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# Romanian Military Thinking

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
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*“At the landmark Warsaw Summit on 8 and 9 July, NATO leaders will take important decisions to enhance collective defence and deterrence, including an enhanced military presence in the east of the Alliance. They will also step up efforts to project stability beyond NATO’s borders, working hand-in-hand with partners to the south and to the east. Leaders will also take practical cooperation with the European Union to the next level in areas including maritime security and countering hybrid threats”*\*

\* Source: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_132797.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_132797.htm)

# *Hybrid Warfare – Between Paradigms and Paraphrases –*

**H**as the time of direct armed confrontations gone forever? Some experts say yes while others are reluctant to provide a definite answer. Reality, as it is revealed to us or as it is perceived by us, seems to prove that both parties are right. In essence, war is war, either it is waged using conventional, already sanctioned, means or it acquires the characteristics of a new hostile environment, employing a wide range of lethal and non-lethal forces and means as well as surprising, unconventional tactics, supported by cutting-edge technological combinations. The IT revolution and the access to its products make possible clashes in which those interested can avoid the classic instruments of war that would certainly put them at disadvantage. Asymmetry, which we have rushed to associate with modern conflicts, has been a characteristic of most wars throughout history. Let us not forget that belligerents have ever sought to exploit the weaknesses of opponents and take advantage of the surplus of forces and means available, and when they did not have them, they employed combat techniques and tactics that were new and unknown to the opponents. Formerly, in the era of “*clean*” wars, of chivalry on the battlefield, no one made a claim to fame hitting the opponent from behind, but today the “*creative*” use of the entire spectrum of operations does not result in any pang of remorse, even though their effects are often beyond acceptable limits. But who can establish that the rules have been broken and penalise it?

In a conflict in which are involved, directly or indirectly, non-conventional actors operating beyond the state prerogatives, in an unclear social-political-military environment, we can talk of hybrid threats and *hybrid warfare* trying to grasp in the paradigm of this new concept a complex mix of typologies, the reality compelling us to new approaches.



The debates over the definition of its terms have not provided congruent lines of expression so far, maybe because of the insistence with which the debaters, more or less competent, but certainly interested in the field, try to point out the novelty of the concept and to establish its paternity. However, it should be emphasised the unanimous opinion that the war of the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be a hybrid one and therefore it should be addressed differently than the traditional one. The new enemy – that, paraphrasing, can be called *hybrid* –, though not easy to identify, employs a wide range of operations and, given the capabilities for action over the entire spectrum of conflict, facilitated by globalisation – terrorist networks extended worldwide and, unfortunately, increasingly virulent –, the availability of technology, especially the cyber one, as well as by the easy access to certain modern weapon systems, cannot be easily annihilated. On the contrary, the tensions and possible hotbeds of conflicts, in all possible environments, which are not timely defused, can turn, sometimes quite quickly, into threats prone to generate wars.

To face an increasingly wide range of threats, it is necessary to seek new ways to respond. However, to be thwarted, we should first accept that they exist and cannot be eliminated just ignoring or addressing them superficially. Modern military strategies have to analyse this new type of conflict – so far dubbed *hybrid warfare* –, that has appeared in the arsenal of Mars, the god of war, maybe just as a natural development or as a regrettable genetic mutation of our times, and to take it into account to develop effective courses of action.

The ability to innovate and employ, by a possible opponent, different capabilities and asymmetric methods of aggression requires a response having appropriate innovative valences, as in a chess game in which one has to take the opponent by surprise even when in defence.

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

***English version by***  
*Diana Cristiana LUPU*



# *La guerre hybride – entre paradigmes et paraphrases –*

**E**st-ce qu'on assiste à un soit de coucher du soleil pour les confrontées armées directes? Certains experts disent oui, d'autres hésitent à donner une réponse définitive. La réalité, dans la mesure où elle est perçue ou que nous pouvons le percevoir, semble donner raison pour certains et pour d'autres. Au fond, la guerre reste la guerre, si elle se déploie par de moyens classiques, déjà consacrés, ou a les caractéristiques d'un nouvel environnement d'hostilité, où ils jetés dans la lutte une variété de forces et moyens létales et non létales, de tactiques surprenants, non conventionnels, soutenus par de combinaisons technologiques de la dernière génération. La révolution informatique et l'accès à ses produits offrent la possibilité d'affrontements dans laquelle les personnes intéressés peuvent éviter les instruments de la guerre classique ce qui bien sur les désavantagerait. L'asymétrie, qui nous précipitions un peu de l'attribuer seulement aux conflits modernes, a caractérisé la plupart des guerres qui ont marqués l'histoire de l'humanité. N'oublions pas que, jamais, les belligérants ont cherchés à exploiter les faiblesses des adversaires et profiter de l'excédent des forces et moyens disponibles. Quand ils ne les avaient pas, ils ont utilisés de nouvelles techniques et tactiques de combat, encore inconnues à ces adversaires. Une autrefois, à l'époque des guerres „*propres*”, de la chevalerie sur le champ de bataille, personne ne faisait un titre de gloire par frapper à derrière l'adversaire, mais, aujourd'hui, l'utilisation „*créative*” de l'ensemble du spectre de la guerre ne produit plus aucun regret, même si ses effets dépassent, souvent, les limites acceptés. Mais, qui peut établir et sanctionner l'enfreinte des règles?

Dans un conflit où ils peuvent entrer – directement ou indirectement – des acteurs non conventionnels qui actionnent au-delà des prérogatives des Etats, dans un environnement social, politique et militaire indéfini, on peut parler des menaces hybrides et aussi de *la guerre hybride*, en essayant d'englober dans le paradigme du nouveau concept un mélange complexe des typologies, où la réalité nous oblige à de nouvelles approches.

Les débats sur la définition des termes de ce concept n'ont pas fourni, jusqu'à présent, des lignes appropriées pour l'exprimer, peut-être à cause de l'insistance avec laquelle les débatteurs, plus ou moins avisés, mais sûrement intéressés par le domaine, ils essaient de souligner le caractère de nouveauté de ce concept et de lui établir la paternité. Mais il faut souligner l'opinion unanime par laquelle la guerre du XXI<sup>ème</sup> siècle sera une guerre hybride et elle sera traitée dans une autre sorte que celle traditionnelle. Le nouvel ennemi – qui, en paraphrasant, on peut essayer d'appeler *hybride* –, bien qu'il ne peut pas facilement être identifié, il a encore un ample répertoire opérationnel. En tenant compte de ses capacités d'action dans le spectre total des conflits, facilités par la mondialisation – les réseaux terroristes entendues dans le monde entier et, malheureusement, de plus en plus virulentes –, de la disponibilité de la technologie, en particulier celle cybernétique, mais la facilité avec laquelle on peut procurer certains systèmes d'armement modern – ne peut être facilement annihilé. Au contraire, les tensions et les éventuels épidémies de conflits dans tous les environnements possibles, qui n'étaient pas neutralisés à temps, ils peuvent se transformer, parfois assez rapidement, en menaces qui déterminent les guerres.

Pour bien répondre à une vaste gamme de menaces, de plus en plus larges, il faut chercher de nouvelles façons de réponse. Cependant, pour contrecarrer ces menaces, nous devons accepter tout d'abord leur existence et nous ne pouvons les éliminer seulement par l'ignorance ou par une approche superficielle. Les stratégies militaires modernes doivent analyser ce nouveau type de conflit – nommé, pour l'instant, *la guerre hybride* –, qui est apparue dans l'arsenal du dieu Mars peut être juste une évolution naturelle ou juste une regrettable mutation génétique de notre temps et de le prendre en compte pour élaborer des directions efficaces d'action.

L'habilité d'innover et d'utiliser, par un possible adversaire, des capacités différentes et des méthodes asymétriques d'agression oblige à une réponse avec des valences novatrices adéquates, comme un jeu d'échecs où nous devons attraper l'adversaire même lorsque nous nous défendons.

*Version française par  
Alina PAPOI*

# INTEGRATED APPROACH

## – Necessity for Countering the Actions Subsumed under Hybrid Warfare –

*Colonel Dr Mihai RADU*

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*According to certain studies conducted by NATO experts, the term “hybrid” appears in different combinations: “hybrid threat”, “hybrid conflict” and “hybrid warfare”. Although they seem to belong to the same category, they are different not only in terms of concept but also in terms of scope or manifestation at all levels of conducting military operations (tactical, operational or strategic). The only common aspect is that they usually occur in an operational environment that is considered free of constraints or means of reaction. The author considers that in such conflicts, potential aggressors will exploit the easy access to weapon systems, command and control systems, and they will encourage the phenomenon expansion through a range of fighting techniques such as incursions, raids, ambushes, employing improvised explosive devices, coercive murders or terrorist attacks.*

**Keywords:** *traditional warfare; non-state actors; integrated action; national security*

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*Hybrid warfare is not going to happen – it is already happening!*

*This paper aims to provide a viewpoint related to the evolution of the current security environment, to the conceptual and structural changes of the forces involved in countering the threats to regional and global security, with a focus on reviewing warfare typology in order to define hybrid warfare. It also focuses on identifying possible countermeasures against the actions related to this type of warfare and on highlighting the need for a new approach to the armed forces system from the perspective of the hybrid warfare concept.*

*We consider that these topics could be important elements in the construction of a possible future strategic concept for an integrated use of national power basic elements – diplomacy, communications, armed forces and economy. Moreover, the outcomes could contribute, as reference elements, to the projection of the military and civilian forces – structure, procurement, manning, equipment, training – that participate in fulfilling the strategic objectives*

*and in promoting national interests.*

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Colonel Dr Mihai Radu – Strategic Planning Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

*Our intention is to facilitate the liaison between the national the Allies' and partners' political and military objectives and, why not, to gain planned political, military and economic advantages in the medium and long ranges.*

*We also estimate this presentation could guide the development and integration of current military concepts and capabilities<sup>1</sup> and could contribute to the development and integration of other institutions'/agencies' concepts and capabilities related to hybrid warfare, in a joint and inter-institutional manner, having direct results in areas such as: doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).*

*We consider that, after comprehensively understanding this phenomenon, we will be able to initiate the restructuring and transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces, of the processes regarding training/education, readiness and equipment, so as to be able to face new types of risks, challenges, threats and conflicts. Following the implementation of the concept and, after that, of the doctrine, which are specific to the hybrid warfare we could also analyse the lessons identified, as painful as they can sometimes be, from the recent conflicts that affect the Alliance and implicitly our armed forces, and integrate them as lessons learned.*

*Last but not least, we hope that, by institutionalising the concept of countering hybrid warfare and having it, doctrinally implemented at the operational level (of the conventional warfare), as well as by establishing responsibilities for conducting it, at a governmental/inter-institutional level, we will be able to finance these operations from a separate budget, other than the Ministry of National Defence, destined for procurement, equipment and training.*

*In conclusion, we consider the information presented in this paper could be useful for both military and civilian environment to crystallise certain theoretical benchmarks that could be used in further analysis, to structure a national system considering a generally balanced approach to war, in general, as well as to establish a joint, inter-institutional capability to efficiently conduct the conventional war as well as to counter the hybrid one.*

\*

## 1. Introduction

At the end of 2008 (after long debates that lasted for over a year) the United States Department of Defence endorsed a document with an important political-military impact for that period of time<sup>2</sup>. It was about the institutionalisation at the strategic

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<sup>1</sup> The term *military capability* comprises all major components, including capability or force structure.

<sup>2</sup> *Irregular Warfare – the United States Department of Defence Directive*, no. 3000.07/01.12.2008, see [www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf).



level of a new type of warfare, *Irregular Warfare*, attaching as much importance to it as to conventional warfare. Moreover, in March 2009, the Department of Defence changed the strategy of waging war in Afghanistan, in accordance with the provisions of the same document.

In this respect, a month later (04.04.2009), at the Strasbourg-Kehl NATO Summit, heads of state and government decided that in order to meet the established strategic objectives a new integrated approach to the Afghanistan conflict, which would involve not only the military but the civilians as well, was necessary<sup>3</sup>.

We can say that, at NATO level, the topic of countering *hybrid warfare* is on the agenda starting in July 2009, when the International Military Staff (IMS) requested the Allied Command Operations (ACO) and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) viewpoints in order to develop a basic concept related to the military contribution to countering this threat. The project called "*Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats*" was sent to member states on 26 August 2010<sup>4</sup>, but it was not agreed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

In the context of the recent events in Ukraine, in the second half of 2014, discussions on this topic were resumed, with the aim of developing a number of documents concerning *hybrid warfare* with a focus on the evaluation of hybrid threats and on the connection with the *Readiness Action Plan – RAP*, as well as on the identification and evaluation of the options and necessary capabilities for countering these threats, simultaneously with training forces and preparing assets meant to respond to such type of threats<sup>5</sup>.

The European Union also developed the *Comprehensive Approach*<sup>6</sup> starting in 2009, aimed at increasing the efficiency of coordinated tools available in the EU and developing Civil Military Coordination – *CMCO*<sup>7</sup>.

All the actions initiated in this area are meant, first of all, to restructure and even transform the armed forces, their training, education and equipment, so as to be able to face new types of threats and conflicts. Moreover, by implementing them, it is desired to prevent making the same mistakes as in Vietnam, by applying the lessons learned from recent conflicts.

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<sup>3</sup> Extending the role played by NATO in Afghanistan, 4 April 2009, see [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int).

<sup>4</sup> *The Countering Hybrid Threats CDE*, see [www.act.nato.int/the-countering-hybrid-threats-concept-development-experiment](http://www.act.nato.int/the-countering-hybrid-threats-concept-development-experiment)

<sup>5</sup> *Deterring Hybrid Warfare: A Chance for NATO and the EU to Work Together?*<sup>2</sup>, see [www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Also-in-2014/Deterring-hybrid-warfare/RO/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Also-in-2014/Deterring-hybrid-warfare/RO/index.htm)

<sup>6</sup> We should avoid translating *comprehensive approach* from English with the same word in Romanian because, according to the *Romanian Language Dictionary – DEX*, *comprehensive* has another meaning, namely *quick and accurate understanding; smart/intelligent, deep* – DEX, 2009.

<sup>7</sup> *EUMS FFT – Proposal for a Military Perspective on a Comprehensive Approach for EU-led Operations at Theatre Level*, 03.03.2009, see [www.european-security.info](http://www.european-security.info)

A question arises, therefore: Would suffice a new approach and the institutionalisation of the new type of warfare necessary or the existing typology (although too much developed from the theoretical point of view), with only little improvement through the implementation of tactics, techniques and procedures extracted from the lessons learned? That very question is the starting point for this approach.

## **2. Changes in the Current Security Environment**

The strategic objectives in the new political-military context, which will probably change the current political arrangements in Europe, have resulted in a new theory of warfare, mainly based on a new kind of citizens' awareness of security<sup>8</sup>. So, we notice the ratio between *security* and *defence* is more and more determined by the manner in which citizens perceive this as a disturbance in their daily life and the way in which they become aware of the use of certain assets in protection and defence actions. By implementing this new theory there will be readjustments and chain reactions, at both national and global level, taking into account the fact that they cover the entire spectrum of current threats from symmetric to totally asymmetric ones, the whole range of possible participants in the confrontation, from state to non-state actors and trans-national ethnic groups, as well as the whole range of combat forms from traditional and conventional to unrestricted ones, including the struggle for a proper perception of conflict development.

The future security environment comprises a mix of military and non-military threats that come from state and non-state actors, *hybrid warfare* being the most important one.

The complexity of the international security environment has forced political leaders to take into account the fact that security cannot be any longer approached by a single state or non-state entity because vulnerabilities, risks, dangers and threats to security have a systemic connotation.

The emergence of extremist political, religious and ethnic ideologies augments conflicts, and the lack of efficient governance can lead to safe havens and shelters for terrorists, criminals and insurgents. Weak states with stagnant economies, corrupt political institutions, environmental problems, weak public healthcare systems or in danger of pandemics and the states/regions that are involved in multinational competition for vital natural resources often become conflict areas.

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<sup>8</sup> We consider necessary a correct, differentiated, use of the words *security* and *defence* as the word *security* means lack of threat in an community (to be sheltered from any harm; trust and peace determined by the lack of danger; protection – according to *DEX*, 2009), while *defence* means the action and the results of this action against any hostile activity (one of the main forms of combat that aims at stopping the enemy's offensive; all the measures taken in this respect – according to *DEX*, 2009).

<b>Changes in the security environment</b>	
<b>Past</b>	<b>Present/Future</b>
Know the enemy, understand the threat and risks.	Not known enemy, multiple challenges.
National defence against conventional and non-conventional threats.	National defence having high risk against non-conventional and terrorist threats.
Participation in humanitarian operations and low intensity conflicts.	Numerous participations in humanitarian operations.
Known threats regarding the possible use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.	Fast proliferation and possible use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
Military operations conducted in destined areas.	Extended scale of the area of operations towards non-belligerent countries. Military operations conducted mainly in urban, populated areas and on rocky terrain.
Force structure, mainly military, known, designed and shaped.	Force structure: civilian-military, inter-agencies, integrated, permanently re-shaped and transformed.
Intelligence is used for the force employment.	Intelligence becomes a force.
Forecasted.	Prolonged.
Of political nature at strategic level.	Of political nature down to tactical level.
Use of military power is essential.	Often, the use of military power is counterproductive.

In this respect, we consider that future conflicts will take place between people, among people, greatly limiting the use of conventional military might. This problem will be intensified by the increased number of hostile state/non-state entities that possess weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated anti-access capabilities, which can precede direct military options. These situations will need or favour an integrated, inter-institutional, civil-military and non-conventional approach to using indirect methods and means in order to meet strategic objectives.

Therefore, the idea of flexible structures and mechanisms is getting shape, mainly from the point of view of rapidly adjusting tactics to decision-making process, which is very short, of using flexible, deployable and capable structures, able to act in urban, crowded environment, and against multiple terrorist, criminal and conventional actions, even against portable weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

### **3. Conceptual and Structural Transformation of the Forces that Participate in Countering Threats in the New Security Environment**

The political and military strategic objectives in the new political-military context are to result in a new theory of warfare, based on the principles and phenomena of the current IT age and on the manner in which people perceive the concept

of *security*. This new theory covers the entire range of current threats, the entire range of possible participants in the confrontation, from state to non-state actors, the entire range of threats, from symmetric to completely asymmetric ones, as well as the entire range of combat forms, from traditional and conventional to unrestricted ones.

Even if the physiognomy of conflicts has changed, the military action still remains present. In this respect, it is essential to understand the differences between the types of conflict so as to choose the most appropriate instruments and means able to ensure maximum advantage.

While taking into account the profound changes, in what concerns the results of conceptual changes in waging the war, both optimistic and sceptic scholars, who are not completely convinced by the total transformation resulted from these phenomena, agreed on the fact that the approach to future warfare should be re-evaluated, in an integrated, global manner, and the military systems should be transformed for being able to plan, conduct and lead military operations despite the size, nature, objective and environment where the force is projected and used.

Therefore, there are constant discussions on the topic of organising the concepts related to the types of armed conflicts in a unitary manner, on the need for adjusting doctrines, and on transforming structures and organisations, as well as on topics related to education, logistic support, leadership, training of participant forces, all these topics being in accordance with the physiognomy of new conflicts (some of them in progress), other than conventional ones.

In this respect, David W. Barno considers that: *“All wars are waged because of political reasons and the political reason is also present in this new type of conflict, down to the tactical level [...] Influencing governments and population is a very complex activity. Therefore, in this new type of war, military leaders as well as their civilian counterparts should have a way of thinking that is both military and political”*<sup>9</sup>. It results in the necessity for a comprehensive approach to this phenomenon, with the proper use of available resources, for both military and civilian reasons, which means enhanced flexibility in organising and planning these resources.

**The first very important changes** are related to *on the way to address the conflict, the strategy used to obtain the desired effects, as well as the source of violence*, which migrate from state organisations to individuals, the capabilities being mixed with the population. In this new type of conflict changes occur from the inside,

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<sup>9</sup> David W. Barno, *Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency*, in *Parameters*, 2006, quote from *Irregular Warfare – Joint Operating Concept*, 2009, p. 18.

by delegitimizing the state institutions and ideologies so as to have ultimately the support of the population. Unfortunately, it has been demonstrated that the states that are well prepared from the military point of view for a confrontation with another state or group of states are not capable of protecting themselves against the attacks of non-state actors. Therefore, we need an inter-institutional civil-military presence, in the long term, so as to develop the necessary capabilities and to extend the operational impact. Thus, we can assert that the new conflict focuses on the control or influence of the population, of ethnic groups/minorities, and not on the control of an adversary's forces or of a territory.

**A second major change**, with a direct effect on the type of conflict, is related to the fact that *we are not confronted with a clear enemy but with a series of non-conventional threats, which are unpredictable, thus hard to be managed, which are called asymmetric threats*. Success in the new conflict depends not only on the military force but also on understanding social dynamics, such as politics, social networks, religious influence and cultural aspects, taking into account the fact that each and every adversary tries to enhance own credibility and legitimacy so as to exert authority over the population and ethnic groups/minorities.

**Another essential change** is the fact that military forces are not able, organisationally and structurally, to accomplish all alone a significant part of the assigned missions. So far nations have been mainly concerned with ensuring the proper number of troops, and the military equipment and fire power necessary for waging a war of attrition – every structure seeking to deter the enemy's actions. We consider that, in the next decades, the security environment will be very different from what we have learnt. The forces able to wage a war in which the dominant role will be played by intelligence are the future winners. Thus, the new type of war will be very different and will entail a great focus on force, both civilian and military, which should have an integrating potential at all levels – strategic, operational and tactical – manoeuvre capacity, especially at small echelon level, at trooper level, who is also transformed (besides being a professional, he needs to be able to negotiate with local population).

We can say that such a continuous change and diversification of the conflict physiognomy is mainly characterised by the replacement of the interest in occupying a territory with that in influencing the events, by giving up the idea of being present in the field in favour of that of controlling things so as to influence or intervene. In addition to that, we notice *the focus on avoiding direct armed confrontation, as well as avoiding causing massive damage to the enemy*.



This new approach to conflict has moved the centre of gravity from a fixed posture, based on exclusively military planning, related to threats, to an ample, flexible, reactive, civil-military planning, focused on the capabilities needed to accomplish the objectives specific to every phase of the conflict. This type of planning is based equally on real time information and forecasted information, including elements of doctrine, organisation, training, procurement, leadership, development, personnel, infrastructure, as well as elements related to interoperability and standardisation.

Essentially, the above presented changes are based on new political and strategic goals, new objectives, specific forces and means of action, another concept and different intensity in war-waging, another attitude towards the enemy, as well as more sophisticated and unexpected ways of expressing violence.

All these changes determine some military theorists to speak about the end of classical, destructive warfare. More and more often, they talk about the need to integrate these new types of asymmetric confrontations – military interventions for reconstruction and for ensuring stability, military operations other than war, low intensity conflicts, fight against terrorism and insurgents etc. – in one single concept called *hybrid warfare*.

## 4. Conceptual Delimitation – Hybrid Warfare Defining Elements

### 4.1. Hybrid warfare definition

The nature of warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century stays the same as in ancient times – “a violent conflict of interests between organised groups characterised by the use of military force”<sup>10</sup>.

According to NATO experts analysis, the term “hybrid” is present in many different combinations, such as: “hybrid threat”<sup>11</sup>, “hybrid conflict”<sup>12</sup> and “hybrid warfare”<sup>13</sup>,

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<sup>10</sup>The terms *organised* and *military force* refer to the ability of a group to obtain support for own political interests and to generate violence so as to get significant political consequences at a large scale.

<sup>11</sup>*Hybrid threats* are defined as the ability of one or more state or non-state actors to use a mix of actions (*conventional and non-conventional*) in the combat area and beyond its borders, with negative effects on the decision-making cycle of the aggressed, so as to meet the set objectives. It may include a fusion of armament systems and conventional combat methods, WMD, espionage, subversive actions, terrorism, cyber attacks and criminality, supported by intell operations or information operations and activities that are meant to influence decision-makers.

<sup>12</sup>*Hybrid conflicts* can be defined as clashes or crisis situations with a large spectrum, which include not only the physical but also the conceptual dimension; the first represents combat against an armed enemy and the other represents complex combat for gaining the support of local population in the conflict area, the support of the population from the states contributing the operations, and the support of the international community.

<sup>13</sup>*Hybrid warfare* entails simultaneous employment of conventional and non-conventional means to wage war, as well as permanent adjustment of political, military, economic, social, informational or diplomatic means so as to meet the set political-military objectives.

which, although seem to belong to the same group, they are different, in terms of both concept and scope at all levels of conducting military operations (tactical, operational and strategic). The only common aspect is the fact that, usually, they are materialised in an operational environment that is considered to be free of constraints or reaction means (vulnerable states).

In such conflicts, potential aggressors (*states, groups sponsored by states or non-state actors, self financed or financed by others*) will exploit the easy access to armament systems, command and control systems (including the encrypted ones) and will promote the extension of the phenomenon with the employment of combat techniques such as raids, ambushes, improvised explosive devices, punitive killings or terrorist attacks.

Planning and decentralised conduct of actions during a *hybrid conflict/warfare* allow for a high degree of adjustment, which the classical structures, with a complicated chain of command cannot afford, but at the same time may lead to the impossibility to detect the affiliation of the adversary, the command and control structure, as well as the liaison elements, which makes countering hybrid threats difficult.

Until clarifying the terms, to better understand the notions, we suggest the following definition: *Hybrid warfare represents a complex social phenomenon, which is ambiguous, chaotic, a non-violent and/or violent conflict among state or non-state actors (organised groups) for legitimising and obtaining or maintaining control or influence over groups/minorities and relevant population. It entails indirect and asymmetric approaches and can be developed by employing the entire spectrum of military or other type of capabilities, in order to weaken the force and influence the motivation of the adversary. The organised groups are not limited to states having regular armed forces, easy to identify, and they do not operate in compliance with the conventions and standards that are accepted at international level. Moreover, hybrid warfare entails the transition from the classic approach to conduct military actions to the comprehensive approach, which combines military means with non-military ones, in the framework of deliberate and synchronised campaigns, conducted in such a manner to allow the state that initiates them to deny its direct involvement.*

#### *4.2. Differences between conventional and hybrid warfare*

*Conventional warfare* is a direct military confrontation between states, coalitions or alliances. This confrontation usually entails military operations, force against force, where adversaries use against one another a variety of conventional military capabilities in air, on land, at sea, in space and in cyber space. The aim can be to convince or constraint political or military decision-making key factors, to defeat the adversary armed forces, to destroy the combat capabilities,

to capture and keep a territory, with a view to forcing a change of government or of its political behaviour. Moreover, *conventional warfare* entails the fact that, generally, the population, ethnic groups/minorities in the operational area are not belligerent and will accept any imposed political solution, arbitrated or negotiated by the belligerent governments. Therefore, one of the fundamental military objectives within conventional military operations is to minimise civilian interference.

On the contrary, *hybrid warfare* focuses on the control and influence over the population, ethnic groups/minorities from the aggressed state and not on the control over its forces or territory. Finally, *hybrid warfare* is a political combat with violent and non-violent elements. The focus of *hybrid warfare* is represented by the centre of gravity, namely groups/populations that are relevant for the nature of conflict. The parties involved in the conflict, whether they are states or armed groups, try to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of adversaries and to isolate them from relevant population and foreign supporters, physically as well as psychologically. Moreover, they try to enhance own credibility and legitimacy so as to exert authority over the population<sup>14</sup>. The creation and maintenance of a durable and functional state require a government that is legitimate in the eyes of population.

A critical aspect of *hybrid warfare* is represented by the generation of a state of ambiguity in the target population, as well as within the international community, aimed at covering what is really going on and at creating an obscure situation. This ambiguity can result in paralysing the opponent's capacity to react, in altering its potential to mobilise for defence, because the initiator of the attack is not clearly defined. Moreover, the state of ambiguity divides the international community, limiting the spectrum and the ways to respond to the aggression.

#### 4.3. Key/characteristic factors

Apparently, all wars are similar. They are characterised by the existence of a political objective and some military objectives, by belligerence and violence, by the existence of a system of laws and principles, which have not been essentially changed throughout history. Therefore, in theory, all wars should be the same. But, in real life, no war resembles another. Each and every war is unique and unrepeatable. Moreover, although war is, essentially, governed by the same laws and principles, very seldom can belligerents learn lessons and comply

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<sup>14</sup> Certain terrorist organisations are exceptions from this general rule because they attack the population so as to constraint or intimidate governments or the society to follow their own objectives, without taking into account legitimacy or popular support.

with the established principles and norms, namely the rules of war. With few exceptions, throughout history, every war has had its own laws and principles. However, we can enumerate a few common elements: in all wars the strategic initiative belongs to one of the belligerents, considering an attacker and a defender; almost all wars has an uncertain development, rarely the political objective of the war being completely fulfilled; there are great human and material losses; when war is the final manifestation of a crisis it results in spectacular economic, social and political development; although prevention of war and avoidance of violent confrontations are always desired, apparently, it will never happen.

As a result, we may state that future wars will have the same characteristics, their typology being subsumed, no doubt, under a diversified and extended design with predictive functions.

Modern crises are characterised by complex inter-dependencies, conflicts take place as a result of a mix of historic, political, military, social, cultural and economic disagreements. They are usually inter-dependent and therefore call for various solutions. At both national and NATO level, considering the area of engagement specific for a crisis, six domains within the *PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information)*<sup>15</sup> concept are taken into account. These domains are:

- *political* – includes political system, political parties and the main actors in the civilian environment, international and regional organisations, central and local institutions that have authority and enforce the law in an established geographical area;
- *military* – includes armed forces, equipped, trained, developed, sustained, as well as the support infrastructure for protecting national or allied assets;
- *economic* – includes the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, as well as the health status of a state or organisation;
- *social* – includes the inter-dependent network of social institutions that support persons from the cultural point of view, ensure opportunities for fulfilling personal expectations; covers social aspects such as: religion, social structure, legal system, policies for support infrastructure, humanitarian support etc.;
- *infrastructure* – refers to basic facilities, services and installations, necessary for the proper functioning of the community, organisations or society; includes logistics, telecommunications and transport

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<sup>15</sup> *Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information – PMESII* model is a way to explain the elements or interrelated domains of a complex operational environment.

infrastructure, schools, hospitals, water/electricity/gas distribution networks, sewage, irrigations etc.;

- *information* – includes specific infrastructure, organisation systems, the personnel and components that plan, register, process, distribute, store, operate and manage data and information, communication systems, the media.

Among the essential characteristics of the new type of warfare, those that not only define it but also differentiate it from conventional warfare, the most important are the following:

- *use of indirect approach*:
  - ⇒ focus is on approaching the economic, political, cultural or security aspects that trigger the population dissatisfaction more than on the direct military action against military forces; even if both approaches are necessary, it is less likely that the direct employment of the military in the initial phase of a conflict;
  - ⇒ disorganisation, deployment and psychological attacks in vulnerable points of the adversary;
  - ⇒ action through third states to have influence in critical domains;
  - ⇒ action through the mix of conventional and non-conventional methods and means (including clandestine and under cover actions, operations in combination with non-conventional forces or non-conventional use of conventional capabilities);
  - ⇒ use of *PSYOPS*<sup>16</sup>, diplomacy and public activities, of control and influence over population, ethnic groups/minorities and resources, for undermining the adversary power and isolating it from local and international support;
- *conduct of prolonged operations/campaigns*:
  - ⇒ *hybrid warfare* is not something new; if we look back in history we can see that such wars require long and sustained efforts, in the long term, for a political outcome;
  - ⇒ critical need for a sufficient capacity to sustain a prolonged effort and the need to rotate forces so as to ensure the continuity of effort by preserving, at the same time, the capacity to maintain training and readiness of forces in a conventional manner;
  - ⇒ need for developing capabilities and inter-institutional actions, in partnership with other structures in the *Defence, Public Order and National Security System (SAOPSN)*;

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<sup>16</sup> According to current *PSYOPS* doctrine, the activity of this structure can be targeted towards friendly forces. The attempt to manipulate minorities as long as they are assimilated to friendly forces can be challenged in a court of law.



- *focus on people's will, necessary to:*
  - ⇒ maintain the legitimacy of government and state institutions;
  - ⇒ have popular support for joint, inter-institutional and multinational forces;
  - ⇒ develop diplomatic, information and economic actions in the long term so as to gain popular support;
- *continuous presence of the force and extension of its role;*
- *prolonged informational and operational preparation of the environment*
  - ⇒ preparing the environment in terms of information will play a decisive role in understanding the adversary operational environment and vulnerabilities; in order to do that, uninterrupted information networks will be needed, with a focus on existing vulnerable ethnic groups/minorities, government, public authorities, security forces;
  - ⇒ preparing the environment in terms of operations by positioning in vulnerable areas a number of structures/forward joint teams consisting of regional experts who know the language, habits, cultural behaviour in that region. These teams will prepare future joint forces operations, by studying the local population, the local authorities and VIPs with the aim of positively influencing them. The teams will also support the education and training of security forces and non-conventional forces, will communicate the established strategic messages, allowing the rapid use of forces during crises and the unplanned operations within the *hybrid warfare*;
- *establish and maintain beneficial inter-personal relations* that are essential for *hybrid warfare* support, taking into account the fact that it is conducted with people, among people;
- *create alternative command and control systems and mechanisms:*
  - ⇒ force structure commands can synchronise and integrate the activities and operations of subordinate elements into those of participant institutions in the areas of operations;
- *understand the social-cultural environment where actions take place:*
  - ⇒ local population, that many times may cooperate with aggressors, represents the centre of gravity for both parties involved in the conflict;
  - ⇒ hybrid threats are diverse and can occur in a complex environment, including in the urban one;
  - ⇒ the environment where they occur will certainly go over geographic and national borders and will enter the cyber space, the area of finance, criminality, governance;

- *win the perception combat:*
  - ⇒ both state and non-state aggressors, having access to the media, will attempt to alter the credibility, the role and the way of action of the aggressed state institutions;
  - ⇒ aggressors will be able to exploit the legal complexity of the situations when, in the aggressed state, the hostile activities overlap with the criminal ones and their effects augment one another;
  - ⇒ orchestrated attacks and media operations against the institutions of the aggressed state will emerge from multiple sources, thus being very difficult to counter;
- *access to high technology:*
  - ⇒ increased availability of specialists and high-tech will allow aggressors to develop their own capabilities and the possibility to act in a combat space larger than the conventional one;
  - ⇒ ability of the states to sponsor or provide logistic support to surrogate-organisations will allow smaller actors to perform precise strikes (potentially devastating), even against the allies and partners of the aggressed state involved in countering these threats;
  - ⇒ high-importance targets will be situated in the area of influence of many aggressors resulting in the need for an increased number of forces and structures for infrastructure protection;
- *adjustment and flexibility:*
  - ⇒ ability to engage a conventional enemy stays critical but the presence in the theatre of the aggressor's well equipped non-conventional forces (with the possibility to even use portable weapons of mass destruction) remains the main challenge;
  - ⇒ aggressors can operate in small teams, hard to be discovered, using multiple actions (terrorism, criminality, conventional methods) without complying with any international law.

## 5. Defining the Problem at the Armed Forces Level

As long as this problem is *not only a military one*, the solution cannot be a purely military one, but we consider that we should find answers to the following questions at a military level:

- *What should we do, at military level, for highlighting the hybrid warfare as a threat to security and for making the national political leaders aware of it?*

- *What is the way in which the armed forces should act so as to prevent, deter, deny and counter the hybrid, asymmetric threats, in cooperation with other institutions and multinational partners and to support the efforts against the cause of a conflict?*
- *How do we use the conventional military capabilities and those specific to the hybrid warfare for the integrated support of the effort?*

## 6. Approach to the Problem

The approach describes a possible answer regarding the way in which the military component and the participant institutions prevent and, when necessary (when established at political level), combat hybrid threats.

Thus, the desired end state as well as the ways and means needed for combating such threats have been identified.

*Desired end state* means maintaining constitutional order and the rule of law, national independence and state sovereignty, social order. It can be done by preventing, deterring, countering, and annihilating the threats to security including the hybrid ones. It is also necessary to change the character of the environment as well the causes and conditions that allow the emergence of such threats.

As long as it is preferable to manage an initial threat and the circumstances that caused it, the main effort will be oriented towards preventive actions. When the threat is manifested it should be deterred and annihilated.

Success, at strategic level, can be assessed by estimating the degree to which:

- influence and control over target groups are eliminated;
- legitimacy and credibility of political authorities are the same as before the aggression.

Therefore, the outcome of these confrontations should not be expected to be immediate, decisive victory. More often than not, success will be defined by the long-term involvement so as to resolve, manage and minimise the conflict and its causes. Moreover, the evaluation of psychological effects on controversial groups/minorities must take into account existing cultural and social norms.

*Ways* are, mainly, the activities and/or operations that can be conducted successively, in parallel or in an aggregated form, within a hybrid threat countering plan, as follows:

- denounce aggression/aggressions in international forums and obtain international political support;
- diplomatic, economic (embargo) and political pressure;
- counter propaganda and misinformation actions;

- strategic communication (*STRATCOM*);
- concentrate conventional armed forces in areas near to target or highly vulnerable zones;
- use special operations forces (*SOF*);
- *InfoOps* and *PSYOPS*;
- cyber activities;
- ensure public order, focused on countering non-conventional adversaries.

*Means* are the elements used by available forces for thoroughly understanding the problem, for planning and conducting activities, missions and operations, as well as for assessing and adjusting them in order to meet the set objectives.

We may define the employed means as being the forces and capabilities completely integrated, conventional and non-conventional, belonging to the Armed Forces and participant institutions, in the framework of a unitary, inter-institutional approach.

The general dimension of a military action is that specific for a low-level operation, as it is defined in the *Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine*. However, more often than not, the armed forces will not be its central, coordination and leading element. The complex nature of *hybrid warfare* and the focus on relevant groups/minorities result in the fact that the forces involved must participate together, in both planning and conducting missions/operations. Joint action is essential for implementing all available power instruments. Thus, the described requirement demands that military structures should reach a common action level, working as a team, at inter-institutional level. In order to do that in *hybrid warfare*, it is necessary to establish clear, integrated, command relations between the armed forces and participant institutions, at strategic, operational and tactical level.

## **7. Actions/Measures to Be Initiated to Counter Hybrid Threats**

The problem of countering hybrid warfare concerns most of the responsible governments as well as NATO and EU leaders, this being an area where a very good cooperation between the two organisations can manifest. Even though the two organisations have developed their own strategies and cooperation programmes, identified ways of responding to these threats with a focus on the need to increase awareness of the real situation, resilience to hybrid actions or deterrence of aggressors' actions, both organisations highlight the primordial role played by states in countering hybrid actions as they have to be aware of their own vulnerabilities and admit their existence.

That is why we consider that, at national level, prevention measures to counter the hybrid threats of potential adversaries or to limit their effects should be initiated, individually or in cooperation with partners and allies.

If we acknowledge the complexity of the environment where a future conflict develops, whether it is conventional or hybrid, as being different from what we already know about conflicts, the approach to the new conflict should be comprehensive, integrated, civil-military, inter-institutional, and should engage all basic elements of national power – diplomatic, informational, military and economic. In this respect, we consider beneficial the idea of introducing in the national strategic documents defining elements for the *hybrid warfare* concept and for the integrated, inter-institutional action meant to counter its effects.

Moreover, we consider that such an approach should be based on a strategy and a general plan, which would include the responsibilities as well as the way of training all participants for solving not only the problems related to defence and conduct of operations but also those related to security – political, social, economic, administrative, rule of law, involving all the capabilities available to the institutions that participate in the conflict.

The development of such a comprehensive and integrated concept with a focus on essential domains (doctrine, operations, training, logistics, maintenance, personnel, facilities/infrastructure, interoperability), based on the current action, will ensure the necessary framework for recruitment, training and participation of civilian experts, together with the military ones, for crisis management as the basis for a good cooperation of the involved institutions.

Identified measures:

- establish the inter-institutional framework for conducting the *hybrid warfare*. In this respect, we consider appropriate to identify, at the Supreme Council of National Defence/government level, the institutions that should participate in conducting the *hybrid warfare*, to establish and develop a *National Security and Integrated Defence Operational Centre (NSIDOC)*, coordinated by the Supreme Council of National Defence and under direct authority of the national security advisor to the president, having as main responsibility the integrated, inter-institutional planning, the unitary organisation and coordinated implementation of activities in the field of national security.

- establish guidelines and identify areas where governmental and non-governmental institutions and organisations (governance, legal system, human rights, economic and social development, health system, education, public order, border security, constructions etc.) should be involved;

- identify ministries and institutions that could be involved in comprehensive crisis management and establishment of inter-ministerial and inter-institutional mechanisms, in increasing the capabilities of identified institutions, and in preparing personnel for sustaining a prolonged action within *hybrid warfare*. Moreover, establish areas of expertise and experts to be part of *NSIDOC*. We consider that they should cover at least the areas of expertise of the following institutions: Government's General Secretariat; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Economy; Ministry of Trade and Tourism; Ministry of Public Finances; Ministry of Transport; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Communications and IT; Public Ministry (DNA, DIICOT); Romanian Intelligence Service; Foreign Intelligence Service; Special Telecommunications Service; Guard and Protection Service; other entities with responsibilities in the area of national security (professional associations of security companies, conflict prevention centres etc.);

- create the legal framework for inter-ministerial cooperation and action at decision-making and expert level and establish the legal framework; establish inter-ministerial and ministerial level expert working groups, in relation with planning the participation in operations;

- need for action according to a common, inter-institutional plan with a joint civil-military force that would be able to sustain prolonged campaigns against potential aggressors; multinational, inter-institutional joint action is essential for winning a war/operations related to *hybrid warfare*; since direct employment of the military could not be the main means to win a *hybrid warfare*, the forces will have to support non-military power instruments and to decide on the circumstances for ensuring strategic success;

- establish the level of ambition regarding the participation with personnel in missions outside national territory. When establishing the level of ambition, Romania's dimension and position, the areas of interest, and the fact that the budget must be able to sustain such missions should be all considered. As a reference, while developing this memorandum, Romania's current participation should be taken into account, upgrades being performed in the future according to the concrete situation. The necessary funds for missions outside national territory should be ensured from a special budget, meant for crisis/war situations, without affecting the defence budget allotted for peace situations and mainly destined for the armed forces training, equipment, procurement;

- establish civilian missions and the structure of the civilian component that could participate in operations (it may include: civilian coordinators for possible projects, coordinators in the security area, representatives of national NGOs),

in parallel with the establishment of the working ways for creating a civilian component targeted for a certain mission;

- identify target groups at expert level within every ministry;
- establish the legal framework for training the civilian component to be used in different types of operations, adjust the national legislation necessary for sending and supporting national personnel in the theatres of operations, draft the legal provisions for the participation of civilian components in operations followed by the elimination of possible restrictions;
- develop and ensure the civil-military capabilities necessary for the participation in such conflicts, in major areas of interest (police, gendarmerie, civilian protection, administration, justice) and ensure separate, specific training but together with the military component;
- develop and maintain alliances and coalitions that will be involved in conducting the *hybrid warfare* and involve strategic partners in planning and conducting specific operations; in this respect, it is essential to improve the exchange of information with NATO members and potential non-military participants;
- adjust training plans for the mission with elements of a detailed evaluation of the social-cultural environment and with linguistic training of the personnel with responsibilities in the field, specific to the theatre of operations;
- enhance the capacity of communication means at strategic, operational and tactical level to influence media campaigns and *STRATCOM*;
- enhance protection of military and civilian components in risk areas;
- modify the force structure and its capacity to meet, in the long term, the requirements of the *hybrid warfare*; because of the long duration of the *hybrid warfare* it is necessary to clearly and thoroughly evaluate the existing capabilities, including a cautious evaluation of the duration of direct involvement (need for rotation);
- specific training for acting in extended operational environments that are usually outside the military authority;
- rebuild the military capability for civilian administration taking into account the fact that a great part of the military component will have to conduct non-conventional operations in support or instead of institutions that are not available in the area of operations for long periods of time;
- manning by recruiting linguists of relevant nationalities (for advanced teams of experts/regional specialists) and permanent deployment for their entire career in vulnerable operational areas; also personnel and force management



should take into account that the skills and knowledge of language and culture are not easily transferable between ethnographic regions;

- train the force for countering the *hybrid warfare* – the military forces that will act in this type of war have to be trained, equipped, integrated, combat ready and available for conducting or countering hybrid warfare operations, on request; in addition to that, such military forces should be flexible enough and adjustable so as to implement a *hybrid warfare* scenario while conducting other types of missions in the entire joint area of operations; they should also have the ability to be precise and stealth during the operations conducted in proximity of the population;

- develop a training strategy so as to provide detailed knowledge about certain geographic areas of interest and train the personnel regarding culture, every day lifestyle in the area, and involve leaders in dialogue and negotiations. The strategy should include the use of support tools for training, such as e-learning, war games and simulations;

- review the current doctrines and publications so as to include the terms specific to *hybrid warfare*, acknowledge the conduct of joint, inter-institutional actions, and of those against non-state actors;

- improve protection of IT networks against cyber attacks, with the possibility to identify the attackers, the attack routes and even to use cyber countermeasures.

