Romanian Military Thinking

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Through the agency of this journal all officers, of all kinds of arms, who are in service, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces.

Carol - King of Romania
Issued in Bucharest on December 8, 1897

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A Man of His Time and a Man for All Times

The Unification of the Romanian Principalities, as a result of the *"double election on 24 January 1859"*, was one of the difficult moments in our history, a milestone on the path of the Romanian national state self-assertion.

Mandated by the political class of the time and supported with genuine enthusiasm by the people to bear the heavy burden of fulfilling the national ideals of the forerunners, Colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza succeeded in meeting the challenge of this option and the huge responsibility he had assumed.

An ardent patriot, deeply marked by the revolutionary precepts proclaimed in 1848 regarding the self-assertion of free nations, the ruler became *"a principle of rightfulness"* in the eyes of the people, and his aura is not at all accidental and artificial.

A loyal and honest servant of the Romanian nation and spirit, he set as supreme goal to contribute to the political development of the Romanian nation so that it could claim a place among the civilised nations of the world. Although he was devoid of personal ambitions and delusions of grandeur, he was, as his contemporaries stated, very proud and he did not bow down to anyone. His diplomatic achievements are due, to a great extent, to this *"worthy of esteem and proud attitude in the relations with all the powers of the time"*. It is worth mentioning his upright and trenchant position in the relations with the Porte – *"the dignity of a sovereign to another sovereign"* –, the perseverance and ability with which he sought and found the support of the great European powers of the time for the Unification and especially the courage of imposing it as a fait accompli. In the words of Nicolae Iorga, Cuza was *"the first ruler of only one Romania, free in all its social classes and having a proud attitude in the relations with foreign countries. [...] The generation of the time had the first thrill of pride when they heard the words of pride he used while addressing the Turks, the European Cabinets, proclaiming a Modern Romania"*.

It is worth pointing out that the same ruler tried to make the young Romanian state known beyond Europe's borders. The attempt to conclude a Treaty on commerce,

navigation and assistance between the Romanian Principalities and the United States of America, in 1859, is another evidence of the dignity and diplomacy of a state in the first days of its revival, one that was seeking international recognition. A treaty meant for each signatory party to enjoy advantages at the political, economic and military level, but one that was not accepted by the Ottoman Porte, which still had the rights of a guarantor power on the Romanian Principalities at that time. Although not concluded, this treaty is certainly a precursor of the first diplomatic agreement between Romania and the United States of America, a treaty signed 130 years ago (14 June 1880), as well as of the current agreements between the two states within NATO. A diplomatic approach that makes us aware of the ability and political sense of the first leader of modern Romania.

The unification was the political faith of the ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza. He considered that it was through the unification that the Romanian nation could be saved and could regain the dignity it had aspired to for such a long time. He fought for the recognition and completion of this political act, and he also strove to provide modern and solid foundations for the state fundamental institutions: the army, the church, school and justice. Although he was constantly aware of the provisional character of his reign and of the inevitable and imminent end as a statesman, Prince Cuza proved to be, as one of his close acquaintances said, *"the real founder of the Romanian nationality, whose first cry of freedom was the Unification of the Principalities".*

Unfortunately, the same political class that invested him with this noble mission, surprised at the courage and perseverance with which the ruler sought to accomplish the mission but discontented, of course, as some of its interests and privileges were violated, hastened his political end and, maybe, the physical one, too.

His work, which he vigorously supported during the seven years of his reign, was meant to remain alive together with the modern Romanian state that had just been born. The major reforms he made (the legal, land, election, education ones), the establishment of the universities in Iaşi (1860) and Bucharest (1864) confirmed, no doubt, that he was the founder of modern Romania. A work marked by profound political, cultural, diplomatic, economic, legal transformations, but one whose real dimension cannot be acknowledged unless its military dimension is taken into account.

The beginning of the young Romanian state military strength, as it was well said at that time, was to be made through the unification of the two armies, those of Moldavia and Walachia. The establishment of strategic management structures, the appropriate equipment and training and the adoption of the legal framework were aimed at assuring the proper functioning of this new military body. The General Staff Corps

of the United Principalities, established *"on 12 November 1859 AD and the first year of Our Reign"*, was meant to be not only the artisan but also the main engine of this course of evolution of the Romanian armed forces. An action initiated by the ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza a century and a half ago, one that has been carried on up to now.

On 24 January 2010, at the festivities held on the anniversary of 151 years since the Romanian Principalities got unified, in Iași, the city that, as the great historian A. D. Xenopol stated one hundred years ago, *"is still bleeding today because of the sacrifice made on the altar of the nation"*, the idea of proclaiming this day a national holiday in Romania was launched. It was an initiative to which the current leadership of the country adhered without any reserve.

Far from trying to cast a shadow on the day of December 1, the day when the *Great Unification* in 1918 and the achievement of Greater Romania are celebrated, a day designated, with good reason, as Romania's National Day, the moment of the *Little Unification* on 24 January 1859 deserves to be perceived and appreciated in its real dimension for the evolution of the Romanian nation. A nation that, since 1859, has focused its efforts on the necessary and natural evolution towards modernity alongside the Western civilised nations.

This year, on March 20, we celebrate 190 years since Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza was born. Nicolae Iorga characterised him as being *"a man of his time and a man for all times who belongs to the history serene eternity"*. Therefore, it is an excellent opportunity for the Romanian Armed Forces to present arms, over time, in fully deserved recognition of their first supreme commander !

Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE
English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

Un homme de son temps et de tout temps

L'union des Principautés Roumaines, par *"la double élection de 24 Janvier 1859"*, a été l'un des moments difficiles de notre histoire, un jalon sur la voie de l'Etat national roumain de s'en affirmer.

Mandaté par la classe politique de son temps et soutenu avec un enthousiasme non dissimulé par le peuple à porter le fardeau de l'accomplissement des idéaux nationaux de ses précurseurs, le colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza a réussi à se relever au niveau de ce choix et de son démesuré responsabilité assumée.

Ardent patriote, profondément marqué par les préceptes révolutionnaires clamés au 1848 de l'affirmation des nations libres, le souverain est devenu aux yeux du peuple *"un sorte de principe du bien"*, et son gloire n'est pas du tout aléatoire et artificielle.

Fidèle et honnête servant de la nation et de l'âme roumaine, il a proposé comme un objectif final d'augmenter le peuple roumain de la perspective politique et de le placer parmi les nations civilisées du monde. Dépourvu d'ambitions et des prétentions de la grandeur pour lui-même, il a été, cependant, comment ont-ils affirmé ses contemporains, très fier et il n'est pas cédé devant personne. Ses victoires diplomatiques sont dues, en grande partie, à cette *"attitude digne et fière vis-à-vis de toutes les puissances du temps"*. N'oublions pas son attitude verticale, tranchante, dans ses relations avec la Porte ottomane – *"la dignité d'un souverain vers un autre souverain"* –, la persévérance et l'habilité avec lesquelles il a cherché et il a trouvé, en faveur de la cause de l'Union, un soutien chez grandes puissances européennes de l'époque, mais surtout le courage de l'imposer comme un fait achevé. Dans les mots de Nicolae Iorga, Cuza a été *"le premier dirigeant d'une Roumanie unique, libre dans toutes les classes de ses citoyens et fière vers de l'étranger. [...] C'est le premier frisson de fierté que l'a eu la génération d'alors, quand ils ont entendu les paroles de la fierté avec lesquelles il parlait aux Turcs, aux Cabinets européens, en proclamant une Roumanie moderne"*.

Et n'oublions pas que le même dirigeant a essayé d'affirmer le jeune État roumain au-delà des frontières de l'Europe. Le démarche d'achever un Traité de commerce et de navigation et d'assistance entre les Principautés Roumaines

et les Etats-Unis, en 1859, est une preuve supplémentaire de la dignité d'une diplomatie d'un État dans les premiers jours de sa renaissance, qui a demandé sa reconnaissance dans la communauté internationale. Un traité avec des avantages évidents dans les domaines politique, économique et militaire de chaque partie signataire, mais auquel la Porte ottomane, toujours le pouvoir garante des Principautés Roumaines à son époque, s'est opposé. Resté inachevé, le traité est certainement un précurseur du premièr accord diplomatique entre la Roumanie et les Etats-Unis, signé il y a 130 ans (14 Juin 1880), et des accords actuels entre les deux Etats au sein de l'OTAN. Une démarche diplomatique qui met en évidence, à nous, ceux d'aujourd'hui, l'habilité et le sens politique du premier souverain de l'Etat roumain moderne.

L'union a été la foi politique du souverain Alexandru Ioan Cuza, à travers de laquelle on considère que la nation roumaine peut être sauvé et peut récupérer la dignité à laquelle il aspirait depuis si longtemps. Il a lutté pour la reconnaissance et l'accomplissement de cet acte politique et pour remettre, sur des bases modernes, solides, les institutions fondamentales de l'État: l'armée, l'église, l'école, la justice. Et même s'il a été toujours conscient du provisorat de sa règne et aussi de son inévitable et proche fin comme un homme d'Etat, il s'est avéré d'être, comment il disait une personne de son intimité, *"le fondateur réel de la nationalité roumaine, dont le premier cri de la liberté a été l'Union des Principautés"*.

Malheureusement, la même classe politique, celle qui l'a investi avec cette noble mission, désormais surprise par le courage et la persévérance avec lesquelles le souverain a cherché d'accomplir, mais, plus encore, bien sûr, insatisfaite par le préjudice des intérêts et privilèges, se hâta son fin politique. Et, peut-être, sur le plan physique.

Son ouvrage, qui l'a vigoureusement soutenu pendant les sept ans de son règne, a été conçu de résister en collaboration avec l'Etat roumain modern qui vient de naître. Ses grandes réformes (juridique, de l'agriculture, d'élection, de l'éducation), l'institution des Universités à Iași (1860) et Bucarest (1864) le confirment, sans droit de négation, comme le fondateur de la Roumanie moderne. Une œuvre marquée par de profonds changements dans le domaine politique, culturel, diplomatique, économique, législatif, mais qu'elle ne peut pas être perçue à son dimension réelle sans d'être soulignée aussi son dimension militaire.

Le commencement de la force militaire du jeune Etat roumain, comme gentiment on appelé dans l'ère, avait d'être réalisé par la réunion des deux armées de la Moldavie et de la Valachie. La création de structures de commande stratégique, de logistique et d'instruction adéquate et l'adoption du cadre législatif vont viser à assurer le bon fonctionnement de cette nouvelle organisation militaire.

Le Corps d'état major général des Principautés Unies, créé *"au 12 Novembre, l'an de notre sauvegarde 1859, et de notre règne c'est le premier"*, sera l'auteur et le principal moteur de cette démarche, sur une ligne en constante accroissement, de l'armée roumaine. Une œuvre qui, initiée il y a un siècle et demi par le souverain Alexandru Ioan Cuza, se poursuit aujourd'hui.

Le 24 Janvier 2010, aux festivités de la célébration des 151 années de l'union des Principautés Roumaines, à Iași, la ville qui, comment disait-il il y a cent ans le grand historien A. D. Xenopol, *"saigne aujourd'hui aussi par les sacrifices sur l'autel de la nation"*, a été lancée l'idée de déclarer ce jour comme une fête nationale de la Roumanie. Une initiative à laquelle le gouvernement du pays a souscrit sans aucune réserve.

Loin d'éclipser le jour de 1 Décembre, la Journée de *Grande Union* de 1918 et d'accomplissement de la Grande Roumanie, désignée, à juste titre, la Journée Nationale de la Roumanie, le moment de *Petite Union* de 24 Janvier 1859 vaut la peine d'être perçu et reconnu à son réelle dimension pour l'évolution du peuple roumain. Un peuple qui, depuis 1859, était axé sur une trajectoire évolutive nécessaire et naturelle de la modernité, à côté des nations d'un Occident civilisé.

Cette année, le 20 Mars, nous célébrons 190 ans depuis la naissance du Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, *"un homme de son temps et de tout temps, qui est entré dans le domaine de l'éternité céleste de l'histoire"*, comment le caractérise le même Nicolae Iorga. C'est une magnifique opportunité, ainsi, pour l'armée roumaine d'en présenter, au fil du temps, les biens mérités honneurs à son premier commandant suprême !

Version française par Alina PAPOI

DEFENCE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (II)
– Material and Financial Resources Management –

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ

Defence resources management must be a matter of interest not only for decision-makers and experts but also for every adult citizen, because the nation's defence and security is our common responsibility.

It is impossible to have defence and security without this "special fuel" called resources. That is why all adult citizens have to acknowledge the role of resources and the correlation between resources, defence and security.

A successful defence resources management consists in solutions for permanently maintaining the correlation between the allotted resources the and level of ambition established by the political decision-makers.

Decision-makers and experts must consider the continuous transformation and evolution of the security environment in order to effectively manage the resources meant for defence and security.

Keywords: material resources; financial resources; national defence; security; level of ambition; correlation; continuous transformation

Defence resources should be a matter of concern for us all, not only for the leadership of the country and of the governmental structures in charge of providing the nation's defence and security but also for the experts who mostly belong to the same structures. The need for information in this field derives from: the **right** we all have to know what happens with the taxes we pay and the legal – and moral – **obligation** to contribute to providing the defence and security of the country we live in.

Unfortunately, there are too many of us who believe that security and defence are the almost exclusive task of the Ministry of National Defence, in which other ministries and governmental structures should also participate. This situation is brought about by several causes, the two most important ones being: insufficient information and convenience.

Insufficient information cannot be blamed only on state institution, but also on us, the citizens, who are lackadaisical and *"do not wish to trouble trouble until trouble troubles them"*. In other words,

General (r.) Dr Mihail Orzeață – Associated-Invited Professor at the "Carol I" National Defence University in Bucharest and former Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

why get involved in the problems of the military, since we pay for it ! Even if I would like to think that the description of this attitude does not represent us, I have enough arguments to say that it expresses a reality one cannot ignore. Too many people have remained anchored in the logic of the *Cold War*, of the military confrontation respectively, when it comes to addressing the topic *defence*. It seems that those who think this way have forgotten or neglected to become informed in relation to the changes that have occurred during the latest decades, in defence and security included, which are no longer the almost exclusive attributions of the military.

No one knows what the future war will look like, even if experts have already provided several probable models in this respect. We will know which its main defining elements are when it takes place. Even if we do not know the physiognomy of future war and even if we do not wish to become involved in another war, we should however take some preventive measures. The first and most important one is knowledge, as a better informed individual means a better prepared one. This is the purpose of this article: to provide more information for those who read it. Even if there is enough data on defence and even on defence resources, in various sources – handbooks, courses, thematic papers, official websites etc., those who are not directly involved in defence and security must be informed regarding the essence of this domain, in order to become aware of their rights, as well as of the obligations that are incumbent on them as responsible citizens of this country. I believe that it is in this way that the first – and more important – step can be taken: from security consumer – a position that is true for most citizens that have a voting right – to contributor to providing the nation's defence and security.

What Are the Material Resources of Defence ?

The material resources of defence consist of **primary natural resources** (minerals, wood, animals – for killing, traction, laboratory experiences, protection etc. – and food) and **derived resources** (they result from processing primary natural resources – pieces of equipment; technologies; finished and semi-finished – alimentary or non-alimentary – products – organised in stocks; transport, communications and production infrastructure etc.).

Both primary and derived natural resources are provided both from own production and from imports. The more defence resources are provided through own production, the less vulnerable the national security and defence are. (This statement is true when the material resources from own production provide a various range of high quality products, from the viewpoint of purity and technological level). The explanation is in the history lessons, showing that, in crisis situations and at war, there are times when some providers might condition the imports or even completely interrupt the supply flow.

Knowing the total need for material resources that must be provided and the ones coming from own production, one can determine the necessary import provisions and initiate actions in order to sign contracts with primary and derived natural resources providers.

Determining the effort that must be made by the state in order to *provide the resources necessary for defence* falls under defence planning, based on:

- the conclusions of the geostrategic and geopolitical analyses, at regional and global level;
- the concrete situation of the stocks existing in military and national reserves warehouses;
- the type of conflict in which it is estimated that the country would be involved;
- the missions planned for the military body, in peacetime, in crisis situations and at war, including for the commitments to NATO and the EU;
- the force employment plans, in crisis situations and at war.

Based on the needed material resources, the **conception of stock realisation** is drafted, which comprises:

- the amount of existing resources;
- the amount of required resources and its sources (imports or own production);
- the sorts of primary and derivate material resources and the quantities for each of them;
- the time schedule of providing sorts and quantities;
- the distribution of material resources on warehouses;
- the territorial (re)location of warehouses on resources, in keeping with operations and intervention plans.

Material resources are placed in: military warehouses; custody of economic agents; state reserves warehouses.

Warehouses are located in accordance with the following factors: natural camouflage possibilities; transport, communications and utilities assurance infrastructure; possibilities of defending against any type of risks and unauthorised entry attempts.

The estimated resources needed for defence will not be entirely provided, because costs are very high, just as the risks of an uneconomical use of this type of resources are, especially given the circumstances of the lack of threats to security. In order to *provide the difference of resources between the existing and the necessary ones*, the following methods are used in practice:

- *"dormant"* contracts – are carried out in the interval established by parties at the beneficiary's request and pay the products and services provider

an amount of money throughout the entire period in which the contract is inactive, for the immobilisation of some product, transport etc. capabilities belonging to the provider;
- requisitions of assets and services from economic agents and private persons.

With a view to knowing the defence potential, it is important that we assess the capacity of national economy to shift from the production in peacetime to the defence one, namely of *conversion* and of the time that is needed for the conversion. Moreover, it is important that we are aware of the range and quantity of resources national economy can provide in a period of time (day, month, year) depending on which the state can take the appropriate measures to provide the difference from other sources.

In order to achieve an *effective defence material resources management*, the following activities must be planned:
- modernisation of the technique and the acquisition of technique that is new, effective and compatible with the one of the armed forces belonging to the allied states;
- consumption, on quantities and sorts, in order to avoid any wastage (as, for instance, the case in which supplementary financial resources are spent in order to delaborate important quantities of ammunitions that were produced and purchased a lot over the estimated needs);
- exchange of perishable resources;
- replacement of used resources;
- realisation of atypical and used resources;
- maintenance of the technique in order to ensure a high operational capacity.

What Are Defence Financial Resources ?

Financial resources consist in the necessary funds for the appropriate functioning of state structures with responsibilities in national defence and security and preparation of the territory, population and economy for defence. The funds are mostly provided by the budget of the Ministry of National Defence, as well as by the budgets of the ministries and other governmental structures with responsibilities in defence and security.

The main *types of expenses* are:
- personnel (wages, bonuses, indemnities, pay rises etc.);
- operation and maintenance (training and education; combat technique, support, logistic support reparation and maintenance etc.);
- procurement (new assets acquisition);

- infrastructure (investment in constructions for military entities or preparation for the territory for defence).

The defence budget is established based on the propositions coming from the structural entities of the Ministry of National Defence, which are centralised at the level of secondary credit accountant – heads of military services, headquarters commanders and heads of the ministry's central directorates –, and consequently are directed to the head of the Defence Integrated Planning Directorate, in order to draw up the project of the *Directive of Defence Integrated Planning* and to be discussed within the Defence Planning Council. Afterwards, the propositions of the Ministry are sent to the Government, which centralises the propositions of all ministries and other governmental structures, synchronises them and they are submitted to the Parliament for approval. After it is approved, the defence budget is divided depending on programmes, priorities and plans and programmes are implemented.

The Impact of Defence Resources on National Security

As we all know, transformation in the military field is a complex and multidimensional process that, until the established objectives are achieved, generates a series of vulnerabilities for the national defence system. That is why the decision to initiate the process as well as its entire development is influenced by a series of domestic (the force and dynamism of national economy, the support of the population for the decisions of the political factors, the economic-social and political stability of the country etc.) and external (risks and threats to national security, evolution tendencies of the international political-military situation – especially the one in the area of strategic interest –, international engagements of the state etc.) factors.

As a consequence of these determinants and influences, the beginning of the transformation process is preceded by an ample and detailed analysis of own capabilities (available resources: human, material, financial, intellectual, technological, time etc.; correlation between transformation objectives and allocated resources; prognosis of the evolution of resources that are available during the process etc.); prognosis of the evolution of the nation's political-economic and social situation; prognosis of the evolution of the security environment (risks, threats, ratios of forces etc.), of the way in which risks and threats to security during the transformation process are countered etc. The conclusions of the analysis of own capabilities – especially of available resources – and of the security environment will also be used in: establishing the transformation objectives, on stages; the major programmes that will be included in the transformation process and the main benchmarks for implementation plans – objectives, deadlines, responsibilities, necessary resources etc.

Resources have a **major impact** on the defence capacity as they provide all that is necessary in order to develop training activities and to meet the commitments made by our country as a member of NATO, the EU, and the ones resulted from the treaties and agreements in which Romania takes part in peacetime, respectively providing the appropriate support in order to carry out the missions comprised in the operation and intervention plans in crisis situation and at war.

Resources play a **crucial part** in the ensemble of the analysis, assessment and decision activities and consequently in the one of the activity meant to coordinate the transformation process, as these represent both the basis of the beginning of the process and the *"fuel that feeds it"* throughout its development. That is why multi-annual planning, drawn up by the Directive of Defence Planning, provides a reasonable perspective for political-military decision-makers. If the planned objectives are not entirely fulfilled, this has middle and long-term consequences, because certain capabilities can be provided only in years and even decades.

The Correlation between National Security and Defence Objectives and Allocated Resources

The need for resources has always existed, however, currently, the *"hunger for resources"* is so big because of the broad transformation process and the economic-financial crisis undergone by our entire society. The limited resources that are available for the transformation process require the highly efficient use of the human, material, technological, financial and other support. Moreover, because the resources demand is usually bigger than the offer, the establishment of allocation priorities is required depending on the directions and criteria developed by decision-maker factors. The assessment that precedes the decision to allocate resources will be based on certain (known) data, as well as – especially – on variable measurements that represent the quantification of the prognosis of evolution of the national economy, the budget allocated for the Ministry of National Defence, the factors that determine the evolution of the security environment and, implicitly, the risk factors and threats etc. The preponderance of variable measurements in assessing the situation will also influence the way to determine the correlation between available allocated resources and the objectives of transformation and of national defence and security provision. Basically, the concordance between *resources* and *objectives* will be a probability function and its size will be as close to reality as the estimations used to draw up prognoses are based on the as exact as possible evaluation of as many as possible factors that can influence the evolution of the situation. Certainly, there can be *"surprises"*, because of the emergence of some factors with an evolution that is different

from the one in the prognosis or because of some factors that have not been considered at the time of the initial assessment. Thus, in the case of the dramatic change of the allocation of resources (quantity, quality, type, rhythm etc.), it is required that the revaluation of the entire process takes place in order to ascertain the new possibilities, to reschedule the deadlines of some objectives (sub-objectives) and, if necessary, to change certain responsibilities. In exceptional situations, *when the allocated resources are more diminished* compared with the necessary ones, and this situation coexists with important changes of the security environment, *it is recommended that the fundamental (general) objective, as well as the level of ambition* and the objectives of the stages, programmes etc. should be revalued.

If the changes in the resource allocation are not significant, one of the solutions is the *revaluation of priorities*. If the initially established priorities are still valid after revaluation, then resource allocation is made for priority plans and programmes and the less important ones are reorganised.

It is highly important for the *objective* to be permanently in everybody's attention – decision-makers and executants, so that any major activity could be related to it. Firmness in maintaining the objective is the key to success in any human activity, yet, if the evolution of the factors that influence the national defence and security resources management does not allow reaching the initial purpose, it is important for firmness to be doubled by flexibility. In this context, *permanently adapting decisions to the requirements of security environment* does not mean lack of firmness, but it is one of the best ways to maintain the correlation between *resources* and *objective*. The ongoing transformations of the North Atlantic Alliance and of the EU have had an important impact on our country's security and defence policy through its harmonisation (synchronisation) with the ones of the Euro-Atlantic organisations Romania is part of.

In order to better understand the impact of defence resources on defence capacity, namely, what it is that we obtain through investing in defence

Figure 1: The Relation between Operational Capabilities and Costs

and security, it is useful for us to analyse *figure 1*.

We assume from the figure that if we intend to have structures with great combat capacity and little reaction time, then we need to invest more financial resources. We can transform the financial resources invested in defence and security in: high training level, state-of-the-art weapon and support systems, command

systems as well as information collection and processing systems that enable making and sending decisions and reports in almost real time and safe from any interference, an infrastructure that is proper to the requirements of the civil society, as well as to the purposes of defence and security, the production capacity with dual – civil and military – use etc.

All major decisions of the defence and security policy must be harmonised with the decisions made at the level of the Euro-Atlantic organisations Romania is part of. In other words, the NATO and EU membership requires the permanent improvement of the efficiency of the structures with responsibilities in the field of security and defence through the adoption of the performance criteria and operational conceptions of these organisations: *mobility, theatre deployment and support capability, firepower, precision, time of reaction, (technical, operational, infrastructural) interoperability level* etc. The performance criteria are – in their turn – subjected to a permanent renewal process, as a result of the requirements of the modern battlefield. Thus, the performance criteria established for weapon systems and combat units after operation *"Peace for Galilee"* in 1982 – considered, at that time, as a *"future war"* – are only partially valid today.

Therefore, living in a world that is dominated by information, in which the *"only constant is change"*, there is no more room for routine and immobility. Permanently prospecting the security environment in order to discover and understand its tendencies, with the purpose of continuously adapting the decisions regarding national defence and security, represents the imperative of our century.

English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

THE JOINT LOGISTICS COMMAND
– Concrete Way
to Provide Logistic Support –

Major General Dr Cătălin ZISU

The article discusses the Joint Logistics Command effort in the context of the missions Romania has to accomplish as a NATO and EU member state. It focuses on the Romanian armed forces participation in multinational operations, especially in Afghanistan.

To better meet the requirements of combat troops, the National Support Element – NSE was established. The Joint Logistics Command is continuously preoccupied with the improvement of the NSE. Moreover, the establishment of a National Command Element – NCE is considered. In addition to it, some structural and actional changes to be made regarding the logistic support activities in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan are presented, taking into account the import of concepts and methods that are proper to commercial logistics.

In conclusion, the author draws attention to the fact that both advantages and disadvantages that may derive from this type of actions should be thoroughly considered.

Keywords: *logistic support; multinational operations; National Support/Command Element; commercial logistics*

The Ministry of National Defence, in accordance with the commitments of our country to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union, makes considerable efforts, in human, financial and material terms, in order to fully accomplish the assumed missions. One of the evident aspects related to this effort is represented by the participation with forces, assets and military equipment in the global operations against terrorism (Afghanistan), in the stabilisation of the internal situation in countries located in different regions of the world (Kosovo), and in the multinational observation missions conducted under the UN auspices, in Africa or Asia.

The human effort involved in these participations gets more and more substantial every year, which clearly proves that Romania has succeeded in being a stability pillar in the region, as well as that it has contributed, alongside the other NATO and the EU member countries, to the global action meant to preserve peace and security worldwide.

Our country participation in Afghanistan, within the *ISAF III* mission, is fundamental

Major General Dr Cătălin Zisu – Commander of the Joint Logistics Command.

and long-lasting, which requires that the decision-makers at the legislative and executive level should conduct a careful and pertinent analysis of the forces and assets that have to be deployed in this country. Not long ago, in January, following the Decision of the Supreme Council of National Defence that is to be submitted to the Romanian Parliament to be approved, it was decided for the forces that carry out missions in Afghanistan to be supplemented with 600 military.

The approval of the figures related to the force package meant to participate in actions outside the territory of the country in 2010 involves, in our opinion, a proactive and predictive approach to the logistic support necessary for the combat troops that accomplish missions under the command of the different force structures in Afghanistan.

As it is known, two of the most important entrance/exit points in Afghanistan, related to the *deployment/redeployment process (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration – RSOM&I)* of our forces are represented by the airports in Kabul (KAIA) and Kandahar (KAF). Starting October 2008, by deploying the *transport and support module (TSM)* in the *Air Point of Debarkation – APOD* in Kandahar, the Joint Logistics Command succeeded in providing the Romanian troops deployed in Zabul Province with effective and efficient logistic support, the main effort being focused on the forces belonging to the Manoeuvre Battalion in the Forward Operation Base Lagman, as well as in the other forward points situated alongside the main communication route in Afghanistan – the M1 motorway that connects Kandahar and Kabul.

The Joint Logistics Command effort directed to the sustainability of the Romanian forces in the area of responsibility of the *Regional Command South – RC SOUTH* got materialised, on new coordinates, during the following rotation, when the *TSM* changed into the *National Support Element – NSE*, increasing not only the number of the military men that participated in the mission (from 18 to 33) but also the available capabilities.

Since the second rotation, the *NSE* has succeeded, through sustained efforts, in ensuring the development of a very important process that consists in the rotation of the Romanian contingents through the KAF Base, on the one hand, and in the need for the logistic support of the above-mentioned forces in this area of Afghanistan, on the other hand.

The increase in the number of the Romanian troops that participate in the *ISAF III* mission requires that the leadership of the Command should conduct an effective analysis of the existent situation in Afghanistan, regarding our forces need for logistic support, not only from the actional standpoint (operational, logistic, administrative), but also from the structural one. In this context, and taking into consideration the requests of the forces deployed in the second important base in Afghanistan – Kabul, the Joint Logistics Command intends to establish

a NSE-type cell (2 military men) here, starting the next rotation in October 2010, cell that should be able to manage the logistic support activity that is necessary for the staff officers and the structures deployed in this extremely important area in Afghanistan.

Moreover, it has become clear that the success of a multinational operation is closely related to the concrete ways of ensuring the logistic support for combat troops. This can be demonstrated only by the efficiency of the capabilities available to the logistics structures, materialised through the modern assets and equipment, through the stocks of materials for self-sustaining, as well as through the effectiveness of logistic support bi- or multilateral agreements concluded with various partners in the theatre of operations.

As for providing troops with modern assets and equipment, we cannot say that the accomplishment of the missions by the *NSE* has recorded a clear qualitative leap (except for the technical and engineering equipment for the manipulation of materials), the structure being provided with major classical assets and equipment made in Romania, which are rather physically and morally out-of-date. However, a qualitative leap is recorded regarding the *NSE* organisation and the effectiveness of the logistic support provided bilaterally with the American partner, materialised in the important aid in the functional domains of the logistic support, such as the transportation of personnel and materials and the campaign services for our forces deployed in Afghanistan.

As far as organisation is concerned, the *NSE* currently has a mobile and effective structure. However, its print on the ground is not a considerable one, taking into account the fact that it does not possess stocks of materials belonging to the third line of logistic support but only to the second class of materials (spare parts for armoured cars, automobiles and tractors), as well as a reserve of equipment and individual armament (the one attached to the combat assets). On the other hand, the *NSE* freedom of movement in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan is limited by the existent restrictions related to the equipment with transportation assets provided with armoured cabin and by the lack of a structure to protect the force able to guard the transportation vehicles on the roads, especially on the M1 motorway from Kandahar to Qalat.

It has thus become evident that the *NSE* has to take into consideration the repeated requests to establish a structure of this type in APOD KAIA, as well as to enhance its transportation and force protection capabilities.

Benefiting from an operational situation that favours the development of the structure, the Joint Logistics Command, together with the decision-makers in the Operations Directorate, Personnel Directorate, and Strategic Planning Directorate in the General Staff, the Land Forces Staff and especially in the Joint Logistics Command, has launched a debate on increasing the importance of the *NSE*

structure, starting 2011, so that it can cover, as well as logistics is concerned, both APODs (KAIA and KAF) and develop the available technical capabilities.

As for the equipment with the necessary assets (armoured transport vehicles, fighting assets for a force protection structure, essential equipment for carrying out the missions – armament, communication equipment/TACST, Hariss radio stations, radio controlled improvised explosive devices jammers/ECM etc.), the *NSE* personnel have submitted the necessary requests to the American partner; some of the assets have already arrived in the Romanian camp in KAF Base (four armoured vehicles HMMWV/Humvee-type, model M 1151M), and the other (two armoured trucks and other two HMMWV/Humvee, model M 1151M) are to arrive soon. Providing the *NSE* with these categories of assets, we appreciate that it could have enhanced possibilities to express, in agreement with the realities in the area of responsibility coordinated by the commander of AOR RC SOUTH and RC NORTH, thus becoming a flexible structure that has freedom of action, one capable of extending its action area.

As for the Joint Logistics Command, in terms of concept, we are confident that we will move to a qualitatively new stage in military thinking in the field of logistic support. Currently, the number of structures that exercise command and control on the *NSE* activity is considerable, two of them having much more responsibility in this area. Thus, the Joint Operational Command and the Joint Logistics Command exercise the operational and administrative command on the *NSE* activities in accordance with the legal provisions in force in the Romanian Armed Forces. *NSE* carries out its activity in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan, being currently deployed in KAF Base.

By increasing the number of positions, for 2011, the Joint Logistics Command plans to increase the number of positions allocated in KAIA Base (starting October 2010), from two to five and to establish a stand-alone structure *(NSE – KAIA)*. By resizing the component structures, the Command intends that both the *NSE – KAF* and the *NSE – KAIA* should enjoy complete freedom in organising their activities, in accordance with each of them competences.

Although they have separate competences (in terms of deployment), technical equipment and certain stocks of material available, the actions of the two *NSE* structures will not be divergent. In this respect, we consider it necessary to establish a command and control structure to manage the effort of both *NSEs*. Based on the *NSE* experience in the theatre in Afghanistan, as well as on the one of the similar logistic structures of the other countries that operate next to us in this country, we propose the establishment of a *National Command Element – NCE*, to provide the integrated interface of the logistic support in Afghanistan in the relation with both the country and the other NATO member states that participate in *ISAF III*.

We highlight, in this respect, that this structure will be formed by resizing the other *NSE* organisational entities (in the force structure for 2011), in the formula commander, deputy for logistic support, for both *NSEs* and classified documents department. Examples in this regard are the organisations of the Dutch, American and British *NCE*. This structure will have certain strategic tasks, by coordinating the logistic support at national level, as well as operational ones, by coordinating the activities of both *NSE*s in the theatre of operations.

Closely related to the structural and actional changes we intend to make regarding the logistic support activities in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan, we consider it necessary to present some of our opinions about certain conceptual changes. Thus, in terms of the logistics flows established to support our forces in Afghanistan, we appreciate that we can learn from the experience of large commercial companies in the supply and distribution chain and we can operate some changes in this field of activity.

In the area of logistic support, the unit, subunit and, ultimately, the military man represent, in general, the beneficiaries (clients) that expect the superior echelon to take care of them and to provide them with the necessary ammunition, food, water, medicines, and assets and fuel for all vehicles in the inventory. From this perspective, the supply and distribution chain of the armed forces could be reorganised on three distinct levels, as follows: the first one must be flexible, able to ensure the necessary velocity, a small volume of transport for food, medicines, blood products, and individual equipment. This could be equated with the supply-delivery system of other commercial companies in the country. This supply and distribution chain will be, in our opinion, the primary responsibility of the *NSE*, which should make every effort to make it functional, viable and effective (it is considered the tactical level).

The second supply and distribution chain unfolds at the operational level, to ensure the transportation and distribution/evacuation of the assets and major equipment that require maintenance and repair during long periods of immobilisation. It is also, in our opinion, the responsibility of the *NSE*, supported this time by the other national and multinational logistic structures in the theatre of operations. Maybe it would be good for the chain to include certain maintenance and transportation capabilities located on the national territory. SC Roman SA Braşov could be assimilated as a commercial agent that has such a supply and distribution chain available; as for the air transportation, there are not similarities in this respect in our country.

Finally, the third supply and distribution chain refers to the deployment chain, through which the Romanian armed forces have to ensure the deployment of a large number of troops and material in a short period of time. The responsibility

for the management of the activities performed at this level is also attributed to the *NSE*. We do not identify, internationally or nationally, commercial agents capable of such performance, a commercial equivalent to this chain.

In this context, we would like to highlight the fact that, at the level of the Joint Logistics Command, the supply and distribution chain has already been changed through the adoption of some simpler processes related to distribution. Thus, the same way traders have commodities that are delivered by manufactures to regional warehouses, where they are placed in containers to meet the needs of the population in different geographical areas, the Command has regional centres (for coordination and storage) from which they distribute goods to the armed forces units.

Last but not least, we consider that the reverse flow of the assets and equipment surplus, of the slow and atypical ones (reverse logistics) should be rethought. It is known that when a unit, large unit or fighter receives new technical assets and equipment, they are considered to belong to the armed forces inventory as far as accountancy is concerned. In this regard, we are prepared and accustomed to using and maintaining the technique and equipment. After the exploitation period, when these types of assets and equipment should be withdrawn, we have to allocate other resources so that the former could be taken out of service (downgrade) and set aside, without having an integrated control on the needs of the armed forces. By this view, we consider it necessary to highlight that, through its competences, the Joint Logistics Command currently manages a considerable patrimony within the Ministry of National Defence. Because of the lack of visibility in the field of logistics, most of the products in storage, which may be useful to other services, continue to deteriorate and lose their qualities. In the same vein, some improvements should be carried out in the current logistics system so that the current and future patrimony of the Ministry of Defence can be more visible.

At the level of the Joint Logistics Command, but not limited to it, the logistic support is managed starting from the willingness to provide what is needed, where and when it is necessary, for the beneficiaries in the Ministry. In contrast, in commercial logistics, logistics is not managed focusing on the final customer, which cannot happen in the armed forces, as the consequences of not being in the right place at the right time can be disastrous. Therefore, we think it is imperative that any approach and import of concepts from the commercial logistics should be designed and considered carefully in order to identify not only the advantages but also the disadvantages that may derive from this type of actions.

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

AFGHANISTAN
– Between Reality, Desire and Patience –

Lieutenant General Dr Sorin IOAN

The author believes that any review of the stabilisation strategy for a normal development of Afghanistan should be based on simple and effective formulae, developed together with the country's government, which is determined to take the fate of the country in its own responsibility, supported by public confidence and tribal structures.

Moreover, social development must be accompanied by a communication campaign and built on an efficient economy, able to re-establish, as a first step, the traditional occupations such as agriculture, animal husbandry, hand woven textiles industry. Cooperation and regional good neighbourhood relations will integrate and draw in elementary trade.

It is only in this way that security and stability will encourage both international foreign support and private sector investment.

Keywords: *national programmes; security and stability; patrol missions; economic development; corruption*

After more than 25 years of wars, internal conflicts and cruel dictatorship, a large country, without natural resources, is far from finding the necessary peace that would open the road to transition. Seven years after the Taliban regime was toppled in the pursuit of building a *"new Afghanistan"* with the support of the international community, starting the Bonn Conference (2001), fundamental questions have still remained unanswered or the answers are controversial or contradictory: *What is the key to stability ?; What is the formula for true governance ?; What is the path from parallel efforts to joint efforts ?; Who coordinates the efforts ?; Transition to what ?*

In the context of collecting and investing foreign funds of 235 million dollars annually, plus a support package of 600 million dollars planned by the EU for the next three years, the reality related to stability indicates that 8 000 people were killed only in 2007, and 10% of the districts still have not been accessible to government security forces. What are the instruments for measuring effectiveness ? What share of the invested funds

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has produced effects and what share has been wasted ? The keyword, widely accepted especially in the circle of economic analysts, is *"patience"* and that is correct, taking into account one of the poorest countries on the planet. The period of reconstruction with patience is still difficult to define. However, some estimate it varies from 50 to 100 years. Will the current financial crisis and the almost globally economic recession represent a factor able to alter the constant long-term support ? It is also difficult to predict how long this crisis will last.

This analysis is aimed at assessing not only the road so far and the current state, but also possible model approaches, through angles of vision having a three-dimensional complexity.

Central Governance – Regional Differences – Control Level

The Central Government established immediately after the Taliban regime was toppled has found neither the necessary instruments nor the local leaders' cohesion to manage a coherent and unitary development programme at national level. Its authority has been limited to the capital Kabul.

The fact that NATO took over the leadership of ISAF mission, coexisting alongside with the Operation *"Enduring Freedom"*, more limited, extended the military presence to almost the entire country, supported the establishment of the Afghan National Army (ANA), of the regional security forces, providing the conditions for the appointment of regional governors alleged to be loyal to the central leadership and limiting the local power of the *"warlords"* that had their own army to defend their interests, outside any manageable laws or rules. In mid 2008, the Paris Conference, which brought the International Community and the Afghan Government face to face, did not agree on the implementation of a funding program of 50 billion dollars, considering the national development strategy presented by the Afghan authorities too ambitious in relation to the poor results of a non-competitive governance, regarded as unprepared to manage such a vast project. The high level of corruption and the lack of coordination of external aid are weaknesses that prevent or significantly delay the effectiveness of any form of support. The same causes, to which the precarious state of security is added, still keep the private sector investment at distance.

Regional differences, contrasting in some cases, make unproductive and unsuccessful any uniform national programme that is not adapted to the deeply real particularities. The image perceived with the help of media sources may be a global one, characterised by insecurity in a country in which most people are *"quiet"*, but, as you approach, the image resolution offers a clearer distinction

of regional differences: the southern area, a desert one, is confronted with a deeply rooted tribal organisation that is difficult to convert, with active insurgent activity and actions; the northern area, with a greater economic potential in agriculture and livestock; the border areas, particularly the western one, coupled to a common trading system, with the traditional routes to neighbouring countries, and the eastern area adjacent to Pakistan that, for the locals accepted as members of the tribes and having ties of kinship on one side and the other, is not considered a separation border. The expression of leadership, the establishment and negotiation of projects, the construction of the future system in which authority functions are but some of the areas that require a specific, delicate, diplomatic approach taken *with patience*. For the time being, the tribal leaders consider the more and more pronounced interference of the state in their life, rules of coexistence and networking system is not acceptable, and the central government considers insurgency is a strategic threat, organised and financed from bases located in Pakistan.

Control level exercised by the central government on all the regions of the country, in the current situation, could be measured through the capacity to manage development on their own, which, in turn, is characterised by two fundamental dimensions: the credibility level of the government in the eyes of the population, and the trust level of the government that the laws and directions from the centre are obeyed by the entire population under the local authority. The current reality gives the feeling that, in the event the international force withdraws, the most probable consequence will be the retalibanisation of Afghanistan or, in the most optimistic scenario, the retalibanisation of important regions in the south, centre and the east. Currently hesitating even when it comes to putting in practice the law regarding the eradication of narcotic crops, control will be perceived as an instrument belonging to the leadership, when the ordinary Afghans support the government more than the insurgency. *In this context, credible and honest governance able to transparently promote projects, through open dialogue and negotiations, is the primary dimension.*

Living Standard – Infrastructure – Alternatives

In a country in which most people live in poverty, and many do not know what another life would be like, it is very difficult to choose the priorities of development programmes, even if they were coordinated. Currently, the PRTs[*], various international organisations, and NGOs develop programmes in parallel,

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[*] Provincial Reconstruction Team.

without a minimum harmonisation and synchronisation. Nothing is useless, any project is welcome and it could add value to the social existence (hospitals, schools, highways), but the *living standard* of the population will not change without economic development, able to provide paid employment. Too little attention is paid to the social realities related to poverty such as the fact that two thirds of homes do not have electricity and one third does not have running water. In the age of computers and various television programmes, considered important sources of information and means of unlimited communication between two points on the globe, almost in real time, this country, three quarters without electricity, is an exception. The Paris Conference on 12 June 2008 revealed that significant amounts of the money collected were not directed towards priority areas and objectives. *Infrastructure*, always and everywhere, is an essential prerequisite for development. But infrastructure is very costly to achieve and it is lost in time if not regularly maintained. Maintenance is normally carried out with funding from the state budget and the budget is strengthened by a productive economy. Alternatively, it could be done with external funds, but how long donations last ? What are the limits of the international community patience until the country has the potential for self-sustaining ? We appreciate that, for Afghanistan, investment in economic development should, at least for a time, be made prior to the construction of highways. *Alternatives* as far as employment is concerned are very limited and, moreover, economy is almost inexistent. Therefore, people resort, many times out of desperation, to what they know to do best, after more than twenty years of war: to handle firearms and other lethal means. *In this context, the improvement of the living standard through economic development having immediate results is the primary dimension.*

Drugs – Corruption – Terrorism

Afghanistan has become the largest producer of *drugs* for Europe. Anywhere in the world, drugs, besides the adverse effects, are considered the *"factory"* for large sums of money, network-like organised, in which each intermediate segment wins. Specific to Afghanistan, the money made out of the narcotic crops is more than the entire national gross domestic product. The raw material resulted from poppy crops is processed into mobile, rudimentary laboratories, and the resulting substances take the already traditional routs of being realised. Growers are those who have money to irrigate the crops and to pay workers in the field. The routes inevitably pass through the areas controlled by insurgents and Taliban, who, in turn, collect *"taxes"*. The total amount of narcotics production achieved in Afghanistan is 2 billion dollars per year, out of which one billion is accounted

for within the country, 100 million fund the Taliban insurgency, thus *terrorism*, and the track of 900 million is lost, but without doubt, a significant amount fuels *corruption*. The picture, although brief, certainly leads to the conclusion that fighting against narcotics in a unified and coordinated manner will significantly reduce the amount of drugs trafficked in Europe, will hit the corruption virus effectively, thus opening the path towards the development of an economically realistic plan in the long run, and will reduce the terrorist organisations opportunities to arm, move and act. Why is the start of this fight delayed ? What are the barriers ? Clearly, the EU is interested to engage in this fight that solves, in part, the attempts to reduce the illicit and harmful trafficking in the Community area. In this respect, it has responded through the *EUPOL* mission meant to train and support the local police structures.

