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Romanian Military Thinking

"Art. I. - The official journal named "Military Romania" is founded at the General Staff, starting 1 January 1898, in which all officers within the Armed Forces will find military studies, which interest their training.

Through the agency of this journal all officers, belonging to all branches, who are in service, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces".

Carol - King of Romania
Issued in Bucharest on 8 December 1897

Romanian Military Thinking

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in the field of military science,
published in the previous year.

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Intellectual Capital – A Remarkable Resource of the Armed Forces –

Major General Dr Ştefan DĂNILĂ
– Chief of the General Staff –

Military thinking, alongside political thinking and economic thinking, is the conceptual pillar of national security, contributing to safeguarding national interests and values and to ensuring a safety climate for Romanian citizens. For that reason, the fundamental elements of military thinking must be presented to the entire society and not just to military professionals.

The Romanian Armed Forces have a valuable intellectual capital, established through in-depth knowledge of the evolution of the military side of human society, which helps us to better understand the nation's history, to have a correct perception of the current realities and to define the coordinates of the progress towards a peaceful and prosperous future. Intellectual capital is a remarkable resource of the armed forces, and the development of its strategic component must be the factor that dynamises and connects the cognitive processes in the armed forces. It is the *Gândirea militară românească* journal that acts like a standard-bearer of the *"troops"* of military theorists and practitioners permanently fighting in the first line of the front of ideas.

The ambition to work in the military domain requires us to display unprecedented openness and broad availability to the dialogue with other institutions having responsibilities for national defence. I am certain that the authors of the articles understand that they have a duty to present their ideas unreservedly, in a way that facilitates the understanding of the networking with other institutions, as well as of the role of the operational and tactical structures. Putting ideas together in a creative way can result in new valences of the military tool, on condition that the provided solutions are real pragmatic. This requires a permanent connection to the realities of the modern battlefield, with a view to assisting the military capabilities development process.

I hope the journal's readers will be convinced that they browse through a genuinely scientific publication that is not limited to describing aspects of military history and art, but conducts relevant analyses of military structures and events and puts forward specific options for existing or predicted military security issues. There is no doubt that the journal supports a cultural act, which significantly contributes to the development of the military personality of individuals and of the military identity of structural entities.

The journal continues to assume, with justified pride, the role of promoter of the armed forces core values: integrity, patriotism and professionalism. All that is comprised in the pages of the journal shows that the processes initiated in the armed forces are in keeping with the security policy of the national authorities, and instils into its readers the courage to think freely, to express openly their opinions and to act in accordance with their own beliefs. Every idea expressed in this military publication revolves around the sense of patriotism and contributes to its cultivation and development among the readers. The quality of the theoretical approaches included in the pages of the journal reflects the professionalism of the authors and we hope that it will stimulate among its readers the wish to improve their knowledge, either general or specific, as well as the skills necessary to fulfil their duties.

I write to you, those who, out of interest or curiosity, will direct your attention, for a while, to the *Gândirea militară românească* journal, for whose prestigious existence we must thank those who are passionate about researching the military field, who generously provide us with a lot of interesting pieces of information and challenging ideas, as well as those who are constantly, devotedly and professionally concerned with the publication process.

I assure you, dear readers, that we are honoured to publish a journal such as *Gândirea militară românească* and we take full responsibility for continuously seeking to improve the quality of this publication in order to meet your requirements !

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

Le capital intellectuel
– une remarquable ressource
de l'Armée –

Major-général dr. Ştefan DĂNILĂ
– le chef de l'Etat major général –

La pensée militaire, avec la pensée politique et économique, est un pilier du concept de sécurité nationale afin de protéger les intérêts et les valeurs nationaux et d'assurer un environnement garanti pour les citoyens de la Roumanie. Par conséquent, les éléments fondamentaux de la pensée militaire doivent être présentés à la société tout entière et pas seulement aux militaires professionnels.

L'Armée Roumaine a un inestimable capital intellectuel, établi par une connaissance approfondie de l'évolution du domaine militaire de la société humaine, qui nous aide à mieux comprendre l'histoire de la nation, de percevoir correctement les réalités du présent et de nous définir les coordonnées du progrès vers un avenir pacifique et prospère. Le capital intellectuel est une ressource remarquable de l'Armée, et le développement de sa composante stratégique doit être le facteur énergique et coagulant des processus cognitifs dans l'Armée.

C'est la publication *La Pensée militaire roumaine* qui a le rôle de bannière de *"forces"* des théoriciens et des praticiens militaires qui combattent toujours dans la première ligne sur le front des idées.

L'ambition de travailler dans le domaine militaire requête une ouverture sans précédent et une ample disponibilité vers le dialogue avec d'autres institutions ayant des responsabilités dans la défense nationale. Je suis convaincu que les auteurs des articles comprennent qu'ils ont le devoir de présenter clairement leurs idées, d'une manière qui facilite la compréhension de la mise en réseau avec d'autres institutions, et du rôle des structures du niveau opérationnel et tactique. Rejoindre les idées dans une manière créative peut générer de nouvelles valences de l'instrument militaire, à condition que les solutions offertes présentent un réel caractère pragmatique. Cela nécessite une relation permanente aux réalités du champ de bataille actuel pour aider le processus de développement des capacités militaires.

J'espère que les lecteurs de cette publication seront convaincus qu'ils aperçoivent une vraie publication de science qui ne se limite pas à décrire les aspects de l'histoire et de l'art militaire, mais réalise même si des analyses pertinentes des structures et des événements militaires et propose des options spécifiques à des problèmes de sécurité existants ou préfigurés. Sans doute, la publication soutient un acte culturel qui concourt significativement au développement de la personnalité militaire des individus et de l'identité militaire des entités structurelles.

La revue continue à assumer, avec une fierté légitime, le rôle de promoteur des valeurs fondamentales de l'Armée: l'intégrité, le patriotisme et le professionnalisme. Tout ce qui est inséré dans la publication montre que les processus initiés dans l'armée sont conformes à la politique de sécurité des autorités nationales et apporte aux lecteurs le courage de penser librement, d'exprimer nettement leurs opinions et d'agir conformément à leurs croyances. Chaque idée exprimée dans cette publication militaire tourne autour d'un sentiment de patriotisme et contribue à la culture et le développement de ce sentiment au sein du lecteur. La qualité des approches théoriques incluses dans cette publication reflète le professionnalisme des auteurs et nous espérons élever, pour les lecteurs, le désir d'améliorer leurs connaissances, générales et spécifiques, et les compétences nécessaires pour exécuter leurs attributions.

Je m'adresse à vous, ceux qui, par intérêt ou par curiosité, vous attarder quelques instants, en dirigeant votre attention sur la publication *La Pensée militaire roumaine*, dont l'existence prestigieuse doit reconnaître à la fois la passion de ceux qui recherchent le domaine militaire, qui nous offre généreusement beaucoup d'informations intéressantes et des idées motivantes, et ceux qui sont constamment préoccupés, avec abnégation, de l'élaboration de cette publication.

Je vous assure, chers lecteurs, que nous sommes honorées d'éditer une telle publication que *La Pensée militaire roumaine* et que nous assumons entièrement la responsabilité d'essayer continuellement à élever la qualité de cette publication au niveau de vos exigences !

Version française par
✍ *Alina PAPOI*

An Alliance for the 21st Century

In a world marked by permanent change and inevitably subjected to new and unpredictable threats, NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring freedom, peace, security, and shared values. *The new Strategic Concept*, adopted in Lisbon in November 2010, will guide the Alliance evolution in the next decade so that it can fulfil this desideratum.

Starting from the initial reason that generated it more than half a century ago, that of providing the member nations with the ability to defend one another against any attack – and that has determined, over time, the accession option for new states –, this *new Strategic Concept* maintains the Alliance commitment to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations, individually or in cooperation with the United Nations and the European Union.

The consolidation of the political and military bonds between Europe and North America is of critical importance, solidarity and fair-burden sharing having to guarantee the process of preserving Euro-Atlantic peace and security and of reaffirming the indivisibility of the security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic.

A Europe whole, free and at peace remains the main goal of the Alliance and commits it to keeping the door open – *open door policy* – to all European democracies that aspire to accession and meet the standards of membership. Enlargement further proves to be the best way to meet this goal that is generous but not easy to achieve.

In a security environment that is difficult to foresee in the medium and long term, NATO reaffirms its commitment to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political means and, when they prove insufficient, by the available military means. Concurrently, the Alliance expresses its willingness to contribute to the enhancement of international security, through partnerships

with states and international organisations beyond its borders, thus reconfirming its status of a key source of stability at global level.

A world without nuclear weapons is also a priority goal that has been unanimously declared for a long time but, unfortunately, it proves to be a task difficult to achieve in the context in which the desire for local or regional hegemony of some state actors that play their own roles and ultimately threaten to resort to their nuclear arsenal cannot be stopped. Therefore, NATO is bound to reassert and reconfirm its status of a nuclear alliance, having capabilities to deter any such reckless impulse.

Unconditionally assuming the responsibility to ensure international stability and Euro-Atlantic security, the Alliance decision-makers have had to redefine, in a clear manner, the new security environment and the threats to it. Besides the real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area represented by the already conventional ballistic missiles, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction, as a potential and extremely serious danger, cannot be ignored, especially if they become accessible to terrorist groups. To them are added the potential cyber attacks on the critical infrastructure and vital communications of states carried out by some foreign militaries, organised crime networks and extremist groups. There are the same reasons for concern and a serious preoccupation with the constraints related to environment and resources, the effects – global and major – of some new technologies (laser weapons, electronic warfare etc.), as well as with health risks, climate change, water scarcity and the growing energy needs of the planet.

Certainly, all these will further shape the new security environment in areas of concern to NATO and they have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

At the end of this new and programmatic document, the Alliance assumes the primary responsibility to protect and defend the territory and populations of the member states against any attack and reaffirms its resolve to intervene to deter and defend against any threat to their safety and security, context in which it is committed to ensure the full range of necessary capabilities. A commitment that surely requires NATO continuous reform, as a condition for a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance that, in relation to the resources invested in defence, will achieve the desired security level.

Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE
English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

Une Alliance
pour le XXIe siècle

Dans un monde marqué par un changement constant et sous réserve d'inévitables et imprévisibles nouvelles menaces, l'OTAN continuera à jouer son rôle unique et essentiel pour assurer la liberté, la paix, la sécurité et nos valeurs communes. C'est *le nouveau concept stratégique*, adopté à Lisbonne en novembre 2010, qui guidera l'évolution de l'Alliance dans la prochaine décennie pour atteindre cet objectif.

A partir de la raison même qui a généré son existence, il y a plus d'un demi-siècle, celle d'offrir aux nations membres la possibilité de défendre les uns les autres contre toute attaque – et qui a conduit, au fil du temps, à l'option de l'adhésion de nouveaux Etats –, cet *nouveau concept stratégique* maintienne l'engagement de l'Alliance dans la prévention des crises, la gestion des conflits et de stabilisation post-conflit, individuellement ou en collaboration avec l'Organisation des Nations unies et l'Union européenne.

Il est considéré comme très important de renforcer les liens politiques et militaires entre l'Europe et l'Amérique du Nord, et la solidarité et le partage commun des responsabilités devraient assurer le processus de maintenir la paix et la sécurité euro-atlantique et de réaffirmer l'indivisibilité de la sécurité des membres de l'OTAN des deux rives de l'Atlantique.

Une Europe entière, libre et en paix reste l'objectif principal de l'Alliance et le contraint de laisser libre la voie d'accès – *la politique de portes ouvertes* – pour toutes les démocraties européennes qui aspirent à l'adhésion et qui accomplissent les normes requises. L'extension prouve encore être le moyen le plus sûr de remplir cet objectif généreux, mais pas facile à réaliser.

Dans un environnement sécuritaire difficile d'y prévision à moyen et à long terme, l'OTAN réaffirme son engagement à préserver la liberté et la sécurité de tous ses membres, par des moyens politiques et, pour le cas où s'avèrent insuffisantes, par les dispositions militaires en vigueur. Pendant ce temps, l'Alliance exprime sa disponibilité de contribuer à l'amélioration de l'état de la sécurité à l'échelle internationale, grâce à des partenaires avec les Etats et les organisations

internationales en dehors de ses frontières, en reconfirmant donc son statut de source essentielle de stabilité au niveau mondial.

Un monde sans armes nucléaires est également un objectif prioritaire et déclaré à l'unanimité de long temps, mais qui, malheureusement, se révèle une cible difficile à atteindre dans les circonstances quand ne peuvent pas être arrêté les désirs d'hégémonie locale ou zonale des acteurs étatiques qui jouent leurs propres rôles et qui menacent ultimativement qu'ils vont utiliser l'arsenal nucléaire. Ainsi, l'OTAN est obligée de réaffirmer et de reconfirmer son statut d'alliance nucléaire avec un potentiel en mesure de décourager un tel pouvoir irresponsable.

Prendre dans une méthode ne conditionnée ses responsabilités pour assurer la stabilité internationale et la sécurité euro-atlantique a déterminé les décideurs de l'Alliance de redéfinir, d'une manière claire, le nouvel environnement de sécurité et les menaces à ce sujet. En plus de menace réelle et progressive de la zone euro-atlantique aux déjà les conventionnels missiles balistiques, ne peut être ignorée, en tant qu'un potentiel et extrêmement grave menace, la prolifération des armes nucléaires et d'autres armes de destruction massive, en particulier si elles deviennent accessibles à des groupes terroristes. Il s'y ajoute les possibles cyber-attaques des forces armées étrangères, les réseaux de crime organisée et les groupes extrémistes sur les infrastructures critiques et aux communications essentielles des Etats. Les mêmes inquiétudes et une grave préoccupation se manifestent pour les contraintes environnementales et des ressources, pour les effets – mondiaux et importants – de nouvelles technologies (les armes à laser, la guerre électronique etc.), mais aussi sur les risques pour la santé, les changements climatiques, la pénurie d'eau et les besoins énergétiques croissants de la planète.

Toutes celles contribueront, bien entendu, dans l'élaboration de ce nouvel environnement sécuritaire dans les zones d'intérêt de l'OTAN et affecteront significativement le processus de planification et d'exécution de ses opérations. À la fin de ce nouveau et nécessaire document de politique, l'Alliance assume sa responsabilité primordiale de protéger et de défendre les territoires et les populations des États membres contre toute attaque et réaffirme sa détermination à intervenir pour la dissuasion et la défense contre tous les menaces à l'adresse de leur sécurité, en engageant de fournir la gamme complète des capacités nécessaires. C'est un engagement qui l'oblige, bien sûr, à son propre remodelage, comme une condition pour augmenter l'efficacité, l'efficience et la flexibilité avec lesquelles, dans un accord avec les ressources investies dans la défense, elle va atteindre le niveau de sécurité souhaité.

Version française par Alina PAPOI

CONTINUOUS WARFARE
Political-Diplomatic Confrontation (III)

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAŢĂ

Relationship between policy and diplomacy

Nations, states, communities, organisations and groups of individuals have their own interests, represented through adequate policies. In totalitarian regimes, policy is directly subordinated to a single's person will.

There are no permanent friends in politics, but permanent interests – many experts and policymakers think and say that – and that is why alliances are so flexible.

Considering the internal and external circumstances of the security environment, policy evolves between democracy and dictatorship.

Policy and diplomacy cannot be dissociated. They act together in accordance with national or alliance interests.

Keywords: *national interest; democracy; dictatorship; political power; force; security; religion*

Policy is the one that sets the objectives, the level of ambition, the courses of action and the attitude – offensive, defensive, neuter etc. – with regard to the partners in international relations. The most important objective of *"each state in its relations with another state is to influence and manage such relations to maximise its own benefits"*[1].

The level of ambition, the courses of action and the way the set objective is achieved depend on many internal and external factors, among which the most important are the following: *the potential* – economic, financial, technological, cultural, moral, demographical and military of the state; *the nature of the relations* of the particular state with the neighbour states and the other states in the region – tense, neuter, friendly, cooperative etc.; *the ratio of forces* between the particular state and the other states in the same geographic area,

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General (r.) Dr Mihail Orzeață – Associate Professor, *"Carol I"* National Defence University, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces.

[1] R. G. Feltham, *Introducere în dreptul şi practica diplomaţiei*, Editura All, Colecţia Juridica, Bucureşti, unspecified year, p. 1.

individually, and the other states in the world – that declare global objectives and interests – and the *system of alliances* the state is part of.

Diplomacy is the instrument (method) through which the interests of the international actors in the global arena are promoted and contributes, many times decisively, to the achievement of the objectives set by policy. Political objectives are achieved in close correlation with diplomacy and the other components that form the state power and that are, concurrently, components of the permanent confrontation an international actor conducts to impose (represent) its interests. Diplomacy, according to Thomas Pikering, *"does not mean instant coffee"*[2]. In other words, achieving the set objectives needs time. However, the world today is not willing or, better to say, is not interested so much in forging and implementing certain courses of action, but in results, which should be as fast and as appropriate as possible to the set objectives. This is the reason why diplomats have to carry out a difficult task, not only because of the internal pressures coming from politicians and the public opinion – many times via the mass media, but also because of the external ones. Currently, the international security environment is fluid and it will probably be fluid in the predictable future, and the relationships between the subjects of international law (states, alliances and organisations recognised by the UN etc.) form a domain that, as neorealist John Mearsheimer asserts, *"has always been a nasty and dangerous business and no amount of goodwill can ameliorate it"*[3]. The statement is supported by the hostility encountered by some initiatives that are not agreed by political opponents in the same country or the adversaries abroad and that are, many times, the causes for political assassinates or international conflicts. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand von Habsburg, in Sarajevo, on 28 June 1914, which generated the First World War[4] (although some authors believe that it was only the pretext, the real cause being the struggle for power and influence in international relations, manifested mainly between Germany and the Tzarist Russia[5]), the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Ytzhak Rabin[6], which has slowed down and, up to now, prevented the conclusion of peace

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[2] Madeleine Albright, *Doamna secretar de stat. Memorii*, Editura Rao, București, 2008, p. 501.

[3] John Mearsheimer, *Tragedia politicii de forță. Realismul ofensiv și lupta pentru putere*, Editura Antet, 2003, pp. 31-32.

[4] Paul Donnelley, *Asasini și asasinate care au schimbat istoria lumii*, Editura Litera Internațional, București, 2009, pp. 56-60.

[5] Paul Johnson, *O istorie a lumii moderne 1920-2000*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2003, p. 23 (in Fritz Stern's opinion, expressed in the article *The Failure of Illiberalism*, citing the German Chancellor of the time in the book *Bethmann Hollweg and the War*, pp. 77-118, and taken by Paul Johnson: *"the fear of the rapid economic – and therefore military – growth of Russia was the most important factor in Germany's decision to start the war in 1914"*).

[6] P. J. O'Rourke, *Pacea ucide*, Editura Antet XX Press, Filipeștii de Târg, 2004, pp. 36-37.

between Israelis and Palestinians, the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, in 1981, which was a punishment for the fact that he concluded peace with Israel etc. are some of the best known and most resounding examples.

Because policy has a decisive role in any activity of a community, in war included, leaders and the elements of the system of political leadership of states have been the most important and most wanted targets. In many political, religious and armed confrontations in the Ancient Times and the Middle Ages, the murder of opponent leaders was planned and executed by people specially trained and indoctrinated[7], in order to derive advantages that proved decisive for winning victories. Although currently the way a political or military confrontation develops is different from the one in the ancient history of humanity, political leadership is the objective that is best protected against any type of attacks: direct strikes of the opponent army, attacks of any kind, influence, disinformation etc.

Policy was, is and will be guided by interests

The system of international relations is governed by the interests of the states that, in the opinion of some experts and politicians, do not have permanent friends but only permanent interests[8] . This is the reason why the well-known neorealist Kenneth Waltz states that *"alliances are flexible"*. The flexibility Waltz refers to has determined some states to make decisions without consulting their allies or even to change one alliance with another, depending on the national interest or the international political and strategic circumstances. There are so many examples in this respect that we will limit to a few of them, the most recent and famous ones. During the Suez crisis, the USA decided to intervene to the disadvantage of the UK, although it was *"its closest ally"*[9].

Because the interests of states, even the allied ones, are different, there may be contradictions between them (the case of the US decision to attack Iraq, in 2003, over which some of its NATO allies expressed their disagreement) and that is why allies may become enemies (the USA and the USSR after the Second World War), and enemies may become allies (some of the former enemies of the USA, UK and France, during the Second World War – Germany and Italy – became their allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; respectively some states in the former Warsaw Pact became allies of their former enemies in NATO etc.).

States interests are supported with the most varied and efficient *"arms"*. The *"arms"* of the political component usually have greater effects than those

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[7] Cristian Jura, *Terorismul internaţional*, Editura All Beck, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 9.

[8] Lord Palmerton, cited by Gwyn Prins in *Strategy, Force Planning and Diplomatic/Military Operations (DMOs)*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, UK, 1998, p. 1.

[9] Gwyn Prins, *Strategy, Force Planning and Diplomatic/Military Operations (DMOs)*, p. 1.

of the military means. Therefore, including a state in the list of terrorism sponsors or in the one of ineffective governments will discourage foreign investments, reduce the country rating at international stock markets and determine an important reduction of the *gross domestic product* and of the population living standard, fact that may generate social unrest and even the rebellion of some categories of inhabitants. Generally, the political decisions to reduce the level of representation of one state in another state, to expel some diplomats, to block the accounts of a state in the national bank of another (other) state(s) or to ban the high technology exports etc. may cause real stock market earthquakes and dramatically reduce the revenues of the *"target state"* for long periods of time.

Henry Kissinger, in his book called *Diplomacy*, considered by some brilliant, controversial and incisive, states that *"Nations have pursued self-interest more frequently than high-minded principle, and have competed more than cooperated. There is little evidence to suggest that this age-old mode of behaviour has changed or that it is likely to change in the decades ahead"*[10]. The statement of the well-known American politician synthesises the lessons learned in the events that have occurred during thousands of years in the history of humanity. Some recent events and even older ones could be more difficult to understand and accept by those of us who really believe that the statements of some statesmen worldwide, through which they declare in favour of renouncing the use of force in international relations and of collaborating and cooperating, are followed with tenacity and determination by them and the states and communities they represent. It would be unfair to affirm that politicians do not keep their words but, however, there are many examples demonstrating that *"hell is paved with good intensions"*[11]. One of the most used formula to explain (justify) the situations in which there are important differences between words and facts is the recourse to the national or state interests that *"have to be paramount"*[12]. Certainly, statesmen sometimes make mistakes but, as George Friedman puts it, these mistakes are caused by the rapid evolution of events: *"things that appear to be so permanent and dominant at any given moment in history can change with stunning rapidity. Eras come and go. In international relations, the way the world looks right now is not at all how it will look in 20 years and even less"*[13]. Politicians' mistakes, G. Friedman continues,

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[10] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomaţia*, Editura BIC ALL, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 16.

[11] Samuel Johnson, *Viaţa poeţilor englezi*, cited in *Dicţionar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, Editura Vestala, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 148.

[12] Louis XIV, *Reflections on the Role of King (1679)*, cited by François Bluhe in *De la Cezar la Churchill*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1995, p. 91.

[13] George Friedman, *Următorii 100 de ani. Previziuni pentru secolul XXI*, Editura Litera, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 12.

are determined by circumstances and not by incompetence or innocence. Historical events provide many situations in which, among the circumstances the well-known American analyst refers to, fear, incompetence and even the betrayal of national interest in favour of the personal one should be included.

The circumstances that determined the US ambassador in the UK in the period that was previous to the Second World War – Joseph (Joe) Kennedy, the father of former American president John Fitzgerald Kennedy – to be pro-German and to declare in favour of the Nazis whenever he could are known. The ambassador's behaviour was determined by his belonging to the organisation *America First* that reunited Irish Catholic isolationists on the US Eastern coast, who hated the British as they did not grant independence to Northern Ireland. Another reason of Joseph Kennedy was his intention to run for President of the United States. That is why he blamed the policy of the president who held the office at that time – Franklin Delano Roosevelt –, which he considered the *"fruit of Jewish influence"*[14]. One of the manifestations of the political sympathies of the American ambassador occurred a few days after Poland was attacked by Germany and a war was declared between Great Britain and Germany. Following this event, J. Kennedy decided to send his 9 children in the USA, giving a banquet on this occasion, during which he *"toasted to honour the Germans … [predicting that they]* would beat the English up"*[15].

Attacking the USSR by surprise by the forces of Nazi Germany and of the states under its tutelage – on 22 June 1941 – was possible due to a very ingenious disinformation programme applied by the ministry of Joseph Goebbels, as well as due to Stalin's attitude, who came to ban any reference to the preparations for the Germans and their allies offensive actions, for fear he should have been accused of aggressive intentions. The worries of the military were expressed by a Soviet strategist and professor of military art history – Nil Ignatovici Romanov –, who tried to get in touch with Stalin to express his point of view, but who was refused by the ones in his cabinet on the grounds that *"Iosif Vissarionovici does not want war and we have to think how to avoid it and not to irritate Stalin dropping in his ear all types of information and suppositions regarding Germany's intentions"*[16]. After the outbreak of the war against the USSR, Stalin admitted his mistake, but only in front of the members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as he sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs – Viaceslav Molotov – to address the nation saying: *"Do not worry ! It will be my turn to speak"*[17].

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[14] William Stevenson, *I se spunea temerarul*, Editura Politică, București, 1983, p. 118.

[15] *Ibidem*, p. 119.

[16] Ivan Stadniuk, *Războiul*, vol. I, Editura Militară, București, 1986, p. 45.

[17] *Ibidem*, pp. 190-191.

Then, he put the blame on the military leaders who should have acted without any directive, as the army's duty was *"to be ready to fight"*[18], although he banned any action that could be considered provocative or aggressive towards the *"German ally"* in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

The interest in the political domination of the world was the main cause of the *Cold War*, although the two protagonists – the USA and the USSR – had their own version regarding the causes, respectively the objectives they pursued. The USA promoted the doctrine of containing communism[19], which became increasingly threatening, after the victory of Mao Tse Dung in China, in 1949, considering it feasible through spreading democracy and observing human rights. In its turn, the USSR was the adept of the export of the communist revolution, under the slogan *"Workers of all lands, unite !"*[20], which – as the Soviet leaders hoped – would have led to the abolishment of capitalism. To meet the set objectives, each party made use of enormous resources not only to support the arms race – nuclear and conventional –, but also to sponsor some regimes and political parties in other states that should have served their interests. Each party faced success and failure in military confrontations through intermediaries – which they called *local wars* (of low intensity, limited etc.) – in Korea, Indochina, Africa and the Middle East.