*In the short and medium term it is essential to develop a unique, common, multi-annual, civil-military memorandum, at national level, regarding the participation with forces in missions outside Romanian territory, coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence, describing the way of gradual involvement of Romanian governmental and non-governmental institutions, depending on the stage of the crisis/conflict, political and military objectives, national interests, with a direct, significant impact on ethnic groups/minorities in possible conflict areas.*

This strategic approach to the civil-military dimension, adapted to the national characteristics and the phases of the new type of war, is a very difficult and complex step, but we consider that it is the only way to ensure Romania's integrated participation in the new types of conflicts, also contributing to the mitigation of the effects of the contradiction "*limited resources-limited needs*".

## Conclusions

While studying the developments in the current security environment, the conceptual and structural changes within the participant structures so as to counter the threats in the new international security environment, this paper is meant

to be a review of the influence of the *hybrid warfare* concept in the construction of the military power system.

In this respect, a great part of this effort is dedicated to defining the concept, being an attempt to highlight, first of all, the differences from the *conventional warfare*. **A first conclusion** would be that *hybrid warfare* is a complex social phenomenon, a chaotic and ambiguous type of war, with many subtleties. Instead of enforcing social changes from the outside, by a decisive defeat of military and security forces, hybrid warfare attempts to produce changes from the inside, by delegitimizing the state institutions and ideologies to finally gain population support. The new concept is a sum of actions and operations under the umbrella (up to now) of low-intensity conflicts, supplemented with civilian actions, aimed at diminishing the effects and vulnerabilities, at re-establishing order in non-military sectors, simultaneously with the reconstruction of this domain. Even if this is not a brand new idea, the current presentation is an attempt to institutionalise a way of approaching military operations that were conducted throughout history under different names: *tribal confrontation, small war, atypical war, low-intensity conflict, insurrection, indirect aggression*. *Hybrid warfare* focuses on control and influence over the population, not on the control over an adversary's forces or territory, being aimed at undermining a group, a government or an ideology, by influencing the population that, very often, is the centre of gravity.

Therefore, we may assert that *hybrid warfare* is a political combat with violent and non-violent components. The foundation of *hybrid warfare* is its centre of gravity, represented by ethnic groups/minorities that are relevant for the nature of the conflict.

Starting from the certainty that the complex environment in which the future conflict, whether conventional or hybrid, will take place is essentially different from what we used to know, **a second conclusion** refers to the fact that the approach to this new type of conflict should be integrated, comprehensive, inter-institutional, civil-military, by engaging all basic elements of national power – diplomatic, informational, military and economic. In this respect, we consider as beneficial the idea of introducing in national strategic, guiding documents the defining elements of the *hybrid warfare* concept. Moreover, we consider that such an approach should be based on a strategy and a general plan, which would include responsibilities as well as training methods for all the people involved, with a view to finding solutions related to security measures and conducting military operations, as well as political, social, economic, administrative measures to preserve the rule of law by involving all the capabilities available to the institutions that participate in the conflict.

**A third conclusion** refers to the fact that, when involved in this new type of conflict, the armed forces should take into account a series of complex factors, and the use of military capabilities, depending on the envisaged political objective, is extremely important within the global effort of the operation.

In this context we considered necessary listing the essential capabilities in such conflicts, capabilities that should enjoy the planners' special attention. Taking into account that separating the adversaries from the population is possible only by involving efficient intelligence networks, we highlighted the need for establishing joint intelligence structures, so as to have a global image of the joint area of operations, with the possibility to timely distribute the essential necessary elements, down to tactical level.

**A fourth conclusion** is represented by the fact that it is necessary to develop special capabilities, able to counter the effects of *hybrid warfare*, which would be trained, equipped and used according to the aim at strategic level. In this respect, the mobility and flexibility of the structures represent a true capacity to generate and multiply the participant force.

Another basic conclusion, **the fifth one**, refers to the fact that the military power transformation process should be continuous and strategically correlated with both the forecast regarding the trends, characteristics and physiognomy of the future war and NATO and EU needs for transformation. It should lead to obtaining capabilities that enable the Romanian Armed Forces to act in a joint, inter-institutional, modular and expeditionary manner and to ensure and exploit superiority in the decision-making process. In this respect, we highlighted the fact that the transformation process should lead to meeting the requirements imposed by the *hybrid warfare*, considering that the use of armed forces is not the main vector of the conflict, this being a characteristic of a known, well organised and structured adversary. It is because the damage caused to civilians, through the military actions collateral effects, can result in the loss of the population support, being opposed to the strategic goal of the *hybrid warfare*.

Taking into account the fact that actions related to *hybrid warfare* are long lasting, another conclusion, **the sixth one**, refers to participants and their training. In this respect, we consider necessary to develop a force structure that would rotate permanently in specific missions outside national territory, so as to ensure continuity and be able to face this environment. Moreover, taking into account that operations are conducted by small expert teams and the success of the mission, more often than not, is conditioned by the efficiency of inter-personal relations, it is obvious that we need methods for creating and maintaining long-lasting inter-personal relations.

**Finally**, we consider that all the information presented above is useful for the crystallisation of certain theoretical benchmarks that could be used in further studies and that could also lead to improving the command of planning, training and conducting operations processes in the Romanian Armed Forces.

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# **INFORMATION COMPONENT**

## **– Essential Element of Military Operations in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Millennium –**

*Colonel Cristian PETRE*

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*Far from being a new process, the increasing impact of globalisation in recent decades has resulted in the fact that global actors (states, alliances, non-governmental organisations, corporations, agencies etc.) have been provided with tools that ensure access to real-time information, processing a huge volume of information and supporting decision-making. It has led, among other aspects, to the evolution of the classical typology of aggression, from traditional conflict to hybrid action methods.*

*The complexity of military actions, generated by this state of affairs, is reflected, in the author's opinion, in the trend of expanding their environment, integrating, besides the land, air and sea dimensions, the cosmic, electromagnetic and information ones.*

**Keywords:** *globalisation; hybrid warfare; military operation; information operations; information environment; information systems*

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### **Introduction**

The unprecedented dynamics of social phenomena, generated and supported by the globalisation process, has more and more influence upon the evolution of the security environment. Such fact becomes the expression of a complex of factors emphasised by a dominating tendency to transform the nowadays world, namely to review the international connections and values system. There have been significant changes lately, the military factor being increasingly involved in extremely complex interactions, from those between global and asymmetrical actors, between state and non-state actions, to the interactions between individuals, interest groups or communities. Last but not least, military action has become an active factor within a complex structure of social actions, which results in no clear lines of demarcation between military, social, political, diplomatic or economic areas.

From the operational point of view, the image of the military action environment has suffered major alteration. The complexity of military actions,

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characterised by mobility, speed, flexibility, the use of high-precision strikes and the involvement of almost fully professional forces reflect in the multidimensional character of the operational framework, emphasising the tendency to expand their environment, by integrating, besides traditional dimensions – land, air, sea – the cosmic, electromagnetic and information ones.

At the same time, victory by physical suppression or the occupation of the war zone is no longer a purpose, informational success being much more important, by changing the opponent's attitude, belief and behaviour so as to be turned from enemy into neutral or into ally. Such aspect may determine the swift from the operational to the informational component of war, resulting in lower intensity violent means of combat.

## **1. Hybrid Warfare – Reality of the Contemporary World**

### *1.1. Globalisation – premise of hybrid warfare*

From the security analysis perspective, the future may be characterised by risks and uncertainties, by threats and opportunities, fuelled by the changes in the social, scientific and technological environment, magnified by globalisation effects.

In his book, *“The Choice – Global Domination or Global Leadership”*, Zbigniew Brzezinski shows that the notion of “globalisation” has two contradictory meanings: *on the one hand, it announces the beginning of a new age of international transparency and cooperation and, on the other hand, it is a synonym for moral narrowness and indifference for the social injustice the richest countries of the world are accused of*.

Another popular point of view is the one that makes the economic factor the core of globalisation. The swifts and turns of the society are mainly due to world economy development and to trade and investment, facilitated by the interdependency between states or even by national boundaries no longer enforced. It is, in principle, the basis for “globalisation”. Such perspective is given by the definition issued by Professor Charles Doran in 2000. According to it, globalisation is: *“the interaction of information technology and the global economy. It is indexed in terms of the intensity, scope, volume and value of international transactions in the informational, financial, commercial, trade and administrative spheres worldwide. A sharp increase in the rate of these transactions in the last decade and therefore in their level is the most measurable manifestation of globalisation”*<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Marea dilemă: a domina sau a conduce*, Editura Scripta, București, 2005, p. 139.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Doran, *Globalisation and Statecraft*, winter, 2000, SAISPHERE, see <http://www.Sais-jhu/edu/pubs/>.

One may notice, under such circumstances, the objective aspect given by the “*measurable*” aspects of globalisation.

Such approach seems to be just, since it has contributed decisively to the development of economy and facilitated the transfer of means of production to attractive areas in terms of raw-materials or labour force, which maximises profit. Yet, it is simplistic, failing to reveal the complex nature of the term, shown by the fact that “*it is not merely a diagnostic tool but also an action programme. Together, in a systematised form, these aspects of globalisation amount to a doctrine, based on a morally confident assertion of its historical inevitability*”<sup>3</sup>. One identifies, thus, more senses of globalisation: for some, the term reflects what already exists, for others, it reflects what should or should not exist, all generating unprecedented cause for conflict.

The economic, ethnic, cultural, religious and educational factors play an important role to create such vision on globalisation, reflected in the military field.

The aspects of globalisation such as the growth of inter-dependence and economic interaction, associated with the loss of the state sovereignty, the tendency to attenuate national identity due to the standardisation of cultural values and norms, the increasing role of non-state factors, the boom of technology in order to create military capabilities, as well as the mass migration of population from conflict zones contribute to a security environment which generates the confrontation known as *hybrid warfare*.

It emerged as a consequence of the diversification of threats that go beyond the military and states’ interest zone, gaining new meaning related to social life fields’ interactions. The source of threat may be identified at the level of aggressive states, cross-border non-state organisations, negative social tendencies or even cultural aspects.

It also symbolises the expression of global security environment, characterised by high instability, by tendencies to redefine the relationships between the great powers, by the increasing freedom of action of the regional, state or non-state factors.

### *1.2. Characteristics of hybrid warfare*

According to American military analysts<sup>4</sup>, *hybrid warfare* is the confrontation in which the opponent employs simultaneously all the available forms of aggression, using a range of unconventional tactics to strike vulnerable points of any nature (military, economic, political, social) in order to meet its goal.

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 141.

<sup>4</sup> Frank G. Hoffman, *Hybrid Warfare and Challenges*, and Leslie F. Brown, *Twenty-First Century Warfare Will Be Hybrid*, are among the promoters of the hybrid warfare concept.



Within this type of confrontation, some states and actors would attempt to combine the various types of warfare – conventional, irregular, cyber, and possibly large scale terrorist actions and taking hostages.

*Hybrid warfare* is not a new concept, but it is different in terms of the level of technology, the involvement of a heterogeneous combination of regular and paramilitary forces that are operationally and tactically integrated, the large scale use of propaganda, manipulation and deception. This hybrid and ambiguous model can hinder the response, the strategy and defence planning by blurring the borders between the normal and the conflict states.

Moreover, the hybrid conflict itself is a mixture of the lethal force of state regular armies and the insurgent fanatic actions. The enemies will take advantage of their access to modern military capabilities, including the proficient command and control systems, air defence missile system, as well as the use of improvised explosive devices and some other methods, such as assassinating people. But this is not all! The show of force and propaganda will seek to affect the way people view risks, with consequences upon the will to intervene, thus influencing the public opinion and the political decision.

Consequently, the confrontation becomes extremely complex, considering the fact that the military operations will take place in ungoverned or weakly governed areas, in large complex urban areas, being characterised by globalisation, which adds to the operational environment the cosmic space and cyber space components. The operations conducted under these circumstances exceed traditional limits and current jurisdiction.

The enemies, states or non-state actors, can operate independently or together in a manner that leads to complications in the response. State entities can use various organisations and paramilitary groups to dissimulate the responsibility of the conducted actions. Non-state actors will be harder to identify and counter, as they do not have any resources and assets that can be threatened and neutralised through the use of military capabilities. Moreover, this type of enemy is more likely not to accept any international regulations, borders, treaties, rules and unanimously accepted norms, which leads to their involvement into actions that are condemned by the international law and cannot be afforded by any state. They will try to use forms of the asymmetrical and irregular warfare<sup>5</sup> to counter military superiority. The mobility of the population, information, money,

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<sup>5</sup> According to *Irregular Warfare (IW) – Joint Operations Concept (JOC)*, irregular warfare is a violent confrontation between states and non-state actors, meant to impose their legitimate domination and influence upon a relevant community. This favours the indirect and asymmetrical approach, even if it can engage the overall military capacity along with other capabilities, in order to disrupt the enemy's fighting power, influence and will, *IW-JOC*, Department of Defence, version 1, 2007, p. 10.

as well as drugs and weapons smuggling allows states and non-state actors to deploy the operations quickly from one area to another, to concentrate their efforts on an operation, and then to disperse their assets in order to prevent and deny detecting and engaging their centre of gravity. This type of action is facilitated by the development of the ability to exchange and disseminate the lessons learned, the tactics and techniques that proved to be effective, by using modern information technology and strategic communication.

## **2. The Information Environment Specific to Hybrid Warfare**

### *2.1. The characteristics of the information environment*

In the operational environment characteristic to the *hybrid warfare*, the strategic, operational and tactical levels become more and more interconnected, thus requiring a different level of coordination, command and control over the entire spectrum of military operations. In order to counter the new complex challenges generated by this type of confrontation, military operations need to integrate the information factor into all their stages, thus helping decision-makers to understand both the enemy operations within the information environment and the effects of own actions on the target audience.

A systemic approach to the information environment through information operations leads to the coherent and consistent coordination of all the assets available in order to achieve the desired end state related to the understanding, perception, will and capabilities of the enemy while protecting the own ones. The analysis of the information environment specific to the *hybrid warfare* has to be a continuous process, which starts as soon as there are any clues referring to the potential crisis situation, being essential to understand the enemy aims and objectives, techniques, means and procedures used to shape the information environment, the interaction between different audiences, the level of interdependence, even if they are not direct targets of the influencing actions. In this process, there need to be taken into consideration the capacity and power of the media (including the new modern means of action in the cyberspace – the *new-media*, communication systems and other factors) of loading the information environment with data that can sometimes be deliberately false, incomplete or taken out of the context, in order to influence the attitudes, perceptions and behaviour of the target audience.

As the area for conducting *InfoOps*, the information environment is the virtual and physical space in which information is received, analysed and disseminated, in order to obtain the planned effects to support the operation objectives. It consists

in the information itself and the information systems, having three dimensions: *physical*, *informational* and *cognitive*.

The *physical* dimension, consisting of mass media and command and control systems, ensures the infrastructure that facilitates conveying messages, conducting operations, and represents the information operations physical support. Through this dimension target groups and peoples are engaged.

The *informational* dimension represents the process of collecting, analysing, storing, disseminating, exploiting and protecting information. In other words, it consists in the information content and flow.

The *cognitive* dimension comprises the psychic system of the decision-makers and relevant audience, with an emphasis on the aspects specific to the thinking process, being the most important of all three. In this dimension, the individuals perceive, visualise, think and decide upon future actions. The political and military decisions, the preparation, and other motivational factors deeply determine this dimension. Under the circumstances of the *hybrid warfare*, in which the action means exceed the pure military means, this component of the information environment receives an even greater value, the behaviour of the involved actors being influenced by a multitude of cognitive factors: leadership, moral factors, group cohesion, emotions, education level, experience, correct perception of the situation, public opinion, media, information quality, rumours etc.

The dimensions of the information environment are dynamic, continuously changing. The decision-maker anticipates the way in which the instruments that are available to the authority can shape the information environment, in order to contribute, as much as possible, to the accomplishment of the mission. Moreover, by using the information as a power element, they maintain initiative and prevent the enemy from approaching the public space.

## *2.2. Implications upon information operations in the context of hybrid warfare*

In this interconnected world, able to develop non-conventional and hybrid methods of aggression as well as the necessary skills to promote interests by efficiently using global networks of information dissemination, the actors that intend to remain relevant need to improve their speed of reaction, connectivity and communication efficiency, to develop a tight cooperation and coordination with the allies, with other entities that follow a common aim, with international organisations and NGOs, with the public, improving the capacity of understanding the situation and the speed of reaction.

The new technologies and the dynamic environment are constant challenges to the traditional information systems, and the use of the cyber space in order to facilitate communication and command/control represents a major change

for the efficient functioning of these systems, making it necessary to reanalyse all specific processes, techniques and procedures.

There are also positive aspects as far as the use of these technologies is concerned, such as the easy access to the target audience through a wide range of message dissemination methods. Nevertheless, this facility requires a supplementary analysis effort in order to identify how the audience is exposed to each channel of communication and to establish which are the most suitable channels to employ. Moreover, an adequate answer requires the analysis of a large amount of information, together with the capacity to conduct the information exchange with a large number of actors and partners.

As a result of the increased access to the wide range of advanced technological capabilities belonging to all the actors, even to non-state actors, a quality balance is likely to be achieved among the operational assets in the information environment. This aspect sets the conceptual system on which information operations are developed and the decision-making system that determines the speed of reaction as critical elements dominating the information environment.

The use of the previously mentioned technologies also generates a series of vulnerabilities, such as: possible obstruction of information dissemination, possible corruption of the message content, engagement of some unintended targets leading to level two or three consequences with a negative impact, stronger than the desired positive effect. Therefore, the operations conducted in the information environment need to be accompanied by a series of protective measures meant to provide their continuity and high level of physical and virtual security, as well as the development of some highly reliable and less vulnerable alternative systems.

Urbanisation is another important element that affects information operations in the *hybrid warfare* context, focusing operations on manipulating and influencing individuals and human communities. *InfoOps* need to consider the direct and prominent interaction between the military actions and the civilian population concentrated in large urban communities, which forms a network that facilitates the information dissemination and, at the same time, constitutes a favourable environment for distorting the original messages, reinterpreting and emphasising upon the characteristics that fit the cultural, moral and religious profile. Within this context, *InfoOps* need to counter the attempts of the enemy to exploit the opportunities provided by the fact that local authorities might be overwhelmed by the crisis situation and by the difficulties in providing basic services to the population.

Last but not least, apart from the factors previously mentioned, while planning and conducting information operations, the freedom of action and the initiative in the information environment are crucial for obtaining the pre-established effects.

This is due to the fact that in institutionalised relationships, decision-making is a process requiring the involvement of multiple levels of command, and the loss of initiative and the need to react hinder the immediate action. This creates an advantage for the enemy, especially for the non-state actors with de-centralised leadership, that generally make decisions at very low levels, thus increasing their speed of reaction to unpredicted and unplanned situations.

### **3. NATO Perspective regarding the Challenges Posed by the Information Environment Specific to Hybrid Warfare**

The complex features of the current security environment represent a major concern for the North Atlantic Alliance and have triggered a series of studies and research that have resulted in the creation of the doctrine entitled *Framework for Future Alliance Operations*<sup>6</sup>. Among the 5 NATO strategic directions<sup>7</sup> analysed here, two of the most important issues are *Strategic Communication* and *Security Networking*.

*Strategic Communication* consists in the coordinated employment of *diplomacy, public relations, InfoOps and PSYOPS*, integrated at every level, synchronised with other military actions and in accordance with the political guidance, the roles and the objectives of the Alliance<sup>8</sup>. It supports the Alliance policies and operations and directly contributes to the success of the military operations and other actions, by the proper coordination of words and facts and by ensuring the correct comprehension of the intentions.

By focusing on information and the aspects of communication during every planning and execution processes and by properly integrating them as part of the general effort, *strategic communication* can become a major contributor to the success of the Alliance. It is an active factor and holds a central role within the concept of *Security Networking*.

The concept of *Security Networking* defines a proactive approach, meant to foresee the challenges of the *hybrid warfare*, being based on the Alliance cooperation with a vast array of governmental and non-governmental organisations with the purpose of preventing potential threats in a holistic manner. It includes the ability to reshape the information environment by continuous interactions,

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<sup>6</sup> \*\*\*, MCM-0199-2015 – *Framework for Future Alliance Operations*, SACT. Enclosure 1 to MCM-0199-2015.

<sup>7</sup> The five strategic directions identified by NATO as essential for future operations are: *Operational Agility, Security Networking, Shared Resilience, Strategic Awareness* and *Strategic Communication*.

<sup>8</sup> \*\*\*, MCM-0199-2015, *ibidem*, p. 14.

by either physical or virtual presence<sup>9</sup>. It also suggests cooperative, persuasive and proactive engagement with organisations and actors, and creates the premises necessary to foresee potential crises and to involve a range of capabilities in order to prevent and solve conflicts. All these require an expansion of the role given to the information operations that contribute to the achievement of the objectives by paving the way for a great amount of participants to be able to adhere to the specific tactical, operational and strategic objectives.

This concept has a special relevance for NATO. Nevertheless, it can be extended to national level, in order to identify the potential conflicts and the way they can be managed, when they occur. A very illustrative example is the refugee crisis, which is a possible problem for our country too. It is important for all the governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in the management of this situation to adopt the same plan of action, in order to perform cohesive and efficient actions and to ensure a quick reaction, to avoid the escalation of social tensions and the populace manipulation.

All these restate the role of *InfoOps* and confirm the fact that the operations within the information environment, at least at strategic level, are not necessarily interconnected and mainly determined by the military operation. Aggression can unfold in the informational field without being followed by a military operation. However, in every case, a military operation specific to warfare will be accompanied by an information operation. Therefore, it is necessary to permanently cooperate with *InfoOps* structures in monitoring the instability factors, thus contributing to the creation of a data base, especially within areas with a high conflict potential. A thorough comprehension of the progress specific to these fields of activity will lead to the identification of the vulnerabilities and threats ever since the incipient stages.

## Conclusions

From our point of view, NATO's approach according to which *InfoOps* and *PSYOPS* are elements of the *strategic communication* can be efficient and beneficial at strategic level. At operational and tactical level, both *InfoOps* and *PSYOPS* should be considered specific to the *Operations* area, because, along with other support components, they contribute to meeting the commander's objectives. We agree with this approach since, during the military operation, *InfoOps* and *PSYOPS* cannot exceed the operations domain and they are directed towards influencing the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of the target enemy audience, while *strategic communication* is mainly addressed to external audience, in order to obtain/maintain support for the operation.

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 11.

Regarding the information operations, future challenges will include both conventional and non-conventional threats, methods specific to the *hybrid warfare*, and the influence of non-governmental participants, with the same purpose, namely to reshape the informational field, to influence the public perception, to slow down the political process of decision-making and to undermine readiness in case of a crisis. Specialised propaganda entities will make use of the social-media specific means and of the traditional communication ones so as to gain superiority in the information environment.

In these cases, it is important to monitor and analyse the adversary activity in the information environment in order to identify, from the very beginning, the characteristics of a hybrid threat, to adapt the decision-making processes to the new circumstances and to optimise the command and control systems for the rapid implementation of the proper response, to obtain initiative and to maintain freedom of action.

The attributes that make an actor powerful are the will, the comprehension ability and the available capabilities to act. In other words, each actor must have the will to act, to be aware of the unfolding situation and to possess the capability to intervene. If one of these elements is missing or is diminished, its response capability is affected.

The actions coordinated by means of information operations within the *hybrid warfare* are based on these three elements, to influence the will, to diminish awareness, and to neutralise those capabilities that facilitate awareness and will, having as ultimate purpose to change the enemy behaviour.

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# KEYSTONES OF PROSPECTIVE THINKING IN PLANNING MILITARY ACTIONS CARRIED IN HYBRID TYPE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

*Lieutenant Colonel Dan-Lucian PETRESCU*

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*The ambiguity and uncertainty that are characteristic of the current security environment, in general, and of the operational environment, in particular, result in the need to conduct an extremely complex analysis in order to prepare a military force able to achieve success in operations, in an efficient manner. To increase the effectiveness of this process, it is required the involvement of prospective approach, as a way of scientifically generating instruments which serve as pillars for planning military actions. In this article there are presented some defining elements of prospective thinking, some mental mechanisms related to it, along with ways to successfully integrate it into the operational planning at all levels of military art. Conducting a study of the activities involved in the operational planning process considering the prospective thinking as a catalyst is also addressed in the article.*

**Keywords:** *prospective; projective; operational planning; exploratory; extrapolation*

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## Introduction

Planning future actions, in general, is one of the *sine qua non* activities when efficiency is a fundamental condition. Moreover, war, which “*is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin*”<sup>1</sup> and military action require special attention in terms of planning. Given the fact that, through the sharpening and “*institutionalisation*” of the hybrid nature of the threat, a new dimension has been added to the uncertainty of contemporary operational environment, the need to adapt the *operational planning process (OPP)* has increased considerably so that the military actions meant to counter it can be conducted accordingly. In what follows, I will not refer to adapting the process in terms of its aspect (meaning steps and procedures, conduct and resulting products) but to approaching the entire planning activity so that the level of difficulty imposed by uncertainty can diminish. The solution identified is to increase the interference of prospective thinking in conducting military action, both in the preparatory phase

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<sup>1</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, The Puppet Press, 1910, p. 35, see <http://www.puppetpress.com/classics/ArtofWarbySunTzu.pdf>.

and during the execution. In this regard, commanders and their staffs must augment the benefits of the prospective dimension of thinking to anticipate the effects planned and generated in the operational environment in order to ensure maximum efficiency in achieving success.

### **The Motivation of Involving Prospective Thinking**

Involving the prospective thinking in planning military actions carried in the hybrid operating environment is justified, as we have previously highlighted, by the high level of uncertainty, as its main feature. Although, in literature, the term used is *prospective analysis*, we believe that a more complete approach is provided by the term *prospective thinking*. This highlights the fact that in order to get a real increase in efficiency relating to *OPP* by involving prospective, one would need something more than analysis. The real purpose of *prospective thinking* is, therefore, that in military action planners and commanders should use prospective as a way of thinking, as something that should be taken into account at all times and not as a simple mechanism to provide them with estimating tools useful in decision-making under uncertainty or even strategies or plans ready to be applied in crisis situations. This need arises from the fact that by analysing these two terms, namely *planning*<sup>2</sup> and *prospective*<sup>3</sup>, and the actions that make up the two incumbent processes, we find a very close connection between them.

### **Prediction, Foresight, Forecast, Prospective**

Before analysing how prospective thinking contributes to the development and implementation of the military action plan it is necessary to define the following terms, close in meaning: *prediction, foresight, forecast, prospective*. Obviously, in what follows, the term *prospective* will be defined at a higher degree of detail, since it is the term that must characterise the mindset of commanders and staffs in planning military actions.

**Prediction** is generally equivalent to the term **foresight**, which is defined as anticipation based initially on empirical observation, then on the knowledge related to laws driving either an existing phenomenon, but still not detected experimentally, or a phenomenon/event to occur in future, or the probable evolution of a natural process or social system. Along explanation, systematisation and others,

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<sup>2</sup>To plan; to think carefully about something you want to do, and decide how and when you will do it, to intend to do something, to think about something you are going to make, and decide what it will be like, see <http://www.ldoceonline.com/search/?q=plan>

<sup>3</sup>Prospective, likely to happen, see <http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/prospective>

foresight acts as one of the main functions of scientific theory and is an expression of the active nature of theoretical thinking.

**Forecast** (prognosis) is defined as the anticipation of the way a phenomenon or a process develops in time, based on the study of the circumstances that determine its occurrence and evolution. It is an estimate of the expected values that some unsafe or unreliable issues will take in the future.

**Prospective** is defined as systematically research of the future, which, starting from analysing the concerted influence of technical, scientific, economic, social and other causes on the accelerated development of the modern world, aims to create a comprehensive and broad approximated vision about it. The initiator of this method is the French philosopher and futurologist Gaston Berger, who also helped set up the International Centre for Prospective. He started from the idea that *“the future is not what comes after today, but what is different about it”*<sup>4</sup>. Berger departs from the term foresight, which he finds limited, and believes that tomorrow will be unlike yesterday, it will be a new day that will depend on us and, as such, we should rather invent it than find it. He also agrees with Paul Valéry, who said about education, addressing the students that *“it is about making you people ready to face what it has not happened yet”*.

I finish my attempt to define *prospective* with the historian and futurologist Philippe Destatte’s words on this issue: *“Prospective is an independent process, dialectic and rigorous, conducted in a trans-disciplinary manner in the long term. It can illuminate the issues of the present and the future, first by considering their holistic, systemic and complex context and, secondly, by registering them, beyond the historicity, in temporality. Consequently, turned towards the project and action, prospective is intended to cause one or more transformation(s) within the system it apprehends by mobilising collective intelligence.[...] In exploratory terms, prospective helps to identify development trends, the continuities, ruptures and bifurcations in the evolution of environment variables (actors and factors) and to determine the panel of the possible facets of the future. In normative terms, prospective allows building desirable visions of the future, developing collective strategies and possible logic interventions and therefore contributing to improving the quality of decisions”*<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Gaston Berger, Pierre Massé, Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, *De la prospective – Textes fondamentaux de la prospective française (1955-1966)*, Editura L’Harmattan, 2007.

<sup>5</sup> Philippe Destatte, *Qu’est-ce que la prospective?*, 10.04.2013, see <https://phd2050.wordpress.com/2013/04/10/prospective/> retrieved on 03.04.2016

## Involving Prospective

Although prospective adds an obvious value to the thinking process in general, it is not always used deliberately. When the situation evolves in a positive way, leaders do not think about anticipation, and when the evolution is negative, considering the prospective nature of reasoning is often belated. The simplest explanation of this situation is the fact that *prospective thinking requires an effort that, because the results do not show a hundred percent degree of certainty, is often found unjustified*. However, reality has shown that in case the direction for further work is not determined in advance by reasoning argued at least logically if not scientifically, in case the plan is not built on solid foundations and in an articulated manner, the present is meaningless. Consequently, those who do not have a plan act circumstantially pursuing the goals set in the near future that, once converted into present, is either difficult to manage (involving high consumption of resources), or impossible to control. The larger the time horizon used in anticipation is, the greater will be the distance between the present and the “future” for which we are prepared, giving us a so called “larger prospective”. It certainly is within the scope of increasing the capacity to be proactive, of decreasing the resources needed to ensure success in action (resulting in increased efficiency) and, not least, of increasing the ability to successfully control the future. In his work *“From Anticipation to Action – a Handbook of Strategic Prospective”*, Michel Godet asserts that *“action in the short-term reality has no meaning unless it takes place in the long-term context of a plan, because the future is the raison d’être of the present”*<sup>6</sup>. He also says that a plan driven by desire generates the force to act. In this context, prospective is not only an attitude, a way of thinking (in terms of anticipation and will) but also behaviour (characterised by imagination and hope) implemented to support, in terms of quantity and quality, the control on the present and future. Given all these aspects, the expression “to build own future” no longer seems so far-fetched in terms of truth value.

## Intuition, Prospective and Certainty

We often hear that intuition can replace prospective thinking. This is all but correct. Intuition must complete prospective thinking, must fill those gaps the latter leaves due to an unacceptable level of uncertainty. From this point of view, *intuition must be regarded as valid justification provided by the mechanism of thinking when considering a situation of uncertainty*. Acknowledging the same proportion

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<sup>6</sup> M. Godet, *From Anticipation to Action – a Handbook of Strategic Prospective*, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Paris, France, p. 2.

regarding the level of certainty, but at another scale, we can formulate the analogy that intuition fills any gaps in the products of the prospective thinking like planning hypothesis completes the documentary base from situational awareness in the planning process. As with planning hypothesis, meanings based on intuition must be carefully supervised, some confirming, others coming to be modified or even cancelled and replaced.

It is also said that it is useless to build mechanisms of prospective thinking based on elements from the sciences, such as mathematics, and then use them in identifying some conclusions about the future and set up a plan to direct actions in an environment characterised primarily by uncertainty. It is a fact that military art is applied in a context that is full of highly uncertain situations. This is not a matter of novelty in the sphere of conflict. Deceiving the enemy and achieving surprise, actions that are based on creating a state of uncertainty around the adversary, have been the catalysts for success in military action since ancient times. The novelty present in contemporary and future operational environment appeals that the two principles stated above have a much greater value in potential adversary's actions. In other words, in the present, uncertainty is caused not only by the fact that it addresses situations placed in the future, but mostly by the fact that the enemy that inserts it builds its entire strategy on the principle of achieving surprise, on the foundation of inoculating the state of uncertainty in the target individual and collective thinking. Hence, the dynamic and the form of contemporary military events become dominated by uncertainty, this situation causing serious problems of efficiency to military action planning process. In this regard, the meaning of Helmuth von Moltke's words according to which "*no plan survives contact with the enemy*" is diversifying, receiving, besides the direct sense on the need for a high degree of flexibility for a plan, connotations on the need for increased accuracy of estimates underlying its drawing and, imperatively, the need for supportive *arguments* for them.

Continuing reasoning, one can consider that crisis response planning, although relates to future actions (of course), has, more often than not, a reactive character. The ideal way would be (of course) planning those actions which, once executed, generate the necessary and sufficient effects for crisis prevention, so that it cannot occur. *Id est*, all actions should focus the effort on crisis/conflict prevention rather than on solving it, after it emerges. In this way, planning would have a more desirable proactive character. However, planning carried out proactively imposes the existence of informational and conceptual bedrock based on prospective thinking. In support to this idea, Gaston Berger offers a mere

example: at night, the greater the speed of the car we drive or the greater the complexity of the road on which we ride is, the greater the need for lights to provide visibility on a longer distance is. In this way, the driver receives information that helps him make decisions now and helps him stay on the road that lies before him. The clearer the image disclosed by headlight on a greater distance is, the more effective the actions will be. But there is no spotlight in the world able to foresee a creature that would appear at a time, by surprise, on the road. Similarly, prospective thinking provides a picture of the future and not the certainty of future events. It does not provide descriptions of the future, but images of the future course of events, more or less likely, depending on the quality of the process that generates them and the accuracy of information used.

### **The Prospective Thinking Operation**

One of the actions underlying the mechanism of prospective thinking is *extrapolation*<sup>7</sup>. This is based on the environmental analysis of the action development and of the current situation, particularly the way it has led to it. Regardless the analytical and deductive methods used, the process must provide information and patterns that characterise the development to the current status. With a mechanistic approach, we consider that, based on the results, the prospective thinking formulates, by extrapolation, starting from  $t_o$  (present), extensions for the course of the past events that transform the current situation in the future situation.

The quantitative aspect of the future situation configuration dictates how to carry out prospective thinking. So, if the future situation is not pre-configured, the model of prospective thinking is *exploratory*, characterised, first, by determining the course of future events, and then by configuring the future situation, based on extrapolating the string of past events that have led to the conditions defining the current situation. The course of future events is, consequently, a normal extension of previous ones, but it is necessary to take into account the bifurcation occurring in inflexion points which can generate different courses, similarly probable, but resulting in different future situations. In addition, it is worth considering some deviations from the normal course, expressed by the occurrence of events with low probability but high impact, which could create disturbances or disruptions.

If, however, the future situation is pre-configured (and, therefore, desirable), then the prospective thinking is *projective*, and the result is reflected in determining

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<sup>7</sup> The action of estimating or concluding something by assuming that existing trends will continue or a current method will remain applicable, see <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/extrapolation>

one or more paths to connect the current situation to the future situation. In this case the extrapolation is used less in its full meaning, to the extent that the goal is to determine how to influence the normal course of events (extrapolated) so as to arrive at the final destination.

As in military action planning, in prospective thinking, *the time* variable is of great importance. In *exploratory* model, a period of time for which prospective is conducted is established from the onset. The desired future situation is the one corresponding to the moment that marks the end of this period, and its configuration depends on the path chosen by extrapolation. For the *projective* model, the time is considered a resource so that it is included in the equation of efficiency related to the way to achieve the projected end state. In this respect, how to achieve the desired situation is all the more effective if it requires a period of time closer to the estimated one.

For the extrapolation results to be considered valid, some basic assumptions must be taken into account. The first one refers to information derived from the analysis of operational environment and of the current situation. It must be considered to be reliable and relevant. The information that forms the documentary base should be considered as being certain or at least having an accepted degree of certainty. In addition to this, the relevance of documentary base refers to the fact that information used as input in extrapolation provides a sufficiently detailed description to have consistent results.

The second assumption refers to the course of the past events that have generated the current situation. Based on this course, one can determine the extrapolation function, which is assumed to have continuity in the future. In other words, considering the operational environment as a system and the extrapolation function as a transfer function that operates with the derivative of operational variables in time, it is estimated that the future configurations of operational environment will be generated by the events that correspond to the dynamic model described by the function.

Both assumptions have certain critical conditions that, if not met, lead to erroneous results for extrapolation. Regarding the certainty of the information underlying extrapolation, the information cycle must be conducted with great accuracy, which provides results with such a characteristic to an acceptable level. The relevance of information used depends fundamentally on the choice of operational variables that describe the environment for conducting military actions and the current situation. These variables must cover all areas necessary to perform their descriptive duties, so that their values, arising from the information contained in the documentary base, effectively contribute to determining the current situation and extrapolation function.



In the second assumption, critical condition refers to the linearity of extrapolation function. When carrying the extrapolation process, the natural tendency is to consider the extrapolation function as linear. In fact, this function is quasi-linear and the real art of extrapolation lies in estimating as accurate as possible the inflection points and the curves they describe in time. These inflection points are effects of some events that affect the normal course of action estimated by extrapolation.

### Conclusions

As a comparison, the projective model of prospective thinking addresses best the operational planning process. The features that the two have in common refer to the fact that both start from an initial position, both are based on data relating to the operational environment and both use estimates to determine the most efficient way in which, by the combination of effects, some conditions that define a final state (*end state*) are achieved.

Finally, these keystones being provided, it can be said that a both useful and interesting exercise could be conducting an analysis through the steps and activities of *OPP* at tactical, operational and especially strategic level with the “*mental outlook*” of prospective thinking. In other words, it is recommended to identify the activities, as sequences of *OPP*, for which the prospective thinking would add value in determining future-oriented outcomes, even because what else the entire process is aimed at if not planning the best way to conduct the military action to come.

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# FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

## – Effects of the Differences regarding the Inter-Institutional Unity of Perception and Vision in Hybrid Operations –

*Major General (r.) Dr Vasile ROMAN*

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*Those in the military have the intellectual and professional capacity to positively influence the development of the inter-institutional process of planning, organisation and execution. However, they should accept that the final solutions are the result of discussions with representatives of the institutions, in compliance with the success of the common cause.*

*Based on this reality, the author considers that the military personnel involved in such activities should be aware of both the time and outcomes as far as the process is concerned. Moreover, the institutions, be they governmental or non-governmental, will seek proper courses of action, streamlined by well established rules.*

**Keywords:** *identified lessons; military forces; operations management; Afghan government*

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**F**rom a broad perspective, as citizens, we are all concerned with the accomplishment of a social process defined by normality as being one that supports an efficient political act and finally, an efficient policy. From a military perspective, we do wish for a maximum of efficiency when we are in the circumstance of dealing with violent acts, during crisis situations or wartime.

Not all the inter-institutional processes are at the same level of complexity, urgency, consistency in the manner in which the planning process of operations is being developed within the *hybrid* type of conflict. The action of facing the inter-institutional challenges reveals the difficulties of the coordination policy within a set of problems and/or institutions, at different degrees of complexity. The central idea

is to identify an approach agreed by everyone involved, more exactly an approach that proves its efficiency in a scenario that should maintain its practical use in the daily activities specific for the coordination policy, programmes and operations within institutions. The essential aspects of the operations planning are mainly

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as follows: mobilisation, engagement, the establishment of the role played by participating institutions, the concept accomplishment and the retreat<sup>1</sup>.

Ideally, a process of *interagency planning* organised in detail should be performed prior to a new and complex operation, involving various representatives of different institutions. However, in reality, things are often different, and, therefore, we are forced, under the pressure of events, to plan following the old models, acting stereotypically and keeping in mind the idea that, in case a previous action planned in a specific manner was successful, then surely all the others will have the same result. It is better for the institutions to become aware quite early that a plan is necessary and that using the old pattern will not have the same success.

The planning process therefore becomes rather difficult, considering the bureaucracy entailed by institutions or their representatives in the process of planning, providing human and material resources, and employing them.

Once the operations planning process starts, *debate* is a must, being a promising element that shows that the process functions. The interagency planning starts with a debate and it hardly ends up in clear understanding<sup>2</sup>.

The planning process is undertaken by an executive committee, and the debates offer options for the political decision, being then translated into operational terms, into plans that cover different areas of missions by interagency subgroups and executive personnel.

The next phase refers to the *detailed work* done by the subgroups that must make sure that every piece of the plan ensures the concrete accomplishment of the political directive and it is compliant with the other aspects of the plan that are in relation. In this phase of the process, the most basic problems have been solved out by shaping specific missions, going deep into details, identifying the problems that may appear and must be solved in an appropriate way at the higher decision levels, in this way meeting the veridicality of the concepts already formulated at the political level.

It is wrong to consider that a plan will become a combat manual for every military man or operator in an institution, but its copies will be used by the decision-makers in terrain as a model for the detailed planning at the executive level.

The plan solutions may not appear extremely imaginative or bold, but they must be understood and accepted by the ones that implement them as well-balanced and practical. As a rule, the operation start will not lack

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<sup>1</sup> Dennis E. Skocz, *A Front-Line View of the Interagency*, US Army War College, Course, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Leonard Hawley, Dennis E. Skocz, *The Progress of Political-Military Process*, in *Finding a Real Peace*, Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic and Leonard R. Hawley, Washington D.C., US Institute of Peace Press, 2005, p. 40.

surprises and problems. The implementation process will generally face cultural, social and political problems. A plan should be a complete document, but what follows in terrain is often a set of adjustments and alterations of the initial plan<sup>3</sup>.

In order to assure a complete representation within an interagency meeting the host agency will establish a very restricted group that will identify solutions for problems. The first concern in case of an interagency group meeting should be *efficiency*, which is the involvement of a correct number of institutions in order to make sure that all possible contributors can express their opinion and can act in the context of the collective effort. There are fewer chances to achieve consensus within a large group than within a small one. Due to the short period of time available, a small group is preferable. If the result of the interagency process is actually a viable and realistic plan, then the involvement in the planning group of all those that have a role in this plan implementation will be essential.

*A comprehensive approach* enhances the chances for the experience and relevant expertise to be included in the assessment of strategies, operations and programmes<sup>4</sup>. Although the process of gathering and considering several opinions may take a long time, their assessment may be speeded up by the specialists in the field.

Within the efforts of operations planning, the stress should be put on the problem solving process and the new approaches in this respect that are to become a reality in a very short period of time. The aim is not to remain focused on the unchanged attitudes of the institutions regarding the previously established problems<sup>5</sup>. Although the public safety and order issues are extremely important, the institutions that get involved in their solving process should limit to the statements regarding what they can or cannot supply. In such cases, the armed forces emphasise in a legal way that the military forces cannot represent the police, and therefore, the actions for the population security must have not only a mandate but also well established deadlines.

It may be considered that the special nature of the described process limits the applicability of any identified lesson (regarding the review at the interagency level of some discrete aspects that may appear on a daily basis at the office level). Within the daily actions, the need for the institutions specialised in a certain field, which are not normally invited, may have as a result a reluctant perspective from a third party over a dead end problem.

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<sup>3</sup> Jock Covey, *Peace Process Responsible*, in *Finding a Real Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>4</sup> Theodore C. Sorenson, *White House's Decision Making Process: the Olive Branch or the Arrows*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1963, p. 18.

<sup>5</sup> Halvor A. Hartz, Laura Mercean and Clint Williamson, *Defending a Real Peace: Imposing the Law*, in *Finding a Real Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

The honest admittance of the different interests represents a different kind of approach with beneficial effects over the whole process, entailing coordination and collaboration<sup>6</sup>.

The coordination of the institutions community has a horizontal and a vertical dimension, at all authority levels.

Many problems may be solved at the executive level through a simple acceptance from the decision-makers, but there are other problems that go to the top of the authority pyramid, requiring solutions from the command centre (chiefs of institutions in the field of external affairs and defence)<sup>7</sup>. The participants should be close to the political decision-makers to understand the main concerns and close enough to the executives so that the executive members can have access to the information regarding the real situation in the field and afterwards to decide what is realistic and what is not.

The localisation of the interagency executive process at the proper level will ensure that the new strategies will be implemented and the programmes and operations will go on with the development of the changing politics.

