Romanian Military Thinking

Romanian Military Thinking

HIGH ROYAL DECREE NO. 3663 THROUGH WHICH "MILITARY ROMANIA" BECOMES THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL STAFF

Art. I. - The official journal named "Military Romania" is founded at the General Staff, starting January 1, 1898, in which all officers within the Armed Forces will find military studies, which interest their training.

Through the agency of this journal all officers, of all kinds of arms, who are in service, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces.

Carol - King of Romania
Issued in Bucharest on December 8, 1897

Romanian Military Thinking Journal's National Awards

"Division General Ștefan Fălcoianu"

"Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu"

"Marshal Alexandru Averescu"

"Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu"

"Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu"

These awards are yearly bestowed on the most valuable contributions to the enrichment of the national military science theoretical heritage

1859 150 years since the General Staff was established 2009

Romanian Military Thinking

Contents

Contenu

Contents

International Connections

Connexions internationales

The Argument of Accomplishing Assigned Missions

In a world of contrasts, reference and support points are more and more necessary to redefine the courses of action and to operate some corrections required, in the last resort, to prevent it from getting adrift.

Strong pillars are, therefore, necessary to provide society with stability and resistance to any attempt to undermine its foundations. These pillars should be protected from the action of corrosive factors, so that the edifice could not be endangered.

Thus, we are required to remind those who seem to forget or intentionally omit it that the Romanian Armed Forces have been one of the institutions, a few, unfortunately, on whose credibility and stability our society has founded its existence and projected its aspirations and its connection to modernity.

A body unanimously accepted as a generator of moral models and stability, the Romanian Armed Forces have understood to only fulfil the duty assigned by the nation and, always with dignity, to counter any attack they have been subjected to, with the weapons that have always been available to them and seem to be less available to others: honesty and the argument of accomplishing assigned missions. The missions they have been mandated to fulfil by the Romanian state throughout time and to which, more recently, the ones subsumed under the national effort to connect to the European values and to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic security structures have been added.

Romania's accession to NATO and to the European Union is, certainly, the most important political objective set by the Romanian state, objective that was fortunately achieved after 1990.

The recently finished Romanian Armed Forces mission in Iraq has really done a service to the country, as it has materialised and consolidated the foreign policy actions and regained the dignity of being part of the nations that work for the benefit of global security, as a prerequisite for guaranteeing own security and projecting the future on secure bases. This effort may not have limited to only

what, many times, mass media intended or could offer the public opinion. It meant more, namely an ample military operation in a totally inhospitable area and against an unpredictable enemy, having moral and ideological standards as well as ways of riposte different from our precepts. That is why the will of our military men to place the Romanian Armed Forces and, through them, Romania at the altitude required for an equal dialogue with the partners in the Alliance should be highly appreciated.

However, would the real dimension of the risks, the intense feelings of the military men involved in missions, the sorrow of the families that lost their children, parents and brothers on the battlefield, the drama of those who lost their comrades, the perpetual tragedy of the mutilated ones be really understood by those who accept only what they are given in the competition, not honest at all, of the so-called opinion-makers ?

Those who wonder today whether we need the armed forces and whether it is necessary to recompense, even at the minimum, sometimes under the decent level, the military men for their effort, privations and sense of sacrifice are part of those who have forgotten and probably intend to make the others forget that this relative relaxation with regard to the threats to national security also owes, to a great extent, to the people in uniform, who …

Would it be, thus, necessary, in order to correct these deviations as far the perception of reality is concerned, to remind all those who still doubt it that the Romanian military man, honest and dignified, no matter the position he might hold in the hierarchy, is capable, in the last resort, of making the supreme sacrifice to accomplish the assigned missions ? Would it be necessary to provide the evidence of the thousands of heroes that have sacrificed themselves, throughout time, on the altar of the national interest, to whom are added the 13 military men who heroically died in the theatres of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well the ones, more than 40, who were wounded, some of them being condemned to live with their infirmities for the rest of their lives ?

To conclude in a more optimistic tone, we mention, once more, that the Romanian Armed Forces reported mission accomplished in Iraq and they will always be ready for new missions to safeguard our national being and to preserve a respectable position among the nations of the world, a world that is far from being able to solve all the problems through dialogue and to willingly renounce the services provided by the military institution.

Therefore, the ones who credit and invest in the future of the military institution certainly invest in the future of our nation. The opposite of this truth is dangerous even if we only dare to think of it.

Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

L'argument
de l'accomplissement
les missions assignées

Dans un monde débordant de contraires, il est exigé, de plus en plus, des points de repère et d'appui pour la redéfinition des actions et le fonctionnement des corrections essentiels pour éviter, finalement, son entrée dans la dérive.

Il est nécessaire, en conséquence, d'avoir des piliers robustes qui donnent à la société de la stabilité et la résistance à toute tentative de détruire son fondement. C'est-à-dire des piliers qu'ont besoin d'être protégés par l'action des agents corrosifs, de ne pas mettre en danger cet édifice.

Il est donc indispensable de rappeler à ceux qui ne plus souviennent ou délibérément négligent que l'armée roumaine a été et demeure l'une des institutions, malheureusement peu, sur la crédibilité et la stabilité dont la société a fondé son existence et elle prévoit toujours ses aspirations et sa connexion à la modernité.

L'armée roumaine, cet organisme unanimement accepté comme un générateur de repères morales et de la stabilité, a compris de faire seulement sa dette avec qui a été investi par la nation et, dans une attitude toujours digne, de contrecarrer toute attaque à laquelle elle est soumise, avec les armes qui ont toujours été à portée de main et qui, pour les autres, paraît-il d'être moins accessibles: l'honnêteté et l'argument d'accomplir ses missions assignées. C'est-à-dire des missions dont le peuple roumain l'a mandaté dans le temps et auxquelles, plus récemment, il a ajouté celles qui sont exigées de l'effort national qui concerne sa connexion aux valeurs européennes et son intégration dans les structures euro-atlantique de sécurité.

L'adhésion de la Roumanie à l'OTAN et à l'Union européenne est certainement le plus important objectif politique que l'Etat roumain a proposé pour soi-même et qui a été heureusement réalisé, après 1990.

La mission de l'armée roumaine en Irak, récemment achevée, a apporté de vrais avantages pour notre pays, a accompli et a renforcé ses approches de politique étrangère, a consacré aussi sa dignité de faire partie des nations qui travaillent

pour la sécurité mondiale en tant qu'une garantie de propre sécurité et d'élaborer son avenir sur de certes fondements. Et si cet effort n'est pas limité, le plus souvent, aux choses qui les médias voulaient ou pouvaient fournir au public, mais beaucoup plus, c'est-à-dire tout ce qui signifie une grande opération militaire dans un espace non hospitalier et avec un ennemi imprédictible, avec des repères morales, idéologiques et des moyens de ripostes hors de nos règles, d'autant plus il devrait apprécier la volonté de nos soldats de placer l'armée roumaine et, implicitement, la Roumanie à une condition supérieure, nécessaire pour un dialogue d'égal à égal avec nos partenaires de l'Alliance.

Mais il sera reçu en totalité, par ceux qui acceptent seulement ce qui est offert à cette compétition, pas honnête, ce que l'on appelle les leaders d'opinion, la dimension du risque réel, les sentiments intenses de soldats qui sont partis en missions, la douleur des familles qui ont perdu leur enfants, parents et frères sur le champ de bataille, le drame du ceux qui ont perdu leur camarades, la tragédie perpétue des mutilés, aussi ?

Ceux qui se demandent aujourd'hui si nous avons besoin de l'armée et s'il est plus nécessaire de récompenser, même si aux niveaux minimaux, parfois au-dessous d'une limite décente, l'effort, les privations et l'esprit de sacrifice des soldats, tous font partie de ceux qui ont oublié et ils vont, peut-être, de déterminer les autres à oublier que cette relative détente des craintes sur la sécurité nationale est due, en grande partie, eux-mêmes aussi, aux soldats, ceux qui portent l'uniforme, ceux qui ...

Il est donc nécessaire, pour corriger ces écarts de perception de la réalité, à toujours rappeler à tous ceux qui se doutent que le soldat roumain, qui est honnête et digne, n' importe où il est situé de point de vue hiérarchiquement, est en mesure, finalement, pour le sacrifice suprême d'accomplir ses missions assignées ? Il est exigé d'apporter en tant que preuve du sacrifice, au fil du temps, des milliers de héros sur l'autel de l'intérêt national, qui ont été ajoutés, au cours de dernières années, les 13 soldats héroïquement tombés dans les théâtres d'opérations en Irak et en Afghanistan, et plus de 40 blessés, certains d'entre eux condamnés à porter ses infirmités pour le reste de leur vie ?

Pour conclure toutefois par une remarque optimiste, il faut rappeler que l'armée roumaine a dignement rapporté l'accomplissement de sa mission en Irak et elle sera toujours prête pour de nouvelles missions pour la défense nationale et pour maintien d'une position intègre parmi les nations du monde. Un monde qui est loin d'être en mesure de résoudre tous ses problèmes par le dialogue et de renoncer, volontairement, aux services de l'institution militaire.

Ainsi, ceux qui donnent leur crédit et investissent dans l'avenir de l'institution militaire investissent sûrement dans l'avenir de notre nation. Même à oser de penser au revers de cette vérité est certainement une chose dangereuse.

Version française par Alina PAPOI

ASPECTS REGARDING THE WAY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS – the UN, NATO, the EU – INTERRELATE IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY

Lieutenant General Dr Sorin IOAN

NATO's attempts to improve its relation with the UN are a reality in their common desire to enhance cooperation, strengthen and expand the dialogue on a permanent basis.

In this respect, the author outlines a few courses of action meant to enhance cooperation, which are aimed at: continuing the dialogue at the level of UN and NATO representatives, mainly with regard to peacekeeping missions, disarming, weapons control, human trafficking, crisis management, reform of the security, stabilisation and reconstruction sector; granting NATO the observer status in the UN General Assembly; establishing a permanent NATO liaison office within the New York UN Headquarters.

Keywords: *funding project; international arrangements; humanitarian assistance; stabilisation and reconstruction; crisis situations; NATO capabilities*

There are, of course, many paradigms regarding the assignment of responsibilities with respect to enhancing and managing security at the level of these organisations. Among them, there are two that may represent the departure point in the analysis of theoretical interrelations and of the way they are put in practice. The *first one* becomes manifest at the level of those that are not part of these systems, namely the *"spectators"* that perceive in their own way the resolutions, declarations and comments that are prior to some events or are associated with the development or the end of some working group meetings. The *second one* is connected to those who work for these organisations or permanently follow the development of their activity, namely the ones that have an *"expert"* perception of the situation, as they know the way the internal systems function. However, there is the risk for their objectivity to erode against the background of inevitable routine.

For those belonging to the first category, we consider it is more difficult to understand why some

Lieutenant General Dr Sorin Ioan – the Romanian Military Representative to NATO and the EU.

operations or missions are under the aegis of the UN (Congo, Eritrea, Sudan and others), of NATO (Afghanistan and Kosovo), of the UN (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chad, Guinea Bissau), of OSCE (in Albania, *"Operation Alba"*, or in Georgia, up to the outbreak of the open conflict between the Russian Federation and Georgia) or why there are more than one missions in only one theatre of operations (NATO, the UN and the EU in Afghanistan; NATO and a coalition of forces in Iraq; the UN, NATO and the EU in Kosovo or the UN, as well as NATO in Sudan, to provide only a few examples).

The first necessary clarification is that any operation is launched following a UN Security Council Resolution, initiated upon the official request of the authorities of the state on whose territory the conflict develops or that is confronted with a major crisis or, exceptionally, when the decisions made by the leadership of a state infringe the provisions of international treaties or endanger regional or global security. In principle, UN resolutions define the state of things and establish immediate measures (from sanctions to interventions with military and/or civilian forces) and the type of mission (humanitarian, observers, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace imposing, stability and reconstruction), as well as the goal, objectives, mandate, the aegis under which the mission is developed, empowering one of the organisations (the UN, NATO, the EU, OSCE) to lead the operation or a leader country to establish a coalition of multinational forces (based on the will of other *countries to participate in the operation*: *"Coalition of the Willing"*). Sometimes, especially for NATO-led operations, the engagement rules are approved.

The second clarification that should be mentioned refers to the fact that, through the same resolution, other governmental and non-governmental international organisations are encouraged to take part in the mission, with financial projects, with support and reconstruction funds, or with forces and experts to manage a segment or a *"niche"* field for the benefit of the mission.

The above-mentioned general clarifications configure the coordinates of the departure point in the analysis of the relations between NATO and other international institutions, under the *"cupola"* defined by the Alliance in an official document, approved at the Bucharest Summit, 2-4 April 2008, as being a *"comprehensive approach"* to stability operations.

The UN – NATO Relationship

There have been numerous attempts for an official framework agreement to be reached to lie at the basis of the relations between the two organisations for the benefit of both institutions. They have all, either old or recent ones, failed to reach consensus. Moreover, the fact that the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon attended

the Bucharest Summit marked the major progress and a unique moment, accepted with conditions and limitations[1]. Before going thoroughly into these aspects of reticence, we will analyse the coordinates of the relations between the two organisations:

• *Coordinates of the legal framework*

According to the UN Charter, the Security Council (UNSC) of the organisation has the *"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"*[2], aspect strengthened by the decisions supremacy in relation to any other international agreement, so that to deconflict different interpretations of situations, it is stated: *" ... In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail"*[3].

At the same time, the authors of the UN Charter, probably anticipating that in some situations the UNSC is not capable to intervene in due time for efficient actions and measures, included the following into the text: *"the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense"*[4], provision that lay at the basis of the formulation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Following the UN Charter in this context, Chapter VIII, referring to international agencies or arrangements that have been assigned responsibilities in the field of maintaining international security and peace, states: *"no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council"*[5], the sense of *"enforcement action"* being explained in Art. 2(4): *"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations"*[6].

On the other hand, the North Atlantic Treaty adopts, in Article 7, the provision in Article 24 of the UN Charter, recognising *"the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining the international security and peace"*. However, to apply Article 5, it assumes the right to collective defence, the decision being impossible to be blocked by the *"right of veto"* of some Security Council member states.

---

[1] The UN Secretary-General participated only in the debates regarding the developing NATO-led military operations, based on the UN Security Council resolutions. However, the two flags (the one of the UN and NATO respectively) did not wave together in the background of the round table.
[2] UN Charter, Art. 24.
[3] UN Charter, Art. 103.
[4] UN Charter, Chapter VII, Art. 51.
[5] UN Charter, Art. 53.
[6] UN Charter, Art. 2 (4).

In this context, there are two situations or types of crises that should be mentioned, as they are relevant for the evolution of the Alliance:

- the use of force against Serbia, in 1999 – *"Operation Allied Force"*, in the context of the conflict in Kosovo, without being explicitly mandated by the UNSC. Even in this situation, NATO informed and reported to the UNSC throughout the operation;

- the events on September 11, 2001 brought back to attention the way *"regional agencies and arrangements"* are defined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, as well as NATO position regarding security and defence missions and operations outside the Alliance territory. Thus, in 2002, in Prague, it was decided, by consensus, that NATO should be able *"to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives"*[7]. Without analysing the implications this principle may have in practice, NATO decision to take action outside the Euro-Atlantic borders was put in practice through the *ISAF Operation in Afghanistan*, starting 2003, the humanitarian aid mission in Pakistan, in 2005-2006, *NATO Training Mission Iraq, NTM-I* and the mission in support of the African Union in Darfur, starting 2005.

• *Coordinates of collaboration in the field of planning*

NATO has the will and interest to collaborate with the UN, as the allied countries seek, during the common decision process, to found their actions on the UNSC resolutions, as a legal basis for their operations and for the legitimisation of the political framework of their development. Such a state of play comes to support the Alliance, in the context in which other governmental and non-governmental international organisations may contribute to the operation, in its different phases, such as: stabilisation and reconstruction, building the new state institutions, promoting a solid security environment. The legitimacy sanctioned by a UNSC resolution creates the paradigm of a *"healthy environment"* in which NATO may be perceived as a contributor to the solution of *"treatment and rehabilitation"* of an area dominated by conflict. A UNSC resolution represents the vehicle for the international community engagement, through which the Alliance makes its potential and distinct role visible, even in more sensitive operations such as the one in Iraq, where its mission is to train the new local security forces. Thus, a UN mandate makes it simpler to reach consensus regarding the Alliance engagement in a mission that requires both the moral authorisation of the public and the official

---

[7] Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, paragraphs 3 and 4, regarding the formulation of principles.

one of the parliamentary political environment. Starting from the importance the legitimate framework has for the large public, the collaboration between NATO and the UN has developed, and a new definition regarding the common command and control system, having productive results, has been acquired. We have in view here the common experience in Kosovo, *the UN Interim Administration Mission – UNMIK*, and the one in Afghanistan, together with the *UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan – UNAMA*, which determined NATO allies to see the UN role of coordinating the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts as a necessity. At the same time, the coordinating role of some UN departments, agencies and offices[8] cannot be substituted for other organisations. Moreover, the practical development of operations in common has clarified the role and functions of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the relations with NATO and other organisations.

The UN, in its turn, needs to have an interactive relation with NATO, as it may benefit from the resources, expertise and capacities of a multinational organised structure that has a significant potential not only from the military point of view but also from the one of the experience of teaming up with a view to planning, organising and leading a large and complex international framework. It includes, besides the allied member states, a large and diverse partnership with countries on many continents.

The relationship with NATO, from the UN perspective, can be characterised, taking into account some circumstances, as follows:

- in some situations, the UN prefers NATO involvement in a conflict environment, *either* as it is, in general, reserved in engaging in peace imposing missions that mean military actions in force (and NATO can establish more severe rules of engagement), *or* because it has available competitive command, control and management systems that can be deployed in a short period of time. We should remember that when the *UNPROFOR* mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina reached a deadlock, after the massacre in Srebrenica and the crisis of the 20 European hostages used as human shields, the decision in Dayton/USA for the Alliance to lead the mission, initially for one year (15 December 1995-15 December 1996), and then up to the mandate was handed over to the EU, contributed to its rescue as the conditions for a state of normality to be re-established were assured;

- in other circumstances, it is preferable, from the political perspective, the consensual agreement of NATO member states or the *"coalition of states, on a voluntary basis"*, to engage in an operation following a UNSC resolution,

---

[8] Departament of Peacekeeeping Operations (DPKO), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Development Programme ONU (UNDP) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

as an alternative to accepting a former colonial power to take action in highly sensitive countries or regions;

- the alternative of NATO involvement offers, besides the financial advantages for the UN, specialised assistance for the mission planning, member states logistical support and already existent operational and functional command;

- in many situations, the UN needs NATO and its capabilities for humanitarian missions, as it was the mission in Pakistan, a country affected by the earthquake in 2005, followed by an ample operation for assistance and support.

From NATO perspective, the relationship with the UN has the following connotations:

- any mission of the North Atlantic Alliance, to reach consensus, needs the approval of the member states national parliaments, that have a more relevant legitimacy (for non-Article 5 operations), when it is mandated by a UN resolution;
- it is available to offer support, either with transport facilities or by providing places at the own training courses, only when it is explicitly requested to do so;
- it is always interested that, in the operations it leads, it should have a comprehensive approach, coordinating, especially in the stabilisation and reconstruction stage, with other governmental and non-governmental organisations, thus promoting the civilian dimension regarding assistance of the new state structures and cultivating the system of interrelationships.

Both parties' availability to cooperate does not exclude some asperities in certain circumstances, but they are not a dominant characteristic at all. Some malfunctions in coordinating that have been identified in practice were analysed and repaired at large, for the benefit of the subsequent missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, creating the framework for the military commanders or the representatives of different missions in the same theatre of operations to meet periodically to exchange information and synchronise the efforts of NATO, the UN and the EU. Otherwise, on 7 October 2008, a UN-NATO political cooperation agreement was signed, a document that formalises the collaboration relations that have already existed in theatres of operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. This document represents an important step in the bilateral relations, if we take into account that the first attempt, a draft, was initiated in 2005, out of the desire to legitimise standards, methods and cooperation procedures. Although the document has an incontestable utility, firstly for the success of the peace missions in which not only NATO but also the UN unfold and coordinate stability and reconstruction activities and secondly, for the *"identity of the international security policy"*, both parties have been prudent.

If we were to draw a parallel, in this context, the *relationship between the UN and the EU* has different connotations, taking into consideration the fact that the first memorandum of cooperation was signed in September 2003 and the following in June 2007[9]. The circumstances of the UN-EU cooperation are different, too, and they do not represent a relevant model for NATO, for the following reasons:

- the relationship has already had a history, the European Commission being granted observer status by the UN General Assembly since 1974. Since then, the Commission has had a Permanent Delegation to the UN Headquarters in New York, as well as delegations accredited to Nairobi, Paris, Rome and Vienna, and the Council of the European Union has had a Liaison Office in New York starting 1994;
- in April 2003, a Framework Agreement was made between the UN and the European Commission (EC) regarding the funding and co-funding of some UN projects by the EC;
- the EU makes the largest contribution to the UN common budget (37,8% in 2003) and ensures the largest part of the United Nations Organisation budget for peacekeeping operations (for example, 39% in 2003) and more than a half of the funds meant for development assistance (56,9% in 2002)[10];
- starting 2001, there have been UN-EU summits each semester (with the participation of the UN Secretary-General, on the one hand, and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, of the European Commission, respectively, on the other hand) aiming at enhancing cooperation;
- the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy stipulates the coordination between EU member countries and the UN General Assembly.

Preoccupations regarding the Enhancement of the UN – NATO Relationship

NATO attempts to enhance the relationships with the UN represent a reality in the common desire to develop cooperation, détente and to extend dialogue on permanent bases. The directions for the development of cooperation aim at:

- continuing the dialogue at the level of the UN and NATO representatives, mainly in the following domains: peacekeeping missions, disarmament,

---

[9] The Joint Declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management, on 24 September 2003, was signed by Silvio Berlusconi representing the Council of the European Union and by Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, and the one on 8 June 2007 was signed by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, representing the Council of the EU, and by Ban Ki-moon, the current UN Secretary-General.

[10] *"The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations"*, Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004, pp. 5, 7 and 28.

arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, people trafficking, crisis management, security sector reform, stabilisation and reconstruction;
- granting NATO the observer status in the UN General Assembly (identical with the EU, OSCE and other international organisations);
- establishing a permanent NATO Liaison Office at the UN Headquarters in New York; mention should be made, in this context, that, in certain periods, during the development of some operations, there were Liaison Teams within the UN International Staff, respectively a UN Liaison Office at NATO (for instance, NATO Office near the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, during the crisis situation in Pakistan, following the earthquake in October 2005);
- using the NATO-EU *"Berlin Plus"* decision (grounded on the agreement reached in June 1996, in Berlin) as a model to interrelate with the UN, such as dedicating some NATO capabilities to UN emergency missions, on the request of the UN Secretary-General, and with the consensus approval, within the North Atlantic Council.

The NATO – European Union Relationship

Great Britain decision, in 1998, to renounce the opposition regarding the EU involvement in the issue of defence and security made it possible for the Union to launch the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), at the European Council Meeting in Cologne, in June 1999[11]. Between 1991 and 1998, the effort was oriented towards the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) as the European pillar of NATO and a defence component of the EU, having in view the fact that the WEU member states were also NATO members, culminating with NATO Declaration in January 1994[12]. However, up until 1998, there were two different

---

[11] From December 1991, when the Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP was initiated, following the Maastricht Treaty, to October 1998, Great Britain stated that the Western European Union (WEU), according to the Brussels Treaty in 1948, changed in 1954, had to be responsible for *"implementing the EU decisions that had defence implications"*. According to the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union, the member states agree to authorise WEU *"to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications"*, see *Treaty on European Union,* Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992, p. 126, Article J.4, para 2.

[12] *"We welcome the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the WEU that has been achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency ... We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security"*, original text, *Brussels Summit Declaration*, 11 January 1994, para 5 and 6.

orientations regarding the role of the WEU within the EU: the one supported by Great Britain and the Netherlands, for the WEU to be as close as possible to NATO, and the French-German one, for the WEU to be kept as close as possible to the EU, having as final goal the assimilation of the WEU main elements within the EU. The success of the French-German vision marked the end of the *"separable but not separate"* approach. From then on, the EU started to establish some capabilities that were distinct from those of NATO, and the member states decided to transfer the WEU capabilities under the EU control[13] and to adopt ESDP to replace the European Security and Defence Identity – ESDI (that belonged to the WEU). It was the most profound transformation that enabled the EU to have a distinct military dimension. Mention should be made that there is a number of states that are EU but not NATO members and a number of states that are NATO but not EU members[14].

In this context, we consider that the aspects regarding the cooperation between NATO and the EU may be summarised as follows:

- the main door for collaboration was opened at the Washington NATO Summit, in April 1999, when the principles for the cooperation with the EU were established *("Berlin Plus")*. At the same time, NATO assures that it is prepared to define and adopt the arrangements for the EU to have access to the Alliance assets and capabilities that refer to: planning capabilities for military operations; identification of the range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR, Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe[15], to assume a set of responsibilities in Europe; adaptation of NATO defence planning system to include the forces available for EU-led operations;

- from April 1999 to December 2002, there were negotiations to make the agreement official, through an optimal formula, which can respond to all national or bilateral sensitivities;

- in December 2002, at the European Council Meeting in Copenhagen, the main requirements and criteria for cooperation were agreed upon: *"Berlin Plus"* arrangements are applicable only to those EU member states that are also NATO members or to those that are members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and have signed bilateral arrangements with NATO[16]. In March 2003, it became official

---

[13] The EU Military Staff, the Situation Centre, the EU Satellite Centre, the EU Institute for Security Studies and the WEU structures involved in promoting cooperation in the field of armament.

[14] NATO and EU member states: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Malta. NATO member states that are not EU members: Canada, Island, Norway, Turkey, the USA and, recently, Albania and Croatia.

[15] DSACEUR, Great Britain, SACEUR belonging to the USA.

[16] The principle excludes Cyprus and Malta that cannot take part in EU-led military operations using assets belonging to NATO. Although they are EU members, they do not have access to NATO classified information.

the framework through which classified information may be transferred to the EU member countries that are not NATO members but take part in the PfP and have signed the security arrangement with the Alliance;

- subsequent to the European Council Meeting in December 2002, it was accepted the possibility for NATO member states that are not EU members – Island, Norway, Turkey to participate in the ESDP;

- the principles of cooperation for crisis situations management, thoroughly agreed upon by both NATO and the EU, are the following: the partnership, through which the two organisations, different in nature, can support each other during crisis situations through mutual agreements; consultations, dialogue, cooperation and transparency; equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of both NATO and the EU; respect for the interests of EU and NATO members states; observance of the UN Charter principles; the Treaty on the EU and the Treaty of Washington are considered vectors for the consolidation of the security environment in the context of the Euro-Atlantic stability supported by resolutions, which contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes; coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations;

- adoption, in March 2003, of the *"Berlin Plus"* package of agreements, which allows the Alliance to support the EU-led operations in which NATO as an organisation is not engaged and which consists of about 50 formal agreements[17]. In principle, they refer to the following essential provisions[18]:

- a NATO-EU Security Agreement that covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules;
- assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities for actual use in EU-led crisis management operations;
- availability of NATO capabilities and common assets such as communication units and other facilities for EU-led operations (there are stipulated functional operation headquarters: Mont Valérien – France; Northwood – Great Britain, Joint Operation Headquarters in Rome, Air Force in Larissa – Greece and the EU Operation Centre at the Headquarters of the Military Committee International Military Staff in Brussels, activated for the first time in June 2007);
- procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;

---

[17] The majority of the them being classified.

[18] The pieces of information regarding *"Berlin Plus"* agreement are available at http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ue/evolution.html, *"NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership"*.

- terms of reference for NATO's Deputy SACEUR, who in principle will be the operation commander of an EU-led operation under the *"Berlin Plus"*;
- NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of a EU-led operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities;
- inclusion, in the NATO long-term defence planning, of some assets and capabilities that may be made available for EU-led missions, principle according to which forces that are trained and ready for mission may be appointed for both NATO and EU-led missions.

The effects of *"Berlin Plus"* agreement were proved in four missions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). In the same context, at the Istanbul NATO Summit, in 2004, it was decided for the Alliance to conclude the *SFOR mission (Stabilisation Force)* in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of 2004 and, following a transition period coordinated by a NATO liaison team, the EU was ready to deploy a new and distinct mission to the country, known under the name *"Althea"*.

- subsequently, in accordance with ESDP, it has been decided that EU-led operations should not be necessarily coordinated with NATO. Therefore, between June and September 2003, the EU led *"Operation Artemis"* in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this being the first EU stabilisation operation outside Europe without NATO assistance. It was followed by police and justice support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, Iraq, Indonesia, Sudan, Gaza, Afghanistan (starting 2007), Chad, in 2008, *EULEX* in Kosovo or *"Atalanta"*, to combat piracy;

- some disagreements, not to call them frictions, appear because the two organisations have different structures. The European Union has a structure based on three pillars: the *first* one concerns economy and trade, protection of community citizens, single market and agricultural policies, situations in which, from a procedural perspective, the member nations sovereignty is transferred to the community decision-making instruments; the *second* one is represented by the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), which includes ESDP, in which the decision-making process is intergovernmental, namely each nation has the right to decide to participate or not in an operation under the ESDP aegis; the *third* one concerns judicial cooperation and the community legal system and functions under the principle of nations sovereignty in the decision-making process. At the same time, the EU has structures, such as the European Agency for Reconstruction, the European Defence Agency (EDA) etc. that have their say in the EU and that are not to be found in NATO.

There are some conclusions to be mentioned here:

a) the EU tendency to compete with NATO may be amplified by the fact that ESDP missions are different from those of the Alliance which take place in keeping

with the *"collective defence"* concept, being based on the optional participation in the operations. What NATO considers to be *"non-Article 5"* missions, are called *"by-choice operations"* under ESDP;

b) in the latest years, the EU has developed its planning, command and control, and conduct operations capabilities, reducing its dependency on NATO, which will probably allow for a greater liberty regarding the engagement in missions; however, for a long time, the EU will depend on NATO capabilities for strategic transport at large distance;

c) the turning point in the NATO-EU relation, according to the current status, was generated by the change in the policy of Great Britain, at the end of 1998, which made it possible for ESDP to be launched under the current form. Having a remarkable military potential in the field of capabilities, Great Britain has, currently, the influence of an essential pillar on both the development of the EU concept of ESDP and on the EU-NATO relation;

d) the EU tendency to involve in military operations independently of NATO has always been perceived as a complementary dimension in the relations between the two organisations.

The evolution of the NATO-EU relationship is also one of interest, having in view the current circumstances in which the Russian Federation has publicly manifested the intention to change the balance of power not only geostrategically but also practically, through the actions against Georgia, in the conflict with the breakaway regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia. During the conflict, Russia showed more sensitive in its relation with the EU, having in view the economic relations with the majority of the member countries, especially as far as energy resources are concerned, and quite aggressive, at the declarative level for the moment, directly or indirectly, towards NATO and especially towards the US policy in Europe. NATO eastward enlargement and the development of the US anti-missile shield in Europe mainly motivate Russia's attitude.

English version by
✒ Diana Cristiana LUPU

KNOWING AND COUNTERING RISK FACTORS AND VULNERABILITIES TO HUMAN SECURITY (II)

Lieutenant General Dr Teodor FRUNZETI

Security is a fundamental right of the human being. It represents a state in which the dangers and conditions that might cause physical, psychical or material losses are controlled in a way that makes it possible for the individuals and human community health and welfare to be defended.

Bearing these aspects in mind, the author presents us a few definitions of the concept of human security. In this respect, achieving the state of security, irrespective of the level and domain of reference, is made difficult by the people's multitude of values and interests, which contradict each other most of the time, thus causing fear for the individual, group, national, regional, global security.

Last but not least, the author insists on the fact that the impact the climate change has on international security is a current issue that will be experienced for a long time, even if progress is made with regard to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions.

Keywords: *cultural flows; communication networks; international security; global warning, cooperation; political dialogue*

In a relatively broad sense, global human security is not only aimed at the threats to individuals and to the population they belong to but it also means the concern of all responsible state and non-state factors for ensuring the welfare of human beings in their integrity. There are considered all the types of threats that can significantly, consistently influence human beings for a long time from the physical, psychical, material point of view as well as their free and enduring development.

Human society represents a constant concern of the UN, which, through its specialised bodies, takes action with the purpose of generating a beneficial state and condition for the human being and for the international human community.

Human beings and their vital necessities are thought to be fundamental, as a supreme value, while material factors, incomes or increasing consumption no longer represent a *sine qua non* prerequisite, but a means of ensuring an enduring human development.

In this respect, one must notice that the reassessment of the correlation between the purposes

Lieutenant General Professor Dr Teodor Frunzeti – Commandant (Rector) of the "Carol I" National Defence University.

and the means of social development is only a return to an orientation of the general conceptions of the world, characteristic of human culture, in general, as well as of the European culture, in particular, but which, because of some social-historical circumstances, lost their intensity and even became distorted in the 20th century.

At the methodological level, the introduction of the category of *human security* is a positive factor, because it appears as a fundamental characteristic within which there are reunited the parameters that reflect both the objective and the subjective aspects of men's social life.

Human security is focused on individuality, it is concerned with the way people live and with how free they feel in society, how free they can exert the multitude of options, to what extent they have access to the market and to the social opportunities and with whether they live in a state of conflict or peace.

Each country, in accordance with its own specific traditions and conditions, will have to create legal and social mechanisms in order to provide human security and develop human potential.

At first sight, the danger of the enduring human development (people's possibility to choose) and of welfare is generated by the state of crisis in the economy and its social effects: inflation, unemployment, minimum incomes, malnutrition, risky activities (underground economy included), poverty, precarious state of health, low level of education, environment pollution, crime, suicides, lack of the state financial means in support of the disadvantaged ones.

During the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen (1995), it was suggested that the conception of *human security* should be put on the list of the top issues of the 21st century, pointing out that social development and the development of the cultural, ecological, economic, political and spiritual environment in which it took place were inseparable.

Social development is closely connected to the enhancement of peace, liberty, stability and security at both national and international levels[1].

As noticed in the National Human Development Report in 1999, globalisation has generated new dangers for human security in rich countries as well as in poor ones, dangers that are reflected through financial instability (global and regional crises), insecurity at work (migration, workers without contract), morbidity increase (AIDS, rapid spread of sicknesses).

Moreover, globalisation has opened people's path towards various cultures, yet, currently, cultural flows are not balanced. The dangers to personal security

---

[1] The Programme of Actions of the World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, 1995.

are generated by elements related to crime and illicit trade (drugs, weapons, money laundering).

Despite these shortcomings, the era of globalisation provides new opportunities for millions of people worldwide.

Trade expansions, new technologies, foreign investment, communication networks development, global ideas and world solidarity stimulate people's lives all over the world, considerably widening their options.

The security of individuals means more than the absence of risks and threats to their physical or psychical integrity. This is a state in which the dangers and conditions that can hinder a human being are controlled in such a manner that the individual is defended under all aspects.

This leads to the conclusion that human security is an indispensable resource of daily life, which makes it possible for the individual and the community to carry out unhindered their aspirations and ideals.

At the same time, the security of the individual is considered a state that results from the dynamic balance established between the various components of the given life environment. It is the result of a complex process, in which human beings interact with their environment: *"Environment means not only the physical environment but also the cultural, technological, social, political, economic and organisational one"*[2].

Security is a fundamental right of the human being. It represents a state in which the dangers and circumstances that may cause physical, psychical or material damage are controlled in a way that makes it possible for the health and welfare of individuals and of the human community to be preserved.

The variety of definitions of the concept of *human security* proves that, for the time being, the issue of security is far from being clarified. The situation is caused by the fact that all the senses of human existence are generated through definitions resulted from the individuals perceptive experience.

Under these circumstances, achieving the state of security, irrespective of the level and domain of reference, is hampered by people's multitude of values and interests, which, most of the time, contradict each other, causing fear for individual, group, national zonal, regional, global security.

An essential component of the individual's security is represented by the psychosocial perception and representation they have on their own state, on the risks, dangers and threats to them.

---

[2] *Sécurité et promotion de la sécurité: Aspects conceptuels et opérationnels*, at http://www.cspq.qc.ca/oms/promotion.pdf, p. 13.

The population feels threatened especially by those disasters/hazards caused by human actions to natural systems or to the structures of the planet, when the changes occurred trigger long-term transformations that threaten a part of or the entire civilisation: pollution, floods, drought and cold waves.

At world level, a most important aspect on security agendas is represented by the issue of terrorism, the threat of a collision of an asteroid/comet with the Earth, yet, what has begun to take shape lately refers to the risks caused by climate change and their impact on human security.

The UN estimated that most of its requests for emergency humanitarian aid in the last two years were related to climate. In 2007, the first debate within the Security Council regarding climate change and its implications as far as international security is concerned took place.

The European Council wanted to draw attention to the impact of climate changes on international security and to the fact that the science of climate change was already better understood.

The observations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that an increase in the temperature up to 2^0C compared to pre-industrial levels will be difficult to avoid, even if, by 2050, emissions may be reduced to less than half compared to those in 1990. Such an increase in temperature will generate serious risks to security, if warming continues.

Non-mitigation of climate change will bring about unprecedented scenarios as far as security is concerned, because these can produce a series of *"critical points"* which, in their turn, will trigger accelerated, irreversible and mostly impossible to predict climate changes.

The investment made in the mitigation of changes with a view to avoiding such scenarios, as well as the ways to adapt to an inevitable situation should be accompanied by an approach to the threats to international security generated by climate change. Both should be considered as part of a preventive security policy.

Climate change is seen as a threat multiplier, which worsens the existing tendencies, tensions and instability. The main challenge consists in the fact that climate change is an additional burden for the states and regions that are already unstable and threatened by conflicts.

In this instance, the risks are not only humanitarian, they also include the political and security domains, which directly influence European interests.

Moreover, in accordance with the concept of human security, many of the issues regarding the impact of climate change on international security are closely connected and require comprehensive political reactions.

The EU is placed on a unique position with a view to approaching the impact of climate change on international security, because of its major role in the field of development, global policy on climate and the wide range of available mechanisms and instruments.

Europe should be interested in approaching the implications of climate change for security, because these will severely influence its natural environment and most of the sectors of society and economy.

The effects of climate change are currently experienced through increased temperatures, ice cap melting, more frequent extreme meteorological phenomena, which can make it possible for climate change to transform into various forms of conflict, such as:

➢ *Conflict on resources*

The reduction of arable land, the water deficit on a large scale, the diminution of food and fish stocks, floods and long droughts have already been experienced worldwide. Climate change will modify the rainfall and will further decrease the available fresh water resources by 20-30% in certain regions. The decreasing agricultural activity will bring about food insecurity in the less developed countries and a generalised increase in food prices, impossible to sustain, or will exacerbate these phenomena. Water shortage especially can cause disturbances among civil population and can trigger significant economic losses, even as far as robust economies are concerned.

The global effect is that climate change will feed the existing conflicts regarding depleting resources, especially when the access to these resources is politicised.

➢ *Economic losses and the risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure*

The rising sea level and the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters represent a serious threat to megalopolises, with their connected infrastructure, as well as to harbour installations and oil refineries that are located near the sea or in river deltas.

The intensification of disasters and humanitarian crises will exert a huge pressure on the resources of donor countries, including on the capabilities used in emergency actions.

➢ *Loss of territories and border conflicts*

Scientists expect major changes of the land configuration during this century. Littoral retreat and the flooding of big land areas may trigger the loss of some territories, including entire countries, as well as small insular islands.

Another dimension of the competition for energy resources resides in the potential conflict regarding the resources in the polar regions, which will become exploitable as a consequence of global warming. Desertification may generate

a vicious circle of degradation, migration and conflicts for territories and borders, thus threatening the political stability of countries and regions.

➢ *Migration caused by environmental factors*

The populations that are already affected by poor health conditions, unemployment or social exclusion are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change, which intensifies the migration within countries or between them. There are countries that, being vulnerable to climate change, demand the international acknowledgement of the migration caused by environmental factors.

➢ *Situations of fragility and radicalisation*

The incapacity of a government to meet the needs of its entire population or to provide protection to face the difficulties generated by climate change can lead to tensions between different ethnic and religious groups across the countries and to political radicalisation, destabilising countries or even entire regions.

➢ *Tensions regarding energy supply*

One of the most significant potential conflicts regarding resources is based on the competition for the access to energy resources or for their control.

Nevertheless, because many hydrocarbon reserves are in regions that are invulnerable to the impact of climate change and many of the oil and gas producing countries are already confronted with important changes of social-economic and demographic nature, an increase in instability is expected.

The multilateral security system is jeopardised if the international community does not deal with the mentioned dangers. In many regions on the globe, climate change feeds one or many such dangers.

Thus, Africa is one of the continents that are the most vulnerable to climate change, as a consequence of multiple pressures and the low capacity to adapt.

In North Africa and in Sahel, increasing drought, water scarcity and excessive use of land will disintegrate the land and bring about the loss of arable lands, supplied with rainwater.

The Nile Delta may be in danger because of the increasing sea level and the salinity of agricultural areas. Currently, climate change already has a major impact on the conflict in Darfur and around it.

Moreover, reduced rainfall and increasing temperatures will negatively affect these regions. For instance, in Southern Africa, drought has reduced the crops, which leads to food insecurity, and in many areas, it is expected that climate change will have a negative effect on health, especially because of the rapid spread of the sicknesses, which will further exacerbate tensions.

The significant reduction of the productivity of cultures in arid or semiarid areas, as a consequence of overusing water systems in the Middle East, will affect

Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia, thus damaging stability in a strategic area for Europe.

In Asia, the increasing sea level can endanger the habitat of millions of people, and the loss of water and agricultural productivity will create difficulties in Asia regarding the feeding process of its population, which is increasing and will be subject to the proliferation of infectious diseases. Monsoon rainfall changes and reduction of water melted from the Himalayas Mountains will affect more than one billion people. The conflicts on the remaining resources and uncontrolled migration will lead to instability.

In the more arid areas of Latin America, climate change will lead to salinity and the desertification of agricultural land and to a decrease in productivity of major crops and animals, with negative consequences on food security.

Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean area are already facing negative effects, including more extreme events associated with El Nino cyclone. It is estimated that the changes of rainfalls and the disappearance of glaciers will have an effect on the water available for human consumption, agriculture and energy production, for example in the Andes area.

In the Arctic region, ice caps melting creates new waterways and international trade routes, causing instability at international level and with regard to the interests of the European Union in terms of security.

Climate change requires the review and strengthening of the EU's instruments of cooperation and political dialogue, placing the emphasis on the impact of climate change on security, setting priorities, strengthening support for climate change mitigation and adaptation to it, good governance, natural resource management, transfer of technologies, cross-border cooperation on environment, enhancement of the institutional capacity to manage crises.

The impact of climate change on international security is a current issue, which will be present for a long time, even if progress is made in reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases.

In this context, we reckon that the active role of the EU in the international negotiations on climate change is essential and must be further kept.

Examining the implementation of the *European Security Strategy* and of the according proposals with a view to complementing it, one must take into account the security-related dimension of climate change.

The enhancement of capabilities at the EU level, a first step in addressing the impact of climate change on international security, should seek to establish a capital of knowledge and assessment of EU's capabilities, followed by an improvement in the prevention and preparedness to respond rapidly to disasters and conflicts.

Among the actions that could be undertaken, we can mention:
- ➤ paying increased attention to the most vulnerable regions and potential hot spots of climate security;
- ➤ developing a EU policy for the Arctic region based on the evolution of geostrategic changes in this region;
- ➤ examining the implications of climate change for security in the dialogue with third countries, including sharing analyses;
- ➤ focusing on the security risks regarding climate change on the multilateral arena, particularly in the Security Council of the UN, G8 and UN specialised agencies;
- ➤ strengthening international cooperation in detecting and monitoring security threats related to climate change and in the capacity for prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response.

Last but not least, one should take into account the additional migratory pressure generated by environmental factors in the process of developing a European policy on migration, in collaboration with all relevant international bodies.

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

THE CONCEPT
OF
STRATEGIC PARALYSIS (II)

Colonel Mircea MÎNDRESCU

The author carries on with describing the concept of strategic paralysis, illustrating it with Sun Tzu' most significant examples in this respect.

Thus, in the first part, he presents the psychological aspect as being the enemy's most important element of analysis. Sun Tzu thought that it was by observing the way a General sets his operational disposition and by noticing the way his troops carry out his commands that the strengths and weaknesses of an enemy can be observed.

In this respect, one reckoned that attacking the enemy's weak points with full energy is the most important condition in order to be successful in battle.

In the second part, Frederick the Great's main contributions to military theory are highlighted, as the author points out the importance of the ideas comprised in his instructions to his Generals.

Keywords: *unity of command; field analysis; strategic advantage; center of gravity; enemy paralysis*

There are numerous authors that consider **Sun Tzu**, the writer of the famous *"Ping Fa" (The Art of War)*, as being the first military theorist who tried to deliver a well thought and balanced theory and methodology regarding warfare[1].

