2000 and 2009, the Chinese economy grew from just 3,7% of global GDP (in nominal US$ terms) to 8,1%.

Over the next ten years, Chinese growth should moderate to an average 7,5%, but this will be sufficient to raise China's share of global output to 14,9%. As *chart 1* shows, this will result in a remarkable degree of convergence with the US – which itself should contribute only 19,4% to world GDP by 2019.

However, even with strong growth over the next 10 years, Chinese GDP per capita will still be just US$ 11 644 or 20% of the US level in 2019.

China's attempts to buy some major Western firms have had only limited success due to political and national security considerations

In 2009, China was the largest investor worldwide in energy and power companies, and second largest for materials: resources accounted for two-thirds of all Chinese deals overseas. Western firms remain a key attraction for China, for not only the natural reserves they would bring but also the expertise that would be acquired.

But China's attempts to buy major Australian and American firms have had only limited success due to political and national security considerations. The failure of *Chinalco*'s US$ 19bn attempt to take over Australia's *Rio Tinto* has led to a move towards less *"threatening"* smaller purchases, such as the US$ 3bn purchase by *Yanzhou Coal Mining* of *Australia's Felix Resources*. With large-scale investment in many Western natural resources companies off the cards, China has increasingly targeted investment in emerging markets, particularly Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Central Asia has long been an area of interest for China on a geopolitical rather than economic basis. China fears Islamist infiltration from Central Asia with regard to the Muslim Uighurs of its westernmost Xinjiang province, which saw mass unrest in 2009. Beijing fears diaspora Uighur communities in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan could provide logistic support for their China-based kinsmen. Beijing does not wish to see an expanded US military presence in Central Asia,

as it fears this could be part of a bid to encircle China, provide covert support to Uighur activists, and reduce Chinese influence in the region.

China has made loans to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan while also making large investments in the region's oil, gas and even uranium industries. This will not only satisfy China's need for natural resources, but also bind regional states more closely to Beijing. For example, a US$ 4bn loan to Turkmenistan to develop the giant South Iolotan gas field coincided with the Central Asian-China Gas Pipeline,

***Chart 1* – it shows the GDP per capita growth between 2000 and 2018 projections of developed countries (top line), China (middle line) and emerging countries as a whole (bottom line)**

a 2 000 km link which was inaugurated in December 2009. The first pipeline will carry 13 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas from Turkmenistan to China in 2010, while a second pipeline will push total capacity up to 40 bcm by 2012-2014, and include exports from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Similar strategies have been employed in Sub-Saharan Africa. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has suggested that US$ 10bn could be given in loans over the next three years – akin to the US$ 10bn loan given to Kazakhstan during its banking sector crisis – paving the way for investment. Indeed, some of the deals proposed are even bigger than those in Central Asia. The Niger-China oil project comes in at an estimated US$ 5bn, while investments of US$ 7-9bn are being proposed in Guinea.

There are a number of attractions for both sides in these deals. For the African states, China offers a source of both aid and investment, which is not immediately tied to governance reform or other political criteria. For China, the investment is most certainly a business decision, first and foremost. However, an important secondary issue for China is promoting its view of non-intervention in the sovereign affairs of other nations. Given China's sensitivities surrounding the political status of Tibet and Taiwan, as well as the Uighur separatists, this remains a logical course of action.

While immediately attractive to both sides, it is arguable whether it would be in the longer-term interests of African states. There have already been reports

of Chinese investors abandoning investment projects in several Sub-Saharan Africa states, and infrastructure investment being slow to materialise.

It is not just Western politicians who are likely to take note of China's growing international presence, but also Chinese military planners

However, China's investment in emerging markets does not preclude investment in developed markets. There are two main ways in which China can access Western markets.

The first is through *"dollar diplomacy"*, which is by no means limited to emerging markets. The speculation in late January 2010 that China would fund a massive bailout of Greece opens up the prospect of rising Chinese influence in fiscally fragile developed states, which could potentially be tied not only into Chinese loans, but agreements to sell infrastructure, technology or financial assets.

The second avenue is simply through purchasing Western assets which are not immediately as politically sensitive, including IT, logistics and supply chains.

Rising Tensions Ahead ?

Chinese investment abroad – especially in the production of strategic commodities, but also in consumer industries – will continue to attract the attention of foreign governments. Against the backdrop of China's ongoing resistance to revaluing the *yuan*, and the persistently large Chinese trade surplus, there is still a major risk of protectionist measures being implemented in the trade policies of the West in addition to the restrictive investment policies. Doing this would certainly hurt China – which is reliant upon its export markets to absorb domestic production which does not yet have a market at home.

It is not just Western politicians who are likely to take note of China's growing international presence, but also Chinese military planners. While China does not yet possess major force projection capabilities, it clearly has increasing aspirations in this direction. In recent years, US defence planners have expressed concern that Chinese economic assistance to Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan is part of a broader *"string of pearls"* strategy of establishing naval facilities to dominate the northern Indian Ocean and its key east-west trade routes.

In financial terms, there is likely to be little barrier to China realising these ambitions given the country's limited defence spending at present. In 2009, the military budget was officially put at US$ 70,3bn, or 1,7% of GDP,

and even if this number is an under-estimate due to hidden spending and differing purchasing power, economic growth alone will allow for a massive surge in spending. With defence spending at 1,7% of GDP, by 2019, an additional US$ 208bn per year would be generated for the military.

***Chart 2* – it shows the percentage of global GDP between 2000 and 2018 projections of developed countries (higher descending line) and developing countries (lower ascending line)**

This would be more than enough to turn China's current soft power and dollar diplomacy into a more credible hard power posture.

THE THINK TANKS AND CIVIL SOCIETIES PROGRAM 2009
European Think Tanks: Regional and Trans-Atlantic Trends (II)

Central and Eastern Europe Think Tank Environment

After the fall of the Communist bloc in 1989, Western Europe turned its attention eastward and worked to develop and stabilize free market democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Increased liberalization and added political freedoms created a unique *"policy window"* for Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter, CEE). For instance, an average 24.5 think tanks were established per year from 1991 to 2000, though the rate decreased to 7.43 new institutions per year from 2001-2007. Such rapid growth reflected think tanks' increasing importance. With a massive infusion of financial aid and expertise from America and Western Europe, independent think tanks such as Bulgaria's *Center for Liberal Strategies*, Hungary's *Center for Security and Defense*, *Agroconsult*, and Poland's *Gdansk Institute for Market Economics* addressed problems of democratization, national defense, agricultural privatization, and economic policy[49]. Their efforts provided institutional support for newly formed democratic governments and, more recently, for accession and integration with the European Union.

Going back to the years after 1989, hundreds of new, independent think tanks entered the scene with the end of the *Cold War* and the break up of the Soviet Union. These new think tanks played an important role in the transition that took place during the 1990s by providing the policies and people who sustained these fledging

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[49] Jonathan Kimball, *"From Dependency to the Market"*, in McGann and Weaver, *Think Tanks and Civil Societies*, pp. 253-254.

democracies[50]. Central and Eastern Europe provides numerous examples of new think tank models that were introduced to the think tank landscape in Europe. These were often hybrids that produced quality work, mobilized the public, compensated for a disintegrating state bureaucracy, and that filled gaps in the nascent civil society. This was a dynamic period that was characterized by an explosive growth in the number and type of think tanks in the region. The experimentation was in part driven by a need to organize high impact think tanks that could help create a new political and economic order and chart the future of these countries. The stars were aligned because the US and Western Europe were presented with a fleeting opportunity to create a Europe that was whole, free and at peace. This shared mission and a sense of urgency were supported by a public mandate for change, which in turn resulted in an unprecedented commitment to provide the financial and technical assistance that would help make possible the transition from command economies and authoritarian governments to democratic governments and market economies[51].

Since the new national governments were often unprepared for day to day policymaking within a truly sovereign state, they maintained a high demand for advice in all sectors of policymaking. While economic instability and dwindling state resources deprived policy advisors of traditional levels of state funding, Western financial assistance helped to sustain independent research institutes that favored democratic politics and free-market principles. Such funds ultimately helped these institutes to function independently from the state at a time when there were few apparent policy alternatives to this *"Washington Consensus"* and precisely when policy officials were often inclined to listen to their advice[52]. As part of their involvement in civil society, these organizations consistently garnered influence through the media, among the public, and within the policy elite[53]. In fact, close personal links between policymakers and policy-analysts fueled a *"revolving door"* phenomenon where influential figures helped to formulate policy – both inside and outside of government[54]. Furthermore, advances in internet communication allowed think tanks to collect information and disseminate research on a global scale[55]. It crucially provided the newly independent states at the time with the new thinking that was required to produce the ideas and activism that would make the political and economic transition possible.

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[50] *Ibid*, pp. 251-253.

[51] *Ibid*, p. 253.

[52] *Ibid*, pp. 251-253 and Juliette Ebele and Stephen Boucher, *"Think Tanks in Central Europe: From the Soviet Legacy to the European Acquis"*, in *Freedom House*, pp. 14-15.

[53] Ivan Krastev, *"The Liberal Estate"*, in McGann and Weaver, *Think Tanks and Civil Societies*, pp. 285, 288.

[54] Ivan Krastev, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-290.

[55] McGann and Weaver, *Think Tanks and Civil Societies,* pp. 19-21.

However, CEE think tanks and political environments differ from state to state. With 40 think tanks, Hungary ranks 22nd among all countries in the number of think tanks and hosts prominent organizations such as the *Center for Policy Studies at Central European University*, the *Center for Security and Defense Studies* and the *Institute for World Economics*[56]. The impact of EU membership included new funds for think tanks in the country. Similarly, Poland represented one of the first countries to make a successful conversion to democratic institutions and market capitalism. It hosts 40 think tanks including the *Gdansk Institute for Market Economics* – one of many institutions that derived their funding through research and advice on regional economic transition. But think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe were generally defined by their reliance on outside financial support from the US and Europe and public and private international donors – as well as their tendency to focus solely on economic and business issues[57]. This may have been true in the early days of the transition but rapidly changed as indigenous sources of support were developed and funding for integration into NATO and the EU became available.

Though many are slowly drifting toward greater independence from the European Union, institutions of the European Union heavily fund organizations in the region. The disproportionate amount of financial support from the EU begs the question, if CEE think tanks can truly be independent in their research dealing with Euro-wide subject areas as the integration process continues. Nevertheless, they have played an important role during the transition period to a democratic and capitalist society[58]. Nearly twenty years later, many CEE Europeans enjoy free and fair elections as well as capitalistic economic opportunities. In this very vein, CEE has become a hub for think tanks that produce in favor of the development of a free market economy.

However, the number of think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe is still small and their number being established has slowed quite dramatically. McGann theorizes that such a slowdown in think-tank creation is the result of a number of factors: the *"success of the transformation process in the region"*[59],

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[56] McGann *"2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks: the leading public policy research organizations in the world"*, p. 11.
[57] Mark Sandle, *"Think Tanks, Post Communism and Democracy"*, p. 71.
[58] Ivan Krastev, *"Interview: Focus on Twenty Years since the Fall of the Wall"*, *Alliance Magazine* 14, no. 2, June 2009.
[59] McGann, *"2007 Survey of Think Tanks: a Summary Report"*, p. 3.

underdeveloped local means of financial support and a lack of institutional and sectoral (non-governmental) development. The slowdown is most likely a combination of these factors and the severity of the problem varies from country to country. The civil societies in some countries such as Russia and Belarus remain fragile, under-resourced and in need of capacity-building if they are to remain independent and viable organizations in the face of increasing interference by the state. We need to study more closely the think tanks that have been effective and successful so we can better understand the reasons for their success so they can be used as models for others to follow.

The unique political moment in Central and Eastern Europe required think tanks to be more activist, policy oriented, media savvy and effective at engaging the public. While not every think tank was a success, the innovations that were introduced during this period had a lasting impact on think tanks throughout Europe. We would go so far as to suggest that the think tank landscape in this region is more varied, innovative and vibrant than its counterparts in either the UK or Western Europe.

Selected Countries in East/Central Europe*	# of TTs	% of Total Ts in Region
Bulgaria	33	6.4%
Czech Republic	24	4.7%
Estonia	15	2%
Hungary	40	7.8%
Poland	41	8%
Romania	53	10%
Russia	108	21.1%
Serbia	27	5.2%
Slovakia	18	3.5%
Slovenia	19	3.7%
Ukraine	45	8.8%
Eastern/Central Euro Total		510

Countries in Eastern Europe with Top Think Tanks*	# of Top 25 Think Tanks Europe CCE	# of Nominees (of 407)	Total Think Tanks in Country
Bulgaria	2	4	33
Czech Republic	3	5	24
Hungary	2	4	40
Poland	3	4	41
Romania	1	1	53
Russia	4	6	108
Serbia	1	1	27
Slovakia	2	2	18
Ukraine	2	2	45
Eastern/Central Euro Total	20	29	389

Derived from TTCSP global think tank database, June 2009 and "The 2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks" report.

Brussels and European Union
Think Tank Environment

The European Union itself can also be said to have its own unique think tank environment, which differs from that of individual European member states. This environment is distinct but related to the model that operates in both Western and Central Europe. Many prominent European think tanks spend a limited amount of time or resources on EU-related issues, while some European nations with lively think tank communities remain outside the European Union (e.g. Norway, Switzerland and Turkey).

