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# Romanian Military Thinking

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Published by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff



**Founded in 1864 under the name "Military Romania"  
- English edition, 8<sup>th</sup> year -**

# Romanian Military Thinking



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*Carol - King of Romania  
Issued in Bucharest on 8 December 1897*

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These awards are yearly bestowed,  
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
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# ROMANIAN MILITARY THINKING

## *Essential Dimension of the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Process*

*Lieutenant General Dr Ștefan DĂNILĂ  
– Chief of the General Staff –*

When analysing the broad transformation process that the Romanian Armed Forces are undergoing, which is generated, on the one hand, by the need of modernising the institution as a consequence of the evolution of the state and, on the other hand, by the necessity of fully integrating in the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, we will notice that this process too, as so many others, in fact, has been developed at first at conceptual level, in the “laboratories of analysts”, after which one has begun to put it into practice.

Therefore, we should ask ourselves more often: Why is the *military thinking* considered so important?

The transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces into modern armed forces, interoperable with the armed forces of the other allied member states, also requires the change of the normative framework that regulates the establishment and functioning of the organisational structure, this implying not only the system component elements but also the relations between them. An important dimension of the system is the military thinking itself.

Starting from the fact that the military institution is based on rules and procedures whose role is to streamline its complex activities and to channel the energies of all the structures involved in a certain mission, in cooperation with the military men belonging to the other NATO or EU member states, one has often considered that the standardisation and interoperability process can be completed only by translating and implementing certain publications from these states, without making any adjustment to the national realities on the ground.

It is my firm belief that this is not at all enough regarding the result expected in the domain of adapting the Romanian military thinking to the new political-military realities and the ones of the international security environment, that is why I wish

to draw attention to two examples of situations in which I believe the current state of facts must be considerably improved.

The first one refers to dealing with certain topics from the above-mentioned domains by conducting certain studies or presenting elaborated opinions of experts in the field, spread through various publications, many of them even through “*Gândirea militară românească*”, which, **even if expressing justified criticism or realistic solutions to solve certain problems, have not been considered when drawing up or amending normative acts.**

The second one refers to an opposite situation, when some articles have been written only as a mental exercise, without any vision regarding their applicability, but only to meet the “*requirements*” of the individual scientific research programmes, and not oriented towards an actual contribution to the activity of the military organisation.

I strongly believe that the theoretical study will be more efficiently guided in order to encourage those ideas that have a practical value by fixing the two mentioned situations as well as by a policy of the military publications, and “*Gândirea militară românească*” Journal is instrumental in this respect.

Starting from the biblical verse “*In the beginning was the word*”, we believe the editorial staff has an obligation to encourage creative thinking and to pragmatically and exigently select the materials intended for publication.

The task of identifying the topics of interest, in cooperation with the leadership of the Romanian Armed Forces, of submitting them to specialists for analysis and debate, as initiators, as well as of assessing the quality of products devolves upon the editorial staff of this renowned and valued publication. As the main relevant publication of the military theorists, the Journal can host debates and exchanges of ideas, which should encourage the presentation of different opinions regarding various military subjects, in which the pertinently justified arguments should prevail and which should lead to the improvement of some states of facts.

The economic limitations and constraints cannot prevent us from thinking, and the undeniable value of the human resource of those who have taken up the profession of arms is furthermore important to us and can be significantly capitalised on if it is aimed at the promotion of national interests, in the context of the European and Euro-Atlantic spirit, as part of the most important international organisations, without excesses of nationalism.

Therefore, I challenge you to think together, with progressive aspirations towards the future we all wish for, through the enhancement of certain concepts meant to project the modernisation of the Romanian Armed Forces of tomorrow!

*English version by  
Iulia NĂSTASIE*

# **LA PENSÉE MILITAIRE ROUMAINE**

## **dimension essentielle du processus de transformer l'Armée Roumaine**

*Lieutenant-général dr. Ștefan DĂNILĂ  
– Le chef de l'Etat major général –*

Lors qu'on fait l'analyse de l'ample processus de transformation de l'Armée Roumaine, qui a été généré, d'une part, par l'exigence de moderniser l'institution par l'évolution de l'Etat, et d'autre part, par la nécessité d'une pleine intégration dans l'Union européenne et dans le Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, nous constatons que ce processus, comme beaucoup d'autres, en fait, a été tout d'abord développé à un niveau conceptuel, dans „*les laboratoires des analystes*“, et puis au fil de son transposition dans la pratique

Donc, il faudrait de nous demander plus souvent: Pourquoi est *la pensée militaire* considérée importante?

La transformation de l'Armée de la Roumanie dans une armée moderne, interopérable avec d'autres pays des armées alliées, exige aussi le changement du cadre réglementaire régissant l'établissement et le fonctionnement de la structure organisationnelle, ce qui signifie les composants du système et aussi les relations entre eux. Une dimension importante du système est la pensée militaire lui-même.

A partir de la vérité que l'institution militaire est fondée sur des règles et procédures qui ont le rôle de rationaliser ses activités complexes et à canaliser les énergies de toutes les structures impliquées dans une certaine mission, en coopération avec les militaires appartenant d'autres États membres de l'OTAN ou l'UE, c'est souvent qu'on conçoit que le processus de normalisation et de l'interopérabilité peut être obtenu que par la traduction et la mise en œuvre de leurs publications, sans leur adaptation à la situation nationale sur le terrain.

Convaincu que ce n'est pas suffisant pour le résultat attendu sur l'adaptation de la pensée militaire roumaine aux nouvelles réalités politiques et militaires et de l'environnement de sécurité international, je veux mettre en évidence deux exemples de situations où je pense que nous devons significativement améliorer la situation de l'état actuel.

Le première se réfère à l'analyse des sujets des domaines auxquels nous avons parlé plus tôt, par l'élaboration des études et opinions développées des experts

dans le domaine, transmises par de diverses publications, plusieurs d'entre eux par „*Gândirea militară românească*“ même, qui, **bien qu'ils exprimaient des critiques justifiées ou des solutions réalistes pour résoudre les unes des problèmes, ils n'ont pas été souvent considérés pragmatiques lors de la rédaction ou la modification des lois.**

Le seconde se réfère à la situation contraire, lorsque certains articles ont été développés seulement comme un exercice mental, sans application d'une vision, mais seulement comme „*des obligations*“ des programmes de recherche scientifique, comme une activité individuelle et non ciblés par une contribution effective à l'activité de l'organisation militaire.

En corrigeant les deux cas mentionnés, mais aussi par une politique de publications militaires, je crois fermement que l'étude théorique peut être guidé efficacement à encourager ces idées qui ont une valeur pratique, et la revue „*Gândirea militară românească*“ a un rôle très important à cet égard.

Basé sur le précepte biblique „*au commencement était la Parole*“, on considère une obligation du collectif rédactionnel d'encourager la pensée créative et de choisir avec pragmatisme et exigence les matériaux soumis à publier.

C'est le collectif rédactionnel de cette publication reconnue et appréciée qui lui revient également la mission d'identifier, en coopération avec la direction de l'Armée Roumaine, des sujets d'intérêt, pour leur analyse et débat par des spécialistes, comme l'initiateur, et pour évaluer la qualité de tout ce qui réalise. Comme la principale publication évidente des théoriciens militaires, la revue peut accueillir des discussions et changements des idées, pour encourager l'exposition d'opinions différentes sur des sujets divers avec spécificité militaire, où les arguments pertinents justifiés soient principalement présentés et mènent à une amélioration de la situation.

Les limites et contraintes économiques nous ne pouvons pas empêcher de penser, et la valeur indéniable des ressources humaines de ceux qui ont choisi la carrière des armes est particulièrement importante pour nous et elle peut être accomplie si elle est orientée de façon significative à la promotion des intérêts nationaux dans le contexte de l'esprit européen et euro-atlantique, comme une partie des organisations internationales les plus importantes, mais sans excès de nationalisme.

Donc, je vous exhorte de réfléchir ensemble, avec des aspirations progressistes pour l'avenir que nous tous le voulons, en renforçant de certaines concepts qui concevaient la modernisation de l'Armée Roumaine de demain!

*Version française par*

*Alina PAPOI*



## *In the Front Line on the Snowfield*

**N**ature once again put us to a tough test. And it showed us that, beyond our false declarations of friendship, in fact a reprehensible ignorance with which we persisted in dealing with the environment, we proved that we did not understand anything from the truce attempts it proposed us – let us remember only the mild winters of recent years! – and we somewhat let ourselves carried away by the sweet delusion of global warming.

Global warming? So much snow fell days and nights in a row in February as perhaps the younger generations had never seen before in all past years put together – in how many skies did God keep so much snow? – while, in the thermometers, because of the cold, the mercury often went down to the blue lines below minus 30 degrees Celsius.

The idyllic image of winter turned too fast into a white nightmare. The snowdrifts swallowed houses barely breathing through their chimneys, closed roads, shut down electricity networks, leaving thousands of people in the dark and cold.

The scourge unleashed in Bărăgan, Dobrogea, and southern Moldova by the snow drifted by the winds escaped from the barriers of the East, in whose way stood only the thistles and, perhaps, the corncobs abandoned in autumn on the unploughed fields, blocked roads and highways, hundreds of people remaining trapped in snowbound cars or in trains stuck on the railways. One cannot describe the hours and even days spent by them under the terror of the snow.

The feeble response of local authorities – overwhelmed, as always, by nature's outbursts and by the lack of real solutions to reduce their consequences – determined once more the leadership of the Ministry of National Defence to get involved, together with the colleagues from the Ministry of Administration and Interior and the Inspectorate for Emergency Situations, in the front line of this confrontation with snow and frost, in the fight with seconds in order to save lives. An utmost priority for those who are in charge of state and citizens security.

Through its specialised structures, the General Staff led all the effort on the snowfield, and the forces – men and assets specific to military units – worked to unblock road, rail and sea access routes, to evacuate critically ill patients, to provide isolated communities with drinking water, food, medicines, firewood.

In the collecting centres organised by the military, tens of tons of non-perishable food and materials of strict necessity were gathered through the generosity and solidarity of our fellows. The military aircraft *C-130 Hercules* and *C-27J Spartan* – which we saw carrying not only troops in theatres of operation, thousands of kilometres far away from the country, but also citizens, Romanian and foreign ones, evacuated from the hot Libya last year – carried this time, together with the *IAR-330 Puma* helicopters, food and materials where people needed them most. A genuine air bridge of hope and life, multiplied, by land, by convoys of trucks also loaded with the absolutely necessary things for the people in need. Our maritime tug boat *Grozavul* and his river peer, *RF-328*, fought, in their turn, with the frozen Danube, carrying to and from the isolated settlements in the Delta hundreds of passengers, some of them to medical centres, and dozens of tons of food.


Intended, first of all, to guard the country frontiers and to participate in international military missions within the North Atlantic Alliance in keeping with the assumed engagements, the Romanian Armed Forces proved once more that they were not indifferent to the suffering of some of our fellows, affected by the elements or victims of accidents, and *took up the battle position*. They pulled out from under the snow and transported by air sick people, some of them in critical condition, to whom no ambulance, no matter how powerful, could have reached. The chances of survival for those injured in methane gas explosions were considerably increased through rapid air transport to specialised clinics.

Sincere, natural gestures of solidarity and dedication made by the soldiers who brought back to life, with extraordinary effort, people who had lost their last hope to see daylight. Their tears, frozen on their cheeks, often were the most beautiful words of gratitude to the Romanian Armed Forces. And, for the anonymous soldiers who fought with snow, with the seconds and with the limits of their own physical resistance, or, in the case of aircraft crews, with the technical limitations of aircraft in extreme weather conditions, these tears will symbolise the most precious decorations received on a battlefield.

The country was yet again terribly affected. And, as always, the Romanian Armed Forces were present where they were needed and did their duty. Even if they never expected gratitude from those to whom they disinterestedly and often decisively gave their help, they fully deserve it. And those who smeared them quite often saying that they received too much of the country's coffers,

not knowing even slightly their true needs, would have to accept as an indisputable reality the commitment and sacrifice of the Romanian soldier, the power instilled in him by the belief of being servant of the country and its people.

It was not a coincidence that the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Gabriel Oprea, wrote a thank-you letter to all the soldiers who participated in the intervention and life rescue missions, noting, among others: *“The Armed Forces have always stood by the people. Whether fighting in theatres of operations for the freedom, peace and safety of those at home, or getting involved, in hard times, in support of his fellows, the Romanian soldier is a symbol of honour, courage, resolution and dedication. These days, the Armed Forces once again prove that they deserve the full respect and appreciation of our society. We have risen at the level of the most demanding expectations, we have made proud all of our military active duty or reserve forces and, most importantly, we have brought comfort to the people awfully affected by blizzards and snow [...]. Your efforts and the efforts of all those who participate in these missions confirm once more the dedication of the Romanian military and the power of the oath that binds us to the country”.*

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*  
**English version by**  
*Iulia NĂSTASIE*



# *A la première ligne sur le front de la neige*

**C'**est la nature qui nous a mis du nouveau à l'épreuve. Et nous a montré que, au-delà de nos fausses déclarations d'amitié, au fait une répréhensible ignorance avec laquelle nous persévérons de traiter l'environnement, nous ont prouvé que nous ne concevions pas du tout par les tentes d'armistice qui elle nous avons proposée – se rappeler seulement les hivers doux de ces dernières années! – et que nous sommes transportés dans une suave illusion du réchauffement climatique.

Réchauffement climatique de la planète? Jours et nuits dans une rangée du ce Février est tombé bien de neige que des jeunes générations ensemble peut-être n'aient pas vu jamais – combien de cieux ont gardé de Dieu autant de la neige? – et, dans les thermomètres, le mercure était souvent accroupi de froid entre les lignes bleues ci-dessous de moins 30 degrés Celsius.

L'image idyllique de l'hiver a été trop rapidement transformée en un cauchemar blanc. Les banques de neige ont avalés les maisons à peine respirer à travers de leurs cheminées, ont cessé de routes, ont éclaté de réseaux d'électricité, laissant dans l'obscurité et le froid de milliers des gens.

La rage refoulée en Bărăgan, en Dobroudja eu au sud de la Moldavie par la neige bien assise des vents sortis des gardes de l'Est, qui ont forcément traversé par des chardons de champs et, peut être, les épis de maïs abandonnés à l'automne sur les chaumes arides, c'est la rage donc qui a bloqué les routes et autoroutes, et des centaines de personnes ont resté piégées dans leurs voitures massés sous la neige ou dans les trains bloqués sur les chemins de fer. Les heures et les jours-même passées de tous hommes qu'ils vivaient dans la terreur de la neige ne peuvent pas être décrites.

Le faible réponse des autorités locales – excédées, comme toujours, des explosions de la nature et de l'absence de solutions concrètes pour limiter leurs conséquences – a conduit, cette fois, le ministère de la Défense nationale à s'engager avec ses collègues du ministère de l'Administration et de l'Intérieur et ceux de l'Inspection des situations d'urgence, à l'avant-garde de cette confrontation

avec la neige et le givre, dans la lutte avec les secondes pour sauver des vies. Une priorité, de la plus haute importance pour ceux qui sont en charge de la sécurité de l'Etat et de ses citoyens.

L'État-major général a dirigé, par ses structures spécialisées, tous ces efforts sur le front de la neige et les forces – les gens et les techniques spécifiques des unités militaires – ont pris des mesures pour débloquer les voies d'accès par la route, ferroviaire et maritime, pour l'évacuation des malades en phase critique, pour transporter l'eau, la nourriture, des médicaments, du bois de chauffage pour les collectivités isolées.

Dans les points de collecte organisés par l'armée on recueilli, grâce à la générosité et la solidarité de nos frères, des dizaines de millions de denrées non périssables et des nécessités matérielles. Les avions militaires *C-130 Hercules* et *C-27J Spartan* – que nous avons vu non seulement transporter des troupes sur les théâtres d'opération, des milliers de miles de pays, mais aussi les citoyens, les roumains et étrangers, évacués de la Libye brûlante de l'année dernière – ont conduit cette fois, près des hélicoptères *IAR-330 Puma*, ces aliments et matériaux où les gens étaient dans le grand besoin. Un véritable pont aérien de l'espoir et de la vie, multiplié, sur la terre, des convois de camions chargés également avec la nécessité de gens qui étaient en difficulté. Notre remorqueur de mer, *Grozavul*, et son frère de la rivière, *RF-328*, se sont battus, à son tour, avec le Danube gelé, portant à et des colonies isolées et de Delta des centaines de passagers, certains d'entre eux vers les centres médicaux, et des dizaines de tonnes alimentaires.

L'Armée Roumaine, conçue d'abord, pour garder les frontières du pays et de participer, en tant que engagements assumés, aux missions militaires internationales de l'OTAN, a prouvé, encore une fois, qu'elle n'est pas indifférente à la souffrance de certains de nos voisins, touchés par des phénomènes naturelles ou victimes des accidents, et *a pris la position pour la bataille*. Ils sont sortis de la céruse blanche de la neige et transportés par l'air des personnes malades, certains dans un état critique, qu'aucune ambulance, peu importe sa puissance, ne pouvait pas atteindre à ces endroits-là. Pour les blessés des explosions de gaz méthane, le transport rapide par avion à des cliniques spécialisées les a augmentés de façon significative leurs chances de la survie.

Il y a des gestes sincères, naturelles, de la solidarité, du dévouement de l'armée, que, avec des efforts surhumaines, a ramené à la vie des gens qui supposaient qu'ils n'avaient plus des espoirs pour voir la lumière du jour. Leurs larmes, par ses visages figées par le gel, étaient souvent les plus belles paroles de grâce à l'adresse de l'Armée Roumaine et elles seront, pour les soldats anonymes qui se sont battus avec de la neige, avec les secondes et les limites de leur résistance

physique, ou, dans les cas des équipages d'air-naves, avec des limites techniques des appareils de vol dans des conditions météorologiques extrêmes, elles seront les plus précieuses décorations reçues dans un champ de bataille.

Le pays était à nouveau de terribles expériences. Et, comme toujours, l'Armée Roumaine était où elle a été nécessaire et elle avait fait son devoir. Et l'Armée, même si elle n'est pas attendu jamais la gratitude de ceux qui elle a en offert son aide dans une manière désintéressé et très souvent décisivement, elle en bien mérite. Et ceux qui, quelques fois, l'ont enduit de boue et ils disent qu'elle reçu trop d'argent de la trésorerie du pays, sans connaître vraiment ses réelles besoins, ils devront d'accepter, comme une réalité incontestable, le dévouement et l'esprit de sacrifice du soldat roumain, le pouvoir que lui donne sa foi de servir du pays et de son peuple.

Pas du tout au hasard, c'est le ministre de la Défense nationale, M. Gabriel Oprea, qui a remercié, par une lettre, à tous les soldats qui ont participé à des missions d'intervention et de sauvetage de la vie, en notant, entre autres: *„L'Armée était et sera toujours près du peuple. Que ce soit il lutte contre dans les théâtres d'opérations pour la liberté, la paix et la sécurité de son peuple, soit il intervient quand est dans une situation dure, à l'appui de leurs camarades, le soldat roumain est un symbole d'honneur, du courage, de la persévérance et le dévouement. Ces jours-ci, l'armée prouve encore une fois qu'elle mérite tout le respect et toute la reconnaissance à travers elle est appréciée dans notre société. Nous nous sommes levés aux attentes les plus exigeantes, je les ai fait fiers tous les soldats actifs ou retraités et, le plus important, nous avons apporté un soulagement aux personnes plus affectés du blizzard et de la neige [...]. Vos efforts et tous ceux qui participent à ces missions confirme, une fois de plus, l'engagement militaire roumaine et le pouvoir du serment qui nous lie à ce pays“.*

**Version française par  
Alina PAPOI**

# **CONTINUOUS WARFARE**

## **Information Confrontation (VII)**

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ

### **Does information confrontation exist?**

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*Reliable information has always been important because decision-makers need it for solving the problems with which they confront. Lack of information or misperceptions of situations have led to wrong decisions.*

*All important leaders have tried to eliminate risks or at least to reduce their impact caused by the lack of or the inappropriate information, starting information gathering in order to forecast the evolution of events. Thus, the so-called information warfare was initiated and adapted to all the situations – peace, crisis and wartime – and to all types and means of collecting, processing and disseminating information.*

*Information dominance is the most important step for gaining victory in any type of confrontation.*

**Keywords:** *intelligence; information confrontation; cyber warfare; economic espionage; full spectrum dominance*

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All human activities encompass opinions and attitudes pro and against ideas, actions, facts etc. Information domain, more than any other human activity, is based on a permanent confrontation between those that want to grab or at least to know data, the content of some plans and programmes they are unauthorised to know and people in charge of protecting those data, plans, programmes etc. Information confrontation consists of two main parts: the non-antagonistic and the antagonistic ones. The non-antagonistic part is represented by competition and it occurs especially in the cultural domain. The antagonistic part accompanies political, economic and military domains.

Information has a growing importance. Every human being needs information in everything he or she does. From common activities like the identification of an address to scientific activities or the discovery of a plot or a terrorist attack, information is the one that helps us.

Curiosity and interest are the most powerful stimuli that push us towards knowledge and implicitly towards gathering and accumulating information. It is said that curiosity pushed Adam and Eve to bite into the fruit of the tree of knowledge. That gesture was explicitly prohibited

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General (r.) Dr Mihail Orzeată – Associate Professor, “Carol I” National Defence University, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

by God. That is why they were punished to be mortal beings and they were sent to the Earth. This event has a triple significance. Firstly, it seems to be the initial point of information confrontation. Secondly, the event signifies the institutionalisation of a rule, which has been applied since then up to these days and I suppose it will be in place forever – the access to information is selective. It means that some data are free to be known by everybody but some others are available to only authorised persons. The third significance is that rules cannot be broken without consequences, and most probably, Adam and Eve's punishment is the first within information confrontation.

Information confrontation was and will certainly be very complex. It is practically part of every human society domain, it is performed in many ways and at many levels – from individuals to communities – and each of us is involved, whether we know it or not. The implications of information confrontation are as complex as confrontation itself and they have moral, judicial, political, economic, cultural and military consequences as well. The desire to know more, to free us from the unknown is tempered by legal, moral and tradition barriers too. Older generations, which are more conservative, display resistance to the changes promoted by younger ones, which are more enthusiastic. Many people do not like to change their habits and their lifestyle, being afraid that changes may bring some bad things and events in their lives. One of the most common reactions to change is to establish prohibition or to restrict access to information. For instance, commercial companies protect their interests by imposing restrictions on the information they own. Priests try to protect their authority and influence over the people of the same faith recalling the dictum *“do not ask questions, just believe”*.

The action (attempt to extend the limits of knowledge, including by breaking some rules, traditions or taboos) and reaction (protection against any unauthorised attempt to access information) are the basic elements of the confrontation and they are continuously performed because states have permanent interests and alliances are flexible.

Being well-informed means being better prepared for any event and course of action whilst surprise has less room to occur. True and timely information is a compulsory condition for the success of any type of activity, from the planning phase to the execution one. No strategy, plan or programme has the chance to meet objectives if they are developed following the *“rule”* of *“seeing and doing”*, that is to say the immediate adaptation of a planned activity in accordance with the circumstances may fail if the evolution of the facts that compose the environment is not envisioned. Of course we have to consider luck but it appears randomly and we should not count on it that much. On the other hand, our feelings cannot help us see and analyse



all the factors that influence an ongoing action. The interdependences generated by globalisation multiply the scope of the factors that could influence our decisions, especially those that refer to human communities. Therefore, the only way that leads us to success is the permanent work for collecting, processing, analysing and using adequately the information from the domains we are interested in, followed by the prognosis of events evolution and the adjustment of our strategies, plans and programmes accordingly.

### ***Information and policy***

Generally, information is meant to fill a gap in our knowledge and to free us from the fear and uncertainty that arise from the unknown. People with initiative have discovered that information can be used to dominate their fellows. Stimulated by the desire for power more than anything else, many people rediscover the Latin dictum that says “*by legal and unlawful means*”<sup>1</sup> and apply it accordingly to serve their interests. In addition, people possessed by the demon of power have extended Bacon’s meaning of power<sup>2</sup> from science to all social domains.

I do believe that information is a power multiplier if we have it at the right time and we know how to use it. That is why states and private companies invest a large amount of money to develop systems for collecting, processing, analysing, delivering information in real time as well as for protecting the information they own. Most of the information protection systems have worked well and nowadays we are not able to know what happened in certain conflict situations. Some historians and information experts believe that one might be surprised to discover that some events have causes that differ from the ones released to the public by the officials. That is to say one might discover hidden worlds buried under a lot of fragmentary information<sup>3</sup>. This way people may be influenced to accept some decisions or explanations for the causes of some important events that are not normally agreed by the population. One situation that divided public opinion in the USA is the Warren Commission report on the assassination of President J. F. Kennedy. There were questions regarding the causes and the authors of the crime at that time and some of them are still valid today. Some people such as Fernando Jimenez del Oso think that the commission did everything wrong, suggesting that the real mission of the Warren Commission

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<sup>1</sup> I. Berg, *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, Editura Vestala, București, 2004, pp. 272-273.

<sup>2</sup> Francis Bacon, *Religious Meditations*, 1598, quoted by I. Berg, in *Dicționar de cuvinte, op.cit.*, pp. 182-183.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas B. Allen, *Declasificat. 50 de documente strict secrete care au schimbat istoria*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2009, p. 5.

was to hide the truth<sup>4</sup>. Referring to the same event, some other authors built a conspiracy theory and accused the CIA, which was in conflict with J. F. Kennedy because he did not give enough support to the Agency during Cuba's Bay of Pigs invasion<sup>5</sup>.

History offers us many examples of using information in an unlawful way by politicians in order to gain more advantages against their opponents. One of the most known and largely commented in the mass media is the *Watergate Affair*, which involved former US President Nixon. According to journalists Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein from *The Washington Post*, the President authorised, on 17 June 1972, the installation of some listening devices inside the Democratic Party Headquarters – the Watergate building in order to intercept telephonic communications. All the details of the illegal activity were transmitted to the journalists by a mysterious individual called “*Deep Throat*”<sup>6</sup>, who was well-informed about the activities of the presidential administration. The entire story was the topic of several hundreds of articles, published in *The Washington Post*. Finally, the Congress and responsible authorities decided to initiate an inquiry committee that confirmed the alleged facts published by the journalists and Nixon was forced to resign, otherwise he could be subject to impeachment procedure. The initiator of the entire story, the so-called “*Deep Throat*”, decided to appear in front of the public during a television programme in 2005. He was a former deputy of the FBI Director Edgar Hoover, namely Mark Felt<sup>7</sup>. His reason for revealing the unlawful activities of Nixon Administration was more like revenge as he was not promoted Director of the FBI after the death of Edgar Hoover.

Another situation in which information generated important modifications of some states policies is the one related to former Romanian General Ion Mihai Pacepa, ex-chief of Foreign Intelligence Division and personal advisor to President Nicolae Ceaușescu. Pacepa decided to ask for political asylum in the USA, in 1978. The effects of his gesture were compared to the ones produced by the worst earthquake in the Romanian history, in 1977<sup>8</sup>. Until then Ceaușescu enjoyed the sympathy of the entire Occident, following his decision not to participate in the Warsaw Pact actions of invading Czechoslovakia, in 1968, in order to suppress

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<sup>4</sup> Fernando Jimenez del Oso, in Miguel Pedrero, *Corupția marilor puteri. Strategii și minciuni în politica mondială*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2004, pp. 10-11.

<sup>5</sup> Jamie King, *111 teorii ale conspirației*, Editura Litera, București, 2010, pp. 101-102.

<sup>6</sup> Leonard Downie Jr., *The Post and Watergate*, in *The Washington Post*, 1 June 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2005/06/01/DI2005060100769.html>

<sup>7</sup> John D. O'Connor, *The Deep Throat Revelation – “I’m the Guy Called Deep Throat”*, in *Vanity Fair*, July 2005, <http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2005/07/deepthroat200507>.

<sup>8</sup> Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Red Horizons*, Universul Press, New York, 1988, p. 16.

the revolution. Practically, after Pacepa's revelations about espionage actions and Ceaușescu's regime collaboration with extremist organisations from the Middle and Near East, the sympathy for the Romanian President in the Occident diminished rapidly and so did Romania's economic relations.

In December 1989, Ceaușescu's dictatorial regime was undesirable not only for the Romanian people and the Occident but also for the USSR. According to Mihai Ungheanu<sup>9</sup>, the result of this perception was a close cooperation between the Eastern (the KGB and the Hungarian secret services) and the Western secret services (the CIA, the French, and British secret services) and the Mossad. Initially, the Romanian Revolution broadcast live on television rekindled the West sympathy for the Romanian people. After the elections in 1990 and the first arrival of the miners in București that resulted in the disbandment of the movement in the University Square, the mass media from the West turned its back again on Romanians and portrayed them as savage and violent, refusing democracy and killing minority groups and so on<sup>10</sup>.

Although all politicians, but especially the ones in decision-making positions, utilised spies for being well-informed and for preventing surprise attacks against the communities they led, they had different attitudes related to intelligence structures and the utility of the conclusions and proposals they submitted to decision-makers. It is said that the first American President – George Washington – was very interested in receiving timely and precise information coming from credible sources<sup>11</sup>. Queen Elizabeth I of Great Britain was the beneficiary of very good information professionals, who contributed, many times decisively, to the victories against her rivals. Sir Francis Walsingham, her information advisor used to say that information was never too expensive because it might save much money spent in wartime<sup>12</sup>.

According to some former CIA senior employees, William (Bill) Clinton had a different attitude related to intelligence services, compared to other presidents of the USA and even to other heads of state. Tim Weiner, for instance, said that President Clinton was less interested in espionage and deliberately ignored the CIA<sup>13</sup>. The result of this attitude was the expected one: the best employees decided to leave the Agency, some objectives of the US foreign policy were not accomplished and the CIA itself looked like an amalgam of unsuitable pieces, put together by nonprofessional and sometimes careless people<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Mihai Ungheanu, *Un război civil regizat?*, Editura Romcartexim, București, 1997, p. 32.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 26.

<sup>11</sup> Thomas B. Allen, *Declasificat ..., op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 10.

<sup>13</sup> Tim Weiner, *CIA – o istorie secretă*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2007, pp. 321-323.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 327.

### ***Information and economy***

Information has always been important for economy. Like any other social activities, information confrontation has two main parts – the antagonistic and non-antagonistic one.

Competition is the *non-antagonistic* part, which has the objective of obtaining information prior to other people that participate in the competition. Having the information prior to all other scientists and experts into the same field of activity will allow the owner to gain fabulous benefits. If we analyse the situation in the stock exchange market, it can be easily seen that the growth or decline of certain company credibility will determine the rise or fall of the price for the company's stocks. The stock price rise might lead to stockholders accumulating a fortune whilst the stock price fall may force the company to declare bankruptcy, ruining the stockholders. Therefore, if a stockholder has information about the evolution of the stock price then he will buy shares prior to the others and, when the price starts rising, he may make a fortune within hours or days. The opposite situation, when the price for each stock goes down, stockholders have to sell shares prior to the moment the price starts falling, following the free market law of supply and demand.

I would say that information is the "*Achilles' heel*" of the stock market because it is easily influenced by information. Knowing this feature of the free market, some people take inappropriate actions such as the ones artificially created by launching rumours, false data or some embarrassing and secret details about the business performance of the rival companies. The result is the stock price rise or fall and some people take advantage of all these actions increasing their fortune and ruining their rivals.

One of such situations, generated by the information that affected the entire world economy, is related to the Arab states in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which declared embargo against the Western states that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. The next day after this measure, the crude oil price was double and the world dependent on oil entered an economic decline, whilst the states belonging to OPEC cashed in a lot of money.

Other economic problems generated by information are those related to the 1991 and 2003 attacks on Iraq and the 2011 attack on the Libyan government forces. Each of the above-mentioned event led to crude oil price and inflation rate rise, because most economic activities depend on fossil energy resources like natural gas, oil and its derivative products.

Manipulation of information could be performed in many other ways such as delivering information at the right time to some people and late to all the others; distorting the information content or omitting some of the details from the content etc. Thus, the owner of the information can create advantages for those that receive timely and correct information whilst the others will be in disadvantage. The advantage of having timely and correct information may lead to fortune, conquering a market, promotion in a good social position or victory in military confrontations. That is why competition for such kind of information is continuous and harsh. I would say that there is no mercy for the loser inside this competition.

The *antagonistic* component of information confrontation gets manifest between those that want to obtain prohibited information and the ones in charge of protecting information. Approaching this subject, Moises Naim says that stolen ideas, from weapons, cars, perfumes and medical products to music and movies are a reality of our world today<sup>15</sup>. The activity of stealing information is very profitable and many states, companies and individuals are involved in it<sup>16</sup>. For instance, the US National Counterintelligence Center – NACIC – quoted the statement of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who confirmed, on 7 February 1996, his country's involvement in industrial espionage<sup>17</sup>; the Cox Commission of the US Congress incriminated China for espionage activities on the USA territory<sup>18</sup>, and so on. There are so many facts and events in this domain because the advanced technologies have a dual usability – military and civilian one. Moreover, those who steal ideas, technologies and products from the states and companies that produce them can sell those ideas and products at a lower price because they do not invest in research and development. Therefore, they have a huge advantage on the markets because price is an important leverage for attracting buyers or determining them to go away.

Industrial espionage is not limited to stealing technologies, products and ideas to produce some competitive goods. Many states and companies are interested in knowing as soon as possible the estimate of a certain state economy at a right moment and of its prognosis and evolution. This information is necessary

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<sup>15</sup> Moises Naim, *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy*, Anchor Books, A Division of Random House, New York, 2006, pp. 109-110.

<sup>16</sup> Chapman Pincher, *Trădare – șase decenii de spionaj sovietic în SUA și Marea Britanie*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2010, pp. 7-10.

<sup>17</sup> *Counterintelligence News and Developments*, March 1996, p. 1, [www.nacic.gov/cind/1996/mar96.htm](http://www.nacic.gov/cind/1996/mar96.htm)

<sup>18</sup> *Report of the Select Committee of US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1999, chapter 1, [www.house.gov/coxreport](http://www.house.gov/coxreport).

for strategic planning investment programmes and for knowing the hidden interests in the defence domain. Having timely and accurate information is helpful for decision-makers to adapt their strategies in the political, economic and defence domains. For instance, former head of the French foreign intelligence service stated that he had information, in November 1971, about the USA intent to reduce gold price, decision that would have led to the depreciation of the US dollar. Right after that, France sold a large amount of dollars and obtained a very good profit<sup>19</sup>.

According to James Dunnigan, the newest and the most destructive information confrontation is the struggle to control the Internet. The one that controls the Internet will have access to a lot of information and, more than that, could use computer worms and viruses to cause damages to almost all industrial companies and government agencies as well<sup>20</sup>. The number of individuals and companies connected to the Internet is growing and so is the potential for doing business. In order to have an image of that potential it is enough to say that the Internet contributed to the economic growth of the USA in 2001 by almost one third of its entire value<sup>21</sup>!

### ***Information and military confrontation***

All great military and political leaders have wanted to eliminate the risks caused by the lack of information or disinformation. Napoleon I used to say that the power of the unknown could not be measured<sup>22</sup>, and Chinese Sun Tzu stated, in his book *The Art of War*, that the one who knew the enemy and knew himself would not be in danger during battles, whilst the one who knew neither himself nor the enemy would succumb in every battle<sup>23</sup>. German military historian Guido Knopp appreciated that Admiral Canaris espionage network was the real Hitler's wonder weapon<sup>24</sup>, which enormously contributed to the victories over the Soviets during the first part of the "Barbarossa" plan.

On the other hand, the Germans and the Japanese were defeated in the field of information protection during the Second World War. Their machines for encrypting

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<sup>19</sup> Alexandre de Marenches, David A. Adelman, *The Fourth World War*, Morrow, New York, 1992, pp. 114-115.

<sup>20</sup> James F. Dunnigan, *Noua amenințare mondială: cyberterorismul*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2010, p. 20.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 55.

<sup>22</sup> Marin Mirea, *Maxime militare*, Editura Militară, București, 1973, p. 45.

<sup>23</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Westview Press, 1994, p. 179.

<sup>24</sup> Guido Knopp, *Războinicii lui Hitler*, Editura Litera, București, 2010, p. 13.

communications – the German *Enigma*<sup>25</sup> and the Japanese *Purple*<sup>26</sup> were no longer encrypted for the allies because of the good cooperation between the USA, Great Britain and the Resistance fighters from the German occupied territories. In turn, the Soviets were successful in their information confrontation with the Japanese, especially due to the activity of their spy, Richard Sorge<sup>27</sup>.

Germany launched a large campaign of disinformation against the USSR prior to the initiation of aggression, on 22 June 1941. The campaign was successful, at least against Stalin and an important part of the Soviet leadership. The non-aggression *Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact*, signed in 1939 by the German and Soviet ministers for foreign affairs, might have helped the Nazis to deceive their adversaries. It is hard to understand why the Soviet leadership did not take into consideration Hitler's strategic objectives written in his book *Mein Kampf*, in which he stated that Germany needed "*vital space*", which was available only in Russia<sup>28</sup>. The problems generated by Stalin's decision to jail and kill many senior commissioned officers and generals, associated with the real situation of the Soviet Armed Forces that had many obsolete weapon systems with lack of ammunition and insufficient training of the personnel<sup>29</sup> could explain Stalin's fear to respond to German provocative actions. Although Stalin was the main to blame for the Nazi's surprise attack against the USSR, and for interdicting all actions to put the military into the right alert status, he furiously blamed the Armed Forces saying that they should have been prepared for fighting without any other political directive<sup>30</sup>.

During the *Cold War*, the need for having accurate and timely information oriented the scientific research to find the most advanced devices for collecting, processing and transmitting data. Thus, there were discovered Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), satellites and technologies for detecting almost everything existing on Earth, under ground or under water, including the full spectrum of radiations.

Satellites and their utilisation for different purposes, especially in the military, economic and information domains, represent the most convincing evidence for the continuity of war.

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<sup>25</sup> Jozef Garlinski, *The Enigma War*, Scriber, New York, 1979, p. 16.

<sup>26</sup> G. J. A. O'Toole, *Honorable Treachery: A History of US Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Actions from the American Revolution to the CIA*, Atlantic Monthly, New York, 1991, pp. 384-397.

<sup>27</sup> Gordon W. Prange, Donald Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, *Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1984.

<sup>28</sup> Ivan Stadniuk, *Războiul*, vol. I, Editura Militară, București, 1986, p. 44.

<sup>29</sup> Mr. X and Patrick Pesnot, *Spionii ruși. De la Stalin la Putin*, Editura Litera, București, 2010, pp. 12-13.

<sup>30</sup> Ivan Stadniuk, *Războiul*, *op. cit.*, p. 191.



Most of the information is dual. Therefore, collecting, processing, analysing and transmitting it timely to the right beneficiary will help make good decisions. If the information is not accurate and timely then decision-makers might take inappropriate decisions<sup>31</sup>. According to Karl W. Deutsch, inaccurate information and wrong perceptions about different events form the basis for wrong decisions that led to almost 50% of the 20<sup>th</sup> century conflicts<sup>32</sup>. Many information experts believe that most of the important events in the world could have had a different result if the information was correctly analysed by those in charge of it. We can mention here the genocide in Rwanda, in 1994; the attacks on US Embassies in Nairobi – Kenya, and Dar es Salaam – Tanzania, on 7 August 1998; the attack on China's Embassy in Belgrade, during the Kosovo War of 1999; the terrorist attacks on the USA, in 2001 and so on<sup>33</sup>.

In order to support mutual trust and avoid missile attacks by accident between the USA and the USSR, American President Dwight Eisenhower proposed, at the summit of the four great powers on 21 July 1955, the drawing up of an agreement. The agreement was supposed to allow each state, party to the agreement, to fly aerial reconnaissance missions over the territories of the other one in order to be well-informed about all military and other activities related to defensive and offensive intentions<sup>34</sup>. The USSR did not accept the proposal and the East-West confrontation went on. Over the years, as a result of so many unpleasant events that generated conditions for launching a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, decision-makers signed the *Open Skies Treaty*, which was, more or less, an extended continuation of President Eisenhower proposal from 1955. The aim of the treaty was similar – increasing mutual trust among all the signatories – but the provisions of the treaty were extended to all states from NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Current and, most probably, future military confrontations will depend more and more on information. Information dominance is the first and the most important step in gaining Full Spectrum Dominance, which leads to a quick victory in military confrontations.

Unprecedented development of communications, computers and networks for delivering information and processed data helped the initiative of developing the concept of *Network Centric Warfare – NCW* – by Arthur Cebrowski and John Garska.

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<sup>31</sup> Barry R. Schneider, *Deterring International Rivals From War and Escalation*, in *Know Thy Enemy*, USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, 2003, p. 11, <http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil>.

<sup>32</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, *Analiza relațiilor internaționale*, Editura Tehnica-Info, Chișinău, 2006, pp. 51-52.

<sup>33</sup> Tim Weiner, *CIA o istorie secretă ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 326, 340, 342, 346.

<sup>34</sup> Abram N. Shulsky, Gary J. Schmitt, *Războiul tăcut*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2008, p. 54.



Generally, this concept consists of a symbiosis between information and advanced weapon systems, used in accordance with the *Effects-Based Operations* concept, meant to shorten the war length whilst reducing the damages and number of victims.

A very well-developed system of communications, usually called network, represents not only an important advantage but also a vulnerability for the owner and users as well. As previously mentioned, information is attractive and many individuals are tempted to gain it using all available means, whether legal or illegal. This permanent fight between people unauthorised to access certain information using electronic devices, methods and software, and those in charge of protecting it is at the core of a new type of confrontation called *cyber warfare*<sup>35</sup>. The party in confrontation that manages to keep its C4ISR system in full capability while damaging the adversary's one enjoys a huge advantage for gaining victory.

Everyone needs reliable information but decision-makers need it more than anyone else in order to solve the problems they are confronted with. Lack of information or misperception of certain situations has led to wrong decisions. That is why information confrontation, usually called information warfare, has been adapted to all the situations – peace, crisis and wartime –, in order to continuously collect, process and disseminate information and data.



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<sup>35</sup> James F. Dunnigan, *Noua amenințare mondială: cyberterorismul ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

# DEFENDOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE SYSTEM OF MILITARY SCIENCES AND THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES

*Brigadier General Dr Maricel D. POPA*

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*The military phenomenon is subject to several dichotomies, some of them being more obvious than others. It has its own economic intimacy and identity. On the other hand, among the most important things that are at the centre of its attention, there is economic-financial confrontation.*

*Thus, we intend to state, in this approach, that economic elements, either premises or results, can distort any effort of conceptualisation or design of a proper management system. If we understand that economic elements are interests, we may easily be aware of why they can be considered as the engine of social action. And this has been and will be a valid fact wherever and whenever worldwide.*

**Keywords:** *defence; economic sciences; military economy; total war*

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**I**t is far from me the thought of a comprehensive approach to the issues contained succinctly in the title of the current article. Especially since it is intended to be a sum of micro-essays on certain issues, which, although are not all evaluated in a innovative manner, are still interesting in terms of the military phenomenon, analysed from the perspective of economic sciences and not only.

## **Defendology – A Theoretical, General, Methodological Military Science**

According to a widespread acceptance, the *phenomenon* can be understood as an exterior manifestation of the essence of a thing, process etc., which is accessible, directly perceptible, or a process, a transformation, an evolution, an effect etc. of nature and society. Based on an already established definition, the *military phenomenon* means the ensemble of social forces and means as well as

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the related institutions and organisations, military by their nature and destination, experiencing a continuous processuality. Summarised, the military phenomenon includes the institutions, activities and relations in the military sphere. By analogy, one can talk of a political, social, economic, cultural etc. phenomenon, understanding the same things, appropriate for each case, according to the own domain of reference, which provides, in fact, the particularisation.

In designing our approach, we have started from the finding and conviction that the subject is topical, considering, on the one hand, the effects of the global financial and economic crisis we are currently undergoing and, on the other hand, the much trumpeted imminence of a possible future war.

These are the reasons for which we have introduced defendology (and defendological evaluations) in the equations of the above-mentioned issue.

We should mention that through *defendology* we understand the theoretical, general military science that studies the issue of defence, in the classic and modern meaning of the concept, at the level of the individual, the human social groups, the political, social or economic organisations, at the national level (national defence) or at the international one (common or collective defence), mentioning that defendology is a science designed in a three-dimensional system, consisting of public policies, public administration and public economy.