The essence of Sun Tzu's thinking is underlined when he stresses that the opposition between the parties to a conflict has its main root at the conceptual level. Fundamentally, Sun Tzu's work could be seen as being a kind of a manual, the purposes of which were to lead the leaders through the hardships of unveiling the main characteristics of a conflict and to help them acquire the necessary skills for mastering the art of waging war, with the general aim of preserving or aggrandising the state. In the context, it should be underlined that the similarities between the Sun Tzu's *"The Art of War"* and Machiavelli's *"The Prince"* texts should not be ignored.

Understandably, Sun Tzu's ideas did not appear in a vacuum but were influenced by the cultural and philosophical concepts of the era in which

---

Colonel Mircea Mîndrescu – Deputy Director, the National Defence College.

[1] Kurt P. Vandesteen, *Classical Theories of the Will to Fight*, B.S., Illinois State University Normal, Illinois, 1986, p. 12.

he lived. Some of the concepts were those referring to *"Tao"* – the harmony – and they were used by the Chinese thinker while explaining the modalities in which wars must have been fought and successes achieved. Some of the novelties were those referring to the notions of *order, disorder* or *manipulation*, which were seen as useful tools for drawing near successes on the battlefield.

Probably the most important characteristic of *"The Art of War"* consists in its nonlinear approach to the war phenomenon. This aspect is evident from the fact that war's chaotic nature is underlined, being stressed that order appears out of disorder and vice versa. Sun Tzu underscored five criteria that were of paramount importance while doing a strategic assessment: *"Tao"*, the climate, the terrain, the way in which command and control was exercised, and the organisation.

"Tao" refers primarily to the way in which unity of command is ensured, and to the relationships between the commander and those under command. For Sun Tzu, the climate takes into consideration not only the physical features and geography but the luminosity of different sectors as well. The terrain's analysis must have taken into account the geographical and human made features, and, above all, their influences onto the unfolding of military operations. Regarding the command and control, the author stressed the importance of the presence of some qualities into the personality of a commander. As such, wisdom, integrity, discipline, courage and humanism were viewed as being of a fundamental importance for the outcome of a military encounter. In its turn, the concept of organisation dealt, in Sun Tzu's view, with the manner in which the headquarters were designed and supplied. For the Chinese thinker, by skilfully utilising the five criteria, one would reach the absolute awareness and knowledge[2].

On the other hand, Sun Tzu often stressed the idea that war was the realm of deception[3]. There are many words regarding the importance of spies whose main tasks were to discern terrain's characteristics or to assess the bond existing between military commanders, soldiers and civil population. At the same time, the accent was put not only on discovering the true nature of the enemy but also on covering one's own dispositions and intentions as well.

The recognition of the importance Sun Tzu bestowed on the concepts listed earlier should note the idea that the most important stress was put by the Chinese military thinker on the psychological aspects of warfare. Sun Tzu treated the possible psychological impacts of military operation with the outmost attention. In this sense, he recommended that the attack must aim at the weakest points of the enemy disposition. In their turn, those weakest points could be uncovered, in Sun Tzu's

---

[2] Roger T. Ames, *Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare*, Ballentine Books, New York, 1993, p. 68.
[3] *Ibid*, p. 104.

opinion, by carefully watching the manner in which a General exercises command and control activities and by paying the necessary attention to analysing the way in which military troops were carrying out military orders. The explanation of this special heed was that the collapse of an army was coincidental with the collapse of its morale and, therefore, what was necessary was to choose those actions that best influenced, to one's own advantage, the morale of its enemy. The recipe for that laid with the proper use of direct and indirect actions and in employing those forms that led to surprising the enemy. Thus, the result must not have only been the destruction of the enemy but, much more importantly, it was necessary to mislead the enemy with regard to the disposition, intentions and capabilities of one's own forces.

At the tactical level, Sun Tzu's opinions were that the advantages already gained at the operational level should be preserved and increased, the main aim being to neutralise the will to fight of the enemy. For him, the most important aspects to be dealt with, in order to master the art of arranging the battle formations, were *choosing the moment when one decided to start an action, the military discipline* and *the morale*.

Some of the factors to be taken into account when deciding upon *entering in action* were the enemy's disposition and its morale. In fact, the Chinese writer spelled out a famous phrase, colourfully linking the level of enemy's morale with the most important parts of a day, inferring that the more a waiting phase is protracted the more the level of morale is decreasing. Thus, Sun Tzu likened the morning of a day to that period of time when the morale is high, the noon to the moment when the morale starts to tremble and the afternoon to the moment when the morale is broken.

For the Chinese thinker, the most important contribution to the power to mislead the enemy was the one brought about by the military *discipline*. It was evident, even at that point in time, that only very disciplined and trained troops could be able to perform accurately and timely those manoeuvrings and movements the intentions of which were to put the enemy on the wrong foot in order to gain a tremendous advantage for the friendly forces. What was aimed at was to ingrain in the enemy wrong perceptions that would be the basics for their plans that, as a consequence, would be inadequate to the situation at hand and, therefore, acted like a hindrance to the enemy actions in lieu of being a tool to coordinate and put order in those actions. What was advocated for was to provide the enemy with an image that would be *"in the mirror"*, that meant the upside down to the reality. In detail, for example, the military commanders were advised to promote

the image of troops in disarray if their troops were in good order and ready to fight and the other way round.

For Sun Tzu, the enemy's centre of gravity was its strategy. From that, it was evident that the enemy plan, in other words an intellectual product, should have been the main preoccupation of friendly strategists. The overall idea was that by the sheer force of a superior intellect, victory was in the reach without the need of that so uncertain and costly trial that was the military encounter.

At the strategic level, what was important to be deciphered was the people and its leaders' will to withstand the hardships of war and the existence of the necessary resources to do so. According to the principle already spoken of before, what was aimed at was to avoid bloody battles, the political objectives being pursued by other methods, political and/or military. As a matter of fact, in a famous text in his *magnus opus*, Sun Tzu plainly wrote that to maintain a state untouched was the first option, the second one, less advantageous, was that one of destroying that state. Those same ideas went with regard to the enemy armed forces.

As well, the Chinese thinker specifically pointed out that winning in no-matter-how-many-battles was not the level of excellence one should have searched for, that level being to achieve one's stated objectives without drawing out the sword[4]. However, Sun Tzu sustained, when the military actions were unavoidable, the wisest one was to attack the *"strategies"*, the second best was with *"attacking the alliances"*, the third option was to *"attack the military"* and the least advisable one was to try to deal with the fortified cities.

What was sought for by attacking the enemy strategies was to put the enemy in such difficulties that it could not extricate itself off them, making the enemy lay down weapons and go for a negotiated settlement, to the advantage of friendly forces. The same general idea applied to the attack of enemy's alliances with the necessary remark that that situation would have required the expenditure of more resources. The phrase "attack the military" did not refer to the action of inflicting physical damage to the military, it rather meant using military means against military forces for achieving political purposes.

In Sun Tzu's opinion, the enemy's centre of gravity, at the tactical level, was the military commanders and troops' morale. Rendering those centres of gravity irrelevant would have meant misleading the enemy regarding the situation and the actions of the friendly forces in order to unbalance it, contributing in this way to creating such a chaos in the enemy's mind that it would make its action dissonant with the real situation so that, when the truth was finally revealed, the enemy

---

[4] Roger T. Ames, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

would have felt itself completely unequipped to respond properly, leading to the dislocation of its morale, to the shattering of its will to fight, making it acknowledge defeat, finally.

In conclusion, for Sun Tzu, the mechanism for neutralising the enemy should have contained tools capable of transmitting to the enemy messages the content of which would have been that friendly forces were so overwhelmingly superior that the enemy that decided to fight it would have been thoroughly defeated, risking to lose things that it valued to the highest level, as the state, human lives, independence etc. Having that in mind, it becomes clear that the Chinese thinker believed in a world where calculations were paramount and where people acted upon the results of those calculations. The fact that a series of factors were put forward as things with great influence upon the running of a conflict backs the previous point. On the other hand, Sun Tzu praised the value and importance of flexibility and adaptability, as attitudes that greatly influenced the unfolding and outcome of a military conflict. This is very clear from that fragment of *The Art of War* where the necessity of adapting an army's actions to its enemy's attitudes is likened to the way in which the running of water is following the terrain's features[5].

Overall and in essence, in Sun Tzu's opinion, winning a war meant to neutralise the enemy's will to fight and the most important tool of doing that was to neutralise its morale. In that way, by defeating the enemy's "heart and mind", one would have managed to paralyse the enemy, making in this way military victory ensured.

One of the most important kings of Prussia, **Frederick the Great**, was, at the same time, an inspired and successful military commander. Searching for an explanation for his outstanding behaviour as a military leader, some analysts went to Frederick's youth, when the young man was addicted to the study of arts and literature. In truth, away from all attempts at explaining the roots of Frederick's greatness, his operational concepts, based on mobility and lightning strikes on the weakest points of the dispositions of opposing forces, made him be seen as one contributor to the nascence of what later, when it became fully fledged under Napoleon, received the dub *"Napoleonic style of action"*.

Frederick's contribution to the military theory was mainly done through his *"Instructions of Frederick the Great for his Generals"*, published in 1747, *opus* whose principal aim was to instil doctrinal uniformity amid the Prussian Army. Generally speaking, although written when the Prussian King was in his thirties, the ideas contained in his book were interesting and some of them truly innovative.

---

[5] *Ibid*, p. 122.

One of the most important feats of Frederick was his redemption of, what is called in professionals' parlance, *"the oblique order"* utilised firstly by the Theban strategist Epaminondas some thousands years ago. At the same time, his concepts bore witness that the Prussian ruler knew and approved of Sun Tzu's philosophical ideas and stood by the perennial Clausewitz's concepts regarding the human fundamentals of war and of the way in which people, individuals and masses alike, and states participated and influenced the unfolding of war[6].

At the operational level, the Prussian King enlisted himself among the most gifted military planners. Time before the modern catch phrase *"see yourself, see the enemy, see the terrain"* made its way, Frederick's indications underlined the importance and the necessity of obeying a rule that said that one must know his enemies, their alliances and the nature of their countries[7].

Frederick's plans included thorough analyses of the climatic conditions, logistic opportunities, terrain, enemy's morale etc. On the other hand, Frederick understood that the enemy had a *"vote"* which could lead to changes in the initial situation and estimation, providing for the necessity of altering the initial plan according to the situation at hand. More than that, the King's opinion was that if one wanted to unfold realistically the enemy's plan, then one should put himself *"into the enemy's shoes"*[8] in order to do that properly.

From the organisational point of view, the Frederick's period of time marked the beginning of the transformation of the relatively small feudally styled armies in big armies formed by enlisted citizens.

Very interesting and informative is the fact that Frederick's analysis started with a serious examination of the German soldier with the aim of drawing out conclusions about his general qualities and frailties. Drawing attention to the numerous cases of desertions from the military duties and those of cowardice on the battlefield, Frederick, at the same time, was of the opinion that under a strong hand ready to impose a harsh discipline, if needed, the Prussian soldier could change himself from being a liability to be the strongest asset of the Prussian Army. The presence of an unwavering military discipline would have been be the most important asset in forming those military qualities that would have supported winning in war encounters, namely agility, speediness and the power to shock the enemy. Operationally speaking, Frederick favoured offensive actions over defensive ones. His rationale in this respect was that offensive movements elevated the troops' morale while a stationary defence affected negatively the troops' will to fight.

---

[6] Kurt P. Vandersteen, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*

Studying Frederick's written works and practical actions the King's preoccupation towards his subordinates' level of morale becomes evident. He even assigned the logistical system with capacities in this respect. Often, Frederick issued orders aiming at perfecting the troops logistics, being conscious that a content soldier makes a better fighter.

This awareness of the importance of logistics to the morale made Frederick, at the same time, ask his military commanders to aim their actions at elements of the enemy's logistical system in order to indirectly affect the enemy's morale. In this respect, the King wrote that the great secret of making war and the supreme proof of military excellence was starving the enemy. He continued that hunger exhausted people more surely than military courage and that victory would come by risking less than in the case of choosing the open fight[9].

In truth, Frederick was a partisan of the importance of logistics whom he appreciated as being the first duty of a General. Consequently, in all analysis he devised, the logistic considerations had a special place. Thus, the procurement system and the protection of supply routes constituted points among the checking criteria while planning a campaign. The existence, or the non-existence, of some facilities that could have supported the supply system made a certain zone be considered, or not, as being *"key terrain"*. Not to be left aside is the idea that for Frederick the military culmination was primarily a result of exhausting the logistic resources at one's disposal[10].

It should be mentioned as well that Frederick was one among the few military commanders who identified the fundamental role of information operations into the overall framework of the strategic design. Accordingly, for example, the King's instructions for his generals contained methods for utilising the religious factor for gaining the good will of public opinion, mainly with regard to neutral countries.

Frederick's operational philosophy concentrated on gradually eroding the enemy's operational capabilities. The general idea that followed for that erosion to take place was to determine adversaries to take decisions that would lead to the continuation or, if possible, to the acceleration of those processes that contributed to the deterioration of the enemy's situation. One important thing in that design was for the enemy to realise the quagmire in which it was and to realise that that situation was worsening still. Thus, realising that engaging further on in active military actions would bring no other things than more pain and destructions, Frederick was of the opinion that adversaries would choose a less destructive

---

[9] Brigadier General T.R. Phillips, *Frederick the Great, Roots of Strategy*, Book 1, *The Instructions of Frederick the Great for his Generals,* 1747, Harrisburg, PA, 1985, p. 324.
[10] *Ibid.*

alternative for fulfilling their political objectives, finally empowering Frederick with more trumps to be used at the negotiation table, to the Prussian King's advantage. Here, the resemblance between Frederick and Sun Tzu is evident having in mind that, according to *"Ping Fa" (The Art of War)*, a strategic evaluation done professionally would lead to relevant conclusions concerning the capacity of one party to obtain, or not, victory[11].

At the tactical level, the aim of demoralising the enemy would have been achieved by employing actions the main characteristics of which would have been mobility, speediness and flexibility. As in the case of the operational level, at the tactical level, the enemy's centre of gravity would have been its logistical installations. As it was said earlier, one of the methods by which Frederick tried to draw near military victory was his rediscovery of the *"oblique order"*, a style of massing troops on the battlefield first used by the Theban strategist Epaminondas at Leuctra in 371 BC. The essence of this arrangement was that one renounced willingly to an even distribution of his troops on the entire battle line, choosing instead to make one flank stronger in order to achieve a better ration of forces on that particular point in space. Of course, there was a risk to be taken into account, but if properly and wisely exploited, that initial superiority at a flank could lead to the destruction of that part of the enemy's disposition, to the encirclement of the entire enemy force, and thus to its disheartening, and finally to the victory[12]. Epaminondas' situation resembled Frederick's in the sense that Prussian forces were often inferior in number to the enemy, and the Theban king's style of winning military victories inspired Frederick and showed him a possible way out from the conundrum in which he found himself. The main lesson that Frederick learned from Epaminondas was that what was important for the moral was not the real number one could muster but the image one could transmit. If that image was impressing that would have meant a boost to the own morale and a powerful blow to the enemy's. So, finally, the fight was between people's minds and hearts.

Along the same line, one could list Frederick's predisposition to employ those methods that would have led to misleading the enemy. The Prussian King made mainly use of two such approaches. If he believed that the situation and his forces should have employed offensive action he feigned refusal to accept fighting, believing that, in that way, the enemy's self-confidence, artificially boosted, became the King's friend and that the security sentiment that the enemy enjoyed finally would have trapped him and, in the end, Frederick's forces would have won. On the other hand, when in reality inferior, he recommended offensive actions.

[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*

It is evident, as the Prussian King himself put forward, the objective was to hide the reality and to make the enemy believe what he wanted him to believe about friendly forces in order to plan a proper trap and to make the enemy fall in that trap. Alike Sun Tzu, Frederick the Great understood the importance of penetrating the enemy commander's mind and the importance of controlling the way in which that mind was functioning. Frederick spoke clearly about *"attitudes"* that must be instilled into the enemy's conscience for controlling the output of that mind. In his words, there were the friendly forces attitudes that made impression on the enemy, and the doubt and uncertainty that those forces were sowing into their enemy's mind regarding the actions that the forces were readying against the enemy, as well as the fact that those forces were ready for the encounter with the enemy, that made the enemy lose the willingness to attack.

The mechanism that Frederick devised for overwhelming his enemies had, at its base, the idea of controlling the enemy's mind by the friendly forces commander. In detail, that was achieved by planting into the enemy's conscience the idea of invincibility of the Prussian forces. All those and many more were aimed at diminishing the fighting power of the enemy forces, finally leading to the paralysation of the enemy's capacity to act and to react.

Frederick the Great realised the fact that psychological aspects were primordial within the *armed struggle* equation. That realisation contributed to the successes Frederick enjoyed and put him forward among the greatest strategists and military commanders of the world. In fact, Napoleon, in his turn one of the greatest name in military history, considered Frederick as one of the most important military commanders of all times.

Although, finally, undeservedly, Frederick fame slipped down on the second row, the Prussian King is the one who has the merit of transforming what was appreciated as being a *second hand* power into one of the most important and successful ruling houses of Europe.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE STRATEGY

Fleet Rear Admiral Dr Niculae VÂLSAN

Terrorism and organised crime are among the most important challenges nations are confronted with in the 21ˢᵗ century. These two phenomena have been acknowledged in the post-Cold War security environment as potential sources of risk and threats to the stability and security of nations and as an obstacle in the development of some liberal, open and democratic societies, governed based on the principles of the rule of law.

NATO's strategic concept that was adopted during the 1999 Washington Summit refers to these two phenomena as being risks that might affect the Alliance's interests in the field of security.

In this context, the author points out a few aspects regarding the consequences of terrorism, the danger of the use or the random use of violence, mainly against civilians, in order to force or intimidate policy-makers or societies with a view to achieving terrorist objectives.

Keywords: *non-state actors; concerted military actions; climate change; peacekeeping; political intimidation*

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an international security structure that protects its members through military and political means. NATO is based on the Charter of the United Nations and the transatlantic connection, a fact that represents the key to peace and stability in its area of responsibility.

The essence of the Alliance lies in the principle of collective defence, stipulated by the provisions of Article 5 of the establishing Treaty: an attack against a member state is considered an attack against all the allies.

NATO promotes cooperation and actions based on the consensus principle: in making decisions, the allies work together and consult permanently over issues regarding defence and security.

Each member state has a seat in the North Atlantic Council, NATO's highest decision-making body. The Council is chaired by NATO's Secretary General, who builds consensus among the allies and expresses the points of view and the decisions of the organisation, in relation with third parties.

The ever changing security environment requires that the reactions to threats should be adapted in keeping with its tendencies of evolution.

Fleet Rear Admiral Dr Niculae Vâlsan – Deputy Chief of the Naval Forces Staff.

Since the end of the *Cold War*, the Alliance has been involved in crisis management operations and has dealt with new challenges to security both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area. In the current complex world, no country or organisation can face the threats to security on its own, that is why the Alliance cooperates with other international organisations, first of all the United Nations and the European Union, as well as with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In this respect, it has launched several partnerships with states from Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean area and the Middle East.

Approaching New Challenges to Security

Since the nature of threats is changing, so should the Alliance's reactions. To maintain peace and promote stability, NATO is changing constantly to address current and future challenges.

Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, states on the *"axis of evil"*, ethnic conflicts are challenges the Alliance confronts with, at the same time with other threats to security for which the allies have adopted a comprehensive and more flexible approach. This approach refers to the use of crisis response capabilities, anti-missile defence measures, cyber attack measures, development of capabilities for early warning as well as for energy security provision.

The September 11 terrorist attacks prove that threats can also come from the outside of the Euro-Atlantic area and that individuals or groups, not only hostile states, can jeopardise the interests, assets and lives of the citizens from the member states.

To fulfil its fundamental security mission, NATO must be capable of deploying and supporting forces wherever necessary.

NATO and the Changing Security Environment

Conflict has always been an intrinsic and inevitable element of social changes. In the analysis of conflict, it has been proven that it would be difficult to provide a comprehensive typology if one were to consider the big number of variables that could characterise it. It is possible, though, to identify the common general tendencies that can shed more light on its characteristics.

The end of the global bipolar order marked the end of a relatively stable era, characterised by balance of power. The subsequent vacuum of power opened in fact *"Pandora's box"* of the conflicts that were dominated before that by the ideological and military balance of world order. Most of these conflicts were intra-state ones and occurred in regions with weaker state governance. We have witnessed the appearance of a new generation of warriors, sub-state entities,

non-national and transnational groups, whose identity is based on a common denominator such as ideology, tribal culture, ethnicity, religion, geography, illegal economic activities or a combination of these factors. They have become more violent and their objective is to alter the internal balance of power in pursuit of their own interests. Considering the extremes, such conflicts resulted in the fracture of state structures and of society, pushing some regions of the world to anarchy.

A series of factors has nurtured the changed nature of the conflict and the probability of its outbreak. Globalisation has intensified the economic contacts between countries and has reduced the relevance of state borders. While this is beneficial for the developed (Western) world, the negative effects of globalisation have generated a numerous disadvantaged population, especially in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Globalisation will widen the gap between the rich and the poor, will increase competition for critical resources and these tensions may eventually lead to conflict, especially in the regions in which population increases rapidly. However, most analysts state that globalisation is a process that should lead to economic and social prosperity, which should pay their contribution to stability and security. The *"losers"* in this developing process have become recruitment pools and their countries have become training camps and safe havens for the terrorists and crime networks that exploit the instruments of globalisation. The key instruments are the Internet and technology, which facilitate communication, action and movement around the world, without being detected. The permeability of borders will make national and international security less manageable, thus making it possible for tensions and conflicts to spread easily from one country to another.

Moreover, non-state actors with aggressive and hostile intensions have become not only global but also more powerful and rich. Proliferation of weapons, especially the ones of mass destruction, has been initially limited to a state level, but non-state actors have gradually entered the arena. The almost unlimited access to technology, military and civil, has dramatically increased the military capabilities of non-state groups, even the individual ones. Combat actions will further be more and more privatised. Not only has the potential of small groups to cause massive damage significantly increase but also the creation of worldwide spread fluid networks of these warriors will provide a capability for concerted military actions. Many of these groups are hostile to Western culture and values. They might attack punctually in an unexpected place or time, not for territorial ambitions but because they seek to obtain an apocalyptic psychological effect, propagated through global communications means and mass media.

The Strategic Challenge of Current Operations

NATO commands the international peacekeeping mission in Kosovo – KFOR, consisting of over 15 000 soldiers. In Iraq, NATO assists the country in getting ready for providing its own security through training Iraqi personnel and supporting the development of state security institutions. Within Operation *"Active Endeavour"*, NATO ships patrol the Mediterranean Sea and monitor the naval transports with the purpose of discovering, discouraging and protecting the humankind against terrorist activities. NATO also provides logistic support in the field of training for the operations of the African Union in Darfur.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO's air strikes in August 1995 changed the balance of power on the ground, providing proper conditions for the launch of peace negotiations. In December the same year, the Alliance deployed, for the first time in its history, a peacekeeping mission in this country.

Because the security environment in Bosnia improved, NATO gradually reduced the number of soldiers. In December 2004, the Alliance handed over the responsibility of peacekeeping to the European Union, successfully completing the initially assumed mission. However, NATO maintains a headquarters in Sarajevo/Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is now a partner country. Its role is to further support the Bosnian authorities in reforming defence and maintaining close cooperation with the EU-led peacekeeping forces.

The civil war threatened FYRO Macedonia in February 2001. NATO and the EU assisted the negotiation on a ceasefire agreement, which led to a peace agreement. NATO then deployed a force with the role of collecting weapons from insurgents and granting assistance in implementing the peace agreement. The Alliance handed over the mission to the EU in March 2003 and maintains a headquarters in the capital of FYROM, in charge of implementing reforms in the field of defence.

However, the most soliciting and challenging operation NATO has assumed and which benefits from the biggest attention is the one in Afghanistan. The Alliance assumed command of the *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)* in August 2003, with the purpose of providing the proper conditions for the establishment of a representative government in Afghanistan that is capable of achieving a climate of peace and security through own means. Initially consisting only in providing peace and stability inside and around the capital of Kabul, the mission has gradually extended and, in June 2006, it took the responsibility, together with the international community, of assisting the Afghan government and maintaining security throughout the country.

Restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan still remains a challenge. The collapse of the Taliban in 2001 left the country devastated by the effects of the two decades of war, suffering from extreme poverty, underdevelopment and lack of infrastructure. To all these, it is added the fact that the country has no traditions in efficient government at central level, that it is subject to ethnic or other division and it is confronted with a permanent insurgency danger. The challenge has been for NATO to help it establish a national state that should function efficiently.

A key element for ISAF's efforts to settle these multiple issues it confronts with has been to focus on the improvement of the conditions in the country so that no one could support the insurgents. ISAF has sought to establish carefully chosen *"areas of governance"*, relatively safe and prosperous ones, in which the efforts of the Afghan government, of the donors and of the international agencies could be attained. An important part of this programme is fulfilled by the 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) of the ISAF, consisting in small groups of civilians and military men that seek to provide local security and assist various actors involved in regional assistance and reconstruction. PRT activities include, for instance, mediation and conflict settlement, demining, schools construction and equipment, roads repairing.

Close cooperation with international actors and the Afghan government is vital for this type of approach and this often lacked during ISAF IX[1], General Richards, the commander of this contingent, noticing a significant lack of coordination between organisations and agencies. The Political Action Group (PAG) established by President Karzai in the summer of 2006, consisting in key ministries of the government and representatives of the international community, the ISAF commander included, has rather successfully managed to improve coordination and, thus, the focus on assistance and reconstruction. The Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan also plays an important part in establishing this coordination. However, a key issue is the fact that there is no agreement between the Afghan government and the international community regarding causes of instability and the measures taken to fight them. This was a special subject in the field of the Security Sector Reforms (SSR), in which, during the 2002 Tokyo Conference, five pillars were established to approach SSR, allocating, at the same time, the role of the nations responsible for each pillar: the military – the USA, police – Germany, justice – Italy, drugs – the UK, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) – Japan. There was some criticism of the pillars, which rapidly transformed rather into *"smokestacks"*, being insufficiently coordinated.

---

[1] NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan – HQ ISAF IX.

Which is the current situation and what are the prospects for Afghanistan ? Clearly, a lot of progress has been made, namely passing from a weak police force to a viable one, creating national armed forces, demobilising more that 60 000 members of militias, bringing back to the country 2-2,5 millions of refugees, increasing the number of children in schools, organising free presidential and local election. Most of the citizens in Afghanistan now feel safe in their districts, security issues occurring in only 5 out of 34 provinces. There is growing concern among them regarding the increased frequency and the level of the Taliban activities, with ample battalion-level attacks against ISAF forces. In 2006, the opium production increased by 59%, according to UN statistics[2], providing more than 60% of Afghanistan's GDP. Many Afghan citizens feel disappointed with the results of the activity of the international community and of the USA especially, sensing that Afghanistan has become a secondary topic as compared to Iraq and being frustrated with the failure to efficiently counter the permeability of the Pakistan borders in the issue of Taliban assistance[3].

Towards an Enhanced and Ambitious Partnership

The Alliance was projected as a political military organisation having the purpose of strengthening fragile European democracies after World War Two and to defend them against the Communist aggression represented by the developing military capabilities of the former Soviet Union.

The world has radically changed since then and the Alliance has changed as well. In fact, since its establishment, NATO has undergone a continuous adapting process. The evolution of the Alliance's strategy in the last decades and the adhesion of new members after the end of the *Cold War* has been the most visible result of this process.

Nevertheless, despite these changes in the last 16 years, NATO has managed to preserve its values, these being, at the same time, the link that keeps the allies together and has made it possible for the Alliance to become a successful organisation that is extremely attractive for the new members.

Today, the Euro-Atlantic community is capable of preserving and of being based on its common values and visions, which include: liberty and security; just and enduring peace; democracy; human rights, individual freedom and the rule

---

[2] *Anul 2006: Evaluare strategică*, Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare și Securitate, Universitatea Națională de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2007, http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/evaluare2006.pdf

[3] Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Globalizarea insecurității. Factori și modalități de contracarare*, Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare și Securitate, București, 2006, http://cssas.unap.ro/ro.pdf_studii/globalizarea_insecuritatii_factori_si_modalitati_de_contracarare.pdf

of law; cooperation and solidarity; market institutions and free enterprises. The Alliance is the unique source of political-military capabilities necessary for an efficient management of instabilities and crises and for the successful establishment of new partnerships through a new cooperating security approach, continuing, at the same time, to provide the security of its own members.

The 1990 London Summit declared the end of the *Cold War* and provided a real support to the Central and Eastern European countries. The new and comprehensive approach to security is based on cooperation and dialogue with non-NATO countries, a fact that rapidly led to the creation of the *North Atlantic Cooperation Council*.

A year later, the Rome Summit outlined a new NATO and drew up a new strategic concept, which defined the new threats after the end of the *Cold War*.

The 1994 Brussels Summit launched the *Partnership for Peace* initiative and, later that year, the *Mediterranean Dialogue*, launched as a new sign of NATO's new commitment to dialogue and cooperation.

The 1997 Madrid Summit added a new dimension to the approach to security through the establishment of a Mediterranean cooperation group, consisting in Alliance member states directly involved in political talks with *Dialogue* countries and facilitating the opinions exchange on a broad range of issues relevant to the security situation in the area, as well as on the ones regarding the evolution of the *Mediterranean Dialogue*. These talks take place on a regular basis through multilateral meetings, in a 26+1 and 26+7 format. Moreover, during that summit, the Alliance invited Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to begin the accession talks and made official the relations with two important strategic partners through signing the documents that established the NATO-Ukraine relations, NATO-Russia respectively.

During the 15th Summit, held in April 1999 in Washington, the heads of state and government of the NATO member countries launched a series of initiatives and made important decisions, while the Alliance was leading its first air campaign – the one in Kosovo. This campaign was led in the spirit of NATO values and its purpose was that of putting an end to ethnic cleansing and imposing a Europe characterised by integration, democracy and ethnic pluralism. On the other hand, this war pointed out two of the Alliance's issues: the increasing difference as far as capabilities were concerned between the USA and the other allies and the huge difficulty to reach political consensus, a fact that was described by *"critics"* as the *"war through committees"*. Commentators maintain that this had huge repercussions on the initial operations in Afghanistan, when the US politely declined the offer to support NATO.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks completely changed the framework of the NATO-Russia relation. Calling upon Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in NATO's history after the September 11 attacks represented the acid test for the strategic evolution of the Alliance. The operation that resulted in order to fight terrorism – *"Active Endeavour"* is carried by the Alliance naval forces, to which some contributions of the partners, Ukraine and Russia included, at the Mediterranean Sea add.

In May 2002, during the ministerial reunion in Reykjavik, the foreign ministers of the NATO member states decided to improve the political and practical cooperation domains through encompassing the new aspects of common interest security, such as terrorism.

A spectacular change occurred in November 2002, during the Prague Summit. What seemed to be rather a summit on the spectacular numeric change turned out to be a transformation summit. Following the September 2001 tragic events, it became clear that NATO needed to tailor to meet the new priorities (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction), to increase and adapt its capabilities. Among the crucial decisions made, one could mention the establishment of the *NATO Response Force*, the review of NATO's command structure, the creation of the *Allied Command Transformation, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)* and the approval of the *military concept for defence against terrorism*. The most conspicuous aspect that made the difference for this summit in relation to previous ones was that everybody understood that not only NATO but also its members needed a comprehensive transformation in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

During the Istanbul Summit, in June 2004, NATO leaders decided to raise the *Mediterranean Dialogue* at the level of *"genuine partnership"* and launched the *Istanbul Cooperation Initiative* with certain countries in the Middle East.

The Riga Summit, on 28-29 November 2006, was originally labelled as the transformation summit. However, some commentators reckon that the progress made in the field of transformation during the Riga Summit met only partially the expectations, because the immediate concern for the mission in Afghanistan became top priority for Alliance leaders. The complete capabilities for NRF were made public during the Riga Summit and new objectives regarding military capabilities were set. The Summit also made future security arrangements for the Balkans, Albania, Croatia and FYRO Macedonia.

During the Bucharest Summit, on 2-4 April 2008, the numeric increase in the organisation was continued through the invitation of Albania and Croatia

to begin the talks with a view to joining the Alliance, while the invitation of FYROM was postponed, as a consequence of the dispute regarding its constitutional name.

In the Bucharest Summit Declaration, the *"significant progress"* within the *Mediterranean Dialogue* was acknowledged, as well as the response of four Gulf countries to NATO's cooperation offer. The Declaration describes the elements of this process, including *NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, NATO Cooperation Course* at NATO Defence College, individual cooperation programmes and projects of trust funds.

While the enhanced *Mediterranean Dialogue* is a joint-type initiative, adapted to the particular interests and needs of its seven members, the *Istanbul Cooperation Initiative* is an offer for the countries that are interested in the wider region of the Middle East with the purpose of supporting the reciprocally beneficial bilateral relations.

Some experts tried to compare what NATO did with the Eastern European members within the PfP with what could have been done with the North African ones. Others pointed out the big difference between these two scenarios. Obtaining the same results and a similar successful outcome in the Mediterranean region as it was the case with the Central and Eastern European countries was estimated as improbable, at least in the short and medium term.

Nevertheless, NATO's *Mediterranean Initiative* has at least two important elements in common with the measures taken within the *Partnership for Peace Programme*: their objective to project security and stability, as well as the gradual approach, starting with the security *"soft"* initiatives. Gradual approach to security issues means activities such as informal dialogue, organising seminars, invitations to courses or observers of peacekeeping exercises, the purpose being the establishment of an environment characterised by transparency and mutual trust, capable of eventually leading to more ambitious accomplishments. All these efforts are aimed at promoting security and stability through increasing reciprocal trust and a better understanding. As a positive result, one should note the fact that three countries of the *Mediterranean Dialogue* – Egypt, Jordan and Morocco – have already cooperated from the military point of view with the Alliance through participating in NATO-led operations in the Balkans.

Two important sources of instability should be emphasised in the Mediterranean region. The first is related to the *"historic"* struggle between the democratic forces and the extremist religious forces. This phenomenon is more obvious in Northern Africa, but it is also present in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Extremism jeopardises democracy and the aspirations of the democratic governments in the region, as well as the social stability on the Southern and Northern shore of the Mediterranean.

The coming to power of extremist regimes may trigger economic and social instability, and the resulting mass migrations may create states of tension between Europe and Maghreb countries.

The second source of instability is represented by the economic stagnation in the Southern Mediterranean region and the wide gap – from the point of view of economic development and standard of living – between the Northern and the Southern shores. Indeed, this disparity has grown so much, that the Mediterranean Sea is a line of division.

The political and religious extremism, the economic gaps and the lack of hope and future among young generations, unsettled political, economic and religious issues are interconnected and provide a fertile soil for international terrorism. These have direct impact on NATO's security and that is why the Mediterranean region matters so much.

NATO still preserves its key values from the time of its establishment and its successful performance from the time of the *Cold War*, continuing to make progress and change from a static alliance into a dynamic agent for change and transformation.

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
– 60 Years of History –

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Marian ALMĂJANU

The author reviews the main phases of NATO's existence. In the first part, the political, historical, economic and military context of the establishment of the Alliance is presented, the author insisting on the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Then, the Alliance enlargement waves are elaborated on, the establishment of new members within NATO being regulated by Article 10 of the Treaty. At the same time, the establishment of the Warsaw Pact is mentioned, thus the two most important actors during the Cold War being defined.

In the final part, the importance of adopting the Alliance's strategic concept at the Rome Summit is described, as it proposed a broad approach to security, based on dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. It was also during the Rome Summit that the allied leaders issued a peace and cooperation declaration that defined NATO's future policies and tasks in relation to the general institutional framework of Europe's future security.

Keywords: *international engagement; defence capabilities; political-military means; risks and threats; crisis situations; peacekeeping*

From 1945 until 1949, faced with the need for real economic reconstruction, the Western Europe countries and their North American allies watched with concern the USSR expansionist policies and methods. After meeting the commitments made during the war to reduce defence power and demobilise forces, Western European governments became increasingly alarmed, because it was obvious that the USSR intended to keep its military forces in their full capacity. Moreover, from the perspective of the declared ideological goals of the Soviet Communist Party, it was clear that all the appeals for respecting the Charter of the United Nations and the international agreements that were agreed upon at the end of the war would not guarantee the national sovereignty or independence of the democratic states confronted with the threat of external aggression or internal subversion.

Between 1947 and 1949, a series of dramatic political events led these problems up to the limit. This meant direct threats to the sovereignty of Greece, Norway, Turkey and other countries in Western Europe, the occupation of Czechoslovakia in June 1948 and the illegal blockade of Berlin,

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Marian Almăjanu – National Military Command Centre, the General Staff.

which started in April the same year. The signing of the Brussels Treaty, in March 1948, marked the resolve of five countries in Western Europe – Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – to develop a system of common defence and to strengthen connections between them in a way that would allow them to cope with the threat of ideological, political and military security to them.

Negotiations with the United States and Canada have led to the creation of a single North Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual engagement between Europe and North America. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited by the signatory powers of the Brussels Treaty to join the process. These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Washington Treaty in April 1949, which led to the establishment of a common security system based on the partnership between these 12 countries. The North Atlantic Treaty, which, seen in itself, is a very simple document, is consistent with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and derives its legitimacy from the Charter.

The North Atlantic Alliance was founded on the basis of a Treaty signed between member states that joined it freely, after public debates and a parliamentary process. The Treaty contains their individual rights as well as the international obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. The Treaty commits each member country to assuming risks and responsibilities and mentions their obligation not to join another international commitment that could violate the Treaty.

Under the Treaty, member states commit themselves to maintaining and developing defence capabilities, individually and collectively, providing the basis for collective defence planning.

The main purpose of NATO, established by the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, is to defend freedom and security of all its members through political and military means. Initially, the Alliance's main concern focused on collective defence against any external aggression, especially from the Soviet Union and its allies. Thus, one of the basic articles of the Treaty, Article 5, refers to the right to collective defence, as stated in the Charter of the United Nations. It stipulated that *"an armed attack against one or more NATO members shall be considered an attack against them all"* and the Alliance *"will act as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area"*.

Gradually, the number of NATO members has increased, the accession of new NATO members being regulated by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulates that *"any other European state in a position to further*

the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to security of the North Atlantic may accede to this alliance".

In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955. In response to the Federal Republic of Germany's accession to NATO on 14 May 1955, the Treaty of the Warsaw Pact was signed between the Soviet Union and the states in its sphere of influence (among which Romania), thus being defined the two important actors during the *Cold War*. In 1982, Spain also became a NATO member, raising to 16 the number of member countries.

After the end of the *Cold War* and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the political and military climate in the Euro-Atlantic area has undergone spectacular changes. Thus, has become clear that, unless the fragile democracies in the former countries of the Warsaw Pact are to be encouraged by being offered the possibility of joining NATO and the European Union, the division of Europe will persist, resulting in potential security problems.

While providing collective defence has been one of the priority objectives of the Alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty pursues the wider objective of ensuring stability and peace in the North Atlantic region, focusing on resolving disputes or crises, primarily through political means and, only as a last resort, by the use of force in case of armed attack on a third country.

60 years of history have passed since the establishment of the Alliance. Most of this time, the attention of NATO decision-making factors has been aimed at providing the immediate defence and security of its members. Today, this remains its fundamental task, but the immediate goals have suffered major changes.

The Alliance's Transformation Process

The important changes in Europe's political, military, economic, social, environmental climate since 1989, manifested through the collapse of communism, the unification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (April 1991) and the withdrawal of the Russian military strategic arsenal from Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia (April 1991) and the collapse of the Soviet Union (December 1991) have had significant and unpredictable effects for NATO.

While, during the *Cold War*, the defence planning system within NATO was primarily focused on maintaining the capability to defend against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, based on two strategic principles – *"massive retaliation"* and, from 1967 , the strategic concept of *"flexible response"*, through which a potential enemy should become aware of the fact that any aggression would have involved

unacceptable risks, after the *Cold War*, clearly emerged the need for redefining its main goals and missions. The next period showed that although the risk of an ample aggression with conventional weapons was reduced, there were still new threats, military and non-military ones, to the Euro-Atlantic security, coming both from inside the European space and beyond it.

These uncertainties referred to:
- the instability in certain areas;
- the possibility of triggering regional crisis, with rapid development;
- the economic, social and political difficulties in the countries with fragile democracies or that were on the road to a market economy;
- the violation of human rights, ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes and some states disintegration;
- the proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons;
- the existence of powerful nuclear capacity in the possession of states outside the Alliance;
- the terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration.

Throughout NATO's history, the transformation process has been determined by several reunions, summits and official meetings, some of which will be furthered approached.

The debut was made at the Alliance Summit on 5-6 July 1990, in London, regarded as one of the most important in NATO's existence through its consequences on the evolution of the political-military situation in Europe. The basic document that triggered the Alliance's transformation process was the *"Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance"*, through which NATO and the Warsaw Treaty did not consider themselves enemies, the termination of the *Cold War* being thus officially acknowledged.

One of the important decisions taken at this meeting was to invite more countries to send representatives to the Permanent Council of NATO in Brussels, which led to the subsequent creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (November 1991) in Rome, as a body of consultations and deliberations between NATO, Central and Eastern Europe, and then to the establishment of the Partnership for Peace.

In response to these changes, a new NATO strategy was drawn up, approved in its final form at the Rome Summit on 7-8 December 1991.

The today Alliance began to take shape in 1991. The Strategic Concept adopted in Rome in November 1991 by the heads of state and government of NATO member countries proposed a broader approach to security, based on dialogue,

cooperation and maintaining a collective defensive capability. This integrated political and military elements of the NATO doctrine in the security field in a coherent whole, to establish sustainable cooperation with new partners from Central and Eastern Europe as part of Alliance strategy. The concept provided:
- the decrease in the dependence on nuclear weapons;
- major changes in NATO integrated military forces, including substantial cuts in number and training;
- improvements in mobility, flexibility and their adaptability to various unforeseen events;
- better use of multinational forces;
- measures for the creation of a NATO military structure and the adoption of the Alliance defence planning procedures and arrangements, especially in the light of future needs in the field of crisis management and peacekeeping.

In this context, NATO planned a series of new missions, to meet the following requirements:
- to provide a new balance of forces in Europe, so as to redefine the nature of future relations with Russia, in the circumstances of the massive reduction of the US presence;
- to meet the security needs of the Central and Eastern European countries;
- to cooperate with the other international institutions to maintain or restore peace;
- to pay special attention to security issues in the Mediterranean and Southern Europe.

At the Rome Summit, leaders and allies issued a declaration of peace and cooperation, which defined NATO's future tasks and policies in relation to the general institutional framework of Europe's future security and the evolution of the cooperation and partnership with Central and Eastern European countries. The declaration underlined the Alliance's support for the steps taken by the Central and Eastern European countries towards reform, offered assistance to help them go through the difficult transition, invited them to participate in Alliance forums and offered NATO experience and expertise in the political, military, economic and scientific cooperation and consultation. On this occasion, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established to supervise the development of this partnership.

Following the publication of the Declaration of Rome, additional measures were taken during the meetings of foreign and defence ministers and through

the Permanent Session of the North Atlantic Council on the future process of Alliance adaptation and transformation. The following three fields were paid special attention, as follows:

- the political framework created for the development of institutional relations between NATO and its cooperation partners in Central and Eastern Europe;
- the development of cooperation in the defence and military field;
- NATO's role in the field of crisis management and peacekeeping.

Firstly, in the institutional context created, the first significant event was the inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, on 20 December 1991, with the participation of foreign ministers or representatives of NATO member states, of six Central and Eastern European countries as well as of the Baltic States. The role of NACC was to facilitate cooperation in the fields of security and in the issues related to it among the participating countries, at all levels, and to supervise the process of development of closer institutional connections as well as informal links between them. The 11 states from the former Soviet Union, which formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), became participants in this process in March 1992. Georgia and Albania joined the process in April and June 1992 and, in 1997, when the NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), there were 22 cooperation partners in the Partnership for Peace/NACC.

Secondly, in the defence and military fields, NATO member states defence ministers met their cooperation partners for the first time on 1 April 1992 to reflect on ways of deepening dialogue and to promote cooperation on issues of their competence.

The Military Committee held the first meeting in the cooperation session on 10 April 1992. Regular meetings with cooperation partners now take place both at the defence ministries level and in the forum of the Military Committee. In parallel with these multilateral meetings, bilateral contacts and cooperation between defence ministers at military level are developed.

Thirdly, against the backdrop of the crisis in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, in recent years, the attention has increased regarding NATO's role in crisis management and peacekeeping and, in particular, regarding the support of the organisation for activities aimed at keeping peace in Yugoslavia. Cooperation and consultations in NACC have been opened, mainly focused on policy and security issues, peacekeeping, conceptual approaches to arms control and disarmament, defence planning and military issues, democratic concepts regarding civil-military

relations, transformation of defence production for civil purposes, defence costs, scientific cooperation and defence issues related to environment, dissemination of information about NATO's cooperation partner countries, political planning consultations, as well as civil-military coordination in the field of air traffic management.

In January 1994, during the North Atlantic Council Summit in Brussels, NATO launched a major initiative to improve the stability of security in Europe. A long-term initiative of cooperation with NATO, known as the Partnership for Peace was launched.

The partnership was then developed into a fundamental security component in the Euro-Atlantic area and it currently holds a central role in the organisation today.