Policy of force

History, this *"mighty tower of experience, which time has built amidst the endless fields of bygone ages"*[21], offers numerous examples of the way force may be used by individuals and communities so that the most powerful one can impose its will and meet the objectives (goals). In ancient times gods were believed to side with the powerful ones[22]. Maybe this is the reason why force has been, many times, the supreme argument for kings and not only for them[23], to settle a dispute between two individuals or two communities. During the Middle Ages, Thomas Hobbes formulated the theory of natural law, according to which

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[18] *Ibidem.*

[19] John L. Gaddis, *The Strategy of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982.

[20] Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Manifestul Partidului Comunist*, London, 1848, cited in *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, p. 270.

[21] Hendrik Willem van Loon, *Istoria omenirii*, Editura Tai-Pan, București, 1993, p. 9.

[22] Lucanus, *Farsalia*, cited by François Bluche, in *De la Cezar la Churchill*, p. 35.

[23] A. Corvisier, cited by François Bluche, in *De la Cezar la Churchill*, p. 90: *"On the cannons of Louis XIV the slogan NEC PLURIBUS IMPAR (above everyone) was engraved"*, slogan that belonged to the Sun King.

"the power that cannot be withstood is a right one"[24]. In the name of the *"law of force"* campaigns to conquer territories have been conducted, ethnic and religious communities have been disbanded, so they had to live in different states, and tensions that subsequently degenerated in bloody confrontations occurred among them.

All empires were formed by conquering some territories or by subjecting their inhabitants through force. In Aristotle's opinion, some people made conquest and plunder a way of living[25], and it seems to be justified by Cicero, through the statement that has become famous, *"inter arma silent leges (law is silent during war)"*[26]. Many conquerors arrogated the right to *"civilise"* the conquered people, considered barbarian. Alexander of Macedon, Roman emperors, Ottoman sultans, European kings and emperors in the colonies in Africa, Asia and the two Americas did so.

Force was used not only during armed confrontations and against other people, but also in peacetime, by leaders greedy for power, dominated by megalomania, paranoia or by both of them. The list of cruel dictators that have used force (political policy, secret policy, armed forces etc.) to kill thousands and millions of subjects is very long, and some of them stand out through their *"macabre performances"*: *"In the comprehensive annals of human barbarism, the cruelty put in practice by the Germans against the Jews during the Second World War stands out in relief through its goal, variety, inventiveness and, above all, through the lack of motivation"*[27]. *"In the brave new world of Pol Pot [...], more than a third of the population perished in the senseless massacres in the camps and prisons ..."*[28]. *"Without counting the ones killed in battles, the total number of executions committed by Franco during and after the Spanish Civil War was about 2 000 000 men and women. Relative to the population of Spain, this figure far exceeds even the millions of people killed by Stalin in Russia"*[29].

Although it has been proved that force can resolve problems only temporarily, it is still preferred by many political decision-makers to settle the disputes and conflicts of interests between communities in the same state or in different states. This appetite for force should not amaze us, since the UN also considers the use of force to impose peace and security in the world.

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[24] Thomas Hobbes, *Elementele dreptului natural şi politic*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 126.

[25] Aristotel, *Politica*, cited by Thomas Hobbes, in *Elementele dreptului natural şi politic*, p. 159.

[26] Cicero, *Oratio pro Milone (IV, 11)*, cited by Thomas Hobbes, in *Elementele dreptului natural şi politic*, p. 158.

[27] Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Călăii voluntari ai lui Hitler*, cited by Tom Ambrose in *Despoţi şi dictatori*, p. 56.

[28] Tom Ambrose, *Despoţi şi dictatori*, p. 57.

[29] *Ibidem*, p. 58.

The policy behind closed doors

Generally, policy has always had areas that are known only by a little number of people, in order to prevent opponents from intervening and countering the initiatives and established action plans. To keep secret some political initiatives that are important for the security of a country, encryption, disinformation, deception, turning attention to other aspects etc. are resorted to. There are numerous examples in this respect, and the most recent ones are based on suppositions and unofficial sources, as official data are secret and they can be disclosed only after a period of some decades, depending on their content and the provisions of law in each country.

If the Italians had known that their government signed the Treaty of London[30], in 1915, through which it expressed its agreement to enter the war on the side of the Entente and against the Central Powers, provided the Holy See was excluded from peace negotiations, at the end of the war, they would have had a vehement reaction of opposition.

If the populations of the states and provinces that were the *"subjects"* of the secret treaties Sykes-Picot[31] and Ribbentrop-Molotov[32] respectively, concluded between Great Britain and France in 1916 and between Germany and the USSR in 1939 respectively, had been consulted and informed regarding their consequences, history may have taken another course. Maybe, in case the provisions of these treaties and other decisions made behind closed doors had been known by those who suffered their consequences, some catastrophes in history would have been avoided. Arguments to support this assumption are offered by Thomas B. Allen: *"In peacetime, secrets are still well hidden, withstanding the attempts of history to identify them* [...]; *after the war is ended, documents come to light, revealing the hidden origins of the celebrated victories and suffered defeats"*[33].

Facts, older or more recent ones, prove the truth of Thomas Allen's words. After the Bolshevik Revolution on 25 October/7 November 1917 in Russia, Lenin decided to make public, in the West, the secret treaties signed by Great Britain, France and Russia, through which they shared part of the territories belonging to the Central Powers and promised other states, that had not been engaged in the First World War, territories and facilities to attract them to their side.

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[30] Bernard Lecomte, *Secretele Vaticanului*, Editura Litera, București, 2010, p. 14.

[31] Harold Nicholson, *Peacemaking 1919*, London, 1980, p. 108 and the following, cited by P. Johnson in *O istorie a lumii moderne*, p. 28.

[32] Williamson Murray, *Strategy for Defeat: the Luftwaffe 1933-1945*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, SUA, 1983, p. 28.

[33] Thomas B. Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

Copies of the treaties started to be published in *Manchester Guardian*, beginning 12 December 1917[34]. By this act, Lenin intended to show the world that he was consistent with the position he had while in exile, through which he declared himself against war, and in favour of the Bolshevik revolutions and the self-determination of all peoples. In reality, he paid for the financial support and the facilitation of his journey from Switzerland – where he was exiled by the Tzarist regime – to Russia, through the territories of the Central Powers, facilities granted by Germany[35]. By this act, he intended to cast a bad light on the attitudes of the UK and France, hoping that they would not have the necessary internal and external support and they would be defeated. The publication of the incriminating documents had an important effect on the American public opinion and especially on the American President Woodrow Wilson, who launched a proposal for *"just peace, for friends and foes alike"*[36], in 14 points, on 8 January 1918. Although Germany was in advanced positions on the territories of France and Belgium and it had almost 9 million combatants, with a fairly good combat capability, it accepted to conclude peace, considering it equitable. However, meanwhile, the 14 points of the American President were amended by some comments of the French and the English, which had never been presented to Germany and Austria-Hungary, as they substantially altered the data of the problems: *"the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, the loss of German colonies, the division of Prussia by the Polish corridor and compensations"*[37]. These changes made some American congressmen disagree on the content of the Treaty of Versailles. Subsequently, the US Congress did not approve the law regarding the US participation in the newly-established League of Nations[38], project supported with fervour by Woodrow Wilson. In some experts' opinion, the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles determined the evolution of the interwar events (the emergence of Fascism, Communism and Nazism) and the outbreak of the Second World War.

In the period before the Second World War, when the isolationist trend was very powerful in the USA, the president in office – F. D. Roosevelt – maintained a secret correspondence with Winston Churchill, who, at the beginning of the collaboration, did not hold any office. Subsequently, he was appointed

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[34] Paul Johnson, *O istorie a lumii moderne*, p. 29.

[35] *Daily Chronicle* on 9 November 1917, cited by Bernard Lecomte in *Secretele Vaticanului, op. cit.*, p. 13.

[36] Harold Nicholson, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-33.

[37] C. Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, London, 1928, vol. IV, p. 159 and the following, cited by P. Johnson in *O istorie a lumii moderne*, p. 31.

[38] Cormac O'Brien, *Vieţile secrete ale preşedinţilor americani*, Editura Litera Internaţional, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 160.

First Lord of the Admiralty and only after the attack of Poland and the outbreak of war he became the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The contacts between the two were maintained without the knowledge of their governments but with the contribution of some people in the secret services that intuited Hitler's plans to dominate the world, employing psychological actions, political pressures and promises, economic and military means as well. Cooperation and especially the way it developed prepared the reaction of the two states to the subversive and direct actions of the Nazis that granted the American businessmen facilities to invest their money in Germany and in the territories controlled by the Third Reich, provided they suspended the support for the UK and did not contribute to the US arming. As for the influence of the public opinion in the USA and UK, Nazi agents and supporters predicted a certain and rapid victory, urging towards peace negotiations, which some of the ministers in the British Government, such as Lord Halifax – the Minister of Foreign Affairs –, inclined to take into account. He was tempted to accept Mussolini's offer who had expressed his willingness to mediate the UK peace and independence in exchange of Malta and the control over the Mediterranean Sea[39].

Another illustrating example of a secret political action is the Suez crisis in 1956. To settle the conflict between the Egyptians and Israelis, the American President Dwight Eisenhower sent a representative to the Middle East to mediate between the heads of the two states. During one of the meetings with the American emissary, the Egyptian President Nasser said: *"if the initiative* [taken by Nasser, to accept the discussion with the American emissary, A.N.] *was known in public I would be faced not only with a political problem, but possibly with a bullet"*[40]. This statement is painfully true and proved by the assassinations numerous politicians were victims of. Many of them were heads of state and government in almost all the states of the world, in different moments of history, especially in the tense ones.

Some actions, objectives and interests cannot be made public, as they may have undesired effects, with a strong impact on states and communities. The transparency that is more insistently claimed by civil societies would allow the declared and undeclared political adversaries to eliminate surprise and to easily counter the initiators' actions. Another undesired effect is the possible change in the attitude of the allies and neuter ones from support to opposition or, at best, to reluctance (distance) related to certain intentions, objectives, projects or actions of the initiators. The secrecy strongly incriminated by some leaders of civil societies

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[39] William Stevenson, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-127.
[40] P. J. O'Rourke, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

and by some mass media representatives is proper to all the political parties and states, and its main aim is not to disregard peoples, even if there are still states in which people are not very important in the eyes of the leaders[41]. Knowledge means power, says Francis Bacon[42], referring to scientific knowledge and science, in general. However, knowledge always has the meaning of information, appreciated by another famous Englishman – Walsingham, Queen's Victoria advisor – at its fair value (when he referred to the intentions, projects and actions of the real or potential adversaries and to the circumstances that may have led to the achievement of the UK political goals), stating that *"a piece of information is never too expensive"*[43].

Currently, more than in any other period in history, information may be a determining factor in any type of confrontation, especially in the political one. The possessor of a valuable piece of information may influence (manipulate) the adversaries' decision or, knowing data about the adversaries' intentions, force and decisions, he may take the appropriate measures to protect himself and to tip the balance in his favour. It is known that, during the Second World War, the British succeeded in having access to the codes used by the Nazis to encrypt their messages[44], and the Americans were capable of decoding the Japanese messages, being informed regarding the majority of their important actions. This fact enormously helped the allies to set their priorities and the way to counter the actions of their enemies.

The breakup of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the course of action to be followed by the great powers and other states interested in this finality represents one of the typical actions prepared behind the padded doors of decision-makers in many European, American and Islamic capitals. Concurrently, the way in which diplomats followed the political directives is subsumed under the type of actions in which the goal and interests are more important than the means and principles. The haste in which some states decided to recognise the new independent states emerged from the Yugoslavian Federation, despite the warning of the former UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, issued in 1991, and the pressures made by some politicians interested in those states, *"prove the respect of the leaders of different communities for their peoples and the principles* [related to the relationships between states and communities, A.N.]*"*[45]. Political actions, especially the ones

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[41] Paul Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
[42] Francis Bacon, *Religious Meditations, 1598*, cited in *Dicționar de cuvinte, expresii, citate celebre*, p. 35.
[43] Thomas B. Allen, *Declasificat. 50 de documente strict secrete care au schimbat istoria*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2009, p. 10.
[44] R. V. Jones, *Un război ultrasecret,* Editura Politică, București, 1983, pp. 148, 171-176.
[45] Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, *The Horseshoe Table. An Inside View of the UN Security Council*, Pearson Longman Press, New Delhi, India, 2006, p. 103.

referring to the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state where, oddly, the Bosnian Muslims are considered a nation, interested more in the American intervention than in the ceasefire, represented a victory of the Islamic states, which appeared as a dominant factor in international life. The Islamic states also proposed and succeeded in imposing sanctions against Serbia. The Americans felt obliged to respond to the requests of the Islamic states favourably, in exchange for the help received in the First Gulf War, the Europeans gave in to the American pressures, and the Russians could not refuse, as they were dependent on the Western economic aid[46].

The ends justify the means

Force, terror, betrayal, deception, flattery, disinformation, manipulation, double standard are but a few of the unorthodox means used by people to meet their goals. It is evident that goals may also be met employing legal methods that comply with the rules of conduct in society. However, most often than not, subversive methods are preferred when goals are, in their turn, immoral. The choice of means in relation to the set goal, the available resources and the imagination of the beneficiaries has been suggestively expressed using formulas such as: *"might makes right", "when life gives you lemons, make lemonade", "through swords and blazing fire", I love treason but hate a traitor", "the ways of God are inscrutable"* etc.

In ancient times, there was the expression *"through right and wrong"*, which was reformulated by Niccolo Machiavelli, in his book – *the Prince*, as *"the ends justify the means"*, meaning that the achievement of the policy objective is more important than the method employed to fulfil it. Machiavelli gives an example regarding the way this formula is to be applied, advising leaders *"to direct their efforts from internal intrigues to external adventures: provoke a dispute with a neighbouring state, he said, then send the military commanders there to fight and plunder; when they come back, share the pray with them*[47]. These pieces of advice were meant to help kings, princes and emperors to divert the attention of the noble subjects, who were animated by pride and the desire to become first rank people in their countries, from conspiracy and domestic wars to confrontations with foreign opponents.

Money – *"the Devil's eye"*, as the Romanians use to say –, has been at the root of some blameworthy actions of some unscrupulous people. The power of finances to influence has been recognised by the majority of heads of state, but only a few of them have been cunning enough to shield themselves from the risks posed

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[46] *Ibidem*, pp. 103-107.
[47] Tom Ambrose in *Despoţi şi dictatori*, Editura Litera, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 23.

by the dependence on bankers. The American President Thomas Jefferson addressed another founding father of the United States – John Adams – regarding finances and their role in the life of a society, saying: *"I sincerely believe, with you, that banking establishments are more dangerous than standing armies"*[48]. Jefferson's fear was rooted in the practice of some bankers to lend money to governments with high interest and to be sure that they would get back the money and the related interest, they also lent money to the governments of the enemy states, and when there were no enemies, they strove to invent some[49]. Currently, bankers do the same, including in the domestic policy, when they sponsor the main political parties, engaged in electoral campaigns, to be sure that the winners will be among the sponsored ones, and they will be given the invested money back and will be granted enough facilities to enhance their wealth considerably.

It is the same desire to increase wealth and power that determined some American businessmen in the interwar period to give substance to the dictum *"there are no permanent friends or enemies, but permanent interests"*. They developed businesses with German companies, through the agency of some Dutch and Swiss banks, especially in the production of armament, ammunition, chemical products and oil derivatives. Apparently, all happened in the spirit of market economy, but the Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany from arming and the USA signed the treaty. The business continued after the USA declared war to the Nazi Germany, and the Congress approved the *Trading with the Enemy Act*, fact that caused the reaction of the US Department of Justice to stop the illicit commerce[50].

A way of thinking based on double standard, similar to the bankers' one, had the US President Harry Truman, who had been a merchant and the only US President in the 20th century without a university degree[51] ! In 1941, when he was senator for Missouri, he was of the opinion that *"if we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible"*[52].

During the *Cold War*, each of the protagonists *"sponsored"* political parties and personalities in the states in the sphere of influence of the other party, as well as in the areas that were not decided whom to choose, hoping to expand their sphere of influence to the detriment of the opponent. The method resulted in some successes as well as resounding failures.

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[48] Miguel Pedrero, *Corupţia marilor puteri. Strategii şi minciuni în politica mondială*, Editura Litera Internaţional, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 18.

[49] *Ibidem*, p. 17.

[50] Marian Oprea, *Dinastia Bush, sânge bani şi putere*, Editura Lumea Magazin, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 35.

[51] Cormac O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

[52] Christopher Simpson, *The Splendid Blonde Beast*, Grove Press, New York, 1993, p. 129.

The case of Egypt that was provided by the USSR with armament, military instructors (counsellors) and political support in international relations up to the Arab-Israeli War (the Yom Kippur War in October 1973) and decided to come under the USA umbrella after that confrontation with the Israelis is one of the best known. Subsequently, in 1976, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed the first peace treaty with Israel in exchange for recovering the territory lost during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The USA was also disillusioned to find that the Taliban in Afghanistan, backed by Pakistan against the USSR, which invaded the country in 1979, turned against America, their actions culminating in the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The explanation of the former Secretary of State during President Clinton second term in office – Madeleine Albright – for this situation is that, *"After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the Americans lost interest in the region, leaving behind thousands of militants without jobs but with many weapons"*[53].

The confrontations at various levels between the two superpowers during the *Cold War* had also other objectives than those stated in the official documents made available to the public. The double standard, employed by the two protagonists of confrontation, was justified by the interest in maintaining the credibility of the allies and of those they wanted to attract to their side as well as the balance of forces by developing and proving the capacity to face the opponent directly[54].

Dictators have been among the most loyal supporters of the double standard. Many of them declare themselves democrats, but, secretly, they prepare to rule for their entire life, *"at the request of the masses"*, or apply the principle *"divide et impera"* bringing in conflict all social categories to overcome their resistance, in turn, although they say out loud the unity of the nation in the face of internal and external dangers.

Politics and religion

In his *Memoirs*, Duke of Lévis says that Tsar Alexander I of Russia would have made a confession to Mathieu of Montmorency, which very well illustrates the connections between secular and ecclesiastical power: *"Religion is said to be necessary for the people. In other words, princes cannot renounce it"*[55].

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[53] Madeleine Albright, *op. cit.*, p. 513.
[54] Michael Cox, *From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War*, published in *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 1 (1990) p. 31.
[55] François Bluche, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

Religion and politics were, in turn, allies and adversaries in their confrontation for power and influence. Some religious leaders had a great appetite for political life, becoming eminences grises in secular leadership or even heads of state. Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, the monk Rasputin, to whom we must add Talleyrand, formerly Bishop of Autun, and Ayatollah Khomeini are among the best known in this category. In Romania, Patriarch Miron Cristea was a prime minister.

Since ancient to modern times, some secular leaders have declared themselves, with the help of the clergy, *"God's anointed"* to attach more weight and prestige to their position in the eyes of the subjects. For the same reason, but also out of vanity, in certain periods in history, some crowned heads were the leaders of the Church, too.

"To dominate someone, make him be afraid !" P. Coelho said in his book *The Devil and Miss Prym*. The method was successfully applied quite widely by both secular and religious leaders, and Blaise Pascal summarised the result as succinctly as possible: *"The essence is power on Earth and faith in Heaven"*[56].

In the not too distant past, individual opponents of power on earth, be it secular or religious, received some harsh treatments that fitted into a wide range of methods, from exclusion from the community (exile, prison or religious excommunication) to physical extermination (hanging, beheading, shooting, burning heretics at the stake – for Christians – and stoning them to death – for Muslims). Although fear of death produced notable results, allowing the imposition of important religions through the forced conversion of many communities and, consequently, the formation of empires, dissidence, both religious and political, existed and then amplified. Under these circumstances, both the religious and political power moved from individual to collective action: massacres (St. Bartholomew's Night, Long Knives Night, pogroms against *"non-Aryan races"*, gassing in concentration camps etc.), red terror, class struggle, deportation to gulags, *"witch hunt"*, ethnic cleansing etc.

To limit the growth of competing religions and the recovery of territories and populations into the possession of other political and religious powers there were initiated wars of conquest under the banner of the Prophet or Crusades with the blessing of the Popes of Rome. In some periods in history, in good agreement with the church, the political power did not hesitate to condition the accession to some public office by the conversion to the religion of the ruler of the state (the province)[57].

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[56] Victor Duță, *Religie și putere. Noua ordine mondială*, Editura Ștefan, București, 2008, p. 356.
[57] *Ibidem*, pp. 196-202.

Religious leaders' charisma as well as the political leaders' religious orientation has contributed to the development or to the restriction of the distribution area of some religious cults. The political ascension of George W. Bush Jr. and his election as President of the United States are related to his connections to what biographer Bill Minutaglio calls right-wing Christianity[58]. In achieving his goals, Bush Jr. successfully used a path trodden by another famous Republican – Ronald Reagan.

Currently, the struggle for spiritual influence and domination over people gets manifest through the aggressive proselytism conducted by some religious cults. Statistics show that in the USA the churches considered fundamentalist – Baptist, Pentecostal, Evangelist – have gained followers attracted from other denominations, mainly from the Presbyterian and Methodist ones[59].

The power of influence was another way of spreading religions. The victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran was enabled by a regime that became unpopular, that of Shahanshah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, as well as by the militancy of religious leaders. Besides, Ayatollah Khomeini declared that *"Islam is politics or it is nothing"*[60]. The success of the Islamic revolution in Iran was an event that gave impetus to its imitation in other countries: *"tapes containing Khomeini's hate-filled sermons were introduced surreptitiously into neighbouring countries over Iran's northern border, thus reaching in the Islamic republics of the Soviet Union [...], the number of mosques in Tatarstan that, in Soviet times, were under a dozen, has grown today to hundreds [...], in Chechnya, President Ramzan Kadyrov required that women wear the veil, ordered the construction of huge mosques, and struggled against Moscow's interference in the problems of the republic [...]; in the middle of the current century, Muslims will be more numerous than any other group of believers"*[61].

On the other hand, neglecting religion or declaring it the *"opium of the people"* and trying to impose atheistic regimes have caused the reaction of resistance – outright or subversive (*"between 95 and 99% of Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Tajik and Kyrgyz ethnics continued to follow the Islamic ritual within the family and community life"*)[62]. *"At the beginning of 1975, the Polish Church had two cardinals, 45 schools, 73 bishops, 13 392 churches, 18 267 priests, 35 341 monks and nuns and 20 million believers"*[63]). The revival of the religious sentiment in the former

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[58] Bill Minutaglio, *First Son*, Three River Press, New York, 2001, pp. 210-224.

[59] Gabriel Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalism Around the World*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2003, p. 27.

[60] Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holly War and Unholly Terror*, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, USA, 2003, p. 8.

[61] Michael Sturmer, *Putin şi noua Rusie*, Editura Litera Internaţional, Bucureşti, 2009, pp. 132-139.

[62] *Ibidem*, p. 136.

[63] Victor Sebestyen, *1989. Prăbuşirea imperiului sovietic*, Editura Litera, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 42.

communist states was the result of the wrong policies of the rulers who oscillated between harshness and the double standard. In some periods in history, political leaders ordered the destruction of places of worship and exterminated, threw into prison or sent to forced labour the religious leaders, declaring themselves atheists. However, they "*were going to church regularly*"[64] or "*pretended to be Muslims but, in fact, they abrogated the Holy Law and adopted foreign infidel laws and customs*"[65].

The relations between religion and politics have often been strained because of the disputes, more political and related to personal pride than religious ones, between religious and political leaders. Many times, the Pope excommunicated crowned heads, while some popes were prisoners of kings and emperors. Following the logic of interest that must prevail, "*when two supreme powers meet, one of them is always extra. The Priesthood or the Empire. The life and death struggle that did not take place between the Pope and Constantine* [the Great, Roman emperor who decided to move the capital of the empire to Byzantium, A.N.] … *was engaged* [by the Pope, A.N.] *against the new candidates to the world domination – Otto the Great and Frederic Barbarossa, until Pope Gregory VII impelled the imperial successor, Henry IV* [emperor of the Roman-German Empire, A.N.]*, to be present in Canossa* [in 1077, A.N.] *to kneel and beg the apostolic pardon*"[66]. About 800 years later, on 20 September 1870, the Piedmont troops – approximately 70 000 fighters – entered Rome to substantiate the proclamation of King Victor Emmanuel, through which he declared himself King of Italy. The troops of Pope Pius IX – approximately 10 000 fighters – do not oppose resistance and thus the Papal States are incorporated in the newly established Kingdom of Italy. Subsequently, through the Law of Papal Guarantees, the Holy See is reduced to the Vatican Palaces, the Pope's official residence at Gandolfo Castle, and the related lands; the Pope is a free, independent and inviolable person, the diplomats accredited to the Pope have diplomatic immunity, but all Vatican properties are placed under the protection of the Italian police, armed forces and courts[67]. The provisions of the law of guarantees remained valid until 1929, when, by the Lateran Agreements, signed by the Italian state, represented by Mussolini and Pope Pius XI, it was agreed that the Holy See had "*full and independent sovereignty over the state called the Vatican City* […]; *in exchange, the Holy See recognises the Kingdom of Italy and definitively renounces any claim regarding the former Papal states*"[68]. After the end of the Second World War, the Lateran Agreements were incorporated into the Italian Constitution, in 1947.

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[64] *Ibidem*.
[65] Bernard Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
[66] Bernard Lecomte, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
[67] *Ibidem*, pp. 25-26.
[68] *Ibidem*, pp. 30-31.

Pope John Paul II was involved in politics when he was the Bishop of Krakow, supporting the leaders of *Solidarity*, the trade union in Poland led by Lech Walesa. After he became a Pope, he was the counsellor and supporter of *Solidarity* through Walesa, who was granted numerous private audiences with the Pope[69]. Subsequently, the Pope militated against communism constantly and intelligently, and his contribution to the end of the *Cold War* was recognised by the former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev: *"Everything that happened in Eastern Europe would have been impossible without the presence of Pope John Paul II"*[70].

The access of fundamentalists and religious extremists to some of the most important public offices – both legislative and executive – in many states, from the USA to Pakistan[71], has stimulated the increase in the number of the followers of these religions and inevitably led to a confrontation of interests conducted bluntly in all the fields, employing any method, terrorist ones included, between extremists, supported by fundamentalists, and their opponents. This situation seems to confirm André Malraux prediction that the 21st century will be religious or it will not be at all.

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The end of the *Cold War* was considered by some *"an ambiguous victory"*[72], and H. Kissinger assessed it as a result that was best described by G. B. Shaw in his dilemma: *"There are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart's desire. The other is to gain it"*[73].