Because the EU itself is a relatively new political arrangement (intergovernmental organization), EU think tanks face the problem of being truly European (that is, transnational) entities. Many of the more prominent think tanks in Europe, such as the UK's *Royal Institute for International Affairs* (established in 1920) and Germany's *Kiel Institute for the World Economy* (established in 1914) were created in the early 20th century with a distinctly national focus that centered on individual nation-state policies and national interest. While EU-oriented think tanks began to appear in the 1960's, the traditional nation-state functions of research organizations precluded the formation of a truly EU think tank community until the 1990s. Ullrich argues that non-state actor activity in Europe began to take hold in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty ratification between 1992 and 1993, which led to an *"acknowledged need for greater transparency in policymaking"*[60].

While nations have continued to integrate into a more holistic European community in the last 15 plus years, think tanks, in general, have failed to keep pace in producing meaningful research to aid integration and address supranational issues. Very few think tanks seek to focus on research involving all the member states of the EU or work in the public interest of all Europeans. Rather, EU-oriented think tanks based in a given nation generally seek to research how the EU can benefit that particular nation. As a result, such think tanks are driven by national interests, are based in national capitals and mostly employ scholars who are citizens of the state to conduct research. This should come as no surprise considering national governments are major sources of funding for many think tanks in Europe and are the basis for the intergovernmental structure of the EU. Especially for think tanks established before the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, the mode of operation had been from the perspective of the national interest. These operating perspectives have been changing, but the large inertia inherent in institutional

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[60] Heidi Ullrich, *"European Union Think Tanks: Generating Ideas, Analysis and Debate"*, in Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, *Think Tank Traditions*, p. 52.

orientation means that these changes happen very slowly. Even though many think tanks have tried to diversify their staff in terms of nationality, historical divisions such as language, culture and work rules have inhibited the development of multinational institutions at the national and regional level. In addition, the national affiliation of most think tanks and the concentration of power and wealth in each national government serve as barriers to more effective EU policymaking. At least for now, as long as think tanks want to be influential they will keep working at least in part through national governments, but think tanks could do more in helping governments explain the idea of a unified Europe to the national public. With the exception of a small group of largely Brussels based think tanks, the staffing, research priorities and organizational culture of European think tanks are state centric.

This is the core difference between the operations of European think tanks and their American counterparts. While American think tanks, for the most part, do not have to worry about intrastate issues and are easily able to generate research about national issues, European research organizations are at a disadvantage in that they must combat the competing interests of the EU's individual members in addition to facing language and culture barriers in disseminating their ideas to a larger audience. This is especially true of think tanks that are not located in Brussels but in national capitals where they can be pressured into conducting research and making policy recommendations that are focused towards their home country. While there is tremendous economic and social interaction among the citizens of the states of Europe, and many European elites are bilingual or multilingual, there is no shared language across all states that would facilitate examination and discussion of policy issues. While it appears that English is increasingly being used in Brussels as the common medium for policy exchanges, it is limited to a narrow band of policy elites. Key groups such as print and electronic journalists continue to report in their native tongue for national audiences. The absence of a common, shared language for policymakers and the public poses a significant impediment to the development of shared and effective policies at the regional level.

These geographical considerations are ultimately one of the major problems in the European think tank community. Several respondents in our survey noted that because European policy is largely made in national capitals as opposed to Brussels, it is difficult for think tanks to have a major impact unless they are located in virtually every European capital (an obvious financial and logistical impossibility). This may be partially compensated by the presence of permanent representatives of the member states in Brussels, but there are interesting

developments elsewhere as well. The *European Council on Foreign Relations*, established in 2007, has been cited as a promising effort, as the organization has offices located in five different capitals and, as a result, has had a much farther-reaching effect on policy than most other organizations.

At this point, a useful distinction can be made between EU-specific and EU-oriented think tanks. EU-specific think tanks deal with issues solely pertaining to Europe and the European Union – it is their main mission. Examples would include the European Policy Centre. Thus, EU-specific think tanks study issues such as EU institutions – the institutional architecture and governance –, the ongoing EU integration process, including enlargement, the EU's relations with its neighbors and the evolution of specific policies and their implementation, as well as the EU's role in global governance. EU-oriented think tanks have separate research programs dedicated to EU studies alongside other programs, an example would be the Institute of International Affairs in Italy[61].

Despite the troubles of think tanks to generate pan-European research, developments within the last decade bode well for an increasingly comprehensive think tank community. While a few organizations have made their mark in Brussels in producing European-wide research for decades, most notably, the *Centre for European Policy Studies* (founded in 1983), several organizations have been established recently with the aim of creating a real European think tank community. These include *Bruegel* (2004), the *European Centre for International Political Economy* (2006) and the *European Council on Foreign Relations* (2007). European policy has also benefited from the creation of think tank networks, such as the *European Policy Institutes Network*, *European Ideas Network*, and the *Stockholm Network*, and from think tanks' more open approach to collaborative research. Last year, a consortium of 13 organizations from 10 different cities worked together on a 336-page report called *"Think Global, Act European"*, which outlined the main issues facing Europe for the French, Czech and Swedish presidencies of the EU, a prime example of collaborative work helping introduce Europe-wide ideas into the public sphere[62].

However, one of the main problems facing these and other organizations is that EU institutions have yet to realize think tanks' full potential in the development of the Union. For this reason, EU think tanks remain small, with limited financial

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[61] Notre Europe, *"Europe and its Think Tanks: A Promise to be Fulfilled"*, p. 4.

[62] *La Fondation Pour L'Innovation Politique* (Paris), *Notre Europe* (Paris), *Bruegel* (Brussels), *CEPS* (Brussels), *CER* (London), *Demoseuropa* (Warsaw), *DIIS* (Copenhagen), *ECFR* (London-Madrid-Berlin-Paris), *Eliamep* (Athens), *EPC* (Brussels), *Europeum* (Prague), *SIEPS* (Stockholm) and *SWP* (Berlin).

resources and limited ability to influence policy. According to Kaetana Leontjeva of the *Lithuanian Free Market Institute* and Ruta Vainiené of the *Coalition for a Free Europe*, *"EU institutions are often unresponsive to think-tanks' attempts to get into closer contact, become informed about new initiatives and involved in workshops, seminars and conferences. Institutions should recognize that independent think-tanks are altruistically interested in achieving what is best for European citizens"*[63]. While this may not always be the case, such problematic interactions – when they do occur – are not grounds for optimal policymaking. For this situation to change, adjustments need to be made on both sides of the policymaking process – think tanks need to offer more concise and practical policy advice and policymakers need to be more willing to listen, especially since think tanks are in a unique position to fill the growing credibility gap between European institutions and its citizens.

In addition, a funding mechanism needs to be developed that makes it easier for think tanks to apply for and receive funds for research that focuses on the issues facing the EU and Europe. Currently the time and paper work involved in securing grants and contracts from the EU discourages some of the best think tanks from doing research on EU policy related issues.

The role of the many think tanks within the EU also needs to be better defined. In the last five years, the EU has expanded dramatically to 27 member states and a population of 500 million people. This growth in national diversity within the EU presents a great opportunity for think tanks to research the integration process as well as provide sound policy advice in anticipation of the inevitable challenges that exist now and will continue in the future. The *Romanian Academic Society (SAR)* highlighted this difficulty in a report issued in 2005, saying that *"New Europe must therefore develop its European voice and become a permanent and competent actor in European affairs in order to promote its views and also the furthering of Europeanization to wider Europe. This means creating a well-coordinated coalition of think tanks, able to play a role as competent and self assertive actors in European affairs, able to propose policies, not only react to them, and to advocate them in Brussels"*[64]. This process will also be affected by the outcome of the Lisbon Treaty, if it does eventually get ratified, potentially streamlining parts of the policy making process.

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[63] Kaetana Leontjeva and Ruta Vainiené, *"What Think-Tanks Can Contribute to EU Policymaking"*, Europe's World, 2008, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21253/Default.aspx

[64] Romanian Academic Society, *"Think Tanks in Europe"*, in *The Romanian Journal of Political Sciences*, 2005, p. 5.

Brussels also has its own difficulties as a policy center. It is only beginning to come into its own as a true think tank hub in Europe and is constrained by what some see as a poor atmosphere for policymaking. Because of the need to reach a consensus from so many disparate parties, there is a tendency to avoid the important questions. An editorial in *The Economist* claimed that in Brussels, *"The tone of policy debate is generally cautious and technocratic. You will have no difficulty finding a seminar on inflation-targeting at the European Central Bank, or the formation of a European border guard. But the really fundamental questions tend to be avoided. The very novelty and fragility of much of what the EU is attempting seems actually to inhibit debate, rather than encourage it. With rare exceptions … senior policymakers in Brussels, and the think tanks that surround them, do not like to rock the boat"*[65]. The European Commission needs to take the lead in developing and supporting proactive, innovative and independent research on the emerging and enduring issues it faces. Strategies need to be developed to address this issue and we would suggest that think tanks are uniquely positioned to act as a bridge between the policymakers in Brussels and its member states. If the proper funding mechanisms are put in place think tanks can serve as a catalyst for ideas and action on key issues facing Europe and the EU. Throwing more money at think tanks alone will not solve the problems. In fact among the think tanks currently in Brussels, there is relatively little collaboration and competition, therefore preventing think tanks from being as effective and relevant as they could be[66]. Finally, the problems mentioned earlier about transparency and accountability in think tanks apply to EU-focused think tanks as well. Because many Brussels think tanks are largely funded either by EU institutions, national governments, or corporate sponsors, intellectual independence becomes an issue if it is not transparent[67]. A 2007 *Economist* editorial highlights this problem: *"The painful comparison is with Washington, DC, where the best think tanks refuse public money, compete to set the agenda with provocative ideas, and enjoy extraordinary access to administration and Congress alike"*[68].

Notre Europe's 2004 study, *"Europe and its Think Tanks: A Promise to be Fulfilled"*, highlighted independence as one of the top concerns for European think tanks, and several respondents in our survey indicated that it was one of the top two problems

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[65] *"The Brussels Consensus"*, in *The Economist*, 7 December 2007, p. 52.
[66] Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, eds., *Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas*, Manchester: Manchester UP, 2004, p. 56.
[67] For an expanded discussion of transparency and funding issues, please see the related subsection within *"Challenges Facing European Think Tanks"*.
[68] *"The Think-Tanks that Miss the Target"*, in *The Economist*, 7 July 2007, pp. 45-46.

for European organizations still today. *"Many think tanks in Europe are effectively outsourced arms of the EU, or member governments, and derive much of their funding from these institutions"*, one respondent noted. *"As a result, think thanks in Europe – in addition to their other failings – are by and large the voice of the establishment. Given that it is the establishment that is responsible for failing to address the issues, this profoundly limits their ability to do much more than serve as an echo chamber"*.

The current and future challenges facing Europe such as an aging population, low economic growth, and high unemployment, exacerbated by the current economic crisis, have shown the policy failures of national governments. Coordination and cooperation on certain important issues would be helpful in dealing with the crisis. Despite the current crisis being an opportunity and learning experience as well as a challenge for governments, think tanks will hopefully strengthen and reform the policymaking process and bring about necessary changes, helping it build capacity to deal with not only European issues but perhaps more importantly, global ones. According to Boucher, McGann and Royo, currently European think tanks are not fulfilling their potential for helping policymakers come up with innovative policy to help deal with the crises and future integration. The challenge in part consists of the fact that most think tanks are national, and focus on national issues, rather than more European ones.

Considering the diversity among the current 27 member states, in terms of size, wealth, and level of integration in the European Union, the transnational aspect of the European project, along with a different political, financial, and legal environment, it is no surprise European think tanks face tensions and a balancing act regarding their activities and operations. Those advising the Commission have to tread an especially fine line as manifested in the following quote from a seminar in Lisbon. *"If we were too independent and aloof from those to whom we offered advice, our advice fell on deaf ears or would be irrelevant, because it did not address the real concerns. If, on the other hand, we came too close in identifying with the Commission, our advice would inevitably become colored by its views and outlook. It would become irrelevant, this time because it did not make any difference"*[69]. Policymakers do not always make their decisions based purely on evidence, and the whole issue of the policymaking process is complex. The lack of leadership and vision among the political elite, coupled with divisions among the 27 member states about the role and future direction of the EU, does not make for easy decision-making.

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[69] Helga Nowotny, Seminar *"Scientific Advice and Policy Making: Where Are We Heading ?"* Lisbon, 22-23 January 2008.