NATO is the main actor interested in the mission success through putting an end to the insurgent and Taliban funding, fact declared through the voice of the heads of state and government at the Summit in Bucharest on 2-4 April 2008. In the context in which the Taliban make million of dollars out of the illegal drug activities, funding the own hostile criminal activities against the multinational force, central and local state authorities, and civilians, this fight is a prerequisite for the entire mission success. The ISAF Mission cannot, morally or as a standard-bearer, carry out this fight alone. For this mission, in the first line should be, in turn, the legal authorities of the state through their decision to initiate it, the civilian structures that represent international governmental and non-governmental organisations, PRTs, having national leadership that, in a coordinated manner, can create, through their objectives, alternative jobs for those affected, and, finally, the Afghan security forces and army that have been handed in the responsibilities regarding the security of the regions by ISAF. In this context, ISAF forces can support the mission or if the national forces cannot settle the situation they can even take part in direct actions, interdiction ones. *In this respect, the gradual eradication of narcotic crops holds the dominant part, but, as it has been stated for the first time here, it is necessary for all the actors that participate in the operation to coordinate.*

Democratisation – Tribal Organisation System – Taliban Influence

The Afghan people have a strong pride that has been challenged and matured in a long period of wars, based on the ancient culture and traditions that have not only lagged this nation behind others but they have also sent it back to roots, especially in the areas dominated by tribal organisations. There is also a growing differentiation between the ethnic groups populating the country, but we do not go

into irrelevant details here. It is very difficult to undo and replace the rules within a tribe, as each member is born with them and tries to get accustomed to them since the very moment he/she starts to perceive the environment. The Taliban are always with them and among them. That is why they are very difficult to be told apart by the multinational force soldiers (who come from several continents and have different traditions and cultures), as they dress alike, look alike, behave alike, and speak the same language. Whether they live together in understanding, whether intimidated, threatened, terrorised, the local people do not uncover or betray them to the foreigners, at least not through a normal, usual, occasional dialogue. Some time ago, a contingent of soldiers realised after four months, incidentally, that a locality where they had executed patrol missions daily, communicating with the authorities and the local people, had been under the total control of the Taliban through many representatives who lived on a hill at the edge of that locality.

What is actually the essential message of this triad ? It is very difficult to impose the rules of democracy and modern coexistence proper to the 21st century overnight in organisations whose rules belong to other historical contexts. Or, in other words, no matter how much we may try to avoid the direct form that sounds challenging and troubling for some environments: *the tribal system in Afghanistan and modern democracy are incompatible*. Any plan or project that will ignore the differences between the life in regional communities in Afghanistan and will treat them uniformly or will encourage for certain laws and rules of the advanced democracies to be imposed successfully in a short period of time, overlapping the traditional culture and customs, may be considered a naive experiment.

Isolation – Regionalisation – Afghanisation

The development projects, no matter the form of organisation they are intended for, do not have to address the country as if it were *isolated* as an island in the middle of the ocean, but in the context of the relations with neighbouring countries and of the regional integration in the area to which it belongs. The absence of any natural resources within its territory requires, undoubtedly, economic exchanges based on good neighbourly relations. The relationship with Pakistan, which is not an amiable one involving public reproaches on both sides, becomes important, since the Taliban, insurgents and terrorist groups prepare their attacks in Afghanistan in bases near the border between the two countries. Because of the unfriendly landscape of the area, with rocky mountains with heights between 4 000 and 7 000 m, it is difficult for the security forces to come closer to the tribal human settlements in the area and to exert any form of control over them. The development of Afghanistan should be considered in a *regional* context.

According to analysts, when Afghanistan, an Islamic state, becomes democratic (a dream too great to fulfil soon !), it could be a bridge between the West and the region, in the same way Turkey is today. *In this context, the primary dimension is the "Afghanisation of the country", meaning the Afghans take control in their hands, the development of the country towards a clearly defined direction, known and accepted by all parties, with external support, in stability and security, on condition the border control is strengthened, and in an open relation of regional cooperation.*

Stability – Reconstruction – Uncoordinated Assistance

The state of general *stability* is far from being a balanced one, able to ensure the necessary peace to implement vital reconstruction projects.The private sector is thus discouraged to invest in the economy of the country in a real and visible way, as it is rather difficult to assume the associated risks, and the preoccupation of international institutions is excessively captured by the neutralisation of active enemies, the Taliban and the insurgency, which causes daily losses of life, reducing the attention paid to reconstruction and development. The *reconstruction* itself is an unrealistic term, as it actually refers to the establishment of an economy that has hardly any history. The parallel development of projects by a large number of organisations without a basic *coordination* of plans and efforts cannot set a coherent, phased and harmonised vision of objectives. *Therefore, repetitively, in this relation, too, the dimension of a comprehensive and coordinated approach to the future Afghanistan is fundamental.*

The latest three-dimensional configuration analyses represent a possible point of view on how to address support for Afghanistan, in the event a change in the courses of action is desired, which, if cannot reduce the time necessary for the establishment of a certain course of progress, will at least contribute to make the current approaches more effective.

Revised Strategy – Confidence – Credibility

A new *revised strategy* is necessary at both levels, the one of the military operation, for stability and security, and the civilian one, to establish the development priorities in all the domains: political, economic, social, military, financial, educational and cultural. There are three common and indispensable aspects for both levels: *the first one*, the will of the national, central and regional authorities, *the second one*, the will of all the contributors to cooperate, *the third one*, to gain the masses confidence for any approach.

The latest assessments of the analysts and experts show that the Taliban have made progress and have had more and more success regarding public propaganda and gaining the people's confidence, the organised and effective information system, and the performance in organising attacks on the territory of Afghanistan. We consider these data cause the appeal to the elementary teachings of an expeditionary mission for any messenger of peace and welfare. Success is given by the determination in achieving the mission, which is supported by two pillars: the credibility of own force in relation to the enemy and the ones that oppose the mission, and the local population confidence in the mission objectives, which are beneficial to them, and in the ways to achieve them. The population confidence adds value and weight in front of the adversary. Considering sufficient arguments have been brought for the necessity of a revised strategy, we will discuss some of the possible coordinates of the paradigm shift, based on the current vulnerabilities:

• security and stability are essential for any further step; the new Afghan National Security Strategy, adopted by the Parliament, has to clearly define and coherently direct the separation from the Taliban and the fight against them, narcotic crop eradication and ban on trafficking as the main funding source for instability and insecurity, the fight against corruption;

• narcotic crop eradication has to be managed gradually, through a multinational programme meant to fund some economic objectives that ensure jobs for the ones affected by the eradication of crops, in a continuous process of reconversion, and through encouraging other useful crops, providing specific details for their organisation, from state subventions to the assurance of crops collection and realisation;

• plan large projects of national interests, simultaneously with the bottom-up ones, with their *"little success stories"*, that can be immediately perceived by ordinary people as a positive change in their lives; for example, taking into consideration that two thirds of the households do not have electricity, a simple form of local project would be the gradual connection to electricity, a state-subsidised campaign to provide households with TV sets, followed by a campaign of communication and information on the future, through images;

• admit the reality that NATO has not played the spearhead role since the conditions for the reconstruction stage were met after the establishment, preparation and transfer of responsibilities to the Afghan national army; from now on, it cannot follow the path to success alone, but as a participant in a *common will process* to which all contributors have to adhere; Who configures the *"process"* ? Who coordinates it ?;

• the increase in the number of the military to 134 000, more over the initially planned number, will cause major problems related to costs (equipment, assets, maintenance, salaries), having in view that donations will not be endless, and the burden of supporting them from the budget cannot be sustained in the absence of the economic development able to produce budget; the subsequent reduction in the number of the military and the reintegration of the discharged ones into the civil society will be a costly and difficult process that may generate convulsions;

• the negotiations with the Taliban are not advisable since some success has been already achieved, especially as far as propaganda is concerned. Reconciliation talks yes, but not negotiations.

Therefore, before a new Bonn-type conference, to collect funds for programmes comprising agreed projects, it is necessary a conference to coordinate, in a way or another, all the institutions and contributors. Who will be the coordinator ? Who will organise it ? The same obstacle that is difficult to overcome soon.

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A possible revision of the stabilisation strategy for a normal development of Afghanistan should have as starting point simple and efficient formulae, developed in cooperation with a government determined to take the responsibility for the fate of the country, and supported by the confidence of the population and the tribal structures. Social development should be accompanied by a communication campaign built on an efficient economy that reconstitutes, in the first stage, traditional occupations: agriculture, farming, textile manufacture etc. The relations of cooperation and good regional neighbourhood will integrate and facilitate elementary trade.

Security and stability will encourage the international external support, as well as the private sector investment. The coherence of the international support programmes cannot be achieved without a comprehensive and coordinated approach regarding not only the efforts of all the international, governmental and non-governmental institutions but also the national programmes involved through reconstruction teams. If it is not possible in the near future, a compromise solution will be the coordination at regional level, as a segment, the leadership role being taken by the EU or even by a nation, with the consent of the central government and based on a memorandum concluded with regional authorities.

English version by
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STATE, SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Security – Topic for International Debate

Fleet Rear Admiral Cătălin-Silviu DUMISTRĂCEL

The provision of national security is a topic of major concern for all states worldwide, as a consequence of the diversification of and increase in the complexity of means and ways of action related to it.

The geostrategic position of our country, the accession to the European Union and NATO, the consistent policy for maintaining internal stability and constitutional rule of law, as well as for supporting and actively participating in Alliance missions in various theatres of operations have all brought about not only a positive feedback but also a series of hostile actions on the part of certain states. However, the current world situation, especially the one in Europe, as well as the technological development nowadays do not provide the framework necessary for the development of conventional war-related violent actions for the enforcement of the will of certain powers of the world upon smaller states anymore.

Keywords: *international relations; information environment; vulnerability; domestic threats; insecurity*

The 21st century will be characterised, among others, by a broad globalisation process, as well as by a strong increase in the interdependency between states. The fact that the number of actors in the international life, either supranational, transnational or subnational ones, has multiplied is obvious through the very assessment of daily life. James Rosenau, in *"Turbulence in World Politics"*, classifies the actors on the world scene in *"players conditioned by sovereignty"* and *"players unconditioned by sovereignty"*[1]. International politics still remains a field of self-assistance, in which states confront with the dilemma of security, and force plays a considerable part. There are tempering instruments such as the balance of power, the norms of international law and the international organisation; yet, these have not prevented wars from taking place. The logic behind an international conflict, as described by Thucydides, is still applied in some parts of the world today[2]. Despite the occurrence of numerous new and powerful

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[1] James Rosenau, *Turbulenţe în politica mondială*, Bucureşti, 1997, p. 56.
[2] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Descifrarea conflictelor internaţionale*, Editura Antet, 2005, p. 222.

actors on the international scene, one can reckon that the national state is still the fundamental element of the current international system. The approximately 350-year experience of this modern organisation system entitles us to believe that any other way of political organisation is difficult to find, at least for the beginning of the third millennium. The study of international relations naturally requires *figuring out the game of national interests* of states. In fact, according to Henry Kissinger, the reasons that set states in motion on the international scene are: national interests, realism in politics and collective society[3].

The issue of security has lately undoubtedly generated one of the greatest debates of the contemporary world. It has received the attention of politicians, political experts and analysts and, last but not least, of professors and researchers in the university environment and of the scientific research in the field of international relations, polemology and irenology. Naturally, a rich and impressive specialised literature has been developed. The result is paradoxical given three perspectives. *First of all*, society has not become safer and more secure. *Second*, when the concept/notion of *security* is used to designate or describe situations and processes in the international politics, we notice that they do not become, as it would be natural, more accurate with regard to their use in the official documents of states and non-state players that are involved in managing the issues involving peace and war in the contemporary world or in the media. Therefore, it is not in any way surprising that what some players (states, political-military organisations etc.) undertake in the form of some military or other nature actions in the international environment, in order to secure a space, can be perceived differently. For some, the act is named *security*, and for other players, it can become *insecurity*. One of the players feels *"insecure"* in a certain region and consequentially takes measures to supplement the number of forces and other means of *"defence"*. According to him and his allies, the area becomes more secured, while for his enemies the action becomes a threat. The area/region in which are gathered more weapons than the enemy has lacks security. *Thirdly*, today, the term *security* has expanded very much to many fields of social, economic, cultural, spiritual life, therefore, it is very difficult to notice the border between *security* studies and other disciplines that analyse human society[4]. It has come to the point in which almost any threat or danger to *something* in the society/international environment is seen as causing a security problem.

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[3] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomația*, Editura Bic All, București, 2007, pp. 723-727.
[4] Constantin Hlihor, *Politici de securitate în mediul internațional contemporan*, vol. I, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2007, p. 5.

Is this good or bad ? Opinions seem not to harmonise in this respect as well.

The explanation for this phenomenon is to be found by most people in the questionable nature of the term *security*[5], as well as in the different nature of the way in which states promote national interests.

We believe that the appeal of certain security theorists and specialists to find as fast as possible a common reference for the scientific research in this field is more than useful[6]. Thus, a situation will be reached when people will talk about different things designated as security problems. This will not be an easy thing to achieve if we consider that security is part of the category of questionable definitions because among its elements there are some that involve moral, ethics, philosophy, religion or ideology. On the other hand, *security* is in a binomial with *insecurity*, as in a balance in which the two *"arms"* are most of the time in a precarious equilibrium. One of them counterweights the other, depending on the type of behaviour adopted by the players that interact either within a society or at international level. From this perspective, the perception of security and insecurity will be in agreement with the position of the one that defines it in relation to a point of reference. If the consensus is not reached as far as the point of reference is concerned, then the same problem can be defined by an actor as *security* and by the other as *insecurity*.

The Enhancement of National Security – As a Necessity

The provision of national security is an important concern for world states, as a consequence of the diversification and increase in the complexity of means and ways of action related to it.

The strategic position of our country, the accession to the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, its consistent policy in order to maintain domestic stability and constitutional rule of law, as well as to support and actively take part in NATO missions in various theatres of operations have brought about not only favourable appreciations abroad, but also hostile actions on the part of some states. However, the current world state of play does not provide anymore the necessary framework for carrying out violent actions, of classic war, in order to impose the will of a world power on smaller states, even if these cannot be totally considered out of the question.

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[5] Apud Walter Bryce Gallie, *Essentially Contested Concepts*, in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, no. 56, 1956, pp. 167-198; apud Thierry Balzacq, *Qu'est-ce que la securité nationale ?* in *La Revue internationale et strategique*, no. 52, winter 2003-2004.

[6] Edward A. Kolodziej, *Securitatea şi relaţiile internaţionale*, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2007, p. 12.

At the international level, it is more and more mentioned the harm to the national interests of states through non-violent and unseen actions, among which the first place is held by the ones regarding information warfare.

That is why, considering the domestic, foreign and transnational threats, our national security is no longer the task of Romania only, but, given the circumstances of the current status of the country, it is ensured in cooperation with the European Union and NATO, thus being provided increased efficiency in preventing and countering malfunctions, vulnerabilities, risk factors and threats, especially external ones.

The fundamental security needs consider opportunities, requirements and utilities that are indispensable to defending, protecting and/or promoting the fundamental values or interests and refer to the decisions of the state bodies regarding the access to the strategic resources that are vital for the existence of one nation (politics, diplomacy, economy, intelligence, defence, national safety, public order, ecology etc.), to the requirements of citizens and of the community, as well as to their protection in front of any threat in the domestic or international environment[7].

Romania embarked on the path of modern development at the same time with Japan and Germany, respectively in the second half of the 19th century. More precisely, the year 1859, when the *"Little Unification"* of the Principalities of Walachia and Moldova took place under the great Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza. Why is it that Romania has not reached some levels of economic and social development that can be compared with the ones of Japan and Germany ? Here are a few possible reasons[8]:

- for almost 2 000 years, the Romanians existed as an ethnic nation, most of the time under foreign domination, providing riches for others and only after 1878 as a territorial, independent nation;
- Romanians lacked a hereditary, powerful and integrating royal dynasty; in Romania, the hereditary monarchical dynasty was established with a delay of 8-9 centuries, when in Europe and worldwide it already exhausted its historical role; in Romania, as in all Balkan states, monarchical institutions degenerated in royal dictatorships between the two world wars, totally compromising themselves;

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[7] Gelu Alexandrescu, Ion Călin, Costinel Nițu (coord.), *Securitate și apărare în Uniunea Europeană – Sesiunea de comunicări științifice cu participare internațională, Strategii XXI/2008, 17-18 April 2008, Section 7 – Sisteme informaționale*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2008, p. 223.

[8] Florian Gârz, *Spionajul și puterea*, Editura Obiectiv, Craiova, 2003, p. 18.

- Romania has never been independent long enough to forge its own identity and destiny;
- in the modern era of its history, from 1859 and to this day, Romania has been governed, according to some authors, by the *"most irresponsible, inefficient and corrupt political class in Europe"*[9]; Romania's evolution between 1990 and 2002 can confirm this opinion;
- in the 132 years of independent state existence (1877-2009), Romania failed in its attempts to become industrialised, urbanised and mass educated, even at the level of the minimum limit existing in Western Europe; most probably, Romania has lost, let us hope that not for good, the train of industrialisation without having accomplished this imperative requirement.

Vulnerabilities Diminish State Power

Currently, the information environment is characterised by vulnerabilities and uncertainties regarding the evolution in perspective of the security of states, which triggers the increase in the interdependence between them in adopting and applying security measures. From this point of view, the Romanian area had gained special importance in the network of European economic circuits for connecting the continent to the areas of interests from the Middle East and Asia[10].

Gianfranco Poggi distinguishes, in the contemporary international relations, between three forms in which power manifests: political, economic and ideological or normative[11].

Of course, there are other visions and ways to perceive power both at the level of academic research and at the one of the political action in the system of international relations.

The analysis of power will have to consider the way in which the players perceive and understand this rivalry in the international environment.

In the geopolitical rivalries, players are in a permanent competition to enforce their interests. In order to do that, they will use all means, from persuasion to threats and constraints. The ability of players to impose themselves or not in the dispute with other players is given by *their power sources*, by the place they hold in the structure of international relations and the prestige they enjoy. This aspect must not be neglected, because it adds to power.

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[9] Paul Lendrai, *"Eagles in Cobwebs. Nationalism and Comunism in the Balkans"*, Hawell Watson Publishing House, published in 1969 in the UK and in 1970 in the USA, pp. 262-349.

[10] Gelu Alexandrescu, Ion Călin, Costinel Nițu, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

[11] Apud Gianfranco Poggi, *Forms of Power*, Polity Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 23.

The prestige given by the promotion of the political and moral values that are unanimously accepted provide the players with legitimacy and, consequently, their chances of success in the geopolitical and geostrategic competition are higher[12].

In equal conditions, the Romanians' performances are comparable not only with the ones of Germans and the Japanese, but also with the ones of any other nations in the vanguard of world civilisation. The ruling class and the order imposed by it were unproductive for Romanians. Those who dominated us for centuries made sure that Romanians did not have any economic power, military power and effective intelligence services. All these are intertwined and outline the profile of every great nation[13].

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The place and the role of players in the international environment are given by their power sources, by their *power capacity*[14] and the legitimacy they build for themselves. In deciphering the potential of players, it is highly important to define and identify the sources, as well as the means for exerting power that they promote in the international relations.

We reckon that vulnerability differs from one player/state to another, depending on the power it has. There are powerful states that are not great powers – Israel, the Netherlands, with a high degree of vulnerability, because of the fact that their material and physical resources, such as the territory or population, are limited, and on the other hand, there are powerful states that are great powers at the same time – the USA, Japan, and are more or less vulnerable[15].

In the industrial age, especially after the Second World War, there has been noticed an extraordinary development of the intelligence services in the economic domain, considered complementary to the military intelligence services. These mainly resort to open sources of information, as well as to clandestine resources.

From the economic intelligence services came the industrial ones, as a specialised dimension of the former, aiming at obtaining financial, technical and production as well as enemy vital trading information.

Those who do not resort to industrial intelligence are usually crushed in the violent battle of competition, specific to market economy, especially in the context of the globalisation process[16].

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[12] Thierry Chopin, *Europe – Etats-Unis: retrouver la voie du multilateralisme*, in *Synthèse*, no. 126, 2002.

[13] Florian Gârz, *Spionajul şi puterea*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[14] Reinaud Bosch, *op. cit*, in *loc. cit.*

[15] Ionel Nicu Sava, *Studii de securitate*, Editura Centrului Român de Studii Regionale, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 189.

[16] *Ibidem*, p. 25.

The competitors of states in international relations, the non-classical players, tend to replace the states more and more also as far as a feature that belonged exclusively to states is concerned – the sovereignty over the territory. Transnational companies such as Honda, Sony, Toyota and Tomitomo control extended zones of the commercial and family life areas in the USA. The Japanese financial companies conquered Hawaii in 1980 through means of control that could not be even dreamt of by the military of the half of the past century[17]: *"When it is discussed in the context of the international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity"*[18].

To conclude, we consider that internal and international politics are, in fact, two different manifestations of the same phenomenon: *the battle for power*. History shows that the nations involved in international politics continuously improve themselves, and in this respect, intelligence systems can be instrumental in staging certain *"incidents"* that cause damage to some states and enhance the power and image as international player of other states.

English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

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[17] Timothy W. Luke, *op. cit.*, in *loc. cit.*
[18] Dănuț-Mircea Chiriac, *Politici şi strategii de securitate la începutul secolului XXI*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare "Carol I", Bucureşti, 2005, p. 17.

THE STATE AND ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION
Do States Fail ?

Colonel Dr Liviu Marilen LUNGULESCU

The defining aspects of economic globalisation cause profound mutations as far as national economies are concerned. Traditional practices and policies are not appropriate anymore in the context of the growing complexity of the government systems and of the new conditions imposed by the political and economic transformations.

The discussion about the capacity of national systems to govern economy is related, as the author highlights, to the fact that the state authority, legitimacy and capacity to draw up and implement policies efficiently are eroded and undermined both internally and externally.

As the state, political authorities and economic policies play a very important part in the gradual transformation of the national systems of economic governance, the author emphasises the importance of studying the implications of economic globalisation for the effectiveness of the states collective action, the models of economic management and the governmental policies.

Keywords: *nation-state; economic policies; globalisation; macroeconomic balance; failed states*

Nation-states undoubtedly undergo a process of adapting to the conditions of globalisation, which requires a significant and simultaneous internationalisation and denationalisation of its institutions, but the way in which they manage to adapt to challenges shows their viability as a form of organisation of social life and of political authority.

Successful states look almost identical. Those that succeed provide their citizens – more or less – with peace, personal security, access to public services, education and healthcare, non-discrimination, participation in making the decisions that concern communities.

Modern Nation-State and World Order

The modern nation-state has played a central part in the emergence of the new international order. The modern state and the modern society of states point out a few innovations. They include the territoriality, the monopolist control of violent means, an impersonal structure of power and a distinct appeal to legitimacy.

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Even if all states claimed territories, it is only when the modern system of nation-states appeared that exact borders could be gradually established.

The pretension to have control over the force and means of coercion (supported through the permanent armed forces and police) has become reality only through the *"pacification"* of peoples, the collapse of rival centres of power and authority within the nation-state. This element of the modern state was not fully accomplished until the 19th century in Europe and has remained a rather fragile accomplishment in many states.

When the appeals to the *"divine law"* or the *"law of the sovereign of the state"* were attacked and eroded, the loyalty of citizens became something that had to be won by modern states: inevitably, this implied a claim of legitimacy on the part of the state, because it mirrored and/or represented the needs, wishes and interests of own citizens.

The main features of world political order could be summarised as follows:
  a) the transformation of states, the expansion of liberal democratic states;
  b) in the international political system, the diplomatic interaction has rapidly increased, the phenomenon of regionalisation has amplified (EU, APEC[1], NAFTA[2]);
  c) the international and transnational regulation regimes have expanded.

Therefore, the core or *"deep structure"* of the modern system of democratic nation-states can be characterised by: democracy in nation-states; substantiation of democratic legitimacy and responsibility inside state borders and pursuit of national interest (and maximum political advantage) outside borders; democracy and citizen rights for the *"insiders"* and their frequent denial for the ones who are outside the territory.

The State and National Economic Governance

The defining aspects of economic globalisation trigger sound changes on the governance of national economies. Traditional practices and policies do not correspond to the increasing complexity of governed systems and to the new conditions required by the political and economic transformations[3].

Discussing national systems of economic governance is owed to the fact that the state's authority, legitimacy and capacity to efficiently produce and implement policies are eroded and undermined both from the inside and from the outside.

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[1] Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
[2] North-American Free Trade Agreement.
[3] I. Bucur, *Guvernarea economiei în era globalizării*, Universitatea București, 2007, p. 57.

Because of the fact that the role of the state, political authority and economic policies is quite important for the gradual transformation of the national systems of economic governance, it is necessary for us to study the implications of economic globalisation on the effectiveness of the collective action of states, the models of economic management and governmental policies. The opinions regarding the state of national economic governance are various, starting from the abdication and demise of the national state to optimistic visions, in support of maintaining the state as a frame of reference for political identification and economic management. The studies and analyses in the field are influenced by ideological pleas and are less based on the rigorous scientific analysis of the factors and conditions that determine certain characteristics of the current economic governance exerted at national level. Ambiguities and confusions occur especially for the following reasons: the misunderstanding of the nature and complexity of relations between economy and politics, market and state, public and private; the tendency to transfer the *"shortcomings"* of the state to the economic governance; the imprecision of the terms used to denote the tendencies in the evolution of state power and authority (for instance: resurgence, eclipse, resettlement etc.); the confusions between the crisis of the form of the state and the crisis of the national state, the governance practices and policies, the economic power and the state's capacity to govern the economy, state power and authority, governance and intervention etc.

The diversity and contradictory nature of some of the opinions expressed by the most notable representatives of economic and political sciences can be (partially) explained through the paradoxes that characterise contemporary governance: *"globalisation causes a diminution of the power or of the capacity of the state to intervene, which is in part the result of state policy and of the level of internationalisation reached by world economy, which reinstates the need for a nation-state, not in a traditional manner, but as a main link between the international level of governance and the level of the organised communities of the developed world"*[4].

The increase in the contribution of the government to economic activity represented one of the central themes of the 20th century. After that, the imperatives of austerity that characterised economic management have determined a tendency to disengage the state. The thesis that proclaims the decline of the state and the increase in its vulnerability in front of globalisation is ambiguous; it is not clear yet if this is a secular tendency or if it serves rather as an ideological instrument in order to support certain interests.

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[4] P. Hirst, G. Thompson, *Globalizarea sub semnul întrebării. Economia internaţională şi posibilităţi de guvernare*, Editura Trei, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 383.

There are two ideas that are put forward: the first sustains the diminution of the economic role of the state *(rolling back the state)* and the second supports the need for restoring the capacity of the state to promote economic development *(bringing the state back in)*. Moreover, it is believed that only a powerful state can intervene and play an active role in a market economy *(free economy-strong state)*.

The experience of the last centuries has proven that the *welfare-state* arrangements are not compatible with international liberalisation and the needed changes have triggered the powerful adjusting presence of the state *(workfare-state)*[5].

Thus, one may notice that there are different reactions to the state *"virus"*: an obvious ambivalence (at the same time, to protect oneself from the state and to be protected by the state, the privatisation of incomes and the socialisation of losses etc.) and paradoxical manifestations (the opposition towards the *"big government"*, as well as the frequent support of the government). The state's means of actions represent the object of political debates, which are often characterised by polemics: the optimal dimension of the government, the distribution of tasks between the public and the private sector, the role of the public budget in accomplishing the macroeconomic balance, the limits of the public debt.

The complex and sometimes paradoxical relation between globalisation, democracy and national state requires the analysis of the impact of globalisation on states, as well as the impact of states on globalisation. The crisis of the state is blamed on the impossibility of the state to oppose market forces as well as on the diminution of its regulatory functions.

At the same time with the marginalisation of the governance of national economy, a part of its prerogatives is spread at regional and world level, as well as at subnational level. As a consequence of undermining the capacity of the state to govern the economy, regional and world governance expand to the detriment of national governance. The practices of globalisation have transferred the power from nations to the global space and have considerably affected the capacity of states to create and implement economic policies. The denationalisation, privatisation etc. processes have brought about the loss of the economic power of states and profound changes in the nature and position of authority.

Do States Fail ?

The label *"failed"* remains a powerful way of describing those states that no longer serve their people. This tough phenomenon attracts the attention of leaders and contributes to the identification of the states that cause the greatest concern.

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[5] I. Bucur, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

The threat of such a state failure also focuses the attention on those who are about to fail: those countries that need foreign help the most. Yet, for this kind of classification to be useful, it must be objective, more precise and more distinctive than it is today the notion of failed state. Rather than placing all states in the same category qualitatively speaking, the title of *failed state* should make a fine distinction between the countries that pose a risk: *"The term should tell us that the respective country proves certain characteristics and not only evoke an amorphous feeling of dysfunction"*[6].

Failed states have two defining criteria: they provide their citizens with very small quantities of political goods with poor quality. The ranking of failed states, as shown in *figure 1*, is a wake up call for the most fragile countries of the world – the virulent economic crisis, the countless natural disasters and the governmental collapse.

The Failed States Map

The most ineffective states in the world are grouped in some of the less hospitable regions of the planet: Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Africa is the location for a little more than half of the first least stable states of this year. Yet, Mauritius and Ghana are part of this region and they are among the first most stable 60 countries. In Southwestern Asia, one can notice some of the most dramatic constrasts, as Iraq, Pakistan, Afganistan and Yemen are among top failed states, while the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuweit are among top stable ones.

Critical ● in Danger ● Borderline ● Stable ● Most Stable

Figure 1[7]

For the most fragile states in the world, the year 2008 was terribly difficult. The countries are assessed depending on 12 indicators. The most important are: *demographic pressures* (unemployment, especially among young population, has become an explosive issue when virulent rebellions broke out in Guinea, Haiti, Kenya, Cameroon); *refugees* (natural disasters changed the location of thousands of people in China; the war with Russia had the same effect in Georgia, while Yemen confronted with an afflux of refugees from Somalia); *migration* (brain migration continued to affect countries such as Iran, Haiti, Eritrea and Angola); *economic decline*

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[6] R. Rotberg, *Dezordine în clasament. O nouă interpretare a ceea ce înseamnă un stat eşuat*, in *Foreign Policy*, August 2009, p. 61.

[7] http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index

(Bangladesh and Cameroon experienced the biggest relative deteriorations, as a consequence of the need for food and assets imports) and *public services* (Burma and Haiti suffered from severe storms). The question *"Which state with risk of failure should draw our attention ?"* comes down to *"Which state is considered the biggest threat at world level ?"*. However, even if the connection generally assumed to exist between state failure and terrorism is less clear than many of us thought after September 11, 2001, the attacks alerted the people with regard to the consequence of the governments losing control over their own territories. For instance, let us consider Somalia, having the status of no. 1 failed state. A recent study of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point – the US Army Academy, based on al-Qaeda documents, has revealed that Bin Laden's forces underwent a terrible experience when they tried to operate in Somalia, for the same reason for which the peacekeeping forces did not manage to accomplish their objectives there in the '90s: terrible infrastructure, excessive violence and crime and few elementary services. In brief, Somalia is *too* failed, even for al-Qaeda.

On the other hand, Yemen is not a headline topic now, yet, it is carefully watched in many capitals of the world. A storm is about to take place there that can trigger a state failure: water and oil reserves are almost gone, many immigrants, including some that are believed to have connections with al-Qaeda, go to Somalia, the neighbouring country, which is failed and has a weak government that is more and more incapable of keeping the country on the functioning track. Many fear that Yemen is the future Afghanistan: a global issue, wrapped in a failed state.

It is not only about Yemen. The financial crisis has been an almost deadly experience for the insurgency-afflicted Pakistan, which receives life support from the IMF. Cameroon was struck by the economic epidemics, which generated protests, violence and instability. The countries that are dependent upon the import and export of goods – starting from Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea and Bangladesh – had great difficulties last year, suffering from the effect of *"whiplash"*[8] – prices went high very fast and then went low.

In turn, global recession causes the fear that several states might fall suddenly and become failed ones.

The current state of the Baltic countries is the best example for a broader story of Eastern Europe, which carried out reforms without considering them carefully, with loads of enthusiasm and little discernment. Looking back to the 20 years

[8] *Şocul asupra gâtului, provocat de o frână bruscă*, in H. Kharas, *Efectul de whiplash*, in *Foreign Policy*, July/August, 2009, p. 57.

since the fall of the Western Wall, it is clear that the economic difficulties the former captive countries confront with have been underestimated. The leader of the *"Solidarity"*, Lech Walesa, said that the transformation of a capitalist economy into a communist one is as easy as the transformation of an aquarium into a fish soup. But the opposite process is difficult. In fact, creating a prosperous capitalist system on the ruins of a planned economy proved too easy. The difficulty was to create powerful establishments under a political surveillance that was needed in order for them to remain healthy.

The glory years of the Baltic countries – as in many other emerging markets with rapid development – seem to be wasted. Instead of firmly applying the brakes, achieving big budgetary surpluses, amplifying the control on the banking system and taking urgent measures in order to maintain competitiveness, the politicians have reaped the harvest and ignored the risks, thinking that economic development is the result of their good decisions. The calls for precaution were ignored. The impulse was, as the tycoon Ainars Sleser said, to *"push the accelerator"*. The effects of this policy are clear: the Baltic states are now in a very difficult situation.

How are things with Romania in this respect? It depends on how we understand success, failure or happiness. We are, as often in our history, *"on the borderline"*. Meaning, between the group of *"stable"* states, which comprises most EU member states, as well as Canada, the USA, Argentina or Chile and the group of the states in danger, such as: Turkey, Russia, Moldova, Serbia or Bosnia, to give only a few examples in our region. We are in the same *"division"* with the Bulgarians, the Estonians and the Ukrainians. As well as with a great player on the global market, already acknowledged through its G-20 membership, such as Brazil, with Algeria, constantly under the threat of Islamic fundamentalists. And with another great player on the global market of energy resources: Kazakhstan.

The Romanians are in the group of Eastern European nations struck by the crisis, together with the Baltic states and Hungary, and not with those that cope better, Poland or Slovakia. Looking at the map of failures, in *figure 2*, one can notice that Romania and Bulgaria are in a limit situation, trapped between countries that are really in danger: Serbia, Bosnia, Moldova, as well as Turkey.

Among the criteria that badly influence Romania, the most important one is regarding the *"criminalisation and/or delegitimisation of the state"*. The elements considered are daily Romanian realities: masive and endemic corruption, to the benefit of ruling elites, their resistance to transparency, accountability or political representation, as well as the connection of political elites with organised crime[9].

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[9] The European Commission monitors Romania in the field of justice precisely because of corruption.

Rank	States	Criteria			General Score
		Demographic Pressures	Uneven Development	Delegitimation of the State	
1	Somalia	9,8	7,7	10,0	114,7
2	Zimbabwe	9,8	9,7	9,8	114
3	Sudan	9,0	9,6	9,8	112,4
4	Chad	9,3	9,3	9,8	112,2
5	Congo	9,7	9,3		118,7
...	...	...	...	...	...
128	Bulgaria	4,7	6,8	6,0	61,5
129	Romania	5,6	5,8	6,2	61,3
136	Latvia	4,6	6,2	5,1	54,6
140	Estonia	4,7	5,4	4,7	51,2
141	Hungary	3,5	6,1	5,5	50,7
142	Poland	4,9	4,9	4,4	49,6
145	Lithuania	4,5	6,2	4,1	48,0

■ Critical
◻ Stable
◻ Borderline

Figure 2: **Failed States Index**[10]

The loss of popular confidence in institutions[12], the *"unequal development"* with discrepancies as far as access to jobs, healthcare or education are considered, as well as *"demographic pressures"*[13] all contribute to the state stability of our country *(figure 3)*.

Still, who is responsible for state failure and who is helping it ? Little states fail by accident. The geographical and historical accidents play a certain part, as well as corruption and faulty management.

Why, for instance during the three decades of Robert Mugabe's ruling, the increase in the GDP of Zimbabwe crashed from 14% to less than 5% ?!

Is it really a coincidence that the immunisation percents in Equatorial Guinea have dropped 10 % in the latest 30 years since the country became a petrostate ?

How is it possible that the percent of asphalted roads in Yemen and North Korea still has one digit ?

Asked how they explain the failure of their own governments, the representatives of the most fragile states in the world pass the responsibility, blame information sources or accuse neighbouring countries of propaganda that is hostile to their interests. Only the Minister of Finance from Zimbabwe, Tendai Biti, admitted the failure of his country and the challenges ahead: *"We now come from the situation of a failed state, in which the GDP has dropped for 15 years"*.

2006	2007	2008	2009
62,6	60,9	59,9	62,3

Figure 3: **Romania's Scores in the Last Four Failed States Indexes**[*][11]

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[10] *Foreign Policy*, August 2009, p. 59.
[*] A lower score means a greater degree of stability.
[11] *Foreign Policy, Ibid.*
[12] The Parliament and the political parties are seen by citizens among the most corrupt institutions.
[13] Romania is included among the nine states with the highest degree of depopulation.

There is however something true in the idea that foreign involvement contributes to state failure. Last year, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, Congo and Yemen bought weapons from *"willing"* distributors from China, Ukraine, Italy and Belgium, despite limited budgets and pressing humanitarian problems. China and Russia, which represent almost 27% of the conventional weapons market, ensured 40% of the weapon sales towards the weakest 60 states in the index, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute *(figure 4)*.

Weapons Importers Top	FSI Hierarchy	Imported Weapons, 2006 and 2007 (in million $)[*]	Annual Military Expenditure (in million $)[**]
China	56	8 562	63 617
Israel/Cisiordania	56	3 384	13 357
Egypt	43	2 557	2 955
Pakistan	10	1 415	4 932
Iran	38	1 308	7 198
Iraq	6	850	3 617
Azerbaijan	56	574	728
Bangladesh	18	437	747
Georgia	33	427	646
Colombia	41	215	5 819

China's Clients — Country (hierarhy) Zimbabwe (2) Sudan (3) Pakistan (10) Burma (13) Nigeria (15)

Figure 4[14]

The weapons designed in the Western world and produced with a licence in countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, China represent a prolific source of small weapons worldwide. Their number is already stunning, but it can be highly underestimated, according to experts, because it includes only official transactions. And weapon traders are, of course, only a part of those who help state failure. The guilt belongs to many more.

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Today, the global economic crisis inevitably brings to discussion the issue of the role of the state in countering its consequences. Thus, we can expect even more to see a different type of state on the world stage, one that restores power within the alliances formed either inside or outside the nation-state.

Just as in the past, it is expected to intervene, with all available resources, in order to settle domestic problems, especially economic and social ones, building or increasing its capacity rather than reducing it.

There are many criteria that can lead to failure – demographic pressures, refugees afflux, unequal development inside states or regions, economic decline, delegitimisation and/or criminalisation of the state, collapse of public services, factionalised elites, danger of external intervention. Each criterion *"contributes"* to a certain extent to the failure of these nations that form a mosaic of unhappiness.

English version by
✑ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

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[14] *Foreign Policy,* August 2009, p. 60.

CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIPS

Colonel Leonard MOCANU

Considering the arguments for effective dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Russia, the evolutions in the latest decades, the lessons learned by both parties, the common and divergent interests, the author suggests that NATO-Russia relations should be based on five principles: dialogue, equilibrium, predictability, trust and honesty. These principles might seem ideal, taking into account that within our world there are not only principles, but especially interests. However, the author strongly believes that, if one wants to remain faithful to his commitments, he has to act in accordance with very strong and clear principles.

The year 2009 showed a new increase in the interest in developing active relationships, from both sides, mainly generated by the political change in the US Administration and by the statements and decisions of President Barack Obama, as well as the statements of the new NATO Secretary General, who invited Russia to an open and productive dialogue in the areas of common interests.

***Keywords:** NATO; Russia; partnership; dialogue; trust; honesty*

In his first press conference after taking over his prerogatives, the new NATO's Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, expressed his priorities, through which, in second place, he stated the relationship between the Alliance and the Russian Federation. His arguments to sustain such a cause may appear very pragmatic and diplomatic and they are intended to rebuild the cooperation bridges that have been demolished, or even closed, one by one: *"I believe that, during my term as NATO SG, we should develop a true strategic partnership with Russia. We should extend practical cooperation in areas where we share security interests. There is clearly scope for us to work together, on counter-terrorism, on Afghanistan, on piracy, on non-proliferation, and many other areas as well. Now, I'm not a dreamer. It is obvious that there will be fundamental issues on which we disagree. We have to insist, for example, that Russia fully complies with its international obligations, including respecting the territorial integrity and political freedom of its neighbours.*

But we cannot let those areas of disagreement poison the whole relationship. So my message

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to the Russian leadership and people is clear: let us build trust on cooperation, and base our cooperation on shared interests"[1].

Why does Russia still remain such an important partner for NATO after the end of the *Cold War*, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, after three stages of NATO's enlargement and after so many instances when NATO's leaders seemed to disregard Russia's interests and its official or non-official positions ? Why, after so many small or big disappointments, Russia still believes in a trustful and honest partnership with NATO ?

There are important questions and this paper may answer, even partially, to them.

Russia

To talk about Russia and its global influence, or at least its intentions and demands to be treated as a superpower, we have to begin the analysis of this country from the geographical, economic, military and geopolitical aspects.

The Russian Federation lies over two continents, totalising over 17 million square kilometres. By far the largest country in the world, Russia covers more than 1/9 of the Earth area, comprises 142 million inhabitants and spans 11 time zones. Its natural resources are in accordance with its huge territory, Russia being considered as the richest country in energy resources and mineral reserves[2]. Around 1/4 of the Earth's unfrozen fresh water reserves are concentrated on its territory, and Russia also has the world's largest forest reserves[3].

Russia was the largest constituent of the former Soviet Union and it is recognised as the continuing legal personality of the former Soviet state[4]. Russia is one of the countries recognised as a nuclear weapon holder, with the largest world's stockpile of WMD. Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council, a member of G8 and G20, and the leading state of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russian people have a strong tradition in science and technology, including significant achievements such as first human spaceflight.

Russia is a major weapon systems exporter. Even though the Russian exports fell from over 10,8 billion USD in 2007 to only 3,7 billion in 2008, Russia is the third weapon systems exporter, on a market dominated by the United States (2/3 of all exports in 2008)[5].

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[1] First NATO Press conference by Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 3 August 2009, as on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_56776.htm

[2] *Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2007. "Russia"*, http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761569000_4/Russia.html, retreived on 26 December 2007.

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia#cite_note-loc-14.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Jasmin Melvin, *US Leads World in Foreign Weapons Sales: Report*, Reuters, 6 September 2009, as in http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE5851XH20090906.

From a military point of view, the national and international profile of the Russian Armed Forces has risen over the latest years. We can notice a growth of defence spending (for 2009, the defence budget was at around 47,2 billion USD, with a growth of about 25% compared to 2008[6]).

The strength of the Russian Armed Forces is estimated at about 1,1 million personnel, and it should be reduced to 1 million by 2013. The Land Forces comprise approximately 60 permanent readiness formations and units, manned by 100 000 contract servicemen. Russia still holds 5 200 operational warheads, with more than 8 100 in reserve, and it has around 430 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, with 1 600 warheads[7].

All the services are planned to be modernised until 2020, and new and modern weapon systems, aircraft and warships are planned to enter into the service. Russia also tested the international market, with the intention to purchase new warships from France[8].

Despite of these huge expenses, the most recent reports state that the Russian Land Forces are into an unsatisfactory state. Over 50 percent of the new military units of the Russian Land Forces have been evaluated as *"unsatisfactory"* or *"satisfactory"*, and only four units achieved *"very well"*, at the evaluations conducted by the Russian General Staff during the month of October 2009[9].

Bound to carry on the legacy of the former Soviet Union, struggling with old generations' conservatism and inertia, Russia has faced many difficulties and, led by two presidents, it has succeeded in addressing most obstacles.

Russia refused to join the West in Western terms, but also failed to do so in its own manner. The great enthusiasm that followed the end of the *Cold War* melted into an atmosphere of economic uncertainty and collapse, augmented by a growing political opposition, mainly generated by the former Soviet elite that refused to abandon its privileges. In 1998, Russia was considered *"lost"*. A decade later, it seems assertive, authoritarian and aggressive[10].

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[6] ***, *The Military Balance 2009*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routlege Group, UK, London, 2009.

[7] *Ibid*.

[8] Author's translation from an article issued in the Romanian newspaper *"Adevărul"*, quoting an information issued by RIA Novosti Press Agency, 31 October 2009, as in http://www.adevarul.ro/articole/rusia-cumpara-o-nava-de-razboi-de-la-franta.html.

[9] Author's translation from an article issued in the Romanian newspaper *"Ziua Online"*, quoting an article from Russian electronic publication *"Gazeta"*, 10 November 2009, as in http://www.ziua.ro/news.php?data=2009-11-10&id=44458.

[10] Dmitri Trenin, *Smart Engagement*, Carnegie Endowment, 2009, as in http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/81792.htm.

The Russians regained their pride and sentiment of utility. As a nation whose contribution to the success of the Second World War was beyond any doubt, as a nation that led, for about three quarters of a century, ideologically and economically, the communist world, the Russian nation lives somehow in the past, but strongly trusting the future.

The Russian people has redefined itself as a multinational one, united by a common destiny[11]. The Russian leaders define the country's foreign policy following three clear principles[12]:

- Russia's business is Russia;
- Russia's business is business;
- Russia's business is nobody else's business.

For Russia, there are no friends and enemies, but partners, and the allies change according to the circumstances: in the past, Russian Army and Russian Navy, today, its oil and gas[13].