The ones that are responsible for the interagency process development try to search the methods that can lead them to success. However, they should also consider the lessons learned from the processes that did not work well. Moreover, those responsible for the operations management in an already existing process that do not have the necessary leverages to review it should consider redirecting the input on a vertical plane. This aspect should not be seen as a professional attack but as an awareness of the personal knowledge and experience limits and as a desire to meet the common goal.

Another approach is represented by the *requirements and information direction* to the action area as a way to reach an agreement within the interagency process. In this case the institutions involved should agree that the solution comes from the common denominator regarding the interpretation of the situation in the field<sup>8</sup>. Here there is a quite sensitive problem, considering that the reality in the field is not always compliant with the political will and with the strategic forecast. A good example in this regard is the case of Afghanistan where, against the idea of troops' augmentation, required by general McChrystal in 2009, the political decision-makers searched for other compensatory solutions (the increase

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<sup>6</sup> Dennis E. Skocz, *op. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> Leonard Hawley, Dennis E. Skocz, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

<sup>8</sup> Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1971, p. 177.

in the number of Afghan troops and policemen etc.). The solution should not be criticised but it was surely not thought up in financial terms, taking into account that the funds for the staff payment were reduced and the Afghan government did not have a financial policy to support those forces.

It is not advisable that the political decision-makers should be blamed for the vague directions. It is the duty of the ones presenting their options to make it in such a manner that operational implications could be fully understood. If there are debates within the interagency community then they should be conducted vertically in order to require and also find courses of action that meet the common interests of different institutions, that lack ambiguity and that need to be the dominant factors for the internal concerns specific to the institutions.

Most part of the interagency process may be well described as a negotiation process, but the negotiation does not exclude debates and, in fact, a serious debate is essential for the interagency process efficiency<sup>9</sup>.

Regarding the role of the armed forces, a clear and honest debate will lead to the thorough understanding of what is to be accomplished. It entails asking clear questions, creating hypothetical but realistic scenarios, containing relevant examples from the recent operations, all these with the purpose of clarifying the role of the armed forces.

In the absence of an objective debate, driven by specific questions and concrete scenarios, the forces may be deployed in the field not knowing exactly the course of action. Troops may be faced with special problems that may interfere with the accomplishment of the mission in good conditions, the commanders being in the situation to improvise solutions in the absence of clear directions, well established in time.

The process of the interagency planning of the operation should benefit, to a great extent, from the help of diplomacy<sup>10</sup>. The plan, a real detailed description of the operation, should attract the participation of the organisations meant to play an important role in its accomplishment as well as of the countries that may affect or influence the debates and decisions within these organisations. Diplomacy may validate the ideas that emerge during the planning process, assuring the organisers that a developed concept will have full support, which allows them focusing on other aspects in the project that require attention.

The possibilities of solving a controversial issue may appear within the diplomatic talks, possibilities the managers have not thought of. The connection between diplomacy and the planning process represents a two way communication. The ideas

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 181.

<sup>10</sup> Dennis E. Skocz, *op. cit.*

within the interagency process, focused on what is achievable, may provide information for the political-military discussions and favour debates and realistic decisions, at international or coalition level. Most often, the problems debated in the interagency environment acquire a diplomatic dimension and the members of the interagency community will want to get informed over the points of view of other countries regarding the issue in progress. Hardly can be identified a possible controversial aspect within the political-military context that does not have a diplomatic dimension.

The joint inter-institutional actions are related to a series of debates and decisions, and the continuous character of the process capitalises on the practices that intensify continuity and coherence in action.

Communication should be interactive and multilevel, continuous and most desirably, direct, because, even if it is not a purpose in itself, it supports the debate that leads to decisions. Decisions should be based on the best collective assessment of the facts, the realistic assessment of the points of view and perspectives and they should meet the political and strategic goals.

The inter-institutional action represents a way of work through which very important problems are solved, not only for the institutions but also for the central administration, and the successful collaboration within the interagency community may contribute largely to the promotion of national interests<sup>11</sup>.

Starting from this conclusion, it is necessary to underline the fact that the organisations that act in operations should identify, present, sustain and manifest the role that they have in the field of expertise, without undermining the importance that the other institutions have.

In *figure 1* are presented the requirements that the personnel engaged in inter-institutional actions must meet, showing professionalism, searching the way through which they are able to perceive, clearly and realistically, the action goals, involving in the planning process and in the joint action effort. A great danger, in this respect, can be found not in *hybrid warfare*, but precisely in the egos of the institutions' members, when there are no common objectives and common understanding of the role of each participant.

Analysed as functioning in a system based on pre-established relations, the institutions, either governmental or nongovernmental, will search for a special way of acting that must be directed according to well established rules.

Having this reality as a starting point we do consider that the military personnel that, through the activities in which it is involved, coordinate or cooperate

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem.*






Figure 1: Interagency Process – from perception to vision

with the institutions, should become aware not only of the duration but also of the outcome of the process. They have, in general, a not very positive perception regarding the quality of the personnel that work within the institutions and, in this respect, consider that the proposed solutions are not very relevant. The military have the intellectual and the professional capacity to positively influence the development of the interagency planning, organisation and implementation process, but they should accept the idea that the final solutions are the result of debates that are carried out with the representatives of the institutions in accordance with the common cause success.

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# THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE CONTEMPORARY HYBRID POLEMOS

*Colonel Dr Doru ENACHE*  
*Lieutenant Colonel Dragoş AXINIA*

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*Present and future warfare is shaping itself as a geostrategic one, based on vital resources, and a survival one, due, on the one hand, to the decreasing food resources and fossil fuels and, on the other hand, to the increased extreme natural phenomena and/or natural disasters. From this perspective, according to the authors, large groups of people will migrate and armed forces will play a key role, being necessary to operationally develop contingency plans, based on a complex operational design.*

*Following the events that have taken place in the Near East as well as in the Middle East, there are more and more refugees. Social networks, both during the “Arab Spring” and at present, have helped the refugees to orient, to find out how much they should pay as taxes and bribery. Online maps, smart phones and GPS help them not to get lost, and instant messaging such as WhatsApp and Viber help them to communicate with their relatives and friends.*

**Keywords:** *warfare; refugees; social networks; contingency plans; vital resources*

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## 1. Introduction

*Polemology* comes from the Greek word *polemos*, meaning: tumult, turmoil, perturbation, flurry, war. Its founder is Gaston Bouthoul, defining it as a *science that aims to study the causes and factors influencing the onset of war (“aetiology of war”) and its functions.* Very often the meaning and concreteness of war, turmoil, unrest must be searched not necessarily in the chances of victory and/or the objective, but in the duration itself and beyond (examples: Iraq or Afghanistan, Crimea, Ossetia, Egypt, Libya, Syria). In modern era, wars are no longer conducted, lost or won exclusively in the classic, physical battlefield. They move, depending on the context, in the information field. Therefore, war increasingly becomes deception and conspiracy more than armed combat and discipline.

Thus, the confrontations between states and modern armed forces move mainly in the mental field, that of natural or artificial intelligence, and in that of the human psyche, aiming at ensuring welfare, abundance, survival. These new types

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of confrontations take into account the triad of power described by Alvin Toffler in *Powershift*, according to which there are three major sources of power: *physical strength, wealth and knowledge*. In contemporary *hybrid polemos* these three elements can be easily converted one into another. The most important and most powerful of them, *knowledge*, becomes intangible power, which changes fundamentally the relationship and world order, no matter the directions, among high-tech nations.

## 2. Contemporary Hybrid Warfare in High-tech Age

*“Generally in war, the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this”.*

Sun Tzu

The main feature of war in the industrial age was mass death and physical violence. The current conjuncture is that of controlling the masses mind, based on high technology, using scientific knowledge and its processes<sup>1</sup> to compete, discourage, and create conflict. In this context, the armed forces existence and development imperatively require adapting to new realities. In this regard the indirect approach is an alternative to the military art. If, in the past, the military action was projected in mental space and materialised mainly in the physical and informational space, currently, its materialisation develops preponderantly in the mental, informational and virtual space, reducing, as much as possible, the physical context.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the US Secretary of State under President Jimmy Carter, said that *technique and communication networks represent the third generation of the world domination*<sup>2</sup>, after the age of force, that of trade and finance, through which, by computers, the privacy of the individual is violated and, by controlling each person, the hegemony over the entire society and over the world is ensured. However, one should consider the fact that it does not replace both of them diachronically but it sums them up simultaneously.

Contemporary *hybrid polemos*, in our opinion, bears the seal of stochastic, nonlinear<sup>3</sup>, randomness, unpredictability that surpasses the planner, the goal/*the final desired end state*, even the anticipated (expected) one. It is subject to contextual realities brought together and implies a system that uses topological models, methods, and relatively stable complex forms but unpredictable

<sup>1</sup> Neurolinguistics, psychology, sociology, logics, communications, computer sciences etc.

<sup>2</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *La révolution technétronique*, Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1971, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Irregular, non-periodic, chaotic, diffuse, as illustrated by the mathematical series equations of the form  $dx(t)/dt = F(x(t)) + w(t)$ , where  $w(t)$  represents the disturbance of the probable process. The term also describes the mathematics of chaotic signals, and the statistical analysis of dynamic series for deterministic nonlinear systems.

on temporal coordinates. Therefore, nonlinearity, for example, “*implies the fact that any system can become unpredictable, over time, by feedback and repetition*”<sup>4</sup>. Setting and derivation, using different methods, of events that are inductive and predictable is subject to chance. Only the Newtonian, Cartesian, mechanical universe is predictable, while that highlighted by the modern theory of quantum physics is not. That is why the conclusion was: at subquantum level, deterministic laws are replaced with probabilistic ones, and it has been observed that science does not advance by extending established/proven, verified theories, but by changing paradigms successively. By derivative reformulation and adaptation, contemporary *hybrid polemos* is a relatively chaotic one and it is subject to procedural hazard or probability. However, chaos theory, a new paradigm of science explains the capacity of any complex system to simultaneously give birth to coherence and turbulence. Inside it there are topics such as: period, iteration<sup>5</sup>, fractals<sup>6</sup>, bifurcation, doubling, recognising the existence of an infinite number of dimensions in a finite space.

We also mention that, in what we have presented above we do not intend to meander on the topic, but to highlight, at the level where we can scientifically understand, that all those who say that everything is done in the laboratory by major sponsors or by biggest planetary conspirators are in error. In our opinion, even they are subject to the inexorable principle of the pyramid, fatally bearing the mark of their decisions nonlinearity. Our explanation is that there have always been higher or lower levels of hierarchy, adjacent or sub-adjacent, which generate, validate, invalidate or supervise any approach, action, act, fact, event or accident in one way or another.

Starting from a definition of the military art according to which it “*is not a product of civilisation, but a consequence of its degradation*”<sup>7</sup>, contemporary *hybrid polemos* is obviously a product of the military art, an effect of this accelerated degradation.

Currently, “*the strategic art is not only an expression of the confronting wills dialectics*”<sup>8</sup> (...) *it is the one that creates, maintains and develops the dialectics*”<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Henri Poincaré, apud David R. Hawkins, *Putere vs Forță*, Editura Cartea Daath, București, 2007.

<sup>5</sup> Iteration is present in innumerable systems. Because of this repetition, a very slight change in the initial condition will eventually produce a pattern dissimilar from the original. The infinitesimal error, magnified through many iterations results in substantial distortion of the original data and makes prediction impossible.

<sup>6</sup> Fractal patterns are characterised by irregularity and infinite length, and strange attractors are composed of fractal curves.

<sup>7</sup> General dr. Mircea Mureșan, general de brigadă dr. Gheorghe Văduva, *Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului*, Editura U.N.Ap., București, 2004, p. 427.

<sup>8</sup> It is about strategy as a whole.

<sup>9</sup> General de brigadă (r.) dr. Gheorghe Văduva, *Flexibilitate în perenitate*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 3, May-June 2005, p. 134.

“It is a virtual construction in a real, ideal but also imaginative space, with concepts, theories and experiences that allow for certain flexibility (...). “It cannot be learned, it has no algorithms, recipes or obligatory check points, it cannot be acquired through exercise and training” but it is lively experienced, and in strategic art “every creative act is unique and unrepeatable”<sup>10</sup>. It is governed by the strategist creation<sup>11</sup> and it is based on a skilful combination of capabilities in key places and at appropriate moments.

*Grand Strategy*, in our view, is mainly related, in the current security environment, to the art of preserving and optimising the nation state of the security, in the event of any type of confrontation. *Strategy* is a science, a practice and an art of confrontation in all dimensions (land, air, naval, informational, geospatial), a system of rules, principles and methodologies. It is a policy of human action, it is complex, multidimensional and multi-layered so that, considering the complexity of the situation, in respect to us and us as a state, the “rationale of any strategy lies in its implementation for national entity living and surviving”<sup>12</sup>.

In this context we appreciate that “military strategy is not something incomprehensible, given only to those capable of building complex structures”<sup>13</sup>, but it is an important aspect of military science, “a complicated way of thinking”<sup>14</sup>, which, analysed depending on context and situation, can sometimes be sensitive and limiting, rigid to incomprehensionable, sometimes flexible, fluid and heterogeneous, currently mostly chaotic therefore hybrid.

### **2.1. Contemporary hybrid warfare as art of dissimulated and diffused hostility**

From the original myth of misinformation expressed by the *Trojan Horse*, the durability of the quote of the Chinese General became a *modus vivendi* in the context of the contemporary polemos, so that we are witnessing a true “power shift of disinformation”.

Three enlightening quotes summarise the above statement:

- “Misinformation is the poison that spreads into our knowledge circuits”<sup>15</sup>.
- “No manipulation is possible without perfect knowledge (intellectual, psychological and empathetic) of the group to be undermined and of its members”<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>11</sup> Strategy generator, expert in strategic theory and specialist in strategy practice.

<sup>12</sup> General dr. Eugen Bădălan, general dr. Valentin Arsenie, general de brigadă dr. Gheorghe Văduva, *Eseu despre arta strategică*, Editura Militară, București, 2005, p. 242.

<sup>13</sup> General de brigadă dr. Gheorghe Văduva, *Consonanțe și rezonanțe strategice în condiții de normalitate, de criză și de risc militar extrem*, in *Impact strategic*, no. 1/2009, Editura U.N.Ap., București, p. 39.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>15</sup> Henri-Pierre Cathala, *Epoca dezinformării*, Editura Militară, București, 1991, p. 47.

<sup>16</sup> Mucchielli, *Subversiunea*, apud Vladimir Volkoff, *Tratat de dezinformare*, Editura Antet, Iași, 2001, p. 8.

- “Masses have never been really thirsted for truth. They neglect the evidence they dislike, preferring worshipping error”<sup>17</sup> and error seduces them becoming their executioner.

Misinformation has come, in our opinion, the *art of perfidy*, a refined form through which physical aggression has been converted to mental annihilation. One does not even liken to the gods but substitutes them to drive crazy those whom one wants to subjugate or ruin.

*Effects*: the individual abdicates when faces disorder, gets accustomed to living in error, becomes irrational and sometimes impulsive and crowds all the more.

In contemporary *hybrid polemos*, propaganda campaigns, misinformation, intoxication and control are primary priority. They are predominantly or exclusively conducted undercover, and/or mixed with discrete ones, as well as overt. The deceiver uses as links in the chain, relays and intermediaries, to propagate and amplify messages (specialist agents and influence agents, as a cover) joined by the group of authors, conspirators, and accomplices.

These “*enterprises*”, clean and cleverly camouflaged under the guise of normality, competition, or any human organised entity right to manifest and develop independently, free and sovereign, evolve unhindered. Therefore, *informational aggression* may contain extensive economic-financial “*engineering*” and complex and systematic actions of disinformation and manipulation, widely using virtual means and the mass-media.

## ***2.2. Hybrid warfare and types of new conflicts from the grand strategy perspective***

“*Who controls the bank logistics, corporatism and microelectronics will lead the world*”<sup>18</sup>, and “*those who do not have a government will fall like leaves*”<sup>19</sup>.

Preserving life and/or wealth growth become more an attribute of brains and increasingly less an enterprise based on mechanical work, so that in present and future wars, if there is no knowledge<sup>20</sup>, there is no strategy either. In 1919, John Frederick Charles Fuller proposed, as a method to immobilise the enemy’s military power, the “*war that targets brains*”<sup>21</sup> using the expression: “*paralyse the brain and the body ceases to function*”<sup>22</sup>. Thus, slow and slight injuries

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<sup>17</sup> Gustave Le Bon, *Psihologia mulțimilor*, Editura Antet, Filipeștii de Târg, Prahova, 2001, p. 56.

<sup>18</sup> Ilie Bădescu, *Noopolitica*, Editura Mica Valahie, București, 2006.

<sup>19</sup> *Proverbs of Solomon*, 11:14, Online Bible in Romanian.

<sup>20</sup> Intangible power, real asset of any physical or legal entity (states, groups of states, organisations, groups of any kind etc. established for any purpose).

<sup>21</sup> J. F.C. Fuller, *The Foundation of the Science of War*, London, 1925, p. 314.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*.



accumulated over time, can lead, if needed, to the moment of using the armed force (or the “*silver bullet*”).

Therefore, the present fully confirms the quote, by the “*fourth generation*” warfare entering the scene. It basically consists of inducing a state of blockage in the political, economic and social systems of the targeted countries, and capitalising on the changes that occur in first phase to install the “*brain paralysis*” in the second phase. It is, in essence, the so called will and functional paralysis<sup>23</sup> of the target state, using business environment, circles and groups of influence, intelligence services, mass media etc., having as first goal to modify the “*thinking system of the enemy political leadership*”<sup>24</sup>.

Therefore, if equipment, weapons, combat training and organisation are quantifiable, volitional paralysis, in terms of degree of precariousness and degradation, is not quantifiable, but once installed, it becomes obvious. Thus, no matter what position or quality in the equation of belligerence one has, the interrelation characteristic to the triad or the “*paradoxical trinity*”, in Clausewitz terms, between *political leadership*, *population* (in terms of support and unconditional protection) and *armed forces* (combat/special forces) is important. So, for any chosen type of strategy one concentrates effort on all at once or sequentially, or two by two and then switch between them, everything integrated. No matter the approach, the established *centre of gravity* represents the objective to be fulfilled. It would be the *defeat of willingness to fight*, defined by Carl von Clausewitz as “*a place of all powers and of the movement on which everything depends*”<sup>25</sup>, which, at strategic level, is aimed at the *strategic immobilisation* of the opponent (strategic centre of gravity<sup>26</sup>), defeat in his political will, reduction/annihilation of its economic capacity (energy of any kind, strategic ones initially), along with a societal degenerative process<sup>27</sup>.

In our opinion, the analogical doctrinal correspondent for contemporary *hybrid polemos* is represented by the *comprehensive approach*<sup>28</sup>. Pursuing success in meeting the national role within NATO and the EU and beyond, that of preserving peace and preventing war, “*depends on deterrence and the effectiveness of the preventive*

<sup>23</sup> Effect that we call “*strategic immobilisation*”.

<sup>24</sup> Professor dr. Teodor Frunzeti, *Războiul modern – generația a patra*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 3/2005, p. 15.

<sup>25</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 595.

<sup>26</sup> The strength of a nation or a force (sum of moral entities: leader, leading elite, population will to fight, ethnic nationalism – *Doctrina Armatei României*, București, 2012, p. 65); power of a regime or a coalition in conjunction with the military and economic power – *Doctrina de planificare operațională a Armatei României*, București, 2008, p. 25.

<sup>27</sup> At this point the degenerative process is accelerated being in the final phase, on the descending branch that we call *emphasised degenerative retro-culmination*.

<sup>28</sup> *NATO Strategic Concept*, adopted in Lisbon in 2010 – *Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(D)*.



*diplomacy and of the crisis management success*<sup>29</sup>. To do this, importance is given by the strictly political, economic, social, cultural and environmental elements of security and stability. Thus, we enter the sphere of “*Grand Strategy*”.

On the lower level, with the role of achieving the end state established for the military by the political objectives, the doctrinal correspondence (synonymic) of the hybrid warfare is the *manoeuvrist approach* as a type of indirect approach used in the full spectrum of armed conflicts, aiming at destroying the cohesion and defeating the will to fight of the opponent. It mainly refers, in the first phase, to the attack of the moral component of the opponent combat power and, subsequently, to the physical component. The approach, to achieve the desired effects, relies on the combination of lethal and non-lethal means, capitalising on the weaknesses of the opponent, gaining initiative and decision superiority, using quick, original and unpredictable actions.

Following the evaluation of the presentation above, we notice how *Effects-Based Approach to Operations/EBAO* as part of the *Network Centric Warfare/NCW*, which integrates and systematically interconnects all three areas of military and non-military operations (physical, informational, cognitive), *Info Ops* (included in *EBAO*, targeting information and information systems) become the scientific expression applied in joint military operations.

Moreover, “*EBAO is harmonised with the new operational concepts, such as manoeuvrist approach*<sup>30</sup> and *mission command*<sup>31</sup>”<sup>32</sup> having a layered nature because it entails combined instruments<sup>33</sup> and components<sup>34</sup> of the national and/or allied power. Relevant to understanding *EBAO* is the definition provided by the Central American Joint Forces Command, namely: the “*effects-based operations represent a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome over the opponent by synergistically, multiplicatively and cumulatively conducting the entire spectrum of military and non military operations, at tactical, operational and strategic level*”. For restricting the current approach, we present the *EBAO* strategy through a plastic, eloquent, statement of the *effect*: Little David who overthrows Goliath (replacing David with “*small clump*” and Goliath with “*great clump*”).

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<sup>29</sup> *Doctrina Armatei României, op. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> The first tenet of the British Army’s capstone doctrine is the Manoeuvrist Approach to operations. This is an indirect approach which emphasises understanding and targeting the conceptual and moral components of an adversary’s fighting power as well as attacking the physical component – *British Army Doctrine Operations* – November 2010.

<sup>31</sup> Unique and decentralised execution plan based on initiative in order to achieve given objectives.

<sup>32</sup> *Doctrina de planificare operațională a Armatei României*, București, 2008, pct. 0510, p. 93.

<sup>33</sup> Diplomatic, economic, military and informational.

<sup>34</sup> Cognitive, moral and physical, based on the doctrinal one.

Therefore, we see how, through the *fog of peace and war*, it is hardly to make the difference between what is military or non-military, conventional or non-conventional, legal or illegal, legitimate or illegitimate, conflict-competition-no conflict, symmetrical-dissymmetrical-asymmetrical, regular-irregular combat forces, permitted or prohibited methods and means, strategists and strategies, confusing areas/territories etc.

*Definition (proposal):* Contemporary *hybrid warfare* is a total one, a surviving one, covert or overt, with mainly treacherous means, in which belligerents mobilise all human and material resources aiming decisively to the unconditional surrender of the opponent, imposing will on it, not by “*physical dislocation*” but by “*psychic dislocation*”<sup>35</sup>, moment from which the other aspects derive.

### 3. Physiognomy of the Hybrid Polemos

In what follows, we will approach the *hybrid polemos*, not only from the perspective of our recent history, inside the country, at the borders, but also from the one of the hotbeds in the Near East and the Middle East.

#### 3.1. The Romanian contemporary hybrid polemos aetiology under the panorama of consequences

*“There is no deaf man than the one who does not want to hear”*

Vladimir Volkoff.

*“A revolution which does not alter the terms of property is a masquerade. Without a triumph over inequality, it is nonsense”*<sup>36</sup>.

*“It is a well known fact that crowds possess appetite, lust and not thoughts”*<sup>37</sup>.

After 1989, as the effect of the *hybrid warfare*, it perpetuated and magnified in our country a more obvious collision of the ill fit ones in non-accidental temporal adequacy and, simultaneously, as a result of this collision, an unprecedented expansion of the newly experienced ones, individuals without calling or inadequate, carriers of darkness, defiled consciousnesses, subversive characters and wanderers through excellence.

*Causal explanation:* primitive Communism (“*the red scourge*”<sup>38</sup>) as a first lower step of the evolution toward the social egalitarianism of the individuals, a higher form of collectivist socialism founded on scientific atheism, which was our religion for over 45 years, diverting us from the natural order, creating deeply corrupted

<sup>35</sup> Concepts defined by Basil Henry Liddel Hart.

<sup>36</sup> Emil Cioran, *Schimbarea la față a României*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1990, p. 144.

<sup>37</sup> Gustave Le Bon, *Legile psihologice al evoluției popoarelor*, Editura Antet, Filipeștii de Târg, Prahova, p. 137.

<sup>38</sup> Pascal had the vision of this misfortune occurrence as a fire. Also Gustave Le Bon foretold since 1894 that “*socialism will soon be the new faith of the crowd disinherited of its fate*”.

souls. It was followed by the second stage, a “*revolutionary*” one, in which the “*liberators*” facilitated, cultivated and maintained an accelerated process of acculturation<sup>39</sup> of the Romanian people, simultaneously with depriving it through the acquisition and/or disposal of material assets of the country, audio-visually preaching for materialistic hedonistic lifestyle<sup>40</sup>.

*Strategic effects*: large samples of amorphous population, emaciated and indifferent, with an atrophied way of thinking and infantilised awareness, that no longer reason and no longer undertake almost anything, following a societal degenerative prolonged process (over 70 years of dismantling the ontogenetic self, altering the unity of living, reaching, in our opinion, the culmination point of the irreversible damage of the strategic centre of gravity)<sup>41</sup>.

Therefore, the alarming state of degradation we have reached is a peremptory fact. Statistically explained, “*when a cause persists, producing the same effect, causes increase in arithmetical progression (1, 2, 3, 4 etc.) and the effects in geometrical progression (2, 4, 8, 16, 32 etc.). So, causes are the logarithms of effects*”<sup>42</sup>. It is really a variant applied to the *effects-based operation*, part of the *network centric warfare* (in terms of operational art rules and the management of response operations, which require, for the strategic defence of the country, a *systemic approach*, interconnected with another one, based on *design*, both incorporated into the *comprehensive* one, based on the conception, development and dynamic review of an extended contingency, pre-emptive and dissuasive plan of operation).

Therefore, related to our situation that has repeated in history, we find that the aggregation of such crossroads and influence territories called by R.D. Kaplan subspaces of the “*sub-national warfare*” leads to the emergence of disputed and “*exquisitely colonised*” fault fronts, using the whole arsenal of the *hybrid warfare* as a form of the war of the future, where the civilian is eclectically mixed with the military.

*Post-scriptum corollary*: “*Do not fight the darkness, look for learning from it*”<sup>43</sup>, projecting your knowledge into its nothingness and exposing it when needed, but especially timely, in its hideousness. For reflection, we advance the following statement: *If the sleep of reason produces monsters, then asleep intellect gives birth to monstrosity.*

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<sup>39</sup> Assimilate or caused to assimilate a different culture, typically the dominant one.

<sup>40</sup> Switching from sexual physiology to what great Ovidiu called “*Ars amandi*”.

<sup>41</sup> Our initiative is not an offended one, expressed from a position of superiority, but rather one of great necessity, prevailing consciousness, and also one of total acceptance of own guilt.

<sup>42</sup> Gustave Le Bon, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>43</sup> Sal Rachele, *Transformări planetare 2012-2030*, Editura Proxima Mundi, București, 2011, p. 239.

### **3.2. Muslim civilisation and Slavic civilisation, the main groups that generate hybrid warfare worldwide**

*“There cannot be real friends without real enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are old truths that we rediscover (...). Those who deny them actually deny their own family, heritage, their culture, their right to be born, their intimate identity!”<sup>44</sup>.*

*“The unfortunate truth”,* said the famous sociologist Samuel P. Huntington, *“cannot be ignored by statesmen and scientists”* so that, for those in search for identity or reinvention of their ethnicity, enemies are essential, and they will likely find them *“around the fault lines of the great civilisations of the world”<sup>45</sup>* because, he argues, *“the most important distinctions between peoples are not ideological, political or economical, but cultural”<sup>46</sup>*, and Immanuel Kant said that a society with no culture or that does not generate culture is doomed to perish.

#### *3.2.1. Muslim civilisation*

Regarding this civilisation, studying the text of the great sociologist, we detach an alarming aspect, namely that confrontation with the radicalised component of this civilisation does not occur along the fault lines but even in *“the belly and chest cavity of Europe”* and it will last long. Nothing more paradoxical than the resemblance with the *Trojan horse* given by the Achaeans, with *“humbleness”*, worshiped as a holy offering for Athena.

This state of affairs began 5-6 decades ago when, being in need, the Europeans accepted Muslim immigrants<sup>47</sup> to work in coal mines, factories, railways, street cleaning etc. We call this the *small Muslim migration*. The progress, supposedly flourishing, was to change in the early '70s when a severe oil crisis began, when many of the Muslims became unemployed thus facing, together with their families, the cruel reality. It was an unhappy situation that gradually determined many of them to revolt, to become radicals, not willing to integrate in spite of the free of charge programmes that were offered to them, claiming that it was forbidden by their religion. Recently, all the events in the Near East and the Middle East have led to a progressive increase in the number of refugees. Social networks, both in the riots during the *“Arab Spring”* and now, help refugees to find out what fees and bribes are. Maps online, smart-phones and GPSs help them not to get lost and instant messaging as WhatsApp and Viber help them to communicate with relatives,

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<sup>44</sup> Michael Dibdin, in *Laguna moartă*, apud Samuel P. Huntington, *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor*, Editura Antet, Oradea, 1997, p. 26.

<sup>45</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor*, *ibidem*, pp. 26-27.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 29.

<sup>47</sup> Between 1990 and 2009, more than 26 million Muslims entered legally and illegally in Europe.

friends. We call this contemporary odyssey the *great Muslim migration*, and the recent suicide bomber attacks of the *Daesh* extremists posed the biggest challenge to the civilised Western world.

Although at the core of the Islamic religion is inner peace and love acceptance, in practice, the dogma has materialised through the territorial expansion policy as Jihad, or the religious war. Today, the militant Islamic fundamentalism in Europe has reached its highest level. For example, the Mosque has become an institution with multiple utilities:

- a) prayer;
- b) indoctrination;
- c) wedding market;
- d) training cell for attacks;
- e) armoury.

From here everything is predictable.

*Re-reflective and meditative corollary:* What will happen when the great Chinese migration starts?

### *3.2.2. Eurasia – the Pan-Russian social and political movement*

Its main actor is Alexander Dughin, the Kremlin ideologist and public relations expert. It is coordinated by Russian special services and comprises veterans of Special Forces “*Wympiel*”<sup>48</sup> and special services. In 2004, Dughin’s supporters set up the *International Eurasian Movement*. He also founded “*Club Izborsk*”, in 2012, after the name of a region considered to be one of the oldest settlements in medieval Russia, symbol of continuity and fight against Western invaders.

The meetings, symposiums, conferences, round tables, organised by the Club have had as a product the imperial nostalgia of the “*Great Russia*”. Surprisingly, alongside the permanent members, the meetings are attended by clergy, experts from various fields and high-ranking military personnel. Therefore, we notice that the Eurasian project becomes active and develops, opposing *Pax Americana* at state level in all strategic areas: politics, economics, culture, information and informatics.

In 2011, Syria case generated the escalation of the US-Russian tensions, aiming at the Syrian Harbour of Tartus, as an outpost at the Mediterranean Sea. There followed the events in Crimea (territory which was annexed in 1783 by Catherine the Great, as a Russian Black Sea pillar, vital for Russia) by the appearance of Russian special forces, the “*little green men*”, of Russian

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<sup>48</sup> Service that was part of the KGB Directorate and also of the External Information Service, which carries out operations outside Russian territory.

speakers who took control over the military units, airports, major institutions, TV and radio broadcasters. It continued with the “*supporting peace and stability*” intervention of Russia, then the referendum on the status of Crimea, followed by the decree of annexation, the veto in the UN Security Council and the abstention of China, Donetsk and Luhansk, the MH17 plane crash, the economic sanctions etc. In the USSR it was crystallised a so-called “*reflexive management*”, which represents the synthesis between the great skills of eastern culture at stratagem and misinformation (innate and developed to the level of great art, a perpetual way of living, as we consider it), along with the new technologies and the great discoveries in the field of cognitive science. It is a project of the Russian Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information, started in 2001, used by all civil and military special services as a Russian response to the NATO informational doctrine called “*Net-War*”<sup>49</sup> and “*Net Centric Warfare/NCW*”.

The concept of “*reflexive management*” is based on a core theme, which is to transmit to the enemy manufactured pieces of information that are probable, along with a coded way of behaviour, based on propaganda, intimidation, persuasion, stratagem and disinformation. All the disseminated ideological and geopolitical conceptions have been mainly materialised in Ukraine (Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk) and Syria, where the action of the famous “*little green men*” have decisively sanctioned the hybrid warfare concept.

A. Dughin, the Russian ideologist, stated in *Liternaturnaia Gazetta*, in 2007: “*Our Russian history is inconceivable without mentioning a fundamental concept: the empire (...) is our identity, our destiny (...)*”.

Consequently, the main civilisations that have generated hybrid warfare hotbeds are: the Slavic civilisation, glorifying the past empire, and the Islamic civilisation based on Sharia<sup>50</sup> law, which wants to create the “*Caliphate*” and control the world.

We consider that the worst situation will be when elementary biological needs will be increasingly difficult to meet for all the inhabitants of the planet, and the “*womb jihad*” will represent the harsh reality. Then Europe will feel the burden of these migratory populations more acutely. We should not forget the Romanian proverb that says “*blood never becomes water*”.

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<sup>49</sup> The term “*network-centric warfare*” and associated concepts first appeared in the Department of Navy publication, *Copernicus: CAISR for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. As a distinct concept, however, network-centric warfare first appeared publicly in a 1998 US Naval Institute Proceedings article by Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John Garstka. This concept was also analysed by Aleksandr Dughin.

<sup>50</sup> Islamic canonical law based on the teachings of the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet (Hadith and Sunna), prescribing both religious and secular duties and sometimes retributive penalties for lawbreaking. It has generally been supplemented by legislation adapted to the conditions of the day, though the manner in which it should be applied in modern states is a subject of dispute between Muslim traditionalists and reformists.



## 4. Conclusion

The challenges of the present and of the future are old and also new. They integrate each other, creating a hybrid composite.

The *Cold War* was a hybrid one. Now it has refined and thus, in “*Putin’s Era*”, it is carried out with the help of unconventional means, combatants that are disguised and wear leather jackets and studded boots, are inserted among civilians or wear uniforms without insignia.

Crises are the epiphenomena of the war, in other words, pre-war products. This will represent the rule in the most future confrontations. The wars of the future will take the form of multiple clusters of crisis and responses to crises.

The traditional balance of power is fluctuating and still perpetual undecided, hierarchies being hard to prioritise. Traditional tools and methods are no longer a feasible option. That is why we consider that the importance of quality within power is given by knowledge, economic growth, political stability, national cohesion. The one who will preserve, capitalise and assert them will endure in the future.

During the contemporary hybrid warfare for new settlers, the *higher lethality* will become the “*Queen*” and this means: disaggregating the personality/identity of the individuals and of the targeted groups.

“*To modernise, in the industrial age, means to mechanise and to armour; in the information age, this means to weave networks*”<sup>51</sup>. Modern war is essentially dependent on and even conditioned by information networks. Computers, networks and terminals are both weapons and targets and since financial holdings became the principal pillar, replacing the property, former principal pillar, the main objective of the war is no longer connected with territory. Thus, increasingly “*more strategists believe that the main priority is the information war, the one which enables the domination of the battlefield* (the confrontation environment – A.N.)”<sup>52</sup>. In our opinion, it is good if one did or does not possess the instruments of war specific to the former age, at least for one reason: the financial one. And if one wishes to have them, it is very late, at least for the same reason.



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<sup>51</sup> Stéphane Marchand, *Când China va învinge*, Editura Pro Editură și Tipografie, București, 2008, p. 210.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 209.



# NATO CRISIS MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

*Major Andrei-Ciprian ZOTA*

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*The importance of NATO early warning system having conflict prevention and crisis management as main goals was one of the lessons learned by the Alliance in the theatre of operations in the Balkans. Early warning provides more time for analysis to plan and prepare a response, and in case of an intervention, it increases the chances of success.*

*Moreover, according to the author, early warning can result in improving the decision-making cycle related to crisis management in terms of setting goals, developing courses of action, comparing and implementing them, and conducting post-action analysis.*

**Keywords:** *crisis management; international security; early warning; Cold War*

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**N**ATO is the organisation with the most extensive experience in conflict prevention and crisis management. Since the *Cold War*, crisis management has developed a dimension characterised by deterrence and intimidation, the Alliance being saturated by ideological hostility and accompanied by remarkable nuclear and conventional arsenal.

However, in our opinion, because of the changes occurred worldwide over the past years and the emergence of new types of risks and threats to the Alliance, the initial approach, though not all obsolete, had to be subject to adjustments and additions. NATO crisis management mechanisms have to be adapted to the new international climate, in order to remain relevant and effective.

They would cover the whole range of eventualities, from low intensity crisis to major confrontation and aggression to reject the opponent.

Crisis management and conflict prevention, including non-Art. 5 crisis response operations, have been major concerns in the continuous adaptation of the Alliance to the security environment in the post-*Cold War* period.

Today, NATO is working to create bridges between the still robust military capabilities of the Alliance and its attempt to adapt, politically, militarily and institutionally, to the changing politico-military environment. It is clear that NATO approach

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to conflict prevention exceeds the basic functions of defence and deterrence. We consider that, with regard to its involvement in preventing conflicts, whatever the definition of this limit in the near future could be and given the ongoing debates on this issue within the Alliance, NATO will have a supporting role to other institutions.

In another train of thoughts, the UN Charter is the basic document for the constitutive documents of many international organisations that have maintaining international peace and security on their agendas. Thus the creation of the Washington Treaty was based on the principles of the UN Charter.

Since the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949, NATO has been involved in conflict prevention and crisis management, even if this specific terminology has not been always used. Thus, the concept of consultations in the spirit of Article 4, when an ally receives a threat to security, sovereignty or territorial integrity, and that of Article 5, when an attack against one or more allied states is seen as an attack against all, has been applicable to the Alliance. In particular, such consultations shall form the foundations for the crisis management system currently applicable in NATO.

The types of crises NATO faced during the *Cold War* were diversified and not only of a military nature having a crisis management system adapted to the given requirements. After the *Cold War*, NATO crisis management process has changed with the sources and nature of crises. Thus, priority has been given to ethnic conflicts, political conflicts between states, nationalism, political changes and economic issues, threat of weapons of mass destruction and, after 11 September 2001, terrorism.

We consider that change in crisis management began in 1991, in Rome, with the launch of the *new strategic concept*. Next steps came in April 1999 at the summit in Washington by launching the *strategic concept* and the *Declaration of Washington*. The decisive change occurred at the Prague Summit in 2002, by adopting the decision on enlarging NATO, establishing NATO Crisis Response Force, and restructuring the command system. These decisions have led to the development of NATO's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management.

Thus, it appears that NATO focuses on preventing and combating armed conflicts, perceived as part of a broader spectrum of crises, from escalation to settlement, from peace to disputes, from armed conflicts to stability.

Amid changing security environment, in the context of atypical crisis management and new types of conflicts, the Alliance has developed its own system of conflict prevention and crisis management needed in this regard. Moreover, diversified ways of cooperation between NATO and other international organisations

with a role in ensuring global and regional peace and security, namely the UN, EU and OSCE, have been developed.

In 2001, the North Atlantic Council issued guidelines for the development of *NATO Crisis Response System – NCRS*. This structure was established to prepare and support crisis prevention and management operations as well as article 5 or non-article 5 operations. *NCRS* main aim is to develop NATO abilities to prepare to respond to the crises the Alliance could face. *NCRS* has implemented a range of measures to be put into practice by the Alliance, independently or in cooperation with other non-NATO nations, to respond to crisis in an appropriate and coordinated manner. It has a number of components, the most important being institutional structures, preventive options and crisis response measures.

In conclusion, the main institutional structures that ensure the functioning of NATO crisis management system are the *North Atlantic Council – NAC* and the *Defence Planning Committee – DPC*.

The North Atlantic Council and the Defence Planning Committee are supported in their activity by other important committees: *Policy Coordination Group – PCG*; *Political Committee – PC*; *Military Committee – MC*; *Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee – SCEPC*.

Other institutional structures, such as the *International Staff – IS* and the *International Military Staff – IMS*, provide support on various levels, in the context of conflict prevention and crisis management.

NATO has also developed a number of essential elements to support the process of crisis management and conflict prevention such as: working groups and physical facilities, jointly agreed arrangements and procedures, and concrete crisis prevention or management measures.

The main task of NATO crisis management system is crisis management in the entire spectrum, from the pre-crisis period characterised by peace and stability through all stages of the crisis to its settlement.

*NATO Crisis Response System* works with *NATO Intelligence Warning System – NIWS*, which is intended to provide early warning about the possibilities for conflict prevention and crisis management.

An important component of *NATO Crisis Management System* is the infrastructure, including airfields, telecommunications, command and control systems, information ones, military bases, headquarters, fuel transportation systems, radar and navigation coordination systems, docks, storage areas on the ground, and assistance facilities for additional forces. Such installations are among those representing the “*NATO common infrastructure*”, being funded and managed jointly by the governments of participating states, and operated by the Alliance members, while their sustainability is usually a national responsibility.

An important aspect related to crisis management is, in my view, the necessary infrastructure to exchange classified information, classified and unclassified voice communications, to transfer data, an initiative supported by NATO modernised communications system.

We consider that *NATO Situation Centre – SITCEN* is another element of infrastructure that is a central pillar in the framework of conflict prevention and crisis management. *SITCEN* provides continuous exchange of data and information between NATO headquarters and military headquarters, and between headquarters and member states capitals. If necessary, *SITCEN* can become operational in conflict prevention and crisis management. However, this function has been tested only in NATO applications and exercises.

NATO Secretary General is responsible, on behalf of the North Atlantic Council, for the overall policy, organisation and efficient operation of *SITCEN*, and the Assistant Secretary General for Operations, on behalf of the Secretary General, is the main responsible for the development and control of *SITCEN*. The *Director General of the International Military Staff – DG IMS* acts on behalf of NATO Military Committee for the coordination of the Operations Centre, along with the head of *SITCEN*. For everyday operations, this role is performed by the Deputy for Operations.

*SITCEN* has an administrative support office, responsible for information management and control, coordination, training, and financial management. Moreover, *SITCEN* is in charge of services and departments responsible for the receipt, exchange and dissemination of political, economic, military and terrorist issues 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. *SITCEN* also provides information products to support high-level decision-makers, task forces and exercises<sup>1</sup> (*figure 1*).

Within the process of adaptation to the new geostrategic circumstances, NATO has developed procedures in order to:


- identify and monitor crisis situations;
- ensure exchange of data and information;
- achieve assessments in support of decision-making and joint consultations;
- develop public relations and those with the media;
- involve in case of civil emergencies.

This module describes the arrangements and procedures employed in NATO for conflict prevention and crisis management.

In the process of decision-making, the North Atlantic Council and the Defence Planning Committee have available a wide range of measures previously approved

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<sup>1</sup> See [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_57954.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_57954.htm), retrieved on 03.02.2016.



by all member countries. However, such measures are continuously reviewed and permanently adapted in tune with the changing security environment.

Crisis management includes preventive, diplomatic and economic measures, as well as a wide range of military response options. Preventive measures can be: the messages conveyed, restrictions on trade, closing air and naval boarding points, manifestation of support for endangered entities and/or initiation of special programmes to support them. Military response measures are primarily as follows: military cooperation cessation, confidential military consultations, inspection and evaluation visits, surveillance, combat readiness, and rapid reaction and conventional forces readiness. At the same time, other alternative operational plans, necessary for the detailed planning of military operations, can be implemented.

NATO also has a system of own procedures to prepare and trigger a gradual response to crises, through civilian and military subordinate command structures, agencies, and other national military structures.

In conclusion, the measures agreed by the Alliance require nations and subordinate commands to conduct certain actions or, in other cases, NATO agencies to directly involve. All cover the entire spectrum of operations undertaken by the Alliance, such as general, combat readiness, intelligence or logistics operations. National prevention systems are closely related to NATO prevention system; the latter is constantly updated based on the lessons learned by the Alliance during the various exercises and own operations, as well as the annual crisis management exercise, conducted within the organisation.

NATO own early warning system with the goal of conflict prevention and crisis management is considered to be one of the lessons learned by the Alliance in the theatre of operations in the Balkans. Early warning gives more time for analysing, planning and preparing a response, and, in the event of an intervention, increases the likelihood of success.

Early warning can also result in enhancing the decision-making cycle related to crisis management, from setting goals, developing courses of action, comparing and implementing one of them, to post-action analysis and review. Because of the *NIWS* importance in the early stages of crisis management and conflict prevention, procedures will focus on data collection, evaluation and analysis.