Brussels Think Tanks	Date Established
Royal Belgian Institute of Natural Sciences/Koninklijk Belgisch Instituut voor Natuurwetenschappen van België	1878
Royal Academy of Overseas Sciences/Academie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer (ASOM)	1928
Gallup Organization Europe	1935
Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations	1947
European Movement	1948
Centre d'Études Politiques, Économiques et Sociales (CEPESS)	1948
Institut d'Études Européennes (IEE)	1963
Atlantic Treaty Association	1954
Royal Institute for Central Africa/Koninklijk Museum voor Midden-Afrika	1960
Centre for Historical Research and Documentation on War and Contemporary Society/Studie- en Documentatiecentrum Oorlog en hedendaagse Maatscappij (CEGES-SOMA)	1967
Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA)	1974
Flemish Interuniversity Council/Vlaamse Interuniversitaire Raad (VLIR)	1976
King Baudouin Foundation/Koning Boudewijnstichting	1976
Groupe d'Etudes Politiques Européennes	1977
Centre for Defence Studies/Royal High Institute for Defense/Centre d'Études de Défense	1978
Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP)	1979
EastWest Institute	1980
Kangaroo Group	1979
European Round Table of Industrialists	1983
Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS)	1983
Ludwig von Mises Institute Europe/Ludwig von Mises Instituut	1983
Observatoire Social Européen	1984
Centre Européen de Recherches Internationales et Stratégiques (CERIS)	1985
Confrontations Europe	1991
Centre for European Security and Disarmament	1993
Centre for the New Europe (CNE)	1993
Royal Institute for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and Promotion of Clean Technologies/Institut royal pour la Gestion durable des Ressources naturelles et la Promotion des Technologies propres (IRGT)	1994
Scientific Institute of Public Health/Institut scientifique de Santé publique	1994
International Crisis Group (ICG)	1995
International Security Information Service, Europe (ISIS Europe)	1995
European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA)	1996
European Policy Centre (EPC)	1997
Federal Council for Sustainable Development/Federale Raad voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling	1997
Belgian Technical Cooperation/Belgisch Technische Cooperatie	1998
Institut Européen des Relations Internationales (IERI)	1998

Brussels Think Tanks	Date Established
Madariaga Foundation	1998
European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)	Active since 1998
Friends of Europe (FoE)	1999
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI)	2000
Academy Avignon	Active since 2001
Institute for European Studies (IES)	2001
Belgian Science Policy Office/Federaal Wetenschapsbeleid	Active since 2002
European Ideas Network	2002
Security & Defence Agenda	2002
Institut Hayek	2003
Lisbon Council for Economic Competitiveness and Social Renewal	2003
Molinari Economic Institute (IEM)	Active since 2003
Réseau Multidisciplinaire en Etudes Stratégiques (RMES)	2003
Thomas More Institute	2003
Bruegel	2004
The Centre	2004
Transatlantic Institute	2004
United Nations Regional Information Centre (UNRIC)	2004
ALTER-EU	2005
Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA)	Active since 2005
European Trade Union Institute for Research, Education and Health and Safety (ETUI-REHS)	2005
Globalization Institute	2005
European Center for International Political Economy (ECIPE)	2006
European Enterprise Institute	Active since 2006
Interel	2006
Carnegie Europe	2007
European Liberal Forum	2007
Centre for European Studies	Active since 2008
Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS)	2008
Green European Institute	2008

* *Derived from TTCPS global think tank database, June 2009 and "The 2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks" report*

Think Tanks with a Brussels Branch	Date Established
Conference Board	1916
Friedrich Ebert Foundation/Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES)	1925
Rand Europe	1948
Centre International de Formation Européene (CIFE)	1954
European Cultural Foundation (ECF)	1954
Friedrich Naumann Foundation/Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit (FNS)	1958
Konrad Adenauer Foundation/Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)	1964
Hanns Seidel Foundation/Hans Seidel Stiftung	1967
German Marshall Fund	1972
World Security Institute	1972
Bertelsmann Foundation/Bertelsmann Stiftung	1977
French Institute of International Relations/Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI)	1979
EastWest Institute	1980
Institute for European Environmental Policy	1980
European Institute for Public Administration (EIPA)	1984
Club of Madrid	1991
Club des Organismes de Recherche Associés (CLORA)	1991
Robert Schuman Foundation	1991
Institute of European Affairs (IEA)	1992
Open Society Institute	1993
Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry	1993
Ecologic – Institute for International and European Environmental Policy	1995
Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP)	1995
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation/Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung	1996
Heinrich Boll Foundation/Heinrich Böll Stiftung	1997
Crisis Management Initiative	2000
Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)	2000
Fondapol/Foundation Pour l'Innovation Politique	2002
International Council on Security and Development	Active since 2005
Open Europe	Active since 2005
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)	2009

Derived from TTCPS global think tank database, June 2009 and "The 2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks" report

The following is a typology of think tanks found in Brussels. While no system of classification can describe every organization active in the EU capital, these categories can help provide a *"road map"* of the terrain on the ground in Brussels.

EUROcracy Tanks (EU Commission tanks)

These organizations maintain formal ties with elements of the European Union bureaucracy, operating as in-house research branches. They can associate with other types of think tanks, but their funding and research agenda is determined by the EU government apparatus.

EU Ivory Tower Tanks (university based EU tanks)

There is a prolific amount of university-affiliated think tanks throughout Europe. They are mostly staffed by professors and can have difficulty reaching the eyes and ears of policymakers since they do not always maintain ties with the policymaking establishment. In addition, academic research is not always directly applicable to policy needs, exemplifying the difficulty in bridging the divide between theory and practice.

EU Policy Wonks (EU independent research and analysis tanks)

These think tanks are policy oriented but maintain an independent stance when conducting research and analysis involving pan-European policy issues.

Pied-à-Terre or EU Postal Think Tanks (office but no critical masse, listening post)

These are branches of nationally-based think tanks founded, as the name suggests, to keep a *"foot on the ground"* within Brussels. They may maintain a substantial staff or consist of nothing more than a postal address, but they are always defined by their status as a secondary sub-branch of a major state-centric think tank.

EU Do Tanks Forum Tanks (EU Issue Forum Tanks)

These think tanks put more of an emphasis on becoming a key nexus for hashing out EU policy. They organize events ranging from major conferences to informal lunches in order to facilitate debate on pan-European issues.

Advocacy Tanks (EU Integration advocates or opponents)

Occupying either side of the EU-ideology spectrum, these organizations focus their efforts toward furthering a specific ideology, whether it be to advance further integration or to impede it.

Party Animals (Stiftungs)

These think tanks are the research arms of political parties, concerned with a particular ideology and with furthering the reach and agenda of their party. A prime example of these think tanks has been the German *Stiftungen*, but there are also examples from other countries, as well as some relatively recent think tanks associated with pan-European political parties.

Perhaps with recent EU parliamentary elections, a new Swedish presidency, and the possible ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, reputable EU think tanks will be allowed to contribute more forward looking and useful advice. As illustrated by the chart and typology above, the number and variety of think tanks in Brussels is steadily growing, but with the EU at a crossroads, the future role of both Brussels and its think tanks remains to be seen.

Recent Research Trends in Europe and the EU

The *TTCSP* conducted a survey of think tanks in the spring of 2009. Provided below is a summary and analysis of some of the findings. The data collected from the surveys were supplemented by information collected on the internet and profiles that were developed for all the leading think tanks in Brussels. There are a number of issues that the majority of top think tanks in Europe are concentrating on, and as funding increases, their scope and breadth of issues will likely increase as well. Below is a discussion of the major economic, security, and foreign policy issues on which the major European think tanks are concentrating their resources.

The European budget has become an important issue in promoting the integration of the European Community. The *Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)* has written a number of relevant articles concerning the European budget; the organization's Macroeconomic Policy Group acts as an independent watchdog on the *European Central Bank* (ECB). They argue that the ECB should look more at financial structures than at money supply numbers. CEPS held a conference in September 2008 entitled *"The Reform of the EU Budget: An Agenda for Growth"*, which was attended by representatives from *Bruegel*, the European Commission and Intesa Sanpaolo[70]. The conclusions from this meeting were that reform of the EU Budget could be used as a tool to re-launch the whole European project.

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[70] *"The Reform of the EU Budget: An Agenda for Growth"*, September 2008. Report available online at: http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=602.

There was also call for the creation of a common defense budget, aimed at reinforcing the peacekeeping capabilities of the EU, allowing it to play a more active international role.

Financially the most pressing issue recently has been how to temper the effects of the current global economic crisis. As the US uses automatic stabilizers to stimulate lending, and both the US and UK continue to push the passage of discretionary financial stimulus programs, the EU is debating its own path to recovery. On the topic of a stimulus package, EU think tanks tend to agree that cash needs to be funneled into the system. However, some think tanks criticize the potential of negative impacts of this package such as further adding to the credit crunch by accruing the government's borrowings and increasing supply of government securities. The increase in government debt is particularly a big turn off – as some think tanks stress the burden to taxpayers and future generations. Simply pumping cash into the system by either borrowing, taxing or printing out more money is not necessarily seen as directly correlated to consumer spending and greater liquidity. Initiatives by the EU Commission such as Dolceta to better educate consumers about financial products and services in the market have been under way for over a year. Still, the EU think tank community offers few alternative economic solutions – other than stimulus plans that prompt government to assume more active control of large financial institutions.

Recent research amongst think tanks concerned with economic policy has largely focused on the impact of the crisis on the EU and the steps that the European Central Bank can take to alleviate it. On the topic of regulation in the financial sector, some EU think tanks believe that there should be a return to a form of the *Glass-Steagall Act* approach, where there is a division between commercial and investment banking activities, the latter subject to strict regulation regarding liabilities, increased leverage and securitization of loan portfolios. Although a few think tanks see a significant increase in regulation as an addition to current obscurity in the system, they also stress a more efficient and active use of current regulating institutions in both the EU and the UK. Some think tanks toy with the idea of nationalization, while more free market-oriented think tanks see government stakes in financial institution as leading to an increase in inefficiency.

Looking to the future, think tanks such as *Chatham House* and the *European Council on Foreign Relations* see a decline in US economic power, and note China as a key player to potentially better weather the storm. They see emerging economies, especially in Asia, as a possible impetus for recovery in areas such as manufacturing, even though these economies are themselves severely affected by the current crisis.

The economy and regulation have also been a significant issue in the European think tank community. As the economic crisis plagues the world, much of Eastern Europe has been hit hard. There has been increasing press coverage on the potential effects of the collapse of parts of the financial systems in Eastern Europe, whose debt is denominated in foreign currency. Experts say it will directly affect the Swiss, German, and other banks that have lent heavily to the region. Although EU think tanks have not specifically addressed this latter possibility, they have looked at the economic effects of European integration. Overall, EU think tanks see new members as a market for their goods and a means of increasing their competitiveness in the global economy. Although EU think tanks, such as *CASE* and the *Romanian Academic Society*, have called for a more significant cohesion between Eastern and Western Europe, many are aware of the challenges confronting both.

One such challenge is the relationship between Russia and Europe, an important issue within the European Union. This has been demonstrated by recent events in the region such as the gas crisis in Ukraine in early 2009. The gas crisis not only raised tensions but also prompted an urgent assessment by think tanks of the need for a common EU energy policy. The *Russia and Eurasia Program* at *Chatham House* published a large number of relevant articles covering Russia, NATO, and the future of European security[71]. In January 2009, *CEPS* held a conference entitled *"Beyond Dependence: How to Deal with Russian Gas"*[72]. *SIPRI* has conducted research on the recent Russia-South Ossetia conflict, which occurred in August 2008; their analysis moves beyond the comparisons between Kosovo and South Ossetia and the Russia–West 'strategic rivalry' framework[73]. *CEPS* also recently published a number of articles concerning security issues discussing Russia's desire for a new European security architecture[74]. This will no doubt be an area of future research depending on how the situation between Russia and NATO develops and impacts European security.

The environment and global climate change is an issue that is uniquely international. Environmental problems in one nation carry over to other ones, and thus require collaborative solutions by nations around the world. However,

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[71] Dmitry Rogozin, *"Russia, NATO and the Future of European Security: REP Roundtable Summary"*, *Chatham House*, February 2009, pp. 1-10; Andrew Wood, *"Reflections on Russia and the West"*, *Chatham House*, November 2008, pp. 1-10.

[72] http://www.ceps.be/Event.php?event_id=353

[73] Ekaterina Stepanova, *"South Ossetia and Abkhazia: Placing the Conflict in Context"*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2008, pp. 1-4.

[74] Andrey S. Makarychev, *"Russia and its 'New Security Architecture' in Europe: A Critical Examination of the Concept"*, *Centre for European Policy Studies*, February 2009, pp. 1-15.

even while Europe has taken a position at the forefront of environmental advocacy, environmental issues remain understudied by European think tanks. American think tanks can be said to act in a similar manner. The *2007-08 Survey of Think Tanks* showed that only 13% of European and 17% of American think tanks pursue any kind of research pertaining to the environment. Even if many other NGO's do study the environment, and thus make up for the lack of scholarship, think tanks are well suited to create policy recommendations that governments can implement.

A small subset of EU-oriented think tanks are anti-EU think tanks that comprise a large portion of the so-called *"Euro skeptic"* community. While there are institutes in most every European nation that can be categorized as EU-neutral, Great Britain has the highest number of truly Euro-skeptic think tanks. These British think tanks, including Open Europe, are a major player in the anti-EU community[75]. Euro-oriented think tanks such as Business for New Europe must not only grab the attention of policymakers, but they must debate the issues with Euro-skeptic think tanks as well. The interplay between the construction of EU-level policies may be the closest European equivalent to the bipartisan system in the United States, as is regularly evidenced by referendums on EU institutional matters which indicate a deep divide among voters' views of the future of EU integration.