The evolution of important events in recent years – Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Georgian disputes on their accession to NATO, Russian-American contradictions on the installation of US missile shield elements in Europe – has increasingly fuelled the rumours regarding a new *cold war*[74], having the USA and the Russian Federation as protagonists. Although the most authorised representatives of the two states deny this course of action, concerns remain, and the Russian-American cooperation has a sinuous evolution, influencing the trends in the evolution of the international security environment.

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[69] Victor Sebestyen, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55, 62.

[70] *Ibidem*, p. 367.

[71] Kevin Phillips, *American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush*, Penguin Books, USA, 2004, p. 216 *("in the USA, Israel and more than half of the Islamic world, national governments were controlled by parties or coalitions that depended on believers for their vital support")*.

[72] Ronald Steel, *Temptations of a Superpower*, Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 6-23.

[73] Henry Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[74] Edward Lucas, *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and Threat to the West*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.

From a negative standpoint, we are *"on the brink of the precipice"*[75], as we are about to lose the global war against terrorism[76] and to enter another, a religious one, that will oppose Christianity to Islam[77].

The tendency of the security environment to evolve mainly to confrontation determined the US President Barack Obama, taking a part of Hillary Clinton's message[78], to invite the dialogue partners at the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh to assume the assigned responsibilities to reduce the risks and threats to national and international security, as the USA alone cannot solve all the problems in the world.

In the following articles, the author will approach the other dimensions of permanent confrontation: economic, financial, social, cultural and military.

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

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[75] Tyler Drumheller, Elaine Monaghan, *Pe marginea prăpastiei*, Editura Minerva, București, 2008.

[76] Michael Scheuer, *Imperiul Hubris*, cited by Tyler Drumheller and Elaine Monaghan in *Pe marginea prăpastiei*, p. 250.

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IRREGULAR WARFARE
– Cultural Differences/Gaps and Strategies to Counteract Them –

Major General Virgil RISTEA

At the end of the 21ˢᵗ century first decade, the contemporary world is both unpredictable and contradictory, as well as full of contrasts. In this context, the approach to the irregular warfare is a topic of sharp disputes, leading to deep implications for the conventional armed forces profile. In this article, a new definition for irregular warfare is suggested, namely: "an armed conflict between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over those population parts relevant for the power control in a specific space". The military forces way to adapt to new threats and risks depends on the strategies issued to counteract the cultural differences and gaps related to irregular warfare, among the most relevant being the following: a more subtle and flexible military posture, high speed and reactive military structures, expeditionary forces, a mandatory and visible military presence.

Keywords*: irregular warfare; military posture; terrorism; military capabilities; expeditionary forces*

At the end of the 21ˢᵗ century first decade, the contemporary world is farther and farther away from the comfort and predictability of the security risks of the '90s. Meanwhile, in August 2008, the world witnessed a scenario that seemed to be forgotten forever, in which a big European country (Russian Federation) attacked a much smaller neighbour country (Georgia), thus contesting the current European order. In this specific case, the close relationship of the latter with Western countries was not a sufficient security guarantee.

At the same time, another crisis was on the point of displaying its effects, namely the economic-financial one, in which the world economy entered a recession period, as in the '30s, overlapping with the previous security risks of the geopolitical scene: terrorism, nuclear proliferation, Islamic radicalism, crisis of resources, global warming and piracy.

Irregular Warfare
– Customary Conceptual Delimitations

In the United States military doctrine, irregular warfare is defined as a violent conflict between state and non-state actors, for legitimacy

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and influence over a specific population. The American military view of irregular warfare could be relevant due to the vast experience the United States has in this domain, especially in its modern and contemporary history.

Besides, the irregular warfare definition, according to JP 1 – 02, might be suggestive: *"A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organised, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery"*[1].

Irregular warfare differs from the classic one, firstly due to its approach and strategy. Thus, a set of relevant irregular warfare features might be inferred. These will be the basis for its definition, from the Romanian Armed Forces' perspective, in general, and from the one of the Air Force, in particular.

Therefore, the most important *irregular warfare features* are the following: it is an armed conflict, usually a long-term one; with state and/or non-state actors; conventional or irregular participant forces: paramilitary, guerrilla, insurgency etc. ones; the forces might be (even though not mandatory) supported from abroad; its goal is to gain and maintain control over that part of the population relevant to the power equation in that specific territory; usually, there is no *"vital national interest"* involved and, basically, there is no support from the population of the state that operates using *"classic"* means; there is no formal war declaration nor exit strategy; the treaties with respect to war and war prisoners treatment are not respected by insurgents or guerrilla warriors.

As a consequence of all the above-mentioned facts, irregular warfare might be defined as: *"a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant population in that specific area"*.

Cultural Differences/Gaps and Irregular Warfare

At the time of the 9/11 attack, the world nations along with the biggest military power of that moment, the United States of America, were ready to undertake a process of *"profound"* military capabilities transformation based on: anti-missile defence, space assets, high-precision weapon systems and information technology. This approach was originated in the time of the *Cold War*.

The American military capabilities transformation process was *"interrupted"* just in time by the 2001 terrorist attack. To some extent, Osama bin Laden infringed

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[1] ***, *Joint Pub 1 – 02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 2001.

one of Napoleon's sacred rule: *"Never interrupt your enemy when he is making mistakes"*. The terrorists' cleverest actions would have been to let American military capabilities become a useless machinery, which would have placed the United States in a profound unfavourable position.

On the other hand, the impact of the 9/11 attack and of the following ones, in the European capital cities (London, Madrid) did not pass unnoticed by the tomorrow enemy in an irregular warfare. At the same time, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide *"lessons learned"* for both the Coalition Forces and their enemies, which have proved they can rapidly adapt to new means to kill.

Going back to Osama bin Laden's decision related to the 9/11 attacks, it can be underlined that it should have been wiser from his part to let American capabilities become an useless machine in terms of the new way to fight a war. On the contrary, we are currently witnessing the rise of the irregular warfare, which causes violent perturbations on the world order. This quite new concept is inspired by the ideology that spawned Islamic terrorism and Osama bin Laden and it will not be forgotten when these forces are defeated. Irregular warfare is a normal reaction against globalisation and the technological superiority of classic weapons.

Even though the nature of irregular warfare is not enough elucidated, this warfare will not come in the way anticipated by the Pentagon, with enemies adopting one of the conventional attack strategies. Future opponents in an irregular warfare will not remain low-tech. On the contrary, they might initiate a so-called advanced irregular warfare, with access to encrypted command systems, portable air defence missiles and other modern weapons. They could choose a cellular command structure, with greater autonomy and less connectivity than the classic networks or they can opt for hybrid structures in which specific capabilities or financial support are provided to a local cell, in order to increase its functional capability for mission accomplishment. This structure speed to adapt and transform might be astonishing with its organisational adaptability as the only constant.

Moreover, these adversaries will avoid linear operations or predictable situations, will seek to minimise the risks posed to own forces while maximising the impact on the target population or government. These enemies tend to surpass the state military structures in the warfare learning cycle.

As a consequence, the future irregular warfare will have a decisive feature and will not be short. Besides, it will be very violent, involving a huge range of domains, being known as *complex irregular warfare*.

Counteracting the Irregular Warfare Cultural Differences/Gaps

In order to counteract the irregular warfare cultural differences/gaps, some strategies could be followed:

1. *To assume a more subtle and flexible military posture.* In the irregular warfare era, the states military posture needs to be less direct than the 20th century garrison-base approach. Instead of using a visible and static forward operating deployable base, the future military deployment should be indirect and less intrusive as far as the adversary territory is concerned. Besides, the use of force has to be subtle, in order to make the impact more forceful.

In spite of the supposed benefits of a high visibility presence in the theatres of operation, there are many debates related to the efficiency of the well-defended military bases. From the standpoint of the cultural gap between insurgents and professional military, these outposts of Western culture area seen by the local populations as an insult and an unwanted intrusion into their traditional way of life. In this case, the minimisation of the direct use of force along with co-operation actions with local militias can solve problems before they transform into strategic objectives for the military body.

2. *To develop military structures with high reaction speed.* Military forces have to act instead of react. Even when response measures are taken, the military structure must have strategic mobility mixed with tactical speed. Besides, this structure should be modular, agile and able to survive in hostile environments.

The key factors of the forward intervention forces into the enemy battlefield are: rapid operating capability, versatility and capacity to show credible force. For this type of missions, *special forces* are the most suitable armed forces branch.

Although the force projection capabilities and those relevant for winning a war must be lethal and decisive, it is necessary for trained special forces to be used in order to employ the proportional force and to accomplish rapid deployment/redeployment in the enemy territory. These forces must be trained in order to act in a hostile environment and to integrate themselves into the joint force, whenever needed.

3. *The expeditionary feature of forces.* Beside the massive costs required by the static military base in order to be operated and supported, there is a full range of operation risks inherent to its presence in the enemy territory. If the future enemies in a regular warfare have to confront superior classic forces, they will try to use those techniques and technologies able to thwart the military intervention. The future adversaries will not admit defeat before the technological superiority; on the contrary, they will try to diminish the intervening military power and to exploit the weaknesses they will discover. The future military forces

that will have to confront their adversaries in a complex irregular warfare should have a profound expeditionary character, in order to win.

4. *Mandatory and visible military presence*. In 2001, the United States Special Forces managed to overturn the Taliban regime. Despite this fact, the respective troops did not managed to defeat the Taliban once and for all. Moreover, the tendency is to supplement the existing military forces. Meanwhile, the current Afghanistan insurgency, which engages classic military forces, has proved to be very resistant to the solutions using sophisticated weapon systems, even though these include the latest technologies nowadays. Moreover, after the Taliban regime was overturned, the violence level in Afghanistan was very low for many years, even though NATO had few soldiers there ! Things became worse as the Alliance began to send more and more troops in the theatre of operation and chose the classic approach.

To sum up, in an irregular warfare, the military presence is both mandatory and by all means visible, only to the level where military forces are not seen as hostile or foreign, in relation to the local culture and religion.

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In the contemporary world, the downsizing of the military is not a brand new fact. After the massive demobilisation following the end of World War II, the active forces of all states were reduced up to 40%. Besides, after the end of the *Cold War*, the military forces were once again reduced by another third. In spite of all the above-mentioned facts, it has been proved that the real solution for a confrontation in an irregular warfare is not changing and quantitatively downsizing, but mostly comprehensively redesigning and rethinking.

To some extent, the most probable catastrophe a military organisation might confront with in an irregular warfare is that terrorist networks could resist enough time so that they could acquire nuclear weapons. Only a few nuclear missiles in Osama bin Laden's hands should give him a great power of constraint, because it is quite difficult to strike a terrorist network in the way a state is.

Some state security forces begin to think in terms of *"many and small"*, invent new methods to *"scout"*. The present Chinese maritime doctrine (the *"pearl string"* strategy)[2] goes right in this direction, same as the Russian Federation Land Forces.

Generally speaking, it is believed that being strong in terms of defence means allocating more resources and building bigger systems. However, being wiser

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[2] China's geopolitical strategy, used by this power to impose itself, firstly in the Indian Ocean, by building Maritime Bases (Hainan Island, Woody Island), as future "pearls" through which the Chinese vessels could exert their influence in this specific area.

related to defence means decreasing costs, while improving efficiency. This adapting model has endured over the last decades in industry and agriculture. We might dare to think that this pattern could be applied to the military domain.

This approach is necessary and of great emergency, because history did not end with the end of the *Cold War* and the arrival of globalisation led by trade and information revolution, but conflict and violence have evolved as well.

Besides, even though we are in an era in which the attraction for the *"soft power"* of persuasion has increased, the *"hard power"* of persuasion still dominates global policy. This should not be surprising for the *"axis of evil"* and *"axis of chaos"* states, as well as for those intending to build nuclear weapons in order to secure themselves nor whenever we discuss about terrorist networks, which believe that their nature stands in violent acts and is supported by them. Nevertheless, the primitive tendency to use the power of persuasion is still present in both small and big states, as well as in the United States of America, whose defence policy has become its main foreign policy over the last decade.

Whenever irregular warfare errupts, states tend to use hard power solutions. When the adjustments regarding the strategies, organisation and doctrines used in irregular warfare are totally ignored, states will continue to spend more to gain less in terms of security. The networks will probably continue to exist, until we can suppose that nuclear measures will be taken. In this context, we can draw the conclusion that a better approach to the irregular warfare refers to the military leap some states are struggling to make, in which concepts such as the *"deterrence"* and *"containment"* of aggression are not the focal point in their military and political doctrines.

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FUTURE MILITARY AVIATION TRAINING REQUIREMENTS IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN SKY

Colonel (AF) Dr Mihai ŞTIR

The SESAR programme is the European Air Traffic Management modernisation programme. The project will combine technological, economic and regulatory aspects and will use the Single European Sky legislation to synchronise the plans and actions of the different stakeholders. It will federate the resources for the development and implementation of the required improvements throughout Europe, in both airborne and ground systems. This article intends to provide the reader with the knowledge and understanding of the generic needs of Military Aviation training activities in the future European ATM environment. It aims at discussing the military airspace requirements in SES for the routine, day-to-day, training of air, sea and ground forces. Finally, the paper will present some recommendations for further enhancement of the utilisation of airspace by all European users, including the Military Aviation, as SESAR evolves.

Keywords: SESAR; ATM Target Concept; Military Aviation; EUROCONTROL Airspace Strategy

The Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research or the SESAR Programme

The SESAR programme is the European Air Traffic Management (ATM) modernisation programme. The project will combine technological, economic and regulatory aspects and will use the Single European Sky (SES)[1] legislation to synchronise the plans and actions of the different stakeholders. It will federate the resources for the development and implementation of the required improvements throughout Europe, in both airborne and ground systems. The long-term targets of SESAR have been defined as political vision and goals for the design of the future ATM System, and as the European Commission objectives of the SESAR programme.

They are to achieve a future European ATM System for 2020 and beyond, which can, relative to today's performance:

- enable a threefold increase in capacity which will also reduce delays, both on the ground and in the air;

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[1] The Single European Sky initiative launched by the European Commission was drafted with the following objectives: to restructure European airspace as a function of air traffic flows, rather than according to national borders; to create additional capacity; and to increase the overall efficiency of the air traffic management system.

- improve the safety performance by a factor of 10;
- enable a 10% reduction in the effects flights have on the environment;
- provide ATM services to the airspace users at a cost which is at least 50% less.

SESAR is a three-phase project: a definition phase (2004-2008) followed by a development phase (2008-2013) and finally a deployment phase (2013-2020). The first phase of SESAR, the Definition Phase, co-funded by EUROCONTROL and the European Commission under Trans-European networks, has aimed at proposing concrete actions and measures to plan, research, validate, develop and support the implementation of the SES. It has ultimately delivered the shared air transport industry ATM Master Plan covering the period up to 2020. The ATM Master Plan defines the content, the development and deployment plans of the next generation of ATM systems.

This article intends to provide the reader with the knowledge and understanding of the generic needs of Military Aviation training activities in the future European ATM environment. It aims at discussing the military airspace requirements in SES for the routine, day-to-day, training of air, sea and ground forces. Finally, the paper will present some recommendations for further enhancement of the utilisation of airspace by all European users, including the Military Aviation, as SESAR evolves.

The real challenge in future ATM

The real challenge in the future European ATM is to propose procedures to integrate the operation of military aircraft in an oversaturated airspace. It is forecast that air traffic in Europe will grow up three times the current figures. And this is without military aircraft on it. Thus military aircraft operation will suppose an additional increase in the air traffic volume; it is an immediate task to assess the feasibility of using these new operational solutions, or proposing new operational solutions in order not to jeopardise the performance of the future European ATM system or to restrict the freedom to operate of Military Aviation.

As EUROCONTROL Civil/Military Interface Standing Committee stated already in 2003[2], airspace managers require new planning concepts to accommodate the military training activities, which are essential to guarantee the level of capabilities

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At the end of 2005, EUROCONTROL and the European Commission signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to enhance their synergy in five areas of cooperation, first of them being the implementation of the Single European Sky.

[2] EUROCONTROL, Civil/Military Interface Standing Committee, *Determining Future Military Airspace Requirements in Europe*, Annex B to C/CMIC's Report to PC/18, Final Version, 02.04.2003.

and readiness needed to satisfy national security and defence requirements. This includes the freedom of movement and enterprise within the respective military's area of responsibility.

In 2008, the Definition Phase of SESAR, including 6 main deliverables, was completed. This triggered the start of the programme next phase: the implementation phase, decomposed into a development phase and a deployment phase. In SESAR's third deliverable (D3), the future ATM Target Concept[3] was developed. It delivers the Concept of Operations (ConOps), System Architecture and the Technologies enablers. Hence, this is the foundation of the future ATM system in Europe.

Before assessing the generic needs, the specific requirements and the recommendations for Military Aviation training in the future SES, it would be of interest to highlight the most representative ideas comprised in the 2020 ATM Target Concept.

Key features of the 2020 ATM Target Concept

The key features of the 2020 ATM Target Concept as defined by the SESAR D3 refer to:

❖ *Business Trajectory* **–** This is a 4D Trajectory which expresses the business intention of the airspace user for a specific flight with or without constraints. For military users the business trajectory corresponds to a mission trajectory. The concept places the business trajectory at the core of the system with the aim to execute each flight as close as possible to the intention of its owner.

❖ *Trajectory Management* **–** This introduces a new approach to airspace design and management, where the focus moves from airspace to trajectory management and it refers to:

- Airspace Users fly preferred routing without pre-defined routes;
- Structured routes will only be activated where and when needed to enable the required capacity, e.g. in congested TMAs (Terminal Manoeuvring Areas);
- The needs of the military are safeguarded;
- It is considered that no other segregation is required.

❖ *Collaborative Planning continuously reflected in the Network Operations Plan (NOP)* – This shall balance capacity and demand and includes:

➥ All main stakeholders collaborate in a layered planning approach to establish the NOP;

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[3] SESAR Consortium, SESAR Definition Phase – Deliverable 3, *The ATM Target Concept – D3*, DLM-0612-001-02-00a, September 2007.

⮑ The collaborative planning ensures that capacity matches demand;

⮑ It enables efficient queue management, optimising access to constrained resources;

⮑ It minimises holding and ground queues.

Additionally, it enables priority setting by Airspace Users in the event of a capacity shortfall.

❖ *Integrated Airport operations contributing to capacity gains and reducing the environmental impact:*

Airports will become an integral part of the ATM system due to the extension of trajectory management, that meaning:

- Full integration of airport operations into the trajectory management processes;

- Increased throughput and reduced environmental impact (via e.g. turnaround management, reduction of the impact of low visibility conditions etc.).

❖ *New separation modes to allow for increased capacity:*

⮑ New separation modes gradually being implemented over time will use trajectory control and airborne separation systems to minimise potential conflicts and controllers' interventions;

⮑ Supported by controller and airborne tools like ASAS (Airborne Separation Assurance Systems) and ACAS (Airborne Collision Avoidance System).

❖ *System Wide Information Management – integrating all ATM related data:*

- A System Wide Information Management (SWIM) environment including all ATM actors, e.g. aircraft and ground facilities, will underpin the future ATM system;

- It supports CDM processes using efficient end-user applications to exploit the power of shared and up to date information.

❖ *Humans will be central in the future European ATM system as managers and decision-makers:*

⮑ To accommodate the expected traffic increase, an advanced level of automation support for the humans will be required;

⮑ The nature of human roles and tasks will necessarily change. This will affect system design, staff selection, training, competence requirements and relevant regulations.

The generic needs of Military Aviation training activities in the future European ATM

Military Aviation plays a vital role for security and defence. Therefore, it is a fundamental requirement that each state should be able to train and operate its military forces to enable them to discharge their security and defence responsibilities. For that purpose the availability of sufficient space and opportunities for military training is the fundamental backbone for ready to operate and capable military forces.

The future airspace structure will acknowledge the general defence and security needs and aims at assuring *"sufficient"* airspace for military purposes.

Since modern aircraft and weapons require larger volumes of training airspace in order to fully exploit their capabilities and civil air traffic is expected to increase in the coming years, the airspace utilisation has to be optimised to satisfy military and civil needs. This can only be achieved with a new flexible approach towards airspace design and airspace management, which requires for airspace planners to be aware of the operational needs of all airspace users.

The divergent task and nature of the European forces as well as the variety of airframes and weapons in their inventory do not allow the introduction of generally standardised airspace requirements for the whole European area. In addition, military requirements hinge on manifold parameters and are therefore more complex and more difficult to quantify than civil requirements. This illustrates the great importance of cooperation between civil and military authorities to best utilise the military ATM expertise in order to accommodate military requirements based on national security needs inside an air traffic environment with increasing capacity demands.

The current airspace structure no longer meets all the requirements of civil and military users. Some of the military activities are carried out within temporary segregated areas (TSA) and temporary reserved airspace (TRA). However, because of the increasing volume of civil air traffic as well as environmental pressures, other military activities have to be exported to remote areas. The required operational capability can thus be maintained only at considerable extra costs. Since defence budgets are limited, however, the current airspace structure needs to be adapted to meet today's military requirements.

The future airspace structure will be developed on the basis of strategies such as the EU proposal for a Single European Sky, the EUROCONTROL Airspace Strategy for the ECAC States and the ATM Strategy 2000+.

All strategies acknowledge the general defence and security needs and aim at dedicating "sufficient" airspace for military purposes. In order to maintain

the operational readiness in a cost-effective manner, the future military airspace requirements will be met by providing sufficient airspace based upon the following principles defined in the EUROCONTROL Airspace Strategy for the ECAC States:

- Freedom to operate at any time in all areas of ECAC airspace;
- Special handling in particular for priority flights and for time-critical missions[4], but also for military aircraft whose equipment is not fully up to civil standards;
- Possibility of conducting uncontrolled VFR flights, including in managed airspace (MAS) retained;
- Temporary airspace reservations (e.g. TSAs for low-level flying, in-flight refuelling, air combat training, high-energy flying and other activities incompatible with the normal application of the rules of the air) as close as practicable to the respective airfield;
- Airspace restrictions for activities not related to aviation, like the protection of areas of national interest, air-to-ground firing ranges, air-to-air gunfire and missile firing areas etc;
- A more dynamic airspace allocation system with enhanced FUA application.

The military airspace requirements in SES for the routine day to day training

Military airspace utilisation falls into different categories. Generally, military airspace requirements vary from state to state and even from region to region, mostly because of the difference in the mixture of aircraft types and weapon systems.

Five major categories exist. They are:
- ☞ Instruction flights;
- ☞ Operational Training flights;
- ☞ Live Exercises;
- ☞ Air Defence flights;
- ☞ Ground Based Air Defence.

It is obvious that the airspace required for these five categories varies from very limited to very large. Additionally, there are different requirements regarding scheduling and availability as well as permeability for other traffic.

The daily need for airspace is determined by a number of factors such as available equipment, available personnel and meteorological conditions. Sufficient airspace must therefore be available for training when conditions are favourable.

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[4] E.g. Air Policing missions in response to situations in which terrorists use a civil aircraft to perpetrate air attacks (A.N.).

The location of the airspace in relation to the intended users is also of vital importance, with regard not only to cost effectiveness but also to the time needed for the transit to remote areas. If too much time is used for the transit, the time available for training will be inadequate, resulting in mission ineffectiveness, which in turn requires that mission to be re-flown.

Governments demand the military to be capable, effective and in a position to cope with unpredictable scenarios. To meet these expectations, armed forces must ensure that their capabilities and readiness posture are adequate and flexible enough to cope with current, future and unexpected threats. To achieve these goals and to ensure that their aircrews *"train as they would fight"*, the military's approach to the utilisation of airspace must also be flexible and they have to routinely, day-to-day, train themselves.

Like in civil aviation, flight safety is paramount for all military operations. It is therefore continuously and closely monitored and enforced throughout all military levels. Each pilot is trained on all aspects of flight safety and the enhancement of individual safety awareness is a permanent part throughout his professional flying career.

To foster and improve flight safety in military aviation, each national service has a military flight safety organisation in place, cooperating between them. These organisations employ experienced pilots, technical experts and ATC-personnel as flight safety officers, who have been thoroughly trained in all areas of flight safety, like accident prevention, accident investigation and reporting.

If flight safety appears to be jeopardised within the military areas of responsibilities, this will be reported to the competent authorities without delay and corrective actions will be taken.

Proceeding on the assumption that air forces must *"train as they would fight"*, military VFR flights provide the aircrews in the majority of cases with the necessary tactical freedom of operation for the development of collective warfighting capabilities through realistic day-to-day training and specific exercises.

Furthermore, they provide military aircrews with the essential opportunity to develop the highly demanding individual skills necessary to operate effectively under threat conditions. These skills include, in addition to aircraft handling and weapons employment, complete situational awareness and specific capabilities like quick and accurate problem response and decision-making under stress. In case of missions where the pilot's workload does not allow for sufficient attention towards other traffic or in which aerial manoeuvres are not predictable to other traffic, adequate separation must be ensured. Hence, where high priority is given

to the self determination of aircrews, the use of segregated airspace will be dictated when working/operating in dense traffic environments.

To ensure that pilots are able to exercise their skills and gain the appropriate level of competence and experience necessary, to operate successfully in all possible conflict or crisis scenarios, an overall requirement of self determination is mandatory for many types of mission activities. Self determination requires the freedom to manoeuvre without restrictions in space and time. Since the manoeuvring capabilities of combat aircraft have to be mastered by their pilots throughout all flight regimes and considering that their handling, management and operating characteristics are different in respect to altitude, the opportunity to operate freely is a prerequisite for effective mission-oriented training.

Military missions are complex in nature and should not be influenced by factors irrelevant to the mission. The high complexity is a result of the requirement to fulfil different operational tasks during one flight. The aircrew, in case of single-seated aircraft only one person, must control the aircraft, navigate, be constantly aware of the current threat scenario, ready to execute defensive measures and prepare and execute weapons employment. A high degree of concentration and steady situational awareness is required over a long period of time. Additionally, the high performance of combat aircraft results in heavy physical stress.

Due to the high complexity of military missions and their wide variety throughout Europe, quantifying military VFR activities for the entire ECAC region remains impracticable, although certainly desirable. Clearly, the use of segregated airspace just for accommodating VFR flights would seem unnecessarily wasteful of a precious resource.

Within the complicated environment of military aviation, the aspect of Crew Resource Management (CRM) must be taken into account. With a view to both training effectiveness and flight safety, it is necessary to keep the airspace structure and the regulations that govern it as simple and understandable as possible.