As in many other areas of NATO, the changes in the international security environment have resulted, in our opinion, in radical changes in the *Early Warning System* and early warning methodology. The *Early Warning System* in the *Cold War* period, based on key steps towards triggering military action, is no longer relevant today. Therefore, instead of that system, it has been established one that focuses on political, economic, social as well as military developments. First, it has been necessary to identify a larger range of potential crisis sources and then to adopt a response methodology appropriate to the circumstances.

Another change has been driven by the need to take into consideration the increasing interaction between the various international organisations active in the field of peace and security. Therefore, new warning methodologies were necessary, and NATO has developed a new system, namely *NATO Intelligence Warning System*, which is intended to be more powerful than its predecessor and takes into account the entire range of risks identified in the *strategic concept* adopted in Washington in 1999. It is based on extremely well documented assessments of analysts and constitutes a true analytical process, unlike the old system in the *Cold War* period, which was based on mechanically implemented measures, selected from a list of options.

The new system covers not only threats to NATO but a much wider range of non-military risk indicators, including uncertainty and instability in the Euro-Atlantic or surrounding area, as well as possible crises that may occur at the periphery of the Alliance. Moreover, it provides warning about increased instability, crises, threats, risks or interests that may affect the Alliance security interests, and monitors the crisis/situation de-escalation.

Mention should be made that warning is not an event but a cyclical process in which a crisis, risk or threat is identified, measured, defined and for which a list of critical indicators is established. Unquestionably, this is more difficult now, given the characteristics of the current international security environment.

Critical indicators are continuously monitored and their assessment matrix is constantly updated. Warning is transmitted and the cycle repeats.

We appreciate the fact that the allies highlight the importance of cooperative activities under different formats for conflict prevention and crisis management. Not only these activities but also the participating countries can contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management in different ways. An important contribution is to reduce structural tensions by adopting democratic norms and practices, waiving unresolved disputes, and undertaking defence reforms by the states aspiring to NATO membership or participation in the PfP programme.

NATO's cooperation activities also contribute to crisis management and conflict prevention through actively discussing the ongoing or potential crises. These consultations allow for a focus on problems that may reduce tensions.

Another aspect of conflict prevention and crisis management support is represented, in our opinion, by the political will of the countries within the PfP as well as of other countries participating in crisis response operations led by NATO, related to their resolution. They are reflected in the declarations adopted by the above-mentioned bodies, such as EAPC, on the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, or the position adopted by them in other international organisations in this context.

It is also evident that partner countries have made important contribution to the crisis response operations led by NATO, providing forces or host nation support (authorisation to use the airspace or land or other facilities granted).

There have been many changes in the Partnership for Peace and in particular in the field of continuous improvement in operational partnership. Thus, we consider as important:

- the increasing role of partner countries for conflict prevention and crisis management;
- the transformation of NATO relations with partner countries from the PfP non-crisis relationship status to the effective involvement of these countries in crisis management;
- the provision of additional information deemed classified during crises to partners and other international organisations.

One of the many aspects that have changed significantly is the extent to which partner countries can participate in discussions on crisis response operations. Although allies take the final decision on the planning and execution of operations to respond to crises, important steps have been taken in terms of the amount of information that can be made available to the partners, the time they have to react, and the extent to which their views are taken into account in the decisions taken by the allies.



The importance of the participation of PfP countries in the crisis response operations led by NATO is reflected by the *Political Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations – PMF*, adopted at the summit in Washington, offering the specific framework for the integration of partners in the political and command structures for their participation in:

- operational planning;
- command arrangements;
- political consultations and decision-making.

Allies and partners have agreed that the information and consultation process with the partners contribution significantly facilitates the development of NATO crisis response operations.

After a long debate on the participation of allies that are not EU members in providing solutions to problems related to the EU defence, in 2002 it was adopted a joint NATO-EU declaration, which paved the way and laid the foundation for cooperation between the two organisations in conflict prevention and crisis management. The document outlines the political principles of NATO-EU cooperation, and gives the Union access to NATO planning system and other capabilities to develop its own military operations<sup>2</sup>. It also highlights the agreement to establish a common agenda of the two organisations, which includes the definition of concrete ways of joint consultations, cooperation and transparency.

In addition, the agreement relates to improving the exchange of classified information and documents between the two organisations, which is essential for efficient cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management.

Crisis management in the Alliance is based on the following **principles**:

- scan the entire area of strategic interest and anticipate crises;
- simultaneously consider multiple crises;
- develop strategic assessments and conduct related activities with caution;
- prepare the necessary military advisers and the necessary guidelines, including by developing planning products, such as operations plans;
- provide the necessary support for command and control structures at strategic level for the proper execution of operations;
- adapt and learn.

**Crisis management in NATO includes the following steps<sup>3</sup>:**

a. **identifying crisis** – the purpose of this step is to scan and filter information from all monitored areas, to develop initial assessments on new potential crises and to identify changes related to potential crises known that may have impact

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<sup>2</sup> Vasile Popa, Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Perspective în evoluția organizațiilor internaționale de securitate*, the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, “Carol I” National Defence University, București.

<sup>3</sup> *SHAPE Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management (CCOM) Handbook*, December 2014.

on the surrounding NATO's strategic interest areas, as well to transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy or cyber ones;

b. **estimating and options** – at this stage, a specific problem related to a potential emerging crisis is analysed. The comprehensive understanding depends on the permanent development and update of the informational situation and on the development of strategic response options;

c. **providing crisis response guidelines** – is achieved by preparing and drafting strategic response options, following the necessary approvals of the North Atlantic Council or the SACEUR decision. The products developed during this stage vary from SACEUR letters on the *strategic concept of operations (CONOPS)* or *plans of operations (OPLAN)*;

d. **conducting current operations** – includes all activities that allow command and control at strategic level for both current and new operations, being achieved by:

- coordinating the actions needed to initiate an operation;
- monitoring, developing strategic analyses and reporting on current and future operations, including strategic risk identification;
- facilitating the development of a new operation;
- assessing the relevance of current plans and directives in the development of a new operation;
- periodically reviewing progress in meeting objectives including by developing documents such as the *PMR (Periodic Mission Review)*;
- monitoring and facilitating the transition and completion of the mission;
- collecting and archiving the information used/generated during the operation execution;
- reporting on *end-of-exercise* and *end-up*;
- drafting replies to external questions concerning the conclusion of the operation.

e. **reviewing crisis** – this stage ensures continuing evaluation of the crisis management process by institutionalising best practices and improving processes and includes:


- collecting and collating feed-back from parties to crisis management;
- contributing to the collection of lessons learned;
- identifying opportunities to improve future crisis management, including crisis management process.

The crisis management<sup>4</sup> within the Alliance is shown schematically in *figure 2*<sup>5</sup>.

We can conclude, therefore, that NATO crisis management process has the role of anticipating potential crises and avoiding strategic surprise.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>5</sup> *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive COPD INTERIM V1.0, 2010.*



This process is flexible, aiming not to produce rigid but rather flexible patterns, allowing for streamlining NATO's internal processes in this field. The Alliance approach to crisis management is based on the ability to think, plan and act strategically and comprehensively in order to effectively and timely prepare the necessary military advice and guidelines.

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## ROMANIA

### – Main Pillar of the European Union Consolidation in the Black Sea Region –

General Dr Ștefan DĂNILĂ

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*Romania has to consolidate its status of the EU and NATO member by meeting their requirements and standards, to decisively contribute to the integration of the Republic of Moldova into the European Union and to the development of partnerships with the countries in the Black Sea region. This desideratum entails, according to the author, a coherent strategy, supported by all political parties, providing courses of action for any government programme and for all sectoral strategies and policies. In this regard, it is necessary not only to continue to harmonise the national legislation with the European one but also to know the decision-making and legislation-implementation mechanisms of the Union in order to integrate the interests of the Romanian citizens and of the Romanian state in the Community law.*

**Keywords:** regional cooperation; military capabilities; FRONTEX; host nation

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The evolution of international relations immediately after the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit was marked by Moscow's reaction to the tendency of the ex-Soviet states in the Black Sea region to reorient to the values of the Euro-Atlantic democracy. The enthusiasm shown by Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and the majority of ex-Yugoslav states touched the sensitivities of the Russian Federation, which risked losing influence in those countries. Russian administration representatives warned that a limit considered inadmissible for them was reached. The first visible reaction was in Georgia, immediately after the summit, in August 2008, when the Russian Federation invaded Abkhazia and South Ossetia, through a very well prepared, brutal and impossible to counteract "peace support" operation in the region. It was the moment when it became clear that the states that would try to escape the Russian domination were vulnerable, even if, apparently, the intervention was only the reaction to the enormous blunder

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General Dr Ștefan Dănilă – Military Advisor to the Minister of National Defence.

of the Georgian president at the time, to impose the Georgian authority over the separatist regions. It was evident that the Russian Federation could impose by force in the region, being ready to seize every opportunity to demonstrate it. Of course, the use of force demonstrated the weakness of the system, imposed and not accepted, even if, momentarily, it could lead to obtaining an advantage or to obtaining/maintaining control over a territory. The next moment of convulsion in the ex-Soviet space was in March 2014, in Ukraine. President Putin did not hesitate, again, to order military intervention.

Moreover, NATO and especially the European Union were unable to support the states that showed their willingness to accede. The enthusiasm generated by the end of the *Cold War*, undisturbed by the intervention in Transnistria, was lost with the annexation of Crimea. The recently built partnerships with the Russian Federation were frozen, each party trying to keep somewhat acceptable limits, especially with reference to the main provisions of the agreements that were not officially denounced. The role of Russian resources in the Western European economy influences the attitude of many European countries, an attitude which could be more trenchant, but the repercussions seem to be manageable for now. The sanctions imposed on Russia affect both the economy and the lives of Russian citizens, and the Euro-Atlantic economy. It has become topical again the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria, important bridgehead, whose value begins to be recognised today after launching the idea of “*Novorossiya*”! It is hardly conceivable that the offensive for the materialisation of the idea launched by the intelligence services, namely Russian propaganda, so as to achieve the land connection with Crimea and isolate Ukraine from the Black Sea should be ended. It is the punishment Putin prepares for *Euromaidan*!

Ukraine, without Crimea, despite the guarantees for territorial integrity provided when it renounced its nuclear arsenal, having an interethnic war in eastern regions, seeks an agreement with the European Union. The relative advantage of those who want it over those who do not want to break the traditional relations with Russia is very fragile. Ukraine’s ties with Russia are still very strong. Most of Ukrainians, especially in the eastern area, prefer working in areas where Russian is spoken to working in states where English or German are spoken. From the dependence on Russian gas and market for food products up to that related to jobs, there are many connections, difficult to replace by the European community in a short period of time. The economic and financial situation, corruption and the institutional weaknesses of the Ukrainian state raise concerns as great as the armed conflict still ongoing in Donbass. Moreover, the people

in the countries in the close vicinity of Ukraine are also worried. There is not only the desire to help and support, but also the fear of instability on own territory. It is because opening the door to Ukrainian citizens means a possible increase in trafficking in prohibited goods, in people and even in hazardous materials, considering the Ukrainian institutions weaknesses.

The Republic of Moldova has become very important to the Russian Federation, representing a key position both in the undeclared conflict with Ukraine and in the dispute with the European Union regarding influence in the region. The existence of Transnistria and the presence of Russian troops in the self-proclaimed state represent continuous pressure on Moldovan citizens. They chose a European path at the penultimate elections, but the coalition established for that purpose failed to consolidate the option, considering the government performance. Thus, in the 2015 elections, the coalition, seriously damaged by corruption scandals, could not be maintained. Moreover, the government resignation, following the accusations against the prime minister related to his education, reopened the struggle to create majority in a delicate moment, namely the local elections. On the other hand, the Moldovans disappointment is also related to the lack of real involvement of the Union and, in particular, of Romania. Political declarations have been followed by delayed and inconsistent practical actions.

The Russian Federation is increasingly present in the region, not only by propaganda but also by more or less visible entrepreneurs. The links with the Russian educational and cultural system, as well as the solid economic links established in the Soviet period are reactivated and capitalised on. In all the state institutions there are people who studied in Russian, whose value system is connected to Russian culture, or who are dependent on Russian resources in terms of finance and energy. The Ruble is a currency at least as much circulated as the Euro, and most of the people who work outside the country do it in the Russian Federation.

The status of neutrality established by the Constitution creates problems in managing national security or some other sectors. International air traffic rules provide as a security requirement the existence of means designed for intercepting aircraft in danger or those that breach the flight regime. Their absence is a vulnerability that reveals the inability of minimal reaction in the event of an air attack. Moreover, an agreement with another state to ensure this capability is difficult to conclude, given the mentioned status of neutrality.

The European Union is facing new problems after the financial crisis of 2008-2012. Some of them are the result of the crisis and others are the result

of an enlargement based on desire and will, less supported by resources and economic capacity. The European project is increasingly challenged, although the evolution of human civilisation is directed towards *generalised globalisation*, in all sectors of activity. The desire for a better life as well as the need for security has generated the unionist, community, current. The failure to meet too great aspirations and/or expectations has resulted in a centrifugal reaction of denying the Union. The regional autonomy policy, fuelled by nationalist tendencies, favours populist, secessionist movements. Additionally, the internal affairs of states are transferred to the Union or are justified by its existence. After the referendum on Scottish independence, ended with a worrying result, the UK new government defused the energy of the masses eager for a change by the promise of a new referendum. This time, for maintaining or not Great Britain in the European Union! Meanwhile, Romania and Bulgaria are striving to be accepted into the Schengen Area!

The evolution of the situation related to Greece repaying its debt and the threat of exclusion from the Eurozone could discredit a complex construction, made with huge efforts over more than six decades. The construction deficiencies should be corrected, and for that efforts are made so that the deficiencies can be known and understood. The enthusiasm of the '90s is increasingly replaced with nationalistic pessimism. Internal problems are magnified by the diversionary actions of the specialised services of the actors interested in destabilising the Community for various reasons.

Member states should resolve the situation. The existence of the Union and the security of each state, in part, depend on the participation of each of them in identifying and implementing appropriate solutions, effective and efficient. First, it needs a new attitude: from waiting for solutions from Brussels to constructively involving in decision-making and implementation. Simultaneously, less EU bureaucracy and transfer of tasks to states, following the establishment of minimum requirements package, can simplify the process. Regional problems should be solved regionally, and support from other EU countries is welcome, when possible. Each contribution can lead to a stronger Union, an institution capable of defending its citizens rights and improve their living standards. Strengthening the Union will generate respect as well as strong and credible partnerships able to compete with other similar constructs. NATO membership of the majority community states is not only a guarantee of security but also an obligation to involve, seriously and continuously, in achieving, maintaining and developing allied defence capabilities.



➤ ***Romania – Powerful State in the Eastern Flank of NATO and Pillar of Stability on the Eastern Border of the EU***

As an EU member, Romania should participate in completing and improving the Community legislative framework, as well as in implementing and complying with its provisions. The EU accession, following a strong political decision, supported by meeting European standards only partially in certain fields, compels Romania to continue the efforts of pre-accession period. The voices claiming a “*country project*” demonstrate that the moment of accession represented, for the majority of Romanian citizens, the process completion. Furthermore, have been in a standby posture, waiting for solutions, funds, resources, tasks, directives... The absence of a panacea or universal solutions, provided by the Union, and the lack of miracles to generate highways, jobs, higher wages etc. have led to the emergence of disappointment and apathy.

This state of mind has been transmitted relatively easily across the border to our neighbours. An additional argument for Russian propaganda. Moldovan citizens have found that in Romania it is slightly better, but not as expected. They have come to work desiring to work in the European Union and benefit from the fact that they speak the same language, and it is easy to integrate, or they have stayed at home, waiting for Romanian investors, already adapted to European standards. But there have been relatively slow changes, and Romania still has not solved own problems.

In conclusion, what should we do? A new *country project*! But not so new! One to complete and continue the one established in the '90s, to join and integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

***Romania has to strengthen its membership of the EU and NATO by meeting their requirements and standards, to decisively contribute to the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union and to the development of partnerships with the countries in the Black Sea region.***

This goal requires a coherent strategy, supported by all political parties, having courses of action valid for any government programme, and for all strategies and sectoral policies. First, it is necessary to further harmonise national legislation with the Community one. Moreover, it is necessary to know the decision-making and legal mechanisms of the Union to integrate the interests of the Romanian state and citizens in Community law. Foreign policy must pursue two main ways: to promote the European and Euro-Atlantic policy without deviations, and, simultaneously, to timely and efficiently support own interests in Community

and allied forums. The main strategic partnership is that with the United States, which requires prior consultation for decisions that exceed the agreements and treaties in force, having an attitude towards international major events and timely informing the US authorities on the interests and potential threats to the security of Romania. Another key objective is to strengthen the position of major actor in the eastern flank of the Alliance, not only in regional forums but also through strategic partnerships with Poland and Turkey. The partnership with Turkey will be based on its membership of the Alliance and the coordinated development of contingency plans and strategic plans for defence, the participation in ballistic missile defence system, as well as the regional cooperation in the Black Sea.

Within NATO, Romania will participate in multinational projects to develop the military capabilities that have been identified as necessary by military experts, promoting the involvement and development of production facilities in Romania. Romania joins the Allied Joint Command (South), from Naples, which will coordinate a possible operation for Romania's defence under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by developing the permanent structure present on our territory. Romania will provide the Alliance with facilities for hosting at least one Allied command agency/structure of high visibility. Priority military capabilities are the early warning, surveillance and reconnaissance ones, as well as the immediate response to possible aggression ones, to ensure the necessary protection until the allied support. Host Nation specific infrastructure necessary for the allied forces will be integrated into the critical infrastructure of Romania and will be developed and maintained functional with priority. In order to strengthen the defence capacity it will be allocated annually, starting in 2017, for a period of minimum ten years, a budget of at least 2% of GDP for the Ministry of Defence, of which at least 30% will be used for investment in infrastructure and equipment.

For the investment required to develop defence capabilities bilateral relations will be established with states considered as "*framework*" for the development of each of them, to the extent to which the capability meets the operational need, is competitive at international level, and involves national economy. Defence industry reorients to partnership or merger with leading companies in the field from the allied states, having refurbishment as main goal to obtain modern, competitive products.

As an EU member, Romania will implement the *Common Security and Defence Policy*, and will consolidate as an important pillar on the eastern border, a stability factor and a model for partners in the region. Romania will be one of the main

promoters of partnerships with Black Sea countries, will support the Republic of Moldova in its way to accession, and will promote a special partnership between the Union and Turkey. To achieve infrastructure projects, it will be negotiated a threshold of 5% of GDP deficit with the International Monetary Fund, the European Development Bank and the European Commission, with strict supervision of the use of investment funds.

Romania will implement the Community standards and legislation, it will strengthen its economy, according to market economy rules, through strong and stable institutions, where human resources will be qualified according to the requirements, promotion will be performed based on fair, transparent criteria, payment will be according to the importance of the work done, in compliance with the rules established in most member countries. The proper functioning of state institutions will be achieved by transforming management control into quality control. The quality control will be implemented in all areas of activity based on clear assessment parameters by competent, specialised, personnel.

The priority investment will be transport and communication infrastructure. The networks of roads, highways and railways will ensure the link between the states of the Union, the Republic of Moldova and partner states in the region. Instrumental to this end is the road and rail transport artery Chişinău-Târgu Mureş. Romania will develop the necessary infrastructure for the transit of natural gas from the Black Sea to the countries of the Union and the Republic of Moldova. The reactors at Cernavodă will be completed and operational, and the hydropower infrastructure will be properly maintained, while electricity production capacity from alternative sources will be developed so that Romania's energy independence and status of energy provider can be ensured. The connectivity with the high voltage network of the Republic of Moldova will be modernised to provide the necessary electricity under the same conditions as for consumers in Romania.

Romania will provide the Republic of Moldova with normative acts, as models, and the necessary advice to implement their provisions as well as the EU directives, if required. Education will be modernised by capitalising on the quality control process. To educate citizens of the Republic of Moldova in Romanian education institutions scholarships and support to acquire the knowledge required for admission will be provided, on condition graduates will employ in the Moldovan state institutions. Enough places will be provided to cover the need for specialists in the sectors that are vital to the state.

The emergency services connected to the 112 system of the two countries will be unitarily coordinated in order to integrate. Romania will provide healthcare

services for Moldovan citizens under the same conditions as for the Union citizens. For full integration, including with regard to free movement, as well as the obligation of a bordering state of the Union, the Republic of Moldova will be supported to join *FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union)* and the Border Police will be provided with consultancy to meet Schengen standards.

The air traffic services in the Republic of Moldova will be connected, and the integration of airspace in the Functional Air Block Romania-Bulgaria will be advocated at *EUROCONTROL*<sup>1</sup>.

Romania will provide the Republic of Moldova with access to the Black Sea and the Danube River under the same conditions as any Community state unless more favourable terms are established through bilateral agreements.

The finality of the project must be: ***Romania and the Republic of Moldova, two Romanian states in a stable European Union and members of the most powerful and robust Alliance.***

***English version by***  
 ***Diana Cristiana LUPU***



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<sup>1</sup> According to the *Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure in Romania and the Ministry of Transport, Information Technologies and Communications in the Republic of Bulgaria*, 26 February 2010, Sofia, Bulgaria.

# CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS HAVING AN IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY

*Captain Robert-Ionuț STANCIU*

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*In terms of security, several major trends will define the strategic landscape around European Union values. Russia promotes an aggressive reaffirmation strategy at all levels. The Islamic State planted terror in the Middle East, with effects all around the world. Migration as well as debt crisis sparked controversy in the European Union. The issues of energy resources and climate change are again on the political security agenda. All these aspects are only some of the new challenges to the European Union security. The new EU global strategy should adapt to the new security environment, to its unpredictable evolution, and should address the new threats boldly. In order for Europe to progress in peace, stability and prosperity, these new challenges should be addressed collectively.*

**Keywords:** *instability; collective defence; Crimea; geopolitical crisis*

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**H**aving in mind the events that have taken place since the first *European Union Security Strategy* was issued, in 2003, we can say that its approach was a visionary one, when among the priorities were introduced threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, fragile states or organised crime. When the *Strategy* was reviewed in 2008, the range of threats was completed by adding cyber security, energy security and climate change. Meanwhile, the situation in the international security environment has evolved. The 2008 economic crisis, the political instability and conflicts in the Middle East, the change in the power poles and the shock of the Russian military action, the conflict in Ukraine, have all contributed to the destabilisation of the European security environment. All of them are characterised by some common elements: geopolitics has become active again, the prospect of a large-scale violence can no longer be neglected, and the border revisionism<sup>1</sup> manifests itself again. Regarding

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<sup>1</sup> Attitude or action aimed at reviewing and amending a law, a treaty, a concept, a border. See <https://dexonline.ro/definitie/revizionism>, retrieved on 25.11.2015.

revisionist attitudes, Nicolae Titulescu says: *“Border revisionism is not a solution; it consists in transporting evil from one side to another. The true solution is to progressively spiritualise borders by lowering customs barriers and facilitating people transit”*<sup>2</sup>.

This new strategic situation can be seen on account of an internal crisis in Europe, especially at the political class level, which has shown signs of inconsistency on developing a strategic concept linked to the development of Europe as a whole. The problem is that the crisis lasts too long and there are no signs that European policy could adapt to the new situation.

### **Ukraine – the Lack of Consistent Political Factors, Source of Instability**

The European Union security architecture and the European security environment have been severely endangered by the unfolding crisis in Ukraine. It can be considered a symptom of previous disagreements between the European Union and the Russian Federation. As a result of its effects, we can talk about a geopolitical crisis in the true sense of the word. The destabilisation of a state, a set of evolving threats and risks, the need for capital decisions at international level to stop the course and consequences of events are all factors delineating a geopolitical crisis. Ukraine fits perfectly into this description. As a direct consequence of the geopolitical crisis, the relations between the great actors, the EU and the Russian Federation, have been disturbed with negative effects for both sides. During the events, the internal discussions within the EU institutions on the subject of Ukraine conflict were characterised by considerable pressure. All these aspects have had direct implications for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Following intense debate, Member States agreed to introduce sanctions aimed at particular sectors of the Russian economy as well as the defence industry. A small number of people directly or indirectly involved in the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula or in supporting the separatists in eastern Ukraine were also affected by sanctions. The negotiation of sanctions was not an easy process. It was characterised by a serious disagreement between the Member States, marked visibly by the proactive positions of certain states, on the one hand, and the reluctance of others, on the other hand, given the Russian influence or own interests. The most expressive example in this regard is Germany, which is considered one of Russia’s traditional strategic partners as well as the *“engine”* of the European Union. Therefore, it faces an antithetical

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<sup>2</sup> Nicolae Titulescu, *Discursuri*, Editura Științifică, București, 1967.

situation in which it has to maintain a good relationship with Russia while protecting the interests of the EU. Chancellor Angela Merkel has often declared that Russia's actions in Ukraine challenge the EU fundamental values – order and territorial integrity. For Western European states, the crisis in Ukraine was a turning point in the US–EU relations, the former forcing the application of more and more sanctions, and the latter making concessions considering own interests. Countries like Italy and Spain promoted the same idea at that time, in favour of imposing sanctions, but they were mostly limited to those for individuals and less for economic sectors. A new example of the lack of consistency was the decision of Austria (in less than 24 hours after the EU and the US imposed new sanctions on Russia) to sign a memorandum on the construction of the *South Stream* gas pipeline. In addition, the decision was taken after the European Parliament adopted a resolution, recommending the Member States to disagree on the implementation of the *South Stream* project, because it increases the EU's dependence on Russian gas. The conclusion is that in the state's decision process, economic preferences prevail. That is why we can affirm that some developments of the Ukraine crisis were predictable. Continuing the line of energy resources, it was foreseeable that the Russian Federation would use this leverage to influence EU Member States to limit penalties. Thus, Russia has repeatedly stopped the supply of gas through Ukraine pipelines, affecting the energy security of several European countries.

At political level, there are very few signs of reconciliation. The general rhetoric of both sides, the West and the Russian Federation, is a reminder of the declarative confrontations during the *Cold War*. All these aspects lead to a serious security crisis, with direct implications on the frozen conflicts in Eurasia and Eastern Europe and, implicitly, on the security of the European Union itself. It is a result of the permanent crisis in the relations between the West and the Russian Federation, with serious consequences for the European security architecture. NATO has reaffirmed its interest not to leave Europe alone in the face of such threats by strengthening its position on Europe's eastern border. The annexation of Crimea sets a very dangerous precedent for the future security environment in Europe and post-Soviet space in particular. The conflict in Ukraine has also indicated weaknesses in international law, agreements and treaties. It is obvious that the West and Russia have very different perceptions and, therefore, the security environment is becoming less predictable and transparent. To overcome the current disputes, a real, firm and coherent political commitment is necessary from EU Member States leaders.



## **The Islamic State and the Recurrent Security Problems**

The Middle East is another area of concern, which poses both traditional and contemporary threats. The failure of the *Arab Spring* has given rise to various forms of extremism, violence and state failure. From a geopolitical perspective, an important aspect is the emergence of a new actor in the international politics, an actor that neither recognises nor fits into the existing international relations. Salafi extremism has two competing factions now: Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS). IS is more powerful and more versatile than AQ and presents a new type of threat. IS brings a new dimension of instability in Europe's southern neighbourhood and presents new challenges and dangers for the European Union. One particular interest comes from the fact that its approach, cruel and brutal, represents a great attraction for young Muslims worldwide. The competition between AQ and IS can mean the renewal of terrorist threats to Europe. Moreover, according to the data available in 2014, almost four thousand people from European countries had travelled to Syria in the previous two years, to join extremist groups. This aspect raised questions among Western governments, and the fear that the organisation could use these people to attack targets in European countries. As we could see after the attack in Paris, when at least one of the suicide bombers was a Syrian refugee registered in Greece<sup>3</sup>, the fear was not unfounded. The vast majority of fighters are recruited in the Western European poor neighbourhoods or in prisons, using active and well organised networks. The economic crisis in Europe, the social exclusion problems, the religious tensions and political frustrations have provided fertile ground for recruiting such people. Their role in IS remains a controversial subject. In this regard, there are divergent views on the foreign contingents size or the extent of their involvement in the global campaign of the extremist group. As a result of its geographical proximity, the European Union is more vulnerable to the threat of IS. This is one of the main reasons why some European states have joined the US-led coalition.

To address these specific threats to Europe, EU leaders should focus their efforts on several key areas: cooperation on combating terrorism, disruption in the IS financial flows, humanitarian assistance, political dialogue and political reforms in the long term. IS presents huge challenges that require innovative responses, including in terms of public diplomacy. In addition, the international community has been relatively slow in assessing the threats posed by IS and even slower in developing a strategy to counter them.

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<sup>3</sup> See <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3318379/Hunt-Isis-killers-Syrian-passport-body-suicide-bomber-Stade-France.html>, retrieved on 06.11.2015.

As far as non-military actions are concerned, the international community has already taken steps in financially weakening the Islamic State. In late January 2015, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution submitted by Russia, which prohibits certain commercial relations with IS, establishing sanctions for countries that buy oil from this organisation and a ban on payments requested as ransom. The problem is that IS exploits opportunities belonging to the black market trade, a market that is not under the control of the United Nations or other international bodies.

In order to effectively counter IS at military level, it is required international unity, particularly of those countries situated in the immediate vicinity. The powerful and influential countries in the region, Russia and Iran, cannot be excluded from such a plan. Considering the polarisation of the forces involved, according to their own strategic interests, it is unlikely that the intervention can gain consistency. The absence of credible political agreements on Iraq and Syria increases the power of the Islamic State and helps it to consolidate. The most credible threat to the extremist group came from the Kurds attempts to break the logistics ties, measures that affected the interests of Turkey. It should be also emphasised here the failure of regional actors to act coherently. To a large extent, it is because many regional conflicts. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, experienced segregation between its members after the military coup in Egypt, when the United Arab Emirates supported the movement to the dismay of Turkey and Qatar.

The spread of IS in the Middle East has already had a significant impact on Europe. The conflicts have forced record numbers of people to flee from Syria and Iraq, assuming the risks of a dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean. The violence shown by the group has resulted in flows of refugees and in the need to ensure humanitarian assistance, having a significant political and economic impact especially on the countries through which migrants penetrate Europe. All these security threats put pressure on one of the most valuable multilateral projects of the EU, the Schengen Agreement, which eliminates any form of border control. In addition, the IS presence in Libya has generated a new threat: piracy in the Mediterranean Sea, similar to that in Somalia.

However, taking measures to stabilise the EU's southern neighbourhood, an area where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is active for a long time, is not the sole responsibility of the European Union. The biggest issue in the European policy to counter terrorism for the coming years appears to be the continuing inability of Europe to create a common voice, able to effectively and consistently approach global problems. In recent years we have seen a decentralisation of powers from Brussels back to the Member States. The lack of a coordinated EU response

to the conflict in Syria has shown once again that the Member States influence on Brussels is decisive in foreign policy and decision-making. All these aspects will have strategic consequences in the fight against terrorism, with considerable influence upon the Schengen area. Given the free movement in Europe, this divided approach will not be of benefit to a cohesive European policy.

### **Migration**

Apart from the threats described in the previous paragraph, there is another adjacent phenomenon, which is the exodus of population from conflict areas. Europe is directly affected by this phenomenon, in that the economies and the social systems from EU countries have suffered. In addition, it should be recalled that due to the economic crisis, after 2009 the European Union has produced a migration phenomenon intra-EU, citizens from Eastern Europe seeking jobs in countries in northern or Western Europe. In connection with the current phenomenon, a clear distinction must be made, at least in theory, between economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, because these groups are entitled to different levels of support and protection in accordance with international law. Immigrants and refugees from Africa, Middle East or South Asia represent one of the biggest challenges to the leaders and decision-makers in Europe, after the annexation of Crimea and the Greek debt crisis. The International Organisation for Migration estimated that more than 464,000 migrants went to Europe by sea in the first nine months of 2015. The EU Member States that were mostly affected by the economic crisis, such as Greece and Italy, served as the main entry points for migrants and refugees, because of their proximity to the Mediterranean Sea. Under the Dublin Agreement, the state used as an entry point for immigrants bears unilateral responsibility. Revised in 2013, the Agreement stipulates that asylum seekers must remain in the first European country they enter and that this country is responsible for examining the applications for asylum<sup>4</sup>. Under the system stipulated in the Agreement, the burden falls disproportionately only on some countries and policymakers have agreed that the Dublin Agreement reformation is an important step in establishing a common European policy on asylum. As with the sovereign debt crisis, national interests have prevented the development of a common European response to this influx of people. The increasingly polarised political climate, in which more nationalist political parties have gained popularity, could constitute

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<sup>4</sup> On 23 June 2015, because of the overloaded systems for processing asylum applications, Hungary suspended the application of the Dublin Agreement. For the same reason, Germany decided to suspend the Agreement regarding the Syrian refugees, on 24 August 2015, followed by the Czech Republic, on 2 September 2015.

a partial cause. France and Denmark have brought security issues as a justification for their refusal to accept immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, in particular as a result of the recent terrorist incidents in Paris and Copenhagen in 2015. Other countries, such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, have highlighted the difficulty of the Muslim population integration in each country, expressing their intention to receive only migrants of Christian religion. However, selecting migrants based on religion is a clear violation of EU laws on discrimination. Moreover, some EU member states have reintroduced controls at their vulnerable borders: France in 2011<sup>5</sup>, Denmark in 2011<sup>6</sup>, and Germany in 2015<sup>7</sup>. Nevertheless, Germany and Sweden remain the states with the most generous asylum policies in the EU. Germany has announced, through the voice of its officials, that it is prepared to approve 500,000 asylum applications in the coming years<sup>8</sup>. A relevant explanation for the policy pursued by Germany and Sweden would be that, in economic terms, in the following years these countries could benefit from this new population, able-bodied, while Europe is faced with declining birth rate and aging population<sup>9</sup>.

The European Union is still discussing to find a way to adjust or manage this crisis. Finding an answer to this challenge has divided EU Member States. A ten-step migration plan includes the ability to capture and destroy the vessels used by traffickers. However, it focuses on smuggling operations and it has almost no effect on triggers: poverty and conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. A similar proposal came in May 2015, when the EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, requested the UN Security Council to authorise the use of military force against smugglers and ships from the coast of Libya. Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, announced that it would veto any proposal of this kind. Consequently, some experts say that Europe should focus and act more on the source of the problem than on its effects. Thus, Europe should address the root causes of migration at source: negotiations to end the civil war in Syria, stability in Libya, increased aid to sub-Saharan Africa and assistance given to countries in the immediate vicinity of conflict (Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan etc.).

On 14 September 2015, European leaders met in Brussels to discuss the crisis. Germany, as the main final destination of immigrants, led the talks.

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<sup>5</sup> See <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13189682>, retrieved on 10.11.2015.

<sup>6</sup> See <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/denmark/8507772/Denmark-announces-decision-to-reintroduce-border-controls-ahead-of-Schengen-meeting.html>, retrieved on 10.11.2015.

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/13/germany-to-close-borders-exit-schengen-emergency-measures>, retrieved on 10.11.2015.

<sup>8</sup> See <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34185353>, retrieved on 10.11.2015.

<sup>9</sup> See [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/publications/european\\_economy/2014/pdf/ee8\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2014/pdf/ee8_en.pdf), retrieved on 10.11.2015.

The meeting was a final attempt to reach a consensus on the solution to this problem. EU leaders agreed to relocate 160,000 immigrants from Greece and Italy to other twenty-three Member States. This plan was approved, although several European countries expressed their disagreement (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia). Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom are exempt from the EU asylum policies in compliance with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty<sup>10</sup>.

Europe acts in a defensive manner, because this sensitive issue has implications for the security of member states and of Europe in general. A number of issues arise, such as social inclusion, crime phenomena or preservation of national cultural values. The delay in finding a unitary and coherent political solution to this regional crisis will cause Europe to continue to face massive waves of immigrants. Only in Syria, four million people have left the country and other seven million have been relocated. So far, only a small part of this vast mass of people has crossed the sea to Europe. The lack of a coordinated response of the EU will continue to nourish feelings of preserving national interests to the detriment of the Community. The reverse is also true, and it will give rise to many uncomfortable questions upon the enthusiasm of a united Europe. The closed borders and the barbed wire could be transformed from an exception into a rule policy, and this is contrary to EU values and ideals, upon which the European Union has been developed.

### **Debts Crisis**

The Maastricht Treaty formally established the European Union and led to the creation of the euro currency in January 2002. Nineteen of the twenty-eight EU Member States are part of the euro zone, while Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland have derogation from adopting the euro, since they do not meet the set conditions. Denmark and the UK are exempt from this provision. According to the Maastricht Treaty, they must comply with certain tax rules, including inflation below 1.5%, budget deficits below 3% of GDP, and a debt to GDP ratio below 60%. To meet these criteria, several countries have had to adopt strict budgetary reforms. In practice, these standards have not been applied consistently, paving the way for future problems. The wish of the EU officials to develop a competitive euro zone has caused some warning signs to be ignored. Initially, the states with peripheral economies have experienced growth, being propelled by the unprecedented access to credit. Following the global financial meltdown of 2007-2008 and the lack of liquidity, disclosure showed unsustainable budget deficits and high public debt. By 2010, the sovereign debt crisis spread. In 2011,

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<sup>10</sup> See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6901353.stm>, retrieved on 11.11.2015.

the EU and the IMF had to intervene to save Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The accents were felt most pronounced in Greece, which erroneously<sup>11</sup> reported the real situation, to hide the scale of its debt. In 2009, its budget deficit exceeded 15% of GDP, more than twice the official figures. A Greek bankruptcy could have caused the exit of the euro zone having a domino effect on the whole Europe. Thus, in May 2010, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund gave Greece a rescue loan of 163 billion dollars. In October 2011, it approved a second bailout<sup>12</sup> worth about 178 billion dollars. In return, the country pledged to implement stringent spending cuts and tax hikes. The flow of those processes was caused by internal political crises. In 2012, Prime Minister George Papandreou stepped down<sup>13</sup> in favour of a technocrat government. Ireland and Portugal were in similar situations, but, unlike Greece, Ireland problems were caused by a banking crisis that resulted from the collapse of the housing market in 2008. As banks in Ireland had heavy losses in the property market, the government intervened to support the financial system. At the level of November 2010, the country was forced to seek a bailout package of 112 billion dollars from the EU and the IMF in return for the implementation of austerity measures. As a result, the Irish economy experienced one of the worst recessions in the euro area with an unemployment rate of nearly 13% in 2010. In Portugal, the budget deficit financed by foreign sources reached about 10% of GDP and, when the foreign investors decided to withdraw, the country was not able to finance itself. The conservative government of Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho, elected in June 2011, decided to immediately implement austerity measures in exchange for a bailout of 116 billion dollars<sup>14</sup> from the EU and the IMF. At the end of 2011, the debt crisis centre moved to larger countries in Europe, including the third largest economy in the euro zone – Italy. Given the debt of over 2.6 billion dollars, a rescue plan was not an option. A succession of political events led to the appointment as Prime Minister of Matteo Renzi, who became the youngest prime minister of Italy. He implemented a series of structural reforms<sup>15</sup>, pulling Italy out of recession. In Spain, like Ireland, a collapse in the property market

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<sup>11</sup> See <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/nov/15/greek-deficit-bigger-than-thought>, retrieved on 11.11.2015.

<sup>12</sup> See <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-01/greek-referendum-decision-blindsided-european-partners-merkel-allies-say>, retrieved on 11.11.2015.

<sup>13</sup> See [http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\\_now/2011/11/papademos-named-greeces-transitional-leader.html](http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2011/11/papademos-named-greeces-transitional-leader.html), retrieved on 11.11.2015.

<sup>14</sup> See <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703937104576302883922114642>, retrieved on 12.11.2015.

<sup>15</sup> See <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21640383-prime-minister-presents-his-reform-agenda-after-winning-crucial-vote-renzis-struggle>, retrieved on 12.11.2015.



occurred, leaving the banking sector very exposed. In 2012, the government was forced to seek a bailout loan of 123 million dollars to recapitalise banks. In France, the election of Socialist President François Hollande in May 2012 led to the formation of a government less willing to undertake structural reforms, although France was also affected by recession, in that the unemployment rate was almost 11%. As we have seen, since 2010, the EU and the IMF have provided bailouts for economies in crisis. But the conditions imposed by powerful economies, especially Germany, that the loans are subject to strict austerity measures, have contributed to deepening negative sentiments among the affected populations of the European Union, leading to popular unrest and overthrow of governments. By 2014, distressed countries, except Greece and Cyprus, had completed their rescue programmes. In December 2013, Ireland became the first country to announce the successful completion of the economic recovery programme. Spain followed, in January 2014, and Portugal in May 2014. Growth continued in 2015, Ireland being, for the second consecutive year, the economy with the highest growth in the euro zone<sup>16</sup>. The economies of Spain and Portugal<sup>17</sup> have recorded positive growth since 2013. But there are still deep structural problems, including high unemployment, weak banking systems, high external debt and rigid labour markets. Spain, for example, began reforming its labour market, increasing the number of jobs in 2014. However, the unemployment rate is over 23%, and in particular the unemployment rate among young population exceeds 50%. France and Italy continue to struggle to implement their structural reforms. Neither of these two economies succeeded in meeting the budgetary deficit objectives set by the EU for 2015, highlighting again the differences between the requirements of Brussels and the political realities in the Member States. In Greece, in early 2015, elections brought to power the Syriza Party, a socialist party that did not want to accept austerity measures. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras requested the EU to renegotiate the bailout terms, putting Greece in a conflict with the policymakers in Brussels, Frankfurt and Berlin, and leading Europe towards a new political crisis. Although some of the peripheral economies have emerged from recession, the debate with regard to Greece leaving the euro zone, combined with economic stagnation, hesitant reforms and rising nationalist current, questions the viability of the monetary union and the political unity of the European Union.

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<sup>16</sup> See <http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-to-be-fastest-growing-euro-area-economy-in-2015-1.2062814>, retrieved on 12.11.2015.

<sup>17</sup> See <http://www.wsj.com/articles/portugal-to-repay-imf-bailout-loans-early-1421840065>, retrieved on 12.11.2015.



## Climate Change

The ecosystem has undergone major changes at both regional and global level. There is strong evidence that most of the changes observed over the past sixty years are attributable to human activities. The causes are complex and have consequences at the local (local pollution, depletion of local natural resources), regional (disproportionate use of land, water pollution, air pollution) and global (climate change, resource depletion globally) levels. The uncontrolled consumption of resources leads to exhaustion and, inevitably, to a deficit that, ultimately, causes increased competition, giving rise to conflicts. Researchers identified a link between climate change and the possibility that conflicts arise in the early eighties. In the nineties, climate change evolved as a non-traditional security concern, including for NATO, as the “*security and stability include political, economic, social and environmental dimensions*”<sup>18</sup>. In recent years, climate change has been identified as a major threat to the international security and stability. Rapid environmental changes cause a series of implications not only for ecosystems. Politically speaking, they put pressure on bilateral relations and global governance or on the available legal frameworks. The United Nations Security Council addressed, for the first time, climate change and energy security issues at its meeting in April 2007. Since then, there have been a number of ongoing multilateral negotiations with the aim of reforming the systems having a negative climate impact. Although the EU has actively sought to lead these negotiations, using own example and demonstrating that emission reductions are possible, the global context has proved to be very difficult. The Union’s approach has also been intended to determine other parties to develop low carbon technologies. At the UN conference on climate change, held at Copenhagen, this strategy did not lead to any concrete result from a legal point of view. Referring to the principle of common, but differentiated responsibilities, the developing countries (including emerging countries) refused to assume the obligation of carbon emissions reductions. Moreover, the main industrialised countries outside Europe, particularly the United States, were not willing to comply with the international legal norms<sup>19</sup>. After 2011, following the positive results at the summit in Durban (South Africa)<sup>20</sup>, the talks were revived. The objective of the Paris summit in December this year was to adopt an agreement that was legally binding. Voluntary commitments have been implemented by many global players. Europe has planned the construction of the most developed

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<sup>18</sup> “*The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept*”, approved at the North-Atlantic Council, Rome, 7-8 November 1991, see [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_23847.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm), retrieved on 13.11.2015.

<sup>19</sup> See <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/107.pdf>, retrieved on 14.11.2015.