The European Union has yet to develop a common foreign policy or create and ratify a Union-wide constitution. For example, support for the United States intervention in Iraq since 2003 has polarized European nations. Efforts to reform Europe's organizing treaties have stumbled ever since Valéry Giscard d'Estaing opened the workings of the Constitutional Convention in 2003. In 2004, the European Constitution failed to pass as French and Dutch voters voted against it. Even with the ongoing ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union still struggles to unite on many key issue areas. European think tanks have the opportunity to step in to aid this process, and doing so would surely render the EU as a stronger force in world politics.

Europe hopes for a reformation of the transatlantic relationship inherited from the post-WWII era and now demands parity with the US. In a recent report, Europe 2020 summarized the situation: Europe 2010/2020 has *"nothing in common with the past decades. Times of construction have become times of management and governance"*[76]. This may be true, but a pressing question still remains: what form of management and governance will the European Union take ? This is undoubtedly one of the biggest questions that truly EU-focused think tanks can address.

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[75] Notre Europe, *"Europe and its Think Tanks"*, p. 26.
[76] *Europe 2020*, *"What Common Policy towards North America by 2020 ?"*, December 2004, http://www.europe2020.org/spip.php?article214&lang=en

Transatlantic relations, and indeed foreign policy in general, presents itself as an enormous opportunity for the EU to assert its place as a powerful and relevant actor on the global stage. Europe prides itself as being a model of a new, more modern type of government – living proof of the promise of a supranational body whose policies are both increasingly *"multilateral"* and yet *"common"*. However, this unified stance is still in development. A recently published study by Bruegel explains *"As long as the EU was legitimately centered on achieving peace in Europe, or reunifying it, the design and implementation of internal integration obviously took precedence over external relations. The message from this volume is that this era has passed and that, in a fast-changing and challenging international environment, external economic relations have become too important an issue for the EU to remain a fragmented power"*[77]. The European Union can seize this moment of opportunity to drive this rhetoric into practice, and present to the world, and to the United States, a truly multilateral and fully functioning political power. Think tanks throughout Europe – be they purely national initiatives or with a presence throughout the continent – can play a role in creating effective and creative policy that will define the *"common"* and simultaneously *"multilateral"* policy of the EU, giving it shape and form. The development of this unified European Union policy could be the work of a network of pan-European think tanks, serving as a means to consolidate European foreign and domestic policy. In so doing, they can present to the world a unified polity based on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

The advent of a new US administration is an opportunity to develop the relationship between Europe and the US following the Bush administration. In a recent unscientific survey, several respondents reported that they viewed the former US administration as a convenient excuse for EU policy makers to remain complacent and complaining. Likewise, the general EU sentiment towards the US, although improved since the 2008 election results, is one of reciprocal frustration about the internal situation of the other. There seemed to be a general consensus that the US suffered from an endemic case of insolence. Again, the Euro 2020 report: *"Many … expressed their conviction that … among [US] elites, the capacity to understand the world has considerably regressed"*. The US resistance to multilateral and multinational diplomacy, especially in the case of the Iraq war, exacerbated this European sentiment. Europe's disgruntled reaction to the recent transatlantic relation is due in large part to the US reluctance to address global crises with a preventative course of action and has instead so far remained focused *"on the symptoms rather than on the causes of enormous global unbalances"*. In this vein,

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[77] Andre Sapir, *Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy*, Brussels: Bruegel, September 2007, p. xii, http://www.bruegel.org/uploads/tx_btbbreugel/Fragmented_Power_Andre_Sapir.pdf

the EU has been a leader within multinational institutions, such as the UN, and has set a precedent in terms of providing global aid throughout the world.

The election of Barack Obama as the 43rd President of the United States may present an obstacle to this hoped-for European common voice and sought-after transatlantic parity. As it becomes easier to *"cozy up"* to the United States, many European nations may confer with the US from a national, rather than supranational standpoint. Observed one EU expert: *"The one thing we can be sure of today is that there will be many transatlantic common relations rather than one transatlantic common policy"*. The risk is, of course, whether or not these many *"common relations"* with the US on the part of member states will undermine or strengthen the multilateral aims of the inter-European alliance[78].

While not specifically an issue affecting relations among the two polities, both the US and the EU face a series of similar impending crises: an aging population, increasing competition from the emerging economies around the world, security threats and new patterns of immigration. The threat of a social security crisis for instance looms along the horizon for both regions. Due to increased wealth and education, both areas have decreased birth rates with many areas below the population replacement level. The only reason many areas gain population is because of immigration, largely from Latin America in the United States and Africa, Turkey and Eastern Europe in the EU. This is an opportunity for think tanks to step in and help to analyze these complex problems and develop policies and programs to address them. The noted economist Robert Samuelson has challenged think tanks to address these issues and specifically to help create better immigration policies[79].

One major issue that has perhaps changed European-American relations most is the creation and rise of the Euro. In less than a decade, the Euro has greatly surpassed the American dollar in value, and many banks and nations have started shifting their holdings from the weakening dollar to the more valuable Euro. However, investment between the two areas is largely inter-connected. Both American and European think tanks should research the opportunity to coordinate fiscal policies that will produce the most mutually beneficial international business environment. Experts agree that, in a competitive world, the sheer magnitude of fiscal independence between the US and EU – as well as their respective influence on the world economy – renders the transatlantic alliance integral to both Washington and Brussels. A misguided rupture of the web

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[78] James McGann, *2008 Survey of Think Tanks*, *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, fpri.org.
[79] Robert Samuelson, *"Making the Think Tanks Think"*, in *The Washington Post,* 1 August 2007, p. 17.

of commercial ties that link the US and Europe due to politicians giving up on one side or another would have grave consequences. Already before the current economic crisis, trade ties were beginning to strain under worries of job losses due to globalization. However, there has been no marked increase in protectionist measures during the crisis, largely because of lessons learned during previous economic contractions in the 1930's and 1980's[80]. Present European leadership recognizes that *"we are all in the same boat"* and that *"there's no national solution, be that Swedish or American or British"*[81]. Think tanks can work to spread the message of the *"high stakes"* of a failed transatlantic relationship. The expectation amongst the EU leaders is one of *"fellowship"* and no longer *"followship"* with the US. This *"fellowship"* is not incompatible with American *"leadership"*, but the US must endorse a modern *"leadership"*. On the US side, this *"modern leadership"* would consist of a more multilateral approach to dealing with its EU allies. Yet, the EU also struggles itself with presenting a strong multilateral voice. Despite all of this, any sign of successful work between the EU and US will serve as an example to the rest of the world that even powers that have disagreements can move beyond them.

The increasing power of the European Parliament has allowed it to guide European policy on issues such as employment, the environment, public health, consumer protection, social security and other issues traditionally researched by domestic think tanks. Today, the need has arisen for a truly *"European"* think tank to research these issues and recommend the best policy to be implemented on a European level. Often, using individual European nations or other large entities such as the United States as models might not suffice. European issues need European solutions created by European institutions. As in the United States, a developed legislative body promotes a variety of political agendas and interests, which in turn fuel the demand for independent policy research and advice. Though national capitals across Europe continue to exert a powerful political pull on members of the European Parliament, these representatives' desire for well-researched policy products will nurture a more active, innovative think tank community. Thus, an EU-level think tank community has been forming in Brussels that tries to research these European issues. Generally, these think tanks operate on the model which, until then, had tended to be specific to the aforementioned Anglo-American model.

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[80] Kati Suominen, *"A New Age of Protectionism ? The Economic Crisis and Transatlantic Trade Policy"*, German Marshall Fund Brussels Paper Series, p. 25, http://www.gmfus.org//doc/Suominen%20final.pdf

[81] Carl Bildt in *"Shared Destiny: How Relevant is Europe to the United States Under Obama ?"* German Marshall Fund (March 20, 2009), http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/2009/transcripts.html

All of these recent issues have made the need for an integrated European think tank community even more vital. Scholarship on the importance of civil society has increased, and in return, many more organizations are being created. The 1990's saw an explosion in the number of think tanks in the US, in Europe, as well as in other regions around the world. While this trend has since slowed, old and new think tanks have found themselves in a newer, more fast-paced world. Many think tanks have had to adapt to continue their successes in the policymaking arena. In Europe specifically, think tanks directed at European Union issues have proliferated since the 1980's. As a result, there has been a shift in think tank research from issues affecting the domestic situation of a particular nation to issues which can be seen as more distinctly *"European"*. However, more policy advice is needed than ever before to make the European Union meaningful and lasting.

Challenges Facing European Think Tanks

While there are a host of challenges facing think tanks in Europe we have chosen to focus on those that appear to be most pressing for the think tanks we surveyed and interviewed for this paper. These issues include the challenges and impact of EU integration; managing the tensions between independence, influence, and impact; and the need for more varied sources of funding and greater transparency in the financing and operations of think tanks.

Both European and American think tanks are seeing changes in their organization and operation, as a result of many different factors such as saturation in the think tank market and recent changes in the political economy. While many authors have speculated on how the scene will change, we cannot be certain whether current trends will continue or entirely unexpected changes arise.

As the European Union and especially the Euro-zone continue their enlargement, the role of think tanks within the European Union will continue to change. While scholars from the original six EU founding countries (the Benelux, France, Germany, and Italy) currently dominate most think tanks which aim to be EU focused, a growth in think tanks specializing on specific issue areas within the EU – whether it is on continued integration or expansion, Euro fiscal policy, a common security policy, or perhaps finally a common foreign policy – will emerge. Some scholars believe that European think tanks will increase their focus on the public and utilize engagement strategies so that the 500 million members of the European Union can better understand the unprecedented changes going on around them. Increasing use of English has helped to simultaneously fuel

such communication and lower operating costs. The advent of internet dissemination also allows think tanks to reach audiences with an unprecedented level of ease, and could mean lower costs and a lower barrier of entry for new think tanks, which could lead to a growing proliferation of new start-ups. Think tanks without endowments are likely to become much more specialized, entrepreneurial and activist in order to set themselves apart from the other think tanks operating in the region. Some have called these *"Think and Do Tanks"*, because of the mix of research and advocacy.

European think tanks have begun to increase their engagement with the public, either through the Internet or news media. Moreover, many institutions have an interest in surveying the public's opinion on certain policy issues. While many think tanks do print and produce their own media for the public, there is still a good deal of room for them to grow and develop innovative approaches to reaching policymakers and the public with their ideas and research findings. Within the next ten years think tanks in Europe could significantly increase their influence on the news media as well as possibly become a media source themselves. In that capacity, they could serve as a group of Pan-European media outlets that can effectively compete with state centered print and electronic media. The spread of the internet may contribute to an increase in *"Eurothink"* and of course *"virtual think tanks"* and other variations of the traditional think tank model. All things considered, the years ahead will be very exciting in the realm of think tanks.

Funding and Impact

Conservative scholars such as Leonard Liggio have noted that many European corporations have forgotten the influence think tanks can have in the policy process[82]. Indeed, in the past, many free market think tanks received a substantial portion of their budgets from corporations pushing the think tanks to work on promoting the free market within nations. However, the scene today appears stagnant, as think tanks receive more government funding and less corporate funding even though their influence has not declined. While this is an important observation, it misses the point: it is not a question of corporate vs. government or EU funding for that matter. The real issue is how diversified and independent the financial support for a think tanks is. There is a saying which claims that *"he who pays the piper calls the tune"*. Think tanks cannot afford to have donors determine

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[82] Leonard Liggio, *"Why Business Needs Think Tanks"*, *Pfizer forum*.

their research agenda or research findings. A think tank's independence is critical to the credibility of its research and must be carefully managed if its research is to have an impact. Donors and boards of think tanks must provide effective stewardship in this area and develop guidelines and published policies that assure that conflicts of interest will not be tolerated and the integrity of the research process will be protected.

As a result of their divergent histories, tax systems and political cultures, private philanthropy in Europe is far less developed than in the US. For many years political parties and government ministries often represented a significant source of funding for think tanks in Europe. Whereas US tax codes require that almost all think tanks maintain a high degree of independence and transparency in their finances and their mission, it is often unclear how many European think tanks are funded and how their resources are allocated. What is clear is that European think tanks received significantly more government funding than US think tanks, and continue to rely on large corporations for funding. In contrast, US think tanks depend on a more diverse set of funders, including a higher proportion of foundations and wealthy private citizens. Lack of non-governmental, non-corporate sources of funding does impact the independence of think tanks, and often undermines their credibility with the public. A 2005 *European Policy Institutes Network* think tank task force concluded that European think tanks, in general, need to do a better job of clarifying their ideological goals and explicitly stating their sources of funding[83]. One has to add a word of caution here because of the tendency of governments to overreact and impose punitive and often ill advised regulations for think tanks and other NGOs. It is not simply that private philanthropy is under developed in Europe, it is also the widespread perception (diametrically opposed to the perceptions in the US) that government money is neutral whereas private money is problematic because it is viewed as an instrument of private interest. *TTCSP* surveys and interviews have revealed that there are large segments of European policy and media elites that hold quite negative views of private philanthropy and independent think tanks. One policymaker went so far as to describe think tanks as a *"useless American invention"*. There is a widespread view that independent think tanks cannot be objective and serve the public interest because they are corrupted by their private benefactors. This is despite the widespread empirical evidence by the US and other countries that independent think tanks individually and collectively serve the public interest.