We wish to insist on the fact that, in the proposed vision, defendology is not and is not intended to be a new science, but it is a new approach, meant to conceptualise and systematise the current military sciences. In favour of this science with new coordinates, we present the following arguments:

a) At the Lisbon Summit, on 19 November 2010, the North Atlantic Alliance adopted its latest strategic concept – “*active engagement, modern defence*”. Details regarding the main provisions of the new NATO strategic concept can also be found in *Gândirea militară românească* Journal<sup>1</sup>.

b) The system of military sciences may be compared with that of economic sciences: “*Following the division made throughout history, the current economic science includes, in addition to a general or theoretical science (known, as a rule, as political economy), a series of special or applicative economic sciences. They are focused on the levels of organisation of the current economic life (...). Between the current components of the economic science there are many interconnections. Consequently, we are dealing with a system of economic sciences, having, at its core, political economy, as a theoretical and methodological basis*”<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Comandor Gabriel Răducanu, *Lecțiile învățate din conflictele sfârșitului de secol XX și începutul secolului XXI – concepte operaționale actuale*, în *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 3/2011, pp. 33-34.

<sup>2</sup> I.D. Adumitrăcesei, N.G. Niculescu, *Știința economică la o răscruce*, Editura Junimea, Iași, 2007, pp. 16-17.

Naturally and logically, we consider defendology to be the science at the core of the system of military sciences, based on which the sum of special, specific military sciences is based. In other words, summarising, defendology is for the system of military sciences what political economy is for the system of economic sciences.

c) The proposed name – *defendology* – comes from the Latin verb *defendo*, -ere, -fendi, -fensum<sup>3</sup>, which simply means *to defend, to protect, to support*.

d) The need to approach the topics scientifically, including its temporal suitability to the coordinates of the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, is more than obvious: *“In the latest decades, the political decisions benefit more and more from the results of scientific analyses, although they are still capitalised on within the limits of the ideological options. The appeal to scientific research is an encouraging proof for the awareness of the limits of the ideological approaches and justifies the hope for substantial reconsiderations in the way the public decision is conceived. (...) The source of the new thinking regarding security can be the reassessment of existing relations, or of the ones that may exist, between nations, states, economic structures, international organisations, groups (nations or populations) or individuals”<sup>4</sup>.*

e) The military economy will, in turn, have to be re-conceptualised and re-systematised, still remaining an important border science between military sciences and economic sciences.

f) We firmly believe that, from now on, we will not talk about possible economic approaches of the military phenomenon anymore. As a novelty, we will need to address the military phenomenon as a whole, as being itself a sum of economic activities – with distinct reasons, actions and economic effects, which generate different, various aspects of political, social, administrative nature, of business nature, of institutional nature etc. In other words, the military phenomenon has its own economic coordinates, its own economic identity.

We consider that there are many other arguments that advocate for bringing defendology to the centre of attention. In this context, we must mention that, in the near future, we ourselves will return to the subject and will present its subsystems in detail, concomitantly with pointing out its place and role within the system of military sciences.

#### ❖ *Aspects Regarding Certain Coordinates of Projecting Defendology*

The military phenomenon is subject to a number of dichotomies, but one of them is more prominent. As we said earlier, it has its own intimacy and economic

<sup>3</sup> Voichița Ionescu, *Dicționar latin-român*, Editura Orizonturi, București, 1993, p. 60.

<sup>4</sup> Conf.univ.dr. Cleopatra Pîrvulescu, *Securitatea națională – perspective ideologice și științifice*, in *Dimensiunile nonmilitare ale securității*, prof.univ.dr. Mircea Mureșan (scientific coordinator), Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2010, pp. 54-56.

identity. On the other hand, among the important things in the centre of its attention is the financial and economic confrontation.

We thus try to say, at this stage, without detailing the determined aspects, that the economic elements, in the form of premises or results, can pervert any effort of conceptualising and projecting an appropriate management system. If among *economic elements* we will identify *interests*, we will easily understand why they can be considered as the engine of social action. This has been valid anytime and anywhere in the world. We carry all these things in our genetic heritage. Just as we carry, as a legacy or as a curse, the genetic sequence of the conflict: we are born with it, we improve it, each one in keeping with our strength and competence, and we leave it as a legacy. Throughout time, everyone has been a link, a stronger or a more vulnerable one, in a food chain of conflict. We, humans, being the raw material of conflict, this food chain is infinite.

To say that *war is a complex social phenomenon* may seem to say or repeat an obvious, commonplace truth. But this truism should be reconsidered, because we are at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and the notions that we used – war, phenomenon, social, complex – currently have other meanings, other contents, other values.

In this context, we recommend the acceptance of defendology as a basic, central science, on which the system of military sciences is founded.

Within globalisation, as its effect or as the effect of its pressure, human communities are placed, at planetary level, in an ensemble of interferences and interdependences, many still unstudied, and even more still unknown.

From the historical point of view, until very recently, the war has been assimilated to a confrontation which used only brute force, only military means.

Today, there are many representations, many opinions about the war of the future, about its possible categorisations or classifications, especially in purely military or political-military terms. The best known of them *“are those regarding the fourth generation warfare, the fourth world war, the preventive war, a new Cold War (but with other actors) and the permanent war. Within these conceptions, the military force does not have the predominant role anymore. (...) Other conceptions, relatively recent ones, regarding the ways of using force, called, by most experts and analysts, types of (parallel, network-centred, effects-based, unconventional, asymmetrical, irregular, hybrid, information, electronic, psychological etc.) war are, in fact, forms of manifestation of the military component of a single type of war, respectively the total and continuous war that the humankind has been waging against itself from time immemorial”*<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> Mihail Orzeată, *Războiul continuu*, Editura Militară, București, 2011, pp. 29-30.

There is another attribute that adds to the two attributes of the war, *total and continuous*, and this is *multidimensional*. The multidimensional feature of war results from the domains of confrontation in which it is manifest: political-diplomatic, economic-financial, military, psychological, ecological, information, technological, cultural etc.<sup>6</sup> These multiple dimensions or components participate in the competition (conflict, game, confrontation) simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the set objectives, the real situations of the moment, the political-military decisions or attitudes and many other circumstances. After, all, this is how history is made.

Another essential coordinate of projecting defendology is the vision that the EU has of itself. Together with the provisions of the *European Security Strategy* (December 2003) and the ones of the *EU Internal Security Strategy* (March 2010), the strategic decisions or options in the economic and financial domain have the same importance for its future: *“Because of the international financial crisis, as well as for reasons regarding internal structural weaknesses, some countries in the Euro area face serious problems. (...) The zero priority currently is to restore the balance in the Euro area and to avoid contagion, because economies are interdependent and the most pessimistic analysts bring to mind the domino principle. However, the higher-ups of Europe give assurances that they will do whatever it takes, both politically and financially, to defend the Euro area from new turbulences. In fact, right now all the financial architecture is redesigned to recover the finances of member states. (...) These are drastic measures of budgetary discipline, of deficit and public debt control, of consumption limitation. (...) Nevertheless, any problem would the European Union confront with, they can be overcome, the political will and the necessary strength to pass all obstacles, present or future ones, exist”*<sup>7</sup>.

All the above-mentioned elements (which will require detailed approaches and further analyses) are constituent, basic grounds for rethinking the system of military sciences, in whose centre will be defendology, a science that studies smart defence.

In our subsequent interventions, we intend to address the economic analysis issues of public decisions in the field of defence and to dialogue about a possible new theory of public goods and services, among which there is also the defence, from the perspective of a new way – the defendological one – of interpreting the relation between public policies and public administration.

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 31.

<sup>7</sup> Magdalena Moreh, *Uniunea Europeană – ce a fost, ce este, ce va fi*, in *Buletin de Europa*, no. 16, May 2011, p. 3 (review of the Representation of the European Commission in Romania).

We must face future challenges, we must be prepared to respond convincingly, operatively and effectively to them. We need to guard ourselves and fight against the hypocrisy of not calling a spade a spade.

❖ *The Decalogue of the Correlation between the System of Economic Sciences and the System of Military Sciences*

1. Economic sciences and military sciences are sciences of *interests*. Do not forget one thing: there is an almost surprising similarity between *market* and *theatre of operations*, between these concepts and their expression, as well as between the actors that participate in the determined actions.

2. The economic crisis and the war are characterised by the same attribute: *continuous*.

3. The future of both systems of sciences – economic and military – depends on the *attitude* they will have towards man and nature.

4. The two scientific domains have *economic warfare* as a subject of study, which, in its exacerbated form, means an apocalypse of resources of the Humankind, of any nature they may be.

5. The system of economic sciences and the system of military sciences are irreversibly condemned to a *permanent transformation*, through a strategy of continuous adaptation.

6. The economic efficiency and the military efficiency must be judged depending on the *social efficiency*.

7. Between the effects of economic thinking and practice of one stage and the effects of the military thinking and practice of the respective phase there is a direct proportion, which implicitly determines the *social effects* of the period.

8. The economic sciences of the future and the military sciences of the future, together and in the context of the phenomena they study and determine, will be those that *will change civilisation*.

9. *War* is not the safest way to get out of a crisis, especially an economic-social one. But no one can guarantee that this is not a solution to which one can resort.

10. In the field of economic sciences and in the field of military sciences *there will never be possible to establish a definitive Decalogue*. It should be periodically analysed, re-projected and reformulated.

We will stop here for now, with the promise that we will return with new analyses and approaches that are specific to our topic and with the belief that defendology is on the path from a simple concept to reality.

**English version by**  
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# **SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL LEARNING**

## **– Necessity and Benefits for the Military System –**

*Brigadier General Dr Vasile ROMAN  
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*This article aims to promote social and emotional learning in the military system, identifying the major benefits and the implied changes. After a short introduction regarding the roots of social and emotional learning in the social context, the authors try to define this educative component and its outcomes for a deeper understanding of the domain. A generous space is dedicated to the concepts of social and emotional learning and competencies.*

*In the second part of this article, the authors seek to identify some of the most relevant aspects concerning the integration of the social and emotional learning in the human resources management of the national defence system. They conclude with some recommendations and warning signs regarding the harmonisation of the military theory and practice with the social and educational challenges.*

**Keywords:** *social and emotional learning; self-management; self-awareness; social-awareness; responsible decision-making*

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### **Conceptual highlights of social and emotional learning**

Social and emotional learning issues generate a more global interest as social problems multiply and become more intensified, at the same time with the complex challenges individuals must face and the insufficient tools and personal skills for responding to these problems. Various international authorities, such as UNESCO, UNICEF, OECD, WHO, have sounded the alarm about social and individual change, have drawn up guidelines and made recommendations to solve or address these challenges effectively. Education systems remain the most convenient authority to intervene in problematic situations, precisely through their component of prevention, training and learning. Therefore, the military system, which has its own ensemble of training and social intervention, should take into account this perspective in thinking its strategies, especially those regarding human

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resource management. Social and emotional learning has emerged as a solution to develop life skills, to cope with ourselves and with others, to make choices guided by axiological reference points, thus also contributing to the smooth functioning of the community as active citizens. The promoters of this type of education, who have identified its benefits through scientifically validated studies, go as far as considering it a complementary component of academic learning, a true revolution in education. Social and emotional learning is valued as an organising framework for all other preventive services in education institutions, including military and other training programmes with ethical, social or sanogenetic aims. The special appreciation and the obvious impact on the formal and non-formal curricula are supported by the beneficial effects manifested in school and professional success, on the improvement of mental health and pro-social behaviour, on an increased academic performance and inclusion.

We will initially outline the marks of the concepts of “*social and emotional learning and competence*” in order to make an introduction to the sphere of interest and points of contact with national security. We accept the definition of “*learning*” from the perspective of the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) as a cumulative process by which a person gradually assimilates increasingly complex and abstract notions (concepts, categories and types of behaviours or models) and/or acquires skills and general competencies.

Consequently, social and emotional learning represents a gradual process for “*helping children and even adults develop the fundamental skills for life effectiveness. SEL teaches the skills we all need to handle ourselves, our relationships, and our work, effectively and ethically. These skills include recognising and managing our emotions, developing caring and concern for others, establishing positive relationships, making responsible decisions, and handling challenging situations constructively and ethically. They are the skills that allow children to calm themselves when angry, make friends, resolve conflicts respectfully, and make ethical and safe choices*”<sup>1</sup>.

According to Joseph E. Zins and Maurice J. Elias, social and emotional learning is “*the process through which children and adults develop the skills, attitudes and values necessary to acquire social and emotional competence*”<sup>2</sup>. When discussing about social and emotional learning, we get in the imagination zone, in the cultural evolutions context and in the world of values. If we want to develop positive skills, we will define and distinguish the negative and destructive aspects of life.

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<sup>1</sup> Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning. *The Benefits of School-Based Social and Emotional Learning Programs: Highlights from a Forthcoming CASEL Report*, 2007 at <http://www.casel.org>;

<sup>2</sup> M.J. Elias, J.E. Zins et al, *Promoting Social and Emotional Learning: Guidelines for Educators*, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, Alexandria, VA, 1997, chap. I, <http://www.ascd.org/publications/books/197157/chapters/The-Need-for-Social-and-Emotional-Learning.aspx>.

Knowledge has its attached responsibilities and involves complex moral choices, and, when it works in a healthy relationship with emotions, it can become wisdom. We believe that the issues listed below are part of the semantic field of social and emotional learning:

- ability to relate to others and cooperation;
- conflict management and resolution;
- autonomous capacity of action;
- ability to work within increasingly large contexts;
- design and conduct of life plans and personal projects;
- defence and assertion of rights and interests, limits and needs;
- use of language, symbols and texts;
- ability to use knowledge, information and technology in an interactive and creative way.

The definition of social and emotional learning is accepted, in our opinion, as stated by its advocates, trying to blend the two aspects, emotional and social, respectively the personal development and the one integrated in the surrounding community, with an obvious emphasis on the finality of approaches, namely formation of competencies as learning outcomes.

According to the same educational policy document (EQF), the learning outcomes mean “*statements of what a learner is expected to know, understand and/or is able to demonstrate after completion of a learning process, which are defined in terms of knowledge, skills and competence*”<sup>3</sup>. For the type of learning discussed in this article, the results are the social and emotional competencies. The notion of *competence* includes: “*a) cognitive competence, involving the use of theory and concepts, as well as informal tacit knowledge gained experientially; b) functional competence (skills or know-how), those things that a person should be able to do when they are functioning in a given area of work, learning or social activity; c) personal competence, involving knowing how to conduct oneself in a specific situation; d) ethical competence, involving the possession of certain personal and professional values*”<sup>4</sup>.

However, “*social and emotional competence*” is a form of social and emotional learning as it assumes knowledge, attitudes and behaviours that can be developed in school. We extracted some definitions of social and emotional competence as found in the literature: “*Social and emotional competence is the ability to understand, manage and express the social and emotional aspects of one’s life in ways that enable the successful management of life tasks such as learning, forming relationships,*

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<sup>3</sup> European Commission, *Towards a European Qualifications Framework for Lifelong Learning*, Brussels, 2005, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

*solving everyday problems and adapting to the complex demands of growth and development*<sup>5</sup>.

On the other hand, social competence means “*possessing and using the ability to integrate thinking, feeling and behaviour to achieve social tasks and outcomes valued in the host context and culture. In a school setting, these tasks and outcomes would include accessing the school curriculum successfully, meeting associated personal social and emotional needs, and developing transferable skills and attitudes of value beyond school*”<sup>6</sup>.

For a more complete and systematic understanding of the conceptualisation area of social and emotional learning, we briefly describe five common groups of skills<sup>7</sup> that are developed through the majority of programmes and can be replicated in training modules for military professionals:

- *Self-awareness* – accurately assessing one’s feelings, interests, values, and strengths; maintaining a well-grounded sense of self-confidence.
- *Self-management* – regulating one’s emotions to handle stress, control impulses, and persevere in overcoming obstacles; setting and monitoring progress towards personal and academic goals; expressing emotions appropriately.
- *Social awareness* – being able to take the perspective of and empathise with others; recognising and appreciating individual and group similarities and differences; recognising and using family, school, and community resources.
- *Relationship skills* – establishing and maintaining healthy and rewarding relationships based on cooperation; resisting inappropriate social pressure; preventing, managing, and resolving interpersonal conflict; seeking help when needed;
- *Responsible decision-making* – based on consideration of ethical standards, safety concerns, appropriate social norms, respect for others, and likely consequences of various actions; applying decision-making skills to academic and social situations; contributing to the well-being of one’s organisation and community.

We further annex the taxonomy of social and emotional skills developed by Professor Katherine Weare from University of Southampton, one of the resource-persons in the UK in this field.

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<sup>5</sup> M.J. Elias, J.E. Zins et al, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> K.J. Topping, *Promoting Social Competence*, University of Dundee project, School of Education, Social Work and Community Education, 1998, at <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/eswce/research/projects/socialcompetence/resources>.

<sup>7</sup> According to CASEL (Collaborative for Academic, Social and Emotional Learning, established, in 1994, by Daniel Goleman, author of *Emotional Intelligence*, with a group of distinguished researchers and practitioners in the field), <http://casel.org/why-it-matters/what-is-sel/skills-competencies>.

## **Taxonomy of social and emotional competencies<sup>8</sup>**

### **❖ Emotional competencies**

#### ***Having self-esteem***

- Valuing and respecting yourself as a unique individual.
- Seeing yourself as separate from others, with the right to be treated with respect and kindness by others.

#### ***Having an accurate and positive self-concept***

- Being able to identify and feel positive about your own strengths.
- Being able to identify your own weaknesses, and accepting them without self-blame or guilt.
- Having a clear view of aspects of yourself, such as your personality, preferences, and needs.
- Having a sense of optimism.
- Having a coherent and continuous life story.

#### ***Autonomy***

- Being able to have an appropriate level of independence from others, to think critically, and to resist pressure from others.
- Being able to make sense of yourself and what has happened to you and integrate your life story into a coherent whole.

#### ***Experiencing a full range of emotions***

- Experiencing, recognising and accepting the full range of emotions as they happen.
- Being aware of the effects of different emotions, for example on the body, on mood, on behaviour, on how others around start to act.
- Talking about our feelings, including naming the full range of emotions.

#### ***Expressing feelings***

- Expressing feelings through facial expression, body language, verbal language and tone.
- Developing a complex language of the emotions, with a wide and precise vocabulary and range of expression.
- Expressing feelings clearly through writing and other forms, for example dance, music and art.
- Taking the social context into account in expressing feelings.

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<sup>8</sup> K. Weare, G. Gray, *What Works in Developing Children's Emotional and Social Competence and Well-Being*, Department of Education and Skills (DfES), London, 2006.

***Controlling the emotions***

This competence primarily involves being able to manage our emotions and not respond immediately or directly to a feeling, or put it behind us. It means being able to: observe our own emotions; be aware of what events, circumstances, thoughts and past experiences may have triggered a feeling; soothe ourselves when anxious; calm ourselves when angry; contain our excitement when it is unhelpful; think straight when in the throes of powerful emotion; avoid sulking or withdrawal when angry or frustrated; talk positively to ourselves when things go wrong; relax physically; distract ourselves by thinking of or doing something else that is incompatible with the emotion.

***Increasing emotional intensity and frequency***

This competence primarily involves knowing how to increase the frequency and intensity of emotions and inner states that we and others find pleasurable. Some emotions and inner states that most people find pleasurable include: happiness; optimism; amusement, fun and laughter; joy; love; engagement with a task, “*flow*”; rapture; calmness and inner peace; relaxation; living in the here and now.

***Being resilient***

This competence involves being able to process and learn from a difficult experience, use it to aid our own development, and then to move on rather than be dragged down or immobilised by the experience.

***Using information about the emotions to plan and solve problems***

- Looking to long-term not short-term benefits and gains/delaying gratification.
- Anticipating consequences of present action.
- Generating effective solutions to interpersonal problems.
- Being creative and seeing several ways forward, and round a problem.
- Having a realistic appraisal of the likelihood of various outcomes.

**❖ Social competencies**

***Attachment to others***

This competence involves the ability to love and care about others, and to trust that they love and care about you.

***Empathy***

This competence involves being able to see the world from the point of view of another person. It includes:

- recognising emotions in others;
- having compassion for others;

- refraining from harming others;
- sensitivity – being able to intuit how people feel from their tone and body language;
- giving people the same concern and respect as we give ourselves;
- accepting others and tolerating difference.

#### ***Communicating effectively***

- choosing our own response;
- listening to others;
- responding effectively;
- being clear;
- giving others the respect we expect them to give us;
- motivating others.

#### ***Managing relationships***

This competence involves the ability to build relationships with others promoting our own wellbeing without damaging theirs. It includes:

- establishing rapport;
- making connections with people;
- establishing appropriate levels of trust;
- taking appropriate responsibility for others;
- negotiating “*win-win solutions*”;
- managing difficulties in relationships;
- breaking and ending relationships where necessary in an appropriate and positive way;
- managing conflict.

### ***Addressing social and emotional learning in the military context***

Social and emotional skills useful to be formed in the military environment can be summarised, in the form in which they were discussed in the literature, with the following connotations to be considered by academics and professionals in the field of national defence:

- Efficient networking in the military organisation for tasks that require cooperation (tactical applications in which teamwork is overrated, alarm exercises in which each individual is a vital wheel in the gear assembly of selective activation of forces).

- Human resource domain in management and resolution of the more or less manifest conflicts in the vertical hierarchy or at the same level of subordination.
- Autonomous capacity for action especially at higher levels of command and at unique functions that involve making decisions for their field, as well as during missions or crisis situations, especially for the fighters in special structures that act alone or in relatively small cells.
- Designing and managing life plans and personal projects on the professional component, setting priorities in shaping the military career path, identifying turning points or promotion steps and associated training courses.
- Defending and asserting the rights and interests, limits and needs within the military organisation with a focus on internalising responsibilities, on the duty to be fulfilled, on valuing the individual self as being unique and creative.

Regarding the formation of the five common groups of skills to the human resource from the military system, we consider it as useful as purely professional skills. Thus, self-awareness that requires maintaining a high level of self-confidence and self-esteem is the guarantor of the emotional balance that all the military should show, at peace, in the exercise of daily tasks, as well as in the extreme situations of armed confrontation. This would ensure an optimal military decision-making, extremely necessary for successful missions. If soldiers have self-management skills, it is more likely that they are appropriate in the expression/censorship of emotions depending on the specific context, can control their impulses more easily, can self-regulate their affects to effectively manage stress, generated by a multitude of difficult situations faced during their careers. To the same extent, they can persevere in overcoming all obstacles and critical incidents that they are subject to in daily life, but especially in combat missions.

Social awareness, through empathy and exposure from the perspective of another person, is beneficial for any task of teamwork that abounds in the military (which by its nature involves a specific action for groups or masses). In terms of group similarities and differences, this is also applicable to military intelligence, in which the knowledge regarding opponents, their values and life beliefs can provide a successful military intervention.

Relationship skills best express the man's nature of "*social animal*" as Aristotle defined it, therefore, military professionals must develop them as well, in order to establish and maintain healthy interactions, manage interpersonal conflicts in a context dominated by stability and accomplished missions.

It is obvious that responsible decision-making is the backbone of national security institutions' management and is not a privilege only for superior levels,



but for each participant in the military actions, regardless of the degree of autonomy. Identifying the personal safety standards, thorough knowledge of the consequences of military actions are resources which, if inculcated, can facilitate the coherent connection to the realities of modern battlefield.

Our perspective of promotion and necessity for the military system of social and emotional learning is supported by Martin Seligman's view expressed in 1998: *"We have discovered that there is a set of human strengths that are the most likely buffers against mental illness: courage, optimism, interpersonal skills, work ethic, hope, honesty and perseverance. Much of the task of prevention will be to create a science of human strength whose mission will be to foster these virtues in young people"*<sup>9</sup>. Summarising, this learning or development can be the key to success in interventions related to national and international security or in critical situations that a military professional may face in terms of unconventional warfare.

The process of development and implementation of social and emotional learning modules since the basic training stage of military profession is a part of the preventive component, of strengthening the mental health of each combatant, managing stress specific to theatres of operations, optimising professional relationships and enhancing labour *"productivity"* in operational terms.

Why is it important to develop these aspects of learning in the curriculum of military education institutions?

- because they underlie almost every aspect of our lives;
- they allow us to learn effectively and develop professionally;
- they make us capable of getting along with others;
- they train us as responsible citizens and productive professionals;
- they ensure the acquiring of a preventive component of maladjusted behaviour in dealing with critical situations in theatres of operations;
- they support the acquisition and plenary exercising of the leadership potential in the military personality;
- they facilitate optimal relations and reintegration into the family once returned from external missions;
- they promote the specific values of the military organisation in a consistent and systematic manner, focusing on discipline, honour, sacrifice and solidarity.

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<sup>9</sup> M. Seligman, *Building Human Strength: Psychology's Forgotten Mission*, vol. 29, no. 1, 1998, p. 1, at <http://www.nonopp.com/ar/Psicologia/00/pres.htm>.

In conclusion, we affirm that the openness of the military system to the challenges of the social system is not a random, contextual or reactive one, but it becomes a necessity in order to keep up with the changes that human society faces, especially in times of crisis. And, as the crisis is not just economic or geopolitical, but also one of the values, deep human milestones that govern our existence, military conflicts will restructure their interests and motives in terms of social and emotional needs. This shift of human resource management strategies will benefit the national security system in terms of its homeostasis, versatility and adaptability to the most varied critical incidents and, last but not least, the success rate of accomplished missions.

The systemic perspective that encompasses all aspects of military life is desirable to addressing risk and abnormality situations that the military frequently faces. Therefore, we considered necessary to elaborate on this fairly complex terminology, as military leaders are still not entirely informed about the research results concerning social and emotional learning value and how well it is integrated as a central component of the curriculum, policy and practice of training institutions. Although scientific evidence and information are available, however, they are not efficiently used in the military organisation. A strategic communication plan is needed at every level of national security system components to inform managers, teachers from military academies and officers about the positive impact in the short or long term of social and emotional learning. We must assume the further publication and wide dissemination of reports on the impact and development of practical guidelines for the implementation of social and emotional learning programmes in the military. Secondly, adopting this vision widely requires a prescribed model for the training of trainers, which includes social and emotional skills, because, without the whole body of professional soldiers to be trained in this regard, there will be only a form without substance and superficial investment. Thirdly, there is still insufficient information and scientific evidence regarding the best way to assess the social and emotional learning outcomes. Finally, we consider that in the implementation of these programmes on a large scale only the action of military trainers is not enough, but also regulations at the level of policy and security strategy are required.

Today's society has discovered the importance and relevance of emotions in all spheres of everyday life, individual and collective, personal or professional ones. As we cannot expect the military to operate in extreme risk situations if they are not trained in military schools or daily instruction, they also do not know

how to control their behaviour and impulses in the same situations, if they have not exercised this. The movement of social and emotional learning is one of the most promising trends in education that we have witnessed lately. It seems to be the “missing piece” in building academic success and preparing people for the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

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# SPACE DIMENSION AND FORCE PROJECTION IN JOINT MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

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*Joint multinational operations require a continuous adaptation of the military forces in line with the changing operational environment. The exploitation of the space dimension of the joint multinational operations may decisively lead to accomplishing the declared objectives of an alliance or coalition and depends on the force capacity to synchronise its components. Besides, in a joint multinational operation, the success is achieved if the force has the capability to project and support itself into a specific area, whereas the enemy will try to deny the access to the engagement space. This requirement means that the needed capability to best project the force in a timely, precise and efficient manner will be developed in order to efficiently exploit the space dimension of the joint multinational operations.*

**Keywords:** *space dimension; force projection; joint multinational operations; engagement space; operational rhythm*

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**W**hat humankind history manages to teach us is that ideas matter. Stemming from different perspectives of historical, technological and human conditions, ideas have the power to influence the knowledge domain and to change the human behaviours. The exchange of ideas and the development of concepts are one of society's first priorities, due to the fact that the need for change, exploration and knowledge has always gone together with the human society.

Despite the gloomiest predictions, the last 20 years from the end of the *Cold War* have proved to be more or less an era of progress towards peace. To a great extent, armed conflicts have decreased in number. The wars involving huge national armed forces vanished along with the *Cold War*. Today, guerrilla irregular warfare may be difficult and may use conventional forces, but it is less likely we will ever again witness events such as the Battle of Stalingrad.

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However, the current phenomena of the contemporary world pose many challenges to joint multinational operations, ranging from the pressure exerted by the defence expenditures downsizing to the need to provide a credible and appropriate response to different threats.

The contemporary armed forces need to permanently adapt in order to meet the present and future challenges. Particularly, one of the most important priorities for the joint multinational force is the necessity to develop those capabilities that best exploit the space dimension of the operational environment. In the same context, the capacity to project military power proves to be really relevant, due to the fact that it allows immediate access to the engagement space.

### **The Space Dimension of the Joint Multinational Operations**

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the space dimension tends to extend vertically towards the space zone. The decision-making factors of the joint multinational force must operate in order to accomplish the domination of the operations space dimension, which is a critical factor for gaining and maintaining the information superiority inside the engagement space. Therefore, the exploitation of the joint multinational operations space dimension may lead to fulfilling the following goals:

- mobility support and low profile in the theatre of operations;
- analysis and understanding of the existing situation on the battlefield starting from the early stages of the operations (the theatre of operations entering stage);
- intelligence, manoeuvre, fire and operation support;
- force protection in all operations stages.

For joint multinational operations, we should use a vast perspective towards *space*. Therefore, we have to surpass Newton's limited notion of space, in which there is no real connection between space and time. On the contrary, the space-time entity must be viewed from the perspective of the space-time continuum, which is another context for operations analysis. In the same respect, the *engagement space* denominates the complex environment in which modern conflicts and crisis take place. Modern conflicts have many complex interdependencies, in which different actors' actions make the conditions acceptable or unacceptable for the joint multinational force. The understanding of the engagement space needs a comprehensive approach to all relevant systems for the crisis situation. For instance, the North-Atlantic Alliance recognises at least six domains of engagement space, namely: *political, economic, social, infrastructure* and *intelligence*.

In this respect, it should be underlined that military forces have developed as a tool to protect the political, military and economic interests. Thus, during the maritime trade development, nations began to build ships in order to protect and support their commercial interests. On the other hand, while the air power has developed, its main goal has been that of supporting and intensifying the land and maritime operations. Nevertheless, in time, air power has evolved, following a different way and in a different combat environment.

The development of the space dimension of war follows, more or less, the same pattern. Firstly, it looks to accomplish the armed conflicts full spectrum domination. From this perspective, the space dimension that the joint multinational force intends to dominate must be controlled at the operational level of the war and focuses on the ways and means through which the operations planners connect the tactical level actions, in order to fulfil the campaign objectives in which they are involved.

In the engagement space, the joint multinational force is an entity that can be threatened from all dimensions, including the space dimension, no matter if the respective space is that in which the confrontation takes place or the one named "*the final frontier*" of the human knowledge. These threats might be quite different, from the means using space up to the cybernetic or intelligence vectors defining the battlespace. Analysing the *space* concept, we should look beyond the classical model of the capabilities that military forces traditionally engage, named "*redundantly layered (limited for their range and land communication lines)*"<sup>1</sup>. In this respect, space capabilities are considered of a paramount importance for implementing the essential principles of operational manoeuvre, especially towards gaining the information superiority and situational awareness of the combat space as well as performing actions with "*high tempo, within discontinuous simultaneous operations*"<sup>2</sup>.

The basic working concepts in this situation are: 1) performing simultaneous and continuous operations; 2) new tactical decisive manoeuvre paradigm; 3) consistent engagement of the tactical level capabilities; 4) self-synchronising and engagement in co-operation with other capabilities; 5) the quality of being the first one.

Another challenge for joint multinational operations is the source of the military appointed for the deployable forces, which poses a strong political mark over these actions. In this specific situation, it will be stressed the tendency to build

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<sup>1</sup>\*\*\*, *TP 525-3-1, The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, United States Army Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia, USA, 2010, p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

more or less durable personal links among the commanders of the multinational elements and the need to reach standardisation maximal levels in the domains of doctrines, operating procedures as well as equipment and techniques. In addition, the military actions command within a joint multinational environment has some particular aspects given by the limited possibility to clearly distinct between tactical and operational echelons, coming from different structures of the contributing nations.

### **Force Projection in Joint Operational Environment**

At the conceptual level, force projection refers to one nation's capacity to project its national power tools as a response to the requirements and threats of the security environment, in order to perform military operations. Basically, force projection includes a wide range of actions and activities, such as resources mobilisation, forces deployment and re-deployment. The forces multinational feature imposes the enlargement of this particular notion and the adjustment for operations, planned and performed at alliance or coalition level, according to the objectives set within the treaties and conventions of the participating nations.

Due to its activity particular nature, force projection is supposed to support and assist forces over the entire deployment period. Force projection includes 6 stages developed in a continuous and iterative way: 1) (resources) mobilisation; 2) deployment; 3) reception, staging, onward movement and integration; 4) force employment; 5) support and 6) re-deployment. On the other hand, from the forces deployment perspective<sup>3</sup>, this process may include: a) strategic transportation and b) reception, staging, onward movement and integration.

This approach does nothing else but to underline the context in which the same phenomenon is analysed, namely: *power tools projection* that for the joint multinational operations belongs to several nations. Therefore, if we address only the forces deployment, the emphasis will be on structures, systems and procedures that employ the strategic transportation actions and those for reception, staging, onward movement and integration. On the other hand, if we look to force projection, we will have a comprehensive perspective of the whole phenomenon, namely the capacity of an alliance or coalition to create a credible combat power and the way to move it further, in order to deter the enemy and force him to abandon its objectives.

It is well-known that force projection means a robust and efficient logistic support. In the present circumstances, there are many situations in which forces

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<sup>3</sup>\*\*\*, *Doctrina pentru dislocarea forțelor din Armata României*, Centrul Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2009, p. 10.



belonging to different nations are deployed in or out of the area of responsibility. In this situation, the main infrastructure capabilities (airports, harbours and communication lines) will prove to be decisive for successful force projection operations. Besides, it should be underlined that nations are fully responsible for own national logistics support elements. Consequently, we can assume that, from the operational perspective, participating nations will co-operate in order to support the operations plan/order, which may comprise matters related to multinational logistic support.

On the other hand, military actions in which a joint multinational force could be involved require that all necessary elements should be taken into account, even from the early stages of the planning process, in order to sustain rapid and efficient forces projection and immediate operations integration. These planning elements mainly refer to: mission, operations area risks and threats, political-diplomatic implications of the military actions, existence and possibility to use transportation infrastructure, means and equipments availability, and the like.

A prerequisite element to be taken into account for the force projection processes is the *operational pace* due to the fact it is one of the most difficult domain to plan and predict, requiring continuous adaptation to permanent changing requirements. For instance, during the stage of forward echelon introduction into the theatre of operations, the operational pace is quite low. Then, while elements of force protection, logistics and C4I capabilities are introduced, the pace intensifies, having the maximum intensity during rotations and forces re-deployment.

### ***Space Dimension and Force Projection in Joint Multinational Operations***

For the joint multinational force, the approach operational environment space dimension is the real challenge, due to the fact that it refers to the ability of an alliance or coalition to project and support its power tools into a specific area, whereas the enemy will try to deny the access to the engagement space.

Thus, the space *displacement* focuses on the force's strategic projection and on the operational agility in order to support the campaign objectives. The joint multinational force approach related to this issue is performed using a timely reaction at strategic level.

From another perspective, force projection means using mostly international maritime space and airspace. Moreover, this aspect means gaining and maintaining control over space engagement elements before the joint multinational force is deployed in the theatre of operations.

A priori, it is considered that force is extremely vulnerable when it uses the operational environment space dimension. These vulnerabilities are magnified by the cyber space risks and threats, given by the more and more sophisticated technologies available for all kinds of actors and users that are hardly controlled and have unpredictable behaviours.

One of the basic mutual elements of both notions – force projection and operational environment space dimension – is the way information is used and generated. Besides, information is the common element of the above-analysed concepts.

Thus, operational environment space dimension takes into account the nowadays world evolution, which is decisively influenced by information. The development of the information notion has led to its transformation into a resource. Within operational environment space dimension, joint multinational force consumes and bears as well as generates information.

In the present international environment, the joint multinational force is integrated in the actional system having the goal to assure the security objectives fulfilment within the operational environment space dimension. This requirement enforces the development of those capabilities that best accomplish timely, precise and efficient force projection. Successful operations are linked with the participating nations understanding of the declared objectives of an alliance or coalition and with the elements synchronisation of the action capacity, concomitantly with command and effort unity in order to maximally exploit the joint multinational force capabilities.



# THE CONCEPTION OF RESERVE FORCES TRAINING IN CERTAIN MODERN ARMED FORCES

Colonel Adrian BĂLĂLĂU

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*Today, defence, as defined in the basic laws, encompasses more than just traditional national defence against a conventional attack, which previously solely determined the structures of the Ministers of Defence but no longer corresponds with the current security policy requirements. It must be ensured that the ability to conduct national defence operations against a conventional attack can be reconstituted within a foreseeable, albeit prolonged, period. This new orientation of the majority of modern armed forces determines the organisation, training, assignment and availability of male or female reservists. The obligation to provide assistance in a state of tension or defence emergency and the performance of basic military service as basic principles will remain. Modern training opportunities for reservists, increased use of their civilian qualifications, close communication with the employers and individually tailored military service are the keys to success.*

**Keywords:** tactical exercises; crisis; training; armed forces; reserves

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**T**he issue of *reserve forces training* is one of present interest. That is why we appreciate it is extremely useful to correctly understand the particularities of the reserve training systems in some modern armed forces, especially in the armed forces of NATO member states, following the fact that the Romanian Armed Forces have proposed to become compatible regarding not only the concepts of constituting forces but also the procedures of training and using them during the conduct of military actions.

NATO permanent military transformation, as a direct response to the more and more complex threats and challenges in the current security environment, has determined the increasing necessity for the Alliance forces to be multinational and joint, coherent as far as interoperability is concerned, deployable wherever and whenever it is necessary. Therefore, currently, NATO must have available capabilities that allow for the extension of the number and types of operations in which it can be requested to intervene, in a geographical area beyond traditional borders.

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In this context, it has been outlined the concept according to which it is necessary to maintain a strongly professionalised active component, having a rapid reaction capability, concomitantly with constituting reserve forces, organised, equipped and trained according to the same standards and principles as the active forces.

### **Aspects regarding some modern armed forces reserve training**

In some modern armed forces conception, the reserve *training system*, not only the individual but also the collective one, within the sub-units and units, is an exclusively national responsibility of the state they come from and it is based on the national legislative framework as well as on own experience.

That is the reason why the reserve training differs a lot from one army to another, the *common general characteristics* focusing on:

- the reserve training is achieved through call-ups, tactical exercises and drills, in units specially designed for this purpose, both on the national territory and outside it;
- the duration of the training sessions depends on the category of personnel and on the reservist job/specialty in the civilian life;
- the obligation for each reservist to carry out a minimum number of military training days annually, having the optional possibility to get additional training.

*The reserve training policy* has to lead to achieving the goal of training and using reserve personnel to participate in the full range of NATO missions. This is mainly based on the training period established to be executed before the deployment to the theatre of operations.

In order to achieve the reserve availability to participate in missions and periodical training programmes, in NATO member countries, laws and regulations have been established stipulating their encouragement and providing their families and employers with the necessary assistance by the community. In this respect, the programmes aiming at the support for the employers are encouraged and sustained by national governments.

To highlight these aspects, we have considered relevant the model in the armed forces of countries such as Germany, France, the United States of America, Great Britain and Poland. The specialised literature makes reference to these countries. Following the study of the mentioned bibliographical materials, we have updated and completed these references with the particularities we have considered useful.

➤ Thus, in *Germany*, *reservist training* is based on the same goals, objectives and priorities as for the active duty personnel, being designed to encourage their willingness and capability to serve as mediators between the armed forces

and the non-military sector of society. The *reservist training goal* is to form, develop and maintain their individual and collective skills necessary to carry out the tasks specific to their future assignments as well as the established missions. Exceptionally, the preparation of *crisis training* is extremely important, being organised and performed depending on the situation.

Training has three components<sup>1</sup>: *basic*, *advanced* and *continuous* and it is performed in the existing facilities in the assigned units, the goal being to create the unit cohesion that is necessary to carry out missions.

In the event of reconstitution of some units, the intensified and extended crisis training is imperative in order to establish operational readiness. For the semi-active and non-active units in the structure of the armed forces, this type of training is performed periodically, depending on the training level established during initial evaluation. *Crisis training* is conducted within the amount of time available for military preparation.

Reserve officers to assume *command positions* participate in special armed forces training courses, and those designated for *staff officer* assignments attend, in an integrated environment, assignment-related follow-on training.

Reserve soldiers and non-rated personnel always perform training following their military service and within the context of a designation for assignment. The most competent reservists participate in the continuous training programme only in the case of structure-related shortages, context in which the civilian-professional qualifications are taken into consideration.

It is also encouraged the reservist willingness to undergo advanced training and obtain additional qualifications independently. To this end, modern training tools and procedures such as simulators, computer-aided training programmes, computer-aided audio-visual training tools, as well as interactive and distance training tools are developed and made available for the reservists' autodidactic study.

Reservists can be taken from their civilian jobs to perform military training for only limited periods of time. Consequently, only the experts necessary for the intended assignment are transferred from the civilian jobs. Therefore, a flexible system of modular training is being designed so that reservists can acquire knowledge and skills successively. When *planning reservist training*, the training capacities of schools and ranges, the needs for reservist training courses, accommodation, training projects and training assets are taken into consideration. If possible, training takes place together with active duty personnel in order to ensure integration and equal levels of training.

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<sup>1</sup> *The Bundeswehr Reservist Concept*, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Berlin, 2003, pp. 16-17.

Reservists earmarked for national disaster relief operations as well as for the protection of Germany and its citizens in peacetime are trained and kept in practice by attending training at regular intervals and with sufficient frequency, in close cooperation with the responsible civilian agencies.

Members of the administrative and command personnel in the reinforcement and manpower reserve are required to maintain and enhance their training level by undergoing reserve duty periodical training. For this type of training, those economic-financial elements that determine the goal and duration of training to be directly proportional to the incurred costs are taken into account.

For basic, further and advanced reservist training, the duration of assignments is different, according to the target groups established by the career guide. The average assignment period is *10 years for officers, 7 years for NCOs and 4 years for non-rated personnel*. An assignment period may be extended, especially for the personnel working in areas where there is a shortage of personnel and where special knowledge and qualifications are required; it also applies to voluntary commitment if it meets the needs of the armed forces.

It is possible that, in the future, the overall period of military service could be *12 months for officers, 9 months for NCOs and 6 months<sup>2</sup> for non-rated personnel*. Following the completion of this obligation, further military service may be performed on a voluntary basis. These regulations are not applicable in *crisis situations* or in a state of *tension or defence emergency*, ordered by the Government, not to affect the military structures operational readiness level and to ensure the armed forces freedom of action, case in which reservist training is performed under the form of *“on-call duty”*. All reserve duty training in the context of assignments up to the maximum duration stipulated by law is compulsory. There are plans not to include the missions outside the national territory in the overall duration of the compulsory reserve duty training stipulated by law<sup>3</sup>.

Call-up for reserve duty training in peacetime starts only 12 months after the retirement from active military duty or completion of a period of reserve duty training, unless the reservist agrees to start earlier. This period of exemption is not observed in the event of national disaster relief operations and in the context

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<sup>2</sup> The present rule is: *reserve duty training*, under Section 6, Subsection 2 in the *Compulsory Military Service Act*, is 18 months for officers, 15 for NCOs and 9 for non-rated personnel, *exercises*, under Section 51a, Subsection 3 in the *Legal Status of Military Personnel Act*, is 6 months for officers, 5 months for NCOs and, under Section 54, Subsection 5 in the *Legal Status of Military Personnel Act*, 3 months for non-rated personnel.

<sup>3</sup> At present, the regulation covering *reserve duty training* applies on condition that special foreign assignments are to be credited to the overall duration of reserve duty training (Section 6a, Subsection 2 in the *Compulsory Military Service Act* and Section 51a, Subsection 3, Sentence 2 in the *Legal Status of Military Personnel Act*).

of protecting Germany and its citizens in peacetime, situations in which reservists have committed themselves voluntarily. This rule is neither observed if reservists are called up for training for a period of up to 3 months on grounds of vitally necessary reinforcement of manpower, maintenance of operational freedom or reserve training ordered by the government as “*standby duty*”.

The operational readiness level of semi-active and non-active units in the armed forces structure is established and maintained through periodical reservist training, which may be *individual training* or *collective training*. However, the focus is on *individual training of command, administrative and specialised personnel*, who must maintain and improve the skills and knowledge through periodical training.

*Individual reserve duty training* is designed to provide standard training, in the context of a training unit or course, so that the reservist can carry out a mission or temporarily meet an urgent personnel requirement of the troops. Individual training in the medical field can be also performed in the facilities of the civilian health service.

*Collective reserve duty training* is mainly performed through *staff exercises* designed to train command and administrative personnel selected to fill positions in semi-active and non-active units. Training is planned to maintain the operational readiness level that is necessary to carry out missions and is indispensable for the forces efficiency and proficiency. For the preparation of the armed forces missions in peacetime, real time exercises are planned. It includes practising call-up procedure, establishing operational readiness, familiarisation and proficiency training of personnel, interaction of units, task forces and major formations (including cooperation with civilian authorities in the event of disaster and the protection of Germany and its citizens in peacetime), as well as troop exercises in the field. Moreover, reservist short training events are planned annually to maintain the armed forces readiness in peacetime.