As Dmitri Trenin puts it[14], Russia sees US and NATO policies in Ukraine and Georgia as an attempt to derail it from its way to becoming an independent global player, and it realises that it can count only on itself, as a lonely power. In this respect, Russia relies on its nuclear power, as well as on its increasing Naval and Air Forces.

Russia and NATO

NATO's relationship with Russia, built on the ruins of 40 years of *Cold War*, is chronologically presented in *table 1*. As we can see, the relationship has had many up-and-down moments, generated and fuelled by both sides.

Why Russia was and remains such an important partner for NATO ? There are many reasons, such as the following:

- Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council, the only decisional power on global security matters, and its position and influence is very important for the future evolution of global trends;
- numerous economic, ideological, ethnic and cultural ties still exist between Russia and the former communist or post-Soviet countries, which, most of them, have expressed their will to join NATO. Despite of all the statements coming from NATO's side, encouraging self-determination and specifically

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[11] *The Constitution of the Russian Federation*, ratified on 12 December 1993.
[12] Dmitri Trenin, *op. cit.*, as in http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/81792.htm.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] Dmitri Trenin, *The Lonely Power, Russian Security Policy and the West,* in *The Security Times*, February 2009.

Table 1

DATE	EVENT	COMMENT
1991	President Boris Yeltsin pledged for the Russia's participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.	Boris Yeltsin suggested even a possible future NATO membership for Russia.
1993	Boris Yeltsin visited Poland and the Czech Republic, giving a tacit approval for first NATO enlargement.	The fact generated important debates within Russia.
1994	Russia joined the Partnership for Peace programme.	Russia asked for a *"far-reaching cooperative"* relationship with NATO.
Spring of 1995	Russia received a special *"16+1"* status within the NAC and Political Committee.	Formally, Russia agreed with NATO enlargement, provided that no allied nuclear means or commands are located on the territories of the new member states.
1996	As a response to the air-strikes against the Bosnian-Serbs, Russia sent troops to Bosnia, in the Implementation Force (IFOR).	Cooperation on ground between Russia and NATO was surprisingly good.
May 1997	The *"NATO-Russia Funding Act"* was signed, document that led to the creation of the Permanent Joint Council.	Russia was invited to create a permanent mission at NATO HQ, in Brussels.
1998	NATO started discussing a plan to move its headquarters from Rendsburg, Germany to Northern Poland.	Russia protested and warned that such a move could lead to a military confrontation. Despite the protests, NATO moved the headquarters.
23 March 1999	NATO launched Operation *"Allied Force"* against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.	The same day, Russia withdrew its representatives from the NATO HQs and suspended relationships with NATO.
July 1999	Russia reopened its representation to NATO.	The only topic that Russia had on the agenda was the Kosovo problem.
31 December 1999	Boris Yeltsin resigned and Vladimir Putin became the new President of Russia.	Vladimir Putin called upon a *"pragmatic relationship"* with NATO, in the context of an important recalcitrance at home.
2001	Vladimir Putin stated that Russia would assist the US and its allies in Afghanistan.	Russia also allowed the US and allies to use the Air bases from Central Asia.
November 2001	Tony Blair proposed a new NATO-Russia relationship, which would treat Russia as equal.	The proposal was rejected by the US and other member states.
December 2001	The US announced intention to pull-out from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.	Russia received the announcement with reserve.
2002	During the negotiations concerning the arms reduction, the US insisted to keep Russia on the list of proliferators.	The fact created rumours and critics in Russia.

DATE	EVENT	COMMENT
28 May 2002	The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established, as a wish to enhance the relationships on an equal basis.	The new document improved significantly the cooperation, but did not give any security guarantee to Russia.
November 2002	At the Prague Summit other seven countries from the Central and Eastern Europe were invited to join NATO.	Russia's objections were very clear.
Spring 2003	The US and allies started war in Iraq.	Russia, with the help of some European countries, opposed to the intervention, even before it occurred.
Spring 2004	After the seven new states joined NATO, the Alliance started air patrols over the three Baltic states' territory.	The fact amplified Russia's mistrust.
Late 2003 and 2004	The Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine took place.	Vladimir Putin blamed the US for engineering such upheavals.
2004-2006	The NRC did not produce policy changes, as well as did not advance into a common agenda.	Both Russia and NATO realised that the NRC did not achieve the expected results.
2007	During the Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin accused the West and the US of bad practices.	The US began negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic on missile defence.
December 2007	The US blocked the agreement on the 2008 cooperation plan between NATO and Russia, due to Russia's refusal to comply with the CFE Treaty.	Russia officially suspended its participation to the CFE Treaty.
February 2008	The US and most European countries recognised Kosovo's independence.	Russia damned the act.
April 2008	The Bucharest Summit Declaration stated that Georgia and Ukraine would become NATO members.	Russia warned of the military and political consequences of such an act.
Summer 2008	New Russian President Dimitri Medvedev proposed a new security pact for Europe and Russia, which would have to exclude NATO and the US.	Although it was received with some interest, no action followed.
August 2008	After Georgian attacks in South Ossetia, Russia responded sending thousands of troops in the region.	NATO announced that it would suspend the NRC meetings, until Russia pulled out its forces from Georgia.
June 2009	First meeting of NRC after the crisis.	The meeting stated to restart NATO-Russia military cooperation.
August 2009	New NATO Secretary General stated in his first speech that the second major priority is the NATO-Russia relationship.	

expressing that Russia has no *"veto"* right, it is axiomatic that a negotiated and amiable solution is most desirable;

- Russia is located in the direct vicinity of NATO's sphere of influence, and its interests concerning the Euro-Atlantic, High North, Mediterranean, Black Sea and Middle East areas intersect with NATO's interests. Some of these interests are complementary, some are convergent, but there are few points where NATO and Russia have different views;
- Russia has borders with six NATO countries, and with most of them there are latent divergences, concerning territorial, economic or ethnic matters;
- Russia is a nuclear power, with a huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, and its difficulties in coping with these *"resources"*, on a background of ethnic and religious insurgencies and with so many terrorist organisations acting in its proximity, may cause huge global problems;
- Russia has special economic relationships with some of the most influential NATO countries, a fact that could influence their behaviour and decisions regarding Russia and its interests. On the other hand, Russia needs a stable and reliable market for its oil and gas, and its actions might sometimes not appear as the most appropriate;
- Russia can be a reliable partner for NATO, as proven, in ongoing operations, such as *KFOR*, *Active Endeavour*, and mainly *ISAF*, given the military resources and forces that it directly provides, but also given to the facilities that Russia puts at the Alliance's disposal;
- given the vicinity or proximity with two of the world's emerging powers, China and India, a pragmatic, principled relationship with Russia would be appreciated much more than a dispute that could coagulate the potential of these three countries against NATO.

As presented in the table, the NATO-Russia relationships could be appreciated as having peak and bottom moments, mainly generated by some declarations, intentions or even actions of both sides. Russia felt that NATO neglected its interests and misinterpreted its position concerning the Kosovo intervention, the Kosovo Declaration of Independence or the NATO enlargement process. Russia showed its surprise in 2008, when NATO explicitly announced that Ukraine and Georgia would join the Alliance, and showed its reservation and concerns, mainly connected with the ethnic and separatist movements existing in these two countries. For Russia, the major concern regarding NATO's enlargement is the possible accession of Georgia and Ukraine, because: Georgia has strong territorial problems with the two separatist republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with a Russian population. In case of an open conflict, as in August 2008, Russia feels the duty to intervene against Georgia, and this may cause a NATO response; concerning

Ukraine, the hottest problem is Crimea, a region with a very strong Russian community, which has already expressed its intention for secession in the eventuality of the country's NATO membership. After the unexpected statement included in the Bucharest Summit Declaration, NATO smoothed its tone, appreciating that Ukraine and Georgia could become NATO members, but not offering them membership action plans and a clear deadline.

On the other hand, the Russian intervention in Georgia, in August 2008, caused a strong and immediate reaction of NATO that suspended its relationships, in the framework of the *NATO-Russia Council – NRC*, with Russia. Through this action, assessed by some experts as an unprepared one, NATO missed the opportunity for a mediating role in this conflict. The conflict showed that there is no consensus inside NATO, concerning a new enlargement, and that the problem of Article V invocation may have disastrous results.

The year 2009 showed a new increase in the interest in developing active relationships, from both sides, mainly generated by the political change in the US Administration and by the statements and decisions of President Barack Obama (especially the postponement of the Eastern Europe anti-missile shield), as well as the statements of the new NATO SG, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who invited Russia to an open and productive dialogue in the areas of common interest, despite the *"small"* disagreements.

Personal vision about the future of NATO-Russia relationships

Taking into account the arguments for effective dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Russia, the evolutions in the last two decades, the lessons learned by both parties, the common and divergent interests, I suggest that the relationships have to stay under the governance of five principles, joined under a symbolic word: DEPTH – Dialogue, Equilibrium, Predictability, Trust, Honesty.

Only *Dialogue* offers the way for understanding each other's interests and concerns, for a common understanding of global and regional problems, for reaching a joint, or at least a mutually accepted solution for all issues. Dialogue is the main bridge between two parties, and it is also stated in the Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, as Consultation.

Equilibrium means to treat the other party as an equal, to better understand other's opinions and reluctance, to try to find, through dialogue, a solution that both sides agree to as a well balanced one.

Predictability means to assume the commitment not to stress and not to harm the other party through your sudden or unexpected acts or statements, to express

a constant position for any matter of mutual concern or at least to notify the other side about your future intentions and actions, with the aim of eliminating surprise.

Trust may be built by a common action, by sitting at the same table to solve the problems and not to give the impression of doing so, to act as a partner and to feel other's actions as partner's actions. Trust means to always use the appropriate tools and not to appeal to economic means in trying to fulfil political or military aims.

Honesty means to tell the truth, even though it may cause harm. The best friend is the one who tells us the truth, and not the one who treats us with sparing attention.

Of course, these principles may appear somehow ideal, taking into account that within our world there are not only principles but also interests. I strongly believe that, if one wants to remain faithful to his commitments, he has to act in accordance with very strong and clear principles.

What is the future ?

It is not very easy to predict a future or to answer to the question *"What will be the future of the NATO-Russia relationship ?"*, having in mind how many and important things happened during the last two decades. For most people, a military conflict between NATO and Russia is less and less likely to occur, and the trend of relationships is expected to continue between the same limits: cooperation, on the one side, verbal, economic and ideological disputes, on the other side.

Will Russia become a NATO member ? Why not, if we have to fully trust (or at least quote) Yeltsin's or Putin's answers to this question. No, if we look at the signals that come from Moscow or from NATO countries' capitals. The best thing we can do is to ask ourselves to whom such a possibility would serve. To Russia ? Does Russia need to be tight-laced by a treaty which was created 60 years ago as a tool against itself and which does not share its principles and aspirations ? Does NATO need to bring inside the Alliance all the difficulties that occurred in the relationship with such a big and controversial partner ? How could we imagine the decision-making process within NATO in such an eventuality ? What will then be the threats, and what will be the role of the United Nations ? NATO has not got (yet) a global vocation, even though it may have a global involvement.

It will take much time for the Russians to understand that NATO is not an alliance oriented against their country anymore.

THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN FORCES IN ROMANIA AND BULGARIA
– The Impact on Regional Security –

Lieutenant Colonel Petrică CRAIOVEANU
Lieutenant Colonel Ovidiu-Stelian FIZEŞAN

The presence of US forces in Romania and Bulgaria within the agreed facilities and areas is regulated by bilateral agreements and subsequent implementation arrangements.

For the American ally, the locations in Romania are attractive from the military-strategic, social and cultural points of view, as well as with regard to the existing infrastructures and logistic opportunities.

On the other hand, one can notice positive social-economic effects resulting from the American forces' presence in Romania and Bulgaria, and an enhancement of the regional security, including the energy one.

The common training of Romanian, Bulgarian respectively, troops and the ones of the most powerful and trained armed forces in the Alliance and worldwide is beneficial for the improvement of interoperability and provides the American troops with the possibility for training in our ranges, the Bulgarian ones respectively.

Keywords: *American superpower; Access Agreement; Implementation Arrangements; facilities and areas; advantages of the American presence; regional security*

After the USSR disbanded, the US National Security Strategy was essentially changed taking into consideration two main factors: 1) the USA – the only world superpower in a unipolar world, and 2) the perpetuation and extension of insecurity in the world. The United States has remained the only global actor able to carry out military actions wherever in the world, with no possibility for the potential rivals to contest its role.

The American Superpower and Foreign Military Bases

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America marked an important moment in the transformation of the US National Security Strategy and of the military one consequently. President George W. Bush declared the *"war on terror"*.

According to the 2004 US National Military Strategy, in response to regional and global contingencies coming from the *"arc of instability"*,

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the US forces could employ, in an expeditionary approach, a combination of enhanced capabilities, rotational or permanently stationed, prepositioned equipment etc., in order to accomplish their missions[1]. Therefore, the American military forces outside the US territory could be concentrated in three types of bases:

- *Main Operating Bases* – large permanently stationed combat forces that enjoy robust infrastructure, command and control structures, family support facilities, as well as reinforced units meant for protection. Such bases are the ones in Ramstein (Germany), Kadena (Japan) and Humphreys (Korea).
- *Forward Operating Sites* – extended facilities with a limited US military presence or prepositioned defence equipment. They would host rotational forces, not permanently stationed ones. Training is mainly provided on bilateral basis.
- *Cooperative Security Locations* – facilities with little or no permanent US presence. They require periodic service or host nation support. They provide contingency access, being a focal point for security cooperation activities[2].

According to the Pentagon Base Structure Report 2008, the US bases were made up of over 545 700 individual sites (buildings, related structures and infrastructures), spread over nearly 30 million acres of land. As for the properties overseas, most of them were in Germany (268 facilities), Japan (124 facilities) and South Korea (87 facilities).

More than 98% of the land managed by the US military was located in the United States of America or its territories. The Army controlled 52% of the land belonging to the Department of Defense, the Air Force – 33%, the Marine Corps – 8% and the Navy – 7%.

In the US bases operating system, the Department of Defense uses two units of measurement:

- *Plant Replacement Value – PRV*, the value of the installations and related infrastructure, calculated at the current prices of materials and workforce;
- the surface of the installations in acres[3].

The US Department of Defense is in charge of the transformation and realignment of the American bases, following the provisions of *BRAC 2005 (Base Realignment*

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[1] www.defenselink.mil, accessed in August 2009. According to this American strategy, the arc of instability stretched from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extended to Asia.

[2] *Politicheski, ikonomicheski i pravni aspekti na izgrazhdaneto na amerikanski bazi v Republika Balgaria ("Political, economic and legal aspects [...] of American bases in the Republic of Bulgaria")*, http://isdo.nbu.bg.

[3] *Base Structure Report 2008*, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/BSR2008Baseline.pdf.

and Closure) and *Global Defense Posture*, and these facilities location and quality are fundamental to the maintenance of the US Forces combat capability[4].

Eight years since the war on terror was launched, there are important signals that the intention of the Obama Administration is to continue to engage in military actions against the terrorist sanctuaries at the Afghan-Pakistan border, as well as to use soft power (economic, diplomatic and cultural levers) more actively to combat international terrorism. The new American Administration also seeks to consolidate the relations with the Islamic World.

Romanian-US and Bulgarian-US Access Agreements

The *Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Defense Cooperation*[5] was signed in Sofia, on 28 April 2006, by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin and the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. It was ratified by the Bulgarian Parliament on 26 May 2006[6].

The agreement has a preamble and 34 articles in which the rules, methods and conditions of the shared use of several Bulgarian military facilities are stipulated. Subsequently, in 2008, pursuant to the Agreement, 12 implementing arrangements were developed and signed separately. They referred to the following domains: the establishment of the Joint Commission; operational matters and exercise planning; security; state acquisition procedures, conclusion of contracts and the status of contractors; real estate management; procedures regarding claims; employment; environmental issues; customs procedures; tax exemption and facilities regarding taxation; procedures regarding the exercise of criminal jurisdiction; logistic support[7].

The number of the US force members and the civilian component on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria cannot exceed 2 500 people. This number may be temporarily supplemented by no more than 2 500 people and no longer than 90 days, with the permission of the competent Bulgarian authorities.

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[4] The BRAC Report was approved by the US Congress in 2005 and it stipulated the closure and realignment of some American military bases by the Department of Defense. 437 locations had to be closed and relocated in other 325 sites.

[5] *Sporazumenie mezhdu Pravitelstvoto na Republika Balgaria i Pravitelstvoto na Saedinenite Amerikanski Shtati za satrudnichestvo v oblastta na otbranata*, http://www.mod.bg/bg/Cooperation/dvustranno/USA/AgreementBGUSA.pdf.

[6] *Darzhaven Vestnik (State Monitor)*, no. 46/2006.

[7] http://www.mod.bg/bg/satr_dvustr_USA.html

The agreed facilities and areas made available for the USA by its Bulgarian partner through the Agreement are the following: the Novo Selo training range, the military storage facilities in Aytos, the air bases in Bezmer and Graf Ignatievo *(figure 1)*.

Figure 1[*]

Bulgaria provides the US forces with logistic support on its territory, as follows: accommodation; maintenance and repair services, including storage; potable and non-potable water supply, including distribution and storage; perishable and non-perishable food; fuel, including storage services, distribution and quality control; transportation services by land, sea and air; utilities, including electricity

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[*] Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian-American_Joint_Military_Facilities.

and communications; medical support and services; aircraft and cargo service, other types of support to be agreed.

By comparison, the Romanian-US Access Agreement – the *Agreement between Romania and the United States of America regarding the Activities of United States Forces Located on the Territory of Romania –,* signed in Bucharest on 6 December 2005 and ratified by the Parliament in June 2006, made no reference to the number of American military men that may be stationed on the territory of our country at a certain moment in time, but this number is stipulated in the Decision of the Romanian Parliament no. 29 on 2 May 2007: maximum 3 000 people; at the American party's request, the President of Romania may decide, following the Prime Minister proposal, to supplement the number approved by the Parliament by up to 500 people, for a period of time no longer than 90 days.

The facilities and areas agreed by Romania and the American party, stipulated in Law no. 268/29 June 2006, are: the Smârdan training range; the Babadag training area and rail head; the Mihail Kogălniceanu base and the Cincu training range. The larger manoeuvre area comprises areas in Constanța and Tulcea counties and is delineated by Babadag in the North, the Babadag range in the East, Tariverde in the South and Horia in the West.

The facilities in Romania are attractive to the US forces because of the available military-strategic, social, cultural, communication lines and logistics opportunities. The Babadag training range is about 75 km far from Mihail Kogălniceanu base. Moreover, there are no violent natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, storms) in the area, in general. The bases where the US forces are stationed in Romania are contiguous with the ones in Bulgaria and Turkey, all being both NATO allied countries and Black Sea littoral states. In addition, the region where the US forces are stationed is the closest – at the boundaries of NATO and the EU – to some turbulent areas: Afghanistan, Iraq and the South Caucasus.

The logistic support given by Romania to the US forces in our country, for a cost price, at the written request of the United States of America, concerns: accommodation; maintenance and repair services, including storage; potable and non-potable water supply, including distribution and storage; perishable and non-perishable food; fuel, including storage, distribution and quality control services; transportation services by land, sea and air; utilities and services, including (electric) power and communications; the necessary civilian workforce; medical assistance and services; air services for aircraft and cargo; other appropriate forms of mutual assistance, as agreed.

Following the conclusion of the Access Agreement, the designated authorities of Romania and the United States of America signed 18 implementing arrangements

regarding: criminal jurisdiction; the movement of vessels, vehicles and aircraft; the workforce employed locally; government procurement and contracting procedures; customs procedures; real estate operations and management; military service activities on foreign currency and exchange, postal services; claims settlement; taxes and tax exemptions; flight training activities; the Joint Committee; command relations; communications; environmental issues; training activities and land manoeuvres; medical services for the US forces, forensic services carried out jointly with the Romanian specialists; security[8].

In order to organise and coordinate the activities regarding the implementation of the Access Agreement provisions, an Interministerial Committee has been established, organised and operates in Romania. At the Ministry of National Defence of Romania, within the Department for Defence Policy and Planning, operates the *Centre for the Coordination and Monitoring of the Implementation of the Access Agreement (CCMIA)*, which is the single point of contact for all the public authorities and institutions responsible for the Agreement implementation[9].

The military units deployed by Washington in accordance with the two access agreements, in Romania and Bulgaria, are known under the name of *Joint Task Force-East (JTF-E)*[10].

The Access Agreements between Romania and the USA, and between Bulgaria and the USA are considered similar as both documents are concluded on a bilateral level and are related to the possibility for the USA to use the above-mentioned military facilities of the two allied countries. There are also some differences, for example in the introductions of the documents. We illustrate, in this respect, by reproducing the preambles comparatively (page 67).

The access of the US forces to the agreed facilities and areas on the Romanian or Bulgarian territory is regulated as follows: Article 2, paragraph 1 in the Romanian-US document emphasises that *"The United States forces shall be authorized access to and use of agreed facilities and areas with full respect for Romanian*

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[8] *Înțelegeri tehnice cu SUA*, http://www.mapn.ro/diepa/.

[9] *Government Decision no. 565/13.06.2007*, regarding the establishment, organisation and functioning of the Interministerial Committee for the implementation of the Romanian-US Access Agreement, regarding the activities of the US forces that are stationed on the territory of Romania, signed in Bucharest on 6 December 2005 and ratified through Law 268/2006.

[10] *Joint Task Force-East* is a United States European Command (USEUCOM) initiative, having as goal to strengthen the military relationships between the United States and the Romanian and Bulgarian allies. JTF-East includes small permanent headquarters that oversee rotations of US Army battalion-sized units and US Air Force Weapons Training Deployments. USAREUR and USAFE (US Air Force Europe) contributed to the JTF-East establishment and currently coordinate this structure. The units selected by the American party to be deployed in Romania may come from the USA, Western Europe or other parts of the world.

Romanian-US Access Agreement[*]	Bulgarian-US Access Agreement
"Romania and the United States of America (hereafter *"the Parties"*):	"The Government of the Republic of Bulgaria (Bulgaria) and the Government of the United States of America (the United States) (hereafter referred to collectively as *"the Parties"* and *"Party"* singularly):
Desiring to conclude an agreement on the enhanced cooperation between Romania and the United States of America; and	Cognizant of the rights and obligations deriving from their participation in the North Atlantic Treaty;
Affirming that such cooperation is based on full respect for the sovereignty of each Party and the purposes of the United Nations Charter and the obligations of the Parties resulting from other international agreements; and	Recognizing the need to enhance their common security, to contribute to international peace and stability and the fight against terrorism, and to deepen the cooperation in the areas of security and defense;
Acknowledging that the presence of United States forces contributes to strengthening the security and stability of Romania and the region; and	Affirming that such cooperation is based on full respect for the sovereignty of each Party and the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter;
Desiring to share in the responsibility of supporting those United States forces that may be present in the territory of Romania; and	Considering that the United States forces and dependents may be present in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria and that the purpose of such presence is in furtherance of the efforts of the Parties to promote peace and security in areas of mutual interest and benefit;
Recognizing the application of the *"Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their Forces"*, done at London on June 19, 1951 (hereafter *"the NATO SOFA"*), entered into force for Romania on December 4, 2004, and the *"Agreement between Romania and the United States of America Regarding the Status of United States Forces in Romania"*, signed in Washington, on October 30, 2001 (hereafter *"SOFA Supplemental"*), to United States forces and their activities when in the territory of Romania; and	Recognizing the application of the *"Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their Forces,"* done at London on June 19, 1951, (hereafter, the NATO SOFA), including its provision for separate arrangements supplementary to that Agreement, and;
Recognizing the need to enhance their common security, to contribute to international peace and stability, and to deepen cooperation in the areas of defense and security;	Desiring to conclude an agreement on the enhanced cooperation between the United States and Bulgaria;
Have agreed as follows: [...]".	Have agreed as follows: [...]"

law. [...]"; Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Bulgarian-US Access Agreement mentions: *"With full respect for the sovereignty and the laws of the Republic of Bulgaria [...] the United States forces, United States contractors and their employees, and vehicles, vessels and aircraft operated by or for the United States forces are authorized access to and may use agreed facilities and areas [...]".*

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* *Law no. 268 on 29 June 2006*, to ratify the agreement between Romania and the United States of America concerning the activities of the United States forces stationed on the territory of Romania, *Monitorul Oficial* no. 585/6 July 2006.

To avoid speculation, it is appropriate to mention here that, under these agreements, the US forces that can be stationed on the territory of Romania and Bulgaria respectively have access to the mentioned facilities, train in these objectives or in certain designated areas, individually or with host country military formations. The bases remain under the Romanian, respectively the Bulgarian national command (own forces and their equipment, as well as the operations conducted by the forces of the host country in and from the objectives), and they are not the property of the USA. The cooperation between the parties is not in any way aimed at any course of action of the host nations or NATO forces, and this can be seen in the texts of the documents.

Advantages Derived from the Presence of the US Forces on the Territory of Romania and Bulgaria

In general, positive social-economic effects have been detected due to the US forces presence in bases located on the territories of other countries, as the workforce has been employed locally, the products and services contracted by the US forces have been sold, and the military (and their families, where appropriate) have spent their personal money.

In particular, the objectives and facilities in Romania and Bulgaria made available to the American party have relatively small size and therefore they cannot bring the economic benefits that would have been generated by traditional larger bases, particularly in terms of local civilians and contractors employment. The former Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Ivailo Kalfin, explained that the most important economic effect of the signing of Bulgarian-US agreement would be the enhancement of the business environment in his country, more stability and security not only in Bulgaria but also in the region, due to the political risk reduction; moreover, the potential for the development of economic relations remained high, Kalfin stated.

In September 2008, the US Army allocated 61,15 million USD over two years for a construction project at the joint training facility in Novo Selo. Eleven of the thirteen companies that won contracts were Bulgarian. The other two were an American company and an Italian one. On this occasion, the American Ambassador in Sofia, Nancy McEldowney, declared: *"This is a great moment for the US-Bulgaria partnership. This project will facilitate our cooperation, both bilaterally and as NATO allies. It will enhance our joint training and make us more effective in facing the challenges that confront our common security. This is the largest construction project the US military has ever organized in Bulgaria and it will inject $61 million into the Sliven district. This money will provide economic opportunities for many Bulgarian companies*

and jobs for even more Bulgarians"[11]. The project finances simple structures that are to be used in joint training.

In the future, the *US Army Europe – USAREUR* plans various infrastructure upgrades at the joint military facilities in Bulgaria:

- building construction: $40 – $50 million between 2008-2009;
- road and utility construction: $5 – $10 million between 2008-2009;
- building maintenance and minor projects: $600 – $800 thousand per year;
- roads and grounds maintenance: $300 – $500 thousand per year[12].

The joint training of the Romanian troops and of the Bulgarian ones respectively with the troops of the strongest and best equipped Armed Forces in the Alliance and in the world is beneficial to improve interoperability and allows the US troops to train in ranges in Romania and Bulgaria.

In particular, the benefit is not only bilateral, Romanian-American, but also within NATO: firstly, Romania will be able to better meet the requirements for the continuation and completion of integration in the North Atlantic Alliance and to enhance its strategic and military role; secondly, other NATO member states will also be able to participate in joint training activities with the prior consent of the Romanian side. Moreover, the Romanian-American exercises will stimulate the modernisation of the Romanian military, including through the possibility of integrating in the North Atlantic Alliance's procurement programmes.

In July 2008, the Romanian and US troops participated, at Mihail Kogălniceanu base, in the annual rotation exercise of the US troops – *Rotation 2008*, after the one in 2007 that had the motto *"Proof of Principle"*, and they benefited in common from the high technology that allowed them to train smarter, safer and at lower costs in a fully operational Training Support Centre; this centre was established by experts belonging to the training support structure in Europe, subordinated to the USAREUR Joint Multinational Training Command. During this exercise, JTF-E coordinated the training of about 900 American troops in Romania. Training included an airborne operation, real shooting in the range, military operations in urban environment, joint patrolling, other training exercises in various conditions, training in the medical field. Subsequently, in August, the exercise moved to Bulgaria and lasted until November 2008. American troops from the American bases in Germany, members of the National Guard in New Mexico and Utah, 280 Romanian

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[11] *US Army Awards $61 Million Project for Construction at Joint Training Facility in Novo Selo*, 09/17/2008, http://www.amcham.bg/amcham_initiatives/us_bulgaria_joint_training_facilities/news/08-09-18/U_S_Army_Awards_61_Million_Project_for_Construction_at_Joint_Training_Facility_in_Novo_Selo.aspx, accessed on 24 July 2009.

[12] http://bulgaria.usembassy.gov/odc_jtf_factsheet.html

military men belonging to the 21ˢᵗ Mountain Troops Infantry Battalion, and 200 Bulgarian troops participated in the exercise in Romania. The Romanian soldiers played the part of the enemy in the exercise, meant for training in urban environment in the Babadag range, trying to put the American ones to trouble. Here is what sergeant Adam Ortega, New Mexico National Guard, a participant in the exercise said in this regard: *"It's really good three-dimensional warfare here; we are out in the open and we get to practice our 360-security all the time, every movement we make. […] We always have to be watching to our left, to our right, to our rear. And it's good, especially for these new guys"*[13].

About 600 Romanian, 1 200 American troops, as well as three observers from Serbia and two from France attended the exercise *"Joint Task Force – East Rotation 2009"*. The Romanian-American bilateral exercise began on 6 August 2009 and the joint training ended on 14 October. Training consisted in conducting joint shooting exercises, real shooting exercises – platoon level, tactical exercises specific to the urban areas, other individual action techniques, tactical situations, joint patrols, first aid in the areas of operations[14].

The Romanian-American military cooperation will further improve the interoperability between the two armies in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan. It will lead to deepening the Romanian and American military level of expertise and organisation in their relations with civilian organisations, including NGOs, as well as the level of multinational interagency cooperation with coalition partners and allies. The mutual knowledge of the technology and weapons in the inventory and the troop cohesion would also contribute to the success in the Afghan theatre.

Another advantage derived from the presence of the US troops is the humanitarian assistance delivered to the local population. The US Navy Europe has maintained in Romania a permanent presence of a detachment belonging to the Mobile Construction Battalion of the US Navy (*"Seabees"*) within JTF-East. The Humanitarian Civic Assistance projects are funded by the US Department of Defense and executed locally by the Seabees. These have included the renovation of medical clinics, elementary schools and kindergartens in Constanța and the Babadag area. The process that starts with the identification of problems and ends with the implementation of projects takes about a year. During this period of time, projects are approved and coordinated by local councils, the US Embassy and the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in Bucharest, USEUCOM and the US Agency for military cooperation in the field of security. Between 20 July

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[13] C. Todd Lopez, *JTF-East Training Rotating from Romania to Bulgaria*, http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2008/07/072508-JTF-East.aspx?src=rss.

[14] http://www.jtf-e.forter.ro, press communiqué on 6 August 2009.

and 28 August, JTF-East executed medical missions in the counties of Tulcea and Constanța. These missions, under the coordination and with the support of Romanian medical officials included medical consultations, dental and ophthalmic, eyeglass prescriptions, vaccinations and others[15]. According to ODC, the humanitarian assistance provided in Romania between 2000 and 2008 totalled over 2,8 million dollars.

The presence of the US forces in Romania contributes to strengthening the cooperation between the two allied countries within NATO as well as to the privileged relationship of strategic partnership between the two states; it will also lead to increasing stability and security in the Wider Black Sea Area – Dobrogea being situated not only very close to the separatist Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, but also to other *"frozen conflicts"* in the post-Soviet space – and in the Balkans.

On the other hand, Romania has been the only actor that has consistently supported the Nabucco project regarding the transportation of natural gas to Western Europe[16], project that is also agreed by the United States of America. Through the beneficial influence on regional security, the presence of the US forces in our country has also an indirect impact on strengthening the energy security in the region.

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

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[15] Lieutenant Colonel Daniel E. Herrigstad, *Romanian-US Team Completes Local Kindergarten Project*, 19 June 2009, http://www.eucom.mil/English/FullStory.asp?art=2210

[16] The Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement was signed on 13 July 2009, in Ankara, by the Prime Ministers of the transit countries: Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. For this project, there is gas in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the approaches to contract the necessary gas quantities have to be made.

ROMANIAN LITTORAL SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES
– Security Enhancement Factor at the Black Sea –

Captain Dr Constantin CIOROBEA

The surveillance system sustains the smooth flow of shipping and coordinates the navy's action to show the naval presence in the traffic routes of merchant shipping, supporting the decision process made by the Naval Component Command.

Surveillance essentially contributes to the achievement of proper situational awareness in the area of responsibility in order to avoid or at least to reduce the risks to misinterpret the ships' action in the vicinity of territorial waters. The boundless nature of the sea requires a regional, European and even global approach, as far as maritime surveillance is concerned, as opposed to a national one. These actions are carried out by different agencies, and the proper integration and interoperability between them support security in the maritime domain, the main responsibility of the Naval Component Command.

***Keywords:** asymmetric risks; maritime surveillance; acts of piracy; national interest; national capabilities*

The increasing complexity of crisis situations, diversification of asymmetric actions, demographic and environmental changes and increasing number of inefficiently governed states affects the security environment, causing an unprecedented diversification of the methods to plan and conduct military actions. Currently, these methods cover a very wide range, from classic conflicts between states or nations to asymmetric conflicts that affect all humanity.

Although, in recent years, only isolated cases of illegal actions have been reported in the Black Sea, this should not give us confidence. We all know that the asymmetric risks and illegal actions in the region may increase and become real hazards if we do not take appropriate prevention actions. Ensuring a maritime security environment not only helps to sustain a continuous maritime traffic in support of economic development but it also provides assistance to national and international efforts to prevent terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or other illegal activities at sea.

Captain Constantin Ciorobea **–** Chief of Staff of the Naval Operational Component, the Romanian Naval Forces Staff.

To all these asymmetric risks, we must add the military risks as well, knowing that a number of the so-called *"frozen conflicts"* that can degenerate in open confrontation are present near the Romanian borders. The August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict showed that we could not exclude the possibility of outbreaks of classic confrontation, in which opponents are the naval military forces of different states, conflicts characterised by the combination of conventional and unconventional actions in all environments: water, underwater, land and air, based on high manoeuvre capabilities, precision in targeting, multidimensional force protection, information operations and electronic warfare.

To ensure an adequate response to these threats, the naval forces must maintain the classic capabilities of power projection, control and protection of maritime lines of communication, at the same time with providing an adequate response to asymmetric threats, usually in crisis situations and in theatres of action situated faraway from their bases, in cooperation with allied or partner forces.

The command and coordination of all these activities is carried out in NATO by a single structure. In the Romanian Navy, the *Naval Operational Component – NOC* was created in June 2008, to ensure an adequate response in this area. This is the specialised structure for operational command, at the operational-tactical level. It is part of the Romanian Naval Forces Staff, under the operational control of the Joint Operational Command, playing the main role in exercising the command and control of the operational forces that are designated to plan and coordinate maritime and river operations, and to implement decisions for the naval forces engagement. This structure is the successor of Maritime Command, which operated from 1943 to 1944, under the leadership of Vice Admiral Horia Măcellariu.

Among the Naval Operational Component tasks, one can mention planning subordinated forces actions, conducting them in rapid reaction actions, during international missions and permanent combat service. The successful fulfilment of these missions requires the continuous surveillance of the maritime space and the accomplishment of the maritime recognised picture; these activities support and provide a particular efficiency to actions at sea. They enable the detection, tracking and precisely identification of targets, continuously and in a short time. Using this information, the Naval Operational Component analyses the situation, makes decisions and, when necessary, employs forces and means. In order to obtain the maritime recognised picture, forces and assets belonging to the naval forces are engaged, such as littoral surveillance means, all ships at sea, as well as forces belonging to the Border Police, the Romanian Naval Authority – RNA and other national or international structures.

The proper analysis of the maritime situation becomes very important at present, given that both traditional and asymmetric threats affect the maritime domain. Therefore, while identifying any enemy task forces and their intentions, there must be found the asymmetric threats in an area characterised by a high density of maritime shipping, which makes the identification and pursuit of these objectives very difficult. Near the coastline, there are many merchant ships vessels or facilities for exploitation of resources, vessels for scientific research or leisure, as well as foreign navies' ships in transit or visit. This intense traffic makes the identification of objectives very difficult and makes it possible for opponents to use platforms that do not normally have military destination and this facilitates their actions, allowing them to hide their actions by integrating in the normal traffic in the area of responsibility.

The problems related to surveillance are clear, given that many vessels using the Black Sea have several registrations and this enables them to change call signs frequently, which allows them to present themselves as different vessels on different occasions. Besides, an unknown but certainly very large number of small fishing boats are used for smuggling.

The Naval Operational Component has recently faced a different situation regarding maritime surveillance, being made responsible for planning and conducting the transportation of own forces materials, after the successful completion of the mission in Iraq. During this mission, the transport ship *"ALBATROS"*, belonging to the Romanian Naval Forces, transited narrow areas, straits and places near the coast, where it was subjected to the direct action of some asymmetric threats, such as piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

In these circumstances, the relations of cooperation and information exchange initiated by the Romanian Naval Forces Staff with CC MAR Naples using the *Maritime Safety and Security Information System – MSSIS* and with the Italian Naval Forces, using the *Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre – V-RMTC*[1] (this year, it will be transformed into a transregional centre, called the *"Trans-Regional Maritime Network – T-RMN"*), have proven their value, being important sources of information regarding the maritime situation in the sailed zones. Furthermore, the cooperation with the *Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa/MSCHOA*, designated to provide assistance for sailors in the Gulf of Aden, Somalia and the Horn of Africa region, has provided the safe transit in dangerous areas, under the direct monitoring of EU and NATO naval forces deployed in the region.

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[1] The programme was initiated by the Italian Navy during the 5th *Sea Power Symposium*, 12-15 October 2005, in Venice.

The three situations presented here emphasise the complexity of modern maritime space and the need to achieve security of maritime communication routes. The Naval Operational Component plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Romanian area of interest and, currently, I consider this area includes the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the areas immediately surrounding them. To successfully fulfil this mission, the Naval Operational Component should focus in particular on the existence of rapid reaction capabilities, which should conduct their actions based on information and carry out basic functions such as:

- maintaining the operational capabilities of a number of forces that are necessary to ensure freedom of sea lines of communication and surveillance of sea infrastructure elements, such as offshore platforms and terminals;
- ensuring proper awareness of maritime situation and achieve *maritime recognised picture*, a process that involves surveillance, information gathering and exchange of information with specialised agencies from NATO/EU or at regional level;
- coordinating the engagement of Romanian naval forces in maritime security operations conducted or supported by NATO or EU, such as *"Operation Active Endeavour – OAE"* or *"Operation Atalanta"*;
- developing a maritime policy and concluding civil-military or inter-agency cooperation agreements, including legal aspects in order to facilitate the interaction between the Naval Forces/NOC and national and international agencies.

Analysing these basic functions, we can conclude that surveillance has important strategic implications for the accomplishment of national military security. Maritime surveillance is the systematic observation of the maritime space, using all available means, electronic, visual or other, to identify and determine the position and movement data for friend or foe surface vessels, submarines and any other capabilities. Making a viable maritime surveillance system, which can provide detailed information about the situation in the maritime area of interest, has become a vital requirement to ensure national security. Surveillance is an important element designated to support national sovereignty at sea and it is used not only in the military field but also in other domains. Currently, the maritime passage close to the Romanian coastline is monitored by several government structures such as: the Ministry of National Defence, through the Naval Forces Staff, which identifies military threats; the Ministry of Administration

and Interior, through the Border Police, which identifies threats coming from illegal activities: drug trafficking, smuggling etc.; the Ministry of Transportation, through the Maritime Ports Administration and the Romanian Naval Authority, which monitors commercial traffic.

It is worth noting that surveillance essentially contributes to having a proper understanding of the situation in the area of responsibility in order to avoid or at least to reduce the risks to misinterpret the ships' action in the vicinity of territorial waters.

In my opinion, the multitude of traffic monitoring systems proves that they still do not allow a proper representation of the maritime situation and a system operating alone cannot ensure effective surveillance. To perform the monitoring and surveillance of shipping, the naval forces, in addition to their own systems, should use the existing traffic monitoring systems in cooperation with different agencies. To discover the more likely threats, the Naval Operational Component realises and maintains the maritime recognised picture in the area of responsibility and analyses the data contained in reports submitted by ships and regional and international centres with which it cooperates. Clearly, in order to achieve and improve maritime surveillance, we should combine and compare the pieces of information received from all sources under various national and international authorities with those obtained using our systems.

At the level of the Romanian Naval Forces Staff, observing and monitoring maritime activities in the area of responsibility is made using means installed at seashore and on board of ships. The procurement of the Romanian *Traffic Control and Surveillance Integrating System at the Black Sea – SCOMAR*[2], in cooperation with Border Police, represents an important step in the integration of maritime traffic monitoring systems in the vicinity of Romanian littoral waters. The system is composed of different elements located along the coast, consisting of radars, video and radio sensors designated to monitor the area of responsibility. The Ministry of National Defence subsystem comprises: the medium range and over the horizon radars; passive observation; Friend and Foe Identification System – IFF; underwater and NBC surveillance. The Border Police subsystem includes: short range radar; optoelectronics equipment (cameras in visible and infrared spectrum). By assembling all the data provided by sensors situated along the border, the system is able to provide the *Naval Situation Awareness Centre*, which is part of the Naval

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[2] *Romania's State Border Integrated Management National Strategy for 2007-2010*, 28 March 2007, http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/securizare/strategie.php

Operational Component, with a complete picture of the monitored area, which is transmitted to a central station and to secondary stations. This system ensures the proper situational awareness in the Black Sea, detection, tracking, identification of the ships engaged in illegal actions and, at the same time, supports the search and rescue operations.

As mentioned above, there are many surveillance and monitoring systems in the maritime environment, belonging to the different agencies cooperating in this environment, such as fishing and environmental protection, security transportation at sea, and the border police. These systems provide data that are used to achieve the maritime recognised picture, but they have some shortfalls, because the transmitted data can be easily forged or even the transmitter can be closed to hide illegal activities and/or avoid detection/recognition by forces engaged in the operation. In this conditions, our own surveillance equipment, which is not dependent on cooperation with the systems existing on board of merchant ships is the only one that can provide reliable information. Combining the data acquired from own equipment with those provided by commercial systems enables the identification of commercial targets and therefore the number of targets potentially dangerous or the ones that require special attention is reduced. Therefore, we think that when different authorities carry out the surveillance of the same areas with different equipment, the integration of the obtained data assures a proper recognised maritime situation to the benefit of everyone and, as a result, the time needed to determine potential threats is reduced.

The boundless nature of the sea requires a regional, European and even global approach, as opposed to a national one. One efficient way to counter asymmetric threats in the maritime domain is the coordination and planning of actions in different directions and levels, with the first actions far from our own shore, starting from ocean waters up to territorial waters, including the coastline and offshore and port installations. Thus, the Naval Operational Component is responsible for coordinating the naval space monitoring action, and for planning the actions needed to achieve naval security in the area of responsibility. Meanwhile, the Naval Operational Component should support regional and international initiatives aimed at achieving a global capability, maritime surveillance and information exchange to prevent and counteract the criminal actions at and coming from the sea.

There is a number of European and international initiatives underway, both civil and military, aimed at achieving a global maritime surveillance and information exchange capability designated to support the need for maximising

the maritime domain responsibilities. The Romanian Naval Forces Staff supports information exchange, which also covers the transfer of recognised maritime picture at regional or global level. The Naval Operational Component has been sending necessary data regarding the maritime situation to NATO Maritime Safety and Security Information System or the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre with additional information regarding merchant ships traffic and their movements. In this regard, after the completion of the legal procedures, Romania will participate in *"Operation Black Sea Harmony/OBSH"*, exchanging data concerning maritime traffic with the permanent headquarter of the Operation, located in Eregli/Turkey.

Beyond the Black Sea coast, but in the same context and with implications for the security of Romania and of the region, NATO conducts *"Operation Active Endeavour (OAE)"*. This operation was initiated in October 2001 under the Command of the Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe located in Naples, Italy, and aims at preventing and combating international terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. The methods used include monitoring routes and crossing points of control, oil pipelines and ports, providing escort for civilian vessels transiting the Straits of Gibraltar and NATO members' warships. An important aspect is that, since April 2003, the naval forces have adopted a proactive approach, inspecting vessels whose cargo is considered suspect, and in the next period, it is intended to change the character of operation and transform it into one that is led based on information.

Another operation underway is against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somali coast, run by US forces, CTF 151 from the Fifth Fleet. On 8 December 2008, the European Union started *"Operation Atalanta"* and deployed in the region the EU NAVFOR.

Along with asymmetric threats, the Black Sea security environment may be influenced by classical conflicts between states, as demonstrated by the Russian aggression against Georgia, in August 2008. The Russian naval task forces arrived at very short notice in the area of operations, practically less than 24 hours. The Georgian forces, in response to the Ossetian actions, entered South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia, during the night of 7 to 8 August, and on 9 August, at 17.16, the Georgian government received notification from the Russian embassy that two ships were deployed in the region to protect its own citizens. From that moment, the Russian Naval Forces imposed a sea blockade on Georgia, designated to interdict the supply of the country by sea. This action secured the total control of Russia over Georgia's coastline and maritime lines of communication and allowed the fulfilment of all planned actions by the Russian army.