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[83] *"EPIN, Ideas, Influence and Transparency – What Could Think Tanks Learn and Contribute ?"* pp. 3-4.

The lack of private philanthropy in Europe, in comparison to the United States, has also contributed to European think tanks being much less visible in the media than their American counterparts. One explanation for this is that historically Europeans did not have the same need to demonstrate their effectiveness to their donors and the public because they were funded almost exclusively by the public sector. In fact, in our recent survey of think tanks, several members of research organizations independently noted that US think tanks tend to be much more media savvy than European organizations. Unfortunately, staying out of the public eye tends to contribute to the perceived lack of tangible influence that European organizations have on policymakers. While think tanks are beginning to have a greater effect on policymaking in Europe, their place in the policy schema is nowhere near the level of American think tanks. American think tanks and particularly the top 25-30 think tanks are much more visible and influential than their European counterparts. Many argue that politicians will often look to government-sponsored or commercial think tanks for advice because there is a perception that those types of organizations are more representative of public opinion.

Academic-oriented think tanks, on the other hand, often have trouble gaining traction in the policy battle[84]. This is especially true in France, where independent research organizations are not a strong part of the national fabric. In the United Kingdom and Germany, several think tanks (e.g. *Chatham House*, *SWP*) have developed *"strategic links"* with governments, in which the government bounces policy ideas off the organizations[85], not unlike the relationship between the US government and the Heritage Foundation during the Bush administration.

Another factor that contributes to the lack of influence of European think tanks is the lack of a *"revolving door"* that is present in the American system. Whereas some scholars move back and forth between research institutions and the government sector in the United States, scholars in European think tanks tend to stay in a think tank or university environment, ultimately limiting their reach. This characteristic of European think tanks is gradually changing as more scholars begin to embrace the *"revolving door"* process that has helped make American think tanks remain so influential[86], but this transformation is more difficult in the European environment and therefore occurring slowly.

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[84] Kaetana Leontjeva and Ruta Vainiené, *"What Think-Tanks Can Contribute to EU Policymaking"*, in *Europe's World*, 2008, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21253/Default.aspx. And Boucher, *"Europe and its Think Tanks"*, p. 94.

[85] Notre Europe, *"Europe and its Think Tanks: A Promise to Be Fulfilled"*, p. 94.

[86] Notre Europe, *"Think Tanks in Europe and America: Converging or Diverging ?"*, pp. 3-4.

On the whole, European think tanks are more academic in that they focus more on conducting research than on affecting policy. Their plans to change policy are often more long-term as they hope to affect the bigger picture of politics more than the details with which some American think tanks occupy themselves[87]. Our research has found that European think tanks produce the highest number of books and journal articles compared to all other regions in the world, including the US[88]. In our recent survey, multiple responses identified the need for linguistic diversity in Europe and how it attributes to high publishing rates; others credited the academic-leaning orientation of most notable think tanks. *"Since most think tank analysts had their formative experiences in academe, I suspect they are keen to put their analysis through this process as a sort of quality control and badge of peer approval, as well as independence"*, one respondent noted. *"Books and journal articles therefore tend to be regarded as possessing greater intellectual rigor and political independence"*.

European think tanks tend to be less advocacy-based than the research institutes found in the United States. However, in Eastern Europe, think tanks did provide a very large advocacy role during the 1990's and even in the current decade. Ideologically, there has been a recent shift in the think tank environment in both the US and Europe. As previously stated, in the US, more left-leaning organizations, such as the Center for American Progress, have been established to combat an environment that was previously conservative-dominated. In Europe, on the other hand, the think tank environment was previously decidedly leftist, but more non-partisan organizations have been established in recent years. Perhaps the results of recent elections in both the US and EU reflect these developments of think tanks.

Overall, compared to their American counterparts, European think tanks have less funds, smaller staffs and play a smaller role in the policymaking process trends; this holds true even for British think tanks, albeit to a lesser extent[89]. Our surveys also indicate that European think tanks are much more intertwined with government entities and rely on much more government funding to conduct operations.

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[87] *Ibid.*

[88] James McGann, *"The 2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks: the Leading Public Policy Research Organizations in the World"*, p. 47; James McGann, *"2007 Survey of Think Tanks: a Summary Report"*, p. 37.

[89] Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, *"A 'Hollowed-out' Tradition ? British Think Tanks in the Twenty-First Century"*, in Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, *Think Tank Traditions*, pp. 232-246.

Transparency

The European think tank community's state of financial transparency remains inadequate, despite the 2005 *European Transparency Initiative*[90]. This initiative was put into place by European Commissioner Siim Kallas and includes new parameters for registering an organization and reporting its financial information. Think tanks, although considered lobbying groups under EU law, have for the most part failed to comply with the *Transparency Initiative* and their sources of funding remain shrouded in secrecy[91]. This secrecy raises two main concerns. The first is simply the value of transparency within a democratic society: citizens, policymakers and the media need to have access to this information so as to deduce the interests behind think tanks' messages. If this information is not released, there remains the possibility that a think tank is merely masquerading as an independent entity, when in reality it may be funded by a private entity and in turn must produce research and recommendations reflecting their interests. The same goes for corporate funding: the 2005 *Corporate Europe Observatory* report poses the significant question: *"How likely is it that these think tanks will advocate policy recommendations that are unacceptable to the large multinational corporations on which they depend for their survival ?"*[92]. This question has been raised before, and, as in the US think tank community, undoubtedly plagues think tanks as they seek to balance the demands of fiscal realities paired with the desire to maintain academic integrity and ingenuity.

While transparency is lacking in many instances, recent trends and a variety of institutions are helping to combat secrecy. For instance, *Bruegel* issues a list of funders and contribution amounts that is more comprehensive than many US think tanks. In response to pressure from the *Corporate Europe Observatory*, institutes like the *Center for European Policy Studies* and the *European Policy Centre* have also adopted greater levels of transparency. These efforts provide models for increased openness in policy research and advice, but the prevailing climate of secrecy continues to foster problems within Europe.

The *Corporate Europe* reports express their wariness in regards to the absence of transparency in European think tanks: *"While think tanks could contribute to the emergence of genuine pan-European public debate, there is clearly the risk that they create a pseudo debate that does not reach beyond EU officials, diplomats, parliamentarians and professional lobbyists within the Brussels bubble"*[93]. The circle

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[90] *CEO Report*, 2005.
[91] *Ibid*, 2006.
[92] *Ibid*.
[93] *CEO Report*, 2005.

of influence and thus the amount of accessibility and accountability will remain small as long as EU think tanks keep their resources and ideas within a closed circuit. In June 2008 the *Transparency Initiative* started the *European Commission Register of Interest Representatives*, which seeks to act as a registry for lobbying groups and think tanks alike. While some think tanks have signed up to the register, many have refused on principle because they do not want to be classified as *"interest representatives"*. Regardless of their status in the registry, many think tanks already publish their funding sources independently, an example which should be followed.

A third concern about the lack of financial transparency is the risk not only of research based upon the funders' interests, but even more so of trying to pass off shoddy research as reputable. The risk of undisclosed funding is that pseudo research supporting fringe constituencies (i.e. denial of climate change) is a way for corporations to pass off biased research as legitimate. This research, funded with their corporate interests in mind, can appear to be independent and objective reports from 'respectable' institutions. A recent example is that of *ExxonMobil*, which *"continues to fuel the work of climate skeptic think tanks and lobby groups in North America and Europe … ExxonMobil wants to create the impression that climate change skepticism comes from respectable sources"*[94]. Similar risks are apparent on the issue of government funding, and the closed circuit between think tanks, their output, and their funders' interests. The increasing trend toward transparency would make this less likely to occur.

In regards to the funding of think tanks by the EU Commission: The EU spends a great sum of money on pro-EU integration promotions each year: a total of at least 2.4 billion Euros in 2008[95]. This money funds organizations that openly promote the EU and other NGOs, think tanks and lobby groups, though this information is not readily accessible. The aforementioned lack of transparency makes it difficult to trace think tank funding to the EU. It is hard to determine the exact amounts of money that such EU-supporting NGOs, think tanks and lobby groups receive and from what sources. Funding provided by the EU under the *Europe for Citizens* program is available online[96], but there is no centralized record of all EU funding. Some think tanks publish the amount of funding they receive from the EU, but this is not yet standard practice.

Open Europe's 2008 report draws many of the same conclusions as that of CEO. *Open Europe*'s findings also address the closed circuit issue in terms of the EU

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[94] *Ibid*, 2006.

[95] *"The Hard Sell: EU Communication Policy and the Campaign for Hearts and Minds"*, Rep. 27 December 2008, in *Open Europe*, www.openeurope.org.uk/research/hardsell.pdf.

[96] *"Calls for Proposals EACEA 30/07 and EACEA 26/08: Results of the Selection"*, http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/funding/2009/selection/selection_action2_1_2_2009_en.php

Commission, its efforts on EU integration, and its funding of think tanks. The failed referendums in France and the Netherlands, and more recently in Ireland, compounded with the general sense of disconnect between EU citizens and their understanding of the EU, have prompted the Commission to reach out to civil society and try to win their favor. The problem is that the EU Commission's efforts have failed so far to deliver transparency in terms of who they fund and how its resources have been allocated to those think tanks and NGOs that support the EU's stance. Not only could this money be spent in other ways, but *"spending time and money on spin leaves fewer resources available for the reform of its policies and processes that the EU so badly needs"*[97]. It feeds the closed circuit of the Brussels elite: the money is targeted at *"civil society"* organizations that serve as convenient means for the EU to "listen" to its people. In reality, it risks addressing *"a minority of interested specialists and supporters"*[98]. These troubles point not only to the question of funding priorities of the EU, but to a much deeper problem of undermining its democracy: by funding only its supporters, who in turn spread the pro-EU message, it *"skews the debate on the EU… it is not in the public good for groups on one side of the argument only to be heavily supported by public funds…this is essentially a constraint on democracy – a huge and concerted campaign to stifle real debate about the future of the EU"*[99]. A society that allows more room for democratic debate will allow the dissenting voices that answered *"No"* in the referendums a platform to express their views. What the fate of the Lisbon Treaty and recent European Parliamentary elections will be remains to be seen, but think tanks and policy-makers would benefit from increasing transparency.

<div align="center">*</div>

In the final part, the study will draw some conclusions regarding the challenges that lie ahead for the think tanks in Europe and the US.

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[97] ***, *"The Hard Sell: EU Communication Policy and the Campaign for Hearts and Minds"*, in *Open Europe*,

[98] *Ibid.*

[99] *Ibid.*

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30ᵀᴴ GUARD REGIMENT "MIHAI VITEAZUL" – 150 Years of History –

NOBLE VIRTUES OF GUARD TROOPS

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Virgil Ovidiu POP

Simplicity and sincere admiration are the best solutions when one wishes to speak of great deeds, of things that are truly important, such as the 150 years of history of the *30ᵗʰ Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul"*.

What really gave the true measure of the honour guard unit starting *1 July 1860* was not just its unique status or the fact that it was one of the few at that time in Europe which conducted combat missions and provided military ceremonies and guard for the royal palace, but, first of all, the acknowledged value of the cadre corps.

The history pages written with courage, altruism and love for the nation and country on the battlefields of the War of Independence and of the two world wars, as well as in December 1989 prove the noble virtues of guard troops. All the more reason for us to offer today our gift of gratitude to all our comrades, heroes of this country, who have placed the Country and its Flag above their own lives throughout time !

There are many professions that can bring many satisfactions, yet, the military career is much more than that – it is simply a way of being, of living, of knowing to be respectful and respected, in other words, of building and defining yourself as a HUMAN BEING. Throughout my military career and especially during the missions conducted in theatres of operations, I have become definitely

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Lieutenant Colonel Dr Virgil Ovidiu Pop – Commander, the 30ᵗʰ Guard Regiment *"Mihai Viteazul"*.

aware of a fundamental truth for the good functioning of any institution, in general, and of the military one, in particular – *the most important resource is the human one.*

The man of character, the genuine and valuable professional, the reliable comrade who stands beside you, from soldier to officer, ensures your success, irrespective of the difficulty and complexity of the mission. The combat technique is important as well, however, when this is removed from combat, the HUMAN BEING is the one you can count on whenever and no matter what.

The respect for the human being, for the professional, for everyone's work was instilled in me by my parents, and this has helped me significantly in everything I have accomplished. It is what I have been trying to pass on to the ones I work with.

I have considered that it is very important to always be next to the professionals, to the best ones, to the individuals from whom I have had a lot to learn and from whom I will further learn, irrespective of their age and training. In order to be a good officer, you must always learn, you cannot say that you know everything – then, the military profession would become ordinary and insipid, and, besides all these, you must make sure that you are on the same *"wavelength"* with the ones to follow ! That is why, in my turn, I feel compelled to share with the younger people, with those who will someday step into my shoes and benefit from my life experience, the *"lessons learned"* from my professors and commanders, as well as from the ones from the theatres of operations. Thus, I have tried to promote the young, to provide them with the opportunity to prove that they are capable and they can achieve everything they have in mind if they are confided in and they have the will to succeed.