The Madrid Summit in July 1997 was an outstanding event, witness to the completion of major initiatives undertaken by the Alliance in the previous 5 or 6 years. At the same time, it announced the beginning of a new and difficult phase in the development of NATO, in which the innovative structures and policies introduced to meet new circumstances would be tested and put into practice.

The task of Alliance leaders in Madrid was to define the essential features of NATO's future policy as a whole and ensure its integrity and consistency.

At the Madrid Summit, the enlargement of NATO's commitment to internal and external transformation was demonstrated through concrete measures in the long term that cover all key areas, the start of accession talks and the signing of an *"open doors"* policy for future accession, the opening of a new chapter in the NATO-Russia relations, the training and increased partnership with Ukraine, the intensification of the dialogue with Mediterranean countries, the progress regarding the European Security and Defence Identity in NATO and the definition of the radically reformed military command structure of the Alliance.

This big agenda represents the today organisation, which is capable of assuming new responsibilities without hindering its traditional tasks and of basing its future role on the proven ability to adapt to the changing needs in the field of security.

The Strategic Concept adopted in Rome in 1991 was reviewed and updated in 1999 to reflect the changes that have occurred in Europe since its adoption, being aimed at a few main elements:

- maintenance of links between the transatlantic allies;
- development within the Alliance of an common European Security and Defence Identity, involving NATO's collaboration with the Western European Union and the European Union;

- conflict prevention and crisis management;
- partnership, cooperation and dialogue with the Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, Russia, Ukraine, the UN etc.;
- continuation of NATO's enlargement;
- arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament process.

NATO's new role currently is to focus on crisis response and peacekeeping operations (even outside the territory of member states) as well as on regional defence. Thus, NATO has transformed from a *traditional organisation of collective defence* into a *multinational security organisation*, operating in collaboration with other security institutions.

The principle of *"collective defence"* has remained one of the basic principles of the Alliance, but it is complemented by a series of new concepts, such as the one of NATO internal planning function. This concept has been enlarged with the emergence of the idea of expanding NATO eastward, through *"projecting stability towards east"*, based on the premise that democratic states do not wage wars between them, NATO also being a *"community of values"* and *"a regional security organisation"*.

The implementation of this concept has proved quite difficult, questions arising about defending the legitimacy of NATO actions outside the Alliance area (Kosovo and Afghanistan).

The crisis in Kosovo was the main subject on the agenda of the Washington Summit in April 1999. NATO leaders assessed the situation with a view to strengthening the decision of the international community to resolve the conflict politically and generate the conditions to restore peace and further maintain security in the region.

The next Summit, in Prague, in 2002, marked the projection of certain NATO missions. This summit sanctioned the great transformations that took place in the world after the fall of *"Iron Curtain"* and drew the guidelines regarding the future of NATO, even if *"collective defence (Article 5) remained a stand-alone mission, of utmost importance, as well as maintaining transatlantic link uninterrupted"*. This meant increasing the importance of *"non-Art. 5"* missions, namely those missions carried to respond to a crisis situation or stability ones both in the Alliance's area of responsibility and beyond.

One of NATO reunions that outlined the Alliance's internal problems was held in Riga on 28-29 November 2006. The discussions were focused on:

- the mission in Afghanistan (and those in Darfur, Iraq, Kosovo or the Mediterranean);

- enhancing military capabilities;
- broadening and strengthening the partnerships framework.

During the reunion, an important subject was discussing documents regarding the repositioning of NATO's purpose (Comprehensive Political Guidance), a transformation that would last over 10-15 years, being aimed at the main threats, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

A role as important as the one of the Riga NATO Summit is held by the Bucharest NATO Summit, on 2-4 April 2008, the largest one in the history of the organisation. After Prague in 2002 and Riga in 2006, Bucharest was the third capital of a country from the former Communist bloc that hosted an Alliance summit.

The topics addressed during the summit included:
- the anti-missile shield;
- the relationship with Russia;
- the issue of NATO enlargement (the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine to join the Alliance), the expansion and relations with the states outside NATO, such as Japan and Australia, which wanted to contribute to Alliance peacekeeping missions, but did not have a say in how the missions were organised;
- NATO's commitment in Afghanistan;
- the issues related to the Black Sea and energy security;
- the reform within NATO;
- the analysis of defence expenditure.

Beyond enlargement, the summit was also aimed at bringing closer to NATO states such as Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. Romania unreservedly supported NATO's enlargement with Croatia, Macedonia and Albania, as well as the fact that the issue of Georgia and even Ukraine should be looked at carefully in order to find solutions to this problem.

During the NATO reunion, a conclusion was reached according to which the Alliance failed to perfect the transformation from a *Cold War* organisation to one capable of managing the conflicts and threats of the 21st century. It was also revealed that one of the biggest problems is the refusal of many NATO member states to contribute enough troops and equipment to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan – ISAF. It was recalled that, for decades, the missions were funded under the principle that any country that sent troops or military equipment had to bear the costs. The conclusion was that the Alliance countries most of the time agreed to a mission, but when it came to the question of providing troops and funding them, many were unwilling to contribute.

Inside the NATO Headquarters, there were different views on a future enlargement, as well as on how the issue of Croatia, Georgia, Ukraine and the Western Balkan countries, who wanted to join NATO, should be addressed.

NATO's Operational Role in Peacekeeping

The history of the generation of operational forces within NATO is relatively recent. The Alliance launched its military operations in 1992, the following years being witness to an unprecedented expansion of NATO's operational roles, both in terms of functionality and geography. These operations have included actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and have been the precursor element of the two big peace-strengthening operations, conducted by the Alliance in the Balkans: IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo.

Each of these new operations have represented, at the same time, a new and unique set of challenges to NATO's process of generating forces, the organisation lacking any pre-established mechanisms for generating forces to respond to crisis situations or for other *"discrete"* non-Article 5 operations. In addition, NATO has had no experience in deploying ground forces outside the Alliance territory, in theatres in which logistical infrastructure and other support mechanisms, which depended on defence planning during the *Cold War*, were not available. Logistics and combat support units, the *"legacy"* of the *Cold War*, were still, in their majority, configured to support large-scale operations for national formation inside NATO territory and even less or not at all meant for low intensity, long-lasting, expeditionary, operations, carried with relatively small formations, incorporated into multinational formations.

To meet these challenges, NATO has used, whenever it was possible, multinational formations to conduct operations and management.

Currently, NATO is engaged in three main theatres of operations, as follows:
- NATO crises response operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans;
- NATO Article 5 operations in the Mediterranean Sea;
- Iraqi and Afghan armies training missions;
- missions within the NATO Response Force – NRF.

In the theatre of operations in Afghanistan, NATO participates with forces in the ISAF, running missions for maintaining a safe security environment and supporting the Afghan government for reconstruction, stabilisation and authority expansion. Currently, there are more than 50 000 troops employed in the theatre from several NATO countries, fighting for drugs eradication, training the Afghan army and increasing the efficiency of reconstruction teams (PRT). The problem of combating

drugs was discussed by defence ministers of NATO member states in the capital of Hungary, in October 2008, when they decided that the ISAF in Afghanistan should be able to act, together with the Afghan forces, against drug producing laboratories and drug traffickers. The decision was taken based on the request of the Afghan government, being in accordance with the resolution of the UN Security Council and the provisions of the Alliance Operations Plan for Afghanistan. The involvement in such type of actions remains, according to the decisions of the North Atlantic Alliance, at the discretion of the national authorities participating with troops in ISAF.

NATO operations in the Balkans are carried under the aegis of the multinational stabilisation force led by the Alliance. The Balkans have been the first test for NATO in addressing the risks associated with the interdependent instability in the region.

The action of the Alliance in the Balkans consists in providing a security environment for the implementation of Decision 1244 of the UN Security Council and other related missions, to assist the returning of refugees. Following the improvement of the security environment in Kosovo, NATO examines solutions regarding the reduction of the military presence through the restructuring of KFOR and the inclusion of small manoeuvring components.

Another important NATO mission is in the Mediterranean Sea, known as Operation *Active Endeavour – OAE*, in which the Alliance's main mission is the fight against terrorism through naval presence, surveillance and control, escorting combatant ships, monitoring the main ways of naval communications, all under Article 5.

NATO's Training Mission in Iraq and the assistance of the African Union in Darfur have represented new examples and new types of challenges to NATO's process of generating forces. More emphasis has been put, for example, on other capabilities than the *"traditional"* ones: trainers, in Iraq, staff personnel with experience in planning and reconstruction capacity, in the African Union.

In the theatre of operations in Iraq, the Alliance is committed to maintaining a safe security environment and supports the Iraqi government for reconstruction, stabilisation and authority expansion, providing training and assistance for security forces in Iraq.

The capabilities and assessments necessary for the management of such complex operations, especially the ones regarding the establishment and development of NATO Response Force have been much improved over the last decade. Thus, from the perspective of a modern management approach to NATO's

peace operations, measures have been taken during the allied intervention in Yugoslavia. Moreover, the lessons learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, then, in Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are extremely relevant, being applied currently in Afghanistan.

*

The North Atlantic Alliance currently undergoes its process of modernisation in line with the new challenges of the 21st century. We can say that, now, NATO is making good progress, being in the middle of the most important transformation process in its history. While operational structures have been reformed, political and decision-making operational processes, as well as resources and funding mechanisms continue to be included in the line of NATO's transformation. The reforms in these areas, particularly important for the evolution of the Alliance, are necessary for granting the guarantees it needs to really meet the political objectives adopted in connection with its new missions. Undertaking such measures is aimed at exercising effective management in promoting stability, with a rapid response and global vocation.

In many ways, NATO analysts have noted the operational status reached by the Alliance in a relatively short time. There are many situations in which people would like NATO to become more involved or to extend its current missions: a greater responsibility in Afghanistan, in Iraq, increasing the assistance in Darfur, expanding the maritime interdiction mission in the Mediterranean Sea, increasing its humanitarian role in the field of assistance for disaster relief, a greater openness to the Wider Black Sea Region or assuming a supporting role in restoring peace in the Middle East. There is also a number of countries seeking to create closer strategic ties with the Alliance and to join it, eventually, including a number of Balkan states (in advanced stages being Macedonia, while Albania, Croatia have just become NATO members) – Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine.

However, there are several problems to be clarified in the Alliance. Among them, one can mention: • resolving the differences between member states that have deployed troops in various theatres of operations (big number of incidents, including with dead and injured persons in some areas with high risk); • addressing key issues of global security in collaboration with the UN and the EU; • optimising the EU-NATO relationship in matters of common interest regarding security, defence and fight against terrorism and crisis management; • further enlarging and defining the strategy for Europe; • adopting an architecture encompassing the anti-missile system for covering all the territories of NATO member states; • better efficiency against cyber attacks; • the issue of supplementing the number

of soldiers in Afghanistan; • NATO's increased role in providing energy security; • closer links with global partnerships (Asia-Pacific) • involving in overcoming the economic crisis and reaffirming itself as the main provider of global security; • reform within NATO; • analysing defence spending by NATO member states, according to assumed commitments; • improving NATO-Russia relationship.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• John Colston, *Asigurarea unei corespondenţe depline între capabilităţi şi angajamente*, in *NATO Review*, summer 2004, pe site-ul http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:BRn9rlAo_mcJ:www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue2/romanian/summaries.html+Colston+John,+Asigurarea+unei+coresponden%C5%A3e+depline+%C3%AEntre+capabilit%C4%83%C5%A3i+%C5%9Fi+angajamente.&cd=2&hl=ro&ct=clnk&gl=ro

• Adam Kobieracki, *Evoluţia operaţiunilor NATO*, in *NATO Review*, summer 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue2/romanian/art3.html

• AAP – 6, *Dicţionarul NATO de termeni şi definiţii*.

• ***, *Culegerea de termeni, concepte şi noţiuni de referinţă din domeniile politicii militare, securităţii naţionale şi apărării armate*, Bucureşti, 2000.

• ***, *Doctrina acţiunilor întrunite ale Forţelor Armate* no. M. 54/2001.

• ***, *Doctrina pentru operaţiile întrunite multinaţionale* no. M. 141/2001.

• ***, *Doctrina pentru planificarea operaţiilor întrunite* SMG/PF – 5/2003.

• http//www.nato.int.

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

NATO IN THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Captain Aurelian RAŢIU

The article presents a few aspects regarding NATO's transformation – a component and consequence alike of the conceptual-doctrinal and military structures adaptation to the new conditions of the security environment and to the new missions and tasks the military forces of the Alliance and of the member states must fulfil.

In the first part, NATO's security and defence purposes and tasks are presented, as well as the security concept and some aspects of its agenda in this field with regard to its assertion as the main factor in fulfilling the conditions necessary for the establishment of the new security and stability architecture in Europe.

In the second part, considering the objectives and the new challenges the Alliance must meet, aspects regarding the role of military operations and the enlargement of the partnership policy in accomplishing Euro-Atlantic security are pointed out.

Keywords: *collective defence; response capability; ethnic conflicts; crisis situations; security and stability*

The fall of the Berlin Wall, in November 1989, and the reunification of Germany, in 1990, the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in 1991, the elimination of the communist regimes and the spectacular changes occurred in Central and Eastern Europe marked the end of the international bipolar order, leaving room for special transformation processes that fundamentally changed the security imperatives in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The end of the *Cold War* has had both positive and negative consequences. However, the positive dominant of this period is the openness towards political dialogue and cooperation between states, international security institutions, NATO included, and the former ideological adversaries, to consolidate and maintain sub-regional, regional and global stability and security. In this context, the Alliance main goal has been attached a new significance and a new dimension.

During the development of these processes, it has become almost a cliché to state that NATO changed its relevance once the traditional adversary disappeared, its primordial role being that of countering the communist threat in its area of interest.

Captain Aurelian Raţiu – lecturer, "Nicolae Bălcescu" Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, Romania.

The fact that, since its establishment, NATO has never been a classical military alliance, *"derived from the geopolitical competition or conflict"*[1], but it was conceived and built on the grounds of the common values related to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, while the institutionalisation of these values has allowed for transatlantic cooperation and cohesion to be maintained in the context of the political transformation and the emergence of new risks and threats, has often led to the conclusion that it is the most successful political-military alliance throughout history.

The Premises
of the North Atlantic Alliance Establishment

The origin of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation emergence on the international scene may be searched for in the attempts made during the last world conflagration to model the post-war world. The realities that were highlighted not only during the war but also immediately after it required the establishment of a political-military entity capable of modelling the security and defence field as well as of managing crisis situations.

The founding idea was originally, as the first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay stated, *"to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in"*[2]. This statement, indeed, summarises the main three objectives of the Alliance. The first objective is that of creating a position of common and united defence of the West against the Soviet Union. The second one is that of restructuring the Western military landscape after the fall of the Nazi Germany and the third one is that of involving America in the international competition.

In international politics, interstate relations used to be based on power and the military dimension used to be omnipresent. Throughout history, military alliances have been established to counterbalance a rival power or a threat. The main benefit derived from alliances is, obviously, enhanced security. The advantages of security within an alliance include: reduced possibility of being attacked (discouraging effect), possession of an enhanced capacity for riposte in the event of an aggression (defence), prevention of the possibility for some of the allies to make alliances with the adversary (exclusion effect).

---

[1] Teodor Frunzeti, *Globalizarea securităţii*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 181.

[2] Apud Gheorghe Minculete, Romică Cernat, *Unele abordări privind rolul prezent şi viitor al NATO*, in *Strategii de apărare şi securitate la frontiera răsăriteană a NATO şi UE*, vol. I, International Session of Scientific Communications, organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, 23-24 November 2006, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Bucureşti, pp. 112-113.

In accordance with the concept of the *"balance of power"*, in case a state or an alliance accumulates enough power to threaten other states, there will be enough reasons for those that are threatened to determine them not to take the apparent and momentary difference in power into consideration and to get united, forming a defensive alliance.

The first step in protecting democracy, liberty and independence in the Western area against the aggressive policy promoted by Moscow was that of France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signing the *Brussels Treaty*, in March 1948. The five states agreed on creating a common defence and cooperation system to assure protection against the ideological, military and political threats and aggressions to their security. The United States of America and Canada considered that a transatlantic organisation based on security guarantees and mutual arrangements would have been more efficient, which led to the establishment of a single alliance between Europe and North America – the *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* or the *North Atlantic Alliance.* There were other European states, such as Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Island and Norway that were invited, on March 15, 1949, by the signatory states of the Brussels Treaty, to participate in this process. Thus, on April 4, 1949, it was signed the *Washington Treaty* that established a common security regime, based on a partnership between the 12 states.

In response, the countries that were under the ideological communist control propagated by the USSR decided to establish a similar military bloc, known under the name of the *Warsaw Treaty Organisation*. It may be thus said that the division between the East and the West acquired, in these circumstances, juridical and institutional consistency, marking, at the same time, the debut of the *Cold War.*

More promising perspectives have followed the dangers of the *Cold War*. However, there has not been a lack in challenges, opportunities and new risks to the Euro-Atlantic peace and security (related to ethnic conflicts, proportions of the structured international terrorism, failure of the political order in some states or regions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).

In this geopolitical context, it can be stated that the North Atlantic Alliance is at the centre of the efforts meant to establish new forms of cooperation and mutual understanding in the Euro-Atlantic region, being engaged in developing new activities and favouring the instauration of a greater stability[3].

[3] See http://www.clr.ro/menu1/istoricnato.htm

NATO Political Purpose and the Fundamental Security and Defence Tasks

NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations[4].

The sense of shared security among the members of the Alliance, in spite of the specific differences or the national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO is able to provide mutual security guarantees within the organisation, discouraging and rejecting any form of aggression against them. To achieve the political and security purpose, NATO performs the following *fundamental tasks*[5]:

• to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes;

• to serve (Article 4) as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests;

• to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state.

In order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, the following are applied:

• *crisis management:* to stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations;

• *partnership:* to promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

The fundamental security tasks are also described in *NATO Strategic Concept* that is considered the most important and authorised document to guide the military and political resources in a unitary way, so that the proposed objectives could be achieved.

NATO strategy after 1949 was thought from the standpoint of some classical threats and then from the one of the bipolar world and its consequences. That is why, after 1990, it emerged the need for a new strategic concept that could present, this time in a transparent manner, the Alliance intentions to undergo radical changes.

---

[4] *NATO Handbook*, Brussels, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2006, p. 19.

[5] *NATO Handbook*, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, at http://www.clr.no/menu1/manualulnato.pdf

[6] *The Alliance Strategic Concept*, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Rome, 7-8 November 1991), in *România – NATO. Negocierea şi ratificarea Protocolului de aderare*, vol. 2, Editura Printeuro, Ploieşti, 2005, pp. 529-540.

The Alliance's Strategic Concept[6] adopted at the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, differs from the precedent documents as far as the form and the content are concerned. The Allies had not prepared a strategic concept since 1967, when they adopted *MC14/3*, a document known as the military strategy of *"flexible response"*. At the same time, the Allies also adopted the *Harmel Report*, bearing the name of the Belgian foreign minister, which proposed NATO political strategy regarding the relationship with the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, covering almost the same aspects of the political-military strategy that were subsequently included in the strategic concept in 1991[7].

The document mentioned the major changes Europe underwent, the need for policies and forces to be adapted to the changes, but the major NATO purpose remained its members' defence. However, the members obliged themselves to cooperate to enhance and extend Europe's security, through a complex partnership and cooperation system with the former adversaries.

The concept proposes an ample approach to security, fact that is reflected in three elements that strengthen each other and that belong to the allied security policy: dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of collective security capabilities.

The Alliance fundamental principle continues to be the common commitment to mutual cooperation among member states in supporting the indivisibility of their security. However, the principle of using the Alliance forces was changed, as a result of the gradual extension of the armed forces role, based on a larger vision on missions and capabilities.

At the Washington Summit in April 1999 this concept was revised, engaging the Allies not only in collective defence but also in achieving peace and stability in a larger area.

In the new strategic concept, there are mentioned elements such as[8]: • a broader approach to security, combining the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions with the military dimension of the Alliance; • a stronger involvement in maintaining transatlantic relationships; • the maintenance of the Alliance military capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of military operations; • the development of the European capabilities within the Alliance; • an efficient partnership programme with the countries that are not NATO members; • the Alliance enlargement through the *"open door"* policy; • the continuation of the efforts meant to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.

---

[7] Iordache Olaru, *Un nou concept strategic al NATO*, in *Gândirea Militară Românească* Journal, no. 3/2006, p. 51.

[8] *NATO Handbook*, Brussels, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, *doc. cit.*, p. 19.

In accordance with this strategic concept, the Alliance tasks refer to:

• providing foundations for a stable security environment in the Euro-Atlantic region, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other country or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force;

• properly coordinating the efforts in the field of common concern, to debate any problem that may affect the Alliance vital interests, including the identification of possible risks, in accordance with Article 4 (transatlantic forum for dialogue and consultations);

• deterring and defending against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state, as it is stipulated in Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington;

• enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, in accordance with Article 7 of the Treaty, through effectively contributing to conflict prevention, engaging in crisis management activities, including in crisis response operations, and through promoting a comprehensive partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states in Central and Eastern Europe, with a view to increasing transparency, mutual trust and the capacity to develop joint and integrated actions with the Alliance member states.

Although it is less likely for a major conflict to burst out in Europe, the Alliance member states as well as other states are confronted with a multitude of non-classic risks and uncertainties such as international terrorism, organised crime, ethnic-religious conflicts, migration, political and economic instability and, last but not least, human rights infringement. At the Bucharest NATO Summit, the Alliance member states strongly condemned all terrorist acts, regardless of their motivation or manifestation, declaring that they would continue to be determined to fight against this scourge, both at the individual and collective level, as long as it would be necessary and in accordance with the international law and the UN principles: *"We attach great importance to the protection of our populations, territories, infrastructure and forces against the consequences of terrorist attacks. We will continue to develop and contribute to policies to prevent and counter proliferation, with a view to preventing terrorist access to, and use of, WMD"*[9].

NATO Agenda in the Field of Security

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is one key structure through which its members pursue their security objectives[10]. In the *Cold War* period, the main task of the Alliance was to maintain sufficient military capabilities to defend its members against any aggression on the part of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact.

---

[9] *Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008*, para 15, at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html, accessed on 10.04.2008.

[10] *NATO Transformed*, Brussels, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2004, at http:/www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/nato-trans-eng.pdf, p. 2.

The policies agreed on by NATO member states have developed continuously in the light of the security environment changes. The concept of *"defence"* has been continually updated and expanded to include partnership – promotion of dialogue and practical cooperation with other states that are not NATO members – as the most efficient way to enhance transparency, mutual trust and to consolidate security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Moreover, crisis management has become a mission of the Alliance, in accordance with the UN Charter, through actively engaging in crisis management and executing multinational peace operations.

The Alliance used to work on the principle that the *"security of each member country depends on the security of them all"*[11], but, today, this principle must be slightly altered through the expression: *the security of each member country depends on the security of all the other actors in the region.* To achieve this desideratum, the Alliance cooperates with former adversaries and acts to preserve and build peace and security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

NATO's role to guarantee security in this area has been consolidated through the option of many partner states to become full-fledged members, and the goal of each enlargement wave was that of enlarging the Euro-Atlantic security area and of enhancing NATO's force, cohesion and viability[12].

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America represent an example of the way the current world security environment and the degree of vulnerability to the security threats have changed. This is the reason why new forms of political and military cooperation have been necessary to guarantee peace and stability and to prevent the escalation of regional tensions in the Euro-Atlantic area. As a response to these challenges, NATO has gradually transformed from an alliance having collective defence responsibilities to one establishing partnerships with many states that actively cooperate in the broader field of security.

To be better prepared, conceptually and actionally, to engage in new missions, NATO has adapted and consolidated its capabilities through: deepening the political dialogue, the cooperation with partners and international organisations and developing military capabilities[13]. Thus, three major initiatives were launched at the Prague Summit on 21-22 November 2002: a new initiative regarding capabilities – *"Prague Capabilities Commitment"*, the creation of a *NATO Response Force – NRF*, and NATO's military command arrangements.

Current risks, threats and challenges to security are too diversified to be managed by a single entity, no matter how capable it might be. That is why the Alliance has to develop capabilities and forces able to efficiently respond to the entire range

---

[11] *Ibidem.*
[12] *Ibidem*, p. 20.
[13] Teodor Frunzeti, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

of risks and challenges to security, including the unconventional and asymmetric ones, in cooperation with other international actors that have a vocation for security. Cooperation has developed on two important dimensions, a political one, embodied, starting 1997 (the Sintra NATO Summit) within the *Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – EAPC*, and one based on the specific cooperation between NATO and the interested partner countries, materialised in the *Partnership for Peace – PfP*, launched in 1994, at the Brussels Summit. The two formats, having distinct but complementary functions, were rationalised through the decisions of the Prague Summit in 2002 and reunited under the concept of *Euro-Atlantic Partnership*.

At the Istanbul NATO Summit (28-29 June 2004), the heads of state and government of the Alliance member states made a series of important decisions regarding regional and global security. To remain efficient as far as defence and promoting security in a new and changing security environment is concerned the Alliance has to engage to: • extend the operations in Afghanistan; • enhance the contribution to the fight against terrorism, including aspects regarding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; • consolidate stability in the Balkans; • make ready more flexible forces with a rapid reaction capacity; • enhance cooperation with the partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, consolidate the Mediterranean Dialogue and launch the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative – ICI; • assist the Iraqi authorities to prepare the security forces and institutions[14].

In the international context of the year 2006, the Riga Summit focused on three domains called *"baskets of work"* by the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: political engagement, transformation of defence capabilities and the operations the Alliance was engaged in.

With regard to the political engagement, through the *Riga Summit Declaration*[15], it was reaffirmed NATO determination to meet the challenges of the 21st century and to defend peoples and common values, maintaining the Alliance fundamental purposes, based on the principle of security indivisibility, respect for democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and faithful to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The permanently changing physiognomy of the security environment determines the continuous transformation of the Alliance, stress being laid on capabilities, in accordance with the *Comprehensive Political Guidance*[16], whose provisions can be met in the next 10-15 years. The document defines the main requirements

---

[14] *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm

[15] *Riga Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006*, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm

[16] *Comprehensive Political Guidance, Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006*, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htp

related to military capabilities, starting with joint forces, characterised by the highest level of interoperability and standardisation, expeditionary and sustainable far from the national territory.

As far as operations are concerned, NATO is present, through six extremely difficult missions and operations, in three geographical regions, in a very broad area, from Afghanistan to the Balkans or from the Mediterranean Sea to Darfur, in Sudan, where more than fifty thousand military men from member or partner states are engaged.

Two years later, in the *Bucharest Summit Declaration*[17], signed by the heads of state and government of the member states of the Alliance, it is highlighted the fact that the Euro-Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to Afghanistan's future as a peaceful, democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism. That is why the *International Security Assistance Force – ISAF*, mandated by the UN, represents the top priority. In addition, the engagement in the regional security and stability in the Balkans is maintained, and NATO is ready to contribute to the implementation of the future security arrangements.

The Alliance also works with its partners to implement certain programmes related to arms control, defence against weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (WMDCBRN) or to civil emergency planning. NATO policies and programmes meant to support arms control play an important part in achieving security objectives.

NATO remains engaged in the efforts to enhance the defence of information systems, as the *"key"* of the Alliance defence against cyber attacks. The Allies have also identified the principles that will govern NATO approach in the field of energy security and highlighted options and recommendations for future activities. Based on these principles, the Alliance will engage in the following domains: information exchange; projection of stability; promotion of international and regional cooperation; support for effect management and protection of critical energy infrastructure.

The Role of NATO-led Operations in the Euro-Atlantic Security and Stability

The dimension of NATO importance in the security policy is given by the current military operations that, conducted under the aegis of the UN, offer credibility and legitimacy to the Alliance.

The North Atlantic Alliance has been engaged in a great range of peace operations conducted on three continents: in the former Yugoslavia (Europe), in Afghanistan

---

[17] *Bucharest Summit Declaration, loc. cit.*

and Iraq (Asia), and in Darfur (Africa). Subsequent to the interdependent instability of the current strategic environment, NATO has more and more assumed the role of a leader in operations and missions such as: *the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan – ISAF*; *the NATO Training (of the security forces) Mission in Iraq – NTM-I*; *NATO's Assistance to the African Union for Darfur – AMIS*; *Operation "Active Endeavour" – OAE* and the operations in the Balkans: *NATO-led Stabilisation Force* in Kosovo – *KFOR* and NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo, Tirana and Skopje.

In the operations in the Balkans, although the nature of NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia is changing, the engagement for long-term stability in the entire area of Southeastern Europe is stronger than ever. The goal is to achieve a more secure environment and a tighter cooperation between partners, so that the states in the region could be integrated in the Euro-Atlantic structures.

The Balkans represented the first test NATO took in approaching the risks associated with the interdependent instability in the region. A convincing example regarding the success of NATO operations in the Balkans is KFOR. That is why all the Allies pleaded for maintaining the Alliance engagement in Kosovo on all coordinates, including from the standpoint of the military presence in the region.

NATO will continue to work with the authorities in Kosovo and, taking into consideration its operational mandate, *"KFOR will cooperate with and assist the United Nations, the European Union and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo"*[18], as it is shown in the *Bucharest Summit Declaration*.

Although NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003, the Alliance engagement in Afghanistan had a major impact on achieving the goal of the mission. The mandate stipulated the support and assistance of the Afghan authorities for the country reconstruction after almost four decades of civil war, foreign occupation and severe fundamentalist rules, which led to the establishment of numerous training camps for terrorists on the territory of Afghanistan.

The launch of the *NATO Training Mission – Iraq, NTM-I* was approved by the North Atlantic Council on June 20, 2004, subsequent to the request of the Iraqi Interim Government and confirmed by the decision of the heads of state and government of NATO member countries in Istanbul on June 28, 2004. The mission's goal is to support and assist the Iraqi authorities in the effective and long-lasting reconstruction of a security force. The Alliance effort is distinct and complementary to the efforts of Multi-National Force and other actors in the area for post-conflict stabilisation, making a unique and special contribution through the *"Training Plan"*[19].

[18] *Ibidem*, para 8.
[19]*NATO Training Mission – Iraq, NTM-I*, at http://www.ofsouth.nato.inf/JFCN_Missions/NTM-I/NTMI_brief.htm, accessed on 22.10.2007.

NTM-I continues to contribute to the international efforts meant to train and equip the Iraqi security forces. Complementary, in Bucharest (2008), NATO approved the extension of the mandate of the NATO Training Mission – Iraq until this year.

The goal of *Operation Active Endeavour*, the first Article 5 one, is to prevent and counter international terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. The operation, initiated in October 2001, was led, starting December the same year, by the Allied Joint Force Command, Naples, Italy. The missions in the Mediterranean utilise ship, aircraft and submarine assets to monitor and discourage the activities related to terrorism, through a series of specific methods: surveillance of the routes and control of the "choke" points, ports and oil pipelines, escort of the ships belonging to NATO member states that request it, and even the inspection of the ships whose freight is considered suspect. To enhance security in the area, starting 2006, Russian ships have participated in the OAE missions and, starting 2007, Ukrainian ships, too.

Currently, NATO agenda is decisively influenced by international terrorism, as the main threat to security, at the beginning of the 21st century, trying to resolve not only the issue of the restrictions imposed by the Allies regarding the use of national capabilities but also the one regarding the necessity of ensuring quality intelligence.

*

NATO, organisation based on the political and military cooperation between member states, on the common values related to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, *"accelerates History"*[20] and corrects it, rapidly tailoring to the political changes in the international environment, promoting the *"open door"* policy and affirming as a main factor in creating the circumstances for a new security and stability architecture in Europe to be built.

The Alliance has had to take into consideration all the major transformations occurred in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The change in threats and in the way they are perceived has resulted in a continuous process of tailoring strategies to guarantee an appropriate political framework and the necessary military structures and capabilities to manage the new challenges to security that characterise the current landscape.

The dimension of NATO importance in the security policy is given by the political goals, the fundamental and specific security and defence tasks, its agenda in the field of security, a broader approach of the concept of security, as well as by the current military operations and the extension of security through partnership.

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

---

[20] Ilie Manole, *NATO, repere istorice*, in *România – NATO. Negocierea şi ratificarea Protocolului de aderare*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

COUNTERING THE SECURITY RISKS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION
– In the Context of the Russian-Georgian War –

Captain Constantin CIOROBEA

In the modern era, a wide range of threats affect the maritime domain and, given these circumstances, it is important to take action by monitoring and preventing security threats from occurring in maritime regions and to achieve a proper maritime security. At the same time, the Russian-Georgian war demonstrates that a direct confrontation between states' naval forces, a regional conflict characterised by combined conventional and asymmetric actions with low and medium intensity, is still possible.

In order to provide a proper solution for the Black Sea maritime security, Romania considers that the risks and opportunities in the region are similar to those in other regions like the Mediterranean Sea and, under these conditions, it is important to have a common approach in all those regions. Romania should support NATO and the EU security commitments and sustain their democratic actions in the region.

Keywords: *risk factors; partnership agreement; naval group; information operations; humanitarian assistance; the Black Sea region*

The security environment has changed after 1990, as the interdependences between international and regional relations have increased, and it is permanently influenced by the rising complexity of crisis situations, asymmetric actions, demographic and environmental changes and the increasing number of weak states. *"International stability can only stem from multinational cooperation of the international community – above all, by making best use of the dialogue within institutional framework and by increasing the decisive role that international organisations play in defining the world security status"*[1].

Inside the modern society risks are continuously amplifying in intensity, diversity and scope, affecting the maritime space more and more. In these circumstances, all countries' naval forces should contribute through decisive actions to achieve maritime security and make possible the free use of sea lines of communication – SLOCs, actions that have a strategic importance for the development of society.

Captain Constantin Ciorobea – Chief of Staff of the Naval Operational Component.
[1] *Strategia de Securitate Naţională a României*, the section dedicated to the international security environment, at http://www.mapn.ro/ strategiasecuritate/strategsecuritmediul.html

The relatively recent conflict between Russia and Georgia, on the other hand, has demonstrated that classical conflicts may also affect security with consequences on maritime environment.

In modern era, maritime security is indivisible, no state is out of the reach of current threats, and concerns regarding international security must be sustained with regional initiatives. Regional naval cooperation supports the consolidation of the relations among the NATO/EU countries and the Black Sea littoral states and, in this way, can effectively support Romania to be considered a factor of stability in the region, this representing one of the possible solutions for consolidating stability and security and for improving the security environment in the context of the Russian-Georgian conflict.

The Regional Security Environment

The Black Sea region greater strategic significance and the development opportunities offered attract more and more the interest of the European and Euro-Atlantic organisations and, at the same time, determine both the littoral states and other states to approach the security issues in this area more attentively. Its geographical location, the existing risks and threats as well as the advantages offered with regard to political, economic and military cooperation not only make this area more attractive but also cause a more thoughtful approach to the problems the Black Sea region is confronted with. In this regard, the 2009 Bucharest Summit Declaration mentions in paragraph 36 that *"We reaffirm the continued importance of the Black Sea region for Euro-Atlantic security. In this regard, we welcome the progress in consolidation of regional ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms. The Alliance will continue to support, as appropriate, these efforts guided by regional priorities and based on transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness, in order to develop dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance"*[2].

The European Union that, since 1 January 2007, has extended its borders to the East, in the Black Sea region, faces in turn the challenges characteristic of this region. The strategic value of the Black Sea region will continue to grow as all global and regional political actors who have interests in the area become aware of its real importance and specific policies for this region are defined and implemented. The rising importance of the Black Sea region, in the geopolitical context of the 3rd millennium, is given by the necessity of ensuring the flow of strategic

[2] *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, 2-4 April 2009, paragraph 36, http://summitbucharest.ro/ro/doc

raw materials, by military and economic cooperation and by the involvement of the great powers and international organisations in the issues of the area.

Ukraine owns significant military and economic resources, which generates a specific characteristic of its international relations. Currently, it enjoys a special cooperation relationship with NATO and signed a partnership agreement with the European Union, gaining thus a privileged position in the regional security architecture. Ukraine actions are influenced by its geographical location (on the periphery of Europe as well as of the former Russian Empire), which is both beneficial and unfavourable in its attempts to act as a regional power and a factor of regional stability.

The United States position indicates a special interest in the region, confirmed by the new direction of the US geostrategic interest in the post-Soviet Union space. Both the EU and the United States consider the security of energy the routes that pass through the Caucasus and the Black Sea region as crucial. The Black Sea region has become more important for the EU and represents a major transit route for energy supplies, as well as passengers and cargo transportation. The EU has clearly become a major player in coordinating the development and transformation of the Black Sea region. In this process, the EU usually engages the rule of *"soft power"*, which includes the promise of integration, political dialogue, support for reforms and development and different sectorial instruments. All these courses of action promote the principle that the EU enlargement represents an export of stability.

After a very long period of time when it was the most important actor in the Black Sea, Russia seeks to maintain its central role in the region. The Russian security concept for the region has its roots in the Tsarist era; it was continued during the Soviet era and is based on the desire to counter the other actors' expansion in the region, such as the USA and the EU at present. In order to support this process, Russia has manifested a continuous interest in the Black Sea fleet, a significant force that has to be taken into account. The statements of the former Russian President, Vladimir Putin, such as *"the Azov-Black Sea basin is in Russia's zone of strategic interest"*[3] or *"the Black Sea provides Russia with direct access to the most important global transport routes"*[4] stress that Russia does not want to abandon the positions held in the Black Sea.

To support its interests in the region, Russia has engaged in a series of coordinated actions in political, economic and military areas designated to sustain Russia's monopoly on the production and transportation of energy resources in the region

---

[3] In *Russia Weekly*, 18 September 2003, cited by Costin Ionescu, *Marea Neagră – un pivot geopolitic în dispută, Geopolitica*, no. 1 (5) 2005, anul IV, p. 46.

[4] *Ibidem*.

and in Europe. The conflict between Russia and Georgia, in August 2008, conducted in accordance with modern concepts, engaging forces simultaneously – in the air, land, naval and information domain – represents one of these kinds of actions. Although full details about this conflict have not been published yet, we can summarise some characteristic elements.

Before the hostilities commenced, the Georgian Naval Forces and the Coastal Guard had together 3 100 people and 23 vessels in various *"ready for battle"* states. From these vessels only *"Dioscuria"* (La Combattante II class), received from the Naval Forces of Greece, in 2004, and *"Tbilisi"* (Makta class), purchased from Ukraine, in 1999, were able to execute an attack with a certain probability of success, using their ship-to-ship missiles. The other vessels are equipped with machine guns and cannons of various calibres, between 12,5 and 40 mm. Most ships are in Poti Port, the only port under the Georgian government control. Batumi Port is under the control of Ajarian Autonomous Region, and Sukhumi under the control of Abkhazian Autonomous Region.

At the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian fleet in the Black Sea had a number of warships (including submarines) that varied, according to expert estimates, between 300 and 635, and the number of personnel associated with this fleet was estimated at 47 000 – 70 000 people; by 1995, in the Russian fleet, there were about 48 000 people, 14 submarines, 31 surface ships, 43 patrol ships, 125 combat planes and 85 helicopters; the equipment covered by the CFE Treaty represent a Coast defend division, with 175 tanks, 450 armoured personnel carriers, 72 pieces of artillery; in the fleet composition was also included a Marine infantry brigade with 50 tanks, 218 armoured personnel carriers and 45 pieces of artillery[5]. It is evident that the Russian Naval Forces in the Black Sea are significantly higher compared to the ones of Georgia.

After a period of tension, the conflict between the two sides reached the maximum level in the night of August 7th, 2008. At that time, the Georgian forces crossed into the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia in an attempt to take control of the capital Tskhinvali. In the morning of August 8th, the Russian forces launched their counter-offensive and went in South Ossetia to prevent the region from entering under the Georgian control. In less than 48 hours, the Russian forces pushed back the Georgian forces and the region entered under their control.

This Russian strong response was possible, as some military analysts assess, because the operation was prepared in advance. Pavel Felgenhauer, observer affiliated to *"Jamestown Foundation"* and *"Novaya Gazeta"*, believes that *"Russia's invasion*

---

[5] *Russian Black Sea Fleet* at www. globalsecurity.org

of Georgia was planned in advance, and the political decision for the design, planning and execution of actions in August was taken back in April[6].

The attack was executed in two directions, one from North Ossetia towards the Georgian city of Gori, in the South. The Russian forces gradually advanced beyond the so-called zone of conflict, deep inside Georgia, occupying towns and villages and destroying the infrastructure of the country using air forces. On the second direction, there were engaged around 1 000 militaries, three assault companies[7], landed in Ocamcie/Abkhazia, another secessionist republic, having the mission to control the Poti Port and to disable the access to the capital from the sea. Russia fulfilled the main objectives of the operation between Friday and Monday, when the entire planet, including President George W. Bush, was concentrated on the Olympic Games and the parliament was on holiday.

On August 9th 2008, a naval task force[8], led, probably, by *"Moskva"* cruiser, and composed of three landing ships, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, an intelligence ship, two minesweepers, having air cover, arrived near the Georgian coasts, in the vicinity of Ocamcie/Abkhazia Port. The large number of forces engaged underlines Russia's intention to prevent any attempt of the Georgian forces to react. The naval task force had to achieve two objectives to support the land operation launched by the Russian forces. One of them was to land an amphibious force in Ocamcie, while the other was to impose a naval blockade to prevent any support and transfer of arms to Georgia from the sea. After landing, the Russian forces began the military actions in the south, towards the port of Poti, action finalised on August 13th, when Poti was under the Russian forces control. In this action, 7 Georgian ships were destroyed by explosive charges, representing almost one third of their naval forces. Among them, there were the two missile carriers. A large quantity of materials and equipment was also sized. This military action practically led to the destruction of the Georgian fleet.

It is important to reflect on the short time it took the Russian naval task force to arrive in the area of operations. The Georgian forces entered South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia, on the night of 7 to 8 August. On August 9th, at 17:16, the Georgian government received a notification from the Embassy of Russia in which the Russian Federation notified that two military vessels were deployed in the region to protect its own citizens. At 19:20, the Georgian naval

---

[6] Pavel Felgenhauer, in *«Novaya Gazeta»*, no. 59, 14 August 2008.

[7] Richard Giragosian, *Georgian Planning Flaws Lead to Campaign Failure*, in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 20 August 2008.

[8] Special Correspondents Mike Barlow and Charles Strathdee, *Russian & Georgian Navies Clash at Sea ?*, http://www.warshipsifr.com/russian.html

surveillance system discovered the landing ship *"Cesar Kunikov"* (Ropucha class), south of Suokhumi. The same system found, at 23:30, four objects near Ocamcie. Taking into consideration the landing forces were transported with the *"Ropucha"* type ships, whose maximum speed is about 17,5 knots, and the distance between Sevastopol and Ocamcie is approximately 400 nautical miles, we find that such a ship needs approximately 24 hours to reach the distance. In these circumstances, it can be concluded that the Russian ships left the harbour immediately after the Georgians began operations in the secessionist region or that the task force had been already formed and was in Novorossiysk harbour, located at 200 nautical miles. In both cases, it is obvious that Russia's task force was formed before the hostilities and was ready for action and practically expected the Georgian offensive.

The articles published in the official newspaper of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence, *"Krasnaza Zvezda"*, support this conclusion. The newspaper published a series of articles about the Russian fleet in the Russian-Georgian conflict[9]. This paper suggests that, in the second period of July, a group of naval ships including the landing ships *"Tsezar Kunikov"*, *"Saratov"*, and *"Yamal"*, as well as four battle ships based in Sevastopol took part in the exercise *"Caucasus – 2008"*. In this exercise, one main training objective was to execute an *"operation to land an amphibious force on an unfortified shore"* and, at the end of the exercise, the task force anchored in the Novorossiysk region, awaiting new orders.

The Russian Naval Forces imposed a sea blockade on the Georgian vicinity, designated to interdict the country supplying using the sea. During this action, the Russian ships denied access to any ship in Georgian ports, including those carrying humanitarian aid, as it was the case of *"Lotus I"*, a ship under the Moldavian flag, carrying wheat, as the Georgian President Saakashvili stated[10]. The blockade provided Russia with a total control over the Georgian coast and the maritime communication routes in the area of operations, and allowed the Russian fleet to execute all the planned actions. At the same time, the blockade was intended to prevent the NATO naval forces from entering Georgia, since these forces are the ones with the highest degree of reaction and it was expected for them to be immediately deployed in the region. The Russian ships that established the Poti blockade informed the port authorities and the ships transiting the region that they had to communicate to the Russian task force the vessel name, flag, port of residence, name and nationality of the vessel master, the quantity and type

[9] Vladimir Socor, *A Rogue Fleet in the Black Sea*, in *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, http://politicom.moldova.org/news/-168261-eng.html
[10] Special Correspondents Mike Barlow and Charles Strathdee, *Russian & Georgian Navies Clash at Sea ?*, loc.cit.

of cargo, and the port of destination. If this information had not been provided before the ship approached under 50 km to the embargo positions, it would have been informed that the Russian forces could open fire on them.

Analysing all the actions performed at sea, we can conclude that the Georgian Naval Forces were totally unprepared to properly respond to such offensive. The attack, heroically indeed, but suicide one, and without chance of success, executed by the Georgian ship armed with only 37 mm calibre guns, against the Russian forces, clearly demonstrated the absence of concepts of action and a Recognised Maritime Picture achieved in real time.