Reservists perform specific training in accordance with the available positions they are to fill. To ensure the necessary continuity in training reservists, these positions are made available, and the assignments are correlated accordingly. To ensure a reliable basis for planning, the availability of positions is ensured at least in the medium term. The positions destined for reservists to meet personnel requirements for disaster relief operations or protection of Germany and its citizens in peacetime, as well as for special missions outside the national territory are managed separately by the positions made available for reservist training.

Within a two-year period, reservists assigned on a voluntary basis have to participate in at least one short training session, voluntarily assigned female reservists have to participate in a short training session in peacetime<sup>4</sup>, and all other

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<sup>4</sup>The difference appears in the stipulations in the *Compulsory Military Service Act* and the *Legal Status of Military Personnel Act*.



reservists are to be called up to attend an official event that is organised by the units they are assigned to. On this occasion, they familiarise with the designated position, receive information and general support. Reservists who have not performed military service within a period of three years are questioned regarding their willingness to continue their commitment. If necessary, release from reserve duty should be considered.

On the basis of voluntary commitment, reservists can be called up for special assignments outside the national territory.

➤ In *France*, the training of reserve officers, NCOs and non-rated personnel<sup>5</sup> recruited and assigned to positions in conformity with the signed commitments is regulated and organised according to the permanent training principle, the goals that have to be achieved being established annually.

According to the category of personnel they belong to, reservists perform different periods of training, both before and after signing the commitment. Thus, *reserve officer training* is performed in three stages: *initial training (level I)*, *level I* and *level II training*.

*Initial training (Formation militaire initiale du réserviste supérieure – FMIR/S)*, meant for any French citizen apt for the military service, aged between 17 and 35, who is a high school graduate and has a baccalaureate degree, lasts for 20 days and is organised during the school holidays, in conformity with a programme established in one or more successive stages. One of them lasts for 5 consecutive days. At the end of training, reservists receive a graduation certificate and the rank of corporal. Reservists who do not have the skills necessary to receive the graduation certificate may continue training specific to junior enlisted members (*Formation militaire initiale du réserviste militaire du rang – FMIR/R*). Depending on the results in meeting some specific criteria, reservists may continue training, having the possibility to attend what is called *initial training for enlistment (Formation initiale à l'encadrement – FIE)* or, for those who are over 25 years old, *initial training for reserve officers (Formation initiale de l'officier de réserve – FIOR)*.

Attendance at the *initial training for enlistment* is conditioned by the number of positions that are to be filled as well as by the enrolment capacity of the training institutions, the programme being conceived to be completed in 2 modules of 2 weeks each. At the end of this period, based on the obtained results, reservists are classified under four groups, as follows: *group I* – reservists who have not graduated and may choose to be junior enlisted members or to repeat the training course; *group II* – reservists who have the necessary skills to be NCOs and who are assigned

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<sup>5</sup> *Instruction No. 708/DEF/EMAT/PRH relative à la formation du personnel de la réserve opérationnelle*, Etat-major de l'armée de terre, Bureau planification des ressources humaines, France, 2003, pp. 6878-6891.

to units to perform a training stage to qualify in a certain military specialty; *group III* – reservists who do not meet the requirements to become officers (licence degree), having the possibility to attend training for NCOs; *group IV* – reservists who have the necessary skills for the career of reserve officer, meet the requirements as far as studies are concerned, being oriented towards continuing the initial training for reserve officers (*FIOR*). Reservists in groups II–IV receive the rank of reserve NCOs, being assigned to units from the first day of the month that follows the date they graduate the training period.

*Initial training of reserve officers (FIOR)* lasts four weeks of 2 modules, successive or separated from a time interval that does not exceed 2 years and it is completed by obtaining the rank of junior officer. After graduation, based on personal option, reservists who are under 38 continue the *specialised training* that is necessary to fill the positions of subunit commanders or those of staff officers in *reserve intervention units (unité d'intervention de réserve – UIR)*, in *reserve specialised units (unité spécialisée de réserve – USR)* or *training subunits*.

*Particularly*, reservists who have not performed any military training for more than 15 years, even if they are still in the system of record, are obliged to attend a training stage whose duration is established annually through orders and dispositions. Reservists who come from those who have fulfilled the active duty military service maintain the received status, according to the rank, seniority and qualifications acquired in activity. No other special training is necessary.

*Level I and level II reservist training* is performed in training centres and is aimed at the continuation of military career in three directions: commander of unit positions, staff positions or expert positions. Thus, the officers who have confirmed the ability to command a subunit are appointed to command a *reserve intervention unit (UIR)* or a *reserve specialised unit (USR)*, in conformity with their initial training.

*Reserve NCO training* is performed in a similar way to that of the officer training, in three stages: *initial training (level I)*, *level I* and *level II training*.

*Initial training of reserve NCOs* is identical to the one of officers and it is completed by obtaining a specialisation within the structure responsible for their training and proficiency.

*Level I and Level II training* of reserve NCOs follows the initial training and it is completed by taking two exams: exam to obtain the 1<sup>st</sup> degree specialty certificate of competency (*brevet d'aptitude de spécialité du 1<sup>er</sup> degré – BAS 1*) and exam to obtain the 2<sup>nd</sup> degree specialty certificate of competency (*brevet d'aptitude de spécialité du 2<sup>ème</sup> degré – BAS 2*).

NCOs on-duty training is completed by two years of training in units. At the end of this period, sergeants obtain a technical reserve certificate (CTR).

*1<sup>st</sup> degree specialty certificate of competency (BAS 1)* validates the experience gained, being issued for sergeants after obtaining the technical reserve certificate (CTR), following the proposal of the chief of structure and the assessment of the qualities and skills to perform the responsibilities specific to the particular rank.

*2<sup>nd</sup> degree specialty certificate of competency (BAS 2)* is accessible to chief-sergeants and adjutants and ensures the acquisition of knowledge specific to all branches to fill a position of subunit deputy commander. Training is focused on exercising command and technical competencies. It is discontinuous and leads to two units of value:

- *unit of value no. 1 (UV 1)*, which is obtained following a 5-day training session within the *Active NCO Candidate National School (L'école nationale des sous-officiers d'active – ENSOA)* and is a condition for the access to the *unit of value no. 2 (UV 2)*;
- *unit of value no. 2 (UV 2)*, which is obtained following a training session that lasts two consecutive weeks and is performed within ENSOA.

Command NCOs oriented towards the staff have to meet the following requirements: to be a senior NCO; to hold a 2<sup>nd</sup> degree specialty certificate of competency (BAS 2) for more than 4 years; to have served for at least 4 years in reserve intervention units (UIR) or reserve specialised units (USR); to have served under contract in the reserve (*engagement a servir dans la réserve – ESR*) for the two years before being assigned to a staff position.

NCOs who are under 32, owners of a 1<sup>st</sup> cycle higher education degree or an equivalent recognised degree as well as of the 1<sup>st</sup> degree specialty certificate of competency (BAS 1), may become indirect entry officers. It is necessary that they should have served under contract (ESR) for at least 2 years after obtaining the 1<sup>st</sup> degree specialty certificate of competency (BAS 1).

NCOs who are over 35 but under 50 and hold the 2<sup>nd</sup> degree specialty certificate of competency (BAS 2) for at least 3 years may become direct entry officers.

*Training of junior enlisted members (Formation militaire initiale du réserviste militaire du rang – FMIR/R)* comprises initial training and basic training. *Initial training* is a volunteer (not compulsory) military training, being allowed for the candidates that have already been recruited and assigned to units and it is performed in the first year of service for 15 days, grouped or separated in two periods of one week each.

The young who are willing to serve in reserve have the possibility to perform training within units during which they execute different training: specific to support branches (e.g.: transport, logistics, medical, military music etc.), specific to land forces (e.g.: paratroopers, mountain corps, commando etc.) or training adapted to local initiative – introductory training (*stage découverte*).

At the end of the training period, the reservist is awarded First Class Honours, if his skills are certified following an exam and if his service has met the requirements. Within service, the reservist has to perform the activity in a specialty that has to be validated by a reserve basic certificate (*certificat pratique réserve – CP-R*) immediately after his competency is recognised. Initial training is completed by awarding this certificate (CP-R).

A year after the *reserve basic certificate* is obtained and following the training performed within the structure he is assigned to, reserve junior enlisted members have the possibility to take exams that validate the qualifications through issuing two certificates and they can receive the rank of corporal:

- certificate of basic military skills (*certificat d'aptitude militaire élémentaire – CAME*);
- certificate of basic technical skills (*certificat d'aptitude technique élémentaire – CATE*).

The basic specialty certificate of competency (*brevet d'aptitude de spécialité élémentaire – BASE*) is issued after at least 2 years of military service under contract, following the chief of structure proposal, as well as the assessment of the qualifications and skills. On this occasion, they may be promoted to the rank of chief corporal.

The junior enlisted accession to the rank of NCO is conditioned by their attendance at the 2<sup>nd</sup> module of initial training for enlistment (*Formation initiale à l'encadrement – FIE*), being called adaptation training (*Formation d'adaptation – FA*).

Junior enlisted who hold a basic specialty certificate of competency (BASE) and a baccalaureate degree may become *indirect entry* NCOs, depending on the established positions, after 2 years of service under contract with the rank of corporal, while those who do not hold a baccalaureate degree may become *direct entry* NCOs on condition they have served under contract for 3 years with the rank of chief corporal.

➤ *The United States Army Reserve training/instruction* is organised and developed based on a concept according to which the active component and the reserve one have to form a homogenous, viable and effective team. In order to put this concept in practice, the following key requirements have to be met:

- *teamwork* – compliance of the reserve component with the standards and requirements met by the active component (with reference to the component units);
- *command integration* – the general staffs of the reserve component units are integrated with the ones of the active component during the staff work;

- *modernisation of assets and equipment* in the inventory of the reserve component units and the familiarisation of their personnel with the assets and equipment in the inventory of the active component;
- *common standards* regarding the necessary training to successfully accomplish the assigned missions;
- *generalisation of the experience* in training the active component units in the case of reserve component units too.

*The reserve component training/instruction objective* is to train the component units to be able to successfully accomplish the assigned missions. The final (major) objective is to prepare the unit for combat, which is based on the individual training of commanders, staffs, and the military men, as well as that of the unit, in order to act as a whole. A unit is considered *combat ready* when training/instruction is completed and the required standards in the “*Mission Essential Task List (METL)*” are met, being prepared to deploy wherever necessary.

The commands of the units in the active and the reserve components work together, in team, during training and pre- and post-mobilisation activities. Thus, during *pre-mobilisation training/instruction*, the focus is on training up to the platoon and company level – for combat units, and up to the company/battery level – for combat support and logistic support units. Training is considered completed when all these structures demonstrate theoretically and practically that they meet METL requirements for the company (equivalent) level, following to achieve the upper level one.

The programmes established to be fulfilled in this period mainly refer to the *individual military training* – basic and specialised military knowledge, firing using the armament in the inventory, executing manoeuvre, survival knowledge, and basic knowledge in the event of becoming a team leader.

*Infantry and tank units* focus on undertaking the necessary training to execute manoeuvres at platoon level, and on executing firing with the armament on the combat assets in the inventory. The other types of units (artillery, land forces combat aircraft, engineer, anti-aircraft artillery) are trained at the company/battery level.

*Independent brigades* in the National Guard prepare and conduct annual training, plan and execute firing with the armament in the inventory, as well as the staff training using simulators or within the staff work drills/exercises. These planning, preparation, conduct and execution documents are approved by upper echelons, in this case by the Defence Command of the Continental United States Army (CONUSA). Training is executed twice a year or whenever commanders consider it necessary, requesting it to be endorsed by upper echelons. The executed drills

meet the active component training standards and the assessment of the level of training is undertaken by personnel who have competence in this respect. The commander of the active component structure that took part in joint training is also present, results being recorded in the “*Unit Status Report*”, and in the case of meeting all the established indicators, a superior level of training may be undertaken.

*Combat support and logistic units* are trained at the company/battery/detachment level. They train at battalion level after demonstrating that they are prepared and meet the requirements established for the joint actions of companies/batteries/detachments in order to support a battalion. It is performed based on the training assessment in which the assigned commander of the active component participates. Training priority objective is the rapid deployment to the established area, having the mission to support combat forces. To that end, they are provided with assets, equipment and personnel to fill vacancies, as well as with funds for training. They are supported by the active component in order to plan, organise, conduct, and execute training/instruction.

*Post-mobilisation training* specific activities are based on the results of assessments during pre-mobilisation period. They consist in: unit monitoring; interview with the unit commander; capitalising on the data in the assessment documents; identifying and correcting deficiencies; preparing and executing specific training following the change in the training plan according to the development of the initial situation and the requirements that emerge during combat actions.

During this period, training to act jointly (synchronisation) at the battalion and brigade level is mainly executed. Staff work units command training and assessment are executed at this level, through drills and exercises, and if results meet the set standards, field exercises and drills are performed with the large unit.

Combat units training at brigade level is similar to that executed in Combat Training Centres. For independent brigades in the National Guard, the training programme has 4 (four) phases:

- *phase 1, lasts for 20 days, and comprises:* deployment from the location of peacetime disposition to the mobilisation area; individual military training, both basic and specialised one, transition to active duty; preparation of assets and equipment; deployment to training or firing ranges;
- *phase 2, lasts for 20 days, and comprises:* firing sessions with the armament in the inventory and the one on the combat assets; military training at platoon and company level;
- *phase 3, lasts for 44 days, and comprises:* training at the battalion and brigade level to act in joint forces operations;



- *phase 4, lasts for 6 days, and comprises:* maintenance, repair, recovery and evacuation of damaged assets and equipment (if necessary); boarding preparation not only for personnel but also for assets and equipment.

*Combat support and logistic support units* execute training at the available level of organisation in order to identify and correct deficiencies.

➤ In *Great Britain*, training of volunteer reserve forces in the Regular Army is usually executed annually, for 15 consecutive days, plus 6 training modules that do not exceed 36 hours, to which training during the period they are mobilised is added, depending on the situation. Training standards and frequency represent major factors to motivate volunteering, centralised training being undertaken at the units they are assigned to, at the Volunteer Reserve Forces Staff, in centres or specially designed training structures.

Royal Marines Reserve has a series of particularities, the most relevant ones being presented below.

*Admission of recruits for basic training courses and commando course.* Only the candidates that are well-motivated, effective, and have skills and abilities that allow them to achieve specific tasks with determination are admitted. To register for these courses, acknowledged as being among the toughest, recruits have to be very determined and inner-motivated and to benefit from their families and employers support, cooperation and understanding. Initial basic training lasts for 12-15 months, period during which recruits have to undergo specific training in the units they belong to, one evening a week and two weekends a month, those less prepared having the opportunity to continue physical training in their spare time.

*Phase 1 training* lasts for 6 months, representing the *basic training* of the *Royal Marines Reserve*, being aimed at introducing recruits to the initial skills and fieldcraft. Recruits must undergo specific training for 6 weekends, to which two-hour night training during the week is added.

The main components of phase 1 are: acquisition and development of the necessary skills *to survive in difficult conditions; construction of different types of shelters; knowledge of camouflage techniques; maintenance of standards of hygiene* under difficult conditions; improvement of *negotiation techniques*; theoretical and practical aspects of *finding their way* over all types of terrain, by day and by night; instruction on how to effectively use the *infantry armament* in the inventory (5,56 mm rifle); development of psycho-motor and moral skills (rope climbing techniques, fireman's carry, obstacle courses, marching etc.).

After the *completion of phase 1*, which confers the right to wear a blue beret and green badge, recruits are admitted to a *2-week course within the Commando*



*Training Centre Royal Marines*, during which the necessary standards and requirements for accomplishing specific missions are assessed. *Phase 2 training* lasts for eight to ten weeks and it is designed to provide recruits with the skills and knowledge required to act as a Marine in a Commando Unit, as well as to prepare them for the rigours of the *Reserve Forces Commando Course*.

*Training programme* consists of:

- *Battle Physical Training – BPT*, designed to develop physical skills, strength, and endurance that are necessary to be admitted to the commando course.
- *Fieldcraft and Tactics*, designed to continue the development of the skills acquired during phase 1, consists of learning the *basic patrolling techniques* (reconnaissance patrols, observation posts, fighting patrols and ambushes).
- *Live Field Firing Exercise – FFX*, in which, for two weeks, the *Royal Marines Reserve* recruits are introduced to realistic live firing exercises, together with regular troops, progressing from individual shooting on a simple range to more complex firing sessions.
- *Amphibious Exercise*, in which Marines are taught the theory and principles associated with *Amphibious and Combined Warfare*.

*Admission* to the *Reserve Forces Commando Course* is conditioned by marching 6 miles to confirm, by the Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, the recruits endurance, and the final assessment necessary to graduate and to be awarded the Green Beret specific to the Commando Forces consists in successfully marching 30 miles.

On completion of the two training phases, volunteers in the *Royal Marines Reserve* have the opportunity to attend different specialist courses in order to gain *Specialist Qualifications*. The *Royal Marines Reserve* units have to provide a pool of suitably trained volunteers to augment the Regular Forces, especially for certain military specialisations such as: assault engineers; heavy weapons (mortars); swimmer-canoeists.

In addition to the basic specialist qualification, depending on the available time, reservists may attend specific courses to obtain more specialist qualifications, courses that usually last for 2 to 4 weeks, being abridged versions of those undertaken by regulars. One or more *Additional Qualifications* allow them to fill different positions in a unit organisation. For example, a reservist qualified as a reconnaissance patrol leader may fill an equivalent position at an upper echelon.

In addition, to complete phase 2 training, marines may undertake the *Commando Company Training* within their units. Thus, they are considered to be fully trained and capable of fulfilling general duties as well as of carrying out specific missions together with Regular Forces, during joint exercises or separately.

The purpose of the *Commando Company Training* is to improve the individual and collective skills for future training, within the actions commanded by the *Royal Marines Command – RMC*. To this end, training is focused on consolidating the basic military skills in the following areas: *weapon training, first aid, signals, nuclear biological chemical warfare and physical fitness*. In addition to learning and developing advanced skills such as conducting *amphibious raids*, they also learn the way of action specific to airborne troops.

The Royal Marines Reserve training system provides reservist with the opportunity to serve with the Regular Forces, anywhere in the world, in military exercises or operations, depending on the available time. These periods may vary from 2 weeks to 12 months, reservists having thus the opportunity to learn and develop new skills.

➤ In *Poland*, *reservists' training* is organised and developed based on the regulations regarding the combat capacity and training in the Polish Armed Forces. Reservists usually undertake training for a period of up to 90 days annually, during a 6-year cycle, a training period between 30 and 60 days being compulsory for the promotion to a higher position. Starting 2005, a new training system was implemented, depending on the time the military units achieve full operational capability.

Thus, in the units where the “*combat readiness*” period is shorter than 30 days, reservists who fill staff and command positions in structures up to battalion level, as well as commanders/equivalent from other levels undertake training every year, having to participate in at least 4 exercises in 6 years. In the units where the “*combat readiness*” period is between 30 and 90 days, reservists undertake training three times in a period of 6 years and in the units where the “*combat readiness*” period is longer than 90 days, two times in 6 years.

In the period designed to train reservists, they execute three types of exercises: *1-day exercises*, usually at weekend, on Saturday or Sunday, when they execute firing using the individual armament and they are informed about the new missions of the units they are assigned to; *short-term exercises (maximum 30 days)* – to improve reservists' individual performance and qualification, as well as to prepare the units and subunits for combat missions; *long-term exercises (maximum 90 days)* – to train reservists during courses.

The *training courses* reservists may undertake are the following: *special courses, improvement courses* and *courses for officers and NCOs*. The first two types of courses are designed to familiarise reservists with the new missions, new military equipment, to improve their performance, leadership methods and skills, as well as to prepare them for promoting to higher positions. They last for up to 45 days for NCOs and up to 60 days for officers. The period of military exercises

cannot exceed 90 days a year. Reservists cannot take part in military exercises for more than 21 months for officers, 18 months for NCOs, and 12 months for reserve enlisted personnel who have served as conscripts under a form stipulated by the law. Reservists who have not been conscripted may take part in exercises for a period that does not exceed 15 months.

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In conclusion, all modern armed forces, especially those of NATO member states, following the continuous processes aimed at restructuring the active and reserve forces, focus their efforts on finding new forms, methods and procedures to train their reservists, so that they can carry out, individually or in already existing units, the *same types of missions as the active forces*. Moreover, reserve forces are and they will be a national responsibility. Therefore, each country may have structures, roles and policies specific to national requirements and international commitments, special attention being further paid to the appropriate professional development, as part of training, including through the participation of reservists in NATO-led collective exercises.

To obtain the expected results, the majority of modern armed forces are in an advanced process of generalising volunteering, supported by important financial resources and by the employers' contribution to the participation of reservists in the specific training required for this category of personnel.

Moreover, the establishment of reserve service on a voluntary basis in the Romanian Armed Forces, emerged as a necessity after suspending conscription in peacetime, in 2007, has obviously generated radical changes in the human resource management and, implicitly, certain requirements related to the adaptation, transformation and modernisation of the principles and rules regarding the reserve training and use.

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# OPERATIONAL, TECHNICAL AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS THAT INFLUENCE UNIFIED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Colonel Dr Daniel BRĂTULESCU

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*The current trend of enhancing connectivity increases the risk of vulnerability, being more and more difficult to locate an illegal network access point or a user with aggressive behaviour. The situation requires the enforcement of security policies and awareness and accountability of communication and information services users of any kind regarding the compliance with them. Unified Communications Systems (UCS) are designed to achieve information transfer in support of command and control requirements of forces participating in coalition operations, through the use of a single light technical infrastructure. Their objective is obtaining critical information where and when appropriate, transferring specific real-time communications in the battle space.*

**Keywords:** *information superiority; unified communication systems; OPCON; information transfer; information facilities; OPCOM*

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**U**nified Communications Systems (UCS) are designed to achieve information transfer in support of command and control requirements of forces participating in coalition operations, through the use of a single technical infrastructure, simplified from the architectural point of view, but with higher transmission capacity, necessary to provide multiple voice, data and VTC services of good quality and in a timely manner, made available to users in the *Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR)*.

UCS's primary objective is obtaining critical information where and when appropriate, transferring specific real-time communications in the battle space, in accordance with the operational control requirements and needs, thus enabling the capitalisation on the opportunities in reaching the objectives of the full range of military operations<sup>1</sup>.

The network acts as an amplifier of UCS capabilities, ensuring the role of force multiplier and determining individual and overall cost

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<sup>1</sup> Direcția Comunicații și Informatică, *Concepția CAI2SR în Armata României*, București, 2005, pp. 12-27.

savings, allowing the extension of effects in time and space. The way the network is configured is based on the following principles<sup>2</sup>:

- the use of geographically dispersed forces that robustly interconnect the force components and provide multiple information transfer possibilities, which leads to the improvement of information exchange;
- the omniscience of forces, leading to battle space knowledge and, implicitly, to an awareness of commanders intentions by streamlining the information exchange, resulting in the qualitative improvement of information and of communications and information distribution on the situation;
- the assurance of effective communication between entities in the battle space, which provides opportunities to generate synergies in the distribution of details on the situation, increasing the viability and speed of command.

UCS aims to obtain information superiority, which can enable decision-making in order to establish directly execution efficiency, to ensure effects consistency and their conjugation between the lines of operations in the fulfilment of military objectives while jointly deploying and supporting coalition forces.

The operational requirements imposed on UCS, during coalition operations, are:

➤ *The need for multidirectional information transfer.* The strategy of carrying out information exchange between military structures of coalition forces (figure 1)




Figure 1: OPCON and OPCOM Information Transfer

<sup>2</sup> C. Dumitru, I. Roceanu, *Războiul bazat pe rețea; provocarea erei informaționale în spațiul de luptă*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", 2005, pp. 3-7.

must deal with the need for the networking regarding *Operational Command – OPCOM*, due to the fact that it belongs to a state, through the requirements imposed by its periodical information and, on the other hand, for the networking regarding the *Operational Control – OPCON*, expressed by relations of coordination, command and control of the upper echelon of the theatre of operations or the coalition forces with which cooperation takes place or which are subordinated. As a derivative of communication, the messages integration and sharing process is identified with the purpose of presenting, briefly and in real time, accurate information regarding the battle space.

*Figure 1* illustrates the hierarchical information transfer in the theatre of operations, putting into practice the basic operational requirement of *USC*, namely that of providing operational command and control of forces participating in coalition operations today.

➤ *Time synchronisation of message transmission and reception.* Unified Communications Systems design should be done based on the need for systems integration and communication and information equipment and means convergence into a single platform that is able to provide the users, according to an array of synchronisation, multiple voice, data, VTC services, as an efficient tool for analysis and decision-making by the commander.

➤ *The need for overspecialisation of communications and IT staff and especially of system administrators.* Communications and information technology specialists are connected, on the one hand, to the needs of the battle space, for which they must be aware of the particularities of the course of current or future operations, in terms of the potential impact on own communications and information systems, and, on the other hand, they are responsible for and have as main mission the uninterrupted operation of the system, the elimination of any malfunctions occurred and the identification/implementation, when necessary, of the possibilities for its reconfiguration.

➤ *Fast integration of the variables and distinct types of messages and transferred communications in order to make available to users full information that can really strengthen timely decision-making.* Information can be transferred through a single technical infrastructure, the one of multiple communications, with different levels of classification, and that can be achieved by IP encryption<sup>3</sup>. In this respect,

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<sup>3</sup> *Internet Protocol* is a protocol that provides a data transmission service without permanent connection. It identifies each logical interface of the connected pieces of equipment by a number, called the “*IP address*”. The standard version used in most cases is IPv4. In IPv4, the IP address is a 32-bit/4-byte number (eg. 192.168.0.1). The allocation of IP addresses is not arbitrary; it is made by the organisation responsible for distributing addresses space. For instance, RIPE is responsible for managing the addresses space assigned to Europe, at [http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adres%C4%83\\_IP](http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adres%C4%83_IP) (editor’s note).



the development of flexible IP encryption devices and of key management systems is an objective requirement for all communications services provided by the information network infrastructure. The rapid implementation of IP encryption interoperable devices is key to developing a “*basic core*”, and the continuous development of technologies in this field is the key to the long-term development from the “*basic core*” to a communication infrastructure able to send communications in real time between users and to extend from one terminal to another across the Alliance<sup>4</sup>. In this case, the ability of the infrastructure to achieve and maintain information security prevails, then it develops and implements solutions for interoperability, interconnection and convergence of systems in order to allow their reconfiguration in unified communications systems.

From a functional perspective, *Unified Communications Systems* must meet the following technical requirements:

- *scalability* – to ensure the connection of command points of different sizes;
- *flexibility* – to meet the multiple connection requirements;
- *transportability* – the ability to be transported on wheels, tracks, railways, air or naval means;
- *modularity* – the possibility to use the components in various missions, specific to coalition operations, providing a greater cost effectiveness;
- *security* – to protect communications by specific information encryption procedures, conducted at all levels of interconnection automatically.

The information systems and technologies, technical pieces of equipment and software related to the technical infrastructure that constitutes *UCS*, similar to the current information and communication systems, are vulnerable to unauthorised access, destructions and accidental or intentional modifications of data and programmes. The current trend of enhancing connectivity increases the risk of vulnerability, being more and more difficult to locate an illegal network access point or a user with aggressive behaviour. The situation requires, on the one hand, the enforcement of security policies and, on the other hand, regular awareness and accountability of communication and information services users of any kind regarding the compliance with them.

Defining *UCS* in a unitary conception aims to provide the following *information facilities*<sup>5</sup>:

- information sharing under the form of data, images, text and voice;
- communications automatic processing and management;

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<sup>4</sup> *NNEC Strategic Framework Documents*, Annex A, NATO HQ, Brussels, 29 February 2008.

<sup>5</sup> G. Timofte, E. Tudose, D. Vişan, *Sisteme de comunicații militare digitale de campanie*, Editura Inedit, București, 2006, pp. 25-36.



- provision of multiple and collaborative access capabilities to devices, data and applications that are common to user groups;
- use of specific applications that enable traffic management, switching and control functions to be carried out intelligently, automatically;
- automation of storage and management of data regarding handling and maintaining the integrity of communications in the system;
- development of network and system management through monitoring and control functions of their available resources;
- provision of specific facilities in the transmission and presentation of complex information to the recipient (graphics, images, text) in complete volume, with their ability to be displayed in a combined manner.

*UCS* should be individualised in a unitary conception, applicable at the level of the conduct of coalition operations, for which the configuration requirements of own technical infrastructure issues are aimed to:

- *encrypt information* – according to their classification level sharing, it must be organised by correlation between the classification level and the attributions regarding users information security;
- *spread information within the coalition* – it should be done based on methods that reduce information overload and provide the easy retrieval of information at the recipient;
- *provide access to the basic functions of communication services* – by improving web security technologies;
- *provide the system technical and procedural interoperability services* – through functional services specifications, identified in keeping with the standards. The services specifications must be published in a common register, according to an established standard and distributed for the knowledge of the users connected to the network.

Implementing the concept of “*Unified Communications Systems*” will require changes in mentality and attitudes, which can lead to significant revisions of the policies regarding making available and sharing information. It is increasingly evident that the “*need-to-know*” principle that is currently in force must be regarded as being functional only in the context of the existence of a computer system based on the *need for unified communications* and only if it is managed properly. This principle must be combined with new principles, such as: *need-to-provide*, *responsibility-to-provide*, *provide-to-share* and *share-to-win*.

# DETERMINANTS OF TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE LOGISTICS OF A JOINT TASK FORCE IN MILITARY ACTIONS ON THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

*Colonel Dr Marian MAZILU*

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*In all the phases of military actions, the deployment of troops in different regions or the activities for forces generation or regeneration take place, most of the time, with vehicles arranged in columns. In the author's opinion, this provides greater independence of movement, the permanent possibility of manoeuvre and of going at any time in battle with all forces. Due to the flexibility that characterises road transportation, traffic continuity, in the situation of the destruction of certain targets or districts, can be ensured easier than in the case of other communication means (rail, naval ones).*

*Any military action, especially an important one, such as the joint operation, involves considerable material and human effort. Given the circumstances of the extremely high resource consumption, the role of road communications, which must ensure the continuous "flow" of logistic transport, increases very much.*

**Keywords:** *infrastructure; road communications; operational forces; fighter*

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ctions, either economic or military ones, largely depend on structures, infrastructures and resources.

History confirms the fact that the greatest errors related to conducting military actions have been caused by the lack of correlation between the three above-mentioned domains and the performed actions. Moreover, the entire history of the military art development is a clear proof of the determining influence of economy on the tactical, operational and strategic concepts. It is economy that provides the technical-material basis for war. The outcome of war itself depends on the level of economic development, on the character of economic organisation, and on the skilful use of all resources. The structure of forces and of the combat procedures used by them, therefore, victory and defeat depend on material, namely economic conditions. Besides them, the conduct of war depends on the production capacity and on the means of communication. Briefly, wherever and whenever, economic conditions and resources are those that help violence to win victory.

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Colonel Dr Marian Mazilu – "DACICA" 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division.

Starting from this perception, we reaffirm the fact that the territory infrastructure is the material basis for actions, in general the material basis that consists of all the essential economic structures, representing the material support for action, the military one included.

Currently, no military action, no matter how reduced in proportion it may be, can be conceived without the simultaneous or singular use of the communications specific to the three basic environments and the associated means, transport becoming one of the basic factors that largely determine the success of the operation in modern warfare.

Given the multitude of aspects that may be the subject of this approach and the impossibility of treating all of them here, we will try to highlight the main correlations between road transport infrastructure and the logistics of a joint task force, during joint operations.

During military actions, irrespective of their character and scope, and especially during the joint operations in which a task force having a rather large logistic area participates, road communications polarise logistic transport as they assure fluidity and have a large bearing capacity irrespective of the category of assets that roll on them, but they are also sensitive targets for enemy attacks.

Although the technical and constructive characteristics of the country's road network leave much to be desired, the radial character, orientation, existence, diversity and condition of the road transport infrastructure assure, with some exceptions, the deployment of all the categories of military equipment in the Romanian armed forces inventory, the ones recently put into operation included, in all the areas of the country and in the majority of the possible directions. This aspect has always determined the mobility of the troops. In this context, the network of public roads, of about 80 000 km<sup>1</sup>, is supplemented by a network of exploitation roads (meaning agricultural, forest, oil, energy and industrial roads), which, together, can assure the transport of materials to combat troops rhythmically, as far as diversity is concerned. Many of these road sectors, especially in the hilly and mountainous areas, limit the traffic of certain categories of military assets and do not provide the technical characteristics that are necessary for the movement of motor vehicle convoys under optimum security conditions, at a steady pace and at full capacity, although they offer multiple opportunities for and variants when the traffic on the main roads is interrupted.

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<sup>1</sup> *Anuarul Statistic al României 2005*, National Institute of Statistics, București, chapter 17, point 13.

In all the stages of military actions, the deployment of troops in different areas or the activities meant to generate and regenerate forces are executed, most of the time, using motor vehicles arranged in convoys of motor vehicles. This fact provides more movement independence, and the permanent possibility to execute manoeuvre and to enter the fight with all the forces any moment. Due to the flexibility that characterises road transport, if some objectives or areas are destroyed, the traffic continuity may be easily assured than in the case of other communications (railway, naval).

Any military action, and especially the joint operation, entails a considerable material and human effort. In the context of extremely great resource consumption, the role of road communications is very important, as they have to assure the continuous “*flow*” of logistic transport. On the other hand, no matter how well the system of resource generation and regeneration may be organised, it cannot fulfil the important role it plays if the road transport infrastructure does not assure the transport of resources to the troops in the area of operations rhythmically.

The importance of road infrastructure is incontestable and it derives, as we have already mentioned, from the fact that it cannot be replaced. Even if we are tempted to believe that its role is only to meet the requirements in the field of transport, it is not limited to meeting the requirements of a certain sector, as it represents a real system of conditions that direct all the functional domains of logistic support. Road communications are determining for logistics, be it only for the fact that all its functional domains depend on transport, and transport depends on communication routes.

For instance, the role of infrastructure becomes evident in the supply chain. Within this process, the reception, management and storage of materials are executed, and then the materials necessary to equip and support operational forces so that they could carry out joint operations are distributed. All these activities require the use of road infrastructure, even if they are performed, depending on the level of military actions, at a different level of intensity and irrespective of the participant forces (naval, air).

Military sources, the civilian ones as well as the ones contracted or requisitioned in the area of operations, the factories that produce military equipment, armament and ammunition, food sources, warehouses, all the other facilities and associated constructions have to be in a close correlation so that resources can get to the area of operations in the shortest period of time and using all ways. Irrespective of the adopted procedures, they have to be adapted to the integrated actions that may cover a large area, and may involve different isolated formations. It entails, besides a great logistic supply and transport capacity, in different conditions

and using combined means, a permanent and intense use of infrastructures. All these require concrete and continuous measures to use the road infrastructure in a planned manner.

Transport, another functional domain of logistic support, certainly represents the segment on which road infrastructure has the greatest impact. As it happens in all the other domains of society, the evolution of transport has had a major impact on the military domain, influencing the conceptual, doctrinal and procedural changes.

Almost everything that is in the sources and has to get to the fighter is achieved by road. In joint military actions or when the task force conducts military actions in the littoral area or in Dobrogea, when the reaction time has a determining role for the success of the action, road infrastructure represents the most rapid means to execute transport. The dynamics and character of joint actions require the development of the transport system and its adaptation to the new requirements. In such situations, the focus is on the development of combined transport. This technique presupposes the existence of a unit load that may be shipped using many means of transport. The unit load may be transported by motor vehicle up to a railway station and then by train to a port. From there, the container is transported by ship to the port of destination. Thus, in order to ship the container, road, rail and naval transport subsystems are involved. The means of transport belong to different carriers, in order to meet such requirements, within an integrated transport system. The purpose of this modular, flexible and effective system, consisting of simple or mixed groups of means of transport, specific to all services (lorries, tank cars, helicopters, planes, trucks, naval or unconventional means etc.), is to provide combat forces with everything they need. This mode of transport will define the execution of transport operations in a joint operation. It can be achieved only if there is an adequate infrastructure that fully meets the transport needs.

If, in general, there are no important problems related to communications in the plains and hilly areas, as their constructive characteristics almost totally allow the movement of military assets, mountainous and littoral areas have both common and specific characteristics as far as this aspect is concerned. Therefore, in all mountain groups, there are mountains oriented N – S and E – V, perpendicular and parallel to the main directions for actions that open. There is an appropriate road network here that provides opportunities for manoeuvre both from the front to the depth (and vice versa) and from one direction to the other, in relation to the contact alignment.

The great number of artworks on the communication routes in the passes and outside them as well as that of hydropower facilities require measures meant to defend them against air strikes and against the actions of reconnaissance-diversion or terrorist groups. Thus, by destroying them or by blocking

some compulsory crossing points, passes may be easily blocked and the traffic may be interrupted for shorter or longer periods of time.

High declivities, small-radius curvatures, the width of the roadways and the road platforms, the limited possibilities to find variants or even the lack of variants in some areas, the absence of the conditions to make a halt require not only a good preparation of the personnel, assets and materials for deployments but also their realistic and judicious planning, in relation to the characteristics of each pass or road. In this context, it is convenient to move on the roads between passes without making halts, at a speed of no more than 25 km per hour, the appropriate dimensioning of convoys, adequate guard and protection measures etc.

Appreciating that the terrain specificity is one of the elements that influence joint military actions planning and conduct, we consider it necessary to achieve (or update, if it exists) a military monograph on the national road infrastructure (the monograph has to provide data related to rail and air infrastructure), to meet the current information needs necessary for planning in all areas of operations. It is necessary that this monograph should include, besides the logistic capabilities in the area, exact details of the axes on which the main forbidden directions are inscribed, as well as of those that connect the areas of operations.

Because the most important problems are encountered while crossing mountainous areas and because of the fact that, in the case of conducting a joint military action in a certain area of operations, the execution of transport over the mountains is a necessity, we consider that the knowledge of the characteristics of communications is defining for planning and executing logistic transport activities.

In the case of joint operations that also include the littoral area, the role of road or rail transport decreases to some extent, not only because of the reduced density and often unfavourable orientation of the communication routes, but also because of the difficulties in restoring road infrastructure. In the high areas on the littoral, the difficulties are those specific to this type of terrain, while, if the terrain is flat, there are usually difficulties that are characteristic to swampy areas, with many lakes, rivers, floodplains etc.

In these regions, it is usually impossible to cross through the ford (waters are deep and their bottom is muddy) or to execute variants, as it is difficult to build embankments on this type of terrain. The reconstruction of embankments in swampy areas is achieved using wood (bridge piers, scaffolds, stockades, fascines), as it requires more time and, many times, it is almost impossible to carry earth from other areas.

In these operations, although there are more possibilities to transport troops and assets due to the river and maritime transport, the problem of transport is more difficult and complicated than usual.

The particularities of communications specific to the littoral area require the deployment of troops and materials using, in a combined manner, all the existing means of transport (road, rail, water and air). To execute transport, it is often necessary to use the successive combination method. The need to use different means of transport and to move the load from one to the other on the deployment itinerary leads to complicating the transport organisation and execution and to lengthening the transport period. Moreover, as the loading points are objectives that are vulnerable to enemy strikes, the stability of transport execution is permanently menaced.

Equipment maintenance, another functional domain of logistic support is determined by the road infrastructure viability. Maintaining road communications permanently viable assures the timely and constant evacuation of assets and materials to the specialised repair sectors. There are multiple implications. First of all, assuring continuous evacuation allows for the evacuated assets to be repaired according to the plan and thus to be timely reintroduced in combat. Moreover, the maintenance of the road communications viability allows for: the timely performance of all the activities in the maintenance process (diagnosis, spare parts and materials assurance, repair etc.); the rapid deployment of the maintenance structures meant to intervene to back or support the threatened units; the possibility to dispose maintenance forces and means so that, if needed, they can assure the necessary time to gather the damaged assets and to execute rapid redeployment manoeuvres etc.

Moreover, following logistics reconnaissance, it can be certainly established which of the infrastructure elements of the 7 regional directorates of roads and bridges<sup>2</sup>, having a number of 44 road and bridge sections and 316 districts<sup>3</sup> and support points, that cover the national road network, may be, if needed, sources to assure the maintenance needs. They have a quite large number of technical facilities available (workshops and mechanical and electrical sections, warehouses to store materials and assets, fuel warehouses, repair capabilities belonging to forestry exploitations, power supply stations and high power transformers in the safety or protection areas of the roads, specialised technical personnel), judiciously placed on the territory of the country, which have to be identified

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<sup>2</sup> *Strategia rutieră pentru dezvoltarea serviciilor de transport pe perioada 2005 – 2015*, Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, Romanian National Company of Motorways and National Roads, internal use, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> See [www.andnet.ro](http://www.andnet.ro).



and used. In fact, these civilian structures represent the main source to assure the communications viability in the task force area of responsibility.

The activities specific to medical and campaign services are influenced, in general, by the contribution of specific infrastructure elements, in certain key situations. The diverse situations in which troops may be during joint military actions require the use of all the opportunities offered by the road infrastructure elements. Besides the specialised units under the tutelage of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, which serve the personnel in the regional directorates (laboratories, hospitals, polyclinics, dispensaries, sanatoriums etc.), the buildings and constructions that have a specific destination (building sites, ballast stations, mobile accommodation and feeding facilities etc.) may be used in limit situations to arrange (improvise) medical points and to provide campaign services. These facilities have to be permanently identified and monitored, being important as they can resolve, at a relatively low level, indeed, the critical situations that may emerge in certain stages of the military action.

The viability of infrastructure and especially of the road infrastructure conditions not only the execution of transport operations but also their organisation and planning, the infrastructure safety being achieved by both active defence methods and passive methods to enhance stability in exploitation.

All the functional domains of logistic support are influenced by the road transport infrastructure to a certain extent, all these influences marking the development of the joint military action. Besides these already mentioned aspects, we consider that the main influences of road communications on the logistic support functional domains are represented by a series of aspects that may result in changes during the action. Therefore, we consider that the following correlations have to be known, analysed and permanently subject to the planners' attention:

- the non-uniform distribution of road infrastructure in certain areas determines particularities in planning and conducting deployments. Size, tonnage etc. limits in some communications sectors require the execution of reconnaissance missions, the update of the vehicles technical condition, and great attention to be paid to planning the deployment of different categories of military assets. Considering these aspects, the time necessary to transport materials is shortened, and many transport operations may be executed in the same period of time;

- the road capacity and the state of roads condition the timely achievement of the logistic system and the action dispositions. The road infrastructure viability is one of the important factors that decisively influence the mobility of the troops. The greater the road infrastructure viability is the more effectively forces and assets manoeuvre is achieved. Romania has a national road network

of about 16 000 km, the most important part of the national roads in Romania being in the technical class III, having the platform of 9,0 m and the roadway of 7,0 m, allowing a traffic of about 8 000 vehicles/day. For about 1 200 km in the network, the number of physical vehicles exceed the normal value, which requires the change in the technical class of the road from III to II. It entails that the road should be widened from two to four lanes<sup>4</sup>;

- road infrastructure assures the continuity of traffic in the case of damage to a large extent in comparison with the other types of infrastructure, especially because of its capacity to “connect” to the possibilities in the zone. The radial and circular road network that connects the capital of the county and the border points as well as the industrial sites, and crosses the Carpathians in many points, assures a permanent connection between the main forbidden directions on the territory of the country. It allows for the deployment of the troops and materials as well as for variants, if necessary, timely and safely, within the strategic manoeuvre of forces and assets from one direction to the other;

- the road infrastructure vulnerability, given by the design errors and the relatively large number of artworks, influences the execution of transport operations by conditioning the use of certain road sectors that are less vulnerable, providing long-distance variants and increasing fuel consumption. This fact negatively influences the execution of transport and the maintenance of assets, having negative consequences on supply, assets, medical evacuation etc.;

- large artworks on road communications, especially bridges, viaducts and tunnels, represent traffic choke points when passing over certain obstacles. They generate, because of their construction characteristics as well as the exploitation conditions, a series of difficulties in planning and executing the movement. Moreover, their number, size, and dispersal in the network make the assurance of appropriate guard measures very difficult, if not impossible. This fact has negative consequences on other connected domains. The existence of these vulnerabilities requires the use of a larger number of military men to execute maintenance and repair operations, diminishing the personnel necessary to perform other activities (to assure the protection and guard measures in the logistics forces disposition area, the diminution of the workforce necessary for campaign services etc.).