Analysing the way these actions were conducted, I consider that the space close to the littoral and the Black Sea is a *"compressed"* battlefield, in which it is very hard to define the main lines of action. This characteristics affect the identification and engagement of these threats in due time and are influenced by several factors, primarily including the short time available to warn own forces. The reaction time of forces can be slowed down if the enemy and his intentions are not discovered fast or if the analysis of the situation in the maritime area of responsibility is inadequate. The existence of these *"classical"* dangers requires a proper situational awareness system and a clear analysis of the situation in the area of responsibility, tasks accomplished by of the Naval Operational Component, and the existence and implementation of credible and capable naval forces in order to operate in all areas of national interest, forces that are balanced and strong enough to make any opponent be cautious if he intends to carry out military operations, at sea or from sea, against Romania's national interests.

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An effective response to these threats in the maritime environment must include the enhancement of multinational cooperation, to which the naval forces have an important contribution. The Romanian Naval Forces currently contribute to all these activities through the participation in Alliance operations, in regional commitments, exchange of information with regional or international agencies regarding maritime situation. In particular, in addition to the actual employment of forces, our country has positively responded to the requirement to participate in countering asymmetric threats by improving the surveillance and alert system at sea and cooperation with national and international structures that act in the maritime domain. Through these activities, I believe that Romania has adequately contributed to the achievement of the maritime security environment. One area still deficient is represented by the engagement of Naval Forces in EU-led actions and, in this context, I think we need to participate, at least every 3-4 years, with vessels in the EU battlegroups.

At the same time, we need to maximise maritime responsibilities and promote the need to have a global or regional capability for maritime surveillance and information exchange between all structures, civil and military ones. It is necessary to develop an easily accessible, clear and unclassified naval situation, based on information submitted by all the organisations involved, as in the case of commercial identification systems and to collect them in a comprehensive database following the V-RMTC model.

Romania must develop programmes that will enhance the national and regional surveillance capabilities and rapid reaction forces designated to prevent

and counter the security risks from the maritime space. At the same time, there will be supported initiatives aimed at enhancing the regional capacity to respond to crises and to deal with asymmetric threats, as well as at increasing the mutual trust and commitment of all countries in the region in this kind of action. The role of the Romanian Naval Forces must include the accomplishment of traditional military missions that are specific to this category of military forces, as well as of those caused by the new risks/threats that need to be known and dealt with systematically in the region or in the Romanian area of interest, in accordance with international commitments.

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• www.nmic.navy.mil.

MODERN MARITIME PIRACY
– A New Risk to Security
in the 21ˢᵗ Century –

Lieutenant Commander Laurenţiu MEŞTERCA

Modern maritime piracy, active off the coast of Somalia, is one of the newest security risks in today's maritime world, and its rise will lead to numerous challenges. The author describes the characteristics of modern maritime piracy as epitomized by activities off Somalia. Piracy off the Horn of Africa is growing rapidly and its rise drives global piracy statistics. In order to address piracy effectively, a good understanding of its causes, consequences and enabling factors is required. The distinction between terrorism and piracy is clear but in certain situations it can easily become blurred. The solution to this menace will not be found at sea, but on shore. Given the fact that Somalia is a failed state and does not have the right legal and military tools in place to tackle this scourge, it is up to the international community to provide the right type of response. The response should take into account the realities of the fabric of Somali society, including its traditional clan structure. This paper gives also an insight into the impact of piracy on Romanian interests. Its conclusion is that the response should have 3 facets: a reactive solution centred on the maritime dimension, a pro-active solution focused on the comprehensive approach ashore and a mix of these two.

Keywords: modern maritime piracy; Somalia; comprehensive approach; naval forces; roots of piracy; consequences of piracy; Romanian interest

Motto: *"Alexander the Great: What reason did you have for making the seas unsafe ?*
Pirate: The same reason as you have for troubling the whole world. But since I do it in a small ship, I am called a pirate. Because you do it with a great fleet, you are called an emperor".
Richard Platt, *Pirates of Ancient Greece*[1]

The spectacular Somali pirate attacks and their dramatic rise have captured mass media interest, directing public attention to a topic that has seemingly been forgotten by many in recent history. Moreover, the recent piracy incidents have resuscitated the international community's interest in maritime security.

Piracy is a crime undertaken to fulfil one's private interests, directly affecting the *mare liberum* principle which states that navigation is free in the high seas. The phenomenon has had a long history which began once the sea started to be used for commercial means, manifesting itself with different intensity throughout the world and centuries. The piracy centre of gravity has changed in recent years from the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea to the Horn of Africa. Since the second half of 2008, modern maritime piracy has intensified in the Gulf of Aden

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[1] Richard Platt, *Pirates of Ancient Greece*, Pirate, Eyewitness Guides, Dorling Kindersley, p. 9.

and west of the Indian Ocean (Somali basin), one of the most congested but most important maritime routes, linking Europe to Asia.

The phenomenon has been named *modern maritime piracy*, as distinct from the classic piracy, being epitomised by the actions of the Somali pirates. These originate mainly from Puntland, one of the three territorial regions of Somalia bordered by the Gulf of Aden in the north and the Indian Ocean in the east. The main particularities inherent to modern piracy consist of its objective, *modus operandi*, and its integration into globalisation. Its objective is to hijack ships and take hostages (the crew) with the expectations of receiving a ransom. On the other hand, classic piracy, which is common to the other piracy "hot spots" around the world, is either about boarding a ship for robbery of the safe or of the crew's belongings[2] or hijacking the ship in order to sell the cargo and the ship itself (after renaming, repainting, fake registration)[3]. In the latter case, the crew may be left adrift or even killed.

With regard to *modus operandi*, the unique nature of the Somali pirate acts is characterised by the concept of the mother ship[4], which uses sea basing

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[2] Clive Schofield, *The Floating Treasure*, http://www.pya.org/wp-includes/pdf/floating-treasure-pya-news-17-full-version.pdf

[3] Kimberley L. Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi, *Transnational Threats and Maritime Responses, chapter 4, Globalization and Maritime Power*, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 2002, pp. 62-63.

[4] These mother ships are mainly hijacked ships or dhows that ensure the logistics (food, water, spare engines for the skiffs, ammunition, weapons, ladders) that enables the pirate operation at ranges between 500-1 000 nautical miles (1 nautical mile = 1 852 m).

for providing resources for their skiffs. As a result, the attack range has dramatically increased to as much as 1 000 miles off the Somali coast, introducing the element of surprise to the shipping industry. Given the increased range of pirate activity, the identification of mother ships in a vast ocean area by the task forces engaged in counter-piracy operations has become more difficult.

Modern piracy integrates itself perfectly into the concept of globalisation, benefiting immensely from its advantages (technology, network-type organisation whose nodes are spread around the world). The piracy network is not only limited to the pirates who plunder the sea. There are reports that indicate the existence of London based informers and Dubai businessmen who finance the operations. However, it is recognised that behind these reports, *"there has been a lot of inventive reporting on very slim evidence"*[5]. Piracy also significantly affects the economy and finance worldwide.

Modern maritime piracy represents a distinct asymmetric security risk. It is widely known that the seriousness of the phenomenon complicated economic security in a period when the global economy entered a recession (the second part of 2008). The concern of the states with maritime interests (including the shipping industry, insurance companies etc.) has increased proportionally with the magnitude of the pirate successes in terms of the number of hijacked vessels, their tonnage, and the type of cargo. The scale of piracy led to its inclusion into the agendas of the most important international security organisations (United Nations, NATO, EU) as well as of a maritime coalition with the US at its core (Combined Maritime Force – CMF). Following the UN request to combat piracy using maritime capabilities (UNSCR 1838) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) request for assistance, starting with August 2008, the CMF and subsequently two of the most influential security organisations (NATO in October 2008 and the EU in December 2008) responded positively by dispatching their own task-forces in the region. Currently, NATO leads Operation *OCEAN SHIELD*, the EU is in charge of the *ATALANTA* Operation run by *EUNAVFOR* (European Naval Force), while CMF is represented by Task Force 151. Moreover, in the area there are other states with high maritime stakes (Russia, China, Japan, India, Malaysia etc.).

It is important to highlight that the piracy off the Somali coast was brought to spotlight by the hijack of a ship involved in the World Food Programme (WFP) for Somalia in February 2007. Consequently, it was decided that the WFP vessels would be escorted by warships (task currently assumed by the EUNAVFOR, while previously they had been escorted on a rotational basis by France, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands).

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[5] Giles Tremlet, *This is London – the Capital of Somali Pirates' Secret Intelligence Operation,* Guardian, 11 May 2009 and Mary Harper, *Chasing the Somali Piracy Money Trail,* BBC News.

A short overview of the threats in the region is useful for understanding the dynamics of the regional maritime security situation. The Gulf of Aden is a dangerous area not only from a pirate perspective but also from the perspective of maritime crimes which are specific to the region: terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal immigrant trafficking. According to the British professor Geoffrey Till, these actions are all part of maritime crime[6]. In this context, it is worth noting that the most aggressive maritime terrorist acts have taken place in the region which saw the al-Qaeda seaborne attacks against the USS *Cole* in the port of Aden, Yemen in October 2000 and the terrorist act against the French flagged oil tanker *Limburg* off the Yemeni coast in October 2002.

Generally, there is a strict delineation between piracy and terrorism, which is characterised by the goals pursued: economic profit and, respectively, political ambitions. So far, it has not been proved any link between them in Somalia. However, the nexus between these two menaces might be an explosive one. The scenarios of terrorists using hijacked vessels for transporting weapons of mass destruction, technology for terrorist organisations, or for carrying out terrorist attacks against port facilities are plausible[7].

Additionally, the continuation of the instability in Yemen can extend the anarchic area that stretches from the North of Kenya, through Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to Saudi Arabia. Piracy, organised crime, and violent jihad can escalate, having a negative impact on the security of the maritime transit routes[8].

Piracy versus armed robbery

It is important to understand the distinction between piracy and armed robbery, as reflected in the piracy definition in the UN Convention regarding the Law of the Sea. As such, the type of crime (armed robbery or piracy) is defined by the location where the act of violence and detention takes place. Armed robbery is any act of violence or detention, or robbery against a merchant ship committed for private ends that occurs in the territorial waters of a state while underway, at anchor, or alongside in ports. In case the vessel is underway, the pirates select narrow transit routes where the navigation is slowed by natural obstacles (islands, shallow areas), which compel the Master to decrease the speed and to head

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[6] Geoffrey Till, *Sea Power – a Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, Frank Cass, London, Portland OR, 2004, p. 356.

[7] Rear Admiral Cornel Mihai, *Consideraţii privind ameninţările la adresa securităţii maritime*, in *Gândirea Militară Românească* Journal, no. 1, January-February, 2006, p. 129.

[8] Ginny Hill, *Yemen: Fear of Failure*, Briefing Paper, Chatham House, January, 2010, p. 1.

for predictable routes, consequently exposing the ship to attacks. In order to combat the armed robbery, the coastal nations need to be able to intervene with their Coast Guard vessels, or in case of their inexistence, with the warships to enforce the law. In the Malacca Straits, the combined patrolling missions of the coastal nations bore fruit, leading to a dip in the pirate attacks.

Piracy is any act of violence or detention against a merchant ship committed for private ends that occurs in the high seas. Normally, piracy should be countered by the state from where it emerges. In the case of Somalia, this could not be put into practice because this nation does not hold the monopoly over the military or maritime security force and is unable to enforce the law ashore, in its territorial waters, or in the Economic Exclusive Zone. Consequently, as previously outlined, the international community had to resort to a naval deployment.

The recent evolution of maritime piracy

Piracy should be analysed in a global context in order to observe its development and in which manner the Somali piracy influences this progress. The number of incidents represents the sum of the successful attacks (hijacked ships) and the failed attacks. According to the graphs presented by IMO regarding the worldwide development of piracy and armed robbery in the last 25 years[9], the peak of piracy occurred in 1999 (approximately 480 incidents) while in 2003 there were 460 incidents.

In order to highlight the development and the weight of the incidents provoked by the Somali pirates and the hijacked ships in a global context, the data is represented below in a table and graphic form for a span of four years based on the Piracy Reporting Centre reports[10].

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Global incidents	239	263	293	406
Hijacked ships worldwide	14	18	49	49
Incidents in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) and the Western Indian Oc.	20	51	111	217
Hijacked ships in the GoA and the Western Indian Oc.	5	12	42	47

Graph 1: **Table of piracy incidents and hijacked ships globally, in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean 2006-2009**

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[9] IMO, *Annual Report, 2008: Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships*, MSC.4/Circ.133, 19 March 2009.

[10] Data in the table was provided following a personal request to ICC (e-mail: imb@icc-ccs.org) of the ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annual reports 2009, 2007 and 2006; Piracy report 2008: http://www.noonsite.com/Members/sue/R2009-01-22-3. The figures corresponding to the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean include the incidents/hijacked ships in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, off Oman coast due to the fact that the Somali pirates were credited with them.

On a global scale, piracy incidents have had an exponential growth since 2006. In the last year, the number of incidents increased 1,4 times. The 2009 annual piracy report indicates that aside from the Gulf of Aden (GoA) and the Somali basin, other "hot spots" were Nigeria and the South China Sea while the Straits of Malacca saw a significant decrease in incidents of piracy.

The comparison of the number of incidents in the GoA and the Somali basin to the number of global incidents *(graph 2)* shows the same exponential growth, but a much higher escalation of attacks in the last two years. Of note, in 2008 and the first part of 2009, the Gulf of Aden was the target of choice, while the West Indian Ocean was plundered starting with the second semester of 2009 due to the presence of the counter-piracy task forces in the Gulf of Aden. However, in 2009, despite the presence of permanent international warships on station,

Global incidents

Incidents in the GoA
and the Western Indian Ocean

Graph 2

the incidents doubled compared to the previous year. Looking at the lowest number of incidents in 2006, this occurred due to the Islamic Courts Union fundamentalist regime which banned piracy under the Sharia law.

Global hijacked ships

Hijacked ships in the GoA
and the Western Indian Ocean

Graph 3

The graph displaying the Somali hijacked ship incidents for the last four years *(graph 3)* reflects a rise of 2,4 times in 2007 compared to the previous year and 3,5 times in 2008 compared to 2007. Even though the number of hijacked ships was higher (1,11 times) in 2009, by dividing the number of hijacked ships to the incidents, a decline in the Somali pirates' efficiency occurs. The driving factors for this drop in efficiency are the presence of counter-piracy task forces, application of anti-piracy measures by the merchant vessels, and measures taken against piracy by the Puntland authorities.

As a proof, in the second part of 2009, there was not any vessel hijacked in the Gulf of Aden for almost 6 months.

It can be inferred that the variables that relate to both the hijacked ships and the pirate incidents in Somalia influence to a great extent the shape of the graphs at global level. In addition to this, 2010 started with two ships hijacked the first day of the year.

The security situation in Somalia

In order to accurately assess the piracy phenomenon in Somalia and to better understand its roots, one must analyse the security situation in a country where the central government enjoys no authority and is being under continuous fire from the fundamentalist group al-Shabaab.

Somalia ranks first in the world, among failed states, according to the 2009 *Failed States* index, published annually by *Foreign Policy*[11]. As it is widely known, the country has been confronted with a precarious security situation since 1991 due to an incessant civil war and political instability. In this context, the economic life has been characterised by hyperinflation (due to the insertion of counterfeited Somali shillings), a massive rise in costs for food and fuel[12], as well as high unemployment. Against this background, a humanitarian crisis of high magnitude broke out, inflicting 1,5 million internally displaced persons and 560 000 refugees in Kenya, Yemen, and Ethiopia[13]. The humanitarian crisis has been exacerbated by spells of famine generated by drought. Consequently, half of the Somali population is dependent on humanitarian aid[14]. Even though the World Food Programme has been implemented to ameliorate the situation, poverty persists creating real opportunities for the proliferation of organised crime (piracy, weapons and drugs smuggling) as well as terrorism. Terrorism risk is very high in a state where there is an acute security vacuum. This was demonstrated in September 2009 by the killing of an al-Qaeda leader by the American Special Forces.

In order to support the limited functioning of the Somali government and to protect the key infrastructure in Mogadishu, the African Union launched *AMISOM (African Mission in Somalia)* totalling 4 000 troops. This mission, whose contributors are Uganda and Burundi, is a temporary measure designed to enable the transition to a UN peacekeeping operation.

The extant situation in Somalia perfectly reflects the Hobbesian theory that calls for the need of an efficient authority that controls individuals, bound by a social contract within the society, with the view to preventing anarchy and civil war. This is the foundation of the centralised state structures. However, the reality is different in Somalia due to the peculiarities of the society structures (clan type) whose nature is inherently decentralised. Somalia technically possesses a Western state structure, but it is obviously inefficient and overshadowed

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[11] *2009 Failed States Index*, in *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings

[12] Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia – What Went Wrong?,* in *RUSI Journal*, August 2009, vol. 154, no. 4, p. 8.

[13] *2010 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Somalia*, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483ad6

[14] *WFP – Somalia*, http://www.wfp.org/countries/somalia

by the clan type decentralised system. In this context, Kaplan suggests that the international community should abandon the support for the current structure (Western type) while simultaneously engaging the traditional institutions (clan type) that wield the actual power in Somalia[15].

Roots of piracy

As previously highlighted, poverty brought on by the civil war, drought, and the inexistence of a functional economy represent the main factors that facilitate piracy.

Initially, piracy was nothing more than a reaction of the fishing community to the stimulus of external factors (illegal fishing by Western trawlers, toxic waste dumping) enabled by the inexistence of national law enforcement agency in the maritime realm. It is worth noting that this state possesses the longest coastline in Africa, but has not had a naval force since 1991, which prevents it from defending its territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone. In this context, the reaction of the fishing community can be seen as a way to satisfy its basic needs, being in line with Maslow pyramid.

The inability of the Somali Coast Guard to respond to the challenges raised by illegal fishing in its exclusive economic zone, rich in tuna fish, is one of the chief causes of piracy in the region: *"approximately 700 foreign fishing vessels are known to operate illegally in the Somali waters, taking an annual catch worth 90-300 million USD – or roughly three times the sum said to be paid out by the shipping industry in ransoms to the pirates"*[16]. This practice is dubbed *fishing piracy* by Somali analysts. Against this backdrop, a direct consequence of the illegal fishing is the insufficiency of marine resources for the Somali fishermen and depletion of important fishing taxes to the Somali treasury. Additionally, the scarce fish resources are affected by an increasingly polluted marine environment due to industrial, toxic, and even nuclear waste dumping by Western vessels[17]. It only costs European companies *"$2,50 per ton while the costs for destroying the waste in Europe are $250 per ton"*, according to the UN Environment Programme spokesman[18].

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[15] Seth Kaplan, *Discard the Top-Down Strategy in Somalia*, 18 February, 2009, http://www.policyinnovations. org/ideas/commentary/data/000111

[16] Clive Schofield, *op. cit.*, http://www.pya.org/wp-includes/pdf/floating-treasure-pya-news-17-full-version.pdf

[17] Mohamed Abshir Waldo, *The Two Piracies in Somalia: Why the World Ignores the Other ?*, 08 January 2009, http://wardheernews.com/Articles_09/Jan/Waldo/08_The_two_piracies_in_Somalia.html

[18] Leigh Phillips, *The European Roots of Somali Piracy*, http://euobserver.com/9/27966

In this milieu, indigenous fishermen, self proclaimed the National Voluntary Coast Guard, organised themselves for intercepting the illegal fishing vessels and vessels engaged in dumping toxic waste, defending the interests of local fishermen. Subsequently, they started receiving taxes from the transiting vessels and soon these acts turned into hostage takings and ransom requests[19]. There was a leap from vengeance-driven actions to profit making operations. Moreover, the insufficiency of the budget allocated by the Somali government for the payment of the port authorities wages, coupled with an endemic corruption in the administrative sector, led to a situation where the pirates make use of the bribe to facilitate their own operations in ports[20]. There is no secret that elements from police, security services, and the government received enticements to favour piracy acts[21].

It is essential to note that in the reconstruction efforts of Somalia, the Coast Guard represents an important entity to enforce the law. Also, in the process of formulating its response, the international community should take into account the Somali perception regarding the roots of piracy. This aspect can be implemented by adding new missions for the task forces involved in combating piracy (e.g. monitoring the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zones to prevent the illegal fishing and the toxic waste dumping). This approach, captured in a coherent and articulated communication strategy, might have a positive impact on the Somali population, especially the fishing community. Moreover, this might deter any vessel involved in illegal activities, concurrently with pushing the fishing companies to follow the legal way and pay the fishing taxes to the Somali authorities.

The consequences of piracy

Piracy has created an *economic-social imbalance for the clan communities* living in the coastal area. The ransom money has led to an increase in food and real estate prices. The money is generally distributed within the clan. Piracy has become an industry in itself organised around the clan. As such, aside from the *"fighters"* there is an entire logistic chain (e.g. food delivery to the hostages, fuel delivery, weapons etc). While certain clans thrive in this industry, other clans are confronted with increased prices that lead to social cleavages. Consequently, the development of a black

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[19] *Ibidem*.

[20] Ashley Robinson, *An Unexpected Problem*, in *Harvard Political Review*, http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:BvRVINptTaYJ:www.hpronline.org/index.php%3Foption%3Dcom_ontent%26view%3Darticle%26id%3D176%26format%3Dpdf+roots+of+piracy&cd=28&hl=en&ct=clnk

[21] Somalia: *The Trouble with Puntland*, Policy Briefing, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing no. 64, Nairobi/Brussels, 12 August 2009, p. 11.

economy based on ransoms makes the job more difficult for the already strained Somali authorities.

Intensification and expansion of the phenomenon at the regional level. Given the high rate of success intensely covered in the media, piracy in East Africa can extend its reach through the massive influx of Somali people. Pirates are looked up to within a society where bravery is extremely respected. One can witness a spill-over effect of this profitable "business" by involvement of individuals from other unstable states in the area (e.g. Yemen) or emulation of this practice by other coastal communities from regions around the world.

Increased costs for services and imported products. By simply having an impact on freedom of navigation, piracy is a real threat to global trade. As such, the existence of piracy has led to a 10 times increase in the cost of insuring cargo and ships[22] transiting the Gulf of Aden. The option of avoiding this area by sailing around the Cape of Good Hope will lead to a spike in costs of fuel necessary to transit a significantly longer distance. Additionally, the new trend to attack vessels at ranges of 1 000 miles compelled the shipping companies to introduce *"forbidden areas"* for ships that are in passage of the Gulf of Aden coming through the Indian Ocean[23]. This presumes taking indirect routes that result in a longer transit in space and time and increased costs for fuel and chartering the vessel. A direct consequence is the *negative effect on individual interests*. People are confronted with increased prices for imported products transported by sea through the piracy ridden region in a period where the effects of the economic recession are still present.

Energy security is seriously jeopardised, especially in the case of states dependant on the Persian Gulf oil. The hijacking of oil supertankers like Sirius Star and Maran Centaurus are good examples of dire consequences of piracy.

Environmental risks are extremely high due to the threat of oil tankers being fired upon by pirates.

Humanitarian aid for Somalia delivered by the vessels chartered by the WFP was temporarily disrupted in the autumn of 2008 by piracy[24]. However, the EUNAVFOR permanent escort operations will prevent further disruptions.

Hiring of warships belonging to another state for escort duties (the case of the *Maersk Line* vessel escorted by a Tanzanite warship in 2008) is an example

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[22] Roger Middleton, *Piracy in Somalia*: *Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars,* Briefing paper, Chatham House, Oct. 2008, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12203_1008piracysomalia.pdf

[23] *Piracy Runs up Fuel Bills*, 14.01.2010, http://www.fairplay.co.uk/login.aspx?reason=denied_empty&script_name=/secure/display.aspx&path_info=/secure/display.aspx&articlename=dn0020100114000006&phrase=indirect%20routes e ships farther into the Indian Ocean.

[24] Roger Middleton, *op. cit.*

of an original solution enacted by one of the world's leaders in the shipping industry in an effort to defend itself against piracy. Practically, the Danish company affirmed that it paid the fuel and the food for the crew. However, this development is appreciated as being dangerous[25].

Individual security is threatened, especially in the case of the crews aboard the ships transiting the area. Being taken hostage, the seafarers are deprived of their freedom, which gravely impacts human rights. In certain instances, some sailors lose their lives. However, the killing of crew members is not a common practice, because the main objective is making money out of the ransoms.

Additionally, piracy has a *negative psychological effect* on seafarers and their families. The distress is present not only in the circumstances where hostages are taken, but also when the crew is passing through the region.

There is also a theory that proposes that the ransom money is used to *finance the civil war in Somalia*[26], especially for supporting the fundamentalist group al-Shabaab that has recently affirmed, for the first time, that it is aligned with al-Qaeda's global militant campaign, confirming the previous US repeated accusations. However, to date, there are no proven ties between piracy and terrorism[27].

Nuanced pirate requests. Pirates have switched their approach from fulfilling their personal financial interests to a new one – seeking social solidarity with the arrested pirates and subsequently requesting the nations that hold them to release them in exchange for the release of hostages (the case of the hostage crew on board the Spanish vessel Alakrana in exchange for the two pirates arrested by the Spanish Navy in October 2009). This development has a political connotation due to the aggressive posture taken by the pirates who threatened to kill the hostages. In this case, the boundary between piracy and terrorism is blurred.

Besides the numerous negative effects of piracy, it paradoxically has had a *positive effect on the fishing industry*. Given the fact that the illegal trawlers were scared away by piracy, the fish population has risen, which has led to a rise in fishermen revenues and a fall in fish prices. This phenomenon has been observed in the coastal villages and towns in the region (Somalia and Kenya)[28].

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[25] *Danish Shipping Company Hires Tanzanian Navy Ship as Protection against Pirates*, 06.01.2010, Copenhagen Post.

[26] Roger Middleton, *op. cit.*

[27] *Somalia's al-Shabaab: Yeah, We're with al-Qaeda*, 01.02.2010, http://www.jihadwatch.org/2010/02/somalias-al-shabaab-yeah-were-with-al-qaeda.html

[28] *Kenya Fishermen See Upside to Pirates: More Fish*, Associated Press, 10.01.2010.

The impact of piracy on Romanian interests

Romania is exposed to the risk of piracy due to two factors: Romanian flagged vessels transiting international waters and Romanian seafarers onboard the foreign flagged ships.

On the one hand, the worst case scenario would be a hijacked Romanian merchant vessel. However, the probability of this occurrence is low given the small number of merchant vessels held by our country. Yet, in 2009, the merchant ship *Albatros*, owned by the Ministry of National Defence, was sailing very close to the spot where a Turkish flagged ship was hijacked. The ship was transporting military equipment back to Romania on completion of the Romanian participation in the Coalition operation in Iraq and it was being escorted by a ship belonging to the NATO counter-piracy task force.

On the other hand, the most likely scenario is having the Romanian sailors taken as hostages due to the status of our country as one of the most important suppliers of the work force for the world fleets. In 2009, Romania was confronted with 25 hostages in seven separate hijacked vessel cases, with 23 of them released until the end of the year[29]. The year of 2010 started with another two Romanian hostages onboard the British flagged ship, *Asian Glory*, which increased the number of hostages to 5. However, following the release of one Romanian sailor aboard *Filitsa* (February 2010), there were left four hostages waiting for ransom pay (aboard *St. James Park* and *Asian Glory*), at the beginning of March 2010.

Piracy acts or terrorist acts in the Black Sea region ?

Currently, the Black Sea is a secure body of water in terms of piracy. This is a direct result of the fact that Romania as well as the other coastal states are fully capable of enforcing the law on their jurisdiction, leaving no room for the piracy emergence in the Black Sea. However, looking back on the past, a hijack occurred in 1918, having in the spotlight the French flagged ship – *Souirah*, which was heading from *Batumi for Marseille*[30].

However, for Romania, the Danube security as well as the maritime security entails a particular consideration, given the terrorist incidents that took place

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[29] *Piraţii somalezi au capturat un cargou britanic pe care se află şi doi români*, 29.12.09, http://www.realitatea.net/piratii-somalezi-au-capturat-un-cargou-britanic-pe-care-se-afla-si-doi-romani_693380.html and *Eliberarea unui marinar de cetăţenie română aflat la bordul navei 'M/V Filitsa'*, 03.02.10, http://www.epochtimes-romania.com/articles/2010/02/article_73275.html

[30] *Black Sea Pirates Rob Americans*, 11 May 1920, in the *New York Times*, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9F06EFD61E31E03ABC4952DFB366838B639EDE

on this river and in the Black Sea region in the past. It is worth noting the makeshift bomb found aboard the Bulgarian ferry *"Balkan Princess"* in the port of Ruse just before her departure to Giurgiu (Romania) in October 2002[31]. Also, against the backdrop of the first Chechen war, the *"hostage crisis in the Black Sea"* took place in January 1996 following the capture of the Panamanian flagged passenger ship *Avarazya* by nine militants supporting the Chechen cause. Previously, terrorists sought to sabotage one of the two Turkish bridges over the Bosporus Straits with the intent of collapsing them with the aim of disrupting the traffic flow in the straits[32]. The three day tactful negotiation process undertaken by the Turkish authorities resulted in the release of all 177 passengers and 55 crew members and the arrest of the terrorists.

Given these developments, it is necessary that the Romanian Naval Forces, in cooperation with other agencies, keep a watchful eye on the asymmetric security risks and be prepared to respond effectively.

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In order to reduce the number of hijacked ships, the most efficient method has proven to be the implementation of self-defence measures by merchant ships (maximum vigilance, increased speed, avoidance manoeuvres etc.) in conjunction with the prompt responses from the counter-piracy task forces.

The most delicate facet of piracy is the possible transition from piracy to terrorism, which can be easily achieved in certain situations through abandoning the economic objectives and assuming an agenda motivated *"more by a wish for social solidarity with the other members of the organisation, than the political platforms or strategic objectives"*[33]. The change in the nature of the Somali pirates' requests regarding freeing the arrested pirates coupled with threatening to kill the hostages is a factor that creates apprehension for the international community. Furthermore, I believe that any future surprising announcement, similar to the al-Shabaab acknowledgment of being an al-Qaeda proxy in Somalia, which would prove or openly state the ties between pirates and al-Shabaab will give a new impetus to the counter-piracy campaign.

Piracy is a multidimensional issue which does not only affect the global economy (including energy security), but the socio-economic life and security in Somalia. Conversely, piracy is merely a symptom of the disastrous political, economic, and security plight of Somalia.

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[31] *Bulgarian Ship Evacuated Upon Terrorist Threat*, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=14906
[32] M. Koknar, *Maritime Terrorism: a New Challenge for NATO,* 2005, p. 7.
[33] Max Abrahams, *What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy*, International Security, MA: MIT Press, Cambridge, March 2008.

The solution for combating piracy needs to initially address the systemic problems internal to Somalia. It is important that the traditional clan structures that wield the actual power should be engaged. A solution that is solely focused on the maritime dimension will only partially address the problem.

The mere inexistence or inability of Somali institutions to cope with the multidimensional challenges calls for the support of the international community. In this respect I envisage three solutions. The first one focuses on decreasing the effects of piracy (especially reducing the number of hijacked ships) which is nothing more than a temporary fix of the problem. The second solution consists of ensuring the conditions that eliminate the roots of instability which are conducive to piracy. This resides in utilising an integrated strategy that should be implemented multi-dimensionally (security, diplomacy, political, economic, financial) and adapted to the Somali culture. The final objective is the reconstruction of Somali institutions capable of managing their own future. Difficulties lie ahead due to the complexity of the process and the long duration. The third solution, which represents the best choice, is a mix of the first two solutions, blending the benefit of a swift response to ameliorate the effects of piracy with a comprehensive effort to eliminate the roots of instability in the region.

THE GLOBALISATION OF POLITICAL, JURIDICAL AND MILITARY APPROACHES WITH THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH CRISIS MANAGEMENT (I)

University Assistant Anelis-Vanina ISTRĂTESCU

The concept of security has been lately redefined by the geopolitical and strategic transformations, the technical and technological innovations and the occurrence of globalisation.

In the context of the increasing transboundary criminality, terrorism, poverty, proliferation of lethal weapons, humanity has considered the preservation of the international security as an essential priority, being aware that such scourges would be eradicated only by reuniting the world's states at the political, legal and military level. The accomplishment of this objective depends on strengthening the cooperation of decision-making bodies in order to ensure global peace and stability, respect the fundamental human rights and freedoms, apply the principles of the rule of law, strengthen democracy etc.

Maximising the success of political, legal and military measures to be taken by the states will require greater flexibility in accepting mutual concessions, as well as larger ability to anticipate the evolution of the security environment.

Keywords: *action plan; threat sources; Maastricht Treaty; defence capacity; rule of law; international relations*

Crisis management, indispensable in maintaining global security, is an extremely difficult task for the state actors involved in the fight to prevent and combat the new risks to humanity, which is an aspect that cannot be approached unless the globalisation phenomenon and its inherent effects are considered, in the sinuous context of geopolitical and geostrategic changes worldwide in the latest decades.

The Implications of Globalisation for Security

Generally, the concept of *globalisation*[1] means the reunion of separate elements into one whole, the consequence being the creation of a situation that is widely generalised.

The compared study of the works on this theme reflects a wide range of definitions of this notion, nuanced according to the research area. Thus, some authors state that globalization is *"a phenomenon that tends to form a unique culture and civilisation"*[2], in which individual rights and freedoms are the same for all individuals, regardless of their affiliation

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[1] http://www.webdex.ro/online/marele_dictionar_de_neologisme/globalizare

[2] See I. Dragoman, *Protecția juridică a drepturilor omului*, Editura Fundației "România de Mâine", București, 2008, pp. 14-15.

or social category, the status or the political concepts they embrace. According to other authors, globalisation *"can be perceived as a tendency of the course of history"*[3] that has *"a planetary wholeness"*[4]. Referring to the same phenomenon, K. Melas shows, in a paper from 1999, that globalisation represents the *"American response to the Europeans and Japanese attempts to put themselves, as dialogue partners, at the same table with the USA"*[5].

In my opinion, globalisation is an incontestable reality, through which, in fact, a unity in diversity is created, resulting from the expansion of the effects of certain local or regional actions or acts at the universal level, in order to standardise and eliminate manifest discrepancies or differences.

The effects of globalisation have practically made their presence felt in all fields, from the economic to the legal one, from the political to the military one, manifesting irreversibly, under various forms, on the configuration of contemporary power structures. In this context, the nation-state diminishes its authority, through the concession of part of its sovereignty through decentralisation and transfer of attributions to local bodies, through the loss of control on the global economy, through the harmonisation of its internal legislation with that of other states, through the dependence on the decisions or recommendations of major regional and international financial and banking institutions.

Against this backdrop, human security gains a new dimension, translated, in the broad sense, through the absence of the danger to the individual, group or community, which some authors believe that manifests in four ways: 1) as a state of calm, confidence, serenity and peace; 2) as a feeling; 3) as the product of conscious, voluntary and responsible human activity; 4) as a result of interactions between internal and international conditions favourable to life and human activity[6]. The continuous adaptation of means and tools for safeguarding world security, a factor which depends on the individual's right to life itself, as an absolutely fundamental right, is a necessity in a globalised world.

The implications of the globalisation phenomenon on world security is reflected in an optimum manner in the very syntagm of the *globalisation of threat sources*, which, in turn, requires the clarification of the meaning of new notions and their

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[3] In M. Iacob, D. Iacob, *Interesul naţional şi lumea globală – riscuri de instabilitate şi strategia securităţii*, in *Surse de instabilitate la nivel global şi regional. Implicaţii pentru România*, the 4th annual session of scientific papers, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 134-135.

[4] *Ibid*.

[5] In *Globalizarea. O nouă fază de internaţionalizare a economiei. Mituri şi realitate*, Atena, 1999.

[6] Detailed by P. Duţu in *Grupurile de interese şi securitatea umană*, in *Impact strategic* magazine, no. 1/2009, Editura UNAp "Carol I", Bucureşti, 2009, pp. 48-52.

conceptual delimitation[7]. In a reflection that has become famous, Confucius said: *"I do not understand to know the answers, I would like to understand the questions"*.

Threats and hazards, risks and vulnerabilities are often mentioned, being elements that, despite being in an unequivocal connection, require focus and differentiation. None of these terms has a perfect definition, especially as the security environment has shown in time its fluctuating and variable nature, being often founded on the *"quicksand"* of a temporary calmness, conferred by state agreements or regional peace regarding the recrudescent conflict areas.

Beyond the subjective assessments in explaining the partly synonymous notions, we believe that the essential difference between threat and danger lies precisely in their way of manifesting on the target objectives. Thus, if, as far as threat is concerned, we are dealing with a clearly stated position of an author (e.g. state, group of states, terrorist groups) on its victim, with the purpose of intimidating and influencing it to act in a certain way, the danger should be understood as a potential threat that hangs over his/her receiver, without the author necessarily being identified. Once these benchmarks are outlined, we can understand that the notion of risk, representing the likelihood of confrontation with danger, is not to be confused with vulnerability, considered the weak link or the point with the lowest defence capacity, in case of occurrence of threats, dangers or risks.

It is precisely understanding such distinctions that could guide the world leaders in the future in taking the most pragmatic measures and in adopting the most effective action plans for maintaining and strengthening global security, which could not be done only by combat actions, but especially by preventive actions. This is where the role of military strategy intervenes, described as *"the ability of capable people, of great commanders to overcome the enemy in war and in war preparation, intelligently using the forces, means and resources allocated by the policymaker and, at the same time, to create the conditions necessary for victory in battle or in war, to achieve the established or proposed goals and objectives"*[8].

Last but not least, we appreciate that our brief statement on international security in the context of globalisation would not be complete without the analysis of the correlation between individual security, of each state, within its own borders – an expression of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity – and collective security, as the value of the entire humanity. This issue is currently a topic widely

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[7] In this respect, see Gr. Alexandrescu, *Ameninţări în mediul de securitate*, in *Studii de Securitate şi Apărare*, vol. 1, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Bucureşti, 2005, pp. 152-184.

[8] Gh. Văduva, *Consonanţe şi rezonanţe strategice politice şi militare, decizionale şi acţionale*, in *Impact strategic* magazine, no. 1/2009, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare "Carol I", Bucureşti, 2009, p. 40.

debated in the specialised literature, in which it is shown that, while nation states remain subjects of international law, *"in the complexity of the contemporary world, it is increasingly difficult for each of them to efficiently and independently offer and provide adequate answers to all problems faced. For this, they are associated, immediately or in the long term, in order to solve certain common issues"*[9]. In the light of these general observations, it was concluded, on the one hand, that national defence is an inalienable attribute of the state and a support for collective defence, and, on the other hand, that collective defence is complementary to national defence and is a product of globalisation[10]. In other words, the two concepts are in a relation of complementarity and interdependence, in a one-to-one relationship, combining harmoniously, in the effort of humanity to enhance its capabilities and give full effectiveness to the principles of the rule of law.

Political Cooperation

The tendencies in the evolution of global security determine a greater involvement in the measures necessary for managing the crises of the modern world and a complex combination of political, legal tools and organisational actions, at the national and international level. Bringing together political efforts in order to ensure a sustainable security environment is no longer a novelty, but its forms of manifestations in the context of globalisation are unusual, a phenomenon which, according to some authors, is produced by *"breaching political boundaries and border states and therefore has a political, economic and commercial nature"*[11].

In a valuable analysis of the evolution of world order, which is considered by Ambassador George Maior to *"stand out through its visionary nature and the power of synthesis of the speech"*[12], former British diplomat Robert Cooper[13] noted that the disappearance of the system outlined on the *principle of the balance of powers* was caused by three factors: the unification of Germany in 1871, the technological changes at the end of the ninth century and the concomitant

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[9] See Mircea Mureşan, *Misiunile Armatei României în cadrul apărării colective şi coaliţiilor*, paper delivered at the international seminar organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies within the National Defence University, *Participarea României la apărarea colectivă sub conducerea NATO şi PESA*, Bucureşti, 25 May 2006; the paper was published in the book that comprised all the scientific papers delivered at the seminar, pp. 17-26.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Constantin Hlihor, *Geopolitica şi geostrategia în analiza relaţiilor internaţionale contemporane*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare "Carol I", Bucureşti, 2005, p. 90.

[12] In *Noul aliat – regândirea politicii de apărare a României la începuturile secolului XXI*, Editura RAO, Bucureşti, 2009.

[13] He was also Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.

emergence of democratic politics and mass politics[14]. The same author showed, in a very suggestive way, referring to the configuration of the current world, that *"we might not be interested in chaos but chaos is interested in us"*[15]. He also considered that the greatest fear for the current system of international relations and global security is represented by weapons of mass destruction and, implicitly, terrorism, which he describes as the *"privatisation of war"* or the *"non-state that attacks the state"*. Finally, the remarkable author proposes three types of policies for defending peace and stability in the postmodern world: 1. the force politics or preventive attack; 2. the extended stability (postmodernity); 3. the foreign policy of the balance of power.

Another author, the Spanish journalist Miguel Pedrero, wrote in his controversial book – *Coruption las cloacas de poder (Corruption the Dumps of Power)* – that terrorism has always been used as a tool by different countries or centres of power to obtain political or economic benefits[16]. More comprehensive is Ali Laidi's theory[17], regarding the current security forms, according to which economic security is the basis, political security is the principle, military security is the guarantee, technological security is the key and cultural security is the salvation.

Regardless of the many different and inexhaustible approaches to the discussed matter, essentially, we bear in mind the primary role politics plays in maintaining global security by managing present crises. We cannot but highlight the imperative of the reunion of all state forces, especially in politics, for ensuring a climate of stability that is so necessary for the protection of humanity and, implicitly, of the fundamental human rights, without which planetary existence will be mere utopia.

We consider that the role of the political component in maintaining security is required to be analysed in terms of both its dimensions: on the one hand, we speak of *domestic policy*, led by each state to protect the persons under its jurisdiction and the national territory of any interference and, on the other hand, of *foreign policy*, as a means of participating in the collective work of the states to build a security environment to benefit the entire humankind.

Even if, internally, they develop their own policies that are connected to the specific realities of each nation, states cannot isolate themselves, they must cooperate and fraternise when the interests of humanity require it, being aware that the result of the political efforts can optimise only through putting

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[14] R. Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, Atlantic Press, 2003, by Atlantic Books Ltd, in Romanian *Destrămarea naţiunilor*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 2007, pp. 35-37.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Book published in Romanian by Editura Litera International, Bucureşti, 2008, chapter 8, pp. 145-171.

[17] A. Laidi, *Retour de Flamme. Comment la mondialisation a accouché du terrorism*, Calmann-Levy, 2006, in Romanian, *Efectul de bumerang. Cum a determinat globalizarea apariţia terorismului*, Editura House of Guides, 2007, p. 122.

in agreement the objectives of domestic policy with those of foreign policy, with the purpose of preserving international order.

That is why collective political steps taken to ensure security have resulted in the development of instruments with deep reverberations in the evolution of international relations, among which, in our opinion, one can notice the *Treaty on the European Union*, known as the *Treaty of Maastricht*[18], fundamental document of the common foreign and security policy adopted at the EU level. Thus, the second pillar of the European Union enshrined in the Treaty[19] is that of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whose primary objectives are strengthening security, international cooperation, safeguarding common values, developing democracy and observing human rights. We notice, including as far as terminology is concerned, a change of substance in the content of the Treaty, regarding the replacement of the term *"cooperation"*, enshrined in the Single European Act[20] (SEA) with the one of *"policy"*.

According to the signatories of the Treaty, the means of implementation of the CFSP are *joint action* and *common position*, the union states being required to participate with own *"arsenals"* in the common effort to build a European political system, able to provide concrete guarantees for the promotion of fundamental rights and freedoms and strengthen regional stability and combat capacity against cross-border crime. Furthermore, another major objective of the Union was established through the annexes to the same Treaty, namely the development of cooperation with NATO, through the harmonisation of working methods and the synchronisation of data and meetings. This way, state cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy has not limited to the European area, but expanded almost worldwide, thus gaining a cross-border feature.

With the adoption of the *Amsterdam Treaty*[21], the *Treaty of Maastricht* underwent essential changes both in terms of strengthening common defence and in terms of setting the goal of maintaining and developing the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice. Common foreign and security policy has been redefined by the new treaty, in which we find, as priority areas, strengthening the security of the Union and its member states under all its forms, maintaining peace and promoting international cooperation.

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[18] The Treaty was signed by the European Council on 7 February 1992 and came into force on 1 November 1993, laying the basis of the European Union.

[19] The first pillar was the community one and the third was the cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs.

[20] SEA was signed on 17 February 1986 and came into force on 1 July 1987; it revised the Treaty of Rome and implemented the Single European Market and the European Political Cooperation.

[21] The Treaty came into force on 1 May 1999.

In order to achieve the same goals, the EU has developed its foreign relations, implementing the concept of *European Neighbourhood Policy*, with the stated purpose of enhancing the security and welfare of the states involved in the project, a concept originally used in the *European Commission Communication on Wider Europe*, in March 2003, and taken over by the *European Security Strategy*, the same year, through which the European Union was assigned to contribute to maintaining stability and good governance in its immediate vicinity. Subsequently, the European Commission's Communication called the *European Neighbourhood Policy*, in May 2004, the courses of action to implement this type of policy and to capitalise on benefits from the EU enlargement on its new neighbours were completed. Based on this policy, the reform of several areas was attempted, through political and legal acts, differentiated in relation to the recipient states: *association agreements* for the Mediterranean countries, *stabilisation and association agreements* for the Balkan states and *partnership and cooperation agreements* for the partner states in implementing the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The most recent changes in the common foreign and security policy of the EU have occurred with the entry into force, on 1 December 2009, of the *Treaty of Lisbon*, through which it is sought to create a more democratic, transparent and effective Europe to ensure better protection of European citizens and to impose itself as an redoubtable actor on the international scene. The new normative instrument enhances the role of the European Parliament and the involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the Union, extends the jurisdiction of the Union to act in the field of security, introduces new provisions on civil protection, humanitarian aid and public health, with the purpose of strengthening the Union's capacity to respond to the threats to the security of the European citizens.

