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# Romanian Military Thinking



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## EDITORIAL STAFF ADDRESS

Bucharest, Izvor Street, No. 13-15, Sector 5  
Telephone: +4021.410.40.40/1001731; 1001732  
Tel/Fax: +4021.319.56.63  
<http://www.defense.ro/gmr>

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# ***Romanian Military Thinking***

Military Theory and Science Journal

Published by the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff



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
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# *NATO*

## *– from Expectation to Certitude –*

**S**ix decades ago, on April 4, 1949, the USA and other 11 European countries agreed on the establishment of an element meant to secure and guarantee the democratic regimes threatened by the Communist scourge that seemed contagious in a Europe shaken by war, thus achieving a performance that was worth envying: discouraging, through making the adversary acknowledge its potential for riposte, any attempt to assault the European democratic values and to limit the *evil* that struggled hard to extend over our old continent and to impose a strange, unnatural and inhumane social system on it.

A political-military alliance generating security and, consequently, stability in a Europe that was vulnerable through its own suspicion and fragile because of its frequent ideological oscillations, NATO was an aspiration we had to nurture, for a long time, only expecting that one day we could express our own option.

Situated, through the force of an unjust fate, at the edge of some empires whose fluid borders used to be overstepped, Romania often had to seek for alliances to protect its national essence and to fulfil the destiny that was in store for it in this corner of the continent. The choice it made or, many times, the imposition of the allies did not always prove to be the most fortunate one.

When, after breaking loose from a system that was alien to the spirit of our people, we created the favourable conditions for an intelligent choice, we opted, in a broad national consensus, at the beginning of the '90s, to join an alliance that we sincerely envied yet we wanted to be part of it.

We chose what we believed to be most suitable for us to be guaranteed a genuine security, in the spirit of our nation real values that proved to be democratic. We opted for collective defence within NATO.

As it was natural, the process of accession followed a *road map*, far from having been merely formal. Besides the interest in the own security

the North Atlantic Alliance sought to safeguard in this area, the states that aspired to become members of the Alliance had to demonstrate their will to achieve it. Romania proved it wanted and was able to do it. Taking part in a race at the end of which it had to win, Romania mobilised its full potential to sip out of the victory cup on April 5, 2004, when it adhered to the North Atlantic Treaty. Raising our tricolour at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels marked the moment of achieving a major national desideratum, that of being part of a system that can offer the most important security guarantee possible in the world today.

Our coming back in the great family of democratic nations was accompanied by a strong engagement and sacrifices that were mostly felt by the military. Vector of stability and element of genuine credibility, the Romanian Armed Forces were the main artisan and the most powerful engine of this national effort. Their role of fundamental actor in the accession process, played with abnegation and devotion, has to be fully recognised.

At the end of a road that was not easy at all and that was sometimes obstructed by the hesitations of a political class that did not remain connected to the challenge of the final goal all the time, the armed forces demonstrated, in an exemplary way, that they understood to assume the own reform as a prerequisite for the accomplishment of their new missions within NATO. It is because the Alliance is not only an umbrella to safeguard its members. Besides the security guarantees the Alliance offers, being a member of it requires seriousness and political maturity.

The transformation of the military body, necessary for it to tailor to the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance, has entailed generating and supporting an ample restructuring process that, although painful for a part of the military, aims at achieving full interoperability with allied armed forces. Assuming this transformation as a key instrument for the enhancement of the state armed power has obviously led to the Romanian Armed Forces being credited as supplier of regional stability and security within the Alliance. The engagement, alongside with the partner armed forces, in the fight against terrorism, in NATO-led operations, is a certain proof of the Romanian Armed Forces assuming and responsibly fulfilling their obligations within the Alliance.

A change in attitude at the level of the strategic vision, as well as at the level of the individual mindset and at the one of the military culture in general, was indeed necessary. The capacity to adapt to novelty, the enthusiasm in accomplishing missions alongside the militaries in the Alliance have eloquently proved the Romanian militaries wish to be equal partners with the ones filling similar positions in NATO.

The level of training, the capacity to relate to partners, the spirit of teamwork, the ability to assume the decision-making process with responsibility have been highlighted by not only the engagement of some detachments in some of the hottest spots in the theatres of operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, but also by the fact that some Romanian generals and officers have become members of the Alliance strategic operations command teams.

Therefore, we aspire to the values NATO can generate and guarantee, but we have to assume the role of investors and contribute to the enrichment of the Alliance patrimony with our own identity, our Romanian values and traditions as part of the values of the democratic world we belong to again. This world will treat us as equals as long as we are able to confirm we deserve this place.

Hoping and having the certitude that the option to join NATO was an intelligent and inspired one, dictated by the need to align with the values in the modern world, we therefore have to meet the requirements of the present as a debt of honour for the future. We wish to have a future in the great family of the democratic world for many years ahead, a family to which we have always deserved to belong.

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

*English version by  
Diana Cristiana LUPU*





# OTAN

## – de l'espoir à la certitude –

**I**l y a six décennies, le 4 avril 1949, les Etats-Unis et 11 pays européens ont légiférés la formation d'un élément de sécurité et de garantie des régimes démocratiques menacés par le fléau du communisme influençable dans une Europe secouée par la guerre, en achevant une performance digne d'une réputation enviable: la dissuasion, par la sensibilisation d'adversaires, de son potentiel de répondre, à toute tentative d'attenter aux valeurs européennes de démocratie et de limiter *le mal* qui essayait d'étendre fortement sur notre vieux continent et d'imposer un système social étranger, non naturel, inhumain.

Alliance politico-militaire génératrice de sécurité et, implicitement, de stabilité dans une Europe vulnérable par sa suspicion et fragile souvent en raison de ses oscillations idéologiques, l'OTAN a représenté depuis longtemps une aspiration que nous avons été obligés d'en nourrir seulement par l'espoir qu'il viendra un jour où nous sommes en mesure d'exprimer notre choix.

Située, par la force d'un destin injuste, au bord de grandes empires dont ses frontières fluides ont toujours sorti de leurs racines, la Roumanie a souvent été contrainte de chercher le refuge des alliances qui permettraient de protéger son être nationale et d'accomplir son destin avec qu'elle l'a reçu implicitement dans ce coin de continent. Et le choix ou surtout l'imposition des Alliés n'a pas été toujours avéré le meilleur.

Et quand, après la libération d'un système étranger pour l'esprit de notre peuple, nous avons créé les conditions favorables d'un choix intelligent, nous avons opté, dans un large consensus national, au début des années '90, pour rejoindre à une alliance qui, dans notre honnêteté, nous en avons envie et nous y voulons devenir membre.

Nous avons choisi ce que nous avons pensé de mieux y adapter pour assurer une sécurité réelle, dans l'esprit de véritables valeurs, prouvées démocratiques, de notre peuple. Nous avons opté pour la défense collective au sein de l'OTAN.

Comme il était naturel, le processus d'adhésion a eu une *feuille de route*, loin de se limiter à une simple formalité. Au-delà de ses propres intérêts en matière de sécurité dont l'Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord a cherché à satisfaire dans ce domaine, il était obligatoire une manifestation de volonté de la part des pays qui aspirent au statut de membre de l'Alliance. Et la Roumanie a prouvé qu'elle veut et peut cela. Entrée dans une course vers le bout elle était obligée de gagner, notre pays a mobilisé tout son potentiel pour se réjouisse de la coupe de victoire à partir du 5 avril 2004, quand elle a rejoint le Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. Le fait d'arborer notre tricolore au siège général de l'OTAN à Bruxelles a été le moment de réaliser un objectif national majeur, celui de faire partie d'un système qui nous offre la meilleure garantie de sécurité en vigueur dans le monde d'aujourd'hui.

Naturellement, notre retour dans la grande famille des nations démocratiques a été réalisé par un profond engagement et par des sacrifices que, de toute évidence, les militaires ont ressentis le plus. Vecteur de stabilité et élément d'une réelle crédibilité, l'Armée Roumaine a été le principal artisan et le plus puissant moteur de cet effort national. Son rôle d'acteur principal dans le processus d'adhésion, joué par dévouement et professionnalisme, doit être pleinement reconnu.

A la fin d'une route pas facile, obturée parfois par des hésitations d'une classe politique qui n'a pas toujours été reliée à la tension de but, l'armée a prouvé, dans une manière exemplaire, qu'elle a compris d'assumer sa propre réforme, comme une condition d'accomplir ses nouvelles missions au sein de l'OTAN. Parce que cette Alliance n'est pas seulement un parapluie protecteur. Au-delà des frontières de sécurité offertes, c'est l'Alliance qui oblige à la sobriété, à un degré de maturité politique.

La transformation de l'armée, imposée comme la nécessité de s'adapter aux structures de l'Alliance, a impliqué la production et le soutien d'un vaste processus de restructuration, qui, même si douloureux pour certaines de l'armée, a proposé de réaliser une pleine interopérabilité avec les armées des pays alliés. Compte tenu de ce processus, comme un outil-clé pour accroître la puissance militaire de l'Etat, cette transformation a conduit, bien sûr, à la possibilité de reconnaître l'Armée Roumaine en tant que fournisseur de la stabilité et la sécurité régionale au sein de l'Alliance. Aussi son engagement à côté des armées des pays partenaires dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, dans les opérations dirigées par l'OTAN, c'est la preuve manifeste d'assumer et d'accomplir incontestablement ses obligations au sein de cette alliance.

Il a fallu, bien entendu, un changement d'attitude de la vision stratégique, mais aussi au niveau du mental individuel, de la culture militaire, en général. La capacité d'adapter à un nouvel élan d'accomplir les missions aux côtés

de militaires de l'Alliance ont prouvé, de façon éloquent, le désir des militaires roumaines d'être partenaires égaux avec ses homologues de l'OTAN.

La capacité de formation, la mise en réseau avec les partenaires, l'esprit d'équipe, le fait d'assumer avec responsabilité la prise de décision ont été non seulement par l'emploi des escadrons dans les unes des plus chauds endroits sur les théâtres des opérations dans les Balkans, en Iraq et en Afghanistan, mais aussi la cooptation de généraux et officiers roumaines dans les équipes de gestion stratégique des opérations de l'Alliance.

Donc, nous désirons vers les valeurs que l'OTAN les génère et les garanties, mais nous devons assumer aussi le rôle des investisseurs pour enrichir le patrimoine de l'Alliance avec notre identité, avec les valeurs et les traditions de la nationalité roumaine dans le cadre des valeurs du monde démocratique dans lequel nous sommes rentrés. Et ce monde nous traitera de la même façon aussi longtemps que nous serons en mesure de confirmer cette place.

Avec l'espoir et la certitude que l'adhésion à l'OTAN a été l'une intelligente et heureuse, dictée par la nécessité de s'adapter aux valeurs du monde moderne, de se tenir debout donc à cette hauteur, comme une dette d'honneur pour l'avenir. Sur lequel nous le voulons, de nombreuses années avant, dans la grande famille du monde démocratique. Là où, d'ailleurs, nous avons toujours notre place.

*Version française par Alina PAPOI*



# **ROMANIA IN NATO**

## **– Achievements and Aspirations Five Years after Accession –**

*Admiral Dr Gheorghe MARIN*



**O**n April 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2004, Romania's national flag was raised, together with the ones of the other 25 states, at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The event marked the end of a period of great transformations in the Romanian society, the military body implicitly, materialised in the expression of our country steady option of adhering to the West-European democratic values and of defending them through the agency of the instruments that are specific to collective security.

There have been five years since then, to which the 55 years of existence of the North Atlantic Alliance add. Therefore, in April 2009, six decades of NATO will be celebrated through an anniversary summit, hosted symbolically by France and Germany, two states that have managed to find, through dialogue and respect, a way to pass from political and military confrontation to union and cooperation.

The Strasbourg-Kehl NATO Summit will be the most important political event of the year both through its anniversary significance and through the decisions that will be adopted regarding the future of the Alliance.

Throughout the 60 years of existence, NATO has evolved from an alliance of 12 states to one of 26 – 28 in the not-so-far future – and from a purely Euro-centric alliance to a security provider that is involved and engaged on many continents and has successfully shifted from security through competition to security through cooperation.

The agenda of the anniversary summit in April 2009 is highly ambitious. The heads of state and government are requested to make decisions mainly

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Admiral Dr Gheorghe Marin – the Chief of the General Staff.

regarding the optimisation of the engagements in Afghanistan, the transformation of the Alliance capabilities, the enlargement and enhancement of the cooperation with various global actors. At the same time, the summit will represent a landmark in the debate regarding the key elements of NATO's new strategic concept, the future of the Alliance and, implicitly, its role in the general security architecture.

The permanent transformation of the Alliance indicates the need for its continuous adaptation to the evolution of the security environment, whose consequences consist in cultural and institutional changes.

In this context, we are right to wonder what place and role Romania holds in this solid establishment, oriented towards defending democratic values as well as the freedom and security of the member states.

To answer that, we should think back to the reasons that made our country decide to become a member of the Alliance, the actions carried out by Romanians, the military especially, in order to fulfil this objective and the rights and obligations that derive from the achieved status.

The political and military arguments that determined our country's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance were first of all generated by the need for providing national security in the circumstances of the end of the *Cold War* and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty.

Our country's option was also favoured by the openness of the organisation towards receiving new members from the young democracies in Eastern and Central Europe. For Romania, NATO has represented the model of the profile of European and transatlantic democracy and cooperation.

The institutional forms of cooperation proposed by NATO had the desired effect. Therefore, Romania was the first state to sign, on January 26<sup>th</sup>, 1994, the Framework-Document of the Partnership for Peace, thus confirming the determination of the entire Romanian society to re-become part of the community of European and Euro-Atlantic values through observing human rights and enhancing the rule of law.

For Romania, the 10 years of participation in the PfP represented a period of preparing and consolidating the candidacy for the Euro-Atlantic structures, of focusing on the actions meant to develop the interoperability of the Romanian armed forces with the ones of the other NATO member states and to strengthen the role of our country as a security factor at the regional level.

Romania was actively involved in the actions within PfP, NATO operations included, such as those in the Balkans, participating in over 3 300 activities, which covered a broad range of actions, from information ones to complex exercises.



All these helped us increase our degree of interoperability and thus get closer to meeting the requirements of modern armed forces in terms of structure and function, professional training, command and control.

Perhaps no one received the decision in Madrid in 1997, which placed Romania outside the borders of the Alliance, with feelings as contradictory as the military did, because they knew they were capable of meeting the exigencies – and they were acknowledged for that – and had to accept the fact that the democratisation and modernisation of the society “*unfolded*” at another speed. Other five years of efforts, of firm, sometimes unpopular measures followed, aimed at tailoring the structure of forces of the Romanian Armed Forces to meet the requirements of the other NATO member countries armed forces. The moment Prague 2002 marked an accomplishment that was assumed without reservation by the entire society, as a confirmation of a just option, officially materialised in the decision for Romania to be accepted in NATO in March 2004.

During the transformation process, the Romanian Armed Forces have clearly defined several firm objectives, correlated with the Alliance ones: to obtain a structure of deployable, sustainable, interoperable, flexible forces, with a proper protection capability, equipped with modern combat means, capable of fulfilling the entire range of planned missions.

In the actions meant to implement the provisions of the strategy, the forces that could be made available for the Alliance have been established and operationalised, through a process consisting of many phases, in accordance with the requirements of our partners and the concrete possibilities to achieve them.

The presence of Romanian soldiers in NATO-led missions has increased every year. Romania has assumed not only the task of carrying out routine missions but also attributions of command and control at the tactical and operational echelons.


The fact that in only two years after the accession our country had the privilege to organise the most important NATO summit lately is a proof of the Alliance trust in Romania’s capacity to fulfil its obligations and assume the role of credible partner, a security provider and not just a security consumer.

How is the future of the Alliance seen in the Romanian Armed Forces ? From the perspective of the relation with the UN and its involvement in the fight against terrorism, NATO has become, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, an organisation that actively and complexly contributes to global security, yet, without altering its feature of a Euro-Atlantic alliance. In this context, the 2009 summit will be extremely important for the orientation of the process meant to draw up the new strategic concept

and to define the role of the Alliance in the current security environment. The public opinion is interested in NATO's response to the new threats – terrorism, cyber or energy security, anti-missile defence – as well as in the extent to which the Alliance, together with other international organisations, will find a way to comprehensively approach the issue of instability areas of cross-border threats.

Defining the strategic concept will be a difficult process because of the complex issues involved by its formulation. The security declaration that will be adopted during the 2009 anniversary summit will set the tone and strategic direction of the process of drawing up the new concept in order to realistically and responsibly reconfigure the most important political, military and security force that has ever existed on this planet and in which Romania has participated for five years now.

*English version by*  
*Iulia NĂSTASIE*





## SIX DECADES SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO

Colonel (r.) Dr Petre OTU

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*On March 17<sup>th</sup>, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed being, for 50 years, the first form of coalition of the Western European states with the purpose of defending security.*

*Through Article IV, the most important one, the signatory states committed to afford reciprocal aid, military included, against any aggression. In the preamble of the document, Germany was explicitly mentioned both to spare the Soviet Union's suspicions and to draw France in, as the country could not forget about its past relations with its Northern neighbour.*

*In this context, the emergence of NATO represented a major event in international relations that were marked by the beginning of a completely new phenomenon – the Cold War. It was for the first time in history that the two sides of the Atlantic were connected through a formal agreement, which united their destinies.*

**Keywords:** *Cold War; Marshall Plan; Soviet expansionism; Europe's reconstruction; collective security; political-military bloc*

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At the beginning of April 2009, there will have been six decades since one of the most important events of the European and world history in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance. The anniversary has a special significance for Romania, a country that joined this political-military organisation in 2004, after 35 years of being part of the opposing bloc – the Warsaw Pact, together with other states in Central and Southeastern Europe.

The accession to NATO, an alliance that survived the bipolar confrontation in the years of the *Cold War*, and to the European Union (2007) represents, in a way, a “*historical revenge*” for the Romanians, who, at the end of the Second World War, were placed by the planetary political game under the Soviet influence. Through the two successive accessions, which do not lack internal controversies, as well as reticence on the part of the allies, Romania reintegrated in the Western world it was already part of through language, culture, civilisation and psychological factor and to which it rightfully owed its statehood.

That is why I reckon that recalling the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty in this

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Colonel (r.) Dr Petre Otu – Deputy Director, the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History.

anniversary year is useful both scientifically, as it pays its contribution to a better knowledge of a long-concealed subject, and as far as its practical purpose is concerned, because Romania's fundamental goal is to strengthen the status of member of this alliance.

### The Beginning of the *Cold War*. The Containment Doctrine

The *Cold War*, one of the most important research subjects in the last two decades, is “the general term for the post-1945 political, ideological, strategic and military conflict between the Western allies led by the United States and the Soviet Union and other communist countries”<sup>1</sup>. The principle that lay at its basis was defined by Raymond Aron as *unlikely war, impossible peace*: unlikely because nuclear deterrence did not allow the two superpowers to move from a “cold” conflict to a “hot” one, and impossible because the objectives of the US and the USSR were antagonistic to the end of the war<sup>2</sup>.

The *Cold War* included several areas of confrontation, one of them being the political-military, where each of the two superpowers created a sphere of influence and a military-political bloc – NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively.

The creation of the North Atlantic Pact, at the end of the '40, was a very important event, which resulted from the intense debates of the early years after the war, carried out on the two sides of the Atlantic, on how to deal with the aggressive policy of the Soviet Union of those years. Mention should be made that after Roosevelt's death (April 1945), disagreements between the two superpowers became increasingly large, thus the *Great Alliance* during the war, which ensured victory in the greatest conflict in the history of humankind, gradually transforming in the *Great Confrontation*.

The two great powers had different interests and visions regarding post-war world organisation so that it can be said that at the origin of the two antagonistic blocs of the *Cold War* years mutual anxiety lay, materialised in the classic “*security dilemma*”. In fact, the debates in the American historiography regarding the causes that led to the bipolar confrontation of the post-war period outlined three major orientations: **traditional**, **revisionist** and the one of **shared responsibilities (post-revisionist)**.

We do not intend to approach in depth the long debate that, under certain forms, continues today. We will bear in mind that, according to **traditionalists**, the outbreak of the *Cold War* and the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance were

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Parish, *Enciclopedia războiului rece*, translated by Ion Nastasia, Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2002, p. 243.

<sup>2</sup> Pascal Boniface, *Relațiile Est-Vest. 1945-1991*, Institutul European, Iași, 1998, p. 20.

the direct result of Moscow's expansionism in the early post-war years, expressed both in Central and Southeastern Europe, as well as in the Far East. Therefore, it was a normal reaction to defend own security in an international environment in which the US had undeniable advantages – an atomic monopoly and clear air superiority.

**Revisionism** occurred in the '60s, being the theoretical product of the US "New Left". It developed against the backdrop of the US engagement in the Vietnam War being, to a certain extent, a reaction against the government policy of that time. The supporters of this trend, grouped in the so-called "Wisconsin School", were placed in opposition to the ideas of traditionalists, considering that they had underestimated the weaknesses of the Soviet Union in the early years after the war and exaggerated the threat it represented. Instead, the active role of the USA in the disintegration of the "Great Alliance" was not mentioned and neither was the fact that the measures taken, such as, for example, the "Marshall Plan", sought to acquire the US economic expansion.

In the '70s, revisionism was replaced with the trend called "**post-revisionist**" or of "**shared responsibilities**". According to the followers of this trend (John Lewis Gaddis, Martin McCauley, Thomas Paterson, Marc Trachtenberg etc.), the blame for the outbreak of the *Cold War* was put on both superpowers that had wrong perceptions about their intentions and actions. Starting from this, reactions escalated and confrontation replaced the previous cooperation. The insufficient communication between the two superpowers, bad diplomacy, fear and mutual suspicion, doubled by the bipolar structure of the post-war balance of power, in the circumstances of the reducing share of other actors in the international system, were the main factors of post-war confrontation and division of Europe that came to be known as the "Iron curtain", after the famous phrase of Winston Churchill.

After the end of the *Cold War*, the analysis and interpretation of the origins and evolution of the North Atlantic Pact have expanded, the number and quality of historical sources increasing considerably, including through the access to the documents of the former enemy, the Warsaw Pact, (self)dissolved in 1991, even if it yet proves to be far from satisfactory, especially as regards the ex-Soviet archives. Therefore, the debate has become freer and the findings have had a greater degree of scientific accuracy.

One of the conclusions drawn from recent research is that Soviet expansionism in the early post-war years was a reality, despite the difficult situation of the Soviet Union, especially as far as its economy was concerned<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> See John L. Gaddis (real name – Robert A. Lovett), *We Now Know; Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford University Press, 1997; *The Cold War: a New History*, Penguin Press, 2005.

Therefore, the political conduct adopted by the USA and its allies in the early post-war years was essential to counter the Soviet Union. It resulted in the already famous “*Truman Doctrine*”, after the name of US President Harry S. Truman, the successor of F. D. Roosevelt, who died on 12 April 1945. The development of this political-strategic doctrine required a longer period, the US Administration initially trying to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union during the war. Nevertheless, a number of Moscow’s actions generated concerns in many European capitals as well as in Washington. Among these, two were of particular importance. The first of them considered the possibility that the Red Army, which obtained impressive results in the last two years of the Second World War, could be headed towards West, in Germany, France and other European countries. The second was the prospect that the communist parties in Western Europe, particularly in France and Italy, could seize power, because of the precarious economic situation and social disorders<sup>4</sup>.

In the light of historical research, both have proved if not false, at least exaggerated, the Soviet Union being exhausted because of the war effort. Stalin, although he had assumed the expansionist programme of Russian tsars, had neither the intention nor the capability to unleash a new conflict with former partners. His aim was apparently more modest, the creation of a “*security belt*” respectively, a “*strategic glacis*”, to prevent attacks against the Soviet government, as it happened on 22 June 1941. Introducing the Soviet model in the countries in its sphere of influence, which resulted from the agreements within the coalition of the United Nations in the last years of the war, represented the second stage of Moscow’s plans.

In Washington, things were perceived differently, so that Stalin’s actions aroused many concerns. These were expressed in a series of diplomatic documents, among which the *Long Telegram* sent on 22 February 1946 by George Kennan, diplomat at the American embassy in Moscow<sup>5</sup>. It reviewed the policy of the Russian Empire, then continued by the Bolshevik regime, its expansionist actions, as they appeared at that time, as an expression of the system. Kennan addressed several major issues: the main causes of the Soviet foreign policy; its historical and ideological

<sup>4</sup> Jean-François Soulet, *Istoria comparată a statelor comuniste, din 1945 până în zilele noastre*, translated by Silvia Albișteanu and Ana Zbarcea, Editura Polirom; Iași, 1998, pp. 11-39; Peter Calvocoressi, *Rușești rândurile. Al doilea război mondial și configurarea Europei postbelice*, translated by Liliana Anghel, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2000, p. 155.

<sup>5</sup> For details, see Liviu C. Țărău, *Între Washington și Moscova. România. 1945-1965. Politicile de securitate națională ale SUA și URSS și impactul lor asupra României (1945-1965)*, Editura Tribuna, Cluj-Napoca, 2005, pp. 126-142; in this chapter the historiography regarding the origins and development of the *Cold War* in its early stages is presented.

roots; the conceptions of the Kremlin leaders, the repercussions on the Soviet foreign policy. In his opinion, Moscow conceived world politics from the perspective of a gap between capitalism and socialism, the Soviet Union having the feeling of a capitalist encirclement. This perception overlapped with the traditional Russian feeling of insecurity that was the result of two historical factors: the agrarian condition of the Russian state and the fear of the contact with the West that was much more developed economically and socially. Against this background, the Leninist-Marxist doctrine overlapped, which became the appropriate vehicle for the feeling of insecurity of the communist regime, in the shape of an expansionist conduct. Kenan appreciated that Moscow's policy sought to strengthen its international status, considering for this purpose the total destruction of the opposing party. In addition, the Kremlin could exploit the contradictions inherent in the capitalist system, undermining the edifice of the Western states from the inside. Therefore, a firm policy was required, but not necessarily that of using war, to hinder the plans for territorial expansion of the USSR. Subsequently, the same diplomat published, at the beginning of 1947, in *Foreign Affairs* journal, the article *"The Sources of Soviet Conduct"*, in which he resumed and systematised the ideas expressed in the above-mentioned document.

Until this episode, which marked the final, theoretical phase, the *"Truman Doctrine"* was set and the confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union was already a reality. Based on Kenan's ideas, H. Freeman Matthews, an official of the Department of State, drafted a memorandum of operational foreign policy. Taking into account Moscow's foreign policy, the document demanded that Moscow would be persuaded to draw back, first by diplomatic means, and if that was not possible, through military means. Mention should be made that Matthews considered the disputes between the USA and USSR in geopolitical terms, as the first controlled the air and sea, and the second the continental mass of Eurasia. Therefore, the relations between the two superpowers that emerged victorious in the second world conflagration gave expression to the conflict between maritime and continental powers, which has remained a constant in the evolution of humankind since the formation of states. The conclusion of the study was that the Soviet armed forces could be countered only in some areas by the air and naval power of the United States and its allies. Other studies followed, which deepened and detailed the ways through which the United States could oppose the Soviet expansionism, significantly manifested in the early post-war years.

The *"Truman Doctrine"*, also known as the "containment" doctrine, became official on 12 March 1947, when the President asked the American Congress to provide aid to Greece and Turkey, on which Moscow's expansionist plans were

focused. Although real, the support for the two countries that had an important geostrategic position was more a pretext for launching a doctrine that showed the US global involvement in the post-war world. It was undoubtedly a historic moment that marked a rupture in the tradition of the American foreign policy until then, which was under the spectrum of the “*Monroe Doctrine*” (1823), Washington assuming the role of defender of the “*free world*” before the “*empire of evil*”, the Soviet Union respectively, portrayed in the bleakest colours possible.

The launch of the “*Truman Doctrine*” generated various reactions in the American society, both for and against it. According to H. Kissinger, the critical perspective subsumed under three major directions<sup>6</sup>.

The first one belonged to W. Churchill, former British Prime Minister, who wanted closer cooperation with countries in the Eastern part of the continent, as the basis for post-war order. The second came from the former head of the State Department, Henry Wallace, for whom the “*containment policy*” was an affair that jeopardised America’s fate in the world. Finally, the third one resulted in the critical analysis conducted by the renowned journalist Walter Lippman in a series of articles published in September 1947. In his opinion, the “*containment policy*” was a utopia, because precise criteria for interventions in different regions of the world were not set, on the contrary, there was the risk of the dispersion of US military forces along the borders of the huge Soviet Empire. The solution provided by Lippman was returning to the balance of power in Europe by adopting an offensive attitude, to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces within its borders. Despite this criticism, the Truman Doctrine represented an important milestone in the American strategic thinking, expressing the new geopolitical and geostrategic role of the USA in the post-war era.

Being in force, practically, during the entire *Cold War* period, the “*containment policy*” bore several characteristics, which had been visible, in fact, even since its crystallisation. Thus, it had an ambiguous character, recognised by its promoters. It did not state very clearly what should be fought against – the Soviet Union and its expansionist policy or communism as a general doctrine stipulating the elimination of capitalism, a system considered historically outdated? Moreover, throughout debates, there were no stipulations regarding the countries and regimes that had to be defended<sup>7</sup>.

Some of them were not morally worthy of this and other commitments could not be contingent with the interests of the US security. The materialisation

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<sup>6</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomația*, translated by Mircea Ștefancu, Radu Paraschivescu, Editura All, București, 2002, p. 420.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 394-395.



of “containment” (military, economic, political etc.) was not properly covered either, which attracted further intervention on the part of George Kennan, who distanced himself from the policy of the US Administration that militarised his ideas. Therefore, America assumed a global role, based on which many things would be clarified on the way, the consequences being, in some cases, far from expectations.

Moreover, the “*containment policy*” had a defensive character, seeking to defend position before the Soviet expansionism that had to be limited, blocked through various means (political, economic, military, cultural, ideological etc.). This was very clearly explained by President Truman, who declared that the US supported free peoples who opposed the attempts to subjugate coming from foreign oppressors or armed minorities.

The defensive character was doubled by the reactive spirit of the doctrine, analysed and criticised, at the same time, by W. Lippman. The USA was like a firefighter, ready to intervene whenever a “fire” broke out worldwide. It had great shortcomings, the Americans ceding initiative to the Soviets, who could predict the actions of the Washington Administration. In addition, undemocratic regimes in Asia, Africa, Latin America could require the US financial and military aid, **citing communist threats or showing loyalty to the Western camp.**

Despite these controversies and discussions, the Truman Administration started to put in practice the containment doctrine. The aid to Greece and Turkey was approved, in the end, by the Congress, Washington spending, in the period 1947-1950, 660 million dollars to assist the two countries. Through these measures, the expansion of communism in Eastern Mediterranean was blocked, and the Black Sea Straits were protected. The “*containment*” policy has fully used economic and financial means, the most relevant example being the Marshall Plan, aimed at the reconstruction of Europe destroyed by war, launched on 5 June 1947 by the Secretary of State George C. Marshall at Harvard University. The Soviet Union, also included in this program, responded with a heavy hand, dismissing the American offer and forcing its satellites on the Eastern and Central continent to do the same. The following year, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was founded, a body that gathered communist countries in Europe, in the first phase.

Based on the “containment” doctrine, the US built military bases that went from the Atlantic shores to the Far East (Korea, Japan), through the Middle and Near East. The construction of this military system took into account the conditions of the early post-war years, but its theoretical foundation was not a completely new one. Its roots can be detected relatively easy in the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical

and geostrategic thinking in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Even though geopolitics has been excluded from the scientific and political life after the end of the Second World War, the works and ideas of scholars such as Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Thomas Renner, Nicholas Spykman etc. could be found in the ideas and all the measures taken under the “*Truman Doctrine*”<sup>8</sup>.

Essentially, the Soviet Union was considered a Eurasian power that owned, at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, what Halford Mackinder called the *Heartland* (World Island), largely circumscribed to Eurasia. In contrast to this continental, land superpower, the USA had an obligation, as a maritime power, to conserve the *Rimland* (the shores of the World Island), a concept introduced by the American researcher Nicholas Spykman during the Second World War. Controlling it provided the freedom of the Planetary Ocean and prevented the Soviet Union from entering the “*European Peninsula*”, as expressed by even George Kenan.

Over the entire period of the *Cold War*, the United States maintained the “*containment doctrine*”, with the changes demanded by the evolving international climate and the ratios of forces between the two big competitors, as well as the military disposition created in late '40s and early '50s, which was one of the factors that led to the victory obtained at the beginning of the last decade.

In the other camp, there was a completely different situation, because actual debates to establish a strategic doctrine could not be held. This was decided only by the political leaders in the Kremlin and the high courts of the Soviet state and party. Therefore, the reactions and measures taken by them replaced the sometimes-heated theoretical confrontation that took place in most Western states and primarily in the US. The measures taken were considered in Moscow as part of a vast “*imperialist plot*” and that triggered strong reactions.

Consequently, Stalin proceeded to clearly delimit the areas of influence, strengthening the control over satellite countries, occupied by the Red Army, at the end of the world war. Between 22-27 September 1947, he convened, at Szlarska Poreba, a meeting of the countries under its domination and created the Cominform

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<sup>8</sup> For the evolution of the status of geopolitics and the ideas of the Anglo-Saxon School, see Bruno Colson, *Jomini, Mahan et les origines de la stratégie maritime américaine*, in *L'évolution de la pensée navale*, sous la direction de Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, 1990, pp. 153-164; Paul Claval, *Geopolitică și geostrategie. Gândirea politică, spațiul și teritoriul în secolul al XX-lea*, translated by Elisabeta Maria Popescu, foreword by Octavian Mândruț, Editura Corint, București, 2001, pp. 40-52; *The Geopolitics Reader*, second edition, edited by Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge, Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, London and New York, 2007, pp. 34-39; Sophie Chautard, *Géopolitique du XX-e siècle*, Studyrama perspectives, Paris, 2007, pp. 145-148; Frédéric Lasserre, Emmanuel Gonon, *Manuel de Géopolitique. Enjeux de pouvoir sur des territoires*, Armand Colin, Paris, 2008, pp. 125-177; Aymeric Chauprade, *Géopolitique. Constantes et changements dans l'histoire*, Ellipses, Paris, 2008, pp. 43-98.

(Communist Information Bureau), a structure with powers that were similar to the Third International that was dissolved by the Soviet leader, in 1943, at the request of alliance partners. The most important figure of the meeting was Andrew Jdanov, presumptive successor of Stalin, who, in his inaugural speech, stressed that, after 1945, the world irrevocably divided into two camps – the imperialist camp, led by the US, and the socialist, progressive camp, under the leadership of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the confrontation between them was something that went without saying, Jdanov proclaiming the victory of the socialist camp led by Moscow. In his earlier speeches, he criticised, in terms of extremely violence, the Western culture, civilisation and science experiencing a downward trend.

At the military level, the “*Jdanov Doctrine*” found its expression in the arming of socialist countries, decided by Stalin at the Moscow Conference on 9-12 January 1951. The Soviet leader considered that recent events showed that the US power was not insurmountable, as originally thought, able to trigger the breakout of a third world war: “*It is clear that the United States, Stalin continued, are not ready and that they need several years to prepare. The United States have sunk in Asia and are trapped there for several years. This is a very favourable circumstance for us. You need to create, in two-three years, in the countries of popular democracy, modern and powerful armed forces that at the end of the three-year period are fully ready for combat. This is the aim of our meeting*”<sup>9</sup>.

Stalin’s decision was taken in the context of two very important events: the Soviet Union’s access to nuclear weapons (1949), the US losing atomic monopoly held by then, and the breakout of the war in Korea, the first *hot war* of bipolar confrontation, an event that will further be elaborated on in this article.

## The Establishment of NATO

The economic instrument of the “*containment policy*” was doubled, in a short time, by the military means, which acquired a special importance in the '50. Extremely worried by the coup d’état in Prague (25 February 1948) and the first crisis of Berlin (1948-1949), the Western leaders created the North Atlantic Pact, completed on 4 April 1949<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Alexandru Oșca, Vasile Popa, *Vremurile fierbinți ale războiului rece. Raport asupra Consfăturii reprezentanților țărilor de democrație populară și ai Uniunii Sovietice, 9-12 ianuarie 1951*, in *Document. Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române*, no. 2/1998, pp. 73-77.

<sup>10</sup> Jean-Louis Dufour, *Crizele internaționale. De la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999)*, translation, forward and notes by Șerban Dragomirescu, Editura Corint, București, 2002, pp. 93-95; Cyril Buffet, *Istoria Berlinului. De la origini în zilele noastre*, translation and notes by Cristina Jînga, foreword by Bogdan Antoniu, Editura Corint, București, 2002, pp. 53-67.

The new political-military alliance doubled the Marshall Plan and represented one of the ways of implementing the American “*containment policy*” on the European continent. However, the origins of the North Atlantic Alliance should be sought on European soil as well<sup>11</sup>.

In the circumstances of the American military disengagement in Europe, the United Kingdom and France initiated, in March 1947, at Dunquerque, a treaty that took into account the possibility of collaboration against Germany. Ernest Bevin, British foreign minister, considered that the Franco-British duo could represent a third force worldwide, after the US and the USSR. The two countries intended to approach the Benelux states to find a formula for the European security. The US did not support this project because it was anti-German, although France insisted on the materialisation of the plan.

The coup d'état in Prague, the Soviet pressure on Norway, on which it wanted to impose a treaty similar to the one signed with Finland, the political turmoil in Italy, due to the elections in which there was a danger that the Communist Party could become the first political group of the country, all led to accelerated negotiations. The initiative came from the part of the United Kingdom that, through its foreign minister, E. Bevin, announced that the country was negotiating with France, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg to create the Western Union, a group that aimed to provide mutual assistance in the event of an armed conflict. At the same time, it had an economic nature, being open to other states<sup>12</sup>.

On 17 March 1948, the five states signed the Brussels Treaty, with a validity of fifty years, as the first form of union of Western European states in order to defend security. Through Article IV, the most important one, the signatory states, under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, committed to provide mutual aid, military included, against any aggression. In the preamble of the document, Germany was mentioned explicitly, from a desire to spare the suspicions of the Soviet Union, and to co-interest France that could not forget about its past relations with its Northern neighbour<sup>13</sup>.

In the next period, proper bodies were created – the Permanent Commission, the Consultative Committee to Foreign Ministers and the Military Committee. The latter one led talks with a view to the organisation of a military

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<sup>11</sup> James Chace, *Acheson. The Secretary of State Who Created the American World*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 1999, pp. 210-240.

<sup>12</sup> Jiři Fidler, Petr Mares, *Istoria NATO*, foreword by Václav Havel, translated by Lidia Nasincová, preface by Georgel Rusu, Institutul European, 2005, pp. 35-36.

<sup>13</sup> Lawrence Kaplan, *NATO 1948, the Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007, pp. 60-63.

structure called *WUDO* (*Western Union Defence Organisation*). Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, a legend of the Second World War, was appointed in charge of this structure.

The integration of the USA in the European efforts to provide security was the most discussed issue after the signing of the Brussels Treaty. Belgium Prime Minister, Henry Spaak, supporter of the Atlantic vision on security, in agreement with the foreign ministers of Great Britain and France, recommended to the State Department the creation of a defence system of Western Europe with American assistance. However, Washington had reservations about mentioning Germany as a potential threat to European security. On the contrary, it was considered that the country had an important role in the reconstruction and defence of Europe. Therefore, the USA believed that the Western Union should be an alliance against the Soviet threat and not one meant to block German hypothetical threats. That is why the dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic continued.

Between 22 March and 1 April 1948, secret talks were held in Washington between the USA, the UK and Canada on how the US could participate in a North Atlantic security pact, which was based on Articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter, articles that stipulate the right of the states to individual and collective self-defence and the possibility of establishing regional arrangements for maintaining peace and international security

The American and British views were different. The first sought an Atlantic Pact and a global security arrangement under the aegis of the United Nations and the others, supported by Canadians, an Atlantic arrangement that would absorb the Brussels Pact. Discussions continued, to which France, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg were invited. The absence of France from the initial negotiations can be explained through the perception created then, according to which a possible presence of communists in the Paris delegation would have damaged the secret talks. It is possible that further resentment of the French elite towards the North Atlantic Pact were due to this initial denial, which reinforced the view that the new alliance was one of Anglo-American origin, and France would have had a secondary role.

An important moment in building the alliance was the adoption by the US Senate of a resolution initiated by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, supported by the Undersecretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, through which the US President was required to support the regional collective alliances that complied with the UN Charter. Thus, the American domestic political difficulties were overcome and negotiations between the US and the countries of the Brussels Pact started on 6 July 1948.

The context in which talks were held helped overcome the differences regarding the profile, goals and structure of the future North Atlantic organisation. It was the moment of the outbreak of the first Berlin crisis, caused by the Soviets through the blockade they imposed on the city. This measure decided by Moscow, which severely worsened international relations, showed the need for the unification of all efforts of Western states to defend security.

The negotiations on the establishment of the new alliance addressed a broad range of issues: the players who were to be part of it; purpose; structure; its partners, commitments; the scope and content of security guarantees etc. As far as the geographical area was concerned, there were two views – that of Kenan, who suggested the compliance with the geographical correspondence, respectively, the North Atlantic one, and that of Hickerson, who had in view the inclusion of other countries outside the North Atlantic area – Italy, Portugal, Spain.

This fact generated disputes because of either their geographical position (the case of Italy, outside the North Atlantic theatre) or their authoritarian regimes (the cases of Spain and Portugal). A special case was represented by Sweden that declined the invitation to be part of the alliance, choosing a Nordic (Scandinavian) security system, which would also comprise Norway. Finally, Italy and Portugal were accepted, the main factor being the geostrategic one. Portugal's presence completed the Atlantic part and Italy contributed to the strengthening of the Mediterranean pillar (along with France, which supported it), as well as the Southern flank.

However, France generated most of the problems. First, it wanted a guarantee against Germany, the conflict with this country marking the history of bilateral relations and the evolution of Europe alike for centuries. In this respect, a trilateral conference (the USA, the UK, and France) was recommended to be organised to discuss the guarantees that should be granted so that German militarism could no longer represent a threat to France. Secondly, Paris demanded the inclusion of Algeria in the forthcoming alliance (especially the coastal areas), the country being considered as part of metropolitan France. This geographical area was about to be governed by the security guarantees of the future alliance.

Discussions were also held regarding the principle of the “*automatic involvement*” in the conflict of alliance members in the case of an aggression against one of the partners. The US rejected this idea based on internal political considerations, granting reciprocal support being eventually accepted in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each country.

After several months of debate, on 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, with 12 signatory countries (the USA, Canada, the UK,

France, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Iceland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal, Luxembourg). The Pact entered into force on 24 August 1949, after its ratification by all signatory states, the last one being Italy.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was an intergovernmental international security institution, in which states maintained their full sovereignty and independence. The Pact stipulated that consultations between partners were mandatory, whenever one of them considered that its territorial integrity, political independence or security were threatened (Article 4). Article 5 was particularly important, which called on the old *“principle of the Musketeers”* (*“all for one and one for all”*). According to this article, an attack against one of the member states was considered an attack against all allied states. If such an attack took place, each contracting party, exercising its right to individual and collective self-defence mentioned in Article 51 of the UN Charter, should resort, by itself or in cooperation with other partners, to all necessary actions, including the use of armed force, for *“restoring and maintaining the security of the North Atlantic area”*<sup>14</sup>. Any aggression and the response measures were to be brought to the attention of the Security Council.

Article 6 detailed the geographical area and the situations in which the provisions of Article 5 would be applied. This was valid on the European and North American territory of the member states, in the Algerian departments of France, on Turkey’s territory or in the islands under the jurisdiction of any contracting party to the North of Tropic of Cancer. Moreover, the principle of the common action was applied to land, naval, air forces of any partner or in any area where the forces of occupation of one of the parties were stationed at the entry into force of the Pact, on the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area to the North of the Tropic of Cancer. These provisions expanded the allied area of intervention to Western Germany that, at that time, was not a NATO member.

The Pact had an open character, the contracting parties being able to invite other countries to be part of the organisation. The Treaty was subject to review, at the partners’ request, ten years after the entry into force or at any later date, and after twenty years, any contracting party could withdraw from the organisation one year after having submitted a request in this respect. The depositary of the documents of the Treaty was the US Government.

The emergence of NATO was a major event in international relations between the sixth and the seventh decade, which were marked by a whole new phenomenon

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<sup>14</sup> *Monitorul Oficial*, part I, no. 185, 3 March 2004.

– the *Cold War*. In many ways, it was a novelty for the alliances so far<sup>15</sup>. It was the first time in history when the two sides of the Atlantic were linked through a formal agreement, uniting their destinies. The United States were born as a state through a revolution, but also through a war against its metropolis, the UK. Consequently, after overcoming the difficulties of the beginning of the state, the US adopted the “*Monroe Doctrine*” (1823), an initiative through which the President at that time, James Monroe, opposed the interventionist intentions of the Holy Alliance, forbidding the involvement of the European states in the US affairs. The Doctrine was isolationist in nature, which allowed the US to focus on internal problems, some of them serious, such as, for example, the Civil War, of Secession (1861-1866) and the conquest of the West. At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the US became a world power, winning the war with Spain (1898), whose dying empire it destroyed, moving beyond its borders.