<sup>20</sup> See [http://www.cdclimat.com/IMG/pdf/11-12\\_climate\\_brief\\_10\\_-\\_durban\\_one\\_small\\_promising\\_step\\_for\\_climate.pdf](http://www.cdclimat.com/IMG/pdf/11-12_climate_brief_10_-_durban_one_small_promising_step_for_climate.pdf), retrieved on 14.11.2015.

and competitive economy based on alternative energy sources in the world. The European Union plays a leading role in mediating international discussions on the security implications of climate change. The 2003 European Security Strategy recognised and addressed the links between climate change and competition for natural resources. Later, in 2007, the High Representative and the European Commission stressed in a joint report “*Climate Change and International Security*”<sup>21</sup> that climate change is not just a threat in itself but a factor that can multiply existing threats, exacerbating trends, tensions and sources of instability, and that addressing these threats is a part of the EU preventive security policy. Certainly, this issue will be addressed in the new global security strategy in 2016. Climate change can be seen as the augmentative factor of threats, with the potential to multiply the already existing security threats. It may increase competition for natural resources, territorial claims or losses, militarization of strategic natural resources, mistrust among nations in the area of regional and international cooperation or increasing pressure on global governance. Even if, by far, the EU has influenced the global agenda on climate policy, EU activities have not contributed to finding a sustainable solution to climate change through a legally binding decision. To achieve this, the EU must adapt its diplomacy in a way more appropriate to the context. This may involve an enhanced coordination between European institutions and among member countries. This observation highlights a lack of EU strategy in this field, a subject that can be addressed in the design of the new security strategy.

### **Energy Security**

Energy security is still at the forefront of European and international policy. The political challenges the EU has met in recent years have shown that the diversification of energy sources, suppliers and routes is important for ensuring safe and sustainable energy supply. More than half of EU energy supply comes from countries that are not members of the Union. Much of this energy comes from Russia, whose disputes with transit countries have threatened to disrupt supplies in recent years. The concerns about the security of supply from Russia were further boosted by the conflict in Ukraine. As it can be seen, energy policy has been often used as an instrument of foreign policy, especially by energy-producing countries and transit countries. Germany is Gazprom’s largest customer, buying about a third of the necessary natural gas from Russia. Six EU Member States are 100% dependent on the gas supplied by Gazprom, and the European Union as a whole is the world’s largest importer of energy. The Russian state control over the production and supply

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<sup>21</sup> See [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf), retrieved on 14.11.2015.

of hydrocarbons to Europe is clearly a problem. In addition to its internal control over energy resources, Russia has also strong control over the resources transport network. Nabucco pipeline project, meant to bring Central Asian gas to the EU by avoiding Russian territory and financial control, has become less commercially viable after Gazprom initiated a parallel project, in cooperation with some Member States. This Russian divide and rule strategy is a major problem for the EU energy policies in terms of ensuring a constant supply. These dependencies and vulnerabilities are dangerous for Europe's security and its freedom to decide on its own account. A recent experience that supports these allegations is the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Thus, the climate change impact will increasingly intersect with the need for resources, causing unprecedented challenges in some of the most vulnerable and volatile regions of the world, exacerbating the risk of conflict in ways that are difficult to predict, especially where there are social or political interests that overlap with the existence of valuable resources.

This is a reality that must be taken into account in shaping a new EU energy strategy. Over time, Europe has tried to implement a series of measures, in order to prevent an energy crisis. Thus, in response to the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, from January 2009, the legislative framework on the security of supply was revised and, in September 2009, the EU Council adopted Directive 2009/119/EC, requiring EU Member States to maintain minimum stocks of oil and/or petroleum products. In November 2010, the European Commission adopted the initiative "*Energy 2020. A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy*". By it, the EU aims to reduce by 2020 the emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 20%, increase the share of renewable energy to at least 20% of consumption and achieve savings in energy consumption by at least 20%. Also, all EU members must use in the transport sector a 10% share of energy from renewable sources. In response to continuing concerns about dependence on energy imports, in May 2014, the European Commission issued the energy security strategy, which aimed to ensure a stable energy supply. The strategy addresses short-term measures that refer to reducing the dependence on Russia, and also long-term measures that refer to increasing security of supply through a series of actions proposed in the following areas: increase energy production in the EU, diversify suppliers and routes and establish a coherent external energy policy voice for the Union.

An ambitious measure to counter the EU energy dependence, launched in 2015, is represented by the Energy Union Project. This is a European Commission project intended to coordinate the transformation of energy supply throughout the European Union. The project was launched in February, with the goal of providing reliable, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy sources. This measure aims to promote environmental sustainability, economic competitiveness, but at the same time,

to limit external vulnerability and to escape from Russia's gas supplies domination on Europe. It would, however, have domestic effects: the centralisation and consolidation of power to Brussels at the expense of national regulations, a strong increase in investment in energy infrastructure, as well as the integration of supply systems at both regional and EU level.

The completion of the internal energy market, the energy-saving methods, the increase in domestic production, the diversification of sources and routes are ways to reduce the EU energy dependence.

### **Conclusions**

The European Union has every reason to feel threatened. Most of the world's hot spots are around Europe: Russia, Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa. All threats to the EU security are consequences of the events in these areas. All but one: the European Union itself. The different level of involvement of EU Member States highlights, once again, the shortcomings of the EU diplomatic mechanism, which continues to pursue a case by case approach, despite ambitious foreign policy. The traditional refusal of EU Member States to coordinate their efforts in the foreign policy and their preference for the bilateral relations instead of a common foreign policy continue to translate into the inability of the EU to align relevant actions in the field, in accordance with its policies. The institutional rivalries and the differing government's priorities, particularly those in France, Germany and Great Britain, have an impact on the efforts to find coherent foreign policy tools. Analysing the strategic decisions and the partnerships concluded by the EU Member States bilaterally, we can say that external threats have not been a bridge between the European Union members, able to unite them around common EU values. Also, from a national perspective, it is still extremely difficult for EU Member States to give up their sovereignty over their own defence and security. National traditions on security and defence, practices or historical legacies, different constitutional frameworks or the influence of Parliaments have been setbacks in developing a common European security document. Once eliminated the possibility of an internal conflict, it seems that the wish to address external threats collectively is at minimum rates.

Even though it is highly active in many areas, the European Union is not always so effective, giving the impression, more often than not, that it is still searching for a strategy. To outline all the changes required by the new security environment and the threats that knock at Europe's gate, the new security strategy envisaged for the summer of 2016 should be developed as a comprehensive, topical document, providing a well determined guideline, in compliance with the evolving world order.

# MODERN METHODS FOR TREATING THE DISORDERS IN MILITARY AERONAUTICAL PERSONNEL - DELAYED SURGERY IN RHINOSINUSITIS MANAGEMENT -

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*Rhinosinusitis is a common cause of military aeronautical personnel temporary inability to work properly. The effective management of this condition would lead, according to the authors, not only to diminishing the cost associated with medication but also to increasing the military physical ability to conduct specific missions. The authors consider that antibiotics are excessively used to treat rhinosinusitis, as well as that both the ENT specialist and the general practitioner tend to prescribe antibiotics for long periods of time, which determines the partial and temporary remission of symptoms. Another aspect that should be also considered is that the antibiotic cannot cure all forms of sinusitis, the surgical treatment being a safe and effective management method in such cases.*

**Keywords:** *rhinosinusitis management; imagistic examination; endoscopic surgery; computed tomography*

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## Introduction

Rhinosinusitis is considered a public health issue and its management represents a financial burden for many health systems. This is the reason why the medical community tries to create guidelines for the management of rhinosinusitis in order to reduce the costs (medical and surgical costs, the costs for sick days, decreased productivity at work) and to improve the efficiency of the treatment. The aim is to obtain the best possible results in the shortest period of time with minimum cost for every patient.

As for the military personnel, the effective management of rhinosinusitis can result in benefits

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for the operational capacity of the armed forces services, especially in the case of the air force, the forces in the theatres of operations etc., where there are special requirements related to the personnel health.

Rhinosinusitis can be acute (up to 4 weeks), subacute (between 4 and 12 weeks) or chronic (more than 12 weeks). Regarding its aetiology, rhinosinusitis can be infectious (viral, bacterial or fungal) or non-infectious (allergic). Chronic rhinosinusitis has two subtypes with and without polyps.

The most common bacteria involved in bacterial rhinosinusitis are *Haemophilus influenzae*, *Streptococcus pneumoniae* and *Moraxella catarrhalis*. It has been shown that maxillary sinusitis of dental origin is mostly determined by anaerobes, and sinusitis in immunocompromised patients is frequently determined by fungi and *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*.

The medical treatment of rhinosinusitis consists of antibiotic (chosen according to the sensibility of the most common bacteria involved), non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs and specific upper airway anti-inflammatory drugs, antihistamine, decongestant (systemic or topic), mucolytic, topic corticosteroids (especially in chronic rhinosinusitis) used after nasal irrigation with saline solution.

The surgical treatment of choice is functional endoscopic sinus surgery that provides appropriate drainage and ventilation of the nasal cavities and paranasal sinuses. Whenever necessary, surgery resolves the complications of rhinosinusitis either acute or chronic.

## **Material and Method**

This paper is an update of the literature concerning the management of rhinosinusitis (medical treatment with antibiotic, anti-inflammatory, antihistamine, nasal decongestant, mucolytic, topic corticosteroids and surgical procedures). We have also reviewed the relevant clinical cases from our department and presented some meaningful aspects.

We have focused on patients with acute or chronic rhinosinusitis who underwent surgical procedures despite prolonged medical treatment. After hospital admission for each patient a history was noted (onset and evolution of symptoms, medication used, comorbidities), a clinical and endoscopic examination was performed, a computed tomography scan of the sinuses was performed, medical treatment was initiated and surgery was planned. The surgical procedures addressed the rhinosinusitis and its acute or chronic complication (orbital cellulitis, orbital abscess, cavernous sinus thrombosis, epidural abscess, brain abscess, mucocele).




## Discussions

As mentioned before the management of rhinosinusitis consists of medical and surgical treatment. It is important to keep in mind both types of treatment in order to achieve complete healing of the disease.

According to the EPOS guide from 2012 most cases of acute rhinosinusitis heal only with symptomatic treatment, antibiotic therapy is not needed. Nevertheless, selected cases of acute rhinosinusitis impose antibiotic treatment and further ENT examination at the end of therapy. A small number of these cases develop complication requiring hospital admission and rapid surgical (orbital cellulitis, orbital abscess, epidural abscess, brain abscess) or medical (meningitis) treatment.

Chronic rhinosinusitis is a disease with important implications for the patients quality of life and great costs for the health system. In the military, it can be translated into the decrease in the personnel operational capacity and, implicitly, into the impossibility to accomplish certain specific missions.


Acute episodes due to the allergic background of the patient (asthma, allergic rhinitis, aspirin sensitivities) are frequently encountered. Chronic rhinosinusitis with polyps (*figures 1-3*) demands surgical approach and sometimes re-interventions are needed thus the costs of treatment for such a patient is higher.



*Figure 1: Chronic rhinosinusitis with polyps – coronal CT aspect*



*Figure 2: Chronic rhinosinusitis with polyps – preoperative aspect (endoscopic examination)*



*Figure 3: Chronic rhinosinusitis with polyps – aspect at the end of surgery*



The main problems when treating rhinosinusitis are:

**a) Inadequate diagnosis and starting point of the treatment with antibiotic**

Correct diagnosis is established after ENT examination and nasal endoscopy (rigid or flexible). Cotton swabs from nasal or sinus secretions should be taken for bacteriological analysis and antibiogram. Detailed history of the current episode (symptoms – onset, evolution with/without treatment, medication used), the chronic disease, other comorbidities, professional exposure to toxic substances is demanded.

**b) The role of imagistic examination in the diagnosis of rhinosinusitis** (computed tomography versus plain radiography)

Nowadays the imagistic examination of choice for rhinosinusitis is computed tomography. If brain or ocular complications are suspected a MRI is also recommended.


**c) Improper antibiotic usage** (for a shorter/longer time than recommended, usage of antibiotic without respecting the guidelines)

Guidelines recommend as first line of treatment amoxicillin/clavulanate, second generation cephalosporins or quinolones (moxifloxacin, levofloxacin). For patients with betalactamine allergies macrolides (clarithromycin, azitromycin) can be used. The duration of treatment is controversial, but most recommend 7-10 days. Antibiotics should be used in patients with severe acute rhinosinusitis, high fever and unilateral facial pain. Long term (12 weeks) low dose macrolides treatment is recommended in some patients with chronic rhinosinusitis without polyps.

**d) Failure in choosing the right time for the surgery** (delayed surgery due to prolonged antibiotic treatment with partial and temporary remission of the symptoms)

The pharmaceutical market is very generous regarding antibiotic drugs – the ENT specialist is tempted with many antibiotics that can resolve a bacterial rhinosinusitis and he/she expects the drug to cure every form of rhinosinusitis and every complication. It is very important to realise when the medical treatment is not efficient and it is time for surgical drainage. Sometimes prolonged antibiotic therapy delays the surgery and we miss the opportunity to resolve the case with limited surgical gesture, ocular or cerebral complications appear, and we are forced to perform extended surgical manoeuvres (*figures 4-6*).

If the symptoms do not improve after 7-10 days of correct antibiotic therapy or the patient feels worse, a sinus CT is recommended and surgical drainage of the diseased sinus is performed (endoscopic sinus surgery). The surgical treatment is complemented with medical treatment (antibiotic, anti-inflammatory, antihistamine, nasal decongestant, mucolytic). Endoscopic sinus surgery is the treatment of choice for rhinosinusitis that does not respond to correct medical treatment.



**Figure 4: Complicated maxillary-ethmoidal-frontal rhinosinusitis – axial and coronal CT aspects**



**Figure 5: Complicated maxillary-ethmoidal-frontal rhinosinusitis – preoperative aspect**



**Figure 6: Complicated maxillary-ethmoidal-frontal rhinosinusitis – intraoperative aspect**

Surgery ensures good drainage and ventilation for the diseased sinus/sinuses and should be performed at the right time. Air is the natural stimulus of the respiratory mucosa and appropriate ventilation creates the premises of healing. If needed, biopsy sampling can be obtained. The risk of surgery is greater when the patient has complicated rhinosinusitis because the extent of the surgical gesture (more invasive surgery), the anatomical structures being modified (inflammation, bleeding).

Surgery is recommended in the following situations (absolute indications for surgery): chronic rhinosinusitis with extensive polyps with/without complications, mucocele/pyocele, extensive fungal sinusitis, secondary sinusitis, orbital abscess, cerebral abscess, frontal/maxillary osteomyelitis, CSF leak. There are some relative indications for surgery: rhinosinusitis without response to correct and complete medical therapy, recurrent episodes of acute rhinosinusitis.

### **e) Unsolved causes or rhinosinusitis contributing factors**

Rhinosinusitis has numerous triggers like uncontrolled allergies (dust, pollen, mites), pulmonary problems (chronic bronchitis, asthma), nasal and/or meatal obstruction. All these contributing factors must be resolved and a multidisciplinary team (ENT specialist, allergist and pulmonologist) should be created in order to obtain the best results.

The ENT specialist should always keep in mind the possibility of secondary rhinosinusitis, also called accompanying rhinosinusitis, which is associated with naso-sinusal tumours or systemic diseases (Wegener granulomatosis, lupus). In these cases biopsy sampling from nasal and/or sinus mucosa is mandatory.

## **Conclusions**

Rhinosinusitis is a frequent cause of temporary incapacity in aeronautical military personnel. The effective management of the mentioned disease would lead not only to lowering the medical treatment-associated cost but also to increasing the physical fitness of the military aeronautical personnel. We consider that antibiotics are overused in the treatment of rhinosinusitis. The general practitioner as well as the ENT specialist tends to prescribe more antibiotics, for longer periods of time, and the temporary remission of the symptoms is sometimes considered cured disease. It is important to know that the burden of healing rhinosinusitis should not be left only on antibiotic treatment and that the surgical treatment provides a safe and efficient way of resolving the disease. Surgery ensures good drainage and ventilation for the diseased sinuses and should be performed at the right time in order to create the premises of healing by allowing air, the natural stimulus of nasal mucosa, to correctly enter the nasal and sinus cavities.

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1916 100 Years Since Romania Entered the First World War 2016

## THE SOUTHERN FRONT IN THE ROMANIAN STRATEGIC PROJECTS (1914-1916)

Colonel (r.) Dr Petre OTU

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*The article analyses the process of strategic planning during Romania's neutrality (1914-1916), focusing on the role and importance of the Southern front, constituted by the Danube River and the land border with Bulgaria in the South of Dobruja.*

*During the two years in which the Romanian state stayed outside the conflict, there was an ample debate on the military intervention opportunity, two ideas taking shape: to go across the Carpathians in order to liberate Transylvania and the other territories inhabited by Romanians, which were under the rule of Austria-Hungary, and to go South of the Danube, against Bulgaria, which entered the war alongside the Central Powers in October 1915.*

**Keywords:** *Transylvania; Dobruja; strategic planning; Army of the Orient; Ion I. C. Brătianu; I. G. Duca; Radu R. Rosetti*

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### **Romania at the Beginning of the "Great War"**

At the outbreak of the First World War (15/28 July 1914), Romania chose to remain outside the conflict, the decision being made in the Crown Council on 21 July/3 August 1914, held at the Peleş Castle in Sinaia<sup>1</sup>.

The communiqué was rather ambiguous, the document stating that "*almost unanimously the Council decided that Romania should take all the necessary measures to guard its frontiers*"<sup>2</sup>. The formula generated different interpretations among politicians, in memoirs and historiography. Some thought that, through the decision, the Romanian state proclaimed neutrality in the conflict. Others spoke about "*watchfulness*" as far as the confrontations between great powers were concerned, to which the particle "*armed*" was added to emphasise the Romanian state will to defend against any aggression. It was also argued that the expression in the document

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<sup>1</sup> Ion Mamina, *Consilii de Coroană*, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1997, pp. 27-52.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 50.

was a concession to King Carol I, who strongly wanted Romania to enter the war alongside the Central Powers, in line with the provisions of the treaty concluded in 1883<sup>3</sup>.

I consider that, at the beginning of August 1914, we cannot speak about the neutrality of the Romanian state as the political leaders of the time, Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu included, did not exclude an intervention in the war even alongside the Triple Alliance. Illustrative of the concern, confusion, and uncertainty regarding the future is the attitude of Nicolae Filipescu, ardent supporter of immediately entering the war alongside the Entente, to liberate the Romanians in the Dual Monarchy. He was in Germany when the war broke out and he witnessed the armed forces mobilisation.

In his well known memoirs, Constantin Argetoianu wrote: *“Nicu Filipescu came from Germany very pessimistic about what he had seen. Under the pretext of meeting different formalities, the former Romanian Minister of War had been led to visit the entire Germany, from Baden-Baden to Berlin and from Berlin to Vienna, to see how the German mobilisation was conducted and to get in touch with the Kaiser armed forces. A few hours after he arrived in Sinaia, Filipescu told me in private: ‘I fear a new ’70; this army cannot be beaten.’”*<sup>4</sup>.

Two military events, one on the Western Front and the other on the Eastern Front, changed the perception of an important part of the Romanian political class. The first was the Battle of the Marne, in September 1914, the miraculous victory of the French armed forces shattering the myth of German invincibility. Then the Russian armed forces exceeded the expectations of the German High Command, mobilising the armed forces very fast and resulting in defeating of the Austrian-Hungarian armed forces in Lemberg (August-September 1914). The German armed forces victories in Tannenberg (26-30 August 1914) and the Masurian Lakes (6-15 September 1914) over the 2<sup>nd</sup> and the 1<sup>st</sup> Russian

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<sup>3</sup> For further details about Romania in the Triple Alliance see also Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *România și Tripla Alianță la începutul secolului al XX-lea, 1900-1914*, Editura Litera, București, 1977; G. Căzan, Ș. Rădulescu-Zoner, *România și Tripla Alianță*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1979; *Documente Diplomatice Române*, series I, volume 11, 1883, Alin Ciupală, Rudolf Dinu, Antal Lukács (editors), foreword by Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Introduction by Rudolf Dinu, Editura Academiei, București, 2006; *Documente Diplomatice Române*, series I, volume 2, 1884-1885, editors: Rudolf Dinu, Alin Ciupală, Antal Lukács, associate editors: Anca-Grațîela Moga, Nicolae Nicolescu, Introduction by Rudolf Dinu, Editura Conphyis, Râmnicu Vâlcea, 2010; Rudolf Dinu, *Diplomația Vechiului Regat 1878-1914. Studii*, Monitorul Oficial, Editură și Tipografie, Presa Universitară Clujeană, București, 2014, pp. 19-108.

<sup>4</sup> Constantin Argetoianu, *Pentru cei de mâine. Amintiri din vremea celor de ieri*, vol. II, part IV, 1913-1916, Editura Humanitas, București, 1991, p. 109.



Armies balanced the situation on the Eastern Front<sup>5</sup>. It was thus evident that the war protracted, the decision on the battlefield being awaited.

Under such circumstances, Romania changed its behaviour, opting for neutrality. Two events are significant for the process of rethinking its policy towards the world war. The first is the signing of the agreement with Italy (10/23 September 1914), which was also out of the conflict, through which the two parties committed to remaining neutral in case there was no eight-day mutual notification. It was also stipulated the permanent contact between the two parties to coordinate actions<sup>6</sup>.

The second important event was the agreement with the Russian Empire, signed on 18 September/1 October 1914, following intense negotiations between the two parties<sup>7</sup>. The agreement was signed by the Russian Foreign Minister, Serghei Sazonov, and the Romanian Minister in Petrograd, Constantin Diamandi. That is why, in historiography, the document is known as "*Sazonov-Diamandi*" Agreement.

According to the declaration written by Sazonov, Russia committed to opposing any attempt to violate the territorial integrity of Romania in the configuration at that time. Moreover, it acknowledged the right of the Romanian state, at the end of the conflagration, to incorporate those territories in the Dual Monarchy that were inhabited by Romanians. As far as Bucovina was concerned, the future border between Russia and Romania was to be drawn in compliance with the principle of the majority population, an inter-ministerial commission being established to that effect. In addition, Petrograd was committed to undertaking diligences to the cabinets in London and Paris to accept the provisions of the agreement.

The secret Romanian-Russian convention marked the transition from the "*armed watchfulness*" to neutrality, the Romanian government intending to remain outside the conflict at least in the short term. Signing the document, Romania decisively opted, in fact, for the Entente, as it would have been very difficult to review its position, considering that Russia agreed on incorporating Transylvania and the other territories that were component parts of the Dual Monarchy.

There is a long debate in Romanian historiography on this agreement and especially on the attitude of Russia that took the initiative to conclude it.

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<sup>5</sup> Général Winogradsky, *La Guerre sur le front oriental. En Russie - En Roumanie*, mis au point et commenté par le général Malleterre, Charles-Lavauzelle, Paris, 1926, pp. 19-88.

<sup>6</sup> Central National Historical Archives Service (further, SANIC), Casa Regală Carol I Collection, file 61/1914, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> See also Alexandru Marghiloman, *Note politice 1897-1924*, vol. I, 1897-1915, Editura Institutului de Arte Grafice "*Eminescu*", București, 1927, pp. 284-285; *Documents diplomatiques secrets russes 1914-1917*, pp. 179-180, 197; SANIC, P.C.M.-S.S.I Collection, file no. 4/1934, p. 60.

We do not intend to resume the discussion in this study aimed at the Romanian strategic planning and the role of Southern Front in the Romanian war effort.

I only mention the statement of I.G. Duca: *Even today I do not understand how [Brătianu – A.N.] could persuade the Russians to sign this secret treaty, as we won everything and they won nothing. My opinion is that we owe this treaty to King Carol. His presence on the Romanian throne made the Russians fear so much that we could go alongside Germany so, on the day Brătianu suggested signing a written agreement that we would remain neutral, they offered us instead everything we asked. It was the last involuntary service brought to the Romanian Kingdom by King Carol*<sup>8</sup>.

### **Political and Strategic Options**

Although it chose to remain outside the conflict, Romania still faced an extremely serious political situation, as going alongside one of the belligerent parties entailed renouncing a part of Romanians. If Romania had accepted to enter the war alongside the Central Powers, it could have regained Bessarabia, an idea often mentioned by Germany and Austria-Hungary, but it would have had to renounce the territories inhabited by the Romanians that were part of the Dual Monarchy. In the best case scenario, Romania could count on a hypothetical improvement in their situation as well as on some territorial adjustments in Bucovina. Vienna and Budapest made some vague promises in this regard.

On the contrary, joining the Entente meant renouncing Bessarabia, which had been part of the Russian Empire since 1812.

Examining the geopolitical position of Romania, Constantin Kirițescu, the author of the best monographs of Romania in the First World War, wrote about the “*tragedy of Romania’s neutrality*”<sup>9</sup>. In fact, the political class and the public had different views on the camp Romania had to join. There were two main currents, namely Entente supporters and German supporters, and the former ones represented the majority<sup>10</sup>. Both parties had impressive arguments. The supporters of both currents sought national unity, but the perspectives, directions, and courses of action

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<sup>8</sup> I.G. Duca, *Memorii*, vol. I, edition completed by Stelian Neagoe, Editura Expres, București, 1992, pp. 82-83.

<sup>9</sup> Constantin Kirițescu, *Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României*, 1916-1919, vol. I, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1989, p. 120.

<sup>10</sup> See also: Ion Bulei, *Arcul așteptării, 1914, 1915, 1916*, Editura Eminescu, București, 1981; Pamfil Șeicaru, *România în marele război*, foreword Ion Gh.I. Brătianu, translated from French by Adrian Iancu, Dan Radu Stănescu, Elis Bușneag, Daniel Nicolescu, Editura Eminescu, București, 1994; Anastasie Iordache, *Parlamentul României în anii reformelor și ai Primului Război Mondial 1907-1918*, Editura Paideea, București, 2001; Lucian Boia, *Germanofilia. Elita intelectuală românească în anii Primului Război Mondial*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2009; Glenn Torrey, *România în Primul Război Mondial*, translated from English by Dan Criste, Meteor Publishing, București, 2014 etc.



were different. Those who were in favour of joining the Central Powers brought into question, primarily, the aspects related to the security of the future political-territorial architecture, emphasising the danger represented by the Russian Empire that could not be satisfied with the existence of a great Romanian state, as it was a barrier in the way its older geopolitical aims to reach the Straits and the Eastern Mediterranean could get materialised.

The promoters of joining the Entente, without denying the Russian danger, considered the empire from the east was not alone, but allied with France and Great Britain, countries that were vitally interested in the empire not having a hegemonic position in the south-east of Europe. When Russia went too far, the two countries mobilised to determine it to renounce or to moderate its expansionist intentions (Crimean War, Treaty of Berlin on 1/13 July 1878).

For geopolitical reasons, the West chose to support the establishment of the Romanian modern national state, as a buffer between the two kingdoms that faced, at the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, as well as the Habsburgs, the so-called “*Eastern Question*”<sup>11</sup>. Therefore, Romania was also a creation of the West, and it was hard to believe that France and Great Britain would renounce the principle of the balance of power in Europe.

*“The Crimean War, as the great diplomat Grigore Gafencu put it in his famous book – Preliminaires de la Guerre à l’Est (1944), was intended to set order and limit in the East. The Treaty of Paris set the Lower Danube as the limit. The Danube, a European river, had to entirely belong to Europe; (...) The Danubian principalities as well as the Danube had to enjoy the guarantee of Europe. Such conditions justified and assured the establishment of Romania, unified and free. The new state that was to be born was based on an act that established a balance. Its destiny was linked to that balance, as the balance depended on its existence”*<sup>12</sup> (emphasis in the original text – A.N.).

Beyond the arguments provided by the supporters of the two camps, which were impressive, as we have shown, above all was the public feeling, decisive in making important decisions. It can influence, as history has shown, both exceptional achievements and great catastrophes. At the outbreak of the war, the public instinct was fully expressed in the direction of reuniting the territories north of the mountains inhabited by Romanians.

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<sup>11</sup> For the evolution of the “*Eastern Question*” see also Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *Formarea statelor naționale balcanice. 1804-1920*, translated by Ioan Crețiu, foreword by Professor Dr Camil Mureșan, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2002.

<sup>12</sup> Grigore Gafencu, *Preliminariile Războiului din Răsărit. De la Acordul de la Moscova (21 august 1939) până la ostilitățile din Rusia*, foreword by Teodor Baconski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, bilingual edition, Romanian-French, translated by Andrei Niculescu, foreword by Laurențiu Constantiniu, Curtea Veche, București, 2011, pp. 471-472.

The extremely complicated geopolitical position of Romania at the beginning of the world war put a decisive mark on the strategic planning process. In the first weeks of the campaign, the uncertainty related to the future option of Romania determined the political echelon to be reserved in respect of the plans of operations. It was much inertia, the General Staff being required, as Radu R. Rosetti, head of the operations office, showed, by the Prime Minister, Ion I.C. Brătianu, to study the plan for a war against Russia<sup>13</sup>.

After Romania opted, albeit indirectly, in favour of the Entente, by signing the Sazonov-Diamandi secret agreement, the strategic planning process took mainly into account the version of a war against the Central Powers. It was developed together with the prospective allies, namely the representatives of France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, once the country joined the war alongside the Entente, in May 1915.

*“Starting in March 1915, Radu Rosetti added, I was commissioned to get in touch with the English and Italian military attaches, lieutenant colonels C. B. Thomson (subsequently Lord Thomson of Cardington) and L[uciano] Ferigo. Whenever Thomson was absent, he was replaced with Fr. Rattigan, the English Legation secretary. From time to time, we had them to dinner, but not together, as, the English say, there was no love lost between them, Ferigo envying Thomson and the influence he thought he could have”<sup>14</sup>.*

In turn, General Iliescu was in touch with the French military attaché, Major Maurice Desprez, and the Russian one, Colonel A. Tatarinov. During their meetings they shared information about the organisation of the German and Austrian-Hungarian armed forces and their actions in the theatres of operations in the East, West and Italy.

Subsequently, following the progress of the talks between Romania and the Entente, there were also debated certain elements regarding the Romanian armed forces project for operations at the moment it would enter the conflict.

In essence, between 1915 and 1916, two important strategic ideas were outlined. The first of them considered the main strike with the majority of forces and assets beyond the Carpathians, in Transylvania, and the adoption of a defensive conduct in the South, along the Danube and on the new frontier of Romania, set by the Treaty of Bucharest (28 July/10 August 1913). The second, on the contrary, considered the attack with the main forces across the Danube, against Bulgaria (after its entry into the war), followed by the defensive, on the Northern and Western Front, in the Carpathians.

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<sup>13</sup> General Radu R. Rosetti, *Mărturisiri (1914-1919)*, edition and foreword by Maria Georgescu, Editura Modelism, București, 1997, pp. 49-51.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 58.

As it can be noticed, from the very beginning, Romania considered the possibility of a war on two fronts, which was a major handicap for any state actor that resorted to war to meet its goals. Facing the same situation, many states, throughout history, have tried to overcome it in different ways. An example in this regard is the German armed forces plan of operations developed at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, known as the “*Schlieffen plan*”, which was an attempt to solve the “*strategic obsession*” of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Reich – confrontation on two fronts. Without going into details, the document stipulated the defeat of France in six weeks, by quickly striking the left flank of the French disposition, practically a turn-back manoeuvre. Then, taking advantage of the slower pace of the Russian mobilisation, the main forces would head for the Eastern front for the decisive confrontation with the Russian armed forces. Germany did not succeed in solving the strategic equation and thus lost the war.

Romania was in an even more difficult situation, wittingly assuming the risk of an asymmetrical confrontation. However, there was an important factor that could eliminate such a worrying prospect, namely the attitude of Bulgaria, our neighbour to the south.

### **“Bulgarian Enigma”**

Like Romania, at the beginning of the conflict, the Bulgarian state proclaimed its neutrality, then negotiating intensively with both belligerent camps. The situation was mainly generated by the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Bulgaria, which was very important not only for the Central Powers but also for the Entente.

As for the Romanian-Bulgarian relations, although they officially got normal, the suspicion towards Bucharest was manifest, the 1913 episode being very much alive in the memory of the political class and the people south of the Danube<sup>15</sup>. The border incidents between July and August 1914, which raised the temperature of bilateral relations, were illustrative in this regard<sup>16</sup>.

The attitude of Bulgaria somehow represented an enigma for the Romanian political class, although there were enough signals regarding the camp Bulgaria would join. During 1915, the relations between Romania and Bulgaria depended

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<sup>15</sup> For the Romanian-Bulgarian relations see also Dimitrie Ghyka, *Memorii (1894-1940)*, translated by Vasile Savin, Institutul European, București, 2004; Trandafir G. Djuvara, *Misiunile mele diplomatice (1887-1925), Belgrad-Sofia-Constantinopol-Galați-Bruxelles-Le Havre-Luxemburg-Atena*, translated and foreword by Andrei-Alexandru Căpușan, foreword by Victor Bérard, foreword, Romanian edition, by Neagu Djuvara, Institutul European, 2009, pp. 25-40; Daniel Cain, *Diplomați și diplomație în sud-estul european. Relațiile româno-bulgare la 1900*, Editura Academiei Române, București, 2012 etc.

<sup>16</sup> *Românii la începutul “Marelui Război”. De la atentatul de la Sarajevo la moartea regelui Carol I*, coordinator: Major General (r.) Dr Mihail E. Ionescu, Editura Militară, București, 2014, p. 45.

on the relations of the two countries with the two belligerent camps. The Entente sought to draw Bulgaria into war and exerted pressure on Bucharest for a Romanian-Bulgarian rapprochement with a view to persuading the two countries to join the alliance. It was a *sine qua non* condition for such a goal to be met – territorial adjustments from Romania to Bulgaria, the most circulated proposal being the return to the border that was established before the Peace of Bucharest (1913), meaning that Romania should cede the new Dobruja (Quadrilateral) to Bulgaria as the price of friendship<sup>17</sup>.

In turn, Romania, taking into account the prospect of a war against the Triple Alliance, was very interested in avoiding the possibility of a war on two fronts. That is why it did not interrupt the discussions with the representatives of the Triple, and then Quadruple Entente. However, Romanian Prime Minister, Ion I.C. Brătianu, constantly refused to respond to the suggestions of territorial cessation, in the absence of a formal and clear commitment of future allies. The “*Bulgarian Enigma*”, as I.G. Duca put it, was resolved in the autumn of 1915, when the authorities south of the Danube joined the Central Powers.

On 24 August/6 September 1915, it was concluded an agreement between Germany and Bulgaria according to which the latter accepted to go to war against the Entente. The materialisation of such a decision required the regulation of the relations with the Ottoman Empire, the two countries being opposing parties in the Balkan wars. To that end, between 27 August/9 September and 3/16 September 1915, the Bulgarian and Ottoman authorities participated in the conference held in Demotika. In exchange for entering the war alongside the Central Powers, the Ottoman Empire agreed to cede a portion of territory on the left bank of the river Maritsa to Bulgaria, as confirmed by the agreement on 10/23 September of the same year.

After overcoming this obstacle, Bulgaria mobilised its armed forces and, on 28 September/11 October, opened hostilities to Serbia, without a declaration of war. It was issued three days later, on 2/14 October 1915. The conjugated offensive of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria led to the defeat of the Serbian armed forces and to the elimination of Serbia from the war at the end of 1915. Part of Serbian troops, about 150,000 people, following a gruelling march through the mountains of Albania and Montenegro, were taken by the British fleet and transported in Corfu, where, at the beginning of January 1916, began the reorganisation.

Bulgaria’s entry into action and the fact that Serbia was crushed had important consequences for Romania. Firstly, they contributed to the strategic encirclement of Romania, which resulted in blocking all the armament and ammunition supply

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<sup>17</sup> See also *România în “Marele Război”. Anul 1915*, coordinator: Major General (r.) Dr Mihail E. Ionescu, Editura Militară, București, 2015, pp. 339-382.

routes. Following the elimination of Serbia from the war, the line Thessalonica-Nis-Turnu Severin was decommissioned and the only remaining possibility, extremely difficult otherwise, was the transport of materiel in Russian ports Vladivostok and Archangelsk and then by the vast railways of the Russian Empire.

Secondly, the Entente powers pushed Romania to enter the conflict to help Serbia. According to some leaders and diplomats, it was an appropriate opportunity for Romania to prove its goodwill and commitment to the allies, especially as they had recognised the claims of Bucharest. The Romanian government considered such decision was too risky and therefore did not meet the suggestions and pressures made by the allies. Brătianu argued that any threat to Bulgaria would automatically generate the attack on Romania, which would have a negative impact on the entire alliance. Without the military support of the Entente, and especially of Russia, without the participation of Greece, the fate of the Romanian state was sealed.

In the talks with the allied diplomats in Bucharest, Brătianu emphasised the hesitation of the Entente about Bulgaria, but he did not receive consistent explanations. Russia did not attack Bulgaria, the Russian fleet limiting to some demonstrative bombing raids against Bulgarian ports, and the actions of the expeditionary corps from Thessalonica were weak, failing to thwart the Central Powers general offensive on Serbia. Under those circumstances, the government did not order mobilisation, limiting to some initiatives meant to stop the Bulgarian forces at the border with Romania, the most important of them being the development of the bridge-heads from Turtucaia and Silistra, which were appropriately advertised.

Thirdly, the Central Powers feared that Romania would allow Russian troops to transit its territory to help Serbia. Therefore, during that period, the Austrian-Hungarian and German diplomats in Bucharest received the urgent mission to test the Romanian authorities position towards that possibility. Romanian Prime Minister assured that the Romanian armed forces would oppose any attempt of that kind of Russian troops. There was no need for it, because Russia's reaction was very discreet, although the tsar's visit to Reni, in early November 1915, generated speculation about an action in force against the Central Powers.

Fourthly, Bulgaria's entry into the war resulted in the intensification of the opposition to neutrality and to the requirement to join the Entente, that being considered an appropriate moment for such a decision. The "*Unionist Federation*", established on 18 September/1 October 1915, launched proclamations, its leaders delivering fiery speeches, the press publishing articles expressing ultimatum to the government, and the manifestations often degenerating into violent acts.

Following the events in the Balkans, Romania's actions on two fronts became an issue that required the political and military leaders to provide an as effective as possible resolution.

### **Role of the Front on the Danube. Dysfunctions among the Allies, Romanian Requests**

In the Romanian strategic projects between 1915 and 1916, the Southern Front was assigned a secondary role, the main forces operating on the border with Austria-Hungary in order to liberate Transylvania. Romania did not have territorial claims to Bulgaria and therefore the expected conduct was mainly defensive.

However, in the debates that preceded Romania's entry into the war it was advanced, as it was previously mentioned, the thesis of a decisive strike south of the Danube. It was generated by the will of the authorities in Bucharest to avoid fighting on two fronts, by pre-emptively eliminating Bulgaria from the war. It was estimated that the ratio of forces, favourable to Romania, allowed for a relatively easy victory, the invoked example being that of the Campaign in the summer of 1913, when the intervention of Romania put an end to the Balkan wars<sup>18</sup>.

After resolving the situation on the Southern Front, Romania would return to the front in the Carpathians, launching the final offensive that was to bring the territories across the mountains in the composition of Romania. It was supported by a series of military personalities such as Generals Alexandru Averescu and Constantin Christescu, but it was completely rejected by Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu, as it did not meet the political goal of Romania's action. It was difficult to explain to the Romania public, officers and soldiers the idea of beginning the war for the unification of Romania by an action against... Bulgaria,

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<sup>18</sup> Of the bibliography related to the subject we mention: Corvin Petrescu, *Istoricul campaniei militare din anul 1913*, Imprimeria "Jockey Club", București, 1914; G.A. Dabija, *Războiul bulgaro-turc din anii 1912-1913*, București, 1914; Lieutenant Colonel C. Șerbescu, *Observațiuni și învățăminte culese din războaiele balcanice (1912-1913) din punct de vedere politic, strategic și tactic. Diverse, cu 11 crochiuri în culori afară din text, pentru ofițeri activi și de rezervă din toate armele*, Tipografia "Buciumul Român" Spiridon Gheorghiu, Galați, 1914; Colonel George Garoiescu, *Războaiele Balcanice 1912-1913*, Editura Centrului de Instrucție al Infanteriei, Sfântu Gheorghe, 1935; Titu Maiorescu, *România, războaiele balcanice și Cadrilaterul*, edition by Stelian Neagoe, Editura Machiavelli, București, 1995; Anastasie Iordache, *Criza politică din România și războaiele balcanice 1911-1913*, Editura Paideea, București, 1998; Gheorghe Zbucnea, *România și războaiele balcanice. 1912-1913. Pagini de istorie sud-est europeană*, Editura Albatros, București, 1999; Daniela Bușă, *Modificări politico-teritoriale în sud-estul Europei între Congresul de la Berlin și Primul Război Mondial (1878-1914)*, Editura Paideea, București, 2003; Mihai Macuc, *România, Balcanii și Europa*, vol. I-II, Editura ANI, București, 2009; *România și al Doilea Război Balcanic (1913)*, coordinators: Major General (r.) Dr Mihai E. Ionescu, Professor Dr Nicolae-Șerban Tanașoca, Editura Militară, București, 2014 etc.



from which we had nothing to claim. It was maybe justified by the relations within the alliance, but the military goal had to be consistent with the political goal. Therefore, although mentioned in the negotiations with the allies, the thesis of a major action south of the Danube was gradually abandoned.

As for Romania's future allies, their opinions were divergent. Under the circumstances of Bulgaria's entry into war and the Central Powers generalised offensive on Serbia, the Entente countries were concerned to help it. In this context, after the operation in Gallipoli failed, they transferred an important part of the forces employed there in the area of Thessalonica, the expeditionary corps being under the command of the French General Maurice Sarrail. It initially consisted of the 156<sup>th</sup> French Division and the 10<sup>th</sup> British Division, to which two more French divisions (57<sup>th</sup>, 122<sup>nd</sup>) and five British (22<sup>nd</sup>, 26<sup>th</sup>, 27<sup>th</sup>, 28<sup>th</sup>) were added.

Concomitantly, on 29 September/12 October 1915, Great Britain requested Romania to intervene to help Serbia, committing to augment the strength of the expeditionary corps from Thessalonica up to 200,000 troops<sup>19</sup>. France, intending to support, requested Italy to send troops in Albania or at Thessalonica, and Russia to intervene with an expeditionary corps<sup>20</sup>.

Obviously, Russia could intervene in favour of Serbia only by transiting the Romanian territory, and the government in Bucharest was requested to allow the 7<sup>th</sup> Russian Army to cross Romania<sup>21</sup>. The Romanian authorities rejected the request showing that such permission would be a breach of neutrality, thus triggering the armed intervention of the Central Powers<sup>22</sup>.

As the Triple Alliance considered an armed intervention against Romania, following the defeat of Serbia, the Romanian authorities requested Russia to concentrate troops at the Mouths of the Danube to counter a Bulgarian attack as well as to assure the north and north-east border<sup>23</sup>.

However, the Russian military authorities views about the strategic intentions of Romania were different. Stavka suggested that the Russian armed forces should concentrate in Northern Moldova, thus ensuring the Romanian troops freedom of action against Bulgaria.

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<sup>19</sup> *România în Războiul Mondial 1916-1919*, vol. I, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Națională, București, 1934, p. 88.

<sup>20</sup> *România în Războiul Mondial 1916-1919*, loc. cit., p. 87.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 88. See also *Documents diplomatiques concernant les rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Roumanie, 22 Juillet 1914-27 Août 1916*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>23</sup> Maurice Paléologue, *La Russie des tsars pendant la grande guerre*, vol. 1, 1914-1915, Plon, Paris, 1921.



In December 1915, the Central Powers renounced the attack against Romania, which improved the military situation of the country. Meanwhile, the negotiations for entering the war alongside the Entente continued, being in the final phase in the spring of 1916.

During the negotiations, the concerns of Romanian planners were also focused on providing solutions to secure the Southern Front<sup>24</sup>. In essence, there were two main solutions: the deployment of an as numerous as possible contingent of Russian troops in Dobruja and an ample offensive of the British-French troops from Thessalonica.

However, as it results from documents, the Army of the Orient, the new name of the French-British-Serbian expeditionary corps, established late, did not have the capability to decisively influence the evolution of the events in the Balkans. In fact, on 10 March 1916, the Great General Headquarters of the French Armed Forces mentioned that: *The political action will be aimed at developing our influence in the Balkans, seeking to make the undecided neutrals (Greece and Romania) join our cause, and to detach, if possible, Turkey and Bulgaria from the opposite bloc. Our military action will consist in retaining as many as possible enemy forces in front of our troops, making them believe they are threatened with an attack, eventually launching offensive if the circumstances are favourable or we are required to do so*<sup>25</sup>.

The British government did not agree with the French authorities opinions, opting for a strictly defensive conduct in the Orient, as the entry of Romania and of Greece into the war was very problematic. Therefore, no offensive having a limited character was considered. Besides the disputes, it was decisively taken into account the extremely high German pressure on the Western front, von Falkenhayn resorting to the “*strategy of exhaustion*” to win victory<sup>26</sup>. Thus, on 21 February 1916, the Germans launched offensive in Verdun, the extremely violent confrontation lasting up to December the same year.

The French-British disputes, combined with the battles of Verdun and Somme, the latter started by the British, resulted in failing to provide the necessary troops for the Army of the Orient so that it could eliminate Bulgaria from the war, and thus making easy Romania’s action on the main front.