There is different and contradictory information about the first and only one confrontation at sea between the Russian and Georgian naval forces, near the Georgian littoral. From different sources results that while the Russian ships were landing the amphibious forces, some Georgian ships were sailing towards the Russian task force. The Russian forces riposted after, as Russian sources mentioned, there were executed shots to warn the Georgian ships. Only then did they execute the attack against them, presumably with missiles. Some sources say that one of the ships, the coast guard ship *"Giogi Toreli"* was sunk in 90 seconds.

The failure of the Georgian forces' actions was caused, according to the analyst Richard Giragosian, by the *"overevaluation of the own forces capabilities and a serious underestimation of Russia's possible reaction"*[11].

The Georgian Armed Forces training and acquisition programs supported by the USA were focused on achieving a proper capability of action in the fight against terrorism and the forces offensive capacity was left on a secondary position. The Georgian Naval Forces were disadvantaged in training and acquisition programmes for the Coastal Guard benefit, whose development was supported by the USA. The deficiencies listed with regard to the fighting capability were much more serious and we can say that Georgia had no resources to ensure effective monitoring and protection of the coast before the conflict. This sustains the statement that, at the Alliance level, in the last decade, the main focus was on adapting the forces, capabilities and concept of actions to the situation created after the terrorist attacks on September 11. The Russian-Georgian conflict contradicts this analysis. In this regard, we would like to mention the statement of the Norway State Secretary Espen Barth Eide who says, in an interview in November, *"We have, in a way, over-focused and over-adapted to a scenario in which our armed forces will only meet enemies that are asymmetric and on a different kind of playing field than ours. We may again see a potential conflict or at least the need to deter a conflict with other states – and states that have modern and capable weapon systems"*[12].

---

[11] Richard Giragosian, *op. cit.*
[12] Peter Felstead, *Guardians of the North*, in *Janes's Defence Weekly*, 14 January 2009.

As seen during the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008, such an approach could not provide an adequate response from the Alliance.

The Russian fleet actions against Georgia were clearly encouraged by not only the diminution of the Western European countries interest in this region but also by the lack of the permanent presence of NATO ships in the region. This was used successfully in the Information Operations campaign to support the idea that American guarantees were not covered by a proper support: *"Russia knew that the USA would denounce attacks. This represented an advantage for Russia. The more the western leaders condemned the actions, the greater was the contrast with their total inactivity, and Russia acted to support the idea that the US guarantees were totally devoid of substance"*[13].

The August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia was also conducted in the information domain, even if the infrastructure in this area was very little developed in the region. Russia directed its strategy primarily towards the justification of the naval, air and land forces actions against Georgia. It is important to note the interview of Sergei Ivanov, the deputy Prime Minister of Russia for the *"New York Times"*. He said: *"I feel that the American public thinks that Russia attacked Georgia. A big Russian bear attacked a small, peaceful Georgia. In fact, the situation is and was vice versa. It was a big Georgia which attacked a small and tiny breakaway republic of South Ossetia"*[14].

Russia planned and led the information operations successfully in this conflict. The main theme supported by all decision-makers in the operation environment was originally in support of the theme *"aggressor – victim"* favourable to Russia. Gradually, the theme has changed to *"it is needed to protect the civilian population of Ossetia from the Georgians barbaric actions"*. Russia provided relatively reliable information to all press agencies – domestic and foreign – about the attacks suffered by the population of South Ossetia and the *"crimes"* of the Georgian soldiers. It was possible because of the lack of cooperation of the Georgian Armed Forces and in the absence of other sources of information. We can clearly conclude that the media in Russia was dominated by pro-Russian sentiments and strongly supported the actions of the Russian forces.

The main task successfully achieved by the Russian Armed Forces within Info Ops was the total destruction of the Georgian Armed Forces command

---

[13] George Friedman, *The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power*, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power

[14] *"Transcript of the interview of the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Sergey Ivanov to CNN on August 11, 2008"*. Russian Mission to the UN, 2008-08-11, http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/warfare/statement110808en.htm, retrieved on 2008-08-23.

and control system, objective achieved on August 11th. In this context, the following report is relevant: *"On August 11th, the Georgian Armed Forces were no longer organised, the world saw images of Georgian forces during the humiliating withdrawal from South Ossetia, Gori and other regions"*[15].

An additional direction for action was represented by influencing the leaders and the local population of South Ossetia to act against the Georgians in the region. To support this activity, the Russian press presented, repeatedly, reports of the Georgian actions in Ossetia that resulted in 2 000 deaths. According to the estimates of *Human Rights Watch – HRW*, these figures are too high. It was quoted a statement made by a civilian doctor who confirmed that during the period 6-12 August 2008 there were treated 273 injured soldiers and civilians[16]. This action was supported at the political level, where the theme was the presentation of current Georgian government as a *"criminal regime"*, which was underlined even by the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin who stated that *"Tbilisi has actually lost the moral right to govern the two separatist regions"*[17]. This theme was used by the South Ossetian leaders to justify the ethnic cleansing operations in the region and, in this context, there have been reported numerous arson attacks against the Georgians' houses[18].

The Russians' actions in Info Ops were organised and coordinated. However, there were situations in which the lack of coordination between messages and actions at the political/strategic level and at the operational level affected the campaign. In an interview, the Russian UN ambassador, Vitali Churkin, denied the presence of the Russian forces in Gori, saying that *"the Russian soldiers are not in Gori, have never been in Gori and do not occupy Gori"*, and categorised all the reports that the city was in ruins as unfounded. A day later, Major General Vyacheslav Borisov addressed reporters, in Gori, and stated that they would withdraw from this city the next two days[19]. The withdrawal of the Russian forces actually accomplished 10 days after this interview[20].

---

[15] Voices from Russia, *Striking on After-War Balance: The World is Changing*, http://02varvara.wordpress.com/2008/09/18/striking-an-after-war-balance-the-world-is-changing/

[16] *Russia/Georgia: Investigate Civilian Deaths*, Human Rights Watch, 12 august 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/nems/2008/12/russiageorgia_investigate_civilian_death

[17] Richard Weitz, *Moscow's Motives in its Georgian War*, in *World Politics Review Exclusive*, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2553

[18] *"Russia Exaggerating South Ossetian Death Toll, Says Human Rights Group"*, in *The Guardian*, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/13/georgia

[19] http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Georgia/idUSLE73186420080814

[20] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2602587/Georgia-conflict-Russians-pull-out-of-Gori.html

The only strong reaction to the Russian offensive came from the USA, which immediately after the first Russian actions provided a continuous presence of the US Navy ships in the region. The presence of the ships in the region was significantly influenced by the stipulations of the Montreux Convention that limits the period of presence in the region of the forces from outside the Black Sea region and the tonnage allowed in this situation. Considering these things, the USA was forced to make permanent rotation of the forces deployed in the Black Sea. Ships belonging to the US Navy 6th Fleet, such as the command ship *"USS Mount Whitney"*, the destroyers *"USS Dallas"* and *"Barry"*, the oceanographic survey ship *"Pathfinder"* and others were engaged in ports visit in Georgia, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as in Sevastopol. *"USS Mount Whitney"*, the Sixth Fleet flagship, was the first Allied ship that arrived in the region after the beginning of hostilities, in order to transport humanitarian aid for Georgia, strongly affected by the conflict. The presence of this ship and the ones that followed was regarded with suspicion by Russia, fact underlined by the Prime Minister and other Russian officials. They suggested that the USA could have supplied Georgia with weapons along with humanitarian aid. Even if the visits could be considered symbolic, these actions demonstrate that the USA wants to become a main actor in achieving security in the region. In addition, the presence of the US forces allowed a balance between the forces of Russia and all other countries in the region, after the attack against Georgia. But the ships arrived relatively too late, when the Russian forces succeeded in accomplishing their disposition and were already on consolidated positions in Georgia.

The Romanian Naval Forces Participation in Countering the Security Risks in the Black Sea Region

The evolution of the security environment and the rise in the risks and threats specific to the naval field require a proper analysis of the different types of operations/military actions in which naval forces are involved. Analysing the risks and threats in the Black Sea region, it results a scale depending on the probability for a conflict or event to occur, conflict to which the naval forces will have to respond. These can be asymmetric actions, directed against organised crime, drug trafficking, smuggling and the refugee flow by sea, pirate and terrorist acts in open sea and inside the harbours. The conflict between Russia and Georgia demonstrated that classic conflicts could also occur, in which the naval forces of another state represent the enemy, as well as regional armed conflict, characterised by combining conventional and unconventional actions, low or medium intensity,

in all the environments: maritime, underwater, land and air, based on assets with high manoeuvre capacity, precision in hitting the target, multidimensional protection of the forces, the use of Info Ops and electronic warfare.

*Countering
the security risks
in the Black Sea region*

The military cooperation and the consolidation of the relations with the Black Sea countries have effectively contributed to the affirmation of Romania as a stability factor in the region. This has been achieved especially starting 1994, through the participation of the naval forces in regional initiatives and in bilateral or multinational exercises, in common with the naval units of the naval forces of the Black Sea states. Some of them are the result of individual or bilateral initiatives, while others aim at almost all the states in the region. It is clear that the new political and security realities call for the situation to be re-evaluated, for an additional effort to be more efficient, or for an attempt to find new ways of action able to capitalise on the opportunities, to adequately respond to the risks and to assure an effective participation of the Euro-Atlantic institutions and of the states that want to be involved.

The increasing importance of the Black Sea at the beginning of the millennium has influenced the action of the naval forces in the Black Sea. As we can see, the Black Sea navy fleets seek to meet the requirements related to the challenges to maritime security in the region, structurally, conceptually and actionally. The future development of the region depends on the achievement of security, and this can be enhanced only through the active presence of the naval forces at sea, aiming to deter aggressive actions and to increase cooperation among littoral countries.

One of the most important regional initiatives is the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Group (BLACKSEAFOR), which aims at contributing to strengthen friendship, good relations and trust among littoral countries (Bulgaria, Romania, the Russian Federation, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine) and to promote peace and stability through the naval forces cooperation and interoperability. This initiative started in 1998, when Turkey proposed this model of cooperation to the regional countries for the first time. After three years of preparation of the Memorandum of Understanding, on April 2nd, 2001, the agreement was signed. The main operations include: search and rescue operations (SAR), humanitarian assistance (HA), Mine Countermeasures (MCM), environmental protection, port visits and other missions agreed by the participants. During the activation, exercises and training take place to increase the interoperability and effectiveness for the accomplishment of

the mission. Decisions inside the BLACKSEAFOR are adopted by consensus at ministerial level or national representatives and in the Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee (BSNC). The status of the force is *"ON CALL"*. The activities developed so far have demonstrated that BLACKSEAFOR is an important element for sustaining the political and military initiatives in the region and also an important initiative for increasing the interoperability end effectiveness for specific missions.

In the same context, we can mention Turkey's initiative – Operation *"Black Sea Harmony/OBSH"*, started in March 2004 based on the UN Security Council Resolutions no. 1373, 1540 and 1566. It has as main objective the naval surveillance, monitoring of suspect vessels, deterrence of terrorist actions and prevention of other possible asymmetric threats in the region, in parallel with maintaining the security of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. At present, the OBSH is conducted only at the national level, inside the territorial waters of Turkey. It includes activities for maritime security, for instance patrolling in important areas, surveillance, reconnaissance, shadowing and control of suspect vessels in Southern and Southeastern Black Sea, especially in the Bosporus Strait. OBSH is similar to Operation *"Active Endeavour/OAE"* and is an open initiative, other littoral countries being encouraged to take part in it. The data regarding suspect vessels are sent to NATO, to other countries that are involved in this operation, and to the Directing Staff of OBSH located in Eregli. In the Directing Staff act the liaison officers sent by the countries that participate in the operation. The official position of littoral countries regarding OBSH is the following: Ukraine became the first littoral state that joined the initiative and signed the Protocol regarding the participation in OBSH, on January 17th, 2007; Russia officially joined the initiative on December 27th, 2006. Our country is currently adapting its legislation so that it could join the OBSH project initiated by Turkey, and it is probable that a liaison officer will be sent to Eregli to take part in the exchange of information only.

The success of NATO operation *"Active Endeavour"* in the Mediterranean Sea determined the desire for this operation to be enlarged in the Black Sea, which happened on June 7th, 2005, when Admiral Sanfelice di Monteforte, in charge of this operation at that time, announced that the commanders of Black Sea Navy Fleets involved in BLACKSEAFOR agreed on extending OAE in the Black Sea. Russia[21] and then Turkey opposed this idea, showing that BLACKSEAFOR

---

[21] In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bruce Jackson, the president of the Project on Transitional Democracies, states: *"whatever we hope to accomplish in the Black Sea region will be impossible without the willingness to confront Russia where its conduct goes beyond the acceptable"*.

and SEEBRIG were sufficient for the Black Sea security. Turkey and Russia have common interests in the Black Sea and both fear that the Montreux Convention might be violated and other countries might become more influent in the area.

The security agreements developed lately in the Black Sea region have comprised several projects regarding maritime security. These initiatives aimed to resolve asymmetric threats against the maritime environment but eventually they supported the Russian and Turkish control in the region, thus excluding the presence of NATO and reducing the influence of Romania and Bulgaria. All these initiatives proved ineffective during and after the Russian aggression towards Georgia, because the forces did not have proper mandate and means to solve the security problems in the region. On the other hand, Russia wanted to demonstrate that it remained a maritime power and the passivity of Turkey combined with the absence of NATO ships in the Black Sea, in the initial phase, facilitated Russia's actions.

After the Russian-Georgian conflict, it is obvious that these regional initiatives designated to face asymmetric threats are not enough for achieving security in the area, as Russia and Turkey want to demonstrate. We consider that only a major contribution of NATO and the EU can lead to the achievement of regional security. The permanent involvement of the Alliance in the Black Sea may mean the initiation of some projects under NATO flag with regard to the security of maritime borders and the elimination of asymmetric threats and expansionist tendencies of some regional countries, which supports the idea that the Black Sea has become an area of strategic interest for NATO. The expansion of NATO area of responsibility in the Black Sea region will allow for a direct control of the crisis areas in Central Asia and for the surveillance of the energy routes in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. Since the Black Sea region has become very important for the international energy network, we appreciate that firm measures should be taken to safeguard the maritime commercial routes and the oil pipes in the region.

The characteristics of naval forces, namely the level of readiness, flexibility, self- sustainment, mobility and accessibility allow them to be used for enhancing the security in the region, deterring aggressions and responding to them, if necessary. To manage a crisis in the Black Sea it is sufficient to have a group of multinational forces that may receive proper information from the littoral surveillance systems and be completed with ships or naval elements belonging to the Black Sea littoral countries.

The evolution of the security environment and the emergence of new risks and specific threats, in the maritime domain included, require a revision of the Naval Forces place and role in the national security system, especially as the country's geographical position and, particularly, the fact that it is a coastal country are Romania's major advantages for the Euro-Atlantic security. Strengthening the Naval Forces role and mission should start from the analysis of the sea and river interests that have to be imposed or defended and from the one of the risk factors that may affect these interests. At the same time, we have to achieve a balance between the classes and types of ships to ensure an appropriate response to both classic and asymmetric security risks.

Taking into consideration the latest conflicts in the region, we can appreciate that the risks and opportunities in the Black Sea region are similar to those in other areas, such as the Mediterranean, and, in these circumstances, a shared vision can be achieved, encompassing the Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean. This common vision should assure security and stability in the region and secure energy routes. Romania has to join NATO and the EU policies meant to support the democratic processes in the region and to assist states in transition. This fact justifies Romania's position regarding the separation of the attributions of BLACKSEAFOR and OBSH and the necessity for the Operation *"Active Endeavour"* to be extended in the Black Sea.

In addition, the Romanian Naval Forces may have an important role in managing a crisis in the Black Sea, since it is very difficult to put together a multinational naval task group, with ships and amphibious forces from outside the Black Sea. The Montreaux Convention allows the passage of a limited number of foreign ships in the Black Sea through the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits. These ships must stay in the area no more than 21 days, with a total displacement not exceeding 40 000 tonnes and a maximum tonnage limited to 4 000 tonnes/ship. The access of submarines is not permitted for the countries outside the Black Sea. In these circumstances, Romania can become an important element in supporting the actions of NATO and the EU in the region. For this support to be properly achieved it is important for a proper force structure to be achieved to ensure the freedom of navigation and the protection of maritime lines of communication that are important for NATO/the EU. The Naval Forces must be equipped and maintained at an appropriate level of readiness to act independently or within regional or international task groups. The contribution to accomplishing missions can be

made with some specific capabilities, such as frigates, multirole corvettes and mine hunting ships, fast patrol vessels and/or support capabilities like submarines, airplanes with early warning systems, anti-submarine helicopters and navy aviation for tactical air support.

An important place in the Romanian defence and the protection of sea lines of communication to enable the access of the Allied forces arrived by sea is the control of the naval and air access ways to the littoral. Under these circumstances, the Romanian Naval Forces must be able to protect the sea lines of communication to enable the access of the Allied forces in cooperation with the Air Force.

Maintaining an adequate security environment in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Black Sea requires, within a foreseeable time perspective, the achievement of reliable naval forces capable of operating in all areas of national interest, both on the Black Sea and in other Romania's areas of interest, balanced and sufficiently powerful to determine any opponent to be wary if it were to execute military operations at sea or from the sea, against the Romanian national interests.

Our country will participate in the development of initiatives launched in various areas of European military cooperation: the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), NATO's Partnership for Peace, Open Sky, Multinational Brigade of Southeastern Europe (SEEBRIG), BLACKSEAFOR, OBSH, and CSBM. The participation of the Romanian Naval Forces in the initiatives on maritime security in the Black Sea (BLACKSEAFOR, OBSH and CSBMs) and in the Operation *"Active Endeavour"* in the Mediterranean Sea is an argument that demonstrates that Romania's Naval Forces have transformed from a coastal navy into one that has the capacity to carry out actions in other theatres of operations, according to national commitments. Moreover, special attention is paid to the extension and development of collaborative relationships with the Black Sea naval forces and with other members of the Alliance.

The Russian-Georgian conflict underlined the need for a reliable surveillance system, as the Georgian Naval Forces failed to detect the establishment of task forces, to monitor the movements of the Russian forces and to avoid surprise. The naval forces should permanently act to achieve and maintain the recognised maritime picture in order to avoid surprise and to effectively command forces during the execution of actions.

The achievement of successful transformation and of modern and interoperable naval forces requires the achievement of modern command and control systems that can assure continuous coordination of forces.

Another important course of action is represented by the need to enhance the representation of the Naval Forces in all the Alliance structures and working groups, as each member supports, naturally and informally, its own goals and promotes the national programmes through staffing all the important structures with staff and scientific personnel.

*

The Russian-Georgian conflict stressed once more the fact that a modern conflict is rapid, and decisions at the strategic/political level should be made very quickly, too. Such conflicts are short in length because, at international level, the public opinion and political forces will exert a strong pressure on all belligerents to settle the conflict, and the strategic objectives must be achieved within a few days. The classic mobilisation systems do not respond the requirements of such a conflict, Espen Barth Eide, State Secretary of Norway, states: *"If Georgia based its defence system on mobilisation, then most personnel were on the way to the mobilisation centres when the war finished"*[22]. From an operational point of view, the Georgian conflict demonstrated the role of deception, disinformation and surprise at the strategic, operational and tactical level. To respond effectively to such attacks, it is necessary for a sufficient number of ships to be maintained ready for action, so that a credible naval task group can be formed in a short time to ensure the protection of maritime communications. At the same time, it is necessary to monitor all the actions of the naval forces in the Black Sea, to understand their intentions and to prevent or at least to reduce the risk of misunderstandings about the actions of these forces at sea.

Romania has had and will continue to have responsibilities for countering the security risks in the maritime environment and, like any EU and NATO member nation, it will be requested and will have to contribute forces, means and resources to the common defence effort. To do this, it needs to have modern interoperable forces, with high expeditionary capacity and sustainability, able to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Romania's full integration into NATO and the EU overlap the national solutions for crisis management with the organisational and actional requirements proper to the political-military alliances we are part of.

The Naval Forces will be the main instrument to support Romania's maritime interests. They should be able, through structure, equipment and training, to cope with any type of naval conflict on the Danube, in the Black Sea and other

[22] Peter Felstead, *Guardians of the North*, in *Janes's Defence Weekly*, 14 January 2009.

areas, according to national interests, as it is the case of participating in Operation *"Active Endeavour"*.

The naval regional cooperation should become the most important factor for the consolidation of the stability, security and peace of the states bordering the Black Sea, as well as an effective tool in combating illicit activities, through the active presence of the ships at sea. We consider that, in the future, Romania must act to counter the intentions of any country to close the Black Sea and, as a member of NATO/the EU, our country must advocate the Alliance active role in projecting a climate of stability and security in the Wider Black Sea Region.

Selective Bibliography

• S. G. Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*, Pergamon Press, London, 1979.
• Comandor dr. Marius Hanganu, *Strategia maritimă – procedee de acțiune*, Editura AÎSM, București, 2002.
• Vladimir Socor, *A Rogue Fleet in the Black Sea*, in *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, http://politicom.moldova.org/news/-168261-eng.html
• Contraamiral de flotilă dr. Niculae Vâlsan, *Reflectarea importanței Mării Negre în conținutul acțiunilor Forțelor Navale*, in *Buletinul Forțelor Navale*, no. 8/2008.
• ***, F.N. – 1, *Doctrina pentru operații a Forțelor Navale*, București, 2004.
• ***, *Legea 117 pentru ratificarea "Acordului privind constituirea Grupului Naval de Cooperare în Marea Neagră – BLACKSEAFOR"*, in *Monitorul Oficial al României*, no. 202.
• *Russian-Georgian War at Sea*, http://turkishnavy.blogspot.com/2008/09/war-between-russia-and-georgia-was.html
• ***, *Strategia de securitate națională a României*, București, 2006.
• http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/search/label/Black%20Sea
• http://www.russiatoday.com/news/news/28759
• http://www.vesti.ru/videos?vid=147844&doc_type=news&doc_id=205452&p=1.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND "WORLD GOVERNANCE" REFORM

Colonel (r.) Alexandru IOAN

Motto: *"This problem has not occurred in a day nor will it be solved in a day. But if we continue to cooperate and we are resolute, we will solve it".*

George W. Bush

Started in the USA, as a rough lack of liquidities and gradually affecting the entire planet, the economic crisis is a new inflection point for the global order that started to take shape after September 11, 2001. The fact that the leaders of the greatest and most dynamic economies representing all the planet's contintents were invited at the Washington G20 summit shows the favourable accumulation of the critical mass necessary for the globalisation's new profundity. The reunion was considered as a historical meeting, representing a change in the global policy.

Keywords: globalisation; world governance; security; economic crisis; soft power; hard power; G20 summit; transatlantic gap

The intensification and thoroughness of specialised studies after the fall of the *Iron Curtain* have substantially enriched the concept of security, adding, next to the military forces, certain dimensions that would have been *a priori* excluded from discussion in the past. Experts in the field have been forced by the reality to recognise the fact that economy, state policy (the domestic one included and especially the foreign one), social evolutions, peoples' culture, ecology are dimensions of security that can no longer be ignored. Consequently, the concept has experienced an important shift from the field of military power or *"hard power"* – as defined by the American specialised literature, to the more subtle one – *"soft power"*, the focus being changed now from the use of the armed force, violence to the use of intelligence that requires the permanent and fully aware participation of all the citizens of the state. This approach is entitled by the evolution of the events that have occurred especially since the beginning of the third millennium: the September 11

terrorist attacks in the USA, followed by the ones from Spain and the UK or the natural gas crisis in Europe, generated by the economic conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, with effects at the continental level and which reappear, one way or the other, almost every year. All these have culminated in the world economic crisis, started in the USA in the shape of the lack of liquidities, and which has gradually affected the entire planet. The events took such a dramatic turn that, at the beginning of last fall, the International Monetary Fund, analysing the evolution of international economic flows, estimated that, in 2009, the increase in the world economy would stay below 2,2%. Even if still positive, such a pace of global development is considered the level that marks the world's entry into recession. The economic crisis is a new point of inflexion for world order that has reorganised itself after September 11.

Analysing its direct and indirect effects, more or less visible, on national and global security, famous international economists have not shrunk from estimating that this crisis is a real economic world war. The fact that at the Washington G-20 Summit were invited the leaders of the greatest and most dynamic economies on Earth, representing all the continents of the planet, proves, on the one hand, the gathering of the critical mass that is favourable to the idea of providing globalisation with a new depth. The reunion was considered a historic meeting, representing a change in global policy. The President-Elect of the United States, Barack Obama, declared himself in favour of providing a coordinated response to the world financial crisis and prepared to cooperate with the G-20 countries. The changes in the approach were so big, that the Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva admitted that he never imagined that emerging economies, such as the Brazilian one, would be assigned such a role in restructuring global economy[1].

The international press welcomed the decisions made in Washington through which world leaders proved to be capable of reacting in emergency situations. In less than a week after the G-20 Summit, results began to take shape. Kenichi Watanabe, the Director of Japan's biggest brokerage house – Nomura Holdings, quoted by BBC, suggested the end of the world liquidities crisis. In his opinion, the main problem of the moment was to find the means through which real economy could be revived. *"The next issue depends on how the nations of the world supply financial support"*, stated Watanabe, adding that world leaders should find means to enhance the economies in crisis.

The observations of the Japanese economist are relevant. The future of nations depends on the way states will manage to adapt their policies and use international financial support.

---

[1] BBC – World Service, 16 November, 8:00, at Rador Press Agency on 16 November 2008.

European Solutions
for the World Economic Crisis[2]

2008 will remain in history as a moment of inflexion in the evolution of world economy, a time when the unbalance and weaknesses in the international relations reached their term. It is the year when it was proved, once more, that it was union that made power. At least at the economic level. The European Union, with 27 member states and a stretch from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, reached the top of the pyramid of world economy. It remains to be seen whether it will find the domestic political resources to maintain itself in this position, whether it will be able to strengthen it and expand it to other domains. Because, strongly affected by the evolutions across the Ocean and playing the trump card of a powerful economy, the European Union has decided to assume the vocation of global leader. Reunited in Brussels, in the summer of 2008, the heads of member states agreed on a series of solutions to deal with the world financial crisis and the French Presidency of the European Union was given the mandate to negotiate a new financial system at the Washington G-20 Summit. Europe was trying to show that it had re-become an important global player and suggested three courses of action: *establishing some common principles for a new international financial system, an efficient working method in order to rapidly adopt decisions* and *a set of immediate measures.* The principles agreed upon by the European leaders required that no market segment and no financial institution could be left outside; the activity of all financial players, rating agencies included, should be regulated and controlled, concomitantly being provided the responsibility and transparency of these players on the financial market; the new system would make it possible for crisis to be prevented and, finally, the IMF would play the leading part in these activities.

Despite the enthusiasm in Brussels and the political declarations that showed Europe's wish to assert as a world economic leader, the analysts looked circumspectly at the results of the reunion. The essential cause for the European Union's weakness is the wide range of the dispersion of the interests of its states and, mainly, the most developed ones from the economic standpoint.

For each state, holding an as much advantageous as possible position for itself in the international financial institutions is more important than solidarity within the EU. In this respect, it is relevant the position of the UK, which is totally different from the French approach. London wishes the perpetuation of a soft approach, which should avoid the *"danger of overcrowding"* financial markets. Paris reckons

[2] For more details regarding the discussions within the EU for finding the best solutions to get out of the world economic crisis, see Alexandru Ioan, *Some Consideration regarding Globalisation and its Associated Phenomena*, *Romanian Military Thinking* Journal, no. 1, January-March 2009, pp. 43-47.

that what has been missing from capital market it is precisely the unanimously accepted framework for regulation. In addition, Germany is closer to the French approach when it comes to the content of the activity of regulation and control; however, Berlin is reticent when dealing with the possibility of an economic governance to occur at the level of the European Union. This centrifugal approach causes the structural weakness of a so much invoked unitary European voice, capable of establishing a productive dialogue with the United States and the new emerging powers. Caught in the trap of the *"young Europe"*, the Central and Eastern areas of the continent run the risk of being marginalised if their specific problems, economic particularities cannot be correctly asses by the great powers in the European Union[3].

The difficulty of the economic crisis is given by the intervention of the political factor. The preparation of the population by the political leaders capable of explaining to the public opinion the evolution of events and the validity of the decisions made is essential. Before the Washington G-20 Summit, analysts thought that the economic recession acknowledged by the developed states would change many aspects in the consumerist attitude of the American population, as well as in that of Europeans.

As far as global governance is concerned, a distinction should be made between authoritarian capitalism – characteristic to the Asian area – and what liberal democracy means, which is proper to Western Europe and the United States. We cannot leave aside the significant evolutions in the Euro-Atlantic region, the extraordinary difference between the metabolism of the capitalism on the North American continent in the '70s-'80s, the deregulation process experienced in the last two decades and the current forms of manifestation. The partial nationalisation of the financial system (even if a reprivatisation is possible in time) points out the resurrection of state capitalism, which will determine the functioning of liberal democracies. Against the backdrop of some transgressions in the distribution of economic power in the world, the financial crisis will increase the struggle for the control of exhaustible resources. Therefore, it is likely that all over the globe, liberal democracies included, we will witness the reflexes proper to war economy, direct interventions of governments. Analysts predict the occurrence of some waves of mercantilist turning back, in which many governments will hinder free trade to protect their investors. It is estimated the appearance of some regional strategies, on blocs of states, which may restrict, in a way, the development of the neoliberal tendency of market deregulation. The failure of rethinking the architecture of the institutional management system of global finance could have

---

[3] Daniel Dăianu in the radio programme *Talk-show de seară* on 7 November 2008, on Radio România Actualităţi, hosted by Alexandru Ioan, quoted by Rador Agency on 9 November 2008.

led to such a big fragmentation of the multilateral system that might have determined the regionalisation of commercial exchanges and even of international finances as well as the cessation of the globalisation process[4].

The European Union was caught by this crisis unawares, without having powerful, functional tools for a coherent response and the desperate attempt of state actors to solve it with own forces will make extremely difficult its functioning in the long term. Meanwhile, strong fragmentation and regionalisation of markets run the risk of acute economic disarray. The major economic powers and the states with high rates of development were not automatically recognised as major world powers. Therefore, it was expected that, in Washington, the current holders of world power would not easily allow emerging economies to become global powers as well. As mentioned, to the surprise of major international actors, including the President of Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the reunion in the US capital contradicted, at least partially, this concern.

World Governance Reform

Seen as a reproduction of the meeting in Bretton Woods in 1944, which outlined the architecture of the financial system after the Second World War, the Washington Summit on 15 November 2008 marked the launch of a process to rewrite the set of rules of the world financial system. At the summit in the US capital, there were representatives of South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, South Korea, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. The meeting took place against the backdrop of the International Monetary Fund forecasts that the 2009 global economic growth will slow to 2,2%, pace considered to mark the entry into recession. Expectations were divergent and referred more to own interests than to the global ones. While some governments lowered the level of their expectations, others added to the agenda issues such as climate change or trade policy.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for *"greater transparency"* and *"a more improved set of principles"*[5]. French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a more important significant role for the International Monetary Fund (led by the French politician Dominique Strauss-Kahn). A *"new meeting as that of Bretton Woods must lead to a «new capitalism»"*[6], said the French President.

---

[4] In *Foreign Policy*, November-December 2008.

[5] German Chancellor Angela Merkel, at AFP and Reuters, during a press briefing before the reunion behind closed doors of the G-20 leaders, 15 November 2008.

[6] Nicolas Sarkozy, at AFT, during a press briefing before the reunion behind closed doors of the G-20 leaders, 15 November 2008.

However, this summit ran a high degree of risk. A strong disparity in views between the United States and the other G-20 key members was predictable, given that the Europeans were trying to force a less flexible regulation of the system as compared with the solutions desired by the USA. Although it was expected that the strong emerging economies such as China, India, Russia and Brazil would demand an increased role in the new global financial architecture, their leaders went to Washington with enough hesitation. The White House previously declared that the summit would establish a set of principles which would represent the basis of the construction of the future system, architectural details being postponed for a later meeting. Among the principles mentioned there were raising the ceiling of capital reserves that precipitated the crisis of loans, subjecting international rating agencies to more extensive investigations and guiding national banking control bodies towards closer cooperation with their foreign peers.

Eight weeks after the bankruptcy of *Lehman Brothers*, the outlooks for a global financial reform were limited. Given that the European Union was strongly divided by divergent interests, the United States did not experience any difficulty in maintaining the dominance of capital markets on Wall Street. Reunited in Washington to establish the *"new capitalism"*, the leaders of the top 20 economically developed countries sent a message of hope, *"which could only come from the convergence of all efforts to support economic activity"*[7]. The group photo, shaking hands, and warm dialogues ended an unprecedented meeting, in which world leaders tried to develop a strategy to exit the financial crisis. The text on which they focused contains positive messages on three levels:
- *support for economy;*
- *a new international regulation;*
- *"world governance" reform.*

Subsequently, the Elysée Palace said that the strategy adopted was aimed at sustaining economic growth through the policies for re-launch, including the budgetary weapon, the contribution of monetary policy, the International Monetary Fund and development banks with activities in fragile countries. The Presidency of the EU promised: *"We will not let any country take a fall. Each knows well that one of the potential axes of crisis development is the risk of this crisis transmission through the fall of one country or another"*[8].

Although the crisis has not ended, the biggest danger seems to have been passed. Former US President, George W. Bush, warned that the need for reform should not overshadow the imperative of a free market, though, the night before,

---

[7] In the G-20 Summit Communiqué, at http://www.realitatea.net/membrii-g20-se-reunesc-la-washington
[8] Communiqué issued by the Elisée Palace, quoted by France Presse Agency on 17 November 2008.

he announced the decision to focus the discussion on keeping the banks on a floating line, in order not to witness any resounding collapse: *"The safest way to this growth* (of the global economy – AN) *is the continuation of the free market policy [...]; one of the dangers of a crisis like this one would be that people could begin to apply a protectionist policy"*[9].

The decision to approach in solidarity the provocations of the world economic crisis was the most important aspect of the meeting in Washington. Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel showed that the soundness of this attitude would demonstrate the ability of states to work together: *"There is here a big common desire to make sure that such a crisis does not happen again and to boost the world economy as soon as possible"*[10].

The germs of the new global economic system are acknowledged by Moscow as well. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev sees in these events the *"first steps towards creating a new system"*[11].

In the official communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the Group of major industrialised and emerging countries expressed their determination to strengthen cooperation for the recommencement of growth and the reform of the financial system. G-20 leaders agreed upon the *"need for a [...] closer macroeconomic cooperation, to resume growth"*[12].

Among the "immediate actions", one can mention the adoption of additional measures to stabilise the financial system, the acknowledgment of the importance of the support monetary policy can provide, depending on the situation in each country, the use of budgetary measures with fast results in order to stimulate domestic demand, maintaining, at the same time, the objective of balancing public finances.

For re-establishing the trust in the financial system, the G-20 leaders agreed on an action plan, a list of priority measures whose application date was 31 March 2009.

G-20 also decided on *"the need for launching a concerted and coordinated economic action"*[13], supported by the EU, and gave satisfaction to the United States and Canada, which insisted on maintaining sovereignty. Thus, the final document stressed that the regulation of the situation fell under the responsibility of specialised

---

[9] George W. Bush, a toast at the dinner given in honour of the participants in the G-20 summit, quoted by Reuters and AFP on 16 November 2008.

[10] German Chancellor Angela Merkel, at AFP, during a press briefing before the reunion behind closed doors of the G-20 leaders, 15 November 2008.

[11] Dmitry Medvedev, at AFP, la 15 November 2008.

[12] The conclusions of the G-20 Washington Summit, at AFP, 15 November 2008 and Reuters, 15 November 2008.

[13] *Ibid.*

agencies of each country, considered as the main line of defence against market instability. G-20 leaders suggested, however, an intensification of international cooperation between national regulatory bodies and a strengthening of international standards, where necessary. *"Through consultation with other states and organisations and using expert advice, we ask our Finance Ministers to draw up projects in five areas, which will be submitted until March 31"*[14], stated the Communiqué of the Group of the 20. Finance Ministers would develop projects for harmonising accounting rules, strengthening of derivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks, reviewing the practices with regard to the remuneration of the leadership of financial institutions in terms of encouraging risk taking.

The G-20 members stressed the important role of the International Monetary Fund. They committed to increase the representation of developing countries within the IMF and World Bank and *"to assist emerging economies and developing countries"* in order to gain access to financing. They promised to encourage the World Bank and other specialised multilateral banks to support the developing countries that had problems and recommended that they should be supplied with *"sufficient resources"*.

European Initiatives after the G-20 Summit

The EU's insistence that it should be acknowledged a new statute was not welcomed on the other meridians of the globe. Europeans attempt to take the initiative to overcome the economic crisis and to restructure global governance generated a US reaction after the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, back in the country after the summit of G-20, announced that he would hold a meeting on the same subject in Paris, in January 2009. The subject was not discussed with the US President George W. Bush or other leaders. The meeting in Paris, scheduled on 8 and 9 January, was to be co-chaired by the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and was intended to be a conference on globalisation and the values of capitalism, involving political leaders and experts with international acknowledgement. The very close competition between the two shores of the Atlantic in terms of the initiative in the issues of global economy and the opposition of the American President George W. Bush, at the end of his mandate, who did not want to allow the Europeans, especially France, to dominate the debate regarding the solutions to this crisis, cancelled this proposal. The meeting initiated by Sarkozy generated discontent not only in the United States but also in other countries, because the G-20 states agreed to meet again in April[15]. Therefore, the French President had to limit only

---

[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *International Herald Tribune*, online edition, 20 November 2008.

to being *"consulted"* on this subject in mid-January by the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, from the position of a European leader, given its quality of host of the G-20 Summit held on 2 April. Paris attempted to take global initiative and was even more severely sanctioned: for the preparation of the Summit of the leaders of the main developed and emerging countries, the representatives of the European countries of G-20 met in Berlin.

Although there had not been much talking on the initiative of President Sarkozy, its failure was not very difficult to predict. Upon the end of its mandate of President of the EU, the leader of the Elysée Palace said: *"I tried to move Europe, but Europe changed me. […] I tried to organise our actions around the belief that the world needs a strong Europe. We cannot have a strong Europe if Europe is not united"*[16]. The statement, which hides France's failure in the attempt to capitalise on the situation in its own interest (see the failed negotiations with the Czech Republic to take over the Presidency of the Mediterranean Union) is a suggestion to Sarkozy's attempt to coagulate the interests of big European players around ideas meant to bring the EU at the top of world hierarchy. Washington kept its supreme position and the leaders of industrialised and emerging countries met in the same place on 31 March to discuss the list of international financial institutions that, in case of bankruptcy, could endanger world economic stability. On 2 April, Europe hosted the reunion of G-20 leaders regarding the financial crisis, but not in Paris, as Sarkozy would have wanted, but in London, in order to verify, before 30 April 2009, the application of principles and decisions on which they had agreed at the meeting in Washington.

As a result of the obligations assumed in the G-20 Summit in Washington, Russia could become one of the donors of the programme meant to support states facing economic difficulties. By the end of 2008, Moscow was to give a loan of one billion dollars to the International Monetary Fund in exchange for expert advice from the IMF[17]. The Russian Federation, which had regularly received funding from the IMF in the '90s, as a support for the disintegration of the USSR, was thus forced to repay a part of the aid. The Kremlin decision came against the background of an announcement made by the General Director of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, according to whom the institution needed additional funds of 100 billion dollars in the next six months to support the states with problems and to restore world economy. The leaders in Moscow were interested in their list: Ukraine and Hungary, for which the IMF already approved loans,

---

[16] Nikolas Sarkozy, speech delivered in the European Parliament at the end of the French presidency mandate of the EU, 16 December 2008, quoted by AFP, 16.12.2008.

[17] Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Kudrin in newspaper *Kommersant*, 18 November 2008.

Belarus and Iceland, which could get an approval in the next period. The Russian newspaper *Kommersant* noted that Bulgaria could be on the list of possible applicants for support from the IMF.

The G-20 leaders that met in Washington agreed that big states with emerging economies should hold more important positions in international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the Financial Stability Forum. The latter institution, having a role of risk assessment of banking systems and financial markets, acquired a greater role in setting the standards and international financial policies to be followed by national regulatory authorities.

The West tended to rely more on the involvement of these countries to support certain states or the banking system to overcome this crisis. Among the topics discussed by Finance Ministers that were present at the G-20 there were the review of accounting standards worldwide, establishment of supervisory committees for major international banks, new standards for rating agencies and ways to limit benefits for banks management through the correlation with a risk profile. However, specialists consider the outcome of talks in Washington *"remarkably gentle"*[18]. Closed investment funds and companies operating in capital investment were exempt from new regulations, using a series of voluntary codes of best practice.

A week later, heads of state from Asia and the two Americas, meeting in Lima, promised to insist on signing an agreement on trade liberalisation and reforms regarding the banks with international activities, in an attempt to avoid an economic decline at the international level. The US President, George W. Bush, his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, the Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and other members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation – APEC said they would maintain trade barriers in the next 12 months at the current level. Yet, past commercial and political disputes between the US, the EU, China or India make uncertain the compromises that these parties may accept. *"The current situation highlights the importance of reforms in the financial sector"*, said the leaders of the 21 member states of the APEC.

Romania and the World Economic Crisis

Recession has deepened in the US as well as in more and more economies of the European states. The growth pace in Asia has decreased a lot. The crisis or economic recession has reached all parts of the globe. In these circumstances, it was increasingly clear that Romania, too, no longer could continue its rapid growth pace. The shock occurred on 17 October 2008, when the national currency

---

[18] Edwin Truman, analyst at Peterson Institute for International Economy at Reuters Press Agency, 16 November 2008.

underwent an unprecedented attack. The National Bank of Romania was forced to intervene and, for the first time in the history of interbanking market, some banks did not close their positions for lack of *lei*.

The interest for the Romanian currency exploded, the National Bank left the market without liquidity, thereby forcing speculators to close their positions on minus. It was a partial victory, because the *leu* saw a constant depreciation.

• Economic Crisis in Romania. Divergent Approaches

Given that all other states had mobilised their energy to mitigate the consequences of the economic crisis, against the backdrop of the election campaign, the Romanian political class did not have a common voice in an essential problem for security. Experts in the economic field, while trying to appear more objective, often filter their own analyses, taking sides, willingly or not.

The ruling parties acclaimed the soundness and invulnerability of the Romanian economy, thoroughly restructured after 1989 and protected by the National Bank. It was believed that as long as the banks were strong, and economic growth remained high in 2008, with prospects for a rate of development between 4 and 5 percent the following year, our country would not be in crisis. It was even accepted the idea that the international situation caused a tightening of credits, that some companies could reduce their economic activity and some personnel could remain unemployed. All these were seen as peripheral forms of international processes, but it was believed that Romania was not, in fact, in an economic crisis. Moreover, even the financial crisis would not strike us directly.

On the opposite side, there was the voice of the opposition, which accused the government of ignoring the global financial crisis and its effects on the Romanian economy and that they did not make public Romania difficult situation. Vulnerabilities arising from international developments continued to be strongly highlighted and specialists recommended not only a constant watchful eye, but also the best measures that could be taken. First of all, the relation between consumption and production was a warning that could not be ignored. Domestic supply of goods and services was outrun by consumer demand and that led to a large deficit of the balance of foreign payments, even if there was a slight decrease for the moment. Experts recognise the possibility that the free market could go wrong, pushing things to an excess of consumption when greed, stupidity and lack of culture become dominant.

From the political perspective, it is important that Romania is not among the crisis generating countries and has means to lessen the effects of recession. This does not exempt it from paying the price of an imported crisis, even if optimists hope that its effects will not be so devastating for Romanian citizens.

The common feature noticed by specialists in the field is the *"lack of synchronisation"* in the measures to counteract the effects of the economic crisis in Romania, where the internal political struggle, accompanied by the election battle, created a filter around the true problems of the recession. Instead of unbiased solutions, on both sides of the political scene, that would have included the members of the government, the opposition, the trade unionists, the employers, the representatives of the society, anti-crisis efforts seem to have been dispersed in electoral speeches.

• Prognoses for 2009

Before the government announced a budget projection of economic growth of only 2,5% in 2009, analysts expected a visible slowing down in the pace of Romania's growth to under 4%, namely less than half compared to the growth pace of 7,8 % of the GDP in 2008. The average forecast of 11 Romanian and foreign analysts asked by the Mediafax press agency indicated a growth of 3,4% in 2009. The most pessimistic estimation was talking about recession, namely a decrease in the economy by 0,3%: *"The increase in exports will slow down because of the decline in the rest of the EU countries and the global liquidity crisis will restrict capital flows towards Romania, affecting consumption and domestic investment"*[19].

Romanian economy recession is forecast, despite the fact that there are expected events that should not allow one: high public spending, with a budget deficit estimated by analysts at about 5% of the GDP (in the circumstances in which the ministries formulated, at the beginning of the year, requests that would have led to a deficit of 9%) and an increase in public debt at 16,2% of the GDP.

Foreign analysts are more pessimistic than the Romanian ones both in terms of economy development in 2009 as well as on short-term and predict a sudden showdown in the GDP increase. They forecast that the economic advancement of 1-2% for the first quarter of 2009 will be due to consumption inertia and warn that the government's tendency to artificially enhance consumption jeopardises the long-term stability of the Romanian economy[20].