The intervention in the two world wars followed, after which the US emerged as the only power capable of ensuring the security of peninsular Europe, as well as of other regions worldwide. By signing the Atlantic Pact, the US ended a long period of isolationism, choosing to take the fate of Europe in its hands, mutilated as it was, as it seemed at the time, following the commencement of the bipolar confrontation. America naturally became the leader of the new alliance, which provided the Western part of the “*old continent*” with a period of stability and prosperity unparalleled in its contorted and bellicose history. Assuming the leadership of the Alliance, the US decided to invite Europeans to unity, leaving aside the wars for power, imperial ambitions, national jealousies etc., which led to the loss of the geopolitical role that the continent played for almost half a millennium, from the adventure of Columbus. As noticed by Professor Sergio Romano, the invitation to unity the Americans made to Europeans was, in fact, an invitation to follow its model: “*The young people of the new world, concluded the Italian Professor, gave a lesson of history to the inhabitants of the old world*”.

The Atlantic Alliance was therefore an act of will of Western Europeans and Americans<sup>16</sup>, determined to defend themselves against a threat that was considered very serious at that time. Initially, the Washington Treaty was an agreement on a classical military alliance through which, based on the principles of collective security, mutual aid was requested in case of an external attack on one or more members of the organisation.

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<sup>15</sup> Regarding the topic of alliances, see Stephen M. Walt, *Originile alianțelor*, translated by Camelia Boca, introductory study by Șerban Cioculescu, Institutul European, Iași, 2008.

<sup>16</sup> Sergio Romano, *50 de ani de istorie mondială. Pacea și războaiele de la Yalta până în zilele noastre*, translated by Mircea Vasilescu, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 1999, p. 33.



The institutional-organisational structure was completed in several stages, the first stage being represented by the inaugural meeting held on 17 September 1949. In accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the Washington Treaty, the North Atlantic Council was established, vested with political authority and real decision-making powers. Each member state was represented by an ambassador or a permanent representative, assisted by a national delegation. The Council gathered at different levels, including at the highest level of heads of state and government. At ministerial level, each partner was represented by its minister of foreign affairs and minister of defence. At the first meeting, the Council created the Defence Committee and the Military Committee, a subordinated body, as well as regional planning groups – the North Atlantic; Western European; North European; South European and Western Mediterranean. The Military Committee was composed of the heads of the member states general staff, having the Permanent Group in subordination, as an operational body. This body, in turn, was composed only of American, British and European representatives. As far as the modus operandi was concerned, regional planning groups developed and submitted to the Military Committee, through the Permanent Group, regional defence plans that represented in fact the initial stage of integration of national defence plans.

The organisation of the alliance was completed in the early '50s, against the background of the conflict in the Korean Peninsula, which broke out, as it is known, on 25 June 1950, through the North Korean military attack on South Korea, on 25 June 1950. The Korean conflict represented the first contact between the two superpowers, even if the Soviet Union adopted a rather reserved attitude, preferring not to engage openly. From the political-military point of view, the conflict in Korea had multiple meanings. It was a limited conflict, carried in a manner that was specific to the two world wars. It stopped on the brink of using nuclear weapons. The conclusions of the two global competitors were partially different. The Americans saw it as an “*exception*”, laying the stress on the development of tactical, strategic and operational nuclear weapons, although conventional means decided the result of the conflict. It was only at the end of the '50s that the US took into account the issue of the limited war.

Starting from the idea that the attack initiated by North Korea is a materialisation of world communism expansionism, American planners focused on defending Western Europe, by strengthening the North Atlantic Pact. In September 1950, the integrated force for Europe was created and on 2 April 1951 General Dwight Eisenhower, future President of the USA, started his work as head of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), located near Paris. The establishment

of the military on the West German territory was particularly important, proper infrastructure being created – airfields, warehouses, land communications, as well as 12 German divisions, which were integrated in NATO structures. Strategic resistance alignments were established, especially on the West German territory, where tactical nuclear weapons were deployed. All these measures facilitated the integration of West Germany into NATO, an event which took place in early May 1955. The rearmament of Germany was meant to contribute, in the Americans' opinion, to a more effective defence of Western Europe, but this triggered a determined reaction on the part of the USSR, which resulted in the creation of the Warsaw Pact, a classical materialisation of the balance of power principle. The new political-military bloc was a tool of Moscow, which provided it with the institutional framework for furthering the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of satellite states and for the use of their resources in dealing with the North Atlantic Alliance. This lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the years 1989-1991.

*English version by*  
 *Iulia NĂSTASIE*



## NATO TRANSFORMATION AND ENLARGEMENT

Colonel Liviu BUMBĂCEA

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*NATO's permanent transformation reflects the cultural and institutional changes at high level. This process is enhanced by the increasing need for the Alliance forces to be multinational and joint, deployable everywhere and anytime is necessary, coherent from the interoperational point of view.*

*The member states are committed to the process meant to explore and adopt the new capabilities that will increase the Alliance's capacity to successfully meet the new challenges of a new and often changing strategic environment.*

*In the author's opinion, transformation is necessary as a direct response to the more and more complex challenges and threats that have occurred in the strategic environment, especially for the last ten years. Thus, it is necessary for NATO to anticipate the environment of future operations and to analyse the lessons learned in the recently ended or ongoing operations.*

**Keywords:** *interoperability; regional instability; collective defence; global terrorism; frozen conflicts*

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In the interview given for *Defense At&L*, Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation Office of the US Secretary of Defence, formulates his philosophy related to transformation in a phrase that has become famous: “*Drive change or be driven by it !*”<sup>1</sup>. In addition to this idea, he states that transformation is “*an imperative for survival and competitive advantage in a changing world*”, declaring himself a fighter against the idea of seeing technology as the only focus of transformation. It is from this standpoint that the issue of transformation and the way the priorities of this component of a vast scenario may affect the armed forces are approached. Transformation is thus seen as the rationale behind creating broad and sustained competitive advantage, which, in practical terms, means to admit that the world is changing.

Transformation is a process that has to firstly respond to the necessity for the changing nature of cooperation and collaboration to be remodelled<sup>2</sup>, in the context of the new combinations of concepts,

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Colonel Liviu Bumbăcea – Strategic Planning Directorate, the General Staff.

<sup>1</sup>Apud Mihail Orzeață (coordinator) et al, *Implicațiile transformării Alianței Nord-Atlantice asupra planificării forței, instrucției, educației și achizițiilor în Armata României*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2004.

<sup>2</sup> A. K. Cebrowski, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, Office of Force Transformation, Washington D.C., in *Defense AT&L*, May-June, 2004.

capabilities and organisations that exploit the national advantages over the asymmetric threats and allow for strategic interests to be supported and for the participation in maintaining and strengthening peace worldwide. Therefore, military transformation involves changes at the level of doctrines, forces' organisation and structure, information activity, training, education, procurement, human resource management and budgetary planning, which thus become the main domains for the transformation in the military field to be applied.

From this standpoint, the most important requirement is related to considering this process a continuous one, which involves creating and anticipating the future, putting together the co-evolution of concepts, processes, organisations/structures and technologies.

As far as NATO is concerned, the roots of transformation go back in time, starting with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid change of the geopolitical landscape subsequent to that event. NATO operations in the Balkans, in 1999, although successful, emphasised the necessity for the Alliance to reconsider its interoperability and to "bridge the gap" between ambition and the capacity to actually achieve something.

They materialised in two summit initiatives, *Defence Capability Initiative – DCI*, launched at the Washington Summit in 1999, followed by the *Prague Capabilities Commitment – PCC*, at the Prague Summit, in 2002.

Both initiatives have evinced a series of critical military deficits that need urgent repair as far as not only equipment but also concepts are concerned. The innovation consists in approaching the issue from the standpoint of capabilities to the detriment of classical perspective – the methodology based on threats and scenarios. To focus NATO future development on the threats that were specific to the *Cold War* has become inappropriate and even dangerous.

The terrorist attacks on the USA in September 2001 stressed the necessity for NATO to address the sources of instability in regions that are outside the traditional area of responsibility. Subsequently, military operations in Afghanistan directed towards the sources of these terrorist attacks have demonstrated the value of modern, light, highly-technologised and expeditionary forces, as well as of a sophisticated and rapid decision-making, command and control system. All these have reconfirmed the need for a new comprehensive military analysis and have demonstrated that collective defence could not exclusively focus on traditional threats generated by numerous forces positioned face to face. The events on September 11 confirmed the fact that global terrorism, the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, failed states, radical ideologies and frozen conflicts posed the most important threat to the future of peace and security of the allied nations.

As a result of these key historical events and of a growing concern within the Alliance to address the issues related to security in a global context, the North Atlantic organisation started to admit the need for it to assume roles such as conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping, intervention in the event of disasters, and humanitarian aid. For these new missions to be successful, NATO acknowledged the need to readapt the way of thinking. The military ways and means should involve the mutual support of member nations political, civil and economic instruments, in a coordinated manner.

It does not imply that NATO will intervene everywhere in the world. On the contrary, the actions will be determined by particular strategic situations and political consensus. In this context, the Alliance should:

- give more consideration to the opportunities implicit in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty that makes NATO a forum for consultations with other actors;
- improve decision-making processes and create the most efficient mechanisms in order to increase the availability of forces in line with transformation and usability concepts;
- rethink partnership structures to make them more synergistic and more global;
- deepen cooperation with Asian and Pacific countries, not with a view to being future global actors, but to determining them to consider possible interventions to support member countries' collective security, interacting, if and when necessary, within wide coalitions.

Among the available tools, the military component is sometimes a decisive option in a wide range of situations including preventive diplomacy, crisis management, humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions, as well as stabilisation operations and post-conflict reconstruction. Military intervention is essential in crises that have got more severe, but in many other scenarios, even in low or very low-risk ones, military forces provide the essential security environment for a wide range of initiatives, including civilian ones.

Nowadays, military operations do not necessarily end when the opponent is defeated. They continue with the stabilisation and reconstruction phases. Typically, these complex and difficult phases that last long and that aim at addressing the causes of destabilisation have a crucial importance for the achievement of the political-strategic objectives. During these phases, military forces are called not only to ensure and maintain a minimum level of security but also to contribute directly and, many times, decisively during the interaction with the local population, through complex modalities, during crisis situations.

This new approach to the security concept is called *transformation*, a conceptual and innovative revolution that involves all sectors: organisations, structures, education and training, capabilities, concepts and doctrines regarding the employment of military forces.

If the conceptual shift to respond to new challenges is based on multinational and interdisciplinary synergy, with the capability to achieve the desired political and military effects, then this transformation must achieve:

- multinational and interdisciplinary interoperability;
- joint integration;
- expeditionary capabilities (to be developed through a force structure that must be agile, flexible, modular, rapidly deployable and sustainable even at great distances);
- information superiority;
- network-centric capabilities;
- effective engagement and force protection capabilities;
- advanced civil-military cooperation capabilities.

At the same time, NATO's permanent transformation reflects the cultural and institutional changes. This process is permanently stimulated by the growing need for the Alliance forces to be multinational and joint, deployable wherever and whenever necessary, and coherent as far as interoperability is concerned. Member states are dedicated to the process of exploring and adopting the new capabilities that will enhance the Alliance capacity to successfully meet the new challenges proper to a new and ever changing strategic environment. Transformation is necessary as a direct response to the more and more complex challenges and threats emerged in the strategic environment, especially in the latest ten years. Thus, it is necessary for NATO to anticipate the environment of the future operations and to analyse the lessons learned from the recently finished or ongoing operations.

Proper policies, concepts and operating procedures have to be developed, tested, exercised and evaluated so that their validity could be determined concomitantly with identifying new capabilities and adopting modern and innovating solutions able to implement the necessary changes through a unitary process meant to defence planning, at the same time with research in the field of future capabilities and technologies. Last but not least, NATO has to educate and train its personnel considering common standards that affect interoperability in the entire area in which the Alliance operates and functions.

To develop and track this process, member states established the Allied Command Transformation – ACT. It is in the position to command NATO military transformation making use of new processes, structures and relationships,

organised according to main domains, in a way that is different from the classical military structures and methodologies and allows for acting innovatively and responsibly to develop the concepts and capabilities in a coherent and systematic way, to command processes, to assess progress and to remain flexible and capable to achieve other tasks.

However, the military transformation only will be less valuable if NATO does not succeed in obtaining political decisions timely and even their rapid transformation, with determination in concrete military actions. Intelligent and rapid decision-making procedures within the Alliance, simple procedures to generate forces and to guarantee the operations funding will be vital ingredients. In conclusion, it is necessary for the Alliance to be able to cope with a large and diversified number of missions and operations it will be asked to respond, in a geographical area much larger than the traditional one.

We consider that military transformation means more than just a gradual reform or the acquisition of new weapon systems. It encompasses accelerated technological modernisation, doctrinal reform, reorientation and reorganisation of force structures, and a culture open towards change and determination in accepting risk. Transformation redefines the way in which fighting power is generated and engaged, and leads to new methods to approach and execute military operations. To narrow the gap between the Alliance member states, as far as capabilities are concerned, it will create the conditions for these gaps to be bridged and for interoperability to be enhanced.

### ***Transformation is not an easy option – to do nothing is easy***

The unique challenge for NATO transformation consists in the fact that this “*revolution*” is experienced in a 26-nation Alliance, in which to approach different military cultures, different points of departure as far as capabilities are concerned, different geographical and historical perspectives, different aspects with regard to security and national legislation is not an issue for those who are not strong-willed enough.

It is recognised that there are challenges in the field of resources for those nations that establish these transformation objectives, and national defence resources are governed by internal political and economic considerations that determine the nation military infrastructure remodelling, reducing and reorganisation and that have ample national political and economic consequences in the short run. However, in the long run, the process will generate cost effectiveness.

At the same time, transformation has to address the difference in capabilities between what NATO aspires to do and what it can currently do. The possibility

for the Alliance forces to operate from and in austere areas of dislocation, in conditions of potential threats, make the difficulties of support more complicated, and precision, speed and ability to rapidly disperse or concentrate force are the new perspectives for NATO expeditionary capability.

To transform the Alliance forces in a systematic and coherent manner, ACT develops a conceptual framework that identifies requirements and changes them into innovative programmes meant to develop capabilities. The key concept is the development of *Effects-Based Approach to Operations – EBAO*. The idea of EBAO was firstly introduced at the Istanbul Summit. In the summit communiqué, the heads of NATO member states stated: *“The current complex strategic environment requires a larger manner to approach security that comprises political, economic and military elements. We are united in our commitment to such an approach”*<sup>3</sup>. It constituted the point of departure for ACT to develop EBAO concept. The effects-based operations, as a developing aspect within the Alliance, represent the topic of considerable discussions regarding the definition, compatibility, applicability and impact for the Alliance.

The final goal of this approach is that of selecting those capabilities that produce the desired effects, avoid duplication and unnecessary pressure (deterioration), encouraging the solutions that engage the joint military capability and not independent air, land or naval solutions.

Effects-based operations have been used starting from Sun Tzu and Thucydides, involving nations and forces that have engaged techniques such as blockades, sieges, dissuasion, subversion and other methods that do not involve forces contact. Current EBAO focus on engaging new technologies and strategies although they also consider the older and cheaper technologies applied in new and different ways. The synergy between EBAO and modern technology gives the opportunity for the concept potential to be fully achieved and for the Alliance to ensure such a capability to thoroughly and coherently apply all these instruments.

Within the integral EBAO concept, there are three key transformation objectives for future operations: to achieve decisional superiority, coherent effects, and joint deployment and support. To achieve these three objectives and to ensure a proper capabilities development, seven main areas or Transformation Objective Areas – TOAs were established:

- Information Superiority – IS;
- NATO Network-Enabled Capability – NNEC;

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<sup>3</sup> *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, paragraph 45, at [http://www.defense.ro/gmr/Arhiva\\_pdf/2004/Revista-4.pdf](http://www.defense.ro/gmr/Arhiva_pdf/2004/Revista-4.pdf)



- Effective Engagement – EE;
- Joint Manoeuvre – JM;
- Enhanced CIMIC – EC;
- Expeditionary Operations – EO;
- Integrated Logistics – IL.

Current analysis confirms the fact that these areas are proper to the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, although there is no guarantee, in this rapid changing world, for these areas to remain valid. To achieve capabilities, NATO needs to periodically examine the relevance of these areas in the emergent strategic context and to redirect efforts wherever necessary.

At the same time, to respond to this new security environment and to the multitude of complex threats associated to it, NATO started to change its activity related to military planning, from one based on well-known threats to one more flexible and adaptable, based on capabilities.

In military terms, a capability represents the capacity to produce the operational results that are necessary for an assigned military mission to be accomplished. In its essence, capability-based planning recognises the fact that not only at present but also in the future the identification of the sources of threats to the Alliance interests is marked by incertitude. Therefore, the objective of the capability-based planning is to develop a wide range of capabilities within the member nations to provide the Alliance strategic command and operational commanders with a spectrum of options and mechanisms to counter a large variety of real or potential threats. More important is that capability-based planning has to respond the entire range of NATO military operations, no matter the area or conditions – from high intensity military actions to peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, disaster response actions, as well as a possible support for the reconstruction and stabilisation efforts.

### ***Implications of NATO transformation on the Romanian Armed Forces transformation***

The Romanian Armed Forces transformation is conceived in strict connection to the Alliance transformation. In the context of forces, concepts and capabilities transformation, the Romanian Armed Forces transformation represents the medium and long-term vision related to the armed forces dimensions, training and equipment so that they could take part in future operations within NATO.

The nature of national constitutional responsibilities as well as the Alliance requirement to cope with any type of threat presupposes for the Romanian Armed Forces to develop capabilities that allow for conducting operations on the national

territory, in NATO area of responsibility, and in a larger strategic environment that is permanently influenced by factors that require for change.

The most relevant mechanisms to correlate with the Alliance transformation are represented by the gradual increase in the Romanian Armed Forces participation in NATO Response Force and in the level of interoperability of deployable forces in the field of communication and informatics, as well as by the actions meant to significantly enhance the level of linguistic competency of the personnel. A complex process to reconfigure the command and control system at the strategic and operational level, based on the achievement of an integrated strategic image was also initiated.

Transformation efforts to meet the Alliance requirements regarding the achievement of the capabilities mentioned in the *force goals* for the structures assigned to NATO are focused on interoperability and deployability aspects, procurement of new equipment, achievement of correlation between the requirements of *force goals* and the ones of NRF, modernisation of the education and training system, and the enhancement of the specific legislative system.

In this context, the correlation between the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process and NATO evolution has been a natural necessity derived from the new strategic orientations regarding the Alliance transformation as well as from the way it develops.

### **NATO enlargement**

In the process of adapting NATO to the new security environment in the first decade of the post-*Cold War* period, particular attention has been paid to the development of the relations with the other states in the Euro-Atlantic region, to the promotion of cooperation within the newly-established institutions (NACC, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO-Ukraine Commission, and Mediterranean Dialogue), with a view to developing the capacity to engage together in peace support operations, involving the Alliance in peacekeeping operations and in other non-Article 5 operations.

The launch of the Partnership for Peace, at the NATO Summit in Brussels, in January 1994, was a major NATO initiative that aimed at enhancing trust and the efforts meant to cooperation with a view to strengthening security. The Alliance and its partners have been engaged in a series of concrete cooperation activities, giving the participant states the opportunity to consolidate their ties with NATO, according to each of them interests and capabilities.

The active participation in the Partnership for Peace has played an important part in the process of NATO enlargement, Article 10 of the Washington Treaty

stipulating the possibility for such enlargement as it invites any other European state in a position to further the principles of the Alliance and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to the Treaty.

Through the Partnership for Peace and, especially, the Individual Dialogue, the countries that had expressed their wish to join the Alliance came to understand the process of accession better. At the same time, NATO got to have a better idea of the contribution of candidate countries within the Alliance. The decision on the first group to start accession negotiations was very difficult to make. The point of departure was the principle according to which the enlargement process was a gradual, active and transparent one, and the first states that were invited were the ones that could meet the allies' requirements.

In September 1995, it was conducted a "Study on NATO's enlargement"<sup>4</sup>, which made public the implications of obtaining the member quality, including the inherent rights and obligations, as well as what the candidate states had to do in order to prepare for accession, as follows:

- to demonstrate their commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the peaceful resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes, irredentist claims or internal jurisdiction disputes;
- to prove the commitment to promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice and responsible attitude towards the environment;
- to establish a proper democratic civilian control on the armed forces;
- to be interoperable with the Alliance forces to meet the requirements derived from the quality of a NATO member;
- to demonstrate commitment to ensuring the adequate resources to achieve these obligations.

At the same time, the Alliance officials refused, for a long time, to call "criteria" the five eligibility principles established in the study on NATO's enlargement, to avoid the introduction of some elements with a high degree of objectivity in the Alliance enlargement process that had not been established any temporal or spatial interruptions.

The enlargement process is conditioned by demand, namely NATO considered a possible enlargement only when certain countries, such as Poland or Hungary, clearly expressed their intention to accede to the system of political-military agreements of the Alliance. There have been more enlargement

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<sup>4</sup> Apud Dr Marian Zulean, *Armata și societățile postcomuniste în tranziție*, Editura UNAp., București, 2005, p. 6.

waves in NATO recent history. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic received individual invitations in 1997, becoming full-fledged members in 1999. In 2004, the following group of countries was included: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The most recent enlargement wave occurred in April 2008, when NATO member states invited Albania and Croatia.

It is certain that the North Atlantic Alliance was consistent with the enlargement perspective as a means to consolidate stability at regional and national level, insisting that all candidate states should have met certain standards. In this context, mention should be made that these standards do not belong only to the category of military standards within the Alliance, meant to promote interaction and interoperability between the candidate states and the military forces and NATO command. The Alliance is a community of states that share some common values and assumed identities. The organisation cannot accept, as members, countries that do not meet its values and standards – political and economic, which are fundamental for its strategic goals.

In this context, the process of transformation undergone by NATO consolidates the Alliance capacity to fulfil multiple and diverse global political and operational functions, including the peacekeeping, security and stability missions in Afghanistan, the Western Balkans, and to train the Iraqi security forces, which all represent useful experience for reform.

At the same time, the development of relationships with Japan, South Korea and Australia, as well as the continuation of the relationships with the Russian Federation and Ukraine are characteristic for the Alliance future profile. In this context, the functions of some partnerships could diversify, in the event of building new structures, such a forum of security providers. The Alliance will also pay attention to the impact of the assumed global functions on the relationships between NATO and UN, especially with regard to the mandate through which the UN Security Council legitimises the use of force to settle disputes.

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Currently, the Alliance is undergoing changes not only at the political but also at the military level, and the development of this process has as result the establishment of military capabilities characterised by flexibility, rapid reaction and interoperability (capacity to develop combined operations at strategic, operational and tactical level), which provides the political-military decision-makers with enhanced opportunities to achieve the objectives. Thus, military structures do not change in themselves but through changing mentality and the professionals' (military and civilian) capacity to adapt to new situations.

From this perspective, it is not necessarily for the future to belong to the most equipped armed forces, as far as technology is concerned, but to those that will be able to properly understand the nature of conflict and to efficiently respond to them.

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English version by  
Diana Cristiana LUPU



# THE EU – NATO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

*Adriana CRĂCIUNESCU*

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*The Bucharest NATO Summit, which took place between 2 and 4 April 2008, provided a significant impetus for the enhancement of the relation between NATO and the EU and pointed out, at the same time, the need for the identification of diplomatic and political solutions for reaching the agreements between the Alliance and the European Union that should provide an efficient cooperation in the theatres in Afghanistan and Kosovo, the assurance of the security of the EU missions personnel included.*

*In the author's opinion, another aspect that deserves our attention is the cooperation in the development of military capabilities, in general, and the assurance of the coordination and compatibility of the rapid response forces of NATO and the European Union, in particular. Thus, from the EU's perspective, the engagement of the forces available to the EU or NATO's must not block them in one organisation or the other. From NATO's perspective, the principle of the double subordination of forces must be avoided.*

**Keywords:** *military capabilities; global actors; crisis management; "Berlin Plus" agreements; information security; bilateral cooperation*

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The cooperation between the two organisations and their strategic partnership represent fundamental elements of the Euro-Atlantic and global security area. The basic principles of the EU-NATO Partnership are stated in the common *EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP*, signed by ministers of defence from NATO member states, on 16 December 2002. They are as follows: complementarity and mutual support in crisis management, transparency, dialogue, bilateral cooperation and equality, decision-making autonomy, coherent development of military capabilities for the benefit of both organisations.

NATO and the EU are both confronted with the same challenges of the security environment, they share the same values and principles, they are global actors who wish and can contribute to conflict prevention and to crisis management. In many cases, the EU and NATO conduct operations in the same theatres, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Afghanistan and the Middle East. The division of tasks between the two organisations has begun to fade. Moreover, 21 EU members are also NATO members, offer the same capabilities for both structures and are confronted with the same

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Adriana Crăciunescu – Strategic Planning Directorate, the General Staff.

budgetary shortfalls. The EU is no longer a “soft power” and uses, besides civilian instruments, the military ones, when necessary.

As a consequence, institutional and political consulting and coordination mechanisms have been developed:

- *at political level*: North Atlantic Council (NAC) – Political and Security Committee (PSC) common reunions, as well as NATO Military Committee (MC) – European Union Military Committee (EUMC) common reunions;
- *at institutional level*: EU-NATO Capability Group, Permanent EU Cell at SHAPE – NATO Permanent Liaison at EUMS.

Periodical consulting mechanism between NAC and PSC works, as well as that concerning the development of military capabilities, within EU-NATO capability working group. The exchange of information in this framework demonstrates the will of both parties to promote transparency in this area.

Cooperation at operational level, under *Berlin Plus* Agreements is not less important. These agreements are based on:

- EU’s access to NATO planning capabilities (assuming that the pre-identified resources and capabilities are available);
- EU’s access to European command options within NATO (DSACEUR);
- arrangements concerning information security in the two organisations.

In these circumstances, the operational planning process is led at SHAPE level and the operational command is ensured by DSACEUR that reports to EUMC. The EU Political and Security Committee offers strategic guidance and ensures political control.

Based on *Berlin Plus* Agreements, *Concordia* Operation (FYROM) was conducted (2003), and *EUFOR Althea* (BiH) is currently conducted. *AMIS-EU civil-military support mission in Darfur/Sudan* was also conducted in coordination with NATO.

EU offered military and police support in strategic transport, logistics, training, planning and finance for the African contingent deployed in Darfur. NATO offered logistic support and helped with the establishment of Joint Operational Headquarters and the certification of African troops.

In the context of latest evolutions and discussions concerning the extension of the areas of cooperation, the Agreements are seen as a base for taking forward the cooperation, although they have some limitations, as they do not cover the full spectrum of relations between the two organisations.

The extension of the operational cooperation between the two organisations in the context of the EU civilian missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan continues to depend on the Turkish opposition in what concerns the adoption of technical cooperation arrangements between NATO and the EU.

However, there has been an evolution in unblocking the EU – NATO relations. France launched an initiative, at both NATO and EU level, by a series of concrete proposals focused on improving relations within ESDP with the European allies, non-EU members, and had in view: the development of contacts between Allied Command Transformation – ACT and European Defence Agency – EDA; reunions at Political and Security Committee – PSC level with the European allies, non-EU members; periodical consultations with Turkey; invitation of European allies non-EU members to CME exercises, as participants or observers (depending on the scenario of the exercise); participation of European allies, non-EU members, with officers in Operation Headquarters (OHQ) and Force Headquarters (FHQ), if they are part of a European operation.

The NATO Summit in Bucharest, 2-4 April 2008, gave a significant boost to the consolidation of EU-NATO relationship (especially while cooperating in Afghanistan theatre of operations) and, at the same time, highlighted the need for identifying diplomatic and political solutions for concluding NATO-EU arrangements so as to ensure an efficient cooperation in Afghanistan and Kosovo as well as the security of the personnel from the EU missions.

Cooperation in developing military capabilities, in general, and in ensuring compatibility and coordination between NATO and the EU rapid reaction forces, in particular, is another important issue to have in view. As the allotted resources for modernising the military systems are limited and because European states have the same force pool both for NATO (NATO Response Forces – NRF) and the EU (EU Battle Groups – BGs), cooperation and complementarity between them are objectives to be accomplished by most of the European actors.

From the EU perspective, engaging forces which are available for the EU or NATO must not lead to “freezing” these forces in one or the other of these two organisations.

From NATO perspective, the principle of double hatting must be avoided.

The issue of capability augmentation has been highlighted in a common “food for thought” document that was focused on establishing the priorities for key action domains (improvement of deployment capability, including strategic transport in the theatre, improvement of information exchange and light force protection) and on ensuring coherence and coordination with NATO, according to Capability Development Plan, through EDA.

A series of initiatives concerning the ensuring of complementarity between NRF and BGs has been presented at the level of NATO-EU Capability Working Group, as it is considered that there is compatibility of missions (common requirements for the force generation and rotation, common standards for training, certification and readiness), as well as of multinationality and interoperability. Great Britain and France have presented a *Non Paper concerning the manner in which training*



*for helicopters can be improved.* The initiative has been overtaken by the EDA that is currently managing it. It focuses on two directions: training of pilots and aspects regarding modernisation and support.

The last two EU presidencies (Slovakia and France) were constantly preoccupied with military capabilities and crisis management. The main conclusion referred to the importance of launching key programs in the area of force projection (strategic and tactical transport, including helicopters, air-to-air fuelling, air-naval capabilities), space (monitoring and surveillance), maritime dimension, crisis management, especially in coordination of evacuation capabilities for EU citizens.

As for the crisis management situations, it was discovered that *Berlin Plus* arrangements no longer represent the needed framework for NATO-EU cooperation and new solutions should be identified to ensure the required flexibility in response, while facing the concrete situations in the field.

While France held the presidency of the EU, it played an important role in re-configuring the EU-NATO partnership and in revitalising the relation between the two organisations.

The idea of establishing a high level Group for EU-NATO coordination in crisis management has contributed to a greater coherence in planning and leading operations in common theatres.

During its mandate, France made multiple attempts to unblock the EU-NATO relationship. However, discussions at technical level can solve only partly the problems that become obvious while analysing the development of capabilities and the EU operations with NATO support.

This blockage, which is of political nature, may be maintained because of the tensions between the EU and Turkey. In spite of this, limited progress has been acquired in this direction, the practical solutions (limited participation in common reunions and the exchange of information – except for Cyprus, that has not access to NATO classified documents) being a step forward in this respect.

The current EU presidency has set the development and the boosting of this partnership as a priority. The reconfiguration of the EU-NATO partnership lies under a favourable light due to the special attention of the new American Administration, which envisages the rediscovery of the philosophy of partnership, alliance and consensus, as groundwork for the relation between USA and the Europeans. Barack Obama proposes an open transatlantic partnership, more balanced and revitalised. A really functional strategic partnership between USA and institutionalised Europe could start a renewed EU-NATO relationship.



## **BUCHAREST NATO SUMMIT – an Element of Continuity –**

*Captain Vicențiu CĂTĂNEANU*

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*The article points out the main aspects of the Bucharest NATO Summit, that is considered the last year most important political event, as well as the amplest manifestation of the kind that has been organised in our country so far.*

*In the first part, the author points out that transformation is a continuous process for the Alliance and it requires constant and sustained attention, to make sure NATO remains efficient and effective.*

*Then, a series of objectives suggested during the Summit are highlighted, the Alliance seeking to carry out the process meant to adapt and reform its structures and processes. It may be achieved through reconsidering NATO's command structure in peacetime as well as the defence planning processes in order to provide capabilities in keeping with the Comprehensive Political Guidance in due time.*

*In the last part, the most important decisions that were made with a view to settling the current challenges to security are mentioned.*

**Keywords:** *security policy; international relations; defence planning; types of provocations; antimissile defence; strategic air transport*

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**N**ATO summits, as political events of high visibility, represent the opportunity for the heads of state and government of the member states to join and discuss major topics of the Alliance and to assess and provide the necessary strategic guidelines for the development of Alliance activities in the medium and long term. Usually, the framework of the summits provides the possibility of introducing new policies that should be focused on various fields of interest for NATO, to invite new states to join the North Atlantic Treaty, to launch new concepts and initiatives as well as to create and develop partnerships with other organisations and states outside the Alliance.

As a rule, a summit agenda includes topics specifically addressing aspects of general policy having strategic importance, concepts and options regarding the Alliance's involvement in solving major security issues, its internal functioning and ways to achieve the capabilities that are needed for carrying out missions, as well as NATO's relations with external partners.

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Captain Vicențiu Cătăneanu – Strategic Planning Directorate, the General Staff.

As it is with all decisions within the Alliance, the summits' decisions are consensus-based and usually followed by declarations or communiqués that explain to the public the decisions made and restate the members' support for NATO policies. Consequently, these decisions become actions through the activity of the subordinated committees of the North Atlantic Council and NATO command structures, thus covering the entire range of NATO functions and activities.

The Bucharest NATO Summit, held between 2 and 4 April 2008, represented not only the greatest political event of the year and the largest event ever hosted by Romania, but also the summit with the largest participation. Its agenda was extremely ambitious, proposing the heads of state and government to find solutions for Afghanistan, enlargement projects, member states security, the Black Sea region and information systems security, as well the energy issue.

Without any doubt, we can say that, after this summit, the North Atlantic Alliance outlined the concept of its future activity within the international relations system, aspects that were pointed out in the *"Bucharest Summit Declaration"*. In spite of the existing challenges within and outside the organisation, NATO member states reached the consensus in different fields considered to be vital for the Euro-Atlantic security and stability.

Most of the political analysts consider that the Bucharest Summit represented a firm expression of the Alliance position regarding the trend of its security policy, as well as a manifestation of its diplomatic ability. The topics on the summit agenda and the decisions made confirmed the continuity of the NATO policies established at the Riga *"Transformation Summit"* in 2006.

With regard to enlargement and Euro-Atlantic integration, Albania and Croatia were invited to adhere to NATO, this representing one of the major and visible results of this summit. Thus, the Alliance sent a clear message on maintaining the principle of *"open doors"* which was proposed not only for Macedonia but also for other Balkan states, including Serbia. As for the refusal to offer *Membership Action Plan (MAP)* to Georgia and Ukraine, we can say that even it was a disappointing decision, the unprecedented language used in the summit declaration was a compensation and, politically, it made very clear the perspective of their membership.

The heads of state and government also decided that future NATO enlargement would include Georgia and Ukraine.

In the operations field, a topic with major impact on the summit agenda, the *"NATO + non-NATO troops contributing nations"* meeting represented an innovating formula that was highly appreciated by all participants.

During the discussions on *ISAF Operation (International Security Assistance Force)*<sup>1</sup> in Afghanistan, which is now the Alliance top priority, the states reaffirmed their long-term commitment to attain stability and democracy in Afghanistan. A long-term sustainability of this operation, beyond 2008, building the Afghan security capability through appropriate training and increasing the reform efforts in the security field, as well as revitalising the Afghan National Army (ANA) equipment programme represent just a part of the assumed tasks. The common declaration on Afghanistan underscores these commitments and stands for an important political document that underlines the necessity for the “*Afghanising*” process and for the increase in the support for ANA’s development through operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLTs) and assistance for the defence planning process. A clear understanding by all the Alliance members of the undeniable truth that the provocations to security after the *Cold War* period require a multidimensional approach that goes beyond the military action per se. This framework made the heads of state and government approve the “*Comprehensive Strategic Politico-Military Plan on Afghanistan*” (CSPMP) and proved the North Atlantic Alliance determination and ability to manage the Afghan situation through “*a comprehensive approach*” whose main goal is to harmonise all actions of various international community actors involved in the stabilising process and reconstruction efforts of the Afghan society. It is an approach that invites to a broader cooperation of NATO with UN specialised institutions, as well as with competent regional organisations.

With regard to the *Kosovo operation – KFOR* established in May 1999, in accordance with Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, this topic was initially considered to have the potential to undermine the summit’s entire agenda, taking into account the complexity of the subject and the existing differences of opinions among the Alliance members. The Unilateral Independence Declaration (UID) and its non-recognition by a series of countries, including Romania, the forecasted withdrawal of UNMIK, once the coming into force of the Constitution of Kosovo on 15 June 2007, and the events on 17 March 2008 were just a few aspects that led to hot debates about NATO’s role in Kosovo. Finally, this issue was addressed as a self-fulfilled event. In other words, the parties agreed diplomatically that Kosovo was going to be supported by all relevant international players among which the EU, in order to set up a stable, democratic, multiethnic and peaceful “*entity*”.

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<sup>1</sup> ISAF was created after the Bonn Conference in December 2001, as a UN mandate coalition of the willing, in order to provide the necessary security for the reconstruction process and to support the temporary Afghani authorities. Subsequently, the ISAF mandate of peace enforcement was based on eight resolutions of the UN Security Council, according to Chapter VII of UN Charter provisions.

The Bucharest Summit Declaration underlined additional guarantees of NATO countries for law supremacy in Kosovo and the security of this region: KFOR, in coordination with the new ESDP mission will play a role to provide a safety and stability climate, including the freedom of movement for all Kosovo inhabitants, without recognising its status at NATO level. Hence, both KFOR and PESMA mission mandate will include security, police and justice elements for an institutional structure.

The meeting dedicated to the defence transformation process discussed and approved the needed actions to be carried out by the Alliance to deal with the new types of challenges, to develop capabilities in order to provide citizens protection against symmetrical and asymmetrical threats, as well as necessary forces and capabilities for current and future Alliance operations, NATO reserve and response forces (NRF).

During the summit, it was pointed out that transformation<sup>2</sup> is a continuous process within the Alliance that needs a special and sustained attention to make NATO efficient and effective. The Alliance will focus on adapting and reforming its processes and structures, as follows:

- to review NATO command structure in peacetime;
- to review the defence planning processes in order to provide in due time the needed capabilities in accordance with the Comprehensive Political Guidance;
- to develop a declaration on the Alliance security that should be approved during the 2009 summit;
- to elaborate and implement concrete proposals in order to develop the *Comprehensive Approach* concept.

Member Nations were requested to continue supplying the Alliance with the necessary resources, encouraging the countries whose defence expenditure is reducing to oppose this tendency and establish, as a goal, an increase in the defence budget in real terms.

The summit also provided an opportunity to further articulate and consolidate the Alliance vision regarding its role, to face the changing challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and to maintain its capacity to carry out the entire range of missions, by collectively defending our internal security and its contribution to international stability. Here there are the main directions of action:

- *NRF* – at the summit, the allies committed to support NATO Response Force and ensure the necessary contributions to improve the forces generation process;

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<sup>2</sup> *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, 3 April 2008.

- *reserve forces* – the final summit declaration states the decision to improve forces availability for the Alliance operations under NATO operational and strategic reserve. This implies a reduction in the reserve forces.
- *deployability and sustainability* – the Bucharest Summit underlined the Alliance operations need for development and deployability as modern, interoperable, flexible and sustainable forces. These forces should be capable to carry out, following a NAC decision, collective defence and crisis response operations inside and outside the Alliance territory, at its periphery as well as at strategic distance, with reduced support or without the host nation support.
- *increased transparency* – in the final Summit Declaration, the allies were encouraged to increase transparency by using their forces in the theatres. The media of today, especially the one related to NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, underlines the necessity to have an adequate, accurate and in due time communication with local and international audiences about NATO policies and commitments. NATO has proven its strategic communication capacity through the rapid response of Media Operations Centre and its own TV channel on the internet.
- *intra-theatre airlift* – the allies consider that troop airlift has a special importance, being imperative for operations. Efforts are made to improve strategic transport and intra-theatre airlift mainly in order to enhance the helicopters availability to meet the Alliance mission requests. The limitations in this field and the associated risks are assessed as being medium and right now, there are under development two initiatives to improve strategic airlift: “*Strategic Airlift Interim Solution – SALIS*” and “*Strategic Airlift Capability – C17*”.
- *missile defence* – allies security indivisibility and security were recognised; request to continue the efforts to achieve a “*comprehensive architecture to extend coverage to all Allies not otherwise covered by the US System*” (“full coverage” syntagm was not agreed); delays in implementing Alliance Ground Surveillance – AGS, especially because the allies do not pay their contribution in due time;
- *energy security* – the summit identified the principles to govern NATO approach in this field and made recommendations for future activities. Based on these principles, NATO will get involved in the following domains: create a common database and classified information exchange; provide stability for those countries that have resources or whose territory

is crossed by oil pipes; promote international and regional cooperation; support to manage effects and protect critical energy infrastructure.

- *cyber defence* – NATO remains committed to strengthening key Alliance information systems against cyber attacks. NATO has adopted a defence policy on Cyber Defence and is developing the structures and authorities to carry it out. NATO Policy on Cyber Defence emphasises the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities, share best practices, and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack. The next step will be to continue the development of NATO's cyber defence capabilities and strengthen the relationships between NATO and national authorities.
- *missile defence* – is part of a larger response to counteract ballistic missile threat. Taking into account the principle of the allies security indivisibility as well as NATO solidarity, the Alliance is trying to find options for a comprehensive architecture of the defence missile system that is able to provide a coverage for all territory and allied population that are not covered by the American system.
- *comprehensive approach*. An action plan was approved with pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO contribution to comprehensive approach concept: coherent implementation of NATO crisis management tools; practical cooperation, at all levels, with other actors (UN, OSCE, EU, NGOs, Private Volunteer Organisations etc.) on request; support for stability and reconstruction efforts: operations planning and conduct; instruction and education; increase cooperation with external actors.

Solving today challenges to security can be best obtained through a vast partnership with the international community, at large, as part of a real comprehensive approach. Regarding different NATO partnerships, several decisions were adopted, as follows:

- *NATO-UN relation*. NATO will continue to contribute to the implementation of relevant UN resolutions by NATO members to fight against terrorism and to provide support for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nevertheless the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the United Nations Security Council.
- *NATO-EU relation*. The decision was to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organisations, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency and to avoid unnecessary duplication in a spirit of transparency. The relations cover a wide range of issues

of common interest related to security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities, civil emergency planning and crisis management operations.

- *NATO-RUSSIA relation.* It was decided to continue the cooperation with Russia, as equal partners (NATO-RUSSIA Council) in the fields of common interest: fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their vectors, cooperation in space and especially in operation “*Active Endeavour*”. Russia ratified the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (PfP SOFA Agreement), as well as the agreement that facilitates the transit of ISAF troops through the Russian territory.

After the Russian-Georgian conflict, NATO-Russia relations became worse. The foreign ministers of NATO member states met in Brussels, on 19 August 2008, to discuss the conflict in the Caucasus region and reaffirmed their support for Georgia. In the common declaration, it was mentioned that future periodical contacts of the Alliance with the Russian Federation would be impossible if this country did not withdraw all its troops from Georgia; at the same time, they decided that the relationship with the Russian Federation would not be the same as before.

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To conclude, we can appreciate that the Bucharest Summit issued new development guidelines for the geopolitical order in the Euro-Atlantic area. The results of this forum represent not only perspectives to shape the current geopolitical relationships between USA, the EU and Russia but also challenges referring to the Russian side losing or giving up essential positions (mainly regarding Kosovo, NATO enlargement etc.). At the same time, there were also moments of consensus between NATO and Russia about Afghanistan and, in a certain way, regarding defence missile capability that favour the Alliance. The negotiations within the NATO-Russia Council were characterised as being constructive (“mature”, in Putin’s opinion) and led to the conclusion of several understandings (fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction etc.).





# PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPING A COMMON EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY STRATEGY

Second Lieutenant Alexandru-Ovidiu BELEA

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*The experience of the latest years regarding crisis management has shown that the military force has proven to be extremely necessary in most situations.*

*In these circumstances, as the author emphasises, the EU is a stringent partner for NATO by virtue of the specific combination of available instruments, such as: civil operations, sanctions, humanitarian aid, trade and development policies, political dialogue. After the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, this will make it possible for the EU and NATO to multiply their efforts in order to develop a framework of integrated cooperation. Thus, the two organisations will be able to strengthen each other and put a practical division of labour into effect.*

*Last but not least, the author discusses the issue of the two organisations regarding their need for deciding which one should deploy forces, this being based on the political will expressed by each of them, on the operational needs as well as on each one's capacity to bring about peace and stability.*

**Keywords:** national security; Alliance values; world partners; strategic concept; military capabilities; transatlantic forum

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The security environment at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, fluid and flexible, makes possible and even requires various constructions, organisations and reorganisations depending on the predominance and impact of some tendencies as well as in relation to the dynamics of interests and the changes of the physiognomy at the level of the problems related to power<sup>1</sup>, against the background of the effects of globalisation, which are felt in all areas.

In particular, the amplification and diversification of risks and their direction, in the context of the existence of internal vulnerabilities and favourable circumstances, require the adoption of flexible and effective means of action<sup>2</sup>, together with the adaptation of national and collective security strategies to current or future conditions. According to the Dutch analyst Peter van Ham, healthy institutions cyclically operate a renewal after several years, because, without innovations, their position erodes and they end up no longer having a place in society<sup>3</sup>.

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Second Lieutenant Alexandru-Ovidiu Belea – 205<sup>th</sup> Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion “Blue Scorpions”, Craiova.

<sup>1</sup> Valeriu Nicuț, *Implicații ale mediului de securitate asupra stabilității europene. Contribuții la asigurarea și dezvoltarea securității regionale și globale*, in *Provocări la adresa securității și strategiei la începutul secolului XXI*, Secțiunea apărare și securitate națională, Editura UNAp., București, 2005, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Eugen Bădălan, *România în noul mediu de securitate după summitul de la Istanbul*, in *Surse de instabilitate la nivel global și regional*, Editura UNAp., București, 2004, pp. 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> Peter van Ham, *L'OTAN et la courbe Madonna: pourquoi un nouveau concept stratégique est vital*, *Revue de l'OTAN*, no. 3, 2008, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/03/ART4/FR/index.htm>.