To exemplify, along the entire network of national roads in Romania 3 286 bridges and 3 114 viaducts are built and in operation, having a total length of over 227 km. Out of the total bridges in the network, only 1 836 are sized

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<sup>4</sup> *Strategia rutieră pentru dezvoltarea serviciilor de transport pe perioada 2005 – 2015, op. cit., p. 8.*

to correspond to “E” class, the others, totalling 1 450, not being built in conformity with the European norms<sup>5</sup>.

The national network has also 9 road tunnels, whose technical condition is not far different from the one of the roads. The great majority of them are built in the '60s, and so far only sporadic funds have been allocated to consolidate, rehabilitate and modernise them<sup>6</sup>.

The roadway capacity is also exceeded at the cities entrances and exits, where there are no detour routes for the routes open to international traffic and there are parts of the road whose capacity is exceeded, where the traffic is in column, taking long time. The “inability” of D.N. 1 (National Road 1) and of the capital beltway to meet the requirements of heavy traffic is well known, both at the exit from București and then, for a long part of them; all these above-mentioned aspects are elements that should capture the attention of planners, elements that generate slides in the normal functioning of the supply chain, having a major impact on any type of activity, irrespective of the level of operational art it is performed;

- over 8 000 vehicles use the national road network daily and there are over 400 railroad crossings, generating 29 000 daily closures and representing over 4 800 stationing hours daily<sup>7</sup>. They determine significant delays and generate additional costs with fuel and lubricants. We mention all these aspects as, during wars, road communications represent the deployment support not only for the armed forces needs but also for the other socio-economic activities. Therefore, the activities on the roads are not reduced but, on the contrary, they get amplified. Under these circumstances, planning material transport operations, assuring the guard and protection measures during deployment, directing the traffic, the volume of assets and materials engaged in executing transport operations are priorities for military planners;

- many times, when the weather conditions worsen (heavy rain, snow etc.) for a relatively long period of time, the situation becomes more difficult. The majority of communications become impracticable, the artworks are out of use and it takes a lot of time to put them in operation again. This fact was fully demonstrated in September 2005 when, in almost all the regions of the country, because of the heavy rain, road transport was “frozen” for a long period of time,

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> See [www.andnet.ro](http://www.andnet.ro).

<sup>7</sup> *Strategia drumurilor publice din România în perioada 1998 – 2005*, Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, Romanian National Company of Motorways and National Roads, București, 1998, p. 2.

and the reconstruction and use of the civilian (and military) bridges was a total fiasco. During military actions, this fact leads to the impossibility to execute material and equipment transport operations, which generates perturbations in the normal activities specific to logistic support functional domains.

Moreover, as it could be seen at the beginning of this year, the national road network became almost impracticable because of the heavy snow. Regular road and rail transport was paralysed, and it had an impact on strategic transport too. Such a situation would invariably affect the logistic support provided to combat forces, the effects propagating to all the levels of logistic support lines;

- the destruction of bridges requires variants as far as itineraries are concerned, to find other crossing points. A detour is necessary in this case, which may extend the initial path with tens or even hundreds of kilometres. It results in the timely supply failure, the increase in fuel consumption, the longer time to deploy, the congestion on other routes, the increase in all participants fatigue and decrease in their physical performance, the increase in the risk factors etc. In such situations, significant delays occur in the process of supplying the necessary materials that are urgently needed in some critical situations during the operation, as well as in the case of equipment and medical evacuation or in that of campaign services. Moreover, more materials, engineering equipment, and workforce are necessary for the artworks restoration. The final consequences of these vulnerabilities get manifest through difficulties in achieving the logistic system, the logistic support and, therefore, in the result of military actions;

- the consolidation, maintenance and rehabilitation of the existing road communications in certain areas, the restoration of the damaged embankments and artworks have to be performed, almost entirely, using local materials, fact that requires a longer period of time and more human resources and materials;

- in adverse weather conditions, communication routes, especially those in mountainous regions, are usually difficult to access. This fact generates difficulties in providing combatants with the necessary materials, in evacuating assets and materials, the wounded and the sick people, in executing transport operations, in general. Often, in the mountainous regions, the characteristics of the communication routes limit the possibilities of using some motor vehicles, which requires the use of combined or air transport or, no matter how incredible this solution may be in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, their partial or total replacement with animal-drawn vehicles (carts, sledges, saddles). This fact leads to the performance of transport with difficulties, in a longer period of time, and considerable limits the transport of certain materials, evacuations etc.;

- the reduced dimensions of the road or roadway platform in mountainous regions make the convoy turning to detour very difficult or even impossible in certain areas, transport of any type being thus disrupted.

To meet the military and socio-economic requirements, the territorial infrastructure needs a permanent modernisation and optimisation. It is so complex and it has so many consequences on the economic-social life and on the military actions that, in the future, the action planning and execution will largely depend on the way in which the opportunities provided by the existing capabilities will be taken into consideration.

We can conclude by stating it is essential that the discrepancies between the infrastructure and the specific requirements related to providing the necessary logistic support should be eliminated and that an optimal and permanent relationship between capabilities and action should be established. It is also essential that the logistic system should be capable of adapting its actions to the existing infrastructure, and of capitalising on the most viable capabilities offered by road communications in key situations, so that they could be optimally used to provide the troops with the necessary logistic support to conduct joint military actions.

*English version by*  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*



# LEADER CHARISMA

Colonel Dr Virgil-Ovidiu POP

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*Today, the term charisma refers to magnetism, intensity, vivacity. The charismatic leader is a person who, by the force of personal style and abilities, is capable of having a special effect over the subordinates. He/She succeeds in imposing himself/herself through exuberance, self-confidence and through inducing order and ethics. The charismatic leader generates trust and integrates the organisation goals with the subordinate individual ones, in outlining his/her vision for the future.*

*The charismatic leader represents the approximation of the ideal leader defined by "Koestenbaum Diamond". He will be endowed, to an extent specific to the field he leads, with all the four qualities: vision, realism, ethics and courage. Although certain abilities may be inherited, they have to be developed and polished in an environment favourable to knowledge, being guided by ethical principles, through the power of personal example.*

**Keywords:** *authority; vision; charismatic credibility; professionalism; reliability; ethics; courage*

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**A**ccording to the *Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language*, charisma is a particular

gift made to people by the divine grace, namely the influence over people due to personal prestige and charm. Etymologically, the term "charisma" comes from the Greek Goddess Charis (the goddess of grace and beauty, considered to be the wife of Hephaestus, the God of Fire, the son of Zeus and Hera), a character of total beauty and charity.

Even in the Greek mythology, this quality – charisma – was considered to be a personality trait, recognised as unusual. That is why it was considered to stem from supernatural powers. Charisma denoted, in fact, a gift, a certain relationship between believers or followers and the master in whom they trusted and to whom they are subject. This gift, the quality of healing, which used to be the attribute of kings, is defined by the belief in a common vision. Once acknowledged, this gift acts like perpetual motion. It produces the desired effect in all who get in contact with the owner.

Today, the term refers to magnetism, intensity, vivacity. The charismatic leader is a person who, by the force of personal style and abilities, is capable of having a special effect over the subordinates. He/She succeeds in imposing himself/herself through exuberance, self-confidence

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Colonel Dr Virgil-Ovidiu Pop – Commander of the 30<sup>th</sup> Guard Regiment "Mihai Viteazul".

and through inducing order and ethics. The charismatic leader generates trust and integrates the organisation goals with the subordinate individual ones, in outlining his/her vision for the future. For instance, Marshal Alexandru Averescu, born on 9 March 1859, was a general, then a marshal, politician, and a member of the Romanian Academy. Between 1911 and 1913, he was the Chief of the General Staff, position from which he coordinated the Second Balkan War. He achieved notoriety for the victories in the First World War, when he commanded the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army, winning the famous victories in Mărășești and Oituz. At the beginning of the '20s, the popularity he gained due to the victories in the war that resulted in the establishment of Great Romania reached its climax. In the countryside, people saw him in their dreams, some of them swore that they saw him getting off an airplane among them, and those who took part in the war told that they lived with him in the trenches. Among countrymen, the name of Averescu was on everybody's lips, in him all hopes were crystallised, he was the only one expected to perform the miracle of a life without worries and difficulties. Thus, Marshal Averescu's charisma has the profound and subtle significance of divine grace, combined with the power of personal example and the professionalism demonstrated in fight, being equivalent to the quality of a sacred character to spiritually enlighten those around him, to alleviate their suffering, and comparable to the ability to create a harmonious and profound relationship between the master and the disciple. As a consequence of the fact that a charismatic leader emanates inner force, convinces without effort and inspires spontaneous confidence, he/she will develop harmonious interpersonal relationships and will instil a feeling of emotional dependence – but a sort of dependence that makes someone feel valued and placed in a superior area of existence.

Jay Conger, expert in leadership and a renowned professor at Claremont McKenna College in California, identifies four general characteristics of charismatic leaders:

1. they have a strong and clear vision, and they know how to present it to the target public;
2. they express their vision so that problems become apparent, and the proposed solutions are not only justified but also desirable;
3. they have the credibility and professionalism to propose changes from old traditions;
4. they lead by the power of their example, thus motivating the public to follow them.



The true leader has the charisma that, far from being reduced to agreeable presence, sonorous voice, nice tone, penetrating look and significant gesture, consists, in substance, in wisdom and tenacity, creative and pragmatic thinking, in the nobility of character, in his/her goals and aspirations that are consonant with those of subordinates. Faith and communication, loyalty and frankness, vitality and enthusiasm, the art of inter-human relations are, in essence, the strengths of a charismatic leader.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (1891-1944), the “*Desert Fox*”, commander of the most effective tank division and the pride of the German Army, embodiment of the allied forces fear in the African desert, qualified as a hero by his allies and as a worthy opponent by his enemies, is another example of a charismatic leader, who stated that: “*An officer has to stand by his soldiers, to think and feel what they think and feel...*”.

In the North African Campaign, Rommel used a light reconnaissance aircraft, flew over the area, being aware of the fact that he had to undertake inspection and reconnaissance personally. Whenever any confusion arose among subordinates, he went there and gave precise instructions. During battles, he never remained in the command post, but he was always present in the front line. Soldiers lived with the impression that he was a man they had to follow without reservation, even if the conditions in the desert were very difficult, especially for Europeans. The confidence in the commander was very important, and the morale could weaken easily under such conditions; however, Rommel, the oldest German officer in the desert (senior officers could not withstand the difficult conditions in the desert), permanently succeeded, through the power of example, in instilling the desire to fight and win in his soldiers. Only the news that Rommel was in the front line among his soldiers was powerful enough to turn the tide of a confrontation!

Nazi propaganda permanently used Rommel ever since he, although very young, was appointed commander of the well-known “*Ghost Division*” (7<sup>th</sup> Armoured Division), division which, during the period of the lightning invasion of France (10 May-25 June 1940) through the Ardennes Forest and across the river Meuse, was the spearhead of Army Group A, thus raising the morale of a whole nation. Hitler himself, another charismatic leader, acknowledged Rommel’s extraordinary abilities and ordered, in the fall of 1939, that he should accompany him in his inspections along the front line.

Being recently appointed commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion in the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment in Goslar, in the Harz Mountains, an elite mountain troop unit,

he was invited to ski by some young officers in his new unit, who intended to demonstrate their superiority over their new commander. Rommel, who was significantly older than them, could ski up and down the mountain three times, without getting tired, and the young officers who were exhausted refused the invitation to go up for the fourth time.

The renowned sociologist Maximilian Karl Emil “Max” Weber suggests that this type of charismatic authority relies on undeniable devotion to the heroism or exemplary character of the leader and to the norms and rules ordained by him. More precisely, the authority of the leader on the others relies on a quality seen as unique and supernatural by the followers. The existence or inexistence of the quality per se is irrelevant. What really counts is the subordinates’ belief in its existence. Moreover, Weber sees this type of authority as a creative force, opposed to tradition and existing rules, having a revolutionary character. In this regard, Max Weber states: *“The only source of charismatic authority legitimacy is its recognition by the followers. Although irrational, as it cannot be calculated or measured, it may be revolutionary and, in certain situations, it challenges legal authority”*. Starting from this statement and taking into account that the legal authority representative is the manager, the charismatic authority attributed to him, although impossible to measure, can transform him/her into an incontestable leader, capable of instilling his/her revolutionary vision into subordinates, of motivating them, of convincing them with regard to the importance of organisational objectives, and of achieving convergence between personal goals and the ones of each individual. On the other hand, if the manager does not have such ability, and a subordinate within the organisation is invested with the charismatic authority, conflicts may arise, which can be resolved by effective managers; such an organisation cannot record progress comparable to the one of other organisations led by charismatic leaders.

The charismatic commander relies on influencing the subordinates through activating inner motivations, needs, skills, beliefs. Thus, the leader causes the desire to undertake certain actions and to exhibit a desired behaviour. To achieve it, the leader creates the conditions that favour the desired behaviour and the development of desired actions. Charismatic leaders have a participative style and, relying on a genuine professional authority, they are preoccupied not only with achieving the tasks but also with resolving the problems their subordinates are confronted with. Such a leader involves the subordinates in substantiating and making decisions, delegates certain tasks, and demonstrates skills

in the relationships with subordinates. Thus, the charismatic leader uses sanctions to a lesser extent, but adopts persuasion, motivation, personal commitment, reward; military groups that have charismatic leaders are united collectives, they have high cohesion, and they are characterised by good relationships both between the members of the collective and between the members and the leader.

In the '80s, the American Professor Abraham Zaleznik distinguished between leaders and managers. He presented the difference between the two groups: *"Leaders are visionaries, managers are planners. Leaders are concerned about the substance, while managers are concerned with the form and the process"*, and in 1989, Warren Bennis, another American expert in leadership, further explicated Zaleznik's study regarding the differences between managers and leaders, in his book – *"On Becoming a Leader"* – drawing the following comparative list:

- A good manager: *administers, copies, maintains, focuses on the system and the structure, relies on control, has a short-term perspective, asks how and when, pays attention to what it was, accepts the status-quo, emulates the classic good soldier, does things right.*
- The charismatic leader: *innovates, is original, develops, focuses on people, inspires confidence, has a long-term perspective, asks what and why, pays attention to what will be, creates, challenges the status-quo, is his/her own master, does the right things.*

The studies conducted highlight the fact that organisations or groups need leaders. Thus, in peacetime, an army that has good managers and administrative staff can accomplish the mission, while in wartime it cannot have success without charismatic leaders. The leader is considered to be the person that achieves remarkable results with certain effectiveness in any field of activity, regardless of the obstacles he/she has to face.

Maryem Le Saget, in the publication *"Intuitive Manager"*, appreciates that: *"A leader is one who has influence on others to such an extent as to instil the desire to follow him/her. Neither footman, nor slave or even disciple, the follower does it of his/her own volition. No law imposes this attitude: it is voluntary, and the leader is able to attract the follower to a vision, to a positive future for all"*.

Thus, we can deduce a series of qualities that are characteristic of the charismatic leader, such as knowing the group and the field of activity (internal and external environment, key personalities, incentives to motivate each individual, professionalism in the field), building principled relations in society and in the field of activity, reputation and exceptional previous results, special skills and attitudes, such as analysis

ability, reliable judgements, strategic and multidimensional thinking, faculty for establishing good working relationships, mobility towards others, understanding of human nature, evident personal qualities, honesty, integrity, as well as powerful motivation for becoming a leader.

These remarkable qualities can be also found in Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery (1887-1976), another charismatic leader in the Second World War. Montgomery was born on 17 November 1887, in London, graduated from the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, successfully participated in the battles on the French front in the First World War, and he was then appointed commander of the British 8<sup>th</sup> Army. In the North African Campaign, Montgomery was Field Marshal Rommel's opponent. Although they were enemies, there were many similarities between the two officers. Like Rommel, Montgomery innovated, was original, had vision and was aware of the power of personal example; he used to permanently move along the British front line, being friendly even towards the most humble soldier. The military had enormous confidence in him and called him "*Monty*". Being permanently preoccupied with the situation of the soldiers in the front line, Montgomery was respected by all the subordinate personnel, but his image recommended him as a true "*Soldier's General*". Montgomery is also known to have hung Rommel's portrait on the wall of his mobile command point, and when he pondered on the tactics he had to adopt, he is said to have thought of what Rommel would have done. After the war, Montgomery was appointed as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and then deputy supreme commander of NATO forces.

Another Field Marshal Rommel's enemy, General Eisenhower (1890-1969), another exceptional leader, highlights other qualities a leader must have. If, at the beginning, in the North African Campaign, because of the lack of experience, the Americans suffered heavy losses, Eisenhower rapidly learnt from own mistakes, adapted to the requirements of the battlefield and, when the Battle of El Alamein ended, benefiting from the superiority of the available forces and assets, he defeated Rommel. However, it would not be the last clash between the two titans. Eisenhower served as Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Commander, and he was appointed as commander of the Normandy invasion operation, considered the greatest military operation in history. Rommel built a line of impressive fortifications in France, known as the "*Atlantic Wall*". However, the Germans did not succeed in coping with the superiority of Eisenhower's forces. Eisenhower's abilities were demonstrated not only by choosing and applying the winning strategy but especially by his ability

to settle the complex disputes within the allied command structures. Moreover, Eisenhower was guided by strict moral rules, and when 130 German prisoners happened to suffocate during transportation, he did not hesitate to send apologies to the German command. His temperate character, his abilities demonstrated in battle, his morality and vision as a leader recommended him to be appointed, in 1950, in the highest position in NATO hierarchy.

Expert Peter Koestenbaum states that a leader has to be characterised by greatness and the leader's greatness of thought and action has four modes of manifestation:

- *vision* – entailing the faculty to distinguish the broadest perspective;
- *realism* – always subjecting to deeds, rejecting illusions;
- *ethics* – expressing concern for others;
- *courage* – action of self-exposing and being perseverant in what he/she does.

“*Koestenbaum Diamond*” analyses the leader's decisions from the standpoint of the four modes of manifestation of the leader's greatness in thought and action. Thus, the larger the space created by the tension between the four contrary directions – vision, realism, courage, ethics – is, the better the leader will be. If a manager lacks one of the four characteristics, the leadership spirit is reduced to zero.

The charismatic leader represents the approximation of the ideal leader defined by “*Koestenbaum Diamond*”. He will be endowed, to an extent specific to the field he leads, with all the four qualities: vision, realism, ethics and courage. In the military organisation, the commander needs the four expressions of the leader greatness in thought and action in order to accomplish missions in peacetime and especially in wartime. However, we cannot require for all the four qualities to be fully developed for all command echelons. In general, at the beginning of the military career, not all these qualities are necessary to a large extent, but it is very important to create the premises for the development of lower echelon commanders, through promoting personal example and creating an environment that favours development. From the above-presented historical examples, we can notice that, besides the genetically inherited abilities, a leader formation entails a complex process, starting with the thorough training in all the aspects of the field of activity, continuing with the awareness of the human factor values and motivations, of the communication methods and strategies, and up to demonstrating the acquired abilities and knowledge or even their testing in battle.

In general, charismatic leaders are those who form leaders. We cannot imagine a charismatic character to be a leader without elementary knowledge. It follows

that, although certain abilities may be inherited, they have to be developed and polished in an environment favourable to knowledge, being guided by ethical principles, through the power of personal example. We can see that, in such an environment, even a character that is less endowed with charisma can learn the art of being a leader, although having the vision, realism, ethics and courage of the charismatic leader in a smaller proportion.

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**PROJECTS AND INITIATIVES IN THE FIELD  
OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION  
FOR THE USE OF AIRSPACE**  
– *Their Effects on Civil and Military Air Traffic Management  
in Peacetime, during Crisis Situations and at War  
and Perspectives for Global Expansion – (II)*

*Colonel (AF) Relu PANAIT*

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*In the second part of the article, the author points out the need for a proper civil-military cooperation in the field of air traffic management that should be enhanced and continued through the common participation in the regional and European initiatives in the field.*

*Then, he approaches the Air Traffic Management and Airspace Management in during peacetime, in crisis or conflict situations, as well as the civil-military interface, concluding that the civilians and the military must jointly develop an integrated command system, which should operate ever since peacetime and should be based on the ongoing and future initiatives and projects, with common procedures and training methods, underlining that the need to work together is crucial in peacetime, crisis or war.*

**Keywords:** *Single European Sky; Flexible Use of Airspace; Functional Airspace Blocks; General Air Traffic; Airspace Control Authority*

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***Combining civil  
and military requirements***

Because of the fact that the studies of the *Regional Airspace Initiative – RAI* and the related projects have had a high degree of success, and the promotion of the civil-military cooperation in the field of air traffic management has benefited both the national economy and the compliance with the operational requirements of the air forces, one has decided to continue and enhance cooperation through the common participation in the regional and European initiatives in the field.

Europe eliminated its frontiers on the ground through the establishment of the single European market in 1985 and, in 1990, it renounced the economic frontiers with the monetary and economic union. A natural step was the elimination of frontiers in the common European space. Thus, the *single currency, single market,*

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*single sky* marked the most important moments of the century in the evolution of Europe as an entity.

The *Single European Sky (SES)* is an initiative launched by the European Commission in 1999 in order to reform the European architecture of air traffic management. Its primary aim is to meet future capacity and safety needs of the flights imposed by the increase in air traffic and efficiency requirements from all points of view<sup>1</sup>.

Within *SES*, the *Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA)*, by both the military and civilians, was the most important objective, for two reasons: firstly – airspace is a limited resource and the intensification of air traffic requires the increasing use of this space, and secondly – the new navigation concepts are developed to meet the operational capacity requirements, on the one hand, and the environment protection requirements, on the other hand.

Air traffic currently requires special precision, considering minimum vertical, lateral and time separations (4D – four-dimensional) to accommodate as many flights as possible. If it is desired the provision in common of these services, then there has to exist an increased level of interoperability of *CNS/ATM* means and the ones that assist them.

It is only in this way that we can give unrestricted access to all aircraft in a dynamic and flexible airspace. Thus, the *FUA* concept leads us to a contiguous airspace, which provides the flexibility that is needed for it to be used by aircraft with different performance and objectives.

The *Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR)* is a programme within *SES* whose objective – the development of a new generation of *ATM* in Europe – has three phases: *definition*, *development* and *implementation* and takes place between 2004 and 2020.

*The definition phase (2004-2008)* means organising the technological aspects and the steps to be followed, the priorities of the modernisation programmes and the operational plans for implementation. It was completed in May 2008. The product resulted following this phase is *ATM Master Plan*, approved by the European Council. The plan includes the work programme for the implementation of concepts and of various strategies regarding technical aspects.

*The development phase (2008-2013)* seeks to develop new pieces of equipment, systems and standards and to ensure the convergence towards interoperability of all European *ATM* systems, either military or civilian ones.

The last phase, the *implementation (2014-2020)*, will consist in the large-scale production of *ATM* infrastructure and its implementation. All its components

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<sup>1</sup> At [http://www.eurocontrol.int/ses/public/standard\\_page/sk\\_ses.html](http://www.eurocontrol.int/ses/public/standard_page/sk_ses.html)

will be harmonised, interoperable and joint into a safe and precise infrastructure, capable of achieving performance at high level.

The fundamental objectives of the *SESAR* programme contribute to the accomplishment of a system that may increase threefold the air traffic management capacity, reducing the delays on the ground and in the air, may increase air traffic safety up to tenfold, may reduce by ten percent the impact of flights on the environment and, very important from the viewpoint of beneficiaries, will diminish by approximately 50% the cost of *ATM* services for airspace users.

Another initiative within *SES* is the accomplishment of *Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB)*. In the legislative package proposed in *SES*, a *FAB* means an “airspace block based on operational requirements and established regardless of state boundaries, where the provision of air navigation services and related ancillary functions are optimised and/or integrated”<sup>2</sup>.

Airspace is one of the domains in which the European Union has made slower progress, considering that there still are 27 airspace sectors dividing the European sky, because each nation still controls its own space.

The negative effects of this fragmentation are translated in the inefficiency with which the numerous airways available and the control systems that provide their guidance are organised. The flight security issues created by the overlapping of airways belonging to various nations, the passing from one control centre to another, the holding areas that have become a routine in every flight, generating an extra fuel consumption and an increase in the pollution level, are a natural consequence of the traffic in the fragmented airspace of Europe.

The European Commission estimated that air traffic would grow by approximately 4-5% per year, leading to a near doubling of traffic by 2020, the current air traffic control infrastructure being probably incapable of meeting the new challenges relating to the sustainable development of European air transport<sup>3</sup>.

The result will consist in increasing delays of all flights, with major repercussions for both users and airlines, for traffic and for the environment.

### ***ATM and ASM during peacetime, in crisis or conflict situations***

An integrated air traffic and airspace management must equally grant access to civilians and the military in peacetime and during alert, crisis or conflict situations. At the same time, it must ensure the tactical freedom for the flights of military aircraft during exercises, training sessions, as well as during situations that require

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> According to the Communication of the European Commission in March 2007, at [http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air\\_portal/sesame/doc/0315\\_comm\\_sesar\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/sesame/doc/0315_comm_sesar_en.pdf)

a response from air defence. In order to provide a transition without malfunctions of the air traffic, in complex situations, from the state of peace to the one of conflict or crisis, we believe that a set of regulations must be drawn up for situations of this kind. This set must cover a number of domains that are essential for the statuses of battle preparation, alert, crisis or conflict, that comprise the organisation of *ATM* and the one of *Air Space Management (ASM)*. Moreover, the transition from the state of conflict to the state of peace must take place in the same way, in reverse, the civilian traffic controllers undertaking the responsibility of *ATM* and *ASM*. The purpose of this integrated air traffic management system is to ensure the quality, flexibility and continuity needed for a professional command-control system at national level, on the one hand, through *Area Control Centres (ACC)* and, on the other hand, through *Air Operation Centre (AOC)*.

❖ *During peacetime*

The airspace and air traffic management must support the objectives of national security and daily military operations as well as the civil aircraft flights. This can be achieved only through a close cooperation between civilians and the military, enabled by the *CNS/ATM* interoperable means, on the ground and in the air.

From the air, the earth's surface appears as a "blanket" made up of different "patches", depending on the crops or vegetation in the respective areas. Currently, airspace can be likened to this blanket, where each patch is a block of airspace, in relation to the requirements of the respective country, either for the military or for civilians, with rules established by the nation or the ministry that manages that *FAB*, in keeping with own objectives. In each of these patches of the European airspace there are still practiced a variety of *Air Traffic Control (ATC)* technologies, triggering inefficiencies in the European *ATM* system. Fragmentation has an impact on the safety and security of flights and on the capacity of existing air corridors and control centres – adding almost one billion Euros/year in operating costs.

That is why the essence of *SES* consists in delivering functioning airspace blocks that will implicitly lead to airspace redesign and fewer control centres, interoperable equipment and procedures<sup>4</sup>.

The significant increase in the air traffic over Europe requires a much more rational air traffic management, which can be achieved not through separating the spaces meant for each state, but through the *Flexible Use of Airspace – FUA*. There has been disagreement with the civilians regarding these airspace areas, but the intention is that, if there is a *Single European Sky*, then we must use it together, as rationally

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<sup>4</sup> At <http://www.aviationtoday.com/av/categories/commercial>

as possible. One must however take into account that there are some priorities and, given the situation in which the military or security requirements prevail, the military will have priority.

*FUA* benefits both users, military or civilian ones, the latter making substantial savings of fuel, time, reducing pollution, flight distances, establishing a system of routes and sectors that provide an increasing capacity of air traffic and a reduction of delays caused by the *General Air Traffic (GAT)*. For the military, it means more efficient ways to separate *GAT* from the military *Operational Air Traffic (OAT)*, a reduction of the needs to separate the airspace, in general, a better response to their operational requirements, in the tactical phase, and an increased and real-time coordination between civilians and the military.

The major goal is reorganising the airspace, defined currently by national borders of the 27 EU members and the institutions that control the various *FAB*. Reorganising air traffic would be more rational with bigger patches of airspace, controlled by one entity, initially for the *Upper Space* – above flight level 285 (FL285), and then for the space below this level. As such, *FAB* seeks to determine one or more countries to agree to unify the airspace above FL285 and to designate a single provider of air traffic control services in this area. Not to worry the governments regarding ceding control over national airspace, the method agreed upon for achieving these *FABs* should be a *bottom-up* one – namely the EU left the nations decide upon the airspace restructuring arrangements. Because the project progressed, however, slowly, in 2008, a deadline was decided for the countries to create these *FABs* – 2012.

The national requirements must be overcome in a balanced way and the economic gains must be distributed, as well as the efforts to re-equip with technology (where needed), to cede functions and authority to some *ATCs*, to establish a central air traffic management system, to harmonise interoperability procedures etc. Lately, we have noticed that sovereignty and integrity in the airspace domain are not mentioned anymore within *FAB*. In these circumstances, there will be a contiguous airspace – agreed upon by the respective nations –, in which the users try to meet their requirements.

Currently, agreed air corridors intersect the borders in as less points as possible or are set according to them. As a consequence, the respective air corridors limit the segregated areas that are likely to be used by the military air force. If borders are not considered anymore, in the case of *FAB*, with the reorganisation of airways, there is presented an opportunity for the military to be able to carry out their preparation in training areas right above borders, which will not “disturb” civil air traffic and which can be used, in agreement, by all the countries that form the respective *FAB*. Thus, *Cross Border Projects* and, especially, the notion of *Cross Border Operations Zone (CBO)* appear.

❖ *The use of airspace during crisis or conflict*

Airspace is not used only by commercial or private airplanes, but also by the military ones. Even if the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty considerably reduced military flights, and the prospect of a war is significantly diminished currently, the military are still important airspace users.

The civil-military interface is therefore stringent in all these projects and initiatives. As we know, the security requirements are not always compatible with the ones of the other airspace users, but we all pursue the same objectives: flight safety and security.

We are currently dealing with great economic difficulties, as well as with a declared war against terrorism and organised crime, which tends to last long. Even if all the countries derive important commercial and economic benefits from air transports, nobody can deny the need for security, in terms of both security and integrity of the airspace nor the need for effective training in order to take part in increasingly varied military operations, from humanitarian actions to armed conflicts, sometimes outside the NATO member countries area, where the Alliance's interests prevail. This implies that the two communities, civil and military, must adopt a stand that should encourage and accelerate dialogue and compromise, in order for both of them to reach their goals.

Since 1999, when the GAT air traffic over the former Yugoslavia was seriously affected because of the air operations conducted by the military in the area, it has been stressed the need to develop clear arrangements between civilians and the military. According to the attitude of the media at that time, Eurocontrol did not respond effectively to this crisis. However, following the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, there has been a more acute need to collaborate with the military in air traffic management in order to ensure the detection of the aircraft that violate flight rules and a rapid reaction of the air defence to counter such threats<sup>5</sup>.

In times of crisis or conflict, efficient air traffic and airspace management is instrumental in carrying out air defence missions. For this, it is necessary to know who is responsible for providing air traffic services during different levels of alert and/or phases of conflict. It is important to define under what circumstances, when and how the transfer of authority is made. The responsibilities regarding the airspace must be set by laws and agreements between ministries and agencies, so that the transfer of airspace management is made automatically and without deficiencies. This does not mean that the civil aviation authority is excluded from the coordination process, but the air defence requirements have priority.

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<sup>5</sup> Eurocontrol, Status of Civil-military Co-ordination in Air Traffic Management, 2001.

Also, it does not mean that civil aviation flights will have total ban, but they will take place under clear rules.

Ever since peacetime there is an *Airspace Management Cell (AMC)* at the level of air traffic service providers, whose main goal is to deconflict the employment of airspace by users. It is formed by both civilian and military men. During crisis or conflict, it provides the same function, but mention should be made that military activities have priority for the fulfilment of all the requirements regarding national security and/or those deriving from the North-Atlantic Treaty or other treaties in which Romania is part.

A command-control structure is established, in which civilians have their well-defined role, in which the responsibility regarding air traffic, with all its constituent elements, as well as the related services will be controlled by the military. Thus, the pieces of equipment and facilities of civilians, as well as those who operate them will serve, first of all, the interests of the defence, and all service providers will be controlled by the military. It is desirable that, in order to enable the transition from the state of peace to the one of crisis or conflict, there should be agreements signed between ministries and agencies through which this structure of C2 should be established, as well as the work methods, the transition from one situation to another, the basic responsibilities and, in time, the preparation necessary in time of peace through common exercises and training sessions should be made.

Even if in times of crisis or conflict it is imperative that combat flights should have priority, there are situations in which civil flights may take precedence – those contributing to defence, those carrying troops or military or civilian personalities etc. Therefore, airspace classifications and definitions of airspace management are made according to the *Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP)*, regardless of the conflict phases or sequence of events in the countries in crisis. Civil-military coordination is always required to carry out military and civil missions and to prevent fratricide.

Modern warfare is characterised by the fact that the Air Force become airspace users with an increased frequency, extending in the national airspace up to covering it totally. This leads to an increased complexity of airspace management. There are enough examples of own aircraft being combated by air defence or interceptor aircraft being engaged in their pursuit. In this case, special measures are taken, called *Air Space Control (ASC)*, stipulated in NATO documents, such as the *Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis or War*. The objective of these measures is to maximise the effectiveness of military operations conducted by land, naval and air forces, in an integrated and flexible manner, with a high degree

of interference, without restrictions or risks to friendly or neutral aircraft. The most important principle in this document is that for the control-command there is only one authority – *Airspace Control Authority (ACA)*, meant for each area of operations, assuming the entire responsibility over the *ASC* in that area. *ACA* must plan, organise and coordinate the *ASC* and be responsible for its own operations to support the intention of the theatre of operations' commander. All other commanders must integrate their weapon systems in the *Airspace Control Plan (ACP)*, which must be approved by the *ACA*. Each commander who is in charge of air and/or discovery, tracking and generating fire on air targets means, radio electronic jamming means will participate in planning the airspace use. Moreover, the requirements of the flights of civil or other aircraft of the host nation will be considered if the conflict takes place in an area of interest to NATO. The results of the *ASC* planning must be incorporated into the *ACP*, which will include a list of responsibilities of the authorities in the theatre, the *Rules of Engagement (ROE)*, instructions and other specific procedures for *ASC* and which will detail the limits of the areas and sub-areas of the *ASC*. Finally, *ACA* will implement *ACP*, by drawing up the *Airspace Control Order (ACO)*.

All airspace users and their control elements will have interoperable communications equipment and computer systems that will provide information necessary for *ACA* in order to exercise command and control of the airspace in its area of operations. C2 can use two main methods: positive *ASC* or procedural *ASC*. The positive method is based on the aircraft positive identification and control by electronic means and the procedural method is based on combining orders and procedures agreed upon in advance. However, operational situations require the combined use of these methods.

### ***Civil-military interface***

One of the most important steps taken by Eurocontrol regarding *SES* has been the military involvement in this project. The Air Force representatives have worked in recent years along with civilians for the development of *SES* and they have shown initiative and interest in this process. Nevertheless, a deadlock has been reached, primarily because the *SES* laws do not apply to the military. Meanwhile, *SES* has defined as its main objective the improvement of aviation safety and security for *GAT*, excluding, in this way, *OAT*. As a result, the military are not forced to carry out operations with military connotations for the protection of security or national defence interests.

This does not mean that military flights must not comply with the laws in force when passing air corridors – not including the flights excepted, by mutual



agreement, from these rules. In Europe, there are also countries in which the military provide air traffic services to civilian users in areas controlled by the air forces and the civilians operate in those areas in accordance with the military requirements. It is therefore desirable that all military men will be equal partners as airspace users.

The conclusion is that the civilians and the military must jointly develop an integrated command system, which should operate ever since peacetime and should be based on the ongoing and future initiatives and projects. This system will have at the top a body/committee for air traffic and airspace management consisting of both military men and civilians, which will represent the authority in the country or in the respective area of operations. Depending on the situations that can occur during peacetime, crisis or war, there will be defined the responsibilities and ways of their transfer from civilians to the military and vice versa, which will guarantee the uninterrupted provision of air traffic management. In addition, the respective rules/laws must contain clear points of command transfer, in order not to have ambiguous situations. The success of this transfer depends on how good the cooperation between civil and military authorities is, on the arrangements and agreements signed in areas such as the financial, legal, education and training domains, the joint use of available facilities, the procurement of equipment and command and control systems, the establishment of common procedures and rules etc.

Returning to civilian-military cooperation, one can notice that, for the military, from the financial point of view, all these changes of systems in order to be interoperable with civilians, both on the ground and in the air, are very expensive. Air navigation systems, *Mode S* identification friend or foe systems, communications systems on the 8,33 kHz band are investments that have limited military utility, but are essential for the civil-military cooperation in order to ensure the equal access to airspace.

In addition, the fact that this type of cooperation already exists and works in countries such as those mentioned above shows that the civil-military interface exists – although sometimes there are frictions – and that it is not an insurmountable obstacle. Institutional arrangements can be organised, open dialogues can be engaged, working groups or stand-alone structures can be formed through which the operational requirements are combined with the commercial and economic ones, even if the objectives are sometimes divergent, the general aim is to ensure flight safety and security.

The need to work together is crucial in peacetime, crisis or war. Due to different performance and requirements, it is dangerous to mix the general air traffic with the operational one without some clear and precise rules. Therefore, the military still have segregated airspace volumes that they use for training

and practice, where the access of other *GAT* or private aircraft is restricted. Moreover, the locations in which these segregated areas currently exist cannot be changed without economic, operational or even social consequences. However, even if this airspace volumes reservation is legitimate, cooperation with other airspace users has led to agreements, such as the *FUA* concept, in which the other users can also benefit from the respective areas at different times.

In peacetime, from the operational perspective, the vision is that civilians should work together with the military so that the impact of air police and security, preparation and training operations on air traffic services could be as small as possible: the civilians alongside the military, in air operations centres, and the military alongside the civilians, in the Air Traffic Coordination Centre. In this respect, common procedures and training methods must be continually developed.

The flexible use of airspace works better than the segregation for its use and the increased efficiency is proven by the employment of the *FUA* concept. Moreover, the co-location of the military alongside the civilians increases the efficiency with which airspace can be used, the aircraft going from *OAT* to *GAT*, and vice versa, with sharing the facilities provided by civil and military radar, the routes for getting near or far from civil airports etc.

Although we can acknowledge the progress, this does not mean that the future will be a smooth path to follow. There will remain obstacles to remove and challenges to meet, but this beginning is very important.

***English version by***  
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# FIFTH GENERATION WARFARE – A SF Concept or an Inevitable Perspective? –

Colonel (r.) Dr Vasile MAIER  
Lieutenant Colonel Dr Eugen MAVRIȘ

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*Fifth Generation Warfare may include, in the authors' opinion, a kinetic or non-kinetic attack on the political, social and military structures of the enemy in order to achieve the established strategic goals.*

*Fifth Generation Warfare pushes the known boundaries of conflicts between different international actors in a manner that cannot be fully described using established paradigms yet. However, it is likely that, despite the preponderance of non-kinetic strategies, which will include, for example, cyber warfare, physical attacks will probably remain just as relevant as they are today. This is demonstrated by the use of improvised explosive devices that can cause a damage that is as massive and effective as a cyber attack.*

**Keywords:** *information flow; non-state actor; state-of-the-art combat means; logistic system*

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According to Clausewitz, the philosophy of war means a way of rationally thinking this phenomenon, of analysing it thoroughly, with all its essential and general features. Against the background of the human society, from both the material and the cultural point of view, the analysis and interpretation of this phenomenon become more profound, however, they also acquire features regarding diversity. In French Marshal Ferdinand Foch's opinion, "The art of war, like all other arts, has its theory, its principles"<sup>1</sup>.

The types of war known so far have paved the way for the affirmation of the war of the future – Fifth-Generation Warfare.

*The First Generation Warfare* is characterised by Napoleonic tactics and technologies, which consist in the disposition of forces in line or in columns, forming mass armed forces. The vestiges of the First Generation Warfare can be found nowadays in the desire of alignment and rigidity of formations

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<sup>1</sup>F. Foch, *Principiile războiului. Conducerea războiului*, Editura Militară, București, 1975, p. 35.

during exercises and ceremonies. The European states embraced the advantages of those new forms of warfare, exploiting them especially in the process of expanding the colonial areas.

*The Second Generation Warfare* was mainly affirmed as a result of technological improvements, which led to the increase in the firepower and the development of communications. The First World War represented the most eloquent expression of the Second Generation Warfare and consisted in the broad use of attrition fire.

*The Third Generation* was also characterised by the increase in the firepower on the battlefield, and, at the same time, by an increased capacity of manoeuvre. Besides the technological improvements and the efficient use of the manoeuvre, the Third Generation Warfare was also based on the implementation of new strategies. The German *Blitzkrieg* from the Second World War was perceived as an innovative strategy that ensured the success of the German troops in the first part of the war.

*The Fourth Generation* evolved in the '70s of the past century, after the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, and its stress was mainly laid on the way in which one could exploit the changes in the political, economic and social environment for one's own benefit. Its actions were characterised by: the use of forces with reduced value; a gradual decrease in the logistic support and the use of the support provided by the economic agents in the theatre of operations or the area of interest; the capacity of carrying out expeditionary operations; the primacy of psychological objectives to the detriment of the physical ones. This final objective of psychological warfare is aimed at the defeat of the enemy's will from the inside.

### **Winning without fighting, defeating without winning**

Currently, there is no widely accepted definition for the *future warfare*, respectively the *Fifth Generation Warfare – 5GW*. In Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui's vision, the *Fifth Generation Warfare* is defined as "*the use of all means whatsoever, means that involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the use of arms, means that entail casualties and means that do not entail casualties – to force the enemy to serve one's own interest*".<sup>2</sup> This entails also the appearance of some non-state actors, which have access to top knowledge and technologies and which can carry out asymmetrical attacks with a view to promoting individual or group interests. For instance, in the current circumstances, a cyber attack launched by an individual or a group of individuals who seek certain interests can determine governments to collapse, corporations to be destroyed etc., entailing effects at regional and global level.

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<sup>2</sup> Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America*, Panama City, Panama, Pan American Publishing Company, 2002, p. 43.

Therefore, the *Fifth Generation Warfare* can include a kinetic or non-kinetic attack on the enemy's political, social and military structures in order to meet the set strategic goals.

*5GW* pushes the known limits of conflicts between international actors in such a way that it cannot be fully described using the well-known paradigms. Yet, it is likely that, despite the preponderance of non-kinetic strategies, which will include, for instance, cyber warfare, physical attacks are likely to remain as relevant as they are today. This is proved by the use of improvised explosive devices that can cause an as great and efficient damage as a cyber attack.

In Thomas Hammes' vision<sup>3</sup>, the USA carries out military actions that are subsumed under the Fourth Generation Warfare on a regular basis – overcoming the transition from the “*manoeuvre warfare*” (specific to the Third Generation Warfare) and passing to hitting multiple targets (political, economic, social and military) in order to accomplish certain strategic goals, which, by classical means, would be “*unattainable or too costly in comparison to the perceived benefits*”. The Fourth Generation Warfare does not focus on the military victory as it was suggested by the other three generations of warfare, but the destruction of the political will represents the price paid for the war.

We are on the brink of the appearance of the Fifth Generation Warfare. Unlike the other generations of warfare, one cannot precisely set a demarcation line or a certain way that represents the transition to this new generation. However, there are certain signs, which we consider worth being considered:

- the technological advance represented by the evolution of cyberspace and, especially, the Internet;
- the possibility of processing a large number of data in cyberspace;
- the use of information to strengthen and increase the abilities of the force;
- the media has become an independent, persuasive body that is more powerful than ever at international level;
- the borders cannot prevent the information flow anymore.

The convergence of these things proves that the changes predicted in the content of the war are not simple, and naming the Fifth Generation Warfare an “*Information Warfare*” would mean an oversimplification, this representing only one of the aspects.

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<sup>3</sup> Thomas Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p. 14, available at [www.amazon.com](http://www.amazon.com). Hammes describes the three generations of warfare using information from William S. Lind; Keith Nightengale, Colonel (USA); John F. Schmitt, Captain (USMC); Joseph W. Sutton, Colonel (USA) and Gary I. Wilson, Lieutenant Colonel (USMCR), *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989, used in analysing the first three generations of warfare as a basis for presenting the consequent elaborations on the Fourth Generation Warfare. He referred briefly to the Fifth Generation Warfare, which, in his opinion, should already take place somewhere in the world.

The Internet today can be compared with Gutenberg's fifteenth century printed works, under the aspect of the revolutionary terms of dissemination, noting that the Internet is exponentially more powerful.

The possibility of processing a large number of data by adding important hardware resources is a significant factor. In humankind history, so far, there has not been possible for one person (or a small group of persons) to affect an economic or banking system by pressing one button. The reality of the cyber attack in Estonia in 2007 and the frequent cyber attacks on the economies of certain Western countries are proof that this is possible. A small group of cyber fighters can cause incredible damage having a limited purpose and with clean tools, namely simple computers.

The media has stretched out its tentacles worldwide becoming an undisputed power in the relationship with citizens. The articles published in the press in a country do not necessarily mean that they have received the approval of civil authorities. Censorship can be applied to different media channels and to the Internet, but reality proves that this is difficult to achieve without causing a negative impact on the public opinion.