Despite an apparent optimism, under the influence of the bleak forecasts of foreign experts, at the middle of the fourth quarter of 2008, all Romanian analysts changed their prospects for the economic evolution in the last three months of 2008[21]

---

[19] Kenneth Orchard, analyst at Moody's Analytics in Alexandra Chelu and Marius Radu, *Pib-analişti*, Mediafax Agency, 23.11.2008, 12:39.

[20] Bartosz Pawuowski, analyst for emerging markets at TD Securities in London in Alexandra Chelu and Marius Radu, *op. cit.*

[21] The results of the last trimester of the year as well as of the entire current year will be calculated in the first trimester of next year, based on final statistics.

and some of them even put their estimations below those of foreign experts: *"It is possible for the third quarter to be very good and the last quarter to be weaker than we have been used to this year* (2008 – AN). *[...] Even so, the fourth quarter will be fabulously high compared to the region"*[22].

The most optimistic analyses predict that economic activity *"will slow down very much in all branches"*, that this period will be characterised by incertitude, that extractions will have a negative development, and constructions will *"slow down dramatically, being very likely that a quite terrible price fall will occur"*[23].

Other experts in the field believe that the reduction in external demand against the background of the recession in the Euro area will inevitably and negatively influence both exports and industrial production in Romania: *"In a neutral to optimistic scenario, the moderation of economic growth would be to 4-4,5% in 2009, in the circumstances of an ordered reduction of crediting, especially as far as the foreign currency is concerned, which could even lead to positive effects of reducing consumption and pressures on the current account and inflation"*[24].

The same analysts estimate that risks are high, because a sudden cessation of the crediting activity could even lead to a negative impact on the economic activity. However, it is considered that recession is not the most likely scenario, based on the currently available information, even if *"the temptation of pessimism is rather high"*.

• Social Consequences of Economic Crisis

The imported economic crisis will be more or less felt in all the sectors of the Romanian economy, estimate the analysts. The most affected domains will be: constructions, services and consumption, industry and agriculture. As far as agriculture is concerned, risks are higher and are connected to the climate conditions, the sector having an unfavourable effect. It is also anticipated a slowdown in the pace of consumption from 13-14% in 2008 to approximately 5-6% in 2009. The limitation of consumption can be possible only following a *"dramatic change of behaviour"*. The hopes are connected to infrastructure investments, which are expected to sustain *"at least a bit"* the economic advance projected through the state budget to 2,5%.

Before being felt in the military domain, this crisis will have important consequences in the social dimension of Romania's security even if, at the end of 2008, it did not seem too threatening as far as jobs were concerned. Statistics

---

[22] Lucian Anghel, Chief Economist, BCR, in Alexandra Chelu and Marius Radu, *op. cit.*.

[23] Cristian Dinescu, Director, Directorate of Treasury, Romexterra Bank, in Alexandra Chelu and Marius Radu, *op. cit.*

[24] Ionuț Dumitru, Chief Economist, Raiffeisen Bank Romania, in Alexandra Chelu and Marius Radu, *op. cit.*

showed at the time a rate of unemployment of 6,3% from the active workforce. The official figure was 4%, but there were another 2,3% in the unregistered unemployment. Based on these facts, it was estimate that laid-off personnel would represent 6,5% in 2009 and they would mainly come from agriculture, clothes manufactures, constructions and car manufactures. It is expected that problems should appear with the Romanian citizens who will come back from abroad and become unemployed. However, specialists state that the unemployed coming from lay-offs will be included in the fields that have an acute lack of workforce.

The first effects of the crisis, felt now through the temporary cessation of production in some companies and the laying-off of certain categories of employees, appeared in the summer of 2008. It is estimated that there even was a temporary advantage. As a result of the decreased production first manifested in the EU, the Romanian companies were able to sell better. The serious problems occurred in recent months in the local car industry, furniture industry and the production of electric appliances showed that the importation of the crisis from the EU could not be avoided, however, and that this transfer would increase as a result of the fact that 70% of Romania's trade balance is with the European Union.

Given that Romania cannot change the rules of the game at the macro level, it needs to focus its policies in such a way, including the financial ones, to better respond to all challenges. The solution to these problems depends on the intelligence of the political elite and its capacity to express its solidarity with the entire Romanian society.

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

SOUTH OSSETIA

Vasile ROTARU

Placed at Georgia's Northern border with Russia, South Ossetia is a mountainous region of approximately 3 900 square km and 70 000 inhabitants. Most part of the territory, including the capital, Tskhinvali, is led by the de facto government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, which declared its independence from Georgia twice, without any international acknowledgement. It was only after the recent conflict in the area, on August 26th, that Russia recognised its independence and it was the only state to do so. There are some parts of the South and East of the region that are led by Georgians, through a "Provisional Administrative Entity". The majority of the population consists of Ossetians (80%), but there are also Russians, Georgians, Armenians, Greeks etc. in the region.

Keywords: *Alania; anti-Ossetian policy; de facto independence; separatists; Russian-Georgian conflict*

Ossetians are among the oldest inhabitants on the territory of the former USSR. Their formation results from the interaction of the tribes that lived in the North Caucasus with the Scythians, the Sarmatians and especially the Alans, who settled in Central Caucasus and whose language and customs were adopted by the local population. Between the 10th and 12th centuries, the feudal state of Ossetians – Alania – is one of the most powerful in the area. Capitalising on the legendary "Silk Road", which crosses its territory, Alania's economy is booming and the Ossetian craftsmen become famous for their armours. Alania maintains diplomatic relations with the Byzantine Empire, Russia, Georgia and the Jewish Khazar state. A proof of its importance is the establishment of dynastic connections with the Georgian or Byzantine monarchies.

In the 13th century, Alania is defeated by Tatar-Mongols, its population is swept off and the remaining Ossetians withdraw in the fertile valleys at the foot of the mountains in the Central Caucasian canyons. There, they set up several small state entities, some of which become dependent on Georgian nobles. The incursions of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire into the area determine the Ossetians to establish alliances with Russia, in the 18th century. In 1774, the current North Ossetia becomes part of the Russian Empire. In 1801, Georgia too is annexed by the Russian authorities

and the mountainous area between Georgia and Russia, the current South Ossetia, thus becomes part of the Empire, but it will not be *de facto* governed by the Russians until 1830, following the Caucasian war (1817-1864). Georgians' attempts to include South Ossetia into their province are rejected by the Russian Senate.

After the Revolution in February 1917, a question arises: *What would be the fate of national minorities in the future democratic republic ?* In June 1917, a Congress of the South Ossetian intellectuals takes place, during which delegates decide to create a Democratic Republic within Russia. During the same congress, the yearning for national self-government is avowed: *"If the Caucasian peoples are given national-territorial autonomy, then Ossetians will have to unite to establish a single national entity, capable of self-governing itself"*.

After the Revolution in October 1917, Georgia proclaims its independence, and the Menshevik government in Tbilisi sets a goal to recreate Great Georgia. This also means the annexation of South Ossetia. Ossetians rise in rebellion in Kornis, Tskhinvali, Djava, Ruk, yet, the Georgian armed forces manage to conquer the South Ossetian territory.

On 20 June 1920, South Ossetia is annexed by Georgia. The Ossetians suffer a real genocide. Over approximately 18 000 people die in armed confrontations and over 50 000 are banished to North Ossetia, Georgians from mountainous district being brought to replace them. This policy, aimed at chasing away non-Georgians from Georgia, ends in January 1921, when the Red Army takes over Georgia, the Mensheviks are deposed and the country becomes, on 25 February 1921, a Soviet Republic. The Ossetians now demand the establishment of an Ossetian Autonomous Republic within the Soviet state. Yet, the Bolsheviks create two Ossetian administrative entities: the Northern part becomes a region and then an autonomous republic within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, while for the mountainous area, the Southern one, Stalin, People's Commissar for Nationality Affairs between 1917 and 1923, decides to put the Tbilisi authorities in charge of the issue. The Georgian Bolsheviks seek to wipe out South Ossetia as a national-administrative entity, in accordance with the principle: *in Georgia, there are Ossetians but no Ossetia*. They draw up a plan for the division of the area into two administrative entities. This project is handed for analysis to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. Another version of the project is sent by South Ossetian Bolsheviks, who demand the establishment of a South Ossetian Soviet Republic with the capital in Tskhinvali and the use of the Russian language as the official language in the Georgian-Ossetian relation. These proposals are handed to the Secretary General of the Transcaucasian Communist Party, Sergo Ordzhonikidze.

A compromise is reached. On 25 February 1922, on the one-year anniversary of the Soviet ruling in Georgia, the Constitution of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic is adopted, stipulating that South Ossetia will be part of Georgia as an Autonomous Region (oblasti), with Russian and Georgian as official languages.

In August 1924, an armed rebellion takes place in Georgia against the Soviet power. In this context, the leaderships of the two Ossetias ask for their unification, but Ordzhonikidze is against this proposal.

Following the rebellion in Tbilisi, Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, both natives of Georgia, decide to get closer to the nationalist forces in Georgia. Stalin suggests the occupation of new territories by Georgia. After Abkhazia, Ajaria and South Ossetia, he proposes the annexation of North Ossetia, Ingushetia and the Sunjenski region (currently, part of Chechnya). This enlargement would have provided Georgia with an important strategic position in Central Caucasus. Stalin's chief argument for this unexpected proposal is that the Soviet power will be strengthened in Georgia through the annexation of these territories and any other nationalist movements in Tbilisi can be avoided. Yet, because Stalin cannot stand being at the mercy of his ideological adversaries, at least formally, he cannot consider himself a Georgian nationalist, consequently, he cannot be accomplice with the leaders of the Georgian nationalist parties. Therefore, he gives up the idea.

In 1925, the representatives of North and South Ossetia demand once more their unification, this time directly of Stalin. Ossetians even agree to establish a unitary republic within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gruzia (a name imposed by the Soviet power instead of Georgia). The delegation recommends the unification of three parts: South and North Ossetia and the Mozdoksk region (currently, a district in North Ossetia). Their argument in support of the need for including the Mozdoksk region is that there are many Ossetians emigrants in North Ossetia who have established villages in the area. Yet, Stalin is not in favour of the annexation of the Mozdoksk region. The delegates are accused of bourgeois-nationalist and reactionary tendencies and soon after they are shot.

This is the beginning of a campaign of repression of Ossetians. Because of Stalin and Beria, the Ossetians come to provide the biggest number of "enemies of the people" in the '40s. For instance, in 1941, there are arrested 796 people in the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 460 in Bassarabia, 396 in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, 395 in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gruzia, 99 in the Kabardino-Balkarian Soviet Socialist Republic, 60 in the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic, 30 in the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. The two Georgians – Stalin and Beria – deliberately pay their contribution to the development of Ossetophobia,

especially since Stalin is born in the Gori district, next to the Tskhinvali district in South Ossetia, being familiar with the frictions between Georgians and Ossetians.

South Ossetia is also subject to economic discrimination. There is no important factory or plant built in the area. In 1925-1926, according to the planned budget, in Georgia there are 9,3 roubles per capita, in Abkhazia – 5, in Ajaria – 7,3 roubles, and in South Ossetia only 4,2 roubles. In 1951, according to the meat production per nutritive unit, a quota of 11,9 kg is established for the Tskhinvali district, while for the neighbouring district in Georgia (Gori) – only 8,6. In consequence of this policy of economic discrimination, the standard of living in South Ossetia is 2-2,5 times lower than the one in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gruzia.

Moreover, South Ossetia is subject to a national assimilation policy. In 1939, the Latin alphabet is replaced with the Georgian one, using the Ossetian writing. From 1944, the Georgian language is used in teaching, Ossetian children being able to study their mother tongue only separately and only in the primary school. Following the education reform in 1949, a decision is made according to which teaching will take place in Georgian and Russian exclusively. In 1951, the entire administration of South Ossetia starts using the Georgian language. Moreover, the entire literature in the Ossetian language is eliminated from the Pedagogical Institute and schools. Ossetians are forced to stop working in institutions such as the militia, prosecutor's office, court of law, public administration, being replaced by Georgians from other districts of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gruzia. Starting 1940, the migration of Ossetians towards North Ossetia increases massively and continues until the second half of the '50s.

In 1951, the anti-Ossetian policy triggers a protest of the Ossetian Komsomol members in Tskhinvali against the closing of Ossetian schools and the use of the Georgian alphabet for the Ossetian language. This demonstration is considered as a manifestation of bourgeois nationalism and its organisers are arrested and sentenced to 8 to 25 years in prison.

The situation improves after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), where Stalin's personality cult is exposed and the chauvinistic national policy of the authorities in Tbilisi is put into question.

On 10 November 1989, the South Ossetian Popular Front decides to transform the region into an autonomous republic and demands the union with North Ossetia within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The next day, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia cancels this decision, declaring it unconstitutional.

Two weeks after the proclamation of the South Ossetian Autonomous Republic, on 23 November 1989, thousands of Georgian nationalists (30 000 according

to some sources, 60 000 according to others) led by Gamsakhurdia (who becomes the first President of the Republic of Georgia after the declaration of independence from the USSR) set out towards Tskhinvali for a meeting aimed at announcing the decision to abolish the autonomy of South Ossetia and organise a referendum in the name of Ossetians aimed at Georgia leaving the USSR. Ossetians forbid them access to the city; therefore, the demonstrators surround the city of Tskhinvali and set up a blockade on the South Ossetian capital. The blockade lasts for over three months, five persons are killed and over 400 are wounded. The complaints sent to the USSR and the SSRG leadership are ignored.

The situation gets worse with the coming to power in Georgia of the nationalists led by Gamsakhurdia, in April 1990. They declare void all the legal documents after the Sovietisation of Georgia and plead for the abolition of autonomies. Given these circumstances, the Ossetian leaders adopt the Declaration of sovereignty and proclaim the South Ossetian Democratic Republic, on 20 September 1990. On 10 December 1990, the authorities in Tbilisi decide to annul South Ossetia's autonomy. The second day, following an interethnic clash in the capital of South Ossetia, Georgia declares state of emergency in Tskhinvali and the Djavski district. In the night between 5 and 6 January 1991, in the city of Tskhinvali, militia and national guard detachments arrive from Georgia. Armed confrontations begin in Ossetia. On 1 February 1991, Georgia shuts down the electricity in the region. Armed clashes occur throughout 1991 and the exodus of refugees begins to North Ossetia and Russia. North Ossetian and Kazakh volunteers arrive in Tskhinvali.

At the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, there is a civil war in Georgia. On 19 January 1991, a referendum is organised in South Ossetia by means of which the population demands independence and unification with Russia.

In February 1992, the Georgian army starts the assault to take control of Tskhinvali. On 20 May 1992, the Georgians attack a convoy of vehicles with Ossetian civilians that are headed towards North Ossetia; 33 people die and 30 are seriously injured. Military operations continue in South Ossetia until 13 July 1992, when, under the pressure exerted by Russia, the Georgian authorities cease fire. The Sochi peace agreement is signed and Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping forces are brought in South Ossetia. The war casualties are of 1 000 Ossetians and approximately the same number of Georgians, over 100 000 Ossetians emigrating in North Ossetia or Russia.

Until 2004, the situation is stable in South Ossetia. However, following Georgia's Rose Revolution, the new President, Mikheil Saakashvili, promises to *de facto* reinstate the Tbilisi administration in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is a very important

oil pipeline that crosses Georgia from the Caspian Sea towards Europe and both the US and Russia are in competition with the purpose of exterting their influence in the area.

Saakashvili's pro-Western orientation does not please Moscow, which is more actively involved in supporting the two regions after Vladimir Putin's coming to power, issuing Russian passports to many citizens and paying state pensions.

In the spring of 2004, after a major crisis in the separatist region of Ajaria, Saakashvili manages to end the *de facto* independence of this province from the southeastern part of the country through an armed intervention and states that he will seek for a similar solution for South Ossetia as well.

On 31 May 2004, Georgia deploys important armed forces in Ossetia, even if in the area of the conflict there are supposed to be only peacekeeping forces. In July 2004, the first clashes after the Sochi agreement occur in South Ossetia. The troops open fire on the city of Tskhinvali and on the Ossetian villages. Under Russia's pressure, a ceasefire agreement is signed on 13 August 2004, which also stipulates the withdrawal of Georgian forces from Ossetia, except the peacekeeping ones.

In October 2006, a pro-Tbilisi provisory administrative entity is created in South Ossetia.

On 12 November 2006, in the South Ossetian areas controlled by the separatists led by Eduard Kokoity, a referendum takes place that confirms, for the second time, by an overwhelming majority, the participants' yearning for independence. The same day, in the areas controlled by Tbilisi, "alternative" presidential "elections" take place. The winner is Dmitry Sanakoyev. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo proclaims its independence. The next day, their leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia demand the acknowledgement of their independence. The Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity, declares that his ambition is to see the two Ossetias united by the end of 2008.

The Kosovo precedent makes the situation in South Ossetia worse. In the first half of 2008, several incidents take place and Georgians and Ossetians accuse each other of their occurrence. On 1 August, Georgian and separatist troops exchange fire. Tbilisi accuses Ossetia of having attacked a few Georgian villages, thus violating the 1992 peace agreement. The next day, the evacuation of the population of South Ossetia in Russia begins. On 7 August, the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who promised to re-establish order and governmental control in the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, orders the attack on Ossetia. In a short while, the separatist capital of Tskhinvali is captured. The next day, Russia sends its troops in South Ossetia, namely on Georgian territory. In five days

of battle, the Russian forces conquer the city of Tskhinvali and determine the Georgian troops to withdraw from South Ossetia, severely damaging Georgia's military infrastructure at the same time. On 9 August, a Georgian military ship in the Black Sea area of Abkhazia is sunk by the Russian fleet on the grounds of having entered the Russian security area. The same day, the Russians open the second front in Georgia – the one in Abkhazia. The Russians occupy the biggest city near Ossetia, Gori, as well as the Poti harbour, where the headquarters of the Georgian naval forces is placed.

Because of the international pressure, on 16 August, the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, signs the ceasefire agreement, a day after the leader in Tbilisi, Mikheil Saakashvili. Exactly ten days after the armistice, on 26 August, Russia officially acknowledges the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

THE KEY
TO THE SUCCESSFUL TRANSFORMATION
OF THE MILITARY BODY
IS THE INDIVIDUAL

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAŢĂ

People can make the transformation process more dynamic or they can hinder it, unless they are well-informed and prepared, or if they are sceptical or against its objectives.

The "recipe for success" is relatively easy to express but difficult to put in practice by the people who are not enough motivated to participate without reservation in the accomplishment of established objectives and are not strong enough to overcome their weaknesses.

People are our most precious asset and that is why, within the transformation process, we must attach proper importance to them in order to educate, train and motivate them with a view to reaching performance goals.

Since the transformation process is continuous, the processes that are subsumed under it must also take place on a permanent basis.

Keywords: *continuous learning; lessons learned; team spirit; transformation strategy; creativity; competence; globalisation; computerisation*

There are a lot of people (politicians, political and military analysts, experts in international relations, futurologists, economists, IT specialists, sociologists etc.) who have written and who will surely write – they and others – tomes on the Information Era, globalisation, the world that has undergone change and transformation.

However, there may be fellow beings who wonder: *Why is it necessary for this well-known subject to be approached ? Isn't the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy, together with the plans and its implementation programme – at the national level and at the one of its structural entities, sufficient ?* The pertinent answer is the following: information explosion and globalisation urge us to *"redefine our life"*[1], and not only once but continuously, as *"if we do not take action, the shock will be so fast and it will have such an order of magnitude that we will not be able to cope with it"*[2].

In other words, we have to permanently remember that *"change is the only constant*

---

in this world"[3]. We should always pay attention to this truth so that we could cope without reserve, comfort and fear when we have to undergo the changes required by the evolution of the security environment or when we have to suffer the consequences of change. More precisely, we should always be able to pass from storing to applying knowledge, as it is one of the vulnerabilities most people have to face.

The consequences of this way of thinking and acting in our society are known: slower progress than expected and an important gap between the living standard in our country and in the Western countries that are NATO and EU members. The cause of the persistence of this way of approaching life, in its aggregate, is the mindset, which should be changed. It is possible only if we render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, namely to attach proper importance to the individual. Although the individual plays an important part in the transformation process, as a collective character, under the syntagm *human resource*, it does not seem to be the nucleus of the process all the time.

It is well-known that the human resource is the component of the transformation process that not only controls and accelerates it, but also puts in practice the plans and programmes and, subsequently, through processing the results, establishes the measures that should be taken to tailor the plans, programmes and even the objectives and guidelines to meet the new circumstances of the security environment. However, there are malfunctions that become manifest especially in the stages meant to inform and hold people responsible. Doubtless this is the truth. Otherwise, there would not be people who complain that they do not know what they are expected to do or what the future has in store for them (!!). It is difficult to accept this situation since the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* really exists and it lies at the root of the implementing plans for all the structural entities of the military body. However, there are such circumstances and people, so there is a malfunction or even a chain of malfunctions that has to be eliminated. The solution to make all those who are part of the military body aware and responsible is relatively simple to formulate, but it is difficult to implement: *the consistent and permanent investment in people.*

Certainly, there has always been investment in people and, among its results, the following may be mentioned: NATO and EU membership, the good level of interoperability proved by our military, who have executed missions in the theatres

---

[3] John Huey, *The New Post-Heroic Leadership*, in *Leadership in the 21st Century*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, SUA, 1997, p. 3.

of operations and have participated in international exercises, the professionalism proved by the Ministry of Defence personnel through the results obtained as part of varions NATO headquarters, as well as the success of the Bucharest NATO Summit, in April 2008, that was also made possible due to the contribution of the ministry personnel etc.

Despite the success, more could have been done and the experience of the latest years should be taken into account to identify more competitive solutions so that the established objectives could be achieved. The assertion is grounded in the truth all of us should know: nothing is perfect though everything is perfectible ! Analysing this truth thoroughly, we will discover that it reflects *the essence of the transformation process* – the continuous character, the tendency to permanently adapt to the environment.

Our intention is aimed at neither finding faults in everything nor getting stuck in the area of theoretical approaches that are many times preferred, especially in case of thorny problems, but at initiating a debate or at least at convincing those who have something to say and the moral and professional authority to take part actively in the entire process of transformation, not only in the stage of putting in practice the plans and programmes that have already been outlined. Colin Powell says that *"ideas may contribute to the rise and fall of empires"*[4], and we all know that the idea is only the beginning of a process. In a similar vein, Napoleon Hill, a well-known author that addresses the philosophy of success thinks that *"no man is ever whipped until he quits – in his own mind ... [because – AN] it is the human mind that builds or ruins ... [as – AN] the limits existing in our minds are self-imposed"*[5].

We all know that man differs from other beings through the faculty of thinking, namely through its mind. Consequently, the key to all human actions is in our mind. Therefore, any step in the transformation process has to start with people: their education, training, development and motivation. This is, in essence, the key to success: *more attention paid to the investment in people.*

It is known that it is easier to criticise than to transform the ideas into facts, as, when not directly involved, one can see better, but those that have created or built something know better what the difference between the theoretical model (the ideal) and the real one is. It is also known that, in general, criticism demobilises, even when it is considered to be constructive. Accordingly, our intention is to provoke a debate for those who have something to say with a view to determining them to pronounce and formulate new solutions or to perfect

---

[4] Oren Harari, *Secretele lui Colin Powell*, Editura Tritonic, București, 2006, p. 40.
[5] Napoleon Hill, *De la idee la bani*, Editura Curtea Veche, București , 2008, pp. 39, 118, 137, 270.

the old ones, so that they could be better known and accepted by all those who take part in the process.

Many times people know WHAT should be done, but they do not know HOW to do or they are afraid to put their knowledge into practice. Although it is proved that fear is the worst counsellor, as it paralyses the initiative, there are too many people who feel the urge of being supported (supervised), of having one more approval for what they have to do according to their job description. Such an attitude can lead to failure or at best to malfunctions (mismatches, delays, results that are poorer than the expected ones etc.) that require for resources consumption that is higher than the planned one to repair defects and, implicitly, result in a reduced efficiency of the programmes, which may affect the entire process. Life has been a permanent struggle and it will continue to be so. If, at the beginning, man had to fight nature and other fellow beings to survive, at present, the most important struggle is the one aimed at the progress through acquiring new knowledge to be transformed in *"end products"* (tools, technologies, equipment, works of art, substances, algorithms, procedures, computer applications and software etc.), which lead to a longer and better life. This struggle starts with ourselves and we have to fight our weaknesses, comfort, as performance requires sacrifices.

God made man in his own image and likeness and let him *"rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over the cattle and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth"*[6]. But, being endowed with intelligence and because he ate the fruit of knowledge, man has always been animated by the wish to know more and to progress. Thus, modern man is the result of the permanent integration of God's initial gift into the subsequent accumulation of all the generations that have lived on Planet Earth. In other words, we, the people, are the product of not only the divine creation but also of our own will. However, in particular, each of us is what they intend to be only if each has a strong will, because *"the individual's will determines the progress of humanity"*[7]. But even a strong will is not enough for us to achieve all the objectives, especially if they are not realistic ones, namely they are not consistent with our potential. That is why, the necessary conditions for success are for us: *to wish and to be able to accomplish.*

The investment in people should be correlated with the permanent selection of human resource so that those that wish and are capable could be motivated

---

[6] ***, *Biblia sau Sfânta Scriptură*, Geneza 26, Editura Gute Botschaft Verlag, 1989, 1990, Dillenburg, West Germany, p. 2.

[7] Marcus Mabry, *Condoleeza Rice şi drumul ei către putere*, Editura Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 133.

(encouraged and promoted). Namely those people who, after a period of *"assisted development"* (to be understood: education and training), are capable *"to fly"* on the wings of creative imagination, supported by the engines of professional competency and experience, to achieve the established objectives and to create or actively participate in drawing up projects for new strategies, doctrines, concepts, programmes, plans etc., which can contribute to modelling a more competent military body. The permanent selection of the human resource should help people to discover what their qualities are and to find the place that better fits them within the military body.

The goal of investment in people has to be: *the right man in the right place.* For the military body transformation process to meet the objectives that are appropriate to the present stage as well as to the future ones, it is necessary for people, in the double hypostasis, that of leaders and performers, to know what they have to do, how to fulfil their duties and to assume the assigned responsibilities. If these conditions – I consider compulsory – are not met, then malfunctions may appear, because of ignorance, lack of responsibility, or even resistance to change, which become manifest under different forms – be they masked or not.

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

THE PROSPECT OF MESH NETWORKS IN MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS

Major Viorel ȘTEFANCU

The article considers the importance of mesh networks in military communications, in the context of the network-centric warfare.

Firstly, a wireless mesh network – WMN is presented as a new way to interconnect nodes by radio, in networks whose coverage zones overlap. Moreover, the main characteristics and types of WMN architectures are presented.

Secondly, some of the main advantages and disadvantages of WMNs are listed. The most important advantage is that networks are no longer dependent on a single point of failure, while the disadvantages are common to all wireless networks, lower traffic capacity, possibility to be intercepted and influenced by propagation conditions being some of them.

In conclusion, WMNs are adequate in situations when wires cannot be used and they respond to the changes in the size and composition of the unit in the battlefield. Therefore, mesh networks are expected to be used on a large scale in the future, in the Romanian Armed Forces included, as it is stipulated in the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy.

Keywords: *communication systems; multi-hop networks; interface; military communications; network management*

In the medium and long term, according to the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, the implementation of the network-centric warfare requirements is taken into consideration, in order to ensure an adequate response of the troops and timely information, in an appropriate format.

Network-centric warfare is based on communications and information systems able to concentrate in a single system sensors, decision-makers and troops, so as to reduce the time needed for the information to flow along the command chain and to accelerate the battle rhythm.

Nowadays, the communications and information systems are transforming their vertical architecture into a horizontal, integrated and IP-based one[1]. Most of the systems currently in service use wires and microwaves, which provide high data rates but have low mobility and are infrastructure-dependent.

A possible solution to overcome these disadvantages, especially at the tactical level, is represented by the *wireless mesh networks (WMN)*.

Major Viorel Ștefancu – the Air Force Staff.

[1] Jim Hauser, D. J. Shyy, Max Green, *802.11s Military Usage Case*, http://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/04/11-04-1006-00-0003-802-11s-military-usage-case.ppt

This concept describes a new way to interconnect nodes by radio, in networks whose coverage zones overlap.

The *mesh networks* are wireless networks, self-configurable, dynamic, where nodes (radio stations, PDAs, laptops) communicate with each other and automatically set up a network with meshed connectivity. Each node can be both a client and a router, corresponding to the connectivity needs[2].

While the classic, 802.11 standard-based networks are centralised, client-server and with fixed topology, WMNs are distributed, peer-to-peer networks, with dynamic topology. Compared to the classic networks *(figure 1)*, where the nodes can communicate through access points only, that can be connected to other access points by optical fibre or wire, WMNs *(figure 2)* are multi-hop networks, with nodes that can directly communicate, and where data sent by a source pass through more intermediate nodes to other access points or to the destination nodes, connected to the network by radio links, with

Figure 1: **Classic wireless network**

Figure 2: **Mesh network**

omni-directional antennas. In this way, the need for direct line of sight (LOS) between a source and the final user is eliminated.

There are three types of WMN architectures[3]:

a. Infrastructure WMN

As the name says, this type of architecture provides an infrastructure for the clients, which enables the connectivity inside the network and with other types of networks. The infrastructure is made up of routers, which are also designated as *access points*. These routers have multiple interfaces, able to communicate with other routers, other nodes using the same type of radio technology or Ethernet interfaces. Apart from the regular functions that routers perform, mesh routers

[2] Stefano M. Faccin, Carl Wijting, Jarkko Kneckt, *Mesh WLAN Networks: Concept and System Design*, in *Communication magazine*, IEEE, volume 43, 2005, p. 23.
[3] Ian F. Akyildiz, *A Survey on Wireless Mesh Networks*, Georgia Institute of Technology, Xudong Wang, Kiyon, INC., p. 2, www.ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=1632476

have additional functions that can support the creation and maintenance of mesh topology.

Figure 3: **Infrastructure WMN**

b. Client WMN

In client WMN there are client nodes only, which can forward data packets received from other clients, but cannot connect to other networks. Compared to mesh router, mesh clients have less complicated software and technology. Client WMNs are designated also as *MANET (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks)*.

Figure 4: **Client WMN**

c. Hybrid WMN[4]

As illustrated in *figure 5*, hybrid WMNs are made up of both clients and routers. In practice, client mesh can be, for example, the radio stations on the APCs (Armoured Personal Carrier), PDAs or laptops, and access points can be the routers installed in the communication centres.

Advantages of WMNs

The main advantage is that the networks are no longer dependent on a single point of failure[5], like Wi-Fi or Wi-Max

Figure 5: **Hybrid WMN**

networks. Unlike these, when a point of access is down, the data packets will be re-routed to other access points or to other intermediate nodes, which will switch from a client to a router functionality.

---

[4] Asad Amir Pirzada, Marius Portmann, Jadwiga Indulska, *Hybrid Mesh Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol*, p. 1, http://crpit.com/confpapers /crpitv62pirzada.pdf
[5] www.pachethop.com/pdf/pw_junejuly_reprint.pdf

These types of networks are very robust, being able to function even when a large number of nodes are destroyed, because there are many redundant paths that can be used by data packets to get a destination in the network or to other networks, using intermediate nodes and gateways.

WMNs are scalable and can have tens or hundreds of nodes (however, the performance degrades when the number of stations increases). Joining or leaving the network does not require an administrator, because this happens automatically. The capability of self-configuration is one of the technical solutions found by developers to meet the tactical needs, like the reduction of planning and installing time of the communications and information systems. This also contributes to the reduction in the number of the personnel and equipment for the network management. Costs are also lower, because there is no need for base stations, compared to other types of networks[6].

The short distances between the nodes facilitate the use of low transmitting power, which generates tactical advantages (lower probability of interception) and technical advantages (higher autonomy for radio stations). The platforms can be very different, ranging from fighting or special vehicles to soldiers. The best performances, regarding data rates and errors rate, are obtained while using UHF/VHF radios. However, new implemented technologies at the physical layer, like MIMO (Multiple Input/Multiple Output) and advanced signal processing allow for reducing the fading and inter-symbol interferences and, hence, increase data rates for HF radios.

The use of Quality of Service (QoS) techniques enables broadband real-time applications, unicast and multicast, interactive (video-conference) and non-interactive (video-on-demand). The implications are very important as the commander and his staff are aware of the situation on the battlefield, of the effect of using weapon systems on targets, they can avoid surprise and reduce the observation-orientation-decision-action cycle.

Disadvantages of WMNs

First, WMN disadvantages are common to all wireless networks. This includes:

- lower traffic capacity, compared to wired networks;

---

[6] Brent A. Peacock, *Connecting the Edge: Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) for Network Centric Warfare*, p. 13, *Blue Horizon Paper*, Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 2007.

- radio waves are influenced by propagation conditions, which can increase the error rates;
- radio traffic can be intercepted by the enemy.

Additionally, there are some specific disadvantages:

- individual performances of the nodes influence the overall network performance; for example, the connectivity in heterogeneous networks, composed of nodes with very different characteristics, can lead to asymmetric links and high congestions;
- as a result of the distributed topology, detection of a malfunctioning node is difficult;
- WMNs are more prone to security vulnerabilities.

Possible Scenarios

WMNs, as other wireless networks, are especially adequate in situations when wires cannot be used, due to terrain configuration and installation time. As a consequence of the high battle rhythm and mobility, command points are frequently moved, and CIS structures lack the necessary time for the installation of wires. In addition, wiring requires supplementary costs and is less flexible.

Well adapted to the dynamic topologies, WMNs will respond to the changes in the size and composition of the unit in the battlefield. Some characteristics – very short installation time and very high flexibility – recommend the use of WMNs during offensive operations, while others – the possibility of communication beyond the line of sight – make them suitable for defensive operations, in the event of deep defence positions.

WMNs are able to integrate the information received from radars, AWACS, UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), friend-or-foe identification systems and video monitoring systems in a common operational picture, and to disseminate it to HQ and troops. A large number of sensors can be managed due to the capability of self-configuration and the requirements of minimum administration of the WMNs.

Other scenarios that can prove WMN's superiority compared to other networks are described below:

- *during the movement of a unit or large unit*

The convoy can have a length of tens of kilometres, and the coordinating and movement centre can be beyond the coverage zone of the front elements. In this

situation, data packets will be forwarded by the nodes situated along the route to the destination, like in *figure 6*[7].

coverage zone

Figure 6

• *during urban operations*

In urban operations, direct links between source and destination nodes are obstructed by obstacles and the signal is affected by multiple reflections and other interferences. The existence of redundant routes will considerably increase the probability of a continuous and good-quality communication.

• *during reconnaissance missions*, for relaying of images by the recce vehicles

• *for the surveillance of an area of interest*

The sensor networks can be used for monitoring an area, in order to prevent infiltrations or to warn about other actions of the Special Forces. If some sensors are destroyed, the network will continue to function, due to the redundant paths. In dense networks, the small distance between nodes requires small transmitting power and so prolongs the batteries life-time.

• *Blue Force Tracking,* by means of automated position reporting systems.

WMNs were first used by the military, but lately they began to draw the attention of commercial providers and other public institutions. Examples of possible employment of WMN are as follows:

- emergency services in case of natural disasters, which lead to the destruction of telecommunication infrastructure, fixed and mobile; the example of New Orleans after Katrina is to be cited, where the only alternative for immediate communications needs was the WMN;
- provision of communication services in areas with poor infrastructure;
- monitoring of natural phenomena (volcanoes), in areas where the installation of other systems in not possible;
- weather monitoring.

---

[7] Jim Hauser, D. J. Shyy, Max Green, *802.11s Military Usage Case*, slide 9, at the mentioned address.

Layer 3 Protocols

WMNs can be structured in the seven OSI (Open Systems Interconnections) layers[8]:

- physical layer;
- data link layer;
- network layer;
- transport layer;
- session layer;
- presentation layer;
- application layer.

The first three layers deal with the way information is transmitted in the network, while the last four are specific to every type of end-user device. Layer 3 protocols are important for the understanding of WMN. Layer 3 protocols uses the services provided by the data link layer and provides services to the transport layer. The role of the network layer is to forward data traffic, from a source node to a destination node, and must be able to choose one from other possible routes. This role is fulfilled by the *routing protocols*, named also layer 3 protocols, whose characteristics greatly influence the performances of WMNs. A protocol is a set of rules that states the way information is transmitted inside or between networks.

In order to choose a route, protocols analyse and base their routing decision on specific parameters called *metrics*, like *congestion, hop number, end-to-end delay* or *data rate*.

Currently, there are many protocols, standardised and not standardised, grouped by different criteria. Implementation of the right protocol is a critical decision, because a protocol with good performances in small and mobile networks can get bad results in large networks.

There are four main types of layer 3 protocols for WMN: proactive; reactive; hybrid; geographic.

- *Proactive protocols*

Proactive protocols derive their name from the fact that the routing information is determined before it is needed[9], and the routes among nodes are established even though there is no data traffic on them. These are Link State protocols, where

---

[8] www.geocities.com/siliconvalley/monitor/3131/ne/osimodel.html
[9] Krishna Gorantala, *Routing Protocols in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks*, p. 10, www.cs.umu.se/education/examina/rapporter/krishnagorantala.pdf

each node has information about every other node in the network, and the routing table is updated as the topology changes. The main advantage of proactive protocols is the minimum delay of data packets. However, proactive protocols are very complex and, even though good results are obtained in small networks, they are not adequate for large ones, because in this case, the routing table would become too big and high processing capacities would be required.

The most important proactive protocols are: OLSR (Optimised Link State Routing Protocol), TBRPF (Topology Broadcast based on Reverse-Path Forwarding Routing Protocol), MMRP (Mobile Mesh Routing Protocol) and DSDV (Destination Sequenced Distance Vector Routing Protocol).

- *Reactive protocols*

Reactive protocols are also known as *on-demand protocols*, as no information is maintained about the routes with no traffic[10]. Routes are established only when they are needed to relay data traffic between specific nodes. The routing discovery process begins with the flooding with route request packets, and ends either when a route has been found or no route could be identified. The main advantage of this type of protocols is scalability, with low routing traffic compared to other protocols. However, the delay between the moment a route is needed and the moment a route is established makes this kind of protocols not suitable for real-time applications.

Some of the most important proactive protocols are: AODV (Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector), DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) and CHAMP (CacHing and MultiPath).

- *Hybrid protocols*

Hybrid protocols combine the characteristics of the proactive and reactive protocols, in order to use their advantages and to eliminate their drawbacks[11]. The networks are divided in zones of different sizes. Inside these zones are used proactive protocols, and outside reactive protocols. The best-known hybrid protocols are ZRP (Zone Routing Protocol) and ZHLS (Zone-based Hierarchical Link State Routing Protocol).

---

[10] *Ibidem*, p. 11.
[11] Liu Changling, Jörg Kaiser, *A Survey of Mobile Ad-hoc Network Routing Protocols*, p. 7, http://minema.di.fc.ul.pt/reports/report_routing-protocols-survey-final.pdf

• *Geographic protocols*

Geographic protocols take into consideration the distance between nodes and their distribution and location in the network. Nodes' location can be determined with GPS or triangulation techniques, and each data packet sent to a destination will also carry its location in header. The advantage of geographic protocols is that, in the process of route discovery, only a specific area is flooded[12], with the consequence of reduced routing traffic. The efficiency of the geographic protocols depends on the balanced distribution of the nodes as a function of traffic.

Presently, the most frequently used geographic protocols are: LAR (Location Aided Routing Protocol), DREAM (Distance Routing Effect Algorithm for Mobility) and GPSR (Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing).

In conclusion, it is expected that, in the future, WMNs should be used on large scale due to their numerous advantages.

Selective Bibliography

• ***, *Strategia de transformare a Armatei României*, 2007.
• Sonia Waharte, Raouf Boutaba, Youssef Iraqi, Brent Ishibashi, *Routing Protocols in Wireless Mesh Networks, Challenges and Design Considerations*, www.springerlink.com/content/n631603374734768/fulltext.pdf.

---

[12] Karim Seada, Ahmed Helmy, *Geographic Protocols in Sensor Networks*, University of Southern California, p. 4, www.cs.usc.edu/research/techreports/04-837.pdf

SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND PUBLIC RELATIONS IN MILITARY CONFLICTS

Lieutenant Colonel Vespazian Liviu DRAGOMAN

Influencing actions are aimed at affecting or influencing the key elements of the actual or potential enemy on which the effectiveness of the decision-making factor or opinion leaders depend: the will of decision-making factors or leaders to act, the power of understanding and their perception regarding the respective situation, the capacity and/or means available to take action accordingly.

To reach the desired purpose, the author points out that, as far as social influence is concerned, three types of activities are used, which cannot be clearly delimited, even if they influence each other, namely: typical/classic influencing activities; activities carried out against command and command capabilities; information protection activities. These include activities that can be carried out through passive means regarding own equipment, procedures and personnel, generically named operation security and information security.

Keywords: *promoting peace; rules of engagement; information environment; information operations; deception*

In the structure of psychosocial phenomena and processes, *influence* plays an important part, as it is one of the main vectors that model social integration and organisation. The process of *social influence* is correlated with the coordinated development of any social activity as well as with socialisation, integration and interpersonal and psychosocial adaptation.

Influence is understood as the action through which a social actor (individual, group, organisation or institution) determines the change in the attitude and behaviour of individuals or groups. In this case, influence is considered to have a predominantly unilateral character, although there are also feedback reactions that are specific to any interaction context.

The result of social influence is certain pressure on individuals and social groups, namely the imposition of the norms and models that dominate a culture. Through social influence, a tendency to similarity is achieved, which, at the level of the *"targets"* subject to influence, may have the aspect of uniformity, under the form of submission and, last but not least, the tendency to similarity that may take the form of conformism.

Lieutenant Colonel Vespazian Liviu Dragoman – Information and Public Relations Directorate, the Ministry of National Defence.

The dictionary of sociology defines *social influence* as the *"action exercised by a social entity (individual, group etc.) directed towards changing the options and behaviour of another entity"*[1]. Social influence is usually associated with the domain of power relations and social control, although it differs from them, as they do not appeal to constraints.

The plans and capabilities that are specific to influence actions may be used in peacetime to promote peace, to resolve crises, to control their escalation or to project power. The use of influence actions in these circumstances requires the approval, support, coordination, cooperation and participation of the government agencies and departments.

The aim of influence actions is to affect or determine the actual or potential adversary key elements on which the efficiency of the decision factors and opinion leaders depend: the will of decision factors or opinion leaders to take action, their power of understanding, their perception regarding the situation and the available capabilities and/or means to act properly.

To achieve the desired end, social influence actions make use of three types of activities that are difficult to clearly delimit, although they affect each other, as follows:

- *typical/classical influence activities* – conducted with a view to influencing the will of the approved targets, through transmitting, according to the established themes, verbal and non-verbal messages capable of supporting the courses of own actions, of negatively affecting the adversary and of encouraging unfavourable attitudes on the part of the neutral ones;
- *activities directed towards the leadership and command capabilities* – conducted with a view to affecting the decision factors flow of information, focusing on undermining the adversary possibilities to make decisions, transmit and put them in practice;
- *activities meant to information protection* – conducted to protect those critical pieces of information that are necessary for the success of own activities. They include the activities that may be carried out through passive means related to own equipment, procedures and personnel, generically called *operation security* and *information security*, as well as through active means directed towards the adversary information and reconnaissance systems.

Through influence actions, the following are mainly aimed at or protected:
- decision factors/leaders;
- decision-making processes and information infrastructure.

[1] C. Zamfir, L. Vlăsceanu, *Dicționar de sociologie*, Editura Babel, București, 1998, p. 385.

If, during a conflict, the components, structures and specialised means are grouped in elements of destruction/degradation of information, for the operations security, psychological operations, manipulation and deception or electronic war, the aspects are different when we consider stability and/or peace support operations. In this case, a series of factors interfere with the information management to amplify the perception of the belligerents and the population in the conflict area.

The destruction of objectives is limited by the rules of engagement, while public relations and civil-military relations organically integrate. The integrator function is held by information operations. All the processes meant to influence are oriented towards establishing a secure environment for own troops, gaining the population support, influencing civil and military authorities and strengthening the force presence. As a support for psychological operations, information operations are aimed at leaders and decision bodies and are focused on decision-making processes, informational infrastructure, as well as on the belligerents' capabilities, vulnerabilities and reactions.

The domain of information and public relations aims at gaining confidence through:
- providing a large audience with information;
- relating to domains that enjoy great interest;
- achieving and providing information products that have a real and up-to-date contents;
- providing the audience with the information that is permitted and approved to be disseminated.

The role of information and public relations actions is to ensure the message transmission through mass media in every corner of the world. In the event of a conflict, mass media will always find someone to talk to about it.

Because mass media institutions have got to hold a well-determined place in society, and currently they enjoy full autonomy, lying is not recommended in the public information activity. If it happened, someone would find out the truth, and then, no one would believe the information delivered to be disseminated. In the long run, the strategic value of the public confidence in the integrity of information operations is much more important than the value of any military advantage derived from a lie. Moreover, engaging in activities regarding propaganda, censorship or keeping information undisclosed without any motivation is also forbidden.

Mass media has succeeded in converging *"tactics"* and *"strategy"*. The attention paid to the events that provide powerful visual images by national and international mass media may attract the attention of the nation, the world and, more important,

of the political and military leaders towards a particular problem, thus forcing the country political leaders to take response measures very rapidly.