Subscribing to this reasoning, the Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has declared himself even since February 2007 in favour of a *new strategic concept*, which should clearly show that the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, and Kosovo have offered NATO lessons on the 21<sup>st</sup> century security<sup>4</sup>. In addition, the new concept will have to define the purpose of collective defence and allies solidarity in relation to the new security environment and to consider additional capabilities needed to protect against new risks such as threats to critical energy infrastructure. The new concept will have to address, in the same way, the issue of civil-military relations and NATO's relations with international partners in crisis management, such as non-governmental organisations. Moreover, the Secretary General recommends a further institutionalisation of cooperation at the strategic level with the United Nations and the European Union and a more structured collaboration with "*global partners*". He believes the following aspects are required: more synergy between NATO and the EU, the strengthening of reciprocal access in the field of capabilities and better harmonisation of their structures.

Regarding the perspectives of NATO enlargement, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer believes that the new strategic concept should clearly express the conditions candidates should meet to join the Alliance, sense in which he points out that "*this vocation to enlarge the European democratic space (...) will remain a crucial element of NATO*"<sup>5</sup>. Taking into account the multifaceted nature of issues to be addressed in the strategic concept, the Secretary General has also expressed his wish to produce a concise document, "*devoid of any technicalities*"<sup>6</sup>, in the form of an Atlantic Charter, expressing the values that the Alliance strives to promote and defend. In fact, this idea was adopted, in principle, at the Bucharest Summit, when the participants decided that a statement on security would be made public in 2009.

On the occasion of the Forum of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, held in Brussels on 15.03.2008, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer estimated that the reflections on the new strategic concept would begin after the NATO Summit held on 3-4 April 2009<sup>7</sup>. The concerns in this respect have got ahead of the official mandate that is expected at the anniversary meeting of the Alliance. Thus, in January 2008, a study was made public named "*Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership*"<sup>8</sup>, conceived by a group

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *La révision de la Stratégie Européenne de Sécurité – Réponse au Rapport annuel du Conseil*, Document A-2000, Bruxelles, 3 June 2008, paragraph 62, [http://www.assembly-weu.org/fr/documents/ressions\\_ordinaires](http://www.assembly-weu.org/fr/documents/ressions_ordinaires)

<sup>8</sup> "*Vers une grande stratégie d'ensemble pour un monde incertain: renouvellement du partenariat transatlantique*", <http://www.mondialisation.ca/index.php?context>

of former heads of the General Staff in France, Germany, Great Britain, The Netherlands and the USA.

The study highlights the need to renew NATO with another strategic concept, rather than the one adopted in 1999, considered outdated<sup>9</sup>. It contains proposals concerning the role of the military action in crisis management, the nuclear strategy of NATO, the European Security and Defence Policy. Moreover, the study proposes the change of the decision-making mechanism within the Alliance. In this respect, it recommends the continuation of the unanimity rule only in the North Atlantic Council, while its decisions, debated by the committees and subordinated working bodies would be adopted with simple majority. Considering the community of interest that binds the member countries of the European Union and the United States, the study also proposes the establishment of a Directorate at the highest political level, linking the US, the EU and NATO. The Directorate should be meant for analysing situations of common interest, making decisions for action, establishing responsibilities for providing command and coordination in response to a crisis.

Before the summit in April this year, hosted jointly by France (Strasbourg) and Germany (Kehl), the two countries argued, in turn, for developing a NATO strategic concept, for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. According to the German view, among the priorities of the new concept, nuclear disarmament and civil reconstruction should be placed, so the Alliance could be the “*guarantor of collective security in a broad sense and not only from a military perspective*”, arguing that “*there is no security without reconstruction and no reconstruction without security*”<sup>10</sup>. Meanwhile, the German representatives advocate for an interconnected security policy and a new transatlantic partnership.

The new strategic concept of NATO will have to stipulate the need for close cooperation and an as reliable as possible partnership with the Russian Federation, as well as for better coordination between the security policy of NATO and the one of the European Union<sup>11</sup> based on a “*necessary complementary*”, in order to make “*European integration and the Atlantic partnership the two faces of the same security policy*”<sup>12</sup>. The desideratum of complementarity has already proved possible to achieve,

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<sup>9</sup> Jacques Alexander, Klaus Naumann, Peter Inge, Henk van den Breemen, John Shalikashvili, *Vers une grande stratégie d'ensemble pour un monde incertain: renouvellement du partenariat transatlantique*, L'Humanité, January, 2008.

<sup>10</sup> Olivier Kempf, *Merkel et le prochain nouveau concept stratégique de l'OTAN*, in *Études Géopolitiques Européennes*, 16.11.2008, pe site-ul <http://www.nato.int/STRUCTURI/library/bibref/acq0107.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> *Merkel a appelé l'OTAN à élaborer un “nouveau concept stratégique”*, in *Romandie News*, AFP, 10.11.2008, [http://www.fp6-nip.kiev.ua/doc/world\\_rem](http://www.fp6-nip.kiev.ua/doc/world_rem)

<sup>12</sup> Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, *La sécurité – notre mission commune*, in *Le Monde*, Paris, 04.02.2009, <http://www.lemonde.fr/opinions/article/2009/02/03>

for example through the EUROCORP (France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg) providing the ground component of the NATO Response Force – NRF in the second half of 2006 until 10 January 2007. Simultaneously, France, Germany and Belgium contributed troops to two tactical battlegroups of the EU – EUBGs<sup>13</sup>. It remains to be seen how the cooperation can be achieved between EUBGs and NRF in some rapid response operations that require very complex activities at the level of planning structures. There is no doubt that the future permanent EU Operational Headquarters will play an important role in this respect: *“It should complement current NATO command structures and would not undermine NATO’s transatlantic integrity”*<sup>14</sup>.

During the Munich Conference on Security Policy in the period 6-8 February 2009, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that the essential elements of the new strategic concept should be cooperative approach, as the basis for joint action of the US and European states, as well as a global approach to security as the best answer to the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, by bringing together the political, development, police, cultural and, if necessary, military measures. In this respect, the new strategic concept will have to find ways to combine NATO’s military capabilities with a global approach to security, which is a key element of the European Security and Defence Policy. This will create the possibility for NATO to become stronger through ESDP<sup>15</sup>. On the same occasion, the German Minister of Defence, Dr Franz Josef Jung, presented ten points that should be taken into account when drafting the future document<sup>16</sup>:

- *“the new strategic concept must enable members to reach fresh consensus on the role, functions and tasks of the Alliance;*
- *it is more a matter of renewing the tried and tested concept rather than developing a completely new one. Nearly all the key points of the 1999 Concept are still correct. Security, consultation, deterrence and defence as well as crisis management and partnership have lost none of their relevance;*
- *the Alliance must strike the correct balance between collective defence as defined in Article 5 and crisis management and the transfer of stability;*

<sup>13</sup> Gustav Lindstrom, *Enter the UE Battlegroups*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2007, p. 49.

<sup>14</sup> *Résolution du Parlement Européen du 19 février, sur le rôle de l’OTAN dans l’architecture de sécurité de l’UE*, AG-0033/2009, Bruxelles, para. 31, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type>.

<sup>15</sup> Discours prononcé par Madame Angela Merkel, Chancelière de la République fédérale d’Allemagne, à l’occasion de la 45<sup>ème</sup> Conférence de Munich sur la politique de sécurité, 7 February 2009, Office de presse et d’information du gouvernement fédéral, <http://www.regierungonline.de>

<sup>16</sup> Apud Bettina Berg, *Zehn Punkte für ein strategisches Konzept der NATO*, Office de presse et d’information du gouvernement fédéral, 13.02.2009, <http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg>

- for deterrence the necessary wide spectrum of capabilities must be retained;
- we need new initiatives on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And we need a further significant reduction in the considerable stockpiles of warheads that still exist worldwide;
- the Alliance upholds its open-door policy whilst retaining the common basic values. Partnership relations must be even more effectively shaped;
- we need Russia as a true strategic partner, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act a good ten years ago. We must develop this partnership and our mutual trust;
- the comprehensive approach, our concept of networked security, must become a core element of the new Strategic Concept;
- we must improve our capabilities. We need flexible, deployable and sustainable forces across the entire spectrum;
- the defence planning processes in NATO and the EU must be further harmonised and also synchronised”.

The need for a new NATO strategic concept is related, in some analysts' opinion, to the evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy, which, in relation to the Alliance, *“inevitably creates overlapping at the institutional and skills level”*<sup>17</sup>. In this situation, *“NATO should choose between a classic strategy of defensive alliance and one of conflict prevention at the world level or intervention in crisis situations, in concert with other institutions having the same vocation”*<sup>18</sup>. In the same context, it is invoked the need to *“stabilise the Alliance on the old continent, adapting the strategic concept and establishing a genuine transatlantic forum together with the European Union which, in turn, should review its own security strategy”*<sup>19</sup>.

Normally, this issue is topical at the level of the European Union as well. After its adoption, in 2003, the *European Security Strategy* was recognised the merit of having initiated a discussion and reflection on the *“political content to be conferred to the European Security and Defence Policy”*<sup>20</sup>. However, some saw it as rather a pre-strategic concept<sup>21</sup>, which required consolidation *“into a strategic concept that should formally state when, why, where and in what manner the European Union*

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<sup>17</sup> Stéphanie Hofmann, *L'OTAN: vers un nouveau concept stratégique*, in *Politique Etrangère*, spring, no. 1/2008, [http://www.fui.org/fountDispachter/ifui/publications/politique\\_etrangere/politique](http://www.fui.org/fountDispachter/ifui/publications/politique_etrangere/politique)

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Simon Serfaty, *Globaliser l'Alliance*, in *Politique Etrangère*, spring, no. 1/2008, pp. 79-90.

<sup>20</sup> Eric Remacle, *L'intégration de la politique de défense européenne. Potentiel et limites*, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2004, p. 330.

<sup>21</sup> Julian Lindley-French, Franco Algieri, *An European Defence Strategy*, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh, 2004, p. 9.

should act”<sup>22</sup>. Its objectives seemed quite general, not being considered as strategic principles enhanced by experience in the field<sup>23</sup>.

Currently, the prevailing assessment is that the European Security Strategy has proved very useful and that it “provides the appropriate framework for its foreign policy”<sup>24</sup>. It highlights the major threats the EU is confronted with and identifies the strategic objectives that serve as the basis for developing sub-strategies – the Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, the Counter-terrorism strategy; Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction etc. Although most of its items are still valid, some of which are required to be updated, especially those concerning the relations with the Russian Federation, its engagement in Africa, energy supply, electronic war<sup>25</sup>. Periodically, the implementation of the Strategy is subject to examination, in order to advance proposals in accordance to which the improvement and, if necessary, their supplementation should be made<sup>26</sup>. The *European Security Strategy* should be reviewed every five years at the beginning of each legislative period of the EU. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the *European Security Strategy*, the White Paper on European Security and Defence is expected to be drafted. Mention should be made that the new provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon also contain strategic elements. Specifically, the provisions concerning foreign policy, defence and security contribute to defining the EU’s external action and, consequently, they have strategic value. In fact, they represent the most recent declaration of the 27, indicating what they intend to achieve together in this area<sup>27</sup>.

At present, the objectives for a new *European Security Strategy* are also aimed at the European Union contributing to global governance undergoing a state of global disorder, commonly defining European interests, seeking international partners in a changing strategic environment, a new partnership between the EU and NATO<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Alessia Biava, *Prévention, gestion et sortie des conflits. La culture stratégique de l’Union Européenne dans le domaine de la sortie des crises et des conflits: un cadre de référence*, Institut Européen de l’Université de Genève, March, 2006, p. 61.

<sup>24</sup> *La révision de la Stratégie européenne de sécurité. Réponse au rapport annuel du Conseil*, Document A/2000, 3 June 2008, p. 1, [http://assembly-weu.org/fr/documents/sessions\\_ordinaires](http://assembly-weu.org/fr/documents/sessions_ordinaires)

<sup>25</sup> Karl von Wogau, *Projet de Rapport sur la Stratégie Européenne de Sécurité et la PESD*, Commission des Affaires Etrangères, Parlement Européen, 05.11.2008, para. 10, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/afet/20030520>

<sup>26</sup> Réunion du Conseil Européen du 14 décembre 2007, Conclusions de la Présidence, para. 90.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 66.

<sup>28</sup> *La révision de la Stratégie Européenne de Sécurité, doc. cit.*, 3 June 2008, chapter IV.

The Munich Security Conference, held between 6 and 08.02.2009, pointed out the existence, at the level of the US Administration, of some concerns similar to those of the allies and European partners. On this occasion, the US Vice President, Joe Biden, declared that the new Administration is determined as far as establishing a “new tone” in America’s relations around the world is concerned, materialised in strong partnerships as a necessity to cope with common challenges<sup>29</sup>.

The US official insisted on two major elements of this new tone, meaning on developing new transatlantic relations and improving relations between Washington and Moscow through enhanced cooperation. Referring to transatlantic relations, the Vice President stated that “*America will do more, but will ask for more from its partners*”. In turn, the Secretary General of NATO expressed the opinion that “*if Europe wants a greater voice, it needs to do more*”. The participants in the Conference joined without reservation the American appeal to multilateralism as an inevitable method to cope with financial crisis, climate change and other threats to common security.

The stances mentioned show that, “*divided by numerous issues, the 32 members of the Euro-Atlantic community need now more than ever to assert their common security objectives*”<sup>30</sup> and to adapt their strategic concepts to these. In the current conditions, this revision process could lead to defining a Euro-Atlantic strategy meant to gather the European Union and its members, on the one hand, and the United States and the EU, on the other hand, and, at the same time, NATO, the EU and the USA. Despite the differences on some topics in major fields, the United States and the European countries, as well as the international structures they belong to have agreed or are about to do it in order to achieve this objective.

According to US analyst Simon Serfaty, in the current circumstances, different from those when the Bush Administration drafted the *US Security Strategy* in 2002 and even that in 2006, the European Union, as an organisation that changes continuously, and the current American Administration could put together new documents in the strategic domain, focused on some elements towards which the European countries and the United States, as well as the EU and NATO manifest convergence, even if they still have not fully agreed on this issue<sup>31</sup>. Thus, if traditional threats involving massive military force have diminished, particularly in Europe, those that manifest through non-military means are still present, not excluding the type of collective response mandated by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

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<sup>29</sup> Un “nouveau ton” de la politique extérieure américaine domine la Conférence de Munich, Xihuanenet/Reuters, 10.02.2009, <http://www.french.xihuanenet.com/french/2009>

<sup>30</sup> Simon Serfaty, *Le temps est venu de définir une nouvelle stratégie de sécurité Euro-Atlantique*, in *Europe’s World*, 30 December 2008, <http://www.europesworld.org/NewFrancais/Accueil/Article>

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

The risks to the security of the contemporary world constantly evolve in fields such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, frozen conflicts, emergence of new centres of instability, organised crime, cyber-terrorism, environmental degradation and the dangers arising from it in terms of security, natural disasters and others, domains that require a closer partnership and greater attention in terms of strengthening the key capacities of the European Union and NATO, as well as better coordination regarding planning, technologies, procurement and training<sup>32</sup>.

A major element of the NATO-EU relationship consists in promoting national efforts with a view to putting in place and providing military capabilities for crisis management, thereby developing the synergies that support the mission of major importance of defending the territory and protecting the security interests of the member states. The experience of recent years in terms of crisis management has shown that military force, although in only few cases sufficient, proved extremely necessary in most situations. In these circumstances, the EU is a necessary NATO partner by virtue of the specific combination of available tools: civil operations, sanctions, humanitarian aid, trade and development policies, political dialogue. After the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, this will enable the EU and NATO to increase efforts to develop an integrated framework for cooperation. They will thus be able to reinforce each other and achieve a practical distribution of responsibilities. The problem of agreeing which of the two organisations should deploy forces must be based on the political will expressed by each of them, on operational needs, as well as on the ability of each to bring peace and stability. Cooperation in the process meant to develop a new European security strategy and a new strategic concept of NATO is instrumental in achieving this objective<sup>33</sup>.

A strong and dynamic Euro-Atlantic partnership is the most effective guarantor of security and stability in Europe. For most EU countries, which are NATO members at the same time, the Alliance remains the basis of collective defence. The security of Europe as a whole, irrespective of the positions taken individually by member states, continues to be the beneficiary of the transatlantic relationship. The results of globalisation have eliminated the possibility of member states to choose indifference, isolation or expectation. In a globalised world, economic growth, immigration and free trade play a significant role in the management of security issues<sup>34</sup>. The meaning of dependencies in the contemporary world

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<sup>32</sup> *Résolution du Parlement Européen du 19 février, sur le rôle de l'OTAN dans l'architecture de sécurité de l'UE, doc. cit.*, para. 15.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, para. 17.

<sup>34</sup> Simon Serfaty, *Le temps est venue ...*, *op. cit.*



was actually highlighted by the US Vice President John Biden who said “*America needs the world just as the world needs America*”<sup>35</sup>.

On the other hand, in the circumstances of strengthening the role of the public opinion and civil society, the support for the assertion of a common Euro-Atlantic security strategy must be explored in the societal and identity plane, especially in order to establish “*the existence of a common vision on (...) the researched field*”<sup>36</sup>. The prerequisites of addressing this problem include, among others, the fact that 94% of the EU citizens are citizens of NATO member countries. Turkey, an old member of the Alliance, is a candidate for accession to the EU. In addition, among the 32 member states of NATO and the EU, 21 are part of both organisations. Moreover, among the six non-EU NATO member states, four are participating in the Partnership for Peace programme, so that only Cyprus and Malta are not connected through formal links with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Among the EU member states, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden keep themselves neutral, proceed in a fairly restrictive interpretation of the Petersberg-type missions and reserve the right not to participate in actions that employ NATO means<sup>37</sup> and reject the idea of the EU adopting a mutual defence clause that would not take account of their specificity. Studying eurobarometers, one can notice “*a gap between the sociological aspiration of the European population towards a common defence and the national reluctance of the one in non-aligned countries*”<sup>38</sup>. It is clear that within the European Union there is an ongoing process of establishing a security community and, according to transactionalist theories, one of reducing the differences in the individuals’ way of thinking. Meanwhile, companies in member countries interact and thereby develop common visions and values<sup>39</sup> of collective security.

Close consultations between the two organisations, the shared need to assert the will to act jointly on the basis of compatible values, interests and common objectives will be essential to ensure complementarity and even convergence of strategic documents and could lead to the shift of the transatlantic partnership towards a common Euro-Atlantic security strategy<sup>40</sup>.

**English version by**  
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

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<sup>35</sup> *Un nouveau ton de la politique extérieure américaine domine la Conférence de Munich, loc. cit.*

<sup>36</sup> Alessia Biava, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

<sup>37</sup> Stephane Pfister, *Les avantages comparatifs de l’Union Européenne dans la gestion des crises et la sortie des conflits*, Institut Européen de l’Université de Genève, September 2004, p. 48.

<sup>38</sup> Andre Dumoulin, *Comment se porte la Politique Européenne de la Sécurité et Défense ?*, Brussels, 21 January 2004, p. 3.

<sup>39</sup> Alessia Biava, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>40</sup> Simon Serfaty, *Le temps est venue ...*, *op. cit.*, in *Europe’s World, loc. cit.*



## ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

*Aurora-Denea GHEORGHITĂ*

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*Romania was the first state to sign, on January 26<sup>th</sup>, 1994, the Framework-Document of the Partnership for Peace, thus reconfirming the resolve of the entire Romanian society to re-become part of the community of European and Euro-Atlantic values, through observing individual freedom, human rights and strengthening the rule of law.*

*The author describes the period of the 10-years Romania's participation within the PFP as being one of preparation and consolidation of our candidacy for the Euro-Atlantic structures. Moreover, the author highlights the most important actions meant to develop the interoperability of the Romanian armed forces with NATO ones and to strengthen our country's role as a security factor at the regional level. In this context, Romania was actively involved in actions within the PFP, paying great contribution to the NATO operations led with the participation of partners, such as the ones in the Balkans.*

**Keywords:** *peacekeeping; strategic interest; NATO transformation; instability sources; defence capabilities*

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*Motto: "The Partnership emerged as an expression of the common conviction that Euro-Atlantic stability and security can be achieved only through joint cooperation and action. Protection and promotion of liberties and fundamental human rights, as well as freedom, justice and peace through democracy are fundamental shared values of the Partnership".*

Partnership for Peace, *Framework Document*  
adopted at the Brussels Summit,  
10 January 1994

In November 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall gave the signal of the *Cold War* end. The rapid rhythm of changes in Central and Eastern Europe put NATO into a position to cope with different challenges to security. The political changes opened not only new opportunities for extending European security but also inevitable incertitude and sources of instability.

The Alliance's leaders reaction did not wait too long to appear and, during the 1990 Summit held in London, it was decided to initiate new cooperation relations between the Eastern and Western Europe to mirror the new situation. From the stated intention to its materialisation it was only a step and, in December 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created, a forum

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Aurora-Denea Gheorghită – Strategic Planning Directorate, the General Staff.

that allowed NATO and the new partners to discuss common interest issues. The first session of NACC recorded another historical event: the Soviet ambassador announced the political decision that the Soviet Union ceased to exist and was replaced with the Russian Federation.

The change of attitude was backed by the development, in November 1991, of a new strategic concept able to have a broader approach to security and include economic, social, political and environmental issues as means to promote stability and Euro-Atlantic security.

From the American perspective, NACC was part of a larger strategy involving diplomacy and economics, in order to maintain a political military equilibrium in Eurasia, and it was in the US strategic interest to promote a balanced power configuration in this part of the world by preventing the Soviet or Russian military from seizing the political control in Eastern Europe, which could be achieved by NATO guaranteeing national independence, territorial integrity, political and democracy and diplomatic neutrality of the former Soviet-bloc states. Moreover, stability in Central and Eastern Europe was encouraged by strengthening the new democracies.

The June and December 1992 NACC meetings of foreign ministers cleared the way for active cooperation between NATO and the partners in the field of peacekeeping, the NACC Work Plan for 1993 included different activities from joint-sessions on planning and preparing such missions to consideration of possible joint peacekeeping exercises.

In April 1993, on the occasion of the Holocaust Museum opening in Washington D.C., President Clinton met separately different leaders from Central and Eastern Europe, including the presidents of Poland and the Czech Republic who told him that their top priority was NATO membership, due to the unstable situation in Russia and the crisis in Yugoslavia. Within this context, it was necessary to develop a new concept to satisfy those countries aspiring to NATO status, thus filling the security vacuum created just at the heart of the continent.

To take a decision became more and more stringent, especially after President Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, gave a speech, in September 1993, in which he argued that the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement, enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies, adding that during the summit in January 1994 this proposal should be on the agenda in order to take a clear decision<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Anthony Lake, *From Containment to Enlargement*, Lecture at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., *US Policy Information and Text*, no. 97, 23 October 1993.

As neither a rapid enlargement nor the strengthening of the NACC was part of the plan because this objective could be seen by the Central and Eastern Europeans as an implausible attempt to postpone their membership debate<sup>2</sup>, and being under the pressure of time the Americans proposed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) solution, an idea unanimously favoured by the Pentagon. General Shalikashvili has the merit of supporting the PfP proposal, first as SACEUR and then as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In concert with Les Aspin, then US Secretary of Defence, Shalikashvili opposed the enlargement, fearing NATO efficiency dissolution<sup>3</sup>. From their point of view, it did not make sense to talk about expansion before NATO had established the type of *military-to-military* relationship that would enable new democratic countries to integrate efficiently into the Alliance.

After reaching the consensus, in October 1993, President Clinton agreed that, at the summit in January the next year, the Alliance should formally present the American solution on PfP.

From the American perspective, the PfP was intended to create the possibility of reacting quickly to potential crisis in Europe by means of political consultations based on the provisions of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. The PfP was also deliberately designed to enable member states to put off questions of formal enlargement and of NATO's ultimate decision in this respect<sup>4</sup>.

Under these circumstances, at the Brussels NATO Summit (10-11 January 1994) the heads of state and government approved the two main PfP documents: an invitation to countries wishing to take part in the programme and a framework document in which the PfP view was outlined by mentioning some basic political principles and compulsory commitments for each Partner, such as<sup>5</sup>:

- civil democratic control over the military institution;
- transparency in the defence planning and budgeting process;
- development of a capability to enable joint NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;
- compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and international agreements provisions on arms control and disarmament;
- non-use of force or force threatening against other states;
- observance of the existing states borders.

<sup>2</sup> Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus*, London and Washington, D.C., 1997.

<sup>3</sup> James M. Goldgeiger, *NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision*, Washington Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 1, 1998.

<sup>4</sup> Charles A. Kupchan, *Strategic Visions*, in *World Policy Journal*, vol. XI, no. 2, 1994.

<sup>5</sup> Apud Major Lecturer Teofil Ispas, *Extinderea NATO și securitatea europeană*, at [http://actrus.ro/reviste/2\\_2001/c2.html](http://actrus.ro/reviste/2_2001/c2.html)

Subsequently, with the introduction of the Planning Review Process (PARP), by the end of 1994, the emphasis within the PfP shifted from peacekeeping exercises to planning them, and a Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC), under the chairmanship of the NATO Deputy Secretary General was established.

The NACC and PfP were formally complementary, the former concentrated on practical defence-related and military activities, while the NACC was the forum for broad consultations on security issues.

Starting that moment, dialogue and cooperation became essential elements to manage the diversity of the challenges the Alliance was going to face. Even if in many ways the NACC had succeeded in providing a new approach, a key element was still missing, namely the possibility that each Partner could develop individual cooperation relations with NATO. Launching, in 1994, the Partnership for Peace initiative created the legal framework for a practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and partner countries, adapted to each nation individual and specific requests, followed in 1997 by the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a body with increased responsibilities that replaced the NACC.

In order to keep its dynamism and relevance to NATO, EAPC and the PfP Programme have known an active and constant evolution within the larger framework of the Alliance's transformation process. The cooperation mechanisms have adapted to the new NATO priorities but, at the same time, they have taken into account the aspirations of different partner countries in order to remain an attractive offer.

Regularly, NATO, through its two mechanisms – *the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council* and the *Partnership for Peace Programme*, confers with the partners that have the possibility to establish an individual relationship with the Alliance and choose selectively among the proposed activities, according to their own cooperation priorities. Therefore, the Partnership is considered to be a key element of the new Euro-Atlantic security architecture and was constantly present on the agenda of the summits debates in Madrid (1997), Washington (1999), Prague (2002) and Istanbul (2004). At the Prague Summit a new cooperation mechanism was launched – the Partnership Action Plan (the first plan was the Partnership Action Plan against terrorism). Another initiative was the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which allowed the Alliance to tailor the assistance on the military institutions reform process for the interested partner countries. At Istanbul was also launched the Partnership Action Plan to encourage the partners create responsible and democratic defence institutions. The decision was to involve the partners countries participating with troops in NATO operations and missions from the beginning of the decision-making process.

### ***The Partnership for Peace significance for Romania***

Romania was the first state that signed, on 26 January 1994, the Partnership for Peace framework document as an expression of the entire Romanian society commitment to return to the values of the European and Euro-Atlantic community: observance of the individual freedom, human rights and the rule of law enforcement.

For Romania, the ten years of PfP participation represented a training period necessary to consolidate its position as a reliable candidate for the Euro-Atlantic structures, focused on the actions meant to develop the interoperability of the Romanian Armed Forces with NATO ones and strengthen our country role, as a regional security provider.

Romania was an active player within the PfP programme, having an important contribution to NATO operations carried out with the partners' participation, as it was the Balkans missions. Our country took part in over 3 300 PfP activities some of which included joint operations and exercises, partners-allies.

The Romanian Armed Forces organised and participated in the entire range of NATO/PfP activities (air, land, naval forces, logistic and civil protection exercises), implying contributions with personnel and equipment from every military service, and participation in the three main PfP basic operations as to the PfP framework document: peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations. They have played an important part in increasing our interoperability and meeting the demands of a modern armed force, as far as the structure, the decision-making process and the military personnel training are concerned, in agreement with a changing security environment.

### ***From partners to members***

If until March 2004, there were more allies than partners, following the two enlargement processes of the Alliance, the equilibrium between the allies and partners has changed. At present, the group of 20 partner nations take advantage of the EAPC framework to consult regularly with the 26 allies and develop the cooperation in the defence and security fields. This group is quite diverse, the Balkan countries still fighting the past heritage, important strategic but underdeveloped countries of Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as Western non-aligned countries. While some of them are in the process of developing their own defence and security structures, others have already a combat readiness that enables them to participate in NATO-led operations and provide other partners with assistance, training and support in different fields.

If initially NATO Partnership goal was to raise the barriers and achieve security through dialogue and cooperation, today its goals are more ambitious

because the partner countries are actively engaged alongside NATO in monitoring the 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges to security – terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and support of failed countries. In this respect, mention should be made that, in 2000, under the Ottawa Convention, NATO's Partnership for Peace Trust Fund was established to assist with the safe destruction of stocks of anti-personnel landmines.

The scope of the NATO/PfP Trust Fund Policy was subsequently extended to include the destruction of small arms, light weapons and surplus munitions, and to cover other defence reform related activities, being enlarged to include the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Each project focuses on one of the above mentioned fields and is funded by NATO countries on a voluntary basis and coordination is provided by a Lead Nation and the Host Nation.

During the years, 30 countries have joined the Partnership. In 1997, a special partnership was established with Russia and Ukraine following the signature of NATO-Russia Founding Act on reciprocal cooperation and security relations, and the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. The relations with Russia experienced a new enhancement in 2002, when the NATO-Russia Council (NAC) was established. The Alliance member countries and Russia work together as equal partners in the NAC, which provides a framework for consultations on current security issues. NATO-Ukraine relation has also an enlarged cooperation framework after the approval of NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, in November 2002. It supports this country's efforts to implement the armed forces reform for its future integration into NATO security structures.

The Partnership programme efficiency was fully confirmed because 10 partner nations became allied countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999, followed by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004. Other two candidate countries – Albania and Croatia were invited to join the Alliance, at the Bucharest Summit, while the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is making good efforts to get the membership.

Initially, the PfP was designed to postpone diplomatically the pressing requests of the former communist bloc countries to integrate into NATO, and it turned to be a viable initiative that provided a success formula for the partner countries<sup>6</sup>, both the NACC, through its multiple channels, and the PfP programme, by carrying out bilateral activities, succeeding in creating the political foundation that made the Alliance enlargement possible.

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<sup>6</sup> Sorin Lungu, *NATO Cooperation with Former Adversaries*, in *The Historical Record, 1990-1997*, at [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD\\_Issues/amdipl\\_12/lungu\\_coop1.html](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_12/lungu_coop1.html)

# **TRENDS IN THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

## **– the State of Security in the Military Field – (IV)**

*General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ*

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*If, during the Cold War, international relations were mainly governed by the argument of force, currently, we are shifting towards a system of relations based on the force of argument.*

*The military dimension of security will diminish in importance as the risks and threats with military character to international security will reduce, and the world will be safer.*

*There is an undeclared arms race taking place and a fight is being carried out with a view to re-dividing the spheres of influence, both denied by the political leadership of the states that promote them.*

*The hegemonic tendencies at regional level of the leaders of some states determine them to try to acquire weapons of mass destruction, especially the nuclear weapon and its delivery systems, thus generating an increase in the international tensions.*

*In order to enhance international security, the relations between states should rely on cooperation and not on confrontation.*

**Keywords:** *international security; arms race, non-proliferation of WMD; preventive actions; spheres of influence; military cooperation; partnership*

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**M**ost of the political and political-military analysts think that a major armed conflict in the current security context is less likely to occur. However, there are many local and regional conflicts in the world, some of them latent, others developing or frozen, which may get out of control and expand, thus affecting entire regions or even the whole planet. The most recent and eloquent example is the conflict in Georgia that put in opposition the government forces and the ones in the separatist region South Ossetia, supported by the Russian Federation (7-18 August 2008). The Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili appeal to NATO for help was followed by only very strong political support but not by military support, as it was required, fact that reduced the risk of escalating the conflict to minimum.

There are many preponderantly military risks and threats to international security but the security environment is mainly influenced by the following: *the frequent use of armed force in the relations between states, the undeclared arms race, the attempts of some*

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General (r.) Professor Dr Mihail Orzeată – former Deputy Chief of the General Staff.



states to get in the possession of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear ones, ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism.

The use of armed force in the relations between states is, in the opinion of some analysts, a consequence of human nature that is warlike in essence (*homo homini lupus* – as Plaut stated in Ancient times). Therefore, “*the fate of man seems to be that of sacrificing to himself ... [and, as a result – AN], there cannot be pretty quiet social-political life without the presence of a contract [treaty, pact, agreement etc.], which, in return, limits everyone’s freedom*”<sup>1</sup>. Following, maybe, the warlike nature proper to man, many political leaders think, as the former German Chancellor Bismark did, that “*the great questions of our time are to be decided by iron and blood*”<sup>2</sup>, forgetting that “*he who lives by the sword shall die by the sword*”<sup>3</sup>. I appreciate as anachronistic the way of thinking summed-up in famous sayings like: “*states do not have friends but only interests*”, “*diplomacy without weapons is like orchestra without instruments*” (expression attributed to Frederic II of Prussia) or “*force is more important than justice*”<sup>4</sup>, (maybe the result of a way to acknowledge the reality that proclaims the pre-eminence of the strongest to say “*vae victis*”<sup>5</sup> or “*la raison de plus fort est toujours la meilleure*”). This way of considering relations between people and states has caused reactions and the implementation, in the conscience of many leaders throughout history, of the idea of relating to their equals from the position of force to obtain what they have proposed.

This type of mentality, very concisely described by the ancient adage “*si vis pacem, para bellum*”<sup>6</sup> or “*if you want peace prepare for war*”<sup>7</sup>, has been a hindrance that is difficult to overcome in building a world on cooperation and not on confrontation.

The current situation of the security environment is, in Professor Barry Buzan’s opinion, generated by the states in the world that “*seem incapable to co-exist in a harmonious way*”<sup>8</sup> and therefore continually fight each other.

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<sup>1</sup> Claude Karnoouh, *Violență politică și modernitate*, in Georges Corm, *Europa și Orientul*, Editura Dacia, Cluj Napoca, 1999, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> François Bluche, *De la Cezar la Churchill*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1995, p. 271.

<sup>3</sup> \*\*\*, *Gospel of Matthew*, 26, 51-52.

<sup>4</sup> François Bluche, *op. cit.*, p. 271 (“*words erroneously attributed to the German Chancellor Bismark who never recognised they belonged to him*”).

<sup>5</sup> Titus Livius, *Historia romana* (V, 48), cited in *Dicționarul de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, Editura Vestala, Colecția Lexicon, București, 2004, p. 341.

<sup>6</sup> François Bluche, *op. cit.*, p. 21 (“*adage dating back in the time of the Roman Republic, adopted then by Vegetius in Epitoma Rei Militaris – Short Guide to Military Arts*”).

<sup>7</sup> William A. Cohen, *Wisdom of the Generals*, p. 102, citing General George Washington.

<sup>8</sup> Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, statele și teama*, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2000, p. 12.

Animated by interests (to impose their point of view or to support it) and fear (of being attacked, losing their independence, sovereignty, liberty, the dominant position and the influence in international relations etc.), communities have developed a concept of security based on the military power and on the settlement of disputes through force.

To justify the use of force and bypass the UN Security Council resolutions, states appeal to their right of self-defence, sanctioned by the UN Charter but interpreted so that it could fit their interests and objectives. This way, the doctrine of pre-emptive actions has taken shape, doctrine understood as a form of active self-defence, namely to harm the enemy before its intentions materialise<sup>9</sup>, on all fronts and making use of all the available means<sup>10</sup>. This way of interpreting the right of self-defence lay at the basis of the Multinational Coalition Forces that attacked Iraq in 2003, starting thus the Second Gulf War.

The idea of using pre-emptive actions (strikes) as a means of defence has been included in the content of national security strategies by all the great powers and the states that aspire to become great powers or at least regional leaders.

Depending on their interests and opportunities, the above-mentioned states stipulate the use of force as to deter potential enemies, to expand and defend their spheres of influence<sup>11</sup>, to impose their point of view in the disputes with other state, to guarantee their access to resources etc.

International public opinion has different views about pre-emptive actions. On the one hand, the supporters of the concept consider it is the only way to fight successfully against an enemy that does not respect the laws of war and takes, preponderantly subversive actions. On the other hand, those who are against the adoption of the concept of pre-emptive actions as a way for the right of self-defence to materialise claim that it equates with accepting the “*law of force*” in international relations while they should be governed by the “*force of law*”. The argument brought to support this point of view is that “... *it is mandatory to provide evidence to convince the international community that the actions are founded ... otherwise abuse will be encouraged*”<sup>12</sup>. This point of view is in the spirit of the UN Charter that conditions reaction (the military action to respond) by the occurrence of attack/aggression.

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<sup>9</sup> George W. Bush, *State of the Union*, Agenția Rador, 21.01.2004, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup> \*\*\*, *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Washington D.C., USA, February 2003, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> \*\*\*, *Instruction 1100, Doctrine Interarmées sur la prévention*, Etat Major des Armées, Division Emploi, 3 July 2002, p. 7 (“*pre-emptive actions are executed in a global manner, resorting to the entire range of measures – diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military ... as a part of the state strategy to influence ...*”).

<sup>12</sup> Michael N. Schmitt, *Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law*, The Marshal Papers, no. 5, November 2002, pp. 70-71.

As far as the supporters of pre-emptive actions are concerned, making public the evidence that a potential aggressor prepares for an aggression (even within the limited circle of the UN Security Council) equates with compromising the pre-emptive action through making it public – and even with endangering the sources of information. As well, more and more voices among security experts support the re-evaluation of the way of thinking of both decision-makers and jurists, as the fight against an enemy whose identity is only vaguely known and who does not obey the rules of armed fight cannot be won acting according to the principle of action and reaction or using methods proper to the classic war.

Pre-emptive actions were crowned with success when they were seriously prepared and executed by well-trained people who were thoroughly familiar with the mission. Pre-emptive action presupposes to strike by surprise the one who prepares to initiate an attack (armed aggression) before he finishes the preparations for the action (aggression). This way, the potential attacker becomes the target and the potential target becomes the attacker.

The dispute between the supporters and opponents of pre-emptive actions and, implicitly, of using force in international relations has both a political and a moral dimension.

*From the political standpoint*, the following question arises: *Is the UN Charter still valid as far as unconventional warfare is concerned?* If there are sufficient arguments to prove that the UN Charter should be enhanced, then negotiations should be conducted so that it could meet the requirements related to the new reality.

*From the moral standpoint*, the problem that occurs is if it is just or not to use force against someone accused of having the intention to use force. In other words, both parties have similar intentions but one party materialises its intention before the other. Therefore, another question arises: *Who is right?* So far, the answer has been: *“The strongest is always right”*. I think the just solution is negotiation – not to get to use force – as well as the harmonisation of positions, through identifying those common points that allow for *“bridging the gaps between parties”* as genuine prevention *“needs for the causes to be eliminated”*<sup>13</sup> [the ones that have led to casus belli – AN].

The debate on the concept of pre-emptive actions is part of the larger context of transforming the military power to meet the requirements related to the new threats and challenges in the security environment.

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<sup>13</sup> Peter Singer (Editor), *Tratat de etică*, Editura Polirom, Iași, p. 422, Chapter *War and Peace*, author Jeff McMahan.

In essence, tailoring the military power to meet the requirements related to the trends in the evolution of security environment presupposes, firstly, the transformation of the decision-makers and fighters attitude to cope with any situation. The best way to achieve this objective is to change people's mindset from the preponderantly reactive one to a preponderantly proactive one. In this context, each of us, depending on the level of competency, has to foresee the trends in the evolution of the domain in which the activity is carried on and to take the necessary measures to avoid contradictions, blockages, syncopes and other types of dysfunctions that occur due to both surprise and insufficient involvement in the projection of the future evolution of the structure we are part in.

The transition from a world in which the law of force is still manifest to one in which the force of law will prevail cannot be possible without determined and competent people who spare no effort to achieve this objective. We will also have to be patient and tenacious enough so that we could be consistent and firm in pursuing the proposed goal, as transition can last for some generations.

**Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction** was, is and will be a problem that cannot be resolved in a short period of time. It is a temptation to get nuclear weapons as possessing them confers a certain status in the competition for power at regional and world level, and the existence of some networks to transfer nuclear technology – as it was the one of the Pakistani A. Q. Khan – makes us believe that history may repeat itself.

The appeal to the history of proliferation tells us that “... *three states that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – India, Pakistan and Israel – have now an accepted nuclear status ... process that may occur in the case of other states, too ... [because – AN], besides the states that are in the possession of the nuclear weapon, it is estimated that more than 40 may obtain it if they want ...*”<sup>14</sup>.

After Libya renounced its ambition to become a nuclear power and after Iran and North Korea accepted the inspections led by the International Atomic Energy Agency, it seemed that the process of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation could normalise. However, the swaying attitude of North Korea as well as the bellicose one of the Iranian leaders have led to a rise in international tension in the Middle and Far East. The sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council have not been as efficient as expected, and the recently proposed ones are less likely to be adopted because of the different positions the Council permanent members hold.

<sup>14</sup> George Soros, *Epoca failibilității*, Editura Polirom, Iași – București, 2007, pp. 150-151.

Although the focus is mainly on nuclear weapons, the chemical and bacteriological weapons are comparable – as far as their lethal potential is concerned – to the nuclear ones but they are more difficult to control and easier to obtain and use, even by those who are not specialised in doing it. That is why, there is a risk for them to be obtained and used by terrorists.

### ***Ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts and terrorism***

These types of threats have many points in common and approaching them in an integrated manner is more beneficial than treating them separately. After analysing the situation in this field, we have come to the conclusion that almost all ethnic as well as religious conflicts are generated by some minority communities discontent with their status compared to majority communities.

Moreover, almost all ethnic conflicts have a religious component and in many cases the insurgents engaged in conflicts act using terrorist methods.

Ethnic and religious conflicts represent a paradox of our days, dominated by globalisation, integrationism and democratisation of international relations.

The causes of ethnic and religious conflicts are to a great extent similar and the most important ones are the following:

- *identity crises and the need for a status to be recognised;*
- *nation (re)formation;*
- *effects of colonialism that did not observe ethnic and religious frontiers<sup>15</sup>;*
- *recrudescence of “tribalism” and local leaders desire for power<sup>16</sup>;*
- *weak legitimacy of some states (regimes) leadership<sup>17</sup>;*
- *increasing number of states<sup>18</sup> and ethnic groups that claim the right to self-determination<sup>19</sup>.*

In most cases, ethnic conflicts have a religious component as, many times, the ethnic groups in conflict have different religions (Buddhist Indians against the Muslim Pakistanis in Kashmir; the Orthodox Greeks in Cyprus against the Muslim Turkish Cypriots in the Island of Cyprus; Muslim Albanian Kosovars against the Orthodox Serbs; Muslim Palestinians against Mosaic Israelis etc.). Another reason

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<sup>15</sup> Jean-Louis Dufour, *Crizele internaționale, de la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999)*, Editura Corint, București, 2002, pp. 137-142, 145-150, 170-172, 187-191.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 187-189, 196-199, 207-209, 221-225.

<sup>17</sup> \*\*\*, *Securitatea națională la început de secol XXI*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 2002, pp. 52-53.

<sup>18</sup> Philip Delmas, *Le Bel Avenir de la Guerre*, Gallimard, Paris, 1995.

<sup>19</sup> Vicki J. Rast, *National Fragmentation, Ethnicity and the New World Order*, in *Global Security Concerns*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, 1996, p. 54.

that lies at the basis of associating religion with ethnic conflicts is the attitude and ideas of most political leaders belonging to ethnic minorities who use religion to promote their wishes for power because “... *there is no purely religious phenomenon ... Religion is a human ..., social ..., linguistic and ... economic phenomenon, as the human being cannot be conceived outside language and collective life*”<sup>20</sup>. Religion is a very strong binder for communities and that is why associating it with ethnicity and the desire for self-determination represents a force multiplier especially in underdeveloped and poor countries where political leaders can easily manipulate people if they co-opt religious leaders in this activity. There are situations when the religious leaders started the “*fight against unbelievers and the secular state*”<sup>21</sup>, setting up Islamic republics in which the Koran is the fundamental law.

**The Undeclared Arms Race** can be demonstrated through the annually increasing military budgets for most of the states in the world<sup>22</sup>, especially those situated in areas with frozen conflicts, developing conflicts and in the areas in which some states try to obtain weapons of mass destruction, mainly nuclear weapons and their carrying vectors.

There is another fact that unquestionably demonstrates that the undeclared arms race really exists, namely the annual volume of transactions in armament, fighting technique and military material, which grows from 35,862 billion in 1998 to 44,158 billion dollars in 2005<sup>23</sup>.

In the official declarations of the majority of leaders in the world, it is specified that the increase in military budgets is necessary to maintain the capabilities needed to defend national interests and to cover the higher and higher costs of the more and more sophisticated armament systems. We have to admit that the achievement of a credible military capability is possible in a rather long period of time and that is why defence investments should be carefully planned for periods of at least 15-20 years. Otherwise, the surprise factor may occur as in crisis situations it is not enough time for acquisition and especially for training the personnel so that they could use modern armament systems efficiently. However, even a brief analysis of the military expenses in “hot spots” or in “simmering spots” in the world (Near East, Middle East, South-East Asia, Far East, the Caucasus etc.) will reveal a continuous increase in the expenses in arming made by the states that have an open or latent conflict as well as by the ones that aspire to the status of regional leader.

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<sup>20</sup> Mircea Eliade, *Tratat de istorie a religiilor*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1995, p. 13.

<sup>21</sup> Karl Magyar, *Challenge and Response*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, 1994, p.17.