In fact, the media has become a "*non-state actor*" on the world stage. The fact that the media can influence political decisions leads to a new concept, "*media arming*". It includes aspects of psychological operations that are substantially different from the aspects of Information Warfare.

In the Fifth Generation Warfare, we will need the core of the kinetic system, composed of cutting-edge combat forces and means. Their presence and their potential use will be the basic components for this new form of warfare. In this context, it will probably be necessary a requirement for a logistic system capable of providing goods and services anywhere in the world, able to sustain forces in time and in the required volume.

The Fifth Generation Warfare does not anticipate clear armed forces or ideas. However, it will be what Major Shannon Beebe, intelligence officer in Africa<sup>4</sup>, called "*a vortex of violence*", destruction full of surprises, motivated more by frustration than by coherence of plans.

*The Fifth Generation Warfare* is what happens when the world turns its disappointments towards the most obvious symbols that are missing, trying to derive advantage from the tactics and battles of the better organised fighters of the Fourth Generation Warfare: "*5GW fighters will win..., pointing up the impotence*

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<sup>4</sup>Major Shannon Beebe, US Army, *War Is Boring. "Human Security" Strategy in Africa*, 30 October 2008, available at <http://www.warisboring.com/.../personal-security-strategy-in-africa/>

of secular military might... **These fighters win by not losing, while we lose by not winning**<sup>5</sup>.

In order to defeat the enemies of the Fifth Generation Warfare, it seems that the attention must be focused on economic development, humanitarian aid, information exchange, yet, without resorting to force.

### Strategic implications

*The Fifth Generation Warfare* is focused on the total use of the resources of an actor, with a special stress laid on digital technology, which is not very different from the one used in cyber warfare, of which the advocates of the transition from the Fourth Generation Warfare to the Fifth Generation Warfare have been very critical.

There are groups with no particular ideology that fight against traditional states (for instance, Somali pirates), but have no strategic objectives except for the fact that they want to become rich, and whose attacks can undermine sea trade. Here are a few examples regarding the Fifth Generation Warfare: the anarchy in Somalia, which made it possible for piracy to flourish, the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, in Chad and Northern Africa, which have led to the exacerbation of violence and have diminished the nations capacity to solve them.

Violence at liberty, with indirect global effects, represents a part of the Fifth Generation Warfare, in the opinion of some experts. As Lieutenant Colonel Stanton Coerr writes in *Marine Corps Gazette*<sup>6</sup>, if one needs to defend oneself from the enemies of the Fifth Generation Warfare, the old rules of warfare will not apply.

The enemies in the Fifth Generation Warfare do not have traditional centres of gravity – armed forces, governments, factories, charismatic leaders – that can be destroyed by military attacks. With only the notion of survival at hand, these enemies undermine the notion of nations, states or ideals.

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However, one thing becomes more and more clear: brute force is history when it comes to defeating opponents from the Fifth Generation Warfare. Given these circumstances, the physical attack carried out by the military forces may be totally unproductive.

The same technology that has defeated in conventional wars can lose in the unconventional ones. Trying to wage a Third Generation Warfare,

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<sup>5</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Stanton Coerr, *Fifth-Generation War: Warfare versus the Nonstate*, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, 20 January 2009, available at [www.mca-marines.org/gazette](http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette)

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*




with great firepower against an elusive fifth generation enemy, who is difficult to define, can be dangerous for those who engage in such an action.

To deal with a Fifth Generation Warfare, one should consider using the means that were used until recently by organisations such as UN or OSCE, which include: economic means, humanitarian aid, legal actions and information exchange. Their goal is to improve security and living conditions where these areas of insecurity were created.

In the Fifth Generation Warfare, the functions that once were considered strictly humanitarian – such as distributing food to starving refugees or paying policemen wages – became part of the strategy used against an opponent whose favourite weapons are human suffering, fear and instability.

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# PHILOSOPHY OF LEADERSHIP

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Ioan-Doru APAFAIAN

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*The author writes about the philosophy of leadership and its importance, pointing out that in developing a credible leadership philosophy, there are seven imperatives: vision, values, care of soldiers and families, leader development, change, diversity and humour.*

*Moreover, he mentions that whatever the leadership level or type of organisation the leader performs, he/she owes it to those who work for him/her to develop a thoughtful, comprehensive and realistic philosophy of leadership. No philosophy of leadership can address all of the issues a leader will confront, but it will serve as a solid starting point that will be understood by him/her but, more important, by subordinates.*

**Keywords:** *discipline; integrity; individual proficiency; vision; values; diversity; strategic leader*

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of all facts before the leadership commit resources and/or risk the lives of soldiers. Integrity is paramount in all we do.

**T**he philosophy of leadership is predicated upon several fundamental beliefs: *discipline, integrity, respect for others, leader development, individual proficiency and open communication*. Here is a brief description of each of them.

*Discipline* is the foundation upon which all good organisations are built. Without both individual and unit discipline, everything falls apart. A disciplined, physically fit unit will have stamina, will conduct physically demanding training in peacetime and will succeed in battle. Leaders must set and demand adherence to high standards. Leaders should also reward personnel who exceed these standards.

*Integrity* is another important factor for a strategic leader. Any leader should operate on trust and confidence. Trust, once broken, is difficult, if not impossible, to rebuild. Integrity, however, extends beyond the simple requirement to be honest. It includes the ability to admit mistakes, avoid misleading others, and ensure that everyone has a complete understanding

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Everyone, regardless of rank or position, is entitled to *respect* and recognition as a human being. Leaders must never abuse their authority when dealing with subordinates. As leaders, we must insist upon and maintain high standards but it should not come at the price of humiliating another individual.

*Individual proficiency* also plays a very important role, just as the other factors do. Every individual in each specialty or leadership position will be expected to be capable of performing his/her assigned duties and to teach those duties to others at a moment's notice. An organisation is only as strong as its weakest link so each person has to fulfil his/her role.

To conclude this part, I will discuss about *open communication*. Well-informed units can overcome many obstacles to achieve success. Units operate best when there is free communication flow up and down both formal and informal channels. Leaders must effectively communicate their intent to the lowest level possible and should encourage dialogue and debate among their senior leaders. If used properly, leaders will find greater loyalty and support from their soldiers.

### ***Why is a philosophy of leadership important?***

Philosophy consists in *“the most basic beliefs, concepts, and attitudes of an individual or group”*<sup>1</sup>. A leadership philosophy is the way we see ourselves as leaders. This philosophy guides our actions, our behaviours, and our thoughts. Our philosophies are influenced by external and internal factors. We can change who we are as leaders by simply changing our philosophy of leadership.

In developing a credible leadership philosophy, there are seven imperatives: *vision, values, care of soldiers and families, leader development, change, diversity and humour*<sup>2</sup>. We will further discuss only four of them in this article, even all seven are very important as well.

### ***Vision***

The first element to consider in developing a philosophy of leadership is vision. *“Vision is a leader-focused activity that gives a sense of identity, purpose, direction and energy”*<sup>3</sup>. Other description of vision comes from Burt Nanus' book *Visionary Leadership*. He contends that vision must be idealistic and a *“mental model*

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/philosophy?show=0&t=1318544174> retrieved on 13 October 2011.

<sup>2</sup> Maureen K. Leboeuf, *Developing a Leadership Philosophy*, <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/MayJun99/LeBoeuf.htm> retrieved on 13 October 2011.

<sup>3</sup> Charles D. Allen and Breena E. Coates, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2010, p. 25.

of a future state of the organisation<sup>4</sup>. He asserts that vision must also possess the properties of appropriateness, standards of excellence, purpose and direction. Ultimately, the organisational vision must be ambitious, easily articulated and well-understood.

Organisational vision is most similar to the military concept of *commander's intent*. Commander's intent is the description of operational purpose and endstate<sup>5</sup>. *Purpose* is what a leader wants the organisation to do – it is the single unifying focus of the operation. *Method* is generally how you intend for your subordinates to carry out their jobs. *Endstate* is what the final result should be.

Vision must be communicated, shared and understood by all within the organisation if the organisation is to succeed.

The leader creates vision but only as far as he/she can see. Once the leader moves to an intermediate point in the journey of learning, the vision is adjusted. This process of vision and revision is essential to keep the organisation viable, healthy and adaptable to change.

### Values

Although many values have been applied to any organisation, the seven values best describe those required for any organisation: *loyalty* (bear true faith and allegiance to the law, the service, your unit and other soldiers); *duty* (fulfil your obligations); *respect* (treat people as they should be treated); *selfless-service* (put the welfare of the nation, the service and your subordinates before your own); *honour* (live up to all the service values); *integrity* (do what is right, legally and morally); *personal courage* (face fear, danger or adversity)<sup>6</sup>.

Furthermore, lack of understanding and discussion of values within some organisations is the overwhelming reason for a number of events involving charges of unethical behaviour. It is the leader's foremost responsibility to serve as an organisation values role model, discuss their particular application within the organisation and apply decisive corrective action when the organisation's values become distorted or compromised.

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<sup>4</sup> Burt Nanus, *Visionary Leadership: Creating a Compelling Sense of Direction for your Organisation*, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992, p. 25.

<sup>5</sup> US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], June 1993, p. 6-6.

<sup>6</sup> Colonel Herbert F. Harback, "Center for Army Leadership Conference", Carlisle Barracks, PA, 30 September-2 October 1996.

### ***Managing Change***

A leader's ability to manage change is a critical skill now and in the future. Senior leaders can manage change by recognising that change is inevitable and striving to master it; or sit back, resist and allow it to overtake the organisation. If the leader chooses to sit back, then the organisation will surely fail. The two keys to successful change in any organisation are the leader and its members. Thus, the leader must clearly articulate the reason for the change, and how it ties into the organisation's mission and purpose, why it is important and how it will improve the organisation. Leaders must address change in their philosophy of leadership and inform the organisation of how change will be managed. The simple act of communicating the reason for the change is not enough. People resist change and do so for a variety of reasons.

### ***Diversity***

One area of philosophy of leadership often overlooked is the strength of leveraging diversity in an organisation. There are distinct and marvellous differences in each person. Men and women, of various ethnic, racial, religious backgrounds and experiences, reflect the treasured differences that make a difference in any organisation. This variety provides organisational richness that gives leaders – if willing to leverage the diversity – different ways to tackle issues and challenges and ultimately find better solutions.

Members of an organisation need to know – through the philosophy of leadership – that the leader values and will listen to every member. In the philosophy of leadership, the leader should generally articulate the mechanisms that he/she intends to use, such as: open-door policy, small-group sensing sessions, getting out of the office daily, and visibility within the organisation. Finally, subordinates must know that those who do not value diversity in the organisation will not be tolerated.

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Whatever the leadership level or type of organisation the leader performs, he/she owes it to those who work for him/her to develop a thoughtful, comprehensive and realistic philosophy of leadership. No philosophy of leadership can address all of the issues a leader will confront, but it will serve as a solid starting point that will be understood by him/her but, more important, by subordinates.

In my opinion, the *philosophy of leadership* comprises the following statements:

- leadership is a journey that consists of followers and leaders;

- always help people to find the best in themselves;
- spend time reflecting on leadership and its implications on others;
- value integrity in personal and professional development;
- respect leadership from different perspectives and ways of knowing;
- listen with respect and gratitude to others.

To conclude, here are few considerations about strategic leaders. Strategic leaders do not try to get visibility for themselves. They try to get visibility for other people. They do not need visibility for themselves; they already have it. They are strategic leaders and everyone knows it.

The trick to becoming a strategic leader is to act like you are *already* one. Do what strategic leaders do *after* they are strategic leaders, not what you think you need to do *to become* a strategic leader.



# CORRUPTION AND UNDERGROUND ECONOMY – Implications for Economic Activities –

Daniel PINTILIE

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*In the author's opinion, the underground economy leads to the degradation of the political and social climate, by establishing and strengthening relations between the political power and the most influential actors acting in the area of illegal business, economic and financial crime. Moreover, the consequences of underground economy must necessarily be analysed from the viewpoint of government fiscal policies, which have a temporary feature.*

*The main consequence of illegal businesses, generating dirty money, is the destabilisation of the legal system, being therefore a serious threat to society, as it represents the core of corruption and economic crime.*

**Keywords:** budget deficit; economic and financial crime; administration; illegal businesses

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**U**nderground economy is considered, in specialised literature, to be represented by all the economic activities carried out in an organised manner, violating social norms and economic laws, in order to get income that cannot be controlled by the state. The emergence of this scourge coincides with the emergence of the state itself, and the development of the phenomenon corresponds to the historical stages in the evolution of a state. A series of practices have been subsumed under underground economy, from the simple to complex ones, as follows: fiscal fraud, clandestine work, drug and weapon trafficking, corruption.

In order to assess the level of corruption in one country, a series of corruption indices are calculated<sup>1</sup>. Among them, the following are more important: *International Country Risk Index*, calculated within the *International Country Risk Guide – ICRG*, based on “expert opinions”; *Corruption Index*, calculated within the *Global Competitiveness Report – GCR* and the *World Development Report – WDR*, based on investigations into the companies

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<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.scribd.com/doc/50598230/Pais3-studiu-3-ro>, retrieved on 19.06.2011.



or citizens; *Corruption Perceptions Index*, calculated by Transparency International (TI), based on a “pole of poles”, and *Corruption Index*, calculated based on “more objectives or powerful data”<sup>2</sup>.

The corruption index calculation is based on the answers provided by foreign investors. Among the indicators used to assess the level of corruption, an important one is *Transparency International Corruption Index (TICI)*<sup>3</sup>. There is a strong relationship between the value of this indicator and the *Human Development Index – HDI*. In developed countries, low levels of corruption are recorded, while in less developed countries, corruption is a general phenomenon, at the level of the entire society. For instance, for the data series of *TICI* and *HDI* variables<sup>4</sup> recorded ten years ago for the countries in the world, the value of the linear correlation coefficient was 0,77. For NATO member countries, the value of the coefficient was 0,71.

Underground economy and corruption existed, under different forms, in the countries in Central and Eastern Europe before 1989 too. Then, the transition processes towards a market economy were accompanied by corruption and by the creation and development of informal economy. In Romania, ten years ago, almost 30% of the population lived in poverty. The *Corruption Index* placed this country in the group of the countries in the eastern part of the continent with the highest level of corruption<sup>5</sup>. We may thus conclude that “in poor countries, if underground economy has allowed for the generation of a certain number of workplaces, out of the desire to maintain certain solidarity and family unity, their excessive development represents a real danger, not only for the economy but also for the political system in these countries”<sup>6</sup>.

In Professor Mircea Coșea’s opinion<sup>7</sup>, underground economy entails “all economic activities that escape, totally or partially, the legal control and statistical record”. The importance attached to underground economy is also highlighted by the involvement of some international institutions and organisations in developing some concepts and interpretation schemes anchored in the reality of global economy. For instance, the International Labour Office in Geneva developed

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. European Institute of Romania, *Impact Studies*, Public Administration Reform in the Perspective of Romania’s Accession to the European Union.

<sup>3</sup> See <http://www.transparency.org/>, retrieved on 19.06.2011.

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<sup>5</sup> See <http://www.scribd.com/doc/50598230/Pais3-studiu-3-ro>, retrieved on 28.07.2011.

<sup>6</sup> See <http://www.scribd.com/doc/50598230/Pais3-studiu-3-ro>, retrieved on 19.06.2011.

<sup>7</sup> Mircea Coșea, *România subterană*, Editura Economică, București, 2004, p. 102.

a *special programme*<sup>8</sup>, presenting seven criteria for defining underground economy in developing countries:

- facilitation of entering this type of economy, meaning that any person may become an agent of underground economy, irrespective of the degree of understanding and using economic instruments;
- prevalence of the use of some local resources and of self-financing;
- importance of family property and family relationships;
- organisation of activity in small units, with less than ten employees;
- use of technology with high-degree labour intensity;
- training and qualification of employees outside the official education and qualification system;
- operation on a parallel labour market, where there are no regulations for the following: working time, payment and labour protection conditions, holidays and public holidays, social assistance elements. These criteria are typical of business conducted by underground enterprises and of underground labour (*“black”* market labour).

In our opinion, any negative phenomenon in society has to be assessed, commensurate, so that its size and magnitude can be known, even if only approximately. Mention should be made that exaggerating the importance of underground economy is as harmful as trivialising its importance.

As in the case of crime<sup>9</sup>, where the following terms are used *“real crime”* (all criminal offences committed within a certain territory in a definite period of time), *“apparent crime”* (all criminal offences brought before justice), *“legal crime”* (all criminal offences legally sanctioned in an actual way), as well as the *dark figure of crime* (criminal offences which remain undiscovered or unreported), we consider that, as far as underground economy commensuration is concerned, one has to operate with indicators to establish, with the inevitable approximation, of course, its rate.

The rate of illegal economic practices is high (between 35% and 50%) in countries such as: Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Latvia, Georgia, Brazil, Columbia, Venezuela, where high rates of crime are constantly recorded<sup>10</sup>.

In an important number of the European Union member countries (Belgium, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Greece, Cyprus) there are rates between 15,3% and 29%, situation that confirms the statement of Professor Mircea Coșea, according to which *“society, whatever it may be, advanced or backward,*

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 106-107.

<sup>9</sup> Georgeta Ștefania Ungureanu, *Criminologie*, Editura Timpolis, 2004, p. 17.

<sup>10</sup> See [books.google.com/books?isbn=9738820162...](https://books.google.com/books?isbn=9738820162...), retrieved on 19.06.2011.

*Christian or Muslim, capitalist or non-capitalist, has found multiple ways to solve problems of survival or development, besides market economy. In all the countries in the world, legal is mingled with illegal*<sup>11</sup>.

According to the analysis conducted in Romania, in 2010, the share of underground economy in GDP was 30,2%, being outrun only by Bulgaria. There are two distinct components in our underground economy, which can be easily identified:

- *black money component*, money that comes from illegal activities but it is not declared and recorded officially; in this category, the following are included: unreported income, not declaring the real value of wages or other taxable values, black labour, tax evasion, practiced by physical, commercial etc. entities.;
- *dirty money component*, money that comes from illegal and criminal activities. We appreciate this is the most important component of underground economy, fuelled by the crime phenomenon, which gets manifest under the form of ordinary crime (theft, fraud, profiteering, embezzlement etc.) and economic-financial crime organised in the financial-fiscal, customs, banking, commercial, industrial systems, as well as under the form of drug trafficking, corruption, human trafficking, smuggling, tax evasion.

Underground economy in Romania is strong, as its most important territory is occupied not by the legal but undeclared activities (black money), but by the crime phenomenon in its economic and financial dimension (dirty money), characterised by the “*financial engineering*” in the area of privatisation, investment institutions, financial-banking institutions and by the use of public funds. Effective means, methods and instruments are employed to illegally convert and divert capital flows out of the country: “*It is a well-structured mix of modern management, sophisticated tax evasion practices and political clientelism, benefiting from the support and protection of powerful interests groups in which power officials hold an important place. It is the source of substantial illicit capital accumulation, which contributes to the Romanian society stratification*”<sup>12</sup>.

Being such a comprehensive concept, difficult to be unitarily defined from the standpoint of norms, sociology, economy and crime, underground economy has to be addressed as an objective phenomenon in the society, as a slippage from normality, impossible to eradicate, although possible and necessary to be reduced to a tolerable rate. It is accepted the fact that economic science

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<sup>11</sup> Mircea Coșea, *România subterană*, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 98.

cannot mathematically measure the dimension of underground economy, but it is capable of and interested in establishing the causes of its development.

Excessive taxation, accompanied by the absence of policies to encourage investment, may generate a culture of avoiding financial obligations, as a reaction to protect against unfriendly economic policy and environment.

In our opinion, underground economy leads to the deterioration and degradation of political and social climate, through establishing and consolidating some clientelist relationships between the political power and the most influential actors in the area of illegal business, economic-financial crime. Moreover, the consequences of underground economy have to be analysed from the standpoint of government fiscal policies, which are not permanent.

Illegal business, generating dirty money, has as main consequence the destabilisation of the legal system, and represents a severe danger to the society, as it is at the core of corruption and economic crime.

In Professor Mircea Coșea's opinion, the consequences of underground economy are the following:

- diversion of resources to other purposes than the ones officially set;
- increase in the budget deficit and reduction in the public investment potential;
- undermining public authority and state prerogatives;
- compromising the social assistance system;
- increase in social insecurity and crime rate<sup>13</sup>.

The dynamic evolution and the devastating consequences of underground economy have determined a more realistic approach to this phenomenon and the development of some strategies meant to limit the most important sources that fuel and develop it. The strategy has to be built having in view the two directions related to the real components of underground economy: the one of grey money, and the one of dirty money.

In this regard, we consider that the big economic-financial crime, which is the main component of underground economy, cannot be countered only by measures that are aimed at "*reducing taxation, enhancing administration effectiveness and reducing bureaucracy*". There is no relationship between big business in the economic-financial area and taxation and bureaucracy.

The genesis of economic-financial crime is different, difficult to decipher, but shows a simple equation: dirty money, namely the money supply that disturbs economic-financial systems, comes from the following controllable sources:

- clean money, in the state budget, that generates dirty money, through: fraudulent privatisations, fake auctions, spent investment funds,

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 126-129.

but justified through false documents, diversion of funds and their use in illegal business, loans at state subsidised interest rates, illegal VAT returns, subsidies for apparently legal businesses, authorities corruption;

- illegal business (drug trafficking, large smuggling acts, soft piracy, human trafficking, forgery of means of payment, art trafficking, theft and fraudulent bankruptcy etc.), which can be detected and investigated by adequate measures by the specially established institutions.

Although in economic theory it is stated that enforced control as well as repression is not the best solution to limit underground economy, we dare state that, in the current configuration of globalised economy, there should be a concept of authorities' globalised response to the phenomenon of economic-financial crime. The "loop"-type control at the national level should be extended to the global level too, as one cannot fight against globalised crime at the national level only.

The concept of *deregulation*, specific to liberal-oriented authorities, does not have to be extended to the fight against economic-financial crime. In a study entitled "*Underground economy morality: pros and cons?*", Dr Dragoş Pătroi states: "*organised crime has oriented towards business crime against a background of the genesis of the economic crime globalisation phenomenon and of its increasingly aggressive extension. In this context, economic-financial crime has grown to an unprecedented scale, through new forms of expression and the increasingly organised character of dirty businesses that, gradually, tend to represent a direct threat to democratic institutions and, why not, to national security. The organised crime structures, favoured by legislative ambiguity and normative volatility but especially by fiscal administration and coercion imperfections, lead to a severe supply and demand imbalance in official markets, as well as to the diminution in the volume of public financial resources*"<sup>13</sup>.

Financial analyst Adrian Vasilescu highlights, in an article published in "*Ziarul financiar*", on 27 July 2005, that "*our economy is divided in two great sectors. One is formal, bookkept, and the other is informal, non-bookkept, both of them being connected by thousands of threads. The fact that numerous channels in non-bookkept economy are fuelled by legal economy is very dangerous. There is also a reverse flow. Much dirty money, coming from informal economy, is used at the surface, in clean economic circuits. Capital injections come from this invisible economy in the surface economy. The links between the two sectors of economy multiply and become increasingly stronger. And it is not easy at all to separate them. Or at least to analyse them separately. The final results melt in GDP. Non-bookkept economy is coupled with a large section, which relies exclusively on underground circuits, its ramifications leading to the organised*

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<sup>14</sup> Dragoş Pătroi, study published in *Tribuna economică*, no. 19, 11 May 2005, pp. 59-60.

*crime. It would be absurd to consider that underground economy could be defeated. However, it is necessary to know it well, as only in this way can actions to mitigate its effects be initiated”.*

In our opinion, based on the analyses of fraud cases investigated in recent years, the main evolution of criminal groups is related to their financial power, as a result of profit accumulation. They have rapidly adapted, following economic and political evolutions, perfectly integrating into the legal world.

Legal systems provide all the opportunities necessary for laundering money that comes from illegal business: banking regulations allow fund transfers abroad, in fiscal paradises included; the money from underground economy is placed on financial markets.

Criminal groups intelligently exploit the opportunities generated by the evolutions of the business environment, as well as by the economic policies promoted by the government and the legislative framework, which is sometimes quite generous. In more simple words, society, in its entirety, provides the instruments that are necessary for criminal groups to initiate, develop, and complete illegal business. In conclusion, we may state that illegal economy is difficult to combat as its ways of operating and financing are not on the fringe but at the very heart of market economy<sup>15</sup>.

***English version by***  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*



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<sup>15</sup> M. Chesnay, *Le Monde*, 6 May 2003.

# SECURITY STRATEGIES IN CERTAIN EUROPEAN STATES

## The Case of France

Dr Tiberiu TĂNASE

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France's national security strategy was articulated around five strategic functions: protection, prevention, deterrence, intervention, to which a new composed function was added – knowledge and anticipation.

In the White Paper on Defence and National Security from 2008, it was proposed the creation of a new national security system and intelligence community coordination mechanism. The newly created mechanism has the role of ensuring the strategic direction of the intelligence services, placed under the President's direct authority.

The French intelligence has a vital place in the White Paper on Defence and National Security – that is why the first proposed changes were aimed at the intelligence itself, under all its important facets.

Whichever might be the American or European model and the way of design and implementation of intelligence reforms, their efficiency is what matters primarily.

**Keywords:** security; defence; military/intelligence institutions; public knowledge; intelligence; intelligence agencies, intelligence community

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Motto:

*“The acknowledgement of this new knowledge and anticipation strategic function, alongside prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention, in the “front line of the country defence” provides the French intelligence too with a doctrinal foundation”<sup>1</sup>.*

The evolution of international situation has changed the traditional foundations of the defence and security policies of France, thus emerging, as in the case of Great Britain, the necessity of a new approach. The first warning sign regarding the necessity to rapidly reform the security sector appeared after the Gulf War. The participation in both common actions, alongside the international coalition forces, and peacekeeping operations, under the aegis of the UN, required that the security and defence concepts should be revisited<sup>2</sup>.

The establishment of the *Strategic Committee* and the development of the first *White Paper on Defence*, in 1994, represent the first stage in setting the basic principles of a major reform in defence sector. The preoccupation with reforming

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<sup>1</sup> *Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, June 2008 (*The French White Paper on Defence and National Security*), at [www.defense.gov.fr/livre\\_blanc](http://www.defense.gov.fr/livre_blanc)

<sup>2</sup> In Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, Somalia, Central African Republic, Congo, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Comoros, Cameroon, Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan. Cf. *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, *op. cit.*



defence and national security became more important after Nicolas Sarkozy took office as President.

On 17 June 2008, the French head of state defined the major defence and security guidelines in the *White Paper on Defence and Security*, document meant to map out a *comprehensive national security doctrine*. In this context, fulfilling international commitments is compliant with the interests of the French State, a strategic analysis in a 15-year perspective being undertaken<sup>3</sup>.

The French White Paper *“seeks to provide responses to all risks and threats which could endanger the life of the Nation. The document introduces a major innovation, being a strategy that does not address only defence but also national security. It associates defence policy and internal security policy”*<sup>4</sup>.

The continuity between the domestic and foreign dimensions of security is presented in the White Paper and it has a strategic importance not only for France but for the entire Europe; it entails the definition of some overall strategies, integrating these security dimensions in the same approach. Moreover, the new French strategy is aimed at:

- defence policy, *in toto*;
- domestic security policy and civil security policy – *they have to permanently ensure the protection of the population, the functioning of public institutions and the maintenance of a degree of normality in times of crisis, and defend the security interests of the nation against non-military threats*<sup>5</sup>;
- other public policies, and first of all diplomacy and economic policy, as they contribute directly to national security.

*The White Paper on Defence and National Security* comprises five important messages:

- *diversification of risks to national security;*
- *uncertainty and the risk of strategic surprise;*
- *global resonance of limited conflicts;*
- *crisis interconnection, as a direct effect of globalisation and the extension of conflict areas. Therefore, under the influence of al-Qaeda and its adepts, terrorist groups, which used to act in a segmented manner, following national or regional logics, prepare offensive actions in several points of the globe. Their strategies are based on support points disseminated worldwide, the groups*

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<sup>3</sup> Document available at <http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr>

<sup>4</sup> Jacques Petit, *Livre blanc et drones*, in *Defense nationale et sécurité collective*, June 2009, p. 116.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, *op. cit.*, at <http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr>

*conducting a cross-border ideological warfare and trying to interconnect conflicts with profoundly distinct roots*<sup>6</sup>;

- *great regional problems*, such as Russia and Asia. According to the *White Paper/French security and defence strategy*, Asia is, probably, the future strategic centre of the world. In 10-15 years, Asia will become the world's strategic centre of gravity, an area where there is real risk of interstate major military conflicts. There are numerous boundary and maritime divergences between the countries in this area. Besides, the context is reanimated by nationalism, which is not always controllable (notable in China). The risk of some interstate wars is, in this context, extremely real<sup>7</sup>.

The document represents a national security strategy adapted to the globalisation age, based on a new balance between the following functions:

- ❖ *Protection* – The permanent protection mission is carried out by the in-depth surveillance of the national territory and adjacent areas. In this respect, intentional aggressions have to be taken into account, such as terrorist acts, major cyber attacks, threat of attack using new weapons, especially ballistic ones, as well as unintentional risks, such as sanitary crises, natural catastrophes with a new intensity, taking into consideration the climate evolution, technological catastrophes. New assets and methods, as well as a new organisation for a better coordination between civilian and military entities responsible for protection are necessary.
- ❖ *Prevention* – The prevention function has to determine the authorities to directly involve in ensuring security, through *preventive diplomacy*, which is aimed at: *reducing the sources of tension; integrating the security concerns in the development policy; permanently monitoring conflict situations at international level; enhancing crisis prevention capabilities; continuing the efforts on security sectors reform, approach that includes: restructuring of armed, police and customs forces, intelligence services, justice and penitentiary administration.*
- ❖ *Deterrence* – Taking into consideration the diversity of risks and threats to France security, the head of state has a *wide range of options and diversified means* available in order to achieve deterrence. The deterrence strategy has to take into account the status of NATO and EU member.
- ❖ *Intervention* – Intervention capability allows for guaranteeing strategic interests as well as for assuming France international commitments.

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.frstrategie.org>.

*French intervention strategy will be subsumed under a multinational framework, benefiting from the legitimacy conferred by international law. The intervention capability has to be integrated into the logic of concentration on priority geographical axes. This concentration principle represents a fundamental orientation of the national security strategy military aspect. The intervention capability definition and dimensioning has to take into account the hypothesis of an engagement in stabilisation and crisis management missions in the next 15 years.*

- ❖ To them a new function was added – *knowledge and anticipation*, covering five major areas: intelligence; the knowledge of areas of operations; diplomatic actions; analysis of future trends; information management. The importance of the *knowledge and anticipation* function is visible not only at the political and strategic level but also in the internal and external theatres of actions, providing France with strategic autonomy<sup>8</sup>.

The fight against new terrorism and the presence of the French armed forces in five theatres of operations thus justify the importance of the intelligence as a new priority. This new approach proves to be more difficult as the intelligence “is perceived as a constraint and not as an instrument that is necessary for the development of the country and its ambitions, in a world in which France has to face a wide range of terrorist or economic threats”<sup>9</sup>.

The adoption of a new security and defence strategy and the acknowledgement of the new *knowledge and anticipation* strategic function, alongside *prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention*, in the “front line of the country defence”<sup>10</sup>, provide the French intelligence with a doctrinal foundation.

Presenting the evolution of risks and threats in an exhaustive manner, information collection makes the decision-making process clearer, as it precedes, supports and monitors the action. Thus, the purpose of the intelligence activity is to allow the state authorities, diplomacy, as well as the armed forces and those in charge of internal and civil security to anticipate and to have autonomy in forecasting, deciding and acting.

The systematic development of the intelligence community is the object of a long-term reform in this domain, aiming at important courses of action:

➤ **Organisation and coordination:** the establishment of a *National Intelligence Council*, chaired by the President, and the *designation of a national*

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, op. cit*


<sup>9</sup> Cf. Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister of France (2008). It is known that the new branch of the terrorist organisation al-Qaeda, *al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)*, officially established on 25 January 2007, represents one of the major threats to the French state.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, op. cit.*

intelligence coordinator, the drafting of a bill concerning intelligence-related activities, the protection of secrecy and personnel; special attention paid to the diplomatic network, in order to improve information sharing; the awareness of the diplomatic network regarding the intelligence activity; the coordination of horizon-scanning activities within the state especially by establishing an inter-ministerial network.

Obviously, this intelligence community coordination effort is part of the process meant to enhance institutional coordination at the national level. According to the stipulations of the *French White Paper* or as a result of the immediate evolutions, this complex process includes:

- The establishment of the Defence and National Security Council (*Conseil de défense et de sécurité nationale – CDSN*)<sup>11</sup>. It was enabled to ensure the coherence of all public policies in the areas of defence and security, where the powers of the President are defined by the Constitution.



\* NIC and inter-services parliamentary groups Secretariat.

<sup>11</sup> In July 2008, it materialised by creating the position of *National Intelligence Coordinator (Coordonnateur national du renseignement)*. This structure chairs periodic meetings of the Directors of intelligence services

- The establishment of the *General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (Secrétariat général de la Défense et de la Sécurité nationale – SGDSN)*, to replace SGDN<sup>12</sup>.
- The establishment of the *Central Interior Intelligence Directorate (Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur – DCRI)*<sup>13</sup>, under the tutelage of the Ministry of the Interior<sup>14</sup>.
- *The National Customs Intelligence and Investigations Directorate (Direction Nationale du Renseignement et des Enquêtes Douanières – DNRED)*, specialised in customs investigations and illegal trafficking.
- *The Unit for Intelligence Processing and Action against Illicit Financial Networks (Traitement du Renseignement et de l'Action contre les Circuits Financiers Clandestins – TRACFIN)*, specialised in collecting information regarding illicit financial networks.

Special importance was paid to information protection by establishing the *Security of Information Systems Agency (Agence de la Sécurité des Systèmes*

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in order to set priorities for research and training necessary for these services, having the role of managing and guiding the *intelligence community*, currently represented by six intelligence agencies having a total of 12 000 employees, according to some estimates, to which are added 4 000 members of the structures specialised in military information collection belonging to the infantry, marine and aviation. *CDSN* was established on 28 October 2008: it may also function *under other forms – National Intelligence Council (Conseil national du renseignement – CNR)*; it has the role of setting the intelligence services strategic directions and priorities; moreover, it plans the objectives, assets and human resources and examines the evolutions in the intelligence activity legal framework. The restricted Council (*Conseil restraints*) analyses “*sensitive*” issues, such as the details regarding foreign operations or nuclear deterrence. The Advisory Board for Defence and National Security (*Conseil consultatif sur la défense et la sécurité nationale – CCDSN*), composed of independent experts appointed by the President, has the role of submitting independent analyses for the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, meant to substantiate political, financial, international etc. decisions.

<sup>12</sup> The intervention capability allows for guaranteeing strategic interests and assuming international commitments. *French intervention strategy will be subsumed under a multinational framework*, benefiting from the legitimacy conferred by international law. The intervention capability has to be integrated into the *logic of concentration on priority geographical axes*. This *concentration principle* represents a fundamental orientation of the national security strategy military aspect. *The intervention capability definition and dimensioning has to take into account the hypothesis of an engagement in stabilisation and crisis management missions in the next 15 years*.

<sup>13</sup> The *knowledge and anticipation function* covers five major areas: intelligence; the knowledge of areas of operations; diplomatic actions; analysis of future trends; information management. The importance of the *knowledge and anticipation function* is visible not only at the political and strategic level but also in the internal and external theatres of actions, providing France with strategic autonomy.

<sup>14</sup> On 13 September 2007, the French Minister of the Interior at that time anticipated the creation of DCRI. He pointed that DG and DST, historical police directorates, would merge, their missions being assigned to other structures. Eric Denécé, *Le renseignement française en chantier*, at [www.cf2r.org](http://www.cf2r.org). The unification of the two intelligence and internal security services was announced on 13 September 2007, and the normative act that made the new intelligence structure operational was adopted on 7 April 2008. By establishing DCRI, a “*FBI à la française*” in intelligence is intended, at <http://www.interieur.gouv.fr>

*d'Information – ASSI*), having the role of coordinating the implementation of preventive and reactive policies against cyber attacks and cyber warfare.

➤ **Human resources and training** are aimed at developing intelligence networks; establishing an intelligence academy; recruiting experts (especially engineers, computer experts, imagery analysts, language specialists) to enhance technical capabilities and competencies, as well as unspecialised personnel; efforts to know the potential areas of operations, favouring the knowledge of other countries culture. The importance attached to the intelligence activity, in the French security and defence strategy, entails an *extremely ambitious human resource policy*, focused on quality, competence, attitudes, motivations, behaviour and effectiveness in work; in this respect, the set principles converge towards the idea that *national security is ensured by dedicated personnel who choose to serve the country and the fellow citizens*; this engagement thus needs the recognition and respect of the entire society.

The measures stated in the French defence and security strategy are aimed at the achievement of a high degree of professionalism by the personnel in the field of security and defence, irrespective of their status: civilian or military, in service, on a contract or voluntary basis.

In order to cope with predictable or non-predictable challenges, adaptation to the assigned missions, cooperation between different defence and security structures to achieve common goals, development of the capability of coping with major crisis, reorganisation of support and administrative structures, as well as accentuation of operational missions are necessary<sup>15</sup>.

In this regard, manpower will be strengthened and special recruitment and promotion strategies will be drafted for experts in: counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, combating organised crime, counter-espionage, and economic counter-information. The re-assignment of agents from one workplace to another and the increase in mobility between different services and ministries will be encouraged. Efforts will be made in order to know the potential areas of operations, especially favouring the knowledge of other cultures. Human resources will be better valued regarding the knowledge of rare languages.

Moreover, special attention will be attached to the establishment of valuable intelligence networks. Recruitment has to be a transparent process, oriented not only towards specialised and technical networks in the administration but also towards higher education institutions, contracts on determined periods being used more often. Thus, the intelligence organisation will remain attractive only if it effectively manages the recruitment activity, providing attractive professional opportunities.

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<sup>15</sup> The focus will be on operational missions and the constraints generated by them and it will be mainly reflected in the adaptation of our defence structures and assets on the French territory and abroad. A structure designed for social and professional assistance will be also established.



The French security and defence strategy recognises the need for training within the French intelligence community and suggests the establishment of some new structures with responsibilities in the field of intelligence education: an *Intelligence Academy (L'Academie du Renseignement)*<sup>16</sup>; the *Joint National Training Centre* (civilian and military) *in the fight against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats*; an *Inter-disciplinarian University pole for research in social sciences in security and defence, addressing a wide range of issues in the mentioned areas*<sup>17</sup>.

Academic research has to facilitate the development of new models and experiment in new situations. These models and situations analysis will allow the development of the new methods, the new instruments, and the establishment of a new intelligence culture<sup>18</sup>.

The support to an active research policy is conditioned by the means to control defence technologies and systems, by the technological training in order to meet the operational necessities in the medium and long run, by the development of new technologies.

In this regard, some institutions with tradition in the field merged, and their responsibilities were taken, starting on 1 January 2010, by the “*internal security pole*”, and the “*defence – foreign affairs pole*” respectively.

*The White Paper* in 2008 mentioned the drafting of a law regarding the *intelligence activity and a better protection of the security-related secrecy and of the intelligence personnel*. These measures follow other recent legislative initiatives, such as the adoption, for the first time, of a form of parliamentary control. If in the United States of America and in the majority of European states with democratic traditions there are permanent parliamentary control commissions, having well-established responsibilities, stipulated by special laws, which have already acquired substantial experience, France was an exception to the rule.

The definition of state secrecy and its compromising will have to include, according to a notification of the Council of State (5 April 2007), classified information, classified networks and some extremely sensitive locations, whose existence is a secret itself. The exchange of information between DNRED (Direction Nationale du Renseignement et des Enquêtes Douanières) and TRACFIN (Traitement du Renseignement et Action contre les Circuits Financiers Clandestins), on the one hand, and the other intelligence services, on the other hand, will be authorised by law. Moreover, the law on 10 July 1991 regarding secret correspondence

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<sup>16</sup> See [http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/livre\\_blanc\\_tome1\\_partie2.pdf](http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/livre_blanc_tome1_partie2.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> This pole is to take the form of a Research and Scientific Cooperation Foundation to support a European Doctoral School for research on defence and security issues, at <http://www.intericur.gouv.fr>

<sup>18</sup> See [http://cerad.canalblog.com/archives/renseignement\\_francais/index.html](http://cerad.canalblog.com/archives/renseignement_francais/index.html)



using electronic means of communication will be revised, taking into account the recent technical evolutions<sup>19</sup>.

➤ **Technical investments:** the development of intelligence services technical capabilities as a response to the development of information and communication technologies, especially in the age of the Internet; space-related information new planning, major efforts being made in the field of processing images and electromagnetic information; the development of collection capabilities and of capitalising on geophysical data in military systems; the consolidation of airborne capabilities designed to obtain information based on image and electromagnetic information, focusing especially on UAVs; efforts regarding information control, to optimise the decision-making process and develop the operational environment computerisation. Analysing these strategic functions, we can highlight that they form a flexible framework that ensures the French security and defence adaptation to the new international context.

*European ambition* is another priority established by the French security strategy. In this regard, France, through the *White Paper on Security and Defence*, suggests *more concrete goals* to defend Europe in the years to come, such as:

- *set up an intervention capability of 60 000 soldiers, with the necessary air and naval components*, deployable for one year in a distant theatre of operations;
- achieve the capability to *simultaneously coordinate*, for a significant duration, *two or three peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations* and several *civilian operations* of lesser scope, in separate theatres;
- enhance considerably the *planning and operational capabilities*, both military and civilian, in parallel to the development of interventions outside the European Union;
- create impetus and restructure the European defence industry.

In addition, the *White Paper* emphasises four priority areas related to the *protection of European citizens*: the development of cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the development of European civil protection capabilities, the coordination of the defence against cyber attacks, the securing of energy and strategic raw materials supply. Moreover, France advocates the drafting of a *European White Paper on Defence and Security*, which could comprise, in agreement with partners, a joint analysis at European level of the threats and the international system, which could then be a source of inspiration for the national documents with regard to defence policy and security:

- re-examination of the evolution of the great poles of power in the world, considering Asia more;

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<sup>19</sup> See [http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/livre\\_blanc\\_tome1\\_partie2.pdf](http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/livre_blanc_tome1_partie2.pdf).

- definition of common European Union security interests;
- precise delineation of the way internal security and external crisis management policy intertwine at the Union level. Continuity should represent a significant part of this European strategic doctrine: terrorism, organised crime, as well as energy security are typical examples of internal threats, whose roots are often outside the borders of the Union; finally, through their potential global effects, sanitary, technological risks, the ones related to the environment may also require the necessity to resort to security and defence means;
- rationalisation of the Union missions (crisis prevention, management, stabilisation), harmonised with the identification of the necessary instruments and capabilities to accomplish these missions;
- a doctrinal framework for external intervention and the use of force;
- a transparent communication strategy for the citizens.

For France, the *White Paper* advocates a new impulse in the following areas: training of young people as well as elected officials; renovation of the Compulsory Defence Preparation Day (Journée d'appel de préparation à la défense – JAPD); *establishment of a civic service; strategic research*, both at the national and European levels; the establishment of a scientific cooperation foundation, which could support the *European Doctoral School*; permanent training that, currently provided by four major institutions, will be reorganised into two poles (defence – foreign affairs; internal security)

In France there is a *strategic change*, especially in the French intelligence, to cope with the new challenges. In this context, the place of the French intelligence within the state is vital.

The *White Paper on Security and Defence* also addresses intelligence, under all its important aspects, from leading, coordination, integration, collaboration, inter-agencies cooperation to the issues related to human resources, research and intelligence process (such as the *development of information collection technical capabilities*).

It is clear, analysing the new French intelligence concept, as well as the drafting of any *national intelligence strategy*, that some radical measures have to be adopted in order to transform intelligence services in some essential aspects, such as:

- meeting the “*changing*” requirements of the users of information for security through enhancing the activity of all the services and capabilities made available by and through intelligence communities;
- developing and exploring intelligence concepts, strategies, policies and technologies, to meet the beneficiary requirements and concerted threats;

- more rapidly adapting to the new challenges in the security environment through preventing and countering the new unconventional threats.

It is an *overall, systematic and long-term process*, which has to involve the entire national information system so that it could meet the expectations regarding the protection of the country interests.