Strengthening, through this new act, the institution of the High Representative of the Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, creating a new European External Action Service, regulating mutual assistance in defence and expanding "Petersberg" missions[22], developing cooperation between member states interested in security and defence contribute to improving the existing institutional framework and increasing the EU's role in security. Through the same act, it was the reaffirmed the status of the European Parliament as a checking, monitoring and control body of ESDP, as well as the need for closer collaboration between competent committees of the European Parliament, national parliaments and NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The express normative establishment of the concept of *good neighbourhood*, as well as the introduction of a solidarity clause between member states, in case of collective threat, are also innovations brought to the community order.

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[22] The EU has resorted to this type of missions in order to manage the destabilisation in Eastern Europe. It includes humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, crisis management missions.

In the hierarchy of international political structures meant to ensure global security, an important place is occupied, without any doubt, by the *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, with special role in maintaining peace and defending the independence of member states, through political solidarity and defensive military force, against all forms of aggression directed against it or its members.

The need for joining the North Atlantic Alliance was acknowledged by Romania as well, explained through the correct understanding of the fact that its participation in NATO operations is the most convenient way to preserve its interests, security and the rule of law. The quasi-unanimous desire of party states to integrate into this structure of collective security is the ultimate proof that the principles, values and goals promoted by the Alliance are to be found in the national governance programmes and are therefore compatible with the particular interests of each member.

In fact, the principles of the Alliance organisation and functioning based on the idea of cooperation and cohesion were reaffirmed at the 2008 *Bucharest Summit*, when the participating states adopted a *Declaration*, with huge consequences for the international community, in which the following principles were established: *"NATO's ongoing enlargement process has been a historic success in advancing stability and cooperation and bringing us closer to our common goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace, democracy and common values. NATO's door will remain open to European democracies willing and able to assume responsibilities and obligations of membership, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. (...) We reaffirm that NATO's policy of outreach through partnerships, dialogue and cooperation is an essential part of the Alliance's purpose and tasks. The Alliance's partnerships across the globe have an enduring value, contributing to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond"*[23].

A significant place in all organisations concerned with international security is unquestionably held by the *Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE*[24]*)*, whose work focuses on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. The Euro-Atlantic dimension of the Organisation, given by the large number of member states located on different continents, have increased its efficiency and role in its actions to ensure global peace and stability. The foundations of the organisation were laid by the *Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*[25], being remodelled by successive acts, which have brought essential changes in its functioning. Thus, through the 1990 *Charter of Paris*, a new objective of the organisation was set, consisting of providing security, developing broad cooperation among

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[23] See points 18 and 30 of the *Declaration* adopted within the Bucharest Summit.
[24] Established in 1973 under the name of *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, the organisation took the current name on 1 January 1995; currently, it has 56 member countries and is located in Vienna.
[25] Also known as the *Helsinki Accords*.

all participating states and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms; through the *Helsinki Conference* in 1992, the organisation assumed an active role in early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management and created a new body – *The Forum for Security Cooperation*, with an advisory and negotiation role in taking measures in order to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region; at the *Budapest Summit* in 1994, it was adopted the *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security*, a document that regulates the principles for the use of armed forces in democratic societies; at the *Istanbul Summit*, after which it was finalised the mutual and comprehensive security model for Europe of the 21st century, the *Charter for European Security* was adopted, a document that perfected the primordial objectives of the organisation: consolidating common values and assisting member states in building democratic, civil, based on the rule of law societies, preventing local conflicts, restoring stability and peace in areas of tension; eliminating real and perceptible security deficits and avoiding the creation of new political, economic or social divisions, which is achieved by promoting a system of security through cooperation[26].

It should be stressed that within the Organisation operates a *Conflict Prevention Centre*, with responsibilities regarding crisis management and support for OSCE missions in various conflict regions[27], which proves the importance of the organisation in the sphere of security and thus in the system of international relations. We emphasise, in this instance, the overwhelming role that OSCE has played in bringing peace in the countries of the former Soviet Union, through the involvement of the organisation in normalising relations between Moldova and Transnistria, through the participation in signing memoranda[28] and agreements[29] for strengthening the relations between the two powers based on the principles of common borders, as well as on economic, social, legal and common defence policies.

The preservation of world order is also among the main objectives of the *United Nations*, representing the largest forum for debate of global issues, given that it currently comprises 192 countries from all continents[30].

The *Charter of the United Nations*, signed in 1945, stated the role of this organisation in preventing armed conflicts, in observing fundamental human rights and principles of international law. The first chapter of the Charter regulates the purpose of the organisation, which, although does not have the powers of a world government,

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[26] For more details, see www.osce.org and www.mae.ro.

[27] For instance, in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova etc.

[28] On 8 May 1997, at the proposition of OSCE, a Memorandum was signed in Moscow that stipulated that the amed forces would no longer be used in the relation between sides.

[29] On 20 March 1998, in Odessa, in the presence of the head of the OSCE Mission, an agreement was signed stipulating the drastic reduction of the number of soldiers in the peacekeeping missions, the demilitarisation of the security area and the use of Ukrainian peacekeeping troops.

[30] Romania joined the UN in 1955.

functions as a centre of the nations reunited to achieve common objectives. Among the measures covered by the Charter, there are collective measures to prevent threats against peace and to suppress any act of aggression or other breaches of peace, to peacefully settle international disputes or situations that may endanger peace and to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The key role in achieving the goals of the UN belongs to the *Security Council*, whose missions have had a significant contribution to creating a lasting peace, especially after their reform, begun in 1999. Among the famous missions of the Council, we can mention the mission to support the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the engagement in negotiations to obtain the final status of Kosovo or the peacekeeping missions in Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, Haiti. The changes in the functioning of the Organisation have eventually led to the establishment of *political missions* to support the transition governments of some countries in difficulty, as in Afghanistan, about which the UN has expressed concern regarding the expansion of the phenomenon of terrorism and drug trafficking. Moreover, the *UN General Assembly* has among its powers, conferred by Art. 13 and 14 of the Charter, to promote cooperation in the political, economic, social and cultural field as well as to recommend measures for the settlement of any situation likely to harm friendly relations among states.

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In the second part of the article, the author will approach the states juridical and military aspects related to international security management.

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CURRENT MILESTONES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

Colonel Vasile MAIER

Expeditionary operations focus on two main challenges, which are of central importance on the Alliance agenda, both being essentially political in nature. The first challenge, as the author emphasises, is to acquire forces that are available, deployable and sustainable on a joint and multinational basis. This has an important military component, yet, in the end, it represents a political engagement, which makes it possible for these operations to materialise.

Moreover, it is necessary to maintain public support for the Alliance effort made in order to complete these operations, which take place a long distance from home. Thus, we must deal with an international security environment, which is a system of more complex systems – nations, groups, organisations, persons etc. These systems interact continuously, thus changing and evolving together in many ways, but they are never entirely predictable.

Keywords: *security environment; expeditionary operations; lessons learned; NATO standards and procedures; defence planning; sea basing*

Today, NATO operates in a complex security environment that is influenced, but not limited by numerous challenges, such as: transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, instability due to the failed or failing states, regional crises and conflicts including causes and effects, growing availability of sophisticated weaponry, misuse of emerging technologies and disruption in the flow of vital resources.

An expeditionary operation is defined as *"the projection of military power over extended lines of communications into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific objective"*. Apart from a three-line definition in *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions – AAP 6*, in 2007, there is no other documentation that conveys the different procedures, doctrine and capability development for expeditionary operations among the nations. People are very cautious with the term *expeditionary operation*. Numerous analysts prefer the terms *operation abroad, force projection*, so we also need a change of mindset in regard to the term. In our vision, expeditionary

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operations are the ones with: high tempo, extended duration, strategic distances, in difficult conditions with no host nation support.

Expeditionary operations bring together two main challenges which are very high on the Alliance's agenda, and both of them are essentially political. The first is the issue of making forces available, deployable and sustainable on a joint and multinational basis. That clearly has a very large military component but, ultimately, it is political commitment that enables that to happen. Secondly, there is the whole issue of maintaining public support for the Alliance effort for these operations far from home.

We have to deal with an international security environment that is a multilevel system of several complex adaptive systems – nations, groups, organisations, people etc. These systems continually interact and, in so doing, change and co-evolve in many never entirely predictable ways. Complex adaptive systems will display something called *emergent behaviour*. It suggests that our biggest challenge – and the one we find most difficult – is not the physical communication network but rather the one of adapting our new organisations to meet our complex needs.

In the last decade, there has been a need for a shared vision regarding expeditionary operations in NATO, and a need for common procedures, doctrine and capability development for expeditionary operations among NATO nations. This common shared vision for expeditionary operations in NATO could foster improved interoperability and cooperation among the member states and could also help non-NATO members in joining NATO operations.

Interoperability of thinking is crucial among NATO member and non-member states. In order to educate future leaders, a mental interoperability is needed to combine thoughts and get used to other cultures.

NATO operations will put a premium on future Alliance forces being expeditionary in character and design, enabling them to be employed wherever and whenever needed. These forces will need to be rapidly deployable and sustainable in austere environments, regardless of the required duration and tempo of operations. War fighting will remain the main ethos, but forces should be easily adaptable to other types of operations, in particular stabilisation and civil-military security operations. A demanding, yet probable environment for expeditionary operations is likely to include urban operations. One of the things in NATO that has been learned slowly is that NATO cannot put many troops on the ground and leave somebody else to do politics as if NATO were just a troop provider ! If NATO puts forces on the ground it has the right and even the duty to be involved in the political process.

The development of NATO expeditionary capabilities and the conduct of NATO's expeditionary operations will benefit from improved collaboration with the EU and the UN. The NATO-EU relation should be more constructive to improve information sharing and the possibility to find areas of common interest for development in order to optimise the use of existing national resources.

NATO has to stop duplicating the same capability programmes and put them together, with the same command structure, the same planning and the same headquarters, on the assumption that this *common basket of forces* can be used equally by both organisations. A common partition of capabilities, architecture, mapping and road map has to be identified. It is quite important to optimise, harmonise and synchronise NATO and national development activities. From a quantitative approach to warfare, NATO is increasingly moving toward a qualitative approach.

Nations have to use NATO STANAGs and NATO procedures in training their forces, in order to be able to be more effective when they rapidly get inserted in a NATO-led operation.

NATO and non-NATO members must share the best practices and lessons learned and embed those capabilities in their national culture. Some nations have a history in their background of being expeditionary. Those nations that have built their national security or security interests on protecting their borders, both from a public and a governmental perspective, have a much greater internal difficulty in convincing their citizens that this is how they ought to spend money and precious time. They also have difficulty in understanding and assimilating, from the military standpoint, the necessary capabilities that are required by expeditionary operations. Moreover, the largest constraint for most of expeditionary operations is the ability of headquarters to work together and the capacity of national forces to be assimilated into a NATO force that is in fact expeditionary. Improving NATO's expeditionary capabilities and enhancing the strategic communications skills go together and must be priorities for the Alliance.

There is a need for improving the relations between *defence planning* and *operational planning*. NATO's operational planning procedures have to reflect more truly the requirements of the comprehensive approach.

Planning for expeditionary operations either behind the spectrum, such as an initial entry operation, or towards the lower end, such as a disaster relief operation, must fully integrate the civil military dimension from the start. Article 5 is still important and NATO needs to be able to do both. The idea that the defence of own territory can be improved by taking action at long distances is not duplication nor is it a question of two distinguished tasks. Expeditionary operations

and expeditionary forces are today central to the Alliance. They are what makes NATO strong and relevant to the security challenges the international community is currently facing. They are in many ways the operational glue of partnerships. We consider there is an absolute priority to increase the readiness of forces, together with the NATO Response Forces and, in the future, of the deployable joint staff elements.

In response to the evolving security situation, the Allied Command Transformation has developed a *sea basing* concept. It develops the ability to deploy and sustain a tailored joint force package using a combination of amphibious platforms, strategic sealift and tactical airlift to effectively project force wherever needed. *Sea basing* provides the joint force commanders with vital command and control, fire support, and logistics from the sea, thereby minimising the vulnerability of assets ashore. Recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq have underlined the fact that the availability of land bases during conflicts may be uncertain owing to physical or political factors that delay, limit or prevent their use. In many future military situations, the assessment of the available degree of readiness and security of land bases is likely to be open to question, although one can argue that the Alliance operates from a sea base of sort today.

Expeditionary operations are as much about culture as they are about the preparedness of our forces and are aimed at all that involves training and procedures, as well as everything that has to with the material solution.

The most crucial element in the conduct of expeditionary operations is the state of mind. This can best be achieved through education and training. An expeditionary mindset implies the ability and versatility to adapt a broad variety of circumstances and respond effectively in a timely way.

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Military operations have shifted from an emphasis on quantitative characteristics of warfare (mass and volume) to a realisation that qualitative factors (timeliness, stealth, precision, sustainability, actions and effects) are increasingly important facets of modern operations. The crucial characteristic of expeditionary operations is therefore the use of properly prepared, trained, equipped and ready forces and their required support projected into a distant setting. This implies the establishment of land or sea forward bases from which the capabilities of an expeditionary force can be brought to bear. Once deployed, the Alliance must sustain these forces at long distance for as long as required.

Expeditionary operations should be considered in a large sense than mere deployment and entry. At the same time, being expeditionary involves much more than the logistics to rapidly deploy and sustain forces in austere environments

for long periods of time. The Alliance should possess a broad set of capabilities that project stability, support humanitarian efforts, dissuade adversaries, deter aggression and, if necessary, defeat an adversary across the full spectrum of conflict with timeliness, precision and flexibility. It is not a matter to decide if we need to develop expeditionary characteristics for our forces versus the capabilities to face Article 5 operations. NATO needs to be able to do both. As mentioned above, it is not a question of two distinguished tasks, but more the idea that the defence of our territory can be improved by taking action at long distance.

In the maritime dimension of expeditionary operations, *sea basing* is one of the components that enable effective and quick response and with a gradual range of solutions to crisis. *Sea basing* must address not only the logistics issues of developing forces, but also the exploitation of all the opportunities offered by waters and the ability to deploy and use capabilities far from home. The concept provides the possibility to exercise command and control and/or the projection of military capabilities from sea born platforms. The effect of *sea basing* can be political and strategic. *Sea basing* can support tactical developments ashore, provide a forward print in joint operations and improve the reaction time and the effectiveness when countering threats.

THE PSYOPS & CIMIC BINOMIAL IN OPERATIONS (II)

Colonel Dr Florentin UDREA
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PSYOPS capabilities are effectively and efficiently used in order to gain the support from the civil population for CIMIC activities. For the most part, the successes achieved by CIMIC provide numerous topics to be capitalised on and valued by PSYOPS through the production and distribution of printed and audio-visual products. In the authors' opinion, the themes and messages of PSYOPS need real arguments, which are provided by CIMIC, in order to support the legitimacy of the intervention force and the local population's confidence in the military, also leading to favourable opinions and motivating cooperative attitude among the members of the audience groups.

Thus, PSYOPS assists the establishment of a permissive environment for the development of CIMIC activities and the fulfilment of missions' general objectives. Throughout the operational planning process and during the actual operation, the permanent, reciprocally advantageous coordination between CIMIC and PSYOPS activities is required.

Keywords: *audience groups; PSYOPS activities; crisis response operations; intervention forces; linguistic support*

At the national level, the *Romanian Psychological Operations Doctrine SMG – FOP 3.16* considers the necessity of developing a *"synergic approach"* to *PSYOPS* and *CIMIC* activities, their harmonisation and synchronisation at the commander's level, in accordance with the concept of information operations. The Romanian *Psychological Operations* doctrine acknowledges the favourable and decisive impact the *Civil-Military Cooperation* projects may have by influencing the population, and explicitly specifies the fact PSYOPS and CIMIC *"must support each other and coordinate own actions, at the same time, preserving own functional identity and specific missions"*[1]. The Romanian PSYOPS doctrine states in detail the benefits resulted from the well-coordinated action of PSYOPS and CIMIC, which work closely as a binomial, on the basis of the permanent exchange of relevant data regarding the situation in the area of operations. All levels – brigade, division, corps, and theatre – PSYOPS *Support Elements* must promote the importance, results and achievements of CIMIC among target audiences, thus increasing the credibility and impact

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[1] *Doctrina operaţiilor psihologice SMG – FOP 3.16*, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 19.

of PSYOPS messages. At the same time, CIMIC demands PSYOPS expertise when it needs to develop any kind of products (school supplies, objects for domestic use etc.). Because of the direct contact with the local population, particular CIMIC activities, such as human assistance, provide an optimal background for PSYOPS dissemination. This includes not only the delivery of "classical" PSYOPS products, printed and audio-visual ones but also novelty items and useful presents, without forgetting the direct, face-to-face, communication, as well as the personalised messages by means of modern technologies – internet, e-mail, pager, fax, phone and sms, simultaneously and/or alternatively with contracted media services in the area of operations.

The Romanian *Psychological Operations Field Manual SMG/FOP-3.14* specifies that the coordination between PSYOPS and CIMIC *"essentially implies that a guarantee for conveying convergent messages towards selected target audiences is given"*[2]. This field manual explicitly describes the relationships between PSYOPS and CIMIC, elaborates on the necessity of improved cooperation with a view to performing convergent influence activities directed towards local population in order to promote the legitimacy of the intervention force and to increase the acceptance of the military presence in particular areas. This coordination is based on the regular exchange of information between the PSYOPS and CIMIC specialists regarding the social-political, humanitarian, cultural, administrative etc. situation in the area of operations. Moreover, PSYOPS products, the messages and symbols used must be compatible with CIMIC objectives. At the same time, PSYOPS structures, through the products they create and disseminate, highlight the CIMIC activities carried for the benefit of the population in the area of operations. The handbook notices the fact that *"the PSYOPS domain and the CIMIC domain support each other in fulfilling own missions, for the benefit of carrying out own and common objectives"*[3]. For instance, in the areas affected by crisis, the members of the audience groups often need medical assistance and material help. The CIMIC personnel, being in permanent contact with the local population, has available pertinent and useful information for the analyses made on the audience groups by PSYOPS specialists. Actually, PSYOPS does not plan a new programme before it resorts to CIMIC expertise. The existence of a real esprit de corps, the permanent consultation between specialists transform the binomial into an effective instrument made available to the commander. Experience shows that it is only through working

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[2] *Manualul pentru operații psihologice SMG/FOP-3.14*, București, 2004, p. 27.
[3] *Ibidem*, p. 134.

together that enduring results can be attained, CIMIC experts providing a qualitative assistance in planning PSYOPS programmes and PSYOPS specialists decisively contributing to the promotion of CIMIC achievements.

❖ *CIMIC Perspectives on PSYOPS*

The reference documents *MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)*, *AJP-9 NATO CIMIC*, together with *NATO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide (FPG)* describe the purpose, organisation, command and control principles and regulations that lie at the basis of planning and developing CIMIC activities, as well as the tactics, techniques and procedures used during the interaction with the authorities in the host nation, the civil population in the area of operations, the international and non-governmental agencies and organisations. Given that CIMIC can be used in collective defence (Article 5), as well as in crisis response operations, the above-mentioned documents recommend the commanders to carefully consider the social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors throughout the operational planning process of the operation per se. The broad range of CIMIC activities is influenced by the nature of the operation, more reduced in the case of combat actions and more complex in the case of crisis response operations. In both situations, the CIMIC role in the effort of *"shaping"* the situation in the area of operations and the need for the action to be coordinated with the PSYOPS to promote the mandate, legitimacy and the objectives of the intervention force are acknowledged. CIMIC and PSYOPS activities, established during the operation planning process and included in the *operation plan (OPLAN)* are harmonised with the information strategy and the conception of information operations in order to actually contribute to the improvement of the relations with the authorities and local communities.

The effectiveness of the PSYOPS & CIMIC binomial depends on the quality of the information regarding the operational environment, the available resources, the quality of the linguistic support, the level of training, the motivation and involvement of the military personnel who work together with and for the members of local communities in the area of operations.

At the national level, the *Doctrine for the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) SMG/PF – 5.2* acknowledges the fact that the CIMIC can be applied in the entire spectrum of crisis response operations, for developing efficient relations with a wide range of civil organisations, ethnic groups, local authorities, governmental agencies, being able to contribute to settling the conflict situation, to restoring order and to successfully developing reconstruction and development projects.

As a force multiplier, contributing to the creation and preservation of the conditions that support the achievement of the objectives of the intervention force, which are circumscribed to the military operation per se, CIMIC activities naturally merge with the other support activities, first of all, with the ones carried out by PSYOPS. CIMIC specialists understand the need for capitalising on and maximising the positive impact of own activities on local population through presenting them within PSYOPS programmes. In fact, the Romanian doctrine mentions the need for developing *"the cooperation with the structures of psychological operations ... for planning and carrying out information campaigns"*[4].

CIMIC activities take place based on a series of principles, among which there is the *principle of communication*, which proposes ways of optimising the relations with civil agencies, local authorities, international and non-governmental organisations, local population etc., through efficient communication, which is vital to consensus and cooperation. Optimising communication entails the planned engagement of PSYOPS and information and public relations structures. The access of PSYOPS personnel to CIMIC databases regarding the needs of the local population, the state of the infrastructure, the humanitarian, medical situation, public safety and order, economy, education and research, culture, environment protection etc. is essential in order to optimise communications and provides PSYOPS messages with topicality and credibility.

The PSYOPS & CIMIC Binomial and Public Information

The CIMIC activities being presented in the international, national and local media have a great impact on the population in the area of operations. The information and public relations structures address the public opinion, they are exclusively focused on informing the domestic and international audiences, which also include the audience groups selected by PSYOPS and the communities for whose benefit CIMIC projects take place.

The various audiences and broadcast channels, as well as the need for respecting the principle of the single voice require the correlation of information and public relations activities with the ones that are specific to information operations, in order to properly reflect the actions of the PSYOPS & CIMIC binomial, providing the dissemination of coordinated, unitary messages for own and common audiences.

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[4] *Doctrina pentru cooperarea civili-militari (CIMIC) SMG/PF-5.2*, București, 2005, p. 62, pct. f.

Effective information of the public opinion increases the freedom of action of the commander and supports the activity of the PSYOPS & CIMIC binomial, however, it requires constant efforts in order to protect the credibility of spokespersons, as sources of information and trust that are useful and timely and are placed at the mass media's disposal.

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Successfully fulfilling the objectives of own operations is conditioned by accepting the presence, acknowledging the legitimacy and obtaining the support for international forces from the population in the country and in the region where the intervention takes place. Therefore, promoting the image of the force, its mandate, legitimacy and impartiality must be among the phases of the operational planning process, being necessarily translated into rules of engagement, rules of conduct for the military personnel, concrete missions and objectives for the units of the force. Unquestionably, it is necessary for a positive perception to be promoted among the locals regarding the presence and activity of the military men belonging to the intervention forces, which should represent a permanent aspect among the preoccupations of all commanders, no matter the echelon they are part of.

Usually, commanders acknowledge the value of positive public perception on the presence, legitimacy and activity of multinational forces in a theatre of operations, resulted following the interaction with the representatives of the host nation government, opinion-makers, politicians, diplomats, journalists, staff of international and non-governmental organisations and last but not least with the population, the local administration and the religious leaders in the area of operations. Thus, gaining the support of the local population is essential, as well as developing the cooperation with the authorities in the host nation in order to implement interesting projects for local communities. The provision of emergency assistance (food, clothing, medicines etc.), the building or rehabilitation of schools or hospitals, drinking water sources, the development of roads and bridges network, of agricultural and industrial productions capacities must be among the objectives of the mission of the intervention force, which means that the operation planning process, that takes place at the same time in various echelons, must consider the optimal ways through which the military intervention must be preceded, accompanied and followed by activities of civil agencies, integrated with the ones of the force multipliers, whose action is aimed at optimising the assistance provided to the local population and the host nation's government. This approach enables the fulfilment of the mission of the intervention force, its direct benefit consisting

in strengthening the positive perception of the presence and activity of military men among the population in the area of operations.

As far as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations are concerned, as well as in order to reduce interethnic tensions, certain political, information-educational, social, economic and reconciliation programmes must be implemented and this entails the use of the PSYOPS & CIMIC binomial. In the medium and long run, this approach has generated positive effects that are bigger than the ones of the military operations as such and contribute to the elimination of the profound causes of the conflict, reducing the recruitment base of insurgency and the support given to terrorist groups. Consequently, in a crisis situation, even if the main mission of the force is to provide a safe and stable environment, the military men have a duty to assume a leading role in the effort to restore public services and infrastructure, especially when the governmental/non-governmental organisations and humanitarian agencies are not capable of or do not have the possibility to operate in that environment.

The activities of the PSYOPS & CIMIC binomial and the necessary resources, including for granting humanitarian assistance to the population in the area of operations, must be considered throughout the operational planning process, integrated in the operation plan (OPLAN) and included in the information operations plan and reconsider whenever the plans are modified. Within workgroups for information operations, at all levels, a rigorous coordination between Psychological Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation is achieved in order to provide the consistence and concordance between the PSYOPS messages and the CIMIC activities, a clear way to increase effectiveness and credibility of PSYOPS programmes, to promote the results obtained by CIMIC in implementing stabilisation, reconstruction and development programmes to the benefit of local communities. Thus, there are ensured the increase in the liberty of manoeuvre in the information environment, the protection of data and information used by military decision-makers, the quality of own decision-making process, simultaneously, the quality and accuracy of enemy decision-makers being influenced.

During the information operations, the action of the PSYOPS & CIMIC binomial enables the protection of the credibility of the intervention force, the establishment and development of the direct relation with the local population, with beneficial effects for the promotion, understanding and acknowledgement of its legitimacy by the local population. The action of the binomial supports the communication objectives of the force, adds the importance of the facts to the themes and messages disseminated by psychological operations, information and public relations structures,

as well as during the activities of engagement of the main leaders from the host nation, developed at the national, regional and local level by the commanders at different echelons. Moreover, this binomial proves to be an important instrument for communication with the local population. Through a correlated action, for the benefit of the population in the area of operations, through granting humanitarian assistance and through contributing to correct and timely information of the population, the PSYOPS & CIMIC binomial enables the fulfilment of the mandate of the intervention force, counters the effects of the hostile influence and disinformation, discourages the enemy actions, reduces the recruitment and support base of the insurgency and terrorist groups.

From the doctrinal point of view, even if there are some autonomous functional domains, with distinct roles and functions, Psychological Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation have the ability to establish, through a conjugated and continuous effort, an effective correspondence between the objectives declared by the intervention force, respectively between the themes and messages addressed to the domestic and international audiences and the activities on the ground, between what the military men say and what they do, between words and deeds.

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POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF JOINT AIR POWER

Colonel Dr Mihai ŞTIR

Post-conflict operations, by military or other means, represent an extremely important research domain, which has not yet been thoroughly explored. This article is aimed at discussing the current global security environment influence on the new political and military strategic objectives. Furthermore, the article addresses the topic of post-conflict activities by delineating their position inside the major joint operation structure.

The role of airpower in the conflict stabilisation phase is to assist the consolidation of the strategic objectives of initial combat operations. Usually, airpower stabilisation operations begin through the threat of air combat actions, even after the official end of military operations, the stress shifting progressively to activities in support of civil authorities as soon as the threat decreases.

Finally, the types of military post-conflict operations are listed and the airpower contribution in the stabilisation and reconstruction phase of campaign is briefly analysed.

Keywords: *security environment; armed confrontations; strategic objectives; globalisation; post-conflict operations*

After more than six years of military operations in Iraq, the coalition multinational forces are still present there. Although the city of Baghdad was conquered in the spring of 2003 and the former political and military leadership does not exist anymore, the confrontation is not over. The situation in Afghanistan is rather similar, despite the fact that a similar multinational force is trying hard to bring security and stability to a country that has been blighted by conflict for decades.

Post-conflict operations, by military or other means, represent an extremely important research domain that has not yet been thoroughly explored. This article aims to discuss the influence of the current global security environment on the new political and military strategic objectives. Furthermore, the paper addresses the topic of post-conflict activities by delineating their position within the major joint operation structure. Finally, the types of military post-conflict operations are listed and the air power contribution in the stabilisation and reconstruction phase of the campaign is briefly analysed.

It has become obvious, especially in the latest few years, that post-conflict operations have gained

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strategic importance. This is particularly true when, often because of the overwhelming technological advantages of one combatant, the conflict phase is complete within a relatively short period of time. The post-conflict sector has now become a major part of the architecture of modern warfare, while asymmetric warfare has completely transformed the geometry of modern conflict. Conflicts can now seem indefinite and more violent and modern forces face new extraordinary challenges.

At the same time, it could be said that air power does not have too much to say in the post-conflict period. However, the realities of the ongoing conflict in Iraq and the way in which events are evolving in Afghanistan prove the contrary and it has become obvious that air power still has an important role to play during the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts following the effective military confrontation.

The Current Security Environment

In the '60s, some elements of international terrorism might have been supported, ideologically and logistically, by the Soviet Union and a few other communist states. This support evaporated sometime in late '80s and, in the '90s, terrorist groups found their motivation in the ideological-religious sphere.

Yet, some doctrinaire similarities, generated perhaps by the long collaboration, have endured. Lenin dreamt, much like Osama Bin Laden nowadays, of monopolising a part of the world and of creating an alternative universe where *Western* rules would not apply.

The attitude of the democratic world has changed and we have been witnessing the evolution of a new international security environment. In this new configuration, the world of finance and the national security of the international community members are closely intertwined. The study of globalisation explains the mechanisms that generate the current phenomena in global security, with the 9/11 events as a catalyst. The map of the major US military operations between 1990 and 2003 *(figure 1)*, released by the American analyst Thomas P. M. Barnett in 2004[1], provides a compelling argument in support of this approach. The chart shows the way in which the locations of conflicts coincide with the *"disconnected"*[2] states area and also reveals that the most violent confrontations take place at the border between them and the rest of the world.

Hence today's major threat to global security is not a religion (e.g. Islam) or a place (e.g. the Middle East) but this border between the *"two worlds"* and the resistance towards the Western rules of war and peace.

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[1] Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map – War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century*, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 2004.
[2] Thomas P.M. Barnett calls *"disconnected"* the states that do not comply with the rules of the globalisation process.

Figure 1: **The Map of the Major US Operations (1990-2003)**

* *"The maps on these pages show all United States military responses to global crises form 1990 to 2002. Notice that a pattern emerges. Any time American troops show up – be it combat, a battle group pulling up off the coast as a reminder, or a peacekeeping mission – it tends to be in a place that is relatively disconnected from the world, where globalisation has not taken root because of a repressive regime, abject poverty, or the lack of a robust legal system. It is these places that incubate global terrorism. Draw a line around these military engagements and you have got what I call the Non-integrating Gap. Everything else is the Functioning Core. The goal of this new strategy is simple: Shrink the Gap. Do not contain it, shrink it !"* (Thomas P. M. Barnett).

The New Strategic Security Objectives

Complete globalisation would at least theoretically leave the terrorists without a perspective. Just like Lenin, Osama Bin Laden has chosen to manifest his brand of terrorism from a *"disconnected"* state (in this case, Afghanistan), as a way of developing and exporting his own doctrine. On 12 September 2001, the world began to realise how fragile and fragmented the global security environment had become.

In this context, the strategic political and military objectives have evolved from a new theory of war based on the characteristics of the information era, from the new relationship between multinational expeditionary operations and national security objectives to a new perception on the part of the citizens regarding the notion of security.

Easy access to high performance IT products, at relatively low costs, has already opened for many people the way towards key operational domains like space, deep seas and cyberspace. This and other technologies on the market have generated new technological threats and, consequently, world security priorities need to change.

The transformation of the current security environment follows the same evolution as the globalisation process, shifting from a containment attitude to more connectedness. Furthermore, true globalisation means that all things are connected and, in this market mechanisms-based system, the main product exported by failed states is terrorism.

Therefore, increased globalisation suggests that a security policy based on containment will no longer work. *Figure 2*[3] depicts the evolution of the strategic imperatives in the last decades, from the period of group arrangements (between 1945-1980, known also as *globalisation II phase*) to the connectivity relations-based period, after 1980, when security began to mean something more than defence *(globalisation III phase)*.


Figure 2

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[3] Diagram taken from the presentation *Transforming National Security – The Logic, The Dynamic, The Opportunity*, delivered by Terry J. Pudas, Deputy Assit. Secretary of Defense Forces Transformation & Resource, at *The C2 Conference of NATO C2 COE*, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 30 May 2007, slide 7.

Post-Conflict Operations

In line with this evolution, the structure of conflict priorities has also changed. The challenges generated by terrorism, failing states and weapons proliferation have shown the necessity for nation building operations, also called *stabilisation and reconstruction operations*.

The violence and instability that follow the official end of a conflict can pose new, substantial and extreme challenges for the international community. The failure of the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 had long-term consequences. It created a power and security vacuum that offered a sanctuary for the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda. In Iraq, a lack of attention before the conflict to the post-conflict requirements – or the wrong rationale regarding them – left the US and allied forces poorly equipped for public security, governance and economic missions immediately after the armed conflict. This led to the coalition's key foreign policy objectives to be undermined and offered the initial impulse for insurgency.

Stabilisation and reconstruction operations are post-conflict activities. They are vital, despite the fact that they occupy an uncomfortable place between fighting a conventional war and offering assistance for development. These operations require a combination of abilities and skills for the forces involved in stabilising public security and the rule of law, in order to facilitate the political transition, infrastructure reconstruction and economic restoration.

Stabilisation and reconstruction missions have to be performed in tougher environments, often hostile ones, taking into account the conditions in which normal development assistance programmes are conducted. The forces have only a very brief opportunity to generate results and to convince the local population about the benefits of peace. The transition from intense combat operations to conflict termination and then to the transfer of control to the civil authorities must be considered as part of the initial campaign/major joint operation planning.

Major joint operations are both demanding and complex and studying their structure delineates the post-conflict operations. According to *US doctrine for Joint Operations – J.P. 3.0*, released in September 2006[4], a campaign/major operation has six phases *(figure 3)*. This document clearly shows the phases of a conflict and the functional balance between offensive, defensive and stability operations in each phase.

The first two phases belong to the conflict preparation, the next two to the combat part and the last two delimitate the post-conflict period. However, stability operations

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[4] DDOD Joint Publication 3.0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006, Chap. V.

– which represent the military contribution to governmental stabilisation and reconstruction efforts – have a feature that is characteristic of all six phases. They are indispensable to the overall success of the campaign.

But What Represents a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Operation ?

Stabilisation, according to NATO MCM-0048, April 2005, describes the process of the effective transition from an immediate

Figure 3: **The Phases of a Major Joint Operation**

response to a current insecure situation towards a long-term development and implies the political, economic and social long-term contribution of the local population. Stabilisation is often associated with reconstruction and is part of the governmental plans to terminate a conflict.

In other words, stabilisation and reconstruction governmental efforts, performed predominantly in the post-conflict period of a confrontation, are supported by military stability and support operations. The types of stability operations and their subordinate forms are listed in *figure 4*, as identified by the *US Army FM 3-07 (FM 100-20) Stability Operations and Support Operations,* February 2003.

The support operations (Domestic Support Operations and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance[5]) normally have the same function as the stability operations, some sources[6] even considering support operations as the eleventh category of stability operations.

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[5] U.S. Army FM 3-07 (FM 100-20) *Stability Operations and Support Operations,* February 2003, pp. 1-6.
[6] SMG/P.F.-3 *Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Bucharest, 2003, section 5, p. 23.

Types of Military Operations	Offence	Defence	Stability	Support

Types of Stability Operations and Their Subordinate Forms	**Peace Operations**
	  • Peacekeeping • Peace Enforcement
	    • Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts
	Foreign Internal Defence
	  • Indirect Support • Direct Support
	      • Combat Operations
	Security Assistance
	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
	Support to Insurgencies
	  • Unconventional Warfare • Conventional Combat Actions
	Support to Counterdrug Operations
	  • Detection and Monitoring
	  • Host-Nation Support
	  • C4
	  • Intelligence, Planning, CSS, Training and Manpower Support
	  • Reconnaissance
	Combating Terrorism
	  • Antiterrorism
	  • Counterterrorism
	Noncombatant (*or Combatant* - A.N.) **Evacuation Operations**
	Arms Control
	  • Inspection • Protection
	        • Destruction
	Show of Force
	  • Increased Force Visibility • Exercises and Demonstrations			

Figure 4: **Types of Stability Operations**

Air Power in Post-Conflict Operations

The Joint Air Operations required by the post-conflict phase of the campaign are mainly performed by airmen/airwomen belonging to all armed forces services. In the joint environment and in close coordination with the campaign's stabilisation and reconstruction plan, air power will conduct both combat and combat support missions.

The role of air power in the stabilisation phase of a conflict is to assist in the consolidation of the strategic objectives of the initial combat operations. Usually, air power stabilisation operations start with the threat of combat air action, even after the official cease of other military actions, the stress shifting then progressively, once the threat decreases, towards activities in support of civil authorities. The most present joint air operations in this context are air interdiction, suppression of enemy air defence and close air support for other friendly forces in the combat area. As the general situation improves,

air power will be used in support of host nation authorities, governmental, non-governmental and international organisations by conducting air surveillance, air policing, VIP transport, MEDEVAC and cargo missions.

Depending on the threat level, low intensity air operations can be initiated immediately after combat operations have ceased, and may include humanitarian aid transport flights and security assistance ones with fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

Through its specific missions, air power can support political and military efforts for stabilisation and reconstruction and strengthen the legitimacy of civil authorities, contribute to the reconstruction of governmental institutions, promote the spirit of confidence and normality among the civilian population and support the resumption of economic activity. However, these actions will need to be coordinated with the efforts of other actors operating in the same area.

The stabilisation phase in a campaign may be of short duration, but sometimes years can pass before the civil authority consolidation phase begins. For this reason, the key for success will be endurance, determination and perseverance in following the strategic objectives. In the final post-conflict phase of a campaign – the civil authority consolidation phase –, the joint operation is normally finished, its strategic objectives have been accomplished and the joint combat force has been redeployed.

Air power elements, which are often some of the first units to be deployed in a joint operation, may be the last ones withdrawn from it.

*

Stabilisation and reconstruction operations incorporate military and civilian activities from the broad spectrum of a conflict. Various agencies and institutions will play different roles in different stages of the transition. Initially, the military will have the leading role in providing the required level of security. As the level of security improves, civil agencies and institutions begin to take the lead, although close collaboration between the military and civil structures is essential for success. Usually, the military contribution is represented by the stability operations.

The use of air power in post-conflict operations must be part of the operations plan. During stability operations and actions for consolidation of civil authority, air power will rarely operate independently, but it will be used in collaboration with other actors in the theatre of operations.

AIR TRAFFIC AT A STALEMATE ?

Colonel Relu PANAIT

Not only has the number of airspace users increased significantly in the latest decades, but also the requirements of using the airspace have significantly changed as well and new parameters have been established, which increase the complexity of flights and improve their security and safety.

The air traffic management system covers an impressive range of regulations, operating procedures, services and infrastructure all forming the so-called operational concept, which establishes the way in which air transport operations take place, taking into consideration the resources, roles and responsibilities of the parties involved. This system has continuously developed since 1944, enhancing its procedures and regulations in accordance with the available technological advance, reaching safety and security levels that are envied by any other transport system.

However, as civilisation has evolved, other parameters have emerged and they should be taken into account: efficiency, environmental protection, system capacity; the flexibility to enable other users to use airspace and the increase in flight safety for personal aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – UAVs, ground-air missiles for weather protection etc.

Keywords: *airspace management; aeronautics; transport system; operational concept; air transport*

Air transport has aroused considerable interest ever since its emergence. Because of the technological conditions, certain clear and precise rules have been required since the beginning, in regard to airspace flights, as well as a rigorous organisation in this respect. Throughout time, these rules have improved, technology has led to the creation of state-of-the-art instruments in order to control airspace management and air traffic, yet, a stalemate has been reached. Even if the aircraft have reached some complexity levels that have never been imagined, ground technology has evolved at a slower pace, as compared to them.

A period of research and technological improvements has followed, with great contributions to the increase in the performance of the systems that take part in air traffic and airspace management. To establishing the parameters that are involved in defining an effective system, one may add: economic efficiency, ecological elements, system's capacity, as well as other factors. Even if it is not clear whether the human element is the one that slows down or contributes to slowing down the reactions on the ground of an effective system, we are still at a time when decisions are made

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by humans and not by machines. It will probably take a while until the projects that are aimed at a gradual approach to air traffic management by effective computers, which take into account the flight elements of aircraft and establish the order of flights based on well-determined criteria, are viable. For the time being, the human element is decisive in air traffic and airspace management and efforts are made in order to improve the performance of the operational concept of this type of management.

Each country's airspace is precisely divided between the four dimensions: length, width, height and time, and the previous distances and limitations on flight corridors, areas serving various purposes or airport terminals have begun to be thoroughly established so that each user could reach its objectives equally.

The keyword in the phrase above is *each*. Each user, each country … Meaning, in time, each country, each user, depending on the requirements and the historical period, has reached its objectives. And we are today in a situation in which the military and civil aircraft companies have more and more difficulties in *"dividing"* the airspace.

Moreover, other users have emerged, such as weather missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles – UAVs, balloons, private aircraft etc. and furthermore: intercontinental competition has occurred !

Each country has created its own air traffic and airspace management system, which is used by each user. Meanwhile, the sky of each country has become its airspace, in which each user has provided various services, established various rules and used aircraft with various technical and avionics requirements. The lack of cooperation has led to a certain lack of coordination between users and, at the regional and continental level, it has also triggered disproportionate differences between countries. Imagine that, just as the ground is seen from the airspace, with a series of plots of various sizes and dimensions, so the airspace looks like, only in this case the differences are three-dimensional and they can be seen only on the screens of the computers that are provided with data from the ground or air radiolocators.

This stalemate had to be broken. In this respect, the flexible use of airspace by all users has been decided. Moreover, a general conclusion has been reached: we have only one sky ! And it should be used by all of us, following similar rules and using the same standards.

The *Single European Sky – SES* is a European project; the Americans have a similar one *Next Generation – NEXTGEN*, whose objective is the adoption of common rules and standards for the classification of airspace, the design of routes and sectors within it, the management of air traffic flow and the establishment

of flexible ways of using airspace. There is also used a common system for the certification of providers of communications, navigation and surveillance (CNS) services, as well as weather equipment and aeronautical information services.

The financial, operational and technical capabilities of navigation services providers will be agreed upon by the countries that take part in the project, because the providers will operate transnationally. Through the establishment of these rules and standards, as well as through the achievement of the technological component of SES, known as *SESAR*, air traffic and airspace management will become modern at the European level, being expected to develop at the international level, together with NEXTGEN, which seeks to achieve the same performance.

What must be done ? First of all, one must make sure that there is coordination between the efforts of those in charge of the transition to *"tomorrow's"* air traffic and airspace management, in order not to waste effort or enthusiasm on divergent directions. The convergence of various initiatives must lead to the implementation of certain technical definitions in support of the global operations of airspace users. Then, one must seek to improve aircraft capabilities, airspace use and air traffic management procedures, both for developing an unmatched transport system, namely the air one, and for reaching the objectives regarding national security and regional and world safety.

The fragmentation of infrastructure, of airspace over countries and continents, of control over the users of this space does not benefit anyone, but brings about only losses that become insurmountable in time.

Although it sounds futuristic, we consider that the world aviation community must reach an agreement on a plan to meet the requirements of all users worldwide. It is therefore vital that each nation should participate in these projects and initiatives ever since the beginning, combining efforts to achieve the common goal of safety and security of flights in the airspace.

English version by
✎ Iulia NĂSTASIE

THE ROLE AND UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE IN ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN THE 21st CENTURY

Colonel Daniel PETRESCU

This article presents some considerations regarding the role and utility of military force as an instrument of power politics. In this respect, the article analyses some opinions of academics and military thinkers on this matter, as well as findings from the author's experience.

The conclusion is that even though asymmetry seems to be in the ascendant today, the role of the state will continue to influence the utility of military force in this century.

However, it has to be considered that military force alone cannot be a solution and all the instruments of a state should be involved in achieving the political goals, within a comprehensive approach. As far as the Romanian military is concerned, emphasising its role among other instruments of the state power could lead to better awareness about its needs and better access to the necessary resources for its transformation.

Keywords: enemy defeat; the Cold War; military force; international relations; armament control

In the circumstances of the evolution of the international environment in the last two decades and in the perspective of what one can anticipate for this century, a discussion on the role and utility of military force is instrumental not only for the military body but also for the clarification of certain theoretical aspects in the field of international relations.

In the contemporary debate of ideas, Karl von Clausewitz's dictum – *"all wars have the same nature"* – is used by some theorists to prove why resorting to history is relevant in researching the future. Thucydides' assertion, according to which *"fear, honour and interest"* are the immutable reasons that determine the warlike collective behaviour, does nothing else but to consolidate the belief according to which history repeats itself cyclically, although irregularly[1]. However, the danger of wrongly using the lessons of past actions will always be present, because classical military history and theory cannot be asked to predict the future, a fact that is beyond the powers of the most brilliant intellectual systematisation.

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[1] Colin Gray, *Future Warfare: Or, The Triumph of History*, in *RUSI Journal*, October 2005; ProQuest Military module, p. 16.