<sup>22</sup> \*\*\*, *The Military Balance 2007*, published by Routledge Taylor and Francis Group for London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK, 2007, pp. 406-411.

<sup>23</sup> \*\*\*, *Ibidem*, p. 412.

The analysis of the international security environment, following military coordinates, urges us to appreciate that:

- increasing extremism – ethnic and religious – has led to the recrudescence of terrorism and the multiplication of the number of local, regional, as well as low intensity conflicts;
- despite the end of the *Cold War* and the decrease in the threat of a high intensity conflict, of using the classic armament and/or the weapons of mass destruction, “... *the world remains a dangerous place ...*”<sup>24</sup>, fact that makes the maintenance of military capabilities a necessity;
- evolution of the security environment requires for the transformation of the security military component as far as the concept, structure, actions and procurement are concerned so that it could meet the challenges and threats it is confronted with;
- in the future, the military have to be trained so that they “*could be as efficient in the fight for peace as they are in the fights conducted during the war*”<sup>25</sup>.

**English version by**  
✍️ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*



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<sup>24</sup> Ike Skelton, *Whispers of Warriors*, National Defence University Press, Washington D.C., USA, 2004, p. 21.

<sup>25</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action, A Future Worth Creating*, Barkley Books, New York, 2005, p. 4.

# KNOWING AND COUNTERING RISK FACTORS AND VULNERABILITIES TO HUMAN SECURITY (I)

Lieutenant General Dr Teodor FRUNZETI

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*Human being is the essential element of any form of social organisation and the degree to which his security is attained is reflected in the security of the group he is part of.*

*The issue of human security, approached by the author of this article, involves, on the one hand, the lack of some dangers such as famine, sicknesses, reprisals and, on the other hand, the protection of the individual against some undesirable events in daily life.*

*In the first part, the author approaches the particularities of human security. In this respect, he elaborates on the subject and object of reference of security, starting from the fact that overall security is the result of a complex process, in which the human being interacts with his environment, and requires the proper control of global dangers, involving a feeling of welfare, quietness and lack of fear of tomorrow.*

**Keywords:** *human security; enduring development; cooperation; neorealism; vulnerabilities; postmodernism*

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**I**n the current context of the security environment, the 21<sup>st</sup> century is a century of profound transformation. Presently, the world is more complex and interdependent, and the phenomenon of enduring development is irreversible.

A special and obvious dimension is reflected in the indissolubility and commensurability of the notions of “development”, “security”, “their dialectic interconnection and interdependence”<sup>1</sup>.

The approach taken to the development of humankind is seen as an aggregate of people’s options, based on strengthening people’s main capacities, such as the ones of reading and writing, gaining knowledge, being healthy and well fed, having a shelter and being mobile, as well as of having safe future.

In this context, the matters of scientific-technical, social-economic and social-cultural development are connected with the processes of human survival. Contemporaneity is increasingly marked by the profound changes of the survival strategy, and the concept of *global security* is defining

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Lieutenant General Prof. Dr Teodor Frunzeti – Commandant (Rector) of the “Carol I” National Defence University.

<sup>1</sup> Teodor N. Țirdea, *Elemente de informatică socială, sociocognitologie și noosferologie*, Chișinău, 2001, pp. 178-180; 183-187.



for the existence and direction of the future society. In this context, the current philosophy, which provides answers to the existential questions of time, must become a philosophy of survival.

The matter of survival through the securitisation of the humankind development process requires a complete change in treating the strategy, the forms and the models of evolution. The transition to a new form of civilisation development is determined by the ecological state and the provision of security, in the broad sense.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century can thus become the century of the transition from world development to enduring development – a form put forward for the survival of civilisation and the preservation of nature as a natural foundation for human life.

Human development is based on four components:

- *equality* – from the standpoint of the equitable access to opportunities;
- *responsibility* for the future;
- *productivity* of the research regarding human resource and the creation of a macroeconomic environment capable of making it possible for persons to attain their maximum potential;
- *the sense of decision* – meaning that people should attain a level of individual development that could make it possible for them to exert options based on their own desires, out of a broader framework of existing opportunities<sup>2</sup>.

The importance given to human development reflects the tendency towards the main reorientation of purposes, in keeping with which social reforms are adopted in the contemporary world.

The human being and his vital necessities are considered fundamental and supreme, and the material factors, the income or the increase in consumption do not represent a central condition anymore, but only a means of providing enduring human development. The revision of the correlation between the purposes and means of social development represents the return to the orientation of general conceptions about the world, which are characteristic of the human culture.

The evolution of humankind cannot be achieved unless human security is provided, and that usually involves a situation in which people can exert their options in safety and liberty, without being afraid that the opportunities they enjoy can be lost or withdrawn.

Security means that the benefits people have attained in enlarging their opportunities and perfecting the capabilities are protected by the current social, economic, political arrangements. The foundation of security is represented

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<sup>2</sup> B. Buzan, *Poșoarele, statele și teama*, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2000, p. 386.

by wide social acceptance, based on enduring institutions of “people’s rights and obligations”<sup>3</sup>.

In the ideology of the contemporary activity, the shift to a new understanding of human security took place at the beginning of the '90s, when the *Cold War* and the ideological confrontations between superpowers ended.

The danger of the atomic extermination of humankind has become weaker, and the humankind security has passed from the military domain to the humanitarian field of life and human dignity.

In the methodological plane, “human security” is perceived as a positive factor, because it appears as an integral feature within which the parameters that reflect both objective and subjective aspects of the human being’s social life are reflected.

Security is approached as a multidimensional concept, which is related not only to weapons and their use but also to the safety of the human being: society, economy, environment, food.

From the perspective of enduring development, the concept of *human security* has the following features:

- it is a universal problem – many of the existing threats are common to all people, varying in intensity from country to country, from region to region;
- the components of human security are interdependent; thus, in the event the security of the people is endangered in any corner of the world (famine, pandemics, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic tensions, social disintegration), the nations are involved, in one way or another, and the consequences of these dangers can extend both at regional and global level;
- human security can be properly provided through measures meant for prevention rather through ulterior interventions;
- security sees the way the individual is integrated in society, as well as the liberty he has at his disposal to exert his right to have an option in a multitude of possibilities.

The two concepts – “*sustained development*” and “*human security*” are related, interdependent but not identical; however, there is an interconnection, meaning that the progress in a field increases the possibilities for the other’s progress and vice versa.

Human security has come to the attention of the international opinion starting from the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, in which, in Article 3, it is written: “*Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person*”. Or, in Article 22: “*Everyone,*

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<sup>3</sup> V. Babiuc, *Securitatea României – o perspectivă europeană. Strategii XXI. Viitorologie. Geopolitică. Strategii operaționale*, București, 1997, p. 86.

*as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.*"<sup>4</sup>.

The issue of human security involves, on the one hand, the lack of some dangers such as famine, sickness, retaliation and, on the other hand, the protection of the individual against certain undesirable events of daily life (diseases, accidents in the workplace or in society).

The concept of *security* has become, after 1989, one of the most used concepts at the level of international elites, together with the ones of globalisation and enduring development. Before the '80s, the concept of *security* had a subsidiary role, being used especially in the military domain, within strategic studies; today, there are only a few people who deny that security is one of the main issues humanity is confronted with.

Currently, philosophers and scholars in various domains of science look for and examine the categories of a new interdisciplinary direction, *noospherology*<sup>5</sup>, which manifests presently as a generally scientific theory of the humankind survival<sup>6</sup>.

The concept used in the security analyses, especially in the ones regarding non-military dimensions, is the one of *human security*. The subject and object of reference of security is the individual, and the individuals' state of security represents the starting point, irrespective of the analysed level – national, zonal, regional or global.

A human being is the essential element of any form of social organisation and the extent to which its security is provided reflects in the security of the group it is part of. The definitions given to this concept demonstrate the fact that, for now, the problem of security is far from being fully clarified. The situation is owed to the fact that all the meanings of human existence are built through definitions resulted from the perceptive experience of individuals.

The state of security is provided with difficulty, as a consequence of the variety of people's values and interests, which, in most cases, contradict each other, creating fears for individual, group, national, state or suprastate security.

The definitions of security, as provided in various dictionaries, refer to protection against danger (objective security), feeling of safety (subjective security) and absence

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<sup>4</sup> *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 10 December 1948, Art. 3 and Art. 22.

<sup>5</sup> The noosphere – the range of information, knowledge and valorisation that are specific to the human being, <http://dexonline.ro/search.php?cuv=noosfera> (Editor's note).

<sup>6</sup> Teodor N. Țirdea, *Sinergetică, aliniaritate, autodezvoltare. Calea spre știința postneclasică*, Chișinău, 1998, pp. 31-39.

of any doubt (trust in own knowledge). The threats of reference (danger and doubt) are very vague, and the subjective feeling of security or trust is not connected to the real state of security or trust.

Security chiefly refers to the fate of humanity and then to the personal security of human beings, individuals, being affected by factors in the military, political, economic, social and environmental sector.

The security of individuals (people) cannot be defined just as easy. The factors involved – life, health, status, financial position, liberty are much more complicated, and some of them cannot be replaced if lost (life, status).

One must notice that the human being cannot exist outside the global system and, consequently, the security analysis cannot ignore its elements, as follows:

- *the context*, both structural and historical, that defines the basic parameters or circumstances;
- *the culture*, meaning the ideological perspectives, cognitions, feelings and judgments that provide the system with value, sense and orientation;
- *the structure* of actors and their resources, with the help of which the established purposes are attained;
- *the processes*, the dynamic cooperation or antagonist relations, through which the actors seek to attain their purposes in the short or long run;
- the intentional or unintentional *effects* or consequences of actions, inactions or processes.

From a different perspective<sup>7</sup>, the global system can be seen as a combination of five major subsystems:

- the political subsystem;
- the economic subsystem;
- the social subsystem (more precisely, socio-demographical, without the cultural component);
- the cultural subsystem;
- the ecological subsystem.

These subsystems are interrelated and, at the same time, each of them reflect the specific nature of their elements – context, culture, structures, processes, effects.

In the security analysis, there are two contemporary theories: *neorealism*, which points out the importance of the role the state has as a security provider and *postmodernism*, whose role is highlighted in the emphasis of the interdependencies between non-state actors.

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<sup>7</sup> Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, Ottawa, IDRC Books, 1999.

Neorealists, represented by Barry Buzan<sup>8</sup>, state that the approach to security made only from the point of view of the military dimension, promoted during the *Cold War*, did nothing more than be detrimental to the development of the concept, which caused the enlargement of its range through the introduction of new security dimensions – political, economic, social and ecological.

Postmodernists, especially Ken Booth<sup>9</sup> reckon that states and governments are not objects of reference of security, because they have become sources of insecurity for the people they are responsible for.

Both approaches address especially the non-military dimensions of security and the main difference between them consists in the nature of the object of reference identified in the security analysis.

The neorealist point of view places human security next to state security, as an identical object of reference in the theory and practice of security. At the same time, postmodernists state that the idea of state security was used by governments to cover reality and real security issues, thus promoting the concept of human security.

In 1993, the *Human Development Annual Report* was published, in which the notion of *human security* was introduced, a notion that consequently became a benchmark for the new model of security, a new security paradigm<sup>10</sup>. In the UN's opinion, human society must become involved in a transformation process on two levels that should result, on the one hand, in the transfer of the centre of gravity from territorial security to people's security and, on the other hand, in the transfer of the means for achieving security from weapons procurement to sustainable human development.

According to the United Nations, human security requires the counteraction of a broad range of threats to people, which are grouped as follows:

- *economic security* – guaranteeing a minimum income required for each individual;
- *food security* – securing the physical and economic access to basic, essential food;

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<sup>8</sup> Barry Buzan, seen as one of the main representatives of the Copenhagen School, is currently a Professor within the Department of International Relations of The London School of Economics and Political Science and author of some of the basic writing regarding security analysis, such as: *People, States and Fear*, 1991 and *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in The Twenty-First Century*, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> Ken Booth is a Professor within the Department of International Politics of the University of Wales and author of some important writing in the field of security, such as: *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security*, 1991; *Statecraft and Security*, 1998; *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*, 2002.

<sup>10</sup> In Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Dimensiunile nonmilitare ale securității*, Universitatea Națională de Apărare "Carol I", Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare și Securitate, București, 2005, p. 11.

- *medical security* – guaranteeing minimum protection against diseases and unhealthy lifestyle;
- *ecological security* – protecting people from the environmental damage and natural disasters;
- *personal security* – protecting people from physical violence, whatever its source;
- *community security* – protecting citizens from losing traditional relations and values, from ethnic and sectary violence;
- *political security* – providing a living environment based on the observance of human rights in society<sup>11</sup>.

The relations between cause and effect regarding the threat to humanity are often obscure and controversial.

Most of the threats to individuals occur as a consequence of the fact that people live in a human environment that permanently exerts inevitable social, economic and political pressures.

Social threats are divided into: physical threats (pain, injury, health); economic threats (destruction of property, obstructing access to work or resources); threats to rights (incarceration, denial of normal civil liberty); threats to position or state (elimination, public humiliation).

The supporters of human security analyse both direct and indirect sources of threats<sup>12</sup>, grouping them as follows:

- *direct threats*: violent death/incapacity (victims of violent crimes, killing women and children, terrorism, riots, pogroms, genocide, torturing and killing dissidents, war victims), dehumanisation (slavery, kidnapping, incarceration of political opponents), drugs (drug addiction, illegal trafficking), discrimination (discriminatory legislation, practices against minorities, undermining political institutions), international disputes (tensions and crises between countries), weapons of destruction (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction);

- *indirect threats*: deprivations at the level of basic human needs (food, water, primary healthcare, primary education), illnesses (rate of occurrence of life-threatening diseases), natural or/and human-provoked disasters, underdevelopment (low GDP/capita, slow growth of the GDP, inflation, unemployment, inequality, poverty, economic instability, demographic stagnation and transformation at the national,

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, p. 12.

<sup>12</sup> Kanti Bajpai, *Human Security: Concept and Measurement*, Kroc Institute, SUA, 2000, in Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Originea socială a religiei creștine. Implicații asupra stării de securitate a colectivităților umane*, Colocviu strategic, Universitatea Națională de Apărare “Carol I”, Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare și Securitate, no 16, December 2005, p. 3.

zonal, regional and global level), population displacement (refugees and migration at national, zonal, regional and global level), environmental degradation at national, zonal, regional and global level.

The new vulnerabilities, risks and threats humanity is confronted with today impose on the concept of security the principles of global security of the socio-natural system, and the balance between man and biosphere allows the simultaneous satisfaction of global and state needs as well as of the ones of all people and each person separately.

Security should be seen as the result of the dynamic equilibrium between different components of the living environment, a state in which hazards and conditions that may cause the insecurity of human beings are controlled so that the individual can be defended in all aspects, thus contributing to the security of all.

Security of all is the result of a complex process in which the human being interacts with his environment and involves the proper control of global dangers, entailing a feeling of wellbeing, peace and lack of fear for tomorrow.

There may be several definitions of the concept of security. Thus, using the criterion "*the interests of the individual or community*", security must protect the vital interests of the person, state or society against the internal and external dangers and threats. Here, the object to protect is not the man (individual), citizen or people, not the state or the group, but their interests, which may not always be assessed objectively by social practice and science. As such, the danger is seen as an opportunity to act negatively on the social body, having as a result the infliction of injuries, damages.

Security is a systemic feature, assuming the ability of some objects to threaten (to create dangers), and of others – to protect, to avoid such dangers.

Dangers can be caused by mistakes (errors) related to the desired end and may be external, internal or scientific. From the point of view of socio-natural situations, dangers are: ecological (the harmful action of nature on man) dangers, demographic ones, technogenic dangers (the harmful action of technologies, of technique on the biosphere, on man), social anthropogenic dangers (subject to the specific of the human understanding of information).

The first three examine, within the limits of the scientific directions, social ecology, demography, industrial ecology, psychology of communication, work protection, with the particularity that they have a quantitative measure for assessing the level of safety (the number of earthquakes and their harmful force, number of floods, increasing population, the annual number of victims of accidents, cataclysms, natural disasters). The following work and affect human consciousness, his soul, which is more dangerous than the previous.

Security for practical purposes is classified into: economic, social, political, state, military, cultural, spiritual, human, production, energy, technical, food, information, ecological, demographic, nuclear, physical, language, environment, soul security etc.

The basic concept that highlights the essence, the core of various types of safety is national security. The global trends of world development – catastrophic environmental degradation and rapid population increase on Earth – point out that the rush for profit and unjustified consumption cannot drive to the sustainable development of civilisation. Hence the need for the development and implementation of new paradigms of human existence, new models of providing human security, of the security of life on the planet.

For contemporaneity, the notion of “*sustainable development*” has become the main element in developing new paradigms of survival for humanity, in finding new ways for managing social systems<sup>13</sup>. The situation in which humanity is now seeking for a new development model, and new objectives related to security.

In their work<sup>14</sup>, researchers recommend us to achieve new imperatives, addressed to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, such as:

- intellectual imperative, through the qualitative advancement of the social intellect;
- consolidation of security, based on strengthening a sense of trust between people and the pursuit of cooperation between countries;
- close links between security and sustainable development;
- collaboration in science, technology, economy and ecology, to meet the new requirements of life.

In this line of argument, the sphere of reason (noosphere)<sup>15</sup> will be interpreted according to the category of security, i.e. it becomes a concrete state of civilisation that will appear during the survival of humankind and its transition to a sustainable and safe development, as a result of eliminating global dangers and disasters, ensuring security for all forms of human activity.

The concept of sustainable development in agreement with bioethics is another paradigm, which envisages the development of the group, respecting the interests of future generations.

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<sup>13</sup> Teodor N. Țirdea, *Securitatea ca noțiune fundamentală a noosferologiei. Progresul tehnico-științific. Bioetica și medicina: probleme de existență umană*, The documents of the 6<sup>th</sup> International Scientific Conference, Chișinău, 2001, pp. 20-23.

<sup>14</sup> Teodor N. Țirdea, *Elemente de informatică socială, sociocognitologie și noosferologie*, Chișinău, 2001, pp. 178-180; 183-187.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*.




After the end of the *Cold War*, the security of people started to become the object of attention for the international community. Putting the individual and peoples in the centre of international concerns represents, in fact, a new orientation of the aid policy in support of human development.

Now, the welfare of the individual, besides the role played by economic factors, begins to be associated with other factors such as: longevity, health, education or access to an adequate standard of living, increased opportunities for everyone to have an option, active involvement in political and social life.

Last but not least, the emphasis laid on the individual and the population to which he belongs, regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, leads to the crystallisation of the manner of defining the concept of “*global human security*”.

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*In the second part of the article, the author will continue the presentation of the concept of human security developing the issue of the impact climate changes can have on international security, individual security implicitly.*

**English version by**  
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**



# **THE ARMED FORCES**

## **– from the Institution to Profession –**

*Lieutenant General Dr Sorin IOAN*

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*The author writes about the trust the population puts in the military institution, a feeling that can be materialised through the participation in collective defence and humanitarian missions, in support of citizens and local authorities, in crisis situations, through the professionalism of actions, the demonstration of the essential military virtues and the structures modern and effective equipment.*

*In this respect, the author outlines an analysis of the motivation of the youth especially for the military profession, taking into account a few general aspects: opportunities to develop, improve and train in Euro-Atlantic institutions and to operate in a multinational environment; becoming specialised in fields that can be found also in the spectrum of civil professions and that provide subsequent professional development; gaining managerial, administrative and diplomatic experience, especially during international missions; rapidly becoming socially mature, through becoming more responsible, by means of firm and risk discipline, in which hesitation, lack of concentration or even minor mistakes can have dramatic repercussions.*

**Keywords:** *geopolitical transformations; antiterrorist coalition; security environment; military profession; collective defence*

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**T**he importance of studying and being aware of the history of a nation and a country is often highlighted both in general and in the academic environment. It is incontestably necessary, formative and instructive for each and every individual to be aware of at least the crucial moments in the evolution of humanity and society, the circumstances in which some states emerged, and the huge leaps that led to essential, revolutionary or progressive mutations, having immediate or subsequent consequences at global, regional or specifically national level. Even if we do not go so deeply into the matter, this awareness helps us understand the origin and development of the nation we belong to as far as its culture, religion and traditions are concerned. We may have a clearer and a more realistic and coherent vision on the current social, political, cultural and military framework if we enlarge it, adding traditions, on the one hand, and the international context, on the other hand.

Unfortunately, in the history of our nation, there were a lot of moments marked by convulsions and military conflicts occurred in the centre or at the extremity of some interests regarding power or influence, be they related to independence or national unity, at the crossroad of empires, or to the

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Lieutenant General Dr Sorin Ioan – the Romanian Military Representative to NATO and the EU.

destructive “*kinetic wheels*” of the two world wars. Invariably and inevitably, the main instrument to support and help the nation cause survival was represented by the *armed forces* made out of the bodies and souls of the people and “*directed*”, despite some imperfections having different causes, to serve the nation. Human sacrifice, a factor that should not be neglected, is a solid argument for it.

### ***Image. Relevance. Trust***

The interest and, to a large extent, the military individual attitude regarding not only the duty but also the civic and social environment essentially depend on the general, public image of the institution. In its turn, the public image is influenced by people’s perception with regard to risks and threats to national security and, implicitly, the individual one, by the armed forces *relevance* as far as a firm response to them is concerned and by the other dimensions that determine a sense of *trust* in the ways to react to and control different conflict-generating situations.

In the period previous to the geopolitical transformations started in 1989, the population did not feel the external threats to national security for a number of reasons, such as:

- the vector of representation in the *Cold War* period – URSS – relied on both the own capabilities and the ones at the border with the “opposed military bloc”;
- the national armed forces were not engaged in common exercises because of the attitude of isolation adopted within the Warsaw Pact;
- there was a strategic concept regarding national defence, by the entire people, having the enlarged dimensions of preparing the population, economy and territory for defence, without the presence of a direct danger;
- the limited and selective system of information was manipulated towards discrediting attitudes and ones that stimulated patriotism;
- the only threat – the West with its “inhumane and exploiting imperialism”, was, in fact, for the majority of the population, an unexpressed dream, a wished direction to evade.

In those conditions, the image of the armed forces was grounded on the support for the population in economic activities (agriculture, constructions, hydropower installations) and in crisis situations generated by some natural calamities, as well as on the own defence industry achievements and on the daily presence of the people wearing the military uniform in the street, the means of public transport or shops, in a time when it was forbidden to wear civil clothes on the way to office or on the one back home. However, the image was affected by the privations of the compulsory military service, the repeated mobilisations aiming

at achieving some economic objectives “*wearing the uniform*”, and especially by the precarious living conditions in the military units. The events in December 1989 proved the responsible position of the institution and the military – that of belonging to the people and supporting its will.

What followed was a period of wandering in a new “*beginning of history*”, trying to find security guarantees or “*collective engagements*” that could offer at least “*peace dividend*”<sup>1</sup>, in a regional environment disrupted by open conflicts (in the former Yugoslavia and in some states that split off from the Soviet Union). The engagement of military forces in multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, having a low degree of risk and local beneficial effects, in a process of reconstruction, doubled by an openness towards communication on the part of the institution, as well as the constant interest of mass media, all these have supported the positive image of the armed forces in the public perception. It was, indeed, an important vein of interest generated by the processes of NATO and the EU accession.

During this time, after the end of the *Cold War*, Europe was confronted with a phenomenon of relaxation as far as the perception of the community public opinion was concerned. In fact, they did not perceive any threat to their security. Therefore, both the number and the budget of the armed forces were reduced.

The attacks on September 11, 2001, followed by other actions of the same type in Spain and Great Britain, made people become aware of the danger of new threats to public security, more difficult to manage, namely *international terrorism* with all the associated risks: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the danger of a nuclear accident. The armed forces became interesting for the public opinion again. It was caused by the new orientation of the transformation processes, meant to respond to real phenomena, significantly influencing the level of trust in the military institution.

Similarly, in our country, the engagement of the armed forces in the anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan and in the stability and reconstruction phase in Iraq accelerated the reform and modernisation process and implicitly the public level of trust in the institution became higher, maybe against the background of a sense of pride in the national effort that joined the international effort for peace and stability. It is desirable and at the same time expected for both the accession to the collective defence structures, once the country became a NATO and the EU member, and the tragedy of the human losses in missions with a high degree of risk, far from the borders of the country, not to diminish the public interest for the continuation of the transformation and modernisation processes, even if the pace of these processes is slackened off by the effects of the global economic

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<sup>1</sup> The syntagm *peace dividend* belongs to John Mearsheimer, in “*Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War*”, *International Security* 15:4, Summer, 1990, pp. 5-56.

and financial crisis. The persistent conflicts in the vicinity of the borders, as well as the recent war between Russia and Georgia, with not only all connotations and causality but also with its effects, in the short and medium run, may represent solid arguments. An important role, in this context, is assigned to the own communication and public information strategy.

The relevance of the institution derives from the participatory engagement, even with reduced forces, in the context of a limited budget, in the European and Euro-Atlantic efforts to defend and secure the common institutional values and the interests of the population belonging to the community.

The population trust in the military institution can be consolidated through the reaction capacity in achieving fundamental missions, national defence, participation in collective defence and in humanitarian missions, supporting citizens and local authorities, in crisis situations having natural causes, through professionalism in actions, through proving military essential virtues and through providing structures with modern and efficient equipment, which confers them superiority.

### ***The military profession: preoccupation and public support***

The favourable attitude towards the military profession, attested by polls and the large number of volunteers to be employed under contract, as well as by the candidates for admission in the military education system, has gone hand in hand with the large public level of trust in the military institution. Moreover, the trend in attitude in our country is similar to the one in developed countries, especially in Europe<sup>2</sup>, which proves a proper degree of integration for the civil society at European level, showing similar processes regarding internal transformations and a coherent vision of the community. Subsequent to analysis, even a succinct one, of the motivation for the military profession, the following general aspects can be mentioned:

- opportunities to educate, improve and train in Euro-Atlantic institutions and to operate in a multinational environment – in some countries, participants in peace-support missions enjoy a privileged status (priority regarding access to higher education, bonus for employment and others);
- specialisation in domains that belong to civil professions and that ensure subsequent professional development free of charge;
- opportunity to gain experience in management, administration and diplomacy, especially during international missions, through managing development projects and the contact with the community and local administration, as well as with representatives of governmental and non-governmental institutions;

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<sup>2</sup> Giuseppe Caforio, *The European Officer: A Comparative View on Selection and Education*, Pisa, ETS, 2000.

- guarantee of a relatively stable workplace, decently remunerated compared to the minimum wage, especially for those living in socio-economically disadvantaged regions;
- non-discriminatory access of the young, irrespective of gender, ethnic group or religion, not only to enter the system but also to fill hierarchical positions throughout the entire career;
- rapid social maturation, through becoming responsible, in the context of a strict discipline and risk, in which hesitation, lack of concentration or even minor mistakes may have dramatic effects;
- public trust in the institution and in the people wearing military uniform stimulate the choice of a profession that benefits from a favourable social position.

It is clear that a professional, specialised analysis would expand perception, and would reveal the less favourable aspects of the profession, which sort options, and, why not, it would make suggestions for future policies meant to enhance the interest, motivation and public support as far as this profession is concerned, with beneficial consequences for the institution.

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In the context of certain competition among institutions, even within the national defence system, attracting the young educated people having reasonable career expectations is grounded on the public position of the society towards the military profession, on the level of trust and respect and on a constant communication, through representatives, with civil society, seizing all the opportunities and not only isolated campaigns.

Polls and other actions conducted by sociologists, especially among the young, potential candidates for the military profession, help with forming and tailoring, through corrections and motivation enhancement, the own strategy to attract, maintain and promote people.

Making public the performances regarding modern equipment and the level of professionalism, proved in exercises and missions, also contributes to the enhancement of civil society trust in the military profession and, in general, in an institution that openly communicate with the public. Before looking outside, trust is grounded on internal cohesion, the structural one, on a solid positive opinion at the level of each component professional corps, oriented towards responsibilities, missions and civic spirit. In other words, the complete measure of trust is given by two dimensions that may be emotionally and symbolically expressed as follows: *“I am proud to serve my country as a military”*, respectively *“I am proud of the armed forces of my country”*.

*English version by*  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

# MILITARY ORGANISATION

## – DEFINITION AND COMPONENTS –

Colonel Dr Gheorghe MOTOC

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*From the perspective of the theory of organisations, there are two essential coordinates that bear an important methodological value: the need for revealing those elements of internal structure that distinguish the military from the other social bodies and organisations, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the need for analysing the military systems and structures in connection with every phase of social development.*

*With these realities in mind, the author draws up an analysis of the elements of this type of structure and the way they are harmonised. Therefore, there are three types of organisational structures identified: hierarchical linear, functional and hierarchical functional.*

*In the end, the author reckons that as far as our military is concerned, carrying out the transformation process in the human resource field is required, as well as achieving an efficient management of the defence professionalised human resources.*

**Keywords:** *organisational efficiency; military structures; combat training; command and execution; command and control; interoperability*

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Motto: *“An organisation is a collection of options in search for problems, of opinions and subjects in search for decision-making situations to be displayed, and of solutions in search for subjects to respond, of decision factors in search for opportunities to become manifest”.*

James March

**O**rganisations represent a thorough reality. Since the beginning, humanity has existed within certain forms of organisation. Since the first years of life, each human being has been part of a multitude of coexistent or successive organisations (family, school, professional system and so on).

The necessity for organising human activity and for constituting organisations springs from the imperative of human cooperation. The individual, as an isolated entity, has access to a limited set of activities and goals. The capacity to take action and the force to respond to the pressures exerted by the external environment are limited. In organisations, through cooperation, people may achieve things they cannot achieve individually.

An organisation is an open and adaptable system, considering the fact that it is a component of some larger systems with which it has ties that

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Colonel Dr Gheorghe Motoc – Deputy Chief of the Structures and Armament Planning Directorate, the General Staff.

are harmonised through the management process. At the same time, an organisation has its own degree of autonomy and the ability to function independently. An organisation may be understood only if we see it as a dynamic and open social system whose internal processes interrelate with the environment.

To define it, its human specificity has to be accentuated and highlighted. Based on this hypothesis, an organisation is defined as a social system in and through which people interact (cooperate) to achieve common goals. In other words, an organisation involves a distinct form of correlation not only between people and goals but also between people and structures.

Organisations, as complex social systems, consist of elements that have to act concentratedly to achieve organisational effectiveness. It presupposes for organisations to be analysed from the perspective of not only their capacity to integrate organisational variables and human factors, but also of the one to properly react to the external environment influence.

The relationship between people and goals is essential, but it does not exhaust the organisation's complexity and specific. The relationships between people, each individual's relationships and the ones of all individuals with the structure of the organisation in its aggregate simultaneously define the organisation. The quality of human interaction and the organisational goal are extremely important within these relationships. Becoming a member of the organisation and consequently assuming the organisational goal does not guarantee the achievement of the organisation objectives unless the nature of the relationships between human beings is modelled in this direction and human interaction has the form of cooperation. Human interaction is the foundation for the organisation functioning.

At the same time, the organisational structure decisively influences the nature of human interaction. The size of the organisation, the number of hierarchical levels, departments, functional subunits and the complexity of its activity, they all influence the entire organisational activity.

Starting from the general theory of organisations and emphasising the aspects that are proper to the armed forces, we can define the military organisational structure as an internal grouping of armed forces and other elements of the military system on armed forces categories, arms, large units, subunits and formations, hierarchically echeloned, as well as the relationships between them.

As far as the theory of organisations is concerned, two fundamental coordinates that have an important methodological value should be considered when analysing military systems and structures:

- the necessity to reveal those elements belonging to the internal structure that distinguish the armed forces, the military organisation, from all the other social bodies and organisations; in other words, there is a type



of organisation proper to any armed forces without which the military system would not be what it really is;

- the necessity to see military systems and structures in their history, namely in the light of their concrete connection with each stage of social development, with the particularities of every country, as well as in their evolution, determined by the change and development of the social organisation forms, in general.

The armed forces organisational structure has to ensure:

- the existence of a professional command corps to organise and lead the armed forces in accordance with the requirements of the national and international juridical system within the existent institutionalised organisational framework;
- the integral and continuous application of the norms proper to military life and activity, making possible the existence of a strict military discipline;
- the continuity of military training and the contact of the command corps with the troops both in peacetime and wartime;
- the procurement of different types of arms and technical means and the development of proper forms of organisation to use them in fight.

The armed forces usually constitute the main military forces of a state. Certain activities and organisations having special functions are necessary to educate, train, equip and supplement the armed forces. They all form the military system: the aggregate of military forces available to a state, of the forms, procedures and methods to organise, maintain and use these forces in peacetime and wartime.

The analysis of the elements of different types of structures and of the way they combine allows for the identification of three types of organisational structures, as follows:

- *hierarchical-linear structure* in which, no matter the hierarchical stage, a subordinate takes orders from a superior only, and is held accountable for his whole activity in front of the respective superior; in the armed forces, this organisational structure is frequent and specific to small subunits, where the reduced number of militaries and the existence of the subunit commander guarantees good leadership and responsibility for the objectives that have to be achieved;
- *functional structure* that presupposes the use of specialised knowledge in the context of the diverse and ample activities that take place not only within economic enterprises but also within military units. Within these organisational structures, a series of functional departments is established to solve specialised problems and perform specialised activities, such as: departments in charge of preparing for fight and providing the necessary

materials, technique, funds etc. According to this organisational structure, executive bodies take orders and dispositions both from direct hierarchical commanders (chiefs) and from the functional departments with the same specialisation. This structure can be found in the armed forces, starting with the military units that perform their activity independently and solve all the problems related to preparing for fight and ensuring technical and material means; a shortcoming of these organisations is the fact that they are double hatted, which may cause disorders as far as the activity of directing and executing is concerned, because contradictory orders and dispositions may be given so that command and control unity cannot be achieved;

- *hierarchical-functional structure* that is a combination of organisational elements belonging to the two above-mentioned types of structures. Within this functional departmental structure, the use of specialised knowledge is ensured. Unlike the functional structure, departments do not have direct authority over executive positions.

This type of structure ensures, besides the use of specialised knowledge, the command and action unity that is indispensable for performing efficient activity. The essential characteristic of this type of structure is the existence of specialised departments, such as the staff, which help the command cadre in their activity or, in general, hierarchical departments that perform the basic activity of the unit.

The hierarchical-functional organisation is frequently used, especially in the organisation of military units. A military system may essentially consist in the following elements:

- *permanent or regular armed forces*, representing the main subsystem, which are capable, due to their organisation, equipment and training to prepare and carry out military actions that have a continual character, following a strategic plan developed in time;
- *non-permanent or irregular armed forces*, organised following two principles, using civilians or militaries that take part in the military activity only in wartime;
- *domestic order forces*: gendarmerie, police, security units, national (royal or presidential) military guards etc.;
- *paramilitary forces*: organisations meant for military education and the preparation of the youth in this spirit even before they join the armed forces; mass forces meant for local defence, medical aid, or reservists training etc.;
- *economic-social institutions designed for military purposes*: companies belonging to military industry, institutions and laboratories for studies,

research and military experiments, publishing houses and cultural institutes having a military profile etc.;

- *modalities of recruiting, supplementing and mobilising the armed forces, and the proper forms of organisation;*
- *political-military superior command forms and bodies* in the armed forces meant for their subordination to the state domestic and foreign policy, to the power of the state.

As a body specialised in waging war, the armed forces, having a specific structure, carry out the activity based on some rules and laws derived from the specific and the requirements of the armed fight. The *military structure* is understood as the internal organisation of the armed forces and other elements belonging to the military system, as well as the relationships between these elements.

As for the degree of structuring, the armed forces represent a formal organisation, characterised by a high level of regulation of the organisational behaviour, through norms, orders and dispositions.

In general, the larger an organisation is, the more formalised it is, so that its maintenance and coherence in activity can be guaranteed. Not only its size but also its goals and the nature of its activity contribute to the high level of formalism. The armed forces have a clearly established structure due to the norms regarding their constitution and behaviour, the roles and the relationships between the members of the organisation, the leaders and hierarchy, the requirements to join the organisation, to develop inside it and to leave it.

In its aggregate, the structure of the military organisation has two major components: *the command or functional structure* and *the operational structure*.

- *The functional structure* reunites the people, modules and organisational relationships that are constituted and placed so that they could meet the requirements related to the technique and personnel necessary for the performance of the managerial process and of the one the military organisation is designed for.

Another approach, a more objective one, defines the command or managerial structure as the aggregate of the superior managers and organisation subdivisions. Through their decisions and actions the managerial, technical, personnel and economic requirements necessary for the organisation activities to develop are met.

Command is a leadership function characteristic to the armed forces, exercised by commanders following the unity of command principle. At the same time, it represents an aggregate of actions through which the leading body imposes its will on the executive bodies, influencing them to take desirable actions. It is clear that the sense of *command structure* is assimilated to the one of *leading system*. Within the military organisation, the leading system (command structure) is represented by the commander of the respective organisation.

Having in view the complexity of the problems human communities, any military structure respectively, are confronted with, we have to admit that managerial relationships become an objective necessity. We support this statement enumerating some of the aspects regarding managerial activities, such as: the relationships between management and execution; management presupposes relationships between technical and organisational aspects; the relationships between management and people.

- *The operational structure* consists of the aggregate of people, subunits, units and the organisational relationships established with a view to directly achieving the military unit object of activity and the operational capacity to carry out the military action. It is dimensioned according to the range of missions assigned to the military organisation and structured according to subsystems categories, depending on their type and diversity.

In time, as a result of the influence of the social-economic, political and technical factors, as well as the specific experience in the field of armed forces organisation, the main military structures have been outlined.

The first military structure was that of *non-permanent armed forces*. The general characteristics of non-permanent armed forces as a structure are the following:

- a) the armed forces are constituted and act only in wartime or whenever the state asks for their services to achieve some special missions internally and externally;
- b) the military training has an individual character or, when training is grouped, it is carried out periodically;
- c) the armament and military technique are predominantly individual;
- d) the actions usually have a local character;
- e) the command corps is not a professional one, from the military point of view, being directly formed on the grounds of position and social hierarchy.

There are advantages and disadvantages of organising non-permanent armed forces. An important advantage is represented by the fact that it is simpler and less expensive to support it and it may ensure, when needed, the engagement of a large number of fighters. The disadvantages consist in the reduced possibilities to adapt to the requirements related to military technique development, the lack of continuity in military training and in the command structures preparation, the reduced capacity to take part in ample campaigns and to deploy at great distance.

*Permanent armed forces* represent a highly specialised military structure. They have the following main characteristics:

- a) the existence of a professional command corps that organises and command the armed forces in accordance with the directives of the state leadership;
- b) the integral and continuous application of the norms proper to the military life and activity, which makes it possible for a rigorous organisation and a firm military discipline;

- c) the continuity of the military training and the contact of the command corps with the troop, both in peacetime and wartime;
- d) the equipment with diverse types of weapons and technical means, and the development of forms of organisation to use them in the battlefield;
- e) the provision, by the state, for all the material and spiritual needs required by the armed forces normal functioning.

The superiority of permanent, regular armed forces is determined, to a great extent, by the existence of a professional command corps, specially trained to organise and command military actions. Once the stable command corps is established, a complex military structure is formed, which is characterised, on the one hand, by the relationship between commanders and troops and, on the other hand, by the relationships established within the command corps.

*Mass armed forces* represent a military structure that usually corresponds to an advanced stage of the society economic and political development. Mass armed forces represent a structure in which the social-economic factors play a more important part, as they are recruited from the large strata of the society. Thus, the social structure of the country, the relationships between social classes, national relationships etc. are directly reflected in the armed forces.

The emergence of mass armed forces has complicated the problem of military organisation, of troops command, and has determined the gap between organisational divisions to widen, as well as the creation of the large tactical units, the operational ones and, later, the great development of logistic activity etc. Troops command needs, in the new context, the performance of some complex work to organise fight, based on numerous pieces of information and connections. Consequently, *the staff* as a permanent body meant to help the commander with making decisions, and with conducting military actions has appeared.

*National armed forces* consist in the citizens of the same state, being characterised by a good internal cohesion and strong ties with the population. In the national armed forces, the traditions of the respective nation regarding fight may be cultivated and developed, and education based on the sense of military duty towards the homeland can be achieved.

The evolution of the military organisation is a continuous process unfolded in stages, slower or more dynamic ones, depending on the evolution of a concurrence of factors that determine changes in the organisation and functioning of the security and defence systems belonging to states or the coalition of states.

The first years of the third millennium have encountered a profound reform process that has been manifest in all the aspects of its existence. This process has determined the change in the organisation, functioning, command and control, procurement of fight and support systems, and the planning and use of financial, material and time resources.

All these happen because the armed forces cannot afford to waste the time when it comes to accomplishing specific missions, no matter how difficult they might be, or how severe the moments of the reform, restructuring and modernisation process might be. They cannot afford to leave aside the limits and constraints imposed by the society in using the resources it offers, either. Moreover, the lever to the success of the evolution has been order, discipline, tenacity and the effectiveness of its architects' actions, all together.

In this context, one may appreciate that, as far as the Romanian Armed Forces are concerned, it is required for the continuation of the transformation process in the field of human resources, the achievement of a competitive management of the professional human resources in the field of defence to meet the requirements of the process of restructuring, reducing and making operational the armed forces structures, to ensure interoperability in this field with the armed forces of NATO and EU member countries.

It is important that, in the process of becoming professional and joining NATO and the EU defence structures, including NRF and tactical battlegroups, the opportunity for the rapid establishment of some integrated structures organised in modules and having the capacity of rapid reaction should be considered in advance. Such a force could consist of multi-role modules and could be constituted depending on the concrete situation, to meet the requirements of the Alliance and the EU.

Such a concept has been already in use in modern armed forces and especially in the armed forces of NATO member countries and may be analysed and adapted to the concrete conditions specific to our country.

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*English version by*  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

# THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS (I)

Colonel Mircea MÎNDRESCU

Motto: "The Moral is to the Physical as three is to one".

Napoleon Bonaparte

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*The author approaches the concept of strategic paralysis from the perspective of its military, spiritual, material, mental and moral features. The main purpose of this concept is the incapacity rather than the annihilation of the enemy.*

*In this respect, the author underlines that this option is intended for acquiring maximum political benefits with minimum material and human expenses. The planned actions are aimed at neutralising the enemy's will to fight through actions carried against the capabilities that provide the resource and command-coordination elements needed for conducting the war.*

*The main purpose of a direct action is to affect the enemy physical, material and mental capabilities, the enemy morale included.*

**Keywords:** *enemy annihilation; force destruction; battlefield; action pattern; social system*

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One of the most debated subjects within the human society has always been the issue of war and peace. Civilian and military thinkers, likewise, aware of the importance of the subjects, which could finally lead to existence or non-existence, have been devoting their attention to the study of the characteristics, specificities and complexities of these two important social phenomena.

Bearing in mind the importance that peace and war have, as well as taking into account the possible consequences of failing to deal properly with the two phenomena, it comes as no surprise the fact that inside the subjects many efforts have been spent on trying to define those methods that when used would inevitably lead to victory. What is that gives one success? What are the reasons for leaving the battlefield by troops that might have had the capacity to continue to fight? These are but two examples of the innumerable possibilities of constructing questions on the margins of the subjects of peace and war.

Colonel Mircea Mindrescu – Deputy Director, the National Defence College.

If requested to respond quickly, one could say that the loser is that one who recognises himself as being like that. If the feeling of powerlessness is not nestled into the soul of a warrior, then he will continue to resist with good chances so that victory could come closer to him. On the other hand, the acceptance of the opponent's superiority derives from a sort of state of mind that one is helpless, from a moral collapse that could appear due to the coming into being of strategic paralysis.

The *operational paralysis* is a relatively new term. Notwithstanding, there are authors who have not only recognised the importance of some concepts congruent to that one of paralysis but have also used this term explicitly.

The famous thinker Basil Liddell Hart was a vigorous advocate of strategic paralysis. The starting point in his thinking process is the recognition of the fact that victory means nothing if the winning nation is drained away of its resources. Therefore, the most efficient and economical way to wage war is to aim at “*disarming*” the enemy through strategic paralysis and not to seek the enemy's destruction through physical annihilation<sup>1</sup>. “*It is thus more potent, as well as more economical, to disarm the enemy than to attempt his destruction by hard fighting... A strategist should think in terms of paralysis, not killing*”. Liddell Hart argues that the resulting “*psychological pressure on the government of a country may suffice to cancel all the resources at its command so that the sword drops from a paralysed hand*”. His analysis of war shows “*that while the nominal strength of a country is represented by its numbers and resources, this muscular development is dependent on the state of its internal organs and nerve-system upon its stability of control, morale, and supply*”.

The roots of the concept of strategic paralysis are with Sun Tzu who, over two thousand years ago, in his famous book *The Art Of War* (Ping Fa), writes that one of the most important rules requests to keep a nation intact rather than destroy it. At the same time, it is better to keep an army intact than destroy it. For that reason, the true skill is not to win in battles but to neutralise other armies without bloodshed<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, Sun Tzu promotes the idea that the adversary must be rapidly incapacitated by saying that that one is skilled in martial arts who manages to win without fight, to conquer cities without sieges and to destroy other nations rapidly<sup>3</sup>.

In his turn, Clausewitz was not prone to “*attrition*”, as it is commonly believed<sup>4</sup>. The German military thinker concludes that there are two types of war. One is the “*ideal*” war, the aim of which is the total annihilation of the enemy, and the other

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<sup>1</sup> B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, London and Faber Ltd., 1954, New York, Penguin Books, 1991, p. 212.