As for the presence of a Russian expeditionary corps in Dobruja, Romanian authorities made it a *sine qua non* condition for the entry into action.

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<sup>24</sup> I.G. Duca, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 136-138; General Radu R. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-63.

<sup>25</sup> *România în Războiul Mondial 1916-1919*, vol. I, Documents-Appendices, p. 98.

<sup>26</sup> Details in Erich von Falkenhayn, *Le Commandement Suprême de l’Armée Allemande 1914-1916 et ses décisions essentielles*, traduction et avertissement par le Général de division Niessel, Charles-Lavauzelle, Paris, 1921.

There were lengthy negotiations, the two parties having different views on its utility, the troops that were to be deployed, and the assigned missions.

Stavka considered that the Russian forces had to be concentrated in Northern Moldova, between Cernăuți and Piatra Neamț, and the Romanian armed forces had to mass in Muntenia and Dobruja to cover the mountainous border and repel a Bulgarian attack in the south<sup>27</sup>.

Moreover, the Russian Great General Staff considered that Romania's intervention in war generated evident strategic disadvantages, by stretching the front along the entire mountainous barrier.

In compliance with the Entente decisions in December 1915, at the beginning of June 1916, the Russian armed forces launched the so-called "*Brusilov offensive*"<sup>28</sup>. Its goal was to break the Austrian-Hungarian front, to head towards south-west, to get to the Hungarian plain and to eliminate the Dual Monarchy from the war.

The offensive was launched on 4 June 1916, on a 150-km front, from Tarnopol to the Romanian border, and it was completed two months later, on 13 August, but, during the last days, it lost the initial vigour. The Austrian-Hungarian armed forces had a lot of casualties, the official history of the war, published in Vienna in 1930, registering, up to 31 July 1916, the following figures: 475,138 troops, of whom 10,675 officers (dead, wounded, prisoners)<sup>29</sup>. The Austro-Hungarians were saved by the intervention of the German troops, under the command of General Conta.

The offensive of the Russian armed forces, commanded by General Brusilov, was executed at the express request of the British and the French, facing the high pressure of the Germans in Verdun, the most important battle up to that time. Simultaneously, the Austrian-Hungarian troops were in full offensive on the Italian front.

During the offensive, Stavka changed his opinion regarding the value of Romania's intervention. Moreover, the Romanian government considered that the intervention could not be avoided. In his memoirs, I.G. Duca noted that: "*Romania would make a terrible mistake if it let the Russians to enter Hungary alone*"<sup>30</sup>. Constantin Diamandi, the Romanian Minister in Petrograd, had the same opinion.

Pressed in Verdun, the French insistently requested Russia to accept the conditions set by Romania, so Stavka made pressure in Bucharest to immediately enter

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<sup>27</sup> *România în Războiul Mondial 1916-1919*, vol. I, *loc. cit.*, p. 106.

<sup>28</sup> For details see *Memoires du Général Broussilov Guerre 1914-1918*, foreword by Général Niessel, Librairie Hachette, Paris, 1929, pp. 203-238.

<sup>29</sup> *Austro-Hungar's Last War 1914-1918*, edited by the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Army and War Archive, translated by Stan Hanna, vol. 1 (1914). *Outbreak of War to the Outcome of the Battle of Limanowa-Lapanow*, Publisher of Military Sciences Releases, Vienna, 1930, vol. 4, p. 729.

<sup>30</sup> I.G. Duca, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

into action. Illustrative in this regard is the telegram sent by General Mihail Alexeev, the Chief of the Russian Armed Forces Great General Staff, on 5/18 June 1916, to Colonel Tatarinov, the Russian military attaché in Bucharest, to be made known to Ion I.C. Brătianu and to General Dumitru Iliescu, the Secretary General of the Ministry of War. He wrote that the situation required for the Romanians to intervene “*now or never*”<sup>31</sup>.

It was obvious that, under those circumstances, Stavka accepted sending a Russian corps in Dobruja. Its strength was the subject of heated debate between Romania and Russia. The Romanian government requested 200,000 troops. However, Petrograd sent only 50,000 troops, namely three divisions (two infantry and one cavalry division).

*I still do not know*, wrote Radu Rosetti, the Chief of the Operations Bureau within the Great General Staff, *who of our negotiators ceded in this issue and convinced Brătianu to agree with diminishing the strength required from the very beginning as the Operations Bureau always insisted on the strength of 200,000 troops as a sine qua non condition*<sup>32</sup>.

There was also another idea among the Romanian politicians, shared for a period even by the Prime Minister Brătianu, namely that the presence of the Russian troops on the national territory would prevent the Bulgarian armed forces from attacking the “*former benefactors*”. It was certainly an illusion, whose price was paid by the Romanian armed forces in the autumn of 1916.

## **Conclusions**

During the two years of neutrality, the strategic planning process depended on the political negotiations between the Romanian authorities and the future allies, as well as on their perception of the benefits that could be derived from Romania’s entry into action. Based on it, Bucharest considered that it was necessary for the Romanian armed forces to participate with the main forces in the actions conducted west and north of the Carpathians, to unify the territories belonging to the Dual Monarchy that were inhabited by Romanians.

As such a course of action made the political goal compliant with the military one, in almost all the plans and projects developed by the Great General Staff, the Southern Front played a secondary role, defensive being suggested.

There were differences in perception between the Entente countries and the political and military authorities in Bucharest. The former attempted,

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<sup>31</sup> SANIC, Casa Regală Ferdinand Collection, file no. 16/1916, p. 1.

<sup>32</sup> General Radu R. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

in the first phase, to reconcile the Romanians and the Bulgarians in order to isolate the Ottoman Empire and to help Serbia. The condition for the reconciliation was that Romania should cede the Quadrilateral to Bulgaria.

Following Bulgaria's entry into war alongside the Central Powers, the future allies insisted on an attack over the Danube, to neutralise the neighbour in the south, without ensuring all the means that were necessary for such a goal to be met.

Finally, pressed by the evolution in the other theatres of operations, the allies accepted the conditions set by Romania, so that, by "*Z*" Hypothesis<sup>33</sup>, the Romanian armed forces directed the main forces to meet the political goal of entering the war, namely over the Carpathians.

The cruel irony was that the first and most important strike after the entry into the war, on 15/28 August 1916, came from the Southern Front, the Romanian armed forces being severely defeated in Turtucaia<sup>34</sup>. Although it had the characteristics of a tactical confrontation, it had a huge moral impact, resulting in changing the course of the war for Romania.

The end of the war came from the Balkans too, as the offensive of the Army of the Orient, led by General Franchet d'Espèray, in the summer and autumn of 1918, determined Bulgaria's exclusion from the war.

In spite of the caprices of Mars, the God of War, we consider that Romania's strategic option in August 1916, materialised in "*Z*" Hypothesis, was correct. Romania, at the moment it entered into the war, could not direct its effort over the Danube, attacking Bulgaria. It had to assert its will to unify the country, through a consistent military effort over the Carpathians. Even if the effort resulted, in the first phase, in a major failure, Romania asserted, through fighting, the right to national unity, which became reality in 1918, in a favourable external context.

*English version by*  
 Diana Cristiana LUPU

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<sup>33</sup> *Proiecte și Planuri de Operații ale Marelui Stat Major Român (până în anul 1916)*, București, 1992, pp. 178-191.

<sup>34</sup> For the Battle of Turtucaia, see: General G.A. Dabija, *Armata română în războiul mondial (1916-1918)*, foreword by Army Corps General Alexandru Averescu, vol. 1, București; General Constantin Teodorescu, *Turtucaia. Studiu tactic și cauzele înfrângerii*, Brașov; Constantin Zagoriț, *Turtucaia*, București, 1939; Petre Otu, *Mareșalul Alexandru Averescu. Militarul, omul politic, legenda*, București, 2005, pp. 135-139; Petre Otu, *Pace și război în spațiul românesc. Secolul al XX-lea*, Editura Militară, București, 2010, pp. 45-53 etc.

# ROMANIA MILITARY POTENTIAL DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Colonel Dr Dan PRISĂCARU

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*Modern warfare introduced a new concept to military theory – that of military potential (war potential) of a state. During the interwar period, this concept was intensely analysed and debated by military theorists, their ideas and papers enhancing Romanian military thinking. One of the main conclusions drawn by military theorists was that international politics was nothing more than a latent war between industrial and financial potentials of states. During the interwar period as well as during the Second World War, demography, economy and morale were the most important factors of the Romanian military potential. Moreover, the shortcomings in supplying the armed forces with modern weaponry and equipment influenced both the decision-making and the military potential.*

**Keywords:** *total war; armed nation; military potential; current and potential factors*

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The concept of “*armed nation*”, analysed by Wilhelm Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz in his work “*Das Volk in Wafen*”, dominated military thinking.

## “War potential” – Concept that Arose in Universal Military Thinking as a Result of the First World War Battlefield Realities

Motto:


“*La politique d’un Etat est dans sa geographie*”.  
Napoleon

The “*Great War*” of 1914-1918, as the First World War was called to set it apart from other military confrontations, being more important in losses and destruction, showed the *total dimension* of modern military conflicts. The conflagration at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century metamorphosed into a conflict among nations because of the substantial scientific and technical progress, which generated the dissipation of the clear separation between the military and the population. Under the new conditions, states and nations had to mobilise all their resources: military, spiritual, material, geographic etc.

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*“The best military superstructure – said von Goltz – is the one that, in case of war, mobilises all intellectual and material resources of the country” (photo 1)<sup>1</sup>.*



**Photo 1: Marshal Wilhelm Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (1843-1916).  
The cover of his book “Das Volk in Waffen”.**

The new concept was actively supported, among others, by General Erich Ludendorff, whose paper (*“Der totale Krieg”*, 1935), constituted a landmark for Nazi’ project to regenerate the German military forces (*photo 2*).



**Photo 2: General Erich von Ludendorff (1865-1937).  
The cover of his book “La guerre totale”, revised edition, 2010.**

Ludendorff criticises Clausewitz’ fundamental thesis that war is a continuation of politics by other means, arguing that, under the new conditions, the ratio is reversed, war becoming the primary factor, having a total character.

<sup>1</sup> Hervé Coutou-Bégarie, *Strategia ca metodă*, in *Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”* no. 4/2005, Editura *Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”*, București, 2005, p. 10, translation and adaptation by Professor Dr Constantin Marinescu; Vladimir Zodian, Adrian Pandea, Mihai V. Zodian, *Enciclopedie de istorie militară universală*, afterword by Major General Professor Dr Teodor Frunzeti, Editura Militară, București, 2006, pp. 124-125.



Consequently, it has to be served by “total politics” thus ensuring the necessary conditions to attain victory. Also, the German military theorist argued that since “total war” entails great moral tests, “total politics” necessarily calls for perfect soul cohesion of the nation, which has to fight to the last man to win – the only thing that brings survival<sup>2</sup>.

The concept of “armed nation” was also present in the debate of the theorists and politico-military decision-making factors of the Romanian state after the Great Unification of 1918, but obviously with different purposes and effects than the German ones. Thus, it was assessed almost unanimously that Greater Romania could not subsist without resorting to the “armed nation” principle. In that respect, an interwar study of the Great General Staff concluded: “In its modern form, the war cannot be waged by the military; it will require spontaneously, continuously and totally, with or without the will of the people, all the nation’s means and, consequently, the sooner and more fully prepared it will be to defend itself, the faster victory will be attained, with fewer sacrifices in lives and money and with greater results”<sup>3</sup>.

The idea is also highlighted in *Enciclopedia României*, in which it is stressed that “today we live the integral concept of Armed Nation, which is confirmed by the fact that modern warfare requires commissioning all forces and means available to a country”<sup>4</sup>.

In this regard, Dimitrie Gusti (*photo 3*) assessed that “war is more than a simple matter of strategy, supplies and armaments, for it sums up an entire historical epoch: all knowledge, economy, culture, and engineering are mirrored in it”<sup>5</sup>.

The total character of modern warfare has imposed the inclusion of a new concept in military theory – the *military (war) potential* of a state<sup>6</sup>.

Taking as reference the experience of the First World War and the opinions expressed internationally, Romanian military theorists rallied around the idea that the phase of isolated wars, in which the military factor had a crucial role, ended, future conflicts



**Photo 3: Dimitrie Gusti (1880-1955), philosopher, sociologist, member of the Romanian Academy, founder of the Romanian school of sociology**

<sup>2</sup> Petre Otu, *Evoluția reformei de la un război la altul (1919-1939)*, in *Reforma militară și societatea românească (1878-2008). Relaționări externe și determinări naționale*, coordinator: Petre Otu (project manager), Editura Militară, București, 2010, p. 145.

<sup>3</sup> Romanian Military Archives (hereinafter cited A.M.R.), collection 948, file no. 28, p. 509.

<sup>4</sup> *Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1, București, 1940, p. 698.

<sup>5</sup> Dimitrie Gusti, *Sociologia războiului*, București, 1915, p. 81.

<sup>6</sup> Details in Petre Otu, *Îmbrățișarea anacondei. Politica militară a României în perioada 1 septembrie 1939-22 iunie 1941*, Editura Militară, București, 2006, pp. 34-54.



consisting of huge clashes between potentials. It was believed that such kinds of confrontation took place in peacetime too, international politics being nothing else but a latent war between the industrial and financial potentials of the states<sup>7</sup>. Therefore, the new realities called for a new theoretical framework to provide the scientific support necessary for outlining the state's foreign and military policy.

Military historian Petre Otu summarises the most relevant definitions provided in the interwar literature for the new concept, namely<sup>8</sup>: “*the ability of a country to wage war*”<sup>9</sup>, “*the ability of a country to preserve, by its own means, and even to increase the quantity and quality of its military capacity during a war*”<sup>10</sup>, “*the capability that a country has to employ at a certain point and for a limited time, all the spiritual, moral and material powers it has, through its population, territory and its organisation, in order to defend the borders*”<sup>11</sup>, “*the resultant of the dynamic material and moral energies of the whole nation*”<sup>12</sup>.

From the listed definitions emerges that the main meanings of the concept of *war potential* are: capability, opportunity, completeness, the sum of these factors being the military might of a state.

Petre Otu also stresses that the most used classification of the war potential components made by interwar Romanian military theorists was that of “*present*” or “*current*” factors and “*future*” or “*potential*” factors<sup>13</sup>. The “*present*” factors define the military potential during peacetime, in this category being included manpower, materials, equipment and armament supplied to the army, stocks of materials, trained reserve troops, weapons and combat equipment, mills and factories, fortification systems, means of communications, geographical environment etc. “*Potential*” factors are defined as “*all elements able to complete, develop and enhance present factors after the declaration of war*”<sup>14</sup>. In this category fall the mobilisation resources (human resources and ethnic composition), raw materials, industrial capabilities that can be used in mobilisation, financial capacity, agricultural capacity, morale factor etc. Analysing the correlations between “*present*” and “*future*” (potential) factors, most military theorists conclude that victory in war is determined, ultimately, by the “*potential*”. In this regard, A. Soreanu and G. J. Ciorogaru claimed

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<sup>7</sup> Lieutenant Colonel A. Soreanu, G.J. Ciorogaru, *Civilizație și potențial de război*, București, 1935, p. 35.

<sup>8</sup> Petre Otu, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-36.

<sup>9</sup> Major Al. Hristescu, Captain D. Popescu, *Potențialul de război material și spiritual*, Tipografia Bucovina, București, 1939, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> General V. Rudeanu, *Apărarea națională și bogățiile României*, Tipografia Școalei de ofițeri de artilerie “Carol I”, Timișoara, 1936, p. 30.

<sup>11</sup> Victor Slăvescu, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>12</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Ioan Vitzu, *Potențialul de război al marilor puteri*, Cernăuți, 1939, p. 10.

<sup>13</sup> Petre Otu, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>14</sup> Major Al. Hristescu, Capitan D. Popescu, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

that “at the beginning of a war or in a short-term war, the ‹present› decides. But for a long-term war – the two military theorists said – the potential is decisive”. They added: “On it [the potential A.N.] relies the regeneration of all the war forces. It feeds and receives the present, keeping it at a level appropriate to war. Without it, the long-term wars are impossible”<sup>15</sup>. Military theorists forecast – and subsequent events confirmed their estimates – that future wars would continue to be for a long time long-term conflicts, in which the nations’ potentials would confront each other with maximum intensity. Also, they warned that the state should pay particular attention to its economic and social development and the internal cohesion.



**Photo 4: Victor Slăvescu (1891-1977), economist, politician, Finance Minister (1934-1935), Minister of the Armed Forces Procurement (02.01.1939-07.04.1940)**

The Romanian expertise acquired during the First World War highlighted the close link between human resource, armament and combat equipment. While General Jitianu, along with other authors such as Victor Slăvescu (*photo 4*), Dumitru Dragu, Emil Predoiu, Mircea Tomescu, believed in the idea that “all war logistics is only scrap, good to be thrown into the trashcan, if not for the man who puts them to good use”<sup>16</sup>, other military theorists underlined that without suitable logistics, bravery and heroism are insufficient to achieve victory on the battlefield.

In this regard, General Sichițiu and Colonel Ioanițiu, stated firmly that “disarmed men, whatever their morale might be, cannot fight against logistics” (*photo 5*).

Moreover, the two prestigious military thinkers warned that “the experience of the last war (referring to the parlous state of the Romanian armed forces logistics – A.N.) must be our last lesson in this regard”<sup>17</sup>. From this followed the imperative of creating a national defence industry, able to provide the armed forces with the necessary military logistics for defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.



**Photo 5: Major General Ioan Sichițiu (1878-1952), Chief of the General Staff between 02.01-11.01.1937**

<sup>15</sup> Lieutenant Colonel A. Soreanu, G.J. Ciorogaru, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.

<sup>16</sup> Major General Ion Jitianu, *Forțele morale și forțele materiale la război*, Imprimeria Statului, București, 1928, p. 491.

<sup>17</sup> Major General Ioan Sichițiu, Colonel Al. Ioanițiu, *Elemente de strategie*, Atelierele “Cartea Românească”, București, 1936, p. 169.

In that regard, Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Verdeş concluded that “today, more than ever, national sovereignty involves the ability to manufacture weapons and war materials”<sup>18</sup>.

Although this kind of warning signs were not lacking, deficiencies in the armament and combat equipment provided to the armed forces repeated on the eve and during the Second World War, with major repercussions on the military potential and combat capacity of the Romanian Armed Forces.

Moreover, there were Romanian military theorists that highlighted the important role of other war potential elements such as raw materials, energy sources, agricultural capacity, financial capacity, moral factor. In this regard, S. Axente Baciú said that “countries that have their own exploitations of raw materials have the most chances to win the war”<sup>19</sup>. Although historical experience shows that not all countries that possess major agricultural or mineral resources find themselves in the winners’ camp, it should be emphasised that, in many cases, the real purpose of war is the control and possession of certain areas or regions rich in various types of raw materials (oil, rare metals etc.)<sup>20</sup>. In turn, Colonel G. Vizanti and Major Scarlat Urlăţianu highlighted the importance of a country agricultural capacity saying that “if the industrial organisation ensures continuity for the armed forces replenishments of weapons and ammunition, the agricultural organisation is required to ensure food. A soldier well armed and equipped, but poorly nourished – emphasised the two military thinkers – will not endure for long the continuous and lengthy brutal regime of modern warfare”<sup>21</sup>. Also, the moral factor was considered by some authors as “the result of the whole complex of potential factors”<sup>22</sup>. In their view, the troop morale was likely to contribute

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<sup>18</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Verdeş, *Potenţial de război*, Bucureşti, 1939, p. 17.

<sup>19</sup> Axente S. Baciú, *Aspecte economice ale războiului actual*, Editura ziarului “Universul”, Bucureşti, 1942, pp. 9-10.

<sup>20</sup> Count Alexandre de Marenches highlighted during one of the many conversations he had with US President Ronald Reagan, held at the White House in the ’80s, that the battle between the Great Powers over controlling the areas in which there are eight strategic raw materials indispensable in times of peace and war, namely: germanium (used in advanced electronics); titanium (used in U-boats construction, because it is a highly durable alloy); magnesium (explosives); platinum (aeronautics); mercury (in the nuclear chemistry); molybdenum (for the production of steel); cobalt (nuclear chemistry); columbium (extremely rare alloys), continues. To these raw materials there can be added: tungsten, manganese, chromium for steel; all of these strategic materials being vital for the defence industry, apud Constantin Corneanu, *Sub povara marilor decizii. România şi geopolitica marilor puteri. 1941-1945*, edition and foreword by Nicolae Raus, Editura Scripta, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 23.

<sup>21</sup> Colonel G. Vizanti, Major Scarlat Urlăţianu, *Strategia românească în viitorul război*, Bucureşti, 1932, p. 123.

<sup>22</sup> Lieutenant Colonel A. Soreanu, G.J. Ciorogaru, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

positively or negatively to victory on the battlefield. This can be explained, among other things, by the particularly sensitive components of the moral factor, such as: people's strength and confidence in their mission; ethnic and religious unity; the choice of leaders with outstanding features and qualities to represent the interests of the respective nation with dignity; social stability etc.

In turn, Lieutenant Colonel Ioan Vitzu, analysing the military might of various European countries, concluded that states with limited resources planned short-term wars with decisive strikes executed from the very beginning of the conflict. In contrast, states with many capabilities, but from a military point of view insufficiently used, took into account long-term confrontations thus being able to exploit their considerable resources<sup>23</sup>.

Moreover, it should be noted that the war potential evaluation depends on a number of factors that can be quantified with great difficulty, including: the morale of a nation, the will and mental characteristics of the population, historical traditions etc.

In conclusion, we can say that the works and ideas of the Romanian military theorists on the new and complex issue, namely the military (war) potential, became very important following the First World War, contributing to both enriching the Romanian military thinking and focusing the political and military decision-making factors attention on the need to strengthen the Romanian war potential.

### **Demographic, Material (Economic) and Morale Factors – Core Components of the Interwar Romanian Military Potential**

*“War is more than just a matter of strategy, supplies  
and weapons, for it sums up an entire historical epoch:  
all knowledge, economy, culture, and engineering  
are mirrored in it”.*

Dimitrie Gusti

❖ *The demographic factor* constituted, under the norms of the interwar period, an important element of war potential because it ensured the troops of a state. The main features taken into consideration in the analysis of the demographic factor were: troops, homogeneity, vitality, as well as professional, physical and intellectual value.

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<sup>23</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Ioan Vitzu, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

According to the census of 1930, there were 18,057,028 inhabitants in Romania. In 1938, the population was 19,533,398 citizens, and in September 1939 it reached approximately 20 million<sup>24</sup>. In terms of the number of inhabitants, Romania ranked the eighth in Europe, surpassed, among its neighbours, only by the USSR (148 million inhabitants) and Poland (30 million inhabitants).

The population density in 1935 was 65.1 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>, higher than the European average, which was 45.4 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>. It was lower than Belgium – 278 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>, United Kingdom – 146 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>, Germany – 144 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>, and higher than other states: the USSR – 7.8 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>, Spain – 47 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>, Yugoslavia – 56 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>, Bulgaria – 59 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup><sup>25</sup>.

The ratio between male and female population of the country and the comparative situation with some of its neighbours is presented in *table 1*<sup>26</sup>:

*Table 1*

Country	Population (year of census)	Male (%)	Female (%)
Romania	18,057,028 (1930)	8,896,833 (49.1%)	9,160,195 (50.9)
Yugoslavia	12,934,000 (1931)	6,895,430 (49.5)	7,038,570 (50.5)
Hungary	8,688,000 (1930)	4,149,432 (48.9)	4,538,568 (51.1)
Bulgaria	5,479,000 (1926)	2,750,458 (50.2)	2,728,542 (49.8)

Of the male population, the age group between 15-55, in total 4,850,206 people (52% of the total male population and about 27% of the total) had military value, being included in the mobilisation potential of Romania. In European military practice the age group between 20-54 was included in the mobilisation studies, which for Romania meant a number of 3,842,727 inhabitants. Compared to some of its neighbours, the percentage situation of the male population, by age group was as shown in *table 2*<sup>27</sup>:

*Table 2*

Age group	Romania	Yugoslavia	Hungary	Bulgaria
20-24	8.95%	9.8%	9.7%	9.7%
25-29	8.63%	8.4%	8.6%	8.1%
30-34	5.97%	7.2%	8.1%	6.3%
35-39	6.49%	5.5%	6.7%	5.6%
40-44	5.00%	5.2%	5.9%	5.4%
45-49	5.10%	4.6%	5.5%	4.2%
50-54	3.33%	4.1%	4.7%	3.3%
Total	43.47%	44.8%	49.2%	42.6%

<sup>24</sup>Victor Slăvescu, *Potențialul de război economic și financiar al României*, Școala Superioară de Război, first edition, 1937, p. 17.

<sup>25</sup>*Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1, pp. 140-141; *Anuarul statistic al României, 1939 and 1940*, București, 1940, pp. 41-134.

<sup>26</sup>Victor Slăvescu, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibidem*, p. 49.

The mobilisation potential of Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria for the age group between 20-54 is shown in *table 3*.

*Table 3*

Country	Mobilisation potential
Romania	3,842,727
Yugoslavia	2,989,143
Hungary	2,031,221
Bulgaria	1,161,695

Given that Yugoslavia, as well as Romania, was part of the Little Entente

and the Balkan Pact, the mobilisation potential of the Romanian state was superior in comparison to that of its potential opponents, Hungary and Bulgaria, both separately and joint.

Combatant forces consisted of the age group 20-39, in total 2,685,882 people. If from this total it is subtracted a 15-20% percentage of unfits, according to interwar military statistical evaluations, it results 2,148,606 people capable of service on the military front.

According to calculations used by some military theorists of the time, if the rule of one combatant for one metre of border is applied, the total of 2,148,606 persons was partially satisfactory, as for 3 400-km border, Romania would have needed 3.4 million soldiers. Also unfavourable was the ratio between a fighter and the number of inhabitants that supported him, namely seven non-combatants for a fighter engaged in combat.

An element with some specificity to be considered in the planning of national defence was the ethnic composition of the population. According to the 1930 census, the citizens of various ethnicities who represented a share of over 0.5% of the population were as shown in *table 4*<sup>28</sup>.

*Table 4*

Nationality	Number	Percentage
Romanians	12,981,324	71.9%
Hungarians	1,425,507	7.9%
Germans	745,421	4.1%
Jews	728,115	4.0%
Ruthenian and Ukrainian	582,115	3.2%
Russians	409,150	2.3%
Bulgarians	366,384	2.0%
Gypsies	262,501	1.5%
Turks	154,722	0.9%
Gagauz	105,750	0.6%

As the census data show 28.1%, namely 4,868,927 people of the total population, were minorities of different ethnicities, and although the share was important, no nationality exceeded 8%. Of them, 2,370,898 were male and 1,017,197 declared they did not speak Romanian.

The distribution of historical national minorities is illustrated in *table 5*<sup>29</sup>.

As it can be seen, in all Romanian historical provinces, less in Bukovina and Dobruja, Romanian ethnic population had an absolute majority compared

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<sup>28</sup> *Anuarul statistic al României*, 1939-1940, pp. 58-59.



**Table 5**

	Citizens of Romanian nationality		Citizens belonging to national minorities	
	Number	Number	Number	Percentage
Transylvania	1.853.500	1.364.200	1.364.200	42%
Crișana and Maramureș	844.100	546.100	546.100	39.2%
Banat	511.600	429.100	429.100	45.6%
Bukovina	380.200	473.400	473.400	55.4%
Bessarabia	1.609.600	1.253.800	1.253.800	43.8%
Muntenia	3.763.700	264.600	264.600	6.6%
Oltenia	1.481.500	37.900	37.900	2.4%
Moldova	2.180.400	247.100	247.100	10.1%
Dobruja	358.500	452.800	452.800	55.5%

to the minority groups in part or in their total. In Dobruja, Romanian ethnics were outnumbered by the citizens belonging to national minorities, but outnumbered each minority in part. Thus, there were 358,500 Romanians and 184,000 Bulgarians, 150,300 Turks, 22,000 Tatars and 3,800 Jews. Also in Bucovina there were 380,200 Romanians, compared to 236,800 Ruthenians and Ukrainians and 92,300 Jews<sup>30</sup>. At the same time, it was assessed that the numerical situation of the minorities in Romania was “*less difficult than in other states*” such as Czechoslovakia, where they totalled 34%, of which 23% were Germans and lived near the borders with the Third Reich or Poland, where Russian and German minorities percentage exceeded 22%<sup>31</sup>.

The Fundamental Law of the Romanian State – the Constitution of 1923 – provided that “*all Romanians, regardless of ethnic origin, language or religion, are part of the armed forces, according to special laws*”<sup>32</sup>, thus establishing equal military service for all citizens. Discriminatory measures based on ethnic origin were only enforced in the summer of 1940, after Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the Herța region were annexed by the USSR.

In relation to this specific element, Victor Slăvescu signalled the following: “*In terms of **human war potential, the proportion of 28.1%** (emphasis in the original text – A.N.) of minority population and especially its ways of settlement in regard to various borders and therefore to different military hypothesis **poses***”

<sup>29</sup> Silviu Dragomir, *La Transylvanie roumaine et les minorites ethniques*, 1934, pp. 41-94, apud Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Verdeș, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 33.

<sup>32</sup> Ion Mamina, *Monarhia constituțională din România. Enciclopedie politică 1866-1938*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2000, p. 52 (Title V, “*Despre Puterea armată*”, article 119 in the Constitution).



***problems in terms of their usability***<sup>33</sup> (emphasis in the original text – A.N.). The events of 1938-1939, in particular those in the summer of 1940, when Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, Northwestern Transylvania and the Quadrilateral were ceded, unfortunately confirmed Victor Slăvescu's comments on the loyalty of the citizens belonging to national minorities to the Romanian state.

An important component of the demographic factor, with implications on the value of the armed forces, was literacy and the level of training. While in the interwar period, education made evident progress, the illiteracy rate was still rampant. As a result, from the total of 14,520,878 people aged over 7, the literacy situation was as shown in *table 6*.

*Table 6*

Literate			Illiterate		
Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
8,250,183	4,893,947	3,356,236	6,209,568	2,177,130	4,032,138

It was interesting that, of the 2,177,130 million illiterate male, 1,396,059 belonged to the group over 20 that were affected by mobilisation. Although the innate intelligence of the Romanians could compensate such limitations, illiteracy nevertheless was an element which undermined the combat capacity of the armed forces, especially considered the military technology and equipment substantial advance.

On this aspect, the military theorist Constantin Verdeş emphasised: *"The Romanian peasant is sober, strong, hardworking, patient, deeply loving his land, less demanding in terms of upkeep, courageous, open-minded and inclined to jokes, even in hard times. With his vivid intelligence and discipline, he would be an excellent soldier, if this could be doubled by a better cultural training"*. About this situation C. Verdeş concluded: *"The low training level mitigated some of the beautiful soldierly virtues innate (in the Romanian soldier A.N.). The percentage of illiterate is considerable, about 43%, and if we think that most of the literate training is extremely low in quality, we can see that the cultural level is very low. An important deficiency, in this day and age, when the use of mechanisation and complicated armament firstly requires elements that are well prepared to use them"*. Also, the same important military analyst noted that *"the lack (in literacy – A.N.) is not mitigated by jobs, because about 75% of the active male population is of rural background, 7% industrial workers, craftsmen, 3% traders etc."*<sup>34</sup>.

On the eve of the Second World War, in the Romanian Armed Forces mobilisation documents there were registered 1,550,000 people, plus a reserve of 236,000. In September-October 1939, in the context of Poland being attacked

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<sup>33</sup> Victor Slăvescu, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>34</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Verdeş, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

by Germany, on 1 September 1939, and subsequently by the Soviet Union, on 17 September 1939, approximately 760,000<sup>35</sup> people were mobilised. Mobilised troops were organised in 4 army commands, 10 corps, 42 large units of different branches and specialties, of which 32 active and 10 reserve, and other bodies provided in the mobilisation plan<sup>36</sup>. 72.36% of the troops were part of the mobilised operational armed forces, and 70% of the forces were organised in large units destined to first emergency defence. Although, overall, the ratio could be considered optimal, the percentage of 21% of the troops organised in service formations was considered high<sup>37</sup>.

Also, the ratio between infantry (58.28%) and artillery (16.40%) was evaluated by military analysts as insufficient, since it would not have had provided the effective fire support that large infantry units would required. In turn, aviation and air defence comprised 1.75% of the total mobilised personnel and navy a percentage of 1.48%, which clearly shows the development levels of such branches<sup>38</sup>.

The deficit of active lower rank officers still existed. Thus, of a total of 19,633 officer positions provided in the organisational chart, 16,167 were employed, and of the deficit of 3 466 officers, 2 550 were for second lieutenants.

As for the reserve officers, it should be noted that the number of 37,441 set in the organisational chart was apparently satisfactory in the event of an armed conflict. However, many reserve officers exceeded the age limit for the held rank and did not participate in conscript trainings. There was also a significant active NCO deficit. Of the 21,250 positions only 12,870 were assigned, the deficit of 8,380 representing 40% of the necessary troops, situation that had repercussions on the subunits training process<sup>39</sup>.

In conclusion, we can say that Greater Romania's demographic resource, although had some limitations, especially qualitative ones, constituted a fundamental factor of the war potential of the country on the brink of the Second World War. This factor was boosted by a number of traits and characteristics, including: the outstanding innate qualities of the Romanians, the relative homogeneous nature of the population throughout the national territory, the experience of the 1916-1919 Great War for National Reunification, the patriotic spirit of the great majority of the population, the desire to live in harmony with the country's neighbours. Those qualities manifested strongly, especially during the preventive conscriptions carried out in 1939-1940.

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<sup>35</sup> Romanian Military Archives, *Microfilms* Collection, roll P.II 1.1759, frame 464.

<sup>36</sup> *Idem*, 948 Collection, file no. 1604 p. 20.

<sup>37</sup> *Idem*, *Microfilms* Collection, roll P.II 1.1764, frame 20.

<sup>38</sup> *Idem*, 948 Collection, file no. 1604 p. 27.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 30.

❖ *The material (economic) factor*, along with the demographic one, constituted a particularly important component of the war potential available to Romania in the interwar period. In this paper we briefly present the most important elements related to the economic factor, namely: agricultural potential, raw materials, and technical and industrial potential, to which we add the situation of the communication routes and means of transport, which are inextricably linked to economy.

Based on the national defence doctrine, agricultural potential had to ensure the food necessary for the armed forces and the civilian population, and, at the same time, to provide stocks for the armed forces procurement and war industry. How important was this aspect in the planning and execution of military operations is proven by the observation made by General Ludendorff in *“La guerre totale”* as follows: *“Germany had great difficulties in providing food for people and the livestock, and the memory of these things remained deeply engraved in the minds of those who lived through the war”*<sup>40</sup>. Moreover, the Chief of the German Great General Staff during the First World War warned that *“following Romania’s declaration of war (15/27 August 1916 – A.N.), the decision to continue the operations until the occupation of Wallachia was dictated mainly by the need to enhance supplying the Central Empires”*<sup>41</sup> (German and Austro-Hungarian – A.N.). Such remarks are likely to emphasise the importance of the Romanian agricultural potential in the assessments done by European powers.

The distribution of the agricultural land in the interwar Romania was as follows: 13,951 million ha (47%) of arable land, 6,584 million ha (22.3%) forests, 3,293 million ha (11.2%) pastures, 1,87 million ha (6.3%) meadows, 369,000 (1.2%) vineyards, 29,000 (1%) orchards<sup>42</sup>.

The distribution of land use (in hectares) in different regions is presented in *table 7*<sup>43</sup>.

*Table 7*

Province/Type of land	Old Kingdom	Transylvania and Banat	Bessarabia	Bukovina
Arable land	7,047,729	3,409,763	3,143,647	337,313
Pastures and meadows	1,216,769	2,121,312	374,469	144,552
Orchards, vineyards	285,674	138,203	134,158	3,677
Forests	2,517,203	3,282,307	199,460	449,503
Barren lands, waters	2,722,925	1,276,615	588,466	109,155

<sup>40</sup> Erich von Ludendorff, *La guerre totale*, 1937, apud Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Verdeş, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>42</sup> *Anuarul statistic al României 1937 și 1938*, București, 1939, pp. 565-567.

<sup>43</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Verdeş, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

In the cultivation of arable land, cereals, especially wheat and corn, occupied the highest percentage, completely ensuring the necessary quantity for the population in peacetime. In the years with favourable weather conditions the production of wheat and corn was about 3 to 3.7 million tons, and 5-6 million tons. For export were available 15,000-30,000 wagons of wheat and 50,000-150,000 wagons of corn. Also, the production of meat and other animal products ensured both domestic consumption and some surplus for export<sup>44</sup>.

In 1938, Romania's foreign trade had the structure shown in *table 8*<sup>45</sup>:

*Table 8*

Commodity types	Export (quintals)	Import (quintals)
Fuel, oil, by-products	33,820,198	707,582
Cereals and by-products	7,991,132	161,099
Wood industry and by-products	6,965,685	3,380
Vegetables, plants	792,027	78,423
Seeds, plants	733,661	15,357
Live animals	452,993	758
Animal products	126,478	43,085
Appliances, machines, engines	1,700	320,816
Textiles, textile plants	1,001	35,632
Vehicles	120	123,725

The presented statistics clearly show that Romania was mainly an agrarian country that had significant raw materials, and was a market for industrial products. Of the raw materials, oil was one of the most important, but also the one most targeted by the Great Powers, a reference point in external trade. With a production of 6,871 million tons in 1930, Romania ranked six in the world in terms of the volume of oil production after the US (170,432 million tons), the USSR (30,112 million tons), Venezuela (28,107 million tons), Iran (10,358 million tons) and the Dutch Indies (7,394 million tons)<sup>46</sup> and first in Europe if we exclude the USSR.

During 1930-1937, Romania's oil exports had the following evolution (*table 9*)<sup>47</sup>.

*Table 9*

Year	Quantity (tons)
1930	3,905,409
1931	4,697,053
1932	5,184,234
1933	5,885,633
1934	6,547,422
1935	6,613,141
1936	6,885,128
1937	5,668,942

Between 1938 and 1940, oil production, domestic consumption and export had the values (in tons)<sup>48</sup> presented in *table 10*.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 40-46.

<sup>45</sup> "Argus", no. 7721, 5 January 1939.

<sup>46</sup> "România", no. 271, 2 March 1939.

<sup>47</sup> *Anuarul statistic al României 1937 și 1938*, București, 1939, pp. 565-567.

<sup>48</sup> Gh. Buzatu, *O istorie a petrolului românesc*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1998, p. 412.

**Table 10**

Year	Production	Domestic consumption	Export
1938	6,610,000	1,647,046	4,159,325
1939	6,240,000	1,784,750	3,848,403
1940	5,810,000	1,862,000	3,192,523

Considered the “*blood of the economy*”<sup>49</sup>, “*keystone*” for industry, transport, and the first condition for the states’ national defence<sup>50</sup>, the Romanian oil became object of dispute between the major European powers, especially Germany, and the *primary objective* in their political and military strategy.

Unfortunately, the Romanian political class did not understand the value that the oil “*card*” could have in our country’s relations with the Great Powers, especially in the turmoil of 1936-1940, and the wrong understanding of the “*game*” of interests would generate adverse consequences for Romania<sup>51</sup>.

Along with oil, the Romanian state had available other deposits of raw materials that could have helped it developing a strong national defence industry, as shown in *table 11*<sup>52</sup>:

**Table 11**

Type of deposit	Region/Area/Town	Total reserves (thousand tons)
Iron	Poiana-Ruscă, Hunedoara, Caraş (Vadu Dobrei, Asăniş, Richitova, Baia lui Crain, Domsuşi, Boiţa, Groşi)	16,000
	Banat (Bocşa-Montană, Lupac, Dolina, Luibova, Ieşelniţa, Ogradina, Dubovna, Armeniş, Ialoniţa)	4,300
	Munţii Apuseni (Vaşcău, Zimbru, Săvârşin, Sebiş, Trascău)	3,400
	Odorhei-Ciuc (Lueta-Ciuc, Racoşu de Jos, Madărag)	1,900
	Maramureş (Kirva-Turc, Poiana-Rona, Baia Luchi, Comărzov, Borza)	270

<sup>49</sup> Anton Zischka, *Războiul petrolului*, Editura Cartea Românească, 1942, p. 14, apud Gh. Buzatu, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>50</sup> Cesare Alimenti, *Il petrolio nell’ economia mondiale*, Torino, Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1939, p. 67, apud Gh. Buzatu, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>51</sup> Gh. Buzatu, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-331.

<sup>52</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Verdeş, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-56.

Type of deposit	Region/Area/Town	Total reserves (thousand tons)
Copper	Tulcea (Alten-Tepe, Hortachioi, Ceamurlia); Banat (Oravița, Ciclova, Sasca, Cărbunari, Moldova); Valea Mureșului (Căzânești, Almaș, Zam); Bihor (Băița, Capnic); the Eastern Carpathians (Pojorâta, Sândominic); the Southern Carpathians (Baia de Aramă, Valea lui Stan)	Reserves estimated at approx. 9 million tons, of which approximately 1,200 tons exploited annually (1935).
Lead	Baia Sprie, Capnic, Herja, Băița, Baia-Mare, Rodna	Production of 6,000-7,000 tons, sufficient for domestic needs.
Mercury	Auriferous and argentiferous regions from the Apuseni Mountains and Baia Mare; the Dosului Valley (Dumbrava Hunedoara)	Production of 3,500 tons (1927).
Aluminium	Bauxite ore containing aluminium is found in significant quantities in Remetea, Pietrosul, the Codrului Mountains (Bihor); Exploitations only in Dobrești-Roșia (Bihor)	Reserves estimated at 30-40 million tons, with about 50% metal. Annual production of only 6,000 tons, much under the necessary quantity, especially in aeronautics.
Manganese	Cărlibaba (the Bărgău Mountains), Vatra-Dornei (Iacobeni), Pucioasa, Ciocănești; Maramureș (Poeni, Vișeu de Sus); Lăpus region (Mașca, Răzoare, Durușa); Baia de Arieș (Turda); Vașcău, Moneasa (the Codrului Mountains). Exploitations only in Moșca and Răzvan (Somes), Delinești (Caraș); Arșița, Aur and Roza (Iacobeni region)	
Nickel	Bădeni-Muscel, Zlatna, Vințu de Jos, Oravița, Teregova, Dubara and Ogradina (Banat)	Not exploited.
Chromium	Dubara, Ogradina (Severin); in Banat, near the Danube	No processing plants.
Zinc	Cărlibaba, Banat, Baia-Mare, Capnic	Annual production of about 200 tons. 45,000 tons were imported.
Titan	Pianul-Românului, Tișovița (Banat)	Titanium, tungsten, antimony, vanadium, needed for the production of special steels, were not exploited.
Tungsten	Baia Sprie, Băița (Banat), Teregova (Banat)	
Molybdenum	Băița (Bihor)	
Antimony	Bulza (Severin), Baia-Sprie, Capnic	
Vanadium	Vanadium is found in the form of efflorescence on the veins of lead, copper, bismuth	
Graphite	Baia de Fier, Novaci, Polovragi (Gorj) in the Parâng Mountains	

Not mining some of the mentioned raw materials was mainly because of the difficult extraction process, the small quantities of the deposits and insufficient domestic capital for mining.

However, military experts were unanimous in assessing that they covered the necessary quantity for the domestic defence industry, “*we can find almost all metals and simple elements that we need*”<sup>53</sup>.

In terms of industrial production, it had in the interwar period an average annual growth of over 5%. In 1938, the year of maximum economic development, there were 3,767 large companies with 289,117 workers, compared to 1919 when there were only 2,747 such economic units, the output value being of 69,206 million lei<sup>54</sup>.

Thus in 1938 the industry contributed 39% to the formation of the social product and 30.8% to the national income. Moreover, non-agricultural sectors (industry, transport, construction, goods movement) had a 61.5% contribution to the national income, and agriculture and forestry area contributed 38.5%<sup>55</sup>. During this period some new branches that were important for the national defence, like mechanical engineering, chemistry, aeronautics etc., experienced a sustained development. However, among the policy makers and the specialists in economics, it was recognised that Romania continued to be an industrially underdeveloped country and with significant gaps compared to the Western countries and even to some Central-European countries like Czechoslovakia or Poland<sup>56</sup>.

In this context, it must be stressed that, although at the beginning of the war, the national defence industry produced some types of weapons and combat equipment (ZB machine guns and ammunition at Cugir, 60 and 81.4 mm calibre mortars at Voina, Braşov; 37 mm calibre antitank guns and ammunition at Astra, Braşov, 47 mm guns at Concordia, Ploieşti; 75 mm cannon in Reşita, planes at IAR Braşov), it was unable to provide appropriate supplies, the Romanian Armed Forces still being dependent on imports. In the worsened international context and with the outbreak of the Second World War, the issue of purchasing weapons and combat armaments necessary for national defence became a critical one for the Romanian State.