In Sun Tzu and Clasewitz' works, war is presented as a violent confrontation between states, taking place using armed forces. Its main goal is to defeat the enemies, usually through annihilating their will to resist and eliminating their combat means or through creating the perception that resistance is futile.

After the end of the *Cold War* and after surpassing the threat of the ideological enemy, the studies regarding the causes and consequences of war have tried to configure new military involvement scenarios. The most radical ones are totally contradictory: *"War no longer exists"*[2], wrote the British General Rupert Smith. At the same time, we find out that the *"United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war"*[3] – as proclaimed in a report from 2006 of the US Department of Defense (2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report). The same world generates different visions: from the one devided by ideology – the world of the *Cold War* – to the one characterised by the conflict between civilisations – Huntington's[4] perspective or the one devastated by the challenges of the 21st century[5].

An analysis of the current debate on war and military force outlines two different types of opinions: *a first direction* is the one of the authors who believe that the nature of war has not changed in essence and the old principles are just as relevant in the era of asymmetry, while the *second orientation* pleads for major changes, a real *Revolution in Military Affairs – RMA*.

Sharing a realist vision on the role of the force in international relations, the representatives of the first tendency (among whom Tarak Barkawi and Colin Gray) plead for maintaining the same vision on the role and utility of armed forces as instruments for the continuation of national policies.

Professor Colin Gray, in a pure Clausewitzian tradition, reckons that the 21st century will be *"another bloody century"*, because: war will always be present; war cannot be controlled through the international law, ethics, disarmament or weapons control, export of democracy, creation of big institutions, but through cost, policy, strategy, force balance, fear and culture; the nature of war does not change: it is given by the trinity passion, chance/probability and reason, in the context of a climate of danger, incertitude and frictions; war takes many shapes, sometimes within the same conflict[6]. In general, it is *regular* and *irregular*.

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[2] *Ibid*, p. 1.

[3] *National Security Strategy of the USA*, September 2002, p. 5 (online), http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/docs/Relevant%20Docs/national_security_strategy.pdf.

[4] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996.

[5] *Global Trends 2025. A Transformed World*, study of US National Intelligence Council (online), http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf.

[6] Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 3.

Currently, the irregular part has gained ascendancy, with the terrorism and insurgency attracting the attention of the international debate. However, even if this privileged place of the irregular enemy or of the enemy driven by the need for using asymmetric methods persists, it will not have the capacity to become characteristic for the 21st century, because of the unchanging nature of international relations.

The same author believes that the September 11 attacks do not reflect an essential change in the nature of war, considering that terror is as old as war. Throughout history, terrorist organisations have threatened many states and regimes.

In relation to the Kantian ideas regarding perpetual peace – which lay at the basis of the way in which liberal theorists articulated *"modernity without violence"* – or Fukuyama's ideas in *"The End of History"*, Barkawi argues that *"war is repositioned here as an inherent aspect of economic globalisation rather than as something that will disappear from history because of globalisation"*[7].

The second group of authors, represented by Rupert Smith and Martin van Creveld, reckons that the nature of war has changed and war has become a *"war among the people"*, defined by six major features:
- *the ends for which we fight are changing;*
- *we fight among the people;*
- *our conflicts tend to be timeless;*
- *we fight so as not to lose the force and we do not use weapons in order to achieve the aim at any cost;*
- *on each occasion, new uses are found for old weapons;*
- *the sides in conflict are mostly non-state actors*[8].

Martin van Creveld is more trenchant and estimates that the role of the state will be soon taken over by *"... organisations of various types that will wage wars"*[9]. (...) *"The attempt of states to monopolise violence in their own hands has failed ... If the current trends will go on, then that type of war that is based on the division between the government, the military and the people seems to be running short"*[10].

Each of the mentioned authors provides pertinent and convincing arguments. At strategic level, each approach can be supported and eventually substantiate an option or another regarding the transformation of the military body. However, we believe that a more thorough analysis of recent conflicts points out a few specific elements.

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[7] *Ibid*, p. 24.
[8] *Ibid*, p. 17.
[9] Martin van Cleveld, *On Future War*, Brassey's, the UK, 1991, p. 192.
[10] *Ibid*.

First of all, the distinction between winner and loser has disappeared, at least as far as advanced states with thermonuclear capabilities are concerned, which are able to destroy the enemy even after its own society is devastated. The physical risk on one's own territory has changed from military reprisals or the danger of mass destruction to the more subtle means of the terrorist attack.

The second revolution refers to weapon systems. The current change in lethality and precision marks a profound difference from the past. One must not ignore the fact that not all armed forces have access to the same degree of lethality and precision, the resort to military technology being subject to political, foreign, as well as economic, internal restrictions.

And, finally, after September 11 and the declaration of *Global War on Terrorism – GWOT*, the military conflict does not take place between organised and legitimate states anymore, which observe an agreed set of international norms and laws. A new adversary is rising, an equivalent of the state, but not having the same level of authority, legitimacy or definition, which makes the perception of the danger to be today perhaps bigger than anytime in history. The Western society is vulnerable, and enemies exploit this vulnerability. The way in which states, in the current Westphalian form, can deal with the danger coming from non-state actors is questioned. The fact that the enemy hides behind certain profound religious precepts triggers constitutional issues in the target countries regarding the way in which this combination of radical Islamism and political ambition, in which terror is the central tactic, can be combated without affecting the own system of notions regarding governance and individual freedom[11].

Yet, beyond any consideration, the analysis regarding the role and utility of military force as an instrument of international politics must take into account the role of state and its military power in a globalised world, in interdependency with the general perception of the population on security. We believe that the changes in the nature of war that are presented in this article do not allow for a certain conclusion to be drawn, namely that the use of armed power will not be an attribute of states in the 21st century as well. The Westphalian system has always had its critics who try to prove that we live in times of *"radical changes in the basic shapes of governance and in the structure of international relations"*[12]. The theories regarding the decline of the state and the rise of transnational organisations suggest even more scenarios: *"a borderless world"* (of liberal-capitalism orchestrated by transnational companies), *"a new middle ages"* (the collapse of organised authorities, in several pluralist

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[11] Hurlan Ullman, *On War. Enduring Principles of Profound Changes ?*, essay in Anthony D. McIvor, Editor, *Rethinking the Principles of War,* Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2007, pp. 79-80.
[12] Paul Hirst, *War and Power in the 21st Century*, Cambridge, Polity, 2001, p. 110.

powers that act inside and beyond state borders), a *"network society"* (the power is diffused in global networks of power, wealth, information and image) or *"cosmopolitanism"* (the emergence of supranational governance)[13].

However, we reckon that the current evolution of the international system contradicts these theories: *"In many ways, the War on Terror has reinvigorated the state and put an end to the idea that states were disappearing from history"*[14]. One may add that the current economic-financial crisis has the same effect. Intervening in support of the companies that have been affected by the crisis, through the financial effort made, as well as through the domestic regulation documents, states strengthen their control in the economy. Paradoxically, the increase in the importance of international trade provides companies with a bigger interest for national localisation[15].

Yet, the economic argument is not the only one in favour of the state. Analysing from a social, psychological and even legal point of view, besides the state there is no other *"supranational cultural cement to ensure commonality and loyalty"*[16]. Moreover, the phenomenon of *"the globalisation of law"* reinforces the power of some states, because their accountancy, consultancy, law enforcement etc. systems are recognised in the entire world[17].

From the military perspective, *"states still have armed forces, which are used as a symbol of power"*[18]. Their realist behaviour tends to put pressure on the international legal environment (see the tendencies to strike preventively): *"The creation of markets and free trade is a political process, and war is an instrument of this policy"*[19]. International institutions are put under the pressure of change, and the media is instrumental in influencing the global perception.

A final argument of those who advocate the decrease in the role of the military element in the contemporary world is the apparent failure of using this instrument, and the examples that can be quoted in this respect are various. Nevertheless, we believe that the possible failure of using military force is not an argument per se. The doctrines of modern armed forces attempt to provide answers in this respect as well, most of them aiming at a *comprehensive approach*, in which the armed

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[13] *Ibid*, pp. 112-114.

[14] Tarak Barkawi, *Globalisation and War*, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers Inc., New York, 2006, p. 131.

[15] Paul Hirst, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

[16] *Ibid*, p. 12.

[17] *Ibid*, p. 121.

[18] Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World*, Peguin Books, London, 2006, p. 1.

[19] *Ibid*, p. 23.

forces are only one of the instruments of state power, which can be used, as a complement to other instruments, in order to fulfil political objectives.

Practice can however prove that, as far as the use of force is concerned, the military response does not necessarily lead to victory. The way in which the current economic crisis seems to complicate international relations cannot but explain the bigger attention paid to this instrument of power – the military instrument. When one cannot foresee the future, a careful planning can be achieved only according to the principle that all the instruments of power of a state, including the military one, must be competitive and functional. For the future, the events that will come as the most severe shocks to security will be surprising, for both experts and the general public. This means that the transformation of armed forces, named by some *the revolution in military affairs,* will have to be adaptable enough to meet the unexpected and even the unthinkable !

And, as a final aspect, the military force can mean different things for different states. Applying this principle to the transformation of the Romanian military body, the issue is not in what way the military force is desirable in the relations between states anymore but to what extent the military body can be useful to the Romanian society. The answers of the military must be convincing to this question. Without a convincing answer, the everyday battle for resources within the society will be lost before it is fought.

English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE

NON-STATE THREATS
AND THE NEW SECURITY PARADIGM
- Armed Groups in Romania's
National Security Strategy -

Andreea C. ZUGRAVU

The article reviews the new threats to security after the Cold War and prefigures a dialogue about the new paradigm developed in the latest decades in the field of security. The emergence of armed groups, the nature of the terrorist threat and the increasing number of weak or failed states that are incapable of controlling or enforcing the laws within their territories bring about new circumstances and dangers that cannot be explained by the old security paradigm. These changes pose questions about the validity of our defence system, undermine the legitimacy of states, widen the horizon of security issues and alter the traditional relations between states and citizens. The final part of the article analyses the way in which these changes are mirrored in Romania's security strategy and advocates the need for adopting a proper strategy regarding the non-state armed groups.

Keywords: *security paradigm; armed groups; terrorism; irregular conflict; Romania's National Security Strategy*

Clausewitz considered war to be a *"social activity […], … a continuation of politics by other means"*[1] and his views have embodied the way we understand war and security. For the last years though, scholars and academicians alike have tried to analyse the impact technology, globalisation, recent events have had on military affairs, and the way war is carried out. The rise of armed groups, the nature of terrorism, and the increasing number of weak and failing states, unable to control and enforce the rule of law on their territory, develop new conditions and perils that the old paradigm cannot explain. War is no longer fought between armies for a known political objective and for a short period of time. Protracted conflicts are fought in the name of vague notions, to kill leaders or ideas, to replace regimes, to serve the economic purposes of criminal organisations or to project both terror and power and they increasingly involve the direct or indirect

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[1] Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Volume 1, Project Gutenberg E-book http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/1946.

participation of civilians. These developments induce new questions about the validity of our security system, challenge state legitimacy, broaden the spectrum of security-related issues and alter the traditional relations between states and citizens.

Etymology and Historic Considerations

Like other philosophical notions, the term *"peace"* can only be discussed in correlation with its antonym – *"war"*. Is then safe to assume that *peace* means the absence of war ? Is security a mere absence of threat ? And if so, how do we define *war* and how do we define *security* ? The most common image that comes to one's mind when thinking of war and conflict is that of two armies marching on a field facing each other, getting ready for impact. However, a mere reading of the *"World"* section in any national newspaper will prove that this mental image does not match the reality of the world. Why ? Because in the aftermath of the *Cold War*, the security paradigm has been slowly shifting to unexplored directions that change the way we perceive peace and perform at war. The days of Napoleon marching his armies across Europe are over; so are the days of the *blitzkrieg* and large military manoeuvres. The definition of peace as the absence of war *"belongs to a few centuries ago"*[2].

Mary Kaldor, Director of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at London School of Economics, identifies five key distinctions that are noticeable in the *"old wars"*: the distinction between the public and private sphere, between internal and external activities, between the economic and the political, between the civil and the military and between the legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant[3]. However, the reality today has changed. Present conflicts are no longer taking place between state actors that, when in combat, perform using regular warfare and adhere to international norms and standards. Today's security challenges come from armed groups, insurgents, terrorists, and transnational organised crime groups, threatening the world in complex ways, not seen before. The key distinctions identified by Kaldor are no longer as clear as they were in the previous centuries. With the increasing involvement of public opinion in foreign policy, state leaders carefully plan their actions as to match the electoral expectations at home. The quest for primary commodities and resources

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[2] Shirin Ebadi, *The Meaning of Peace in the 21st Century*, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-fifty/meaning_century_4670.jsp.

[3] Mary Kaldor, *New Wars and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global War*, Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 20.

clashes under both economic and political policies, and terrorist threats undermine the traditional distinctions and rules between combat forces and civilians.

Historically, *"our ideas about war – its sources, nature and solutions, come from the European and Cold War experiences"*[4]. The 1815 Vienna Congress established a key component of the stability of the international system: *the balance of power*. By and large, the great powers of the time were interested in making sure that there would be no other Napoleon among them. However, they restrained themselves from punishing France (in sharp contrast with the 1919 winners in World War I and Germany) and together managed to create a system that brought unprecedented peace and stability in Europe. The Industrial Revolution and the two world wars that followed changed the way war was fought: technological improvements, mass regimentation and genocide are just several key distinctions. The *Cold War* divided the world according to Churchill's famous *"iron curtain"* and nuclear weapons became the main point in how peace and war were understood. Through concepts such as deterrence and the theory of mutual self-destruction (the supposition that, because of high level of casualties and civil destructions, no power would start a nuclear war), both powers refrained themselves from using force directly one against the other and instead challenged each other in other regional theatres of operations.

The end of the *Cold War* and the collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed a worldwide feeling of euphoria and triumphalism. Fukuyama announced the *"end of history"*, military budgets were cut down with the speed of light and only very few realised the challenges that the system was about to face: unstable states in transition, bloody ethnic and nationalist conflicts, weapons of mass destruction, poverty, local warlords, to name just a few. Since the end of the *Cold War*, the security paradigm has slowly changed and Clausewitz's theories have become increasingly distant from the realities. Holsti argues whether we can really *"understand the Somalis, Rwandans, Myanmars and Azerbaijanis of the world in classical European terms"*[5]. There has not been a single war among democratic nations, but the escalation of conflict between states and groups within states challenging its legitimacy has increased dramatically. And so have organised crime, transnational criminal networks and, since 9/11, the far worse threat: terrorist groups. Thus, security issues seem to rise and develop from the nature of internal politics in the new formed states. Hanlon considers that *"the transformation of armed groups is a key*

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[4] Kalevi Holsti, *The State, War and the State of War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 13.
[5] *Ibid*, p. 14.

aspect of a newly emerging security paradigm for the 21st century"[6]. Empowered by economic and technological consequences of globalisation, armed groups have now acquired means and weapons available until recently only to state actors and national armies. Taking advantage of the revolution in communications, of the weak nature of failing states, which are capable of inflicting damage that far exceeds national borders, armed groups are one of the biggest threats to the international system. The *Cold War* doctrines such as deterrence and mutual self-destruction no longer apply to armed groups. Armed groups do no have an address to locate them, they do not have a territory nor a population to protect. Moreover, as Hanlon points out, armed groups are decentralised, operating in networks in various areas of the globe and have a significant degree of freedom in choosing their "programmes" and the amount of damage they inflict increases proportionately. Armed groups operate among civilians, not in a large terrain where national armies have overwhelming advantage.

In addition, terrorist cells and criminal organisations have arranged in what Hanlon refers to as *"marriages of conveniences"*[7]. In exchange for a small part of the profits, armed groups offer protection to organised crime units, thus getting their hands on enormous amounts of resources, weapons and soldiers: al-Qaeda transferred $30 to $300 million in commodities working with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. Jeremy Weinstein, a professor at Stanford, has researched RUF and one of his most important results resides in the progressive erosion of the initial motivations among a rebel group, *"when the organisation is held together by material incentives or by force"*[8], as it is the case for RUF. His main idea is that when a rebel group gains access to natural resources, the incentive for getting rich becomes the main motivation that keeps its members united throughout time: *"Resource-rich groups attract opportunistic joiners and must maintain their organisations through a consistent flow of material payoffs or through the use of force"*[9]. Weak states, due to their administrative incapacities, are unable to protect their monopoly of force across their territory, leaving huge portions ungoverned that become safe havens for armed groups. Paul Collier calls this

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[6] Querine Hanlon, *Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups* in *Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counter-terrorism, and Counterinsurgency*, Jeffrey Norwitz, Naval War College Press, Newport, 2008, p. 137.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 140.

[8] Jeremy Weinstein, *The Structure of Rebel Organizations – Implications for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, http://www.stanford.edu/~jweinst/files/WorldBank_2002.pdf

[9] *Ibid*.

"the conflict trap"[10], as states are caught both in a continuous war and an increase in poverty due to it, giving the advantage to the armed groups. Breaking out of the conflict trap is almost impossible.

The International Impact of Local Conflicts

One of the biggest challenges in dealing with local conflicts is the failure of the international community to realise the regional and global dimensions these conflicts have. Many local conflicts have *"spillover"* effects in neighbouring countries: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – FARC expanding from Colombia to Ecuador and Venezuela; al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Kosovo Liberation Army – KLA in Albania and Macedonia are just a few examples. The explanation is simple: the conflict extends and generates the territory that is outside the authority of a legitimate recognised government. The importance of such territories increases especially when illegal activities are carried out on them.

A project done by the Research and Development – RAND Corporation has identified the policies needed to handle these areas[11]. First of all, governments should re-evaluate the role of development agencies and donor's aid. Unfortunately, much of these resources can be targeting ungoverned territories and their overall impact is to make them more attractive to armed groups. For example, infrastructure building in areas where the government has given up its control is aiding armed groups, not the government or local population. A second policy change aims to promote competent government practices and strengthen the presence of local authorities. For example, in Colombia, under the Democratic Security and Defence Policy, by 2004, the government had established police headquarters in all 1 099 municipalities compared to 1995, when 25% of municipalities had no police presence. A good indication of the perceived security measures is the fact that *"the highway traffic between major cities increased by 64% between 2003 and 2006"*[12].

The difficult challenges that arise from these new developments range from revising the relevance and rethinking military training to the increasing involvement of non-combatants and civilians in the international arena. Should the world, including Romania, rely on the new US grand strategy that seems to have formed in Washington during the Bush Administration and that Ikenberry

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[10] Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion – Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done about It,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 32.

[11] RAND Project Air Force, *Ungoverned Territories – A Unique Front in the War on Terrorism,* http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB233/index1.html.

[12] Roberto Lorente, *Colombia's Democratic Security and Defense Policy: Its Impact in FARC, Human Rights and Regional Stability,* GMAP Master's Thesis, 2009.

defines as *"America's imperial ambition"*[13] ? Is pre-emption the doctrine that should replace the *Cold War* doctrine of deterrence ? If terrorists have no territory to protect, does this mean we have to be ready to interfere wherever, regardless of the sovereignty principle ? Are our military forces trained and equipped to deal with increased combat in civilian areas ? When we aim at decreasing the number of members in armed groups, are we ready to prevent having them replaced with child soldiers ? And finally, should these questions be answered unilaterally or in international institutions where actions can be vetoed ?

Obviously, situations are almost never easy to interpret and judged the same way by different actors. In the report released to the public on 21 September 2009, General McCrystal, top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, is very clear when he states that it is not resources that are going to win the war, but *"an urgent change of strategy"* on how the war is conducted. The US needs to coordinate better with the Allies in NATO and to connect more with the Afghan people. Although he never mentions it directly in the article, McCrystal seems to be advocating for a nation-building role of the military. A common practice is that of politicians often connecting military operations with stability and support tasks. One such example in Afghanistan is the provision of security, understood in military terms, and democratic elections[14], implying that the latter determines the former and, afterwards, elections bring about security. Elections are, some might argue, easy to organise but will that bring an end to the conflict and a lower level of violence ? Collier thinks the opposite when he states that *"electoral competition can make things worse, because patronage will often win out honest politics in the struggle for votes"*[15]. Thus, the main lesson for military forces, but most importantly for political leaders is that the work is not done once you have held elections. In a conflict area, security is the sine qua non condition for any hope towards peace and conflict resolution[16].

Armed Groups in Romania's National Security Strategy

Romania has undergone major effort in implementing policies and adapting to the new security realities and its National Security Strategy reflects these transformations. In addition to strategic concepts and responsibilities assumed

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[13] John Ikenberry, *America's Imperial Ambition*, in Robert Art, Kenneth Waltz, *The Use of Force*, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 2003, chapter 2.

[14] Wadir Safi, *Securitatea şi alegerile din Afghanistan – motivele pentru care cele două trebuie să fie complementare*, in *Gândirea Militară Românească* Journal, no. 4/2009, pp. 160-163, http://www.defense.ro/gmr/Ultimul_nr/safi-p.160-163.pdf.

[15] Paul Collier, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

[16] Wadir Safi, *op. cit.*

as an EU and NATO member, the *Strategy* highlights Romania's interests and role at the Black Sea, its relations with the Republic of Moldova and its options regarding regional security. Without doubt, the document approaches security from the larger perspective of human security understood as economic security and prosperity.

Despite all these achievements, the *Strategy* has several major drawbacks. It is worth noticing that the *Strategy* has not identified the necessary conditions that would engage Romania in a war, nor has it changed the traditional way we look at war. A lot of studies have focused on the limitations and inconsistencies in the *Strategy*. The *"Ovidiu Șincai"* Institute has conducted an analysis on the strategy's content, form and style and has also compared it to other national security strategies (USA, Russia and Poland)[17]. Adrian Pop's comments[18], especially about *The Black Sea Forum*, are very revealing and add substantial value to the way Romania has to understand its security priorities.

One aspect neglected in both the *Strategy* and the consequent debates is represented by the security threats posed by non-state armed groups. The *Security Strategy* indeed identifies terrorist groups as a primordial threat and has one mention of criminal organisations, but in addition to the vague definition and usage of the concept, the *Strategy* continues to refer to the conflict between traditional armies and terrorist groups using the traditional concept of asymmetric warfare.

Asymmetric warfare is *"a means through which one inferior side (an army) seeks to obtain advantages towards a stronger opponent, or one through which a superior army seeks to obtain a rapid victory with no or minimal losses"*[19]. The problem with this perspective resides in the focus it puts on the military dimension of the conflict, shaping the idea that military means can bring security. However, in a conflict between state and non-state actors, the military force is not the dominant factor that can *"win"* a war. For example, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a common factor in asymmetric warfare, where insurgents and terrorist groups rely on such devices to challenge regular armed forces. The war, however, is not going to be won by finding a *"silver bullet"* for IEDs. Even if military technological developments will make IEDs harmless, the *"war on terror"* will not be over. This argument can be extended to any other asymmetric warfare components. Instead, these conflicts should be defined as *irregular warfare*, highly emphasising the interplay between political means and military strategies.

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[17] Institutul Ovidiu Șincai, *Raport de analiză politică, analiza Strategiei de Securitate Națională a României*, http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport_SSNR.pdf

[18] Adrian Pop, *Strategia de Securitate Națională – de la proiect la realitate*, in *Revista 22*, 30 June 2006, http://www.revista22.ro/strategia-de-securitate-nationala-de-la-proiect-la-realitate-2844.html

[19] Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare și Securitate, *Conflicte asimetrice. Cerințe operaționale privind structura Armatei Române*, http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/confl_asimetrice.pdf

Just as Rupert Smith argues[20], military force has lost its utility in winning a decisive military victory. This happens mostly due to the fact that the theatres of operations have moved among the people, the ends for which we fight have changed, and conflicts tend to be protracted. The political level has to identify the political objectives and then corroborate them with the adequate military strategy. Together, both military and political levels have to cooperate in choosing the most adequate function of force: amelioration, constraint, deterrence or destruction. On the field, military forces have to use force to achieve new objectives: when you fight among the people, you have to win over the people, and not necessarily to occupy or destroy traditional targets.

Romania's National Security Strategy has significant deficiencies in understanding the situation and describing the nexus of connections between the political and the military factor. With its largest number of effectives in Afghanistan, where the daily situation involves direct involvement in such type of irregular warfare, these deficiencies could have serious repercussions.

In order to play an active and responsible part in the collective security structure it belongs to, Romania has to understand the evolving nature of armed groups and the complexity of the security problems such groups pose. These issues need to be addressed in a strategic and efficient manner. The pre-emption and prevention doctrines that the *Strategy* postulates are, in addition to the ideological criticism brought to them, inoperable from a practical point of view, as they tell nothing about an adversary. In wars among the peoples, fought among civilians, anyone can be, or shortly become, an enemy. An adequate strategy includes an integrated nexus of diplomatic pressure, counterintelligence and counterterrorist actions, strategic communications enhancing legitimacy, adequate choice in the theatres of actions and usage of the right function of force.

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[20] Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in Modern World*, Penguin, New York 2006, p. 5.

WILL THE FINANCIAL CRISIS MAKE CHINA A SUPERPOWER ?

Prof. Dr Jing MEN

The author writes about China's rising economic power, which has led to the steady increase in its military expenditure, with double-digit annual growth. It is building its military force into one that can defend, in particular, its air and sea territory. However, he points out that China will also need to address lagging political and social reform in order to build up a comprehensive welfare system, which offers its people reasonable social security. In the author's opinion, the problem of sustainable development in the long run will remain a challenge for the Chinese government.

To conclude, he highlights the fact that China has neither the ambition nor the capability to challenge the leadership of the United States. Compared with the superpower of the US, China is only a regional power. Both the cost and risk are too high for Beijing to commit itself to so many international issues as the US, from Iraq to Afghanistan, from Iran to North Korea.

The 20th century was the century of the United States. Will the 21st century be the one of China ?

China is rising. Since its reform policy at the end of the 1970s, China's economy has been growing at an average rate of 9 per cent annually. China has become the third largest world economy. It overtook the United States as Japan's largest trading partner in 2004, as India's in 2008, and as Brazil's in 2009. China is the largest source of US imports, with which it enjoyed a trade surplus of $ 266,3 billion in 2008. In the same year, China became the largest foreign owner of American government debt, overtaking Japan.

> **The financial crisis has further enhanced China's importance in the world economy. It is said to have about $ 2 trillion in foreign currency reserves**

The financial crisis has further enhanced China's importance in the world economy. It is said to have about $ 2 trillion in foreign currency reserves. This huge reserve of US currency contrasts sharply with the US, whose budget deficit is likely to exceed $ 2 trillion this year.

The Chinese government's $ 586 billion stimulus package demonstrated its determination to keep the crisis at bay. The Chinese Premier Wen said in early 2009 that China would introduce a second stimulus package to boost its economy if necessary. The G-20 summit indicated that China is expected to play a bigger role in dealing with the crisis.

Chinese trade has been its motor.
Will it now stall ?

Chinese leaders are not only trying to find solutions for the problems that have occurred, but are also interested in finding out why they occurred in the first place, so as to avoid similar problems in the future.

Reuters

China's development is an issue which is difficult – and dangerous – to ignore

Zhou Xiaochuan, the head of the People's Bank of China, feels that the flaws in the international monetary system could be dealt with to a certain degree by creating a new world reserve currency. His controversial idea alarmed the Americans, but was quietly welcomed by many Europeans and Asians. Although Zhou's idea is not to replace the dominant status of the dollar in the near future,

it may provoke a revolution in the international monetary system.

Together with China's rising economic power, China has also steadily increased its military expenditure, with double-digit annual growth. It is building its military force into one which matches its rising economic power and which can defend, in particular, its air and sea territory. After many years of discussion among its leaders, China will probably have its first aircraft carrier in the coming years.

As a consequence of its military build up, China has gradually flexed its muscle and become more active. For the first time since the Ming Dynasty, China sent ships to protect its vessels when two of its destroyers and a supply ship were sent to an area off the Somalian coast. China has also carried out several military exercises with other members of the *Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*.

Since early 2009, there have been several reports that Chinese vessels have harassed alleged American spying ships in the South China Sea. In June, a Chinese submarine accidentally collided with an underwater sonar array towed by an American destroyer, which was in the South China Sea to participate in a joint military exercise with *ASEAN* members.

> **Some people have postulated that the role of the United States in the global economy is declining, with its position as a world leader being replaced by China. The financial crisis seems to give China a golden opportunity to strengthen this trend**

Most recently, the *BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China)* countries held their first summit meeting. Seeing the international crisis as an opportunity for the international economic and political order to be readjusted, the four countries expressed their ambition and willingness to participate more actively in international affairs.

China is undoubtedly the most influential among the four, but the *BRIC* format can be a good platform for China to bargain with the US and Europe on issues of sustainable development, global warming and world peace and stability.

Some people have postulated that the role of the United States in the global economy is declining, with its position as a world leader being replaced by China. The financial crisis seems to give China a golden opportunity to strengthen this trend. But, while it is undeniable that there is a long term tendency that China is rising, the current financial crisis will not dramatically facilitate China's rise at the sacrifice of the interests of the United States.

Reuters

China's top priority is its own economic development as well as regional stability

Why not ? First of all, the financial crisis is a challenge for both the US and China. The fact that China is the largest owner of US debt only serves to emphasise that the two are in the same boat. Both must accept this major interdependence and coordinate with each other. And like it or not, China will be obliged to continue to buy American debt.

Although the Chinese Premier Wen expressed his concern early this year about the value of the American debt, he knows that if China stopped buying it, its value would drop even more drastically. China needs to help the United States in order to help itself. On the other hand, while China is in search of other currencies as target of investment, it seems that neither euros nor yens are ready to serve as alternatives.

Furthermore, China's development is led by exports. The drastic decline of demand from the United States, the European Union and Japan due to financial crisis had an immediate impact on Chinese foreign trade – it decreased 25,9 per cent in May 2009 compared to the same period of the previous year. Many export-oriented enterprises have been bankrupted and more than 20 million workers have become jobless.

The financial crisis posed questions to the Chinese government: *How to effectively stimulate domestic consumption ? How to create jobs for the laid-off workers ? How to maintain sustainable development ?* Beijing faces huge pressure to maintain the 8 per cent growth rate of its GDP, because failure to do so would bring huge social problems. Even if the problems are solved in the short term, the problem of sustainable development in the long run will remain a challenge for the Chinese government.

China will need to address lagging political and social reform in order to build up a comprehensive welfare system, which offers its people reasonable social security. Only by removing Chinese people's concerns about education, medical insurance and pensions can domestic consumption be stimulated effectively. But this will not happen overnight.

Finally and most importantly, China has neither the ambition nor the capability to challenge the leadership of the United States. Compared with the superpower of the US, China is only a regional power. Both the cost and risk are too high for Beijing to commit itself to so many international issues as the US, from Iraq to Afghanistan, from Iran to North Korea.

> **If managed well, China's both hard power and soft power will further grow after the financial crisis – but the US' will still be unmatched**

More power in the world means more responsibility. But China is not yet ready to take on so much international responsibility. China's top priority is its own economic development. What China cares about most is regional peace and stability. Despite the fact that China is rising, it is incapable of playing the role the United States has been playing in international affairs.

In fact, the economic and political order established by the United States created a favourable environment for China's development. China jumped on the bandwagon of the US and benefited tremendously from the international system maintained by the US. The benefits Beijing gains will encourage it to stay under the leadership of Washington.

If managed well, China's both hard power and soft power will further grow after the financial crisis – but the US' will still be unmatched. What China needs to clarify to the US is that they are not competitors but partners – for both their own interests' and those of the world.

THE NEW KILLING FIELDS ?

Gretchen PETERS

The author argues that the main way to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is through cutting off their drugs money. However, she writes that these vast criminal profits do not only come from drugs. Afghanistan and Pakistan anti-state groups appear to expend a significant amount of their daily energy engaging in criminal fund-raising techniques. In this respect, she mentions opium trade, drug markets, kidnapping, timber smuggling, human trafficking, bank robbery etc. Then, she mentions that a key question western intelligence forces need to be asking is what the Taliban leadership intends to do with the vast profits it earns from the drugs trade and other crime. Finally, she concludes that degrading the enemy's source of funding, while simultaneously improving governance, are critical pillars to any counterinsurgency campaign, and Afghanistan and Pakistan will be no exception.

Keywords: *AfPak; drug trade; the Taliban; insurgent groups; criminal activity*

According to a recent report for the *US Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, American intelligence agencies continue to believe that donations from wealthy sympathisers in the Gulf make up the bulk of funding for the Taliban, *al-Qaeda* and other extremist groups operating along the AfPak (Afghanistan/Pakistan) frontier.

An examination of their day-to-day activities at the ground level suggests otherwise however. Whether protecting the opium trade, engaging in kidnapping, bank robbery, gunrunning, extortion or human trafficking, *takfiri* groups on both sides of the frontier today behave more like Mafiosi than mujahidin.

It is hard to make generalisations about the wider AfPak insurgency because there are so many different anti-state groups operating on both sides of the Durrand Line, and they do not always behave the same way. There continue to be reports of extremist leaders asking for – and receiving – cash donations from sympathetic members of the community.

But increasingly, AfPak anti-state groups appear to expend a significant amount of their daily energy engaging in criminal fund-raising techniques,

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and this involvement in crime is changing both their battlefield strategy and the fundamental nature of the wider insurgency.

Increasing evidence shows some Afghan Taliban commanders controlling drug shipments as they leave Afghan territory, indicating the movement is widening its sphere of criminal influence.

The morphing of the AfPak insurgents is neither new nor unique: throughout history and around the world insurgents and terror groups have repeatedly turned to crime to support their activities. And over

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time criminal earnings have corrupted levels of dedication to the original ideology. The FARC, the IRA and Hezbollah have undergone similar metamorphoses, and perhaps the most famous case from history is the Sicilian Mafia, which got it start much like the Taliban – protecting an ethnic community from the excesses of local rulers.

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In southern and southwestern Afghanistan, where the Taliban protect and tax the multi-billion-dollar opium market, insurgents have deepened their involvement in the trade since 2001.

Initially, Taliban commanders mainly confined themselves to taxing drug shipments that moved through their control zones, and later began providing protection for opium shipments and heroin refineries. It is now common to hear of Taliban commanders running their own refineries, which have exploded in number inside insurgent-held territory.

There is also increased evidence that some Afghan Taliban commanders continue to control drug shipments as they leave Afghan territory, indicating the movement is widening its sphere of criminal influence.

Although Taliban commanders have integrated their activities throughout the opium trade, it is still not accurate to suggest the Taliban control the drug market. Drug cartels, which are mainly based in Pakistan and dependent on ties both to anti-state and state actors, remain the key decision-makers and earn the greatest profits.

*A key question western intelligence forces need to be asking
is what the Taliban leadership intends to do with the vast profits
it earns from the drugs trade and other crime*

And while it is clear that growing numbers of Taliban commanders are in it mainly for the money, it would also be wrong to conclude that the movement as a whole has abandoned its goal of driving western forces out of Afghanistan. Rather it is more accurate to say a small core of true believers still command the Afghan Taliban, and there is scant evidence those leaders live lavishly off the profits they earn from protecting and taxing the drugs trade.

A key question western intelligence forces need to be asking is what the Taliban leadership intends to do with the vast profits it earns from the drugs trade and other crime – which I estimate to value as much as half a billion dollars annually.

These vast criminal profits do not only come from drugs. Since 2001 insurgent and *takfiri* groups on both sides of the Durrand Line have broadened their involvement in a wide range of criminal activities. Kidnapping has become a growth industry, in which criminal gangs and insurgent groups collaborate to snatch wealthy businessmen and then sell them back to their families.

In the past, kidnap victims were often beheaded on camera to make a political statement, most famously the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. The more recent abduction of New York Times correspondent David Rohde was illustrative of the fact that profit is now the central motive. Insurgents who held Mr Rohde initially were asking $28 million for his release, according to tribal sources in the *FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan)*.

In other parts of the war theatre, insurgents engage in timber smuggling, human trafficking and selling emeralds on the black market. In some cases, insurgents have resorted to bank robbery: fighters loyal to the late Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, for example, recently robbed a money changer in the southern port city Karachi and then smuggled the money all the way to the FATA.

© Reuters/Goran Tomasevic

The way the various groups interact is similar to the way Mafia crime families relate to each other. Sometimes they collaborate, and sometimes they fight each other, including the recent power struggle in South Waziristan that followed Mr Mehsud's killing.

In many cases where insurgent and *takfiri* factions fight amongst themselves or when there are battles between the factions, money is at the centre of the struggle.

To head off this problem, there are routine high-level meetings between the various groups to decide who has rights to earn in what territory.

When the various groups collaborate, earning money is usually the goal. There are reports that the Pakistani Taliban's push into the northwest parts of that country has been financed in part by other branches of the wider insurgency. One of my researchers recently interviewed low-level operatives in Bajaur who told him that Uzbek and Afghan fighters have begun arriving with suitcases full of cash, apparently to help pay for operations in Swat and Buner.

> *There are growing indications that some fighters in Afghanistan*
> *have links to criminal street gangs in the West.*

There are similar reports from Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan, which has seen an explosion in Taliban activity in recent months. One of my researchers got word from local authorities that Uzbek fighters had been advising the Afghan Taliban as they pushed back into the province.

US officials tracking the *HIG (Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin)* group in eastern Afghanistan have come across evidence that foreign fighters operating in that region funnel funds to insurgents in Chechnya and Central Asia. And perhaps more worrisome still are growing indications that some fighters in Afghanistan have links to criminal street gangs in the West.

The recent report for the US Senate also indicates that American intelligence officials continue to believe *al-Qaeda* plays no role – and earns no profits from – the Afghan drug trade and other criminal activity. I believe that is incorrect.

Throughout my research for *Seeds of Terror*, I found evidence that al-Qaeda leaders and foreign fighters closely allied to them, in particular the *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*, played a coordinating role. I never found much evidence of *al-Qaeda*'s engagement in the operational side of the drug trade – such as coordinating drug shipments or running heroin labs. However it was clear that senior *al-Qaeda* officials made contacts and facilitated relationships that made major drug transactions possible across tribal lines, district and national borders.

> *The intelligence community would be wiser to focus its efforts on identifying*
> *and disrupting flows of money reaching insurgent, extremist and terror groups.*

Rather than debating whether terror groups profit from criminal activity or trying to quantify the percentage of funding that comes from crime, the intelligence community would be wiser to focus its efforts on identifying and disrupting flows of money reaching insurgent, extremist and terror groups (as well as, of course, corrupt state actors). Degrading the enemy's source of funding, while simultaneously improving governance, are critical pillars to any counterinsurgency campaign, and Afghanistan and Pakistan will be no exception.

EUROPEAN THINK TANKS: REGIONAL AND TRANS-ATLANTIC TRENDS (I)

The Think Tanks & Civil Societies Program

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

European and American think tanks have played a varying role in the policy-making process in their respective regions for some over seventy-five years now. They are some of the best examples of non-governmental organizations creating true change in public policy. Both areas have think tanks that run the gamut of budgets, purposes, and research focuses. They can be small, medium, or large organizations in terms of funding and staff, and cover the entire political ideology spectrum or focus on almost every possible issue. While they are similar institutions, they fulfill different roles in their respective policy processes as well as have different operating procedures.

American think tanks have generally been more visible because of their resources and ability to engage with the public, the media and government officials. As a result, several think tanks in the United States have high profiles and prestigious reputations. Think tanks have been able to stay relevant in the public realm

by harnessing the Internet to reach policymakers, the public and the media. Since many have posted their board of directors and sources of support online, there is a higher degree of transparency and accountability that is not matched by most think tanks in Europe or elsewhere in the world. In terms of purpose and activity, think tanks in the United States can be entirely research-oriented, advocacy-oriented, or a combination of both. In contrast, European think tanks attempt to balance these approaches; few, however, adopt either the depth or breadth of research topics, policy outputs or dissemination strategies that the top US think tanks attain. In the US, scholars that work within think tanks tend to move between the think tank community and positions in Washington, and thereby take part in the so-called *"revolving door"* phenomenon. But it should also be noted that there are state and local-level think tanks that recommend policy on a lower governmental level. These think tanks can often employ more grass roots methods to convey their messages and goals.

However, given that think tanks rely on donors such as companies or individual philanthropists for their funding, they can become too dependent on fragmented, project specific funding to fund their growing operations. In this process, they lose their potential for innovation as they research or recommend policy on specific issue areas specified by their donors. This dependence upon project specific funding is an increasing challenge for the US think tank community because the core operations are underfunded. Another growing challenge is the sheer number of think tanks, lobby groups and other civil society organizations all working to affect government policy. In the new age of the Internet, it has become very easy for all of these organizations to share their goals, forcing think tanks to find increasingly more creative means to gain the attention of busy public and government officials.

"European think tanks", in our study encompassing all of Europe, are nearly as numerous as American ones, but most tend to be primarily research-oriented institutions, acting essentially as universities without students. They often do shy away from making policy recommendations and tend to be underfunded, understaffed and underutilized by policymakers when compared with their American counterparts. Most have not been engaged by the media nor do they seek media attention, thus remaining elusive in the European political scene. Most are not recipients of large private donations and instead obtain their funding from governments or political parties. This is a system with both positive and negative implications: academically-based research organizations can more credibly lay claim to objectivity, but their research goes largely ignored at the policy level. However, new think tanks born in the last decade or so suggest that a degree of convergence with the US

could occur and a more diverse set of organizational forms may emerge in the years to come.

"European Union think tanks", those in EU member states, were divided into four models to make their analysis more manageable. They include an Anglo-American, Western European with the Nordic Countries as sub category, Central and Eastern European, and an emerging EU model. Many of the think tanks face language and culture issues or barriers. As the European Union seeks to further integrate its current 27 member states, the need for a truly diverse European think tank community has therefore never been greater. In theory, this type of think tank community would work to research and recommend policy alternatives to help the European Union, its institutions, and neighbors with not only good governance but also forward looking and smart policies. In practice, however, most have not yet been able to focus and develop policy for the EU interest as opposed to separate national interests. Demographics and language barriers make it more difficult for an institution to be representative of the entire EU since some nations are far more populous than others and therefore have more scholars and perceived influence. The real challenge however is disseminating ideas to a larger audience of EU citizens in their own language, making them more accessible, easy to understand, and creating a greater and meaningful impact.

The EU also lacks a common foreign policy which would aid with increased integration; a clear subject area for the European think tank community. Currently, there are only about a dozen think tanks in Brussels and elsewhere trying to establish a truly European think tank community. While this is a comparatively fewer number than the amount that exists in Washington, it has similar potential influence. However, there is an underlying assumption in any pan-European policymaking that integrated policy is always good for the continent. This type of sentiment has tended to limit past debate in the European community, and hence think tanks must be careful not to become too insulated in their discussions.

Looking towards the future with the EU at a crossroads, the US facing more domestic and international challenges, and the world facing various crises, think tanks have a great opportunity to help inform policy debates and support the policy formulation process. Their success hinges on the ability to maintain their relevance and influence amidst growing globalization, an increasingly non-stop news media, and competition from other organizations trying to affect government policy. In order to do so, they must engage the public and policymakers, secure funding and top scholars and think creatively and proactively about enduring and emerging policy issues. The circumstances and needs between US and EU think tanks vary, but their importance for civil society cannot be taken for granted.

Recommendations

The potential of European think tanks will not be fulfilled unless they are successfully managed. In order to overcome the political, social and economic challenges of integration, we suggest the execution of those recommendations detailed below. By conforming to these proposals, an objective forum will be constructed, in which European scholars may effectively aid in the formulation of transnational legislation and policies. The recommendations provided below are intended for public and private donors at the national and regional level who have a stake in increasing the quality and impact of public policy research and analysis. While the leadership and funding for these proposed initiatives would be best confined to private, independent sources they require a public private partnership. These recommendations are intended to strengthen think tanks at the national and regional level so they can better serve policymakers and the public.

1. A public-private partnership should be developed to provide the start up capital and an endowment for 1-2 pan-European public policy think tanks that would be independent of state and EU politics and funding. They should be designed to produce rigorous policy analysis and engage the public on the major issues facing the EU and its member states. Ideally, these centers should be composed of multi-national staffs and be general purpose policy research organizations that have the staff and resources to address a full range of domestic and international issues. The centers should be located in a single location in Europe but would have the resources to conduct outreach programs throughout Europe.

2. A multi-national group of think tanks should develop and implement a regional think tank policy forum and a related European think tank network. Seed money should be provided and small secretariat established to launch and lead the effort. The initiative would be designed to encourage state-based think tanks to collaborate on a regional basis. To ensure that they are autonomous and able to transcend national affiliations, these two initiatives should be funded by private sources.

3. Private donors should work together to create independent funding mechanisms that are comprised exclusively of private sources to fund truly independent, high impact, multi-disciplinary, policy oriented research throughout Europe. The grants should target the social, political and economic implications associated with EU and its 27 member countries. The grants program should emphasize innovative and forward looking policies and proposals that will address the ongoing challenges of integration in Europe.

4. Public and private donors should support training and capacity building programs that are designed to enhance the rigor, relevance, and impact of research at free-standing and university based think tanks. To do so, think tanks should exchange best practice techniques on policy research, impact assessments and performance evaluation methods with think tanks in Europe and elsewhere.

5. Think tanks and donors should jointly develop a program that will encourage think tanks working at the national and EU level to make better use of the media and information technologies so that they can reach larger, national and transnational audiences.

6. A coalition of think tanks and civil society organization should be mobilized to reverse the troubling trend in Europe of classifying think tanks that operate in the public interest in the same category as private interest lobbying organizations. Such a practice threatens all civil society organizations and undermines the critical role that think tanks play in the policymaking process. A related educational effort should be undertaken to promote a greater understanding and appreciation of independent think tanks and the important role they play in the policymaking process.