<sup>2</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated in English by Thomas Cleary, Boston and London, Shambhala Publications, 1988, pp. 66-67.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> David S. Fadok, *John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power Quest for Strategic Paralysis*, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1995, p. 5.



is the “*real*” war within which total annihilation of the enemy is not possible due to some constraints or limitations posed by the political masters of the resources at one’s disposal<sup>5</sup>. In other words, the meaning that Clausewitz gives to the phrase “*the enemy forces must be destroyed*”<sup>6</sup> is that these forces should be put in such conditions as not to be capable of continuing to fight. Therefore, it is evident that Clausewitz’s definition of destruction of enemy forces is in fact compatible with what could be called the paralysis or the annihilation of the enemy.

J.F.C. Fuller is probably the first to draw a military plan that aims at paralysing the enemy (*The Plan 1919*). That plan has at its foundation the idea that the force of an army rests with the way it is organised and, by that, controlled by its brain. Therefore, it is inferred, if the brain is paralysed the body ceases to function<sup>7</sup>. Fuller insists on the fact that the war that aims at the brain is the most efficient way to neutralise the enemy organisation and, through that, the enemy military might. For that to happen it is fundamental that resources should be found for delivering an instant blow resembling a shot in the head, avoiding by this a kind of lengthy death due to the bleeding caused by some smaller wounds<sup>8</sup>.

Fuller and Liddell Hart were witnesses to the emergence of a new weapon, the airplane, on the battlefield. Notwithstanding the position of other contemporaries, the two military thinkers foresaw that the air force would have a very important part to play in those actions destined at paralysing the enemy. For example, Fuller proposed an operational model that included a ground force fixing the enemy ground force while the air forces were completing the destruction of enemy bases and communications hubs, paralysing the enemy actions by that<sup>9</sup>. Hart’s ideas to the matter spelled out that if the blow was sufficiently powerful and rapid, then, there was no reason that, in the framework of a few hours or a few days, the party with an inferior air force would not have its nervous system broken down<sup>10</sup>.

*Strategic paralysis* is an option that presents military, spiritual, material, mental and moral characteristics aiming at debilitating (incapacitating) and not destroying the enemy. Thus, it is envisioned that the political benefits will be obtained with minimum material and human expenses. The blue forces’ actions will be geared towards those capacities that deal with command and coordination activities. The main objectives to be hit are of material, physical or mental substance. Thus, indirectly, what is aimed at is the adversary’s moral fabric. Operationally,

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<sup>5</sup> Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 196-197.

<sup>6</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated in English by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 90.

<sup>7</sup> J.F.C. Fuller, *The Foundation of the Science of War*, London: Hutchinson and Company, 1925, p. 314.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 292.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* p. 181.

<sup>10</sup> B. H. Liddell Hart, *Paris: or the Future of War*, New York: Garland Publishing, 1972, pp. 40-41.

the enemy's incapacitation will be achieved by fusing battle with manoeuvre. More specifically, less stress will be put on using direct actions, the main accent being put on interfering with the enemy command, control and support structures' activities. Non-lethal intensions do not necessarily prevent a commander from desiring to destroy enemy facilities; the stress though is not on physical elimination. Another aspect to be kept in mind is that the effects will not necessarily be everlasting; they will be purposefully designed to last for short, medium or longer term according to the way in which the operational scenario has been written. In essence, the method of strategic paralysis accommodates the idea of attacking the enemy's material and mental capabilities with the stated aim of neutralising his morale by using the indirect approach.

The *strategic paralysis theory* has evolved along the evolution of human society. Notwithstanding, the most general aim, that of incapacitating the adversary through neutralising his will to fight, remains the same. Moreover, for a long time, but not anymore, even the practical methods by which it was envisioned to incapacitate the enemy remained the same. In modern era, however, these methods have evolved visibly, the result being that many practical forms have been borne. The beginning of this era was with actions against the material domain, especially with regard to those actions destined at destroying the war making capacities. Today, it seems that this material-oriented approach has somehow faded, the domain of command and control being on the rise. There are already thoughts that today's revolution in information will generate new practical formats of paralysing the enemy. One of the most challenging tenets of today's situation is that the importance of vertical infrastructure is decreasing while the horizontal cooperation is growing. As a result, in the future, the main effort will be dedicated not to destroying the vertical relationships but to harming the horizontal ones through damaging the horizontal centres with the aim of making them non-cooperative. As it is evident, the informational domain will be the playing space for those who will seek to paralyse the enemy.

To ensure efficiency, it must be borne in mind that planning has to take into account not only the violent phase of the conflict but the aftermath period, namely the peacetime. Any other approach, namely one that seeks conflict as a disparate bunch of independent phases, will have no other result than to prolong and often complicate the conflict. What is really necessary for terminating the conflict in favourable terms is producing a change in the enemy's behaviour. And that takes time and necessitates a skilful approach.

The model of strategic paralysis presents those characteristics that are necessary for changing the enemy's behaviour. On the one hand, paralysing the enemy will result in creating the vital leeway to act efficiently against the enemy. On the other hand, the paralysing actions, due to their less destructive consequences

and to the fact that they request a shorter period of violence, generate less hostility and thus the possibility of mending the bilateral relations is greatly increased.

However attractive, paralysing the enemy is not an easy thing to achieve. The greatest difficulties do not spring from the marshalling of necessary material resources, but from the intellectual difficulties pertaining to put such a complex model at work.

Defeating an enemy means more than victory on the battlefield, what would be necessary being the annihilation of its will to fight. For an extremely complex social system, as warring war is, material factors are relatively easy to calculate, that aspect being part of what could be described as being part of the precise part of the military science. The organisation, weaponry, military materiel, military doctrine etc., are relatively quantifiable factors.

On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that a conflict, a military one included, is far from being science only. A lot of attention should be devoted to the subjective factors, among other things, to the human will. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the genesis of a military conflict is with the human factors like proud, jealousy, fury and resentment, greed etc. Or from other causes more or less related to those needs found at the base of Maslow's pyramid.

In one of his famous letter, Liddell Hart says that in war the chief incalculable factor is the human will<sup>11</sup>. Consequently, there could not be a thorough study of a conflict without paying maximum attention to those factors related to human actions.

In all this equation, one of the most important factors is the *will to fight*. Generally speaking, the will to fight may be defined as being the ability, or the lack of it, to initiate and sustain a fight. The process of analysing the will to fight is more than simply taking into account the morale, doctrine or the capacity to lead or to be led. There are other factors that add their complexity to the already existent complexity, amongst of them being those related to how, for example, the fighters regard the national will to fight, the cohesion that exists within a unit or formation, the impact upon our troops due to the enemy's actions, especially in the first phases of a conflict, the troops' fatigue etc. Of a paramount importance is to understand the influence that religion, ideologies, indoctrination, superstitions or other deep entrenched beliefs bear upon men and women.

The will to fight of a military component has to concentrate on the system as a whole and, at the same time, has to take into account some isolated components that may not submit to the general direction. On the other hand, analysing the will to fight of a nation is an awesome task, overwhelming by its complexity due to the myriad of connections and interdependencies that play their roles. A point to start

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<sup>11</sup> Timothy J. Sakulich, *Precision Engagement at the Strategic Level of War*, Air University, Maxwell Air Force, Alabama, 2001, p. 27.

could be Clausewitz's *paradoxical trinity*, namely the political leadership, the armed forces and the people. It should be stressed that it is not obligatory for all three to be aligned in their positions. A case in point is the shock suffered by the German army and the German people at the end of the First World War when they found that their government surrendered.

Another important term of gravity to be dealt with is the one of *centre of gravity*. Establishing this centre will channel the actions against the enemy as long as this centre of gravity is defined as being the hub from which the enemy draws its strength.

At the strategic level, the centre of gravity could be the capital of a state, the armed forces, the political will, the national will etc. If the correct determination of a centre of gravity could fundamentally influence the proficiency of actions, a flawed analysis of the centres of gravity could lead to the worst consequences. One well-known example is that of the war in Indochina where the Vietnamese leadership correctly appreciated that the American centre of gravity was the popular support for the American armed forces actions. Acting coherently for the neutralisation of the American centre of gravity, the Vietnamese succeed in winning strategically in spite of the fact that they were not able to win a single battle.

At the operational level, on many occasions, the centres of gravity could be the armed forces disposition but do not confine to those only.

At the tactical level, the pattern utilised for determining the centre of gravity is determined by the same method as at the operational level. The tactical level centre of gravity could be military formations or the control of various geographical features.

Experience has demonstrated that in spite of the importance and intellectual challenges posed by the concept of the will to fight there are difficulties and wrong approaches in dealing with this subject. In fact, according to Trevor Dupuy, the military specialists do not approach the study of the subject seriously. The study of the will to fight concept is important for many reasons. The first one may be the one linked with the lack of serious preoccupation related to the matter. The others are related to the intrinsic importance of this concept for the study of conflict.

Beyond success or failure with regard to the study of the will to fight, there are some fundamental truths related to the concept. The study of human psychology is important because there are humans that fight battles. Therefore, the general and particular study of the human psychic could offer fundamental information regarding leverages for imposing strategic paralysis upon the enemy.

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*In the second part of the article, the author will analyse a few works of persuasive scope that approach the "war" or the "conflict" phenomenon, such as the ones of Sun Tzu and Frederick the Great.*

# CONTEMPORARY TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS

## – Non-State Actor

### with Major Implications for Security –

*Major General Dr Ion-Aurel STANCIU*

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*The terrorist waves that hit America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East, especially after 9/11, brought to our attention the reality according to which international terrorism has reached an extremely dangerous level regarding the vulnerabilities, risks and threats posed to security institutions and democratic countries.*

*Terrorist organisations have reached an organisational and specialisation level that allowed them to establish their own worldwide network, making thus possible for a real time reaction to take place anywhere on the planet. Their actions are extremely violent and the targets are various, especially civilian objectives and populated areas.*

*The international reaction to terrorist actions consists of several measures and actions among which: intensifying the measures to fight terrorism in more and more countries; increasing international cooperation in fighting political, military, institutional and financial terrorism; arresting the most important leaders of terrorist organisations.*

**Keywords:** *political violence; globalisation; terrorist acts; ethnic strife; ideological conflicts; democratic freedoms*

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The current evolution of the international security environment can be seen as part of the phase meant to clarify the relations between state and non-state protagonists, which have a significant influence at the global level, the beginning of this phase being considered the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United States.

The main actors of the international security environment are the *states* (through structures and persons in charge of the internal executive power) and the *groups* or *organisations*, the non-governmental ones included, and, in certain situations, even the *persons* with great power of decision.

In this context, the complexity and instability of the current security environment are mostly determined by the intensifying phenomenon of the proliferation of actors, resulted from the disintegration process of some federal states (which has implicitly determined an increase in the number of countries) and the increasing number of international organisations (created against the background of the complex regional and global problems the states must resolve).

Major General Dr Ion-Aurel Stanciu – Chief of Romanian Air Force Staff.

Moreover, economic connections have strengthen lately and new sales markets have emerged, determining an increase in the number of multinational companies as well as in their desire to be acknowledged as international actors<sup>1</sup>.

Among the most important organisations, there are the political ones, either multi-state or supra-state ones, then the technical, scientific ones and other non-governmental bodies, many of which are involved in settling global or regional issues.

Given these circumstances, terrorism is the main threat posed to the current international security environment, the reconsideration of the strategies and national security policies – following the September 11, 2001 events – being directly connected with the identification of the most viable solutions meant to prevent and combat terrorist actions. Thus, terrorism, through its way of manifestation, is transformed into a global actor in the international security environment.

The waves of terrorism that have struck America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East for the latest years, especially since September 11, 2001, have pointed out the fact that international terrorism has reached a level of extreme dangerousness, against the background of the vulnerabilities of the security institutions in the democratic countries to the new risks and threats.

Preventing and combating international terrorism require new ways of evaluation, proper capabilities and ways of action, while the expansion of the terrorist phenomenon and its increasing dangerousness determine concerted actions to combat it, and the creation of a large global coalition against it.

Given these circumstances, the efforts made for countering such threats require proper attention, the identification of the causes, methods and procedures of action of the organisations or groups that disturb the equilibrium of the internal and international security environment.

Before transnational and international terrorist organisations began attacking the urban targets in an organised and systematic manner, the public opinion and national authorities thought political violence was something that existed only in certain third world countries in Africa and Latin America.

Currently, the main features of terrorism can be gathered around a few elements, the most significant being: the tendency to become more radical, the use of “human bombs”, the tendency to become global, the diversification of the forms and ways of action, the disappearance of the barriers that used to separate terrorism from organised crime in the past.

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<sup>1</sup> From open sources, the latest news: China ranks first in the foreign investment made by the USA (totalling about 580 billion \$).

However, at the same time, the lack of mass support and a clear ideological basis can represent features of contemporary terrorism, regardless of its orientations and tendencies. These terrorist acts can win the heart of only but a few small groups of people, followers, while being repudiated and stirring huge reactions against them on the part of most people.

Terrorism, one of the key elements in the analysis of contemporary international politics, is a special form of political violence, with the following features:

- it is premeditated and seeks to establish a climate of terror and extreme fear;
- it seeks to target a bigger audience or, as an immediate purpose, to cause victims through violence;
- attacks can occur against random or symbolic targets, civilians included;
- the violent attacks are perceived by the society as out-of-the-ordinary events that defy social norms;
- terrorism is used to politically influence (a state, a government) in a certain way, for instance, to force opponents to make some concessions, to receive a favourable response to certain requests or to stir a major reaction that could serve as a catalyst for a generalised conflict or make a certain political cause public.

In consequence of the fact that terrorism has been manifesting in many forms, the purposes of and reasons for terrorist actions not being the same, it has been categorised by specialists in accordance with certain criteria; therefore, there are numerous categories of terrorism and numerous attempts made for establishing a certain typology, the difference between them being only in terms of the complexity of the analysis, the thoroughness of the criteria and definitions or the specific of the author, the place and the moment in which these categories have been drawn up.

The analysis of the international situation highlights the fact that contemporary terrorism has multiple ways of manifestation, respectively *national*, *transnational* and *international* terrorism:

- *national terrorism* is used, from case to case, by terrorist groups comprising citizens of that certain state who, for various reasons, act against state institutions or, on the contrary, by the state system, which acts against its own citizens, using terrorist methods;
- *transnational terrorism* is practiced by individuals or groups of individuals who are supported or not by one or more independent states and carry out terrorist actions against some installations of a target state that are both on the territory of that particular state and in other states;

- *international terrorism* is characterised by the actions performed by one or more terrorist groups, coordinated by a country or a central coordinating entity, which target objectives on the territory of many states that are part of the same political, social or economic system.

A few major features of the contemporary international political system have brought about acts of violence capable of turning into terrorist actions. The most important one is deepening the ethnic, religious gaps and ideological conflicts that remain unsettled and embitter the life of the international system, generating several forms of violent conflicts (terrorism included) that periodically turn into civil or international wars.

The “uncovered areas” in the domains of the economic-social and political life of the international system have determined the occurrence of some “niches” that provide terrorists with the opportunity to act unrestrainedly and terrorist organisations with the one to train and activate new cells, benefiting from an increased freedom of action<sup>2</sup>, according to the principle “*fight against democracy by means of democracy*”.

Terrorist organisations exploit democratic freedoms, institutional deficiencies, unconsolidated democracies or corrupt systems, the resuscitation of some religious or ethnic claims making it possible for their political purposes to be attained.

According to the reasons that lie at the basis of their actions, the essence of these international terrorism-generating organisations is: *fundamentalist Islamic, ethnic-separatist* and *ideologically rooted*, being characterised as follows:

#### *Fundamentalist Islamic Terrorist Organisation*

The Islamic ideology transforms de facto domination into de jure authority and provides permanent submission without resorting to physical constraint, making it possible for religious confusions to occur as far as the battle between right and wrong is concerned.

One must clearly understand that the danger is not represented by the Islamic religion, but by the Islamic fundamentalism, which must not be mistaken for the Islamic religion<sup>3</sup>.

#### *Ethnic-Separatist Terrorist Organisation*

Currently, one cannot predict whether integration or separatism will prevail in the future. One can only assume that, if globalisation progresses, it will be

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<sup>2</sup> As it is the case of the terrorist organisation al-Qaeda, which has managed to establish training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, without being afraid of any interference on the part of the states.

<sup>3</sup> Mention should be made that, as far as more than 1,4 billion Muslims are concerned, only a few million (2-3%) are fundamentalists (the Wahabi and Salafi movements – that think of themselves as pure Islamists – represent, in fact, the strictest part of Islamic fundamentalism).



completed by other “subjects” than the ones that are known at present, because there are fears that certain European, African, Asian and South-American countries cannot maintain their current unity.

There are only a few states worldwide ethnically and religiously homogenous. In most of them, there are various ethnic groups that live together with the majority of the population. A part of these minority groups wishes to separate from the majority, sometimes resorting to violent methods and means, generating local conflicts of various dimensions.

#### *Ideologically Rooted Terrorist Organisations*

The revolution manifests as a radical social, political and economic change. It is a change of system and not a strategy.

Revolutions are declaratively characterised through spontaneity, but they are prepared clandestinely and thoroughly. According to the strategy that is used, the period of violence in a revolution is short. The takeover of the power is a cataclysmic episode for the society and, from this point of view, missions are taken during preparations to avoid, as much as possible, the exacerbation of the violence.

Guerrilla combat is a form of insurgent fight in which the belligerent sides, either military or paramilitary ones, carry out actions that are specific to armed fight.

Thus, terrorism appears as an atypical form of fight against the rule of law. Through its ways of manifestation, it does not produce only terror, being assimilated with a doctrinal idea, as well as to a deliberate way of action.

The idea according to which a terrorist is another kind of fighter for freedom is, in fact, a great confusion over the morality of the forms of violence and over terrorism.

When the actions of terrorist organisations are motivated by an injustice and have a legitimate significance, the expansion of terrorism is encouraged. In this case, the purposes are mistaken for the means.

However, there are situations in which pacific forces resort to force in particular circumstances and on well-grounded reasons; still, terrorism is a special form of violence that involves deliberation with regard to innocent civilians.

The use of terrorist actions can be justified not even in keeping with the doctrines regarding a just war or just rebellion against tyranny and for the right cause.

Assuming the assassins of the state use terror against their own population and not only, there can be no excuse for the use of terrorism, not even in the name of resistance, even against a tyrannical regime.

Extremely violent and broad actions have been carried out lately, targeting especially various civil objectives and big crowded urban areas worldwide. In these circumstances, terrorism has gone beyond the area of relative predictability

as far as its reasons, ways and objectives are concerned, which proves that its promoters can “strike” “everywhere” and “everyone”.

Terrorist organisations have reached such a level of specialisation and organisation that they have ramifications all over the world, being capable of reacting at any given moment and in real time, in any region on the globe.

The compartmentalisation has been deepened by some terrorist organisations horizontally, while others have embraced a more efficient one, the vertical one. The “horizontal” compartmentalisation does not require a central structure.

The structure of terrorist organisations and their way of action have lately experienced constant evolution, especially as far as the aspects regarding globalisation effects and facilities are concerned, determining: increasing counter measures in more and more countries, enhanced international cooperation in combating terrorism at the political, military, institutional and financial level, as well as the capture of the most important leaders of some important terrorist movements.

According to the vision on global terrorism, the characteristics of terrorist phenomenon evolution are the adjustment of command structures, the specialisation on objectives, the increasing complexity of terrorist acts through coordination, simultaneity or synchronisation, the increase in the threat with the use of weapons of mass destruction, the abler mediatisation and the use of the media in order to reach/obtain maximum audience, the continuous diversification of the means and methods to finance and collect funding.

The non-state actor status of terrorist organisations can be also “argued” through the presentation of the factors that are common to most of the international terrorist groups and organisations that contribute to this position within the international security environment, as follows:

- the bases or headquarters of the organisations are placed in one state and the insurgent and terrorist activities are carried out on the territory of other states; the training of the militants takes place in training camps with state-of-the-art equipment and utilities that are quite similar to the ones existing at the place and time of the occurrence of the terrorist attack;
- any person irrespective of his native country, who supports the objectives of the organisation and is capable of learning how to use large or small calibre automated weapons, assault carrabines, explosives and missiles etc. can join terrorist organisations;
- there are organisations in other countries, which have a different orientation “at the surface” than the one of the terrorist organisations or there are firms that have different “peaceful” objects of activity, which apparently

have nothing to do with terrorism, which finance the actions of terrorist organisations; other funding sources of the organisations mostly come from trade activities, either legal or illegal, used as a cover-up by the members of the branches of the movements in various states worldwide;

- the military logistics of the organisations, which is used in the military confrontations in different areas worldwide, is mainly procured from states that support terrorism or from states that fell apart after the fall of the Iron Curtain;
- following the withdrawal of the occupation forces from certain territories, terrorist organisations have strengthened their position through establishing armament depots, recruiting activists and fighters and granting humanitarian assistance to residents (donations in money, equipment and medication), all these being done with the purpose of gaining support from the local population;
- a broad network of charity associations and committees act in different urban centres, being bodies that cover-up the organisation that activates in parallel and serve as a cover for terrorist organisations. The ideology of the movement pays special attention to charity events. The network of charity associations represents a cover-up for covert activities, including the connections with the leaders abroad, the transfer of funds by the members in the field and the identification of potential recruits;
- frequent methods are money exchange, cheques written for some members and firms abroad, business accounts abroad with economic interest in the territory in which the terrorist organisation acts and cash transfers, directly from abroad, usually made through Western banks;
- the export of revolution (or ideology) is another factor that provides the international character of certain terrorist groups and organisations;
- the use of supporters or members of terrorist organisations who are sent to study abroad to plan and carry out terrorist attacks, as they have the advantage of being familiar with the local situation and of not causing suspicion regarding their presence in the area of the attack;
- the doctrine of the terrorist organisation is promoted at the regional or world level, through the creation of some structures within which activities are carried out in the countries in which the organisation has interests (the presence of a relatively large number of supporters), thus seeking to draw new members, irrespective of their nationality or citizenship;

- the penetration of some networks of the computer systems in various countries makes it possible for some attacks on the cybernetic infrastructure in the action area to be planned; these are aimed at the access and security digital systems in the air traffic control towers, while phone networks, water supply systems, power plants, nuclear reactors and natural gas collection and transport infrastructure can be studied through the communication centres in the countries in which terrorism is more present. All the actions that are developed on these coordinates seek to shut down some vital components of the infrastructures of the states that are targeted by this scourge called *terrorism*.

The international involvement of terrorist organisations also results from the cross-border nature of drug trafficking, knowing that the benefit gained from selling drugs returns to the country as armament, reactive materials, explosives, state-of-the-art communication technique or IT.

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Through its scope and medium and long-term implications, through the consequences of the actions and the psychological impact on the political factors worldwide, terrorism is strengthening its position as an actor on the international scene, its eradication being a priority for the most important actors, states or regional and global organisations.

International terrorist organisations have their own capabilities that are used to attain specific purposes, generating major implications for the dynamic of the international security environment.

In the short term, one will probably witness, on the one hand, the tendency of the international terrorist organisations tactics, techniques and action procedures and, if possible, of the globalisation of the phenomenon to diversify and, on the other hand, the attempt of the international community, of the states to find the most efficient answer to counter these actions, pointing out the causes that generate it and not so much the effects.

Considering the new developments brought about by the globalisation of terrorism, it will be influenced, in the short and medium term, by manifestations and reorientations such as:

- the wider use of some specific means, methods and procedures, borrowed from the arsenal of secret services;
- the structural reconfiguration of the most important terrorist groups, through the reciprocal coordination of some organisations that were not connected before (for instance, “Neofascist organisations”);

- the change in the general action strategy of some terrorist groups, in the sense of the legalisation and legitimisation of their existence, concomitantly with the attempt to change their image and become political groups (for instance, “Shin Fein” in Northern Ireland and “Muslim brothers” in Egypt);
- the more and more frequent use of some state-of-the-art communication means in order to establish connections between the headquarters of organisations and the operative cells, as well as to train in order to organise and carry out terrorist attacks.

The tendency to attract some elements within the organised crime to take part in the development of terrorist organisations and carry out adequate missions, especially in the logistic field (one of the main sources of terrorism funding increasingly consists in the actions in the field of organised crime, respectively money laundry, drug, weapons and human trafficking) is much obvious.

The terrorist phenomenon must be successively fought from the superior to the inferior level, it must be “brought” from the *global* to the *regional* level, then to the *sub-regional*, then the *national* one, then the *group* to the last link – *the individual*; the individual terrorist attacks, probably sporadic, will not be eradicated in the long run, however, there are chances that the last two mentioned links could be controlled.

The key to a successful fight against international terrorism is the international cooperation between state actors, on the one hand, and the cultural, religious etc. non-governmental organisations, on the other hand.

**English version by**  
✍️ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*



# **SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING GLOBALISATION AND ITS ASSOCIATED PHENOMENA**

*Colonel (r.) Alexandru IOAN*

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*Globalisation is a normal consequence of the human being's evolution as a social being. Despite the great confrontations between human groups, regardless of the criteria that united these groups and of their proportions, the human being has always felt the irresistible need for establishing contact with neighbours.*

*Just as globalisation is written in the human gene, the individual's security depends on his/her biological structure. The big problem of "war against peace", seen as a paradigm of international relations, is nothing more than the expression at international scale of the confrontation between individuals, under the domination of the feeling of security. Bringing in a third person directly or indirectly, from the beginning or during the confrontations between two individuals, is nothing more than the mimesis effect provoked by the perception of individual security.*

**Keywords:** *globalisation; regionalisation; security state; neoliberalism; neostatism; economic crisis; recession; power*

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**G**lobalisation is the natural consequence of the evolution of man as a social being. Despite the great confrontations

between human groups, regardless of the criteria that have coagulated these groups and their dimensions, man has always felt the irresistible need to come into contact with his fellow beings. Certainly, behind this need that is related to the ancestral "software" the human being, regarded as an ultra-performing "hardware", is endowed with a lot of "justifications" of economic, political, cultural, religious etc. nature may be noticed. The mechanisms that generate the "need" for communication between individuals and for subordination of others by acting more or less "warlike" may be also regarded as resulting from the need for collective existence. This need is very well explained and should be understood as an action commanded through the security "centre of balance" of each individual and then extended to the level of groups, regardless of their size.

At its roots, the concept was used as such by several centres of power and referred to the economic field, taking into account the need for the extension

of market outlets throughout the world. The spectacular developments of the last century technology provide this concept with more profound meanings. With good reason, some experts in security matters believe that the globalisation process began long before the concept was theorised<sup>1</sup>. There is even the idea of a successive “globalisation” or in steps, with gains and losses measured through different criteria, with structures more or less defined and with a stage on which a series of polarising power core performs<sup>2</sup>.

The approaches are not new and represent nothing but the partisan commitment in the race against time to fill the most advantageous possible economic and political positions when the world will have structured an acceptable system of unitary coordination of planetary development.

Expanding the idea, the problem that may arise is whether the globalisation phenomenon is not something that springs from even the human being it is attached to. Given that in about 12 hours it can be crossed from one pole to another, by a significant majority of individuals, the Earth cannot be considered otherwise than a “*planetary village*”, whether it is observed by supporters or opponents of globalisation. The entire path covered so far has gone one way and has been irreversible. Human society has experienced a continuous expansion, even if the speed of evolution has not always been constant. Man has never reduced its entourage, he has not isolated himself from others. Not even now, in the era of “messenger loneliness”. If this initial discussion is accepted, the next question that may be legitimately posed is *whether the total globalisation of the planet is the ideal the human being may tend to in terms of both its security and the society he is part of*.

The evolution of the entire system of processes that defines this phenomenon will extend in history only if it is left to chance. This would not necessarily mean a negative aspect, because even an intervention that is favourable to quickening the process, if insufficiently substantiated, might be even more harmful. The theorists of the concept can be accused of neither emphasising the phenomenon nor of accelerating the processes they have discerned. Possessor of technological progress, of a flourishing culture and civilisation, the West has all the arguments that entitle it to conduct these processes, even if it lacks absolute exclusivity on the needed leverages. The reaction of the “rest” of the world is understandable. The fear that the head runner in the platoon will take it all and that the others will be excluded determines the participants in the competition to forget that the winner

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<sup>1</sup> Mihail Orzeacă, *Tendențe de evoluție ale securității internaționale – situația de securitate în domeniile economic, social și cultural (II)*, in *Gândirea Militară Românească*, no. 4/2008.

<sup>2</sup> T. Frunzeți, Vl. Zodian et al, *Lumea 2007. Enciclopedie politică și militară. Studii strategice și de securitate*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2007.

cannot exist by himself ! It is thus overlooked the fact that nobody will never rule the planet supported by the starved. The Western solution for creating powerful societies, at the economic level included, is perhaps the most powerful force in the “competition of civilisations”<sup>3</sup>.

The acceleration of the processes accompanying the globalisation phenomenon generates an unequal dispute. On one side, there are the most powerful states of the world, the most developed world economies, an overwhelming financial and military force, the most influential international organisations. On the opposite side, there are international or regional movements with much weaker physical strength, but which gather more and more numerous and organised followers. The most common image of this confrontation is represented by the very expensive international meetings held on the issue of globalisation and which are contested by impressive gatherings of protestors worldwide. They use the Internet and the mobile phone to communicate with each other, as well as air transportation to go where the contested events are held. The Internet, mobile phone, air transportation are realities of the globalisation they oppose. Their actions are nothing but a confirmation of the victory of this process.

Who will rule the world and how ? These questions preoccupy the analysts and trouble the world leaders. If technological progress is in the hands of the West, what will the language in which it could send messages on the planet be ? Established as a means of dialogue among world diplomats, English will remain the “protocol language” of global society. The power of the British colonial Empire was the determining factor that imposed it in all its areas of influence, and the essential characteristics of English, its grammar, phonetic and lexical structure have facilitated its assimilation and use in different corners of the world. Yet, imposing it perpetually, by force, at the level of the entire planet would be impossible, even if all world leaders would agree to this.

A first aspect that should be taken into account lies in the huge costs of such a process that is meant to determine profound cultural transformations. However, it is plausible only in the short term. Despite the absence of the means of education required for learning a language on extended geographical areas, given the circumstances in which illiteracy occupies huge areas on the globe, the issue of the costs of learning a universal language would only be a “piece of cake” compared to the huge rejection that might be generated by the perception of the intention of abolishing local cultures. Such an approach would facilitate the reaction of those who oppose globalisation, would enhance the manifestations of self-isolation and the uncontrolled development of this phenomenon. The solution to a “global language”

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<sup>3</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale*, Editura Antet, 1997, p. 115.



of communication can and must come from the world of microelectronics. It is true that the number of languages and dialects on the planet is not known exactly because in the areas that are very difficult to reach undiscovered tribes could still exist. Yet, these difficulties are not insurmountable. The technology that has made the mobile phone an indispensable and extremely convenient accessory can provide a solution consisting of an excellent translator for every individual, regardless of the country he lives in. If we take into account the fact that NASA specialists have set up systems capable of ensuring communication with alien civilisations, the purpose of instantaneous translation between speakers of all languages on the planet could soon be achieved. Thus, both the problems of the need for communication and the preservation of languages and dialects as “unity in diversity” should be solved. The “war of civilizations” may remain a simple theory that has shown the realities of the beginning and end of the millennium, if this step could be taken.

Avoiding a confrontation of civilisations is not automatically a victory of globalisation defined as the acceptance by all actors of the single international market as a basis of the suprastate organisation at the international level. The precipitate events after 11 September 2001 showed clearly that no one could truly and entirely have enough power to ensure own security. If we add here the current global economic crisis, whose consequences cannot yet be estimated, one may assume that the USA will face enormous difficulties to maintain the position of guarantor of international security. It is more and more clear that the United States needs a strong transatlantic relationship not only in terms of security. The North Atlantic Alliance will have to be doubled by a partnership with the EU at least in the economic field if not stronger. The relations between the EU member states can neither remain at the level of competition. It is necessary for the European leaders in developed countries to understand the urgency of a real partnership with the new members of the Union. Seeing the states recently admitted into the Union as some entities from the third world is damaging both for each state and for the EU as a whole.

### ***The Global Economic Crisis and the Role of the State in Providing Security***

Just as globalisation is “inscribed” in the human gene so is the security of the individual connected to his biological structure. The great problem “war versus peace”, seen as a paradigm of international relations, is nothing but the expression on an international scale of the confrontation between individuals actuated by the “feeling of security”. Involving a third person either directly

or indirectly, from the start or during the confrontation between two individuals, is nothing but simply mimicry caused by the perception of personal safety. The mimetic phenomenon caused by the evolution of its state of security extends to the level of the family, subgroups and groups, social entities of any kind and takes shape at the state level to acquire the most refined as well as the most disputed form at the level of international relations. Expressed in the form of interest, this aspect explains the entry into military confrontation of states that had previously declared their neutrality when hostilities started.

For a good period of time, analysts estimated a gradual reduction of the importance of the state, however, the developments at the beginning of the millennium and in particular the global economic crisis – which is deepening and spreading – have placed again the state entity in the centre of the approaches to the concept of security. Professor Daniel Dăianu noticed, in a programme on Radio România Actualități that the impact of the crisis that initially began in the world finance and then rapidly expanded its scope determined the democratic governments to take inconceivable measures: *“I think that, in fact, about everywhere – liberal democracies included – we will witness the reflexes of a war economy, the direct intervention of the states, motivated in one form or another, “Kriegswirtschaft” – and this can be seen right now: the way the intervention has been made during the crisis. President Sarkozy called the captains of the banking industry from France and told them: “We will recapitalize you but if you do not finance the economy to make it work, you should know that we will nationalise you and the entire banking industry !”. If one were told years ago that the President of a democratic state could do something like that ... Imagine Romania, where a president – President Băseșcu or Iliescu or Constantinescu – would say: “Sir, if you do not finance the economy, we nationalise you !” ... This discussion should be placed in a reality, on the fly, of course, but very different through what happens. These are unimaginable, overwhelming things for those who could think or rethink the international financial architecture six months or a year ago”<sup>4</sup>.*

An unfolding of events with such a strong impact on the economic security of the big international actors will necessarily lead to the reassessment of all the other components of the security of states: human, political, social, cultural, ecological and, obviously, military. The security issue, as I mentioned before, is often seen as a prerequisite or a state in which an entity, regardless of its size, is sure of its

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<sup>4</sup> Daniel Dăianu, famous Romanian economist, Minister of Finance between 1997 and 1998, Professor at the National School of Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, corresponding member of the Romanian Academy since 2001, President of the Romanian Society of Economics (SOREC), member of the American Economic Association, member of the Romanian Academic Society, quoted in the programme *“Talk-show de seară”*, 7 November 2008, Radio România Actualități, cited by the Rador Agency on 9 November 2008 and hosted by Alexandru Ioan.

survival<sup>5</sup>. The definition is obviously unclear. Despite the ambiguity, the concern for security has remained constant over the time, even if, in various states and moments of history, the concept did not have a common meaning. When power and peace were key concerns of states, security remained an “underdeveloped concept”, hidden in the shadow cone of power, being long seen as its derivative<sup>6</sup>.

The end of the *Cold War* and the accelerated dynamics of international relations at the beginning of the past decade provided security with a prominent practical interest. Even if, at the time, specialists did not distinguish more than military aspects in its preoccupations, they recognised the triple hypostasis of security: *individual*, *national* and *international*. A brief overview of the main trends shows that, from the traditional perspective, the state and the military dimension are in the spotlight of the “approach goals” to *positivism*. The supporters of this theory draw attention to a broader vision of the security agenda that includes non-military problems as well. The state has a determining role in the conception of *realists* as well, who see in security the clear expression of power relations between state entities. The *constructivist* trend sees the world as a product of social interaction, and from this perspective, considers it can be measured and analysed with specific scientific means. Starting from the same conviction (the world – a product of social interaction), *postmodernists* consider that, on the contrary, the world cannot be easily measurable and analysed because of the contested nature of knowledge. Postmodernist analysts critically reconsider both the *poststructuralism* represented by Simon Dalby and Jef Huysmans and the *postmodernism* of Michael Dillon and David Campbell<sup>7</sup>.

Reflecting the perception of political factors and academic environment, Stephen Walt sees security as a field study of the threats, use and control of military force<sup>8</sup>.

The state is the centre of gravity of security, according to Mohamed Ayoob, too, the representative of the point of view of third world countries. He believes that security and lack of security are defined in relation to external and internal vulnerabilities that threaten or have the ability to destroy or significantly weaken the structure of the state and regime, as far as its territorial, institutional aspect

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<sup>5</sup> Luciana Alexandra Ghica, Marian Zulean, *Politica de securitate națională*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, p. 79.

<sup>6</sup> Barry Buzan, *New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty First Century*, International Affairs, vol. LXVII, no. 3, 1991 and *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2000, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> T. Frunzeti and Vl. Zodian, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.

<sup>8</sup> Stephen Walt, *The Renaissance of Security Studies*, International Studies Quarterly, vol. XXXV, no. 2, 1991, pp. 211-239.

is concerned. He warns, however, that the main source of insecurity in underdeveloped countries does not come from the outside, but from the inside, from the incomplete process of creation of state structures and of monopolisation of the military force by central authorities<sup>9</sup>.

The representatives of neoliberalism (Lord, Keohane, Wallander, Haftendorn) maintain the state at the origin of the system of security coordinates; yet, they change the emphasis on the importance of economic resources in the relations between countries. From their perspective, economic difficulties represent a threat to state security, but the institutional environment of international cooperation has beneficial effects on strengthening security. In the long term, the security of a state depends on its economic capabilities, which are a very important element of power<sup>10</sup>. The representatives of this trend suggest the interdependence between the elements that characterise a security situation and provide the concept with a dynamic dimension, which can be represented on the axis of time and capable of capturing the pace of the transformations of international relations.

Security is more and more considered from a perspective whose complexity cannot be called into question anymore. “*The Copenhagen School*”, represented by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, supports and consolidates the arguments of the English School of international relations. The confusions of the '90s are critically reviewed. The concept of security cannot be separated from the state entity. Therefore, when talking about this concept, basically, it is the security of a state that is considered. The dynamics of security is linked to the interdependence between states and, in this respect, international security refers more to the systemic conditions that determine the way in which the states perceive their own safety<sup>11</sup>. Cooperation and internalisation of certain rules of action represent the main support for international security.

The globalisation of the style American, the so-called “*Anglo-Saxon fundamentalist capitalism*” has accelerated and expanded in Japan, too. The inhabitants of “*The Land of the Rising Sun*” have treated this development as being inevitable, an ineluctable destiny presented by history. Neoliberalism was adopted as the new national policy. The idea that this is the only way to survive the global competition that threatens Japan’s status of economic power is widespread among Japanese officials<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Mohamed Ayoob, *Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective*, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1997, pp. 128-144, cited by Luciana Alexandra Ghica, Marian Zulean, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

<sup>10</sup> Haftendorn et al, *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 22.

<sup>11</sup> Luciana Alexandra Ghica, Marian Zulean, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

<sup>12</sup> Takahashi Tetsuya, Professor of philosophy at the University of Tokyo.

The process has had a serious impact on all the components of society. Japanese financial world makes now a clear distinction between the elite and the “available”, namely the workers who may be disposed of in a moment in favour of fresh “raw material”. Accordingly, in education, the system now makes the difference between “1% – the percentage of elite students – and all other persons without a useful skill, without any talent”<sup>13</sup>. The Japanese society seeks to establish this distinction from an as early as possible age in order to extend the preferential treatment for the elite. There was a time when man, from the moment of birth until his entry into society, had to go through school. Now, the stratification begins in school, it will continue in the social (corporate) life, so that practically the entire life will be lived in a fixed, layered social framework. In the era of globalisation, post-war Japan shifts from a “society without classes” or “with only the middle class” to “class society”: *“If I were to speak about “the reconfiguration of the nation-state” with respect to Japan, I would say that we have to focus on the simultaneous advance of neoliberalism and neostatism*<sup>14</sup>. *And what we have is not just a matter of a parallel synchronicity, but rather a situation in which neoliberalism is dependent on neostatism and neostatism has strategically adopted neoliberalism as state policy. [...] It was difficult at first to grasp how to connect this [statism, nationalism – AN] with the analysis of the neoliberal reorganisation of the nation-state that we have been talking about. It is only recently that we “got” how neoliberalism and neostatism reinforce each other while advancing separately at the same time*<sup>15</sup>.

Looking broadly, the Japanese Professor places the globalisation of the capital at the origins of the fact that the West is in advance of the rest of the world. He notices the success of this process, although the Westernisation of the world encountered throughout several stages the opposition forces but it has surpassed them, now being about to “swallow the world”. In its view, globalisation can be described as the process in which the United States, a state with the “shape of a new empire”, which inherited the West, now truly leads the entire planet. In full

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<sup>13</sup> Shumon Miura is a writer and was Deputy Director of the Japanese Agency for Cultural Affairs (1985-1986). Miura was President of various governmental committees and organisations, the National Curriculum Committee included.

<sup>14</sup> “Statism” is a term used to point out the powerful role of the state in social and economic issues. OED lays a rather different stress, in its edition from 1989: “extreme development of the power of the state over the individual citizen”; it is a word less known in English than *Etatisme* in French. Takahashi Tetsuya uses it with the meaning of nationalism.

<sup>15</sup> Takahashi Tetsuya, *Reconfigurarea națiunii-stat în ordinea neoliberală, neostatală*, interviewed by Lee Hyo Duk. The document is a revised vision of an interview published in 2004 and 2005 by *Zen'ya* Trimestrial, republished in Tetsuya Takahashi, Kono Kuni (*In Pursuit of “Freedom of the Spirit” in this country: Can philosophy Constitute Resistance ?*), [http://www.japanfocus.org/\\_Takahashi\\_Tetsuya\\_H\\_D\\_Lee-Philosophy\\_as\\_Activism\\_in\\_Neo\\_Liberal\\_Neo\\_Nationalist\\_Japan/](http://www.japanfocus.org/_Takahashi_Tetsuya_H_D_Lee-Philosophy_as_Activism_in_Neo_Liberal_Neo_Nationalist_Japan/)

global financial crisis and against the backdrop of the international extension of the economic recession externalised by the US, the economic dimension of security, although frequently contested and politicised, is now under discussion more than it has ever been. It is no longer the exclusive concern of mercantilists and neomercantilists and tends to be accepted as incontestable fact.

### ***In Pursuit of Solutions to Overcome Global Economic Crisis***

During the extraordinary meeting in Brussels at the beginning of November 2008, the European Union decided to assume the vocation of a leader in the global economy. European leaders agreed on solutions to overcome the global financial crisis, which through its implications is affecting increasingly large areas of the global economy. The European Presidency of the European Union was given a clear mandate to negotiate a financial system in the G-20 summit in Washington. The unique voice sought by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, was created and Europe tried again to show that it was an important global player. Three directions were pursued at the summit on 15 November: *common principles based on which a new international financial system should be build, a working method to enable the rapid adoption of decisions and a set of immediate measures to be taken urgently*. The common principles agreed by European leaders state that no financial institution and no market sector should be left out; the activity of all financial actors, including rating agencies, should be regulated and supervised, while ensuring the accountability and transparency of these actors on the financial market; the new system should enable crisis prevention and, finally, the IMF must have a central role.

Despite enthusiasm from Brussels and political declarations that dealt with the EU's desire to reclaim its status as the world economic leader, a position it has always longed for but never held, analysts treated it with circumspection. Professor Dan Dungaciu's reluctance is justified by the "fragility of the unanimity of European leaders" and the scepticism of the Czech Republic, that chairs the European Union in the first half of 2009<sup>16</sup>. The Czech Prime Minister, Mirek Topolánek, said that the mandate of President Nicolas Sarkozy at the summit in America was quite vague, because the 27 actually did not manage to reach an agreement. Neither was the achievement of the European Union's ambition to redefine its place within the International Monetary Fund and to hold a share equal to the US very clear, given that the Union needs a transatlantic partnership to deal with the complexity of the world financial market.

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<sup>16</sup> Dan Dungaciu is a sociologist and geopolitical scientist, Professor at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Bucharest, cited in the programme "*Talk-show de seară*", 7 November 2008, *Ibid*.

Statistics seem to confirm the position of the European Union in the global economy, but a monolithic unity of its political leaders that would provide it with the power to play the role of world leader lacks realism, Professor Daniel Dăianu believes: *“There has been a discussion for a long time now about the need for a greater reach in international institutions, about the fact that there is a big difference between what is shown in the aggregated statistics regarding the gross domestic product, the share in international trade, the increase in the role of the Euro as reserve currency and what is in fact, as a global political actor, the European Union”*<sup>17</sup>.

The essential cause for the weakness of the European Union faced with its main partner is the wide range of the dispersion of the interests of its states, mainly, the most economically developed ones. For each state, holding an as advantageous as possible position within the international financial institutions is more important than solidarity within the EU: *“British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, wants to pose as the saviour, at least from the conceptual point of view, of global finances; on the other hand, he has a great responsibility in the waves of deregulation that has led us into a monumental failure as regards the functioning of the system of international finance”*<sup>18</sup>.

The main point is that the UK position is clearly different from the French approach. The British want to perpetuate a soft approach, meant to avoid “the danger of overregulation”, although financial markets lack precisely the widely accepted regulatory framework. Germany is close to the French approach when it comes to the content of surveillance, regulation activity, but Berlin is very reticent about the possibility of an economic governance to take shape in the European Union. Here we can find, in fact, the structural weakness of forming a unitary voice, capable of establishing a rich dialogue with the United States and the new emerging powers. The problem that can become overwhelming for the chances of a positive outcome lies in the way the desirable architecture at the international level will be envisaged and in the involvement of China and India. In the current context, Central and Eastern Europe is likely to enter a shadow cone and be marginalised if the specific particularities of the economic situation in this area are not taken into consideration as they should be by the “big ones” in the EU, as Professor Dăianu highlights.