The global information environment provides a rapid and efficient way of transmitting own messages to a global audience, giving the opportunity to achieve the national security objectives through the strategic use of public information. Unfortunately, this is a double-edged sword, as the enemy has the same opportunity to access the information. In addition, because, many times, the enemy is not interested in the long-term value of the information integrity and credibility, it will be always prepared to engage in propaganda and public information techniques that lack in ethics against own forces, in an effort to derive military and diplomatic advantages. Therefore, the global information environment has become a vital battle space for the modern warrior of these days.

On the *"public information front"*, the national will is the centre of gravity, the most important objective to achieve. The importance of national will has been recognised throughout history. Sun Tzu called it *"moral influence"*, while Douhet considered it so fragile as to be destroyed by bombing the population. The goal of public information is to protect and support the own national will and the one of the allies, while the one of the enemy is diminished.

The enemy intentions may be eliminated through influencing the political and military leaders, sometimes directly appealing to the population of the enemy state. The instrument or weapon for these operations is a rapid flow of correct and sincere information. During the Operation *"Desert Shield"*, the President of the USA recorded a message that was transmitted to the Iraqi people without being censored, explaining the fact that America was not against the Iraqi people but only against their leaders.

Unlike the public information actions, the psychological ones are conducted to influence, are intended to be credible, are directed towards a precise target and provide only certain information, carefully selected. Psychological actions usually control the means of transmitting and aim at inducing a certain type of behaviour in the audience. These actions manipulate, are credible and realistic or they only seem to be so and impose a lot of false or distorted information as being true. Control is exercised by certain structures that are strictly assigned this mission, and the goal of the actions conducted is for the adversary to be forced to react in such a way that its interests may be prejudiced.

These actions may:
- destroy the morale, reducing the enemy fighting capacity;
- induce defeatist attitudes and support delusion;
- encourage dissident elements;

- influence friendly population to obtain the allies support, promoting understanding and benevolence;
- facilitate the control of occupied areas;
- counterattack the enemy psychological actions.

For social influence actions to be as efficient as possible, some essential conditions have to be fulfilled: the number of people who receive the message has to be numerous, the time elapsed between sending and receiving the message has to be as short as possible, the transmission channel has to be specialised in transmitting information for the large public. Mass media, the written but especially the audio-video one, meets these conditions. Moreover, it succeeds, involuntarily or not, in amplifying the character of the sent message, thus acting like a resonance box and increasing the initial impact of the message. The combination between psychological influence campaigns and physical attacks against the troops had a devastating effect on the morale of the Iraqi soldiers, resulting in the important number of deserters, civilians who rose against the regime, population who stayed at home or did not involve in actions to support the structures of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

The characteristics of military actions have dramatically changed, and the latest military actions NATO forces have been involved in, from the operations in the Balkans to Operation *"Enduring Freedom"* in Afghanistan, have demonstrated that, in the circumstances in which the purely military approach is not always the appropriate response to any crisis situation, it is necessary for the actions to be coordinated at the political, economic, military and information level to offer a unitary response to the actual situation.

To be able to contribute efficiently to conflict prevention and conflict management, crisis response and post-conflict operations included, the future military actions require the coordinated engagement of the forces and means in the information environment to influence the will, to affect the level of understanding or the decision-making process of the actors involved in the conflict and to protect the own ones.

In conclusion, influence actions do not represent an actual fighting capability but a force multiplier and an instrument to coordinate, synchronise and harmonise military actions in the information domain.

English version by
🖂 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

INDIVIDUAL CAREER
– A Priority in the Modernisation
of Career Management
in the Romanian Armed Forces –

Lieutenant Colonel Ionel ONICIUC-CORDUBAN

Human resource management is among the most fascinating domains, having one of the biggest intellectual, emotional and social significance as far as human activity is concerned.

As everybody knows, human resource management includes career management, whose major component is individual career management. In this respect, the author reviews the domain of the human resource management, defining career as the standard way from receiving the first military rank to being discharged. In the author's opinion, within the limits of this path, each one works their way up. This path is, in fact, the individual career.

The concept of individual career management in the Romanian Armed Forces regulates the various norms and regulations regarding the military career evolution, in terms of competition, transparency, fairness and equal opportunities, in accordance with military needs and individual professional aspirations.

Keywords: *professional hierarchy; military speciality; individual interests; direct dialogue principle; career courses*

In everyday language, the notion of *career* has multiple definitions. At present, there is no official definition that is unanimously accepted and meets the consensus of specialists. In the specialised literature, there are known different formulations and numerous opinions.

In Romanian, the word *career* means profession, occupation and, by extension, it signifies either a good situation or a good position in society[1]. The English Dictionary of Human Resources defines it as a job for which you have been trained and you expect to do all your life[2].

The concept of *career* is utilised in the domain of human activity, most of the time having the meaning of changing one job for another due to the accumulation of a certain work experience or to the promotion in the organisational hierarchy.

The current meaning of the concept of *career* is related to the idea of *evolution* or *promotion* of a person in a certain field of activity, with the purpose of obtaining more responsibility, more

---

Lieutenant Colonel Ionel Oniciuc-Corduban – the Territorial Selection and Orientation Centre, Câmpulung Moldovenesc.

[1] ***, *Dicţionar enciclopedic*, vol. I, A-C, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1993, p. 327.

[2] ***, *Dictionary of Human Resources & Personnel Management*, second edition, Peter Collin Publishing Ltd., 1997, p. 38.

money, or in order to get more prestige and more power. In other words, the *career* represents an important aspect and a significant part of an individual's life.

Gradually, the concept of *career* has acquired a much broader meaning and a more global applicability. Therefore, becoming very complex, this concept is aimed at both all the personnel of the organisation and one's personal development while doing a job, or even while having other occupations.

Thus, according to the specialised literature, the concept of *career* has more meanings, from which we mention the following:

- *career – promotion*[3]: this vision of the career entails mobility, ascension in an organisation or in the professional hierarchy;
- *career – profession*[4]: certain occupations represent careers (managers, professionals, military men), while other occupations are accepted as *"jobs"* (waiters, unqualified workers or shop-assistants);
- *career – succession of jobs in the professional activity*: from this point of view, the *career* represents an evolution of the individual jobs, a succession of functions, in the ascending order of the prestige, that the employee follows, in an ordered, consecutive way, according to a well-established algorithm;
- *career – series of experience-connected roles along our life*[5]: according to this meaning, the *career* represents a succession of work roles of an individual or a succession of separate, correlated experiences that a person goes through in life.
- *career – individual and subjective perception* of the succession of attitudes and behaviours, associated with the work experiences and the activities along one's professional life[6];
- *career – dynamic framework in which a person perceives life in its entirety* and interprets the significance of different personal qualities, actions and things that have happened to him/her.

At the same time, the concept of *career* is influenced by a multitude of *objective factors*, which include a multitude of elements that depend on the context in which every individual works and lives. These elements also depend on the way in which one manages to understand the respective environment. Moreover, the *careers* of individuals are influenced by *subjective factors,* which belong to their personality, as well as to their interests and to the way they manage to know and evaluate themselves.

---

[3] A. Bârcă, *Managementul resurselor umane*, Editura ASEM, Chișinău, 2005.
[4] I. Gamov, *Managementul personalului*, Editura Evrica, Chișinău, 2004.
[5] G. Johns, *Comportament organizaţional*, Editura Economică, București, 1998.
[6] S. Hall, *Cariere profesionale*, Editura Economică, București, 1996.

Therefore, numerous specialists in the field try to make a distinction between the *objective career*, which is based on the development of the personnel and their chances to get a promotion, and the *subjective career*, which is focused on self-perception and the role of work in every individual's life.

Nevertheless, the career evolution is one of the most controversial aspects in the military environment. Because of this, we consider that the approach of this ample and complex problem is risky and represents, at the same time, a challenge to thoroughly research the phenomenon, to investigate aspects connected to this theme, and, on the other hand, an attempt to indicate less studied realities.

The Concept of Individual Career Management

General Considerations

The need for the *individual career management* depends on compatibilities and interoperability with NATO structures; thus, we cannot act in this alliance without being compatible as far as the number one element of any organisation is concerned: *the human being*.

Individual career management represents the central objective of the whole system of human resource management, because it aims at its essential component, namely promoting and filling positions in accordance with the principle *"the right man in the right place, at the right time"*.

In the short run, *individual career management* has as an objective the provision of the candidate who is professionally trained and has the competences specified by his job description. In the long run, the objective is to provide a sufficient number of candidates adequate to fill the leading positions at the top of the military hierarchy, in keeping with the requirements of the jobs.

The concept of *individual career management* in the Romanian Armed Forces regulates the distinct norms and rules regarding the career evolution of the military men, under the conditions of competitiveness, transparency, fairness and equal chances, in agreement with the needs of the armed forces and the individual professional aspirations. Furthermore, *individual career management* comprises the activities of planning, administration, orientation, consultation and career counselling for the military men. Its goal is to prepare them to meet the requirements of career evolution, according to pre-established career trajectories.

The Principles of Individual Career Management

Having knowledge of the current and future tendencies requires an anticipative behaviour of the Romanian Armed Forces, as far as the functionality of *individual career management* is regarded. In order to achieve this, *individual career management* must be based on the observance of the following general principles: *the transparency principle* – the military men will have free access

to the information necessary for filling various functions, for their career evolution, for the possibilities of professional development; *the principle of equal chances* – refers to providing equal conditions of access and participation of all personnel in the process of selection, promotion and professional development; *the integration principle* – the processes specific to *individual career management* take place within an integrated system, at a level that enables all candidates of the same rank and from the same branch or military specialisation to enter the competition, no matter what the structure where they perform their activity is; *the principle of the priority of the armed forces needs* – filling positions is done according to the needs of the armed forces, the requirements of the jobs and the options of the military men (in this order); *the principle of sharing the decision responsibility regarding career evolution* – individual career management must ensure the balance between the needs of the armed forces and the individual interests of the military personnel; *the principle of the controlled management of individual career* – the individual career of military men is carried out in a controlled manner, following pre-established career trajectories; *the direct dialogue principle* – the military men are counselled and consulted, through periodical dialogues, regarding the opportunities of the military career evolution. They are suggested variants of carrier trajectories, in correlation with their aptitudes, with the responsibilities written in job descriptions and the individual aspirations; *the principle of the compulsory stages to go through for career evolution* – the career evolution is conditioned by the fulfilling of certain key career functions, at different hierarchical levels, for certain periods of time, by the graduation of the necessary career and specialisation courses, as well as by the minimum time in rank.

The Basic Components of the Individual Career Management System

Enumerating the individual career management principles, one must also mention the basic components of the system of the individual career management. These are:

- *the organisational framework* – comprises those structural elements that ensure the functioning of the individual career management system and is given by the career management structure, as well as by the organisation and the manner in which the selection committees carry out their activity;
- *the career trajectory* – represents the descriptive theoretical model of the evolution of the career of a military man, starting from the first rank and the first assignment until the moment of becoming a reserve military. Therefore, we can state that the career trajectory refers to the process of rotation of the individual in successive functions, to gain experience and competence in order to prepare for being promoted to higher positions in the military hierarchy.

Moreover, the career trajectory refers to the functions a military must fill at certain stages of the career evolution, to the time necessary to occupy them, and to the training programmes that must be attended in order to achieve his professional competence. Mention must be made that designing the career trajectory must be made in accordance with certain well-established rules, of which we enumerate: the first assignment, the time spent in functions at different hierarchical levels, the time spent in command or leading functions, the minimum time in military functions and structures, the maximum time in functions, the functions rotation, the career courses, the professional improvement or specialisation courses, the minimum time in rank, the participation in missions outside national borders.

- *the selection process of the military man* is instrumental for the individual career management system. We have to take into consideration the fact that it ensures the identification of competitive individuals, with potential for career evolution, and the algorithm by means of which an established committee ensures transparency, fairness and equal chances for the career ascension of military men. Thus, the selection committees have a special importance. They are made up of people of great moral authority, who must confront the job requirements with the qualities and competences of the military men. This fact will enable the committee to select the person who is the best for a certain job. Consequently, the committee must be absolutely neutral, to resort to reason and not to feelings and, based on the obtained data, they must choose the most competitive military man. As a result, we can state that selection is fair and transparent when it is based on clearly defined criteria, approved by decision-making factors, and when it does not analyse the individuals on the basis of previous knowledge, as the result of direct relations, but based on the yearly evaluation documents written by their direct commanders.
- *the registration system of the military men* will ensure the timely identification of the needs for personnel and of the necessary data for the planning of the military career evolution of each military man.

The capitalisation on the *individual career management* system is achieved, from an organisational point of view, within an integrated system, which comprises specialised structures, selection committees, commanders (chiefs) and military men.

What Is a Career Manager ?

The career manager is a very new element in our armed forces. This is the person who provides all the data in a fair competition, and holds all the information instruments about those who are managed in the evolution and progress of their

individual career. In this sense, the working instrument of the career manager for every military is the performance evaluations.

The career manager represents a specialist in the field of human resources, in charge of drawing up a plan for the individual career of the military men in the counselled group, of organising, coordinating and monitoring the activities specified in the plan, of developing analyses and proposals for the selection committees that evaluate the members of the group, and, ultimately, of putting their decisions into practice.

In order to be a good career manager, one must have broad knowledge and personal qualities that will help him/her with the problems related to professional orientation and military career development.

Thus, we can state that some of the responsibilities of the career manager are the following: to design, organise, coordinate and monitor activities in the individual career plan for the military men in the counselled group; to identify training and preparation improvement requirements for the military men in the counselled group; to identify the functions they must fulfil during their career; to plan and monitor the evolution and progress of the individual career of every military man in the counselled group; to establish and maintain a permanent orientation and consultation programme regarding the opportunities for career evolution for the military men in the counselled group; to provide assistance to the selection committees, by preparing and handing in the necessary documents; to write the documents required for enforcing decisions of the selection committee regarding the advancement to another position and the promotion to the next rank; to write the assignment documents and those necessary for sending military men to courses or other forms of preparation.

The following aspects synthesize the profile of the ideal career manager: *desirable knowledge*: the theory and practice of human resources management, juridical knowledge and psychological, measurement systems, computerised instruments for the human resource management, communication techniques, professional equity and ethics, organisational behaviour and *personal qualities:* high capacity for analysing and synthesising, fairness, objectivity, perseverance, excellent communication skills, psychological resistance, patience, understanding, tact, diplomacy, team spirit, intuition, confidentiality.

*

To conclude, we can mention the criteria stipulated by *The Guide to Military Career*[7] for the evaluation and rating of the candidates by the selection committees

---

[7] Ministerul Apărării Naționale, *Ghidul carierei militare,* București, 2005, p. 7.

for career ascension. Filling jobs by the military men should be done according to the following criteria: the years in rank over the legally stipulated limit; the performance in accomplishing their function prerogatives mentioned in the work performance evaluations at the end of the time in rank; the development potential, evidenced by the work performance evaluation; the results obtained for the career courses, which ensure the preparation necessary for the promotion to the next rank; the process of previously undertaken preparation: university degree, post-university education, master studies, specialisation and improvement courses; the level of professional qualification, in the case of specialisations that have class titles stipulated; the professional experience concretised in the held functions, according to the career planning; the accomplishment of the standards regarding the knowledge of the foreign languages utilised by NATO member states; the duration of the participation in theatres of operation and international exercises and missions; their health and level of physical preparation.

The implementation of the individual career management system must make it possible for the objectives established by *The Conception of the Modernisation of the Human Resource Management in the Romanian Armed Forces*[8] to be reached: designing a career structure that should cater for the needs of the armed forces and the individual aspirations of the personnel; bettering the results and development of the potential of military men; increasing transparency, ensuring equal chances and opportunities in the processes of promotion, professional development and career evolution; increasing the motivation for the military career, the professional satisfaction and the devotion of the armed forces personnel for the military institution; maintaining a competitive personnel in the military system; revising the rules and procedures of career evolution, of utilisation during their career and of capitalisation on the potential of the military men.

Considering the current practice in the western armed forces, we reckon it is necessary and topical to draw up a regulation of the individual career management (officer, warrant officer and non-commissioned officer), which should describe in detail each of the stages an individual must go through, from the first assignment to the highest position in the military hierarchy corresponding to that particular category of personnel. This regulation must be based on the norms established by *The Guide to Military Career* and on the career trajectories recently approved and found in *The Conception of Personnel Dynamics*. Moreover, it should provide a clear image, without omissions or any possibilities of interpretation,

---

[8] Ministerul Apărării Naționale, *Concepția de modernizare a managementului resurselor umane din Armata României*, București, 2005, p. 4.

of what the individual as well as the career manager have to do in order to be promoted in the military hierarchy.

In order for career managers to be efficient, it is necessary for an adequate program for their training, preparation and development to be conceived and implemented. For example, in some NATO member states, such as the USA, career managers attend a complex preparation program, designed in such a way to provide them with essential knowledge and to develop the competences necessary for fulfilling the prerogatives specified in the job description. In other states, such as Belgium, the training of career managers is carried out utilising the concept of *"on-the-job training"*.

Selective Bibliography

• Victor Barbu, *Managementul resurselor umane ale apărării pentru asigurarea compatibilităţii cu armatele statelor membre NATO*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, Bucureşti, 2002.
• A. G. Cole, *Managementul personalului*, Editura CODECS, Bucureşti, 2000.
• A. Manolescu, *Managementul resurselor umane*, Editura Economică, Bucureşti, 2003.

ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR AND CULTURE IN THE ROMANIAN MILITARY INSTITUTION

Principal Psychologist Giulia NEGURĂ

The author's study approaches the influence of the features of the Romanian military organisational culture, which, marked by the features of the national culture, is also reflected in the military behaviour at work. Thus, in military structures, the "Power Distance Index" is high. The increasing formalism in the relation between commanders and subordinates determines the personnel not to express any opinions that are contrary to their superiors and execute the orders received without asking any questions. Then, from the perspective of "uncertainty avoidance" in military structures, the author points out the fact that, at the behavioural level, military structures are characterised through strict rules of behaviour, which makes it possible for the anxiety resulted from ambiguity and uncertainty to be much more reduced and for greater tolerance towards the plurality of ideas to be generated. Last but not least, assessing the "masculinity/ femininity" axis, the military domain is defined by competitive relations, which provides military organisations with an attribute of masculinity, not only in terms of its members belonging to a genre.

Keywords: *organisational behaviour; national cultural specific; productivity; uncertainty avoidance; cultural dimensions*

Knowing people in an organisational context, through putting together the issue of human behaviour and of the organisation, has expanded the meaning of the concept of behaviour, as defined by traditional behaviourism, generating the syntagm *organisational behaviour*. Thus, behaviour is not seen only as a stimulus-response reaction, but as a manifestation of the individual psychical life in the organisational context.

Although it may seem simple to define the concept of *organisational behaviour*, as the majority of people considers it refers to the sum of all types of behaviour occurred within an organisation, the definitions found in specialised literature are different, depending on the viewpoint

---

Principal Psychologist Giulia Negură – Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate, the General Staff.

on the phenomenon. Organ and Bateman[2] provide three different ways to define *organisational behaviour*, as follows:
- *"set of psychosocial phenomena"*;
- *"object of study"*;
- *"focus of interest for different groups"*. Thus, the authors make a complete synthesis of the different ways of defining the concept.

The definition of *organisational behaviour* as *a set of psychosocial phenomena* includes the notion in the larger area of the types of behaviour manifested by individuals within the organisation. From this perspective, the concept is seen as a living phenomenon, in all its existential respects. To clearly differentiate it from any other psychosocial phenomenon, the authors mention that it is considered *organisational behaviour* only the type of behaviour that meets the following requirements: it is provoked or facilitated by the organisation, it is caused, determined by the organisational processes and a behavioural-organisational relevance is attributed to it by the members of the organisation. This definition is closer to the meaning assigned to the notion by empirical research.

Being the preoccupation of a series of research fields, *organisational behaviour* may also be defined as an *object of study*. In this context, it is considered an academic discipline and presupposes to describe and explain the notion through a multitude of concepts and theories, to investigate it through specific methods and to generalise it. From this standpoint, stress is laid on the organisational behaviour assessment criteria that, in the authors' opinion, have to refer to efficiency (productivity, profit, development, innovation, adaptation to change) and to people's benefits (satisfaction, personal development, physical and psychical health, security, quality of life).

The definition of *organisational behaviour* as a *focus of interest for different groups* presupposes to capitalise on the results of the research in the field. To study this organisational reality is not significant for itself but for the individual and the organisational groups it belongs to.

A synthetic, integrationist and purely psychological definition of *organisational behaviour* is given by Mielu Zlate: *"The aggregate of the individual or the group reactions to adapt, the global manifestations of the individual or group-organisational psychical activities. In both cases, they may be influenced and guided"*[3]. From this perspective, there are four characteristics of organisational behaviour:
- it has a double quality: effect of the organisation functioning and structure and cause of organisational changes;

---

[2] Dennis W. Organ, Thomas Bateman, *Organizational Behavior. An Applied Psychological Approach*, BPI IRWIN, Homewood, Illinois, 1986.

[3] Mielu Zlate, *Tratat de psihologie organizaţional-managerială*, Editura Polirom, Bucureşti, vol. I, 2004, p. 38.

- it simultaneously affects both the individual and the organisation, in its aggregate;
- it becomes specific depending on the different types of activities the individual and the group are involved in, as well as on the interrelations between them;
- it also gets individualised through its goal that may be to adapt or not to change, to support and promote novelty or to put up resistance to it.

As far as the military organisation is concerned, the syntagm *organisational behaviour* is still new. However, it cannot be ignored as when speaking about the military organisation we more or less directly refer to the behaviour of its members.

Although the military organisation is not among those working places that have a direct productivity, being different from them as far as the tasks and the type of organisation and functioning are concerned, it is a *"humanised organisation"*, in which the human factor plays an essential part.

In this context, we highlight that not only the theorisation but also the practical-applicative study of the interaction between people and organisation should be paid special attention, as they are aspects that represent the essence of preoccupations in the field of *organisational behaviour*.

Military behavioural determinants consist in the set of beliefs and values that are built and found in the public image of the Romanian Armed Forces. The values and beliefs that are specific to the military organisation form what we call *military organisational culture (figure 1)*.

Bringing arguments for its existence, Florin Petruţ states: *"The military organisation, as a social sub-structure that, through the permanence of its functional requirements and the specificity of its means, assures a social control,*

Figure 1: The influence of national culture and of military values on the military organisational culture

has a proper organisation, segregates and includes certain individuals, performs certain types of behaviour and relates to a set of relevant values, to meet the goal. All these aspects entitle us to highlight the existence of a military culture"[4].

[4] Florin Petruţ, *Sociologie*, university textbook, Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, 2007, www.actrus.ro/biblioteca/cursuri/sociologie/petrut/socializarea.html

Unlike culture in general, defined at the level of the population, as far as social and psychological variables are concerned, organisational culture is defined at the level of organisations.

The cultural portrait of the military organisation is not anything else than the result of the impact of the national cultural specific on the value, attitude and behaviour patterns in the military organisational environment.

The impact of national culture on organisations should be neither overemphasised nor ignored. The cultural characteristics of the environment in which individuals educate, train and live work like constraints and influence the organisation functioning.

In the '60s-'70s of the 20th century, Professor Geert Hofstede from the University of Maastricht[5] conducted a research on the differences in values among the employees of a multinational company with branches in 40 countries. The goal of the research was to understand why some organisations of the same company, located in different countries, were more productive than others, although they had a similar organisational culture and used the same recruitment techniques, and the employees could have been expected to have the same behaviour and productivity.

The conclusion of the research is that the employees in organisations assimilate the practices indicated by the organisation but preserve the values of the culture they belong to and that characterises them. These values are expressed in the behaviour adopted by the employees in all respects, from the interaction between colleagues to the way they relate to their direct superior. The research thus emphasises the fact that each nation may be described from the perspective of four bipolar dimensions under which the values of the respective culture may be subsumed:

- the way social inequity, power and authority as well as the relation with the authority are perceived;
- the ways to cope with incertitude and ambiguous situations, to express emotions and to control aggression;
- the way individuals and groups relate;
- the social and emotional implications of gender, masculine and the feminine one respectively.

These bipolar cultural dimensions were subsequently called: *"Power Distance"*, *"Uncertainty Avoidance"*, *"Individualism/Collectivism"* and *"Masculinity/Femininity"*.

---

[5] Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values* (Abridged edition), Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1984.

According to the author, the definitions associated with the four cultural dimensions are the following:

- *"Power Distance"* is the dimension that reflects how the members of a society acknowledge and accept social hierarchy, which triggers differences as far as behaviour is concerned.
- *"Uncertainty Avoidance"* comprises the aspects that differentiate societies depending on the way they assume risk, tolerate ambiguity and need strict rules and procedures to function.
- *"Individualism-Collectivism"* is the dimension that refers to the manner in which the culture of a society influences the gender-related behaviour of its members.
- *"Masculinity-Femininity"* represents the way in which cultural differences are influenced, as a result of the importance societies attach to competition versus cooperation, to the objectives achievement versus interpersonal relations, to aesthetics and the quality of life versus materialism and, especially, to the roles and characteristics assigned to each gender in society.

Using the conceptual framework and the investigation methodology proposed by Hofstede, in 2005, in our country, a comparative study regarding Romania and other countries was conducted by the Gallup Organization[6]. The study, whose goal was to identify the commonalities and differences between the values and behaviour of the Romanians and of the members of other nations, demonstrated that Romania has values that are similar to those of other Balkan countries, as follows: high power distance, collectivism (low degree of individualism), femininity and a high degree of uncertainty avoidance. Cultural dimensions were assessed on a scale having values from 0 to 100, and three classes of interpretation: 0-40 – low level; 41-60 – medium level; 61-100 – high level *(table 1)*.

	Power Distance	Uncertainty Avoidance	Individualism/ Collectivism	Masculinity/ Femininity
Romania – poll 2005 –	70	61	49	39

Table 1: **Indices values, according to G. Hofstede model**

The conclusions that were drawn from the interpretation of the significance of the indices recorded by the Romanian sample for the four dimensions were the following:

- Romania signals the need to have authoritarian leaders, centralised decisions, and the population wants to follow the rules established by the leaders

---

[6] Gallup Organization Romania, *Studiu despre valorile şi comportamentul românesc din perspectiva dimensiunilor culturale după metoda lui Geert Hofstede*, 2005 [www.geert-hofstede.com].

(*"Power Distance Index"*). Although the index for this dimension was situated in the *"high level"* (70) class, there was a question whose interpretation led to a very interesting idea: the majority of the sample questioned affirmed that subordinates preferred to be consulted by superiors in the decision-making process. This preference for a participative and cooperative approach to the leading style, in contradiction with the evident need for authoritarian leaders, has led to identifying a characteristic that is specific to our country, called by the authors of the study the *"complex of power"*, in which the term *"complex"* has the meaning it usually bears in psychology. This characteristic may explain some people's obstinate refusal to obey the rules and to acknowledge authority, while they request rules and regulations. If we look back in time, some decades ago, we find that the great thinker and scholar Constantin Rădulescu-Motru mentions the *individualism in the soul* among the fundamental characteristics of the Romanians. The author explains: *"the Romanians want to be on their own. They want to be absolute masters at home (…). That is why they are a little bit inclined to anarchy* [7]. In addition, the author notes that breaking rules and regulations is a direct manifestation of this subjective individualism: *"The Romanians consider that breaking the rules and regulations is a sign of grandeur and power"* [8].

• Romania is highly anxious about the future and prefers the certitude of today to the incertitude of tomorrow (*"Uncertainty Avoidance Index"*). The high level of uncertainty avoidance (61) shows that the population feels more comfortable in situations of general consensus than in situations that generate anxiety and uncertainty. Moreover, the high level of anxiety determines the need for an immediate reaction, the impulse to express negative emotions without control. In this respect, Constantin Rădulescu-Motru emphasises the Romanians tradition regarding collective work: *"The population in the countryside is marked by the tradition of collective work. Each countryman does what he considers everyone will do. He does not have the courage to start a work when it is not established by custom. For the Romanian countryman, to be different from others is not simply a risk but a proof of insanity"* [9].

• Romania is a collectivist society (*"Individualism/Collectivism Index"*). According to the value of the index that assesses this dimension (49), the population of our country is tributary to the need for collectivism, opposed to that of the individualism that springs from the members of the society need for self-affirmation and financial independence. Collectivism, opposed to individualism, is not one of the characteristics of modern Romanian society. Constantin Rădulescu-Motru highlighted it more

---

[7] Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, *Psihologia poporului român*, Editura Paideia, București, 1999, p. 16.
[8] *Ibidem*, p. 29.
[9] *Ibidem*, p. 16.

that 50 years ago: *"The Romanians seem to have a group consciousness rather than an individual one"*[10]. Group consciousness is the fundamental feature of collectivism, sort of unity between the members of the society souls, and it is built through *"gregariousness"*: *"Gregariousness is the result of imitation (…). A society with a gregarious soul does not oppose to imitation: its members have slightly similar souls, which leaves room for imitation (…). Gregariousness is the souls harmony gained passively, almost mechanically"*[11].

• Romania is a feminine country, namely the members of the society seek for a collaborative environment and ask for the members of the society to support them, irrespective of their degree of involvement (*"Masculinity/Femininity Index"*). The index value (39) of this dimension places our country among the predominantly *feminine* peoples. It means that the two genders roles are not predetermined, men assuming the responsibilities of women with easiness and vice versa. The population is, in general, less competitive or greedy. People adopt values that have mainly feminine characteristics, like personal spare time and cooperation to the detriment of performance objectives.

Subsequent to the above-mentioned conclusions, it has been highlighted that Romania, like the other countries in the Balkans (Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania), and the Anglo-Saxon countries are at opposite poles, although it borrows managerial practices in the field of human resources from the latter ones. Naturally, the following question arises out of this conclusion: *How appropriate and successful are these practices for the future of the Romanian organisations ?*

Appealing to the framework for interpretation developed by Professor Geert Hofstede, we will try to analyse the military organisational culture and behaviour, deriving from and reflecting the dimensions and values of the contemporary Romanian culture, as they are revealed by the above-mentioned study and by other papers on sociology related to the Romanians behaviour.

Any attempt to approach this issue realistically should start from *"what we are"*. Contrary to the desideratum that corresponds to the syntagm *"what we should be"*, the answer to the question *What* and *How we are* requires an honest and thorough self-reflexive exercise.

Almost 20 years after the Romanian Revolution in December 1989, we can state that our country has experienced a profound transformation, starting from a dictatorial, overcentralised political regime and trying to build a democratic regime that allows for the integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, such as the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.

---

[10] *Ibidem*, p. 41.
[11] *Ibidem*, p. 43.

The revolution in 1989 is an important milestone in the development of the Romanian military organisation, as it delimits two distinct stages of this process. Replacing the communist regime with the democratic one means, for the military organisation, too, *"interrupting the type of institutional reproduction"*[12].

Another important aspect that has fundamentally influenced the transformation of the military organisation is the need for the armed forces to meet the requirements related to their new missions. If, in the previous period, the role of the armed forces was to assure national security in a relatively *"passive"* way, once Romania adhered to the discouragement policies adopted by the governments of great powers, which redefined the military organisation tasks and missions, more and more frequently using the syntagm *"peacekeeping through armed forces"*, the same role has to be assured *"actively"*, which is characteristic for the military professional. The transition from conscription to professionalism, on a voluntary basis, in the armed forces is specific to the countries that have a democratic regime.

Our country embraced the model of the NATO member countries professional armed forces, a fact that was politically and judicially *"sealed"* with the adoption of the Constitution of Romania, in 2003. The option for professional armed forces was one of the requirements of the democratisation process started after 1989.

In conclusion, we may appreciate that the transformations the military organisation has undergone after 1989 have been echeloned, based on many conceptual re-adjustments in concordance with the trends in the evolution of Western armed forces, and have determined a series of changes in the field of organisational culture and behaviour. However, there is a series of perennial characteristics deeply imprinted in the existential matrix of the Romanian people out of which the armed forces too gain vigour.

Therefore, the characteristics of the Romanian military organisational culture, bearing the hallmark of the national culture, are also reflected in the military behaviour at the workplace:

• In military structures, *"power distance"*, as an indicator of individual differentiation, is, certainly, high. This dimension, which reflects the way the members of the military organisation acknowledge and accept the precisely delimited hierarchy of functions and ranks, the decisional and executive levels, as well as the authority, results in differences among individuals as far as their behaviour is concerned. Thus, the pronounced formalism in the relationship between superiors and subordinates determines the personnel not to express points of view that are different from the ones of the superior and to execute the received orders without asking questions.

---

[12] Constantin Niculae, *Schimbarea organizaţiei militare – o perspectivă (neo)instituţionalistă*, Editura Tritonic, Bucureşti, 2004.

• The *"uncertainty avoidance"* level is also high in the military structures. It is reflected in the fact that, as far as behaviour is concerned, military structures are characterised by strict behavioural rules, which determines the anxiety derived from ambiguity and uncertainty to be mitigated and to generate great tolerance towards the pluralism of ideas. At he same time, emotional manifestations are sometimes considered less desirable, from the organisational point of view.

• Analysing the basic features of collectivism, the very strong feeling of belonging to a group, the personal identity, given by the self-perception of the individual inclusion in the group, we may appreciate that the military organisation is a strongly collectivist structure. In the military institution, people represent a real investment, their affective and effective involvement, as well as their engagement, are considered moral, and the positive attitude of the individual towards the group is encouraged.

• From the perspective of the *"masculinity/femininity"* axis assessment, the military domain is especially defined by competition relations that provide military organisations with the attribute of masculinity, not only as far as the members belonging to the gender are concerned. A special importance is attached to ego-psychological needs, recognition, achievement, challenge, although many of the characteristics of feminine societies, such as good capacity to relate in society, cooperation, agreeable climate etc. may favour military structures functioning. Therefore, military behaviour is strongly intentional, determined, combatant, contrasting with the behavioural characteristics of the Romanian civil society.

As it has already been mentioned, the specific of the military organisational culture is not influenced by the dimensions of the national culture only. The fundamental element of military organisational culture development is represented by *values*. Built on specific beliefs, values and attitudes, *military culture*, in its aggregate, is an institutional culture, belonging to the armed forces as a social structure. Through the essence of its institutional culture, the military organisation has always been the promoter and bearer of the highest moral standard.

Because, in this attempt, we have not intended to discuss aspects related to the specificity of the military values in the current period, we can ask, inviting you to reflect, the following questions: *how topical and coherent is the system that used to promote the military ethos before December, the previous set of attitudes, the functional aspirations to fulfil the assigned role ?; How and to what extent can we speak today about* **patriotism, self-sacrifice, military solidarity, loyalty to the military institution** *or* **organisational devotion,** *as values that are specific to the military ?*

<div align="right">

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

</div>

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IS ALSO AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE EU'S SCIENCE STRATEGY

Dr Janez POTOCNIK

If Europe is to breathe new life into its largely discredited Lisbon strategy, a comprehensive new strategy for science, research and technology is needed, says Janez Potocnik, adding that the strategy is as relevant as ever because of its aim to make the EU the most competitive and knowledge-based economy, notably through the implementation of the European Research Area.

The author places technology and innovation at the root of economic power, pointing out the need for multiplying the benefits of research as well as for providing proper support for scientific research and technological development. He reviews the measures already taken and elaborates on those that should be considered in the future in this domain, concluding that an integrated European Research Area will determine Europe's attractiveness as a destination for Research & Development investment.

Keywords: Lisbon strategy; technology and innovation; research and development; European Research Area; "Fifth Freedom"

Like arts and culture, science used to be considered a luxury – albeit a useful one – that societies could afford only in prosperous times. Today is hardly a time of prosperity, but no one would contest our need to maintain the EU's scientific effort. Obviously, pure science will not help us to overcome the economic crisis, nor mitigate its consequences. But most people would agree that technology and innovation are at the root of economic power, and that research has become deeply embedded in the fabric of our society. And we in Europe are not the only ones to be concerned about its future: *"We will restore science to its rightful place"*, said Barack Obama in his inauguration speech, the rest of which was largely devoted to the economic crisis. He followed up on his commitment when at the end of April he announced the US ambition to spend at least 3% of its GDP on R&D and international scientific collaboration.

I hope that the same thinking will predominate in Europe; science and research are vitally

important in preparing our economy for the post-crisis world. Europe remains the second largest scientific power in the world, and by far the top destination for R&D investment by American and European multinational companies. That is a sound basis to build on, because we in Europe could multiply the benefits of our research and make ourselves the world leaders in innovation if only we would develop a more comprehensive science and technology strategy.

But we Europeans are still far from providing the support which scientific research and technological development need. Despite some progress, the overall European research effort has stagnated for years at around 1,84% of EU GDP. Our latest data show that this average figure hides great differences. Despite a general effort from the less well-performing countries – mostly the new member states – to approach the 3% of GDP target, the variations between member states remain significant. At the same time, US investment in the field stands at 2,61%, even though it too is stagnating, and Japan's investment is at 3% significantly above that. More striking still is the situation in emerging countries like China, which are swiftly catching up with the most advanced regions of the world.

It would be an error to put the blame exclusively on European governments who contribute to the public part of the investment. A closer look at the figures reveals that Europe's underperformance in research funding compared to the US lies in the weakness of private investment. The level of R&D investment in Europe reflects our industrial structures, in which the high-tech sector has a smaller role compared to other economies. The intensity of R&D investment within industrial sectors is also generally lower in Europe than in the US. But now the situation requires a sustained effort from European governments, which have to keep investing in research to create the counter-cyclical effect needed in times of economic breakdown, and also need to orient this investment in strategic areas to ensure tomorrow's competitiveness. They need to actively create the framework conditions for research and innovation, the roadmap for which was laid out in the *EU's Lisbon strategy* that member states adopted in 2000 and agreed to reinvigorate in 2005. It is often said that this strategy has not been as effective as expected, particularly because of flaws in its implementation. There is some truth in this, and the real test now is to find the right way to induce action by national governments. A permanent effort is needed to reinforce the impetus gained nine years ago, because the core of the *Lisbon strategy* is as relevant as ever because of its aim to make of the EU the most competitive and knowledge-based economy, notably through the implementation of the *European Research Area (ERA)*. As to the European Commission, within the limits of its legal competence, it supports the member states by proposing and promoting the measures needed to create the ERA.

It is worth looking at the ERA in more detail. For obvious reasons, starting with the growing costs of research and the scale of some of the problems research and technology are supposed to help to solve (in fields like health, energy, climate change and environment), science policy issues are increasingly addressed at European level. A genuine EU research policy is being implemented, based on EU funding, to create a European market for research and technology and to coordinate research across Europe. The ERA strives for the free movement of researchers, technology and knowledge, and call this the *"Fifth Freedom"* in recognition of its power to boost the European economy in much the same way as the free movement of people, capital, goods and services.

But EU research policy is approaching a crossroads. The coming months will see the mid-term evaluation of *Framework Programme 7*, much discussion on the future of Framework Programmes, in general, the EU's future budgetary arrangements (the new financial perspectives), a new Commission and hopefully the implementation of the *Lisbon treaty*. All of these offer a new opportunity for defining the EU's next steps towards a new science strategy.

Which direction could we and should we move towards ? One can credit the past 40 years of EU research funding and policy with having significantly raised the average level of research. Europe could progress further by creating the conditions for acting in a much more integrated manner on research and technology. We need to act on three fronts: larger-scale collaboration between member states, better methods for distributing EU funding and by combining our technology and industrial policies.

EU research policy has since its earliest beginnings supported cross-frontier collaboration as a way of maximising the added value of European funding. Up to and including FP6, these collaborative partnerships were between research teams; but from FP6 (2003-6) to the current FP7 (2007-13), they have been extended to national research programmes. This will continue under the label *"Joint Programming"* following a July 2007 proposal by the Commission. The joint programming of national research agendas will focus on *"Grand Challenges"* in such areas as energy, health and aging that are beyond the scope of anyone. Another example of this joint approach is the planning of research infrastructures. The *European Strategy Forum for Research Infrastructures (ESFRI)* brings together EU Member States and associate countries to plan the pan-European Research Infrastructures needed for the coming 10-20 years. The Commission has proposed a *"European Research Infrastructure"* regulation to provide a European status for large-scale EU research infrastructures, and it would also enable them to be

recognised as international organisations. I hope that this regulation will be adopted by the Member States as soon as possible so that future European research infrastructures can be put together faster and more efficiently.

We are still far from having fully realised the potential for transnational partnerships. There is still a gap between simple projects and large programmes, so there is both a clear need and a latent demand for some form of collaboration at the level of full research institutions. This would imply joint initiatives involving a small number of partners like research centres and universities that would pool significant parts of their activities. This is already starting to happen. Ten leading European Research Institutes have banded together as the *European Energy Research Alliance (EERA)* to conceive and implement joint research programmes on clean technologies as part of the *Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan*, adopted by the Council last October. Ways of supporting this sort of joint venture could be developed in a more formal framework along the lines of two recent initiatives: the *"Networks of Excellence"* and the *"Knowledge and Innovation Communities"* of the *European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT)*, which could become a kind of "distributed European MIT" bringing together academic research teams and units from different countries in a context of industrial applications and technological innovation. Some say that the EIT is a risky experiment, but isn't it precisely what the EU needs if we are serious about encouraging innovation and entrepreneurism ?

Another step towards a comprehensive science and technology strategy would be to re-examine the EU rulebook for funding research. The present framework is the product of history; it has been developed by adapting legal and regulatory structures that were conceived for other purposes than research funding.

We have already taken a step in this direction with the creation of the *European Research Council (ERC)*, which funds individual scientists and their projects without any partnership obligation. Another recent addition to the European research family is the *European Research Executive Agency (EREA)* to which we have outsourced the management of research funding. The idea is that by delegating to these bodies the management of funding, the European Commission's *Directorate General for Science and Research* will be freer to focus on shaping European research policy.

Scientific research as such is only part of the picture. Much more challenging is the question of how to create a genuinely European industrial and technology policy. Alongside the creation of the European Research Council, the major novelty

of the 7th Framework Programme has been the launch of a number of *Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs)* that associate public institutions and large private companies in fields like aeronautics, electronics and pharmaceuticals. These initiatives could add-up eventually to a modern industrial policy that is being implemented at European level. In the US, industrial and technology policy is implemented with support going to private enterprise, not through research funding in the main, but through public procurement, in particularly although not exclusively in the defence sector. Isn't it time for Europeans to explore public procurement in such fields as clean transport, health infrastructures and energy ?

But to do so would demand a clear vision and strong commitments from all the EU's Member States and institutions. These troubled times in fact offer us a narrow window of opportunity that should not be missed. What is at stake is an integrated European Research Area that will determine Europe's attractiveness as a destination for R&D investment.

NATO NEEDS TO THINK TWICE ABOUT ITS FUTURE

Xinghui ZHANG

Xinghui Zhang, a journalist for a major Chinese newspaper, gives a personal account of how he has gained greater insight into NATO: and how he feels that NATO needs to focus more on its future development. First, the author outlines the three main trends of the changing world, based on which NATO will make clear the strategic direction of its transformation: cooperation has replaced confrontation, peace has already become a common universal goal and further economic and social development is in the mutual interests of all state and non-state actors.

Then, he mentions the way NATO has been transforming itself since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War: NATO is enlarging its membership, it launched out-of-area campaigns, it has established a worldwide network through its various partnership programmes and, as the author believes, the organisation is seeking to change itself into an omnipotent giant.

To conclude, the author mentions a few steps taken in the establishment of an official relation between China and NATO.

***Keywords:** NATO; partnership programmes; international peacekeeping efforts; NATO eastward enlargement; NATO-China relations*

Let me start by telling you what NATO once meant for me. It was an operationally mysterious, geographically faraway and adversarial organisation. This held true during the *Cold War* – and in certain periods after.

Why ? Well, it was *"operationally mysterious"* mainly because of its opaque policy-making process and the fact that its activities had little to do with Chinese political, economic or social life. It was *"geographically faraway"*, because all its members are Western European and Northern American countries. And it was *"adversarial"* because its original core purpose was to confront the former Soviet Union Communist Bloc.

For these reasons, I once viewed NATO as a *"big stranger"* and considered it a tool used by the USA to expand its *"global hegemony"*. So it was natural that there was no relationship between China and NATO.

Then, in 1999, NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during its airstrikes on Milosevic's regime. Three Chinese citizens died. Few had thought that the first direct contact between NATO and China would occur under such terrible circumstances.

At that time, I was working as a journalist in the *"China Youth Daily"* newspaper's headquarters in Beijing. I shared the bitter emotions of my infuriated colleagues. I witnessed the waves of demonstrations and protests by various ranks of Chinese people in the streets.

It was that embassy bombing that sowed seeds of hatred in the hearts of Chinese people – and which seemed to make any kind of relationship between China and NATO impossible.

© Oliver Atkins
One of the first major initiatives designed to lead to a rapprochement between the West and China was led by President Richard Nixon in the 1970s.

The Chinese say that one can enjoy a successful life if one knows how to give up unnecessary things. I think this holds true for NATO.

Fast forward to the end of 2007, and I arrived in Brussels as my newspaper's bureau chief. That has given me the chance to follow NATO to its doorway. And to think carefully about questions like *"what is NATO really about"*, *"where is NATO heading"* and *"how is NATO being transformed ?"*. What follows is a summary of what I have concluded.