7. The EU should develop a universal legal and tax structure for non-governmental organizations and private foundations in Europe.

8. A blue ribbon study group comprised of think tanks, donors, government officials and other civil society representatives should be constituted to develop recommendations for how to realize greater transparency in the finances and operations of non-governmental organizations. Ideally, the initiative should take the form of a self-regulated association of policy research institutes which creates standards that help assure the quality, independence and transparency of policy research.

9. Given that language is a significant impediment to meaningful policy debates, the European Commission, the Parliament and other organs of the EU should embrace a single common language for policy debates and provide financial incentives for think tanks and other policy related groups to produce and widely disseminate their analysis of key issues in the common language. Special intensive language training programs should be developed for members of the print and electronic media so they are willing and comfortable using the common language once it is agreed upon. The EU should also explore investing in information technologies that would translate policy documents in the languages of the 27 member countries.

10. Public and private donors should fund an exchange program that would enable policymakers and journalists to spend time at think tanks and scholars from think tanks to spend time working in government and media. The purpose of the program would be to improve policy and increase the utilization of the research and analysis conducted by think tanks.

11. Public and private donors should consider providing a short term infusion of capital required for think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe to enable them to develop strategies and programs that will help the countries and the region respond to the current economic crisis. The foundations, institutes, and individuals that supported the post-communist political transition are ideally placed to provide targeted grants to these institutions given their knowledge of the region and the think tanks in each country and their experience making grants to these organizations. Within this framework, application, oversight, and evaluation of recipients should be streamlined in order to allow smaller think tanks access to funding.

12. A systemic assessment of the capacity and sustainability of think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe involving key stakeholders (policymakers, donors, think tanks) needs to be undertaken so that a vibrant and independent think tank community can continue to operate in the region. Reviewers should address how to promote philanthropy within the region. National legislation on non-profit organizations might be restructured to put think tanks on a more equal footing with for-profit, private institutions.

13. A conference should be organized to explore the role of public and private think tanks in Europe. The conference might explore issues such as: whether privately funded think tanks can serve the public interest; the strengths and weaknesses of sole source government funding versus privately supported think tanks; and how to promote partnerships between government affiliated and government funded think tanks and independent and privately supported think tanks.

INTRODUCTION

There are currently over 5 500 think tanks in the world, including 1 817 located in the United States and 1 750 located in Europe. For the purposes of this study, all think tanks within the European Union as of June of 2009 will be examined. Most notably, this includes nations from Central and Eastern Europe which joined the European Union starting in 2004. (Please see the appendices for more data detailing the think tanks in the respective regions). Although their growth in number has slowed recently, their roles in civil society have perhaps never been greater.

There is concern however that with the increasing *"competition of ideas"* think tanks have been forced to spend more resources on fundraising, publicity, and advocacy, and less on independent and evidence based research. The challenges of the European Union as a polity will be discussed, as well as the issue of the existence of a truly "European" think tank. With the current economic crisis this will only be exacerbated, making it a challenging period for the majority of the world's independent think tanks at a time when their ideas and recommendations are needed most.

This report chronicles some of the major trends and challenges facing think tanks in Europe. We first provide some background on the development of think tanks in Europe and the United States. We then focus on the state of think tanks in Europe and explore how the rise of the European Union is altering national and regional responses to major policy challenges facing the region. The research is informed by our ongoing study on think tanks and policy advice around the world and the data collection and profiling of all the major think tanks in Europe. While we consider Europe as a single entity we have divided our analysis of the region into four separate frames in order to better understand how the political dynamics in the UK, Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe and European Union have affected the development and evolution of think tanks at the national, regional and sub-regional level. Although Turkey boasts a vibrant think tank community of its own, has been an associate member of the EU since 1963, and is now a candidate country for EU membership, we have excluded it from this report due to concerns of scope and focus. Nevertheless, as outside observers, we hope that our research and analysis provides some useful insights and serves as a catalyst for those issues that require attention and from which European think tanks can benefit.

BACKGROUND

The emergence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as important global actors has received increased attention from researchers and scholars in international relations, development studies, and nonprofit management. One type of NGO, the think tank, has received much less attention despite the growing number and influence[1]. Think tanks now constitute a set of knowledge-based policy-oriented institutions that serve governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society. These institutions generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international issues in an effort to enable policymakers and the public to make

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[1] For a list of academic references on think tanks, please see the material on page 11.

informed decisions about public policy issues[2]. Governmental and individual policymakers throughout the developed and developing world face the common problem of bringing expert knowledge to bear in governmental decision-making. The challenge is to harness the vast reservoir of knowledge, information, and associational energy that exist in public policy research organizations in every region of the world.

The breadth and scope of this reservoir has expanded considerably since the 1990s as think tanks have responded to the need of policymakers and the general public for information that is useful, reliable, accessible, and understandable. Although this need has been an inherent dynamic of the policymaking process, the forces of globalization have fostered and markedly accelerated the growth of independent think tanks, due to these institutions' unique ability to bridge the research-policy divide in a way that improves the quality and effectiveness of the policymaking process. As a result of their success, think tanks have grown in size and number, solidified their position as integral contributors to the policymaking process, and developed and strengthened ties with other nongovernmental and research organizations through the establishment of state, regional and international networks.

DEFINITION OF A THINK TANK

The ethereal term *"think tank"* has gained increasing popularity and use, to the point that it is necessary to launch this chronicle with a clear definition of the term. Think tanks or public-policy research, analysis, and engagement institutions are organizations that generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international issues that enable policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy issues. Think tanks may be affiliated or independent institutions and are structured as permanent bodies, not ad hoc commissions. These institutions often act as a bridge between the academic and policymaking communities, serving in the public interest as an independent voice that translates applied and basic research into a language and form that is understandable, reliable, and accessible for policymakers and the public[3]. Policy research organizations perform a variety of roles: offering original research and analysis; generating new information; providing policy advice; evaluating public policies and programs; identifying, training and developing talent; providing a home for public figures who are out of office or planning to assume key positions

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[2] James McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US: Academics, Advisors and Advocates*, New York, Routledge, 2007.
[3] *Ibid.*

in future administrations; convening experts in and outside government to float policy proposals and build consensus; and educating and engaging policymakers, the media and the public[4].

Historical Overview of Think Tanks in the United States and Europe

Think tanks have existed since the early part of the last century when the Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Chatham House and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy were established to bring knowledge to bear on government decision-making. The United States and Western Europe saw an explosion both in the number and activity of its think tanks during the 1960s and 1970s as a result of the social upheaval that took place during the period. These think tanks helped recommend policy pertaining to the Cold War, foreign aid, and domestic issues such as the health of the economy. They became increasingly specialized and influential in the policymaking process. After the end of the Cold War in 1990, this specialization increased and think tanks began to research and recommend policy options on a variety of highly technical and specialized issues. The growing prominence of think tanks in many different fields of research has contributed greatly to the decision making process by allowing policymakers and the public to bring expert advice to bear on key policy issues. While the activity and presence of think tanks have grown immensely, the study of think tanks as important actors in the policy-making process is rather new, having started in the 1980s[5].

Although the United States and Europe have close economic, historic and cultural ties, the role of think tanks as policy-making organizations differs greatly between the two regions. For example, think tank activity in the United States is more centralized. Most prominent think tanks are found in either Washington DC or New York City, though they do exist in almost every state. Activity in the European Union, on the other hand, exists across several national capitals and in many non-capital cities. While this state of affairs is changing, the location of many of the leading think tanks in Europe is still likely to be found in capital cities

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[4] For an excellent discussion of the role of think tanks in Washington DC, see Richard N. Haass, *Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker's Perspective*, in the November 2002 *US Foreign Policy Agenda*, an electronic journal of the US Department of State, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals, and for an overview of the changing role of think tanks, see James G. McGann, *Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy*, in the November 2002 *US Foreign Policy Agenda*, an electronic journal of the US Department of State, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals.

[5] Stephen Boucher et al, *Europe and its Think Tanks: a Promise to be Fulfilled*, Rep. Oct. 2004, Notre Europe, www.notreeurope.asso.fr/article.php3?id_article=538, p. 7.

and cities where major universities are located. In contrast, all of the major think tanks in the US are located in DC, with Rand, National Bureau of Economic Research and Hoover Institution being the notable exceptions. It should be noted that Brussels is trying to become a hub for those think tanks that concentrate mainly or solely on the EU. These think tanks will be given specific consideration later in the paper.

European and American think tanks also differ in organizational structure, sources of funding, and degree of policy orientation. In part, this reflects differences in the political environments such as number of political parties, type of parliamentary system, etc. The individual scholars who work at American and European think tanks therefore have different degrees of job security and move between academia and government at varying degrees. This can partly be explained by different funding sources and patterns (state vs. private funding), reliance on business vs. academic organizational models and the much stronger presence of the *"revolving door"* phenomenon in the United States, in which scholars and policymakers move freely between government jobs and positions in the think tank sector. Additionally, the think tanks in the US are much more visible in the media and consciously use the media to advance ideas and policy proposals when compared to Europe.

Given that the EU and the United States share common political systems, cultural backgrounds, and levels of economic development – as well as a common history of think tanks and other civil society organizations – they lend themselves naturally to a comparative study. However, a comparison of single member states within the EU to the United States would prove more problematic. This study seeks to compare think tanks in the United States and the European Union on several aspects. Since this is a macrolevel look at think tanks, and not focused on any specific institutions, both the opinions of experts in the field, as well as empirical research data presented in the *Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program's 2006-2007 Survey of Think Tanks*[6] and Notre Europe's survey of EU member states will be utilized to gain a comprehensive understanding of the two regions[7]. As part of the research for this report, a study of a small but representative group of European think tanks was also conducted to capture some of the more recent trends. European research organizations were asked a set of 14 questions and responses were compiled and analyzed (see appendix for survey). It should be noted that trends can be deduced

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[6] McGann, James, *2007 Survey of Think Tanks: a Summary Report*, Rep. August 2007, *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, fpri.org.
[7] ***, *Think Tanks in Europe and America: Converging or Diverging ?*, in Notre Europe, 13 Dec. 2004, www.notreeurope. eu/uploads/tx_publication/Semi22-en.pdf.

from the data and research, but that not every single think tank will follow the pattern. Indeed, as dynamic institutions, think tanks change and act on their own accord.

CURRENT LITERATURE ON THE GLOBAL STATE OF THINK TANKS

The growth in numbers and influence of independent public policy research organizations – "think tanks" as they are commonly called – has been noted by a growing number of scholars, donors and practitioners in the United States and abroad[8]. Regional and global intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and NATO have recently come to recognize the significant role think tanks play in the policymaking process. These organizations have organized nascent think tank networks to help develop and assess policies and programs and serve as a link to civil society groups at the national, regional, and global level.

Think tanks now operate in a variety of political systems, engage in a range of policy-related activities and comprise a diverse set of institutions that have varied organizational forms. While their organizational structure, modes of operation, audience or market and means of support may vary from institution to institution and from country to country, most think tanks share a common goal of producing high quality policy research and analysis that is combined with some form of public engagement.

That being said, all think tanks face the same challenge: how to achieve and sustain their independence so they can speak "truth to power" or simply bring knowledge, evidence and expertise to bear on the policy-making process. Unfortunately, not all think tanks have the financial, intellectual and legal independence that enables them to inform public decision-making. This problem is most acute in developing and transitional countries where the means of financial

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[8] See James McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US: Academics, Advisors and Advocates*, Routledge, 2007; James McGann and Erik C. Johnson, *Comparative Tanks, Politics and Public Policy*, Edward Elgar, 2005; Andrew Rich, *Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise*, Cambridge University Press, 2004; James A. Smith, *The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite*, Free Press, 1991; James McGann and R. Kent Weaver (eds.), *Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Actions*, University Press of America 2000; Diane Stone, Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett (eds.), *Think Tanks Across Nations: A Comparative Approach*, Manchester University Press, 1998; Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, eds., *Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas*, Manchester, Manchester UP, 2004; Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter ? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes*, McGill-Queen's University Press 2002; Donald E. Abelson, *A Capitol Idea Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy*, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006; James G. McGann, *Academics to Ideologues: A Brief History of Think Tanks in America*, in *PS:Political Science and Politics*, December 1992, and R. Kent Weaver, *The Changing World of Think Tanks*, in *PS: Political Science and Politics*, September 1989, pp. 563-578.

support for think tanks as well as for civil society at large are limited, the legal space in which these organizations operate is poorly defined and the channels for influencing public policy are narrow. It is these characteristics that distinguish think tanks in the northern and western hemispheres from their counterparts in developing and transitional countries.

The number and overall impact of policy research organizations have been growing and spreading. A survey of think tanks conducted in 1999 found that two-thirds of all the public policy research and analysis organizations in the world today were established after 1970, half since 1980. However, figures from the 2006-2007 *Global Think Tank Trends Survey* indicate that the rate of establishment of new think tanks may be slowing for the first time in twenty years. The reasons for this trend will require greater research and analysis, but we suspect that it may be the result of a combination of complex factors: shifts in funding,

Average Number of Think Tanks Established Per Year Worldwide

lack of start up grants/capital, and unfavorable government regulations that attempt to limit the number and influence of think tanks (see graph above). While think tanks are one of the many civil society actors in a country, they often serve as catalysts for political and economic reform. Analogous to a "canary in the coal mine", the indigenous think tank sector can also function as a key indicator for the state of the civil society in that country. If analysts and critics associated with think tanks are allowed to operate freely, so too can the rest of civil society.

CURRENT LITERATURE ON EUROPEAN THINK TANKS

On the topic of EU think tanks, there has been an increasing amount of research highlighting the rise of broad Euro-wide think tanks, as well as a sizeable amount of criticism on the current state of EU think tanks[9]. There is a fairly common

[9] See James McGann and Erik C. Johnson, *Comparative Tanks, Politics and Public Policy*, Edward Elgar, 2005; ***, *Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Actions*, University Press of America, 2000;

notion that there is disunity within the EU and that the European community needs to find one voice or at least a set of coherent voices that effectively advance the interests of Europe. This is particularly important considering the EU wants to strengthen it role on the world stage. Adoption of the Lisbon Treaty may help in this regard, although it still faces a few obstacles, including a second referendum in Ireland. In the absence of such a single voice, the EU may be overshadowed or overlooked as an important player in the international arena.

In general, there have been few significant scholarly projects on the specific topic of EU think tanks, but a few efforts do stand out in recent years. A fall 2004 Notre Europe report, *"Europe and its Think Tanks: A Promise to Be Fulfilled"* is one of the more extensive discussions of EU think tanks to date. In the report, Stephen Boucher outlines the current state of EU think tanks and their involvement in EU policymaking. Boucher states that there is general agreement on three categories for European think tanks: national, Euro-specific (concerned with only European issues) and Euro-oriented (addressing European issues among others). A growing number of think tanks follow the Anglo-American think tank model which is more advocacy-focused; the traditional model for the rest is predominantly academic-type research institutions. According to the Notre Europe report, EU think tanks want to be a part of the policy initiation stage, where they are most likely to have the greatest impact, but they often fall far short of this objective. In the US, there is a focus on public debates, discussions, conferences, academic research, and publications – all employed to amass support and to become more visible. With competition growing as more think tanks enter the arena, there is a need to be seen as relevant, which for some requires developing a niche market. According to McGann think tanks in the US and elsewhere achieve this objective by specializing in a particular issue area or developing a political or philosophical brand. Notre Europe recommends five strategies for maintaining their relevance and effectiveness in the future:

- Strategically and actively cultivate private sources of funding;
- Develop performance measurement tools;

Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, *Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas*, Manchester University Press, 2004; Stephen Boucher, Martine Royo and Pascal Lamy, *Les Think-tanks: Cerveaux de la Guerre des Idées*, Editions du Félin, 2006; Stephen Boucher et al, *Europe and its Think Tanks: A Promise to be Fulfilled*, Notre Europe, 2004, www.notreeurope.asso.fr/article.php3?id_article=538; Juliette Ebélé and Stephen Boucher, *Think Tanks in Central Europe: From the Soviet Legacy to the European Acquis*, Freedom House, 2005, www.freedomhouse.hu/pdfdocs/Think%20Tanks%20in%20Central%20Europe.pdf); ***, *What Common EU policy toward North America by 2020 ?*, in *Europe 2020* (europe2020.org/spip/spip.php?article214&lang=en); ***, *Ideas, Influence and Transparency – What Could Think Tanks Learn and Contribute ?*, EPIN Think Tanks Task Force meeting, 2005.

- Welcome new entrants and develop synergies through networks and cooperation
- Consider greater focus, and perhaps, further specialization
- Develop a better awareness of potential audiences.

Much of the other noteworthy research on the subject has come within larger books that discuss the world of think tanks in general. *Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action*, ed. James McGann and Kent Weaver, contains a number of relevant chapters on think tanks in Spain, Portugal, France, as well as those in Central and Eastern Europe. Alan Day gives an overview of think tanks in which he notes a trend towards advocacy think tanks and an increasing focus on issues that affect the European Union. Jonathan Kimball offers a comparison of think tank activity in Albania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria. He notes that think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe face similar challenges to those in the rest of Europe: the search for influence, independence and sustainability. In *Comparative Think Tanks, Politics and Public Policy* by James McGann and Erik Johnson, the authors note that despite increasing European integration there still exist profound ethnic, economic and political divisions in Europe. Despite these issues, McGann and Johnson note that Europe is able to provide *"a relatively healthy and stable environment for independent analysis and advice"*. They focus their analysis on Russia, Germany and Hungary, identifying a number of indicators that have affected the think tank communities in these countries: the existence of strong higher education systems, economic strength, and political and press freedom. Lastly, *Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas*, ed. Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, devotes chapters to holistic European Union think tanks, as well as think tanks in Germany, Italy, France and Eastern Europe. In this edited volume, Heidi Ullrich gives a broad typology of EU think tanks and discusses the positive effect of think tank networks, while also mentioning that little collaboration and competition exists among Brussels based think tanks. A distinction is also made between German think tanks, which are mostly academic and have been established by the government, with French think tanks, which do not have strong connection or interaction with civil society when compared to other countries.

Howard Wiarda discusses how a general trend of privatization of government in the US, combined with the *"bigness, inefficiency, sheer lack of time for long range planning in public bureaucracies"* leads to a void readily filled by think tanks[10].

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[10] Howard Wiarda, *New Powerhouses: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy American Foreign Policy Interests*, Volume 30, Issue 2, March 2008, pp. 96-117.

We question the efficacy of Wiarda's assessment and suggest that a range of complex factors explain why think tanks have flourished in the US and enabled them to become highly independent and influential organizations.

These factors include: a political culture that distrusts big government; a highly decentralized government (Federal, State and Local); separation of powers between the different branches of government; weak political parties and a proclivity to seek the advice of outside experts or civil servants. These elements have created a political and policy environment that has many points of access. These factors more than anything else have made it possible for close to 1 800 think thinks to exist in the US. Unlike their purely academic counterparts – universities, think tanks have a real world policy orientation that enables them to understand how Washington or Brussels works. In addition, proximity to policymakers gives them access to insider knowledge of the political situation at a particular place and time. Along with their proximity to policymakers and being able to develop contacts with public officials, understanding policy constraints gives think tanks the edge when it comes to translating knowledge into effective decision-making. With the volume, variety, and velocity of information constantly growing, decision makers need to help with identifying, sorting and synthesizing relevant information into a manageable format that policy makers can use. These advantages must be weighed against the need for sustained analysis of enduring policy issues. Murray Weidenbaum argues however that think tanks need to be sensitive to long-term societal concerns more than rapid responses to opportunities of the moment. He also sees competition in the future based less on visibility, and more on *"developing responses to economic, environmental, and national security problems that are likely to be adopted and carried out"*[11].

Financial transparency along with increasing the sources of funding were also a recurring issue in the literature, deemed seriously inadequate for many EU think tanks. For example, *Open Europe* suggests that the EU funds think tanks in order to justify its own existence and to cement the European Commission's view that continued European integration is the best, or even the only, future path for progress[12]. At the other extreme Boucher and Royo mention the risk of some think tanks becoming *"submarines of private interests"*[13]. We view both as an overreaction since most think tanks are organized to serve the public interest and are designed

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[11] Murray Weidenbaum, *The Competition of Ideas: The World of Washington Think Tanks*, Transaction Publishers.

[12] Open Europe, *The Hard Sell: EU Communication Policy and the Campaign for Hearts and Minds*, Rep. 27 Dec. 2008, www.openeurope.org.uk/research/hardsell.pdf.

[13] Boucher and Royo, *Les think tanks – Cerveaux de la guerre des idées*, co-écrit avec Martine Royo, Editions Le Félin, Paris, April 2006.

to support the public policy process. For further discussion of financial transparency and its implications, please see the following subsection within *"Challenges Facing European Think Tanks"*. In general, too close of a relationship to any sector, whether it be government, business or unions, can impact the independence and effectiveness of a think tank. This was perhaps a main concern when a conference held between members of the *European Policy Institutes Network* and several other think tank representatives concluded that there is a need for think tanks to clarify their sources of funding, where their researchers come from, and to develop a code of conduct[14]. According to the members, there is a distinction between European think tanks, which have limited set rules that regulate their operations, and American think tanks which must often comply with a complex set of regulations in order to operate and must provide annual tax returns to the US Internal Revenue Service. While these regulations are cumbersome and time consuming they provide a great deal of transparency and tax advantages for non-profits in the US as individuals are encouraged to support think tanks by receiving a tax credit for making contributions to a non-profit organization. This being said, US think tanks still have a way to go and need to be more proactive in policing the practices of some think tanks that have been less than transparent in their operations.

The intended focus however is on think tanks and their ability to help deal with current and future challenges for both government and civil society. Despite the challenges of European integration, or perhaps in response to it, there exists a clear need for European think tanks primarily concerned with Europe as a single entity: one with a truly regional perspective, and whose programs are exclusively focused on issues surrounding European-level policymaking and the issues confronting Europe.

THINK TANK ENVIRONMENTS

Think tanks are not islands in a sea; rather, they are born within a greater socio-economic framework and must remain responsive to any changes within the greater society to stay relevant. An analysis of the environments in which think tanks operate is therefore crucial toward understanding their influence on policy. This includes studying the movement of scholars within think tanks and the government as well as recent trends within the think tank community. This comparison is an expansion upon a section in earlier works by James McGann, *"National Interest vs. Regional Governance: Think Tanks, Policy Advice and the Future*

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[14] *Ideas, Influence and Transparency – What Could Think Tanks Learn and Contribute ?*, EPIN Think Tanks Task Force meeting, p. 2.

of the EU", "Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US: Academics, Advisors and Advocates", "Comparative Think Tanks, Politics and Public Policy" and *"The Rise of the Euro Think Tank".*

American Think Tank Environment

Think tanks in the United States have held an extremely influential position in the policy-making process for at least fifty years. Most notably, the 1970s saw an influx of think tanks fulfilling crucial roles in government processes. As time went on, these institutions became larger, more complex and more dynamic than ever before. They exist in ever-greater numbers, and even more recently-founded institutions have garnered successes. Today, they interact with both the public and the government to get their policy recommendations adopted. Think tanks in the United States are an important part of American civil society, independent from the government, working in the public interest, and offering policymakers practical and effective policy recommendations.

While the vast majority of think tanks in the United States are focused on foreign relations and economic affairs, there is truly a think tank for every issue area. As more than mere advocacy groups, these think tanks unite scholars and policymakers to discuss and debate pressing issues in order to create relevant and applicable policies for the government to adopt.

Some top American think tanks are very well funded relative to think tanks in other regions of the world. This is in part due to the many philanthropic organizations in the nation which seek to influence policy and participate in the American political system. Philanthropic institutions such as the Carnegie Corporation, Hewlett Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, Ford Foundation, and the Pew Charitable Trusts have made and continue to make important and lasting funding contributions to think tanks. However, while many philanthropists hope to simply create a better world by giving to organizations that strive for the public good, others give money so that think tanks can produce research and analysis that advances a particular agenda. Partisan politics in the US has at times narrowed the space in which think tanks operate in the US by limiting the range of policy choices that they might consider. While some think tanks do not like to be branded, most of them can be characterized as favoring a singular political ideology[15]. The large number of think tanks and the diversity that exists among them helps guard against any one institution from undue influence on the president or congress.

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[15] McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US*, p. 17.

A defining characteristic of American think tanks is that they often serve as a source of qualified staff for key positions when there is a change in administrations in Washington. This was the case most recently with both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, who both relied on the help and expertise of think tanks such as the conservative American Enterprise Institute and the progressive Center for American Progress, respectively. These think tanks helped shape the ideas and policy of the administration in power[16]. Indeed, many government officials participate in the *"revolving door"* and move between positions within the government and in the think tank community, usually depending on which party is in power in the White House and in both houses of Congress. This movement is not new, either; the *"revolving door"* phenomenon has helped to form *"governments-in-waiting"* since 1961[17]. Moreover, several think tanks have even been founded by high-profile government officials, including US Presidents and presidential candidates[18]. The Hoover Institution at Stanford University is a notable example. The ease of entry between the government sector and think tanks allows scholars and public officials to maintain a healthy balance between hectic, purely policy-focused work and more abstract, scholarly pursuits. Lee Hamilton, a former member of Congress who now directs the *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, contends *"Many of the think tanks are developing talent for a new administration. You will see a large number of people leaving the think tanks to go into the Obama administration"*[19]. Indeed, P.J. Crowley, formerly of the Center for American Progress and now serving in the Department of State's Bureau of Public Affairs, explains, *"There's a lot more sanity in the think tank world than there is in government. You're not on the treadmill as much … It is a chance to step back, to actually think. If you're in government, you're dealing with those boundaries that have already been set. In a think tank, you start with a blank piece of paper"*[20]. This ends up benefiting the policy-creating process as a whole. In their own words, academics who straddle the academic and policy worlds can attest to the importance of the *"revolving door"*: *"One of the most effective transmission belts for ideas to travel from the academy to government might be called 'embedded capital' in the minds of 'in and outers' … As Henry Kissinger once pointed out, the pressure on time that bears upon policymakers means that they rely on ideas and intellectual capital created before they entered the maelstrom"*[21].

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[16] Michael Lee Katz, *American Think Tanks: Their Influence Is on the Rise*, in *Carnegie Reporter*, Vol. 5/No. 2, Spring 2009.

[17] Haass in McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US*, p. 92.

[18] Simes in McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US*, pp. 124-125.

[19] Michael Lee Katz, *American Think Tanks: Their Influence is on the Rise*, p. 1.

[20] *Ibid*, p. 6.

[21] Joseph Nye, *Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Policy*, in *Political Psychology*, Vol. 29, no. 4, 2008, p. 600.

Despite increasing competition for outreach, several think tanks hold very high profiles in the media, and some can even become household names. Think tank scholars like Michael O'Hanlon (Brookings Institution), Richard Haass (Council on Foreign Relations), Steven Clemmons (New America Foundation), Norman Ornstein (American Enterprise Institute) and Fred Bergsten (Peterson Institute for International Economics).

Economics are quoted frequently in the press and are regulars on the nightly news and 24/7 cable news networks. To assert better control over their public image, many think tanks deal directly with the public and media. While many prominent journalists serve as fellows for various think tanks, institutions such as the *Heritage Foundation*, the *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, and the *Center for Strategic and International Studies* even maintain their own television studios. In addition, the *Peterson Institute* inaugurated its Media Center in 2008.

Financial transparency is a major feature of American think tanks, as briefly mentioned before. Partly because the US Internal Revenue Service requires that all non-profits including think tanks submit financial reports each year in order to maintain their non-profit status, American think tanks are often very forthcoming about their main sources of funding, and the records of many institutions are available to the public through the Internet. Overall, the American public and media generally demand a greater degree of transparency and accountability than their European counterparts[22]. Many think tanks even have their own public relations representatives, and websites often provide public access to the leaders of these organizations and enable them to engage with the scholars on staff. With the ability to scrutinize these political intermediaries, the public has grown to believe that think tanks are working in the public interest.

Not all think tanks are non-partisan however. Some represent nearly every possible position on the political spectrum, with four main categories encompassing most American think tanks: conservative, libertarian, centrist and progressive. The chart below enumerates some of the more prominent organizations in each category.

Over the last decade, right-of-center think tanks have had a commanding presence and influence in Washington. This was in part due to their superior funding advantage and to the effectiveness of conservative organizations such as the Heritage Foundation and Cato[23]. Recently, however, liberal-leaning donors, most notably George Soros, have helped even out the partisan imbalance with the creation of organizations such as the Center for American Progress, which has had a close

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[22] ***, *Think Tanks in Europe and America: Converging or Diverging ?*, in *Notre Europe*, pp. 3-4.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

Center-Left Think Tanks		Centrist Think Tanks		Center-Right Think Tanks	
New America Foundation	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	Peterson Institute for International Economics	Baker Institute	Washington Institute for Near East	Center for Strategic and International Studies
Progressive Policy Institute	Carter Center	National Bureau of Economic Research	Brookings Institution		Milken Institute
Urban Institute		Public Policy Institute of California	Council of Foreign Relations	**Conservative Think Tanks**	
Progressive Think Tanks		RAND Corporation	Economic Strategy Institute	Hudson Institute	American Enterprise Institute
Economic Policy Institute	Center for American Progress	Resources for the Future	Freedom Forum	Manhattan Institute	Competitive Enterprise Institute
Institute for Policy Studies	Center for Defense Information			National Center for Policy	Family Research Council
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies	Center for Public Integrity			Progress and Freedom Foundation	Heritage Foundation
Justice Policy Institute	Center on Budget and Policy Priorities				Hoover Institution
Worldwatch Institute	Citizens for Tax Justice				**Libertarian Think Tanks**
				Reason Foundation	Cato Institute

relationship with the Obama Administration. Its leader, John Podesta, made clear *"his plan for what he likes to call a 'think tank on steroids'. Emulating those conservative institutions,* he said*, a message-oriented war room will send out a daily briefing to refute the positions and arguments of the right. An aggressive media department will book liberal thinkers on cable TV. There will be an edgy Web site (thinkprogress.org) and a policy shop to formulate strong positions on foreign and domestic issues"*[24]. Presently, the reemergence of liberal think tanks has brought about a balance of power in Washington's partisan playing field.

Another characteristic of US think tanks is their geographical distribution and the variety of topics they cover. While there are some 374 think tanks in Washington DC alone, every single state in the United States, with the exception of the least populous one, Wyoming, has at least one think tank. While commonly thought of as a national institution, think tanks also research topics pertaining to state and local issues. Indeed, power has increased in the hands of the states in the recent decades, and it is often up to the states alone to balance large and complex budgets and programs. Just as with national policy, these think tanks research and debate issues in order to make recommendations to policymakers on the local level. While they do not operate in as competitive of an environment as the national think tanks, these think tanks work just as hard in order to convey their messages[25].

Finally, the US has well developed national networks of progressive and conservative think tanks such as the Public Interest Research Group, or PIRG, and the Heartland Institute. For example, established in the 1970s as an outgrowth of the consumer movement spearheaded by Ralph Nader, PIRGs are now part of a nation-wide movement of state-based think tanks, primarily concerned with environmental issues, consumer protection, and political and social justice. Nonetheless, PIRGs differ from other think tanks in that they were founded as a student group and remain one today. Indeed, most of their members and financial resources come from student-driven organizations. Often, they employ grass roots methods to get their voices heard, which other think tanks might not find effective[26]. The conservative Heartland Institute (HI) was established in Chicago in 1984. According to its web site in 2007 it received 71 percent of its income from foundations, 16 percent from corporations, and 11 percent from individuals. No corporate donor gave more than 5 percent of its annual budget. HI maintains a network of 125 academics and professional economists serving

[24] Matt Bai, *Notion Building*, in *New York Times*, 12 October 2003.
[25] McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US*, pp. 26-28.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

as policy advisors to the Heartland Institute, including members of the faculties of Harvard University, the University of Chicago, and Northwestern University. Generally, think tanks have played an important role in the policymaking process in the United States, influencing the activities and policies of the government yet remaining responsive to issues of the public.

Why do American think thanks have greater independence, influence and resources than European think tanks ? The answer lies in American and European political cultures.

Think Tanks and Political Culture in the United States and Europe

United States

Porous and highly decentralized system of government:
- Separation of Powers (Legislative, Executive and Judiciary);
- Federal, State and Local Governments;
- Fear of an imperial congress or president;
- Pluralist Political System Model.

Weak civil service and a strong reliance on independent advice:
- "the government that governs best, governs least";
- Desire to avoid centralized power and giving too much power to unelected bureaucrats.

Strong two party system but weak party discipline:
- Members of Congress and the President are elected by popular elections, not the majority party;
- No viable 3rd party-Democrats and Republicans dominate;
- Personal attributes, power base and financial support matter more than party affiliation;
- Candidates use party label but are not defined by or bound to the party;
- Primary elections are open for President and members of Congress attracting a wide range of candidates.

US President's candidacy is not tied to party:
- Presidential candidates do not have to rise through the ranks of the party;
- President is elected by popular election vote, not by the majority party.

Hyperpluralistic and Individualistic Society:
- Most religiously and ethnically diverse country in the world;
- Individual rights and responsibilities are emphasized;

- Volunteerism is integral part of American culture;
- Every interest has a group to represent it.

Highly Developed Philanthropic Culture:
- Individuals, Private Corporations, Private Foundations, Unions and other interest groups fund and support non-governmental organizations;
- More wealthy donors in the US Bill Gates ($56 Billion), George Soros ($8.5 billion);
- Well established legal, tax and public support for independent, non-governmental organizations.

Europe

Highly centralized, unitary form of government:
- Most policies are made at the national level;
- Most states are national and not federal republics;
- Legislative and Executive branches of government are fused in the Parliamentary System;
- Political process tends to be closed with limited points of access;
- Corporatists Political System Model.

Multi-party system with strong party discipline:
- Members of Parliament are selected and supported by the party;
- Prime Minister is selected by the majority party and not elected by popular vote;
- Prime Minister's fate is tied to party not to the public;
- Party affiliation and loyalty to party are paramount in European politics;
- Personal attributes, power base and independent financial support are less important.

Strong European civil service and reliance on government:
- History of strong central government;
- Look to government and not individuals or outside experts to solve society's problems.

Homogeneous and Collectivist Society:
- Historical ethno-national groups tend to be reflected in national government and culture;
- Focus on preserving national identity not diversity;
- Assimilation and integration of foreign nationals has not been very successful;
- Reliance on government, not the individual or civil society to provide services and address societal problems.

Underdeveloped Philanthropic Culture
- Sources of support are limited (Government and Large Corporations);
- Donations tend to be limited and earmarked for traditional charities (Church, Red Cross, Widows and Orphans, not think tanks);
- Tax structure does not encourage individuals to make contributions and discourages wealthy donors from making large contributions;
- Weak legal, tax and public support for independent, non-governmental organizations.

European Think Tank Environment

The evolution and development of European think tanks has taken at least four different paths during the last three decades. This report contrasts with other studies in that it takes a geographic and regional approach. There is the **Anglo-American, the Western European, the Central and Eastern European, and the evolving European Union model.** Clearly, the cultural, political and economic traditions in each of these areas have impacted the nature and shape of their think tank communities.

Anglo-American Think Tank Environment

Given the history of cooperation and high degree of similarity between British and American think tanks there is a case for identifying a specific Anglo-American model. This occurrence can perhaps find its roots in the contemporaneous establishment of Chatham House (the *"Royal Institute of International Affairs"*) in London and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York following World War I. Originally conceived as a single entity, the two separate organizations nevertheless strengthened Anglo-American relations as they helped to establish a new order following the Great War[27]. These foreign affairs-oriented think tanks have since become enormously influential within their home countries and abroad.

In general, think tanks in the United Kingdom have a much longer tradition than those in continental Europe. The Royal United Services Institute and the Fabian Society are usually identified as Britain's first think tanks, founded in 1831 and 1884, respectively. Many of Britain's other prominent think tanks were established in the interwar period, including Chatham House (1920), the Policy Studies Institute (1931), and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (1938)[28]. They are characterized by their high degree of influence and activity in comparison to their continental European counterparts.

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[27] Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy*, Palgrave, New York, 2004, p. 28.
[28] Alan J. Day, *Think Tanks in Western Europe*, in McGann and Weaver, *Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action*, p. 108.

On a domestic level, free-market think tanks are also much more prevalent in the UK than in other countries, due in part to Margaret Thatcher's tremendous influence during her tenure as prime minister[29]. The emergence of these "new right"[30] organizations such as the Center for Policy Studies and the Adam Smith Institute was an important source of support for Thatcherite conservatism during the 1970s. Subsequently, when the Labour party experienced a resurgence in British politics during the 1990s, think tanks like the Institute for Public Policy Research and Demos took over the role of majority-party research outfit that the "new right" had previously fulfilled[31]. This pattern of political affiliation in British think tanks is mirrored in the United States: the development of think tanks in public policy during reforms in the 1980s under Prime Minister Thatcher paralleled what was happening in the United States during the Reagan era. When the Heritage Foundation broke onto the scene in 1973, it was the first to specifically target its research toward members of Capitol Hill through focused, succinct policy briefs and toward the wider public through a highly developed media arm. Both the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute supplied George W. Bush's Administration with policy advice and personnel. In turn, Barack Obama's Administration has picked a number of former staff from the liberal Center for American Progress to serve in high government posts. However, not all are happy with the level of intimacy that these think tanks share with party politics. Gerry Hassan bemoans a think tank world that *"began as a set of outsiders challenging the old establishment. In its place it has become part of the new establishment, defending an even more narrow, undemocratic and doctrinaire view of the world"*[32]. He goes on to claim that the think tank model is inherently *"more suited to the politics of the pro-business, corporate world of the right than the left"*[33]. This is a questionable claim that is not empirically valid and reflects Mr. Hassan's own opinion that think tanks have benefited right wing ideas more than progressive ones. All think tanks (left, right and center) tend to be a part of the policy establishment and must manage the inherent tension between relevance and influence and distance and objective analysis.

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[29] *Ibid*, p. 112.

[30] Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, *A 'Hollowed-out' Tradition ? British Think Tanks in the Twenty-First Century*, in Stone, Diane and Andrew Denham, *Think Tank Traditions*, Manchester UP, Manchester, 2004, p. 236. Also chronicled in Denham, Andrew and Mark Garnett, *British Think Tanks and the Climate of Opinion*, UCL Press, London, 1998.

[31] *Ibid,* p. 238.

[32] Gerry Hassan, *The Limits of the 'Think Tank' Revolution*, OurKingdom essay, pub. 8 September 2008, pp. 3-4, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/yes/the-limits-of-the-think-tank-revolution.

[33] *Ibid*.

In addition to having ideologically-affiliated think tanks that jostle for political influence, British think tanks also share another common trait with their American cousins: a large media presence. Demos, which could either be paired with the Labour party or classified as a "postmodern" think tank[34], enjoys widespread media coverage due to its sometimes controversial research[35]. The British press is constantly publishing the newest report from a think tank. Media appearances are one of many ways that the think tanks can maintain a public profile and, therefore, a wider audience and broader influence. It allows UK think tanks to hit above their weight when it comes to policymaking on the EU level.

Western European Think Tank Environment

After a successful reconstruction and high growth during the 1950s and 60s, Europe entered a period of *"Europessimism"* and *"Eurosclerosis"* during the 1970s, worsened by the oil embargo, stagflation, and unemployment. To make things worse, the European Commission and other institutions were seen as weak if not impotent in confronting the new global and regional challenges. In the midst of these crises, the first Eurocentric think tanks were formed to mitigate the shortcomings of the 1970s and to enhance the European Commission's international prestige. Following De Gaulle's resignation in France and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's relaxation of British nationalist economic policies, European integration made great strides with the aid of these adolescent advisory institutions. Consequently, across Western Europe independent scholars formed think tanks in order to train European diplomats, to smooth the complicated legislative processes surrounding integration, and to offer policy advice in order to strengthen the European Community both in depth and breadth. Thus, the Eurosclerosis of the 1970s and 1980s created among policymakers an immediate and intense desire to establish independent research institutions. Because they were able to supply this demand and to alleviate, at least in part, the cumbersome nature of the European Commission, think tanks flourished in these decades.

Think tanks on the continent, however, are in general characterized by a more academic orientation. Whereas Anglo-American think tanks are perhaps more criticism-focused and more engaged in challenging existing policies, policy organizations in continental Western Europe tend to be more idealistic, focusing on academic oriented research rather than policy oriented research, public

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[34] Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, *A 'Hollowed-out' Tradition ? British Think Tanks in the Twenty-First Century.*

[35] Alan J. Day, *Think Tanks in Western Europe*, in McGann and Weaver, *Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action*, p. 114.

engagement or advocacy. Many think tanks are at least in part government funded, which marks a sharp difference from most British organizations. Political party think tanks are also rather prevalent, but unlike American think tanks, Western European institutes do not usually fit the typical issue-based think tank typology: very few can be described as 'single issue' organizations, while very few also address the same breadth of issues as many American think tanks[36].

Individual countries on the continent also have their own unique characteristics. Germany, for example, has think tanks of a more academic orientation that train researchers and aspiring politicians and have professors often delivering influential reports[37]. There were also three categories of non-profit research institutes. The first category included thirty five research institutes, on a so called blue list. Heavily supported by government ministries, they mostly work on long term questions and usually do not get involved in current policy debates or the media, although they do publish all of their work[38]. The second category included another thirty to forty groups that can be considered more independent, but still are funded by ministries as well. In fact Germany is dominated by organizations that are technically independent but are nonetheless often funded by government institutions, except for a third category of institutes supported by business and labor organizations which do their own research. Perhaps it is one reason why more German think tanks have been centralizing in its capital Berlin. Some estimates put the proportion of publicly-funded think tanks at over 75 percent[39], and most are so-called *"universities without students"*, almost purely academic research organizations. Two notable exceptions to the government funding trend are the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and Bertelsmann Foundation. Research foundations directly linked to major German political parties also hold a dominant position in the think tank scene and *"are in some ways the nearest European equivalents of full-service US think tanks like the Brookings Institution in that they cover a wide policy spectrum and have large financial resources"*, though those resources come mostly from state subsidies to the political parties[40]. However, the corporatist structure in Germany is quite different when compared to the more pluralistic US model. Having undergone changes, Jochem and Vatter mention that since the 1980s the emergence of large multi-national firms with their own lobbying strategies,

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[36] *Ibid*, p. 129.

[37] ***, *The Changing Face of European Think Tanks 2005*, 25 July 2005, http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/changing-face-european-think-tanks/article-142652.

[38] Raymond J. Struyk, *Reconstructive Critics: Think Tanks in Post-Soviet Bloc Democracies*, Urban Institute Press, Washington, DC, 1999.

[39] Martin Thunert, *Think Tanks in Germany*, in Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, *Think Tank Traditions*, p. 71.

[40] Alan J. Day, *Think Tanks in Western Europe*, p. 117.

more emphasis on market deregulation and liberalization to achieve economic stability and growth, and intensified competition in global markets created a paradigm shift and a policy window which strengthened think tanks with liberal attitudes. Changes in traditional policy making also allowed scientific experts or think tanks to channel new policy ideas in the process of interest mediation. In addition to offering advice under new political circumstances and the need to balance budgets, policy advice *"may help legitimize unpopular decisions"*. So despite German think tanks working under different conditions than those in the US, they are still seen as established political actors who successfully influence necessary reforms[41].

To understand think tanks in France, one needs to look back to the time they were being developed in the early twentieth century as well as the historically grey line between the policy elite and government. While it is true that French bureaucratic and intellectual disposition did not necessarily see a need for think tanks, Andrew Williams argues that a distaste for Anglo-American politics and policy in the aftermath of World War I – when think tanks such as Chatham House, the Carnegie Endowment and the Council on Foreign Relations were established – hindered the creation of similar organizations in Paris. *"It might even be said that the 1920s saw France dive ever more uncomfortably into corporatist non-solutions while the Americans and British tried to think more creatively and put their faith in capitalism to sort things out … this emphasis on technical solution-seeking tended to encourage the growth of think tanks in Washington and London and damaged their cause in Paris"*[42].

Perhaps as a result of the environment in France historically not being conducive to the presence of think tanks, the think tanks that do exist in France usually operate at more of a European level than at a national one. With the notable exception of the *French Institute of International Relations (IFRI)*, French think tanks are therefore smaller in general and have a lesser role in the policymaking process, at least within France. Many French organizations are university-based and thus tend to have an academic orientation that eschews involvement in policy-making. Others are affiliated with political parties but are more limited in their reach as a result. Moreover, major research centers such as the *Centre d'Analyse Strategique*, *Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision*, *CEPII*, *Conseil d'Analyse Economique*, and *OFCE* are incorporated into the government, and their power

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[41] Jochem Sven and Adrian Vatter, *Introduction: Think Tanks in Austria, Switzerland and Germany – A Recalibration of Corporatist Policy Making ?*, p. 146.

[42] Andrew Williams, *Why Don't the French Do Think Tanks ?: France Faces up to the Anglo-Saxon Superpowers, 1918-1921*, in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 34, 2008, pp. 53-68.

and activities have precluded independent think tank formation. In general, French think tanks are also often much more localized than their counterparts in other countries, a result of the general belief in the importance of grass roots politics. However, a commenter on our paper stated that *"In Europe (especially in France), non-academic research is perceived as lower-level research. When a think tank aims at explaining international, strategic, economic or political issues to the general public, it is seen as 'vulgarisation' (popularization) – a pretty negative meaning in France"*.