More and more specialists believe that the reform of the international financial system should address at least the following issues:

- ❖ a greater number of decision-makers to contribute to the management of globalisation for the benefit of several countries and geographic areas

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<sup>17</sup> Daniel Dăianu, *op. cit.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

than before (the evolution of the crisis proved that the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Bretton Woods institutions have not produced beneficial effects for all actors);

- ❖ the importance of some post-Bretton Woods tools or mechanisms, to prevent a crisis as big as the one that is still underway and that seems to turn into an economic crisis (it is debated the issue of establishing an International Monetary Fund with a real capacity to monitor involutions and enforce rules respected by everyone, not just by some);
- ❖ the reformed global financial system should be capable of producing progress in the regions that greatly need development: *“The neoliberal-type solutions highlighted by Joseph Stiglitz, in his famous book “Globalization” – “have been solutions that served the most powerful states on the planet, but they have done great disservice in terms of developing the countries that mostly needed progress” – the third world countries. However, one should think of the fact that “pax Americana” generated a “market fundamentalism”, which considered that the market regulated itself, that the smaller the public system, the more desirable it was. There were affected not only the interests of many countries that aspired to development, but the core of the global financial industry itself. Under these circumstances, the regulation and supervision of all financial entities are the more necessary”*<sup>19</sup>.

Some specialists argue that the solution to the economic crisis is rather political and that this is the cause of its difficulty. Overcoming the economic crisis involves the preparation of population and some political leaders that are capable of explaining to the public opinion the evolution of events and the justness of the decisions made. The habits, types of economic behaviour and general psychological state are essential in difficult situations. The citizens' solidarity with and confidence in their leaders explain the success of the Marshall Plan, and keeping the pre-war economic hierarchies made these states, regardless of circumstances, winners in the economic competition. Analysts consider that the economic recession recognised by the big states will change in many aspects the consumerist attitude of the American population, as well as that of the Europeans, which, although it was not like the one over the Ocean, will however be subject to adjustments due to the tragic experiences in the past.

Persuasive leaders are needed in democratic societies to articulate the topical ideas of the time and to apply them in very clear policies. We need to distinguish

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<sup>19</sup> Victor Boștinăru is a member of the European Parliament, initiator and vice-president of the National Consultative Council for Euro-Atlantic Integration, founding member and Secretary General of the Euro-Atlantic Council of Romania, in the programme *“Talk-show de seară”*, 7 November 2008, *Ibid.*



between the authoritarian-type capitalism, characteristic of the Asian region, and what liberal democracy means, which is characteristic of Western Europe and the United States. One cannot overlook the significant developments in this area, the extraordinary difference between the metabolism of the capitalism on the North American continent in the '70-80, the deregulation process experienced in the past two decades and the current forms of manifestation. Even the partial nationalisation of the financial system, although a re-privatisation is mentioned to take place in time, reveals a revitalisation of state capitalism, which has certainly influenced the functioning of liberal democracies. The European world is more corporate than the American one. Furthermore, this financial crisis occurs against the backdrop of a transgression in the distribution of economic power in the world. The fight for the control of exhaustible resources will increase in the future. It is expected that all over the world, liberal democracies included, people would assist to the reflexes of a war economy, direct interventions of states, motivated in one way or another.

This “Kriegswirtschaft” or “war economy” can be noticed right now in the way the intervention during the crisis has been made.

Another possible change will be aimed at the types of liberalism to which society is headed. Will the US type be assumed, which is suitable for a freer market and is afraid of regulations, or the centralised model followed by China and the Russian Federation ? It remains to be seen what answers will be found between these two extremes.

Some analysts predicted the emergence of waves of mercantilist turn-backs, in which many states will place obstacles in the way of free trade to protect their investors. It is expected the emergence of regional strategies, on blocs of states, which, in a way, will limit the development of the neoliberal trend to deregulate markets. The failure of rethinking the architecture of institutional management of global finance can lead to a fragmentation of the multilateral system that is so large that it could determine the regionalisation of trade and even of international finance.

The crisis caught the European Union unawares, without powerful, functional tools for a coherent response, which, in fact, unfortunately, it rarely provided, whether the nature of the crisis was economic or geopolitical. In these circumstances, every head of state, every minister of finance, every government provided a national individual response and this will make the functioning of the Union extremely difficult in the long run.

Secondly, the strong fragmentation of markets and this regionalisation involves a very high risk of economic disarray. It is also generated by the fact that major economic powers and emerging economic powers have never become great

world powers. In the global competition, it is not enough to be a great economic power to be a great world power. The current holders of world power will not allow the emerging economies to become global powers too easily. Therefore, the struggle for power will not be carried only in the realm of economy, but it is expected that other mechanisms will be involved. This perspective emphasises the difficulty of estimating the progress of the European Union towards a more important position in the balance of world power.

### ***Romania and the Global Economic Crisis***

Recession deepens in the US and in more and more European states economies. It slows the pace of economic growth in Asia. Economic crisis or recession reaches all areas of the globe. In these circumstances, Romania can no longer continue the rapid pace of growth either. The vulnerability of our economy – external deficits, more complicated access to external and internal financing etc. – will require a public agenda that is specific to a period of crisis, even if a positive growth rate will be noticed in 2009. Because Romania will not be able to change the rules at the macro level, it will need to tailor its policies, the financial ones included, in such a way that they could better respond to all challenges. The solution to these problems depends on the intelligence of the political elite and its capacity to determine the entire Romanian society to express its solidarity.

***English version by***  
*Iulia NĂSTASIE*



# **ROMANIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION**

## **– Economic Security through Integration –**

*Colonel Liviu LUNGULESCU*

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*The author mentions a few aspects regarding the way national sovereignty is managed by the state, given the circumstances of the major effects of globalisation.*

*For developing states, the free access to resources, facilitated by globalisation, is not seen as a prerequisite for power, but as a sine qua non for survival.*

*In this respect, the author underlines the fact that the state must manage especially economic sovereignty, taking into account a series of constraints, such as the intensification of national competitiveness – the growth of national wealth based on the participation in international economic relations.*

*However, this objective entails a paradoxical action: the state must support the external competitiveness of national companies, while simultaneously maintaining the coherence of the national production system, given that it is likely to be blocked, because of the internationalisation of national companies and their business, as well as of the internal markets.*

**Keywords:** *security objective; international relations; economic security; economic sovereignty*

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Motto: *“Romanians perceived and treated the EU accession as a security guarantee and NATO admission as an opportunity for economic development”<sup>1</sup>.*

The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is characterised by the profound transformation of the security environment. The world has become more and more complex and interdependent and globalisation appears to be an irreversible phenomenon.

Given the context, the security of a country, as well as the one of the international community, in its aggregate, *“is grounded on not only the capacity to react and adapt but especially on the capacity to anticipate and to act proactively. In a complex, dynamic and conflicting world that is in plain process of globalisation, the profound understanding of the major tendencies of the world evolution and the way each country has the opportunity to become an active part in this process is an essential condition for progress”<sup>2</sup>.*

The security interests and goals of the European states do not generate conflict situations, *“the security environment being positively influenced by the European and Euro-Atlantic integration*

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Colonel Liviu Lungulescu – Chief of Human Resources, Air Force Staff.

<sup>1</sup> Paragraph from *“Principiul democratic și țesătura NATO: noile democrații europene și lărgirea NATO”*, presented, in 1996, by the Special Associate Rapporteur for NATO Political Committee, <http://capriro.tripod.com/polit/polint06.htm>

<sup>2</sup> *Strategia de securitate a României*, 2006, p. 3, [www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf](http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf)

*processes, by the extension of the community of states sharing and promoting the values of democracy and market economy, and by deepening regional cooperation. The risks of the emergence of a traditional military confrontation on the European continent have seriously diminished. Nevertheless, there are still occurrences of instability and crises at the sub-regional level and tendencies of fragmentation, marginalisation or isolation of some states. Countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe are being confronted with economic, social and political difficulties accompanying the process of transition to a society based on the principles of democracy and market economy, which can generate risks for the security of the states in the area”<sup>3</sup>.*

The European Union has undergone a profound process of internal reform, concomitantly with the ongoing process meant for new members to join the Union. The progress made in pursuing a common foreign and security policy, the solutions chosen and the involvement of the international and European organisations for solving difficult situations on the continent prove that Europe is preparing to assume a more substantial role in the architecture of its own security, including defense, and provide models of setting the relations between states and nations on a rational and fair basis, by harmonising their interests.

In this context, Romania’s *National Security Strategy* mentions that “*a strong, highly-performing, competitive and macro-stable economy, dynamic from the viewpoint of the pace of the growth and functionality, is a key pillar for creating the conditions of the economic and social security, is in the interest of people in strengthening the democratic institutions and a necessary basis for promoting initiatives aimed at the nation’s prosperity and security*”<sup>4</sup>.


### ***The concept of economic security***

To understand the concept of *economic security*, the previous approach of the term *security* is necessary. Security is essential for the life of individuals, communities and states. Moreover, physical security is vital. Traditionally, security was associated with military power. After 1990, and September 11, 2001, security has been expanded on the political, economic and societal domains.

*Figure 1* illustrates the hypotheses of security through a traditionalist, objectified approach (it does not take into account the social component of risks) or an absolutist, militarised, power-based one. On the other hand, the constructivist approach is pragmatic and understands security as a social construction resulting from the “*social actors game*”. Between these two models, security unfolds.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.mapn.ro/strategiasecuritate/index.html>

<sup>4</sup> *Strategia de securitate a României, op. cit.*, p. 31.



**Figure 1: Security studies diagram**<sup>5</sup>

An economic problem is not necessarily a security problem<sup>6</sup>. To define an economic problem as a security one is not simple, taking into account the objective conditions – a state level of economic development etc., as well as some subjective factors.

Stephan D. Krasner defines *economic security* through an enumeration that does not intend to be exhaustive, as follows: “*economic security may presuppose the welfare of the groups in a country, the electoral perspectives of parties, the freedom of action for those who create governmental policies, the stability of a specific regime or the aggregated economic welfare and the opportunities of a country for economic growth*”<sup>7</sup>.

The definition of the concept of *security* through its global, comprehensive dimension allows for it to be applied to the study of international relations, as a basic theoretical unit. A consensus regarding the implications of the state of security would aim at the *lack of threat to the vital values* of the individual or the reference group: “*objectively, security is the measure of the absence of threats to earned values and, subjectively, it is the absence of fear that these values should be attacked*”<sup>8</sup>.

We consider the following definition as relevant for the purpose of this paper. The definition of the concept of *security* in the post-Cold War era is provided by the British politologist Barry Buzan: “*The security of human community is subject to the influences of some determinant factors in five main sectors: military, political, economic, social and environmental. Military security involves two reference levels, the defensive and offensive capacity, on the one hand, and the states perceptions regarding reciprocal intentions; political security refers to the organisational stability of states, government systems and ideologies that make them legitimate. Economic security aims at the access to resources, finance and markets that is necessary to ensure an acceptable*

<sup>5</sup> B. Buzan, O. Waever, Japp de Wilde, *Security, a New Framework for Analysis*, Reinner, London, 1998 in Sava N. I., *Teoria și practica securității. Note de curs*, Universitatea București, 2005, p. 15.

<sup>6</sup> S. Arghire, *Conceptul de securitate economică în noul context economico-politic global*, Doctoral thesis, ASE, București, 2002, p. 14.

<sup>7</sup> S. D. Krasner, *European Economic Security in the New Global Environment*, in *The Future of European Security*, Beverly Crawford Editions, Center for German and European Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1992, p. 97.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 17.

level of welfare and state power. Societal security refers to the preoccupation on maintaining some acceptable conditions for the evolution of traditional models of language, culture, religion and identity, national customs. Environmental security refers to the preservation of local and worldwide biosphere as an essential system meant to support the system all human activities depend on. These domains do not act separately but related and interdependent in a complex network<sup>9</sup>.

As far as the open access to resources, finance and markets is concerned, the relation economy-security involves the existence of some economic rivalries, of competition for economic resources and markets, which is perfectly acceptable in a liberal economic system.

The majority of theorists in the field emphasises the relevance of food and energy security, the access to strategic goods and to high technology, with reference to the economic content of security<sup>10</sup> or to the conditions necessary for survival<sup>11</sup>.

### ***The role of states in achieving and consolidating economic security***

The management of national sovereignty by states is profoundly altered by globalisation<sup>12</sup>. For the developing countries, the open access to resources, facilitated by globalisation, is not seen as a premise for power but as a condition for survival.

Currently, the state has to manage economic sovereignty, within the following limits<sup>13</sup>: the amplification of national competitiveness – enhancement of national wealth as a result of the participation in international economic relations and the guarantee of national economy security.

The achievement of these objectives simultaneously involves an apparently paradoxical action: the state has to support national companies competitiveness externally but, at the same time, it has to keep the national production system coherent, given that this coherence tends to be broken, as a result of national companies and their business, as well as internal markets internationalisation. In this context, the state has to defend the cohesion of the internal market, which is necessary for it to function, and the capacity of the national economic system to develop. Moreover, the state has to maintain social cohesion, as globalisation tends to destroy the cohesion of certain collective structures and to deepen social polarisation.

<sup>9</sup> B. Buzan *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>10</sup> V. Cable, *The Future of Regional Integration*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994, in S. Arhire, *Conceptul de securitate economică ..., op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>11</sup> B. Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

<sup>12</sup> A. Bal (coord.), *Economie mondială*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Editura Economică, București, 2002, p. 421.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 422.

Approaching the role of states in assuring economic security, the responsibilities of rich countries should be mentioned, as far as the access to resources and equal opportunities for poorer countries are concerned. It would generally work in four directions:

- aid;
- cut in external debts;
- trade favouring underdeveloped countries;
- responsible attitude towards environment and the pursuit of enduring development.

Indisputably, any state is preoccupied with guaranteeing economic security. Economic security is much more than a simple component of national security. Externally, a state manifests its intention to integrate in a multidimensional economic environment, in relation to the extent to which its security is assured. It is, of course, about normal trends, in accordance with the national will democratically expressed and not with forced processes, most often imposed from outside.

### ***Risk factors for Romania's economic security***

The main security problems Romania is confronted with are those having economic nature. At the same time with preventing these risk factors from becoming manifest, Romania should be preoccupied with diminishing internal vulnerabilities in different domains that, in certain circumstances, may have an impact on national security. Among these *vulnerabilities*, there are<sup>14</sup>:

- prevailing economic, financial and social problems generated by prolonged transition and delayed structural reforms;
- increased corruption and mismanagement of public resources, resulting in deeper social inequities and underground economy proliferation;
- reduced effectiveness of the state institutions responses to the phenomena related to economic crime, disturbance of public order and citizen safety – such phenomena entailing ever more obvious negative effects on social cohesion and solidarity, on the citizen's standard of life;
- maintenance of some sources and causes for particular potential social conflicts, of smaller or greater extent, leading to dissipating the energies, slowing down or cutting the processes and actual economic activities, as well as the people's peace of mind;
- non-observance of the environmental norms in the functioning of some industrial facilities;
- lower reliability of the citizens in the state institutions, as a result of indolence and excessive bureaucracy within the administration, which also leads to weakened social and civic cohesion;

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<sup>14</sup> <http://www.mapn.ro/strategiasecuritate/stratisc.htm#a44>

- maintenance of some disparities in the development of the country's regions;
- shortcomings in complying with the commitments that have been undertaken for NATO integration;
- maintenance of information technology at a lower level and delaying its upgrading to the standards demanded by the dynamics of globalisation;
- migration of specialists from various high technology domains, a phenomenon that affects the Romanian society potential for development;
- reduced capacity to absorb the European funds;
- reduced expertise in domains of vital importance.

### ***The impact of the EU accession on Romania***

As it happened with the majority of states that joined the EU, where the “*resuscitation of economic mechanisms was intensified with tailoring to meet the Union exigencies*”<sup>15</sup>, it is expected for it to happen in Romania, too. Following the model provided by the European Union seems to be an inspired choice for our country whose economy is in full process of development to be compliant with the EU standards. The world economy provides many examples of implementing reforms as a result of internal wish or as one of the country joining international organisations or bodies, which requires reforms.

As far as we are concerned, the first way was not enough exploited as reform was considered entailing populist measures. Therefore, the EU accession and everything it entails provides the opportunity to overcome this situation that does not correspond to reality: “*Equating reform with the firm engagement in the direction of a market economy grounded in the primacy of private property and economic freedom and in limiting the intrusive behaviour of the state economy, being close to the EU is providential (from this perspective)*”<sup>16</sup>.

Integration entails profound internal transformation, having stimulating effects on economic growth<sup>17</sup>. Accession brings with itself a series of transformations at the political and economic level. They are presented in *table 1*.

We do not have to remain prisoners of the idea that financial assistance will solve the problems Romania is confronted with, but we have to be firmly engaged in the reform: “*It will bring profound mutations: economic, political and social. Economy will settle on healthy foundations but it will still be affected by the previous errors, as far as social effects are concerned*”<sup>18</sup>.

Romania's accession to the EU has added value with regard to economic security goals as long as the engaged and applied economic and social policies

<sup>15</sup> A. Bal (coord.), *op. cit.*, ch. 15, p. 19.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>17</sup> M. Spiridon, *Uniunea Europeană și țările din Est: dezvoltare prin transformare sistemică*, in Bal. A. (coord.), *op. cit.*, ch. 15, p. 20.

<sup>18</sup> A. Bal (coord.), *op. cit.*, ch. 15, p. 22.



**Table 1: Transformations at the economic and political level<sup>19</sup>**

	Direct impact	Indirect impact
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- elimination of trade barriers;</li> <li>- application of European provisions regarding competition (having evident effects on business environment);</li> <li>- implementation of CAP;</li> <li>- access to structural funds;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- reorientation of commercial flows;</li> <li>- industrial and agricultural restructuring;</li> <li>- implications at regional level;</li> <li>- meeting the convergence criteria for EMU (Maastricht);</li> </ul>
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- prevalence of community law over national law in certain domains;</li> <li>- direct applicability of European legislation;</li> <li>- changes of the constitution and the constitutional status of the national parliament;</li> <li>- representation and participation in the community decision-making process;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- re-orientation of foreign policy (commercial diplomacy included);</li> <li>- modification of the way governmental policies are drawn up and applied;</li> <li>- emergence of new models of interests representation at the society level.</li> </ul>

can prove that the tendencies to economically differentiate Romania from other member states are *“temporary and the factors that have led to lag will be eliminated. External factors as well as the conflicts in former Yugoslavia that have widened the gap between the Balkan states and the EU are symptomatic tendencies that entail a series of more profound problems that will thwart the full integration in the European economic structures”*<sup>20</sup>.

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Economic security represents a complex and dynamic concept. Its complexity derives, on the one hand, from the multitude of the economic, social and financial processes and phenomena it entails and, on the other hand, from globalisation, seen as both a process and phenomenon that systematically and permanently influences national economy. Its dynamism is given by the alert rhythm of the economic processes and phenomena that occur at both national and world level. Economic security should be understood as being<sup>21</sup>: an essential factor of national security, namely the one that assures the resources and dynamic equilibrium of the other components of this system (national security); one of the dimensions of national, regional and world security; desideratum of any individual, human community, national state etc.; priority goal of governments, of the regional and international organisations meant to ensure and guarantee global human security; state of economy seen as the source and foundation for the eradication of poverty,

<sup>19</sup> C. Ciupagea (coord.), *Evaluarea costurilor și beneficiilor aderării României la UE*, Institutul European din România, Studii de impact (PAIS II), București, 2004, p. 11.

<sup>20</sup> S. Arghire, *Conceptul de securitate economică ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

<sup>21</sup> T. Pițui, *Securitatea economică și securitatea umană globală*, Colocviu strategic, Editura UNAp, no. 4, 2004.

famine, social and economic inequities among both individuals and different regions of some countries.

To become an EU and NATO member represented two major strategic goals of Romania. Integration is seen as a solution for many problems of the Romanian society that seek to modernise and transform its economy. Why have we mentioned this fact ? Because Romania, as well as other Eastern European countries, has been considered a backward country, socially and economically, fact that has deep roots in history, even before the fall of communism. Will Romania succeed in strengthening its economic security, given the post-communist transformation and modernisation combined with the efforts to integrate in the European Union ? It may and should be an obsessive question for all of us. At first sight, the answer cannot be but a positive one, because the EU is a club of wealthy and democratic countries. The EU accession is the corollary of a period of deep economic and social changes. However, we have to distinguish the final moment of accession and full integration seen as a gradual process meant to change the Romanian society, which will make Romania a compatible European country not only in the field of economic and institutional structures but also as far as economic security is concerned. If the stress is laid on the process, then the problem is a little more complicated, because Romania is among the member countries with weak economic performance. That is why we may come to the conclusion that, in our case, the process would take more time.

As for the role of the state, the policy of our country's governments in the field of economic security should be grounded in the overwhelming importance the economic element has in the foreign and security policy of any modern state. Currently, it is easy to notice that the *"power of a state depends on ensuring a stable financial environment at domestic level and facilitating some external contracts and encouraging export in accessible areas"*<sup>22</sup>.

In a global policy in which defence and diplomacy are more and more supported by trade and commercial policies, Romania has to establish adequate priorities. Collective security, seen as being gained within the North Atlantic Alliance, may be used to promote the economic interests of the Romanian state, and the political objectives may be supported by the economic ones.

A secure economy is vital for the future of any country and cannot be seen out of the modern context of global and natural phenomena that burden economies and may cause losses and imbalances in the long run.

*English version by*  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

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<sup>22</sup> R. Dumitrescu, *Obsesia securităţii politico-militare versus obsesia economică*, in *Revista de politică și cultură creștină*, no. 7, September, 2003.

# INFORMATION OPERATIONS WITHIN MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS

*Captain Constantin CIOROBEA*

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*In modern era, a wide range of threats affect the maritime domain and, in these conditions, it is important to take action by monitoring and preventing security threats in maritime regions and to create a proper maritime security in order to guarantee a continuous maritime traffic.*

*To provide a proper solution for the security of the modern maritime domain, we have to change the way we operated in the past, namely by means of large number of forces engaged in lethal actions, with the main goal to control the seas using mainly non-lethal actions, designated to protect the main sea line of communication.*

*The Information Operation capabilities engaged in the maritime domain can properly support the Maritime Security Operations and can sustain the actions to neutralise maritime security risks.*

**Keywords:** *maritime security operation; security risks; terrorist attack; weapons of mass destruction; response capability; target audience; Alliance forces*

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There has been a direct connection between seas and oceans and humanity welfare for centuries and it will continue to exist in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, too. Maritime environment represents an important resource that will assure upcoming development and even human survival in the future. Currently, 95% of the international maritime trade transits 9 “choke” points and 5 of them are part of the so-called Wider Mediterranean Region and this creates proper conditions for terrorist actions against maritime transport with significant effects on the economic development of all countries. In these circumstances, it is important to monitor and counter all security issues from the maritime environment and to achieve a proper maritime security that allows a secure maritime flow of goods.

Maritime environment has been increasingly exposed to a wide range of threats such as: piracy, terrorism, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, weapon smuggling, weapons of mass destruction included. To these, other threats are added. Among them, there are the states that sponsor terrorism as well as the military rebel groups from failed states. Terrorists and rebels generating the above-mentioned

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Captain Constantin Ciorobeia – Chief of Staff, Naval Operational Command.

threats take actions to influence the public opinion especially using high-tech in telecommunications, computers and command and control systems. These threats tend to become global, thus the necessity of ensuring the needed security by improving the stability of different regions worldwide. Understanding these new realities represents an important issue that has guided the recent transformations of the way in which naval forces plan and execute their operations.

Maritime security programs, monitoring and counteracting the risks related to security that come from the maritime environment, and all the initiatives are coordinated to achieve a unitary international approach not only by engaging all the structures that take action in the maritime area at local and governmental level but also with the support of the private sector. The objectives of the maritime security strategy and the drawn up plans designated to implement it must consider a series of economic, military and political aspects. Maritime security is an international problem and taking into account that all countries benefit from it, states, non-governmental structures, international companies etc. should share the responsibility of achieving and preserving it.

To successfully integrate these activities, in maritime and joint theatres of operations a new way of conducting military operations was initiated, as part of the so-called **Maritime Security Operations – MSO**.

### **Combating security-related risks**

The operations meant to monitor and combat maritime security risks, generically called **Maritime Security Operations**, are defined by Admiral Oudot de Dainville, the Chief of the French Naval Forces Staff, as *“those measures performed by the appropriate civilian or military authorities and multinational agencies to counter the threat and mitigate the risks of illegal or threatening activities in the maritime domain, so that they may be acted upon in order to enforce law, protect citizens and safeguard national and international interests”*<sup>1</sup>.

In the United Kingdom doctrine we can find out other definition for **Maritime Security Operations – MSO** considering these operations *“... set the conditions for security and stability in the maritime environment and complement the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional nations. MSO deny illegal use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or to transport personnel, weapons, or other material”*<sup>2</sup>.

Vice-Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, Commander of the US Fifth Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, considers that *“Maritime Security Operations offer tangible benefit*

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Dainville\\_Maritime\\_Security\\_Operations.pdf](http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Dainville_Maritime_Security_Operations.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.6074/changeNav/3533>

*to all entities that use the seas – and need to be able to use the seas – without risk of harassment or worse*<sup>3</sup>. Forces engaged in these operations hope to enable and achieve the following objectives:

- setting the conditions for security and stability in the maritime environment;
- influencing those engaged in the maritime environment to deny the illegal use of the sea as a venue for attack or to transport personnel, weapons, or other material in support of terrorist activities;
- common action against enemies of peace, stability, and prosperity in the region;
- denying and disrupting transportation and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction using maritime line of communications.

The naval forces engaged in MSO operate in large areas and achieve a visible presence there in order to accomplish their missions, to protect ships – passenger, military and trade ones, and to keep maritime lines of communication open and safe. As part of the mission, navy forces carry out port visits, boarding suspect ships, collecting information and assessing the situation in their vicinity. When a vessel operates in a suspicious manner, military forces can conduct vessel inspections aboard all types of vessels, with the consent of both the flag state and the ship's captain.

The CTF 150<sup>4</sup> operation starting December 2002 represents one of the most important MSO in place in the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and its main goal is to develop a climate of security and stability in this region. Countries presently contributing to CTF-150 include Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, Great Britain and the USA as well as forces belonging to other nations.

Forces engaged in MSO usually operate to achieve a complete **Recognised Maritime Picture – RMP**. Submarines execute surveillance close to the “choke” points, the surface ships patrol in the area of main trade line of communication where there are many of the Contacts of Interest – COI, and maritime patrol airplanes are engaged to keep under surveillance the large areas where other naval forces on the sea or at shore cannot execute the mission in the proper way. Surface ships should classify all targets after detection. The list of COIs is established by the Intelligence Fusion Centre, NATO Centre for maritime transport in Northwood/UK and NATO Maritime Component Command, Naples, grounded on the received information regarding suspect ships from ships at sea, the services

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/10/mil-071011-nns06.htm> - Maritime Security Operations Key to Regional Stability, Security.

<sup>4</sup> Coalition Task Force – led by the USA, <http://www.cuscn.navy.mil/articles/2008/019.html>

of the Alliance member countries and the national agencies meant to impose law as well as from the national port and shipping authorities<sup>5</sup>.

MSO is focused on developing actions at different levels to combat sea-based terrorism and it is grounded on the capability to create and maintain proper maritime situation awareness for all forces in the area of responsibility. The Recognised Maritime Picture – RMP creates the conditions to monitor all COIs, shadowing them, board the vessel to inspect documentation and cargo or ensure that it is inspected as soon as it enters any NATO country's territorial waters. Naval forces assigned to execute MSO may also assist seafaring vessels in distress and their crew providing medical and technical assistance or executing search and rescue operations. Forces engaged in operation complement the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional nations and protect oil terminals, maritime oil rigs and other important objectives. These objectives ensure the economic development, prosperity and stability of the countries in the region the operation is conducted and have an impact on global economy. **Information Operation – Info Ops** plan and execute actions to support MSO.

Info Ops encourage and support the actions to engage regional nations in operation and promote coordination of coalition naval forces actions with local navies, this representing a significant way to deny illegal activities in the area of responsibility. Maritime security is a collective responsibility and each nation must support it. The coordination between coalition and regional nations is very important to deny terrorist activities this moment when they spread and have a great mobility worldwide. These activities contribute to the involvement of regional nations or other partner nations in operation to achieve a large coalition in the maritime environment.

Boarding and “hailing” represent some of the most visible activities in information domain, actions that highlight the naval forces presence in the region and dissuade terrorist activities. Lately, a tendency that affects these actions efficiency has occurred as many trade vessels start to be registered under the flag of the countries that do not allow pre-authorised board inspections, like North Korea. It happens mainly with the ships defined like *Contact of Interest – COI* or *Vessel of Collection Interest – VOI*.

On the other hand, the extended use of the **Automatic Identification System – AIS** represents a great support for RMP and thus, as a result of surveillance combined with the actions of naval forces, the number of boarding and “hailing” actions

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<sup>5</sup> *Combating terrorism at sea*, [http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism\\_at\\_sea2006/terrorism\\_at\\_sea2006-e.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism_at_sea2006/terrorism_at_sea2006-e.pdf)

has been reduced, fact that enhances operativity but affects the naval forces visibility in the area of operations.

Info Ops can promote the high level of Maritime Environment Awareness achieved by MSO and stress the forces potential to take action short time after receiving information from various sources using all available capabilities. The forces engaged in operation act rapidly and execute boarding or shadowing the COI and in this situation relay all the necessary information to the appropriate law-enforcement agency in the vessel's next port of call. Along with all these actions, naval forces will organise press conferences or will transmit press statements in order to keep the public opinion well informed and to influence the target audience.

The visibility of naval forces actions and the level of awareness of the target audience represented by terrorists and all those who support them assist the MSO and deter illegal action in the area of responsibility. Along with the engagement of appropriate forces in operation, it is important to demonstrate the intention of participating nations to keep the forces in the region for a long time. This message must be sent directly to terrorists, as main target audience, or using a selected audience that will take action to influence terrorists' actions. Naval forces presence in the region represents an important factor to influence terrorists' actions. These forces must carry out as visible as possible operations for the target audience and for those that intend to plan illegal activities. Deterrence achievement is also supported by engaging other partners in operation and by promoting the involvement of regional nations in operation to achieve the maritime security in the region. Partner nations' naval forces will cooperate with the coalition forces participating in operation only if they derive benefit from this cooperation. Before starting collaboration, the coalition comes to a proper agreement with partner nations (organisations) in order to set the conditions for their engagement. Partner nations and non-governmental organisations engaged in maritime security operations will not cooperate with naval forces if the coalition is not considered credible.

The permanent presence of credible naval forces in the area of operations influences terrorist decision makers. This influence can be also achieved using the political and religious leaders and the global, regional or local stakeholders. The force presence, posture and profile, public relations, PSYOPS and the electronic warfare will support all influence activities.

Winning the goodwill of the local population as well as the regional leaders engagement support for operation and understanding the cultural and educational environment represent other important MSO activities.

### **Information Operations in Maritime Security Operations**

Maritime environment, characterised by freedom of movement, is more and more affected by illegal actions. When the political and diplomatic action cannot find an agreed solution in this complex environment, the Navy engagement in Maritime Security Operations is considered the best if not the last resort in crisis management.

Terrorist actions are given excessive coverage, which is facilitated by the fact that the access to mass media is larger and freer for more and more people, especially by means of television and the Internet that have a great psychological impact. This modern information environment favours transmitting and receiving messages, especially using images, which can directly affect political leaders' decisions, as well as our way of life. It is relevant, in this context, the impact of the events that followed the failure of the American forces action in October 1993, meant to release some American soldiers captured by Somalis rebels. The rescue mission launched by the American forces was a failure because of the opposition of the population in Mogadishu/Somalia.

During this operation, some American militaries were captured and, after the battle, the bodies of several US casualties of the conflict, members of the Black Hawk "SUPER 64" crew, were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by crowds of local people<sup>6</sup>. These horrific images ran around the world and forced the Americans to change the way they engaged in third world countries and to withdraw the American contingent from Somalia. This process was finalised in March 1995. This example underlines the way Information Operations can influence the actions of key decision-makers.

Each of the coalition forces engaged in MSO has an Info Ops cell that coordinates these efforts within its command and is made up of the military disciplines that operate in the Information environment – namely the core capabilities. In NATO doctrine – *AJP 3.10/ Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operation*, the capabilities that comprise Info Ops in NATO are: Psychological Operations (PSYOPS); Presence-Posture-Profile (PPP); Operations Security (OPSEC); Information Security (INFOSEC); Military Deception (MILDEC); Electronic Warfare (EW); Physical Destruction; Computer Network Operations (CNO).

It is important to specify that only when all these capabilities are used to influence the will, to affect the level of understanding or the decision-making process can they be considered part of the Info Ops operations.

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<sup>6</sup> Paul Watson, "Pulitzer Prize-Winning Photo", Toronto Star, Toronto Star Newspapers Limited.



Naval forces employ Info Ops to influence the adversary, to protect their own information systems and to shape the information environment to their benefit. MSO engages naval forces in information domain in three directions, as follows: to shape the information domain adjusting the influence activities, assure proper reaction flexibility and put in place a strong collaboration with the countries in the area of operations. Info Ops Cells perform the planning, coordination, execution control, monitoring and assessment of Info Ops in their naval command.

❖ **Planning**

Planning represents an important step to achieve operation objectives in information domain. Planning, coordination and execution of the activities in the information domain are performed by separate naval staff cells that have to be synchronised and coordinated during operations.

During the information activities planning process a proper attention has to be given to each ship capabilities.

The main Info Ops responsibility in the planning phase is to coordinate the contributions of the various ships capabilities that will execute the Military Information Campaign under a unifying concept using PSYOPS, EW, CIMIC, and PA (Public Affairs). Info Ops is an integrating strategy that ties together all maritime information-based activities and disciplines in military operations.

The INTEL cell plays an important part in the planning process. INTEL provides critical information on the adversary to support Info Ops in planning, coordination and assessment. Additionally, it provides analysis and estimate of the adversary's Info Ops means and capabilities and determines his intent for Info Ops.

❖ **Coordination**

In order to accomplish a synchronised and coordinated information campaign, the OPLAN annexes are prepared in accordance with the information operation objectives and these plans must fit within the Task Group commander overall maritime security concept.

The Info Ops coordination process in Maritime Security Operations is both a bottom-up and a top-down process and requires a strategic coordination of the political leaders of all countries engaged in operations. All the coordination activities are based on the directive of the naval group commander regarding military actions in information domain.

❖ **Information Operations activities**

According to *MC 422/3 – NATO Military Policy on Information Operations*, approved by the Military Committee on March 9, 2007, all capabilities from the information domain are integrated into a single unified effort, “to influence

*decision-making of adversaries in support of the Alliance overall objectives by affecting their information-based process and systems while exploiting and protecting one's own*<sup>7</sup>. These capabilities are applied through three core activities: influence activities, counter-command activities and information protection activities.

Information presentation is an essential element in influence activities as, in all circumstances, the capabilities of the forces in the area of operations, the main objective of MSO to achieve a proper maritime secure environment, the naval forces reaction capability and the will of the countries in the region to support the actions of the coalition are presented. Truthful information encourages a desired behaviour or it may be used to counter enemy actions in the information environment. The consistent use of truthful information also builds credibility with the media and with non-governmental organisations.

Other approach consists in information manipulation. Information may be influenced or manipulated by means of MILDEC, EW or CNO.

The systems used to process the information obtained by an adversary can be targeted to prevent the correct functioning of the systems.

The C2 function of an adversary can be reduced or denied through damaging or destroying C2 related facilities, systems or the personnel that operate or manage the systems. Denial or degradation of C2 capabilities reduce the ability of an adversary to maintain command and control of their military or political activity, and can affect decision-making responsiveness and effectiveness.

MSO Info Ops actions are directed to influence or/and to shape adversary or potential adversary decision process mainly for those with access to open seas. Any activity executed by naval forces produces effects in the information domain, and only the forces presence in the region can prevent illegal activities from taking place.

In the maritime environment Info Ops support the achievement of operational objectives denying or damaging the adversary information process and protecting the naval forces decision-making process. Info Ops support all kind of naval activities but the main focus is on planning the engagements to achieve maritime security environment. The engagement activities represent the periodical contacts between regional military leaders, local authorities and other agencies from operation areas of responsibility to build mutual confidence. Info Ops shape the information environment and generate naval forces initiative in this domain.

In support of the Info Ops action as part of MSO, boarding teams, during inspection missions, offer to vessels crew water, food, information about the ongoing operation, and points of contact where they can communicate about illegal activities. A good

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<sup>7</sup> <http://.nato.md/content/view>

example is the Info Ops executed by forces engaged in NATO *Operation Active Endeavour* in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2007, JFC Naples Info Ops Section<sup>8</sup> started an Info Ops Military Campaign designated to inform trade vessels about operation objectives, naval forces presence in the region, and points of contact where information about illegal activities could be communicated. As part of the campaign, an Internet database link was provided so that additional information could be found<sup>9</sup>. Terrorist actions are deterred using Info Ops to promote the naval forces presence in the region.

The engagement of regional countries naval forces in MSO creates a strong multiplying effect of the Alliance forces with an important strategic impact on all those who intend to conduct illegal activities.

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A great number of non-traditional risks influences the maritime environment and, in this context, sea control is not associated with denying a determined (established) maritime space for adversary naval forces and it is neither connected with the key fighting actions and convoy protection as it was before. Currently, sea control represents keeping maritime line of communications secure and free, forbidding terrorist actions and illicit activities, such as people and weapon trafficking and protecting environment. To meet these requirements, we consider a permanent system to inform about the maritime situation should be created through maintaining a recognised maritime picture and achieving a proper fighting capacity, able to respond to these threats, all these in cooperation with other military and civil organisations, both national and international ones.

In this context, maritime security environment is an international issue and, taking into consideration that everyone derives benefits from collective protection, all countries have to contribute to keeping a proper security environment.

In order to provide a proper solution for the security of the modern maritime environment, the way to operate has to be changed, from the old one characterised by actions in which a large number of forces were engaged in kinetic actions having as goal seas control to operations destined to achieving seas security and liberty in which non-kinetic actions have a significant role. The Information Operation (Info Ops) capabilities engaged in maritime environment can properly support Maritime Security Operations and can sustain the actions to neutralise the maritime security risks.

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<sup>8</sup> Captain Constantin Ciorobea was the commander of the Section at that time (Editor's note).

<sup>9</sup> [www.shipping.eastlant.nato.int](http://www.shipping.eastlant.nato.int)

The presence of the Alliance naval forces, as part of Maritime Security Operations, in unstable regions generates an important impact on the population in the region and on those who intend to conduct illegal actions. The goal of these actions is to prevent terrorists from using the maritime environment and to influence people living in the region not to support terrorist actions.

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# ASPECTS OF USING OUTER SPACE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES

*Colonel Nicolaie BUZATU*

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*The issue of using outer space for military purposes has never been more serious than nowadays. Many of the military satellite systems are nothing but means to multiply the precision, flexibility and speed of armament systems and armed forces on Earth.*

*The consequences of using outer space for military purposes at an ever growing scale are therefore different. Some of them reduce the lack of confidence and the threat of war; others increase the efficiency of military assets and the tendency to put them to work.*

*The dominant position of a spacecraft over the Earth, beyond the frontiers and limits of national sovereignty is not only an opportunity to dream about absolute conquest of military superiority but also a starting point in overcoming conflicts among nations or alliances, in converging all efforts towards stopping military space competition and building peaceful collaboration among nations.*

**Keywords:** *dual-use technology; space power, airspace force; space threats; compact laser system; anti-satellite systems*

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Once the first artificial satellite was launched (on October 4, 1957), man confirmed his extraordinary ability to operate in a transforming way beyond the limits of the native planet, as well as his amazing capacities to become aware of the surrounding world, to understand and use the opportunities it provides.

The issue of using outer space for military purposes has never been so acute and serious as it is today. However, we cannot state that it is a phenomenon proper to the latest years. On the contrary, the development of space equipment technology based on the V-2 rockets that belonged to the German air force, during the Second World War, has mirrored, since its beginning, the fundamental ambivalence of the research activity conducted by people. The humanity's thirst for knowledge and its determination to improve itself economically and socially have been combined since the beginning with the aspiration for achieving military power. Therefore, the launch of the satellite SPUTNIK in 1957 represented not only an economic and technical success but also the emergence of a new threat having a different nature.

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Colonel Nicolaie Buzatu – Chief of Operations and Training, 86<sup>th</sup> Airbase, Fetesti.

The fact that nowadays satellites are basic pieces of the strategic defence system of any great power is certain. That is why it cannot be denied that a conflict of proportions between two of these great powers could start by attacking and neutralising the enemy satellites. Therefore, it is expected for each of these geostrategic actors to equip with means of attack and defence for a possible war in outer space.

There have been attempts to place armament in outer space since the beginning of the '60s, when the USA and the Soviet Union tested the possibility to place nuclear armament into a geostationary orbit to permanently menace the adversary territory. In the end, the two superpowers gave this option up, as intercontinental ballistic missiles serving the same goal have proved more effective and secure.

Moreover, they realised that a powerful nuclear explosion in outer space would have jeopardised own satellites to almost the same extent as the enemy ones. Therefore, they tried to find other solutions. Thus, in 1968, the Soviet Union started to test its own anti-satellite system (ASAT). A satellite was launched into the orbit to be guided against an enemy satellite and then an explosive device was detonated. This way, both own satellite and the enemy one were destroyed (the so-called kamikaze satellites). Because its maximum range was about 2 400 km, this system had serious limitations as it could threaten only research satellites and some American navigation satellites. The so important telecommunication and reconnaissance and early warning satellites (Satellite and Missile Observation System – SAMOS and Missile Defence Alarm System – MIDAS)<sup>1</sup> were outside its range, at about 36 000 km far from the Earth, into geostationary orbits. The Chief of the American Air Force Staff at that time, General Lew Allen, characterised the Soviet anti-satellite system as a threat that was not particularly verisimilar.

The next important step in this covert race for seizing the space situated at hundreds of kilometres above our heads was made by the USA that, on March 23, 1983, informed the public opinion worldwide, through the declaration of President Ronald Reagan, about the intention to build a defence system against the strategic nuclear ballistic missiles, the so-called “*Star Wars*” programme.

The successful launch of an anti-satellite missile, from a F-15 strike fighter, on January 21, 1984, missile whose fight component was infrared guided towards the orbit of a satellite that was destroyed by the impact, was part of the programme *Strategic Defense Initiative* – *SDI* that was made public worldwide. Under the circumstances of advancing rocket technology, their range and destructive capacity will considerably improve, which will facilitate the use of such a procedure.

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<sup>1</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile\\_Defense\\_Alarm\\_System](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_Defense_Alarm_System)

The George W. Bush Administration continued SDI with the *National Missile Defense – NMD* programme, which stipulated the creation of an anti-missile shield to defend the USA against incoming last generation intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to current plans, NMD intends to be a defence system able to intercept missiles during the flight, in the extra-atmospheric space, with the help of weapons with guided energy – high-power lasers and devices capable of emitting particle beams<sup>2</sup>.

Russian military experts appreciate that, in the next few years, it is possible for the third generation of nuclear weapons to appear, which “*will be capable to destroy the enemy strategic targets both in the outer space and on the Earth*”<sup>3</sup> and will be used in any type of conflict.

They will be precision-guided weapons. Such a weapon acts like a scalpel (an X-ray; an electromagnetic or a microwave ray; a shock wave) whose enormous force is precisely focused on targets, including the ones sheltered underground, such as: strategic command centres, nuclear or energy installations etc.

Relatively simple is to achieve space mines, namely satellites that stations for a long time near the installations they are about to destroy or neutralise through explosion in the event of a war.

A remarkable leap was marked by the use of laser and accelerated particle weapons. “*Anti-satellite laser weapon holds a central place in the military arsenal meant to destroy orientation and photographic optical sensors, solar cells and other satellites sensitive elements thus thwarting the satellite navigation of strategic navigation, nuclear submarines and cruise missile*”<sup>4</sup>.

According to military experts, at the end of the '70s, the Soviet Union “*surpasses the USA with an entire range of spatial weapons components*”<sup>5</sup>. An advanced laser system shown to the researchers from Lawrence Livermore Laboratory during the visit they paid to the Scientific Association “*Astrophysics*” in Moscow, in 1992, seemed to confirm the fact that the Russians were more advanced with creating high technology in the field of compact lasers. They are considered world leaders as far as laser beam control and its propagation in atmosphere is concerned.

According to the Russian academician I. B. Kariton, researcher at the Nuclear Federal Centre of the Scientific Research Institute for Energy Physics

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<sup>2</sup> *Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet – History of BMDO*, [www.defenselink.mil/specials/missile](http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/missile)

<sup>3</sup> General de brigadă dr. Vasile Paul, *Conflictetele secolului XXI. Proiecții în spațiul strategic*, Editura Militară, București, 1999, p. 33.

<sup>4</sup> General-maior ing. Dumitru Andreescu, *Enciclopedia programelor spațiale*, vol. II, Editura Militară, București, 1980, p. 369.

<sup>5</sup> General de brigadă dr. Vasile Paul, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

in the Russian Federation, “a laser device to protect aircrafts against anti-air missile system is about to be achieved in this centre”<sup>6</sup>.

As it is known, satellites are the “eyes” and “nerves” of modern military command systems. That is why it is easy to understand the anxiety with which anti-satellite programmes are followed, the fear that the enemy should technologically impose.