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# LEGITIMACY OF PURPOSE AND LEGALITY OF MEANS IN CURRENT ARMED CONFLICTS (I)

Colonel (r.) Dr Ionel HORNEA

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*The persistence of armed conflicts in the history of the humankind has been an evil, to some extent, necessary to the human being and the world on their way to progress. In this case, the evil is the war with all its bad consequences and the good is peace and international law applicable in armed conflicts. In the author's opinion, it is not at all true what Cicero said that laws must be silent when weapons speak, because war is not a simple fight for existence and survival, but remains, in its essence, a human action. That is why the possibility of legal regulation of armed conflict situations arises from the ancient principle of "ubi societas ibi jus" so that, being an action decided and carried out by the members of an organised human society, the armed conflict has also available a legal reflection through which the rights and duties of belligerents are established.*

**Keywords:** *armed conflict; revolution in the military domain; conventional weapons; peace and war*

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Motto:

*"Global government is unlikely in the twenty-first century, but various degrees of global governance already exist. The world has hundreds of treaties, institutions, and regimes for governing interstate behaviour involving telecommunications, civil aviation, ocean dumping, trade, and even the proliferation of nuclear weapons.*

*But such institutions are rarely self-sufficient. They still require the leadership of great powers. And it remains to be seen whether this century's great powers will live up to this role".*

Joseph S. Nye, "The Future of Power",  
Project-syndicate.org/commentary

The new millennium shows us not only that the world is not like it once was, but also that nothing lasts forever, that we live in an ever-changing environment, under the impact of continuous modernity and technology. Trying to adapt to the new current circumstances, we all change and so does the vision of our rights. States undergo revolutionary transition processes and the entire international community is reformed. In response to the new challenges generated by the new situation of modernity, the new global threats and risks, the international humanitarian

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law must also follow the same requirements and tendencies, because, as any objective law, it requires a permanent and consistent struggle in order to be effectively carried out in the practice of social relations. And if the people, states and the entire international community will provide it with enough force in these moments of global change, in the sense of modernity, the international humanitarian law will be able to prevail in this struggle upon which depend not only our wellbeing and happiness but also our existence, on the whole, as a species on Planet Earth.

The international community will probably experience a thorough reorganisation and the step taken towards a better organised world in terms of global governance will be big and will coexist with the contradictory tendency of fragmentation and hierarchy of the world. While globalism makes almost unlikely a war between great powers, the amplification of asymmetrical risks such as terrorism, organised crime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction generates more and more often reasons for conflict. Given the circumstances of the rapid decrease in natural resources, concomitantly with the accentuated demographic growth, the battle for strategic resources has most likely remained the element to cause conflicts<sup>1</sup>.

Analysing the tendencies of the current centres of power, we notice that the *USA is constantly dedicated to its global role*, being unable to imagine reducing its ambitions to only one region, because its interests are connected to all the areas of the globe so that any obstacle in the way of their materialisation can have undesirable consequences not only for its position of a leader in the construction of a new world order but also on the competition meant to establish a real hierarchy of the centres of power. The same thing is true, to a much moderate extent, for the other contenders for a superior position in the current world power hierarchy: Japan, China, United Europe and Russia. Short-circuiting, in any form, the affirmation of their interests, damaging, even partially, the relations between them can seriously affect the security environment, with negative consequences for the process of development and affirmation of the new international relations. In addition, many other state and non-state actors will certainly appear on the world stage and will face the tough and permanent competition for a place as advantageous as possible in the power system of the third millennium. New alliances, coalitions and partnerships, some of them unpredictable, will appear, bold and comprehensive strategies

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<sup>1</sup> According to “Jus in bello” and “Jus ad bellum” in the contemporary age, at <http://andreivocila.wordpress.com/2010/09/Ejus-ad-bellum%E2%80%9D-in-epoca-contemporana/>, pp. 1-3.

will be developed, in which technology, information and knowledge, in general, will be benchmarks, and, on the other hand, structures and bodies considered “immortal” will collapse, against the background of more and more visible and widespread competitions and disputes, all these creating a new typology of modern military operations<sup>2</sup>.

The persistence of armed conflicts in the history of the humankind has been an evil, to some extent, necessary to the human being and the world on their way to progress. In this case, the *evil* is the war, with all its bad consequences, and the *good* is peace and *international law of armed conflicts*. It is not at all true what Cicero said that laws must be silent when weapons speak, because war is not a simple fight for existence and survival (as in the animal world), but remains, in its essence, a human action (in the sense that it takes place through people). That is why the possibility of the legal regulation of armed conflict situations arises from the ancient principle of “*ubi societas ibi jus*”<sup>3</sup>, so that, being an action decided and carried out by the members of an organised human society, the armed conflict has also available a legal reflection through which the rights and duties of belligerents are established<sup>4</sup>.

In conducting this analysis, one must start, according to experts in international law, from the following assumptions: a) the current military actions have substantially changed their features following the *revolution in military affairs*, the stress being laid today not on war operations per se, but on the stability and support operations, in which the armed forces act to maintain the political and legal order in the region (or in the area), in keeping with international provisions; b) despite adjustments occurred in recent years, the *law of armed conflicts* does not always succeed in hindering the horrors committed by some belligerents in time of war, not being fully adapted to the new realities of the beginning of the millennium; c) the specific visions of politicians, diplomats, soldiers and jurists often affect the way the principles, laws and customs of war are applied and followed because of the intentional desire for efficiency, creating a false opposition between military strategy and international humanitarian law; d) the need to multiply efforts to increase national and international solidarity and responsibility for implementing a new legal order, in which the law of armed conflicts should be harmonised with the new types of threats to the security of all human communities.

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> “*If there is a society, law will be there*” (Cicero).

<sup>4</sup> Including the limits within which military needs must stop in front of the humankind exigencies.

From this perspective, the *law of armed conflicts* has made a slow progress, in leaps, at short intervals of time, when the public consciousness was favourable to a moderator approach and under the strong pressure from a humanitarian catastrophe. Nobody can deny the motor role of *technological progress*, much faster than the one of legal regulations. The phrase “*revolution in military affairs*” is not used accidentally, being the most appropriate to express the radical changes that take place in this domain. The analysis of the modern military art principles compatibility with the current law of armed conflict has been the experience resulted in recent years in the Romanian Armed Forces, in the process of adopting the new specific legal acts and the theory and practice of military training. Also, it is the result of the participation in (stability and support) operations of war in various theatres, where cooperation with the armed forces of other countries as well as the implementation of multinational principles and doctrine had favourable effects in the continuous improvement of the Romanian military training and in the modernisation of its procurement and equipment.

The increasing performance of conventional weapons, corroborated with the adaptation of a more efficient leadership style, as the effect of introducing new systems, have caused the doctrines of “*total war*” to become obsolete.

### **War and peace in the vision of various schools of thought in the theory of international relations<sup>5</sup>**

When asked if it was possible to have peace where once there was war, Kenneth N. Waltz, one of the most renowned theorists of international relations, stated that the answer was usually pessimistic<sup>6</sup>. Herfried Münkler, referring to this aspect, stated: “*At first glance it would appear that war and peace are two clearly definable political situations: if a state of peace exists, there is no war and visa versa. (...) According to this, then, war and peace, separated from each other by either a declaration of war or a peace treaty, represent two political situations cancelling each other out. One of these two states must always exist: war or peace, there is no other option. Yet for all this, the very term Cold War demonstrates that political reality is far more complex than the two-sided construction of war and peace would suggest*”<sup>7</sup>. There are only two opinions that show that, in fact,

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<sup>5</sup> Apud Constantin Hlihor, Elena Hlihor, *Comunicarea în conflictele internaționale. Secolul XX și începutul secolului XXI*, Editura Comunicare.ro, București, 2010, pp. 36-51.

<sup>6</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Omul, statul și războiul*, Institutul European, Iași, 2001, p. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Herfried Münkler, *Krieg und Frieden*, in vol. Iring Fetscher/Herfried Münkler (ed.), *Politikwissenschaft. Begriffe – Analysen – Theorien*, Ein Grundkurs, Reinbek, 1985, pp. 280-281.



the studies on peace and war have provided different visions and perspectives on these phenomena that have gone together with the history of the humankind<sup>8</sup>. There are authors who believe that the definition of peace and war is not even the same. Lothar Brock, for instance, draws attention to some *ambiguities of the concept of peace* and recommends a non-violent world society as a target that unfortunately cannot be fulfilled, but in keeping with which all the activities can be oriented. These ambiguities, in his opinion, derive from the different responses that are provided to the following questions: *Peace means that the weapons remain still. But for how long? Does peace only exist when the last war has been fought? Should everything else be regarded as quiet before the storm and as nothing more than a cease-fire? When there's peace, the lives of individuals and entire peoples are protected from the use of military aggression; but what about other forms of aggression? Can there only be peace when there's justice?*

War seems to have been overcome in Western Europe. But can peace here be lasting when conflict and aggression rage elsewhere? Is peace divisible or can it only be achieved when there is peace in the world?<sup>9</sup>

The scientific interest for war and peace is probably as old as the science itself<sup>10</sup>. However, it is only in the '50s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that research in the field of peace and the one in the field of conflicts appear as independent scientific disciplines – irenology, and polemology respectively –, with the purpose of analysing the various aspects of conflicts and war, as well as the requirements needed to accomplish a climate of peace<sup>11</sup>. The attempts made to create a special science to research the field of peace are noticed on several occasions throughout the nineteenth century. However, it is only after the Second World War, that people become aware of the killings and mass destruction, that international relations research institutes appear in the US and Britain, in relation to the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice. Their goal is to study conflicts and wars, revolutions and civil wars as well as the conditions of achieving a lasting world peace<sup>12</sup>. However, in the '20s, few are those who want to incorporate war and peace in international relations. The new discipline rapidly becomes a legitimate factor

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<sup>8</sup> For details, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *op. cit.*; Robert D. Kaplan, *Politici de război*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2002; Thomas C. Schelling, *Strategia conflictului*, Editura Integral, București, 2000.

<sup>9</sup> Lothar Brock, *Frieden. Überlegungen zur Theoriebildung*, in vol. Volker Rittberger (ed.), *Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen*, PVS-Sonderheft 21/1990, p. 72.

<sup>10</sup> Mircea Malița, *Între război și pace*, Editura C.H. Beck, București, 2007, *passim*.

<sup>11</sup> Egbert Jahn, *Friedens und Konfliktforschung*, in vol. Dieter Nohlen (ed.), *Pipers Wörterbuch zur Politik*, München, 1989, pp. 256-258.

<sup>12</sup> Ionel Nicu Sava, *Studii de securitate*, Editura Centrul Român de Studii Regionale, 2005, p. 91.

that serves national foreign policy and military and power interests of different states. The increasing tension in international relations, the crises that cannot be resolved within the security institutions, based on the new concept of peace and war, lead to the outbreak of the Second World War, which affects the state system. The crimes of the Stalinist and Fascist policies, on the one hand, but especially the prospect of a nuclear war that can kill entire nations, on the other hand, trigger the increase in the research in the field of peace at the end of the '50s as a reaction to the ideology imposed by the *Cold War*<sup>13</sup>. It first appears in universities and private institutes in Canada, USA and Norway. In parallel with this development, polemology (the study of wars and conflicts), which interests only a few people in France and the Netherlands, focuses on the systematic research on wars and conflicts. The goal of peace research is not only monitoring, demarcating and restricting the phenomenon of war, but also eliminating it as a kind of social and interstate relationship. It is sought that peace research will resume its previously considered utopian ideas regarding the achievement of world peace. This trend, which focuses rather on monitoring wars and keeping conflicts under control, first works in parallel with peace research, in the study of war and especially in the US. The two research areas are brought together in the '60s, in a discipline that combines peace research with conflict research<sup>14</sup>. During the relaxation of international tensions, interest is shown for the establishment of a new discipline with the purpose of studying issues of peace – irenology. In 1964, in Groningen, the *International Peace Research Association*<sup>15</sup> is established. The same year, in Oslo, the *Journal of Peace Research*<sup>16</sup> is created, which has made an outstanding contribution to the dissemination and promotion of studies on peace and war alike. Through the emergence of regional Latin American and Asian organisations in the late '70s, devoted to irenology studies, peace research crosses the borders of North America, Western Europe and Japan, thus being spread worldwide. Peace research increases spectacularly with the establishment of the *International Peace Research Institute*<sup>17</sup> in Stockholm. The institute is established, on a proposal by the then Prime Minister of Sweden, Tage Erlander, on 1 July 1966, to celebrate the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the modern state. The ultimate objective pursued is to create a scientific basis

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<sup>13</sup> For details, see Stefano Guzzini, *Realism și relații internaționale*, Institutul European, Iași, 2000, pp. 45-106.

<sup>14</sup> Constantin Bușe, Constantin Hlihor, *Security Paradigm between Classic and Modern*, in *Euro-Atlantic Studies*, nr. 7, 2000, p. 118.

<sup>15</sup> For details, see, [http://soc.kuleuven.be/pol/ipra/about\\_history.html](http://soc.kuleuven.be/pol/ipra/about_history.html)

<sup>16</sup> At <http://jpr.sagepub.com/>

<sup>17</sup> See <http://www.sipri.org/contents/about>

for the Swedish diplomacy and to provide expertise to UN institutions and commissions in Geneva that deal with disarmament issues<sup>18</sup>. The studies and research on the causes of war and crisis in the field of international relations have been published in the *SIPRI Yearbook*. The fact that this publication has appeared in no less than six foreign languages has had a great impact on the public opinion worldwide on the need for development of peace research<sup>19</sup>. Propaganda theory expert Jacques Ellul believes that the need to study all aspects of crises and conflicts stems from the very feature of modern societies. He observes in modern society that “*man always lives in the environment of war, a war that takes place in all the dimensions of the social environment*”<sup>20</sup>.

The relaxation of the East-West conflict, the end of the War in Vietnam and the weakening interest in the problems of the Third World development have shifted the public attention to other issues. Thus, an expansion of peace research paradigms has become necessary, beyond the previous concerns regarding the arming dynamics, terrorist systems, control of the arming process and monitoring of disarmament.

### **The School of Realism<sup>21</sup>**

In the *international relations theory*, the Realist School is extremely interested in the research of war and of the ways through which states can ensure their own security. Generally, peace and war are linked by the struggle for power taking place between the actors of the international environment. One of the *founders of realism*, Hans Morgenthau, arguing with the representatives of another prestigious international relations theory trend, states that, in fact, the hope of imposing a disarmament policy through international institutions is naive. He reaches this conclusion by a comparative analysis that he makes to the domestic and foreign policy of the modern state. Within the borders of a state, the struggle for power is mediated by a plurality of loyalties, constitutional arrangements and “*rules of the game*”<sup>22</sup>, dependent on a culture. These mask, but also direct the struggle for power towards competing conceptions about welfare. The coercive power of the state, combined with a network of social norms and relations within the community, emphasises politics as an arena of potential progress.

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<sup>18</sup> At <http://www.sipri.org/contents/about/sipri/history.html>

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Jacques Ellul, *Propagandes*, Economica, Paris, 1990, p. 162.

<sup>21</sup> Apud Constantin Hlihor, Elena Hlihor, *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> Martin Griffiths, *Școli, curente, gânditori*, Editura Ziua, București, 2003, p. 74.

In the international arena, all these factors that determine the struggle for power act very weak or, in some circumstances, they cannot even manifest. Here, “*not only is the will to power allowed free rein and therefore the continuity in foreign policy is not a matter of choice, but a necessity, for it derives from factors which no government is able to control, but which it can neglect only at the risk of failure ( ...). War or peace are decided in consideration of these permanent factors, regardless of the form of government ... and its domestic policies. Nations are peace-loving under certain conditions and are warlike under others*”<sup>23</sup>.

Although sceptical about the possibility of eliminating war from the international life, as long as it is an instrument in the struggle for power, Morgenthau believes that these factors can be identified using the instruments and methods of the theory of international relations. In fact, in the book that has made him acknowledged and internationally famous – *Politics among Nations* – he tries to find the principles with which to build an empirical theory of international politics. On this basis, one can identify those circumstances in which a state could shift from a policy of peace to a policy of confrontation. The realistic vision of the phenomenon of war is found in the work of French sociologist Raymond Aron. For him, foreign policy consists in the political and strategic behaviour, and international relations are conducted in the shadow of war. By this, he does not mean that the war is always likely, but only that *the legitimacy of violence to achieve state goals is common among states* and that it cannot be monopolised as it has been within states. In his opinion, international relations are “*relations between political units each of which claims the right to take justice into its own hands and to be the sole arbiter of the decision to fight or not to fight*”<sup>24</sup>. Understanding the causes of war is essential for Raymond Aron in deciphering the behaviour of states in the international environment, combating those theorists who explain the causes of conflicts between states by geographical and economic determinism, as it is the case of geopoliticians and Marxists. This does not make him reject all kinds of determinism, as long as he believes that the historic one may be relevant in understanding the mechanisms that lead to the outbreak of war. In his opinion, *traditional interstate rivalry is the main cause of war*<sup>25</sup>.

Robert Gilpin, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University (USA), considers that war is the one that ultimately leads to essential changes in the world order structure.

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 74-75.

<sup>24</sup> Raymond Aron, *Peace and War*, Praeger, New York, 1968, p. 5.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, p. 279.

Gilpin's systemic change model is based on a series of hypotheses about states that he derives from the *microeconomic rational choice theory*<sup>26</sup>. Analysing the evolution of relations between states from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the *Cold War*, he concludes that the *cyclical theory of change* in the international system is validated by history. From this perspective, he notes that, since 1648, the order in world affairs has modified several times, depending on the changes that took place in the hierarchy of the balance of power. In time, a gap appears between the status and prestige of the hegemonic state/states and the power they can deploy to safeguard their national interests. Despite the desire of states that change in the world order could take place peacefully, Gilpin notes that, until now, "*the principal mechanism of change ... has been war or what we shall call hegemonic war (a war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern the system)*"<sup>27</sup>. The assertion of the American Professor seems to reach a crisis point when a question arises regarding the military means with which the hegemonic war will be waged. The existence of nuclear weapons and their use in such a war question Gilpin's theory. In this case, the next hegemonic war has many chances to be the last one. On the other hand, it can be seen that the change in the world order based on the hegemony of two superpowers – the USA and Russia – has not occurred through a hegemonic conflict.

The place and role of wars in the international relations system, but especially the causes that lead the actors of the international environment to a conflictual behaviour have been the major concerns for another brilliant representative of realism, Kenneth Waltz. He believes that peace is reached more easily if we understand the causes of war. Starting from the fact that the main causes for war are "*bewildering in their variety and in their contradictory qualities, to make this variety manageable, the answers can be ordered under the following three headings: within man, within the structure of the separate states, within the state system*"<sup>28</sup>.

Referring to human nature and the dual behaviour of the human being in the society, he points out that, in issues of peace and war, one must analyse and understand the individual with a policymaker role. In this regard, Waltz quotes former President Dwight Eisenhower: "*Now people don't want conflict – people in general. It is only, I think, mistaken leaders that grow too belligerent and believe that people*

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<sup>26</sup> Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 10-11.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, p. 15.

<sup>28</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Omul, statul și războiul...*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

*really want to fight*<sup>29</sup>. People do not live in isolation, but within rigorously structured societies. These are the key elements of the international society and understanding their behaviour in the mutual relations would answer many questions regarding the origin of conflicts. From this perspective, the solution of eliminating war would mean the generalisation of a model of “good” state, which, unlike the “bad” state, would be inclined towards cooperation and understanding in the international environment. Is there anywhere on this globe such a recipe valid? The states in the international environment always behave in relation to the rationality that stems from the most generous ideals of humanity. Is there a supreme authority to which all states listen in this anarchic environment? These are questions to which the liberal school representatives believe they have more appropriate answers than the realists.

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*In the second part of the article, the author will continue the analysis of war and peace from the perspective of liberalism and the sociological school.*

**English version by**  
✍️ **Iulia NĂSTASIE**



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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, p. 17.

# THE GLOBAL DIMENSION OF THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF CHINA'S SEA POWER

Lieutenant Colonel (N) Laurențiu MEȘTERCA

Dictum:

*“For whosoever commands the sea commands the trade;  
whosoever commands the trade of the world commands  
the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself”.*

Sir Walter Raleigh<sup>1</sup>

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*This paper approaches a subject of high interest – the rise of the Chinese civilian component of sea power – the Chinese maritime industry driven by its global maritime security interests against the background of a growing economic power. The author tackles China's growing dependence on the maritime space and the fact that China has been lately in the limelight on the maritime arena given its prominent role in the shipping industry, shipbuilding, fishing etc. All these factors gathered under the umbrella of global Chinese maritime interests entail inherent protection ensured by a suitable blue water fleet.*

**Keywords:** *maritime space; global economy; Middle East; market economy*

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The international power system has been in a profound transformation process, from a unipolar system, dominated by the United States, dubbed by Huntington “*the only superpower*”, to a multipolar one. In this context, a series of analysts, among which the renowned British Economic History Professor Niall Fergusson, maintain that we are witnessing a “*powershift*” phenomenon from the West to the East, signalling, basically, the end of an epoch of Western dominance which lasted approximately half of a millennium<sup>2</sup>. American analyst Robert Kaplan deems that *the strategic world centre is represented by “Western Pacific, East Asia and South Asia”*, all these regions being characterised by an unprecedented economic and military dynamism.

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<sup>1</sup> Michel Mollat du Jourdin, *Europa și Marea*, Editura Polirom, 2003, p. 132.

<sup>2</sup> *Power Shifting from West to East?*, 8 January 2011, at <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/saturdayextra/stories/2011/3067911.htm>



Throughout history, the change of the centre of gravity of the world economic system has been a relatively slow process, the torch has been passed on, successively, by Venice (1380), Antwerp (1500), Geneva (1550-1560), Amsterdam (1590-1610), London (1780), New York (1929)<sup>3</sup>. Of note, all these cities were either city-states or belonged to states which, at that time, were veritable maritime powers (the US still retains this status). The maritime spaces within which all this action took place were the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, or at least from these two main waters the force was projected into the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The *sea power* concept was defined by Mahan who used three pillars – *maritime trade, merchant fleet and warships* and *the forward bases*<sup>4</sup>. This concept was updated by Geoffrey Till, who included contemporary aspects<sup>5</sup>. Thus, the *sea power* has a wide meaning, encompassing both a military component (naval power) and a civilian one (maritime trade and industry), and one has to distinguish it from the concept of naval power.

Throughout time, the judicious application of maritime power has led to prosperity, and in many instances, it ensured the sea dominance, which proved the intrinsic tie between the maritime power and economic power. This has been also highlighted by the American Professor Sam J. Tangredi: “*sea power is a facilitator of economic power, and the quest for economic power is, in turn, a motivator for the development of sea power*”<sup>6</sup>.

Currently, based on the Braudelian theory, through extrapolation, it can be inferred that we are witnessing the emergence of a new economic and financial pole – this time a Chinese one, located in Shanghai (the *World Financial Center* building representing a symbol in this respect). Following the above logic

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<sup>3</sup> Fernand Braudel, *Dinamica Capitalismului*, Editura Corint, București, 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power and World History*, Fireship Press, 2009, *Discussion of the Elements of the Sea Power*, p. 1. These three pillars, in China’s case, were approached by C. Raja Mohan in “*Maritime Power: India and China turn to Mahan*”, in *ISAS Working Paper*, no. 71, 7 July 2009.

<sup>5</sup> This concept includes “*the non-military aspects of sea use (merchant shipping, fishing, marine insurance, shipbuilding and repair and so on) ... the contribution that the other services can make to events at sea, and the contribution that navies can make to events on land or in the air*”, Geoffrey Till, *Seapower, A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2004, pp. 4-5.

<sup>6</sup> Sam J. Tangredi, *Globalization and Sea Power*, chapter 1, *Globalization and Sea Power: Overview and Context*, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=110804>.

<sup>7</sup> It is unanimously recognised that the GDP does not reflect the prosperity of a nation, being less significant than the GDP per capita (in 2009, China’s GDP/capita was 3 687 \$, compared to Japan’s 37 800 \$). The governmental newspaper *People’s Daily* also strengthened this idea noting that being “*the world’s second-largest economy is not the same as being the second-largest economic power*”, in the article “*China Points Out: Second-Largest Economy but not Second-Largest Economic Power*”, 18.08.2010, <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/08/18/china-points-out-second-largest-economy-but-not-second-largest-economic-power>.

that holds that to a large economic power corresponds a large sea power, then China should become a large sea power.

This paper approaches the civilian component of China's sea power from a global perspective, leaving aside the military component for a separate article. In this context, I opted for two relevant pillars, which fit in Mahan and Till's visions: economic power (including the foreign trade) and maritime industry (including the merchant fleet, fishing, shipyards, maritime insurances), which have been projected against the Chinese economic and maritime commercial realities/facts, whilst noting their impact on the global scene.

### **Economic power.**

#### **The Chinese economic dynamism**

Against a background of a sustained economic growth, based mainly on industry, including the high technology, and on trade, in 2010, China became both the first exporter at the global level overcoming Germany and the second world economy, following Japan's surpassing in terms of GDP<sup>7</sup>. In addition to this, in 2009, *Goldman Sachs* foresaw that China would get the status of first world economy in the year of 2027<sup>8</sup>. However, as long as the GDP per capita indicator is low, China remains a developing country. Of note, the main objective of the Chinese decision-makers is to build a prosperous society by 2020, when it is predicted a quadrupling of the income compared to 2000<sup>9</sup>. However, in order to have a much realistic image, these indicators should be looked at in a correlated manner, not individually. The developing countries usually provide the raw resources to the developed states, but it is not the case for China, which is dependent on raw materials coming in from almost all around the world in order to feed its industry. As such, the best syntagm that reflects very well the status of China is "*neither developed (which describes its impact on the global economy) nor developing (which describes the average wealth of its citizens)*"<sup>10</sup>. In spite of all these progresses, other states and international organisations do not recognise China as a market economy. This recognition is foreseen to be granted by 2016, but the EU has put as a condition the downsizing of the number of privileged state enterprises with regard to access to cheap credit<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> Andrew Marshall, "BRIC Nations: Growth and Risks", *Reuters Online*, 10 June 2009 at <http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSSP31967220090610>, retrieved on 11.06.2010.

<sup>9</sup> Le Tian, "Hu: Well-Off Society Is Top Goal", in *China Daily*, 16.07.2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/16/content\\_6177389.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/16/content_6177389.htm)

<sup>10</sup> Kevin Voigt, "Is China a Developing Country?", <http://business.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/12/is-china-a-developing-country/>

<sup>11</sup> În căutarea unui nou statut economic, in *Observatorul Militar*, no. 38, p. 14, (28 September – 4 October 2011).

Being in full swing towards the status of great power, China's economic power needs to be complemented by a military power, "*corresponding to its national interests and its power*"<sup>12</sup>. In this respect, the minister of defence, Liang Guanglie, sees China's growing military capabilities as being "*entirely appropriate and consistent with China's rise as an economic and political power*"<sup>13</sup>.

➤ ***The evolution of Chinese economy. Dependence on maritime space***

The economic development of China in the last 30 years has been based on abandoning the internal orientation of the economy concomitantly with adopting gradual reforms promoted by Deng Xiaoping starting with 1978 with a view to liberalising it. The prominent Chinese Professor Ni Lexiong wrote: "*when a nation embarks upon a process of shifting from an "inward-leaning economy" to an "outward-leaning economy", the arena of national security concerns begins to move to the oceans*"<sup>14</sup>. The central idea was strengthening the external trade by increasing exports and lifting the restrictions regarding the imports. It supposed applying liberalised economic policies having in the centre the privatisation of state enterprises, decollectivisation of agriculture and offering incentives for foreign investors with a view to increasing production. One of the most successful policies was the establishment of *Special Economic Zones (SEZ)*<sup>15</sup> on the South Eastern coast, which aside from stimulating the foreign investments, led to the opening up of the Chinese economy to the global economy where it plays a central stage role. As such, the South Eastern coast of China, which constitutes the location of the main Chinese production and trade centres due to their closeness to the sea and the port infrastructure, has become China's economic centre of gravity. In addition to having the perennial role of dominant facilitator of the globalisation<sup>16</sup>, the sea represents for China the medium that ensured its access to global market

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<sup>12</sup> Rear-Admiral (r.) Yin Zhuo in the article "*China Plans Lowest Defense Budget Raise in 10 Years (Update 1)*", 4 March 2010, *Bloomberg*, at <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-04/china-plans-lowest-defense-budget-raise-in-10-years-update1-.html>

<sup>13</sup> Anne Gearan, "*US, China Defense Chiefs Mend Frayed Military Ties*", 10 January 2011, [http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2011/01/10/us\\_china\\_defense\\_chiefs\\_mend\\_frayed\\_military\\_ties/](http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2011/01/10/us_china_defense_chiefs_mend_frayed_military_ties/)

<sup>14</sup> Ni Lexiong, "*Sea Power and China's Development*", in *The Liberation Daily*, 17 April 2005, [http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/translated\\_articles/2005/05\\_07\\_18\\_Sea\\_Power\\_and\\_Chinas\\_Development.htm](http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/translated_articles/2005/05_07_18_Sea_Power_and_Chinas_Development.htm)

<sup>15</sup> Recently, in 2011, by approving the development plans for the Economic Zone of Shandong Peninsula and the Zones of Zhejiang and Guangdong and by their integration, it was created a cluster of coastal cities focused on maritime economy, according to Ye Xiaowen, "*China Heightens Ocean Awareness*", in *People's Daily*, 12 August 2011, at <http://english.people.com.cn/90786/7568194.html>, retrieved on 25.11.2011.

<sup>16</sup> Sam J. Tangredi, "*Globalisation and Sea Power*", *loc. cit.*

both for final products and resources. As such, China is dependent on the sea to maintain its sustained economic growth. Thus, one can note the importance attached by the Chinese decision-makers to the maritime dimension, these realising that “*China cannot achieve sustainable development and national rejuvenation without going to the ocean*”<sup>17</sup>.

➤ ***Global maritime interests generated by economic dynamism***

We have noted that the Chinese national interests, especially those of commercial-economic nature, overlap in many instances with the maritime interests. Moreover, as the economic development consolidates, the Chinese national interests, impacted by the globalisation phenomenon and in continuous expansion, have got a global dimension.

Zhang Wenmu, Professor at the Centre for Strategic Studies at the Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics, writes that the Chinese national security has to be dictated by global national interests in terms of *security boundary*, not *border security*. Consequently, security boundary spreads farther than the territorial border, constituting a border of interest that has got a global dimension.

Back in 2006, Professor Wenmu maintained that “*the security boundary China is capable of protecting does not reach beyond its own territory and is far more limited than the United States due to a deficient military capability overseas*”<sup>18</sup>. This leads to the necessity of building a capable and deployable global naval force, so that “*wherever China’s interests lead, there too must follow China’s capabilities to protect those interests*”<sup>19</sup>.

The global dimension of the Chinese national interest is given by the **import of resources from the Middle East** (oil<sup>20</sup> from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman), **Africa** (oil from Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, minerals – chrome, manganese from South Africa; cobalt and copper from Zambia and Congo)<sup>21</sup>, **Latin America and the Caribbean** (iron ore, copper ore, processed copper, oil)<sup>22</sup> and **Oceania** (fish – from the Exclusive Economic Zones of the majority states in Oceania,

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<sup>17</sup> Ye Xiaowen, “*China Heightens Ocean Awareness*”, *op. cit.*

<sup>18</sup> Zhang Wenmu, “*Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices*”, in *China Security*, summer 2006, [http://www.wsichina.org/cs3\\_2.pdf](http://www.wsichina.org/cs3_2.pdf), p. 22.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> In 1993, China “*became a hydrocarbon importer*”, according to C. Raja Mohan, “*Maritime Power: India and China Turn to Mahan*”, *op. cit.*

<sup>21</sup> Kent Hughes Butts and Brent Bankus, “*China’s Pursuit of Africa’s Natural Resources*”, June 2009, volume 1-09, Center for Strategic Leadership, Collins Center Study, US Army War College, at [http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/CCS1\\_09\\_ChinasPursuitofAfricasNaturalResources.pdf](http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/CCS1_09_ChinasPursuitofAfricasNaturalResources.pdf).

<sup>22</sup> Rhys Jenkins, Enrique Dussel Peters, *China and Latin America, Economic Relations in the Twenty First Century*, German Development Institute, Bonn, Mexico City, p. 29.

timber – Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea<sup>23</sup>, nickel and cobalt – Papua New Guinea<sup>24</sup>).

The Westerners accuse China of being a neocolonial power in Africa, against the background of “*plundering Africa’s resources*” and “*dumping goods in Africa*” and that Chinese enterprises evade social responsibility in Africa<sup>25</sup>. These accusations are rejected by the Chinese officials who maintain that the relationships between China and Africa are based on common prosperity, mutual benefit and reciprocity<sup>26</sup> and that they are not limited to resourceful states. For instance, China ensures assistance for development, direct investment in infrastructure projects and in the extracting industry for some African states. However, there are some issues<sup>27</sup> that provoke worries in Africa towards China, such as imposing a fix percentage of 70% for the workers for the infrastructure projects to be Chinese, and flooding the South African market with textiles which forced many textile factories to close down, whose side consequent effect was high unemployment rates (25 000 jobs lost in the past two years)<sup>28</sup>. These problems have generated a review of the approach to the trade with Africa by China in order to avoid other negative consequences.

The Chinese businesses abroad do not suppose only financial capital but a substantial number of Chinese citizens, which reaches the figure of 5 millions<sup>29</sup>. Many of them live and work in unstable states, where, not for a few times, they lost their life (in 2007, 7 oil workers were killed in Ethiopia, other 5 were kidnapped and killed in Sudan in 2008, whilst, in 2004, 2 engineers were killed in Gawdar in Pakistan etc.)<sup>30</sup>. More recently, in 2011, the outbreak of the civil war in Libya

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<sup>23</sup> Sea Sovereign Thomas, “*Engaging Oceania*”, in *Naval War College Review*, winter 2010, vol. 63, no. 1, p. 101. The relationship China-Oceania is also presented by Nicholas Thomas, “*Looking South China’s Oceanic Relations*”, pp. 119-226 in Shaun Breslin, *Handbook of China’s International Relations*, Routledge, 2010.

<sup>24</sup> Terence Wesley Smith, “*China in Oceania*”, in *Pacific Islands Policy 2*, The East – West Center, 2007, p. 11.

<sup>25</sup> Zhang Hongwei, “*China Not Neo-Colonialist*”, in *China Daily*, 16.11.2010, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-11/16/content\\_11554152.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-11/16/content_11554152.htm).

<sup>26</sup> Du Xiacong, “*China’s Role in Africa*” at the “*Symposium on Africa-China Relations*” held by Syracuse University, 28.04.2010, <http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/dfzc/t689653.htm>.

<sup>27</sup> For Chinese policy in Africa: Todd A. Hofstedt, “*China in Africa. US Navy an AFRICOM Response*”, in *Naval War College Review*, summer 2009, vol. 62, no. 3 and Kent Hughes Butts and Brent Bankus, footnote 21.

<sup>28</sup> He Wenping, “*The Balancing Act of China’s Africa Policy*”, in *China Security*, vol. 3, no. 3, summer 2007, pp. 23-40, [http://www.wsichina.org/cs7\\_2.pdf](http://www.wsichina.org/cs7_2.pdf)

<sup>29</sup> Daniel J. Kosteka, “*From the Sea, PLA Doctrine and the Employment of Sea-Based Airpower*”, in *Naval College Review*, summer 2011, p. 25.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, p. 25.

led to the necessity of evacuating the Chinese citizens, action supported, for the first time, by a Chinese frigate, part of the national task force participating in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Another aspect which is worth highlighting is the **strategic importance attached to energy security**, given that the appetite for economic development has to be satisfied by a continued ship borne oil flow coming from the Persian Gulf through Hormuz Strait and Africa, by transiting the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. Malacca is considered an extremely vulnerable point for China since through the strait pass “*appreciatively 85% of the Chinese imported oil and half of its merchant fleet*”<sup>31</sup>. Therefore, President Hu Jintao considers the “*Malacca dilemma*” the key of the Chinese energy security. The security of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and of the “*choke points is guaranteed by the US Navy; along with the dependence on a US dominated energy market, this is seen as a strategic vulnerability*”<sup>32</sup>. The strategy for minimising this vulnerability includes among others the development of a “*blue water naval capability*”<sup>33</sup>. This syntagm comprises those forces capable of executing naval operations for an extended period, wherever its national interests dictate<sup>34</sup>. Ultimately, the SLOCs represent the lifeline of the Chinese economy and its strangulation is the equivalent of a real financial-economic disaster with major implications on the social plane. The renowned academic Zhang Wenmu justifies, from a realist point of view, the necessity of naval capabilities for SLOC protection through the very existence of the possibility of having China as a target for the West-imposed economic sanctions. Notwithstanding, the test for the Chinese naval capabilities did not take place in this context, but against the background of an asymmetric phenomenon – maritime piracy<sup>35</sup> –, which is manifest in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast.

The prospective melting of the Arctic Ocean over the future summers has stimulated **China’s interest in the Arctic region**, both for the maritime routes and the rich resources for hydrocarbons and fish. The use of North Sea Route would substantially diminish distances, but there are disadvantages such as: lack

<sup>31</sup> Li Zhihui, Quan Xiaoshu, Zhu Xudong, “*Chinese Navy Sees Role Further Afield*”, [http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2009-04/23/content\\_1737372.htm](http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2009-04/23/content_1737372.htm)

<sup>32</sup> Kent Hughes Butts and Brent Bankus, *op. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> In order to study in depth the *blue water* concept, see Michael Lindberg, Daniel Todd, “*Brown-, Green- and Blue-Water Fleets: The Influence of Geography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present, 2002*”, Westport, Connecticut, London.

<sup>35</sup> For maritime piracy phenomenon, see Major (N) Laurențiu Meșterca, “*Modern Maritime Piracy – A New Risk to Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*”, in *Romanian Military Thinking*, no. 1, 2010, pp. 81-94.



of infrastructure, danger posed by icebergs, high costs for maritime insurances, impossibility of cargo ships transit through the shallow waters of Bering Strait<sup>36</sup>.

With regard to resource exploitation, although China is not an Arctic coastal state and does not possess advanced drilling technology, it can be part of the oil extraction process by making available its financial resources<sup>37</sup>. Moreover, recently, a Danish ambassador affirmed that Beijing has got legitimate economic interests in the Arctic<sup>38</sup>.

I deem necessary to give a historical dimension to China's sea power. As such, it needs to be recalled that during the Ming dynasty (1405-1433), before the Portuguese discovery of the Indies, a fleet headed by the eunuch Admiral Zheng He explored the Indian Ocean, entering into contact with the populations from Java to Ceylon and the East Africa, "*bringing tribute and exotic products for the Chinese court*"<sup>39</sup>. The fall of China's sea power took place after the death of Zheng He against a background of the upswing of the neo-Confucianism current that was against profit making, concurrently with the downswing of Eunuchs thesis that favoured maritime trade. In addition, besides promoting an agrarian policy and a theory according to which there was nothing of good use beyond the Chinese borders, on the Northern border it was the Mongol threat. All these factors contributed to the resource redirection towards the continental dimension. In this context, following an imperial edict, eventually the shipbuilding ceased, all the oceanic ships were destroyed and the Chinese maritime destiny was decided until the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>40</sup>.

Consequently, the maritime interests of China are global, from the access to the resources and markets to the defence of Chinese investments and Chinese citizens who work and live abroad. All these require global shipping and its protection by naval forces capable of force projection.

### **Maritime industry**

All these upswing economic progresses could not have taken place without a seamless development of the maritime industry. This industry comprises *shipping* (merchant fleet), shipbuilding, and fishing, which in 2007 represented

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<sup>36</sup> Linda Jakobson, "*China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic*", in *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*, 2 March 2010, at <http://books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1002.pdf>

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> "*Denmark Welcomes China in From the Arctic Cold*", 28.10.11, *Reuters*, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/28/us-china-arctic-idUSTRE79R28S20111028>

<sup>39</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *Sistemul mondial modern*, Editura Meridiane, vol. I, 1992, p. 59.

<sup>40</sup> See Gavin Menzies, *1434 – The Year a Magnificent Chinese Fleet Sailed to Italy and Ignited the Renaissance*, Harper, 2009 and at <http://www.basicrps.com/chine/histoire/china.htm>.



10% of the economic sector<sup>41</sup>. The key role in China's development belongs to the shipping, necessary to export its manufactured goods and import mainly the raw materials, indispensable to sustain its production, but also the import of consumer goods that has become increasingly diversified and required by the Chinese market. For instance, in 2008, the oceanic trade represented 9,87% of GDP (approximately 456 billion USD), while 85% of its international commerce is performed through maritime routes<sup>42</sup>. Actually, almost half of its GDP is dependent on *shipping*<sup>43</sup>. In this context, it is worth recalling that two of world top ten containers shipping companies are Chinese state-owned enterprises: *China Ocean Shipping (Group) Corporation (COSCO)* and *China Shipping Container Lines/LTD (CSCL)*<sup>44</sup>. The Chinese company *Hutchison Whampoa* is the world largest port operator operating in 48 ports in 25 countries (among them Australia, Belgium, EAU, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Oman, Panama etc.)<sup>45</sup>.

With respect to merchant fleet, based on net shipping tonnage, globally, China is the ninth, but by adding to it the Hong Kong fleet (which is separately listed in statistics), China would be the third, following Panama and Liberia<sup>46</sup>. It is worth recalling that these two states offer attractive fiscal incentives such as: registration and profit taxes are extremely low and the ships sail under flag of convenience. In another ranking in accordance with the net tonnage of the ships controlled by mother companies registered in various world states, China comes the fourth behind Japan, Greece, and Germany<sup>47</sup>, whilst, by adding the Hong Kong ships, it would be placed on the third position.

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<sup>41</sup> The maritime industry rate of growth increased by 15% in 2007, representing a quicker rate of growth than the entire Chinese economy, creating 1,9 million jobs. According to *Jane's Merchant Ships*, 2008-2009, 12<sup>th</sup> edition.

<sup>42</sup> State Oceanic Administration, *Ocean Development Strategy Research Study Group, China's Ocean Development Report*, Beijing, PRC: Maritime Publishing House, 2010, pp. 227, 224, 446 apud Dean Cheng, "Sea Power and the Chinese State: China's Maritime Ambitions", *Background*, no. 2 576, 11 July 2011, published by The Heritage Foundation.

<sup>43</sup> In 2003, it was 46%, according to W. Gao, Executive Vice President of COSCO Group, "Development Strategy of Chinese Shipping Company under the Multilateral Framework of WTO", Speech at the International Maritime Forum, 30 October 2003, <<http://www.cosco.com/en/pic/forum/654923323232.pdf>>.

<sup>44</sup> Alphaliner, "Top 100: 100 Largest Container/Liner Operators", at <http://www.alphaliner.com/top100/index.php>, 29 June 2011 apud Dean Cheng, "Sea Power and the Chinese State..." *op. cit.*

<sup>45</sup> More details at <http://www.hph.com/globalbusiness/ports.aspx>

<sup>46</sup> China is registered with 34 705 141 registered tones (TR), whilst Hong Kong 55 543 246 TR, according to data based on IHS Fairplay "World Fleet Statistics 2010" as of 31 December 2010. TR is conventionally calculated reflecting the total volume closed within the ship hull including the superstructures, having the value of 100 ft<sup>3</sup> or 2 831 m<sup>3</sup>, in *International Shipping Facts and Figures – Information Resources on Trade, Safety, Security, and the Environment*, Maritime Knowledge Centre, 2011, p. 12.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p. 11.

China also has the status of global power in the field of fishing, its “massive fishing fleet is concentrated in the Western Pacific, but is also active now on all the world’s oceans”<sup>48</sup>. In 2007, “with a total haul of over 17 million tonnes, China’s take is four times that of the nearest competitor, and far exceeds the catch of Japan, the United States and other major Pacific maritime powers”<sup>49</sup>, whilst in the 1990s its objective to outrank South Korea and Taiwan on short term and eventually the former USSR had been seen as ambitious<sup>50</sup>. Thus, China became the world largest fish producer and exporter<sup>51</sup>.

In 2010, China became leader in shipbuilding, surpassing South Korea, by building the highest number of ships. Although quality is not at the highest standards, one can notice significant improvements<sup>52</sup>. The Chinese shipyards have the capacity to build modern seakeeping warships, having a stealth design. These warships could have been seen on operation in the Gulf of Aden, on port calls, on naval diplomacy and on the 2009 naval parade<sup>53</sup>, celebrating 60 years from the establishment of the *People’s Liberation Army Navy – PLAN*.

In the process of changing its status from a developing to a developed country, aspect that is going to be reflected in the prosperity that is to be enjoyed by the Chinese citizens, the volume of goods is set to increase, which in turn will mean an intensified maritime trade requiring an increase in ships and their tonnage.

All these spectacular achievements in the Chinese maritime industry should be seen in conjunction with the trends in other states. An American analyst characterised the US maritime situation: “we have an anaemic commercial shipping fleet and virtually no large-scale commercial ship construction – yet we maintain a pre-eminent naval force”, whilst traditionally the US maritime power had been built on a pyramidal structure, having a solid shipping and shipbuilding industry at the base and at the top a powerful navy<sup>54</sup>. The same thing is valid for the UK,

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<sup>48</sup> Lyle Goldstein, “China’s Fishing Fleet Sets Challenge to US”, in *Asia Times Online*, 07.08.2009, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KH07Ad01.html>

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid* apud *The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2008*, Rome, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2009, p. 11.