For every young human being, it is very important to *"invent"* himself/herself as he/she considers properly; paradoxically, the military career opens up this fantastic opportunity especially because the military environment, governed by strict laws, with a clear hierarchy, also requires the nurturing and development of certain physical, but especially psychical and moral qualities, which can provide them with the status of real HUMAN BEING. Therefore, here, in the military, any young man/woman is given all the tools necessary for them to develop and then widen their horizons, and I am not referring only to the professional ones.

I believe that the best examples are the young people who came to the *30th Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul"* as volunteers and who are now at a different career level, becoming non-commissioned officers or officers and returning to the unit. Nothing is accidental, all that we build today, human beings and destinies, represents the beginning for other at least 150 years of history and that is why the responsibility is huge, but so wonderful and honouring !

We will have to further manage to balance and merge the history and tradition with the evolution of the military institution, the most recent training methods,

assets and cutting-edge technologies with the inheritance of our forefathers. Consequently, the labour and sacrifices of all those who, since 1 July 1860, either in difficult times or in moments of celebration have served under the Battle Flag of the honour guard unit rest on our shoulders, on everybody's shoulders, but especially on those of the competent young people I am proud to have beside me !

Permanent training and improvement are determining in the life of a military man, and when you can have at hand all the necessary data, all that is *"state-of-the-art"* in one domain, here and everywhere in the world, as well as certain innovative approaches to history, success is ensured.

Starting from Confucius' words, who said that *"To study and not think is a waste, and to think and not study is dangerous"*, I wish to express my sincere and warm gratitude towards the *Gândirea Militară Românească* journal, the valuable editorial staff and all collaborators, because they exist and provide us, the military men, with the possibility of being permanently informed regarding the evolution and tendencies of the Romanian and foreign theory and science, of studying and thinking, perfecting ourselves as officers, as well as of sharing our own experiences and ideas with our comrades !

Happy Anniversary !

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Armée d'aujourd'hui, France, no. 347, February 2010

Earthquake Haiti 2010 Operation • Tiger Attack Helicopter in French Navy • Decorative Artist in the Engineer Corps • Interview with the Armed Forces Chief of Staff • Integrated Command Centre Balard of the Defence French Ministry • Recruitment Reform: Joint Promises • Students of Joint Defence College Visiting the Allied Normandy Landing Site – 6 June 1944 • Under the Sign of French-Senegalese Friendship – *"Deggo"* Exercise • An Ariane Rocket Launching the Military Satellite Helios-28 • Military Disengagement Mission in Chad • Fighting Piracy (File) • Surprise, Decisive War Weapon

Armée d'aujourd'hui, France, no. 348, March 2010

Command Group of Mountain Corps • Woman Military Chaplain • Interview with the New Chief of Joint General Staff • Djibouti: Foreign Military Base • Reflection Group Concerning Actions in Operations • Demining in New Caledonia Lagoon • Fuel Logistics in Afghanistan • Foreign Operations: Successful Comeback from Mission (File) • Innovation Breath • Sportsmen Ready for Victory

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French Instructors for Uganda Peace Soldiers • Home Operation: Xynthia Tempest: Armies Mobilisation • Contemporary Turkey • Armies Modernisation • Afghanistan: French La Fayette Task Force Joints Hands • Mirage 2000 for the Baltic Sky • Briefing before Foreign Operation • Military Justice: Usage Directions • Defence Oversees the Web • Defence Civil Staff (File) • The New History Lesson of Verdun Memorial

Army AL&T, USA, April-June 2010

Program Executive Office (PEO) Integration Aligns Joint Weapon Systems Across Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) • Joint Programme Executive Office Chemical and Biological Defence (JPEO-CBD) Provides Joint Weapon Systems Total Life-Cycle Management • Joint Combat Identification (ID) Marking Systems (JCIMS) Continues to Save Lives • DOD Biometrics – Lifting the Veil of Insurgent Identity • Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Prototype Builds Underway • Mine Resistant

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Defence Science Journal, India, vol. 60, no. 1, January 2010
Controlling a Mobile Robot with a Biological Brain • Robotic Architectures • Temporal Logic Motion Planning • Motion Segmentation Algorithm using Spectral Framework • Discrete Cosine Transform-based Image Fusion • Path Planning in the Presence of Dynamically Moving Obstacles with Uncertainty • Novel Redundant Sensor Fault Detection and Accommodation Algorithm for an Air-breathing Combustion System and its Real-time Implementation • Sensor/Control Surface Fault Detection and Reconfiguration Using Fuzzy Logic • Handling Out-of-Sequence Data: Kalman Filter Methods or Statistical Imputation ? • Aircraft Height Estimation Using 2-D Radar • Flexural Vibration Characteristics of Initially Stressed Composite Plates • Strength Investigation of Thick Welded T-Joint using Finite Element Modelling

Defence Science Journal, India, vol. 60, no. 2, March 2010
Aerial Delivery Systems and Technologies • Advances in High Energy Materials • Developments in Pyrotechnics • Smart Munitions • Inconsistent Performance of a Tandem-shaped Charged

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The Military Veterinary Centre (CEMIL VET). Document • War and Peace Missions • On the Underestimation of the Military Condition. Are We, Soldiers, Really a Different Kind of People ?

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The Fiasco of Copenhagen • Many Questions about the Kunduz Air Raid • Engineering the Change • *"Political Springtime will Continue in 2010"* • *"Munich Young Leaders"* and the Munich Security Conference • Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs • *"Iran Does Not Strive for Nuclear Weapons and Puts No One in Danger"* • Constitutional Right to Security and Programme on Internal Security • Fresh Start in Latin America ? • Shipborne Helicopters of the Navy • Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS) – Thoughts and Views About the Future of Ground-based Air Defence • The U-Boat (Submarine) of 2025 • POL Supply of the Bundeswehr through Public-Private Partnerships • Command, Control and Information

System of the Army • Protection of Convoys and Object Security • Update on the Equipment of the Medical Service • Eastern Partnership or Partnership with Russia ? • Switzerland Struggles for the New Security Partnership

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New Strategy for Afghanistan • Progress in Disarmament Debate • *"The Optimal Equipment for our Soldiers especially in View of their Protection and their Security Must Be Guaranteed and Improved"* • *"The Present Stagnation in Middle East Nurtures Hopelessness and Helps the Extremists"* • Setting out for New Shores ? • Tight Legal Limits for Armed Force's Missions Abroad • Climate-induced Armed Conflicts • Specialised Forces for the Army • PUMA Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AFIV) under Contract • Integration and Transformation of the Bundeswehr Military Police • The Tasks of the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement within the Scope of Immediate Mission Requirements • Multinational Center of Excellence for Engineers • Islamism and Transatlantic Point of View • Can Clausewitz be of Service ? • Use of the Information Domain for the Luftwaffe • Wars of Nerves. The Significance of Strategic Thinking for Future Conflicts • Private Military Companies in the 21st Century • Tactical Firing 2009 • Light Combat Aircraft Counter-insurgent Operations • Confidence-building Measure in Accordance with the 1999 Vienna Document

Europäische Sicherheit, Germany, no. 3, March 2010

The USA and China • Europe's Armed Forces Need TALARION • 46th Munich Security Conference (MSC) Conference Reports and Speeches • The Munich Security Conference from a Journalists View • Maintaining Industrial Defence Technology Competence is the National Interest • Process Orientation in the Joint Support Service (JSS) – An Approach to Better Mission Accomplishment • The TIGER Shows its Teeth – A Combat Helicopter in Operational Tests • Protection of German Ground Forces • The Army Aviation Corps The OSCE Of Ministers in Athens • *"This ATALANTA Fleet is Actually an Overkill"* • The Way from an Ordinary Citizen to a Terrorist

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Foreign Affairs, USA, vol. 89, no. 1, January-February 2010

A Few Dollars at a Time: How to Tap Consumers for Development • Against the Grain: Why Failing to Complete the Green Revolution Could Bring the Next Famine • From Hope to Audacity: Appraising Obama's Foreign Policy • The New Population Bomb: The Four Megatrends that Will Change the World • Not So Dire Straits: How the Findlandisation of Taiwan Benefits US Security • The New Energy Order: Managing

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***Foreign Affairs**, USA, vol. 89, no. 2,*
March-April 2010
From Sun King to Karzai: Lessons for State Building in Afghanistan • Empty Promises ? Obama's Hesitant Embrace of Human Rights • Complexity and Collapse: Empires on the Edge of Chaos • After Iran Gets the Bomb: Containment and Its Complications • Armistice Now: An Interim Agreement for Israel and Palestine • Global Energy After the Crisis: Prospects and Priorities • India's Rise, American's Interest: The Fate of the US-Indian Partnership • The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50: Still a Grand Bargain ? • New Treaty, New Influence ? Europe's Chance to Punch Its Weight • Enemies into Friends: How the United States Can Court Its Adversaries

***Géopolitique**, France, no. 108, January-March 2010*
Potestas, auctoritas, potentia (Action, Authority, Power) • Seductive State: Short Review of Side-Slipping • Political Authority before the Fourth Power (the Press) • On Power and Authority • Power and Media During the French Fifth Republic: Mutual Influences Game • Federal Republic of Germany: a Democracy Built of Free Information Circulation • Italy: the Power on Videopolitics Trial (1994-2009) • Portugal: Media Emancipation after 1974 Revolution • China, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Iran: Media and Totalitarianism • Brazil: Television Leading Role in Pursuit of Democracy • Transsaharian Energy Geopolitics: Game and Stake ?

***Géopolitique**, France, no. 108, April-June 2010*
Betrayal • On Betrayal Essence • Jude, the Betrayal Gospel • *"Ganelon"*, Model of Traitor in Middle Age Is Talleyrand a Traitor ? Oh, yes. • Truce of 22nd June 1940: Resignation, Collaboration with the Enemy or True Betrayal • A New Reading of Machiavelli: Betray his Friends – a Kind of Sacrilege • Traitor Between Honour and Vengeance: Charles of Bourbon • Bazaine, Traitor or Victim of his Incompetence • The *"Traitor"*

Malvy Orchestrated by Clemenceau • Lenin, Stalin, Trotski …, Traitors and Renegades in the Communist System • Stauffenberg and the Plot Against Hitler, 20 July 1944

***International Security**, USA, vol. 34, no. 4,*
spring 2010
Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory ? • Sex and Shaheed: Insights form the Life Sciences on Islamic Suicide Terrorism • Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy • Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses • The Deception Dividend: FDR's Undeclared War

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vol. 43, January 2010
Romania Unveils Light Vehicle Laser Warner • Romanian Army Receives Boost from Armoured Engineer Tank • Facing Realty: Joint Exercise Provides Benefit of *"Live Interaction"* in Littorals • Boosting Missile Defence: Technologies Focus on Early Interception Challenges • Generic Littoral Interoperable Network Technology in the Eye: NATO Undersea Research Centre Explores Novel Autonomous Concepts for Future Anti-Submarine Warfare • Weapon of Choice: 40 Years at the Top for Grenade Launchers • Keep on Keeping on: FFG-7 Frigate Upgrades Offer a New Lease of Life • Long-Rangers: Expanding Reach of Theatre-Wide Air Defence • American Evolution: Fighting Vehicles That Keep Tract of the Latest Moves • Nowhere to Hide: New Radar Technology Exposes the Enemy's Hidden Secrets

***Jane's International Defence Review**, UK,*
vol. 43, February 2010
Horns of a Dilemma: Project SEA 1000 Seeks to Balance Technology and Risk • New-Generation Austrian Spanish Co-operative Development Takes Aim at the UK Future Rapid Effect System-Specialist Vehicle Requirement • Approaching Reality Talarion Resurrects EADS' Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Aspirations • FCS Projects Re-emerge in Wake of Future Combat Systems Demise • Holding Steady: Helicopter Handing Takes a Firmer Grip • Flying High: Improved Parachute Systems Hit the Ground Running • Gripen Evolves with a Deadly Determination • Tail to Teeth: Unmanned Haulers Ease the Soldier's Lot on the Battlefield

Jane's International Defence Review, UK,
vol. 43, March 2010
China Refocuses Heavy Artillery Caliber, but Revitalises the Smaller 122 mm Fleet • Holding the Initiative: Immersive Mode Heads US Marine Corps Small-Unit Training Drive • A400M Programme Progresses as Governments Pursue 11th-Hour Talks • Close-Quarter Battle Technologies Help Forces Grapple with Short-Range Front Line • Open Season: Submarine Sonars Build on Commercial Imperatives • Fire Control: Active Electronically Scanned Array and Mechanically Steered Track Advances in Fighter Radars • United Arab Emirates Awaits in Expectation as Baynunah Corvette Commences Sea Trials • How to Maintain the Military's Relevance During the Cyber Age