In order to meet the defence and security needs, sufficient airspace is to be provided for Military Aviation routine, day-to-day, training. This leads to the following requirements:

> ➢ To accomplish their missions, military aircraft must be able to operate without restrictions in all classes of airspace at all the times required in accordance with their assigned tasking;

> ➢ In many cases, military activities must be separated from other air traffic in segregated airspace;

➤ Besides the dimension of airspace for military use, the distance from the airbases to the TRAs/TSAs must be short enough to ensure an economic ratio between transit and training time;

➤ The TSAs/TRAs used for air combat manoeuvring should generally be under radar coverage of military air defence units;

➤ The design of TSAs/TRAs must reflect the regional/national composition and task of forces and may have to be adjusted whenever new aircraft and weapons are introduced;

➤ Some TSA/TRA or portions of them must be *"hard-walled"* without crossing civil air traffic while other portions do allow the coexistence of OAT and GAT in the same area and at the same time and will thus permit as much as possible the continuation of civil air traffic flows.

Recommendations for further enhancement of the utilisation of airspace

To be able to fulfil the requirements of all European airspace users, the generic military requirements described above need to be taken into account when designing airspace in Europe. To further enhance the utilisation of airspace, especially in respect to capacity improvements, the following should be taken into account:

• Collaborative planning must be improved at the strategic level to increase the opportunities for airspace sharing, and to explore new methods in the management of airspace in order to increase efficiency and thus capacity;

• AMCs[5] must increase their efforts to make maximum joint use of finite airspace resources through appropriate civil/military coordination based on the principle that any necessary segregation of airspace is derived from real usage within a specified time period;

• New simulation systems that reflect characteristic military airspace requirements have to be developed;

• The use of common data formats between ATC and air defence units must be exploited.

The full implementation and further enhancement of the FUA[6] Concept is needed as a tool to optimise civil and military airspace usage. The FUA Concept must ensure

[5] Airspace Management Centres.
[6] Flexible Use of Airspace.

that military needs get priority when dictated by essential national security and defence interests.

The common goal of all efforts is to meet the requirements of all airspace users to the maximum extent possible. Mutual knowledge, understanding and respect of individual limitations of different airspace users must be the start. A commonly acceptable balance in accommodating the aspects of economy and commerce, as well as defence and security must be the result.

As a member of EUROCONTROL, Romania has been actively involved in these efforts regarding SES approach. Mentioning only a few steps performed so far, it can be pointed that the FUA Concept is in place here since its early stage and it has already been applied to the Romanian planning system, for both civil and military flights. More recently, an initiative to establish a Functional Area Block (FAB) within the Romanian and Bulgarian airspace is in the development phase, and a common view on Air Policing over the two countries border has been negotiated and is following the ratification procedures.

THE NEW NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE

Colonel Dr Crăişor-Constantin IONIŢĂ

The current economic crisis that takes place all around the world and the continuously refinement of the Alliance's mission and roles in the international security arena have modified both the planning and conduct of NATO-led operations and the organisation of the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure. The implementation of new allied concepts, like the Effects-Based Approach to Operations – EBAO and NATO Network-Enabled Capability – NNEC, has influenced dramatic changes into the organisational structure of the Alliance's Command and Control System, from the regular "J"-type one to the more modern functional structure.

Keywords: "J"-type structure; functional structure; level of ambition; SHAPE; HQ SACT; JFC HQs; CCs

The international events occurred in the last two decades, after the fall of the *Iron Curtain*, have exacerbated the necessity for NATO to address emerging instability challenges from regions that are outside the traditional area of responsibility. The recent military operations in Afghanistan, aimed against terrorist attacks, have demonstrated the requirement of building up modern, light, high-tech, expeditionary forces, as well as of a modern Command and Control (C2) System, capable of speeding up the decision-making process. These new requirements have reconfirmed the need for a comprehensive military analysis and demonstrated the fact that collective defence cannot focus exclusively on the traditional threats anymore, even if they are produced by numerous military forces, being face-to-face. Global terrorism and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional instability, failed states, radicalism and the existing *"frozen conflicts"* represent now the most important threats to international peace and stability.

Even if *collective defence* (Article 5) has remained a core mission of the Alliance, as well as the *preservation of the transatlantic link*, a dramatic change took place inside NATO at the same time with the changes occurred in the international

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security environment. It is about an increase in the importance of the so-called *"non-Article 5"*-type missions, which are well-known as Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO), being conducted inside the Area of Responsibility (AOR), adjacent to or out of it.

Initially, a decision was taken not to entirely change the political-military structures of the Alliance, but to review the whole military part of it – the NATO Command Structure – NCS, in order to make it more linear, efficient and capable of conducting all type of future NATO-led operations. Therefore, after the disbandment of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, three major restructuring events took place inside the NCS: between 1994-1997 the Military HQs were reduced from 64 to 20, having a more regional perspective; between 2002-2003 the Military HQs' reduction continued from 20 to 11, plus 6 Combined Air Operations Centres – CAOCs, and the new developed *Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)* Concept was experienced at the operational level; during 2006-2009 the existing Military HQs transformed themselves from *"J"*- type structures to the functional integrated ones and the number of CAOCs reduced to four (two deployable and two static)[1].

If the first two reviews of the NCS were highly detailed previously[2], this article is aimed at informing all the Romanian military personnel about the latest and newest structure adopted by the North Atlantic Alliance starting 1 August 2010, its impact upon the C2 systems in international arena, as well as the last minute thoughts of the allied politicians as an answer to the world economic crisis.

Just after finalising the new configuration of the NCS, established during the Prague Summit of 2002 as an important objective of the transformation of the Alliance to meet the 21st century challenges, the allied political-military decision-makers issued new guidelines to modify the modality in which the Alliance should conduct its future operations, together with new policies and strategies. One of these decisions, regarding the improvement of the political decision-making process, was taken at the Istanbul Summit of 2004 and was completed in 2006 in the *Comprehensive Political Guidance – CPG*. The CPG had the aim to deepen the consultation process among NATO nations and their partners for achieving a common goal and clearly establishing desired strategic objectives and opportunities before the beginning of an operation. Also, the efficiency of the Force Generation Process was addressed inside this document, in order to allow more transparency for the contributing nations and state the sovereignty of them in deciding the use of their own forces[3].

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[1] See *NATO Handbook,* NATO HQ, Brussels, 2009, pp. 23-34.

[2] In locotenent-colonel Crăișor-Constantin Ioniță, *Noua structură de comandă a NATO*, in *Gândirea militară românească* Journal, no. 6/2004, pp. 85-89.

[3] See *Comprehensive Political Guidance*, NATO HQ, Brussels, 2006, p. 5.

The second major decision led to the establishment of a new NATO Level of Ambition (LoA), translated into the *Ministerial Guidance 06*. This new LoA proposes to analyse the possibilities of the Alliance to conduct, concurrently, two Major Joint Operations (MJO) and six Smaller Joint Operations (SJO)[4].

The two above-mentioned documents, adopted at the Riga Summit in 2006, asked for a detailed three-year study (2006-2009) at the SCs level for a new review of the NCS to meet the new political requirements. Of course, this study also had to analyse the possibility of a 30% reduction of the personnel within the military command structure.

During the 60th anniversary summit, Strasbourg-Kiel 2009, the heads of state and government approved the recommendations of this study, together with the implementation of a new reduced but improved NCS, able to fulfil the NATO established LoA. The political agreement also considered the lessons learned from the recent NATO-led operations, which showed that the major deficit of the operational C2 consisted of the lack of deployment capability, especially for forward C2 elements.

As a result, the current NCS was endorsed by the Military Committee – MC and approved by the North Atlantic Council – NAC in 2010, except for the air components (2 CC-Air and 6 CAOCs), for which two member nations did not reach agreement. Therefore, the respective HQs continue to operate under the Peacetime Establishment – PE approved in 2003. The new NCS has a profound operational character, in which the C2 for each operation is approved by the NAC based upon the SACEUR's recommendations and the MC endorsement. At the strategic level, NATO continues to use single HQs designed for operational responsibilities, Allied Command Operations – ACO, led by the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe – SACEUR, US Admiral James Stavridis. The ACO, having its location at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe – SHAPE, near Mons, Belgium, coordinates all Alliance's operations and missions, as well as the way in which NATO Force Structure – NFS is used during peace time and at war. The SACEUR is always the Strategic Commander for NATO-led Operations. The ACO PE is highlighted in *figure 1*[5].

SHAPE, being the Strategic HQ of ACO, has suffered a real transformational impact, both structurally and numerically, which demonstrates that the continuous downsizing of the NCS is also an effect of the world economic crisis. A consequence for NATO nations is the necessity to reduce, as much as possible, their resource

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[4] See *Ministerial Guidance 06* no. DPC-D (2006) 0004-AS1, 07.06.2006, p. 3.

[5] See *MC 324/2 (Final), The NATO Military Command Structure*, NATO HQ, Brussels, 16 February 2010, p. 3.

Figure 1: The new ACO PE

contribution inside the Alliance. In order to mitigate this impact and to implement the desired *Effects-Based Approach to Operations – EBAO Concept* and *Comprehensive Approach – CA*, very *"fashionable"* concepts in 2007, SHAPE went from *"J"*-type structure (J1-J9) to a more integrated one, based on five principal functions established by nations: operational planning, conduct of operations, capability development, support for operations, and military cooperation *(figure 2)*.

Currently, SHAPE PE comprises five divisions: Operations and Intel – OPI; Capabilities, Plans and Policy – CPP; Force Readiness – FOR; Support – SPT; and Military Cooperation – MCD. Apart from this general staff organisation, there are also established a Command Group, special staff offices and enabling staff elements. In this functional approach for staffing, some operational functions were mixed to create integrated elements. This is the case of the OPI Division, where former J2, J3, J6 and J9 work together as directorates. What has not yet been solved inside the current structure in order to meet all EBAO and CA conditions, are the elements of Knowledge Management (KM) and Knowledge Development (KD), two very important pre-conditions for planning and conducting a modern Crisis Response Operation (CRO).

SACEUR continues to have dual-hatted responsibilities being, at the same time, the US European Commander (USEUCOM). Therefore, this position is always

Figure 2: **Current SHAPE Integrated Structure**

filled by the United States of America. His/her first responsibility as SACEUR is to maintain peace, security and territorial integrity of the Alliance. In the case of an attack, he/she is responsible for taking all necessary measures to maintain or restore the Alliance's security. Moreover, he/she has to provide the Strategic Military Advice to the NATO Pol-Mil authorities for any military option being under his/her responsibility.

Deputy SACEUR – DSACEUR is, at the same time, the EU Operational Commander, once the EU decides to request the access to the NATO planning tools, as stated in the Strategic Partnership *"Berlin Plus"*. As of today, for example, DSACEUR conducts *"Althea"* Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, having a small EU Staff Group at SHAPE.

In order to increase the effectiveness of this HQ, the SHAPE Chief of Staff (COS) is assisted by five Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCOSs), each of them being responsible for one principal function and the head of the respective division. As a particularity, starting in 2008, the DCOS for Military Cooperation (DCOS MC) is also DCOS for the Allied Command Transformation – ACT, and the Military Cooperation Division – MCD is a Bi-SC structure.

SHAPE Divisions are organised in Directorates, which are structures bigger than the *"branches"* from our strategic structures. These structures are usually led by one-star generals. In fact, they represent the former *"J"s* and comprise *branches* and *sections*.

The level immediately situated bellow SHAPE, the operational one, has also a distinct functional (and not regional) character and is based on three Allied Joint Force Commands (JFC HQs), one in Brunssum, the Netherlands, one in Naples, Italy, and the last one in Lisbon, Portugal. They are capable of conducting operations from their standing locations or by deploying a Deployable Joint Staff Element – DJSE inside the theatres of operations *(figure 3)*.

The Joint Operational Commander is proposed by the SACEUR, endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC. Normally, he/she should be one of the Commanders of the three JFC HQs. Two JFC HQs (Naples and Brunssum) can establish the initial C2 for a MJO and two SJOs, while the last one (Lisbon) represents the C2 arrangements for two SJOs, only. When a NATO-led operation is going to start, each JFC HQ will have one DJSE element prepared by the NCS and one taken from the NFS. This new concept of deployability at the operational level was discussed in detail in a previous article[6]. These DJSEs can be collocated with the JFC HQ or separately dislocated. A final decision will be taken at the political level in due time.

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[6] Colonel dr. Crăişor-Constantin Ioniţă, *DSJE – un nou concept privind dislocabilitatea sistemului de comandă şi control la nivel operativ*, in *Gândirea militară românească* Journal, no. 2/2010, pp. 37-45.

POLAD

COM
COS
DCOM

SUPPORT OF STAFF
DIRECTORATE
(SSD)

FACILITIES
MANAGEMENT (FMB)

BUSINESS AND INFO
MANAGEMENT (BIM)

SPECIAL STAFF
LEGAD MEDAD
SCA PAA
FINCON SOFAD CSM
LE (JFCLB)

RESOURCES
DIRECTORATE
(RD)

COMMUNICATIONS
AND INFORMATION
SYSTEMS BRANCH
(CISB)

ENGINEER
BRANCH
(JENGB)

MEDICAL
BRANCH
(MEDB)

LOGISTICS
RESOURCES
BRANCH (LRB)

FINANCIAL
RESOURCES
BRANCH (FRB)

HUMAN
RESOURCES
BRANCH (HRB)

OPERATIONS
DIRECTORATE
(OD)

JOINT PLANS
BRANCH (JPB)

JOINT
ASSESSMENT
BRANCH (JAB)

JOINT
EFFECTS
MANAGEMENT
BRANCH (JEMB)

JOINT
SYNCHRONISATION
& EXECUTION
BRANCH (JSEB)

SITUATION
CENTRE
(SITCEN)

KNOWLEDGE
MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORATE
(KMD)

KNOWLEDGE
CENTRE
(KCB)

EXERCISE
& PREPARATION
BRANCH (EPB)

JOINT
POLICY APPLICATION
AND LESSONS
IDENTIFIED/LESSONS
LEARNED
BRANCH (JPAL LB)

***Figure 3*: JFC HQ Integrated Structure**

JFC HQs are organised on three directorates, from which one is responsible with the Knowledge Development – KD, one deals with operations, and the last one is for resources. Of course, there is a Command Group, elements of the special staff and enabling ones. The new idea here is represented by the establishment of the Knowledge Management Directorate – KMD as the first step in achieving the goal of the EBAO and CA, very important for operational planners and more advanced than the current developed systemic analytical tool.

Both JFC HQs Brunssum and Naples have under their control Component Commands (CCs) as tactical level HQs to directly conduct Air and Naval Forces. Moreover, in order to ensure more deployability into the ToA and to allocate more C2 capabilities form the NFS, the former CC-Land HQs have been reduced and transformed into Allied Force Commands (FC HQs), one in Madrid, Spain, and the other in Heidelberg, Germany *(figure 4)*.

Figure 4: **FC HQ's Organisational Structure**

Thus, the JFC HQ Brunssum has under its control the FC HQ Heidelberg, one Maritime Command HQ (MC HQ) in Northwood (UK) and one CC-Air in Ramstein (Germany), the latter having also under its control two standing and one deployable CAOCs, located in Uedem (Germany) and Finderup (Denmark). The JFC HQ Naples has resubordinated the FC HQ Madrid, MC HQ Naples (Italy) and CC-Air Izmir (Turkey), with two standing and one deployable CAOCs in Poggio Renatico (Italy) and Larissa (Greece).

The responsibility for organising four DJSEs, fully operational and integrated, is with the two FC HQs (Heidelberg and Madrid), which are structured and manned to fill two DJSEs each, also maintaining the land component feature for a designated MJO.

After analysing how ACO is organised and designed, let us shift to the other NATO Strategic HQ – the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT), located in Norfolk, VA, USA. This HQ is led by the Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT), French General Stéphane Abrial. The SACT has, as primary responsibility, the lead of the entire transformational process of the Alliance, starting with the interoperability, continuing with the jointness, experimentation, education and training, and ending with the development of new operational concepts.

In order to maintain an uninterrupted cooperation amongst the two sides of the Atlantic, the SACT established at SHAPE a strong representational element, able to ensure the permanent link between operational and doctrinal requirements.

The ACT has under its control the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) from Norway, the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Poland and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) from Portugal. Moreover, ACT supervises the activity of the NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC) in La Spezia (Italy). It also coordinates the curricula of Allied designated schools and agencies, like the NATO College in Rome – Italy, the NATO School at Oberammergau – Germany, and the CIS School in Latina – Italy and maintains cooperation with the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in Norfolk, USA. The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Centre (NMIOTC) from Greece is also associated with the big family of the Allied training and education institutions, together with a variety of Centres of Excellence (COEs), national or multinational, specialised in some phases of the transformation *(figure 5)*.

The HQ SACT was reorganised on four Divisions, out of which three are focused on transformation and one on management: Strategic Plans and Policy (SPP) – the focal point for establishing starting points for developing new capabilities and the responsible body for the Defence Reforms; Capability Development (CD) – identifies development requirements for capabilities and possible options; Joint Force Training (JFT) – supports and conducts force training at all levels; and Integrated Resource Management (IRM) – supports the development of resource policies and ensure the management of them for all ACT structure *(figure 6)*.

All these modifications have taken place gradually, necessitating long debates and many approvals, both at the Pol-Mil level of the Alliance and at the NATO member nations one. Even if the majority of such decisions were taken during 2009, it was required one more year to implement the current structure. This action implied not only many deficiencies, but also risks.

One of those risks is represented by the fact that NATO nations do not 100% fill up all designated positions, and the acquisition process of the newly established deployable capabilities has not been completed. This, in turn, might jeopardise

Interaction with ACT required

NATO Agencies/Bodies

NC3A

NSA

USJFCOM

Coordination with ACT required

Centres of Excellence

HQ SACT Norfolk, USA

SACTREPEUR, NATO HQ Brussels, BEL

Strategic Plans & Policy

Integrated Resource Management

Capability Development

Joint Force Trainer

ACT SEE

NATO HQ (Brussels, BEL)

SHAPE (Mons, BEL)

Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre Monsato, PRT

Undersea Research Centre La Spezla, ITA

Joint Warfare Centre Stavanger, NOR

Joint Force Training Centre Bydgoszcz, POL

Coordination with ACT required

NATO Education Facilities

NATO Defence College Rome, ITA

NATO School Oberammergau, DEU

NATO CIS School Latina, ITA

NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre Souda Bay, GRC

Figure 5: **ACT Structural Organisation**

Figure 6: **Integrated Structure of the HQ SACT**

the possibility of some NCS elements to fulfil their assigned missions and probably will increase the number of necessary activities to support the preparation of DJSE and NRF.

ACT also considers the necessity of hiring highly qualified personnel a risk, because it is very difficult to find and train them in modern disciplines like resource management, programme manager, project manager etc. The political will to reduce the NCS also impacts framework functions and tasks of subordinate commands and entities, like military advising, military cooperation, partnering, evaluation and exercises. Moreover, taking some responsibilities from other NATO agencies (like ACCS) and temporarily deploying staff personnel to fulfil operational tasks have resulted in diminishing HQ's possibility to carry out the assigned missions with less personnel.

Some negative effects of the world economic crisis have required for the member nations to reconsider the new NCS so that it could be more efficient, flexible and as much reduced in manning as possible, which would determine the diminution of the national contribution to NATO common funds. The future NCS should be more agile, flexible and capable of adapting to the deployable missions, including Article 5 operations, demonstrating the active implication of the Alliance all over the world. The current established 30% reduced NCS and the military reintegration of France, together with the invitation of two new nations to join NATO – Albania and Croatia, which increased national contributions to common funds or fulfilling designated PE positions were not enough to compensate those negative impact of the world economic crisis. Therefore, following some member nations' requests,

the NATO Secretary General (SecGen) announced, last autumn, a new initiative to reform all the Alliance at once, including here a new review of the NCS together with the reform of HQ NATO and Allied Agencies, reducing them from 14 to 3.

The recent Lisbon Summit of 2010 adopted, together with the new *Strategic Concept*, the report of some senior political experts regarding the analysis and possible models of a new reviewed NCS, in which the total PE posts to be again reduced. The chosen model *(figure 7)*, reduces the total number of Military HQs from 11 to 7 and downsizes the current PE posts by 35%, approximately 5 000 positions[7].

Figure 7: **The new reviewed NCS Model**

What the Alliance gets with the new reviewed NCS and with downsizing the PE ? First of all, there will be only two Operational HQs, renamed Joint Force Headquarters (JF HQs), deployable and without any subordinate commands under their control. These HQs must be capable of conducting either a MJO or a SJO for one year period. The deployable element, being well designed, will constitute the cornerstone of transforming the Alliance.

One of the available options in the hands of strategic planners is the CJTF Concept, developed by NATO in the '90s, in order to allow allies to conduct operations at Army Corps level + its appropriate Air and Naval support[8]. This concept[9] established that an Operational Commander, nominated inside

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[7] See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm, *Lisbon Summit Declaration*, 20 Nov 2010, art.49-51.

[8] See *Military Committee Decision for the NATO CJTF Concept* no. MC 389/2, 04.05.2004, p. 5.

[9] See locotenent-colonel Crăișor-Constantin Ioniță, *Noi transformări în structura de forțe a NATO*, in *Gândirea militară românească* Journal, no. 2/2004, pp. 168-171.

the Joint Force Commands/Joint HQ (JFC/JHQ) as the CJTF Commander, should be deployed into the ToA together with the necessary staff. The proposed C2 stipulated that the Commander would directly report to the SACEUR. Unfortunately, the necessary capabilities to deploy such kind of CJTF HQ have never been funded and the implementation of all established Capability Packages was postponed to the end of 2018. Other options are represented through the new DJSE Concept or the model of the ISAF HQ.

Even if the C2 system for each NATO-led operation will be decided by the NAC at the SACEUR's proposal and after the MC endorsement, ACO will have to rapidly establish a flexible chain of command from which to select, case-by-case, the most advantageous C2 arrangements to conduct future operations – Operational HQs capable of simultaneously ensuring the command and control of both MJO and SJO. Inside those SJOs, some will have a profound air character; others will be maritime-heavy.

Another innovation that the new proposed NCS could come with is the absence of tactical HQs. The proposed functional HQs which will be established – one Air Command (AC) and one Maritime Command (MC), will be directly subordinated to SHAPE and will be responsible for conducting one specific SJO (Maritime-heavy or Air-heavy).

Even if SHAPE will be dramatically reduced in the number of posts, it will directly coordinate NATO-led operations and not through the JFC HQs, as it is done today. Therefore, the necessity of designating one KM/KD structure and the service-competency is increasing.

It is also taken into consideration the possibility of relocating/collocating some Military HQs or functional Pol-Mil elements of them, if necessary. Everything is calculated to reduce future national contributions.

Up until now, the first step of the NATO reform process has been finalised – the initial approval of proposed models, including a new reviewed NCS –, by national and allied decision-makers. But a final decision of how the NCS will be designed for 2012-2015 period has not been taken yet. This decision is scheduled for the June 2011 Ministerial Meeting, when it is also expected that the establishment of the geographical location of the Military HQs will be agreed.

A HISTORICAL-CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THE INTEGRATION OF UNCONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION CAPABILITIES

Lieutenant Colonel (AF) Alfred VASILESCU

After the Second World War, the process of transformation of security policies and strategies had to adapt to the realities of the time. Therefore, the political-military leadership had to understand that the information, public opinion, morale, mind and soul of the human being, motivation to fight are decisive in gaining victory. As such, the next step was to integrate all these realities in the military science regarding warfare. In this respect, the author points out the main stages of these transformations: the perception of information warfare and the new revolutionary doctrine of the 1999-2011.

As the author writes, in 2025, unconventional threats will be characterised by: increasing information, evolution of irregular warfare capabilities, primacy of unmilitary aspects of warfare.

Keywords: *media warfare; cellular telephony; public opinion; strategic communication*

The history of the use of unconventional means in conflicts goes back in time more than 2 000 years. At first, there was *military deception*, known and applied since Ancient Times, theorised by Kautylia, *"a Hindu Macchiavelli"* of the third century BC, in his Arthashastra, and by the famous Sun Tzu in *Art of War* (4th century AD), then *propaganda*, and then, at the beginning of the twentieth century, *public relations* appeared, the war in Vietnam proposed *psychological operations* (PSYOPS), the intervention of American troops in Panama established *civil-military cooperation* (CIMIC) and the Gulf War meant the beginning of *information operations* (INFOOPS). Marked by these milestones, each area has developed, over time, its own policies, strategies, doctrines, conceptions, techniques, tactics, procedures, structures and mechanisms of cooperation. The metamorphosis in the field of *"soft"* confrontation underwent a slow process of evolution, first passing through a *"period of childhood"*, a *subdomains coagulation phase*, which ended with the first War in Iraq (1991), continuing with the *information war and information*

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operations integration phase, between 1991 and 1999, and was finally theorised, in a brilliant manner, in the revolutionary doctrines of the Chinese and American military schools of thought after 1999, expressed in the refined products of the *unrestricted warfare*, the *combination warfare* respectively.

Over time, polemology has developed taking into account the determinants of conflicts: costs, expenses, losses, implications and effects. The way in which humankind has fought wars has reflected the way in which wealth has been created[1] because, as a general rule, as Dick Cheney said, *"in the real world, it is the budget that shapes strategy, and not strategy that shapes the budgets"*[2]. Moreover, often, it is the domestic political power and the rivalries of various services that determine budgetary processes regarding the military domain. With this sceptical vision in mind, in order to try finding accurate determinants of the relevant factors of conflicts, we can see that, in recent decades, neither the size of an army nor the abundance of a state resources have been decisive factors in achieving victory. What really matters has been the speed of reaction, the technological advances and the information management.

The political and military leadership understood, after the Second World War, that information, public opinion, perception, morale, mind and soul of the human being, the motivation for war, the media are not only important but also crucial in achieving victory and made efforts for the integration of the mentioned aspects in the military science regarding war. In keeping with this new paradigm, it is not the budgets, nor the structures and strategies that prevail, the starting point being the effect that states wish to obtain by using war. This effect, required to be obtained to achieve goals, exceeds processes and structures (which are developed subsequently) and, increasingly often, the moral and legal limits of international relations. The process of transformation of security policies and strategies, in this respect, has been rather lengthy. For information-type unconventional aggressions, we have divided it, for heuristic, purely academic purposes, in three distinct phases.

The subdomains coagulation phase: from the beginning until 1991

The predecessor of all the techniques of *"soft"* war developing today is considered to be *propaganda*. It was conceptualised in the early seventeenth century, then evolved and refined, becoming specialised and producing, in time, several new disciplines, which have inevitably added innovative features and ways

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[1] In Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Război şi antirăzboi. Supravieţuirea în zorii secolului XXI*, translated by Mihnea Columbeanu, Editura Antet, Oradea, 1995, p. 16.
[2] *Ibid*, p. 214.

of approaching reality. Even if, at first, these disciplines did not have a distinct name, they still functioned as instruments used in confrontations between political actors. In early forms, components of information operations (as we call them today) and other fields of unconventional aggression were used in the American Civil War (attacking lines of communication, telegraph lines, enemy deception or perceptions management operations) until the Second World War (using *"Enigma"* codes, jamming radio communications, conducting massive operations of military deception to prepare the landing in Normandy). Another example would be that, in the early twentieth century, few people heard of *public relations*. This is understandable, because only after the Second World War did propaganda become specialised, in the Western world, in different fields: political, civic, economic or military, the last one also divided, in the past 30 years, in new branches: psychological operations, military deception, imagological operations, media warfare, web warfare or *public relations*.