In Italy, the think tanks can be independent, backed by political parties, epistemic communities of like-minded people, or engage in contract research. Traditionally, they are characterized by a more academic bent, with a larger portion of staff consisting of university professors. Funds are provided by the government and by client contract research, so there is not as much self-determination of the research agenda as in the Anglo-American model. These agendas were influenced, however, by changes on the domestic and international level during the 1990s: the run-up to the Italian adoption of the Euro currency and domestic controversy over election laws during the 1990s[43]. After the failure of the traditional system of parties, the consequent phenomenon of the personalization of the politics, and the institutional reforms, there was a big increase in the number of Italian think tanks[44]. As previously noted, Italy and the rest of Western Europe engaged in significant experimentation and diversification in how think thanks are organized and operate in the last decade. For instance, new political think tanks connected to a politician (see, for instance, *Fondazione Italiani Europei* of Massimo D'Alema and Giuliano Amato, *Astrid* of Franco Bassanini, *Fondazione Liberal* of Ferdinando Adornato or *Fondazione FareFuturo* of Gianfranco Fini) were created. They replace in part, the traditional Italian *"fondazioni di partito"*, and can be described as *vanity tanks*[45]. More recently, there has been the birth of advocacy think tanks, see for example the *Fondazione per la Sussidiarietà*, the *Lavoce.info* or the *Istituto Bruno Leoni* (IBL). These are two relatively new institutions that are focused on marketing their ideas and using communication technologies such as the web to help convey their policy proposals. *Lavoce.info* is a virtual think tanks that operates on line. They also engage in marketing and networking development, similar to American think tanks. As a result, these think tanks are attracting increasing attention from the media and are having a real impact on the public opinion.

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[43] Sonia Lucarelli and Claudio M. Radaelli, *Italy: Think Tanks and the Political System*, in Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, *Think Tank Traditions*, p. 90.

[44] Mattia Diletti, *I Think Tank Bologna: il Mulino,* 2009, p. 114.

[45] James G. McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advise in the United States*, p. 20.

The pattern of development in other states in Europe has followed a pattern similar to France and Germany with the exception of Spain and Portugal, which developed their think tanks later than most of their counterparts because of stifled political and economic development. Scandinavia, Austria, Switzerland, and the other less populous countries still have a fair number of think tanks despite their smaller populations, each with its distinct areas of research.

Scandinavia, while clearly apart of Western Europe, has its own unique think tank environment. Think tanks are rarely linked to political parties, as independence is very important. Objectivity and neutrality is emphasized, regardless of the political party in power, perhaps reflecting its credible and respected reputation of its think tanks abroad. They seem to be more transparent as well, at least regarding annual

Think Tanks in Western Europe

Selected Countries in West Europe*	# of TTs	% of Total Ts in Region	Countries in Western Europe with Top Think Tanks*	# of Top 25 Think Tanks Europe	# of Nominees (of 407)	Total in Country
Austria	36	2.8%				
Belgium	97	7.6%				
Denmark	32	2.5%				
Finland	26	2%	Belgium	3	7	97
France	167	13.2%	France	1	10	167
Germany	187	14.8%	France	1	10	167
Greece	34	2.6%	Germany	4	19	187
Italy	88	6.9%	Greece	1	2	34
Netherlands	55	4.3%	Italy	1	4	88
Portugal	19	1.5%	Italy	1	4	88
Spain	50	3.9%	Netherlands	1	4	5
Sweden	68	5.3%	Spain	2	10	50
Switzerland	72	5.7%	Sweden	3	3	68
United Kingdom	285	22.5%	United Kingdom	12	20	285
Western Euro Total		**1262**	**Total**	**28**	**79**	**1022**

* Derived from TTCSP global think tank database,
June 2009 and "The 2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks" report.

financial reports. Because these states are smaller in size than Germany, France, Italy and Spain there tends to be a closer working relationship between think tanks and government officials.

In general, European think tanks are much smaller than their American counterparts in both budget and staff size[46]. The contrast is especially apparent when it comes to think tanks universally regarded as the best and most influential in their respective regions. Of the top 15 US think tanks highlighted in the 2008 Go-To Think Tanks report, 12 have a budget over $20 million, while only one of the top 10 European think tanks operate on a budget that large[47] (See Appendix 3). In terms of staff size, while both the majority of institutions in Europe and the United States responding to our 2006 survey report having less than ten staff members, the US had ten respondents citing over 300 employees, while Western Europe only had four similarly-sized institutions.

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In the second part of the study, the think tank environment in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Brussels and the European Union in analysed. Moreover, the recent research trends in Europe and the EU and the challenges facing European think thanks are discussed.

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[46] ***, *Think Tanks in Europe and America: Converging or Diverging ?*, in *Notre Europe*, pp. 3-4.
[47] McGann, *2008 Global Go-To Think Tanks: the Leading Public Policy Research Organizations in the World*, pp. 42-43.

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THE GENERAL STAFF
and Romania's Stand
on the Disarmament Issue
in the Interwar Period

Luminiţa GIURGIU

During the Disarmament Conference, held in six sessions, between 1926 and 1930, the debate focused on two theses. Thus, the French thesis meant reducing armaments to provide states security and advocated a rigorous control of armaments and arms limitation to the degree to which acts of aggression committed by surprise would not be possible, also setting an appropriate ratio between land, naval and air disarmament. On the other hand, as the author points out, the English thesis assumed that the term "military potential" was too complex to be taken into accout and rejected international control, because it would have triggered "susceptibility" on the part of some states, agreeing to reduce or limit a country's armed forces that were "available at the time of the mobilisation".

omania, a national state formed on 1 December 1918, faced from the very beginning serious problems generated by the international situation: the northern, eastern and southern borders were defined by states that ended the war with important territorial losses – the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria, aspect that explains why the state of siege maintained untill 1924. Moreover, on the Dniester and the Danube, there were registered frequent terrorist attacks that resulted in important damages to the Romanian population from the nearby areas.

In order to make the best decisions regarding the internal policy and the alliance system, which allowed Romania to enjoy social development and security, through Article 122 from the Constitution adopted in 1923, the Homeland Defence Superior Council[1] was established with the purpose of taking the measures that were necessary for the organisation of national defence. The Council consisted of the Prime Minister as a chairman and the principal ministers: of war, foreign affairs, internal affairs, industry and commerce, communication, public

Luminiţa Giurgiu – Editor-in-Chief, the *Document* journal, the General Staff.

[1] Law no. 999 on 13.03.1924, published in *Monitorul Oastei* no. 21 on 12.09.1924.

works, finance, agriculture, public health. The expertise of this institution was assured by the Great General Staff that also comprised the secretariat.

In order to assume the obligations deriving from the adhesion of our country to the League of Nations for *"the study of the measures that were susceptible of providing all the states with the arbitration and security guarantee necessary for fixing the level of the armament at the lowest figures in an international disarmament contract"*[2], it was established the *Military Mission to participate in the meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference*[3] that was composed of General Nicolae Samsonovici[4], Chief of the Great General Staff, General Toma Dumitrescu and Colonel Stoicescu.

Starting 1 November 1932, in the organisational chart of the Permanent Secretariat of the Homeland Defence Superior Council, it was added the *5th Bureau of Disarmament* with the purpose of preparing the participation of the Romanian Mission in the Disarmament Conference. Between 1927 and 1932, this bureau functioned in the 2nd Department Intelligence-Counterintelligence, under the name *Study Bureau of the Military Romanian Mission at the Disarmament Conference*[5].

On 1 September 1933, the Disarmament Bureau fused with the 1st Bureau Political Management of the War and, starting 1 May 1934, it was moved again to the 2nd Department Intelligence-Counterintelligence.

The Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference carried out its activity during six sessions: two in 1926 and 1927, one in 1928 and the last one between 1929 and 1930[6].

During the debates two theses were outlined: *the French thesis*, which established that the armament that assured the security of the states should be diminished and also stipulated a rigorous control of the armament, the limitation of the armaments so that they could no longer provoke any act of aggression by surprise, determining an appropriate ratio between the land, naval and air forces disarmament, and the *English thesis*, which started from the premise that the notion of *"military potential"* was too complex to be taken into consideration, rejected the international control because it could touch the *"susceptibility"* of some states, being in agreement to reduce or limit the armed forces of a country that were *"available at the mobilisation moment"*[7].

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[2] Central Historical National Archives, Fund Presidency of the Council of Ministers, file no. 17/1928, p. 12.

[3] Established in 1925.

[4] Chief of the Great General Staff between 1927-1932 and 1934-1937.

[5] Romanian Military Archives, Fund microfilm, roll FII. 1 338, cd. 591.

[6] Viorica Moisuc, *Premisele izolării politice a României* 1919-1940, Editura Humanitas, București, 1991, p. 291.

[7] *Ibidem*, pp. 291-292.

One of the major preoccupations of the Homeland Defence Superior Council was that of providing the armed forces with armament and ammunition for the land, air and naval forces and with the necessary assets to accommodate, equip and train them. Although the thorough studies that were conducted emphasised the need for equipment through imports as well as through the development our own armament industry, these needs could be met only partially because of the large budget deficit.

The Great General Staff, by its participation in the meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, considered necessary to send to the Homeland Defence Superior Council, through the 2nd Intelligence Department, some notes regarding the opinions on the limitation/stabilisation of the armament for the land, air and naval forces. According to it, after the sixth session of the above-mentioned commission, an agreement between the great powers and the majority of the states, except Germany, the Soviet Union and the other defeated countries, had to be signed. The discussions regarding the armaments of the land forces were dominated by the French point of view, those about the armament for the naval forces by the English-American one, and as far as the armament for the air force was concerned, the French-English point of view was predominant.

It is interesting a *Table* regarding the work performed by the Great General Staff, which assured the Secretariat of the Homeland Defence Superior Council during the period 1 July 1927-31 May 1932[8]. Among them, the following studies were mentioned: the *Ideal Armed Forces* (November 1927), the *Memoir regarding the Needs of the Armed Forces* (January 1928), the *Plan of the Armed Forces Equipment* (July 1929), the *Stage of the Accomplishment of the Execution of the Plan of the Armed Forces Equipment* (March 1930) and the *Comparative Study between the Budget of our Armed Forces and the one of the other European Countries Armed Forces* (October 1930).

The Romanian Mission supported the French view according to which the first step towards disarmament was to be made taking into account the level of safety each state enjoyed and the assurance of full sovereignty. In this context, each state would have to present the maximum figures, which had to be perfectly justified, representing the armament for the land, naval and air forces, as well as the budget allocation, the armament necessary for the defence of the particular state. This view was in accordance with the interests of the Romanian national defence system and with the situation of the armament that it was relying on, also allowing the possibility of providing it with the necessary armament.

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[8] Romanian Military Archives, Fund Great General Staff, Section adjutancy, file no. 835, p. 55.

The Romanian point of view was related to the following desiderata: opinions shared with the states with which it had signed international arrangements; increase in the number of troops in compensation of the lack in armament caused by the poor financial situation; freedom as far as the military expenses were concerned, taking into consideration the situation of the Romanian armed forces and the war industry possibilities, as well as the establishment of advantageous conditions for the organisation and development in the field of arming the land, air and naval forces, according to our geographical situation[9].

It should be mentioned that in order to consolidate this position the agreement of the Foreign Affairs Ministry was obtained, and the General Staff of Polish, Czechoslovakian and Yugoslavian Armed Forces were consulted. The leader of these negotiations was the Chief of the Great General Staff – General Nicolae Samsonovici.

The Great General Staff drew attention to the necessity of larger budgets for the *Plan of the Armed Forces Equipment* up to the moment of the Disarmament Conference, when the contracting states were to limit or reduce these expenses.

During the debates of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, three projects of the conventions were drafted regarding the control and publicity of private and state fabrication of the war material, the control and publicity of the commerce of the war material, and the limitation and reduction of the armament[10].

The facts presented in these projects were not considered in favour of Romania because it had to submit to control and publish the materials that it needed, imported or made in the country, creating the idea that it was one of the most militarised European states. Taking into account the proximity of the Soviet Union, the Great General Staff made a request to the international institution that the stipulations of the convention should not have been applied to Romania, Poland and the Baltic states.

In the opinion of the Great General Staff, *"the solution of this problem was to hasten the equipment of the armed forces with the materials they needed, as the increase in our expenses for the equipment of the military would be very difficult in the future when the convention on the limitation and reduction of armament came into force"*[11] .

The importance of the Romanian participation in the Disarmament Conference was given by the establishment, in May 1931, of the Bureau of Studies for the Preparation of Military Mission Works, within the Homeland Defence Superior Council Secretariat.

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[9] *Ibidem*, p. 56.

[10] In 1925, the Convention regarding the control and publicity of international arms, ammunition and war materials commerce was drafted and signed by more than 50 states. It was ratified by only 4 states because if it had been applied, only the non-producers would have been controlled.

[11] Romanian Military Archives, Fund Homeland Defence Superior Council Secretariat, file no. 1/1928, p. 53.

In a *Note* on 20 October 1931, the Great General Staff requested the Foreign Affairs Ministry *"not to subscribe to the truce until the moment we have the necessary «Safety Supply» available and the national industry is organised, so that it can meet the war needs"*[12].

The efforts regarding the equipment and modernisation of the armed forces were presented in the *Note* of the Senate National Defence Commission in March 1933, according to which *"the members of the commission, preoccupied with the importance of this matter, considering this a moral duty, ask the Government to realise that the whole existence of the nation relies on armed forces proper equipment, so that they can accomplish any possible mission and support all the activities, in the aggregate, contributing to the proper development of the state"*[13].

Nicolae Titulescu[14] analysed with premonition, in a conference held at Cambridge, on 19 November 1930, the causes that hindered the fulfilment of the ideal of the League of Nations[15] regarding peace establishment, as follows:
- the lack of understanding between the former allies in dealing with delicate problems related to the situation of the states that had great territory losses at the end of the war;
- the defeated countries were powerful and proud nations and it was difficult for them to accept this situation;
- the lack of the social doctrinal unity of Europe after the war;
- the powerful economic crisis the old continent was confronted with.

The illustrious diplomat suggested the solution that was considered optimal: *"disarmament, or rather, the employment of the correct technical term, the limitation of armaments is an absolute necessity for peace"*[16].

The Conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments took place between 1932 and 1934. Because of the strong differences between the states, dominated by the efforts of Germany to have equal rights as the other countries regarding the arming process, the Conference ended in failure.

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[12] The General Staff, Military Historical Service, Centre for the Study and Preservation of Historic Military Archives, *Equipment of the Romanian Armed Forces in the Interwar Period, Documents*, vol. II, 1931-1935, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2008, p. 107.

[13] Romanian Military Archives, Fund War Ministry, General Secretariat, file no. 1342/1933, p. 183.

[14] Nicolae Titulescu (1882-1941), born in Craiova, politician and diplomat, academician (1935), professor in Iași and Bucharest, President of the International Diplomatic Academy in Paris, Minister of Finance (1917-1918, 1920-1921) and Foreign Affairs (1927-1928, 1932-1936), permanent representative of Romania at the League of Nations (1920-1936), campaigned for the establishment of a climate of international security and cooperation in the European economic, political, cultural and scientific life.

[15] International organisation established on 10.01.1920, after the Paris Peace Conference (1919), based in Geneva in order to develop cooperation among nations, and to ensure peace and international security; its Statute was signed by 44 countries among which Romania; it ceased working in 1940, and it was dissolved on 18.04.1946.

[16] Nicolae Titulescu, *Documente diplomatice*, Editura Politică, București, 1967, p. 347.

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THE NATIONAL AWARDS
OF THE
GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ
JOURNAL
THE 11th EDITION – 11 November 2009

The 11th edition of the *National Awards of the Gândirea Militară Românească* Journal, which took place as part of the series of manifestations dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the General Staff, represented a highly important event in the past and present history of our journal. Just like in the previous years, the most valuable conceptual works in the field of military theory and science were given an award, following a thorough analysis.

The event also celebrated 145 years since the first issue of *România Militară (Military Romania)*, the precursor of *Gândirea Militară Românească* journal, was published.

It was in this context that Major General Niculae Tabarcia, Director of the General Staff, reminded everybody that *"in 1939, the journal (…) not only disseminated the military culture but it also represented an inexhaustible source of suggestions, inspiration, information and encouragement to develop intellectual works, thus contributing ceaselessly to the development of culture and to our military and national enhancement"*.

In the same festive spirit, Academician Dan Berindei, member of the Journal's Editorial Board, highlighted the significant contribution of the military to the creation and development of the modern national state.

Congratulating the laureates of this year, the Chief of the General Staff, Admiral Dr Gheorghe Marin wished to mention that the *"real winner of today's awards are not the authors but most of all the readers of the books in this field. I am certain*

that the real winners are the pupils, students, candidates to Master's or Doctor's degrees, those who prepare themselves in order to make one more step in this vast domain of military science and art !".

The Certificate of Excellence of the Gândirea Militară Românească Journal was bestowed on Romania's Military Representation to NATO and the EU for *"their professionalism in promoting the national interests in the process of committing the Romanian Armed Forces for fulfilling the collective missions of the North Atlantic Alliance".*

The Certificate was handed to Lieutenant General Dr Sorin Ioan, the Chief of the Military Representation, by the Secretary of State for Defence and Planning Policy, Viorel Oancea, who, on behalf of the Minister of National Defence and of himself, *"thanked and congratulated the General Staff and the entire staff of specialists who have worked hard to edit this publication with tradition in the Romanian Armed Forces, and to support and promote the Romanian military thinking !".*

Here are the laureates of this year's National Awards of the *Gândirea Militară Românească* Journal:

The Award **"Marshal Alexandru Averescu"** was given to **Major General Dr Visarion NEAGOE** for ***"Irak. Calvarul păcii (iunie-decembrie 2007) (Iraq. The Hard Way to Peace (June-December 2007))"***.

The Award **"Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu"** was given to **Brigadier General (r.) Corneliu SÎRBU**, **Colonel (r.) Dr Lucian STĂNCILĂ** and **Lieutenant Colonel Dr Constantin FLOREA** for ***"Stigmatul războiului (A Touch of War)"***.

The Award **"Division General Ştefan Fălcoianu"** was given to **Lieutenant General Dr Teodor FRUNZETI**, **Colonel Ion PANAIT** and **Paul Dănuţ DUŢĂ** for *"Organizaţiile internaţionale şi problema balcanică. Studiu de caz: Kosovo (International Organisations and the Balkan Issue. Case Study: Kosovo)"*.

The Award **"Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu"** was given to **Major General Dr Cătălin ZISU, Brigadier General Dr Liviu SCRIECIU, Colonel Dr Bixi MOCANU** and **Lieutenant Colonel Marcel DOGARU** for *"Coordonate ale sprijinului logistic în operaţiile internaţionale (Reference Points of Logistic Support in International Operations)"*.

The Award **"Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu"** was given to **Colonel Dr Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU**, for *"Planificarea operaţiilor bazate pe efecte în coaliţiile militare actuale (Effects-based Operations Planning in Current Military Coalitions)"*.

# Other nominees for the National Awards of the Gândirea Militară Românească Journal were:

"Marshal Alexandru Averescu" Award nominees: *"Resurse energetice, crize, conflicte (Energy Resources, Crises, Conflicts)"*, author **Cristian BĂHNĂREANU** and *"Carol al II-lea și teroarea istoriei (Carol II and the Terror of History)"*, author **Christophe MIDAN**.

"Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu" Award nominees: *"Militarul și societatea. Relațiile civil-militare la începutul mileniului al III-lea (The Military and the Society. Civil-Military Relations at the Beginning of the Third Millennium)"*, author **Marian ZULEAN** and *"Sinergia acțiunilor armelor și specialităților militare din compunerea Forțelor Terestre (The Synergy of the Actions of Land Forces Military Branches and Specialties)"*, author **Nicolae N. ROMAN**.

"Division General Ștefan Fălcoianu" Award nominees: *"România în Organizația tratatului de la Varșovia (1955-1991) (Romania in the Warsaw Pact (1955-1991))"*, author **Petre OPRIȘ** and *"Evoluții ale principalelor organizații militare internaționale în raport cu problemele asigurării securității regionale și globale (The Evolutions of the Main International Military Organisations in Relation to the Problems of Providing Regional and Global Security)"*, authors **Cătălina PREDOIU, Tiberiu TĂNASE, Adrian DUMITRESCU, Mariana MARINICĂ** and **Ioan-Codruț LUCINESCU**.

"Army Corps General Ioan Sichitiu" Award nominees: *"Oştirea română. Origini, organizare, dotare, războaie. Microenciclopedie (The Romanian Armed Forces. Origins, Organisation, Equipment, Wars. Micro-encyclopaedia)"*, *vol. II*, authors **Nicolae CIOBANU, Eugen BOAMBĂ, Ion VOIEVOZEANU**, and *"PSI – Securitate (PSI – Security)"*, author **Nicolae ROTARU**.

"Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu" Award nominees: *"Un atac terorist pentru viitorul Europei (A Terrorist Attack to the Future of Europe)"*, authors Cornel PARANIAC, **Ioan GEANTĂ**, and *"Dicţionar enciclopedic de marină (Marine Encyclopaedic Dictionary)"*, vol. II, coordinator **Anton BEJAN**.

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
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✍ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

The Certificate of Excellence
of the Gândirea Militară Românească Journal

EDITORIAL EVENTS

✍ *Alina PAPOI*

The annual session of scientific papers with international participation – ***"Perspective ale apărării și securității în Europa (Perspectives on Defence and Security in Europe)"***, carried out under the auspices of the *Centre for Strategic Defence and Security Studies*, in cooperation with the *Section of Military Science of the Romanian Academy of Scientists*, has once more been the host of valuable and exciting works in the field of security.

Held in the Palace of the National Military Circle, in a great atmosphere, the event brought together five sections, divided in two days (19-20 November): *The Security Process in the Circumstances of the Global Crisis; Space in European Defence and Security; Security Institutions in a Changing World; Challenges for Defence* and *The Romanian Armed Forces between Defence and New Missions.*

Within the third section, there were presented more than 40 scientific papers, gathered in a book coordinated by *Dr Constantin Moştoflei*, published by *Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare "Carol I"*. Here are some of the topics discussed: *"The European C4ISR Capabilities – Transatlantic Interoperability of Systems"*, *"Consequence Management Strategies"*, *"European Security in Determining the Security Environment in the Wider Black Sea Area"*, *"The EU Reform Treaty (of Lisbon) – Milestone in Affirming the Union as a Global Actor in International Security"*, *"UN role in International Relations in the International Security Framework"*, *"Defence and Security Strategies of Certain States at the EU and NATO Current Eastern and Southeastern Border"*, *"Determinants of Romania's Security Status at the International Level on the Role and Place of the Romanian Gendarmerie Forces in the System of Public Order and Safety Forces"*, *"The Values and Spirit of the European Construction"*, *"Considerations on the US Defence Intelligence Community and Strategy"*, *"War based on Information Technology"*.

The ***Counterterrorist Operation*** is *"aimed at a distinct echelon in the organisation of the armed forces – the specialised structures meant for counterterrorist assault, therefore for counterterrorist elite. The elite in question is prepared for a long time, equipped due to the use of substantial financial resources, trained assiduously and used punctually. (...) We are in front of a special book. It can be categorised differently, as appropriate: study, compendium, manual, handbook, documentary, guide"*. (Lieutenant General Dr Teodor Frunzeti).

The book, published by *Editura Militară*, therefore focuses on the presentation of counterterrorist operation, based on its specifics in military actions; specific principles – clearly defined mission, firm command, efforts concentration, support; economy of forces, surprise, permanent cooperation; counterterrorist operation structure and phases; lethal capabilities used in this type of operation – for foreign missions, within national borders, in the aquatic environment, logistics and support structures capabilities; then from the tactical processes with lethal finality – external assault, internal assault and exterior ambush; typology of the situations of adopting a non-lethal finality, to tactical processes with non-lethal finality. The last chapter is dedicated to possible developments of the non-lethal-fatal relation in the case of a counterterrorist operation: *"In the future,* as the authors – **General (r.) Dr Eugen Bădălan** and **Colonel Dr Vasile Bogdan** emphasise – *one cannot completely exclude the possibility of major military operations, even if their probability to take place is reduced"*.

The Award *"Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu"* of the *Romanian Military Thinking* Journal, conferred during the eleventh edition, was given this year to the book ***Stigmatul războiului (A Touch of War)*** – *"The title is not accidental. It reflects the mark left by the horrors of war on the face of humankind for thousands of years now, as an ancient curse, despite the efforts and the sometimes sincere but often hypocritical statements of political leaders about the need for universal harmony, upright and fair world. If there were even a slight ray of hope that war might disappear, such approaches as this one would probably not make any sense, yet,*

as long as violence is seen as something that is "given", there will be sufficient conflict generating elements between individuals, social groups or entire nations".

The book, published by *Editura Sitech* in Craiova, succinctly presents: crises, anomic social phenomena; political and military crises; atypical contemporary wars; armed conflicts similar to war; political confrontation in war preparation; significant moments of diplomatic confrontation during the *Cold War*; diplomacy tools and methods used during military conflicts; nomological foundation of armed confrontations; the specifics of multinational operations; economic confrontation in the practice of wars; the role of technology in modern society; *"Waves war"*; the dependency of war on information; the intelligence activity.

An editorial approach that is part of all elaborations dedicated to this so old yet so new topic: war. Always a controversial and topical subject, because, as the authors – **Corneliu Sîrbu, Lucian Stăncilă** and **Constantin Florea** – write, *"War no longer means just campaigns and battles between armed forces, but much more !".*

România în Organizația Tratatului de la Varșovia (1955-1991)/(Romania in the Warsaw Pact (1955-1991)) – book nominated for the Award *"Division General Ștefan Fălcoianu"* of the *Gândirea Militară Românească* Journal, is a thorough scientific and exciting study about our country's participation in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. A doctoral thesis, initially, now a comprehensive work based on numerous research, published or unpublished documents, among whose main topics we mention the following: international conditions of the establishment of the Warsaw Pact – preliminaries and Moscow Conference (1954); documents adopted at the Warsaw Conference (1955); Romania's position within the organisation between 1955 and 1968 – the Romanian defence industry, workers guards and popular combat formations, secret protocols of the organisation, the Romanian-Soviet differences, military exercises; the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the political and military effects in Romania; the Polish crisis and its consequences; the military exercises in the '80s under the auspices of the organisation and the concept of *"the entire people's war for the homeland defence"*.

"The research I have done in the latest five years, the author – **Petre Opriș** – mentions, *was intended to be part of a scientific paper on Romania's activity*

within the Warsaw Pact (1955-1991). (...) The main objective of the Organisation's military structures was to establish a closer link between the Soviet armed forces and the military forces of other alliance member states".

The book was published by *Editura Militară*.

Knowledge is Power ! That is a proven fact. With a consequence in accordance – survival: *"the evolution of society, the emergence and enhancement of various structures of power, the assertion and development of state norms cannot be possible without a continuous access to information, in all domains"*.

In the book **De la Serviciul Special de Informații la Securitatea Poporului (From the Special Intelligence Service to the People's Security)**, **Dr Mihai Șerban**, University Reader at the *"Mihai Viteazul"* National Intelligence Academy, provides us with an analysis of the intelligence activity within the Romanian Special Intelligence Service between 1944 and 1948, a period that has been chosen on purpose, because *"rarely has it happened that an institution changed its strategic objectives within such a short period of time so radically, but not instantaneously (…), and, in the history of the Romanian intelligence service, the year 1944 was one of that turning points that would occur once in several generations"*.

The aspects of the legislative norms in which the Special Intelligence Service carried out its activity are approached, beyond the ones published in the *Official Gazette*, of course, namely certain regulatory provisions regarding the professional evolution of the Service's personnel – for instance, *"the only way in which a candidate could go from the trial period to the permanent employee status was through displaying exceptional devotedness or performing brave deeds"* –, Romania's strategic reorientation after 23 August 1944, *"the public administration cleansing"*, the sovietisation of the Special Intelligence Service, the establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate, which represented the *"final step after the assimilation of the Special Intelligence Service into the Security"*.

The book was published by *Editura Militară*.

Under the auspices of the *Romanian Academy* and of the *"Moldova" National Museum Complex*, the volume **Toți în unu – Unirea Principatelor la 150 de ani (All in One – The Unification of the Principalities at 150 Years)** was published in Iași, by *Editura Junimea*, consisting of memorable pages dedicated to the act

of 24 January 1859. Here are a few titles: *"The National Dimension in the Political Behaviour of Paşoptişti*[1]*"; "Alexandru Ioan Cuza's Role in the Union"; "Theological Education in the United Principalities during the Political Regime of Prince Cuza"; "The Military Work of Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza"; "Nicolae Istrati, Ideologue of the Moldavian Separatism"; "The United Kingdom and the Romanian Issue (1855-1859)"; "The Union of Bucovina with Romania. Milestones and Stages".*

"Having a biblical origin, as Alexandru Zub underlines in the historiographic notes of the book, *the formula <All in one> initially had a metaphysical meaning, inducing the <solidarity> with the Supreme Being, merging into the Absolute. God is portrayed in a mosaic of the 12*[th] *century creating the Sun, Moon and the Stars. Unus Mundus was the immutable and perfect model of the cosmos, to which the earthlings had the duty to relate as well. Becoming Prince of the United Principalities, Alexandru Ioan Cuza considered that there could not be a more effective motto for the role he had assumed than the one that priests always evoked during religious ceremonies ...".* This aspect is presented in one of the topics mentioned here, namely the union of the armed forces of the two Principalities, *"materialised by appointing Colonel Cuza, the Prince, as the head of the armed forces"*, becoming thus the supreme commander of the Romanian Armed Forces. At the same time, we can also mention the creation of the General Staff Corps of the United Principalities, *"thus responding to the need to integrate the armed forces of Moldavia and Wallachia in a homogeneous national military organisation that is capable of giving strength to the national will act on 24 January 1859".*

Organizaţia Naţiunilor Unite – schimbare şi continuitate (The United Nations – Change and Continuity): starting from the reality of perpetual transformation (!) of the UN, in a context in which survival means change, in outlining this paper, the authors take into account several pressing issues such as globalisation, new challenges to security, and the acute gap between the goals of the organisation and the means it has available.

Dr Tiberiu Tănase, Adrian Dumitrescu and **Roxana Tudorache** build the image of this fundamental change, briefly presenting the need for this transformation – reform initiatives and programmes, the issue of UN forces,

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[1] Participants in the Revolution of 1848 in the Romanian provinces.

the protection of human rights; the organisation's responses to asymmetric security threats – environmental degradation and global warming, food insecurity, UN fight against terrorism, UN fight against organised crime. In the authors' opinion, *"the UN can continue to manifest as a significant actor of the world in the circumstance of globalisation. Therefore, the transformation in the system's organisation should be continuously adapted to the new challenges of the millennium, the scope and objectives of transformations being defined".*

The book was published by *Editura Academiei Naţionale de Informaţii "Mihai Viteazul".*

The special English issue of ***Revista Academiei Forţelor Terestre (Land Forces Academy Review)***, dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the General Staff, brings to our attention topics such as: *"General Staff – 150 Years of Existence"; "Contributions to Developing Combat Artillery, Generated by Doctrinal Changes within the General Staff"; "The Combined Joint Task Force"; "Environmental Protection in Military Training Areas"; "Cultural Challenges for the Military Organisation"; "The Global Crisis and the Perspective on Human Security".*

Here are a few thought of the Chief of the Land Forces Staff, Major General Dr Dan Ghica-Radu: *"The General Staff is a flexible structure, capable of training and leading forces in order to develop joint military actions, within the Romanian Army area of operational interest, due to acquiring and building up new skills and knowledge jointly in NATO, EU and OSCE member countries".*

No. 4 of ***Cer Senin (Clear Sky)*** **–** the review of the *Romanian Air Force*, describes aspects of the informal meeting of heads of Air Forces in Europe (7-10.09), held in Poiana Braşov under the name *"The Role Air Forces Can Play in Current and Future Conflicts in Response to the New Challenges, Risks and Threats".*

In the pages of the review, there are two interviews that draw our attention: the first one, with the Chief of the Resources of the Air Force Staff, Colonel University Reader Dr Mihai-Silviu Popescu, and the second one, with Lieutenant General Vasilios Klokozas, head of the Hellenic Air Force.

In the feature report made at 86th Airbase in Feteşti, the commander, Colonel Constantin Dobre, says that the unit, with its facilities and overqualified staff, *"can perform, under NATO command, the entire range of air-ground and air-air missions"*.

The review published by the *Romanian Intelligence Service – **Intelligence***, no. 6, brings to our attention an interview with Filip Teodorescu, former Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence Directorate within the State Security Directorate: *"The citizen should know that intelligence exists since ancient times, in the pre-state entities, and even in the time of the Dacians. Decebal also had agents in Rome. Not to mention the Romans, who had agents in the occupied provinces or the ones about to be occupied. Counterintelligence was born as a necessity to respond to espionage, to opponents"*.

Here are a few topics approached in the review: *"Intelligence Services: Reform or Transformation ?"*, *"Intelligence, state and statehood. The End of Holiday"*, *"The Enigma of Renegades-Defectors from the Former Eastern Communist Bloc in Europe"*, *"Modern Intelligence"*, *"Plan, Planner, Planning"*, *"Open Sources and New Media Technologies"*, *The New Identities of Islam"*, *"Features of Modern Management"*, *"Microtechnologies Used in Surveillance Systems"*.

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

Résumés

Un homme de son temps et de tout temps

L'union des Principautés Roumaines a été l'un des moments difficiles du people roumain, mais aussi un repère sur la voie de l'Etat national roumain de s'en affirmer. Mandaté par la classe politique de son temps et soutenu avec un enthousiasme non dissimulé par le peuple à porter le fardeau de l'accomplissement des idéaux nationaux de ses précurseurs, le colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza a réussi à se relever au niveau de ce choix et de son démesuré responsabilité assumée. L'auteur souligne le patriotisme de Prince Cuza, profondément marqué par les préceptes révolutionnaires clamés au 1848 de l'affirmation des nations libres. Cette année, le 20 Mars, nous célébrons 190 ans depuis la naissance du Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza.

Le management des ressources pour la défense – la gestion des ressources matérielles et financières (II)

Le management des ressources pour la défense doit être une question d'intérêt non seulement pour les décideurs et les experts, mais aussi pour chaque citoyen, parce que la défense nationale et la sécurité représentent notre responsabilité commune. L'auteur souligne qu'il est impossible d'avoir de la défense et sécurité sans ce carburant "spéciale" appelé ressources. C'est pourquoi tous les citoyens vont à reconnaître le rôle des ressources et la corrélation entre ressources, la défense et la sécurité. Les décideurs et les experts doivent envisager la transformation continue et l'évolution de l'environnement de la sécurité afin de gérer efficacement les ressources destinées à défense et sécurité.

Le Commandement logistique interarmées – modalités concrètes d'assurer le soutien logistique

L'article décrit l'effort du Commandement logistique interarmées dans le cadre des missions de la Roumanie qui doivent les accomplir en tant que les États membres de l'OTAN et l'UE. L'auteur met l'accent sur la participation des forces armées roumaines à des opérations multinationales, en particulier en Afghanistan. Pour mieux répondre aux exigences des troupes de combat, a été établi l'élément de soutien national. En outre, la création d'un élément de commandement national est envisagée. Ils sont présentés aussi certains changements structurels et actionnelles en concernant les activités de soutien logistique sur le théâtre des opérations en Afghanistan, en tenant compte de l'importation des concepts et des méthodes qui sont propres à la logistique commerciale.

Afghanistan – entre réalité, désire et patience

L'auteur estime que toute révision de la stratégie de stabilisation pour le développement normal de l'Afghanistan devrait être basée sur une formule simple

et efficace, développée avec le gouvernement qui a décidé de prendre le destin de leur responsabilité, soutenu par la confiance du public et des structures tribales. En outre, le développement social doit être accompagné par une campagne basée sur la communication et de l'économie efficace, pour reconstruire, dans une première étape, les métiers traditionnels comme l'agriculture, l'élevage, l'industrie des tissés à la main. En plus, les relations de bon voisinage et la coopération régionale viennent d'intégrer et de former des échanges élémentaires.

L'Etat, la sécurité et l'environnement international

L'organisation de la sécurité nationale est un sujet d'une préoccupation majeure pour tous les Etats dans le monde entier, comme une conséquence de la diversification et l'accroissement des méthodes et des moyens des actions qui s'y rattachent.

La position géostratégique de notre pays, l'adhésion à l'Union européenne et l'OTAN, la politique cohérente pour maintenir la stabilité interne, ainsi que pour soutenir et en participant activement aux missions de l'Alliance dans divers théâtres d'opérations ont entraîné non seulement un effet positif, mais aussi une série de réactions hostiles de la part de certains Etats.

L'Etat et la mondialisation économique. Est-ce que les Etats subissent un échec ?

Les aspects économiques de la définition de la mondialisation provoquent des mutations profondes dans la mesure où les économies nationales sont concernées. Les pratiques traditionnelles et les politiques ne sont pas appropriées plus dans le contexte de la culture de la complexité des systèmes de gouvernement et de nouvelles conditions imposées par la politique et les transformations

économiques. Le débat sur la capacité des systèmes nationaux de gouverner l'économie est lié, comme l'auteur souligne, sur le fait que l'autorité publique, la légitimité et la capacité à élaborer et mettre en œuvre efficacement les politiques sont érodées et minées à la fois à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur.

Considérations sur les relations OTAN-Russie

En tenant compte des arguments d'un dialogue efficace et de la coopération entre l'OTAN et la Russie, les évolutions des dernières décennies, les leçons apprises par les deux parts, des intérêts communs et divergents, l'auteur suggère que les relations doivent être régies par les cinq principes: le dialogue, l'équilibre, la prévisibilité, la confiance et l'honnêteté. Ces principes pourraient sembler idéals, étant donné que dans notre monde il y a des principes, mais aussi des intérêts. Mais l'auteur croit fermement que si quelqu'un veut rester fidèle à ses engagements, il doit agir en conformité avec des principes clairs et forts.

La présence des forces américaines en Roumanie et Bulgarie – l'impacte sur la sécurité régionale

La présence des forces américaines en Roumanie et en Bulgarie est réglementée par des accords bilatéraux et des modalités d'exécution. Pour l'allié américain, les emplacements en Roumanie sont attrayants de point de vue militaire, stratégique, social et culturel, ainsi que en ce qui concerne les infrastructures existantes et les possibilités de logistique.

L'instruction commune de la Roumanie et de Bulgarie engendrera l'accomplissement de l'interopérabilité et fournira aux troupes américaines la possibilité pour une instruction efficace dans les polygones roumaines et bulgares.

Les capacités de surveillance sur le littoral roumain – facteur de renforcement de la sécurité sur la Mer Noire

Les systèmes de surveillance vont maintenir la fluidité de la navigation, la coordination de l'action de la marine pour montrer la présence navale dans les voies de circulation de la marine commerciale et pour soutenir le processus de décision pris par la composante de commandement de la Marine.

La surveillance contribue essentiellement à réaliser une bonne compréhension de la situation dans la zone de responsabilité afin d'éviter ou au moins de réduire les risques de mal interpréter l'action des navires à proximité des eaux territoriales.

La piraterie maritime moderne – un nouveau risque de sécurité dans le XXIe siècle

La piraterie moderne, active au large des côtes de la Somalie, est l'un des risques de sécurité plus récents qui affecte principalement la dimension économique de la sécurité et conduit à relever de nombreux défis. A résoudre le problème du piratage nécessite une bonne compréhension de ses causes. La solution à cette menace n'est pas en mer, mais sur la terre. Compte tenu du fait que la Somalie est un état d'échec et qu'elle n'a pas mis en place les outils adéquats pour lutter contre la menace, la communauté internationale doit fournir le type de droit de réponse.

La mondialisation des approches politiques, juridiques et militaires pour assurer la sécurité internationale par la gestion des crises (I)

Dans le contexte de l'amplification de la criminalité transfrontalière, de l'expansion du terrorisme, la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, l'approfondissement de la pauvreté, c'est la préservation de la sécurité internationale qui est devenue l'une des priorités actuelles de l'humanité, consciente que l'éradication de ces fléaux ne peut être atteinte que par une coalition d'Etats du monde dans les domaines politique, juridique et militaire. La réalisation de cet objectif est soumise aux décideurs à renforcer la coopération pour assurer la paix et la stabilité mondiales, le respect des droits individuels et des libertés fondamentales.

Repères actuelles des opérations expéditionnaires de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord

Les opérations expéditionnaires se concentrent sur deux principaux défis, qui couvrent une importance centrale sur l'agenda de l'Alliance: le premier défi, comme l'auteur souligne, est d'acquérir des forces qui sont disponibles, déployables et soutenables dans les bases multinationales. Il est nécessaire aussi de maintenir le soutien public à l'effort d'Alliance pour effectuer ces opérations, qui se développent à longue distance de la maison. Par conséquent, nous devons assurer un environnement de sécurité internationale, qui est un système de systèmes plus complexes – nations, groupes, organisations, personnes.

Le binôme PSYOPS & CIMIC dans les opérations (II)

Les capacités PSYOPS soient utilisées efficacement et effectivement à gagner le soutien des activités réalisées par des civils. En particulier, le succès du CIMIC offre de nombreux sujets qui doivent être évalués et exploités par des opérations psychologiques liés à la production et la distribution d'imprimés et de produits audio-visuels. Selon les auteurs, les thèmes et les messages du PSYOPS doivent

être soutenu par CIMIC afin de génér la légitimité de la force d'intervention et de la confiance des populations locales dans l'armée, ce qui entraîne également des avis favorables et justifie les attitudes de coopération entre groupes de membres de l'auditoire.

Les opérations post conflits et la contribution de la pouvoir aérienne interarmées

Les opérations post conflits, avec un caractère militaire or d'autre nature, représentent un très important domaine de recherche, qui n'a pas encore été profondément exploré. Cet article vise à discuter l'environnement de sécurité mondiale actuel qui influence la nouvelle politique et les objectifs militaires stratégiques. L'auteur souligne la problématique des activités post conflits en délimitant leur position dans la structure des opérations interarmées majeures. L'auteur présente aussi une liste avec les types d'opérations post conflits et analyse la contribution de la pouvoir aérienne dans le processus de stabilisation et de reconstruction.

Le trafique aérien est-il en impasse ?

Le système de gestion du trafic aérien comprend un éventail impressionnant des règlements, des procédures d'exploitation et des services d'infrastructure qui réalisent ensemble le concept opérationnel. Cela détermine la façon dont les opérations aériennes sont atteintes, en tenant compte des ressources, des rôles et des responsabilités de parts impliqués. Ce système a une évolution continue de 1944 à ce jour, en améliorant les procédures et les règlements des progrès technologiques, pour atteindre les niveaux de sécurité et de sûreté enviés par tout autre système de transport

Le rôle et l'utilité de la force militaire pour accomplir les objectifs politiques du XXIe siècle

L'article présente quelques considérations en concernant le rôle et l'utilité de la force militaire comme un instrument d'accomplir les objectifs politiques de notre siècle. À cet égard, l'auteur analyse certaines opinions des penseurs universitaires et militaires sur cette question, ainsi que les conclusions de l'expérience de l'auteur. La conclusion est que, même si l'asymétrie semble être dans une voie ascendante aujourd'hui, le rôle de l'Etat continuera toutefois d'influer l'utilité de la force militaire dans ce siècle.

Les menaces non-étatiques et le nouveau paradigme de la sécurité – les groupes armés dans la Stratégie de la sécurité nationale de la Roumanie

L'article présente les nouveaux défis visant la sécurité après la guerre froide et détermine un dialogue vers le nouveau paradigme de sécurité. L'émergence des groupes armés, la nature des menaces terroristes et le nombre accru des Etats faibles ou échoués fournissent de nouveaux conditions et périls. L'article analyse aussi la manière dont ces échanges sont relevés dans la Stratégie de sécurité de la Roumanie et offre des conclusions sur la nécessité d'adopter une stratégie adéquate en ce qui concerne les groupes armées non-étatiques.

La crise financière fera-t-elle de la Chine une superpuissance ?

L'ordre économique et politique créé par les Etats-Unis a déterminé un milieu favorable pour le développement de Chine. Ainsi Chine s'est ralliée au jeu des Etats-Unis et a eu plus de bienfaits de système international

maintenu par les Etats-Unis. Les bienfaits de Beijing inciteront Chine d'accepter la position de Washington, celle de leader. S'elles sont bien gestionées, les pouvoir hard et soft de la Chine augmenteront en plus après la fin de la crise financière, mais les Etats-Unis seront toujours uniques. Les Etats-Unis et Chine sont deux pays partenaires et elles ne sont pas dans une compétition.

Les nouveaux champs de mort ?

Les profits énormes de la criminalité ne sont pas le résultat exclusivement des drogues. Dès 2001, les groupes des *takfiri* et des insurgents des les deux parts de la Ligne Durrand ont élargis leur implication dans une gamme vaste d'activités du domaine de la criminaliste. Les rapts se sont devenus une préoccupation qui a une ampleur graduelle. Les groupes insurgents collaborent pour voler des hommes d'affaire cousus d'or pour les vendre,

ensuite, à leurs familles. Dans le théâtre d'opérations, les insurgents font trafic des êtres et vendent des émeraudes sur le marché noir.

L'Etat Major General et l'attitude de la Roumanie à l'égard de désarmement pendant la période de l'entre-deux-guerres

Pendant la Conférence de la Désarmement, déroulée en six sections, entre les ans 1926 et 1930, les débats ont été concentrés sur deux thèses. La thèse française supposait la diminution des armements de l'assurance de la sécurité des Etats et préconisait un contrôle sévère des armements, en établissant un accord adéquat entre le désarmement terrestre, naval et aérien. L'auteur souligne aussi la thèse anglaise, qui est parti de la notion du "potentiel militaire" qui était plus complexe pour être prise en considération et rejetait le contrôle international.

Version française par Alina PAPOI

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