Jane's International Defence Review, UK,
vol. 43, April 2010
Combat Rock: Singapore Gears Up for Introduction of New 8x8 Terrex Infantry Carrier Vehicle • Terma's Podded Self-Protection Suite Finds Favour Fast Jet Operations • Patriot Games: Raytheon Tries to Woo Medium Extended Air Defence System Partners with Integrated Solution • Hidden Protection: Special Forces Cover Up to Blend in with Locals • Bolt from the Blue: Helicopters Tool Up to Joint the Littoral Fight • Under Control: Addressing Aerial Congestion in Operational Areas • Tigre Fleet Gives New Punch to French Army Attack Capability in Afghanistan • One-Shot Wonders: Sniper System Technology Emerges from Call to Arms

Military Review, USA, vol. 60, no. 2,
March-April 2010
Unleashing Design: Planning and the Art of Battle Command • Field Manual 5-0: Exercising Command and Control in an Era of Persistent Conflict • NetWar: Winning in the Cyberelectromagnetic Dimension of *"Full Spectrum Operations"* • The Maneuver Company in Afghanistan: Establishing Counterinsurgency Priorities at the District Level • Political Capital and Personal Interest: Understanding the Economy of Power in Defeated Countries • Interagency Command and Control at the Operational Level: A Challenge in Stability Operations • Social Media and the Army • In Defense of After Actions Reviews: The Art and Science of Small Unit Coping • The Quiet Enemy: Defeating Corruption

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Selection and Translation
Ioana MANAFU, Delia PETRACHE,
Dr Mihai POPESCU, Cătălina ROJIŞTEANU
National Military Library

EDITORIAL EVENTS

✍ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

A BOOK FOR HISTORY

The Romanian Armed Forces engagement in international missions starting with the Gulf War – in February 1991 – in Somalia and Angola, followed by the involvement in missions in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, certainly one of the biggest challenges for the Romanian military body, an entirely original experience, with significant achievements, as well as with painful sacrifices, has had as main objective, assumed and supported by the entire nation, the return of the Romanian state to the great family of democratic nations, interested and actively involved in the process of providing and guaranteeing regional and global peace and security. The option of the accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures was certainly a smart and fortunate one, required by the need to align to the values of the modern world, and the Romanian Armed Forces, the main artisan and the most powerful engine of this national effort, played this role, of key actor of the accession, with dedication and professionalism. And, it must be fully acknowledged as such.

"The Romanian soldier should be proud that he has made history in the areas of operations where he acted or acts, enriching the history of the Romanian military institution. I personally thank and congratulate him !". These are the words through which Admiral Dr Gheorghe Marin, Chief of the General Staff, concluded its argument in support of a successful editorial accomplishment – ***Armata României în misiuni internaționale 1991-2009 (The Romanian Armed Forces in International Missions 1991-2009)*** – a reference work, meant to chronicle for the contemporaries, but most of all for posterity this most recent epic of the Romanian Armed Forces, their path of glory and sacrifice in international missions, between 1991 and 2009.

Coordinated by **Major General Dr Visarion Neagoe**, who has a record of many other editorial successes, some of them a result of his active and responsible presence in theatres of operations, the authors engaged in this difficult undertaking responded to the challenge and gave us a model of professional writing, substantiated by documents coming from *direct source*, with reflections, appreciative judgments, as well as predictions on the future international missions meant to contribute to the affirmation of Romania's role as a generator of security and stability.

A structurally well-designed work, extremely rich in information, without being too technical, although the authors, professionals in this domain, of course, most of them being part of the structures that coordinated and led the Romanian detachments actions in these theatres of operations, and some even participating directly in these missions, felt the need to use the specific terminology and make the necessary references to well-known definitions. A book that provides its readers, but particularly the military men and, why not, the military analysts with the clarification and conceptual delimitations regarding the participation in these multinational operations. Moreover, it represents a very useful tool for those who are concerned with the training, evaluation and exercise of operational command and control of the structures participating in missions abroad.

Mention should be made that in the book it is shown, briefly, indeed, the participation of each operational structure, starting with the General Staff and the Joint Operational Command *Marshal Alexandru Averescu* and continuing with all combat units and subunits, engaged in this joint particularly demanding effort, which has one of the highest risk degrees. It is praiseworthy, however, the authors' concern to point out the contribution of other elements to the success of missions – and we must mention here the distinct chapters of the book devoted to the presence of military staff personnel within multinationals headquarters, but especially the support of forces during the participation in these international missions. Those who will read the book will notice with satisfaction that a special part is dedicated – in recognition of their effort – to the structures of personnel, logistic support, communications and information, intelligence, information protection and safety, force protection and fire support, sea and air support, engineering support, protection against chemical, bacteriological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction, geographical assurance, health protection, legal aid, psychological operations support, CIMIC, INFO OPS, information and public relations, religious assistance. A special place is held in the book by the dimensions and implications of the equipment of the Romanian military structures participating in international missions, as one of the most difficult problems to be solved by Romanian detachments into the theatres of operations.

The book ends, deliberately perhaps, for a longer reverberation in the emotional memory and especially for an undisguised gratitude for their sacrifice, with a too long and painful list of the losses – the wounded and the dead – in international missions between 1991 and 2009. Ten pages with the names of these heroes, who will certainly be attached to the Golden Book of the nation's heroes.

This is a book for which we all, contemporaries of this segment of our recent history, as well as those who will follow, must congratulate and thank the authors for having dared and having worked hard for making it ! A history book of the Romanian Armed Forces, for the real history of Romania.

The book is published by *Centrul Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei*.

PSIHOMIL – VII, National Symposium on Applied Military Psychology

It has already become a tradition for the works of the *National Symposium on Applied Military Psychology* to take place at the beginning of June. This edition, the seventh organised, just like the previous ones, by the Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate of the General Staff, gathered under the generous dome of the National Military Circle reference names from the academic and university environment, as well as many specialists from the Ministry of National Defence and other components of the National Defence System. Organised on three sections, the symposium pointed out this time the concern of participants to make public the news in a field that is so exciting, that of military psychology, to present them before an audience of certain scientific authority, but especially to accept the argumentative duel and take note of the challenges and new ways that open before this branch of scientific research.

In the first section, *Psychological Evaluation of Human Resource in the Military Organisation*, the authors or teams of authors tried and certainly managed to emphasise the results of their research. We noticed here the work *Physiological Reactivity in the Processing and Identification of Facial Micro-expressions*, signed by Prof. Dr Mihai Aniței, Mihaela Chraif, Claudiu Papasteri, Andrei Neacșu, Sebastian Vlăsceanu, Mihai Ciolacu, from the Department of Psychology within the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences/University of Bucharest, in which it is addressed the principle of psychophysical examination through

the polygraph method, based on the dynamics of some emotional and motivational processes of the subject, generators of the neurophysiologic mechanisms of the detection of simulated behaviour.

In the second section, *Diagnosis and Psychological Intervention in the Military Organisation*, one of the works that drew our attention was called *Conceptual Guidelines on the Role and Functions of Military Structures in the Activity of Vocational and Professional Guidance*, signed by Alexandru Jianu, Sorina-Ioana Scărlătescu, George Gîdea, Alexandru Zaharia, from the Selection and Psychological Assistance Coordination Office/the General Staff. Starting from the need for the reformulation of the conceptual framework regarding the specific activities of vocational guidance of students in military colleges, the authors intend to rethink and to establish new coordinates for the psychologist's role in these institutions. We also noticed Nicoleta Simona Sasu's work, *Individual and Organisational Resources Involved in the Adaptation of the Military Men to the Specific Requirements of a Mission in Theatres of Military Operations*, in which it is stressed that the determinants of morale, as a vital element in military operations, are tied to the motivation and enthusiasm of the military men for the successful accomplishment of the mission.

The third section of the symposium, *Psychological Counselling and Psychotherapy in the Military Organisation*, also gathered very interesting works, and we can mention that of Virginia Popa, *Manifestation of Disadaptative Schemas of Thinking in Anxious Spectrum Disorders*, a study aimed at detecting certain significant differences in the level of manifestation of some disadaptative schemes postulated by J. Young: vulnerability to potential dangers, lack of self-control and discipline and the claim of personal rights/dominance as well as the shaping of significant correlations between all disadaptative schemas, in the case of people with anxious spectrum disorders.

The scientific contributions of the authors are certainly a valuable instrument for those who operate and want, of course, to perform in the field of military psychology, but they can also raise the interest of those who are less familiar with this domain, which are thus provided with a rich material to clarify and, why not, to substantiate their intellectual research. The effort of the organisers to gather all the 65 papers between the covers of a book, coordinated by *Colonel Psychologist Alexandru Jianu* and *Colonel Psychologist Dr Adrian Prisăcaru*, this year is therefore very praiseworthy. With special graphics, matched by great content, this book will certainly enrich every library in which it will be hosted.

Therefore, it is worth congratulating the organisers of the symposium, the coordinators of the book and all the participants in this successful scientific event !

✒ *Alina PAPOI*

Among the multitude of books dedicated to the art of command and the position of a leader within an organisation, the volume of **Major General Dr Cătălin Zisu –** *De la arta conducerii la leadership (From the Art of Command to Leadership)*, published by the *Military Writers Society* – brings something extra: a purely personal approach, result of a long and prolific life and professional experience, in which the relations between human beings *"are the cornerstone of leadership, of the art of command respectively"*. A plea, says the author, for a new vision of the issue of the relations between people, of the way in which a military leader manages to particularise both the quality of his subordinates and their results on the whole.

In his excursion into interpersonal relationships, the author outlines the profile of the leader, his leadership style, the valences of the organisational climate, the cultural dimension of the leader's personality. We are, at the same time, in front of some questions – simple, at first sight, rather dull in essence –, that the author finds some ways to respond, through examples and details of daily life: *"the leader actually fulfils the role of a manager only if he manages to trigger collective capacities and appropriate attitudes in order to help resolve specific problems of the group he leads"; "the leader's authority lies not only (or primarily) in his individual qualities, otherwise very important, no matter how strong, dominating and active he may be, but in the whole situation as well, in its requirements, in the reality he faces"; "the organisational climate in a group is valuable when the leader circumscribes his behaviour on certain coordinates"; "without reducing the principle of unity of command, any manager (leader, chief) relies on a team whose role is to procure, select and process information, solutions and alternatives that provide him with the possibility to make, after a careful assessment, optimal and timely decisions".*

Last but not least, the author points out, *"an authentic leader knows how and in what direction to go. He has an overall, integrating vision, which naturally includes all the consequences of the undertaken actions, including the resultant of the management act".*

<div align="center">*</div>

"The informative work of intelligence services is the basis for any national and international action. It is noticed in intervention actions, in certain conflicts between states or in the mediation between them, in accordance to the interests

of international security ... Good diplomatic intelligence activity helps big and small world leaders in preparing basic international agreements and in making understood basic phenomena in progress in some hot regions of the world". **Despre intelligence și putere (On Intelligence and Power)** – a book-documentary, why not ?, a pertinent analysis of the context in which, we can undoubtedly say it, information gathering appeared at the same time with the human society, even if not fully acknowledged at the time ! In the pages of the Old Testament there are some examples in this respect, the author mentioning, chronologically, the adventures of the 12 heads of tribes sent by Moses to find the Land of Canaan or those of the agents of Joshua – the first spy mentioned in the Bible – and Jericho and other many spies or the last battle of Saul, who *"remained with no sources of information and, concerned about the fate of the battle he would fight, turned to the spirit of Samuel, from whom he learned he would lose the battle and perish".*

Structured in fourteen chapters, with an impressive and comprehensive bibliography, the book details the functioning mechanisms and processes of intelligence services of some NATO member states, ex-communist countries, the Near and Middle East, stressing at the same time the role of intelligence as a tool for public institutions. A chapter is dedicated to the EU intelligence architecture, the author drawing attention to the existence of the requirement of *"a real balance between the necessary assistance on the organisational vertical of the Community intelligence system and the level of horizontal cooperation with other intelligence services of EU member states".*

Known for numerous articles, studies and books devoted to the national and international security environment, **Prof. Dr Stan Petrescu** presents us here with this precious achievement, published by *Editura Militară, "result of a balanced and creative professional psychological comfort offered by the prestigious National Academy of Intelligence ... as well as of the unforgettable years, full of experience in the intelligence work, spent in the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff".*

*

Poezia și înțelepciunea cărții (The Poetry and Wisdom of the Book) – an anthology compiled by **Prof. Dr Mihai Popescu** and *"dedicated to all readers, writers and librarians of all times ...",* poems and thoughts gathered over time precisely to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the National Military Library. Here are a few titles of poems: *"Literary Will"* (Ienăchiță Văcărescu),

"Our Language" (Alexei Mateevici), *"Preface Poetry"* (Liviu Vișan), *"Let the Words Fall"* (Ana Blandiana), *"Hurt Eye"* (Angela Buciu), *"Book of Life"* (Alphonse de Lamartine), *"God and Man"* (Mihai Eminescu), *"Goal"* (Romulus Vulpescu), *"Chronicler"* (Mateiu I. Caragiale), *"Șincai's Chronicle"* (George Sion) *"Ink Bottle"* (George Topârceanu), *"Antique Bookshop"* (Emil Niculescu), *"In My Mind"* (Valentin Busuioc), *"Among Books"* (Mihai Popescu): *"The blind librarian/from the southern hemisphere,/ Jorge Luis Borges,/ has opened our mind's eyes/our soul's eyes,/but the worldly ones as well,/telling us that,/ while others imagine/Paradise as a palace or as a garden,/*

he "sees it"/as a library./Whenever I remember/these wonderful words,/I realise I have spent/a big part of my life/in Paradise".