Many of the satellite systems are but multipliers of precision, flexibility and speed of the weapon systems and armed forces on the Earth. They amplify the precision of the intercontinental ballistic missiles and make the computerised command of operations possible, through providing information in real time, assigning missions with precision, as well as coordinating the use of military means at global level. They also enhance the effectiveness of destructive mechanisms, exacerbating, at the same time, the ambitions of political decision-makers and technicians.

Great strategists should not forget the fact that the world has undergone continuous change and the military domain cannot be an exception. The attempt to deter military powers from using a destabilising yet inefficient weapon system through creating a more powerful destabilising system will not generate more security. On the contrary, it will reduce deterrence stability at geostrategic level through re-launching the arms race.

Thus, any attack against important satellites may be interpreted as a first step towards the first nuclear strike that may be countered on the spot, with devastating effects. The psychical pressure political-military decision-makers would be subject to under these circumstances could be enormous, thus increasing the possibility for a too quick, asymmetrical or even erroneous decision to occur.

The consequences of using outer space for military purposes are thus different. Some of them are related to reducing the lack of trust and the risk of war and others to enhancing the efficiency of military means and to increasing temptation to make use of them, the latter two seeming inseparable.

In addition to the consequences on international security, there are also the economic effects of this arms race in the outer space. To the enormous cost of space programmes (the USA allocates about 65% of the NASA budget for military purposes, which represented, only for the period between 1955-1995, 251 billion dollars<sup>7</sup>, and annually the Department of Defence is allocated large sums of money for the development of space programmes – 17,6 billion dollars for 2009<sup>8</sup>), it may

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<sup>6</sup> Richard Star, *The Project for a New National Security Concept in Russia*, in Strategic Review, Spring 1998, p. 12, apud general de brigadă dr. Vasile Paul, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>7</sup> *Buletin de informare și documentare al MApN*, no. 3/1999, p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnems/2008>



be added the cost of protection and defence measures such as consolidating and equipping space platforms with armament, preparing some space satellites for conflict situations etc. Practically, this decision would mean a considerable increase in military budgets, with all the consequences deriving from it, at economic, social and political level.

Military experts unanimously consider that targeting enemy nuclear missiles should be achieved in each phase of the flight but striking it in the first minutes after the launch would be the key of success. To this end, the majority of proposals regarding the anti-ballistic missile system supports the set up, in the outer space, of orbital stations provided with different weapon systems with radiations or mirrors that could reflect radiation bundles from the ground towards the enemy missiles.

Military history shows that, starting from the principle according to which the invulnerability of one party in a conflict causes the vulnerability of the other, it would be absurd for one to imagine that the states affected by the move of the warfare to the outer space could see their most important systems neutralised without reacting. They would apply specific countermeasures which prove to be cheaper and easier to achieve from the technical and political-military standpoint.

The dominating position of a spacecraft towards the Earth, beyond the borders and limits established by the *Outer Space Treaty* and the national sovereignty, represents not only an opportunity to dream of gaining military superiority forever but also a proper starting point to overcome the conflicts between states or alliances and to achieve *peace on Earth*. That is why the history of the Space Era consists not only in the efforts directed towards using space technology for military purposes but also in important steps towards putting an end, at least partially, to the military competition as well as towards peaceful collaboration between states.

International efforts to limit the outer space militarisation, started in 1963, when the *Limited Test Ban Treaty* stipulating the ban of carrying out any nuclear weapon test explosion was signed. It was followed by the *Outer Space Treaty* signed in 1967 by the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union (currently, there are 164 signatory states). These efforts should be continued by all the countries that develop space weapons (USA, Russia, Japan, China, India, France, South Korea, Taiwan, Brasilia, Israel, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey)<sup>9</sup>. The most eloquent example in this context is China whose space ambitions are planned

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<sup>9</sup> *The European Parliament Resolution on 10.07.2008 regarding Outer Space and Security* (2008/2030/INI), p. 2.

in the long run. It intends to put a robot on the Moon in 2012 and an astronaut by about 2020<sup>10</sup>.

A new treaty to ban anti-satellite weapons tests would guarantee the fact that own satellite systems could be safe in the event of an important threat on the part of the potential enemy. The economic losses caused by the destruction of a satellite system justify urgency with regard to approaching this issue.

States and international bodies should not forget the fact that, *“if in the Cold War era the cooperation between the East and the West was limited, currently this cooperation is one of the most important solutions for détente, tension reduction and, implicitly, the enhancement of world security”*<sup>11</sup>.

Therefore, the *outer space has become the fourth dimension of warfare and military conflicts*<sup>12</sup>. It is a relatively recent achievement but its influence is seen everywhere and it will become decisive in the near future. The effect of using the outer space is occurred starting from the actions of isolated fighter up to the higher level of joint military actions.

Taking into account its amplitude and significance, the conquest of the circumterrestrial outer space as a new domain of human activity and its influence on the development of science, economy and the social conditions of life on Earth surpass the consequences of the conquest of the planetary ocean and of the airspace.

*English version by*  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

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<sup>10</sup> [www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/31/spaceexploration.china](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/31/spaceexploration.china)

<sup>11</sup> General-locotenent dr. Mihail Orzeacă, *Tendențe de evoluție ale securității internaționale*, în *Gândirea Militară Românească*, no. 3/2008, p. 11.

<sup>12</sup> Dr. Nicolae Dolghin, *Studii de securitate și apărare*, vol. IV, *Spațiul și viitorul războiului*, Editura UNAp., București, 2007, p. 6.

# MONTENEGRO, NATO AND A NEW STATE'S SECURITY

Boro VUČINIĆ

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*Montenegro is one of Europe's newest states. One of the first issues it tackled was if – or how – to have armed forces. Mr. Vučinić, the country's defence minister, describes how the process unfolded – and in what NATO's involvement consisted. First, he writes about the way MOD was created from, in essence, a blank sheet, meaning it required all the essential legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as defence planning and budgeting systems, along with the associated policies and procedures.*

*Then, he points out his desire that the process of building professional armed forces should continue as the country's engagement in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) process increases, and the assistance of NATO and other international partners is more evident.*

*To conclude, he mentions that he is under no illusion the tasks ahead with regard to the Montenegrin military and security will not be easily or quickly accomplished. However, the country is committed to this effort, as it possesses the potential to make great contribution in this respect.*

**Keywords:** *professional armed forces; collective security; stability; defence cooperation; ministry of defence*

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**I**n Montenegro's referendum of May 2006, the country regained the independence it had initially won at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

It is a credit to the people and governments of Montenegro and Serbia that the independence process was conducted without violence. It is normal for an event of such gravity to be accompanied by strong emotions; however, we are proud that these emotions did not spill over into conflict, and we believe that the new relationship between our countries will deepen and prosper.

As a number of NATO and PfP countries understand very well, the business of a newly independent state is replete with challenges, many of which are only discovered in the process.

One of the major decisions taken by the government of Montenegro in 2006 involved whether or not to have armed forces (AF). As a country of nearly 700 000 people, with a struggling but steadily improving economy and no imminent external threat, there were reasonable concerns raised about both the need and affordability of an AF. However, there is substantial agreement that security and stability within our region remain fragile – but also a belief that they are attainable.

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Boro Vučinić is Montenegro's Minister of Defence.



© NATO  
*Boro Vučinić during a meeting  
at NATO Headquarters.*

***If one benefits from collective security,  
one should contribute to it.  
Living in a secure house cannot be  
rent or maintenance free.***

Many within and outside the government believe that rather than Montenegro being a net recipient of security, a country has a responsibility to contribute to security and stability, both within the region and beyond. If one benefits from collective security, one should contribute to it. Living in a secure house cannot be rent or maintenance free.

By extension, it was decided that a Montenegrin defence establishment would provide not only an element dedicated to national defence and crisis response, but also to defence cooperation within the region, as well as beyond, that would contribute to enhanced security and stability.

It would be disingenuous, and at odds with the reality in any government, to imply that there was consensus in the decision to create a defence establishment with a modest (approximately 2 400) AF; however, the decision was taken, inspired by the success of defence cooperation among NATO nations for so many decades. A goal was established to learn from their success, and contribute to its sustainment.

In the period immediately following the referendum, a small number of senior military officers, formerly members of the Armed Forces of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, began the task of forming the AF of Montenegro. By November 2006, Montenegro had established its first Ministry of Defence (MOD).

The MOD was created from, in essence, a blank sheet. It required all the essential legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as defence planning and budgeting systems, along with the associated policies and procedures.

The term “defence reform” has become so common that nearly everyone uses it to refer to our MOD; however, the reality is that the MOD is “forming” rather than “reforming” in Montenegro.



© Ministry of Defence of Montenegro  
*The end result: deliberations, followed by decision  
and finally action has led to Montenegro  
having its own, new armed forces.*

The same is not entirely the case for the military; there are reforms ongoing within the military, in parallel with the formation of the AF. A number of the regulatory frameworks, systems and policies within the AF are based on those that were in use within the Union AF of Serbia and Montenegro. Our AF are deeply engaged in adapting these legacy systems, bringing about a transition to best democratic practices.

As the process of building professional AF continues, we are beginning to see the rewards in more competent leadership, more effective training, and a force with higher morale. The pride of the AF is increasing and, importantly, so is the pride of the people of Montenegro in their AF. We expect this trend to continue as our engagement in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) process increases, and with the assistance of NATO and other international partners.

***In terms of security and stability, we realise that our region is not yet “out of the woods”.***

We also understand that the success of any organisation depends largely upon its people. The MOD has employed a number of young people, nearly all with good English language skills. We have also made the best use of our military officers, by bringing a number of the experienced ones into the MOD staff. There, beyond their functional duties, they assist the staff that have had no association with the requirements of a defence establishment.

Establishing democratic oversight of the armed forces and best democratic practices within the ministry are mutually reinforcing efforts.

Earlier this year the MOD submitted its first Annual Report to Parliament, detailing MOD activities in its first year of existence. The ministry is in the process of introducing additional initiatives, such as the creation of effective mechanisms to enhance communications between the MOD and Parliament on a regular basis.

Just as it is necessary for the MOD to be aware of – and respond to – the information needs of the Parliament, it is equally necessary for Parliament to develop its knowledge of the defence establishment: where we are going, how we intend to get there, what resources are necessary and why. Our initiatives are intended to address both these needs.

To address the issue of improving support for NATO membership among the people of Montenegro, a Communications Strategy aimed at informing the public on the costs and benefits of membership was created in late 2007. We are beginning

to see successful results from the activities associated with this strategy, and are intensifying our efforts in this essential area.

***We are under no illusions.  
The tasks ahead  
will not be easily or quickly  
accomplished.***

The government of Montenegro decided from the earliest days of contemplation of independence that it would play a role in the effort to create durable solutions to security challenges in Montenegro, in the region, and beyond – to the extent our resources will allow.

It was also clear to us that within NATO countries work together, pool resources and develop policy through consensus to enhance the security of all members. Our decision to seek an invitation to PfP, and ultimately full membership in NATO, was not a snap decision.

We were well aware of the contribution the Alliance has made to peace, security, stability and prosperity in Western Europe. We also knew that, even though a number of significant differences had arisen between NATO member countries over the years, compromises were made and differences resolved. That process seemed to strengthen collective defence and security.

We could see that security and stability provided a necessary platform for economic development, for increased foreign and domestic investment, and for a continuing trend of social wellbeing in member countries.

The government of Montenegro wants a better future for its people, a future of peace, security and stability, and improved social and economic wellbeing. While we are not yet fully certain of every detail of the costs of membership in NATO will incur, we remain painfully aware of the costs of insecurity, instability and the ravages of war in our region. We are dedicated to ensuring that these latter costs are never again borne by our people.

In terms of security and stability, we realise that our region is not yet “*out of the woods*”. But along with those in the region of a like mind, we feel that the most promising path includes NATO membership.

The NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 represented a positive milestone for Montenegro in our quest for peace and stability in the region. We were pleased with NATO leaders’ acknowledgement of Montenegro’s success to date in PfP.

PfP has provided Montenegro with an opportunity to benefit from NATO’s nearly two decades of experience in assisting countries transforming to democratic systems of government, including the experience of NATO and PfP countries.

The lessons learned in this process have been invaluable to Montenegro in focusing its efforts – not only in the reforms underway within the military, but also in the development of our new Ministry of Defence.

The willingness of NATO, its member countries and other PfP countries to assist Montenegro, in a true partnership, is at the very core of the success of the Alliance. Our challenge is to effectively manage assistance according to our priorities, without overwhelming our staff's capacity to absorb this assistance.

We are under no illusions. The tasks ahead will not be easily or quickly accomplished.

We are, however, committed to this effort in the firm belief that, regardless of Montenegro being a small country, it possesses the potential to make a contribution, and we intend to exercise that potential to make a positive difference.



# THE GULF AND NATO

## – Time to Revisit Relations –

Abdulaziz SAGER

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*With key security issues such as Iran, Iraq and oil all on their doorstep, Gulf States need to think about a new direction for their security arrangements. In this article, the author shares his own views on why more cooperation with NATO may be one of the answers. The recent crisis illustrates that the Gulf region has an economic and security-related stake that is related and tied to both regional and international developments. Up to now, the main strategy to provide for Gulf security has been to rely on one big external power, the US, to maintain the status quo, regulate the relationships among the regional states, and provide at least a minimum of security. However, a redirection in the way the Arab Gulf states should view their security is needed. In the author's opinion, it is time for the GCC States to send a strong signal to NATO of their desire to see cooperation deepened and expanded. Closer ties between NATO and the GCC become a viable alternative that can assist the region with the stability it requires, while maintaining the links to the necessary presence of the US.*

**Keywords:** *economic and security-related stake; Gulf Cooperation Council; Istanbul Cooperation Initiative; regional cooperation and security; security arrangements*

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**T**he way the current financial crisis has gripped the world clearly shows how no region in the world can remain isolated.

Take the Gulf region for example. A recent report by the Gulf Research Center on the *Impact of the US Financial Crisis on GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) Countries* shows that in addition to having considerable assets in the United States, which have lost value in a short period, GCC states (comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) also have to deal with funding and liquidity issues that have now tightened and which in turn have impacted their own domestic economic development.

In GCC equity markets, some bourses have lost more than 40 percent of their value since the beginning of 2008. This not only underlined the large-scale inter-relationships that exist but also the role that will be expected of GCC states in bringing about a renewed sense of stability in world financial markets.

British Premier Gordon Brown made this clear during a visit to the Gulf States at the beginning of November 2008 when he called on countries like Saudi Arabia and other leading Arab Gulf oil

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The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, January 2009, [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/08/NATO\\_GULF\\_RELATIONS/EN/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/08/NATO_GULF_RELATIONS/EN/index.htm)

Abdulaziz Sager is Chairman of the Gulf Research Center and can be reached at [sager@grc.ae](mailto:sager@grc.ae).



producers to contribute to a new fund facility being created within the International Monetary Fund.

What the recent crisis also illustrates is that the Gulf region, already the most strategically important part of the world, has an economic as well as security-related stake that is closely related and intricately tied to both regional and international developments.

What is often not understood, however, is that the impact works both ways.



*Gulf states have also been targeted by terrorists attacks. Pictured is the Saudi Abqaiq oil refinery plant, which has been the subject of more than one attempted attack.*

***It is important to realise that the role played by the GCC Gulf states is an integral part of the movement towards a regional security solution.***

Events in the Gulf region have consequences far beyond the regional borders. This can be in the price for a barrel of oil, the increasing role of Gulf investment in Western countries, the instability in Iraq, the threat from terrorism, or the possibility

of Iran militarising their nuclear programme.

As a result, just as the Gulf cannot effectively isolate itself from the turmoil happening in the rest of the world, the key actors on international security and stability cannot afford to ignore the Gulf or pretend that developments there can be contained.

It is from this perspective that recent events on both the security and the economic front need to be seen.

In more direct security terms, it is important to realise that the role played by the GCC states is an integral part of the movement towards a regional security solution.

Up to now, the main strategy to provide for Gulf security has been to rely on one big external power, the United States, to maintain the status quo, regulate the relationships among the regional states, and provide at least a minimum of security or a sense thereof. Given the often hostile attitude of their neighbours, the Arab Gulf States increasingly saw their own state and regime security tied to the military power and protection of the United States.

It was not necessarily because the US was going to resolve all existing and underlying security dilemmas, but because it would, at a minimum, prevent the main regional antagonists, Iran and Iraq, from putting their plans into action and realising their designs. As a result, the US has become a regional power and has firmly entrenched itself in the regional strategic debate.

Yet, the widened dependence on the US has proven not to be the answer for achieving lasting security in the Gulf.

The US has taken various approaches to ensure regional security. Its twin pillar policy of the 1970s caused it to rely on Saudi Arabia and Iran. Its balance-of-power approach in the 1980s strengthened Iraq vis-à-vis a revolutionary Iran. 1990s, its dual containment was intended to isolate both Iran and Iraq at the same time. And in 2003 its approach led finally to outright intervention and invasion of Iraq.

But not one of those approaches has managed to give the region the outlines of a better security environment. Each policy simply supplied the seeds for the next crisis.

From an American perspective, the situation has become equally untenable given that the US military has found itself shouldering an increasing burden at a time when its military and political role has become the target of regional frustration and extremism. Following eight years of the unilateral policies pursued by the Bush Administration and coupled with the recent financial crisis which began in the US, it is clear to me that the United States is as much a problem as it is a solution to regional issues.

All of this is to suggest a redirection in the way the Arab Gulf states should view their security. To be sure, the relationship between the US and the GCC countries remains strong. Given their own very real security concerns, the GCC governments cannot afford to suddenly cut their ties and look for alternate security arrangements.

Yet, a shift is occurring which is already leading to the increased internationalisation of the Gulf and which includes both the expanded involvement of powers from Europe and Asia in addition to re-shifting the focus of the Arab Gulf States about their place in the international system and the role played by the United States within that context.

It is within this overall debate that the idea and concept of the *Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)* and its application towards the Gulf region need to be placed. When NATO began its initiative towards the region within the context of the 2004 Istanbul Summit, the idea and concept behind it was often described as either too vague or too ambitious.

On the one hand, ICI was perceived as a grand scheme that would resolve all the problems associated with the US presence while at the same time providing the GCC states with the security they require to ensure their longevity and stability.

On the other hand, others argued that ICI was nothing more than a US presence in sheep's clothing and that what ICI offered was not necessarily what the region required.

Most importantly, what was missing was the concept of multilateralism in the sense that while NATO approached the region as a multilateral organisation, ICI was essentially a bilateral program applied to GCC states individually.

*It is time for the GCC Gulf States to send a strong signal to NATO of their desire to see cooperation deepened and expanded.*

In light of the fact that the Gulf security dilemma remains unresolved, that the GCC states continue to face the twin challenges of a threatening Iran and an unstable Iraq, and the recent turmoil which has underscored the interdependency between the GCC and the rest of the world, the ICI initiative needs to be revisited to better understand where its actual value lies.

This initially involves an assessment that instead of seeing ICI as something suspicious and filled with ulterior motives, places the initiative as a first step of an evolving relationship based on better and deeper cooperation.

ICI is not the automatic solution to the Gulf's regional security dilemmas – but neither was it ever intended to be.

Rather, it is part of a gradual process that can highlight possible areas of cooperation and proceed to establish concrete areas of mutual interests and common objectives. In the end, ICI offers what the recipient countries want it to offer and it is up to the GCC states to decide what they want to receive from the NATO Alliance.

More important is the increased realisation that ICI represents a mechanism through which the GCC states can see their security concerns being best represented and as such there is a need for the GCC states to strengthen their relations with NATO.


As far as Gulf security is concerned, China, Russia, India and other Asian states are no alternatives and cannot be viewed as replacements for the US in the region. While the US military role in the region does come with its own problems and complications, it does remain an integral part of assuring the independence and sovereignty of the GCC states in a dangerous and unpredictable neighbourhood.

At the same time, under the new US Administration, Washington might move towards a position where, due to domestic pressures or financial reasons, it decides to reduce its military presence in the overall Gulf region as well as move towards internationalising its presence in Iraq. Under such conditions, closer ties between NATO and the GCC become a viable alternative that can assist the region with the stability it requires, while at the same time maintaining the links to the necessary presence of the US.

Moreover, ICI is the right platform to enhance regional cooperation and coordination.

Consequently, it is time for the GCC to send a strong signal to NATO of their desire to see cooperation under ICI deepened and expanded.

And while Saudi Arabia and Oman have so far not joined ICI, such a new course might speed up developments and accelerate the process where they would consider joining.



# THE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 2008

## Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force (I)

The main purpose of the study *The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force*, drawn up by the *United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)*, a structure that plays a leading part in the process of transformation of the American military capabilities, is to outline the operational environment of the next 25 years, as well as its implications for the structure and function of the *Joint Force*.

There is no doubt that no study, however thorough and well-documented, can claim it can predict the future 100% right. Nevertheless, an extremely recent (November 25<sup>th</sup>, 2008) and competent perspective on the future trends, vulnerabilities, contexts and implications for the commanders of the *Joint Force*, as well as for other leaders and professionals in the national security field is always more than welcome, that is why we reckoned we should publish this study in our journal.

In the author's opinion, the study is speculative in nature and is intended to serve as a starting point for discussions about the future security environment at the operational level of war. As pointed out in the Introduction, the changes in the political, economic, technological, strategic and operational environments, the creativity and capability of adversaries can be efficiently faced only by a *Joint Force* with attributes making it capable of adjusting with minimum difficulty when the surprise inevitably comes.

In the last resort, the most important attributes required by military organisations are the ability to innovate in peacetime and adapt during wars to the actual realities of the battlefield. These aspects are instrumental in facing future risks, threats and vulnerabilities, as well as in capitalising on the opportunities provided by the future.

*The Editorial Staff*

## Foreword

Predictions about the future are always risky. Admittedly, no one has a crystal ball. Regardless, if we do not try to forecast the future, there is no doubt that we will be caught off guard as we strive to protect this experiment in democracy that we call America.

*The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* is our historically informed, forward-looking effort to discern most accurately the challenges we will face at the operational level of war, and to determine their inherent implications. We recognize that the future environment will not be precisely the one we describe; however, we are sufficiently confident of this study's rigor that it can guide future concept development. While no study can get the future 100 percent correct, we believe it's most important that we get it sufficiently right, and that the daunting challenge of perfection not paralyze our best efforts. When future war comes, our concept developers across the Armed Services should have the fewest regrets if today they study, challenge, and implement solutions to the security implications defined here in the *JOE*. In our line of work, having the fewest regrets defines success when the shocks of conflict bring the surprise that inevitably accompanies warfare.

America retains both the powers of "intimidation and inspiration". We will continue to play a leading role in protecting the values that grew out of the wisdom and vision of our nation's original architects. We must be under no illusions about the threats to our shared values, but we must also recognize the military as only one, albeit critical aspect of America's strength. This strength must specifically recognize the need to adapt to the security challenges we face, whether or not the enemy chooses to fight us in the manner that we would prefer. America's military cannot be dominant yet irrelevant to our policy makers' requirements.

As the *JOE* goes to print, we face a challenging set of circumstances. The *JOE* maintains a longer term view and avoids a preclusive vision of future war. Any enemy worth his salt will adapt to target our perceived weaknesses, so the implications contained in this study cannot be rank ordered. But the implications do serve as the basis of the companion *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)*, which outlines how the Joint Force will operate in the future. If the *JOE* serves as the "problem statement," the *CCJO* serves as the way the Joint Force will operate in the future to "solve" the problem. These two documents should be seen as two parts of the whole.

In a field of human endeavor as fraught with uncertainty as war, it is essential that we maintain an open mind in our approach. Our responsibility is to turn over this military to our successors in better condition than we who serve today received it. We encourage criticism of our work. We plan to update the *JOE* routinely in response to your input. Creativity in technological development, operational employment, and conceptual framework is necessary, and it's our intent that the *JOE* inspires an openness to change so urgently needed when both high and low-intensity threats abound.



J. N. MATTIS  
General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command

## Introduction

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*“War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied”<sup>1</sup>.*

Sun Tzu

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The next quarter century will challenge U.S. joint forces with threats and opportunities ranging from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons. During this time, the causes of conflict will vary from rational political calculation to uncontrolled passion. Our enemy’s capabilities will range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers to long-range precision-guided cyber, space, and missile attacks. The threat of mass destruction – from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons – will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks.

It is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take. Nevertheless, it is absolutely vital to try to frame the strategic and operational contexts of the future, in order to glimpse the possible environments where political and military leaders will work and where they might employ joint forces. The value of such efforts lies not so much in the final product, but much more in the

participation of senior leaders and decision-makers in the discussion. Only by wrestling with the possibilities, determining the leading indicators, and then reading the signposts of the times will the *Joint Force* have some of the answers to the challenges of the future. The alternative, to focus exclusively on the here and now or to pass this mission to the bureaucracy, will certainly result in getting caught flat-footed, reacting to near-term crises as they arise, at great cost in blood and treasure.

Thinking about the future requires an understanding of both what is timeless and what will likely change. As Thucydides suggested in the fifth century BC, *“the events which happened in the past... (human nature being what it is) will at some time or other and in much the same way be repeated in the future”<sup>2</sup>*. Many features will not change. The challenges of the future will resemble, in many ways, the challenges that American forces have faced over the past two centuries. In spite of the current intellectual climate in much of the developed world, conflict will not disappear. War has been

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<sup>1</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. and ed. by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford, 1963, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. by Rex Warner, Penguin Books, London, 1954, p. 48.

a principal driver of change over the course of history and there is no reason to believe that the future will differ in this respect. Neither will the fundamental nature of war change. War will remain primarily a human endeavor.

In contrast, changes in the strategic landscape, the introduction and employment of new technologies, and the adaptation and creativity of our adversaries will alter the character of joint operations a great deal. Here too, the past can suggest much about the future – the nature of change, its impact on human societies, and the interplay among human societies in peaceful and warlike competition. While much will stay the same, change will also continue to be a driving force in human affairs.

One cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. military forces will be engaged in persistent conflict over the next quarter century. In the next twenty-five years, there will continue to be those who will hijack and exploit Islam and other beliefs for their own extremist ends. There will continue to be opponents who will try to disrupt the political stability and deny the free access to the global commons that is crucial to the world's economy. In this environment, the presence, reach, and capability of U.S. military forces, working with like-minded partners, will continue to be called on to protect our national interests. Merely sustaining the health of the *Joint Force*, never mind

adapting and transforming, is far more complicated in a period of persistent conflict, with its toll on equipment, people, and national will.

The nature of the human condition will guarantee that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will dominate the course of events. However carefully we think about the future; however thorough our preparations; however coherent and thoughtful our concepts, training, and doctrine; we will be surprised. Even the wisest of statesmen have found their assumptions about the future confounded by reality. The eighteenth century British leader, William Pitt, the Younger, declared in a speech before the House of Commons in February 1792: “*Unquestionably there has never been a time in the history of our country when, from the situation in Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace, than we have at the present moment*”<sup>3</sup>. Within a matter of months, Britain would become embroiled in a conflict that would last nearly a quarter of a century and would kill more Europeans than any other war in history up to that time.

In the broadest sense, the *Joint Operating Environment* examines three questions:

- What future trends and disruptions are likely to affect the *Joint Force* over the next quarter century ?

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<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Colin Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, Penguin Books, London, 2005, p. 40.

- How are these trends and disruptions likely to define the future contexts for joint operations ?

- What are the implications of these trends and contexts for the *Joint Force* ?

By exploring these trends, contexts, and implications, the *Joint Operating Environment* provides a basis for thinking about the world over the next quarter century. Its purpose is not to predict, but to suggest ways leaders might think about the future.

If war at its essence is a human endeavor, then it follows that one of the most effective ways to understand human nature is by a close consideration of history. As such, rather than futuristic vignettes, the *Joint Operating Environment* uses history as a principal way to gain insight into the future. The discussion begins with the enduring nature of war, the causes and consequences of change and surprises, and the role of strategy. Part II then describes some trends, discontinuities and potential trouble spots that joint forces may confront. Part III analyzes how these trends and disruptions may combine into contexts that will likely define joint operations over the next quarter century. Part IV describes the implications of these contexts for the *Joint Force* as it confronts an uncertain future. This section also suggests how senior leaders might think about creating a force that is suited to address the challenges that these

contexts will present. This is the unique contribution of the *Joint Operating Environment* to the broader discussion about the future. Before concluding, Part V offers some “*leading questions*” about topics that may fall outside the traditional purview of this study, but that nonetheless have important implications for the future *Joint Force*.

We will find ourselves caught off guard by changes in the political, economic, technological, strategic, and operational environments. We will find ourselves surprised by the creativity and capability of our adversaries. Our goal is not to eliminate surprise – that is impossible. Our goal is, by a careful consideration of the future, to suggest the attributes of a joint force capable of adjusting with minimum difficulty when the surprise inevitably comes. The true test of military effectiveness in the past has been in the ability of a force to diagnose the conditions it actually confronts and then quickly adapt. In the end, it will be our imagination and agility to envision and prepare for the future, and then to adapt to surprises, that will determine how the *Joint Force* will perform over the next twenty-five years. The agility to adapt to the reality of war, its political framework, and to the fact the enemy also consists of adaptive humans, has been the key component in military effectiveness in the past and will continue to be so in the future.



## Part I: The Constants

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*In the late fifth century BC, Athenian negotiators, speaking to their Spartan competitors, with whom they were soon at war, staked out their rationale for their refusal to abandon their position as Greece's other great power: "We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from doing so – security, honor, and self interest. And we were not the first to act in this way. Far from it"<sup>4</sup>.*

*Thucydides*

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### A. The Nature of War

We cannot predict exactly what kind of war, or for what purposes, the armed forces of the United States will find themselves engaged in over the next quarter century. We can only speculate about possible enemies and the weapons they will bring to the fight. But we can state with certainty that the fundamental nature of war will not change. In a democracy such as the United States, political aims, pressures, and hesitations have always conditioned military operations – and will continue to do so. *"When whole communities go to war ... the reason always lies in some political situation"*<sup>5</sup>. War is a political act, begun for political purposes. In the twenty-first century war will retain its political dimension, even when it originates in

the actions of non-state and transnational groups.

The *Joint Force* will operate in an international environment where struggle predominates. While the origins of war may rest on policy, a variety of factors has influenced the conduct of that struggle in the past and will do so in the future. The tension between rational political calculations of power on one hand and secular or religious ideologies on the other, combined with the impact of passion and chance, makes the trajectory of any conflict difficult if not impossible to predict. In coming decades, Americans must struggle to resist judging the world as if it operated along the same principles and values that drive our own country. In many parts of the world, there are no rational actors, at least in our terms. Against enemies capable of mobilizing large numbers of young men and women to slaughter civilian populations with machetes or to act as suicide bombers in open markets;

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<sup>4</sup> Thucydides, *op.cit.*, p. 80.

<sup>5</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, NJ: Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, p. 87.

enemies eager to die, for radical ideological, religious, or ethnic fervor; enemies who ignore national borders and remain unbound by the conventions of the developed world; there is little room for negotiations or compromise. It can become a matter of survival when human passion takes over. Such a world has existed in recent history – in World War II on the Eastern Front and on the islands of the Pacific, in Africa in the Rwandan genocide, and to some extent in Iraq. In a world where passions dominate, the execution of rational strategy becomes extraordinarily difficult.

War more than any other human activity engages our senses: at times providing a “rush” of fear, horror, confusion, rage, pain, helplessness, nauseous anticipation, and hyper-awareness. It is in these vagaries that imponderables and miscalculations accumulate to paralyze the minds of military and political leaders. In the cauldron of war, “*It is the exceptional human being who keeps his powers of quick decision intact*”<sup>6</sup>.

There are other aspects of human conflict that will not change no matter what advances in technology or computing power may occur: fog and friction will distort, cloak, and twist the course of events. Fog will result from information overload, our own misperceptions and faulty assumptions, and the fact that the enemy will act in an unexpected fashion.

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 113.

Combined with the fog of war will be its frictions - that almost infinite number of seemingly insignificant incidents and actions that can go wrong, the impact of chance, and the horrific effect of combat on human perceptions. It will arise “*from fundamental aspects of the human condition and unavoidable unpredictabilities that lie at the very core of combat processes*”<sup>7</sup>.

It is the constant fog and friction of war that turn the simple into the complex. In combat, people make mistakes. They forget the basics. They become disoriented, ignoring the vital to focus on the irrelevant. Occasionally, incompetence prevails. Mistaken assumptions distort situational awareness. Chance disrupts, distorts, and confuses the most careful of plans. Uncertainty and unpredictability dominate. Thoughtful military leaders have always recognized that reality, and no amount of computing power will eradicate this basic messiness.

Where friction prevails, tight tolerances, whether applied to plans, actions, or materiel are an invitation to failure – the more devastating for being unexpected. Operational or logistical concepts or plans that make no allowance for the inescapable uncertainties of war are suspect on their face – an open invitation to failure and at times defeat.

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<sup>7</sup> Barry D. Watts, *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington DC, 1992, pp. 122-123.

Still another enduring feature of conflict lies in the recurring fact that military leaders often fail to recognize their enemy as a learning, adaptive force. War “*is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass ... but always the collision of two living forces*”<sup>8</sup>. Those living forces possess all the cunning and intractable characteristics human beings have enjoyed since the dawn of history.

Even where adversaries share a similar historical and cultural background, the mere fact of belligerence guarantees profound differences in attitudes, expectations, and behavioral norms. Where different cultures come into conflict, the likelihood that adversaries will act in mutually incomprehensible ways is even more likely. Thus, “*if you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles*”<sup>9</sup>.

The conduct of war demands a deep understanding of the enemy – his culture, history, geography, religious and ideological motivations, and particularly the huge differences in his perceptions of the external world. The fundamental nature of war will not change.

## **B. The Nature of Change**

If war will remain a human endeavor, a conflict between two learning and adapting forces, changes in the political landscape, adaptations by the enemy,

and advances in technology will change the character of war. Leaders are often late to recognize such changes. Driven by an inherent desire to bring order to a disorderly, chaotic universe, human beings tend to frame their thoughts about the future in terms of continuities and extrapolations from the present and occasionally the past. But a brief look at the past quarter century, to say nothing of the past four thousand years, suggests the extent of changes that coming decades will bring.

Twenty-five years ago the *Cold War* encompassed every aspect of the American military’s thinking and preparation for conflict – from the strategic level to the tactical. Today, that all-consuming preoccupation is an historical relic. A quarter century ago, the United States confronted the Soviet Union, a truculent, intractable opponent with leaders firmly committed to the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology and expansion of their influence. At that time, few in the intelligence communities or even among Sovietologists recognized the deepening internal crisis of confidence that would lead to the implosion of the Soviet Empire. The opposing sides had each deployed tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, as well as vast armies, air forces, and navies across the globe. Soviet forces were occupying Afghanistan and appeared on the brink of crushing an uprising of ill-equipped, ill-trained guerrillas. In El Salvador, a Soviet-backed insurgency was on the brink of victory.

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<sup>8</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>9</sup> Sun Tzu, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

Beyond the confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union lay a world that differed enormously from today. China was only emerging from the dark years of Mao's rule. To China's south, India remained mired in an almost medieval level of poverty, from which it appeared unlikely to escape.

To the sub-continent's west, the Middle East was as plagued by political and religious troubles as today. But no one could have predicted then that within 25 years the United States would wage two major wars against Saddam Hussein's regime and commit much of its ground power to suppressing simultaneous insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The differences between the culture and organization of the American military then and now further underline the extent of the disruptions with the past. The lack of coordination among the forces involved in overthrowing the "New Jewel" movement in Grenada in October 1983 reminds us that at the time jointness was a concept honored more in the breach than observance. That situation led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.

In terms of capabilities, stealth did not yet exist outside of the research and development communities.

The M-1 Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle were only starting to reach the Army's forward deployed units. The Global Positioning System (GPS) did not exist. The training ranges

of the National Training Center, Twenty-Nine Palms, Fallon, and Nellis were just beginning to change U.S. preparations for war. Precision attack was largely a matter for tactical nuclear weapons.

One might also note how much the economic and technological landscapes outside of the military have changed. Economically, in 1983 globalization was in its first stages and largely involved trade among the United States, Europe, and Japan. The tigers of Southeast Asia were emerging, but the rest of the world seemed caught in inescapable poverty. Just to give one example: in 1983 the daily transfer of capital among international markets was approximately \$20 billion. Today, it is \$1.6 trillion.

On the technological side, the internet existed only in the Department of Defense; its economic and communications possibilities and implications were not apparent.

Cellular phones did not exist. Personal computers were beginning to come into widespread use, but their reliability was terrible. Microsoft was just emerging from Bill Gates' garage, while Google existed only in the wilder writings of science fiction writers. In other words, the revolution in information and communications technologies, taken for granted today, was largely unimaginable in 1983. A revolution had begun, but its implications remained uncertain and unclear. Other advances in science

**Strategic Estimates  
in the Twentieth Century**

- 1900 If you had been a strategic analyst for the world's leading power, you would have been British, looking warily at Britain's age old enemy: France.
- 1910 You would now be allied with France, and the enemy would now be Germany
- 1920 Britain and its allies had won World War I, but now the British found themselves engaged in a naval race with its former allies the United States and Japan.
- 1930 For the British, naval limitation treaties were in place, the Great Depression had started and defense planning for the next five years assumed a "ten year" rule – no war in ten years. British planners posited the main threats to the Empire as the Soviet Union and Japan, while Germany and Italy were either friendly or no threat.
- 1936 A British planner would now posit three great threats: Italy, Japan, and the worst, a resurgent Germany, while little help could be expected from the United States.
- 1940 The collapse of France in June left Britain alone in a seemingly hopeless war with Germany and Italy with a Japanese threat looming in the Pacific. America had only recently begun to scramble to rearm its military forces.
- 1950 The United States was now the world's greatest power, the atomic age had dawned, and a "police action" began in June in Korea that was to kill over 36 500 Americans, 58 000 South Koreans, nearly 3 000 Allied soldiers, 215 000 North Koreans, 400 000 Chinese, and 2 000 000 Korean civilians before a cease-fire brought an end to the fighting in 1953. The main opponent in the conflict would be China, America's ally in the war against Japan.

since 1983, such as the completion of the human genome project, nano technologies, and robotics, also seemed the provenance of writers of science fiction.

In thinking about the world's trajectory, we have reason to believe that the next twenty-five years will bring changes just as dramatic, drastic, and disruptive as those that have occurred in the past quarter century. Indeed, the pace of technological and scientific change is increasing. Changes will occur throughout the energy, financial, political, strategic, operational, and technological domains. While some change is foreseeable, even predictable, future joint force planning must account for the certainty that there will be surprises. How drastic, how disruptive they might be is at present not discernible and in some cases it will not even be noticed until they happen.

The interplay between continuities and disruptions will demand a joint force that can see both what has changed and what endures. The force must then have the ability to adapt to those changes while recognizing the value of fundamental principles. That can only result from an historically-minded mentality that can raise the right questions.

**C. The Challenge  
of Disruptions**

Trends may suggest possibilities and potential directions, but they are unreliable for understanding the future, because they interact with and are

- 1960 Politicians in the United States were focusing on a missile gap that did not exist; massive retaliation would soon give way to flexible response, while a small insurgency in South Vietnam hardly drew American attention.
- 1970 The United States was beginning to withdraw from Vietnam, its military forces in shambles. The Soviet Union had just crushed incipient rebellion in the Warsaw Pact. Détente between the Soviets and Americans had begun, while the Chinese were waiting in the wing to create an informal alliance with the United States.
- 1980 The Soviets had just invaded Afghanistan, while a theocratic revolution in Iran had overthrown the Shah's regime. "Desert One" – an attempt to free American hostages in Iran – ended in a humiliating failure, another indication of what pundits were calling "the hollow force". America was the greatest creditor nation the world had ever seen.
- 1990 The Soviet Union collapses. The supposedly hollow force shreds the vaunted Iraqi Army in less than 100 hours. The United States had become the world's greatest debtor nation. No one outside of the Department of Defense has heard of the internet.
- 2000 Warsaw is the capital of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nation. Terrorism is emerging as America's greatest threat. Biotechnology, robotics, nanotechnology, HD energy, etc. are advancing so fast they are beyond forecasting.
- 2010 Take the above and plan accordingly ! What will be the disruptions of the next 25 years ?

influenced by other factors. The downturn of Wall Street after the crash of 1929 might well have remained a recession, but passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs destroyed American trade with other nations and turned the recession into a catastrophic global depression. In considering the future, one should not underestimate the ability of a few individuals, even a single person, to determine the course of events. One may well predict that human beings will act in similar patterns of behavior in the future, but when, where and how remains entirely unpredictable. The rise of a future Stalin, Hitler, or Lenin is entirely possible, but completely unpredictable, and the context in which they might reach the top is unforeseeable.

The interplay of economic trends, vastly different cultures and historical experiences, and the idiosyncrasies of leaders, among a host of other factors, provide such complexity in their interactions as to make prediction impossible. Winston Churchill caught those complexities best in his masterful history of World War I:

***One rises from the study of the causes of the Great War with a prevailing sense of the defective control of individuals upon world fortunes. It has been well said, "there is always more error than design in human affairs". The limited minds of the ablest men, their disputed authority, the climate of opinion in which they dwell, their transient and partial contributions to the mighty problem, that problem***

**The Fragility of History  
– and the Future ...**

The patterns and course of the past appear relatively straightforward and obvious to those living in the present, but only because the paths not taken or the events that might have happened, did not. Nothing makes this clearer than the fates of three individuals in the first thirty plus years of the twentieth century. Adolf Hitler enlisted in the 16<sup>th</sup> Bavarian Reserve Regiment (the “List” Regiment) in early August 1914; two months later he and 35,000 ill-trained recruits were thrown against the veteran soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force. In one day of fighting the List Regiment lost one third of its men. When the Battle of Langemark was over, the Germans had suffered approximately 80% casualties. Hitler was unscratched. Seventeen years later, when Winston Churchill was visiting New York, he stepped off the curb without looking in the right direction and was seriously injured. Two years later in February 1933, Franklin Roosevelt was the target of an assassination attempt, but the bullet aimed for him, hit and killed the mayor of Chicago. Can any one doubt that, had any one of these three individuals been killed, the history of the twentieth century would have followed a fundamentally different course ?

*itself so far beyond their compass, so vast in scale and detail, so changing in its aspects – all this must surely be considered ...*<sup>10</sup>.

Thus, individuals, their idiosyncrasies, genius, and incompetence, are major actors in these disruptions. Perhaps the worst president in American history, James Buchanan, was followed by the greatest, Abraham Lincoln. Individuals invariably remain the prisoners of their cultural and historical frame of reference, which makes the ability to understand,

<sup>10</sup> Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis* (MacMillan, Toronto, 1931), p. 6.

much less predict, the actions of other states and other leaders difficult. But we should not allow this to discourage us from gaining as deep an understanding as possible of the historical influences of potential political and military leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.

Clearly, not all disruptions occur through the actions of individual leaders. Great events, involving the overthrow of regimes, the collapse of economic systems, natural disasters, and great conflicts within or among states have taken the flow of history and channeled it into new and unforeseen directions. Such singularities are truly unpredictable, except that we can be sure that they will happen again. They will twist the future into new and unexpected directions. Here, the only strategy that can mitigate the impact of surprise is a knowledge of the past, an understanding of the present, and a balanced force that is willing and able to adapt.

**D. Grand Strategy**

*As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful the superstructure, is radically marred and imperfect if the foundations be insecure – so if the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier, the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of their effect*<sup>11</sup>.

*Mahan*

Future *Joint Force* commanders will not make grand strategy, but they must

<sup>11</sup> Robert Heinl, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*, U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1976, p. 311.

fully understand the ends it seeks to achieve. They will have a role to play in suggesting how the Joint Force might be used and the means necessary for the effective use of *Joint Forces* to protect the interests of the United States. Thus, their professional, nuanced advice as military leaders is essential to the casting of effective responses to strategic challenges.

In the twentieth century the relationship in the United States between political vision and military leaders responsible for the execution of policy proved crucial in winning two world wars and the Cold War. Yet the dialogue and discourses between those

responsible for casting grand strategy and those responsible for conducting military operations has always involved tension, because their perspectives of the world inevitably differ. In the future, joint force commanders must understand the ends of strategy in order to recommend the forces required (the means) to achieve those ends. And policy makers must be clear as to the strengths, limitations, and potential costs of the employment of military forces. The relationship between ends and means drives the logic of joint operations. Only clear and unfettered military advice from commanders to policy makers can provide the understanding required to employ the *Joint Force* effectively.

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*In the second part of the article, the authors will approach the relations between conventional powers from the perspective of both cooperation and competition and will review some of the potential challenges and threats to security, as well as the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the threats of unconventional power.*

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*The study The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force, released by the United States Joint Forces Command – USJFCOM to describe the future operational environment, provides a perspective on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field.*

*In the first part of the study, the authors begin with approaching the enduring nature of war, the causes and consequences of change and surprises and the role of strategy.*

*Then, they review the trends influencing the world's security, elaborating on the most important ones, such as: demographics, globalisation, economics, energy, food, water, climate change and natural disasters, pandemics, cyber and space.*

*In the end of the first part, the authors conclude by writing that these trends will combine together in ways to form more broad and robust contexts that will define the world in which the Joint Force will operate in the future.*

**Keywords:** *war; change; discontinuations; world population pyramids; globalisation; economics; oil; water scarcity; climate change; pathogens; computing*

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\* Publication of the JOE is not intended as a DOD endorsement of *Romanian Military Thinking* and *Gândirea Militară Românească* or its purposes. Inquiries about the Joint Operating Environment should be directed to USJFCOM Public Affairs, 1562 Mitscher Avenue, Suite 200, Norfolk, VA 23551-2488, (757) 836-6555.