However, not just the Western World was the promoter of this ideational development. Asia also had a strong tradition in the field. As early as 1953 (but published only in 1959 in Chinese and in 1973 in English), in Taiwan, a visionary work in the field appeared: *Theory and Practice of Political Warfare*, that divided the political warfare sphere in five distinct areas, analysed both in offensive and defensive terms: *ideological warfare* (for the conquest of the enemy); *strategic warfare* (aimed at the peaceful coexistence with the defeated); *organisational warfare* (based on three major weapons: propaganda, agitation and organisation); *psychological warfare* (relying on temptations and intimidation); *intelligence warfare* (for covert actions and assassinations – *"cloak and dagger"*) and *mass movements warfare* (based on the manipulation of the power of the masses)[3].

The history of unconventional methods of engaging the enemy continued at a rapid pace. The Vietnam War individualised *psychological operations*, refining and revealing, at the same time, the enormous impact of *public relations* in maintaining public support in a conflict. The US operations in Salvador (at the end of '80s and early '90s) repositioned the *undercover actions* and the application of the *Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, and the US operations in Panama (1989-1990) established the *civil affairs* (civil-military cooperation, known as CIMIC). Nevertheless, the starting point of a new stage in the development of unconventional means was undoubtedly represented by the first Gulf War.

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[3] General Wang Shang, *Theory and Practice of Political Warfare*, translated from Chinese by Hsin Kwang-hsu (1973), Taipei, July 1959, pp. 19-66, at http://jmw.typepad.com/files/wang-shang-theory-practice-of-political-warfare.pdf, retrieved on 17.05.2010.

Comparing it with any other conflict in history, the first Gulf War can be considered a major one. More than 300 warships, 4 000 aircraft, 12 000 armoured vehicles, 12 000 tanks and about 2 million soldiers from 30 nations took part in it. Of the 42 days of fighting, 38 were committed to air strikes, the land offensive lasting only 100 hours. The United States-led multinational force crushed 42 Iraqi divisions, the Iraqis having between 40 000 and 100 000 dead, 80 000 prisoners, 3 847 tanks, 1 450 armoured means and 2 917 artillery pieces destroyed, while the US forces lost only 184 troops. If truth be told, the costs of war of the United States reached 61 billion US dollars[4], but it remains in history as the most efficient war of military art, with the clearest ratio of combatants killed in fighting between the attacked and attacker of 378 to 1, according to some estimates, and of 675 to 1, according to others[5].

There is a certain explanation for the success of anti-Saddam Coalition. Despite the presence of a massive *"hard"* force in the theatre of operations, the most important innovation of this war resided in another field, the non-kinetic one. In this first conflict of the *"CNN age"*, the concepts of *"joint"*, *information warfare* and *media warfare* were applied and affirmed their identity. However, even if it put forward revolutionary action methods, the first Gulf War was rather a *"war of Janus"*, with a face turned towards the old forms of conflict and with the other pointing towards the future warfare[6].

In that crucial year of 1991, the Americans defined their *grand strategy*, giving it an understanding that was very close to that of *combination warfare* today: *"the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and in peacetime) best interests"*[7]. Also in 1991, NATO adopted its policy aimed at the post-*Cold War* global reality, reflected in a new strategic concept. Although this was a modern strategic concept with regard to political objectives and attitude, it was not a step forward, a revolutionary one in military terms, especially because the implementation of *"soft"* capabilities that functioned effectively within the US operated with difficulty at the NATO integrated level.

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[4] See *Războiul din Golf – Raportul final al Departamentului Apărării către Congres*, April 1992, at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf retrieved on 12.09.2010.

[5] In Jack Kelly, *Estimates of Deaths in First War Still in Dispute*, Post-Gazette National Security, 16 February 2003, http://www.post-gazette.com/nation/20030216casualty0216p5.asp, retrieved on 15.11.2010. The first estimation belongs to researcher Beth Daponte, from Carnegie Mellon University, and the second one to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from the United States of America.

[6] James Adams, *Următorul – ultimul război mondial. Arme inteligente și front pretutindeni*, Editura ANTET, 1998, p. 109.

[7] Paul M. Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategy: Toward a Broader Definition*, in *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991.

The exchange of information, INFOOPS or media warfare capabilities have remained a constant *"Achilles' heel"* ever since the beginning of the Alliance. Therefore, the process continued in force in the next decade as well, but this time, especially at the level of the nations.

The Information Warfare integration and Information Operations phase – 1991-1999

The syntagm *Information Warfare – IW* was invented in 1976 by a team that worked with Andrew W. Marshall, expert in the US Department of Defense, under Nixon Administration. Gradually, it has been frantically created a new conceptual conglomerate, that of *Revolution in Military Affairs – RMA*.

The Soviet Union was another state where the issue was debated, in the mid '80s, the process being called the *military-technical revolution*. With the writings of Alvin Toffler *(Powershift)*, and especially after the first Gulf War, the discussion about *information warfare* has become very fashionable ! The understanding of the process has been enabled by the analysis of the crises in Haiti and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In time, all the components of the information arsenal have developed their own doctrines, tactics, techniques and procedures, their own logistics, specific military structures, expert corps, as well as their pride.

In 1992, Harlan Ullman launched in the USA the concept of *"rapid dominance"* or *"shock and awe"*. The idea was to cause fear and deter the enemy in order to win without resorting to physical pain and destruction but only to feelings of fear, demotivation and confusion[8]. This approach represented a great step forward to establish a clearer identity of *information warfare* and, concurrently, to shape the new types of aggression. Therefore, the first course in IW was introduced in the curriculum of *National Defense University* in Fort McNair, Washington, relatively soon, in 1993.

Colin Powell Cabinet integrated the concept of IW in the traditional format of warfare theory, known under the acronym *C2W (Command and Control Warfare)*, which also comprised: OPSEC, PSYOPS, Military Deception – MD, Electronic Warfare – EW and physical destruction. This integration phenomenon continued in 1998, with the development and signing of the *US Joint Doctrine for Information*

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[8] In Ullman's terms, *"shock and awe"* means *"to deter and overpower an adversary through the adversary's perception and fear, regarding its vulnerability and our invincibility"* and *"to control the adversary's will and perception. It refers to affecting behaviour"*. In Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, *Shock and Awe — Achieving Rapid Dominance*, NDU Press Book, December, 1996, at http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/7259/pg7259.html, retrieved on 12.11.2010.

Operations. A year later, in 1999, NATO Military Committee adopted *NATO Doctrine for Information Operations.*

During the last years of this decade the syntagm *information warfare* was constantly replaced, in military terminology, with the one of *information operations*[9]. INFOOPS then included the coordination of the following activities: OPSEC, PSYOPS, Public Affairs – PA/Public Information – PI in NATO, civil affairs (civil-military cooperation, including outside the military), intelligence, military deception, physical destruction, electronic warfare, information warfare (technically speaking), the action of the special operations forces, perception warfare, and computer network warfare[10].

To understand what IW really meant was not an easy process. As the interpretations were very different in the US Army, it was necessary to define it firstly as a domain of the *War by Other Means – WBOM*[11]. According to it, *information warfare* consisted in three distinct parts: *perception management* (in which information is the message), *physical destruction* of the systems (information is the medium) and *information exploitation* (information is the resource of an adversary established as target)[12]. *Information warfare* did not have a strictly technological nature only. Moreover, it had also conceptual and organisational dimensions such as disinformation, deception, propaganda, electronic warfare or the employment of other non-lethal weapons[13]. At strategic level, the expression of information warfare, of this revolutionary change in the military doctrine of the time was based on the *concept of DIME*[14]. The evolution did not stop there, being stimulated especially by the dramatic events in 2001, in the United States of America.

Towards a revolutionary doctrine: 1999-2011

Between 1991 and 2000 it is estimated that between 5 and 10 nations achieved high standards and capabilities in strategic warfare (combination and information warfare): the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, France, Germany and Italy, at least. There are a lot of proofs of these transformations. The United States developed new doctrines[15] or war tactics, such as *Network Centric Operations – NCO*,

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[9] Information operations were theoretically divided into *close, deep* and *rear.*

[10] Călin Hentea, *Noile haine ale propagandei*, Editura Paralela 45, Pitești, 2008, pp. 36-37.

[11] The concept of WBOM also included IW and, subsequently, information operations.

[12] James Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[13] Non-lethal weapons were defined 15 years ago, in 1996.

[14] DIME is a famous US acronym for: diplomatic, information, military and economic; see FM 100-6.

[15] For example: *Joint Vision 2010*. This strategic document, developed in CFJO (Concept for Future Joint Operations) by the American Army, predicted major changes in 6 critical domains: people, leadership, doctrine, education and training, organisational structure and materiel. Combination warfare deals with all the six domains.

Effect-Based Operations – EBO, Niche Warfare, Space Warfare[16] or *Cyber Warfare*[17]. In the US Navy doctrines such as *SONATA* or *COPERNICUS*, steps were already taken towards implementing IW at a lower echelon, its components being included in the *"cube warfare system"*, based on the Network-Centric Warfare – NCW, sensors and precision weapons. All were subsumed under the RMA theory. This way of conducting a war was actually aimed at meeting two objectives: protection by the USA of the life of every American citizen (be it a military combatant) and concern for the image of the American Administration (image enhanced through reducing the number of victims).

The first important reaction to the American RMA and to the US offensive foreign policy was the emergence of the asymmetrical (terrorist) warfare, in 2001. This evolution required two responses from the US: the accelerated development of RMA, on the one hand, and the development of a counterrevolution in military affairs (CRMA). *Combination warfare* exactly met the security requirements and needs. For example, in 2003, 90% of the American doctrinal effort was focused on state actors and not on the other types of international actors (non-state or transnational ones). It happened in spite of the fact that the economic ratio, in asymmetrical conflicts, between terrorist attacks and the measures to counter them was 1:3 000 000 USD[18] !!! Therefore, something had to be done; some unprecedented measures had to be taken to reassess the emergent forms of aggression.

In conformity with CRMA, the Office of Strategic Influence was established in the USA, after the events on 11 September 2001, under the command of General Simon Warden, a secret institution, responsible for the *"grey"* and *"black"* propaganda and for the disinformation of the European countries hostile to the war against terrorism. The public opinion rejected this initiative and, despite denying the existence of such an institution, this type of actions was considered vital, even if it was recognised or not, not only for the American Administration but also for any other country that wanted to protect the national interests. The adoption of the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes and the outbreak of the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and the second war in Iraq were the signal that a new type of conducting war emerged. Jonathan Alters, a journalist from the *Newsweek*, called the Second Gulf War the *"mother of propaganda wars"*[19].

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[16] Today, but especially tomorrow, it is considered that power crosses the outer space. The USA, EU, Russia, China, Japan, India and Israel dominate this environment.

[17] *Cyber war* is a term that was first used by David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, at RAND Corporation.

[18] In Mircea Mureşan and Gheorghe Văduva, *Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului*, Universitatea Naţională de Apărare, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 470.

[19] Cited in Călin Hentea, *Noile haine ale propagandei, op. cit.*, p. 155.

General Franks, commander of allied troops, observed that the new information technology could radically change the vertical hierarchical structures of the conservatory military organisation that hindered a rapid transfer of information. Another observation was that a prerequisite for achieving military success was represented by the joint use of the information weapon by all the Armed Forces services. In a certain way, this conflict was the pinnacle of propaganda, and, most importantly, it showed that the nature of war should have changed once the boundary between the pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situation became rather fragile and theoretical during a total and continuous confrontation (as the *combination warfare* and *unrestricted warfare* are defined today).

Having information operations capabilities meant, during that period, having capabilities in at least 5 classes, grouped in 15 subdomains: C2 processes; cryptography/cryptology and intelligence; systems security, information security and physical security; communication technology, software, LAN and WAN means, models and simulation (M&S); PSYOPS; deception; OPSEC; electronic warfare and special operations[20]. These subdomains were coordinated by military experts within some unitary information campaigns[21], planned and led at operational or strategic level by structures such as the US JSIWC[22].

All these developments were conceived in the last ten years of the previous century. However, this progress has continued ceaselessly. New concepts have permanently emerged, covering other areas that have had to be integrated by the military (and not only) or bringing into attention older theories whose content has been profoundly updated. Therefore, in the new millennium, the following aspects have been experimented and affirmed, among others: *Entropy-Based Warfare; Effect-Based Operations*, the concept of *COIN* (regarding counterinsurgency operations), *Non-Kinetic Operations*, *Strategic Communication* (STRATCOM) or *Interagency Operations*.

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In this article, we have shown when the different concepts and theories in the field of unconventional confrontations emerged and how they have changed into instruments of action. We have seen how, through successive sedimentation, the unconventional instruments of the contemporary society have become more complex

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[20] Roger W. Barnett, *Information Operations, Deterrence, and the Use of Force*, Naval War College Review, vol. 51. no. 2, spring, 1998, pp. 7-19.

[21] From the US standpoint, information campaign is the coordinated and synchronised use of psychological operations, public affairs, civil affairs, military deception and projection of truth to cause the adversary to act in a manner favourable to the US objectives.

[22] JSIWC (Joint Service for Information Warfare Center) based in Norfolk, the USA, unified all the agencies involved in the information warfare planning and conduct.

and sophisticated. Progress in this vast and polymorphic areal does not stop here. Following different analyses, it will continue in relation to the human society pace of development. Thus, it is considered that, in 2025, conflict will be characterised by the following strategic trends: *increasing importance of information* (it will allow for a large number of states to be able to threaten an enemy with the rapid destruction of critical, economic, energy, political, military and information infrastructure), *evolution of irregular warfare capabilities* (modern technology of communications, satellites and cellular telephony, internet, commercial encryption combined with miniature navigation devices and high capacity information systems, which will enable the future irregular forces to organise, coordinate and execute dispersed operations), *prominence of non-military aspects of warfare* (the forms of conflict based on cybernetic, economic, psychological and information aspects and aiming at resources will prevail). In the future, *state and non-state adversaries will engage in "media wars"* to dominate the 24-hour news cycle and to manipulate the public opinion, in order to impose the own agenda and to gain the popular support for the own cause), and *conflicts beyond the traditional battlefield will expand and escalate* (through the use of long range precision weapons, the continuous proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the employment of new forms of warfare, such as the cyber or space one)[23]. That is why, we consider that the process of unconventional capabilities integration will diversify and continue concomitantly with the development of the policies, strategies and security doctrines that substantiate them, more and more states understanding the potential the optimisation of this process may have for the preservation of their interests.

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[23] ***, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, National Intelligence Council, November, 2008, p. 71, at www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html retrieved on 18.06.2010.

LISBON SUMMIT
- A Milestone
in the Alliance History –

Lieutenant Colonel Chivu GHEORGHE

The Lisbon NATO Summit is considered as a historic one, especially because the member states decided upon the new strategic concept of the Alliance for the next 10 years. Beyond the terrorist danger, the concept considered the new challenges, such as cyber attacks and the potential threat of ballistic missiles from states like Iran or North Korea.

During the reunion, NATO also debated the future of the mission in Afghanistan, the member states deciding, in this respect, upon a calendar regarding the withdrawal of the military presence until 2014.

Moreover, the members also approached the project regarding the setting up of the anti-missile shield and the relaunch of the cooperation of Western allies with Moscow, on the occasion of the NATO-Russia Summit.

Keywords: capabilities; comprehensive approach; energy security; reform and transformation

The end of World War II on 9 May 1945 was one of the most important moments in the world's history, in general, and in the twentieth century, in particular. West European countries and their North American allies were faced, in the years following the conclusion of peace, with a multitude of problems inherent in post-conflict periods but which, in the context of the particular new created situation, were different from one another through special requirements concerning the economic, social, cultural and political reconstruction. The armed forces of the countries participating in the conflict had to be demobilised and, depending on the actual possibilities and needs, the coordinates of the new military capabilities of each country were outlined. The strategy of establishing military alliances was heavily influenced by the geopolitical situation still barely crystallised before the end of the conflict.

Under Soviet pressure, the USSR intending to maintain its military force, given the circumstances of the shaping of the conditions of a bipolar world, the Western countries and the North American allies (the US and Canada) decided to establish a political-military alliance as a counterweight to the Soviet military block. The North Atlantic

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Treaty Organisation (NATO) was founded in April 1949, through the North Atlantic Treaty, known as the *Washington Treaty*. It set up a collective defence alliance, in accordance with the provisions of article 51 of the UN Charter, intended to protect the security of all its members by political and military means, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. According to the provisions of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO would remain open in the future for the accession of other countries.

The main landmarks in NATO history

Since its foundation, the Alliance has acted for establishing a fair and durable peace, based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The North Atlantic Council adopted, in October 1953, the NATO emblem as a symbol of the Atlantic Alliance. The circle represents unity and cooperation, while the wind rose symbolises the common direction towards peace, for the member countries.

Representing the concrete expression of the transatlantic dialogue between European NATO members, the US and Canada, the Alliance's fundamental objective was to ensure peace and stability in Europe and in the emerging area. The fulfilment of common objectives, political primarily, between the European members and the North American members of the Alliance, is supported by joint defence planning, military cooperation, consultation and collaboration in the economic, scientific, environmental protection, as well as other relevant areas.

The historical evolution of over 60 years of the Alliance has been marked by important moments, NATO adapting and shaping itself again and again, continuously and successfully meeting all the changes in the global security environment, serving as a forum for consultations between the allies on any issue of interest, having the role to deter and defend against threats to NATO member states.

NATO's doctrinal guidelines – historical evolution

Throughout the Alliance history, the international political-military situation has been characterised by fluidity and unpredictability, and through political and/or military meetings, at the highest levels, various doctrinal orientations have been discussed and adopted. These have characterised not only the international situation but also the interests of Alliance members. Therefore, a quick overview of the past 30 years, with regard to these doctrinal guidelines, reveals the historical evolution of the main guidelines:
- Ottawa, 1974 – defence in the light of the use of nuclear forces;
- Ankara, 1980 – restore trust between East and West;

- Washington, 1984 – dialogue and cooperation, East-West;
- London, 1990 – the end of *Cold War*;
- Rome, 1991 – a new strategic concept;
- Madrid, 1997 – openness of the Alliance to new members and partnerships;
- Washington, 1999 – a new strategic concept: collective defence, crisis management and the Partnership for Peace (PfP);
- Prague, 2002 – evolution of the global security environment: terrorism;
- Istanbul, 2004 – NATO's engagement in Afghanistan and new partnerships;
- Riga, 2006 – Summit of the transformation and completion of the 1999 strategic concept;
- Bucharest, 2008 – solutions for the new threats of the 21st century;
- Strasbourg-Kehl, 2009 – revision of the current strategic concept.

During the *Cold War*, NATO, an Alliance based on political and military cooperation between member countries, focused primarily on providing and maintaining collective defence through cooperation and through the development of means for collective management of crises and peacekeeping in order to overcome the fundamental political issues that were dividing Europe. After the end of the *Cold War*, the Alliance went through a difficult process of adjustment, the policies trying to predict as precisely as possible the geopolitical development of events at regional and global levels. The end of the *Cold War* caused, at least in military terms, the transition from bipolarism, in which the two big military blocks adjudicating their ability to ensure control through the two great military powers (the USA and USSR) on their areas of interest, well defined geographically, to a unipolar world in which the US would have a dominant position, at great distance from any other state, particularly in the military, economic, technological, financial etc. fields.

The nature and content of the relations between the US and its European allies have therefore undergone a profound revision, which brings again to discussion the transatlantic institutions, together with the political and strategic logics that supported more than half a century. NATO has adapted and reshaped continuously, dealing successfully with the changes in the global security environment. Thus, the cycle is obvious: we have new threats (in particular asymmetrical ones), and they require an appropriate response, with new types of missions; new types of missions require new capabilities, and new missions and new capabilities require a new framework of cooperation, new relationships and new doctrinal concepts. In this respect, in response to specific threats, in some instances, the Alliance has adapted and based its doctrine on:

- *collective defence – 1949*, strategy of large-scale operations for territorial defence;

- *defence of the North-Atlantic zone – 1955, "massive retaliation"* strategy;
- *defence of NATO territory – 1967,* strategy of *"flexible response"*;
- *the new strategic concept – 1990,* replacement of confrontation with cooperation, initiation of the transformation from military alliance in defence and security alliance;
- *strategic concept – 1999,* review and updating of the 1990 concept.

In 1999, when the Alliance had 16 member countries, in Washington it was adopted a *new strategic concept*: *collective defence, crisis management and PfP,* which allowed members of the Alliance to commit themselves, alongside the old principles relating to safeguarding freedom, perpetuating the legacy of common traditions and civilisation of their peoples based on the principles of democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law, to paying close attention to the enlargement of the organisation, under the provisions of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty – 1949.

Now, when the Alliance includes 28 countries, numerous aspects of the old strategic concept remain, of course, pertinent and relevant. However, after 10 years, this concept is no longer fully anchored in the reality of major political and security events, which occurred at the beginning of the 21st century, such as 9/11, and NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, and the premises of developing the present concept were dictated by the need to adapt the Alliance to the new existing geostrategic conditions, duplicated by the need to identify and implement some substantial and profound transformations. The nature of risks and the evolution of threats to the vital interests of NATO have imposed taking into discussion new challenges related to the establishment of the strategic unity of the Alliance, maintaining solidarity and achieving a common understanding of the patterns of a possible Article 5 specific event of the Washington Treaty. Increasing interaction with countries that are not members of NATO and with other international actors has led to broadening the opportunities of the Alliance's role in ensuring security and stability beyond the traditional areas of employment.

The Summit

Specialists have considered the Lisbon NATO Summit as one with a historical significance, because the member countries decided upon the Alliance's new *strategic concept* for the next 10 years. It took into account, beyond the danger of terrorism, new challenges such as cyber attacks and potential threat of ballistic missiles from states such as Iran or North Korea. The meeting also discussed the future of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Member states established a timetable

for the withdrawal of the military presence by 2014. At the summit, there were also discussions about the project on the construction of missile shield; the Western allies made official and re-launched their cooperation with Moscow, during the NATO-Russia Summit.

On the agenda of the debates held at the summit, at the level of heads of state and government, representatives of the member countries put in discussion the issues of major importance for the present and future of the Alliance:

❖ NATO's vision on the Euro-Atlantic security in the period 2010-2020: *new strategic concept*; command structure reform; NATO agencies reform.

    ❖ *Operations:*

        a) Afghanistan – the drafting of a separate declaration for Afghanistan; the revision/updating of long-term partnership NATO – Afghanistan; the assessment of progress and implementation of the four priorities of the *Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan – CSPMP* for 2010; the reviewing of Technical-Military Agreement NATO-Afghanistan; implementation of Resolution no. 1325 of the SC of the UN on women, peace and security; the US proposal on the variant of defining the final status of the transition.

        b) The other operations.

❖ *Capabilities:* developing NATO missile defence capabilities; critical capabilities package for defence transformation; stage report on energy security.

❖ *Comprehensive approach:* guidelines on the NATO enlargement process; stage report – proposals for concrete actions relating to the implementation of the action plan in the field of comprehensive approach.

❖ *Partnerships:* decision on a concept of integrated partnerships; guidelines on strengthening NATO's partnerships, as a strategic dimension of comprehensive approach.

      - *NATO-Russia Relationship.*

      - *Evolving challenges to security* – stage report on energy security.

The main decisions/documents from the NATO Summit – 2010

The Summit was a real success, all the documents submitted to the heads of state and government being approved and reviewed.

    1. *Lisbon Summit Declaration* – the fundamental document that reiterates the commitment of the Alliance to the common vision and shared democratic values, in accordance with the provisions of the Washington Treaty.

The document reviews all other decisions adopted or approved at the level of heads of state and government.

2. *NATO's Strategic Concept* – called *"Active Engagement, Modern Defence"* – is short and comprehensive, balanced and operative. The structure of the concept includes the chapters: core tasks and principles; security environment; defence and deterrence; security through crisis management; arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; *"open doors"* policy; partnerships; reform and transformation; an Alliance for the 21st century; each chapter brings the necessary details on the domain that it addresses.

Mainly, the concept presents the following aspects: reaffirmation of the fundamental principles, according to the Washington Treaty; reconfirmation of the principle of mutual defence and guarantee of the integrity of the citizens and the territory of the allies against an attack, including against new types of threats; Alliance's engagement in crisis prevention, conflict management and post-conflict stabilisation, in cooperation with partners, the UN and the EU; Alliance's substantial political commitment in the relationship with partners and the provision of an optimal framework for their contribution to NATO-led operations; definition of the purpose of creating a world free of nuclear weapons, noting that, as long as there are these types of weapons, NATO will remain an alliance with nuclear potential; continuation of the *"open doors"* policy for the European democratic nations that meet and adhere to the goals and values of the allies; NATO is and will remain the fundamental forum for transatlantic consultation, between North America and Europe, regarding their common concerns and the two will mutually influence their views and positions, will decide on joint activities, will share responsibilities and risks; continuation of the reform for the implementation and/or preservation of the efficiency, effectiveness and flexibility of the Alliance.

3. *Missile defence* – it is stipulated the extension of the aim of the current programme of NATO regarding territorial defence against missiles, so as to become an integral part of the general system of defence and to carry out the protection of the territories, population and forces of NATO member states in Europe; also, reference is made to the American contribution associated to the missile defence architecture, as well as the participation of Russia in this project.

4. *NATO Command Structure* – the decisions are related to the broad framework of the revision of the structure (as it is known, for the purpose of significantly reducing by about 4 000 posts and by 7 the existing structures), as well as courses of action on the preparation of documents

and plans on host nation support, information and communication system, geographical location of headquarters, relationship between the command structure and the NATO forces.

5. *The reform of NATO Agencies* – there were approved the reduction of the present number of 14 agencies and their grouping on 3 functional areas (procurement, logistic support and communications), and the plan of implementation of this reform.

6. *The issue of the most urgent needs of Alliance capabilities* is reflected in the Declaration of the Summit and addresses the directions for their development in the period ahead, on the basis of a realistic projection of available resources. It is proposed a prioritisation of existing initiatives that are already on the agenda of NATO transformation, introducing neither new additional commitments nor the extension of the allied common funding. It was agreed to maintain a balance between nuclear and conventional weapons and those for missile defence.