<sup>50</sup> You Ji and You Xu, “In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy’s Maritime Strategy in the 1990s”, in *The Pacific Review* vol. 4, no. 2, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 138.

<sup>51</sup> Sea Sovereign Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>52</sup> Wang Ying, *op. cit.*

<sup>53</sup> For more details see Zhang Xiaoming, *A More Powerful China on Parade*, in *China Security*, vol. 5, no. 3, 2009, pp. 7-11, World Security Institute, 2009 and footnote 56.

<sup>54</sup> Douglas T. Tastad, “Hobson’s Choice for the American Maritime Industry: The Navy or Nothing”, in *JFQ*, issue 50, 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 2008, p. 19.

Professor Geoffrey Till noting that, in 2004, its commercial fleet decreased, but London remained the centre of the world maritime economy<sup>55</sup>. The question is now – *for how long is London going to enjoy this status?*

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In spite of the short maritime supremacy enjoyed during the Ming dynasty under Zheng He's command (1405-1433)<sup>56</sup>, China is not a traditional maritime state but the decision-makers have understood the importance of the sea in the political, economic and military equations. From this assessment comes out that the pillars of the civilian component of the Chinese sea power are very well structured and anchored globally. In the context of a security boundary which extends at the global level and the necessity to ensure the prerequisites required to continue the economic development, China needs to secure access to resources and markets by a *blue water* fleet. Thus, China is entitled to aspire to the status of global great sea power since it has global security interests and hinges on a strong expanding economy that allows the development of a modern (civilian) maritime industry and the allocation of the necessary resources to acquire (military) naval capabilities.



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<sup>55</sup> Geoffrey Till, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

<sup>56</sup> Gavin Menzies, *op. cit.*

# **THE EU SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES – Key Documents for the Community Area Security –**

*Dr Ioan Codruț LUCINESCU*

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*The author writes about terrorism, which is presently one of the greatest threats to security, peace, stability, democracy and fundamental rights, the organic values of the European Union, but especially about the need for countering terrorism and the strategies and other types of documents draw up in for this purpose: The EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, The Action Plan for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment into Terrorism etc.*

*According to experts, terrorist threats should be approached mainly at national level, even if we know that the current threat is especially at the international level. The activity at the EU level complements these efforts and is built around the prevention, protection, prosecution and response in the case in which an attack occurs.*

**Keywords:** *terrorism; organised crimes; radicalisation; counter-terrorism legislation; Passenger Name Record*

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The main crime risks and threats Europe currently confronts with, namely terrorism, serious crime forms – organised crime, drug trafficking, computer crime, human trafficking, sexual exploitation of minors and infantile pornography, economic crime and corruption, weapon trafficking and cross-border crime –, adapt extremely rapidly to the scientific and technological changes in their attempt to exploit illegally and undermine the values and stability of democratic societies.

For European Union citizens, security is a top priority. The EU annual work programmes have already provided an adequate basis for the enhancement of operational cooperation, yet, currently, a wider consensus is needed regarding the vision, values and objectives that lie at the basis of the EU internal security.

Terrorism is presently one of the greatest threats to security, peace, stability, democracy and fundamental rights, organic values of the European Union, as well as a direct threat to European citizens. The threat of terrorism

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is not limited only to certain geographical areas. Terrorists and terrorist organisations exist inside the borders of the European Union as well as outside them, and they have proved their ability to commit attacks and violence acts on any continent and against any country.

### **The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategies**

Starting October 2001 and until the adoption of the *Internal Security Strategy*, in March 2010, at the level of the European Union, an important number of documents were adopted with the purpose of fighting terrorism and preventing the purchase, possession and use of assets or goods by such organisations. Starting with June 2004, we mention the *EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism*, which includes, as strategic objectives<sup>1</sup>:

- to reduce the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources;
- to maximise the capacity within EU bodies and member states to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks;
- to protect the security of international transports and ensure effective systems of border control;
- to enhance the capability of the European Union and of member states to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack;
- to address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism;
- to target actions under EU external relations towards third countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced.

In order to enhance the strategic and political coherence of these objectives and of the implementation actions, the European Union rearranged them, at the end of 2005, in four big pillars of a global strategy seeking to:

- prevent new recruits to terrorism;
- better protect potential targets;
- disorganise existing terrorist networks;
- improve capability to respond and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks.

*The Hague Programme* – regarding strengthening freedom, security and justice, adopted in November 2004<sup>2</sup>, set the EU policies for 2005-2010 for the mentioned dimensions, in the field of preventing and combating terrorism. The document

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<sup>1</sup> Annegret Bendiek, *EU Strategy on Counter-Terrorism*, SWP Research Paper, Berlin, November 2006, pp. 28-31.

<sup>2</sup> *The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU*, at <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st16/st16054.en04pdf>

underlines the importance of cooperation between intelligence services to protect the security of the Union, on the whole.

*The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, approved by the European Council on 1 December 2005<sup>3</sup>, set as its main goal “to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice”. In this respect, the stress is laid on the following:

- to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment;
- to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attacks, through improved security of borders, including critical infrastructure;
- to disrupt – to pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders; to impede planning, travel and communications; to disrupt support networks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials;
- to respond – to prepare ourselves to manage and minimise the consequences of terrorist attacks, by improving capabilities to assess the terrorist threat and to efficiently coordinate the response operations.

In order to reach these objectives, there are four main ways in which the EU can add value:

- *strengthening national capabilities* – using best practice to improve national capabilities of information collection;
- *facilitating European cooperation* – working together to share information securely between member states and institutions and establishing efficient mechanisms to facilitate cooperation;
- *developing collective capability* – ensuring the capacity to understand and make collective policy responses with a view to preventing and fighting the terrorist threat;
- *promoting international partnership* – working with others beyond the EU, with international non-governmental organisations and third world countries to counter terrorism.

In July 2010, the European Commission adopted the *Communication* in which there are assessed the main tools in force within the *EU Counter-Terrorism Policy*<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Council of the European Union, *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, Brussels, 30 November 2005, at <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf>; see also Stan Petrescu, *Apărarea și securitatea europeană*, Editura Militară, București, 2006, p. 179.

<sup>4</sup> *EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Commission Outlines Main Achievements and Future Challenges*, Brussels, 20 July 2010, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/987&format=HTML&aged=0&language=RO&guiLanguage=en>

The *Communication*, highlighting both the achievements and the future challenges and initiatives, laid the basis for the comprehensive *EU Internal Security Strategy*.

On this occasion, Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, stated: “Thankfully, the overall number of terrorist attacks and arrests is decreasing in the EU, but at the same time terrorist methods and terrorist propaganda are evolving and taking new forms. We must make sure that we are able to meet these new threats”<sup>5</sup>.

The assessment specifies the existing measures with a view to preventing, protecting, pursuing and responding to terrorist threats, underlying all the effort to counter the terrorist propaganda and recruitment as well as the measures to avoid attacks with explosives and to prevent chemical, biological and nuclear threats. The *Communication* also identifies the future challenges in the domains such as crisis situations radicalisation or management.

In order to *prevent* people being drawn into terrorism and hinder the appearance of a new future generation of terrorists, the European Union developed a *Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*<sup>6</sup>, which is implemented through the *Action Plan for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment into Terrorism*, adopted by the European Council in December 2005.

Starting from the obvious fact that the radicalisation and recruitment into committing terrorist acts must be combated first of all by member states, at national, regional and local level, the activity developed at the EU level, especially through the contribution of the European Commission, may provide the necessary framework meant to support the coordination of national policies, information exchange and establishment of a good practice in the field.

In the Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council regarding “*Terrorist Recruitment: Addressing the Factors Contributing to Violent Radicalisation*” (Brussels, 3 October 2005) it was stipulated that “*violent radicalisation is the phenomenon by which certain individuals holding certain points of view, opinions and ideas may be led to commit terrorist acts as defined in Article 1 of the Framework-Decision on Combating Terrorism*”.

Regarding the *disruption* of the terrorist activity, the European Union aims to:

- internationally pursue terrorists, hinder terrorist plans, annihilate networks and recruitment activities into committing terrorist acts, cut off funding and materials used in attacks and bring terrorists to justice while respecting human rights.
- assess threats and develop common policies to respond to terrorism.

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<sup>5</sup> At [http://ec.europa.eu/commission\\_2010-2014/malmstrom/welcome/default\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malmstrom/welcome/default_en.htm)

<sup>6</sup> *Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*, 24.11.2005, at <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14781-re01.en05pdf>



- deprive terrorists of the means by which they mount attacks – either directly (for instance, weapons and explosives) or indirectly (for instance, false documentation to enable undetected travel or residence).

The European Commission drew up an EU Action Plan, which consists of 50 concrete actions to minimise the risk of terrorist attacks with explosives, approved by the Council in April 2008. With a view to better protecting the European population and infrastructure, a series of proposals regarding the improvement of the control of the access to dangerous substances and the enhancement of public transport security were introduced in the new EU internal security document<sup>7</sup>.

*The EU Action Plan on Chemical, Biological or Radiological/Nuclear (CBRN)*, approved in November 2009, consists of 130 specific actions in the field of preventing, detecting and responding to CBRN incidents; it establishes a clear agenda for the Union member states and institutions for the following period.

*The Action Plan for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment into Terrorism* put in charge the EU Council, in cooperation with the Commission, to draw up a communication strategy meant to combat radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism through the efficient communication of the values and policies of the European Union through the media.

*The Media Communication Strategy* was developed in the wider context of the fight of the European Union against radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism, being adopted by the EU Council in July 2006.

As far as terrorism financing is concerned, the *EU Counter Terrorist Financing Strategy*, adopted by the European Council in December 2004, stipulated<sup>8</sup>:

- enhancement of national codes of conduct for non-profit organisations;
- adoption of regulations regarding bank transfers;
- provision of capacities and improvement of assets freezing procedures;
- improvement of cooperation between the intelligence community/authorities that enforce the law and financial supervision authorities;
- increased financial investigation capacity and cooperation between financial investigation units (FIU), including through the use of FIU.Net;
- implementation of EU legislation regarding money laundering and liquidities transfer, and combating the inadequate use of the non-profit sector.

Through a mechanism and a logic that are similar to the *Foreign Terrorist Organizations – FTO* list, of the US Department of State, the Council of the European Union drew up the *List of Terrorist Organisations and Persons Linked to Terrorist Activities*, periodically updated (every six months) or whenever needed.

<sup>7</sup> At [http://ec.europa.eu/commission\\_2010-2014/malmstrom/welcome/default\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malmstrom/welcome/default_en.htm)

<sup>8</sup> At [www.mie.ro/\\_documente/negocieri/consiliul\\_european\\_dec.2004pdf](http://www.mie.ro/_documente/negocieri/consiliul_european_dec.2004pdf).

In 2007, a new working party was established, the *Working Party on the Implementation of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism*, which was in charge of examining proposals for listing and de-listing and of preparing the regular review of the list (the improved procedure for listing and de-listing represents an important step forward in ensuring fairness and transparency)<sup>9</sup>.

In 2008, the European Commission changed the *Framework-Decision on Combating Terrorism* in order to conduct a thorough analysis of different aspects of the *European Union Counter-Terrorist Strategy*, such as the way in which terrorists used the Internet for communication, fundraising, training, recruitment and propaganda. The actions in this field will further strengthen through the review of the *EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*, which is now in force.

In keeping with the Resolution of the European Parliament on the external dimension of the fight against international terrorism (15 February 2007 – Strasbourg), countering the terrorist phenomenon is a priority for the European Union and a key element in its external action, sense in which the Union and its member states must integrate the own counter-terrorism strategy in a multilateral strategy. Moreover, one must seek to approach terrorism in all its dimensions, including the security, political, economic, social and cultural aspects (as a consequence of the global dimension of terrorism, a global response is needed).

In the Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council named *Stepping up the Fight against Terrorism*, on 11 November 2007, the international dimension of the EU approach to the phenomenon is presented: “*Since terrorism is a global phenomenon, the EU also cooperates closely with partner countries and international organisations regarding counter-terrorism legislation, law enforcement and judicial cooperation. The fight against terrorism in its various facets is a standing agenda item in Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial meetings with strategic partners and in other fora such as the UN and the G8*”<sup>10</sup>.

After the 11 September 2001 attacks and the terrorist attacks that took place in Europe consequently, the EU and the USA stepped up their police and judicial

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<sup>9</sup> Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, *Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP – 2007*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2008, p. 62, at <http://consilium.europa.eu>

<sup>10</sup> *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Stepping up the Fight against Terrorism*, COM/2007/0649 final, Brussels, 6.11.2007, at <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0649:FIN:RO:HTML>

cooperation at penal level. An important element in this respect is the transfer and processing of personal data when they are relevant to preventing, investigating, tracking down or prosecuting crimes, including terrorist acts.

Both the European Union and the American authorities are determined to provide the protection of personal data and private life. Yet, the two parties have had different approaches, in the recent years, to data protection and that has sparked controversy in the context of the negotiation of information exchange agreements (such as the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme, the so-called *SWIFT Agreement* or the data transfer agreement – *Passenger Name Record/PNR*).

For these reasons, in Brussels, in June 2010, a common EU-USA document was adopted: *Common EU-US Declaration on Counterterrorism*. The Declaration is one of the most important documents adopted lately. The Spanish Presidency of the EU (January-July 2010) considered that the declaration was a positive message for the international community, in general, and the Muslim countries, in particular. The Europeans and the Americans now subscribe to the same principles – prohibition on torture as well as on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of the perpetrators of terrorism, assurance that all terrorist suspects' trials occur within a legal framework that provides for meaningful due process rights and prosecution of the personnel who are alleged to have committed abuses relating to efforts to combat terrorism<sup>11</sup>. Basically, the *Declaration* ends the divergences occurred between the Americans and the Europeans on this topic during the mandate of former American President George W. Bush.

The European Commission seeks to adopt standards regarding the protection of personal data that have mandatory juridical power, are enforceable and guarantee the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. The observance of these standards will be controlled by independent public authorities on both sides of the Atlantic.

### ***The European Security Strategy and the EU Internal Security Strategy***

Throughout time, the European Union has adopted a series of strategies regarding preventing and countering the threats to the security of the community area, the first of them and the most important being the *European Union Security Strategy*.

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<sup>11</sup> Council of the European Union, *Signature of EU-US Agreement on Financial Messaging Data for Purposes of the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme*, Brussels, 28 June 2010, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>

*The European Security Strategy*<sup>12</sup> (*A Secure Europe in a Better World*), drawn up under the coordination of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and adopted within the European Council in Thessaloniki (December 2003), is the document that sets the guidelines of the European Union internal and international security strategy.

The “*Solana Document*” was aimed at establishing the strategic objectives of the European Union from the perspective of assuming a much more powerful role in the global approach to the management of the new types of risks and threats. Starting from the global analysis of their impact on European security, it established three major goals that the Union had to promote in supporting the values and principles that govern it:

- a. to promote a conflict prevention efficient policy through the use of the entire set of capabilities (military or civil) the EU possesses;
- b. to guide the Union’s approaches to the creation of a security climate in the immediate neighbourhood of Europe (the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus);
- c. to maintain the international order based on effective multilateralism, to uphold and develop international law in keeping with the principles of the United Nations.

In the field of European security policy, the implications of the *EU Strategies* translate into:

1. *Partnerships:*

- international cooperation;
- enhancement of the transatlantic relationship;
- enhancement of the relations with Russia;
- strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India.

2. *A more coherent Union:*

- common will of action;
- increased synergy between the various EU tools as well as between the EU and its member states;
- harmonisation of member states policies.

3. *A more capable Union:*

- increase in defence resources and optimisation of the way they are used through common capabilities development;
- civil capabilities development;

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<sup>12</sup> *Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 14 December 2003, at [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

- EU-NATO cooperation development;
- broader spectrum of missions.

4. *A more active Union:*

- the development of a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention;
- the capacity to sustain several operations simultaneously;
- preventive engagement in managing crisis situations.

Moreover, the *strategic objectives* of the European Union in the field of European security and defence are the following:

1. *An international order based on effective multilateralism:*

- strengthening the United Nations;
- the transatlantic relationship, one of the core elements of the international system;
- strengthening the role of regional organisations.

2. *Security climate in the immediate neighbourhood:*

- cooperative relations with the countries to the East of the European Union;
- resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict;
- development of cooperation with the states to the South of the European Union – Barcelona Process.

3. *Countering threats:*

- preventive action;
- optimal combination in using the tools made available to the EU.

The strategy distinguishes between *threats* (international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, collapse of the state, organised crime) and *global challenges* (poverty and bad governance, global warming, competition for natural resources, energy dependence and provision of security as a precondition of development).

The European Council in December 2003 also adopted the *EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*<sup>13</sup>, enhanced through the adoption of a common EU-USA declaration regarding the cooperation in this domain. The new document sets out the ways in which the EU will contribute to the global effort aimed at combating this type of threat. From this perspective, the EU believes that the promotion of a stable international and regional environment is a condition for the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a close cooperation with key partners such as the USA, the Russian Federation, Japan and Canada being crucial.

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<sup>13</sup> At <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>

The strategy also affirms the necessity to enhance the political, financial and technical support with regard to the verification of the international regimes in the field of non-proliferation, as well as the efforts of the EU in settling regional conflicts through the use of all CFSP/ESDP valid instruments. Last but not least, the Strategy underlines the need for adapting the EU institutional architecture through the creation of a unit within the General Secretariat of the Council that must function as a monitoring centre, in close connection with the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) of the EU and the European Commission.

The evaluation of the way in which the provisions of the *EU Security Strategy* were implemented was materialised in the report entitled *Providing Security in a Changing World*, presented to the European Council in December 2008. The document reiterates that the effectiveness of EU actions in countering terrorism depends on the cooperation and enhanced information exchange between EU institutions, member states and their intelligence services as well as the EU specialised agencies (Europol and Eurojust)<sup>14</sup>. To this end, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has a vital role to play and should be given more competences and resources, and must receive the intelligence services reports, key elements in combating terrorist activities.

Essential part of the *Stockholm Programme*, which regards the security of the European citizens, the *Security Strategy* points out the complex challenges<sup>15</sup> for which there must be a common, integrated approach, the document being implemented over the next four years.

The *Internal Security Strategy* was adopted in order to assist the Union to advance in terms of providing internal security, regrouping the already existing activities and setting out the principles and guidelines for future action. It is designed to prevent crime and increase the capacity to respond quickly and appropriately to natural and man-made disasters, through the efficient development and management of appropriate tools.

Countering terrorism holds a central place in the *EU Internal Security Strategy*<sup>16</sup>, because, in various reports, the experts on security issues, including the EU counterterrorism coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, points out that the main threat to the Union is posed by the terrorism inspired by al-Qaeda and that more and more

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<sup>14</sup> *The European Security Strategy 2003-2008. Building on Common Interests*, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), February 2009, no. 5, p. 65, at [http://www.iss.europa.eu/index.php?id=18&no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=1154&tx\\_ttnews\[backPid\]=133&cHash=6b68b1ac7d](http://www.iss.europa.eu/index.php?id=18&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1154&tx_ttnews[backPid]=133&cHash=6b68b1ac7d)

<sup>15</sup> Organised (cross-border and cyber) crime, terrorism, drug, weapon, human trafficking, car smuggling, economic crime and corruption etc.

<sup>16</sup> *EU Internal Security Strategy. Towards a European Security Model*, March 2010, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>

citizens of the member states go to conflict areas, where they are trained and then return to Europe in order to perpetrate attacks.

To counter this phenomenon in all its aspects, the *Strategy* identifies five major objectives to be achieved and proposes a series of actions as well as the year of their implementation.

The *first objective* is to *disrupt international crime networks which threaten member states*. For that purpose, there have been proposed several measures: to seize, freeze, manage and confiscate criminal assets, to use the EU Passenger Name Records, to monitor and assist member states in their anti-corruption efforts, all of them being implemented by 2011.

The *second objective* refers to *preventing terrorism and addressing radicalisation and recruitment of Islamist militants*. This would be achieved by the development of a policy for EU extraction and analysis of financial messaging data, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme, the creation of an EU radicalisation-awareness network and the adoption of measures to combat violent extremist propaganda, the enhancement of the community transportation security policy<sup>17</sup>.

The *third objective* is to *raise levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace* by the creation of an EU cybercrime centre (2013), the establishment of a network of Computer Emergency Response Teams (2012), the establishment of the *European Information Sharing and Alert System – EISAS* (2013).

Strengthening security through border management is the *fourth objective* contained in the document, resulting in the establishment of the *European Border Surveillance – EUROSUR*, the identification of “*sensitive points*” at the external borders, the development of joint reports on human trafficking, human smuggling and smuggling of illicit goods, which were made in 2011.

The *last objective* set is to increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters, by submitting a proposal on the implementation of the solidarity clause, on the development of a European Emergency Response Capacity or the establishment of a coherent risk management policy (by 2014).

Annually, the European Commission will present to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers a report on the progress made. A key role in implementing the joint strategy will be the *Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI)*<sup>18</sup>, which will work continuously with the European Commission. The proposed goals began to be implemented; in this regard, in February 2011, the European Commission presented a proposal for the *EU Passenger*

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 16-18.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, p. 25.



*Name Record*<sup>19</sup>, meant to prevent and prosecute terrorist offences and serious crimes. The proposal requires airlines to provide member states with data on passengers entering or leaving the territory of the EU, while ensuring a high level of protection of privacy and personal data<sup>20</sup>. This initiative replaces the Commission's proposal for a framework-decision on the RNP-type data use, adopted in 2007. Following the entry into force of the *Treaty of Lisbon*, it was necessary that the framework-decision of 2007 to be resubmitted under the new rules stipulated in this treaty.

To fulfill the EU's role as coordinator of antiterrorist activities, the cooperation between intelligence services is essential, taking place at European and transatlantic level. Internationally, a growing role is played by bilateral and multilateral contacts; of obviously, all cooperation forms are subject to many political, structural and legal factors of influence<sup>21</sup>.

The United States cooperate effectively with the corresponding services of the group G5 (the UK, France, Spain, Germany and Italy) also at the level of intelligence services of the Euro-Atlantic community<sup>22</sup>. Nevertheless, in terms of structural cooperation between the EU and NATO, it is still at an early stage. More exactly, for the intensification of intelligence sharing with the EU, the Alliance established *Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit*, in which the United States, Germany, the UK and Spain are represented. The organisation began its activity in 2005. The purpose of the new entity is drawing up intelligence reports on combating terrorism; moreover, it develops and provides direct collaboration with the security services of the member states of NATO, Partnership for Peace and of those the Alliance works with within the Mediterranean Dialogue<sup>23</sup>.

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The *2007 Europol Report* on terrorism situation and its evolution in the EU – “*EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007*”<sup>24</sup> indicates that almost all terrorist campaigns are transnational, an issue that has maintained

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<sup>19</sup> The data from the Passenger Name Record consist in the pieces of information provided by passengers and collected by transporters at the time of the reservation, check-in and boarding.

<sup>20</sup> *EU Proposal for Passenger Data to Fight Serious Crime and Terrorism*, 02.02.2011, at [http://www.amosnews.ro/Propunerea\\_UE\\_privind\\_datele\\_pasagerilor\\_in\\_vederea\\_combaterii\\_criminalitatatii\\_si\\_terorismului\\_-29-62561](http://www.amosnews.ro/Propunerea_UE_privind_datele_pasagerilor_in_vederea_combaterii_criminalitatatii_si_terorismului_-29-62561)

<sup>21</sup> Gerd Föhrenbach, *Transformare și securitate internă*, in „*Europäische Sicherheit*“, no. 9/2006.

<sup>22</sup> William Rosenau, *Liasons Dangereuses? Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation and the Global War on Terrorism*, RAND Corporation Washington Office, p. 8.

<sup>23</sup> Annegret Bendiek, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>24</sup> *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007*, at [www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU\\_Terrorism\\_Situation\\_and\\_Trend\\_Report\\_TESAT/TESAT2007.pdf](http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TESAT/TESAT2007.pdf)

and enhanced lately. It is obvious that the internal and external aspect of fighting terrorism are interdependent and that, for the effectiveness of any measure, there are necessary an enhanced cooperation and a more intense information exchange between member states and their respective services, as well as with the Europol and, where necessary, with competent authorities of third party countries.

This requirement is needed especially in relation to the cooperation between national intelligence services; because of the risk of uncovering the secret human resources and work methods, and as a result of the bilateral relations features that some EU member states maintain with other countries (the most obvious example is the one between the British and the American intelligence), the formal cooperation between intelligence services does not match up the threats aimed at all member countries: terrorism, cross-border crime, illegal immigration etc.

According to experts, terrorist threats should be approached mainly at national level, even if we know that the current threat is especially at the international level. The activity at the EU level complements these efforts and is built around the prevention, protection, prosecution and response in the case in which an attack occurs. These four elements form the basis for the community legislation to counter terrorism, being found in the strategies adopted by the Union in the last decade.

**English version by**  
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# COOPERATION PERSPECTIVES IN THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Valentin-Bogdan DĂNILĂ

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*The dynamics of political, economic and military changes at the international level at the beginning of the third millennium is fast and unpredictable. Each event can have decisive influence over the strategy of the entities that dispute economic resources and markets, today more intense than ever, making it more difficult to organise a debate regarding the construction of a new international order and of the geopolitical changes that it will bring about.*

*These changes have affected the international security environment have determined the clarification of a vision of the international community aimed at strengthening global peace and security and, implicitly, at reducing the conflicting tensions of all kinds and the causes of major international disputes.*

**Keywords:** *security environment; security reform; Southeastern Europe; cooperative security; non-military challenges*

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**T**he topic of the national armed forces transformation is placed on the agenda of almost every European state, no matter if it is part of the European Union or NATO or it is not yet part of any of the two. In the past 20 years, the significant geopolitical changes in Europe have determined the transition from the classical tasks of defending the country to peacekeeping and crisis management operations, and security networks.

Although the armed forces transformation does not represent an issue that detects only the transformation of the Southeastern European states, this region must also deal with supplementary challenges as far as military issues are concerned. In particular, the social aspects of the armed forces transformation in Southeastern Europe seem to play a more important part than in the case of Western Europe. Unlike the established democracies and the market economy in Central and Western Europe, in which security institutions are easily accepted by citizens,

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in some countries in Southeastern Europe, people unfortunately lost confidence in their own security forces. The reasons are obvious: the abuse of the security forces with a view to reaching the political objectives during the Communist authoritarian regime and, mainly, during the wars in the Balkans in the '90s.

The reorientation of the armed forces in Southeastern Europe, which is usually connected with an ample and painful personnel cut, becomes an important issue for the regional stabilisation processes and not for only one state.

The changes in the domain of civil-military relations have been put into practice officially by the domestic political forces. However, Chris Donnelly, NATO adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs, underlines that *“as all Western countries have had to struggle with this problem over time, there is a value in Western specialists sharing their experience and analyses of the problem, as certain elements may nevertheless be applicable to the new democracies”*.

Consequently, the European and Euro-Atlantic political and military organisations have become directly involved in the process of transformation of the relation between the military institution and the political forces in Eastern European countries. Starting with 1989, when Romania and Bulgaria renounced their own Communist political system, their armed forces have undergone a radical transformation process.

In the early '90s, the two countries acknowledged the need for reconsidering their membership in the former Warsaw Pact and looking for new alternative methods to protect their national security. The need to become part of NATO was expressed by the two countries in the middle of the '90s, when they considered more seriously the idea to officially apply for membership in the North-Atlantic Alliance.

In order to reach this status, Romania and Bulgaria initiated more radical reforms of their security and defence institutions and related policies in order to meet the accession criteria imposed by NATO for candidate countries. In addition to increasing cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria, NATO member states underlined, during the North-Atlantic Alliance Summits in Madrid (1997) and Washington (1999), the *“political pledge towards Southeastern Europe, being aware that, as proven by the developments in the latest years, the overall stability in Europe is inseparably linked to the stability of this region”*.

The challenges with which modern states deal are higher now compared to massively recruiting armies, which seems archaic. The policy of these latest years is to reduce existing armed forces to the detriment of increasing soldiers performance and ability to engage in modern wars. Our age has witnessed the mass recruitment for the national armed forces, in which every young person

could join the military to do his duty to defend the homeland; today, the military are replaced with a smaller but professional force.

In our opinion, the armed forces transformation should be directed towards a sharp increase in the interaction between national and multinational actors, which respond together to various attacks either being part of permanent organisation, such as the North Atlantic Alliance, or when it is extremely necessary, in ad-hoc coalitions.

The armed forces transformation should be directed towards adapting to a risk fragmentation environment, in which the enemy carries out his activities in a virtual space. This brings radical changes in the strategies and ideas of crucial wars<sup>1</sup>.

As the main enemy is not represented by another national army anymore, but a difficult-to-follow network of non-state actors, the military must find the correct way to respond to such an opponent. We are therefore facing the challenge given by the asymmetrical wars for which the mass recruitment-based armed forces were not prepared.

### ***Why Are Cooperative Security Strategies Needed in Southeastern Europe?***

In the globalised world, the crises and personnel downsizing in the military are reflected in the privatisation of the military performance – it can be noticed an explosion of private companies engaged in various military activities. The number of private companies in the field of war and security is increasing. We are thus witnessing the appearance and the increasing number of global companies that provide a variety of pieces of information regarding logistics, secret intelligence, security counselling and services to states and transnational companies (such companies exist in Bosnia and Kosovo, in Iraq and Afghanistan)<sup>2</sup>.

The current trend is to privatise peacekeeping operations, the UN carrying out special campaigns to restore order in various regions. From the '90s of the twentieth century, private companies have set up armed forces in order to obtain intelligence and security consultants for the trained soldiers, guards, secret agents, purchasing weapons and providing logistic support in order to take part in operations in high-risk areas.

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<sup>1</sup> Carl Bildt, *La politique de sécurité et de défense de l'UE, les cinq premières années*, Institut d'études de sécurité de l'UE, Paris, 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Ch.C. Moskos, J.A. Williams, D.R. Segal, *The Post-modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000.

The increased processes of “*computerisation*” of the society and the resulting threats, the increased vulnerability of nuclear, biological, genetic, geological and chemical weapons technology involve radical changes in the military structures with a view to achieving very well-trained and professional armed forces.

Dynamic organisational structures, either non-state actors or nation states, become key factors in the new type of war. This makes the cooperation of traditional hierarchical structures of a state with so dangerous networks very difficult. They must adapt their organisation and strategies to combat the new type of enemy “*network*”, and not to the similar structures of other states.

Therefore, there is a need for a coalition with a variable geometry, which responds rapidly to the threats that may require more time and more consideration on behalf of the organisational structures that cannot deal with today’s unconventional threats. These types of wars do not take into account the dominance of the principle of sovereignty from the years following the Second World War, replacing it with the principles based on pre-emptive actions, anti-terrorist attacks and humanitarian operations. They are not waged for conquering new territories or driving away enemy forces, but in contempt of politically motivated violence, domestic disturbances, civil wars, drug trafficking, namely for all the factors that could lead to the privatisation of violence for the state not to be able to ensure its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.

The conflicts between networks rather than within hierarchies become more imminent. This is part of a new kind of information warfare in most part with low intensity conflicts. However, the focus is on procedures, such as information and perception management operations, or on the efforts to persuade or mislead the enemy.

The key factor is psychological coercion and not physical pressure. It is significant, in this respect, that it would be once more wrong to compare Bulgaria and Romania, Macedonia and Albania, Slovenia and Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia.

The concept of “*cooperative security*” has been developed in the latest decades. A definition of the early ’90s describes it as “*a key strategic principle that seeks to achieve its purpose through the institutional consent rather than the threat of material or physical coercion*”<sup>3</sup>.

The central purpose of cooperative security arrangements is to prevent war and to achieve this first of all by removing the means of aggression, thus avoiding the need for threatened states to implement their own countermeasures. Cooperative

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<sup>3</sup> J.E. Nolan, *The Concept of Cooperative Security*, in J.E. Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement, Cooperation and Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Brookings, Washington DC, 1994, pp. 4-5.

security shifts in this way the centre of security planning from preparing to countering threats, from deterring aggression to ways of making its preparation more difficult. Cooperative security differs from the traditional idea of collective security, seen as preventive medicine for acute care<sup>4</sup>.

However, the term is not free of problems. The first one refers to its semantics. It is hard to imagine how “security” can be “cooperation” or the opposite. The concept that stems from the above definition is not “security” as such, but a specific strategic security policy. In this context, the term may indicate a shift from the “traditional” strategy security policies based on coercion and confrontation to a strategy that seeks to find solutions to security problems, even perhaps in cooperation with potential enemies.

In contrast to the way in which it was often presented, it is not precisely a novelty. It can be found almost throughout the entire history of diplomatic relations. It was expressed explicitly for the first time in the development of the concept of *arms control* in the early '60s by Schelling/Halperin, Brennan and Bull<sup>5</sup>, whose theory stressed the need to cooperate, even with potential enemies, in order to prevent the outbreak of wars. However, it gained popularity in the later stages of the confrontation between the East and the West, where it was often presented as an alternative security policy, juxtaposed to deterrence and, after the end of the East-West division, it eventually emerged as a dominant principle of the European security policy, substantiated in relevant documents, especially in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE)<sup>6</sup>.

Ironically, while the concept of “cooperative security” became a mantra of European security policy, Europe experienced the worst outbreak of violence since the end of the Second World War, culminating in the secession wars from former Yugoslavia. It became, on the one hand, a clear indicator for the limitations of the cooperative security strategies, while post-war arrangements, on the other hand, clearly indicated the role of security political cooperation strategies not only to prevent armed conflicts, but also to restore the state of security in post-war situations.

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<sup>4</sup> Ashton Carter, William Perry, John D. Steinbrunner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1992, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, 1961; republished in 1985, McLean, VA, p. 1; the same approach can be found in Donald G. Brennan, *Setting and Goals of Arms Control*, in D.G. Brennan (ed.), *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security*; G. Braziller, New York, 1961; Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race*, London, 1961.

<sup>6</sup> Kari Möttölä, *Prospects for Cooperative Security in Europe: The Role of the CSCE*, in Michael R. Lucas, *The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation*, Nomos, Baden, 1993, pp. 1-29.



The concept and its use seem rather unclear, especially within the academic community (there are no clear suggestions regarding its characteristics, substance or limits both in conceptual terms and in practice)<sup>7</sup>.

A particular weakness within this debate is the lack of a concept opposed to the one of “*cooperative security*”, which in most of the cases brings about a mixture of traditional concepts, such as, for instance, the one of *collective security*<sup>8</sup>.

Thus, the lack of conceptual clarity triggers rivalries and mistaken expectations. On the one hand, cooperation is presented as a general concept, meant to overcome the anarchy in the international system<sup>9</sup>, as it is perceived by the “*realists*”. On the other hand, and especially in reaction to these somehow optimistic opinions, the concept of “*cooperative security*” is considered as insufficient by the main trend of “*realists*”. The contradictions are aggravated even more by the presentation of the concept not only as an antithesis but also, implicitly, as an alternative that is preferable to the policies of the traditional security strategies<sup>10</sup>.

One must take into account that the worsening of the social and economic situation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFR Yugoslavia), in the early '80s, led to the rise of nationalism in different republics<sup>11</sup>. During the early stages, it seemed that the different actors on the ground would adopt, in principle, cooperation strategies, emphasising the negotiations despite the increasingly clearer rhetoric. The first hint for non-cooperative attitudes was the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy by the Serbian government, in the cases of violation of the 1974 SFR Yugoslavia Constitution as well as the increased repression. A stronger indication for non-cooperative strategies showing the willingness to use force was pointed out in the speech of Slobodan Milosevic, on the occasion of the commemoration of 600 years since the battle of Kosovo Polje<sup>12</sup>.

The willingness to compromise further decreased at all levels, when the last chance for a peaceful development was missed because of the non-acceptance by the Serbian side of a proposal for constitutional changes in 1990 with a view to forming a confederation rather than a federation. When Slovenia and Croatia eventually

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<sup>7</sup> Charles L. Glaser, *Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help*, in *International Security*, 1994/1995, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 50-90.

<sup>8</sup> See John J. Mearsheimer, *The False Promise of International Institutions*, in *International Security*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-49.

<sup>9</sup> W.J. Perry, *Military Action: When to Use It and How to Ensure Its Effectiveness*, in J. Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement*, pp. 235-241.

<sup>10</sup> C.L. Glaser, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>11</sup> Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, new edition, 1993, Penguin Books, London; Laura Silber, Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, Penguin Books, London, 2<sup>nd</sup> revised edition, 1996.

<sup>12</sup> H. Vetschera, Andrea Smutek-Riemer, *Early Warning. The Case of Yugoslavia*, a paper given within the 16<sup>th</sup> World Conference of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), Berlin, 1994.

declared their independence in the summer of 1991, the political conflict turned into a military one, soon followed by a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from 1992 to 1995.

In parallel with these developments, the situation in Kosovo deteriorated gradually, but it however remained below the level of armed confrontation. At the end of 1992, the international community tried to defuse the growing tensions in Kosovo, Sándzak and Vojvodina by deploying the first CSCE mission in these areas. Their mandate was clearly one of cooperation. While the panic government Milan in Belgrade initially accepted these missions and was ready to cooperate, the Milosevic-Seselj coalition government, which appeared in the December 1992 elections, took an anti-cooperation stand and refused to extend the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with those missions, forcing them to leave by mid-1993.

This does not exclude cooperation activities. Slovenia and, in fact, the remains of Yugoslavia already dominated by Serbia (later named the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/FRY), accepted a cease-fire immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and a compromise that led to a *de jure divorce* of Slovenia from Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1992. In addition, in early 1992, Croatia and Yugoslavia agreed upon a cease-fire agreement and its supervision by a UN peacekeeping force – United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). While the ceasefire and the subsequent development of the UNPROFOR were made under pressure by the international community, it however proved to be functional, even if there were some mental reservations from the Croatian side, which kept open the option to recapture the parts occupied by the Serbian forces. The implementation of a peacekeeping force with a mandate for cooperation thus proved to be the most suitable situation, the way it was, for the moment, in principle, accepted by all the parties. The situation changed only when Croatia readopted uncooperative strategies, by attacks, in 1995, retaking the parts occupied by Serbian forces.

The reactions from the international community, especially the West (for instance, the US and other NATO member states), indicated that the lessons were learned from the implementation of the two approaches in the security policy. The policy of ensuring cooperative security was challenged occasionally, for example, by the outbreak of the armed conflict in FYROM in 2001. However, this conflict was kept under control through international mediation before it could endanger the existence of the state or the regional stability. Another challenge arose with the declared wish of Montenegro to separate itself from the FRY. While these trends were encouraged by the West during Milosevic government, after the changes in Belgrade, they were considered less positive.

In 2003, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Javier Solana, brokered a three-year moratorium before a referendum

on Montenegro's independence could take place. Again, cooperative approaches managed that the agreement and Serbia and Montenegro's accession could undertake the considered procedures. When the moratorium expiration date approached, in 2006, Montenegro was – contrary to all expectations of the West – still forced to engage in the spectre of a new secession war for the independence, despite the much lower level of emotions, compared to the previous secession. Again, the cooperative security policy determined, in the case in which the EU brokered a special procedure, the adoption of a threshold for the referendum. The compromise was accepted by both Serbia and Montenegro, the referendum taking place in May 2006, with a real success, but with some questions.

However, the issue of Kosovo still remains, in which both the Serbian and the Albanian parties insist upon their positions and leave little room for compromise. For the Albanians, nothing lacking independence would be acceptable. Similarly, for the Serbians, a secession of the Kosovo province is just as unacceptable. The question is whether they eventually can find a compromise, at least in real life, even when an officially negotiated compromise may not be possible for domestic reasons or in the case in which they choose to engage in non-cooperation strategy.

One must not ignore the fact that cooperation strategies require, at the final stage, the willingness to give up some elements of the issues involved, in order to reach a compromise, and there are no such signals on the horizon. On the other hand, non-cooperative strategies require, at the final stage, the willingness to wage war for the issue in question, either to defend against it or to coerce. Although it remains unclear whether the concerned parties would go with their uncooperative attitudes to extremes, one can notice the increasingly belligerent rhetoric especially from parts of the political scene in Belgrade. Combined with the expressed lack of willingness to reach a compromise, the situation reminds more and more of the moment the conflicts began.

### ***Security Standardisation Programme-Mandate Developed by European Organisations***

It is rather difficult to talk about security and defence sector reform in Southeastern Europe. There are as many reforms as countries involved and, again, it would be wrong to compare Bulgaria and Romania, Macedonia and Albania, Slovenia and Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia. Each of these countries has a different perception regarding the threats to national and regional security. Each one has a different status and different level of engagement regarding the main defence and security institutions (EU, NATO, OSCE, UN).

The responsibility of any democratic state is to exist as such, and for this purpose, institutions are needed. The second step is to have these institutions, including those related to security and defence, and to make them work properly and democratically. Until then, nothing can be imposed from the outside, except the need for democratic institutions and, most certainly, there cannot be given incentives to participate in foreign operations on behalf of *“the global war on terrorism”*.

The framework is very clear: the European Union, with the United Nations’ support, OSCE’s monitoring and NATO’s support, technical assistance and advice.

We believe that the future of the Balkan countries lies in regional cooperation. Nevertheless, not to repeat the mistakes of the past, some guidelines must be developed and followed by all countries. Since economic revival seems to be the most important area at the moment, efforts should be channelled towards this sphere of activity.

For too long, Western governments have failed to obtain a consistent commitment at all levels, yet, after a long absence, optimism has returned among Balkan policies.

One way to achieve security goals in the today interdependent world economy is the use of economic tools, such as economic sanctions or incentives. Of course, experts estimate that the chances of a quick economic recovery in the region are very slim despite the many integrative initiatives, both at external and internal level, aimed at promoting regional cooperation and economic development.

Joseph Kipling said, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, that: *“The world outside receives information about the Balkans only in occasions of terror and turmoil occurring therein and for the rest of the time this region is contemptuously ignored”*. A lot of time has passed since then and, yet, the image of Southeastern Europe as an uncertain and unsettled area still remains. The transformation process is being completed and the future political practices will probably lead to positive changes in relation to the return of Balkan states into the family of European democratic countries.

From a traditional perspective, national and international security has mainly been determined by military factors. But it can be said that non-military challenges are more numerous and more threatening. The development worldwide demonstrates more and more that security and stability, both political and social, are multidimensional concepts and that economy is the most important dimension. Europe, including the Balkans, becomes more stable and peaceful and there is no indication of any armed conflict in the near future.

Within Southeastern Europe, the discrepancies in the last century, combined with economic stagnation, backwardness and primitivism in agriculture and the low living standard, generate dissatisfaction among many social groups, conflicts of interest, interethnic conflicts where there are minority communities involved.

Therefore, some of the major factors that have lately contributed to the insecurity in the Balkans are related to the total collapse of the economy in transition countries,

repeated reduction in the living standard, high unemployment, high taxes, uncontrollable corruption and crime and privatisation at any cost.

Following the *Great Depression* of the '30s<sup>13</sup>, no other region in the world had a greater cut in peacetime production, a faster unification of the population and a deeper social stratification. Statistics show that, while in the late '80s, the GDP in the Balkans was 3 to 5 times lower than the indicator of Western Europe, in the late '90s, the difference increased tenfold. This blockage of progress was due to scarce material and energy resources, the indicators of debt to foreign countries, the value of production in most of the Balkan countries, most of them in economic transition.

### ***What Does Regional Cooperation Require?***

Regional cooperation is a prerequisite for long-term stability in the region. Some progress has been made in this field: the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Croatia have agreed on closer cooperation within the Ohrid-Adriatic Sea Group in order to accelerate the process of the countries during the NATO and EU integration.

The Ohrid-Adriatic Sea Group countries also collaborate on border security, their ultimate goal being to meet European standards. Regional cooperation is a key element of the EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement and of PfP<sup>14</sup>. In addition, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, created in 1999, complements the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) by creating new forms of cooperation and by stimulating the practical and financial support from the international community. The Stability Pact is focused on regional cooperation in the field of business and environment initiatives, fight against corruption and organised crime, elimination of ethnic discrimination, security sector reform and independence of the media.

The Stability Pact includes more than 40 countries and international organisations. Its six main objectives are: local democracy/cross-border cooperation, media, energy and other fields of regional infrastructure, trade and investment, combating organised crime and population movement management and stabilisation, as well as the primary area of activity regarding defence and security.