# **HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE TERMS FOR THE TASKS CARRIED OUT ABOARD SHIPS**

*Alina BALAGIU*

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*The study takes a historical approach to the terminology regarding the tasks carried out aboard ships between the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.*

*The author begins by writing about the origin of the terms regarding these tasks, drawing a clear distinction between the two branches – the civil and the military.*

*Then, the author points out the fact that most of the terms used in the 19<sup>th</sup> century that designated tasks aboard ships were also used in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Semantically, the terminology mirrors the continuous specialisation of the tasks aboard ships, as well as the fact that the crew aboard a sailing ship was quite numerous. In this respect, the author refers to the basic term of “chief”, which is mentioned in combination with other nouns and designates a person in charge of coordinating his/her subordinates.*

**Keywords:** *craft; navigation; steersman; craftsmen; merchant navy; military ships*

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**T**he terms referring to functions aboard ships and craft make a category with a special status due to

the importance and spreading area of these terms. The terms can be placed within the job terminology that has been discussed in many studies and articles about the crafts in the Middle Ages or about traditional occupations. Sailing is not considered to be among the traditional occupations because it took place in a restricted area (there are a few navigable rivers), although the terms from several categories are mentioned in the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

## **Terminology of Functions Aboard Ships until the 19<sup>th</sup> Century**

a. Between 1532 – 1640, in the studied chronicles and documents, there can be found several words from the naval vocabulary, among which some referring to functions or duties aboard ships or craft of the time: *corabnic* < v. sl. *korabuniku* “sailor”; *naftic* < ngr. *ιάδοέυò* “sailor”. Within firmans from the 16<sup>th</sup> century it is set as a duty of the Ruler of Walachia to give *vâslasi* “oarsmen” to the fleet that carried the taxes to the Ottoman Empire. In Walachia there also used to be,

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Lecturer Dr Alina Balagiu – “Mircea cel Bătrân” Naval Academy.

starting 1615, the obligation of getting *lopătași* or *opăcinași*, “oarsmen” and “helmsmen”, who should have known the Danube very well.

The words are part of the literary language that was to be formed, being specific to the written form used by the upper class. Within the rhotacised texts there could be found many Greek and Slavonic words that did not appear in other written documents, *naftic* “sailor” being among them. The borrowed words had a unique, stable form, although they did not appear in many texts.

Regarding the phonetic changes, the Greek letters *á* were written as *af*, like in the previous word *naftic*. There is a situation of synonymy for the words *corabnic* and *naftic*, both meaning sailor, because of the different origin: the first word is borrowed from Slavonic; the second word is borrowed from Neo-Greek, and both words competing with the older word *corăbier*.

b. Between 1640 – 1780, the structure of the vocabulary of functions aboard included terms like: *caiciu* < Tc. *kayıçı* “boatman”; *chiureciu* < Tc., “Captain”; *dutmengiu/dumendgiu* < Tc. “boatman”; *topdgiu* < Tc. *topçı* “gunman”. To these neologic terms there were added those used in the previous period.

The etymological analysis proves that the neologisms borrowed from the Turkish language were the most numerous and they were a consequence of the predominant Turkish sailing into the Black Sea by the Romanian shore and at the Danube. We can notice a compound word, *comandant-căpitan* “captain-commander”, formed from two separate words: *comandant* < Fr. *commandant* and *căpitan* < It. *capitano*, Germ. *Kapitän*, which can be considered to be formed within the Romanian language, because it was compounded of simple words coming from two different languages. For this period, as for the one previously discussed, a characteristic was keeping the etymon at the phonetic or morphological form, although the number of words with heterogeneous forms and adapting difficulties is increasing: *dunanma/donolma/dunalma*, *dutmengiu/dumendgiu*.

Besides the terms denoting functions aboard ships, as in the previous period, there were, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, crafts and craftsmen related to sailing and building ships in good conditions, e.g. weaving, with the characteristic word draper (*pânzar*); or wood working with the connected words: carpenters, workers building boats of different forms and sizes (*lemnari*, *luntrari*, *șeicari*, *dulgheri* etc.).

### **Terminology of Functions Aboard Ships in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century**

During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the terms denoting functions aboard ships were considerably enhanced: *amiral* – “admiral”; *amiralitate* – “admiralty”; *bosman* – “boatswain”; *calfatagii* – “workers that cover the holes with oakum”; *cărmaci* – “helmsman”; *căpitan* – “master”; *căpitan de comerț* – “master”; *căpitan de fregată*

– “frigate commander”; *căpitan de al II-lea rang* – “second rank commander”; *căpitan de I-ul rang* – “first rank commander”; *căpitan de lung curs* – “master”; *căpitan de port* – “harbour master”; *căpitan-locotenent clasa I* – “equivalent lieutenant captain”; *căpitanul de arme* – “petty officer that takes care of the crew”; *căpitănia portului* – “harbour master’s office”; *cărbunar* – “sailor that brought the coal”; *comandant* – “commander or master”; *contraamiral* – “rear admiral”; *echipagiu/equipagiu/equipage* – “crew”; *econom* – “accountant”; *facționari* – “watch keepers”; *fochist* – “sailor that works at the boiler, fireman”; *furier* – “military clerk”; *gabier* – “sailor that manoeuvres the upper sails, upper top man”; *gabieri de luptă* – “fighting top men”; *lampist* – “person that keeps in function and distributes the lamps, lamp lighter”; *lemnar/lemnari* – “carpenter”; *magasioner* – “storekeeper”; *marinar* – “sailor”; *marinar torpilor* – “sailor specialised on torpedo ships”; *mașiniști* – “engine personnel”; *matroz* – “navy sailor”; *matelot/mateloți* – “sailor”; *mecanic torpilor* – “navy personnel from the torpedoes”; *mecanic motor* – “engine personnel”; *mecanist/mecaniști/mecanici* – “mechanic, engine personnel”; *michmans* from English *Mitch man*; *mus/muși* – “cadet/cadets, cabin boy”; *na(v)igator* – “seaman”; *oficer* – “officer”; *oficer de quart/ofițer de cart* – “watch officer”; *oficer secund* – “First Officer, the first in charge after the Master on a merchant ship”; *permissioner* from the French *permissionnaire* – “sailor on leave”; *pilot* from French *pilote* – “pilot”; *profesi* approximate translation – “experienced sailors”; *scafandru/scafandrier* – “diver”; *secund* – “First Officer”; *șef de căldări* – “donkey man”; *șef de manevră* – “top man”; *șef de mașină* – “Chief Engineer”; *vâslaș* – “oarsman”.

Starting from five terms selected from texts in the previous period, the number of terms went up to 50 in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, 14 of them being synthetic terms and the rest periphrastic. From the etymological point of view, the synthetic terms were borrowed mainly from French: *scafandru/scafandrier* < Fr. *scaphandre*; *pilot* < Fr. *pilote* – “pilot”; *permissioner* < Fr. *permissionnaire* – “sailor on leave”; *mus/muși* < Fr. *mousse* – “cabin boy”; *matelot/mateloți* < Fr. *matelot* – “sailor”; *furier* < Fr. *fourrier* – “military clerk”; *echipagiu/equipagiu/equipage* < Fr. *equipage* – “crew”; *amiral* < Fr. *amiral* – “admiral”. Two of the terms are borrowed from English *michmans* < Engl. *mitchman*; *bosman* < Engl. *boatswain* and denote functions from the merchant marine. We think that the term “michmans” was borrowed orally, from the so-called the seaman’s language or “pidgins”, supposition that is demonstrated by the plural form of the word which is incorrect, the correct literary English form of the term being *Mitch men*. The other terms could have multiple origins: *oficer* < Polish *oficer*, Russian *ofițer*, Fr. *officier* – “officer”; *matroz* < Germ. *Matrose*, Russian *matros* – “seaman”; *căpitan* < It. *capitano*, Germ. *Kapitän* – “captain, skipper”; *mecanist/mecaniști/mecanici* Lat. *mechanicus*, Fr. *mécanique*, Germ. *Mechaniker*, It. *meccanico* – “mechanic”.

The terms derived with suffixes were more numerous than in other segments of the maritime or navy terminology: *cărbunar* – “donkeyman”, *fochist* – “fireman”, *lemnar* – “carpenter”, *magasioner* – “storekeeper”, *vâslaș* – “oarsman”. The most frequently used noun suffixes denoting jobs were: *-ar*, *-ist*, *-aș*. Another category of derived terms were those used by decalcomania, lexical phrase calques, according to the foreign models: *amiralitate* cf. It. *ammiralità*, Germ. *Admiralität*; *calfatagii* from *calafat+agiu* cf. Turkish *calfatgi*; *cârmaciu* cf. Bulgarian *Karmaè*; *comandant* cf. Fr. *commandant*; *lampist* cf. Fr. *lampiste*; *marinar marină+ar* cf. Fr. *marinier*; *mașiniști* cf. Fr. *machiniste*, Germ. *Maschinist*; *na(v)igator* cf. Fr. *navigateur*, It. *navigatore*. Only one term is formed with the prefix form “*contra-*” – “against” *contraamiral* cf. Fr. *contre-amiral* – “rear admiral” and we consider that it could be included in the same category of the lexical phrase calques.

The term *profesi* was formed by regressive derivation (we could not find the singular form registered) probably from the form *profesioniști* “professional” because the meaning is “experienced seamen”. The term *secund* is formed by reduction from “*ofițer secund*” “first officer”, term that has been maintained in the maritime terminology until the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, designating the most important person on board, following the Master, having various duties concerning the goods, crew and provisions.

There were many periphrastic terms, about a half of the total number of agent noun terms, and they can be classified in two categories: two-word terms and more-word terms. Two-word terms were formed, like for the other parts of the terminology, especially from nouns, the first noun in nominative, which forms the basis of the term, and the second one in genitive or accusative with or without a preposition: *căpitan de comerț* – “Master”; *căpitan de fregată* – “frigate commander”; *căpitan de port* – “harbour master”; *căpitanul de arme* – “petty officer that takes care of the crew”; *gabieri de luptă* – “fighting top man”; *marinar torpilor* – “sailor specialized on torpedo ships”; *mecanic torpilor* – “navy personnel from the torpedoes”; *mecanic motor* – “engine personnel”; *oficer de quart/ofițer de cart* – “watch keeping officer”; *oficer secund* – “First Officer”; *șef de căldări* – “donkeyman”; *șef de manevră* – “top man”; *șef de mașină* – “Chief Engineer”.

The terms containing more words are mainly formed with ordinal numbers: *căpitan de al II-lea rang* “second rank commander”; *căpitan de I-iul rang* – “first rank commander”; *căpitan-locotenent clasa I* – “lieutenant commander 1<sup>st</sup> class”; the word order, with the ordinal number preceding the noun, is the same for the following term, where the adjective is situated before the noun: *căpitan de lung curs*, proving the influence of French.

From the semantic point of view, the terms denoting functions aboard ships began to develop differently in accordance with the two branches – navy and merchant. Apart from the ship types that started to specialise in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, no other part of the terminology proves linguistic changes between the two branches, except the one we are analysing. For the navy, the terms denote the duties the personnel had to perform: *căpitanul de arme*, *gabieri de luptă mecanic torpilor*, *marinar torpilor*. There were also terms in common with army and air force, which created, by overlapping, the general military terminology: *comandant*, *furier*, *fașionar*, *căpitanul de arme*. The navy was already well organised in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, with leading structures and ranks that permitted, from the linguistic point of view, the development of families of words: *amiral* – “admiral”, *contraamiral* – “rear admiral”, *amiralitate* – “admiralty”. There should be noticed three synonyms for the unqualified personnel aboard navy ships: *matroz*, *marinar*, *matelot* – “sailor”, from which two neologisms borrowed from two different languages *matelot/mateloți* < Fr. *matelot*; *matroz* Germ. < *Matrose*, Russian *matros*, the other term *marinar* is calqued according to the French model and formed in Romanian. Although the scientific language is defined by lack of synonymy, thus by using only one term to describe a certain phenomenon, process or thing, there is a situation when the same term is used to name two things that are connected with the place of performing the activities *gabia* (a platform situated at the joint of the mast with the pillar, crow’s nest): *gabier* with the first meaning “sailor that keeps watch in the crow’s nest” and the second meaning is “sailor that manoeuvres superior sails”. The same term *gabier* designates a type of square sail used on sail ships that were functional in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Some of the phrases used for indicating duties aboard merchant ships used to have a different form: *căpitan de comerț*, *căpitan de lung curs*, *oficer secund* others, especially single-word terms has been kept until present: *bosman*.

### ***Terminology of Functions Aboard Ships during the First Half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century***

The great majority of the terms expressing functions aboard ships that were used during the 19<sup>th</sup> century were still in use during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The new terms of that period are, except one: *marangoz* – “carpenter”, periphrastic terms made of two words: *marinar brevetat* – “able seaman”; *marinar de arboradă* – “sailor from the masting”; *marinar de punte* – “deck watch sailor”; *om în prova* – “the first oarsman on the bow”; *șef de arbore* – “chief of mast”; *șef de barcă* – “boatman”; *șef de gabie* – “chief of crow’s nest”; *șef de rame* – “the oarsman situated on the last seat aft”; *șef de vergă* – “chief of main yard”. From the semantic point of view, the terminology shows both the continuous specialisation of the duties

performed aboard ships and the fact that the crew of a sail ship was quite numerous, if we take into consideration the term *șef* – “chief” that is usually combined with other nouns to designate the person who is in charge of others whose activity he should coordinate.

Although the terminology is enriched with relatively few terms, or few neologisms can be found in specialised books, in the *Dictionary* written by Candrea in 1939 there are terms concerning functions aboard ships or connected to sailing that form quite complete lexical families for a domain considered to be very new by most linguists. Some of these terms are: *căpitan* – “commander, skipper, master” with the lexical family *căpităneasă*, *căpitănesc*, *căpitănie*; *pirat* – “pirate” with derived terms *piraterie*, *piratericesc*. Other terms registered by Candrea are: *armator* – “ship-owner”, *aspirant de marină* – “cadet”, *barcaș* – “boatman”, *comandor* – “navy officer, commander”, *dunkeman* – “donkeyman”, *gondolier* – “gondolier”. The terms *armator*, *aspirant* and *comandor* have been kept in the core vocabulary, being still in use. The terms *dunkeman* (probably of German or English origin) and *barcaș* (derived from boat, perhaps under the influence of other derived terms like *luntraș*) are used on rivers or on the Danube.

### **Terminology of Functions Aboard Ships during the Second Half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century**

The terms from the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century can be divided into two categories: scientific neologisms, which are part of the main maritime vocabulary and are known by most of Romanian speakers, and terms that make the professional jargon, which are known by a few specialists in the field.

From the first category there can be noticed: *căpitan de cursă lungă* – “master”; *căpitan maritim-portuar* – “master”; *căpitan secund maritim* – “first officer”; *conducător de ambarcațiune de salvare* – “chief of safety boat”; *conducător de șalupă maritim* – “pilot, seaman”; *dragor* – “dredge man”; *motorist* – “motorman”; *nostrom*, It. *nostromo* – “boatswain”; *ofițer de cart mașini* – “watch engineer”; *ofițer electrician maritim* – “electrical engineer”; *ofițer maritim II* – “second officer”; *operator radio-telegrafist maritim* – “maritime radio officer”; *personal de cart de pe comandă* – “deck watch personnel”; *șef de echipaj maritim* – “boatswain”. The analysis of the terms structure shows the fact that one term is synthetic – *nostrom* < It. *nostromo*, two terms are derived with suffixes: *dragor* formed with the suffix *-or* and *motorist* formed with the suffix *-ist*, both noun suffixes name of agent. The multiword periphrastic terms are about 80% of the total of the neologisms and among them there can be noticed the difference between the river and sea terminology by using the adjective *maritim* – “maritime” for 70% of the terms.

The terms denoting the professional jargon and the slang have been selected from the discussions with all type of personnel from the navy.

Terms used aboard navy ships for different duties: *aenist* – “electrician for navigational apparatus”; *ajmec* – “chief engineer assistant”; *boacter* – “sailor” (pejorative); *vardie* – “sailor, watch keeper”; *curier alergător* – “watch keeper”; *hidrolocatorist* – “personnel in hydro location”; *joker bun la toate* – “petty officer” (pejorative); *mineri* – “sailors working with mines”; *minero-torpilor* – “miner and torpedo man”; *ochitor* – “trainer”; *popotar* “cook”; *rachetist* – “sailor working with torpedoes”; *radiotelegrafist* – “sailor working at radio telegraph”; *radiolocatorist* – “radioman” ; *semnalizator* – “signalising sailor”; *submarine* – “sailor working on submarines”; *torpilor* – “sailor working with torpedoes”; *tunar* – “sailor working at machine gun”; *unsuroși* – “sailors working in the engine room”; *veselar* – “sailor on duty in the galley; *vitalist* – “sailor maintaining the ship”. Half of these terms are made by derivation with noun suffixes, of agent: -or *ochitor*, *torpilor*; -ist *hidrolocatorist*, *rachetist*, *radiotelegrafist*, *radiolocatorist*, *vitalist*; -ar *popotar*, *veselar*, suffixes that prove to be very productive in Romanian. The term *aenist* is formed by abbreviating the terms “navigation electronic apparatus” plus the suffix -ist, method that could become productive in technical domains. Another term made by shortening the first and the last word from the phrase “chief engineer assistant” is *ajmec*. None of these terms appear in dictionaries because they are part of the navy jargon and slang and they are used by people working in the field. Two of the terms are pejorative *boacter* or *bacter*, which is common to the military, and *unsuros* – “sailors working in the engine room” term made by a metaphor, as an adjective denoting a characteristic of the function. A third pejorative term – *joker bun la toate* is periphrastic, defining at the same time the multiple duties of the function.

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
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
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
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### ***Selection and Translation***

*Ioana MANAFU, Delia PETRACHE,  
Mihai POPESCU, Cătălina ROJIȘTEANU  
National Military Library*

# EDITORIAL EVENTS

George Cristian Maior returns to the Romanian journalistic landscape with his third book, in the field of defence policy, after having published another one in the field of international law as well as one in the field of the issues of the civil-military relations in the globalisation context, as a coordinator.



The book *Noul aliat: regândirea politicii de apărare a României la începutul secolului XXI (The New Ally: Rethinking Romania's Defence Policy at the Beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century)* brings to our attention the years of the accession to NATO and the EU and the development of the military policy of that time. As defined by the author, this book is a collection of articles that approach a broad range of issues, starting with the theoretical approach to the European and national security, NATO enlargement and the transformations occurred in the post-accession period and the new world security threats, especially the ones that are specific to the Black Sea, going all the way to defining the milestones of the military reform and the armed forces professionalisation – a field in which he is one of the initiators.

The author starts from the fact that our country is situated in an instable region, in which the Black Sea remains at the crossroads of divergent geopolitical interests, a region that is totally different from the one of security, peace and prosperity assumed by means of consensus inside the European Union. Considering these realities, George Cristian Maior seeks to define an analytical apparatus that is necessary for the re-conceptualisation of our national interests following NATO accession. In this context, the author suggests a different approach to the relations with the European and North Atlantic partners and allies – through the states voluntarily

assuming the cooperation, collective security and negotiation instead of resorting to the armed force – as compared to the ones outside the Euro-Atlantic area, where the relations between states are still dealt with by means of force. The author thus reckons that moral legitimacy – given by our integration among the European nations – should be intertwined with physical might – provided by the geographical position of our country, the area and our own security and defence capabilities –, estimating that it is only through this interplay that Romania's international role can be increased. However, there is one entire chapter, illustrated with concrete examples, that draws our attention towards what both force without legitimacy and legitimacy without force mean, indicating that, given the position Romania has towards these two concepts, our country's voice can gain much more importance in the international relations at the beginning of this century.

A distinct aspect that the author insists on refers to the “*demythologisation*” of territorial defence in the context in which the current risks are more different from the ones at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. That is why Romania's defence policy must be reoriented towards the importance of national values and borders in the Euro-Atlantic context, because, faced with terrorists and organised crime networks, we do not defend territories anymore, but rather seek to manage crises and sources of conflict wherever they occur.

The arguments of the accession to NATO are brought to our attention once more, even if they might seem outdated. In Mr. Maior's opinion, there are many analyses of that time that are still valid. Romania remains a link between the East and the West, given that it is placed at the border of the Western world it is part of now and it is provided with the possibility to give assistance regarding its experience in the transition to democracy, a process that is in full progress in various area in the Caucasus, Central Asia or the Middle East. Moreover, the security in the Black Sea is more and more present, not only from the perspective of risks but also from the one of the proposed political recommendations, some of them being also found at the core of the development of the European Union's role in the area of the Eastern Partnership, as well as in the Alliance's involvement in new security issues, such as the energy field or the critical infrastructure protection.

An important part of the book is dedicated to the evolution of the military body in the pre- and post-accession to the North-Atlantic Alliance period. Mr. Maior was directly involved in this field, as it was from his position as a State Secretary in the Ministry of National Defence that he managed the entire range of defence and integration policy at that time. The following aspects are comprehensively approached: the military reform, started with the Guide to the Military Career

and carried on, with inherent difficulties, throughout his entire mandate. One of the accomplishments he believes to be notable is the revision of the Constitution and the abolishment of the mandatory military service, thus taking place the transition towards fully professionalised armed forces. One can notice today that the decision made then was a correct one, because the *“military career remains an attractive option”*, and military volunteers *“accomplished notable deeds”* in the theatre of operations in which they were medalled by NATO officials.

Essentially, Mr. Maior’s book, published by *Editura Rao*, is an appeal for continuity in the public discourse and policies in Romania and a rejection of the attitude of the accomplished fact, by the virtue of which the transformation and reform of the armed forces should end when Romania joined NATO and the European Union. Certain continuity is required in some domestic reform policies and in providing an overall vision of the security field, starting with the civil control of defence and ending with the forces protection and the contribution to NATO and to the role our country wants to play regionally or globally. *“A security strategy for the new millennium should correlate the aspects of the human security that provides state cohesion, the elimination of social injustice and the preservation of national identity with the military aspects (hard security), without which state actors would be unable to act at the international level to promote their citizens’ rights. The military in support of security are not meant for war exclusively, but a vehicle for increasing confidence and security and for acting preventively to strengthen peace regionally and globally”*, concludes Mr. George Cristian Maior.

 **Lieutenant General**  
**Professor Dr Teodor FRUNZETI**

Last year, on November 10<sup>th</sup>, the Romanian modern artillery reached 165 years of existence, a moment celebrated by the publication, at *Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei*, of a work dedicated to this military branch and, therefore, *“to the memory of artillery heroes and of those who devoted their entire activity to the development and modernisation of the Romanian Artillery”*: **165 de existență a artileriei române moderne (165 Years of the Modern Romanian Artillery)**.

Developed by a team of authors coordinated by **Colonel Dr Adrian Stroea**, the work succinctly treats,



in its nine chapters, the history of one of “*the oldest and noblest of army weapons*”, a few relevant data being the following: in 1838, the National Assembly proposed the “*purchase of cannons for the completion and equipment of our army*”; between 1843 and 1849 the first battery was organised, thus practically the specific training being started in the country, with trainers from the Russian artillery; in 1853, the artillery of Walachia participated in actions against the Turks, thus proving “*the Romanian people’s yearning to escape from the Turkish sovereignty and to gain independence through the use of weapons*”.

Moreover, during the War of Independence, the artillery participated in the operation of covering the Danube, in providing fire support for the Russian units on the Danube and in conquering the Nicopole fortress. On 15/27 May 1877, Prince Carol I ordered the troops to open fire on Vidin, the signal being given by the 1<sup>st</sup> cannon of the “Carol I” battery, then the 1<sup>st</sup> cannon of the “Mircea” battery and the 1<sup>st</sup> cannon of the “Elisabeta” battery. “*The Turks responded after the second shot, the duel of fire lasting an hour, 5 Turkish shells falling over the “Carol I” battery. While the battery was launching the first blow towards Vidin, Prince Carol I uttered the famous words: <This is the kind of music that I like !>. Over the years, the artilleryists annually organised, on 15 May, in accordance with the decision of their superiors, the great meeting of gunners at the Army’s Construction Arsenal on 28 September 1895, The Anniversary of the First Cannon*”.

In the last part, the greatest personalities of the Romanian artillery are portrayed and the biography of Prince Gheorghe Bibescu is presented, whose name is connected to the establishment of modern Romanian artillery.

Being in agreement with the scientific reviewer of this work, *Lieutenant General Dr Teodor Frunzeti*, I invite you to read this history of artillery, considering it “*a very useful, enjoyable and exciting reading, for both the gunners and the other readers, be they military and civilians, who, in one way or another, can influence the development of this weapon, knowing better its history and spirit*”.


“*A thorough study on the phenomenon of terrorism, resorting to the most renowned works in the field ... an essential theoretical guide to contemporary terrorism*” – this is the quintessence of the work ***Terorismul. Studii și cercetări asupra fenomenului terorist (Terrorism. Studies and Research on the Terrorist Phenomenon)***, which appeared in Cluj published by *Risoprint* under the signature of two researchers in the field – **Cristian Delcea** and **Aurelian Bădulescu**.

In the first three chapters of the work, the authors provide us with some definitions of the concept of terrorism, some of the theories that address this phenomenon, as well as with a description of the types of terrorism – international, nationalist, fundamentalist Islamic, state-sponsored, left, cyber, drug, biological



terrorism, as well as ad-terrorism, tour-terrorism, air-naval terrorism and naval terrorism.

The second part of the study is focused on describing terrorism – conceptual demarcations, the profile of the terrorist, of the leader of a terrorist group; it approaches some theories regarding the personality of the terrorist – the structure, purpose, observational learning processes and self-adjustment of terrorists, as well as the concept of terrorist vocational identity, the values of the terrorist's career, his skills and abilities. In this respect, I recommend you to read some of the instructions contained in a four-page letter handwritten in Arabic, found in the luggage of one of the 19 terrorists who is believed to have commanded the Boeing 767 of the American Airlines company that hit the Northern tower of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001: *“Remember the Prophet's battle against disbelievers, while building the Islamic state. You will enter paradise. You will have eternal life, full of happiness. Swear to die and renew your oath ... Remember all the promises made by Allah to martyrs. Pray during the night and implore Allah to give you victory, power and control ... It is the last night ... Let peace surround you because your wedding in heaven is close. You will then start a happy life in the companionship of the prophets and martyrs, and Allah will be pleased with you. When the time comes, receive death with joy, because <those who die for Allah are not dead, but alive>”.* Quod erat demonstrandum !



The English edition of *Revista Academiei Forțelor Terestre* brings to attention titles such as: Superiority and Tactical Isolated Low-Intensity Operations”, “The Political-Military Evolutions from Afghanistan – A Challenge to NATO”, “Conceptual Coordinates – Romanian Army’s Transformation Doctrine”, “Welche Faktoren Beschreiben die Touristik?”, “Symmetry, Asymmetry and Dissymmetry in the Military Conflict”, “Generating, Testing and Assessing Learning Items within the E-Plasticity Education Module”.



There is one relevant and, why not ?, still topical passage in this review that I would like to point out here, and that is part of the article of Captain Aurelian Rațiu, “Conceptual Coordinates – Romanian Army’s Transformation Doctrine”: *“Although the concept of transformation has become*


particularly important in recent years, NATO has effectively dealt with this phenomenon since the collapse of the Soviet Union ... The purpose of transformation was mainly to keep the Alliance in the security environment and able to fully meet its responsibilities”.

*Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române – Document* (The Bulletin of the Romanian Military Archives – **Document**) was published. Out of the contents page I will mention the following titles: “The German Occupation of Romania in 1916-1918 in the Light of German Memoirs of the First World War” (Günter Klein), “The Meeting in Giurgiu” (Anca-Oana Otu), “Petru Groza and the Great Union” (Captain Dr Marian Moșneagu), “About the “Good Conduct” of the Romanian Soldier in Revolutionary Times” (Dr. Petre Otu), “Testimonials on 1918” (Colonel (r.) Dumitru Stavarache), “The Battle of 13 September 1848 between the Romanians and the Turks as Described by Ion Brătianu” (Luminița Giurgiu), “A Project for Organising the Romanian Fleet” (Dr Maria Georgescu).




In the editorial, Dr Ion Scurtu stresses the importance of the Great Union on December 1<sup>st</sup>, 1918, considering it an act “that was part of the extensive process of self-determination of peoples that occurred in Europe at the end of the First World War. Then the map of the continent was reshaped, following the emergence of nation-states such as Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Austria, Hungary... The establishment of the national unitary state was achieved through struggle and sacrifice, through firmness and intelligence, with a broad participation of all the creative energies of the Romanian people”.

From the contents of no. 2/2008 of the **Review of the Air Force Academy**, published by the “Henri Coandă” Air Force Academy, we recommend the following titles: “Computer Aided Preliminary Design of the Height Control Systems”, “Current Aspects of Solid Modelling”, “The Usage of Fuzzy Logic in the Decision-Making System”, “On the Possibilities of the Education Process Support by Means of the ICT in the Military University Environment”, “Multicultural America. Ethnic Adaptation to American Culture”, “The Geopolitical Crisis Management at the End of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century”, “The Role and Place of the Mentor within the Medical University Field”.



*“One of the most complex dimensions of the contemporary economic development is the military. There is an indissoluble limit between the military expenditure of a state and its economic situation, the military options depending on the consistency of this relation”, it is noted in the article “The Military Dimension of the Economic Development” of the **Buletinul științific (Scientific Bulletin)**, no. 2, published by the “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy. Out of the contents, we recommend titles such as: “The Effects of Globalisation on Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, “Logistical Support of the Czech Republic Armed Forces in Military Operations”, “Specifics of Orientations, Two Reasons, and Four Approaches to Knowledge”, “The Strategic Management of the Public-Private Relation in the Constanța Harbour”, “Moral and Immoral Issues in Economic and Social Quantification”, “Trends in Romanian Military Audiovisual – Romanian Military Radio on the Net”.*



*Alina PAPOI*

*English version by*

*Iulia NĂSTASIE*

# Résumés

## **OTAN – de l'espoir à la certitude**

Alliance politico-militaire génératrice de sécurité et, implicitement, de stabilité dans une Europe vulnérable par sa suspicion et fragile souvent en raison de ses oscillations idéologiques, l'OTAN a représenté depuis longtemps une aspiration que nous avons été obligés d'en nourrir seulement par l'espoir qu'il viendra un jour que nous sommes en mesure d'exprimer notre choix. Située, par la force d'un destin injuste, au bord de grandes empires dont ses frontières fluides ont toujours sorti de leurs racines, la Roumanie a souvent été contrainte de chercher le refuge des alliances qui permettront de protéger son être nationale et d'accomplir son destin avec qu'il a été faire dans ce coin de continent.

## **Roumanie dans l'OTAN – les réalisations et les aspirations à cinq années après son adhésion**

Le 2 avril 2004, le drapeau national de la Roumanie a été arboré, ainsi que les autres 25 États, au Siège de l'OTAN à Bruxelles. L'événement a marqué la fin d'une période de profondes transformations de la société roumaine et de l'option militaire matérialisée par l'expression forte d'adhésion de notre pays aux valeurs démocratiques de l'Europe de l'Ouest et de les défendre à travers des instruments de sécurité collective. Depuis cinq ans, qui ont été ajoutées aux 55 d'existence de l'Alliance

Atlantique, de sorte que, en avril 2009, on marquera la fête de six décennies par un sommet anniversaire de l'OTAN.

## **Six décennies après la création de l'OTAN**

Le 17 mars 1948 a été signé le Traité de Bruxelles, avec une évolution de cinquante ans, la première forme d'union des pays d'Europe Occidentale pour défendre la sécurité. En vertu de l'article IV, le plus important, les États signataires s'engagent à fournir l'assistance mutuelle, y compris contre toute agression militaire. Dans le préambule du document, l'Allemagne a été mentionnée explicitement, d'une volonté de ménager les soupçons de l'Union soviétique, mais aussi pour co-intéresser la France, qui ne pouvait pas oublier le passé des relations avec son voisin du Nord. Apparition de l'OTAN a été un événement majeur des relations internationales marquées par le déclenchement d'un phénomène tout à fait nouveau – la Guerre froide.

## **La transformation et l'élargissement de l'OTAN**

La transformation permanente de l'OTAN reflète implicitement ses changements institutionnels et culturels. Ce processus est stimulé par la nécessité croissante pour les forces de l'OTAN à remplir et devenir

multinationales, déployés où et alors quand elles sont nécessaires, cohérentes en termes d'interopérabilité. Les États membres sont consacrés à l'exploration et l'adoption de nouvelles capacités qui améliorent l'aptitude de l'Alliance à répondre avec succès aux nouveaux défis d'un nouvel environnement stratégique et des changements. La transformation est nécessaire, à l'avis de l'auteur, pour répondre aux défis et aux menaces de l'environnement stratégique très complexe, en particulier dans les dix dernières années.

### **Le partenariat stratégique UE-OTAN**

Sommet de l'OTAN à Bucarest, du 2 au 4 avril 2008, a donné une impulsion significative à renforcer la relation UE-OTAN, mais en même temps a souligné la nécessité de trouver des solutions diplomatiques et politiques pour la conclusion de l'Alliance et l'Union européenne d'assurer une coopération efficace en Afghanistan et au Kosovo, y compris le personnel de sécurité aux missions de l'UE. Ainsi, à partir d'une perspective européenne, l'emploi des forces à la disposition de l'UE ou de l'OTAN ne doit pas conduire au blocage de ces forces dans l'un ou l'autre des ces deux organisations. Du point de vue de l'OTAN, il est recommandable d'éviter la double subordination des forces.

### **Sommet de l'OTAN à Bucarest – un élément de continuité**

Nous pouvons apprécier le fait que le sommet de Bucarest a fixé les nouvelles orientations pour le développement de l'espace géopolitique euro atlantique. Les résultats de ce forum ne sont pas seulement les perspectives de la transformation géopolitique actuelle des relations entre les États-Unis, l'UE et la Russie, mais aussi les défis liés à la perte ou l'élimination

des éléments essentiels à la Russie, en particulier, sur le Kosovo, l'élargissement de l'OTAN. Cependant, il y a eu des moments d'un consensus entre l'OTAN et la Russie, relatif à l'Afghanistan et, à une certaine mesure, au bouclier anti-missile, qui se révèlent favorables spécialement pour l'Alliance.

### **Perspectives de développement une stratégie de sécurité euro atlantique commune**

L'UE est un partenaire impérieux de l'OTAN dans des strictes combinaison d'outils disponibles, tels que des opérations civiles, les sanctions, l'aide humanitaire, le commerce et la politique de développement du dialogue. Cela permettra, après la ratification du Traité de Lisbonne, que l'UE et l'OTAN accroissent les efforts visant à élaborer un cadre intégré de coopération. Ils pourront ainsi se renforcer mutuellement et développer une pratique de la partition du travail. Non moins, l'auteur pose la question à l'accord que les deux organisations déploient des forces, ce bâtiment de la volonté politique exprimée par chacun d'eux sur les nécessités opérationnels et la capacité de chacun d'eux d'apporter la paix et la stabilité.

### **L'origine et l'évolution du Partenariat pour la Paix**

La Roumanie a été le premier État qui a signé, le 26 janvier 1994, le cadre de Partenariat pour la Paix en confirmant, de cette façon, la détermination de l'ensemble de la société roumaine de devenir partie de la communauté européenne et euro atlantique, les valeurs, en respectant les libertés individuelles, les droits de l'homme et de renforcer la primauté du droit. Pour la Roumanie,

les 10 années de participation au PpP ont été une période de formation et de renforcement pour poser sa candidature aux structures euro atlantique; aussi elle s'est concentrée sur les actions destinées à améliorer l'interopérabilité des forces armées roumaines à celle de l'OTAN et de renforcer notre rôle en tant que le plan de sécurité régional.

### **Tendances de l'évolution de la sécurité internationale – la condition de la sécurité dans le domaine militaire (IV)**

Si, au cours de la Guerre froide, les relations sont principalement régis par les arguments de la force, actuellement, nous avons évolué vers un système de relations fondé sur la force de l'argument. La dimension militaire de la sécurité diminuera en importance à mesure que les risques et menaces à caractère militaire permettront de réduire la sécurité internationale et le monde sera plus sûr. Il y a une course aux armements déclarée et une lutte qui est en cours en vue de re-diviser les domaines d'influence, à la fois rejetée par la politique du leadership des Etats qui encouragent cela.

### **La connaissance et la lutte contre les facteurs de risque et la vulnérabilité à la sécurité de l'homme (I)**

L'homme est l'élément essentiel de toute forme d'organisation sociale et la réalisation de la sécurité est reflétée dans le groupe de sécurité dont il fait partie. Le problème de sécurité de l'homme indique, d'une part, l'absence de menaces telles que la faim, la maladie, la répression et, d'autre part, la protection de la personne de certains événements indésirables de la vie. L'auteur

montre et décrit les particularités de la sécurité humaine. À cet égard, il détaille le sujet et l'objet de référence, de tout ce que la sécurité est le résultat d'un processus complexe dans lequel l'être humain agit avec son environnement et à l'adéquation des risques mondiaux, entraînant une sensation de bien-être, silence et l'absence de la peur pour demain.

### **Les forces armées – de l'institution à la profession**

La pertinence de l'institution découle de l'engagement de participation, même avec des forces réduites, avec un budget limité, aux efforts au niveau européen et euro atlantique de sécurité et de défense de valeurs communes et les intérêts institutionnels de la population communautaire. La confiance de la population dans l'armée peut être renforcée par la réactivité de répondre aux missions fondamentales de la défense nationale, de participer à la défense collective et aux missions humanitaires à l'appui des citoyens et des autorités locales dans les situations de crise à des causes naturelles, les actions menées par le professionnalisme, par la preuve de vertus militaires essentielles et l'équipement d'une structure moderne et efficace.

### **L'organisation militaire – définition et composants**

Il est important que le professionnalisme et le processus d'intégration dans l'OTAN et dans les structures de défense de l'Union européenne, notamment la NRF et des groupes de combat tactique, soit construits à l'avance ou de créer la possibilité de formation rapide de structures à une organisation modulaire et intégrée avec la capacité de réaction rapide. Une telle force pourrait être composée

de modules multi rôle et formée en fonction de la situation, sur la base de l'OTAN et l'UE. Ce concept existe déjà dans les armées modernes, particulièrement dans les armées des pays membres de l'OTAN et il peut être analysé et adapté aux conditions de notre pays.

### **Le concept de paralysie stratégique (I)**

L'auteur présente la notion de paralysie stratégique en lumière de ses fonctions – militaire, spirituelle, matérielle, mentale et morale. Ce concept a pour objectif principal plutôt que d'une incapacité l'annihilation des adversaires. À cet égard, l'auteur souligne que cette option est d'obtenir le maximum d'avantage politique dans la conduite des coûts humains et matériels minimales. Les actions visent à neutraliser la volonté de combattre de l'adversaire pour des actions contre les capacités et les ressources d'adversaire et d'assurer que la gestion de coordination est nécessaire pour la guerre.

### **Organisations terroristes contemporaines – acteur non étatique avec des implications majeures pour la sécurité**

Les vagues de terrorisme qui a frappé l'Amérique, l'Europe, l'Asie et le Moyen-Orient, surtout après 9/11, relèvent la réalité selon laquelle le terrorisme international a atteint un extrêmement dangereux en ce qui concerne le niveau des vulnérabilités, les risques et les menaces posés à la sécurité des institutions et des pays démocratiques. La réaction internationale aux actions terroristes se compose de plusieurs mesures et d'actions parmi lesquelles: l'intensification des mesures de lutte contre le terrorisme de plus en plus dangereux

pour les pays; l'augmentation de la coopération internationale dans la lutte contre le terrorisme de point de vue politique, militaire, institutionnel et financière; l'arrêt de plus important des dirigeants d'organisations terroristes.

### **Quelques considérations sur la mondialisation et les phénomènes associés**

La mondialisation est un phénomène normal, une conséquence de l'évolution de l'être humain, qui est en même temps un être social. Malgré les grands affrontements entre l'homme et les groupes, indépendamment de certaines critères, l'être humain a toujours senti le besoin irrésistible de l'établissement du contact avec ses voisins. Tout comme la mondialisation est écrite dans le gène humain, en matière de sécurité l'individu dépend profondément de sa structure biologique. Le grand problème de la «guerre contre la paix», considéré comme un paradigme des relations, n'est que la expression à l'échelle internationale de la confrontation entre les individus, en vertu de la domination du sentiment de sécurité.

### **Roumanie et Union européenne – la sécurité économique par l'intégration**

L'auteur présente quelques aspects de la gestion de l'état de la souveraineté nationale, profondément marquée par les effets de la mondialisation. L'accès aux ressources, facilité par la mondialisation, est considéré comme une condition préalable pour le pouvoir, mais aussi comme une condition de survie. À cet égard, l'auteur souligne que l'Etat doit gérer, en particulier, la souveraineté économique, en tenant compte d'un certain nombre de contraintes, telles que renforcer la compétitivité nationale – d'augmenter la richesse nationale

sur le compte de la participation dans les relations économiques internationales. Cet objectif implique un paradoxe, cependant: l'Etat doit soutenir la compétitivité externe des entreprises nationales, mais, en même temps, doit maintenir la cohérence de la production nationale.

### **Opérations informationnelles dans les opérations de sécurité maritime**

Dans notre époque, un large éventail de menaces affecte le domaine maritime et, dans ces conditions, il est important de prendre des mesures de surveillance et de prévenir les menaces à la sécurité maritime en diverses régions et de créer un cadre maritime de sécurité afin de garantir la continuité du trafic maritime. Pour fournir une solution adéquate pour la sécurité maritime de la modernité, nous devons changer la façon dont nous avons opéré dans le passé, à savoir par le biais d'un grand nombre de forces engagées dans des actions meurtrières, avec l'objectif principal de contrôler la mer en utilisant surtout des actions non létales, désignées pour protéger les principales mers et la ligne de communication.

### **Aspects de l'utilisation de l'espace extra atmosphérique pour des fins militaires**

La question de l'utilisation de l'espace extra atmosphérique pour des fins militaires n'a jamais été plus grave que de nos jours. Beaucoup de systèmes de satellites militaires ne sont seulement des moyens de multiplier la précision, la flexibilité et la rapidité de l'armement des systèmes et des forces armées sur la terre. Les conséquences de l'aide de l'espace extérieure à des fins militaires, à une échelle croissante, sont donc différentes. Certains d'entre eux veulent réduire le manque

de la confiance et la menace de guerre, d'autres d'accroître l'efficacité des moyens militaires et la tendance de les mettre au travail.

### **Le Monténégro, l'OTAN et la sécurité d'un nouvel Etat**

Le Monténégro est l'un des plus récents Etats de l'Europe. Une des premières questions abordées il a été si et comment nous devons avoir des forces armées. M. Vucinic, le ministre de la défense du pays, décrit comment s'est déroulé le processus et en ce qui consiste l'implication de l'OTAN. Aussi, il écrit à propos de la façon dont a été créé à partir de Ministère de défense, en substance, une feuille blanche, par laquelle il a exigé tous les sens de l'essentiel des cadres juridiques et réglementaires, ainsi que la planification de la défense et les systèmes de budget, de même que les politiques et les procédures.

### **Le Golfe et l'OTAN - c'est le temps de revoir ses relations**

Avec les principaux problèmes de sécurité tels que l'Iran, l'Irak et l'huile sur toutes leurs portes, les Etats du Golfe ont besoin de réfléchir à une nouvelle orientation de leur dispositif de sécurité, affirme l'auteur. Dans cet article, il partage son opinion sur les raisons pour lesquelles il doit réaliser une coopération plus étroite avec l'OTAN. Qu'est-ce que la crise récente montre que la région du Golfe a un tant économique qui est lié à la sécurité, un enjeu qui est étroitement lié à la fois régionales et internationales ? Jusqu'au présent, la principale stratégie pour assurer la sécurité du Golfe a été de s'appuyer sur une seule grande puissance extérieure, les Etats-Unis, de maintenir le statu quo, et de régler les relations entre les Etats de la région.



**The Joint Operating  
Environment 2008 – Challenges  
and Implications  
for the Future Joint Force (I)**

L'étude relève les défis et les implications pour l'avenir commun de la Force, publié par United States Joint Forces Command pour décrire le futur environnement opérationnel, qui fournit une perspective sur les tendances futures, les chocs, les contextes et les implications pour l'avenir commun des commandants de force et d'autres dirigeants et de professionnels dans le domaine de la sécurité nationale. Dans la première partie de l'étude, les auteurs commencent par aborder le caractère durable de la guerre, les causes et les conséquences du changement et de surprises et aussi le rôle de la stratégie.

**Etude diachronique des termes  
des fonctions remplies au bord  
des navires**

L'étude réalise une approche historique de la terminologie concernant les tâches effectuées au bord des navires entre le 19<sup>ème</sup> siècle et la première moitié du 20<sup>ème</sup> siècle. L'auteur commence par écrire sur l'origine de la matière en ce qui concerne ces tâches, établir une distinction claire entre les deux branches – l'état civil et celui de la marine militaire. Ensuite, l'auteur souligne le fait que la plupart des termes utilisés dans le 19<sup>ème</sup> siècle pour désigner les tâches aux bords des navires ont également été utilisés au cours du premier semestre du 20<sup>ème</sup> siècle.

*Version française par Alina PAPOI*



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***King Ferdinand I and Generals Averescu and Văitoianu,  
assessing the situation on the Grozăvești Front***

*Source: The National Military Museum, by the kindness of Professor Neclai MOGHIOR*

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