7. *Afghanistan Political Declaration* – the document presents: the general lines on the transition based on the conditions in the theatre of operations, not on the calendar, action which should not be confused with a withdrawal of NATO and which is planned to be initiated earlier this year and completed in 2014; the international community's support so that the Afghan security forces could lead and conduct operations in all provinces; the NATO-Afghanistan long-term partnership; the process of reconciliation and reintegration; the importance of Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan.

Moreover, it was reaffirmed the agreement of all the heads of state and government contributing troops in ISAF to continue a commitment for long-term participation under such operations.

With regard to the *Declaration on NATO-Afghanistan long-term partnership*, the document was signed by the NATO Secretary General and the President of Afghanistan, after the meeting. In the document, it was kept the specification of Afghanistan's request to initiate negotiations with NATO on the conclusion of the *Agreement on the status of NATO forces on the territory of Afghanistan (SOFA)* in the next 3 years, and the *NATO-Afghanistan Military-Technical Agreement*.

8. *Implementation of the Action Plan in the field of comprehensive approach and the ability of NATO to provide elements of stabilisation and reconstruction* – the document presents NATO's involvement in the international community's efforts regarding comprehensive approach, in all aspects,

military and civilian, to the issue of stabilisation and reconstruction in the theatre of operations.

In essence, this concept reflects a NATO integrated approach to participation in operations and the fulfilment, in general, of its tasks, which involves networking with other international partners and actors, civil-military instruments for crisis management, support for stabilisation and reconstruction operations (for example, Afghanistan, where NATO's role is no longer strictly military).

9. *EU-NATO relations* – the document was drawn up as a result of the initiative launched by the member states of the EU and NATO in order to identify possible solutions to remedy the shortfalls, as well as to further develop this relationship.

10. *NATO Partnerships* – with a view to improving the profile of partnerships, by increasing the level of efficiency and flexibility of the mechanisms of partnership, it was considered the use of a single work programme and a single set of tools for the states in the framework of the types of partnerships developed by NATO. In this sense, the *"Political and Partnerships Committee"* was created, which would integrate the political and defence dimension of the cooperation with partners.

With reference to the Joint Declaration on NATO-Russia relationship, we can say that it establishes the future terms and directions of development of the dialogue and practical partnership between NATO and Russia.

11. *NATO's posture in deterring an attack and defending the territory and population of members against the full range of threats to Alliance security* – it was agreed to maintain a balance between nuclear and conventional weapons, the missile defence.

12. *Countering cyber-attacks* – tasks were assigned related to the development of a NATO policy in the field of combating cyber attacks, as well as to the conceptual elements for *"NATO defence against cyber attacks"*.

13. *Countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED)* – the document presents a summary of the activities planned and of those in progress at the level of NATO and the EU in the field and the identification of possible ways of decreasing deficits, as well as establishing the possible areas of collaboration in the future. The suggestions will be discussed at the level of each organisation and, subsequently, in the NATO-EU Capabilities Group.

14. *NATO's role in energy security* – this role is developed according to the principles, recommendations and guidelines outlined at the Bucharest (2008) and Strasbourg/Kehl (2009) Summits.

15. *Crisis management* **–** there were presented a status report and a study on the possibilities of implementing the civilian capabilities in this area.
16. *Raising NATO's profile in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation* **–** it was submitted an evaluation on the level of mass proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.
17. *NATO's policy on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution no. 1325 on women, peace and security* **–** it was highlighted the essential role of women in conflict prevention and in post-conflict period, as well as reconstruction efforts.
18. *Activities in perspective (associated with the 2010 Summit results)* **–** for the coming period, three major events are planned: two meetings of Ministers of Defence, in March and June, and a meeting of Foreign Ministers, in April, in which the chiefs of defence play an important role, considering the decisions to be taken on the military dimension of the Alliance for the next decade.

There are detailed the tasks incumbent on NATO's Military Committee, from the Lisbon Summit Declaration, within five areas: a. the *New Strategic Concept* (developing military recommendations; determining the necessary conduct principles for the defence planning process; development of contingency plans, taking into account the identified risks and threats); b. *NATO reform* (command structure; agencies; resource management; headquarters); c. *Alliance capabilities and the development of the procurement process*; d. *Defense and deterrence*; e. *Partnerships*.

In order to preserve the dynamism and relevance, in terms of maintaining a complex security environment, which includes a lot of hybrid threats and risks, we believe that a clear understanding of specific elements and a diplomatic manner of approach have made the cooperation mechanisms adapt to the new priorities of NATO, which have taken into account the aspirations of various partner countries so that the Partnership could remain an attractive offer.

The structural configuration of the world has changed, and the assurance of national interests continues to be the primary responsibility of the foreign policy of the European states.

The evolution of human society emphasises the importance of the fight for gaining control, from the primary forms of social organisation to supranational levels. This permanent effort has been led against opponents always very difficult to predict, who have never hesitated to use their imagination to surprise and, therefore, to prepare in advance for that type of confrontation, forcing response forms that have not been anticipated nor adopted in a hurry.

Recent historical experience reveals the tendency according to which, over time, the union of the states that set up common structures intended for defence get to acquire more and more the defining characteristics of a nation and to behave as such, both internally and as an international actor.

The careful analysis of the politico-military events, in this era of truly total confrontations, helps professionals in identifying the main parts of the physiognomy of future armed conflicts and anticipates their influence on the process of Alliance capabilities improvement, thus contributing to the development of a climate of security, stability and confidence in the multilateral framework, in different cultural and geopolitical conditions, in which the ability to adapt quickly to local traditions and rules, specific to the area and missions, is one of the keys to success.

In our opinion, the future developments of regional and global conflicts, the ability to understand the patterns and structure of the world will prove the conclusions, doctrinal concepts and modern approaches contained in the final documents of the Lisbon Summit, the ways of solving the problems occurred as a result of internal and international security environment challenges, the will and consent of the states that wish to organise jointly the security and defence system of the fundamental national interests.

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE – 2010

Colonel (N) Constantin SAVU

The assessment of the NATO strategic concept, from the perspective of the objectives promoted by Romania, points out a few special premises, initiated and supported by the national decision-makers during the debates related to this topic, as follows: to reaffirm the collective defence as a central element of NATO, as well as the need for meeting the new security threats; to enhance NATO's role as a forum for transatlantic dialogue on security issues; to pay increasing attention to the security developments in NATO's vicinity; to enhance partnership relations, through expanding activities and organising them depending on the specific interests of the partners; to acknowledge the importance of including the anti-missile defence among NATO missions; to recognise the increasing role of the Alliance in the field of energy security; to take a balanced and pragmatic approach to the relation with Russia.

Keywords*: collective defence; global player; EAPC; crisis management; NATO enlargement*

Motto:
"NATO's Strategic Concept matters because NATO matters; and NATO matters because freedom will surely need defenders in the next decade and for generations to come".

Dr. Madeleine Albright,
on the occasion of the Seminar on NATO's
New Strategic Concept, Washington,
DC, 23 February 2010

Following the decisions taken and the documents adopted, the 2010 NATO Summit is categorised as *"one of the most important in the history of the Alliance"*. In this forum, *NATO's strategic concept* was approved, defined as *"the mode of action, adopted following the analysis of strategic situations. It is the announcement of what should be done, in terms sufficiently flexible to allow the development of the guidelines for political, military, communication, development, transformation, partnership action etc., as well as other actions arising from them"*.

We must however stress that the definition of strategic concepts is usually carried out through NATO classified documents, which contain essential political and military guidelines. The public versions explain the political objectives

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of the Alliance, the essence of its existence and vocation, the environment in which it operates and its vision in the medium and long term. All strategic concepts adopted by NATO, from its founding until the late 1980s, were known in general but there were few detailed discussions about them.

In the framework of the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit (2009), as part of the *Declaration on Alliance Security*, NATO Secretary General was mandated to convene and lead a wide open group, composed of 12 experts[1], who, in close cooperation with NATO political and military authorities, allied and partner states, relevant and interested international organisations would set up and develop the project of a new strategic concept. The *Declaration on Alliance Security* defines the indicators of the process of drafting the concept, as well as the specific roles of the political and military authorities of NATO (North Atlantic Council, NATO Secretary General, Military Committee and the Group of Experts), but the decision-making role regarding the approval of the concept belonged naturally to the heads of state and government at the Lisbon NATO Summit in November 2010.

This approach was based on objective grounds, among which the most relevant were: the significant change, in the last decade, of the world political-military, economic and security environment, combined with the way the Alliance aligned itself and adapted to it; the differences of visions of allied states[2] concerning the perceptions of threats and the capabilities required to combat them and even some views on the role of NATO in the future. In the same context, it should not be ignored that the major forces and resources acting under the Alliance flag are deeply engaged in military actions, in different theatres of operations, outside NATO's *"traditional"* area of action – Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans. In this perspective, it was appreciated that it had been created the optimal moment for the allies to discuss the (re)definition of NATO's role and missions, as well as to achieve a new political consensus, the opportunity being materialised and finalised with the Lisbon Summit.

Thus, the debate on NATO's new strategic concept, the 7th in the history of the organisation, occurred against the background of the intensification of criticism within the Alliance on the unfulfilment of the objectives undertaken in the framework of the Riga Summit (2006), a fact demonstrated by the reluctance of several allied states to make available to NATO the forces and means necessary for the implementation of political decisions, mainly in support of the ISAF operation.

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[1] The group of experts, chaired by Dr Madeleine Albright (former US Secretary of State), consisted in civilian personalities from the Netherlands, Italy, Canada, the UK, Turkey, Spain, Germany, France, Latvia, Poland and Greece.

[2] The number of members grew from 16 in 1999 to 28 in 2010.

In addition, some views emerged on the balanced orientation not only towards the asymmetrical threats but also towards the classic ones, as well as NATO's involvement in areas with particular relevance, such as the Arctic area, cyberspace and the mode of involvement in the safety of energy infrastructure of European interest.

Immediately after taking office (August 2009), on different occasions (conferences, interviews etc.), NATO Secretary General stressed the idea that the Alliance should be able to develop and manage a new strategic concept and emphasise the need for optimisation of the allocation of budgetary resources to the military while maintaining and sustaining the tempo and scope of the general transformation within NATO (the reform of the command structure, NATO Headquarters, information gathering, processing and disseminating process, resources, capabilities structure and agencies), however, through an intense and sustained political dialogue between members. The predecessor of the present NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, stated*: "... the development of a new strategic concept is given by the need to explain to a wider audience what this transforming Alliance is. Many do not fully understand the huge changes that NATO has undergone since the end of the Cold War, or simply are not aware of them. A new updated core document would make it easier to explain what the Alliance is and would strengthen public support, essential to its continuing success. And I would add that it will not only interest the public opinion in allied countries. Since NATO's strategic interests coincide with those of a growing number of countries that are not members of the Alliance, I have no doubt that a new strategic concept would be carefully considered in these countries as well"*[3].

Developing a strategic concept comprised three distinct stages, namely: *reflection* (marked by a series of seminars, meetings, workshops etc. on various relevant themes); *consultations* of the Group of Experts with NATO political and military authorities, with allies and partners; *drafting and final negotiation of the text* of the concept. In this process, states, especially the allied ones, have exposed and supported their points of view, promoting their own views on the issues under discussion. Therefore, conferences, seminars were carried out, letters to request information and support for certain points of view both at the policy-making level and at the military one were exchanged, testing at the same time, the allies' reactions to the topics under discussion.

In this connection, I appreciate that the strategic objectives of the various states were expressed differently, depending on the respective national interests.

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[3] Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the NATO Defence College, Rome, 28 May 2009.

For example, the United States sought to include in the concept paragraphs that could lead, directly or indirectly, to the stabilisation of Afghanistan, to the focus on the challenges ahead, and to NATO's institutional reform[4]. France took a more critical approach to the Alliance, campaigning in its vision for the examination of the relationship between the function of deterrence and the one of projection of the political-military guarantees; the quantification of the strategic impact of Russia's influence on international security; the settlement of the dynamics of the tendencies to expand or reduce the allied missions and functions reflected in the national limitations and constraints in the use of forces *(caveats)*. Germany's objectives were to shape NATO's medium-term prospects; to maintain a balance in the relationship with Russia; to prudently continue the Alliance enlargement process. On the other hand, Norway considered that, at ten years from the commencement of NATO enlargement process, a maximum threshold of new members absorption capacity was reached, further expansion could become a source of vulnerabilities and the geographical expansion of NATO paradoxically contributed to diminishing the interest for the territorial security of its members.

The basic principles of the strategic concept development process, as they were sustained by NATO Secretary General, highlighted the following: an ambitious but realistic approach; the need to keep the Alliance in the global community of international actors; a global vision of security in which NATO should identify its own contribution.

NATO's Strategic Concept – "Active Engagement, Modern Defence"

The design and development of the concept were made based on the most open process in the history of the Alliance, so that all those interested could present their views. As it may be downloaded from the official website of the Alliance, the document may be studied by everyone who is interested in the allied strategic visions and predictions for the next decade. The efforts of all nations to find their own national interests in the content of the concept are visible. It is justly considered that the document is short and comprehensive, balanced and operative. We will further try to present the main elements of the strategic concept.

In the preface of the document the fundamental principles included in the Treaty of Washington are reaffirmed, with the emphasis on the transatlantic link and indivisible security, which will be further promoted through allied solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing, reflecting the defining character of the Alliance

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[4] According to American analysts, it was time NATO supported the USA, after a long period during which the USA supported NATO.

as a community of values and principles and not a community generated by the threats that must be addressed.

The strategic concept is structured in nine chapters, as follows:

    1. Core tasks and principles.
    2. The security environment.
    3. Defence and deterrence.
    4. Security through crisis management.
    5. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
    6. Open door.
    7. Partnerships.
    8. Reform and transformation.
    9. An Alliance for the 21ˢᵗ century.

1. Core tasks and principles: the chapter reaffirms the fundamental and enduring purpose of the Alliance to safeguard freedom and security of its members, presents the bond and indivisibility of transatlantic security, which will be further promoted on the basis of the allied solidarity, and reflects the defining character of the Alliance as a community of values and principles. If the 1999 version of the concept defined security, consultation, deterrence and defence as the fundamental tasks of the Alliance, the current concept redefines them on three levels:

- *collective defence* – there are firmly restated the commitments stipulated in the provisions of Article 5, according to which the allies will always assist each other in case of an attack directed against a member state or the Alliance, as a whole;
- *crisis management* – the actions that take place before, during and after conflicts, which can affect the security of the Alliance, in which the organisation will actively employ the political and military means available;
- *cooperative security* – political and security developments outside the allied boundaries may affect or may be affected by the Alliance, an organisation that will actively engage in these issues, through partnerships with relevant states, through contributions to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as through the *"open doors"* policy for all European democracies that meet NATO standards.

2. The security environment: it is underlined the impact of current conflicts on the Euro-Atlantic security, highlighting the new assessed security risks: international terrorism, failed states, proliferation of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) weapons and their delivery means, cyber attacks, climate changes, as well as the potential use of new technologies in order to conduct

illegal activities[5] associated with the risks of destabilisation of NATO's security environment – laser weapons, electronic warfare, anti-satellite technologies, insecurity of global goods, such as vital communications, transport and transit networks that are essential to world trade system or energy security. All these sources of instability and/or conflicts can directly threaten the security of the Alliance. Moreover, another component that can significantly influence the security environment, which concerns the Alliance from the perspective of planning and leading operations at war, is represented by the disturbance of the environment and reduction of the level of vital resources, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs. It is also relevant that the Euro-Atlantic space is at peace, and the danger of a conventional attack against allied territory is low, yet not to be ignored.

3. Defence and deterrence: it is reaffirmed the Alliance's supreme responsibility to protect and defend the territory and population of member states. Deterrence is the key element of NATO defence strategy, which can be performed by the combined use of conventional and nuclear capabilities, despite the fact that the use of the latter is a highly unlikely scenario. NATO does not consider a given state as its opponent, however, nobody should ignore the allied capability and dedication to resolve any situation affecting its security. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance is the existence of strategic nuclear forces, provided by the USA, as well as those of the UK and France.

4. Security through crisis management: it is innovative, reiterating the fact that NATO, through political approaches and/or military involvement, in cooperation with civil structures, will engage *where possible and when necessary* to prevent and manage a crisis or to undertake specific measures to stabilise the situation and support the reconstruction. In this sense, there are mentioned the measures to increase NATO efficiency in crisis management, such as: enhance intelligence sharing; enhance integrated civilian-military planning; form crisis management civilian capabilities; identify and train civilian specialists from the allied states, made available for rapid deployment in theatres; broaden and intensify the political consultations between the allies and partners.

5. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation focuses on strengthening the role of NATO in this area. The following objectives are considered: to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons; to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency in the field of Russian nuclear weapons in Europe and their relocation away from NATO territory; to consolidate conventional

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[5] Extremism, arming, terrorism, trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.

arms control in Europe, through the modernisation of the *Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty – CFE,* on the basis of reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent.

6. Open door stresses that NATO enlargement has contributed substantially to strengthening the allied security. However, it is considered the prospect of further enlargement of the Alliance with European candidate states, which assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership.

7. Partnerships: the relations of dialogue and cooperation with partners are highlighted, based on reciprocity and mutual benefit, which can make a concrete contribution to Alliance operations and to enhancing international security. In this context, it is underlined the importance of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), PfP programme, NATO relations with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia in ensuring cooperation with partner countries, in strengthening the partnership with the EU and the United Nations to build a genuine strategic partnership. The EU remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. In the interest of keeping peaceful international relations, NATO maintains its willingness to engage and develop a political dialogue and consultations with any state or international organisation.

8. Reform and transformation: quite explicit details are given on the parameters that military forces should meet, *when and where necessary*, on the basis of the necessary approvals, without geographical limits, in any environment, under the conditions of joint actions. All these aspects are in conjunction with sufficient financial, military and human resources. It should be noted that NATO level of ambition is unchanged, with a view to ensuring the concomitant leadership of not more than eight simultaneous operations: two large and six small.

9. An Alliance for the 21st century: it mentions the determination of the allies to continue renewal of the Alliance to meet the current and predicted security challenges. NATO is committed to preserve its relevance as a global actor and the most successful political-military Alliance.

I consider that the assessment of NATO's strategic concept, in light of the aims promoted by Romania, reveals a few topics of particular interest, which were initiated and supported by the national policy-making factors at the debate associated with this topic, as follows: *the re-affirmation of collective defence* as the central element of NATO and of the need to respond to the new security threats; the need to strengthen *the role of NATO as a forum for transatlantic dialogue* on security issues; the increased attention on *security developments in NATO's vicinity*; the strengthening of *partnership relations*, through the expansion of activities and differentiation depending

on the specific interests of the partners; the importance of the inclusion of *missile defence* among NATO missions; the increased role of the Alliance in the field of *energy security*; a balanced and pragmatic approach to the *relationship with Russia*.

<p style="text-align:center">*</p>

The need for a new strategic concept was also motivated by conceptual purposes at the Alliance level. The exigencies regarding NATO are today greater than ever. Consequently, it was urgently needed to (re)define a clear vision of the role and tasks of the Alliance, as well as its limits, such a common perception not being easy to establish. It called for a substantial, long and difficult debate among allies. Such an exercise can take place only in support of the decision-making process that is necessary to establish priorities, among the numerous exigencies that are formulated, and that will undoubtedly be formulated regarding the Alliance in conjunction with the identification of the resources that are necessary to meet them.

Although the Alliance has managed, after the end of the *Cold War*, to show a great capacity for adaptation, by the admission of new members, reorganisation of the military command structure and reconfiguration of the mission, which made it possible for NATO to engage itself beyond the traditional area of action, a number of factors induced additional obstacles for the development and implementation of a coherent strategy of the Alliance. These factors relate mainly to the lack of a common perception on risks and threats; the relative disengagement of the USA towards European security problems; the inability of the allies to allocate sufficient resources for ongoing military operations, as well as the US command of NATO operations. All these factors have led, in my opinion, to the emergence of a group of states that support the *"Europeanisation"* of the Alliance.

The significant dynamics and magnitude of the changes in the international political-military scene, in conjunction with the continuous improvement of the operating methods of terrorist organisations, have prompted the North Atlantic Alliance to adopt a new, more flexible and open doctrinal line, with immediate applicability, both at the political-strategic and at the operative-tactical level. In this context, it remains to be seen in what manner and with what magnitude the current strategic allied concept will address at least two major objectives: the *enhancement of collective security*, the initiation respectively and, more important, the *achievement of NATO transformation*.

Currently, at the level of the Alliance political and military leadership, specific steps are undertaken to implement the decisions made and the provisions of the strategic concept, through the development of more detailed and appropriate directives, on areas of action. Thus, the agenda of future NATO meetings,

at the level of Chiefs of Defence, Foreign or Defence Ministers will be loaded with proposals of decisions that are relevant to the implementation of those decided upon at the summit. The most important step, until March 2011, is the development, by the North Atlantic Council, of policy recommendations for the transformation of defence capabilities and for the military implementation of the provisions of the strategic concept. In this context, at the level of the Military Committee, there are detailed the tasks assigned through the Lisbon Summit Declaration, in five areas – the new strategic concept; reform in NATO; Alliance capabilities and the development of the procurement process; defence and deterrence; partnerships –, for which the support and point of view of nations will be required.

From this perspective, the national political and military authorities will undertake specific arrangements for the implementation and fulfilment of the adopted decisions. In this connection, at the level of the Romanian General Staff, while initiating requests for obtaining specifications from the political factor, it is required the initiation of a campaign of analysis of the provisions of the concept, as well as their implications, with possible impact on: adjusting the concepts, structure of forces and means to act against the new types of threats; prioritising and reviewing the major procurement programmes or, why not, participating in multinational procurement programmes necessary for an adequate response to security risks; developing expeditionary and force projection capabilities; the opportunity and the need for changing, updating and harmonising the national legislation in the field of defence and security, and their consequential documents, when needed.

This brief analysis of NATO's strategic concept reveals the responses offered by the Alliance to the threats posed to allied security provided that these threats are perceived and treated appropriately. The strategic concept will guide the next stage in the evolution of the Alliance, an organisation that continues its effective evolution in a dynamic and changing environment, *against the new threats, with new capabilities and new partners*. In this perspective, transformation is further applicable. He who is able to predict the need for transformation has chances to survive, but he who can really do it will definitely survive !

DETERMINING CRITICAL NEEDS AND CAPABILITIES WITHIN NATO AND THE EU

Colonel Liviu BUMBĂCEA
Lieutenant Colonel Constantin JIANU

In order for Romania to have available a credible military force, that is dimensioned in keeping with its population, territory and missions and capable of ensuring the defence of its national security interests and the fulfilment of the commitments made at international level, it is necessary for the priorities in the field of the Romanian Armed Forces procurement programme to take into account the following aspects: providing the contingents deployed in the theatre of operations with equipment and weapon systems necessary to increase the protection and security level of the troops that participate in missions; procuring the pieces of equipment necessary for completing the implementation of the conception regarding command-control at national level; providing the forces with low operational capability with weapon systems and pieces of equipment; developing procurement/ modernisation programmes in order to ensure the protection of national territory.

Keywords*: border security; ISTAR capabilities; operational environment; target prioritisation*

Even if changes in Romania's security equation, arising from the accession to NATO (2004) and the European Union (2007), indicate a low risk of engagement in a major military conflict, our country's position at the Eastern border of the two integrating bodies and in the proximity of regional conflicts undergoing various stages of development, as well as the declared intentions of regional actors to play an important role in managing the security situation in the area maintain the risk of a regional political-military crisis that could impair the national security interests.

Romanian Armed Forces Missions

Since the NATO and EU accession, the Romanian Armed Forces missions have grown, diversified and increased their level of importance and complexity. The main missions of the Romanian Armed Forces are:

- Romania's protection and participation in the allies defence within NATO;

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- Romania's contribution to security in peacetime;
- promotion of regional and global stability through the participation in crisis response operations;
- support of local and central public administration bodies, during crisis management, according to law.

In addition to these missions, the Romanian Armed Forces participate with troops and means in order to accomplish derived missions or some belonging to other structures of the Romanian state institutions, namely:

- participation in border security, protection of strategic importance objectives and strategic goods transport;
- guarantee of free movement of ships and aircraft, as specified in national laws and treaties Romania is party of;
- implementation of measures provided by law against unauthorised use of aircraft or ships, at national level;
- fight against piracy and illicit trade in dangerous goods;
- guarantee of Romania's access to resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone.

Critical Capabilities within NATO and EU

During the Lisbon Summit, the heads of state and government approved the following *critical capabilities*:

a) covering ongoing operational deficits:

- *Afghanistan Mission Network* – developing the computer network for the theatre of operations in Afghanistan;
- *C-IED Action Plan* – reducing the strategic impact of *Improvised Explosive Device – IED* in Afghanistan and in future conflicts by achieving two main objectives: to improve NATO's capability to *"attack the IED network"* and neutralise IED devices;
- *Strategic and Tactical Airlift* – meeting NATO strategic transport needs, generally and in the theatre, in particular;
- *Logistic Collective Contracts* – ensuring efficient logistics in the theatre of operations;

b) countering new and emerging threats:

- *Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD* – missile programmes and systems) – NATO expeditionary force protection, inside or outside the area of responsibility (AOR);
- *Cyber Defence* – countering threats in cyber environment;
- *Comprehensive Approach/Stabilisation & Reconstruction* – reaching the stabilisation and reconstruction goals by using various tools

and capabilities available to all actors in the theatre of operations (alliances, NGOs and humanitarian agencies).

c) supporting current and future operations:

- *Bi-SC Automated Information Systems* – developing efficient systems for information exchange;
- *Air Command and Control System (ACCS)* – developing an integrated command-control system designed to plan and execute offensive and defensive air operations and air support missions;
- *Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)* – synchronising acquisition, planning and operation of all sensors, platforms and other means of data collection for processing, exploitation, fusion and dissemination of products to directly support current and future operations;
- *Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS)* – ensuring information superiority for NATO forces deployed in theatres of operations.