❖ *The means of communications* and transport were, in turn, an important element of war potential, closely linked and interdependent with the material factor (economic).

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<sup>53</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Verdes, *România. Studiu geografic, fizic, economic și militar*, vol. I, second edition, Bucureşti, Tipografia ziarului “*Universul*”, 1939, p. 66.

<sup>54</sup> *Enciclopedia României*, vol. II, 1943, p. 453.

<sup>55</sup> *Istoria economiei naționale*, Bucureşti, 1974, p. 474.

<sup>56</sup> Virgil Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești după războiul mondial*, Bucureşti, 1940, pp. 357-358.



Their importance was highlighted in the interwar military studies, which considered that the communication network in peacetime conditions ensured the speed at which the transport between different regions was performed, and in wartime facilitated or hindered the mobilisation, concentration or manoeuvre of troops and supplies in a theatre of operations from one direction to another<sup>57</sup>.

The communication system had to meet the needs of both national defence, making it easily achieve flexible and operative leadership, and the country. Given the poor condition of the railways and roads in Transylvania, and especially of those from Bessarabia, the political-military leaders had to include, among their priorities, linking the two provinces to the national communication networks, as well as completing and upgrading them. It was required for strategic reasons too, as “... *poor communication network means long, heavy and slow convoys, which cause delays in organising the battle formations, in delivering supplies and in evacuation*”<sup>58</sup>.

The number of km of railways increased during 1930-1940 from 11,135 km to 11,410 km, and that of double track from 218 km to 405 km. The rolling stock consisted of 2,271 locomotives, 190 cars and 63,420 wagons<sup>59</sup>. The improvement of the link between eastern, western and southern theatres and the Transylvanian Basin was achieved by building the Ilva Mică-Vatra Dornei railroad and some portions of the Braşov-Nehoiu-Buzău; Deda-Sărătel; Salva-Vişeu; Bumbeşti-Livezeni sections etc. However, the density of 4 km railway to 100 km<sup>2</sup> was unsatisfactory both economically and operatively, placing Romania among the underdeveloped European countries<sup>60</sup>. The small number of track sections that could be used for military operations created major difficulties for moving troops toward the border areas. Also, the transport capacity was low, as the 405 km double tracks were insufficient to meet the economic and military needs.

In 1936, the length and condition of the national (highways), county and village roads network were as presented in *table 12*<sup>61</sup>.

The *Law on the nation and territory organisation for war*, dated 27 April 1933, took into account the development of road communications so that to address the needs of both the military and the population<sup>62</sup>. Firstly, it was stipulated

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<sup>57</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Constantin Verdeş, *Potenţial de război...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-81.

<sup>58</sup> General Ioan Sichiţiu, Lieutenant Colonel David Popescu, *Corpul de armată în bătălie*, Tipografia Şcolii militare de infanterie no. 1, 1928, p. 29.

<sup>59</sup> *Anuarul statistic al României, 1939 şi 1940*, Bucureşti, 1939, p. 522.

<sup>60</sup> Leonida Loghin, *Apărarea ţării în concepţia militară a României în perioada 1932-1939*, Doctoral thesis, Military Academy, Bucureşti, 1979, pp. 48-49.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 513-514.

<sup>62</sup> C. Hamangiu, *Codul general al României*, vol. XXI, Part II, codes, laws and regulations, Imprimeria Centrală Bucureşti, 1933, p. 447.

*Table 12*

Type	Total, of which	Upgraded	Stone	Paved roads quality			Unpaved
				Good	Mediocre	Poor	
National	13,882	1,742.1	12,139.9	5,142	5,384.6	1,613.3	
County	29,787.8		23,836.4	6,392.4	12,818.8	4,625.2	5,951.4
Village	57,467.3		17,922.4	2,383.4	9,177.7	6,361.3	39,544.9
Total	101,137.1	1,742.1	53,898.7	13,917.8	27,381.1	12,500.2	45,496.3

the construction and repair of a number of roads and paved roads in Transylvania and Banat<sup>63</sup>. The project was unduly delayed, among the invoked reasons, in the case of railroads, being the inadequate funding.

In early 1938, the Superior Council of National Defence decided over the roads that had to be urgently built in the three operative fronts. Most were penetration communications to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies to the border<sup>64</sup>. For the construction of those roads there were provided loans worth 7-8 billion, phased over 4-5 years<sup>65</sup>. According to the overall operative conception, priority was given to the Western Front to which most funds were allocated<sup>66</sup>. On that front, work started in 1937 and until the summer of 1939, over 50% of the planned volume was done. The pace on the Eastern Front was slower during the same time, only 81 km of roads frame being constructed<sup>67</sup>. The same slow pace manifested on the Southern Front. The works contracted there were aimed at improving communications in south-eastern Muntenia, and not at developing the roads in Dobruja, where the defendable main actual front was, and where the operational needs required the movement of human and material forces.

Regarding the maritime and river roads, Romania had six ports – Bugaz, Sulina, Constanța, Mangalia, Cavarna and Balchik – the most important being Constanța and Sulina. Between 1927 and 1938, the Romanian Maritime Society had 25 vessels, carried 39,996 passengers and 364,409 tons of freight<sup>68</sup>. From a military perspective, the cabotage traffic could ensure the deployment of forces from the eastern theatre to the southern one, and then, by the Danube, to the western front.

<sup>63</sup> A.M.R., 948 Collection, file no. 503, pp. 1-5.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 30-31. They planned to build urgently the following roads: a) On the Western Front: Marghita-Almașu Mare-Nușfalău-Mesteacăn; Bratea-Roșia-Beiuș; Tășnad-Supuru-Mirșid-Greaca-Fodora; Nușfalău-Sirbi-Ciucea; b) On the Southern Front: București-Roșiori de Vede; București-Budești-Mănăstirea-Călărași-Chiciu; Medgidia-Cobadin-Caraomer; București-Urziceni-Slobozia-Medgidia; c) On the Eastern Front: Iași-Sculeni-Bălți; Iași-Ungheni-Cornești; Bârlad-Fălciu-Românești; Reni-Tarutino. And then there were scheduled for execution other 12 itineraries.

<sup>65</sup> *Idem*, file no. 494. In 1939, 600 million lei were allotted for the construction of roads in Transylvania.

<sup>66</sup> *Idem*, file no. 438, p. 581.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>68</sup> *Anuarul statistic al României, 1939 și 1940*, București, 1939, p. 575.

The waterways – the Danube with its branches, in total, 1396 kilometres, certain sectors of the Dniester and the Prut rivers and the Bega Channel – appropriately ensured the transportation of goods and people. At the same time, they helped strengthen the defence system, representing strong defensive alignments.

During the interwar period, air transport witnessed a significant development so that in 1938 there were 22 airports and air stations. There were five airlines operating internationally and four domestic airlines on the routes București-Arad-Timișoara-Craiova, București-Constanța, București-Chișinău and București-Cetatea Albă. The air infrastructure could be also used in the event of armed conflict by the air forces.

In conclusion, we can say that, at the beginning of the Second World War, the national network of communication routes, particularly the road one, was insufficient as density and orientation, and only partially met the needs of the military to transport and manoeuvre the forces. Given that in modern European armed forces the focus was on increasing the number of mechanised troops, in the Romanian Armed Forces the base of road transport was still provided by hypo means (horse and cart)<sup>69</sup>.

❖ *The morale factor* was throughout the entire interwar period, as well as on the eve and during the Second World War, an element of significance for the Romanian state war potential. Military theorists emphasised the special value of this factor for the combat capability of the troops. Thus, Major General Ion Jitianu showed that the forces' morale is the *"unseen power that can galvanise both masses and individuals, and makes them capable of extraordinary achievements"*<sup>70</sup>. He also stated that *"the more a nation possesses people superior in terms of intelligence, will and energy to work, to do something useful for society, the better its morale is"*, and concluded *"When, the leaders of a nation are people of superior quality, they boost the morale of the nation, which influences the **armed forces** (emphasis in the original – A.N.)"*<sup>71</sup>. Referring to domestic issues, the military analyst stated: *"Our country is so rich, it only needs superior people to live up to its material forces. So **intelligence, will, energy and character** (emphasis in the original – A.N.). No matter how blessed this country is, we will not achieve anything without hard work, honour and good leadership, in order to take advantage of what nature has given us"*<sup>72</sup>.

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<sup>69</sup> Leonida Loghin, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>70</sup> Major General Ion Jitianu, *Forțele morale și forțele materiale la război*, București, Imprimeria Statului, 1928, p. 18.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 32.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 35.

Fair and perennial are these observations and conclusions. In turn, Professor Victor Slăvescu warned *“For today and the future, it is primarily required a more solid consciousness and a higher moral education. Fulfilment of duty, selfless spirit of sacrifice, and love for the motherland must still be thoroughly nurtured into the souls of peasants, through culture and education. Discipline and blind obedience must be attained through conscience and reason, not by fear of sanctions”*<sup>73</sup>.

Reunified in its ethnic and historical borders, by the will expressed during the National Assembly in Chişinău – 27 March 1918, Cernăuţi – 28 November 1918 and Alba Iulia – 1 December 1918, and legally sanctioned by the Paris Peace Treaties in 1919-1920, Romania led throughout the interwar period a defensive foreign and military policy, in defence of European peace and territorial status quo. The dramatic events of the years 1938-1939 destroyed the Versailles political order, the stability and balance of power in Europe, putting in serious jeopardy its territorial integrity and its existence as a state.

Faced with its revisionist neighbours’ threat of attacking its borders even to the disappearance as a state, the nation responded jointly, and openly manifested its determination to fight to defend the territorial integrity and independence of Romania. In January 1939 Armand Călinescu synthesised the fundamental characteristics of the Romanian state: *“We are, of course, a national state. We are the oldest and the first people who occupied it, worked for it and got the best of it. If subsequently – highlighted the future president of the Council of Ministers – some regions were temporarily under foreign domination, they did not change our fundamental right, they only violated it... Therefore, the Romanian state border is the border of the Romanian nation. It is not drawn by any convention; it is not attributed by any treaty. It is shown by history and natural rights. Therefore, we will defend it to the last breath, as a holy heritage”*<sup>74</sup>. In March 1939, following the partial mobilisation, in the opinion of Prime Minister Armand Călinescu, *“three to four times more citizens than those conscripted”*<sup>75</sup> presented themselves to sign up for the armed forces. It was a clear demonstration of patriotism and firm will of the Romanians to defend their borders and their right to live freely and in peace with all neighbours.

The issue of the journal *“Semnalul”* on 1 August 1939 reiterated the Romanians’ decision to defend the country, noting: *“We do not covet for what is not ours, but, even in case of a world cataclysm, we do not hesitate to defend our borders up to the last drop of blood”*.

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<sup>73</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 26.

<sup>74</sup> „*Universul*”, no. 10, 13 January 1939.

<sup>75</sup> „*România*”, no. 298, 29 March 1939.

During the mobilisation in September 1939, the Romanian intelligence offices reported to their echelons: “*Conscripts answer readily to the conscription orders they receive through the gendarmerie stations. Requisitions done by the requisitioning commissions are running without any opposition from the population at an accelerated pace*”<sup>76</sup>. It was a new expression of the unwavering decision of the citizens to reject by fighting any aggression against Romania’s borders and to unconditionally support the entire country’s war effort.

Taking into account the above-mentioned aspects, we consider that the morale factor was an essential resource to support and strengthen the military potential of the Romanian state in the times of distress and tension during 1938-1939. In the summer of 1940, the military and political decision-makers chose to yield to the aggressors’ ultimatum and diktat, although the armed forces and the great mass of citizens were determined to fight to defend the country.

In conclusion, we consider that the factors that strengthened the country’s military potential in the interwar period were: the demographic and economic resources, the military homogeneity in terms of attitude and motivation. The following aspects negatively affected the combat capability of the country: the utterly unfavourable to Romania international context, especially after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact; the external pressures aimed at taking control over the economic resources and the geostrategic position of the Romanian state; the failure of the military-political alliances concluded by Romania in the interwar period; the shortcomings and irregularities in supplying the armed forces with modern weapons and combat equipment; the lack of strategic vision in Romania’s foreign policy, especially after 7 March 1936; the surrendering attitude of a significant part of the Romanian political class during the tragic events of the summer and fall of 1940.



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<sup>76</sup> A.M.R, *Ministerul de Interne* collection, file no. 305/1940, pp. 107-108.

# ROMANIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY IN THE 1916-1919 CAMPAIGNS

Sorin TURTURICĂ

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*The author presents the activity of the Romanian anti-aircraft artillery in the 1916-1919 campaigns. Thus, the spring and summer of 1918 were not favourable for the Central Powers. The German Armed Forces launched several offensives on the Western Front, but all of them failed. The fate of the First World War was to be decided in the autumn. On 16/29 September, Bulgaria signed the armistice in Thessalonica, following a large-scale action conducted by the Entente. On 17/30 October, Turkey exited from war (the Armistice of Mudros), forced by the English from Palestine and Syria. Austria-Hungary was defeated by Italy and signed the Armistice of Villa Giusti, on 21 October/3 November. Finally, on 29 October/11 November 1918, following the Armistice of Compiègne, the German Armed Forces capitulated and the First World War ended.*

**Keywords:** counterattack; artillery; political factors; Mărășești; French Military Mission

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**O**n 14 August 1916, at 20.45 o'clock, Edgar Mavrocordat, Romanian diplomatic representative to Vienna, sent to the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, Count Istvan Burian, the declaration of war by the Romanian government. A quarter of an hour later, the Romanian troops crossed the Carpathians and headed to Transylvania. After three hours, starting the first minute on 15 August, general mobilisation was ordered.

Once the armed forces were mobilised, the anti-aircraft artillery was established. Thus, in compliance with Order no. 2615 on 9 August 1916 of the Great General Staff, on 15 August 1916, it was established, under Bucharest Fortress Command, the *Antiaircraft Artillery Corps*. The first commander of the new structure was Captain Gheorghe Ciurea, who, up to that time, was in the 1<sup>st</sup> Artillery Regiment Cetate<sup>1</sup>.

The beginning of anti-aircraft artillery was marked by improvisation. Most officers were retired engineers, career officers avoiding to be part of the structure

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Sorin Turturică – the National Museum of Romanian Aviation.

<sup>1</sup> Romanian Military Archives (further, AMR), *Journal of Operations of the Antiaircraft Artillery Division* Collection, f. 1.

led by Captain Ciurea, because of its novelty, its precarious combat assets and the lack of information on their use. The cannons came from the field ones (75 mm calibre) or of those that had been part of the fortifications batteries (57 mm calibre); they had been adapted since 1915 for anti-aircraft combat at the Army Arsenal in Bucharest by Majors Gabriel Negrei and Ștefan Burileanu.

On 25 August 1916, ten days after the onset of mobilisation, the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps had the following organisation:

- five 75 mm calibre batteries, (Md.) 1880 model, each consisting of two sections with two cannons. The sections were situated in the following points: Ghencea, Rahova, Șerban Vodă, Văcărești, Dudești, Obor, Floreasca, Băneasa, Atelierele Noi and Cotroceni;
- a 57 mm calibre battery, having two sections, situated at Chitila Triaj and at Văcărești depot;
- an infantry platoon consisting of eight anti-aircraft machine guns sections, disposed to defend some military installations in Bucharest;
- 22 observation posts, in Comana, Titu, Țigănești, Movilița, Bilciulești, Sohat, Prundu, Greaca, Hotarele, Putineiu, Gustinari, Budești, Pârlita, Vida-Cârtojeni, Drăgănești, Toporu, Frățești, Crevedia, Clejani, Letca Nouă, Bila, Călugăreni;
- twelve projector sections in: Ghencea, Cupole, Rahova, Șerban Vodă, Văcărești, Obor, Dudești, Floreasca, Băneasa, Chitila, Ateliere, Elisabeta Blvd. no. 15. The projectors were "*Harlé system*", having 90 cm diameter concave parabolic mirrors.

Independently from the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps, the following structures were established:


a) Antiaircraft defence of the Târgoviște-Teiș and Sălcuțele areas, to protect the ammunition depots and the military units concentration areas. It consisted of five 75 mm Md. 1880 cannons, two 57 mm "*Negrei system*" cannons, and five machine guns, all under the command of Lieutenant (r.) C. Vișoreanu, who, in turn, was subordinate to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division Sedentary Part;

b) The anti-aircraft defence of the area Cernavodă – Borcea – Fetești, having as objective "*Regele Carol I*" bridge over the Danube. The seven 75 mm Md. 1880 cannons formed three sections, under the command of 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenants Sion Teodorescu, Victor Priboianu and Constantin Vlădescu, all depending on the Commander of Cernavodă Bridgehead;

c) The anti-aircraft defence of Dudești gunpowder mill that, besides the already-mentioned section, appointed by the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps, had a 75 mm Md. 1880 battery (four cannons), a 57 mm "*Negrei system*" battery



(four cannons), a 57 mm “*Burileanu system*” cannon, and three machine guns, all under the command of Lieutenant (r.) A. Popp, depending administratively and operationally on the commander of the gunpowder mill;



**Photo 1: Anti-aircraft “*Burileanu system*” cannon<sup>2</sup>**

d) The “*Deport system*” battery, mobilised by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Artillery Regiment in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Corps, was situated at the regiment headquarters, in the yard of Malmaison, in Plevna Street. It was established on 17 August 1916, under the command of Lieutenant Constantin Constantin. Because it belonged to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Corps in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Romanian Army commanded by General Al. Averescu, the battery could be considered the *first Land Forces anti-aircraft artillery structure in our history*<sup>3</sup>.



**Photo 2: Field guns adapted to anti-aircraft combat by Romanian experts, hidden by vegetation (1916)**

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<sup>2</sup> Photos are from the National Military Museum Archive.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*.

In the first week after Romania entered the war against Austria-Hungary, the strategic situation deteriorated seriously. The states that were allied to the Dual Monarchy – Germany, Turkey and Bulgaria – declared war to Romania (on 15, 17 and 19 August). However, the obligations assumed by our country allies to launch offensive operations in Galitia and Thessalonica failed to materialise.

While the majority of the Romanian divisions were concentrated in the Carpathians, the Bulgarian-German troops, under the command of Marshal August von Mackensen, attacked Turtucaia, which was conquered within few days (20-24 August 1916). The defeat had immense psychological consequences. Wrongly considering that an enemy attack on the capital was imminent, the Great General Headquarters ordered to stop the troops advance in Transylvania<sup>4</sup>.

For several weeks, the situation on the southern front was stabilised by augmenting the defence of Dobrudja with three Romanian and three Russian divisions. In parallel, on 18-19 September, under the command of General Averescu, a decisive strike was attempted to encircle the enemy troops in the Quadrilateral. It is the *manoeuvre at Flămânda* (the name comes from the village situated east of Giurgiu, where five divisions tried to cross the Danube, using a pontoon bridge). Although it began in force, meeting the objectives set for the first two days, Averescu's action was stopped because of the attacks launched by the German and Austrian-Hungarian troops in Transylvania. Again, the situation on another front stopped a Romanian offensive action.



*Photo 3: 75 mm calibre cannon, imported from France in the autumn of 1916*

<sup>4</sup> For details, see Constantin Kirîţescu, *Istoria Războiului pentru Întregirea Naţională, 1916-1919*, Ediția a II-a, vol. 1, Editura Casa Școalelor, București, pp. 348-403.

However, during “*Flămânda episode*”, it was recorded the first victory of the Romanian antiaircraft artillery over an enemy aircraft. For the antiaircraft defence of the bridge, the *Deport* battery was deployed, which was subordinate to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Corps Bucharest. On 19 September – the second day of the manoeuvre over the Danube –, the section of the Sergeant candidate Dumitru Limburg succeeded in shooting down a German aircraft, which fell 500 metres west of the bridge, on the Romanian bank. On impact, the aircraft caught fire. It was the first acknowledged victory of the Romanian antiaircraft artillery. In memory of it, the day of *19 September* is celebrated as the *Antiaircraft Artillery and Missile Day*. For the victory, Lieutenant Constantin Constantin, the battery commander, was awarded the Order “*Crown of Romania*”, and the Sergeant candidate Dumitru Limburg was awarded the Medal “*Bravery and Devotion*”<sup>5</sup>.

After the operations to cross the Danube were stopped, the *Deport Battery* was appointed to the Capital defence disposition, where the situation became worse from one week to another. In fact, starting the night that followed Romania’s entry into the First World War, the Capital was bombed by a German zeppelin. There were other night attacks for a month, but they did not result in great damage. Several German zeppelins (no. 86, 97 and 101), which attacked the cities of Romania, operated from Bulgaria, from Iampol, where there was a base, and from Austria-Hungary, from Timișoara. On 21 August, zeppelin no. 86 was damaged. It succeeded in returning to Bulgaria only after it threw most of its equipment. Once it returned to the base, it was found out that the damage caused by the Romanian antiaircraft artillery was so serious that the aircraft could not be repaired and used in other missions. Related to that episode, in 1917, in the German press appeared the notes of an officer that belonged to the crew of zeppelin no. 86, which were then translated by Nicolae Iorga and published in Iași. Reading them, we find out interesting pieces of information about the effect of the Romanian antiaircraft artillery on the zeppelin: “... *On both sides of the aircraft there are reflectors that stretch their huge wings to the sky. There are about a dozen and the number increases. They quickly sweep the sky searching everywhere. They are about to catch us.*

*A blaze flashes the middle of the aircraft. Immediately, all the reflectors are directed to it. In the gondola, all the people look to the ground blinded. As on command, the antiaircraft artillery takes action. The shrapnel that explodes gets closer and closer as white clouds. (...) <Throw!>. Bombs come one after another.*

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<sup>5</sup> AMR, *Journal of Operations of the Antiaircraft Artillery Division* Collection, f. 6.

«Explosive bomb, incendiary bomb». The aircraft rises and descends under the pressure of the air; everyone holds well. «It was a wonderful explosion down there!»<sup>6</sup>. The cannons of the antiaircraft artillery fire wildly. The reflectors sweep the sky. It is an overwhelming show that marks the memory. The crew members are very tense...

Slowly but constantly, which is sinister, the barograph scores a downward curve on the paper. Certainly, we were struck! No wonder, considering the cannonade of the Romanians. And, indeed, when the windows of the gondola shattered into tiny bits, the shrapnel clouds were near the balloon. Of course, some shrapnel parts got through the cells...

It is no time for doubt. Each lost minute means cube meters of precious gas wasted. The Danube is in front of us. We can see it as a wide and bright stripe. The friendly country is on the other side. Z 86 will not fall prey to the enemy. That's for sure! If we succeed in repairing the damage in flight, namely to occlude the pierced cells, we can get home. If we manage to do it only partially, we will land wherever possible. (...)

The commander orders to examine the aircraft in the light. It is not much to examine. Exactly above the first gondola there are two cells damaged. (...) The commander looks at the map carefully. Beneath, there shine the waters of the Danube. The barograph ruthlessly designs the downward curve. «Remove and throw the BB engine!», orders the commander. The machinist begins to disassemble it. Heavy-hearted, he throws the engine, piece by piece. All the other dispensable objects follow the engine, obeying the order of the commander.

For a moment, the aircraft seems to be able to maintain the altitude. Then the barograph indicates a light decrease. Some barrels of gasoline, the last ballast on board, are thrown. Out of the big window, in the night, I can see a pretty large town, a railway, a railway station... It is Y[amp]. We are safe!<sup>6</sup>.

However, the great danger for Bucharest was not the zeppelin but the bomber. On 12 September 1912, it was the first German aerial attack. Five *Taube* aircraft dropped bombs in crowded areas, killing many people, especially children and women (the figures in military documents indicate some dozens dead, while the press raised the number to some hundred). The attacks continued until the Capital was occupied by the Germans, as the city could not be effectively defended because of both the lack of fighters and the poor equipment of the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps.

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<sup>6</sup> Constantin Kirişescu, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 299-300.

On 26 September 1916, General Mihail Boteanu reported the problems faced by the air defence of the Capital. Among the shortcomings, the most important one was that the cannons fired in slow motion, and the projectiles could not reach the altitude at which the enemy airplanes flew. Moreover, the slope of the platforms was not sufficiently inclined. That is why, when the German aircraft were over Bucharest, the cannons could not open fire on them: *“The platforms were not enough studied – Boteanu cynically wrote in the report –, so that the cannons had a platform that enabled firing the Capital and not the aircraft”*.

In the short term, it was not much to do. However, to make progress related to the fire results, the following measures were adopted:

1. Helped by the experts in the French Military Mission, aiming devices were installed on the cannons. On 10 October 1916, it was the first time when *“command telemeter”* was used for the 75 mm 1880 model batteries, adapted for antiaircraft firing, following the instructions of French Captain Humbert; subsequently, also helped by French officers, more land artillery equipment was adapted;

2. Increase in the number of cannons in the inventory of the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps – until the Capital was evacuated, the number of cannons in the disposition got to 36 (the number was, however, small compared to the necessary mouths of fire);

3. Establishment of two schools for antiaircraft firing (starting on 1 November 1916) – one of them was at Herăstrău, commanded by Lieutenant Dumitru Negreanu (for 57, 75 and 87 cannons), and another for the cannons that were recently brought from France, 75 mm cannons firing in fast motion, was near the town hall, commanded by Lieutenant Gibery<sup>8</sup>.

An important change in the structure was also on 1 November 1916. Starting on that day, the authority of the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps was extended over all the batteries in the interior area. Lieutenant Dumitru Matak became the Commander of the Capital Air Defence, and Lieutenant Șerban Ghica was appointed Commander of the Interior Area Air Defence<sup>9</sup>.

As it is well known, the 1916 Campaign ended up with the loss of Oltenia and Muntenia and with the withdrawal of political factors to Moldova. As the territory of Romania was occupied by the divisions of the Central Powers, in October-December 1916, the cannon batteries and the projector sections

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<sup>7</sup> AMR, *Bucharest Fortress Command* Collection, File no. 57, f. 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 13.

in the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps received the order for redeployment. It was executed in stages as follows:

- on 14 October, after the fall of Cernavodă, five cannons were sent to Brăila, and two temporarily occupied defence positions near the railway station in Fetești; subsequently, they joined those in the Brăila defence disposition;
- on the night 13/14 November, the largest part of the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps left Bucharest heading to Moldova; the 32 cannons (of which 8 were received from the Arsenal) and 12 projector sections got to Pașcani on 3 December 1916;
- on the night 20/21 October, the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps Command and Depot battery were evacuated, one being sent to Pașcani and one to Galați;
- on 19 December, the air defence of Brăila was evacuated to Galați.

During the difficult moments of withdrawal, on 13 December 1916, the second acknowledged victory of the Romanian antiaircraft artillery was obtained, when a section of 75 mm Md. 1880 cannons, under the command of 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Sion Teodorescu, shot a German bi-engine in Brăila<sup>10</sup>.

On 1 February 1917, the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps was no more under the command of the Bucharest Fortress Command (which was disbanded, as its existence was no longer justified). Therefore, Major Nicolae Opran was appointed as the Corps Commander and Captain Gheorghe Ciurea as Deputy Commander (on 30 April, Major Gh. Ciurea was transferred to a heavy artillery regiment, and Lieutenant Ioan Constantinescu was appointed as Deputy Commander of the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps). In the spring of 1917, the Corps had 40 officers and 1 400 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. To educate and train the newcomers, on 28 April 1917, in Stolniceni, shooting courses for air defence were organised. The number of cannons continually increased, the batteries being deployed not only in the front area but also in some centres in the interior, where there were commands, depots or installations that were vital for ensuring communications with the divisions in the front line. In fact, there were antiaircraft artillery batteries in Iași, Roman, Vaslui, Bârlad, Tecuci, Galați, Adjud and Onești. Moreover, because the royal train was, in the first half of 1917, the target of several attacks of the German aviation, an air defence wagon was attached to it. A 57 mm Burileanu system cannon and a machine gun were installed on it.

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<sup>10</sup> For the stages of withdrawal, see AMR, *Journal of Operations of the Antiaircraft Artillery Division* Collection, ff. 12-25.



In June 1917, the last month of relative calmness on the front in Moldova, in the *Journal of Operations* of the Antiaircraft Artillery Division it was written: “*On the front of the 1<sup>st</sup> Army as well as on that of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army the antiaircraft posts strike enemy aircraft executing incursions and reconnaissance missions almost every day, forcing them to go back or hampering their mission*”. In this context, on 12 June, a German aircraft, *Albatros* type, was shot down by a cannon situated near Cosmești railway station; the aircraft fell down in the German lines<sup>11</sup>.

In the summer of 1917, both Romanian and German commands planned large-scale operations. The Romanians were the first to launch offensive, on 9 July, in Mărăști area, where there was the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army led by General Alexandru Averescu. After two days of preparation, on 11 July, artillery troops assaulted the enemy lines. In the trenches there were bayonet attacks and the offensive continued southward. After several days it should have been launched the main attack on the front in the south of Moldova: the Romanian 1<sup>st</sup> Army offensive in Nămolosa. It was not executed because, in another sector, the Russian troops defence started to yield, endangering the back of the Romanian divisions.

In Mărăști, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army continued the offensive actions for more ten days. Then it received the order to stop. Even though it had failed in meeting its goal, the victory in Mărăști boosted the Romanian armed forces morale as it proved, for the first time, that the Central Powers troops could be defeated.

Meanwhile, many antiaircraft artillery batteries were close to the first line. Related to the preparation and onset of the offensive in Mărăști-Nămolosa, the *Journal of Operations* of the Antiaircraft Artillery Division contains the following information: “*The antiaircraft artillery, by massive retaliation, prevented the enemy aircraft from meeting their goal. Thus our field and heavy batteries could not be easily discovered through photographic trials and the enemy failed to destroy our artillery, as it happened during the first part of the campaign. Although the numerous [Romanian] artillery troops were disposed all over the front, there was no battery damaged. Captive balloons, being protected, were not fired; it can be cited the case of the captive balloon at Hanul Conachi that, not being backed by air defence, was fired on 21 June by an enemy aircraft. The balloons that are backed by defence can accomplish their missions; it is the case of the captive balloon of the Heavy Artillery Group, as well as that of the balloon of the 40<sup>th</sup> Russian Division, which, being protected by our fixed post no. 3, were not prevented from accomplishing their missions, the post receiving written thanks for it. (...)*”

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, ff. 33-37.



*The enemy attempts to get closer to and attack the troops of the 12<sup>th</sup> Division, which were in the Dorața Forest, were hampered by the fire of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> mobile posts whose mission was to protect them.*

*It was difficult to cross the front, part of the enemy aircraft that targeted the interior being forced to fly back. (...)*

*As for the way the posts achieved their tasks, most of them received written thanks and congratulations from divisions and army corps<sup>12</sup>.*

On 24 July 1917, the 9<sup>th</sup> German Army launched the offensive to encircle the Romanian and Russian troops in the south of Moldova and then to eliminate them. The first attack was in the sector of the 34<sup>th</sup> Russian Division, which withdrew without fighting. Instead of the Russian regiments that were out of their commanders control the 5<sup>th</sup> Romanian Division was inserted, which managed to stop the enemy between the Siret and Mărășești. Other Romanian and Russian divisions were inserted in the front and there were other four weeks of bayonet attacks and counterattacks, strongly backed by the field and heavy artillery. There were more than 100 000 casualties, military from both parties.



*Photo 4: An anti-aircraft machine gun defending a bridge over the Siret*

After 29 days of violent fight, the German advance on the right bank of the Siret was stopped. The Romanian anti-aircraft artillery contribution to the Battle of Mărășești was mentioned in the same journal of operations as follows:

*“The activity conducted by the posts is the most intense in the period the 1<sup>st</sup> Army has fought. Each post executes between 20 and 30 shootings, namely 2 or 3 shootings daily, except for the days when flight is not possible.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem.*

*Mention should be made that the usual altitude is beyond 3 000-3 500 m and even over 4 000 m, so that both the field and heavy artillery can execute the assigned missions successfully.*

*No balloon has been on fire and the aircraft attempts to get close to them have failed.*

*The enemy raids are not regular, being carried out not only in the morning but also in the evening.*

*Posts 11 fixed, 2 mobile, 5 and 6 fixed, situated close to the battlefield, although often bombed by the enemy artillery, can achieve their tasks, being at the service of our troops”<sup>13</sup>.*

During the fights, a 57 mm Burileanu system cannons section shot down a German aircraft that fell down in the enemy lines. Even if fights ended up on 22 August, the enemy raids continued in the next weeks, the anti-aircraft artillery posts having to open fire daily, “often succeeding in hampering or preventing them from executing their assigned missions”.

To back the 9<sup>th</sup> German Army offensive in Mărășești, the 1<sup>st</sup> Austrian-Hungarian Army attacked the area of Oituz, where there was the 2<sup>nd</sup> Romanian Army. The fights began on 26 July and continued up to 9 August, disputing the heights between the Cașin and the Doftana Valleys. As in Mărășești, the enemy offensive ended up with a prestigious Romanian victory. The Romanian infantry divisions, backed by a cavalry division, a border guards brigade, the augmented mountain hunters battalion and some Russian regiments managed to prevent the Austrian-Hungarian and German troops from advancing. As in the case of the battles in Mărăști and Mărășești too, the Romanian anti-aircraft artillery was present on the front during the entire period of the battle in Oituz.

The period that immediately followed was also very interesting as the anti-aircraft batteries, gaining experience in the previous battles, became more and more effective. Thus, on 21 August 1917, two enemy aircraft were shot down. The first fell down in Piatra Neamț, being struck by a projectile of a 57 mm section. As a token of gratitude, following the proposals of the local garrison commander and the prefect of Neamț, it was organised a subscription and the sum of 1 524 lei was collected, to be offered to the anti-aircraft section. Its chief, Sergeant Grigore Surdu, distributed the sum of 1 200 lei among the subordinates and donated the rest to an orphanage.

The second victory on the 21 August was obtained by a battery situated in Bacău, under the command of Lieutenant Henri Montezi. It was also the battery of Montezi that managed to shoot down another aircraft, on 11 September 1917, thus becoming the first Romanian anti-aircraft artillery battery that won two air victories.

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<sup>13</sup> For the activity of the Romanian anti-aircraft artillery in the battles of Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz, see AMR, *Journal of Operations of the Anti-aircraft Artillery Division* Collection, ff. 39-55.

Another victory was obtained on 27 September on the front near Mărășești. After a 57 mm Burileanu system section opened fire, a German aircraft had to execute forced landing in the German lines. Detected by an artillery regiment, it was destroyed.

Another interesting episode was that on 27 August 1917, described in the *Journal of Operations* as follows: *The crew of the Royal Train, under the command of 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant Al. Popovici, accompanying H.M. the King in Coțofănești, execute firing on the front in the presence of H.M. the King, having very good results against a German aircraft*<sup>14</sup>.

It was an evolution, not only in quality but also in quantity. Thus, at the end of September 1917, more than a year after Romania entered the First World War, the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps had 153 cannons, 23 machine guns and 12 projectors in the inventory. Moreover, there were other machine guns on the front, adapted for antiaircraft combat, subordinate to brigade and regiment commanders. To train those who were newcomers in the antiaircraft batteries and sections it was established a school near Iași, having Romanian and French trainers.

In the autumn of 1917, the political situation in Russia changed radically. The Bolshevik movement, led by Lenin, seized power in Petrograd and announced that Russia would withdraw from war. Russian armies fell into anarchy and started withdrawing eastward. Consequently, Romania remained alone in front of the Central Powers and their Balkan allies, requesting to make peace with them. The armistice was signed in Focșani, on 26 November 1917. One of the consequences was the fact that the members of the French Military Mission left Romania, on 27 February 1918.

A new government was formed, led by Alexandru Marghiloman, who signed peace with the Central Powers (Bucharest, 24 April 1918). Consequently, the Romanian Armed Forces were demobilised.

Immediately after the event, all antiaircraft artillery posts started to concentrate at Stolniceni, to be demobilised. On 15 May, more than 2000 troops in the antiaircraft artillery were demobilised. On 1 July, in the context of the Romanian Armed Forces transition to peace establishment, the Antiaircraft Artillery Corps was renamed the Antiaircraft Artillery Division, consisting of four batteries, and having in its structure 35 officers and 173 enlisted and re-employed troops. Lieutenant Colonel Nicolae Opran remained the commander. The division also provided subsistence for 14 orphans.

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem.*



*Photo 5: The Antiaircraft Artillery Division troops in 1918*

However, the spring and the summer were unfavourable for the Central Powers. The German Armed Forces launched several offensives on the Western front, but all of them failed. The fate of the First World War was to be decided in the autumn. On 16/29 September, Bulgaria signed the armistice in Thessalonica, following a large-scale action conducted by the Entente. On 17/30 October, Turkey exited from war (the Armistice of Mudros), forced by the English from Palestine and Syria. Austria-Hungary was defeated by Italy and signed the Armistice of Villa Giusti, on 21 October/3 November. Finally, on 29 October/11 November 1918, following the Armistice of Compiègne, the German Armed Forces capitulated and the First World War ended.

Few days before the end of the conflict, in Iași it was established a new government, led by General Constantin Coandă, who ordered the armed forces mobilisation. Thus, Romania re-entered the war.

The collapse of the neighbouring empires made possible the unification of all Romanians within the same state. On 27 March/9 April 1918, Bessarabia got united with Romania. After the conclusion of the war, the Romanian provinces that belonged to the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire also decided to incorporate into the Romanian state (Bukovina on 15/28 November, and Transylvania, Banat, Crișana and Maramureș on 18 November/1 December 1918).

Even if the First World War ended on 11 November, the Romanian Armed Forces were on the warpath the next year too. The unification with Bessarabia

was not acknowledged by the Soviet Russia; that is why, along the eastern border the situation continued to be tense, which often resulted in armed confrontations between the Romanian border guards and the pro-Soviet groups on both banks of the Dniester.

It was also a serious situation in Transylvania, where five Romanian divisions (the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Hunter and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Cavalry Divisions) as well as a group of volunteers from Transylvania (two regiments) faced Hungarian troops that were ready to attack the Apuseni Mountains area. To back the Romanian sector of the front, up to the end of February 1919, the first two Transylvanian divisions (16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>) were established, which became the reserve of the Troops Command in Transylvania.

On 21 March 1919, the communist regime led by Béla Kun was installed in Budapest. Following his order, on the night of 15/16 April 1919, the Hungarian troops attacked the Romanian units that stationed in the Apuseni Mountains area. On 17 April, the Romanian armed forces, organised in two groups (the Northern and Southern ones), stopped the Hungarian offensive and launched counteroffensive, getting to the Tisza on 1 May 1919.

The second Hungarian attack on Romania took place on the morning of 20 July 1919. After several days, when the Romanian armed forces lost ground, they succeeded again in performing a rebalance, coming back to the Tisza at the end of July. On 31 July, the Romanian troops started to advance westward and got to Budapest, occupying it on 3-4 August 1919. The Romanian Armed Forces remained in the capital of Hungary up to 12 November.

The Romanian divisions that participated in the Campaign in Hungary were under the command of General Gheorghe Mărdărescu. Military aeronautics backed their action with a group of aviation and four antiaircraft artillery batteries (two road cannons and two railroad cannons)<sup>15</sup>. As the flights of the enemy aviation were rarer than those in the Campaigns in 1916 and 1917, the antiaircraft cannons successfully accomplished reconnaissance and firing missions.

The two road cannons batteries were established in November 1918, in Iași, using the material abandoned by the Russian troops. Thus, near Socola railway station, eight 76.2 mm antiaircraft cannons on vehicles were identified. They became part of the inventory of the Antiaircraft Artillery Division, after approval in that regard was obtained from the Great General Headquarters. After they were partially repaired at the Arsenal in Iași, they became part of the Road Cannons

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<sup>15</sup> For details regarding the participation of Romanian Air Force in the 1919 Campaign, see Valeriu Avram, *Aeronautica Română în Războiul de Întregire Națională*, Editura Militară, București, 2012, pp. 369-377.



Group (Commander: Major Ioan Anghelescu), which consisted of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battery (Commander: Major Constantin Vârgolici) and the 4<sup>th</sup> Battery (Commander: Major Emanoil Leoveanu, replaced, on 28 February 1919, with Captain Ion Caton). As technical commander of the group was appointed Major George Valentin Bibescu, a well known motorist and aviator in the period that preceded the First World War<sup>16</sup>.

About 150 antiaircraft artillerists belonging to the division were appointed to operate the road cannons. In addition, there were 18 firemen from the Bucharest Company. There were four road cannons, four caissons, a lorry, a tank car and a car in each battery. To be used to back the divisions in Transylvania, between December 1918 and January 1919, the road cannons were repaired at the Schiell Plant in Braşov. At the beginning of March, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battery was sent in the first line, being used for the antiaircraft protection of some installations as well as for the reconnaissance missions for the benefit of the land forces. During the Romanian troops offensive to the Tisza. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Road Cannon Battery advanced along with the Romanian regiments. On 5 May 1919, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Section in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battery, which was near the Tisza, was given the mission to execute fire on land against a Hungarian artillery position situated south of Szolnok. The enemy battery was eliminated but, following the bombardment executed by another Hungarian battery, *“a road cannon was seriously hit by a projectile, without causing casualties and much damage to the cannon”*<sup>17</sup>. The road cannon was sent to be repaired in Oradea.



*Photo 6: 76.2 calibre mobile cannons in Hungary*

<sup>16</sup> AMR, *Journal of Operations of the Antiaircraft Artillery Division* Collection, ff. 59-60.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, ff. 62-66.

Meanwhile, in the country, on 8 March 1919, it was established the 5<sup>th</sup> Battery, having four Burileanu cannons, put on railway platforms. Besides the wagons for cannons, in the battery train there were also: a wagon for ammunition, one for people (sleeping wagon) and one equipped to be a kitchen. The second railroad battery was the 1<sup>st</sup> Battery, having 75 mm cannons. Both batteries left Iași for Sibiu in April 1919. After the Romanian troops got to the Tisza, a 75 mm railroad section was sent to Debrecen, to defend the Northern Group Command that was installed there.

The other anti-aircraft artillery batteries that were in Moldova at the beginning of 1919 came back to Bucharest. Initially, the Anti-aircraft Artillery Division Headquarters was in the barracks of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Artillery Regiment in Malmaison (Plevna Street). On 27 May 1919, the division moved to the barracks of the 28<sup>th</sup> Howitzer Artillery Regiment in Ghencea, in the eastern part of the barracks. Subsequently, the street in which the barracks were situated was named Șoseaua Antiaeriană (the Anti-aircraft Road).

On the Tisza front, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battery was replaced, on 7 July, with the 4<sup>th</sup> Battery. During the same period, two posts in the 1<sup>st</sup> 75 mm Railroad Battery were sent to Debrecen and transformed in an armoured train (15 June – 13 July 1919). The train was then sent in the southern part of the Tisza front, where it became the sector mobile artillery reserve<sup>18</sup>.

The last role played by the Romanian anti-aircraft artillery in the Campaign in Hungary was that in the second half of July. Following the initial success of the Hungarian offensive on the Tisza front, launched on 20 July, the Romanian armed forces launched counteroffensive, managing to get back the lost train up to 31 July. In the avant-garde of the Romanian divisions were the armoured anti-aircraft train and the cannons belonging to the 4<sup>th</sup> Battery. Two infantry platoons operated them and thus, on 26 July, the 4<sup>th</sup> Battery became the first Romanian subunits that managed to get back to the Tisza again, namely to Szolnok. On 31 July, when the Romanian troops crossed the Tisza using pontoon bridges, the anti-aircraft artillery backed them. As the pontoon bridges were not highly reliable, the cannon batteries remained on the eastern bank of the river<sup>19</sup>.

In September, all the four anti-aircraft artillery batteries that participated in the campaign in Hungary were concentrated in Oradea. In October they were sent to Banat, where there was high tension between Romania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. As the governments

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 70.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 74.





*Photo 7: Romanian officers in the antiaircraft artillery and devices to establish the flight height, speed, and trajectory*

in Bucharest and Beograd reached an agreement regarding the establishment of the border, the situation became less tense and, in November, the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Antiaircraft Artillery Batteries got to Bucharest.

It was the beginning of a new stage in the history of the Romanian Antiaircraft Artillery. It lasted for about two decades. Thus, in the interwar period, the Antiaircraft Artillery Division became a regiment (1920); out of that regiment, in 1929, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment was established – moved to Iași Garrison, and at the end of the '30s, there were also established the 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiment (Cluj), the 4<sup>th</sup> one (Brașov) and the 5<sup>th</sup> one (Sibiu). Moreover, during that period, new generation personalities in the field of antiaircraft artillery were acknowledged. Among them the following can be mentioned: General Gheorghe Popescu, General Gheorghe Marinescu and General Ion Bungescu.