The world today is undergoing tremendous changes and adjustments. All the players in the world system should have a clear understanding of the main trends and, from these, work out their own positions.

Personally, I see three main strands.

First, cooperation has replaced confrontation. NATO is an organisation that grew up in an adversarial environment. Whether NATO can fully rid itself of this confrontational ideology will decide whether it can be transformed successfully within the international community.

Second, peace has already become a common universal goal. NATO, as the most powerful military group in the world, bears the unmistakeable responsibility of demonstrating to the world that disputes do not need to be resolved by military means.

Third, further economic and social development is in the mutual interests of all state and non-state actors. NATO (apart from its own development) needs to make its own unique contribution to the creation of peaceful development for all mankind.

On the basis of these three main trends of the changing world, NATO will make clear the strategic direction of its transformation. It will map out its long-term missions without being interrupted by short-term difficulties. Just as a Chinese poem says, *"Unworried about floating clouds blocking the view, as one is already at the very top of the mountain"*.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Communist Alliance, NATO has been transforming itself continuously in four ways.

First, NATO is enlarging its membership. NATO has added ten former communist countries or republics of the Soviet Union as member states in two major rounds of the eastward expansion. In 2009, two more will be added to the list.

Secondly, NATO launched out-of-area campaigns. Originally, NATO was designed to contain the expansion of the Communist influences and defend Western Europe. The geographical areas of NATO's

Shanghai today: as China's skyline changes, should its approach to NATO too ?

mission were clearly restricted by its founders. But in the post *Cold War* era, NATO directly got involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars, and assisted the African Union in expanding its peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Meanwhile it is still playing a role in Iraq's transition.

Thirdly, NATO has established a worldwide network through its various partnership programmes. To extend its global influence, NATO tailored different partnership programmes for different countries in the world, such as *Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,* etc. These programmes help NATO's antennae reach a large number of the countries in every continent.

Fourthly, I believe that NATO is seeking to change itself into an omnipotent giant. NATO, in substance, is a militarily defensive organisation. But in fact, I believe it has behaved in an opposite way if you look at its activities in the 1999 Kosovo War and the current counter-terrorism war in Afghanistan. On the other hand, NATO keeps extending its interests into many areas in which defence organisations normally seldom get involved. For instance, NATO has jumped into the businesses of climate warming, energy security, education training programmes, and the like.

The Chinese have a proverb which effectively says that one can enjoy a successful life as long as one knows how to give up the unnecessary things. I think this holds true for NATO. So I believe it would be wise for NATO policy makers to shortlist the priorities which NATO can do best.

It is easy to see that China is one of the major global powers which has no official relations with NATO.

Terrorism is a material threat to the world. After the September 11 terrorist attack on the United States, NATO swiftly changed its focus to counter-terrorism. Since August 2003,

NATO has been leading international peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan. But up to now, there are no clear signs proving that NATO can achieve these designated goals in the foreseeable future. A failure of NATO's operations in Afghanistan would inevitably lead to increasing doubts about the necessity of its existence. So I argue that NATO should take the mission in Afghanistan as its top priority and devote itself to fulfil the task.

It is a common interest for all countries to see security and stability in Afghanistan resume. The war in Iraq has proved that exporting Western freedom and democracy does not work. If NATO wants to bring success to Afghanistan, it should learn the lessons from Iraq. I think a key one is that NATO has to gain the understanding and cooperation from the rest of the world: but it also has to respect particular traditions, histories and cultures.

On enlargement, I think NATO should stop and *"digest the fruits of previous expansions"*. After the *Cold War*, NATO expanded its members from 16 to 26, and probably to 28 next year. Increasing the number of members risks causing internal rifts and weakening its consensus policy-making capacity. The leadership of NATO needs to prevent the organisation becoming a two-tiered one.

NATO's Achilles' heel was exposed by the measures it adopted to deal with Russia during and after the Georgian crisis: France and Germany did not want NATO to play a bigger role and NATO had very limited leverage to counter-balance Russia.

Externally, NATO's uninterrupted eastward enlargement has contributed to a deteriorating relationship with Russia and caused the watchfulness of China. Looking around the relationships built up by NATO in the world, it is easy to see that China is one of the major global powers which has no official relations with NATO.

In the past six years, NATO and China have gradually developed some official contacts and academic exchanges, which paved the path for both sides to move out of the shadows cast by the Belgrade embassy bombing. If NATO and China further strengthen this mutual understanding, it is highly likely that they will establish some kind of official relationship. But *"it takes two to tango"*, so NATO and China should make joint efforts to move on.

Confucius said, *"From the age of 60, I have been able to distinguish right and wrong in other people's words"*. In 2009, NATO will be 60 years old. I hope Confucius' words hold true for it too.

THE EUROPEAN UNION – Why Such a Democratic Deficit ? –

Dr Pierre VERLUISE

Starting from the book "L'Europe, l'Etat et la démocratie", the author raises a few questions regarding the participation of European citizens in the European Parliament elections in June 2009.

In this respect, the community model, the average voting participation of Central and Eastern European countries, the European project and numerous political controversies are discussed. On the other hand, the period the European Community was established (1948-1969) appears as one of empirical invention, explorations and compromise. The result is a European construction, marked by the importance attached to law, construction of a common market and political cooperation.

The article ends in the same interrogative note: is low participation, in fact, a sort of avoidance strategy ? Moreover, the author wonders whether the elections for the European Parliament will lead to the enhancement of the link between citizens and the European Community.

Keywords: European Community; European project; mutual interests; democratic deficit; political-economic elites

The approach to the European Parliament elections in early June 2009 causes concern about the participation of European citizens in this important moment of their democratic life. Beyond the issue of participation[1], this election calls us to consider a paradox. The European Community is undoubtedly a democratic area; however, the EU suffers from a democratic deficit[2]. Why ?

Is the democratic deficit of the European Community just coincidence ? In this respect, Paul Magnette has provided some elements of a possible answer in a key book: *"L'Europe, L'Etat et la democratie"*[3].

Ever since the late '40s, he explains, the invention of the community model has appeared as a result of a bypass strategy, a palliative of the impossible great federalist and political strategy. *"What characterises the minor way of the European construction is the projection of the first alternative, which establishes an opposition between the federalists*

and the sovereignists, and the domination of the other two (the supporters of the politics and the advocates of functionality). The revival orchestrated by Schuman comes indeed from the belief of some activists, whose central figure was Monnet, according to which the European project cannot move forward unless we put an end to the political controversies around some institutions, sensitive by force of circumstance, because they affect concepts and symbols in order to focus on the content of cooperation. The change of strategy consists in focusing on the substance instead on the form, with the secret hope that the former will determine the latter"[4].

After the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the failure of the European Defence Community illustrated *a contrario* the major difficulties of this pathway. This voluntarily led to leaving aside the institutional issues that could have caused discontent. Ultimately, the moment of the creation of the European Community (1948-1969) appears as a period of empirical invention, of explorations and compromise. The result is a European edifice, marked by the importance given to law, the construction of a common market and political cooperation.

Paul Magnette raises interesting questions: *"We can question the attitude of governments. Are they so hostile to the jurisprudence progress that are suggested by competitive representation ? Are they really unable to prevent judicial activism and forced to comply with it ? And isn't sometimes their inertia a form of benevolence towards the decisions that suit them best and they could not afford to make ?"[5].*

In fact, an active "elite", united by a culture of common interests, made use of less political dimensions, of the right, in this case, to promote supranational institutions and policies. Why is this possible ? *"The favourably attitude of states towards the Court [of Justice of the European Communities] is probably explained through the fact that their leaders have* an interest *in their normative work"[6].* This way of functioning is, in fact, an indirect way to secure the other partners. This may also be the result of a form of *"complicity"* between *"elites"*. This determines the use of a more accurate proportion between the interests of the national political game.

In the same way, the pattern of the relations between politicians and community technocrats is marked by many signs of willingness to cooperate rather than compete.

---

[2] On 14 February 2000, the *"Declaration on the future of the Union"* adopted by the Conference of Representatives of the Governments of Member States, held in Brussels, said: *"The Conference recognises the need to improve and ensure the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its institutions to bring them closer to the citizens of the Member States".* The Convention, chaired by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, was especially designed to provide a partial solution to this deficit now formally admitted.

[3] Paul Magnette, *L'Europe, l'Etat et la démocratie. Le Souverain apprivoisé*, Brussels, ed. Complexe, August 2000.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 44.

[5] *Ibid*, p. 80.

[6] *Ibid*, p. 96.

"In the long term, promoting deregulation and privatisation doctrines is not the direct effect of the [European] Commission, which is aware of some disputes within it, but the result of a progressive convergence of politico-economic elites around these objectives and means. One can notice here is a process that is largely similar to the one that led to Monetary Union: the national elites converted to liberal beliefs have used the [European] Commission to pursue policies they thought they were unable to impose on themselves. National administrations, which, together with bureaucracy, find a source of independence in their respective governments, have been particularly active in this dynamic, same as economic actors, who see this as a benefit, being exempted from national regulations. Nevertheless, governments cannot claim to have been doubled by other segments of their states, since it is their responsibility to make decisions that ascertain their choices. They cannot claim to be victims of the extension of majority voting, which they themselves have decided and which may allow them to avoid the right of veto, even if this can claim a vital interest. It is, in short, an outsourcing of coercion, wanted by the states, or at least, by significant segments of the states, which has made it possible for them to break free of the national constraints operated in a very technical world and, by virtue of its legal nature, with an objective pretension"[7].
Many of the officials concerned are aware of the limitations of this process, but how could they resist the temptation ?

The 2004 enlargement did not have the effect of a *"magic wand"* as long as the end of the *"democratic deficit"* of the European Union is expected. Rather contrary, given that most new member countries have such little participation. If the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have just gotten used, such as the United Kingdom, to an average participation of less than 37%, this will become a real challenge to the legitimacy of the European Parliament. Austria, for instance, shows that a recent membership can quickly lead to a low participation.

And what if the democratic deficit was nothing but a boomerang effect, namely the political result of the mode of historic production of the European Economic Community and the European Union ? The so-called outsourcing model of obligation has eventually (re)found the limit it intended to circumvent: the population. So not to write the sovereign people. Isn't it, ultimately, less deceived than the leaders who would like to believe all this ? Isn't the low participation a form of avoidance strategy ? In June 2009, have the elections for the European Parliament opened the door to strengthening the link between citizens and the European Community ?

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

---

[7] *Ibid*, p. 127.

THE "NEW TERRORISM"

Dr Nagaioh MANOHARAN

The author approaches the issue of terrorism, contrasting the "old" with the "new" one.

Firstly, the different meanings attached to terrorism throughout history are discussed. The aim is not to add a new definition but to offer a proper context for the concept of "new terrorism" to be better understood.

Secondly, the characteristics of the "new terrorism" are listed. Thus, the "new terrorism" is described as being global and amorphous, its perpetrators having wide-ranging motivation. In addition, it results in numerous innocent victims, as the attacks are more and more lethal. Moreover, the diverse support systems act like force multipliers.

Thirdly, different means of countering the "new terrorism" are mentioned. Having in view its complex nature, a "new" set of counter-terrorist policies is required. Appropriate methods should be used to prevent as well as to deter terrorists. In addition, a multilateral approach is imperative.

In conclusion, the author states that it is necessary for the fight against terrorism to be compatible with fundamental freedoms and human rights.

Keywords: *terrorism, globalisation, characteristics of "new terrorism", counter-terrorist comprehensive convention.*

Starting the last decade of the last millennium, the phenomenon of terrorism has been redefined. Moreover, since the French Revolution, when the term *"terrorism"* became prominent, its connotation has undergone changes over a period of time. It is pointed out that there are at least 212 different definitions of *"terrorism"* throughout the world, 90 of them being used by various governments and institutions over the past two centuries[1]. Yet, there is no single internationally acceptable definition of *"terrorism"*, making it one of the most disputed terms in social sciences[2]. The aim here is not to add yet another definition of *"terrorism"*, but to describe the term in the traditional sense so as to place the concept of *"new terrorism"* in a proper context.

Evolution of the "Old"

At the layman's level, terrorism can be defined as the illegal use of political violence, although, when the term firstly came to the fore during the French Revolution, it had a positive connotation, being used as *"an instrument of governance"* to *"consolidate the new government's*

[1] Jeffrey D. Simon, *The Terrorist Trap*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994, p. 29. See also David Rapoport, *Terrorism*, in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (eds.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 1061.

[2] Alexander Spencer, *Questioning the Concept of "New Terrorism",* in *Peace, Conflict & Development*, Issue 8, January 2006, p. 2.

power by intimidating counterrevolutionaries ..."[3]. However, with the spring of democracy and liberalism in Europe in the 19th century, the term started gaining revolutionary and anti-state connotation, exactly the reverse of the earlier Robespierreian context. In the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, terrorism meant *"propaganda by deed"* to attract public attention to the then existing anarchist terrorist groups and their cause[4]. Except during the interwar period, when state terrorism dominated, the revolutionary connotation of terrorism continued even after the Second World War. Significantly, it meant violence used by anti-colonialist and indigenous nationalist groups especially with the sponsorship of some sovereign states.

During the *Cold War*, some American scholars went to the extent of regarding terrorism *"as a calculated means to destabilise the West as part of a vast global conspiracy by the USSR"*[5]. *"Terrorism"* also got associated with the *"proxy war"* employed by the smaller states to take on the powerful ones without risking formal retaliation. This was when the well-known phrase of *"one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"* came to the fore bringing in the problem of moral judgement while defining the term *"terrorism"*. This problem continues even today, not as a moral dilemma, but more as a usage for convenience by the states that sponsor terrorist groups to *"bleed their enemies"*. The use of terrorists as *"surrogate warriors"* by some states to take on their powerful adversaries has become a kind of asymmetric strategy mainly to escape identification, retaliation, and sanctions. In its evolution, the term *"terrorism"*, thus, from a *"positive"* origin reached the other end of the spectrum to bear a *"pejorative"* and subjective connotation[6].

Birth of the "New" ?

Down the evolutionary ladder, the term further became more pejorative, although less subjective. In the 1990s, the concept of *"New Terrorism"* started appearing in the literature on terrorism as the *"grey area phenomenon"* mainly to describe catastrophic and religiously motivated terrorism threatening *"immense regions or urban areas"*[7]. Soon, new patterns of terrorist attacks were conspicuous

---

[3] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 3.

[4] See James Joll, *The Anarchists*, Little Brown, Boston, 1964.

[5] See for instance *The Terror Network* by Claire Sterling, claiming that the Soviet Union was the source of all international terrorism in the world.

[6] Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism*, in Michael Foley (ed.), in *Ideas that Shape Politics*, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1994, p. 189.

[7] Main works that highlighted this emerging phenomenon were Max G. Manwaring (ed.), *Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder*, (Westview, Boulder, 1993); Xavier Raufer, *Gray Areas: A New Security Threat*, in *Political Warfare*, no. 19, Spring 1992.

to force the acceptance, if not formalise, the concept of *"New Terrorism"*. The New York World Trade Centre bombing, in 1993, and the Sarin gas attack in Tokyo, in 1995, can be taken as defining timelines between the *"old"* and the *"new"*. In the Indian context, it was Mumbai (formerly Bombay) serial blasts of March 1993. Some called it *"postmodern"*[8] or *"catastrophic"*[9] terrorism. While some described this as the *"fourth wave"* in the evolution of terrorism, a metamorphosis, having been preceded by terrorism focused on the breakup of empires, decolonisation, and anti-Westernism[10]. In short, it is described as a *"new evil in our world"*[11] that encompasses *"both the dark forces that threaten ‹‹civilisation›› and the fears they arouse"*[12].

Walter Laqueur notes that *"there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, in the character of terrorism"*[13]. Although the *"New Terrorism"* is not fundamentally or qualitatively *"new"*, but grounded in an evolving historical context, there are some characteristics that should be acknowledged that distinguish it from the *"Old Terrorism"*. Those distinctions vary from its amorphous and global nature, the character of perpetrators, organisational structure, motivation, lethality, support systems and technological sophistication.

Characteristics of the "New Terrorism"

• **Global and amorphous**. While the old style terrorism is not wholly but mainly local, the *"new terrorism"* is mainly global. As a result, the traditional distinction between local and international terrorism has blurred. The globalised *"flat world"*[14] has facilitated not only the movement of terrorists, but also their operations, support system and methods. With advancements in information and communication technology, terrorists are now in a position to guide operations thousands of kilometres away. The World Wide Web is also used as a tool of propaganda and fundraising by the terrorist groups[15].

---

[8] Walter Laqueur, *Postmodern Terrorism*, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, no. 5, 1996, pp. 24-36.

[9] Ashton B. Carter, John Deutch & Philip Zelikow, *Catastrophic Terrorism*, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, no. 6, 1999, pp. 80-94.

[10] David C. Rapoport, *The Fourth Wave: September 11 and the History of Terrorism*, in *Current History*, December 2001, pp. 419-424. According to Rapoport the "four waves" were Anarchist Wave, Anti-Colonial Wave, New Left Wave and Religious Wave.

[11] George Jones, *We Will Help Hunt Down Evil Culprits*, in *London Daily Telegraph,* 12 September 2001.

[12] Geoffrey Nunberg, *The War of Words: "Terror" and "Terrorism"*, in *International Herald Tribune*, 22 July 2004.

[13] See Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, Oxford University Press, London, 1999.

[14] For detailed exposition on the "flat world", see Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: The Globalised World in the Twenty-First Century*, Penguin Books, London, 2006.

[15] Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism Goes Global: Extremist Groups Extend their Reach Worldwide*, Brookings Institution, 23 February 2009.

The organisational structure of the new terrorist groups is more networked than the traditional-formal-hierarchical one of the old. Pyramids have been flattened with multiple leaders wielding authority. Decision-making and operations are decentralised, allowing for local initiative and autonomy[16]. Although the network-based structure existed earlier, what is new is the professional way of networking in the globalised world. Most of the present-day terrorist groups prefer operating in small, dispersed and autonomous entities, yet linked by advanced communications and *"shared principles, interests and goals – at best an overarching doctrine or ideology – that spans all nodes and to which their members wholeheartedly subscribe"*[17]. Simon and Benjamin term such arrangement as a combination of *"a <hub and spoke> structure (where nodes communicate with the centre) with a <wheel> structure (where nodes in the network communicate with each other without reference to the centre)"*[18]. Overall, the structure *"sometimes appears acephalous (headless), and at the other times polycephalous (Hydra-headed)"*[19]. This phenomenon is called by various names: *"leaderless resistance", "phantom cell networks", "network of networks", "lone wolves"* and *"franchise terrorism"*[20].

The new form gives them more flexibility and adaptiveness to the rapidly evolving situations. The network-like form also increases their resilience as even few of its constituent entities are destroyed, while the others carry on[21]. As a result of loose, informal organisational structure, it is difficult to find terrorist groups having a permanent infrastructure in place. For training, they tend to utilise more of *"how to do"* or *"do it yourself"* sources freely available on the Internet, and for physical/weapons training they take the help of freelance, retired or disbanded military personnel. They are trained not only in the military art but also in the *"black arts"*[22]. Amateur groups prefer taking short-term training courses from established terrorist groups. For instance, cadres of Indian Mujahedeen are trained by Lashkar-e-Toiba in Pakistan. It is due to this amorphous nature that the new terrorists are difficult to spot and counteract[23]. The anonymous nature of modern-day terrorists is further reinforced by their comparative disinterestedness to claim

---

[16] Ian Lesser et al, *Countering the New Terrorism,* Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, p. 51.

[17] *Ibidem*.

[18] Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, *America and the New Terrorism*, in *Survival*, Vol. 42, no. 1, 2000, p. 70.

[19] John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt & Michele Zanini, *Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism*, in I. Lesser et al, *op. cit.* p. 51.

[20] Raymond Whitaker, *Bin Laden Hunt Stepped up*, in *Canberra Times*, 22 March 2004.

[21] David Tucker, *What's New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It ?*, in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 13, Autumn, 2001, p. 1.

[22] Col. Russ Howard, *The New Terrorism*, MIT Security Studies Program Seminar, 9 March 2005.

[23] David Tucker, *op. cit.* p. 2.

credit for their attacks. According to statistics, only about 30 percent of all terrorist attacks in 2004 were claimed[24].

• **Wide-ranging motivation**. The *"new terrorism"* is also characterised by perpetrators who are paranoiac and fanatic elements especially from the right. Religion has emerged as a predominant impetus for terrorist attacks unlike predominantly secular motivations of the *"old"* one[25]. Political impulse for committing terrorist acts has fallen from being a priority. Consequently, the new terror groups have *"radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation and justification, concepts of morality and Manichean world views"*[26]. Their sense of alienation makes them all the more deadly as for *"the religious terrorist, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative"*[27]. The struggle is seen as *"good against the evil"* and therefore large-scale violence is morally justified as necessary for the advancement of their religious cause. They hold themselves accountable to none other than to *"their own God"* or their representatives[28]. The inevitability of their victory is taken for granted for *"God too plans"* for them and *"would grant victory"*[29].

The rabid motivation of present-day terrorists also lies in *"inhuman hatred, all-consuming ill-will and raging fanaticism"*[30] in addition to personal vengeance. Suicide attacks are mostly *"motivated by the desire for revenge and retaliation"* rather than by deprivation or love for a political cause. Significantly, most of the Islamist terrorists have deep hatred towards the West, in general, and the United States, in particular. A fatwa issued by the *World Islamic Front: Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders* on 23 February 1998 pointed out *"the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty of every Muslim who*

---

[24] Craig Whitlock, *Terror Probes Find "the Hands, but Not the Brains"*, in *Washington Post*, 12 July 2005. See also Bruce Hoffman, *Why Terrorists Don't Claim Credit*, in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 9, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 1-6.

[25] Kumar Ramakrishna & Andrew Tan, *The New Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prescriptions* in Andrew Tan & Kumar Ramakrishna (eds.), *The New Terrorism – Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies*, Eastern Universities Press, Singapore, 2002, p. 6. According to Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, only two out of sixty-four international terrorist organisations in 1980 could be classified as religious. This figure has risen sharply to twenty-five out of fifty-eight by 1995. By 2009, religious-based terrorist groups were predominant. See Nadine Gurr & Benjamin Cole, *The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction*, I. B. Tauris, London, 2000, pp. 28-29.

[26] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 88.

[27] *Ibidem*, pp. 88-89.

[28] Bruce Hoffman, *Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative*, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 18, no. 4, 1995, p. 273.

[29] Gamat al-Islamiya (Islamic Group), *Statement on US Sentencing of Sheikh Rahman*, 19 January 1996.

[30] B. S. Raghavan, *Fight the War on New Terrorism to the Finish*, http://www.rediff.com//news/2008/may/14guest1.htm

can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it ...”[31]. Osama bin Laden made the *“holy war”* between Islam and the Western world as his sole mission and went on to invoke religion to spur terrorist attacks.

• **Numerous and innocent victims**. Present-day terrorist attacks have become bloodier. Accordingly, the choice of victims by the new paranoiac terrorists has been indiscriminate. The aim is no longer to conduct *“propaganda by deed”* but to effect maximum destruction[32]. Thus, the *“new terrorism”* is not only deadlier but also more indiscriminate and unpredictable, which is evident in attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing, the Tokyo subway attacks by the Aum Shinrikyo cult, Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, 9/11, London train bombings and more recently Mumbai attacks.

The *“new terrorism”* aims at destruction as an end in itself, while the *“old terrorism”* used violence that was *“targeted and proportionate in scope and intensity to the practical political objectives being pursued”*[33]. In other words, it is *“a terrorism that seeks the total collapse of its opponents”*[34]. As some experts aptly put it, *“they [the new terrorists] believe that their violence is divinely justified and that great goals require dramatic means, and the dramatic means is mass bloodshed”*[35]. This is evident in the increase in the number of casualties per attack. They are *“freed from ordinary constraints of morality. ... There is less inhibition to kill in quantity and a greater willingness to die in the process”*[36]. Although the use of suicide/suicidal tactics existed before, their use is more predominant now because martyrdom is seen as a way of reaching heaven. The *“suicide terrorist production line”*[37] has become all the more easier than ever before. This is one of the main illustrative characteristics of the new terrorism[38].

Unlike in the past, both the incidents of terrorist attacks and the casualties per attacks have increased. For instance, 0,17 percent of international terrorist

---

[31] Quoted in Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden’s al Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network,* Transnational, Ardsley, 2001, Appendix 1 B.

[32] Walter Lauquer, *No End to War*, in *Continuum*, New York, 2003, p. 9.

[33] Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, *America and the New Terrorism*, in *Survival*, *loc. cit.*, p. 65.

[34] Dore Gold, *The American Spectator*, March/April 2003.

[35] Karen DeYoung and Michael Dobbs, *The New Terrorism: Global in Scope, It’s Based not on Politics but Fervor*, in *The Washington Post*, 18 September 2001.

[36] *Ibidem*.

[37] The elements of this *“production line”* include the establishment of a social contract, the identification of the *“living martyr”* (which accrues great prestige within the community), and – in the culminating phase – the production of the final video. See Jerold M. Post, *Addressing the Causes of Terrorism Psychology*, paper presented at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March 2005, Madrid.

[38] Except the LTTE and PKK, all other terrorist groups that employ suicide attacks are religiously motivated.

attacks in 1995-1999 caused 67 percent of the casualties[39]. In this regard, urban terrain holds significant advantages for terrorists. It is in urban areas where targets are most varied and abundant: laymen, officials, foreign nationals, corporate heavyweights, government buildings with symbolic/strategic value, bus stands, railway stations, airports, markets, foreign embassies, communication centres etc. By attacking high profile symbolic targets, terrorists wish to make a point that if a government fails to protect high value targets, it is obvious that it may not be in a position to protect the normal ones. As a result, the credibility of the government of the day is undermined.

Since the quality and quantity of terrorists' *"defined enemy"* is high in cities, the impact of a destructive act is more widespread. Urban operations often demand less for terrorists in the way of brute physical strength and endurance than do operations in mountainous or rural terrain[40]. And they do not need sophisticated long-range weapons to inflict desired damage. As is the characteristic of urban areas, population is not only high but also dense. Unlike in rural areas, inhabitants in cities and towns are more heterogeneous, which gives more space for anonymity. It is this posture of anonymity that enables the terrorist fish to swim easily; an excellent place for camouflage. For terrorists, logistical support like arms, medicines, food, and lodging are readily available in an average urban area[41]. Manoeuvrability of terrorists is guaranteed by the presence of public and private transportation facilities that are both dependable and unobtrusive. In urban areas, a terrorist group may find it easier to recruit prospective terrorists in a predictable manner, for it is the city that nurtures dissidence in general. Cities are the nerve centres of a country[42].

Since terrorism is *"propaganda by the deed"*, the attention-seeking goal of the terrorist is well served in the urban environment, where the immediate audience is greatest and where representatives of print and electronic media are readily available and quite eager to report. Such coverage also magnifies the fear-generating capabilities of terrorists. If the general population begins to fear, the objective of a terrorist group may have been achieved. Overall, an urban landscape facilitates terrorists in realising their goals: surprise, maximum damage with minimum risk, hyper media attention and subsequent disappearance[43].

---

[39] *The US State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism* (2002), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002/pdf/index.htm

[40] Edward L. Glaeser and Jesse M. Shapiro, *Cities and Warfare: The Impact of Terrorism on Urban Form*, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, in *Discussion Paper* no. 1942, December 2001.

[41] *Why is Terrorism an Urban Phenomenon?*, in *Financial Express*, 15 February 2009.

[42] Joshua Woods et al, *Terrorism Risk Perceptions and Proximity to Primary Terrorist Targets: How Close is too Close ?*, in *Human Ecology Review*, Vol. 15, no. 1, 2008, p. 64.

[43] Jo Beall, *Cities, Terrorism and Urban Wars in the 21st Century*, Crisis States Research Centre Working Paper no. 9, February 2009.

• **More lethal attacks**. The *"new terrorism"* is described as *"far more lethal than anything that has come before it"*[44]. Accordingly, their choice of weaponry, techniques, and tactics are made to meet the objective of causing mass casualties in a more lethal manner. The new terrorists are more *"high tech"*. Terrorist arsenal is not only deadlier, but also more miniature and sophisticated, obtained from various sources. Through the general diffusion of scientific skills and dual-use technologies, there is a danger of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists, who wish to use them for mass destruction[45]. For instance, al-Qaeda considers as a *"religious duty"* to acquire WMDs[46]. WMDs are highly destructive, but also difficult to defend. They may produce an enormous psychological impact because of the sheer fear they inspire. The new terrorists have no taboo, no morality and see no reason to limit extreme violence that might trigger a backlash. Their *"purpose is not to intimidate or persuade but rather simply to destroy"*[47]. The new cohort of terrorists believes that they have to do something spectacular to receive a grand attention. To them, according to Bruce Hoffman, *"both the public and media have become increasingly inured or desensitised to the continuing spiral of terrorist violence. Accordingly, these terrorists feel themselves pushed to undertake even more dramatic or destructively lethal deeds today in order to achieve the same effect that a less ambitious or bloody action may have had in the past. Indiscriminate lethal attacks against civilians are also motivated to demonstrate that the state is incapable of protecting its citizens"*[48]. They feel driven by the urge to surpass previous *"body counts"* and the scale of destruction. Thus, there is an unrelenting upward spiral of violence.

• **Diverse support systems**. State sponsorship has also become more subtle and diverse in the new form of terrorism. Today, one can see resources from many countries for terrorist groups routed through a single organisation or state. Diverse state sponsorship has, in fact, acted as a *"force multiplier"* by enhancing planning, intelligence, logistical capabilities, training, finances, and sophistication

---

[44] Dore Gold, *The American Spectator*, March/April 2003.

[45] For a more detailed view on terrorism and WMDs, see Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, *America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack,* MIT, Cambridge, 1998; Jessica Stern, *Getting and Using the Weapons* in Russell D. Howard & Reid L. Slayer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism – Understanding the New Security Environment*, McGraw-Hill, Guildford, 2003.

[46] Osama bin Laden's interview to Rahimullah Yusufzai, dated 23 December 1998, cited in Ben Venzke and Aimee Ibrahim, *The al Qaeda Threat: An Analytical Guide to al Qaeda's Tactics and Targets*, Tempest Publishers, Alexandria, 2003, p. 53.

[47] David Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[48] Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorism: Trends and Prospects*, in *Countering the New Terrorism*, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1999.

making the new terror groups more akin to elite commando units. In addition, support from non-state *"amorphous constituencies"* has swollen[49]. Moreover, a new dimension of private sponsorship has come to the fore. Now, individuals like Osama bin Laden run foundations like al-Qaeda to support terrorist projects they consider worthy. Declining costs for conducting terrorist attacks have increased the confidence of terrorist groups to become independent of state sponsors. The modern-day terrorist groups have also been increasingly relying on their own income generation through illegal sources such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, video piracy and credit card fraud, as well as legal business investments, donations from wealthy individuals, charities and diaspora[50]. Due to advanced communication and information technology, appealing to their supporters and sympathisers, near and far, has become very easy.

Countering the "New Terrorism"

The *"new terrorism"* is seen as *"a threat to all states and to all peoples, which can strike anytime, anywhere"*[51]. Yet, the world has not fully grappled with the ways to deal with this new form of threat. Amorphous nature of present-day organisational structure of terrorist groups is deliberate not only to thwart any easy identification but also to facilitate the escape of terrorists. The *"new terrorism"* is more lethal, claiming more casualties than ever before. *Religion* and *revenge* factors constitute major ingredients of motivation to the new cohort of terrorists. They are high-tech, professional and leave fewer footprints[52]. The present-day terror groups are difficult to penetrate. The funding for them has become diverse and, at the same time, opaque. Therefore, it is difficult to identify and fully block the funding sources. Since the target of the new form of terrorism has become more urban-oriented, it gives an added advantage to terrorists to prevent any kind of indiscriminate counter-terrorist operation by the state that could maximise collateral damage. For the same reason, the use of aerial bombardments against terrorists becomes difficult.

Countering this complex nature of terrorism effectively requires a *"new"* set of counter-terrorism policies. The entire counter-terrorism mechanisms demand

---

[49] Mathew J. Morgan, *Origins of New Terrorism*, in *Parameters*, Spring 2004, p. 37. See also Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999.

[50] Nimrod Raphaeli, *Financing of Terrorism: Sources, Methods, and Channels*, in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 15, no. 4, 2003, pp. 59-82.

[51] Kofi Annan, *A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism*, Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, in *Terrorism and Security*, 10 March 2005.

[52] Raymond Whitaker and Paul Lashmar, *Franchise terrorism: "Trying to Hit al-Qa'ida is Like Trying to Hit Jelly"*, in *The Independent*, 10 July 2005.

a thorough overhaul based on clear understanding of the threat potential of the *"new terrorism"*. What is required is a comprehensive approach based on thinking beyond conventional methods.

The basis for any counter-terrorism policy, at the outset, should be *"zero tolerance"* – terrorism as a means of redressing grievances is unacceptable under any circumstances. Addressing the *"root causes"* of grievances is vital. Some of the important *"root causes"* that require immediate attention include deprivation, inequity, religious intolerance, discrimination etc. By neutralizing the causes, most, if not all, militants can be dissuaded from resorting to violence as a means of achieving their ends. Appropriate methods should be used to prevent and as well to deter terrorists. Appropriateness is such that *"one does not use a tank to catch field mice – a cat will do the job better"*[53].

Multi-pronged and multilateral approach, as well as solidarity within the international community is imperative. The strategies should involve the prevention and elimination of sources of terrorism wherever they are rooted, effective mechanisms of sanctions, transnational cooperation of all law enforcement authorities. Despite 12 international treaties relating to terrorism, a comprehensive convention covering all aspects of counter-terrorism is missing. Such a convention should be powerful enough to deter states from supporting terrorist groups. Multilateralism should not prevent states from having bilateral arrangements aimed at enhancing intelligence ties between the security agencies of their countries, mutual sharing of database and experience on counter-terrorism, as well as joint training/exercise of their forces.

At the same time, the fight must be compatible with fundamental freedoms and human rights. The argument is that if we compromise on the *"core values"*[54] in our response, we are handing a victory to the terrorists. In other words, any counter-terrorist strategy disregard for human rights keeps alive the underlying tension, hatred and mistrust of government among precisely those parts of the population where terrorists are most likely to find recruits. A vicious circle should not start all over again.

---

[53] Charles Foley (ed.), *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, Longman, London, 1964, p. 71.
[54] The United Nations identifies these "core values" as the rule of law, the protection of civilians, mutual respect between people of different faiths and cultures, and peaceful resolution of conflict.

THE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 2008

Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force

Part II: Trends Influencing the World's Security

> *Engage people with what they expect; it is what they are able to discern and confirms their projection. It settles them into predictable patterns of response, occupying their minds while you wait for the extraordinary moment – that which they cannot anticipate[1].*
>
> *Sun Tzu*

Trend analysis is the most fragile element of forecasting. The world's future over the coming quarter of a century will be subject to enormous disruptions and surprises, natural as well as man-made. These disruptions, and many other contiguous forces, can easily change the trajectory of any single trend. The *Joint Operating Environment* recognizes that many, if not all, of the trends and trajectories of the future will be non-linear. But for the purpose of analysis, it has used a traditional approach to examine many of the trends and utilized conservative estimates. For instance, demographically, it has used estimates from sources such as the *U.S. Census Bureau*. Economically, the *Joint Operating Environment* assumes growth rates for developed countries of 2.5% and 4.5% for developing countries, including China. It is in this manner that this study considers the trends below. In the final analysis, the value of the trends lies not in accurately predicting them, but in intuiting how they might combine in different ways to form more enduring contexts

---

[1] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. and ed. by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford, 1963, p. 92.

for future operations. Trend analysis can also help in identifying some indicators or signposts that one can use to *"check"* the path that the world takes into the future and make adjustments as necessary. Nevertheless, the resource and strategic implications of even a conservative and linear rate of increase possess consequences that suggest a dark picture of the future.

A. Demographics

A good place to begin the discussion of trends is demographics, because what is happening demographically today, unless altered by some catastrophe, has predictable consequences for the populations of regions and states. Equally important, it possesses implications for future strategic postures and attitudes. In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s. Ninety-five percent of that increase will occur in developing countries. The more important point is that the world's troubles will occur not only in the areas of abject poverty, but also to an even greater extent in developing countries, where the combination of demographics and economy permits populations to grow, but makes meeting rising expectations difficult. Here, the performance of the global economy will be key in either dampening down or inflaming ethnically

or religiously based violent movements.

The developed world confronts the opposite problem. During the next 25 years population growth in the developed world will likely slow or in some cases decline. In particular, Russia's population is currently declining by 0.5% annually, and given Russian health and welfare profiles, there is every prospect that decline will continue, barring a drastic shift in social attitudes or public policy. As a recent *Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS)* report suggested, *"Russia needs to cope with a rate of population decline that literally has no historical precedent in the absence of pandemic"*[2]. To Russia's west, a similar, albeit less disastrous situation exists. Overall, European nations stopped replacing their losses to deaths in 2007, and despite considerable efforts to reverse those trends, there is little likelihood their populations will significantly increase by the 2030s. This raises serious concerns about the sustainability of economic growth in that region. It also has serious implications for the willingness of European societies to bear the costs involved in lives and treasure that the use of military force inevitably carries with it.

Likewise, Japan's population will fall from 128 million to approximately

---

[2] Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), *"The Graying of the Great Powers"*, Washington, DC, p. 7.

117 million in the 2030s, but unlike the case of Russia this will result not from any inadequacy of Japanese medical services, which are among the world's best, but from the collapse of Japan's birthrate. The Japanese are taking serious steps to address their demographic decline, a fact which explains their major research and development efforts in the field of robotics as well as their shift to a capital-intensive economy.

Over the next quarter century, China's population will grow by 170 million, but its population will age significantly because of strict enforcement of the government's edict of one child per family. An additional demographic factor, which may impact on Chinese behavior, is the choice of many families to satisfy that limitation with a male child. How the resulting imbalance between young males and females will play out by the 2030s in China's external and internal politics is impossible to predict, because there are few historical analogues. Nevertheless, there are some indications of an increasing predilection to violence among Chinese youth, while there have been exuberant displays of nationalistic feeling among the young in response to criticisms of China's behavior in Tibet.

Demographics:
Population by Age

- Eight billion people in the world by 2025 (2 billion more than today).
- Nearly all growth in the developing world.
- Absolute decline in Europe, Japan, Russia, and Korea.
- The U.S. will add 50 million people by 2025 (unique among the developed countries of the world)

## World Population Pyramids

A population pyramid is a demographer's tool used to track the size and age composition of a country or group. Each bar represents an age group in four-year increments (youngest at the bottom) with males on the left and females on the right. The pyramids above show projected populations of selected countries in the 2030 time frame and the width of each pyramid is to scale. Thus, we see a 2030 Yemen that rivals Russia in terms of population. Developed countries generally show a

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

typical "inverted" pattern with dramatic declines in the raw numbers of youth relative to the retired. This pattern of decline will be difficult to manage as most welfare systems in the developed world are based on an assumption of moderate population growth. Developing countries such as Nigeria and Yemen illustrate how the population pyramid in fact got its name, and are typical of fast-growing countries with large multichildren families. The effects of China's one-child policy are clear, especially when compared to fast-growing India. The United States occupies a middle position among states, with a large, yet relatively stable population.

By the 2030s the U.S. population will climb by more than 50 million to a total of approximately 355 million. This growth will result not only from births in current American families, but also from continued immigration, especially from Mexico and the Caribbean, which will lead to major increases in America's Hispanic population. By 2030 at least 15% of the population of every state will be Hispanic in origin, in some states reaching upwards of 50%. How effective Americans prove in assimilating these new immigrants into the nation's politics

Source: United Nations Populations Reference Bureau

and culture will play a major role in America's prospects. In this regard, the historical ability of the United States to assimilate immigrants into its society and culture gives it a distinct advantage over most other nations, who display little willingness to incorporate immigrant

populations into the mainstream of their societies.

India will grow by 320 million during the next quarter of a century. The tensions that arise from a growing divide between rich and poor in a nation already driven by a multiplicity of races and religions could seriously impact on its potential for further economic growth. Exacerbating tensions will be the divide between the sub-continent's huge middle class and those in the villages mired in poverty, as well as the divide between Muslims and Hindus. Nevertheless, India's democratic system gives some latitude for political changes to accommodate society's poor.

The continued population growth across the Middle East and in Sub-Saharan Africa has only recently begun abating, but not fast enough to forestall a demographic crisis, where economic growth fails to keep pace with population growth. In areas of abject poverty, continued growth among the youth has significance for the employment of U.S. forces called upon to feed the starving and mitigate the suffering. Where economic growth fuels but does not satisfy expectations, the potential for revolution or war, including civil war, will be significant.

Even as the developing world copes with its youth bulge, the developed world will confront its acute aging problem. By the 2030s the number of elderly people in developed countries will double. In Japan there will be

63 elderly for every 100 workers, with Europe not far behind with 59 per 100. The United States will be slightly better off with 44 elderly per 100 workers. Even China will see its ratio of elderly to working population double (from 12 to 23 per 100 workers) as a result of better diet and improved medical care. Such demographic trends will make it less likely that nations in the developed world will sacrifice their youth in military adventures, unless extraordinary threats appear. Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.

Around the world, humanity is on the move, with Muslims and Africans moving to Europe, ethnic Chinese moving into Siberia, Mexicans and other Latin Americans moving north to the United States and Canada, and citizens of the Philippines and India providing the labor and small commercial backbones of the economies of the Gulf States. Equally important are the migrations occurring in war-torn areas in Africa in areas like the Sudan, Somalia, Darfur, Rwanda. Such migrations disrupt patterns of culture, politics, and economics and in most cases carry with them the potential of further dislocations and troubles.

Everywhere, people are moving to cities. Skilled workers, doctors, and engineers are leaving the undeveloped world as fast as they can to make a living

in the developed world. Increasingly, these global diasporas connect through the internet and telephone to their home countries. Often, the money they send back to their families forms major portions of the local economies back in their home communities.

B. Globalization

For the most part, the developed world recognizes that it has a major stake in the continuing progress of globalization. The same can be said for those moving into the developed world. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the histories and passions of popular opinion in these states as they make their appearance. One should not confuse developed world trappings for an underlying stability and maturity of civil societies. A more peaceful cooperative world is only possible if the pace of globalization continues. In particular, this means engaging China and other nations politically and culturally as they enter into the developed world. The critics of globalization often portray its dark side in the inequality of rich and poor. In some worst-case scenarios, they portray the rise of resentment and violence throughout the world as a direct result of globalization. Not surprisingly, the future is likely to contain both good and bad as globalization accelerates the pace of human interaction and extends its reach.

The processes propelling globalization over the next two decades could improve the lives of most of the world's population, particularly for hundreds of millions of the poorest. Serious violence, resulting from economic trends, has almost invariably arisen where economic and political systems have failed to meet rising expectations. A failure of globalization would equate to a failure to meet those rising expectations. Thus, the real danger in a globalized world, where even the poorest have access to pictures and media portrayals of the developed world, lies in a reversal or halt to global prosperity. Such a possibility would lead individuals and nations to scramble for a greater share of shrinking wealth and resources, as occurred in the 1930s with the rise of Nazi Germany in Europe and Japan's *"co-prosperity sphere"* in Asia.

Admittedly, some will also be left behind by globalization, either through the misfortunes of geography, culture (much of sub-Saharan Africa), or design (North Korea and Burma). Many of these nations will be weak and failing states and will require an international array of economic, diplomatic, and military resources to establish or sustain stability.

In a globalized world of great nations, the United States may not always have to take the lead in handling the regional troubles that will arise. By the 2030s, every region of the world will likely contain local economic powers or regional organizations capable of leadership. In any case,

Lessons from the History of Globalization

How can one best define globalization? Some might delineate it in terms of increased international trade, limited restrictions on the movement of peoples, and light regulation on the flow of capital. At least that was how politicians and pundits defined it at the start of the twentieth century. At that time, Europeans did not require passports to travel from one country to another on the continent, a situation restored only in the late 1990s. By 1913 the value of international trade as a percentage of world GDP had reached a level the global economy would not replicate until the last decade of the twentieth century. The economies of the United States and the German Reich were expanding at unheard of rates. Western merchants were queuing up to supply China's teeming masses, as that country opened its markets for the first time in centuries. Furthermore, the largest migration – and a peaceful one at that – in history was taking place, as 25 million Europeans left home, most immigrating to the United States.

The world also saw technological and scientific revolutions unequaled in history, which in turn spawned revolutions in travel and communications. Travel across the Atlantic was now a matter of days rather than weeks or months. Telegraph cables linked the continents for near instantaneous communications. Railroads allowed travelers to cross continents in days rather than months. The internal combustion engine was already impacting on travel by land, while the appearance of the aircraft in 1903 suggested even greater possibilities. A complex web of international agreements, such as the International Postal Union and the International Telegraph Conventions, welded these changes together. Again as with today, many were not content to leave the direction of the new world order to governments. In the first decade of the century activists formed 119 international organizations and 112 in the second decade.