The European Defence Agency – EDA, through the capabilities development plan, has identified the following priority actions to deepen *critical capabilities*:

- *Collect Information on Operational Situation* – providing timely information on the operational situation;
- *Conduct EOD/IED Activities* – narrowing the C-IED deficit in the following areas: prediction, prevention, detection, neutralisation, IED events mitigation and exploitation;
- *Conduct Airlift* – using air transport capabilities to meet current and future operational requirements of the EU;
- *Conduct & Exploit ISTAR Activities* – providing a capability for decision superiority, coherent effects, by identifying and monitoring potential targets, supporting political and military decision-makers in selecting and prioritising targets;
- *Establish C4I Infrastructure* – facilitating communication and integration capabilities of the information network;
- *Provide Surveillance & Security Operations* – performing surveillance in order to secure areas of European interest;
- *Establish a Common Operational Picture* – integrating information to produce a common operational picture;
- *Establish Information Assurance* – providing information necessary for decision-making;
- *Establish ISTAR Architecture* – providing ISTAR architecture required to implement functions at European level;

- *Ensure Ground Mobility & Counter Mobility* – providing mobility and counter mobility of land forces in the areas of operations;
- *Conduct Sea Mine Countermeasures* – ensuring mine counter in maritime coastal areas of the EU;
- *Provide Medical, Dental & Veterinary Services* – providing an efficient medical service in the areas of operations of the EU;
- *Provide Effects in Cyberspace* – ensuring environmental superiority in cyberspace;
- *Minimise Health & Safety Risks* – reducing risks and minimising the effects on health and safety of the staff deployed in the areas of operations;
- *Protect Critical Installations & Facilities* – protecting critical installations and facilities;
- *Conduct CBRN Passive Defence* – developing preventive measures to protect troops in the areas of operations and increase operational knowledge of the situation in the CBRN risks and threats.

Commitments Assumed by Romania

Compliance with the commitments undertaken by Romania as a NATO member state requires that the Ministry of National Defence creates military capabilities set by the *Force Goals*, and provides training and capabilities necessary to carry out NATO and EU led operations, as follows:

a. Force Goals

- For the 2009-2018 period planning, Romania has undertaken the implementation of *53 Force Goals, representing 154 military structures*, from the group/team to division headquarters in all categories of military forces and branches. Undertaking the achievement of quantitative and qualitative capabilities resulting from the *2008 Force Goals* was derived from a financial forecast based on the recommendations of the Alliance for the allocation of not less than 2% of GDP for defence. This forecast was assumed in the Government Programme 2005-2008;
- Low percentage of allocated funds compared with financial needs, according to implementation plans, determines major limitations in achieving the specific requirements in terms of objectives or even the failure of some of these commitments. Following this situation, out of the 53 targets, only four were reached in due time, the remaining 49 being delayed between 2 and 4 years;
- as a result of this situation, new deadlines for implementation were proposed and approved by the Minister of National Defence,

for the period 2010-2018. These terms are estimates of the possibilities of implementing the NATO requirements assumed by Romania, in accordance with the 2018 financial forecast. The deadlines were set unilaterally by Romania, then communicated to NATO authorities through specific mechanisms of the analysis phase of the Alliance defence planning process and submitted for the approval of defence ministers at a North Atlantic Council meeting.

b. *Participation in capabilities implementation in multinational environment*

  b.1. within NATO

- *ACCS* – implementing a *NATO ASBE (ACCS Software Based Feature)* at CRC Baloteşti by 2013;
- *C-IED* – training specialists at the Centre of Excellence for C-IED and participating with forces in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan;
- *ALTBMD/MD* – significant resources have been invested to fund feasibility studies and components of the NATO programme for defence against ballistic missile threats in the theatre of operations *(ALTBMD)*;
- *JISR* – through position and stationary surveillance capabilities of *SCOMAR* and *SCAN* systems, namely through creating deployable ISTAR capabilities (force goals, *"ISTAR Architecture and Capabilities"*);
- *SAC* – we benefit from 200 flight hours by participating in the initiative;
- *AGS* – participation of national specialised companies in the AGS system should be of approximately 70%.

  b.2. within the EU

- *ECSR* – equipping forces with modern combat equipment, able to meet future requirements of the operational environment and to ensure interoperability with other NATO member states;
- *EATF (European Air Transport Fleet)* – participating in this EDA project through exchanging flight hours and providing/receiving the support functions used and/or shared by the states participating in the project;
- *ESCPC* – alternative option for achieving the capabilities of providing the connection with the country of the Romanian land forces deployed in theatres of operations;
- *CIED* – participating with personnel in manning level 2 laboratory, which will be deployed in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan;

- *MMCM* – participating in outlining *joint operational requirements*;
- *CMANPAD* and *CBRN* – the participation takes place only at conceptual level.

National Priorities in Developing Capabilities

In order for Romania to have a credible military force, sized in relation with the population, territory and incumbent tasks, able to safeguard national security interests and fulfil international commitments, it is necessary for procurement priorities, at the Romanian Armed Forces level, to take into account the following aspects:

- to provide contingents deployed in theatres of operations with equipment and weapons systems needed to increase the protection and security level of forces participating in missions;
- to purchase the equipment necessary to complete the implementation of the concept of command control at the national level;
- to purchase the equipment for investments that contribute to achieving other security policy objectives of the country, in the military area;
- to provide weapon systems and equipment for forces with low operational capacity and long build up period;
- to carry out purchasing/upgrading programmes to protect the national territory.

Essential Operational Capabilities

This prioritisation scheme is aimed at ensuring essential operational capabilities that are provided in the implementation of the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* and that carry out the tasks entrusted to the armed forces and enable the fulfilment of obligations and commitments, which represent the strategic objective of foreign and security policy of the state.

To provide the combat capacity of the forces engaged in operations and to ensure the Romanian military presence in risk areas and their proximity, we believe that the following capabilities are essential:

- command – control – communication – computer – information – surveillance and reconnaissance system;
- to provide planning and management capacity of the armed forces;
- to perform the full range of missions within the two organisations;
- force protection;
- deployment and mobility of forces;
- to engage in military action;
- to self-sustain for a long period in the area of deployment.

Implications of the Failure to Develop Capabilities

- decreased ability to conduct specific missions in peacetime (air surveillance and airspace defence, aviation, maritime surveillance communication paths, security and defence objectives of strategic importance);
- significant reduction of the operational capacity of large units and combat and support units (level of employment, training, procurement);
- re-assessment of the role and tasks that are incumbent upon the Romanian Armed Forces and national defence commitments in relation with NATO and the European Union, including participation in international missions and operations;
- postponement of the operationalisation of power structures in the force package with which Romania committed to participating in the structure of NATO and EU forces;
- limitation of the operational capability of the structure supporting forces engaged in operations and missions of NATO/EU;
- development of inhomogeneous structures, in terms of procurement and equipment, compared with the armed forces of other Alliance members;
- decreased opportunities to ensure the security of deposits and other military objectives, as well as the equipment gone out of use and surplus/atypical/dangerous ammunition.

IMPLEMENTING THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT BASED ON NATO'S POLITICAL GUIDANCE

Colonel (AF) Dr Dan STROESCU

The membership of the Alliance brings about the fair sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities. In this context, the budget meant for defence within the national GDP, as well as the percentage from this budget allocated for procurement expenditure are indicators of the effort of a member state in the field of defence. In essence, it is recommended that member states should constantly allocate 2% or more of their GDP for defence. The member countries that frequently allocate resources under this percentage are advised to stop doing so and increase the level of budgetary allocations, in keeping with the commitments made. In the same context, they are also advised to keep the procurement allocations in real terms at least at one fifth of the budget meant for defence, with the purpose of transforming the existing units in deployable, modern units, which are logistically sustainable and have interoperable forces.

Keywords: *interoperability; group of experts; international cooperation; defence industry*

The Political Guidance provides the guidelines for the continuous transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities and for the implementation, at the military level, of the new strategic concept, as a basis for the first stage of the new *NATO Defence Planning Process – NDPP*, approved by the Defence Ministers in June 2009. The new Political Guidance represents the unified policy to guide the defence planning efforts in all areas of planning, both at the level of nations and at the level of NATO, and to achieve consistency in implementing the New Strategic Concept, and it will replace, after it is approved, all the other documents initiated at the ministerial meetings, such as: *2005 Comprehensive Political Guidance*, *2006 Ministerial Guidance* and relevant elements of the *Ministerial Guidance for Civil Emergency Planning for 2010-2013*. In this context, if there are inconsistencies or discrepancies between this document and other documents in the planning or development of Alliance capabilities, this one will prevail.

Colonel (AF) Dr Dan Stroescu – Strategic Planning Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

The Strategic Context

The 2010 Strategic Concept defines the factors that characterise the present and future security environment. Although there is peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is reduced, the risk still persists, while there are many countries that have plenty of important modern military capabilities in different regions, thus posing a threat to the international and Euro-Atlantic stability and security. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction represents a real threat to international security. Terrorism remains a direct threat to the stability and security of the citizens of the Alliance. While modern technology will increase their potential to cause damage, due to the vulnerability of computer networks of governments and national economies to some common cyber attacks, countries will depend increasingly on routes of communication, transport and transit on which trade takes place, including energy supply, thus increasing their vulnerability. The development of technology, including in the electronic spectrum, the use of lasers and the possible limitation of access to outer space can affect NATO military planning and operations. Instability and conflict beyond the borders of the Alliance may threaten the security of NATO member nations, while the global factors such as increased competition for resources, climate change and influence of health factors may adversely affect the regional and global environment security.

The Alliance Missions

The Alliance primary responsibility remains *to protect and defend its members*, as stipulated in the Treaty of Washington. Where this will be necessary, all Alliance members will contribute to fulfilling this mission. Political solidarity of its members and adequate military capabilities will contribute to deterrence, a key element of NATO strategy, offering visible security guarantees to its members. *Deterrence* will be based on a combination of nuclear and conventional capabilities, both elements being essential, not being able to replace each other. Although the circumstances in which the Alliance might use nuclear weapons remain, as long as nuclear weapons exist, *NATO will remain a nuclear alliance*.

The Alliance needs a range of capabilities that provide it with the ability to perform essential tasks for: collective defence, including against emerging security challenges, crisis management, ability to act effectively before, during and after conflicts that could affect the Alliance security, further security cooperation, including through arrangements with partners and other relevant countries, with international organisations, through maintaining active contribution to weapons control, non-proliferation and disarmament and preservation of NATO's *"Open Door"* policy.

NATO's Level of Ambition

NATO must maintain its ability *to conduct the full spectrum of missions, from high intensity to low intensity ones*. Planning must meet current and future operational requirements, with particular emphasis on the most likely operations, thus ensuring the ability to perform the most demanding operations. To determine the required size of the NATO Forces Structure (number and quality of national contributions of forces and capabilities, including civilian capabilities, necessary for NATO to be able to fulfil the tasks set in common, apart from the forces the nations may choose to maintain for national purposes), planning must reflect the need for the Alliance to meet a greater number of smaller scale operations as well as to be able to conduct large-scale high intensity operations.

NATO must have the ability to respond appropriately to any Article 5 situation predictable within the area of responsibility and beyond. In the current security environment, a large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance remains highly unlikely. However, in the event of such an aggression, it will prevail over all other missions, and nations will have to be ready to provide all the available forces and capabilities to meet its commitment to collective defence. Crisis response operations underway can be reduced or cancelled to ensure the availability of sufficient forces for such an event. In this way, the Alliance will be able to manage any type of Article 5 operation in the area of responsibility. However, the nature of potential Article 5 challenges continues to evolve. *In this planning cycle, forces development will be led towards this Article 5-type contingency situations, the need to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, including Non-Article 5 operations.*

The overall purpose of the Level of Ambition – LoA aims to achieve a balance of forces, based not only on the size of operations, but also on their type, distance and duration. These factors should result in combat, combat support and logistic support capabilities, deployable computer and communication means and strategic lift capabilities. The number of operations to be carried out concurrently may vary, and the size of the force structure will be established depending on the specifics of each operation, for reasons pertaining to defence planning and capability development.

The planning process must take into account the package of capabilities that addresses the major needs of the Alliance, package endorsed by the heads of state and government in Lisbon. These capabilities were selected to meet the ongoing operations requirements, the emerging challenges and to provide some key capabilities. The implementation of this package is to be incorporated into the general set of requirements and existing/planned capabilities and priorities to be developed following the analysis in progress.

The capabilities required for Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations are largely the same. Defining the scale and range of capabilities for the Alliance to fulfil all tasks requires careful consideration and fair judgement. Planning hypotheses that should lie at the basis of this analysis are described below, together with a number of factors that should be taken into account when addressing quality issues necessary in defining capabilities. From this analysis, the minimum capabilities requirements and the reasoning meant to correct anomalies arising from the conduct of a single process of operational analysis will result. Minimum capability requirements will be composed of planning objectives to be addressed to NATO nations, individually or collectively, to Alliance bodies and to the Alliance itself[1]. Before planning objectives are directed to the nations individually and collectively, as well as to the Alliance, strategic headquarters staffs (especially Allied Command Transformation – ACT) and the International Staff (Defence Policy and Planning) will inform the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced)/DPPC(R) with regard to the NATO requirements.

Guidelines for NATO Capability Requirements

In the context of the future security environment, *the Alliance will have to respond to the occurrence of any threat and challenge*. As a result, the Alliance capability development and planning will focus on modern, deployable and sustainable capabilities and forces. NATO and member countries should continue to transform its command structures and forces, including through the NATO Response Force (NRF), in modern, deployable and sustainable expeditionary forces, provided by command and control, and support capabilities through robust arrangements. In addition, nations will need to maintain the infrastructure and capabilities that could be used in transit to the theatres of operations or in support of their implementation. A rigorous analysis will be undertaken to identify the capabilities that fulfil these functions, taking into account the limited financial resources available through NATO common funding. This analysis will need to highlight the balance between limited resources, especially to ensure essential support for ongoing operations and an acceptable level of risk, due to the fact that there will not exist the full range of capabilities that would allow the LoA to be fully accomplished. Planning for the development of new capabilities should take into account ongoing work on reviewing the overall situation of the Alliance for deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance and should take into account the conclusions that can be drawn.

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[1] In developing NATO requirements, the analysis of necessary qualitative and quantitative capabilities should not describe completely independently each capability, but elements of the capabilities for various combinations-scenarios. For instance, medical and CBRN requirements, strategic lift and transportation inside the theatre should be assessed for a common set of scenarios.

Operational experience has shown in many cases that NATO operations will not succeed by military means alone. *The Alliance will have to be prepared to use a wide range of instruments and to cooperate with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach that will effectively combine political, civil and military elements* in order to achieve its security goals. In certain circumstances, civilian mechanisms will require coordination of efforts with other institutions, authorities, international organisations and nations in a comprehensive manner, to create the overall effects that are necessary to meet the desired outcome. Given the agreed procedures and NATO command and forces structure, including the involvement of appropriate civilian personnel, the connection should be established and information should be exchanged with civil authorities, international organisations and, where appropriate, with non-governmental organisations and contractors, with the purpose of effectively and comprehensively cooperating in planning and conducting operations. NATO must be able, if necessary, to deploy and manage resources and capabilities that come from outside military structures in order to fulfil its objectives. This requires the development of consultations and planning capabilities within Alliance structures, civil and military ones, as well as mixed civil-military ones to cope with such circumstances and to integrate civil resources and capabilities into proper command and management structures. NATO nations must continue to develop civilian capabilities to contribute to operations and promote security and stability. Allies will choose whether to make these capabilities available to international organisations and, if so, to which organisations. The Alliance must identify the capabilities that might be needed in NATO-led operations, so that allies could knowingly choose whether they will provide them.

The Alliance will need to continue allocating resources to support reform efforts in the areas of security and defence, starting from the experience it has already had in this area. The support for such reform efforts, which are politically driven processes, contributes to the development of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic space. In areas where the Alliance is involved in operations, this becomes an important task, including in training local security forces, and can serve as a key element of NATO operation exit strategy, which may also include contractor support arrangements. Therefore, the Alliance military structures should have, on the one hand, the ability to support NATO civil authorities in encouraging the reform of NATO security and defence sectors and, on the other hand, the capacity, planned in advance and with sufficient resources, to contribute to the preparation of the local security forces.

It is possible that the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts are needed in all the phases of the crisis. Therefore, the *Alliance must be able to plan, prepare*

and conduct reconstruction and stabilisation activities and the capabilities must have available resources. As far as increasing NATO's involvement in stabilisation and reconstruction[2] is concerned, the 2010 Political Guidance establishes the political context, the general principles and actions to be taken to make sure that these provisions take effect. NATO military authorities are recommended to implement it in future relevant activities. The specialised capabilities needed for future reconstruction and stabilisation activities will be addressed through NDPP, including by using generic planning situations and case studies that are relevant to civilian tasks in the operational analysis. The syllabus of NATO and national defence and military training and education institutions will have to cover relevant aspects of these tasks, and nations will have to make sure that appropriate training arrangements are to be taken so that the civilian staff could be engaged in operations. In the further development or adjustment of force structures for the improvement of relevant capabilities for stability and reconstruction efforts, the allies must ensure that the resulting structures can still carry the full range of Alliance missions and that they will not be optimised only for low intensity missions. Even if the allies are deployed in operations characterised as being of low intensity or in stability and reconstruction operations, they must make sure that the force structure includes adequate and robust capabilities to defend and protect themselves and other allied forces, including civilians and international actors in the theatre, against all forms of violence in the area of operations.

It is likely that NATO-led operations include contributions from partners or other nations that are not NATO members, which may be of great value in military, political and economic terms. It will be required an *enhancement of cooperation with partners and other nations outside the Alliance, in order to increase their ability to participate in NATO-led crisis situation response operations and to facilitate the decision-making process regarding contributions to operations.* In this context, NATO and member states should assist these nations in their efforts to provide their forces with a high degree of interoperability with the allies, including through providing documents and standards and through supporting the implementation of interoperability goals. The partners can also provide civilian contributions to NATO-led operations, the Alliance partnership policy being in a constant evolution and development. NATO Defence Planning will need to closely monitor these issues and the progress made, and be ready to implement the proper elements in the development of planning objectives.

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[2] PO (2010) 0140. In this context, there are also applied the *Conclusions and Courses of Action of the Report on the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Improvement of NATO's Ability to Deliver Stabilisation and Reconstruction Effects, approved by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon.*

It is required that *NATO forces structures and command should be able to provide the necessary capabilities to support the Alliance operational requirements and its Level of Ambition*. Recent efforts made to streamline the command structure are based on the need to support this level in an optimal way. The conclusions of this work have highlighted the fact that the decision-makers factors of the NATO force structure should provide the command and control of capabilities for some joint operations of smaller proportions.

Capabilities of command, control and communications (C3) are key features (pivotal enablers) to achieve the Alliance security objectives flexibly and effectively. This requires defining and implementing a clear C3 strategy, which will provide consistent consultation and robust, flexible and measurable control functions. C3 systems should benefit from state-of-the-art technologies, either recent or to be developed. However, such arrangements will be effective only if they are widely adopted by the allies, using the same basic philosophy, in particular in terms of the degree to which they are prepared to share sensitive information or to allow access through mechanisms that depend on the technological access between federations of networks. Because a number of allies have not yet taken concrete measures to ensure that their national legislation will accept such mechanisms to allow access to information, relevant NATO structures will have to set with the nations, including the technical, political and security authorities, whether and in what timeframe all allies will be ready to adopt such measures that will make available a *Network-Enabled Capability*.

Using the existing NATO Integrated Air Defence System (*NATINADS*), *the Alliance will develop and lay the political, strategic, conceptual and technical foundations of an integrated air and missile defence for NATO*, which will allow the Alliance to conduct air and missile defence operations necessary for non-Article 5 and Article 5 operations. This will include the *Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence* and its link with the US missile defence system, in accordance with the *US-European Phased Adaptive Approach*[3], that will allow the Alliance to protect its population, territory and forces against air and missile attacks. In parallel, the analysis of a future framework for cooperation on missile defence will be developed. To obtain a maximum effect within the Alliance in terms of information and data sharing, *an enhanced information distribution is needed, in order to obtain accurate information, whenever and wherever needed*. This implies a professional approach to information and its functions, incorporating risk management, supported by protected network architectures, corresponding

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[3] In keeping with the DPPC (R) report given by the Council regarding missile defence C-M (2010) 0103 approved by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon.

to monitoring requirements, task setting, distribution and protection. This could be extended to non-NATO partners and agencies with which it collaborates.

Developing planning objectives for nations, individually and collectively, and those targeting Alliance bodies (e.g., aimed at developing capabilities packages) must take into account the quality required to meet the planning objectives, analysing the extent to which the military standards must be applied in order to achieve resource savings. In making decisions on equipment purchase, nations should always consider whether the respective standard commercial capabilities provide an acceptable level of the military utility, even if they do not meet all existing military standards. Similarly, in making decisions about allocating resources in order to obtain or maintain military capabilities, nations should prioritise the capabilities that can be used indeed in operations. In particular, they should carefully consider the usefulness of investing in means that will be used, in reality, only for national purposes (for example, in some cases, combat aircraft for national air police), whether this will reduce their ability to contribute to operations involving deployment. In such cases, nations should not be required this type of means, but those capabilities that can be used in operations involving deployment. It is recommended that the management of tasks, such as air police in countries that have not and cannot allow combat aircraft, should be done through the existing mechanisms for allied deployments on a rotational basis and through bilateral arrangements with countries that have these capabilities anyway; these are practical and valuable examples of the role specialisation and multinational cooperation.

Planning should also take into account: the potential effects of the allied access to vital routes of communication, transit and transportation; energy supply; probability of cyber attacks on computer systems and other vital systems of NATO nations; probability that terrorists will be able to use increasingly sophisticated means in order to accomplish their goals in the future as well as the need for defence against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, especially missile defence. Work is underway on developing policies and action plans in some of these areas, including cyber and missile defence. The process of NATO defence planning should be aimed at achieving progress in these areas and at being prepared to implement proper elements in the development of planning objectives.

For many nations, *multinational approach is the only viable option in order to achieve some critical capabilities*. Multinational armaments cooperation is a way of achieving capabilities that could not be materialised on a national basis and, therefore, would not have been made available for the Alliance. In the circumstances of the financial crisis, multinational armaments cooperation should strengthen the ability of nations to harmonise national requirements, to develop effective multinational capabilities in terms of costs and to increase interoperability.

Multinational armaments cooperation is an important means meant to enhance experience, understanding and *"joint"*-type practices, which are essential for multinational operations. This will cause nations to extend multinational cooperation to support the equipment that is already part of the national inventory. It is also required the development of multinational solutions beyond traditional high-tech areas, which include less complex equipment, such as combat vehicles. The allies should build on existing bilateral or multinational arrangements (such as NATO high-level operational commands) to promote armaments cooperation among participating nations. They should seek opportunities for multinational cooperation, including with other partners where necessary, with a view to meeting urgent operational requirements and developing the common process for enabling efficient multinational procurement at effective costs.

The development and implementation of the necessary forces and capabilities will require the involvement of the defence industry. In this context, NATO will strengthen the relationship with the defence industry in order to identify, define and implement the best solutions, as well as widely adopt the standards specific to open sources. In this way, the establishment of an effective relationship between NATO and the EU, as well as an effective transatlantic industrial cooperation will be essential to achieve the highest level of interoperability among allied forces.

NATO will need to maintain its capabilities in order to ensure close cooperation in the aviation domain with the other international and regional organisations, including the International Civil Aviation Organisation, with the EU, the US Aviation Administration and to ensure free access to airspace, effective supply of services and civil-military interoperability in order to maintain the ability to perform missions in the full spectrum of operations and in support of Alliance objectives.

In line with recent revisions of maritime operational requirements, special importance will be given to *countering the threats to maritime security*, according to NATO *Standing Defence Plan – SDP*.

To meet NATO requirements and operational expectations in the medical field, it is important that the Alliance continues to develop, preserve and maintain the necessary medical capabilities, individually or in cooperation with other partners. It will mean focusing on the benefits of partnership activities, continuous improvement of medical support for operations and better use of common multinational mechanisms for the development of procurement programmes. Greater attention will be given to developing modular capabilities, which will allow for wide cooperation between contributing nations in a multinational environment. There will also be monitored closely the fair share of tasks in specific areas (such as medical policies, doctrines, and standing operating procedures) with partner organisations

and non-NATO nations, which will increase operational efficiency in theatres of operations. Health care personnel deficits are the biggest challenge for military medical structures, given the circumstances in which operational requirements will deal with difficulty with demographic challenges. It is recommended that nations should take measures to increase the attractiveness of military career in the medical field. At the same time, where this cannot be done, it is recommended the establishment of cooperation procedures and use, where possible, of human civilian capabilities and resources to fill these gaps.

NATO will aim at *reducing the strategic impact of asymmetrical threats with Improvised Explosive Devices – IED during the current or future conflicts*, by limiting their tactical and operational effects.

Interoperability will be a multiplier that will allow the Alliance to develop in partnership a package of capabilities/forces, able to conduct combat actions in any environment, to monitor continuously the conduct of operations, based on an integrated command and control structure. Addressing aspects that are specific to interoperability must be done holistically, consistently and coherently, based on defining and establishing the requirements in this area, starting from identifying, evaluating and implementing the solutions by all parties involved. Standardisation, education, training, exercises and evaluation, lessons learned and cooperative programmes will contribute to determining an optimum cost/benefit relation, in order to increase joint and multinational capabilities efficiency. A particular attention will be given to issues of interoperability, in support of operations, with reference to the identification of specific combat standards and solutions relating to combat procedures in radio communications.

NATO will have to monitor systematically the restricted access to and the scarcity of energy, natural, water/food and human intelligence resources. This will be needed to make better and timely decisions to reduce the negative effects on the Alliance members in areas such as: economic development, public welfare, political stability and social progress as a whole. In this context, the Alliance will promote political consultations regarding the impact of these issues on the way of attaining the level of ambition in order to advise policymakers.

The Alliance must have its own capability for the assessment and control of the impact of technology, expertise and technical and scientific community on the allied defence and deterrence capabilities. The assessment of the impact of emerging technologies in the field of security will require the constant monitoring and analysis of scientific and technological programmes and of the security environment in order to identify developments, threats and opportunities, to develop relevant analyses/evaluations and to avoid duplication of the common effort with the EU and other civilian research and technology agencies in these areas.

It is therefore necessary to coordinate the activity of the groups/network of experts within the Alliance in order to ensure a comprehensive approach to the evaluation/ timely provision of information of the decision-makers related to the impact of emerging technologies on the current security environment. This will be done in cooperation with the EU and civilian research and technology agencies with the purpose of maximising efficiency and avoiding duplication of efforts in this regard.

Recommendations regarding Resources

Alliance membership entails fair sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities. In this context, the defence budget in the national GDP and the percentage of the budget for procurement expenditure are indicators of a member state's defence effort. In principle, it is recommended that member states should consistently allocate 2% of their GDP, or more, for defence. Member countries that usually allocate less than this percentage are advised to stop this and to increase budgetary allocations in accordance with their commitments. In the same context, they are advised to maintain/increase in real terms procurement allocations to a minimum level of a fifth of the defence budget, in order to transform existing units into deployable, modern, logistically sustainable and interoperable forces.