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

Résumés

La garde d'honneur

Le Régiment 30 de la Garde *"Mihai Viteazul"* célèbre un siècle et demi de son existence. Au 1er juillet 1860, le prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza ordonnait l'institution du Bataillon 1 chasseurs (tirailleurs), avec la mission de s'instruire comme une unité en ligne, mais destinée *"à défendre la Cour princière et son Eminence le Prince du Pays, à servir les honneurs pour le palais royal"*. Le drapeau de lutte de cette unité a obtenu non seulement la réputation d'être présenté son salut et d'être accueilli par des personnalités de premier degré dans le monde, mais aussi par la gloire des victoires dans la Guerre d'indépendance, à la Première et la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

Le management des ressources pour la défense – la planification (III)

La planification est l'un des plus utilisés concepts encore moins compris. Le grand certain nombre de facteurs impliqués dans tous les activités humaines exige une planification pour atteindre les objectifs fixés. Le progrès ou le déclin dans tous les domaines de l'activité humaine dépend de la mentalité de la population. La planification et l'implémentation des plans sans flexibilité conduiront toujours à l'échec.

Sans une planification effective, le monde pourrait être un véritable Tour de Babel. Ainsi, il faut maintenir une bonne corrélation entre les plans, les programmes et les objectifs.

Le niveau d'implémentation doctrinaire et opérationnelle du concept *irregular warfare*

Partant du fait que le contexte mondial actuel est plus interconnecté et plus complexe que le monde bipolaire, caractéristique de la Guerre froide, l'auteur estime que l'environnement où se développe la guerre dans les prochaines décennies sera presque totalement différente de ce que nous avons appris jusqu'à présent.

En ce sens, l'information aura le rôle dominant pour les forces qui prévaudront en mesure de mener une guerre. Elles nécessiteront une plus grande concentration de la puissance.

DSJE – un nouveau concept sur le déploiement du système du commandement et de contrôle au niveau opérationnel

Le principe de l'utilisation C2 dans les opérations militaires comprend la réalisation de certains arrangements à tous les niveaux de commandement et de contrôle dans les missions de l'OTAN. En considérant l'importance des rapports de coexistence, le caractère multinational ainsi que le temps réduit disponible pour le déploiement, l'auteur estime que DJSE accomplie dans le NCS peut être une des options initiales que l'Alliance dispose pour prouver l'utilisation efficace de NCS. Une fois déployé sur le théâtre, DJSE ne représente pas un niveau de commandement en soi, parce que les commandants des éléments tactiques

restent directement subordonnés au niveau opérationnel.

La transformation de l'OTAN et de l'Armée Roumaine dans l'environnement de sécurité actuel

L'Initiative sur les capacités de défense de 1999 visait à principalement développer les fonctionnalités suivantes: le déploiement et la mobilité, l'auto-support et les forces de soutien logistique, la survie, l'engagement effectif et de commandement, de contrôle et des systèmes d'information. Il a été créé, à cet effet, un groupe de pilotage, chargé de superviser les progrès de mise en œuvre des huit objectifs principaux, qui ont été détaillés des zones d'amélioration des capacités de l'Alliance.

Les caractéristiques des missions militaires en Afghanistan

L'auteur analyse les caractéristiques des missions militaires en Afghanistan. Ainsi, sont présentés quelques repères dans l'histoire de ce pays: l'invasion soviétique, la guérilla, le mouvement taliban et la présence des forces de la coalition. Ensuite, sont discutés le blocus économique, politico-militaire, culturel et religieux des caractéristiques qui définissent l'Afghanistan. L'auteur souligne le fait que la communication avec la population locale et des chefs reconnus joue un rôle décisif dans la réalisation des objectifs politico-militaires.

Les relations OTAN-Russie et leur impact sur la sécurité euro-atlantique

Les observateurs de l'OTAN et les experts dans la politique étrangère de la Russie semblent être d'accord que les relations entre l'Alliance et la Russie ont atteint un point important. À cet égard, l'auteur s'arrête aux événements tragiques du 11 septembre 2001, qui ont ouvert un nouveau chapitre dans la coopération OTAN-Russie.

En fait, la solidarité de la Russie avec l'Occident contre la menace du terrorisme international a ouvert la voie vers un partenariat stratégique entre OTAN et Russie, amélioré et réformé, dirigé contre l'ennemi commun – le terrorisme.

La piraterie – une menace à l'adresse de la sécurité nationale et internationale

Les actions des forces navales contre la piraterie dans les eaux internationales n'ont jamais cessé. En outre, la piraterie n'est rien mais un acte de vol dans le milieu marin et, comme tout acte criminel, s'est répandue dans les endroits où l'application des lois est difficile et où les criminels croient pouvoir éviter l'application des lois. La première action d'envergure contre la piraterie est enregistrée dans l'an 67 avant J.-C., quand le sénat romain a décidé d'libérer les eaux de l'empire pour les pirates et a donné des pouvoirs dictatoriaux au général Pompée pour mener à bien la mission.

Nouveaux horizons pour les opérations de paix des Nations Unies

Les opérations de maintien de la paix de l'ONU exigent de capacités stables et fortes pour relever les défis actuels et futurs. Pour créer de telles capacités et de maintenir un instrument au service de la paix et la sécurité mondiale, on a besoin d'un partenariat efficace. Ce partenariat peut être renforcé par une projection des objectifs en vertu de l'incertitude quant à l'identification exacte et la disponibilité des ressources, une approche fondée sur les capacités caractérisées par une haute capacité militaire spécialisée de mobilité et de la police civile et par un élargissement du partenariat pour la paix.

La mondialisation des approches politiques, juridiques et militaires pour assurer la sécurité internationale par la gestion des crises (II)

Maintenir la sécurité internationale peut être possible grâce à l'association des États dans les structures syndicales fortes, avec l'objectif principal de réaliser l'efficience du système judiciaire et renforcer la coopération judiciaire. Ce qui est envisagé par la création de l'Union européenne, lorsqu'elle est poursuivie, entre autres, par l'application d'une loi uniforme – le droit communautaire –, par une juridiction impartiale et indépendante des membres de l'Union, mais aussi par une coopération plus étroite des États dans le plan législatif et institutionnel dans la lutte contre la criminalité, le terrorisme, la prolifération des armes de destruction massive.

Modélisation et simulation – des instruments modernes pour la formation militaire de la gestion des leaders militaires

La complexité de la guerre asymétrique au début du XXIème siècle a eu de nombreux changements dans la manière dont la guerre est combattue. Une grande diversité de forces sont confrontées, en présentant une diversité des structures, doctrines militaires ou paramilitaires avec de différents systèmes et technologies, en adoptant des tactiques plus ingénieux, des techniques et des procédures et ayant le soutien en conséquence d'intelligence et de la logistique. Ces nouvelles réalités demandent un nouvel environnement de formation pour les opérations militaires, impliquant des technologies de formation modernes, conformément aux normes de l'OTAN et l'UE.

Les fondamentaux du leadership militaire moderne

Les défis actuels et futurs de la sécurité nationale et internationale ont une pression considérable sur la nécessité de changer. Plus jamais et que beaucoup d'autres domaines d'activité militaire, le processus décisionnel des forces armées et des structures d'intelligence de défense nécessite des procédures de révision pertinentes, fondées sur des études avancées, appropriées sur la bonne combinaison de celui-ci avec des méthodes plus traditionnelles de gestion et de leadership modernes.

Le système de codification de l'OTAN – un pont vers la connaissance de la logistique

Cet article propose de présenter le système de codification de l'OTAN et le Bureau national de codification de Roumanie. Le système de codification de l'OTAN est géré et exécuté par un groupe de cadre de l'Alliance consistant dans l'administration nationale sur la codification du Comité 135. C'est un système uniforme et commun pour l'identification, la classification et le stock de numérotation des articles des approvisionnements des nations de l'utilisateur. Il est conçu pour atteindre une efficacité maximale dans la prise en charge de la logistique et de faciliter la gestion des données du matériel.

NRF – une contribution essentielle pour le développement des forces terrestres roumaines

L'Initiative sur les capacités de défense visent à réduire les disparités entre les alliés européens et ceux américains, en concentrant des acquisitions, des efforts et des budgets de la défense européenne, à cinq voies déficitaires primaires: la mobilité et le déploiement, le soutien, l'emploi effectif (efficace), la survie et l'interopérabilité des communications. Dans ce contexte, dans l'opinion des alliés, la réalisation de la NRF est l'effort principal dans le processus de transformation, parce que la façon dont une nation s'engage à participer c'est l'élément de changement de toutes les forces armées nationales.

La gestion des connaissances – une nécessité pour les forces armées

Les systèmes d'information pour la gestion des connaissances est l'application pratique de la technologie dans ce domaine. Habituellement, ils sont conçus pour faciliter le travail et de permettre une répartition efficace des ressources de l'organisation. Pour soutenir à la fois des connaissances explicites et celles tacites, l'auteur estime que le système informatique de gestion des connaissances doit être fondé d'une part sur les technologies de la gestion du contenu, d'autre part sur les technologies de collaboration.

Asie Centrale: l'endroit où se télescopent puissance, politique et économie

L'intérêt que l'Asie Centrale présente sur le plan historique tient à la situation qu'elle occupe au carrefour de l'Orient et de l'Occident, nichée entre des empires et jouxtant des zones de conflit et d'insécurité. Si la région a été largement ignorée tout au long de la Guerre froide, sa vitalité et son importance ont rapidement été redécouvertes. L'Asie Centrale est unanimement considérée comme une importante partie prenante dans le jeu énergétique de la Mer Caspienne, une plaque tournante de la sécurité énergétique chinoise, un terrain de jeu de la politique russe de la puissance.

L'économie de la Chine: sa meilleure arme ou son talon d'Achille ?

Au cours des vingt dernières années, la croissance réelle du PIB de la Chine a été en moyenne de 9,9%. Ainsi, l'économie du pays, auparavant d'une importance marginale, est devenue l'un des principaux moteurs de la croissance mondiale. Entre 2000 et 2009, elle est passée d'à peine 3,7% du PIB mondial à 8,1%. Au cours des dix années à venir, la croissance chinoise devrait se modérer pour se situer, en moyenne, à 7,5%, ce qui suffira toutefois à faire passer la part du pays dans la production mondiale à 14,9%.

European Think Tanks: Regional and Trans-Atlantic Trends – Report of the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program 2009 (II)

Les think tanks européens et américains ont joué un rôle variable dans l'élaboration des politiques dans leurs régions pour certains plus de soixante-cinq ans. Ils sont quelques-uns des meilleurs exemples d'organisations non gouvernementales de créer un changement véritable dans les politiques publiques. Ces domaines couvrent toute la gamme des budgets, des fins et de la recherche. Elles peuvent être de petites, moyennes ou grandes organisations en termes du financement et du personnel et de couvrir tout le spectre d'idéologie politique dans son ensemble ou de se concentrer sur presque tous les sujets possibles.

Les hautes vertus des soldats de la garde

Pour être un bon officier il faut toujours apprendre, on ne sait jamais ce que nous savons. Alors, la profession militaire serait devenu banale et sans intérêt. Nous devons donc essayer de promouvoir les jeunes, de leur donner la possibilité de démontrer qu'ils peuvent procéder à tout ce qu'ils ont proposé.

L'auteur éloge l'activité et l'abnégation du Régiment 30 de la Garde *"Mihai Viteazul"*, qui fête son anniversaire au 1er juillet: 150 d'ans de victoire, efforts, sacrifices et bonheur. Bonne anniversaire !

Version française par Alina PAPOI

FOR THE ATTENTION OF THOSE INTERESTED IN SUBMITTING ARTICLES TO "RMT"

Manuscripts submitted to the editorial staff should be either accompanied by the magnetic support or sent by email. They should be edited in *Microsoft Word*, *Times New Roman*, *size 14*, *justify*, and they should have no more than 8 pages. The **graphic illustration –** schemes, figures, tables should be designed using *CorelDraw*, and maps and images **–** in *JPEG* format.

Manuscripts should be written in accordance with the academic standards and adopting the norms in the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, available at www.ldoceonline.com. Abbreviations and acronyms should be either avoided or explained.

To optimise our collaboration, submissions should be accompanied by the following: name, phone/fax number, email, address of the institution and other relevant information.

RMT Editorial Staff reserves the right to make editorial changes regarding the style, grammar and length of the manuscripts. Authors will be consulted, in case the changes could affect the form or the content of the manuscript.

We expect You, with interest and hope, to submit your articles for publication, mentioning that manuscripts and relating materials are not given back to authors. Thank you for your understanding !

The Editorial Staff

The editorial and layout process was completed on 23 June 2010.

General Alexandru Averescu delivering a speech to the troops in Rucăreni, July 1917

1ˢᵗ Cover: The 30ᵗʰ Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul"
4ᵗʰ Cover: The Honour Guard of the 30ᵗʰ Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul" taking part in the inauguration of the Infantry Monument, 28.04.2000.

http://www.defense.ro/gmr