### ***Episode of War***

From the *Journal of Operations* of the Antiaircraft Artillery Division:

*“5 June 1919. Today, the enemy tries to force crossing the Tisza in Venczele Balsa-Gava area [about six kilometres north-east of Tokay – A.N.]. At 17.30, two enemy battalions crossed and occupied Venczele, which was occupied by only one infantry company [Romanian]. Covered by these two battalions that form a bridgehead, the enemy starts to build the bridge. Most of the enemy columns occupy*

*the village Kenézlő, on the right bank of the Tisza and its neighbourhood. The friend reserve in the sector is insufficient. Immediate assistance is required. The [antiaircraft] road cannons in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battery are forced to Venczele. At 18.30, the Battery succeeds in opening fire against the bridgehead, after having marching for 32 km, reconnoitring and occupying the position in three quarters of an hour and passing through the enemy barrage near the village Rakamaz without serious damages.*

*About 100 shells were employed against the two battalions that formed the bridgehead, causing great damage. The few survivors tried to cross the Tisza back, but they could not, being prevented from doing it by the fire executed by the road cannons behind them as well as by the 9<sup>th</sup> Hunter Regiment, from the general reserve, and a battalion from a regiment in Transylvania in front of them. After that, the road cannons continued to execute fire against the village Kenézlo, where there were the enemy reserves, releasing about 200 projectiles.*

*At 20.30, as the field artillery and the howitzers from the sector reserve were in the position, the road cannons got back to the general reserve at Kiraly-Telek-Pusta [probably Nyírtelek today A.N.] with two posts, and two posts [remained] situated in the antiaircraft position in Rakamaz and Nyíregihaza<sup>20</sup>.*

**English version by**  
✍️ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 67.

# THE ACTIVITY OF THE KOMITADJI IN SOUTHERN DOBRUDJA IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD – Hybrid Threat or Nationalist Terrorism? –

*Daniel-Silviu NICULAE*

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*The article considers the main features of Bulgarian revisionism in the interwar period, primarily substantiated by the activity of the Komitadji gangs in Southern Dobrudja. Following the presentation of the main available definitions of hybrid threat and nationalist terrorism, the author concludes that the actions of the Komitadji gangs were performed at political, military, and economic level, entailing guerrilla and psychological warfare techniques, intimidation, bribery, propaganda, methods still used today in conflicts subsumed under the category of hybrid warfare or nationalist terrorism. An important mention related to such types of action is that they are organised and conducted so that they cannot be addressed employing traditional specific military means.*

**Keywords:** *Komitadji; hybrid threat; nationalist terrorism; irregular military*

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**H**ybrid threats are not novel. Over time, hybrid actions have been differently defined.

Lately, the phenomenon has become a major concern of decision-makers, mainly the political and military ones, in the context of the recent conflict in Ukraine. Debates have focused on the difficulty to respond appropriately to this type of threats, especially under collective defence, as in the case of NATO, which requires consensus regarding the definition of threat and of its source. In this context, it is increasingly evident that the traditional, military, response is insufficient. Irrespective of the terms used to define hybrid threats, their common feature is the combination between some modes of irregular warfare, including guerrilla, civil war, insurgency, terrorism, economic and social destabilisation of some regions, ethnic cleansing, indiscriminate violence, illegal or almost illegal actions, blackmail, bribery, propaganda, so that the initiator, be it a state or non-state entity,

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can achieve the political objectives, avoiding, as much as possible, the traditional, military, conflict.

*Terrorism* is another term that, despite being increasingly used, has no unanimously accepted definition. Bruce Hoffman highlights the fact that the difficulty of definition comes from the multiple transformations the concept has undergone for the past two hundred years, its main characteristic being that terrorism is fundamentally and inherently political, involving violence or threat of violence and gravitating around power, be it exercise of power, seizure of power, or use of power to determine political change. In this context, ethnic-nationalist/separatist terrorism is the most known and spread as well as the most difficult to counter particular case, its adepts being seen as patriots, freedom fighters, in the name of history, and terrorised victims sometimes joining the terrorist movement. More often than not, there is a strong connexion between nationalist terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism, foreign governments being actively involved in sponsoring or commissioning terrorist acts<sup>1</sup>. The methods employed in the case of nationalist terrorism are largely similar to those mentioned above. Mention should be made that this type of terrorism is practised by individuals belonging to some organisations that could be identified.

With respect to the theme of the paper, given the European security context following the First World War, Romania had to consolidate the national state, as it was established by the peace treaties signed between 1919 and 1923. In that regard, Romania focused on concluding some political, diplomatic and military alliances to develop a regional security mechanism mainly aimed at countering the revisionist actions of neighbouring states. As for the diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, they were resumed in December 1920, being dominated by the issue of the Quadrilateral (Southern Dobrudja). Throughout the interwar period, efforts were made to enhance the relations between the two states at all levels. However, Bulgarian revisionist attitudes were present, and they were best illustrated by the actions of Bulgarian komitadji.

*Komitadji* is a term having a Turkish origin, which refers to the members of rebel bands operating in the Balkans since the final period of the Ottoman Empire. The initial goal was the fight against the Turkish authorities, being supported by the authorities of neighbouring states, especially Bulgaria. Then the goal was to intervene in regions whose frontiers were disputed following the provisions of different treaties that reorganised the region. They acted in almost all the countries in the Peninsula, but their activity was especially acknowledged in Bulgaria,

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<sup>1</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, pp. 5-10.

Serbia, Macedonia, Greece, and Romania, as members of different committees, such as the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, and the Internal Dobrudjan Revolutionary Organisation.

The main features of Bulgarian revisionism in the interwar period are mentioned by academician Ilcio Dimitrov as follows. *“It encompassed the reducing and removing of financial and other obligations, which was an unbearable burden on the weakened Bulgarian economy, full restoration of national sovereignty by liquidating foreign control and freeing from the military terms interdictions; avoidance of any complications that might lead to armed conflict (after the two national catastrophes of 1913 and 1918, the Bulgarian military euphoria had evaporated, and the majority of Bulgarians were against stepping in another conflagration, which may have relegated their country back to the camp of defeated), avoidance of political commitments which would have hampered the freedom of action”*<sup>2</sup>.

The listed objectives are pragmatic, realistic, and there is no obviously-associated claim. However, besides *“these above-mentioned peaceful traits of Bulgarian revisionism, others were also coming out which sowed the seeds of potential aggression: a lenient attitude of Bulgarian officials and ties with the komitadji gangs, the obviously revisionist doctrine of the Bulgarian Army, the share of military expenditure in the country budget, allocation of disproportionately large amounts of money to the army, despite the restrictions imposed on the country at Neuilly and the modernisation of roads and railways. Although these actions were known to decision-makers in Bucharest, Nicolae Titulescu opined in 1934 that Bulgarian revisionism could not get as far as undertaking armed aggression”*<sup>3</sup>. Although Titulescu did not consider, in 1934, that the conflict would get as far as armed forces could be involved in the issue of Southern Dobrudja, the idea expressed by the head of Romanian diplomacy, maybe in the context of the Balkan pact, is extremely interesting and topical given that, as it has already been mentioned, one of the main problems posed by hybrid actions is that they can hardly be militarily addressed, as the armed forces, especially NATO ones, cannot have a clear mandate to intervene, in the spirit of solidarity within the Alliance, according to the principle of collective defence expressed in Article 5 of the founding treaty of the organisation, as long as an armed attack that can guarantee NATO intervention is not identified in compliance with its definition in international law.

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<sup>2</sup> Ilcio Dimitrov, *Bългария na Balcanite i v Evropa*, Sofia, 1983, pp. 5-21, in Nicoleta Ciachir, *Romanian-Bulgarian Political-Diplomatic Relations during Bulgarian Agrarian Government (1921-1923)*, Journal of Humanities, Culture and Social Sciences, vol. 1, no. 1, 2015, pp. 9-10, see [http://www.journal.faaa.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/1\\_1\\_article\\_nicoleta\\_ciachir.pdf](http://www.journal.faaa.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/1_1_article_nicoleta_ciachir.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> Antonina Kuzmanova, *Ot Nioi do Craiova. Văprosăt na Iujna Dobrogea v mejdunarodni otnošenja*, Sofia, 1989, p. 63, in Nicoleta Ciachir, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

However, “in June 1922, considering that the komitadji gangs question had not been resolved satisfactorily, the three states (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Romania A.N.) issued a second note addressed to the Bulgarian government. From the rostrum of the League of Nations, the Romanian diplomat Titulescu accused Bulgaria of the komitadji attacks, amalgamating these attacks in the definition of aggression”<sup>4</sup>. This aspect once more emphasises the value of Titulescu as a diplomat. In fact, in 1922, he raised an issue that is still topical today, namely the definition of aggression, from which the response measures stem.

The problem of the komitadji gangs was also addressed to the League of Nations in 1928, following the complaint of Professor Kyroff from Sofia related to the situation of minorities in Durostor and Kaliakra, territories belonging to Romania. The answer of Nicolae Petrescu-Comnene, the Romanian minister, permanent delegate to the League of Nations, analyses the state of affairs at that time, its profound causes, as well as the actions undertaken, providing interesting and relevant pieces of information in the context of the proposed theme, which are summarised below.

Firstly, the Romanian diplomat cites, in the mentioned document<sup>5</sup>, the names of some internationally and nationally acknowledged historians, guarantors of the fact that the disputed territory belonged to Romania. Moreover, the treaties containing provisions in this regard, adopted by Bulgaria, are mentioned: “Historical works of inestimable scientific value, such as those of Professors Iorga, Xenopol, Pârvan, Tafrali, Arbore, and of other eminent scholars categorically demonstrated the historical and political right of Romania over Dobrudja and the Quadrilateral. Those rights were acknowledged in the Treaties of Berlin, 1878, Bucharest, 1913, and Neuilly, 1919. Bulgaria complied with the provisions of the first for half of a century, and adopted and ratified the last two”<sup>6</sup>.

Secondly, in the document it is shown that, unfortunately, “without directly involving the Bulgarian Government in the cause, it is impossible for us not to see that, for a couple of years, an anti-Romanian movement has been organised in Bulgaria, movement that has generated regrettable incidents and repeatedly endangered the cause of peace”<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Stefan Ancev, *Dobrogeanskiat vā pros v politiceskia jivot na Bālgaria (1818-1923)*, Veliko Tārnovo, 1994, in Nicoleta Ciachir, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Central National Historical Archives, *Ministry of Justice Collection, Judicial Directorate*, File 6/1927, *Observations complémentaires du Gouvernement Roumain en date du 30 janvier 1928 au sujet de la Pétition adressée à la Société des Nations par le professeur Kyroff, de Sofia, concernant la situation des minorités bulgare, turque et gagaouze dans les départements du Durostor et Caliacra, en Roumanie, Berne, le 30 janvier 1928*, signed by N.P. Comnen, Romanian minister, permanent delegate to the League of Nations, f. 118, pp. 3-4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 4.



Moreover, the Bulgarian feelings against neighbouring countries, exacerbated by the transient success of the Central Powers, in 1916, 1917 and 1918, which could not be stopped by the defeat either, are identified as the causes of the anti-Romanian, anti-Serbian and anti-Greek movements: *“The heads of these movements have not wanted to resign and promote a policy of peace and cooperation with neighbouring countries. Moreover, in 1919, they started to put into practice all the available methods to weaken the authority of the Romanian, Serbian and Greek governments in the provinces that had been returned or assigned to them by the peace treaties provisions. More or less secret societies were established on the territory of Bulgaria, aimed at sabotaging the peace and justice undertaking carried out in Neuilly. Since 1919, the activity of these societies have been conducted as follows: 1) Through subversive propaganda in Greece, Serbia and Romania, against the newly-established order, by means of leaflets, brochures, magazines, calendars and other publications; 2) Through tendentious propaganda in Western media as well as at the League of Nations Union, stating that Dobrudja, Tracia and Macedonia are Bulgarian provinces inhabited, if not entirely at least in the majority by Bulgarian people, who are illegally maltreated by the three administrations – Romanian, Serbian, Greek; 3) Through the bloody action of the komitadji gangs whose mission has been that of making incursions in neighbouring territories to rob, plunder, set on fire and kill, in order to create panic among the Romanian, Serbian, Turkish and Greek population, to intimidate the local administration and prepare the ground for larger scale unrest and actions”<sup>8</sup>.*

As for the anti-Romanian action, the cited document shows that *“it has been organised especially by ‹Dobrudja› Society. (...) The declared goal of ‹Dobrudja› Society is to help, supported by the Bulgarian government, the Bulgarian refugees coming from Dobrudja. In reality, the actions undertaken by this society are intended to: create panic and anarchy on the territory of this Romanian province and seize all the opportunities to trigger the revolution and prepare the ground for Bulgaria to annex Dobrudja. To meet these goals all means can be employed: besides propaganda, the terrorist actions conducted by the refugees organised in komitadji gangs are very important”<sup>9</sup>.*

In the same context, *“to meet as appropriately as possible the two goals, the official and the undeclared ones, ‹Dobrudja› is led by a supreme executive committee based in Sofia, having two branches, as follows: a) An official branch, based in Sofia, and three official committees in Şumla, Varna and Târnava; b) A secret (terrorist)*

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, ff. 118-119, pp. 4-5.

branch, based also in Sofia, which subordinates the following terrorist centres: Rusciuc, Șumla, Varna”<sup>10</sup>.

Then the document presents the goals of the society branches: “The official branch has two goals: an official, declared, one, namely to secure – by collecting the subventions provided by the Bulgarian government – the refugees in Dobrudja, as well as a covert one, its main desiderata being presented as follows: I. to arouse the foreigners interest in the ‘issue of Dobrudja’ by as intense as possible propaganda; II: to energetically fight against the colonisation of Dobrudja by the Romanians; III: to act, with all forces, to ‘definitively liberate Dobrudja’ and incorporate it in Bulgaria; IV. to preserve a neutral attitude towards the internal fights in Bulgaria and to act in compliance with similar organisations in Bulgaria (irredentist societies ‘Macedonia’, ‘Tracia’, ‘Tzaribrod’, ‘Traw’); V. to establish some groups of young people born in Dobrudja who, educated and trained under the direct supervision and control of the supreme executive committee, could be useful in the fight undergone by the society in order to meet the above-mentioned goals; VI. to organise the enrolment of an as large as possible number of people, refugees or not, born in Dobrudja, in the komitadji gangs.

The secret branch, whose role is to implement, point by point, the programme established in 1925 at Târnava by the general congress of the refugees from Dobrudja, is a purely terrorist branch. In order to prevent the colonisation of Dobrudja by the Romanians, it does not hesitate to recommend the employment of all possible means, including the individual or mass suppression of Romanian colonists, the plan implementation being preceded by the creation of an atmosphere favourable to this action, through the tendentious articles published in the Bulgarian press, presenting the events occurred in Dobrudja in dramatic, extremely unfavourable terms for Romania.

The subventions obtained, including by collecting money from the population, are mainly used, contrary to the declared intention, to support the irredentist publication ‘Dobrudja’, which runs an extremely dangerous campaign against Romania”<sup>11</sup>.

In addition, the document provides a list containing the komitadji gangs incursions between 1919 and 1925: 1919 – 56 attacks, 10 casualties, 6 dead and 4 wounded, Romanian; 1920 – 104 attacks, 8 casualties, Romanian; 1921 – 125 attacks, 17 casualties, 15 dead and 2 wounded, Romanian; 1922 – 99 attacks, 18 casualties, 10 dead and 8 wounded, Romanian; 1923 – 33 attacks, 8 casualties, 4 dead and 3 wounded, Romanian, 1 member of the komitadji gangs wounded; 1924 – 35 attacks, 7 casualties, 6 dead and 1 wounded, Romanian; 1925 – 91 attacks, 19 casualties, 9 wounded, Romanian, 2 dead, members of the komitadji gangs, and 8 wounded, Romanian<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 119, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*, ff. 119-120, pp. 6-7.

Moreover, the document mentions the fact that *“the governments of the two countries promoted measures to put an end to the phenomenon, which, unfortunately, remained mere declarations of intent. In addition, it is shown that the joint military investigation in 1925, conducted by the Romanian and Bulgarian authorities could not put an end to the deplorable state of affairs. The Romanian delegation (...) proved that Bulgarian local authorities did not take an action to hinder or prevent (the attacks A.N.) (...), Bulgarian military representatives responding textually: ‘This is not our responsibility but that of administrative authorities’”*<sup>13</sup>.

In conclusion there are mentions of the observations on 10 December 1927 regarding the existing state of mind, identifying as its causes *“the repeated attacks, the lack of real and efficient actions of Bulgarian authorities, as well as the fact that the actions meant to assume responsibility through the League of Nations did not have the desired results (...)”. Under such circumstances, it is easy to understand why the assassination of Romanian colonist Tanace Goța by the komitadji gangs, on 1 November 1927, exasperated the entire Romanian population.*

*The retaliation against certain Bulgarians, accused of complicity with the komitadji gangs, is but the effect of an explainable, although reprehensible, reaction to a long series of previous provocations and assassinations.*

*The facts invoked in Mr M. Kyroff petition are greatly exaggerated, as demonstrated by the investigation undertaken immediately by the Romanian judicial authorities. (...) However, the incidents in Cocina and Cazimir demonstrated, on the one hand, that the local population ran out of patience and it was absolutely urgent to put an end to the terrorist actions of the Bulgarian komitadji gangs to allow for the region pacification; on the other hand, that the government took the necessary measures to calm the people and block such incidents so that they could be contained.*

*In this regard, we repeat, the League of Nations bodies have to accomplish a complex mission.*

*The Royal government considers this incident a regrettable warning that demonstrates how severe the issue of the komitadji gangs is, issue that has to be seriously considered by the Bulgarian government and by the League of Nations as well”*<sup>14</sup>.

The existence and actions of the komitadji gangs were officially acknowledged. The high-level discussions in 1921, when Bulgarian Prime Minister, Stamboliyski, visited Bucharest coming from Warsaw testified to it. He had a meeting with General Averescu, the President of the Council of Ministers, and Take Ionescu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs: *“The second issue the Romanian government raised was that of the komitadji gangs. Bulgarian Prime Minister firmly committed his government*

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 120, p. 8.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 121, p. 9.

to take steps to guard the border so that the gangs would not infiltrate into Dobrudja. Moreover, Bulgaria's proposal to establish a joint commission of inquiry of the Romanian-Bulgarian border line incidents was accepted<sup>15</sup>.

The report related to the conclusions of the commission, made by the Bulgarian party, in the person of its "vice-president, Colonel Pecigargov, emphasised that all protocols (55 in total) clearly show that the Romanian criticism is unfounded. The commission also documented incidents that clearly unmasked a Romanian commander of a company of guards, guilty of lies and provocative actions. According to the report of Colonel Pecigargov, people with aggressive behaviour from which both countries' border guards suffer, smugglers and thieves are unavoidable present in any border areas. But in most cases offenders are poor refugees from Romania to Bulgaria, Romanian Army defectors and refugees settled in Bulgaria who, for one reason or another, cannot return voluntarily in Dobrudja, struggling to assuage the alertness of the border guards and sneaking to see their families."<sup>16</sup>

The invocation of the desire to visit relatives, of the quality of civilian on leave, or that of volunteer, in the context of suspicion of the presence of irregular troops or private military structures, who do not wear uniforms or insignia, militants for human and minority rights, reminds us of the different debates on the issue of the recent conflict in Ukraine.

To offer a balanced view on the above-mentioned aspects, I consider it is appropriate to present a Romanian point of view, as shown in a Gendarmerie report in 1922, in which the following aspects are related:

*"One of the multiple causes for the failure to chase, capture and destroy the komitadji gangs in the Quadrilateral is that the gangs are wherever helped and informed in detail by the local population that, in the majority, tacitly fraternise with them by failing to guard the localities during the night, preventing information from being transmitted during the night when an incident occurs, by destroying the telephone lines when the gangs start operating, by directly helping the gangs guarding them while operating, by providing our posts and troops with false information, by making the carts and horses along with the identity cards for animals and bandits available to the gangs, by providing detailed information related to the actions of our patrols etc. Thus several citizens in many localities have become suspects, some of them being caught while helping the gangs as mentioned above.*

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<sup>15</sup> Antonina Kuzmanova, *op. cit.*, p. 71, in N. Ciachir, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>16</sup> Ghencev, *Văzvrăştane na Iujna Dobrogea kăm Bălgaria prez 1940*, in *Istorigeski pregled*, kn. 6, 1969, p. 61, in N. Ciachir, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

*The 4 suspects referred to in the report no. 78 of the Gendarme Company Durostor are part of the above-mentioned category. In the report it is clearly shown that the local Parquet (Prosecutor's Office), based on we do not know what legal considerations especially in the exceptional situation existing here, in the Quadrilateral, knowing the efforts made by the chiefs of posts, chiefs of sections, commanders of platoons and companies to chase the gangs and their accomplices, (...) although we requested issuing the search warrant in due time, the only one measure able to provide complete indications related to their accomplice liability (...), however, prosecutor Negulescu, threatening, in the presence of Colonel Tiuleanu, imposes their immediate sending to the Parquet, based on the investigation conducted so far, without issuing the search warrant, which was executed by the Durostor Company*<sup>17</sup>.

*“On the same occasion I report that there are individuals caught in complicity with the gangs, either taking part in the robberies or helping them and, although they were sent to the Parquet with clear and complete evidence of their guilt, they were set free and today such individuals terrorise the trustworthy citizens who helped us in the past and categorically refuse to do it now saying: ‘I am suspected by someone and, if caught in the act, I will be executed by the bandits’. Moreover, the accomplices who were set free have come to terrorise even the gendarmes*<sup>18</sup>.

Coming back to the activity of the joint investigation commission, “shortly before the Bulgarian-Romanian commission completed its work, on 11 April 1921, the Romanian, Yugoslav and Greek governments dispatched a collective note to Bulgaria, which demanded it ‘to prevent the passing of Bulgarian gangs onto the territory of neighbouring states and also to end the Bulgarian propaganda which was directed openly against the order and safety and caused unrest in the border areas’<sup>19</sup>. The idea of propaganda aimed at causing unrest, especially in the border areas, is thus proved old enough not to be considered specific to the recent events. Of course, technology is different today, and the methods employed by strategic communication have evolved accordingly, but the aim remains the same, namely to influence and even to exercise reflexive control.

As for the concrete measures taken by the Bulgarian government following the Prime Minister Stamboliyski talks with the officials in Bucharest, “in September 1921, the Law to condemn the acts against public order and safety

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<sup>17</sup> Central National Historical Archives, *Ministry of Justice Collection, Judicial Directorate*, File 58/1922, copy of confidential report no. 14 on 24 August 1922 of the Mobile Detachment Silistra to the Commander of the Gendarme Corps. Report no. 78 on 23 August 1922 of the Gendarme Company Durostor, f. 39.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 40.

<sup>19</sup> Ghencev, *op. cit.*, p. 61, in N. Ciachir, *op. cit.*, p. 15.



of goods and people in foreign countries was enacted, which contained nine articles and provided the imprisonment of 8 to 15 years for gang bosses and 3 to 5 years for police inaction<sup>20</sup>. Besides its concrete effects, I consider that the law was very important for the progress of the relations between Bulgaria and its neighbours, showing the will of the Bulgarian government at that time to address the problem.

In the same vein, namely the concrete measures required or implemented by the two parties, Romanian and Bulgarian, to put an end to the discussed phenomenon, I present some quotations from the reports of the border guards related to the topic.

Thus, in Report no. 6667, on 16 March 1926, on the killing of some Romanian border guard soldiers by the komitadji gangs, it is shown that:

*“Here, I am honoured to send the report of the Prefecture from Durostor no. 3658 on 12 March 1926, showing with substantive evidence that all the bandit attacks committed so far as well as the killing of the two border guard soldiers, Buga Gheorghe from the 1<sup>st</sup> Border Guard Regiment, and Corporal Radu Ioan from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Cavalry (Roşiori) Regiment, (...) if not directly commissioned by the Bulgarian government, at least known by the bodies of the neighbouring state, be they administrative or military border ones.*

*Therefore, we would like you to be so kind to appropriately and urgently request the Bulgarian government to:*

1. *Extradite, based on the evidence presented in the report of the Border Guard Corps no. 97/1926, the following individuals: (...), who, on the night of 5-6 March, attacked and plundered the commune Satul Vechi, and the next day, at 10 o'clock, killed the above-mentioned border guard soldiers*<sup>21</sup>.

Moreover, in the Report of the Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Border Guard Regiment on 15 March 1926, common efforts are referred to: *“Following my report no. 326 on 13 December 1925 and report no. 72 on 9 March 1926, in which we reported that the incidents, robberies and killings in the Quadrilateral are known and supported by Bulgarian border guard officers. During this investigation, we established, once more, that Bulgarian officers helped and covered the komitadji gangs.*

*During the joint investigation conducted in December 1925 at Turk-Smil, the Bulgarian officers in the commission suggested and we commonly agreed that any incident on the border should be resolved by our officers and Bulgarian officers, cooperating to catch the criminals (...)*

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>21</sup> Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Problem 52 Collection, vol. 4, Incidents on the Border with Bulgaria, 1916-1930.*



Consequently, in this typical case with substantive evidence, we should and have to, because of the blood shed and the sacrifices made, under the Bulgarian hypocrisy related to good neighbourhood relations, we urgently, energetically and diplomatically request the following:

- to immediately arrest the above-mentioned bandits and to extradite them to be judged by Romanian authorities; as for their relatives, arrested today, who fed the Komitadji, to be indicted for crimes against the state security<sup>22</sup>.

In the same context, in a report on 25 June 1931, it is requested: "Based on the Great General Staff report, regarding the security and public order measures that have to be taken on the border in Dobrudja, report approved by the President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of War Ad-Inertia, I am honoured to request you to intervene so that the Bulgarian government, jointly with us, could implement the following measures:

1. To deforest an area of about 1 kilometre on both sides of the border in the Quadrilateral, so that the border guard troops can easily patrol and the pickets can have a better eyesight.

2. In case of border incidents and conflicts, they should be investigated on the ground by border guard officers on both sides, issuing legal documents and implementing appropriate measures<sup>23</sup>.

Moreover, "the cooptation of the komitadji did not undermine the state-building project in Bulgaria. (...) Over time, the sophisticated state fund-raising mechanisms that were needed to support the komitadji fed back into a strengthening of Bulgaria's state capacity. This strength, in turn, allowed Bulgaria to develop the military capacity necessary to disband the komitadji, whose members were then absorbed by the Bulgarian military – a move which further expanded and consolidated the Bulgarian state"<sup>24</sup>.

It is therefore obvious that the actions were performed at political, military, and economic level, entailing guerrilla and psychological warfare techniques, intimidation, bribery, propaganda, methods still used today in conflicts subsumed under the category of hybrid warfare or nationalist terrorism. An important mention related to such types of actions is that they are organised and conducted so that they do not meet all the elements that are necessary to define them, in compliance with the international laws in force, as conflicts that can be responded to employing traditional specific military means, which represents the main challenge not only for the parties directly involved but also for the international community.

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<sup>22</sup>*Ibidem.*

<sup>23</sup>*Ibidem.*

<sup>24</sup>John Gledhill, Charles King, *Captive States, Divided Societies: Political Institutions of Southeastern Europe in Historical Comparative Perspective*, Project, see <http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/captive/king-gledhill.pdf>.

In conclusion, focusing on either the elements that define hybrid threats or those that are specific to nationalist terrorism, the main characteristic of the events discussed in the present paper is what can be called *contracting violence*<sup>25</sup>, contracting parties being private and governmental authorities that consider the above-mentioned methods convenient for a number of reasons. Among them the following can be listed: firstly, the cost, which is lower than the one entailed by regular armed forces; secondly, this option allows the contractor to act at the limit of law or even to elude it, without complying with the treaties and agreements concluded at international level, based on historical legacy, in the attempt to force the adoption of a certain course of events that favour the initiator of actions; thirdly, the contract initiator, even having limited possibilities, can control the periphery without being involved in a direct armed conflict, which could be devastating and it is surely disadvantageous, as it was the case of Bulgaria, especially after the two Balkan wars and the First World War.

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*English version by*  
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<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem.*

# NATO: Changing Gear on Cyber Defence

Neil ROBINSON

*Today's cyber threat landscape is markedly different from that of a few years ago. Experts and officials agree that the speed of attacks and their sophistication has changed dramatically. Another vital difference lies in their diversity. Cyber risks threaten the benefits, whether economic, political or social that the human invention of cyberspace can offer.*

*The increasing importance of cyber as a new "Great Game" merits the question as to whether NATO's current role and activities are enough. With its extensive experience and unique status as an important player in global security, should NATO play a different, more pro-active role in contributing to cyber-security globally?*

## Cyber Attacks on the World Stage


Many more states now consider cyber capabilities as a legitimate and necessary part of their strategic toolbox alongside diplomacy, economic prowess and military might. This raises concerns about whether in the near future we might witness a full-on war in cyberspace between states. Additionally, we see occasional interest in the employment of cyber capabilities by non-state actors – at present with scant evidence as to their actual use.

Nonetheless, academics such as Thomas Rid are of the view that cyber war will not take place. Experience to date on the actual uses of cyber capabilities by states suggests such capabilities are better characterised as either espionage or sabotage, making their employment most likely below the threshold of armed attack. While there is a certain logic to this argument, it is increasingly clear that some states consider cyber capabilities as an integral part of operational military capability and are not afraid to employ them as such, even if they are reluctant to acknowledge such use publicly.

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*The speed and sophistication of cyber attacks have been increasing over time*

### Diverse Cyber Threats

The diversity in the ways in which cyber capabilities can be used poses one of the greatest challenges to NATO in understanding its own role when it comes to cyber defence. Two main types of cyber attack are particularly relevant in considering NATO’s role on the cyber stage. First, cyber-enabled espionage – whether at the strategic or operational level – can compromise the confidentiality of information and information systems, potentially giving away secrets and sensitive information to adversaries. Second, cyber-enabled sabotage can have important physical ramifications, especially when infrastructures such as energy or transportation networks are targeted or where data is manipulated to confuse the target and undermine command and control decision-making.

In addition, NATO’s staff at all levels and in all areas can also be targeted by extortion or fraud for financial gain, or as a preliminary stage in the forms of attack identified above. The ubiquity of the Internet on mobile devices coupled with the proliferation of social media further compounds the challenge of operational security in cyberspace.



*The targeting of energy networks is one of many diverse cyber threats, where data is manipulated to confuse the target and undermine command and control decision-making*

In managing these challenges, a comprehensive approach for all things cyber is required of NATO, which can accommodate these diverse and evolving threats in a single robust and agile framework.

### **NATO's Current Offer**

Viewed very simply, NATO's cyber defence role may be split into two broad themes. The first priority is the protection of its own networks, as agreed by Allies at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014. This is a challenging task given the expansive footprint of the Alliance at a variety of sites and operational facilities in conditions ranging from the urban metropolis of Brussels to the austere, harsh environments of deserts. In discharging this part of its cyber defence role, NATO has to ensure that the communication and information systems that the Alliance relies upon for its operations and missions are protected against threats emanating from cyberspace.

NATO's second priority is to assist its members in developing their own cyber defence capabilities and capacity. This is done through a variety of means, including a two-year process of setting collective cyber defence targets which each Ally must sign up to, for example, the creation of a cyber defence strategy. Progress against the achievement of these jointly agreed goals is regularly reviewed. In addition, NATO offers a wide range of education, training and exercise opportunities through diverse educational institutions including the NATO School in Oberammergau and the planned Cyber Academy in Portugal. The NATO-accredited Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn also plays an important role in this regard.

Combined, these activities are intended to be self-reinforcing since any network is only as strong as its weakest point. The security of the Alliance and its ability



*NATO offers a wide range of education, training and exercise opportunities through, for example, the NATO School in Oberammergau*

to conduct agreed tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security is, to a large extent, dependent upon the cyber-defence capability and capacity of its individual Allies.

### **Other International Actors**

Externally too, as NATO sets out its cyber case more publicly, it sits in an increasingly complex constellation of international actors. The United Nations has been deliberating the principles of norms of state behaviour in cyberspace through a special Group of Governmental Experts. This has been galvanised in part by a longstanding initiative, backed by Russia and China, to agree an international treaty regulating the use of cyberspace that may give authoritarian governments greater scope to interfere with and censor Internet content critical of their regimes.

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe has adopted its second set of cyber confidence-building measures. These aim to increase transparency in relations between states by encouraging those who sign up to follow a common series of steps, such as cooperation between incident-response communities in each country.

Finally, the European Union (EU) is another pre-eminent actor which engages in a broad range of efforts to help raise cyber security standards among its 28 member states and the private sector. These include capacity building for civilian cyber security, support for training, increased cooperation between law enforcement to tackle cyber crime and policy making (including through binding legal tools).





*A Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence is signed on 10 February 2016 by the Head of the European Union's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU), Freddy Dezeure, and the Chief of Cyber Security at the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), Ian West. © NATO*

## **NATO as a Cyber Enabler**

The public-private character of how the Internet is governed highlights the need to work together – a key issue when reviewing NATO's role. Looking to the East, the Alliance has been recently reminded of the realities of international relations through the unilateral application of state power by Russia in Crimea. However, cooperation between like-minded states and international organisations remains the best way to address many cyber risks.

Here are five areas where NATO could strengthen its role as a cyber enabler over the medium term:

***Mainstreaming cyber defence:*** mainstreaming cyber defence into Alliance operations and missions by providing a clear doctrinal framework for Allies to elevate the contribution of cyber defence to operations led by NATO from a supporting to a more standalone role.

***Capability development among Allies:*** NATO could offer a clear platform for advice and exchange of detailed good practice between Allies through a more extensive variety of formal and informal channels, including NATO's Defence Planning Process. Such mechanisms might include an organic capability to offer on-the-ground policy, operational and technical support and advice to Allies regarding cyber-defence capability development and implementation. This might include advice on the establishment of a military cyber-security programme or brokering the exchange of good practice on resourcing for cyber defence.

***Support for international norms:*** The Alliance might also define its international role more explicitly through advocating support, via its international engagements,

for the norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and cyber confidence-building measures. It should also encourage Allies to do so.

**Law enforcement intelligence exchange:** More could also be done through facilitating the exchange of cyber situational awareness both between Allies and other relevant international organisations, especially those that have an operational insight into how cyberspace can be misused. States can buy cheaply on the black market sophisticated cyber-attack capability that would otherwise take time and resources to develop. So interaction with law enforcement is key and practical cooperation with Interpol and Europol would represent a useful first step.

**Engaging with the EU:** NATO needs to cultivate its complementary role to the EU on cyber issues. It has become clichéd to talk about NATO-EU co-operation on the basis of mutual complementarity, especially given the current debate regarding hybrid warfare or grey-zone conflicts. Nonetheless, both organisations have yet to fully come to terms with how cyber issues that confront one affect the other. On the one hand, militaries rely upon critical infrastructure protection which is the provenance of EU policy-making including via legislation and industry standards. They can also benefit from the insights into criminal cyber activity that can be offered by the EU's Cyber Crime Centre in The Hague. On the other hand, the economic prosperity of the EU member states and by extension the region as a whole can be (and is being) threatened by state-level actors whose motives may be better understood by NATO.



*Interaction with law enforcement is key and practical cooperation with Interpol and Europol through intelligence exchange would represent a useful first step*

Of course, such mechanisms would require agreement by Allies on crucial aspects, such as NATO's remit when it comes to civilian infrastructure, which would take time to mature. Similarly, establishing co-operation with law enforcement would require a great deal of effort due to the legitimate and longstanding legal and cultural concerns about cooperation between defence and law enforcement. There are glimmers of progress however. One such example is the recently signed technical arrangement on the exchange of information between the respective NATO and EU incident-response teams.

Such suggestions represent realistic and practical opportunities for NATO to bring its global brand as the security provider par-excellence into the evolving "Cyber Great Game".

# **STANDING BY AFGHANISTAN – THE STRATEGIC CHOICE –**

*Mohammad SHAFIQ “Hamdam”*

*Afghanistan’s defence and security forces face enormous challenges. They are countering an insurgency of well-equipped guerrilla fighters, who enjoy the unconditional support of organised crime, international terrorists and some neighbouring countries. They are on the front line of the fight against terrorist groups including Al-Qaida, so-called Islamic State and the Haqqani Network. Moreover – as Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani has said repeatedly – for fourteen years Afghanistan has been in an undeclared war with Pakistan. And it is also believed that the country continues to be the proxy battleground for India and Pakistan, two nuclear powers.*

*It is essential that the international community continues to stand by Afghanistan, building up the capacity of its forces and sustaining them financially until the country is able to do so itself. Not only is this support vital for Afghanistan, it is also in the strategic interest of its international partners.*

## **A Proud Military Destroyed**

Afghanistan is no stranger to conflict. It has suffered numerous civil, regional and cross-regional wars over the past three millennia. The security and defence of the country depended on militias for a long part of its history but started to develop its formal military in the tenth century, during the Ghaznavid Empire.

By the 1980s, Afghanistan had a small, but strong military. As a landlocked and mountainous country, it depended heavily on its air force for transport, reconnaissance and close air support. It had more than 400 aircraft, including around 240 fixed-wing combat aircraft, 150 helicopters and perhaps 40 transport aircraft.

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*Afghan security forces countering the insurgency take their positions on a hilltop in Baghlan province in March 2016. © REUTERS*

The country's proud aviation history was symbolised by Abdul Ahad Momand, an Afghan air force aviator who was the first Afghan – and the fourth Muslim – to journey to outer space as one of Soyuz TM-6 crew members and spent nine days aboard the Mir space station in 1988 as an Intercosmos Research Cosmonaut.

These achievements were erased and most military assets were looted and destroyed during decades of war and internal conflict, before the international community intervened following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

### ***Starting from Scratch***

In August 2003, NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), mandated by the United Nations (UN). Over the following decade of ISAF's deployment, building up the Afghan national security and defence forces became an increasingly important part of its mission.

This meant starting from scratch. Afghanistan's military assets had been destroyed. Moreover, the UN-led Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme disarmed around 100,000 of the mujahedin and officers of the former communist regime – and many were excluded from serving in the Afghan security forces.

With time it became clear that disarming the militia groups and excluding professional military officers – along with ISAF's extremely centralised security and governance strategy – provided an opportunity for the Taliban and terrorists to re-emerge and re-organise in the rural areas of Afghanistan.

Resistance and casualties increased. Eventually, under the command of General Stanley McChrystal, ISAF adopted a counterinsurgency strategy in 2009. This called for more ISAF troops to push back the Taliban, while also placing



*In early August 2003, with NATO poised to take command of the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, an Afghan woman walks past a sign in Kabul calling on the force to be expanded beyond the capital. © REUTERS*

a greater focus on training and building up the Afghan security forces so that they would be able to secure their own country eventually.

By the time that ISAF had completed the gradual transition of responsibility for security to the Afghan authorities before ending its mission in December 2014, Afghanistan had around 352,000 well-trained soldiers and police – an impressive achievement. ISAF also underpinned other vital progress in Afghanistan, helping provide the security and space for democracy to take root, institutions and infrastructures to be rebuilt, thousands of schools to be reopened, free media to thrive, and the country to recover its international recognition.

### ***Lack of Leadership***

Of course, the insurgency was not defeated by the end of the ISAF mission. The challenges of insecurity and instability facing Afghanistan remain immense and its national security forces will require long-term international support both financially and in terms of capacity building.

The Afghan security sector has come a long way in terms of quantity but it is time to focus on quality and in-depth security sector reform. The Afghan security forces lack strong political and military leadership at all levels as well as the resources to fight hybrid warfare. The position of defence minister has been vacant since mid 2014. Moreover, reform of the ministry of interior has lagged.

Nevertheless, Afghan forces have proved to be fierce fighters against the terrorists and insurgents. Beyond expectations – and against the many predictions that civil war would follow the transition of security to Afghan lead – they have been defending their nation with courage and honour.





*Afghan National Army soldiers take part in a training exercise at a military base in Kabul in November 2014. © REUTERS*

The focus now should be on nurturing educated, professional and well-trained officers and non-commissioned officers. Leadership development, gender mainstreaming and accountability mechanisms in the security ministries should be prioritised. Afghanistan also needs to develop the capacity of young officers and soldiers to replace the older generation in the defence and security forces. Moreover, it is time to professionalise the police and draw greater distinctions between the duties of law enforcement and the military.

### ***Blood and Treasure***

Afghanistan's costly, bloody and lengthy war has exhausted the taxpayers of donor countries and troop contributing nations. There is no exact figure for the costs incurred by the international coalition during the war. However, the United States on its own has committed around US\$113 billion since 2002 for the reconstruction and support of Afghanistan. And the human cost has been high: as of end February 2016, 3 515 coalition members and tens of thousands of Afghan security forces and civilians have died.

Yet, NATO and the wider international community have renewed their commitments to support Afghanistan for another decade. NATO and its partners launched a new train, advise and assist mission ('Resolute Support') in January 2015. Wider cooperation with the Alliance is also being taken forward through its Enduring Partnership programme with Afghanistan. The United States and Afghanistan have also agreed a long-term partnership framework and a bilateral security agreement.

NATO and its partners committed – at NATO's 2012 Summit in Chicago – to provide financial support to sustain the Afghan forces until the end of 2017





*A US Marine says goodbye to his fallen, friend during a memorial service in Helmand Province in 2009*

and are currently working to ensure support through 2020. Already, since 2007, NATO Allies and partners have donated around US\$430 million per year to the NATO-Afghan National Army Trust Fund.

Afghanistan's partners want to secure the investments of blood and treasure they have already made to help the country get back on its feet. Reconciliation and a peace deal are the best options to end the war but – until a settlement is reached – the deteriorating security situation and the growing terrorist threats require the continued engagement of NATO Allies and partners in Afghanistan.

It is also in their own strategic interest to remain engaged.

### **Strategic Choice**

As a landlocked country neighbouring China, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian countries, Afghanistan has significant geostrategic and geopolitical importance. It is the only country in the region which gives open access to the United States and NATO Allies. The Khyber Pass, located between Afghanistan and Pakistan, has long been one of the most important trade routes and strategic military locations in the world. Moreover, the Silk Road passes through Afghanistan. This ancient network of trade routes, 4 000 miles long, is known as the cultural crossroads of the Indian, Persian and Chinese civilisations. Insecurity and instability in Afghanistan would destabilise the region and provide fertile ground for terrorist groups, posing a threat to Allies and partners.

Afghanistan also faces immense economic and development challenges. The country is rich in natural resources, gas, minerals and oil (worth more than a trillion US dollars according to some estimates). But insecurity and war have limited

opportunities to explore and extract these resources, and Afghanistan remains among the poorest countries of the world. Combined with insecurity, lack of economic opportunities is driving many Afghans to flee the country. According to the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, more than a quarter of the one million refugees and migrants who arrived in Europe in 2015 were Afghans (coming second after Syrians). Helping Afghanistan to establish peace and to grow its economy could help stem the flow of refugees, which represents a brain drain for Afghanistan and also risks destabilising the European Union.



*An Afghan migrant holds his son after arriving at a port on the Greek island of Lesbos, after having been rescued at sea by the Greek Coast Guard in March 2016. © REUTERS*

So, it is well worth sustaining investment in the development of Afghanistan as well as its security forces. The year 2017 is just around the corner. Setting an exit date for the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission and the US presence may help the Afghan security forces to take responsibilities – but it also helps the Taliban narrative of “*you may have the watches, but we have the time*”. NATO’s upcoming summit meeting in Warsaw in July 2016 is an opportunity for NATO and its partners to renew their commitment to long-term support for the further development of the Afghan security sector. It is in the interest of both the Allies and Afghan people.



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
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**Signal, USA, Vol. 70, No. 3, November 2015**  
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**Signal, USA, Vol. 70, No. 4, December 2015**

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**World Policy Journal, USA, Vol. 32, No. 4,  
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**Selection and translation**

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National Military Library*

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**Manuscripts** submitted to the editorial staff should be sent by mail or email, edited in *Microsoft Word, Times New Roman, size 14, justify*, and they should have no more than *8 pages*. The **graphic illustration** – schemes, figures, tables should be designed using *CorelDraw*, and maps and images – in *JPEG* format.

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**The Editorial Staff**

The editorial and layout process  
was completed on 7 July 2016.





**Cover 1: Romanian and Canadian officials attending the opening ceremony of the Romanian-Canadian exercise in Mihail Kogălniceanu.**

*Photo: Adrian Sultănoiu*

**Cover 3: Aspect of the ceremony for the declaration of the Initial Operational Capability of the Multinational Division Southeast and of the Full Operational Capability of NATO Force Integration Unit. Photo: Valentin Ciobîrcă.**

*See [http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20160701/9W2A4904\\_resize](http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20160701/9W2A4904_resize)*

**Cover 4: Special Operations Forces Day – 1 March 2016.**

*Photo: MApN, see <http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20160302>*



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