Other regional initiatives meant to promote peace, stability and cooperation are the Central European Initiative (CEI) and the Southeastern European Cooperation Process (SEEC). CEI was launched in 1989, rapidly increasing

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<sup>13</sup> At [http://www.livinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe30s/money\\_08.html](http://www.livinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe30s/money_08.html)

<sup>14</sup> Romeo Oiță, Albert Patterson, Constantin Onișor, *Împreună pentru securitate*, București, Editura Academiei Oamenilor de Știință, 2010, p. 63.

the number of its members (Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine). SEECP was established in 1997 and comprises nine countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Greece and Turkey). Both provide a comprehensive framework for regional cooperation, coordinating the activities with international organisations and regional initiatives.

The parliamentary dimension of the South Caucasus initiative is extremely remarkable, led through the Memorandum of Understanding in 2003. Parliaments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have formed a common ensemble, chaired alternately every six months.

Parliamentary cooperation could try to overcome the stereotypes promulgated by the media and to improve the mutual knowledge among the new generations which ... do not know about themselves after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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The dynamics of political, economic and military changes at the international level at the beginning of the third millennium is fast and unpredictable. Each event can have decisive influence over the strategy of the entities that dispute economic resources and markets, today more intense than ever, making it more difficult to organise a debate regarding the construction of a new international order and of the geopolitical changes that it will bring about. The American hegemony is today beyond doubt in the international system of states (*“the supremacy”*), as American theorists call it and it has all the chances to last in the foreseeable future.

Disquieting and unpredictable, the new security environment requires a specific and determined approach to the new cross-border and asymmetrical threats and risks. During the *Cold War* and in the period that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of threats to security was dealt with from the national perspective, focusing on the dangers coming from known clearly identified enemies; even the transnational issues – terrorism, organised crime, proliferation, drug trafficking – were addressed from the perspective of the state.

This vision guided the national security policy of the great powers towards actions meant to influence the behaviour and attitude of the other states through economic sanctions, military assistance etc., the stress being laid on the military power, as a guarantee of national security. Currently, this approach to threats from the perspective of the state remains necessary, but not sufficient, because it does not cover the entire range of threats. Globalisation has created

new conditions, which minimise the importance of national borders and the bipolar threat was replaced by a diverse and multipolar set of threats, generated also by conflict situations.

The fact that the current security environment is characterised by high instability, unpredictability (as a manifestation of certain risks and threats, especially asymmetrical ones, of redefinition of relations between great powers and of increased freedom of action of regional, stable and unstable actors) has already become a common topic of specialised studies.

The changes that have affected the international security environment have determined the clarification of a vision of the international community aimed at strengthening global peace and security and, implicitly, at reducing the conflicting tensions of all kinds and the causes of major international disputes. This means identifying the existing vulnerabilities at the international level, the risks and threats that are posed to spaces that are larger than the national state space and even the regional area, resulting in sources of instability or even contributing to worsening the existing ones.

**English version by**  
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**





# E-POWER TO RISE UP THE SECURITY AGENDA

*Joseph S. NYE*

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*When the Internet was created 40 years ago, this small community was like a virtual village of people who knew each other, and they designed a system with little attention to security. Until recently, the issue of cybersecurity was the domain of computer specialists. But in the last decade and a half, the commercial web has created a burgeoning interdependence with great economic opportunities and national security vulnerabilities.*

*If one treats most amateur hacktivism as mostly a nuisance, there are four major categories of cyber threats to national security, each with a different time horizon and with different (in principle) solutions: cyber war and economic espionage are largely associated with states, and cyber crime and cyber terrorism are mostly associated with non-state actors.*

**Keywords:** *cyberspace; cyber terrorism; hacktivism; security threats; non-state actors; diffusion of power*

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**T**he cyber domain is unique in that low barriers to entry contribute to the diffusion of power. It is cheaper and quicker to send signals through cyberspace around the globe than move large ships across oceans.

The costs of developing multiple-carrier task forces and submarine fleets create enormous barriers to entry and make it possible to speak of NATO's naval dominance. In contrast, the barriers to entry in the cyber domain are so low that non-state actors and small states can play significant roles at relatively little cost.

While a few states, like the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China have a greater capacity than others, it makes little sense to speak of dominance in cyber space as in the case of naval or air power. If anything, dependence on complex cyber systems for support of military and economic activities creates new vulnerabilities in large states – ones that can be exploited by other states and non-state actors.

If one treats most amateur hacktivism as mostly a nuisance, there are four major categories of cyber threats to national security, each with a different

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The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, the *2012 Security Predictions* issue, 2012, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/2012-security-predictions/e-Power-cybersecurity/EN/index.htm>.

Joseph S. Nye – Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and author of *The Future of Power*.



time horizon and with different (in principle) solutions: cyber war and economic espionage are largely associated with states, and cyber crime and cyber terrorism are mostly associated with non-state actors.

At present, the highest costs come from the espionage and crime, but over the next decade or so, war and terrorism may become greater threats. Moreover,

as alliances and tactics evolve among different actors, the categories may increasingly overlap.

Looking ahead, as other states develop their capacities for cyber attack on critical infrastructures and are able to deprive NATO military forces of their information advantages, the costs to our hard power could be significant. And as terrorist groups wishing to wreak havoc develop their capacity to do so, their actions could impose dramatic costs as well.

The cyber domain is both new and volatile, and the threats to security are bound to evolve. As I argue in *“The Future of Power”*, the characteristics of cyberspace reduce some of the power differentials among actors, and thus provide a good example of the diffusion of power that typifies global politics in this century. But the diffusion of power does not mean equality of power or the replacement of governments as the most powerful actors in world politics. The United States, for example, has greater vulnerabilities, but also greater capabilities for exploiting the vulnerabilities of other states.



© US Air Force

Security experts wrestling with cyber issues are now at about the same stage in understanding the full implications of this new technology as nuclear experts were in the early years after the first nuclear explosions.

At some point, but not soon, states may progress far enough along a learning curve to design cooperative measures that limit such threats from non-state actors. But we are still a long way from such norms.

# **CAPRONI AND COANDĂ**

## **... Not Only Jets**

### **Similarities and coincidences between two pioneers of the aviation industry**

*Francesco VADALÀ*

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*The purpose of this article is to remind us of the activity of two famous engineers and colleagues, Gianni Caproni and Henry Coandă, and of some of the coincidences and similarities between the two regarding their activity in the field of aeronautics.*

*They met during a stay in Belgium, for a specialisation in electrical engineering, where they discovered that they shared a mutual interest in aerodynamics.*

*After these studies, they embarked on different paths, but continued to stay in touch, keeping each other up-to-date regarding the latest developments in the field.*

*To conclude, we should mention what we believe to be the most important aspect regarding the two: they are both pioneers of jet-propelled airplanes.*

**Keywords:** *"heavier than air"; jet propulsion; aerodynamics; circular wing; "the airplane without propellers"*

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**G**oing through the historical research for the celebrations, in 2010, of the centenary of the first flight of a jet aircraft, it was not possible for us to remain indifferent to the numerous coincidences between the biographies of the two pioneers of aerospace construction: Gianni Caproni and Henry Coandă.

Henry Maria Coandă, only a few weeks older, was born in Bucureşti, on 7 June 1886, while Giovanni Battista Caproni was born in Massone d'Arco (Trento) on 3 July the same year. Both attended university engineering studies at German polytechnics: Coandă at "*Hochschule*" in Charlottenburg, Berlin, and Caproni at the one in Munich, Bavaria. They would later meet in Liège, in 1908, for a specialisation in electrical engineering at the prestigious "*Institute Montefiore*". During their stay in Belgium, the two young men found that they were also interested in aerodynamics, so they decided to practice its applications.

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
The article and pictures were published in "*Rivista Aeronautica*", the magazine of the Italian Air Force, no. 4/2011, pp. 106-109 (pictures: Archivio Fotografico A.M.)

They designed a Chanute-type glider and, after it was built by a carpenter, they tested it on 19 April 1909 at Bomal near the Ardennes. It was their first step towards their follow on prolific activity as aircraft builders. The type of the glider used for testing proves that the two students were aware of the latest researches upon the matter and guided by both the model and the criteria adopted a decade earlier by Octave Chanute, a great theorist and flight tester of “*heavier than air*” machines.


In the second half of 1909, having accomplished their specialisation in Liège, the two young engineers then embarked on different paths, still keeping in touch.

Caproni went back to Massone to begin his work in aircraft design, while Coandă went to Paris to pursue his studies as he had learnt that the classes at *École Nationale Supérieure d’Ingénieurs de Construction Aéronautique* (*National Higher School of Aeronautical Constructions*), recently founded by Commander Roche at 30 Falguière Street, were about to begin. He too would become aircraft manufacturer both on his own, and together with other entrepreneurs.

However, the similarities did not stop there. Both would become pioneers in the domain of jet propulsion aircraft.



*The Stipa Caproni, the precursor of jets, is inspected by two technicians; in the small picture on the left corner, teasingly labelled “barrel airplane” for its shape, there is the Stipa Caproni, which had a short life.*



*The Coandă 1910, “the airplane without propellers”, which took its first and only flight on 16 December 1910 in Issy-les-Moulineaux, near Versailles (picture published by courtesy of the Romanian Air Force National Museum).*

### ***Propulsion-related problems***


In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, aeronautic supporters also dealt with the jet propulsion: the specialised literature of the time considered it as a desirable solution to the inconveniences caused by propeller construction and application, such as, for example, the turbine Moulins in 1909, built in France, and the turbine engine of Canovetti, presented at the Milan exhibition in the same year.

Coandă certainly knew about them during his studies at École Roche and, from Paris, kept his friend Caproni informed about the latest developments.

The latter, in his notes of 1956, wrote about Coandă: *“At the opening of the Aeronautical University in Paris he went to attend its courses.*

*[...] I have to find a volume of lessons containing the first coupling of two motors Gnome-Rhône triggering a propulsive turbine with the use of exhaust fumes and the heat produced by the cooling of the engines in order to ease propulsion”.*

Was it that volume, together with the coming news in the domain, that made Caproni bound and determined to test the jet propulsion whenever a favourable opportunity would have occurred?



*The Campini Caproni without the tail section during an engine test; the aircraft, although it was not equipped with a conventional jet engine, reached a top speed of 360 km/h; in the upper pane, a snapshot during a flight.*

### ***The collaborations after Liège***

In May 1910, Caproni moved his workshop and his first model of airplane, the “Ca.1”, from his native town to the Army training field at Malpensa – Somma Lombardo (Milan), where he was allowed to run “aviation experiments”, as per the authorisation given by the Military Command in Milan on 4 April. There he built the second model of “Ca.1”, after the disastrous flight experiment with the prototype flown by the unskilful, although enthusiastic, Ugo Tabacchi.



Meanwhile, the equipment at Caproni workshop was made available to other productions and cooperation with Coandă resumed.

According to some references, it was right in Malpensa that the *“thin plywood”* covering the steel structure of *“Coandă 1910’s sesquiplan”* was produced at the request of *“Aeroplanes Coandă”* company (offices: 15 Avenue Mercedes, Passy); the airplane equipped with a jet engine would then be presented at the 2<sup>nd</sup> *“International Air Locomotion Exhibition”* in Paris (Grand Palais, Champs-Élysées) from 15 October to 2 November 1910. The Coandă 1910 would make its first and only flight on 16 December 1910 in Issy-les-Moulineaux, near Versailles, piloted by its designer. Henry Coandă, who had promoted his plane as *“the airplane without propellers”*, received great interest among visitors of the Paris Air Show.

Among those there was American aviator Charles Weymann, the holder of US pilot’s license no. 14, just flying his Farman biplane back from the *“Milan International Circuit”* (25 September – 2 October 1910). Weymann started negotiations with Coandă who, after the Exhibition, moved the aircraft to Issy for a demonstration flight for the benefit of the prospective buyer. Years later, he would describe what happened as follows: *“My intention was to test the engine on the ground, but the heat of the jet flow coming in my direction was more than I had ever experienced and I was worrying it might cause a fire to the aircraft. For that reason, I focused on the adjustment of the jet and I did not realise that the airplane was quickly gaining speed. I looked up and saw the walls of Paris approaching. I had no time to stop or turn and therefore I tried to fly. Unfortunately, I was not an expert in piloting and in using flight controls. The airplane seemed to nose up and then it began to fall. The left wing hit the ground first, then the entire airplane went to pieces”*. By the words he wrote down, it seems clear that Coandă only intended to run some engine controls, with the airplane just standing for two weeks at Grand Palais, or, at most, to taxi it on the runway in order to show the effectiveness of the jet propulsion, before handling the cockpit to the purchaser; it is likely, therefore, that, in the air, the flight controls were incorrectly handled, causing the airplane to fall.

However, the Coandă 1910 jet flew for a few tens of seconds, as it had occurred in the same month, seven years before, to the famous Wright brothers first propeller-driven airplane. Luckily, the fall and the burning of aircraft had no serious physical consequences for the pilot, but for his finances, so that the Romanian accepted a job offered by the British company *“Bristol”*. Then, from 1911 to 1914, Coandă served as technical director of *“Bristol & Colonial Aeroplane Company Ltd”*, for which he designed several airplanes. It goes back to this period an agreement between the *“Caproni”* and *“Bristol”* companies, called for by Coandă, with the aim of presenting, at the forthcoming 1913 Italian military


airplane competition, an aircraft similar to the “Bristol” one that had won the English competition in 1912. Caproni himself referred to this agreement: “Coandă went to England [in 1911, A/N]. He discussed for our collaboration with Sir George Bost, owner of Bristol. This did not happen then, but [...] two years later”. Indeed, at the Italian competition in 1913, Caproni presented three aircraft, one “Caproni” and two “Bristol-Caproni”.

### ***Parallel developments***

Coandă, after the First World War, during which he collaborated with the French Air Force, intensified the research on fluids, and, in 1935, he presented the “Coandă effect”, as Albert R. Metral called it in a monograph of 1939, deriving a revolutionary (*sustenance*) system through a circular wing (Aerodyna Lenticulara), a flying saucer.

Meanwhile, Caproni, at the end of World War I, during which he designed three-engine airplanes (from 300 to 650 hp), restarted testing activity of new types of aircraft (both military and civil), although still thinking about jet engine and the circular wing.

The effectiveness of those elements was already recognised in principle, as a mean of removing troubles caused by the propellers and the wing-tip turbulence of the flat wing). Indeed, Caproni would address again the two elements once the possibility of collaboration with technicians who thoroughly researched the related issues and the actual implementation of the necessary technology would concurrently occur. Thus, on 7 October 1932, it was the first flight of the “Stipa Caproni” aircraft (designed by BEng Luigi Stipa), with a circular wing that took advantage of a moderate propulsive effect generated by the warming up of the air flow, using the heating released by the reciprocating engine, which was internally fitted, as well as the interaction between the flow produced by the ducted fan and the Venturi duct shaped area; and, on 28 August 1940,



*The Stipa Caproni, which took its first flight on 7 October 1932.*





*The poster of the "Aeroplanes Coandă" Company that advertised the "aircraft without propellers" (picture obtained by courtesy of the author).*

it was the first flight of the Campini Caproni equipped with a sort of reciprocating jet engine and designed by BEng Secondo Campini.

The only difference in the propulsion system of the two aircraft was that, in addition to the heat generated by the reciprocating engine, in the "*Stipa Caproni*", the energy of the jet was mainly produced by the ducted fan inside the circular wing, whereas in the "*Campini Caproni*" that was the result of the dynamic effect of the compressor.

### ***Not only contemporary engineers***

The coincidences and similarities between Giovanni Caproni and Henry Coandă were not only related to ageness and to aeronautics interests.

In addition to the brilliant technical insights, both of them evinced intimate inclination for art. Caproni himself writes about this, in his already mentioned notes, given at the age of adulthood:

*"In terms of mental disposition, we were similar, he was a good sculptor, and I was in charge of the painting".*

Who would have guessed it?

***English version by***  
*Iulia NĂSTASIE*



# 10 YEARS OF ACTION ON SMALL ARMS: WHERE ARE WE NOW?

Sarah PARKER

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*The 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) celebrated its tenth anniversary in the summer of 2011. On this occasion, the author asked herself what difference has this programme made.*

*First, she defines this programme and reviews the wide range of areas covered by it. Then, she writes about the progress made in its implementation, detailing some of the factors that hinder the implementation as well as several developments in the PoA process.*

*To conclude, the author points out the need to go beyond the text of national reports to fill in missing details of implementation and, further, verify the information they contain.*

**Keywords:** *small arms; UN Programme of Action; UN Office for Disarmament Affairs; International Tracing Instrument*

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**I**n 2001, UN member states signed up to a politically binding plan to tackle small arms. They did this amidst a growing awareness that the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons – and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many parts of the world – was undermining human security and development.

The 2001 *UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA)* came into existence. Ten years on, it is vital to see what progress it has made.

***Measuring “progress”  
in UN’s Programme of Action  
implementation is no easy task***

Before doing so, what exactly is in this *Programme of Action (PoA)*? It contains national,

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The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, the *Small Weapons, Big Impact* issue, 2011, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Arms-control/10-years-actions/EN/index.htm>

Sarah Parker – a senior researcher for the *Small Arms Survey*, a Geneva-based independent research institute based at the *Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies*. Her thanks go for the contributions of her fellow senior researcher, Dr Glenn McDonald. For more information on these issues, see: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP28-Analysis-of-National-Reports.pdf>

regional and global commitments to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. This covers a wide range of issue areas including:

- small arms manufacturing;
- marking;
- record-keeping, and tracing;
- stockpile management and security;
- surplus identification and disposal;
- international transfers;
- brokering;
- public awareness;
- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes;

and international cooperation and assistance to facilitate implementation of the *PoA*.

Measuring “*progress*” in *PoA* implementation is no easy task. Several factors hamper our ability to measure or assess the extent to which states are fulfilling their *PoA* commitments.



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Firstly, the *PoA* has no formal monitoring process. No mechanisms or bodies have been established to assess states’ compliance with their commitments. The *PoA* follow-up provisions foresee meetings every two years to “*consider*” the implementation. Beyond this, it contemplates reporting by states “*on a voluntary basis*” on their implementation efforts. So, the limited consideration

of compliance and implementation is dependent on self-reporting and evaluation by states themselves.

Secondly, although the *PoA* is broad in terms of the range of issues and small arms control measures it covers, many of its commitments are open-ended. They articulate a range of important goals, but rarely set out the concrete steps states need to take to achieve them.

For example, the *PoA* says that states should adopt “*adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the production of small arms and light weapons ... and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of such weapons*”. But it does not elaborate on what “*adequate*” laws are – or what “*effective*” control looks like.

***Reporting on implementation of the UN Programme of Action has generally been good. However, 34 member states have never reported***

Despite this, there have been several promising developments in the *PoA* process. For instance, there has been a high level of participation in *PoA* reporting. Between 2002 and 2010, 158 member states reported at least once on their *PoA* implementation, (though 34 member states have never reported).

Reporting activity has been most intense during years in which biennial meetings were held (2003, 2005, 2008 and 2010). Indeed, biennial as opposed to annual reporting now appears to be firmly established practice.

Over 580 national reports have been submitted since 2002, describing the progress states have made, the support they have given or received, and their unmet needs in implementing the *PoA*.

What the statistics do not reveal is the quality of information and level of detail contained in the reports submitted, which vary widely. This affects the comparability of national reports, which in turn hampers an overall assessment of *PoA* implementation.

The absence of a prescribed format for reporting has contributed to this divergence in reporting practice. Although a reporting template was developed to assist states, they have not used it consistently nor is it comprehensive in its coverage of *PoA* commitments. The *United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)* has now revised the reporting template to ensure it is more comprehensive and eases the “burden of reporting”.

The move towards biennial reporting may help to increase the number and quality of reports, and use of the new reporting template should increase comparability among national reports.

Other tools developed by *UNODA*, such as the web-based tool for matching needs and resources in international cooperation and assistance to implement the *PoA*, also offer outlets for enhanced implementation.

But comparability of national reports is limited. This is not just because of diverging reporting practices, but also due to a lack of specificity in many *PoA* commitments and the absence of benchmarks.

However, there are several developments in the *PoA* process that will enhance states’



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understanding of what adequate and effective controls look like (and, in turn, provide a benchmark against which we can measure their implementation progress). These include:

❖ The development of *International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS)* by the *United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms* mechanism. These will provide guidance on implementation and measurable benchmarks for assessing the adequacy of states' implementation efforts.

❖ The adoption of the *International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (the International Tracing Instrument or ITI)*. The *ITI* contains politically binding commitments designed to enhance the traceability of small arms and light weapons through improved marking, record keeping, and international cooperation. It builds on the marking and tracing provisions in the *PoA*.

❖ A growing and evolving understanding of the *PoA* commitments and benchmarks for assessing *PoA* implementation. For example, the report of the group of governmental experts on brokering provides recommendations such as record-keeping by brokers and/or the state and examples of penalties that could be imposed for illicit brokering activities. Another example is the 2008 biennial meeting (2008) which highlighted the need to minimise the environmental impacts of destruction programmes.

While these developments are promising, it is unclear whether states will take advantage of these new tools. For example, just under one-third of all states that submitted *ITI* national reports in 2010 provided specific information on their implementation of this instrument, even though it includes a firm commitment for states to report biennially.

The disappointing level of reporting on the *ITI* suggests that six years after its adoption, states are generally unaware of their obligation to report on its implementation, or, alternatively, choose not to report specifically on it.

***There is a need to go beyond the text of national reports to fill in missing details of implementation***

In summary, ten years after its adoption, the *PoA* should not be viewed in isolation. It established the normative framework for small arms control, but is now, effectively, “*supplemented*” by other instruments and processes that enhance and expand on its provisions. Further development of specific benchmarks and practical guides for implementation will, if integrated into national reporting practices, assist in evaluating overall progress in *PoA* implementation. But whether they translate into concrete action by states remains to be seen.

The *2012 Review Conference* provides an opportunity to assess the state of overall implementation. Some ten years after the adoption of the *PoA*, it has become clear that national reports, although an important basis for any such evaluation, rarely offer sufficient information. There is a need to go beyond the text of national reports to fill in missing details of implementation and, further, verify the information they contain.

A further question relating to the *PoA* and *ITI* – extending beyond the facts of implementation – is whether such implementation is having the impact it was intended to have. Is the *PoA* in fact “*preventing, combating or eradicating*” the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects?

The current focus of attention is on improving our understanding of implementation and determining how much states are in fact implementing the *PoA*. Over the medium and longer term, both questions are in fact crucial to determining the course of future action on small arms: are states implementing the *PoA*? Is this having an impact on the illicit trade in small arms? The *2012 Review Conference* will have a crucial role to play in guiding the process towards answering these questions.





# ROMANIAN-POLISH AERONAUTICAL COLLABORATIONS

General (r.) Iosif RUS

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*In order to ensure stable air connections between București and the capitals of the members states of the Little Entente, to which Poland was added, a convention on air navigation with Poland was signed on 9 May 1930. On 1 June, air traffic was started three times a week between București and Gdansk. The Romanian state pledged to jointly exploit, through a national airline and the Polish LOT companies, the București-Warsaw air route. Soon after signing the documents, the Polish built a building at the Băneasa airport for the staff ensuring the arrival of aircraft from Warsaw and the boarding/disembarkation of passengers. On 28 June 1931, the Gdansk-Thessaloniki airline was opened, via Warsaw, București, Sofia.*

**Keywords:** aviation; evolutions; tests; flights; collaborations; relations; monument; associations

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**A**nalysing the cooperation between Romania and Poland in the aviation field I found many historical milestones that originated over 90 years ago. The emergence and development of the aeronautical phenomenon in both countries followed paths that often interfered. After the First World War, Romania and France founded the *French-Romanian Company for Air Navigation – CFRNA*. It opened the first transcontinental airline in the world. Paris was linked to Istanbul passing through Eastern European capitals, including Warsaw and București.

There are also other interesting arguments. In 1804, Iordache Cuparencu born in Călineștii Sucevei in 1780 (1784, according to Polish sources)<sup>1</sup> reached Warsaw with the *Kolter* theatre troupe and gave acrobatic performances in Bracka Street. In 1806, he started to build a balloon made of glued paper with a basket and hot air produced by a little stove installed on board. The first public ascent

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General (r.) Iosif Rus, former commander of Military Aviation, President of Romanian Association for the Propaganda and History of Aviation (ARPIA).

<sup>1</sup> Ion Vasile Buiu, *Românul Iordache Cuparencu – un pionier al aeronauticii mondiale redat istoriei naționale*, in *PARAȘUTIȘTII* Magazine, no. 23 (32)/2007 (see also *Warszawska* Magazine, 02.07.1808, p. 877, signalled by Ion Vasile Buiu).



was made in June 1806 in Warsaw, in the Foxal Garden, when the balloon reached up to the Church of St. Cross. The balloon caught fire but Cuparencu was able to escape.

The second ascent took place in Vilnius, on 6 December 1806, with another paper balloon. This time, he travelled 2,5 km. His third ascent was in Warsaw, in July 1808, in the same place, the Foxal Garden, when he reached a height of about 1 280 m. In 1811, he joined the Polish Army as an artillery officer. He seems to be the inventor of mechanical theatre, being recorded for his shows performed in Poland during 1830-1842. He died in 1844 and he was buried in the Greek Orthodox Cemetery in Wola.

Part of the information about Iordache Cuparencu was obtained from Piotr Lopalewski, head of research department of the Polish Aviation Museum in Krakow, by some Romanian historians, in 2001. Data were also received from Professor Dr Boleslaw Orłowski, a well-known researcher at the Institute for the History of Science of the Polish Academy of Sciences (Instytut Historii Nauk – PAN). Thus, although being considered to have a Polish origin, the research of engineer Ion Vasile Buiu proved the Romanian origin of this parachuting pioneer worldwide<sup>2</sup>.

These examples show that, even since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there were some important cultural links between the Romanian Principalities and Poland. It is known the great interest of Romanian inventors Henri Coandă and Ion Stroeescu in the aeronautical scientific work of famous researcher S. Drzewiecki (*Le Vol Plane Essai d'Une Solution Mecanique du Probleme*; 1891 – French Edition).

After the First World War, Romania was seized with contradictory feelings: on the one hand, a general euphoria, stimulating many ambitions, and, on the other hand, the fear that everything that had been obtained through the sacrifice of half a million Romanian soldiers could have been lost.

The insecurity of its borders and the fear of the revisionist forces counterattack determined Romania to conclude a treaty of alliance with Poland (3 March 1921), then to join the countries that were part of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). In 1925, the Locarno Conference took place and it was signed the famous *Pact Kellogg – Briand* between the US Secretary of State and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, joined by other countries which pledged to abandon the use of force as a continuation of their policy. However, the immediate result was an increased budget for weapons. In a short time,

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem.*

the Little Entente countries realised that the diplomatic barrier standing in the way of Germany would not last. At the conference held in 1927, at Ioachymow, the three component states of the Little Entente decided the development of a mutual economic plan. Each state preserved its sovereignty, but had to remove the economic weaknesses within the alliance, which was focused more on political and diplomatic aspects. Numerous bilateral economic treaties were signed. Subsequently, economic cooperation deepened with the establishment of the Alliance Economic Council. Regarding the military cooperation, every state conceived a detailed plan of economic and industrial mobilisation in case of war.

In 1928, one of the largest military air contests of the Little Entente was organised. Poland also participated in it. On the morning of 4 August, participating crews were at the airfield in Prague; two days later, they took off on the air route Prague, Krakow, Warsaw, Lwow, Iași, București (Băneasa). The next air route stage was București, Belgrade, Brno and Prague.

There followed a series of contacts with Poland. In 1929, the Polish General Staff requested the Romanian party to collaborate on the development of railway directly linking Poland to Romania, and also on proposals for a plan of economic cooperation during peacetime and wartime. Maybe it was pure coincidence that the Minister of War in Romania was a general whose origins came from Poland, Henri Cihoscki.

In order to ensure stable air links between București and the capitals of the states that joined the Little Entente, an agreement on the air navigation between Romania and Poland was signed on 9 May 1930. On 1 June, the air traffic from București to Gdansk started at a rate of three times a week. The Romanian state pledged to jointly exploit the air route București – Warsaw by a national airline together with LOT Polish Company. Shortly after signing the documents, the Polish built at Băneasa airport a building for the staff, providing the aircraft arrivals from Warsaw and the passengers boarding/disembarkation. On 28 June 1931, the airline Gdansk, Thessaloniki, via Warsaw, București, and Sofia opened. Two days later, Romania and Poland signed a new commitment to mutual support in case of attack on their eastern borders. Each of the two states had available 17 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry divisions and 20 aviation squadrons as intervention forces.

Between 3 and 9 July 1937, the conference of the Romanian and Polish General Staff was held in Bucharest. They discussed the forces situation at that time, conduct of operations in the junction area, organisation of permanent defence of the junction area, including through aviation. There were exchanges of information on the Soviet army. These contacts also increased the role of mediating the military economic relations that would materialise in the aeronautical field by building

in Romania, under license, some types of Polish jet fighters and trainers, including the famous *PZL*<sup>3</sup>.

In this context, the connections in the sport aviation field should be also emphasised, which were maintained at a very high level by the International Aeronautical Federation President himself, Romanian Prince George Valentin Bibescu. Between 27 and 30 August 1936, he chaired the Federation conference held in the capital of Poland. As a premonition, the members of the flying clubs affiliated to the federation discussed the problem of prohibited overflight areas, the militarised ones. During his stay in Poland, Prince Bibescu visited *Wieliczka* plants. Following his initiative, numerous international competitions provided the Romanian and Polish pilots with the opportunity of sports confrontations. There were many cases when the orders and medals of one of the two countries rewarded the other country airmen merits.

During the invasion of Poland by German troops, in 1939, part of Polish aviators took refuge in Romania; some valuable Polish engineers started to work for the aviation factories in Bucureşti and Braşov. One of them, Iakimiuk, became friend of the Romanian engineer Radu Manicatide and after the war he got to France, to the famous company *Sud-Aviation*, where he gave a helping hand to the Romanian delegation which was negotiating the license for *Allouette* helicopters.

After the Second World War, Romania and Poland were among the states in the Soviet sphere of influence. Later on, the two became members of the Warsaw Pact. A new collaboration, this time in the field of helicopters was to be mentioned in the '60s. The first helicopter purchased by Romania and manufactured in Poland arrived in 1959 and it was used by the Reed Central. It was flown by pilot Aurel Damian who was trained by the supplier. Later on, in 1962, four officers were selected to be trained as pilots, Major Iacob Mihai and First Lieutenant Constantin Nae, the other two, Captain BEng Teodorescu Rafael and Captain Gogescu Ioan were prepared for the maintenance and technical operation of helicopters *SM-1* and *SM-2*. Each pilot totalled 10 hours of dual and single control flight. After qualification in Poland, the four officers returned home and in a short time two helicopters *SM-1* were brought for school and training, registered 01 and 02, then three other *SM-2* SC helicopters for transport missions, registered 28, 29 and 30.

Moreover, there have been numerous other contacts between military and civilian aeronautics representatives of the two countries including visits

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<sup>3</sup> The PZL was a Polish fighter aircraft, designed in the mid-1930s in the PZL (*Państwowe Zakłady Lotnicze*) factory, in Warsaw, by Zygmunt Pulawski. The fighter aircraft was exported and built under license in countries such as Romania, Greece, Turkey, but it was not used in Poland (editor's note, according to [http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/PZL\\_P.24](http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/PZL_P.24)).

of military delegations at ministerial level. Also, the close relationships, developed within the *Intercosmos* programme between the Romanian and Polish spacemen are well-known, and they are still fostered nowadays.

A few years ago, a good collaborator of ARPIA, Colonel Cristian Scarlat, former Director of the National Office for Heroes Memory, told me about a monument erected in Poland, in memory of Romanian and Polish airmen. From his explanation, it resulted that the monument appearance and condition, at the time, were not good at all. Time, wind, moisture and frost deteriorated it faster than expected by our neighbours, designers, pilots and visitors. Our colleague, Second Lieutenant (r.) Ioan Vulpoiu, Head of the Department for monuments and historic sites within ARPIA, had the chance to discover on the Internet a material about this monument located in Michalowice, near Warsaw. The author, *Roman Wozniak*, entitled his article *ZAPOMNIANY POMNIK LOTNIKÓW W MICHAŁOWICACH/ The Forgotten Aviation Monument at Mihalowice*. In the article, the author also mentioned the following text engraved on the monument:

**MAM – FARR – ARPA  
AND  
THE AERONAUTICAL CIRCLE  
FROM  
– ROMANIA –  
PAY THEIR PIOUS HOMAGE  
TO DISTINGUISHED AIRMEN  
AND TECHNICIANS  
WHO SACRIFICED  
THEIR LIVES ON THE ALTAR  
OF THE AERONAUTICAL SCIENCE  
ON - 7-XI-1936  
MAJOR – MIHAIL PANTAZI  
PILOT – JERZY RZEWNICKI  
CAPTAIN BENG – ROMAN POPESCU  
TECH SECY – JERZY SZRAJER**



*Detail of the monument*

Deciphering the abbreviations, we find out: *MAM* – Ministry of Aviation and Marine, *FARR* – Romanian Royal Air Force, *ARPA* – Romanian Association for Aviation Propaganda (currently, ARPIA).

The Airmen Monument in Mihałowice, Pruszkow Area, Mazowieckie Voivodship, is located at the crossroads at Aviation Street and Romania Street. Why? “*It was a question I also asked myself, writes the author, at the beginning of the '90s, when I decided to live in the neighbourhood. I have known the commune since the '60s, but it was only in 1994 that I began to find out data and explanations related to the monument. The fact that it was near Okecie Airport could provide an explanation for the name of the streets. Before the Second World War, there were very good political and economic relationships between Poland and Romania. During that time, we bordered Romania*

and we exported a lot of aircraft there, but which could be the major cause for the names of these streets? I began to understand when I saw the monument, affected by the passing of time and the people carelessness.

In the first half of 1933, engineer Zbyslaw Ciolkosz began working, for the Polish Aerospace Industry (PZL), on a transport plane for 10 to 12 passengers, called PZL 30, powered by two Pratt & Whitney engines of 295 kW (400 HP). The project was contracted by Polish Airlines in 1934. Subsequently, LOT renounced PZL 30 and bought Lockheed L 10A Electra. Then, the Industrial



Department received Colonel T. Karpiński's suggestion to convert the prototype PZL 30 into a bomber. Under such circumstances, in March 1936, the P.30 B.I prototype was flown by Bolesław Orliński at Okęcie Airport. This plane, with a weight of 2 891 kg was named Żubr (European Bison). Tests were conducted at the Institute of Aviation Technology between 24 April and 3 July 1936, achieving a maximum speed of 277 km/h and a ceiling of 4 600 m, although the engine power was quite low. The P & W engines were changed with the PEGASUS VIII ones in order to improve the bomber performances.


The P30 B.II aircraft, such modified and having a mass of 4 004 kg, became the series model number LWS 6 ŻUBR whose production began in Lublin Aircraft Plants, in the fall of 1936. It was tested at the same Institute of Aviation (ITL) between 23 September and 28 October. Romania was interested in that bomber and negotiated the purchase of 24 items equipped with GNOME-RHONE engines.

On 7 November 1936, during a flight demonstration, the P 30 B. II prototype, having on board the members of the Romanian military delegation that arrived in Warsaw, lost an engine and a few wing elements. The pilot Jerzy Rzewnicki, the technician Jerzy Szrajer and the two Romanian air officers were buried under its remains. This disaster determined Romania to abandon this contract and stop the manufacturing of LWS 6 ŻUBR aircraft. Engineer Z. Ciolkosz was withdrawn from this project and transferred, which gave fresh impetus to the construction of LWS 6 aircraft, whose development was entrusted to engineer Jerzy Teisser. The production prototype LWS 6 – with two vertical tails – flew at Lublin in late 1937. In 1938, the production was resumed for 15 ŻUBR aircraft, with a single vertical tail. Since 1937, the production model received the designation LWS 4. The aircraft was completed in the second half of 1938. It was not a success and therefore it was subject to endless reconfigurations absorbing large amounts of money. In 1939, the building of another prototype whose wing tubular structure was made of welded chrome-vanadium started, resulting in a decrease in weight by 300 kg. In the summer of 1939, ten ŻUBR aircraft were used for training, five were in reserve, and one at the plant in Lublin. The aircraft did not carry out operational flights. During the war, LUFTWAFFE used some of them for crews training in blind flying.

In 1937, the Romanians erected a memorial to the four pilots, on the very place of the catastrophe, while local authorities named the streets at the crossroads Aviation and Romania. The Romanian text engraved on the commemorative plaque, in 1994, recorded all that I have described above.

Under the engraved text, the author continues, a beautiful emblem includes **a propeller having a damaged blade supported on both sides by bird wings**, into a new expression of **unfulfillment**. Here we can feel the Romanian specificity in creating such a plastic and realistic vision of the tragedy, as it happened here, on this land. Several papers were written in 1997 and 1998 about the monument, but still nobody has said that it **“belongs to us”** (A.N. to Poland).





Postcard issued in 1937

The pilot of the ŻUBR aircraft – **JERZY RZEWNICKI** – was 36 years old, and he was a lieutenant in reserve, engineer, founder of the “Skrzydłata Polska” Magazine (Polish Wings, magazine founded in 1930 that still exists today). He should have proved the aircraft performances to the Romanian officers **MIHAIL PANTAZI** and **ROMAN POPESCU** who would have also lost their lives in that disaster. The fourth victim was **JERZY SZRJR**, 24 years old, reserve lieutenant, who was on the plane as a technical-observer. Both Polish officers were buried at the Military Cemetery WARSZAWA-POWAZKA.

The monument fell prey to the ravages of time and rust crept in all possible places. The remains of the monument were cared for by Anton Kowalski, a neighbour that kept what fell off and what had not been “rendered profitable” as scrap metal.

Anton Kowalski takes care of the monument as one of the faithful people settled in these lands. The filigree and metal lattice as well as the entire construction soars

toward the skies. Each airman, a member of the crew of this aircraft, has a distinctive element represented on the monument.

Everything has a regression and an end, although the construction of the monument had to last for more than one hundred years. The winds and weather left their marks on the monument. It survives somehow (A. N.: at the time the document was written), perhaps because Michałowice benefits from the proximity of the Okęcie Airport! Most of the citizens in our village are linked to aviation, working as technicians, pilots and other airport-related jobs! The airmen’s monument is also remembrance of the friendship between our peoples once neighbours, with similar traits and purposes but also under similar threats. Does a similar monument exist in Romania too? Maybe any of our readers knows more on this topic!?”<sup>4</sup>

3-4 years ago, the author insistently informed all village inhabitants, officials of Military and Civil Aviation, Aviation Seniors, the Ministry of Culture, and all people interested in aviation about the need for urgent repair of the monument. Since then, the author of the mentioned article, Mr. **Roman Wozniak**, a specialist in civil aviation, has tried by all means and methods to concentrate forces, means, supporters and sympathisers of aviation, aiming to restore, renovate and unveil again the Monument. All his efforts have been successful. Hats off!

Our story relates further the moment of the new unveil of the Romanian and Polish airmen monument on Monday, 7 November 2011. It was the date when, 75 years ago, during testing, the *PZL 30 Zubr* bomber in the Warsaw Airport

<sup>4</sup> The local paper of Gmina Michałowice Village Hall, *Oficjalny serwis informacyjny*. Aktualnoceae. Pomnik lotników. Zbur-Michałowice. (Zam: 19.01. 2009 r., godz. 14.02).



*Monument to Romanian and Polish Airmen in Michalowice*

area, crashed at Michalowice. The crew's members were: Mihail Pantazi, BEng Roman Popescu, Jerzy Rzewnicki and Jerzy Szrjer.

The work, the monument and the details, as they were at that time, confirm that the structure and architecture are of Romanian design. The monument was made by students of the Industrial High School *Carol II* in București. It is the school where Major Mihail Pantazi had taught the engines course until the year of his death. The monument was inaugurated in 1937, survived the Second World War and the communist period. It started deteriorating, and a retired Polish airman, now journalist, as we have already mentioned,

searched the history and origin of the monument. Then he provoked the Polish Sejm (Parliament), embassies, and hosts to react. An ARPIA member, at his expense, attended the debates related to technical, financial and organisational issues, along with Polish media, the representative of the Polish Parliament and the Romanian Embassy in Warsaw. The Senior Aviators Club, the National Association of Aviation Techniques and the Polish Air Force Association restored the monument with the support of Michalowice Village Hall and the Romanian Embassy in Warsaw.

Its aspect is impressive, causing interest, piety and reverence. The area is monitored and at night it is electrically lighted. On Monday, 7 November 2011, during a very impressive official military and religious ceremony, the new unveiling of the monument took place. A great local audience and representatives from all backgrounds and institutions honoured the event.

The monument is built on the place where the plane crashed in 1936, and adjacent streets were named "Romania Street" and "Aviation Street" to honour the heroes. Initially, ARPIA answered the host's invitation



*General (AF) (r.) Iosif RUS, President of ARPIA, attending the events in Michalowice*





07.11.2011, Michałowice

with a promise that three persons would participate, one being a member of the acrobatic flight group “*Aerobatic Yakers*”. He intended to get there by his plane to greet the commemorated heroes with a flight salute. Romanian aviation has indeed fantastic folks! They love the camaraderie of the flyers worldwide. However, problems related to organisation and weather along with announcements and participations

in various events cancelled the flight to Poland and this elegant professional salute.

On the site, I joined discussions with several people and I was pleasantly surprised, even beyond expectations, that in Poland they know more about the evolution of Romanian aviation, and about the two Romanian heroes... Yes, indeed! Major Mihail Pantazi, along with Petre Ivanovici and Max Manolescu, was a long-time member of the air acrobatics group “*Dracii Roșii*” (the Red Devils). In fact, it was the same Mihail Pantazi that held the record for flights over South Africa! The *Aviation Legends Foundation* in Poland, a very active non-governmental organisation, tried to obtain new information, details and addresses related to the well-known Romanian aircraft, the *IAR-80*. When I returned to Romania and read my e-mail I found a lot of questions meant to obtain further information to enrich their knowledge and publications.

Before and after the date of 7 November 2011, I found quite a lot of comments about the monument and the tribute to the four pilots on the Internet, in local newspapers and several radio and television broadcasts, including on Radio Romania Actualități and also at a meeting I attended in Poland where I met a few pilots who were members of some bodies. Their honourable gesture to restore the monument together with the Romanian Embassy in Warsaw and the village hall of Michałowice is to be emphasised and appreciated both in writing and, maybe in the near future, even by some institutional and moral rewards. As the author of these lines and a member of the Romanian delegation, as a soldier and an airman, I can say that my colleagues and I felt, on site, the consideration and consistency of a common effort to pay homage to the four pilots – heroes who died in a mission which meant the substance of certain connections between two countries whose ways have often interfered, as I have written above. Their mission was one of responsibility and prestige in favour of national defence,

based on a unitary and mutual support conception when facing the danger that would arise in Europe at the end of the fourth decade.

Our mandate, as ARPIA members, is to strengthen the collaboration started on that occasion, and to further support the image of Romanian aviation. The tribute paid is significant if we also mention that the two countries, Poland and Romania, have their national days on close calendar dates – 11 November and 1 December, respectively – whose historical significance originated in 1918, under the same historical circumstances.

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\* Editor's note: Photos were taken by Second Lieutenant (r.) Ioan Vulpoiu.

# MILITARY JOURNALISTIC UNIVERSE

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November-December 2011

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• P-3C ORION Mission Support System • Symposium of the Association of the German Army and the German Army Office • The IT System of the Bundeswehr • 32<sup>nd</sup> Annual Convention of the European Military Press Association • Power Sources of Islamism • Syria: Russia's "Predictability" is Guaranteed • Maritime Border Conflicts in East and Southeast Asia • Iran's Battle for Dominance in the Middle East • "The Clausewitz Society's 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary – a Great Birthday"

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**Signal, USA**, vol. 66, no. 2, October 2011

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NGEN Race Heats Up • Navy Amasses Digital Armada • Defense Intelligence Aims For Saving Via Reforms • Sailors Simultaneously See Same Fleet Readiness Data • Underwater

Communications Rise to Surface Fleet • It's a Bug, It's a Plane, It's a Flying Circus Board • Military Website Spoofing Is no Laughing Matter • Keeping Pace With Cybercrime • Network Intricacy Complicates Computer Defense • Cyber Professionals Wanted; No Experience Necessary • Robot Looks and Leaps

### ***Selection and Translation***

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***National Military Library***

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*Marshal Alexandru Averescu stepping on the historic battlefield of Mărăști*

*Source: The National Military Museum, by courtesy of Professor Neculai MOGHIOR*

*Cover 1: Air Bridge in support of the population isolated by snow. Food packages being unloaded from IAR-330 PUMA helicopter, in Vrancea county, February 2012 ([www.mapn.ro](http://www.mapn.ro))*

*Cover 4: The military in support of people affected by snow storms. River tugboat 328 in action, February 2012 ([www.mapn.ro](http://www.mapn.ro))*



<http://www.mapn.ro/smg/gmr>