For much of humanity, this was a time of hope and optimism. As early as the midnineteenth century, John Bright, a British industrialist, argued that *"nothing could be so foolish as a policy of war for a trading nation. Any peace was better than the most successful war"*. In 1911 a British journalist, Norman Angell, published a work titled *The Great Illusion*, which became an international best seller. In it, he argued the expansion of global commerce had changed the nature of wealth, which no longer would depend on control of territory or resources. For Angell, the belief that military strength was the basis for security represented a dangerous illusion. As for war itself, it represented a futile endeavor incapable of creating material wealth, while putting much at risk. His arguments boiled down to a belief that the interlocking networks of global trade made war impossible. In 1913, he published an improved edition to even greater acclaim. Yet, within a year the First World War had broken out. The result of that conflict in political and economic terms was to smash globalization for the next seventy years. Angell had been right about the absolute destructive effects of modern war. He had been wrong about human nature and its passions.

Why is this important ? Because these same arguments have regained currency. For many, particularly in the West, the interlocking trading and communications networks of the twenty-first century with their benefits have made war, if not impossible, then at least obsolete. Accordingly, any future war would cost so much in lives and treasure that no rational political leader would ever pursue it. The problem is that rationality, at least in their terms, does not exist in much of the world outside Europe, the United States, and Japan. Saddam Hussein managed to invade two of Iraq's six neighbors in the space of less than ten years and sparked three wars in the period he ruled. The first of his wars against Iran resulted in approximately 250 thousand Iraqi deaths and half a million Iranian dead, while his wars against his own people killed upwards of 100 thousand. In historical terms, globalization is not the norm for human affairs.

the United States will often find it prudent to play a cooperative or supporting role in military operations around the world. In most cases the assisting of, or intervention in, failing states will require a cooperative engagement between the United States and regional powers. Again, the skills of a diplomat in working with other people and military organizations from different cultures must be in the tool kit of commanders, staffs, and personnel throughout the *Joint Force*.

C. Economics

Using a base line of 2.5% growth for the developed world and 4.5% growth for the developing world, including China and India (a figure that grossly understates the present growth trajectory of these two nations), the world economy would double by the 2030s from $35 trillion to $72 trillion. Global trade would triple to $27 trillion.

Given these projections, those living in extreme poverty would fall from 1.1 billion to 550 million, while those living on $2 a day would fall from 2.7 billion to 1.9 billion. Currently, only six countries in the developing world possess populations of over 100 million people and a GDP of at least $100 billion (China, Russia, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico). By the 2030s Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Vietnam will have joined that group. Thus, in terms of the developing world alone, there would be 11 states with the

population and the economic strength to build military forces possessing the ability to project significant military power in their region.

As more young enter the work force, the developing world will need to increase employment by nearly 50 million jobs per year. China and India alone need to create 8 to 10 million jobs annually to keep pace with the numbers entering the work force every year. If economic growth suffices to provide such employment, it would go far to reduce international tensions and the endemic troubles inherent in youth bulges. While poverty has rarely been a driving force for revolutionary movements and wars, rising expectations often have. And in a world covered by media reports and movies from around

Source: World Bank simulation, using the Linkage model

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION LIVING ON LESS THAN $2 A DAY

World	East Asia and The Pacific	Low and Middle Income Countries

Legend World:
- East Asia and the Pacific
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- South Asia
- Europe and Central Asia
- Middle East and North Africa
- Sub-Saharan Africa

Legend East Asia and The Pacific:
- East Asia and the Pacific
- China
- Rest of East Asia and the Pacific

Legend Low and Middle Income Countries:
- Low – and middle – income countries
- Excluding China

Source: World Bank

The Volatility of Trends

Economic estimates rest on trend lines easily disputed both in the present and the future. For instance, were one to employ the same methodology used to compute the chart on the previous page in 1935, to predict future national GDPs in 1955, the results would be *off by an order of magnitude.* This chart presents the equivalent of a central scenario. Nevertheless, a word of warning is in order. In 1928, most economists would have given far rosier prospects for the American and world economies. Four years later, they would have given a far darker picture. That is the nature of change in economics as well as in every other human endeavor. Wide variations in either direction are not just feasible – they are likely.

As the *Joint Operating Environment* goes to print the world is in the midst of the worst economic crisis since the *Great Depression*. While the final resolution is not yet in sight, the authors are of the opinion that the proactive measures taken by world governments (adding huge amounts of liquidity, recapitalizing the financial system and purchasing bad assets) will ensure that a global economic meltdown will not occur. Yet, it is almost certain that there will be a rather nasty global recession of indeterminate length. Recessions, while painful, are part of the natural business cycle and are unlikely to have a major impact on the trends outlined in this document.

Nevertheless, the long-term strategic consequences of the current financial crisis are likely to be significant. Over the next several years a new international financial order will likely arise that will redefine the rules and institutions that underpin the functioning, order, and stability of the global economy. There is one new watchword that will continue to define the global environment for the immediate future – interconnectedness.

Until a new structure emerges, strategists will have to prepare to work in an environment where the global economic picture can change suddenly, and where even minor events can cause a cascading series of unforeseen consequences.

the globe, rising expectations will increasingly be a driving force of politics, war, and peace, however well individual economies may perform.

In contrast, real catastrophes may occur if economic growth slows or reverses either on a global scale or within an emerging power. Growing

economies and economic hopes disguise a number of social ills and fractures. The results of a dramatic slowdown in China's growth, for example, are unpredictable and could easily lead to internal difficulties or aggressive behavior externally. That is precisely what happened in Japan in the early 1930s with the onset of the *Great Depression*. Even within the most optimistic economic scenarios, there will be major areas of the world left behind – the bottom billion. Between now and the 2030s, many of these areas will likely lie in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East (excluding the oil boom countries). Although both regions have maintained impressive growth rates over the past several years, those rates have not been sufficient to decrease unemployment.

If economic stability and growth continue unabated up to the 2030s, there would be sufficient global resources to provide support for failing and failed states -- that is, providing the political will is there. A broken economy is usually a harbinger of social collapse and anarchy, or ruthless despotism. Neither is attractive, but if the United States chooses to intervene in such situations, political and military leaders should keep in mind that they should only insert professional military forces if they are willing to sustain and inflict casualties which could result on both sides, as the experiences of the intervention in Somalia in 1993 underline.

A central component of America's global military posture is its massive economic power. This power is predicated on a financially-viable, globally connected domestic economy. Should this central feature of American power be weakened, it is highly likely that military capabilities will be diminished or otherwise degraded as a result.

D. Energy

To meet even the conservative growth rates posited above, global energy production would need to rise by 1.3% per year. By the 2030s, demand would be nearly 50% greater than today. To meet that demand, even assuming more effective conservation measures, the world would need to add roughly the equivalent of Saudi Arabia's current energy production every seven years.

Unless there is a major change in the relative reliance on alternative energy sources, which would require vast insertions of capital, dramatic changes in technology, and altered political attitudes toward nuclear energy, oil and coal will continue to drive the energy train. By the 2030s, oil requirements could go from 86 to 118 million barrels a day (MBD). Although the use of coal may decline in the *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)* countries, it will more than double in developing nations. Fossil fuels will still make up 80% of the energy mix in the 2030s, with oil and gas comprising

upwards of 60%. The central problem for the coming decade will not be a lack of petroleum reserves, but rather a shortage of drilling platforms, engineers and refining capacity. Even were a concerted effort begun today to repair that shortage, it would be ten years before production could catch up with expected demand. The key determinant here would be the degree of commitment the United States and others would display in addressing the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents.

That production bottleneck apart, the potential sources of future energy supplies nearly all present their own difficulties and vulnerabilities as shown here:

Non-Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil: New sources (Caspian Sea, Brazil, Colombia, and new portions of Alaska and the Continental shelf) could offset declining production in mature fields over the course of the next quarter century. But without drilling in currently excluded areas, they will add little additional capacity.

Oil Sands and Shale: Production from these sources could increase from 1 MBD to over 4 MBD, but current legal constraints, such as U.S. law forbidding importation of oil from Canada's tar sands, discourage investment.

Natural Gas: Production from this energy source could increase to the equivalent of 2 MBD, with half coming from OPEC countries.

Biofuels: Production could increase to approximately 3 MBD– equivalent, but starting from a small base, biofuels are unlikely to contribute more than 1% of global energy requirements by the 2030s. Moreover, even that modest achievement could curtail the supply of foodstuffs to the world's growing population, which would add other national security challenge to an already full menu.

Renewable: Wind and solar combined are unlikely to account for more than 1% of global energy by 2030. That assumes the energy from such sources will more than triple, which alone would require major investments.

Nuclear: Nuclear energy offers one of the more promising technological possibilities, given significant advances in safety since the 1970s. In particular, it could play a major role in replacing coal-fired plants, and a greater supply of cheap electricity could encourage electric-powered transportation. Nevertheless, expanding nuclear plants confronts considerable opposition because of public fears, while the disposal of nuclear waste remains a political *hot potato*. Moreover, construction of nuclear power plants in substantial numbers will take decades.

OPEC: To meet climbing global requirements, OPEC will have to increase its output from 30 MBD to at least 50 MBD.

Significantly, no OPEC nation, except perhaps Saudi Arabia, is investing sufficient sums in new technologies and recovery methods to achieve such growth. Some, like Venezuela and Russia, are actually exhausting their fields to cash in on the bonanza created by rapidly rising oil prices.

None of the above provides much reason for optimism. At present, the United States possesses approximately 250 million cars, while China with its immensely larger population possesses only 40 million.

Projected Energy Demand to 2025

2006   2025

2006:
- Coal 24.80%
- Oil 32.20%
- Natural Gas 20.50%
- Other 0.50%
- Hydro 2.50%
- Nuclear 5.50%
- Biomass & Waste 11.00%

2025:
- Coal 22.80%
- Oil 32.50%
- Natural Gas 21.90%
- Other 2.40%
- Hydro 2.40%
- Nuclear 6.90%
- Biomass & Waste 11.10%

Source: Energy Information Agency

Projected Energy Resources to 2025

Legend:
- Biomass and Other
- Hydro
- Nuclear
- Gas
- Coal
- Oil

Terajoules (y-axis: 0–700), 2008 marked. Years 1970–2020.

Source: OECD/IEA World Energy Outlook

Future World Oil Production

P/qw (y-axis: 0–125), Years 1971–2030

Legend:
- Existing capacities
- Enhanced oil recoveries
- Development of the discoveries
- Development of existing reserves
- Non-conventional oil

Source: International Energy Agency – World Energy Outlook, p. 103

Although the world depends on oil, existing capacities and the development of existing reserves cannot keep up with demand. Massive investments in enhanced oil recovery techniques, nonconventional oil reserves such as oil shale, and large scale new finds will be required to meet anticipated future oil demand.

The Chinese are laying down approximately 1,000 kilometers of four-lane highway every year, a figure suggesting how many more vehicles they expect to possess, with the concomitant rise in their demand for oil. The presence of Chinese *"civilians"* in the Sudan to guard oil pipelines underlines China's concern for protecting its oil supplies and could preview a future in which other states intervene in Africa to protect scarce resources.

In summary:

To generate the energy required worldwide by the 2030s would require us to find an additional 1.4 MBD every year until then.

During the next twenty-five years, coal, oil, and natural gas will remain indispensable to meet energy requirements. The discovery rate for new petroleum and gas fields over the past two decades (with the possible exception of Brazil) provides little reason for optimism future efforts will find major new fields.

At present, investment in oil production is only beginning to pick up, with the result that production could reach a prolonged plateau. By 2030, the world will require production of 118 MBD, but energy producers may only be producing 100 MBD unless there are major changes in current investment and drilling capacity.

By 2012, surplus oil production capacity could entirely disappear, and as early as 2015, the shortfall in output could reach nearly 10 MBD.

To avoid a disastrous energy crunch, together with the economic consequences that would make even modest growth unlikely, the developed world needs to invest heavily in oil production. There appears to be little propensity to consider such investments.

Although as oil prices increase, market forces will inexorably create incentives. But the present lack of investment in this area has created major shortages in infrastructure (oil rigs, drilling platforms, etc.) necessary for major increases in exploration and production.

The implications for future conflict are ominous. If the major developed and developing states do not undertake a massive expansion of production and refining capabilities, a severe energy

World Oil Trade Choke Points

Source: U.S. Department of Energy/Energy Information Administration

OPEC nations will remain a focal point of great-power interest. These nations may have a vested interest in stymieing production increases, both to conserve finite supplies and keep prices high. Should one of the consumer nations choose to intervene forcefully, the *"arc of instability"* running from North Africa though to Southeast Asia easily could become an *"arc of chaos"*, involving the military forces of several nations.

OPEC nations will find it difficult to invest much of the cash inflows that steadily rising oil prices bring. While they will invest substantial portions of such assets globally through sovereign wealth funds – investments that come with their own political and strategic difficulties – past track records, coupled with their appraisal of their own military weaknesses, suggests the possibility of a military buildup. With the cost of precision weapons expected to decrease and their availability increasing, joint force commanders could find themselves operating in environments where even small, energy-rich opponents have military forces with advanced technological capabilities. These could include advanced cyber, robotic, and even anti-space based systems.

Finally, presuming the forces propelling radical Islam at present do not dissipate, a portion of OPEC's windfall might well find its way into terrorist coffers, or into the hands of movements with deeply anti-modern, anti-Western goals, movements which have at their disposal increasing numbers of unemployed young men eager to attack their perceived enemies.

crunch is inevitable. While it is difficult to predict precisely what economic, political, and strategic effects such a shortfall might produce, it surely would reduce the prospects for growth in both the developing and developed worlds. Such an economic slowdown would exacerbate other unresolved tensions, push fragile and failing states further down the path toward collapse, and perhaps have serious economic impact on both China and India. At best, it would lead to periods of harsh economic adjustment. To what extent conservation measures, investments in alternative energy production, and efforts to expand petroleum production from tar sands and shale would mitigate such a period of adjustment is difficult to predict. One should not forget that the *Great Depression* spawned a number of ferocious totalitarian regimes that sought economic prosperity for their nations by ruthless conquest, while Japan went to war in 1941 to secure its energy supplies.

One other potential effect of an energy crunch could be a prolonged U.S. recession which could lead to deep cuts in defense spending (as happened during the *Great Depression*). *Joint Force* commanders could then find their capabilities diminished at the moment they may have to undertake increasingly dangerous missions. Should that happen, adaptability would require more than preparations to fight the enemies of the United States, but also the willingness to recognize and acknowledge the limitations of America's military forces.

The pooling of U.S. resources and capabilities with allies would then become even more critical.

Coalition operations would become essential to protecting national interests.

E. Food

Two major factors drive food requirements: a growing global population and prosperity that expands dietary preferences. While food shortages still occur today, they are more likely to reflect politically-inflicted, rather than natural causes. Several mitigating trends could diminish the possibility of major food shortages.

Grain Use and Projected Demand

Growing demand for grain in the developing world will require significantly more production – or higher prices to reduce demand in line with historical trends.

Source: USDA; www.ciesin.columbia.edu

For starters, any slowdown in the world's population growth may reduce overall demand for food and thus ease pressure to expand and intensify agriculture. On the other hand, increased animal protein use in countries with rapidly rising income levels is placing considerable pressure on the world's food supply, since animal production requires much greater input for calories produced. Opposition to genetically modified foods is dissipating. As a result,

there is a reasonable chance of sparking a new *"green revolution"* that would expand crop and protein production sufficiently to meet world requirements. The main pressures on sufficient food supplies will remain in countries with persistently high population growth and a lack of arable land, in most cases exacerbated by desertification and shortages in rainfall.

In a world with adequate global supply but localized food shortages, the real problems will stem from how food is distributed. How quickly the world reacts to temporary food shortages inflicted by natural disasters will also pose challenges. In such cases, joint forces may find themselves involved in providing lift, logistics, and occasionally security to those charged with relief operations.

Natural disease will also have a say in the world's food supply. The Irish potato blight was not an exceptional historical event. As recently as 1954, 40% of America's wheat crop failed as a result of black-stem disease. There are reports of a new aggressive strain of this disease (Ug99) spreading across Africa and possibly reaching Pakistan. Blights threatening basic food crops such as potatoes and corn could have destabilizing effects on nations close to the subsistence level. Food crises have led in the past to famine, internal and external conflicts, the collapse of governing authority, migrations, societal collapse, and social disorder. In such

cases, many people in the crisis zone may be well-armed and dangerous, making the task of the *Joint Force* in providing relief that much more difficult. In a society confronted with starvation, food becomes a weapon every bit as important as ammunition.

Access to fish stocks has been an important natural resource for the prosperity of nations with significant fishing fleets. Competition over access to these resources has often resulted in naval conflict. Conflicts have erupted as recently as the Cod War (1975) between Britain and Iceland and the Turbot War (1995) between Canada and Spain. In 1996, Japan and Korea engaged in a naval standoff over rocky outcroppings that would establish extended fishing rights in the Sea of Japan. These conflicts saw the use of warships and coastal protection vessels to ram and board vessels, and open conflict between the naval forces of these states. Over-fishing and depletion of fisheries and competition over those that remain have the potential for causing serious confrontations in the future.

F. Water

As we approach the 2030s, agriculture will likely remain the source of greatest demand for water worldwide, accounting for 70% of total water usage. In comparison, industry will account for only 20%, while domestic usage will likely remain steady at 10%. Per unit harvest yield, developed nations are

more efficient than developing nations in using available water supplies for agricultural irrigation and use far less than the 70% average. Improved agricultural techniques could further increase the amount of land under irrigation, and increase yields per unit of water used.

In short, from a global perspective, there should be more than sufficient water to support the world's population during the next quarter century. However, in some regions the story is quite different. The Near East and North Africa use far more than the global average of 70% of available water dedicated to irrigation. By the 2030s, at least 30 developing nations could use even more of their water for irrigation.

Projected Water Scarcity in 2025

▇ Little or No water scarcity	▇ Economic water scarcity	▇ Approaching physical water scarcity
▇ Physical water scarcity	▇ Not estimated	

Source: International Water Management Institute

Physical Scarcity: Physical access to water is limited, or sources of water overused and overmanaged, leading to serious water scarcity downstream.

Economic Scarcity: A population does not have adequate financial or political means to obtain adequate sources of water.

In recent times, the increasing unreliability of an assured supply of rainwater has forced farmers to turn more to groundwater in many areas. As a result, aquifer levels are declining at rates between one and three meters per year. The impact of such declines on agricultural production could be profound especially since aquifers, once drained, may not refill for centuries.

Within a quarter century, water scarcity could affect approximately 3 billion people.

One should not minimize the prospect of wars over water. In 1967, Jordanian and Syrian efforts to dam the Jordan River was a contributing cause of the Six-Day War between Israel and its neighbors. Today, Turkish dams on the upper Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, the source of water for the Mesopotamian basin, pose similar problems for Syria and Iraq. Turkish diversion of water to irrigate mountain valleys in eastern Turkey already reduces water downstream. Even though localized, conflicts sparked by water scarcity easily could destabilize whole regions. The continuing crisis in Sudan's Darfur region, now spreading to Chad, is an example of what could happen on a wider scale between now and the 2030s. Indeed, it is precisely along other potential conflict fault lines that potential crises involving water scarcity are most likely.

Whether the United States would find itself drawn into such conflicts is uncertain, but what is certain is that future joint force commanders will find conflict over water endemic to their world, whether as the spark or the underlying cause of conflicts among various racial, tribal, or political groups. Were they called on to intervene in a catastrophic water crisis, they might well confront chaos, with collapsing or impotent social networks and governmental services. Anarchy could prevail, with armed groups controlling or warring over remaining water, while the specter of disease resulting from unsanitary conditions would hover in the background.

The latter is only one potential manifestation of a larger problem. Beyond the problems of water scarcity, will be those associated with water pollution, whether from uncontrolled industrialization, as in China, or from the human sewage expelled by the mega-cities and slums of the world. The dumping of vast amounts of waste into the world's rivers and oceans threatens the health and welfare of large portions of the human race, to say nothing of the affected ecosystems. While joint forces rarely will have to address pollution problems directly, any operations in polluted urban areas will carry considerable risk of disease. Indeed, it is precisely in such areas that new and deadly pathogens are most likely to arise. Hence, commanders may be unable to avoid dealing with the consequences of chronic water pollution.

G. Climate Change and Natural Disasters

The impact of global warming and its potential to cause natural disasters and other harmful phenomena such as rising sea levels has become a prominent – and controversial – national and international concern. Some argue that there will be more and greater storms and natural disasters, others that there will be fewer[3]. In many respects, scientific conclusions about the causes

---

[3] Kerry Emanuel, Ragoth Sundaraarajan and John Williams, *"Hurricanes and Global Warming"*, *Bulletin American Meteorological Society*, March 2008, pp. 347-367.

and potential effects of global warming are contradictory.

Whatever their provenance, tsunamis, typhoons, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes and other natural catastrophes have been and will continue to be a concern of joint force commanders. In particular, where natural disasters collide with growing urban sprawl, widespread human misery could be the final straw that breaks the back of a weak state. In the 2030s as in the past, the ability of U.S. military forces to relieve the victims of natural disasters could help the United States' image around the world. For example, the contribution of U.S. and partner forces to relieving the distress caused by the catastrophic Pacific tsunami of December 2006 reversed the perceptions of America held by many Indonesians. Perhaps no other mission performed by the *Joint Force* provides so much benefit to the interests of the United States at so little cost.

H. Pandemics

One of the fears haunting the public is the appearance of a pathogen, either man-made or natural, able to devastate mankind, as the *"Black Death"* did in the Middle East and Europe in the middle of the fourteenth century. Within barely a year, approximately one-third of Europe's population died. The second- and third-order effects of the pandemic on society, religion, and economics were devastating. In effect, the *"Black Death"* destroyed the sureties undergirding Medieval European civilization.

It is less likely that a pandemic on this scale will devastate mankind over the next two decades. Even though populations today are much larger and more concentrated, increasing the opportunities for a new pathogen to spread, the fact that mankind lives in a richer world with greater knowledge of the world of microbes, the ability to enact quarantines, a rapid response capability, and medical treatment, suggests that authorities could control even the most dangerous of pathogens. The crucial element in any response to a pandemic may be the political will to impose a quarantine.

The rapid termination of 2003's *Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)* pandemic does provide hope that current medical capabilities could handle most pandemic threats successfully. In the five months after initial reports from East Asia in February of an atypical respiratory disease, medical authorities reported more than 8,000 cases in 30 different countries. The disease itself was highly contagious and life-threatening: almost 10% of reported cases died. However, once doctors identified the disease, the combined efforts of local, national, and international authorities contained it. Newly reported cases increased rapidly in March and April 2003, peaked in early May, and thereafter rapidly declined.

The SARS case suggests that the risk of a global pandemic is not as great

as some fear. That does not mean that it is nonexistent. A repetition of the 1918 influenza pandemic, which led to the deaths of millions worldwide would have the most serious consequences for the United States and the world politically as well as socially. The dangers posed by the natural emergence of a disease capable of launching a global pandemic are serious enough, but the possibility also exists that a terrorist organization might acquire a dangerous pathogen.

The deliberate release of a deadly pathogen, especially one genetically engineered to increase its lethality or virulence, would present greater challenges than a naturally occurring disease like SARS. While the latter is likely to have a single point of origin, terrorists would seek to release the pathogen at several different locations and it would spread faster. This would seriously complicate both the medical challenge of bringing the disease under control and the security task of fixing responsibility for its appearance.

The implications for joint forces of a pandemic as widespread and dangerous as that of 1918 would be profound. American and global medical capabilities would soon find themselves overwhelmed. If the outbreak spread to the United States, the *Joint Force* might have to conduct relief operations beyond assisting in law-enforcement and maintaining order when legal prerequisites are met, as currently identified by the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza*. Even as *Joint Force* commanders confronted an array of missions, they would have to take severe measures to preserve the health of their forces and protect medical personnel and facilities from public panic and dislocations. Thucydides captured the moral, political, and psychological dangers that a global pandemic would cause in his description of the plague's impact on Athens: *"For the catastrophe was so overwhelming that men, not knowing what would happen next to them, became indifferent to every rule of religion or of law"*[4].

I. Cyber

Perhaps the most important trend in the area of science and technology is the continuing information and communications revolution and its implications. Although many pundits have touted the ability of information to *"lift the fog and friction of war"*, such claims have foundered on the rocks of reality.

Key to understanding information technology in the 2030s is the fact that the pace of technological change is accelerating almost exponentially. Because most individuals tend to view change in a linear fashion, they tend to overestimate what is achievable by technology in the short term, while dramatically underestimating and discounting the power of scientific and technological advances in the long term.

---

[4] Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trad. Rex Warner, Penguin Books, London, 1954, p. 155.

• An iPod today can hold some 160 gigabytes of data, or 160,000 books. The iPod of 2020 could potentially hold some 16 terabytes of information – essentially the entire Library of Congress.

• Connectivity to the home (or node in military networks) grows by 50% a year. Therefore by 2030, people will have about 100,000 times more bandwidth than today.

• The computing capacity available to the average home will be a computer that runs at a rate of one million times faster than a computer today (2.5 petabytes vs. 2.5 gigabytes). A typical home computer would be capable of downloading the entirety of today's Library of Congress (16 terabytes), in 128 seconds – just over two minutes' time. The technical capacity of the telegraph in 1900, was some 2 bits per second across continental distances, meaning that same Library of Congress would have required a transmission time of 3,900 years.

If the pace of technical advances holds true, greater technological change will occur over the next twenty years than occurred in the whole of the twentieth century. In many ways the world of 2030 will be nearly as strange as the world of 2000 would have been

Exponential Growth of Computing

Source: Ray Kurzweil

to an observer from 1900. The advances in communication and information technologies will significantly advance the capabilities of the *Joint Force*. Nevertheless, those same advances will be available to America's opponents and they will use those advances to attack, degrade, and disrupt communications and the flow of information. Indeed, our adversaries have often taken advantage of computer networks and the power of information technology not only to directly influence the perceptions and will of the United States, its decision-makers, and population, but also to plan and execute savage acts of terrorism. It is also essential that joint forces be capable of functioning in an information-hostile environment, so as not to create an Achilles' heel by becoming too network dependent.

J. Space

In 2007 the Chinese used an interceptor missile to destroy a satellite in space. In that single act, they made clear their belief that space was a potential theater of conflict and that they aimed to possess the capability to fight in that environment. As with the profusion of inexpensive precision weapons, technological advances and increasing wealth will place the ability to conduct military operations in space within the reach of an increasing number of players.

Over the past several decades the United States has enjoyed an unchallenged dominance over the

dark realm beyond the atmosphere. However, the increasing proliferation of launch and satellite capabilities, as well as the development of anti-satellite capabilities, has begun to level the playing field. Other countries are leveraging the benefits of space for both commercial and defense applications, and the United States already confronts increased competition over its use. This will increasingly be the case over coming decades. The implications are clear: the *Joint Force* is going to have to be in a position to defend the spaced-based systems on which so many of its capabilities depend. As well, the *Joint Force* must anticipate the inevitable attack and know how to operate effectively when these attacks degrade those systems.

K. Conclusion

The previous discussion outlined just some of the trends that are likely to influence the security environment for the next quarter century. These individual trends, whether they adhere to predictions or not, will combine together in ways to form more broad and robust contexts that will define the world in which the *Joint Force* will operate in the future. By understanding the trends and resultant contexts, joint force leaders have a way to appreciate their implications, and to identify some key indicators to watch along the way. This provides a means of assessing our assumptions and predictions, and our progress towards building and operating the *Joint Force* to meet the future. What follows then is a discussion of the contextual world of the 2030s.

*

In the third part of the article, the authors will continue to present the main challenges and threats that are manifest in the contextual world, elaborating on them from the geographical perspective, at the same time approaching a few aspects regarding the issue of weak or failing states, as well as the one of technology and urbanisation.

EDITORIAL EVENTS

✎ *Alina PAPOI*

"Science and practice alike, and according to some master minds, even art, management is today one of the most fascinating domains with one of the highest intellectual, emotional and social significance of human activity" – the words belong to *Professor Dr BEng Tudor Niculescu*, the one who signs the Foreword of the book ***Capacitatea operațională a sistemelor manageriale (Operational Capacity of Management Systems)***.

Structured in four chapters, the work successively approaches the dynamics of management systems, the main features of management systems, information-decision-making dimensions of management processes and the shaping of systems and decision-making processes.

The authors – **Major General Dr Cătălin Zisu**, **Brigadier General Dr Liviu Scrieciu** and **Colonel (r.) Dr Alexandru Mihalcea –** present the main elements of the management system, its functions, evaluation and effectiveness; the principles of the approach to management systems; the principles for improving the structure of the management system; the security and quality of management systems; the management process and the information-decision-making correlation; the shaping of management systems and processes.

Beyond its scientific rigour, the book is a "primer" on figuring out the meanders of this as diverse as (ever) new domain. As a sine qua non of managerial efficiency, the authors quote Andrew Carnegie: *"It draws together people who can do best what you need, even if they are sometimes better than you"*.

The book is published by *Editura Militară*.

Released under the auspices of *Editura Academiei Naționale de Informații*, the book ***Evoluții ale principalelor organizații internaționale în raport cu problemele asigurării securității regionale și globale (Evolutions of the Most Important International Organisations in Relation to the Issues***

of Providing Regional and Global Security) presents the structure, typology and functioning of international organisations that play an exponential part in the field of security. Moreover, the authors point out the most significant developments and trends of these entities, depending on the assumed goals and responsibilities.

Starting from the fact that international politics is increasingly influenced by international as well as regional organisations, the authors – **Cătălina Predoiu, Tiberiu Tănase, Adrian Dumitrescu, Mariana Marinică** and **Ioan-Codruț Lucinescu** – approach the need for a more effective and balanced cooperation on global security, a special aspect in this context being provided by the complex threats that humanity must face.

Divided in four chapters, the book briefly discusses the defining elements of international organisations, the major international organisations with global security objectives, the sub-regional cooperation structures that have objectives in the European security area, initiatives and security policies: *"International organisations represent the most important forces in coordinating, through a reliable set of procedures, the actions and cooperation in areas such as the economic, social, military or cultural ones, being indispensable tools in the international system. Multilateral international cooperation is the foundation of a stable world system, because international organisations allow states to identify and address common problems together, within a collective decision-making process".*

In **Colonel Dr Constantin Apetroaie**'s opinion, *"dealing with the problems of large units command and units based on the standards that regulate the doctrinal, information, operational and technical aspects is an original way to place own scientific effort in the international military context. Thus, there are created the most favourable preconditions for achieving interoperability of the command of large units and units of different national armed forces participating in multinational military actions".* The author addresses this issue in the book ***Conducerea forțelor în acțiunile militare multinaționale***

(Forces Command in Multinational Military Actions), which appeared at *Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei*, showing, in the four chapters, the role played by coalition forces and the forces for multinational military operations; operational, tactical and technical factors that influence the stable operation of command systems in multinational military actions; place and role of command systems as key elements of the adopted operation (combat) disposition; the principles of the command of large units and units in such actions; the technical means for information, communications and computers needed to modern command.

Forţele terestre (Land Forces) – military theory bulletin, published by the *Land Forces Staff*, presents, in its first issue of this year, a series of articles that are relevant to the current international context, marked by substantial changes in the modern armed forces. Here are a few topics: *"Considerations regarding the application of effects-based operations in stability and support operations"; The strategy of war and modern combat, the content and general physiognomy"; "The conflict environment and its implications on land forces structures"; "The multi-dimension and complexity of the terrorist phenomenon"; "Opinions on application of the* concept of effects-based operations in ISAF-led operations in Afghanistan"; "The conflict between religions and the physiognomy of crises"; "Fourth generation warfare"; "Considerations regarding the establishment of joint groups of forces with strategic and operational role on the national territory"*.

Psihosociologia & mass-media (Psychosociology & Mass media), a quarterly journal published by *Academia Naţională de Informaţii*, no. 3 and 4/2008, brings to the attention of its readers subjects such as security, geopolitics, history, mass media and communication, psychology and psychosociology, such as *"Nonverbal communication in politics: vulnerability or persuasion"; "US security strategy and policy during G.W. Bush Administration"; "2008 Bucharest NATO summit: internal and international press coverage"; "Considerations regarding*

the effects of media on public opinion"; "Communication, influence and dialogue repercussions"; "The history of the interaction between the Western and Islamic civilisations"; "Terrorism – definitions and concepts"; "The United Nations and peace operations in the post-Cold War era (military interventions carried out under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter – a new chance or a last chance".

In *Efficient Intelligence: from Control to Cooperation*, the Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, Dr George Cristian Maior, points out: *"Intelligence services are institutions involved in a "silent war", a war of the intelligence, in which they must protect and support the interests of the nation. In such a war, having and exploiting information is critical: efficiency, rapid reaction, prognosis and serious analysis are needed for being able to counter increasingly diverse and complex risks, from terrorism or cyber attacks to energy or economic ones"*. In the same note, here are a few topics approached in the 15th issue of **Intelligence**:

"Second Life Jihad – integration of new communication platforms in the Islamic propagandistic arsenal"; "The importance of the Black Sea in Romania's energy security strategy – the Black Sea, European interface with the Caspian Sea and the Middle East"; "The management of information analysis process in contemporary intelligence"; "Globalisation and its implications for terrorism"; "Rationalisation of antisocial behaviour of terrorists".

English version by
✉ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

Résumés

L'argument de l'accomplissement les missions assignées

L'adhésion de la Roumanie à l'OTAN et à l'Union européenne est certainement le plus important objectif politique que l'Etat roumain a proposé pour soi-même et, heureusement, il l'a réalisé, après 1990. La mission de l'armée roumaine en Irak, récemment achevée, a réalisé de vrais avantages pour notre pays, a accompli et a renforcé ses approches de politique étrangère, a consacré aussi sa dignité de faire partie des nations qui travaillent pour la sécurité mondiale en tant qu'une garantie de propre sécurité et d'élaborer son avenir sur de certes fondements.

Les aspects concernant l'interaction des organismes internationales – ONU, OTAN, UE – dans le domaine de la sécurité

La tentation de l'OTAN d'améliorer les relations avec les Nations Unies est en fait un désir commun de développer la coopération et le dialogue sur une base permanente. À cet égard, l'auteur présente quelques-unes des orientations de la coopération du développement, qui visent: la poursuite du dialogue au niveau des représentants de l'ONU et de l'OTAN, notamment en termes de missions pour maintenir de la paix, le désarmement, le contrôle des armes, la prolifération des armes de destruction, le contreterrorisme massive, la gestion des crises.

Savoir et combattre les facteurs de risque et les vulnérabilités relatifs à la sécurité humaine (II)

La sécurité est un droit fondamental de l'être humain. C'est un état où les dangers et les conditions qui peuvent provoquer des dommages physiques, mentales ou matériels sont contrôlés de manière qui permette la défense de la santé, de bien-être des individus et de la communauté humaine. En ce sens, l'état de la sécurité, quel que soit le niveau et la portée de la notification, est rendu difficile par la multiplicité des valeurs et des intérêts des personnes qui, souvent, entrent en conflit, créant des problèmes de sécurité individuelle ou de sécurité de groupe.

Le concept de la paralysie stratégique (II)

L'auteur décrit la notion de paralysie stratégique, en mentionnant Sun Tzu comme l'exemple le plus significatif à cet égard. En ce sens, l'auteur présente l'aspect psychologique comme étant le plus important élément de l'analyse de l'ennemi. Sun Tzu considère que, à partir de la manière dans laquelle un général établis le dispositif opérationnel et il est attentif à la façon dont les troupes réalisent la commande, il peut

déterminer les points forts ou faibles d'un ennemi. Ainsi, dit l'auteur, c'est une condition essentielle d'attaquer les vulnérabilités d'un ennemi pour reporter une victoire.

L'évolution de la stratégie de l'Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord

Le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée sont parmi les plus importants défis que les pays doivent résister dans le XXIème siècle. Ces deux phénomènes ont été constatés dans l'environnement de sécurité post la guerre froide en tant que sources potentielles de risque et de menaces à la stabilité et la sécurité des nations et comme un obstacle au développement de la société libérale, ouverte et démocratique, régi par les principes de la primauté du droit. Le concept stratégique de l'OTAN (1999) fait référence à ces deux phénomènes que les risques qui pourraient affecter les intérêts de l'OTAN dans le domaine de la sécurité.

L'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord – 60 ans d'histoire

L'auteur présente les principales phases de l'existence de l'OTAN. Dans la première partie, il décrit le contexte politique, historique, économique et militaire de l'existence de l'OTAN, en mettant l'accent sur l'Article 5 du Traité de Washington. Ensuite, il présente les étapes de l'élargissement de l'Alliance et il mentionne la relevance du Pacte de Varsovie, ces deux importants acteurs mondiaux définis pendant la Guerre froide. Au sommet de Rome a été proposé un approche vaste de la sécurité, qui se fonde par le dialogue, la coopération et le maintien d'une capacité collective de défense.

L'OTAN dans la politique de sécurité et de défense

L'article décrit quelques aspects en ce qui concerne la transformation de l'OTAN – la conception, la doctrine militaire et l'adaptation des ses structures aux nouvelles conditions de l'environnement de sécurité et aux nouvelles missions et tâches des forces militaires de l'Alliance et des États membres. L'auteur présente le concept de sécurité et certains aspects de son ordre du jour dans ce domaine, relatif à son affirmation tant le facteur principal dans la réalisation des conditions nécessaires pour la création de la nouvelle architecture de sécurité et de stabilité en Europe.

Contrecarrer les risques de sécurité dans la région de la Mer Noire dans le contexte de la guerre russo-géorgienne

Dans l'époque moderne, le domaine militaire est affecté par de diverses menaces. En ces conditions, il est nécessaire de prendre des mesures de préserver les risques de sécurité dans les régions maritimes et pour créer aussi une réelle sécurité maritime. En même temps, la guerre russo-géorgienne montre qu'il est possible un conflit régional, même si une confrontation directe entre les forces navales des Etats. C'est la Roumanie qui considère que les risques et les opportunités de la région sont similaires avec ceux de la région de la Mer Noire.

La crise économique mondiale et la reforme de "gouvernement mondial"

La crise économique actuelle est un point de partir pour le nouvel ordre mondial. Elle a débuté dans les Etats-Unis, comme

un état brut, et maintenant le monde entier est affecté.

Le fait que les dirigeants de plus grands et plus dynamiques économies ont été invités au sommet de G20 à Washington montre favorablement l'accumulation de masse critique nécessaire de la mondialisation pour la nouvelle situation. Ainsi, la réunion a été considérée comme une réunion historique, ce qui représente un réel changement dans la politique mondiale.

Ossétie du Sud

Située à la Géorgie du Nord, à la frontière avec la Russie, l'Ossétie du Sud est une région montagneuse d'environ 3 900 km² et 70 000 habitants. La plus grande partie du territoire, y compris la capitale, Tskhinvali, est dirigé de facto par le gouvernement de l'autoproclamé République d'Ossétie du Sud, qui a déclaré deux fois son indépendance de la Géorgie. C'est seulement après le conflit dans la région, le 26 août 2008, que la Russie a reconnu l'indépendance.

La clef du succès de la transformation de l'organisme militaire c'est l'individu

Les gens peuvent faire le processus de la transformation plus dynamique ou ils peuvent passer les obstacles, sauf s'ils sont bien informés et préparés. La *"recette du succès"* est relativement facile à exprimer, mais elle est difficile à mettre en pratique par les personnes qui ne sont pas suffisamment motivées pour participer sans réserve dans l'accomplissement d'établir les objectifs. La ressource humaine est une composante du processus de transformation qui conduit, contrôle et dynamise les actions.

La perspective des réseaux Mesh dans des communications militaires

Le concept de réseaux Mesh décrit une nouvelle interconnexion avec la radio, des nœuds dans les réseaux dont les zones de couverture se chevauchent partiellement. Les réseaux Mesh sont des réseaux sans fil, auto configurables, dynamiques, dans lesquels les nœuds (stations de radio, PDA, ordinateurs portables) communiquent réciproquement et créent automatiquement un réseau avec une connectivité de maillage. Chaque nœud peut avoir le rôle de client. Le passage d'un rôle à l'autre est réalisé en conformité avec les besoins de connectivité.

Influence sociale et relations publiques dans les conflits militaires

Les actions visent à influencer ou affecter la détermination des principaux éléments de l'adversaire ou de l'adversaire potentiel, qui dépendent de l'efficacité des décideurs ou leaders d'opinion: la volonté des décideurs politiques et des dirigeants à agir, le pouvoir de compréhension et de perception leur situation, la capacité et/ou les moyens d'agir en conséquence. L'auteur souligne que pour l'influence sociale sont utilisé trois types d'activités: les activités typiques/classiques d'influence; les activités qui visent les dirigeants et les capacités de commande; l'information des activités de protection.

La carrière individuelle – une priorité dans la modernisation du management de la carrière dans l'Armée Roumaine

La gestion des ressources humaines est l'un des plus fascinantes, avec un potentiel

intellectuel, émotionnel et social du plus haut de l'activité humaine. Comme on le sait, le management des ressources humaines contient y compris la gestion des ressources humaines de carrière. Le concept de gestion de carrière individuelle dans l'armée roumaine règle les normes et les règlements régissant les différentes évolutions dans la carrière de l'armée en termes de concurrence, la transparence, l'équité et l'égalité des chances, en ligne avec les besoins militaires et les aspirations professionnelles de chacun individu.

Comportement et culture organisationnelle dans l'institution militaire roumaine

Cet étude de l'auteur aborde l'influence des caractéristiques de la culture organisationnelle militaire de la Roumanie, qui, marquée par les traits de la culture nationale, se sont réfléchis sur le comportement des militaires.

Ainsi, dans les unes des structures militaires, *"la distance par rapport au pouvoir"*, comme un indicateur de la différenciation entre les individus, est certainement importante, et le formalisme des relations entre patrons et employés conduit à ne pas exprimer des opinions contraires.

La crise économique est un plus d'opportunité pour la stratégie scientifique de l'UE

Si l'Europe décide de relancer la plus discréditée stratégie de Lisbonne, il est nécessaire une nouvelle stratégie globale pour la science, la recherche et la technologie, a déclaré le commissaire européen pour science et recherche Janez Potočnik. L'auteur place la technologie et l'innovation à la base de la puissance économique, en insistant sur la nécessité de multiplier les avantages de la recherche et pour fournir un soutien approprié de la recherche scientifique et de développement technologique.

L'OTAN doit penser deux fois à son avenir

Zhang Xinghui, journaliste pour un grand journal chinois, donne une opinion personnelle et il estime que l'OTAN doit se concentrer davantage sur son futur développement. L'auteur décrit les trois grandes tendances de l'évolution du monde, sur la base de laquelle l'OTAN va élaborer clairement la direction stratégique de sa transformation: la coopération a remplacé l'affrontement, la paix a déjà devenue un objectif universel commun et de nouvelles économiques et sociaux sont nécessaires pour le développement et dans l'intérêt mutuel de tous les États et les acteurs non étatiques.

UE: pourquoi un tel déficit démocratique ?

A partir du livre "L'Europe, l'Etat et la démocratie", l'auteur a posé quelques questions quant à la participation des citoyens européens aux élections du Parlement européen en Juin 2009. Ainsi, ils sont remis en question le modèle communautaire, la participation moyenne au vote des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, la légitimité du Parlement européen, le projet européen et de nombreuses controverses politiques. D'autre part, le moment de la fondation de la Communauté européenne (1948-1969) apparaît comme un temps de l'invention empirique, exploratoire, avec plus de compromis.

Le "nouveau terrorisme"

L'auteur aborde la question du terrorisme et le contraste entre *"l'ancien"* et *"le nouveau"* type de terrorisme. L'auteur relève les différentes significatives du terrorisme à travers l'histoire. L'objectif d'article n'est pas d'ajouter une nouvelle définition, mais d'offrir un bon contexte pour mieux comprendre le concept de *"nouveau terrorisme"*. Ainsi, le *"nouveau terrorisme"* est mondial et amorphe et ses auteurs possèdent une réelle motivation. De plus, les divers systèmes d'aide agissent comme des multiplicateurs de force.

The Joint Operating Environment 2008 – Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force (II)

L'étude relève les défis et les implications pour l'avenir commun de la Force, publié par United States Joint Forces Command pour décrire le futur environnement opérationnel, qui fournit une perspective sur les tendances futures, les chocs, les contextes et les implications pour l'avenir commun des commandants de force et d'autres dirigeants et de professionnels dans le domaine de la sécurité nationale. Ainsi, les auteurs décrivent le caractère durable de la guerre, les causes et les conséquences du changement et de surprises et aussi le rôle de la stratégie.

Version française par Alina PAPOI

FOR THE ATTENTION OF THOSE INTERESTED IN SUBMITTING ARTICLES TO "RMT"

Manuscripts submitted to the editorial staff should be either accompanied by the magnetic support or sent by email. They should be edited in *Microsoft Word*, *Times New Roman*, *size 14*, *justify*, and they should have no more than 8 pages. The **graphic illustration** – schemes, figures, tables should be designed using *CorelDraw*, and maps and images – in *JPEG* format.

Manuscripts should be written in accordance with the academic standards and adopting the norms in the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, available at www.ldoceonline.com. Abbreviations and acronyms should be either avoided or explained.

To optimise our collaboration, submissions should be accompanied by the following: name, phone/fax number, email, address of the institution and other relevant information.

RMT Editorial Staff reserves the right to make editorial changes regarding the style, grammar and length of the manuscripts. Authors will be consulted, in case the changes could affect the form or the content of the manuscript.

We expect You, with interest and hope, to submit your articles for publication, mentioning that manuscripts and relating materials are not given back to authors. Thank you for your understanding !

The Editorial Staff

King Ferdinand I and General Averescu on the battlefield, Tg. Ocna, in 1917

http://www.defense.ro/gmr