Cost-effectiveness will continue to be a particularly important factor. This requires a prioritisation of investments, increased efficiency in terms of operations and maintenance costs, and redirecting the resources of outdated structures and programmes to other priorities. It is considered that the resources allocated in the budget and the *NATO Security Investment Programme – NSIP* should be redirected towards deployable capabilities and critical infrastructure supporting the development of operations, as well as essential needs of current and future operations planned and conducted under Article 5 (and not for existing structures, fixed installations and infrastructure NATO does not need anymore). It is emphasised the need for member states to ensure entirely the national contribution to NATO's common fund in order to support operations and provide the necessary capabilities. Risk assessment made by the deployment of NATO's methodology will allow for information and support of Alliance decision-makers in prioritising negotiations regarding NATO common funding, to ensure the essential requirements of key capabilities supporting and contributing to NATO's Level of Ambition. Stratification takes into account the connection between the level of capabilities and types of operations expected to be planned and led (a major joint operation or one of smaller proportions), which are clearly specified in the Alliance's Level of Ambition. In these circumstances, if NATO strategic commanders wish to receive financing

from the common Alliance or NSIP funds for projects other than those strictly related to current operations, they should provide clear reasons why the analysis and debate proposals submitted for the analysis/decision will have to be given the necessary funds, to the detriment of other projects with lower priority. In such situation, they will have to prove, within a year, that the total value of additional certified projects subject to analysis/decision will not exceed the expected funds to be allocated to the Alliance.

In conclusion, to increase efficiency, in terms of costs, it is also recommended resorting to the leverages of multinational cooperation in the use of allocated funds and in the development of capabilities that are impossible to achieve only by a single member state. There are encouraged the approaches and multinational cooperation in equipping, training and education, logistic support, creation of large multinational units as well as development of civilian capabilities, able to determine the increased interoperability and operations planning and execution. In this context, it is estimated that there will be a series of technical and legal obstacles in this respect (legislation requirements, various provisions relating to *"industrial offset"*, the existence of different terms and agreements on cooperation between the armed forces of other countries and the one between armed forces and civil society of the same country) in order to develop capabilities at low cost. Thus, NATO has decided to set up an analysis team, composed of experts from all areas of planning with a view to identifying and recommending possible areas of multinational cooperation.

In addition, the efficient use of critical resources requires that NATO and the EU member states will identify/develop common capabilities of both organisations.

<p style="text-align:center">*</p>

As it was conceived, the 2010 Political Guidance was meant to be a high-level guidance that would provide the line and political guideline for NATO's continuous transformation, setting the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence for the next ten or fifteen years. The document was intended to provide a vision and priorities agreed by Alliance members regarding NATO's continuous transformation. Its basic intention was that the implementation of the Political Guidance would lead to the development of capabilities with a higher degree of usability for future operations and missions, thus providing the certainty that NATO would maintain its effectiveness, credibility and relevance in the 21st century.

THE NEED FOR CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES

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The comprehensive approach to the process of developing capabilities, in general, and the military ones, in particular, includes upgrading the technology and pieces of equipment, making ready the forces and using the results of the scientific research that should make it possible for the full range of undertaken missions to be carried out.

In this context, the main fields of capabilities development are: command and control, information assurance and research, mobility, effective engagement, logistic support, survival and protection.

The development of military capabilities is a process that manifests jointly in the following functional fields: doctrine, organisation, training, procurement, command, personnel, infrastructure and interoperability.

Keywords: interoperability level; operational concepts; military capabilities; globalisation

The world is undergoing an unprecedented transformation process, especially as a consequence of geopolitical, military and geophysical events, which have a major impact on the security environment. Due to the current evolution of international relations the way state power manifests is very diverse. While territorial and ethnic conflicts have a tendency to fade out, the number of those generated by access to resources and economic proficiency is growing: *"In such a tense and complex context, every country's security, as well as that of the international community, as a whole, depends not only on the ability to react and adjust, but mostly on the ability to anticipate and act in a proactive manner. In a complex, dynamic, conflictual and globalised world, the deep understanding of major evolution tendencies in the world and of the way in which every country has the chance to become an active part of this process is an essential condition for any kind of progress"*[1].

[1] *Strategia de securitate naţională a României*, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 3.

The success of military actions is determined by gaining supremacy in modern battlefield, in areas such as IT, psychology, special operations, conducted by highly trained forces. This way, combat actions become precise and efficient, they are prepared and coordinated in detail, they are fast, with minor losses, but they have major effects.

The above-mentioned perspectives will determine, in the medium and long term, the development of capabilities which would make available structured, equipped, led and trained forces for conducting a broad range of missions, starting with classical combat actions, of high intensity, up to those related to reconstruction and stabilisation operations. In what concerns the dynamics of the international security environment and the diversity of the ways of conducting military actions, the development of military capabilities will be determined by a series of requirements which are to be approached in the following pages.

Military capabilities – conceptual framework, areas of manifestation and development

We have currently several terms/notions for defining the *"military capability"* as used in NATO and EU planning documents, and especially for *military capacity* and *military capability*. We will try to present a variant which would be used within the Romanian Ministry of National Defence, starting with a few definitions of this concept.

Capacity[2], capacities 1. to be spacious; unit that represents the maximum quantity of material or energy that can be included in an object or system. 2. the possibility that an object or system has to accumulate material or energy. 3. the possibility to work in a domain, to accomplish something; someone's moral or intellectual capacity; ability. Able person.

Capacity[3] 1. to be spacious; size of an object related to its content. 2. skill, ability to do something. 3. quality of the one who is able to understand or do something; skilful person; scholar, scientist. 4. the quality of a technical system of being able to operate, produce an effect or suffer a transformation. 5. industrial or economic asset having a certain speciality.

Capability[4] – to be able to (fr. *capabilité*).

Capable[5], who is able to do something, gifted, valuable, efficient.

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[2] Source: *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române (DEX)*, Academia Română, Institutul de Lingvistică *"Iorgu Iordan"*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1998.

[3] Source: *Marele dicționar de neologisme*, Florin Marcu, Editura Saeculum, 2000.

[4] *Ibidem*; Florin Marcu, Constant Maneca, *Dicționar de neologisme*, Editura Academiei, București, 1986.

[5] Source: *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române*, *op. cit.*

International literature gives a multitude of definitions *for military capability.* We are going to enumerate the most representative ones, in order to make proper connections with the Romanian language.

In the US military, *military capability* is defined as: *"the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, sustainability.* **a. force structure** *(number, size, and composition of the units that comprise US defense forces, e.g., divisions, ships, air wings);* **b. modernization** *– technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment;* **c. unit readiness** *– the ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed;* **d. sustainability** *– the ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives"*[6].

Within NATO, the term *capability* is defined as *the ability to conduct a certain action or to produce a certain effect.* This is *the result delivered by an action or a series of actions produced by the capability and contains the following components: Doctrines, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership Development, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability – DOTMLPFI (figure 1).*

DOTMLPFI

- Doctrine
  Strategic to Tactical, including Joint

- Organisation
  Unit structures to operate and sustain
  capability

- Training
  Individual to unit training to employ
  the capability

- Materiel
  All required materiel items, including related
  spares, repair parts and support equipment,
  necessary to equip, operate, maintain
  and support capability

- Leadership
  Professional military education for the joint
  commander and staff officers who will use
  the capability

- Personnel
  Adjustments to PE, CE and CJOSR
  to take advantage of capability

- Facilities
  Real property consisting of buildings, structures,
  utilities, pavement or land

- Interoperability
  All the issues related to interoperability
  and connectivity of information systems
  and security domains

Figure 1

Within the EU, the accepted definition highlights the fact that a *military capability* is the ability to deliver an operational effect required by specific standards in a nominated environment, in a specific timeframe, the ability to sustain

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[6] *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, US Department of Defense, 2005.

that effect for a certain period of time; it is delivered by a system or a system of systems, which consists of training, doctrine, organising/structure, personnel, equipment, readiness and deployment.

At national level[7], we start with clarifying the fact that capacities and capabilities apparently mean the same thing, there are still essential differences between the two notions.

Capacity is, generally speaking, characterised by quantity/number of forces, means and resources destined for the defence of the country. They can be numerous or reduced, depending on the specific requirements of the security environment, but also on the possibilities to allot necessary resources. In order to create a capability, besides the capacity, one needs a coherent system of abilities, knowledge and competencies, which are formed and developed in time.

Capability is, generally speaking, the skill to do something. In other words, capability means the skill to create, prospect, plan, conduct, as well as the means, methods, expertise and procedures necessary for implementing a plan, an idea, a concept.

Capacity and capability are interconnected. *Capability* is a continuation of the capacity and results in an effect. In other words, current capacities are associated with certain capabilities which can change into actions that result in effects. In this case, capability is external to capacity and their connection creates the effect. *Capability* is an intrinsic part of the system, it is its quality.

This is very well presented in the following formula: Capability = Ways + Means + Will, where:

- *Ways* – represent the intellectual or conceptual component expressed in concepts, doctrines, principles of war etc.;
- *Means* – express the material component: equipment, training, sustainability, readiness, level of proficiency etc.;
- *Will* – represents the moral component: the will to fight that comes from a multitude of factors, such as purpose, integrity, leadership, motivation, will to use forces for expeditionary operations, will to implement institutional and training reform.

Taking into account the relevant elements from the definitions and approaches presented above, we consider that *military capability* is the *ability to deliver an operational effect, required by the specific standards in a nominated environment, the ability to sustain that effect for an indicated period of time.*

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[7] Dr. Gheorghe Văduva, in *Capabilități facilitate de rețea*, Universitatea Națională de Apărare *"Carol I"*, Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare și Securitate, București, 2009.

Military capabilities development

A comprehensive approach to the capability development process, in general, and to the military one, in particular, involves the modernisation of equipment, training of forces and the use of scientific research results, which would allow the accomplishment of the entire spectrum of assumed missions. In this context, the main areas for developing capabilities are the following: command and control, intelligence and reconnaissance, mobility, efficient engagement, logistic support, survival and protection.

Developing capabilities is a process that is manifested in a joint manner in the following functional areas: doctrine, organisation, training, procurement, leadership, personnel, infrastructure and interoperability.

They can be detailed as follows:

➢ *Doctrine* includes all the fundamental principles that guide the way to engage forces in a military action for the accomplishment of specific objectives. Doctrinal principles have in view the parameters of the capabilities that exist at a certain moment, and assimilating and following them are mandatory for the engaged forces.

➢ *Organisation* involves the creation of joint capabilities, where elements with different functions must systematically cooperate so as to accomplish a common mission and attain the established objectives. Additionally, organisation requires, from superior echelons, the creation of necessary conditions for an efficient action at the level of subordinated echelons.

➢ *Training* requires the assimilation of doctrinal elements, at strategic, operational and tactical level, and the creation of the abilities necessary for the combatants so as to efficiently use the current equipment, in order to be able to accomplish the assigned missions.

➢ *Procurement* includes all the means and necessary equipment needed for creating, maintaining and developing a capability, including spare parts and protection equipment.

➢ *Leadership and education.* Professional training of commanders is the result of a continual process of developing knowledge and skills, which includes training, education and self-improvement. The outcome of this process must be the best professional competence at individual level.

➢ *Personnel.* The quality and proficiency of the created capabilities depend, first of all, on the level of training of the personnel involved in the process of their development. This requires a careful selection and training of all persons involved in the creation of a certain capability.

➢ *Infrastructure* is the total of buildings, terrain and roads needed for the creation of a capability, for maintaining and enhancing their use for the accomplishment of the operational objectives.

➢ *Interoperability* ensures an interrelation among elements included within the capabilities, as well as an efficient connection with other capabilities so as to accomplish missions and established objectives.

Military capabilities development at NATO level

Within NATO, the complex process of capability development is based on the Alliance's level of ambition and is presented in *figure 2*:

CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Figure 2

The phases described are developed within a cyclic defence planning process. These cycles have 4-year duration and have in view a medium-term planning period of 6-10 years.

Phase 1 – Analysis of strategic environment
- Identify the area for a potential mission;
- Evaluate the perspectives of the international environment: risks, threats, demography, environment, globalisation, high tech etc.;
- In order to identify the types of NATO missions, one has to take into account: NATO strategic concept, Military guidance for the implementation

of strategic concept, Comprehensive Political Guidance, Implementation Guide of the Political Guidance, Ministerial Guidance, types of NATO agreed missions.

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┌──────────────────────┐     ┌──────────────────────┐
│    Future trends     │     │                      │
│ in military-related  │     │  Strategic guidance  │
│  technology,         │     │                      │
│  globalisation       │     │                      │
│  and demography      │     │                      │
└──────────┬───────────┘     └──────────┬───────────┘
           │                            │
┌──────────▼───────────┐     ┌──────────▼───────────┐     ┌──────────────────┐
│ Describe future global│     │  Identify mission    │ ──▶ │  Mission types   │
│  security environment │     │       types          │     │                  │
└──────────────────────┘     └──────────────────────┘     └──────────────────┘
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Figure 3

Phase 2 – Identify capability needs
- Establish types of missions and identify necessary capabilities;
- Create a proper ratio between requirements and the capabilities structure.

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                                    ┌──────────────┐
                                    │   Concepts   │
                                    └──────┬───────┘
                                           │
┌──────────┐   ┌──────────────┐   ┌────────▼────────┐   ┌──────────────┐
│ Mission  │──▶│ Analyse      │──▶│   Identify      │──▶│ Capability   │
│ types    │   │ mission types│   │   capability    │   │ structure    │
│          │   │              │   │   needs         │   │              │
└──────────┘   └──────────────┘   └────────▲────────┘   └──────────────┘
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
Figure 4

Phase 3 – Develop capability requirements
- Requirements for capabilities are analysed in relation with possible identified scenarios;
- Create their *architecture*;
- The activity is completed by *establishing a capability requirement list* for ensuring the accomplishment of current and future missions.

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      ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐                        ┌──────────────┐
      │ Assumptions  │  │ Operational  │                        │ Level of     │
      │ mission types│  │ concepts     │                        │ ambition     │
      └──────┬───────┘  └──────┬───────┘                        └──────┬───────┘
             │                 │                                       │
┌──────────┐ │ ┌───────────┐   │ ┌───────────┐   ┌───────────────┐ ┌──▼──────────┐
│Capability│─▶│ Determine │──▶│ │ Conduct   │──▶│ Define        │▶│ Overall     │
│structure │ │ │ planning  │   │ │situation- │   │ requirements  │ │ capability  │
│          │ │ │ situation │   │ │ to-task   │   │ per situation │ │ requirements│
└──────────┘ │ └─────▲─────┘     │ analysis  │   └───────────────┘ └──────┬──────┘
             │       │           └───────────┘                            │
             │ ┌─────┴─────────┐                              ┌───────────▼──┐
             │ │   Security    │                              │ Capabilities │
             │ │  environment  │                              │ architecture │
             │ │   Contextual  │                              │              │
             │ │  information  │                              └──────────────┘
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Figure 5

**Phase 4 – Conduct gap analysis and fulfilment**. This way we can identify those which are available, planned, not covered or in excess.

Figure 6

Phase 5 – Identify and select solutions
- Identify the already started activities at NATO or national level, which could support the covering of capability needs (avoid effort duplication);
- Establish ways to be followed, make projects that are appropriate to requirements and introduce them in the Programme for improving capabilities;
- Establish a coordinator, partners for execution and the relations among them;
- The program will be configured according to the functional components of *DOTMLPFI*.

Once the capability created, the process of implementation begins.

Figure 7

Phase 6 – Conduct implementation

It means involving NATO bodies having responsibilities in domains such as resources, armaments, logistics, communications and standardisation and the implementation of methods that involve inclusion in the Programme for improving capabilities, for capability packages, Force proposals, Standard military requirements and Education packages.

Figure 8

Military capability development within the EU

Military capability development is based on an integrated conceptual approach and on the use of certain working mechanisms, on the synergy principle which engages all relevant actors involved in the process, so as to attain the level of ambition established by the Union, having in view the following: scenarios for future military operations in which the EU could be involved; distance from a possible theatre of operations (starting point – Brussels); reaction time of forces made available for the EU; duration of operations; rotation of troops; simultaneous operations. In this context, we consider as very important to highlight the algorithm the Union has in view for capability development.

Figure 9

Need to configure a national process for military capability development in correlation with the similar ones in NATO and EU

For a coherent and efficient capability development within the Romanian Armed Forces, we must have in view: the understanding of the principles for developing and making available the military capabilities used at NATO and EU level; the establishment of an algorithm for national capability development; the military capability development for the protection of national interests and later for making them available to the Alliance in accordance with the assumed commitments through Force Goals; the intensification of cooperation with NATO member countries and partners; the implementation of transformation concepts at NATO and EU level; the prioritisation of the capabilities that must be developed, taking into account the available resources; the development of national procedures for the implementation of NATO planning system, which would include tools for capability shortfalls identification, as well as solutions for shortfalls elimination.

In order to do this, we have to take into account the following priorities: establish a level of ambition; determine capability requirements (the minimum needed, identify shortfalls, analyse risks, establish priorities for shortfalls approach); identify solutions/objectives by elaborating a plan for capability development, as well as develop a planning process based on capabilities (for developing capabilities as well as for their management).

Having in view that capability development must lead, in a coherent and systematic manner, to the achievement of capabilities, from their origin

(a requirement of the national level of ambition, derived from the security environment analysis, missions and assumed commitments) to their implementation, a possible national capability development process could contain the following phases:

❖ **Identify the needed capabilities** based on:
- missions and specific requirements the Romanian Armed forces can conduct and fulfil, taking into account the national level of ambition and the military commitments assumed by the Romanian state;
- possibilities of the existing capabilities to fulfil the requirements related to assumed commitments, possibilities and needs for development/ modernisation, as well as necessary resources for these activities;
- discover capability *shortfalls* by comparing formulated requirements to inventories and acquisition intentions.

❖ **Establish priorities for capability needs**, so as to create a **list with critical capabilities** with the following points of reference:
- type and mission the capabilities are needed for;
- necessary resources and the perspective of budget allocation;
- how many nominated capabilities will be established (depending on assumed commitments within NATO).

❖ **Identify possible development solutions**, which would allow:
- development of capabilities at national level or through international cooperation;
- use, at national level, of NATO and EU transformation concepts;
- subsequent review, which would facilitate a strategic vision on the capability development process, on planning and support.

❖ **Capability development in specific areas**, which would ensure:
- one or more operational needs;
- development and technological procurement;
- military requirements;
- implementation of lessons learned or of ideas resulted from experimental programmes.

❖ **Implementation of capabilities**, through:
- doctrines, manuals, regulations, directives and other documents that ground military capability development;
- develop structural or technical operational prototypes which ensure the efficiency of the existent capabilities or develop new ones;
- including them in capability development programmes and in the training process;

- acquiring/modernising equipment;
- developing necessary infrastructure elements.

❖ **Capability evaluation**, having in view that:
- they are in accordance with current force standards;
- they meet requirements and missions they have been designed for.

*

National military capability development, seen as a systemic, long process, which is conducted in accordance with the national military level of ambition, must have in view to:

- define, for the sake of a unitary use within the Romanian Armed Forces, the term *military capability*, domains and guidelines/phases for capability development, according to similar activities within NATO and the EU;
- establish a national algorithm for military capability development, so as to ensure efficiency while using resources versus real defence needs which would make them compatible with those used in NATO and the EU;
- identify those capabilities which would ensure the improvement of efficiency in fulfilling missions, interoperability with other NATO and/or EU member states, as well as a balance between the requirements imposed by new types of operations and the available resources;
- identify solutions which would allow a coherent response to current and future challenges in the security environment and establish requirements and priorities for capability development within the Romanian Armed Forces;
- generate a force package which can be used in the collective defence in accordance with other military commitments assumed at international level;
- combine national and multinational efforts, based on the principle of assuming responsibilities and commitments;
- analyse the planning process as a whole with an emphasis on opportunities for developing niche capabilities, in correlation with elements that result from such an approach (procurement, equipment, personnel selection/reserve under the circumstances of lack of experts, special training programmes).

TRANSPORT OF ROMANIAN ASSETS FROM THEATRES OF OPERATION USING NAVAL FORCES SHIPS UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND

Colonel (N) Dr Constantin CIOROBEA

Romania's accession to the North Atlantic Organisation and the engagement of this organisation in security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have led our country to participate with forces in these theatres of operations. The Navy actively participates in Romanian military commitments by carrying out activities with a special character, such as the transport of materials after successfully finalising the assignment in a theatre of operations.

In order to fulfil this important mission, the vessel "NST ALBATROS" had to cross an area with an unstable security environment, characterised by asymmetrical actions of piracy. Given the danger represented by pirates, activities were planned in the Naval Component Command following the two lines of operations.

Keywords: *naval group; pirates; hostile actions; Aden Gulf; prevention and deterrence*

Military actions and modern battlefield have changed in the recent years, new characteristics have emerged and asymmetrical conflicts, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are engaged frequently. Romania's accession to the North Atlantic Organisation and the engagement of this organisation in security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have determined our country to participate with forces in these theatres of operations. Along with the Land and Air Forces, the Naval Forces actively participate in Romanian military commitments by carrying out activities with a special character, such as the transport of materials after successfully finalising the assignment in a theatre of operations. The Romanian Naval Forces Staff, through the *Naval Component Command/NCC* planned, coordinated and executed the transportation of Land Forces materials from the Iraqi theatre of operations. In order to fulfil this important mission, the vessel *"NST ALBATROS"* had to cross an area with an unstable security environment characterised by asymmetrical actions of piracy. Pirates' actions

Colonel (N) Dr Constantin Ciorobea – Commander, Naval Component Command.

in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa area represent a permanent and significant threat to the safety of shipping in this region. Moreover, in Kuwait persists a high degree of security risk arising from terrorist threats that exist throughout the region. Terrorist groups can trigger spontaneous actions and can thus jeopardise the safety of the vessel operating in the port of Shuayba (SPOE) during materials embarkation.

Preparation of such a task required a series of actions containing many novelties such as a continuous improvement of operational planning processes, collecting data about the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Aden region, along with reviewing the operational impact of this area. Data collection was improved using the data exchange with NATO/EU and regional agencies. During the transport planning and execution process, in order to provide a successful coordination of the forces employed in action, the Naval Component Command cooperated with other national and international organisations engaged in maritime security and with command components of other forces.

Another innovative characteristic was the continuous monitoring of the activities and of the existing status in the operation area using *"NST ALBATROS"*, the Army's reports and the information received via direct connection with the Allied Forces command structures responsible for coordinating activities in the Gulf of Aden, such as Maritime Command Naples/MC Naples, NATO Shipping Centre from Northwood, England and Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa/MSCHOA.

The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa ensures assistance to seamen in the Gulf of Aden, Somalia and the Horn of Africa region. This centre coordinates sailing in the region and ensures safety navigation in the area using the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). Forces operate on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions no. 1814, 1816 and 1838.

Given the special nature of this mission, meaning the transportation of materials from Iraq, in addition to the preparation of planning and monitoring activities, to ensure the execution of the mission, training activities were diversified, and standard operating procedures were reviewed. At the same time, even the crew structure was adapted to meet the specific requirements of the mission in an unstable security environment.

The main threat that could affect the mission consisted in the actions of pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. They took place in an area of approximately two million square nautical miles (representing 15 times the surface area of Romania). The explosion of this phenomenon, especially close to the coast of Somalia, as in 2008, determined the UN Security Council to adopt diverse resolutions regarding piracy, each of them being designed to increase the authority of action of the forces in the region. To reduce the danger represented by pirates, a number of warships

from many countries were deployed in the region. The US V Fleet organised a new task force, *Combined Task Force 151*, based in Bahrain, 20 countries being invited to be part in it.

The European Union, following the approval of the EU Council on 8 December 2008, authorised the execution of Operation *"ATALANTA"* and deployed in the region a naval operational group/NAVFOR Group, this being the first major deployment of forces made by the European Union in a theatre of operations. This multinational effort was supported by vessels from Russia, India and China, operating under national command[1].

This international effort could not stop all acts of piracy in the region. As reported, in 2008 there were more than 120 attacks, a total of 35 ships were seized by pirates and about 600 sailors were abducted. In January 2009, 14 ships and 280 sailors from 25 countries were held hostage in Somalia, while two sailors were killed during the attacks carried out by pirates[2].

Given the difficulties presented, in the Naval Component Command planning process, the danger represented by pirates was identified as a major risk and the centre of gravity consisted in securing the shipping and transportation of materials. To protect this centre of gravity, activities were planned following the two lines of operations. One of them was represented by the special measures of protection organised on board and the coordination of these measures with the action engaged by NATO/EU naval forces to ensure freedom of navigation, protection of merchant ships, prevention and deterrence pirates' actions in the Gulf of Aden.

To improve security measures and carry out a specific level of protection required by such a mission, specific protection measures were set on the safety of the ship to prevent and counter pirates' attacks. These measures were aimed mainly to avoid unexpected attacks, prevent and deter pirates' actions. Surprise attacks executed by hostile craft or skiff were avoided using permanent supervision of the maritime radio-navigation equipment on board, along with visual surveillance of the area near the ship. At the same time, the bridge installations were checked periodically to avoid becoming potential supports for seizing equipment used by pirates. Pirate activities were also hampered by executing route and speed variations.

To prevent and deter pirates' actions, a protection team was embarked on board and it had as primary mission the protection of the ship, its crew and cargo during the transit of dangerous areas. This group was subordinated

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[1] http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2008/019.html
[2] Merle D. Kellerhals Jr., *UN Forms Group to Coordinate Actions against Maritime Piracy*, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2471&blog=all

to the ship commander during the mission. Throughout the mission, training spaces and places for safe storage of weapons and ammunition were provided for the force protection group. The reorganisation was conceived to allow the physical training to maintain the team readiness level, but without interfering with the crew activities.

The rules of engagement for the protection team represented an important limitation during this mission because only a minimum usage of force was allowed. The use of the armament was permitted only as a last resort for self-defence and protection. Preventive actions consisted mainly in setting up armed patrols on the ship during transit through high-risk areas. During these activities, particular emphasis was given to prevent direct confrontation with the pirates by planning specific actions in accordance with the information operations synchronisation matrix prepared in accordance with the Naval Component Command concept of operation. The main measures were the permanent, visible and energetic actions of the protection team during transiting the high-risk areas. Those actions were focused to deter the pirates hostile action influencing their leaders decision to attack the ship. The Naval Component Command incorporated the presented measures in OPORD and submitted them to the ship.

These measures were established after analysing the pirates' way of action, the lessons learned by NATO and EU forces operating in the area and the experience of the crews that transited through the region and faced the pirates. Coordination of prevention and deterrence procedures planned on board of the ship, with the warships' action in the region to ensure freedom of navigation, was mainly achieved by registering the vessel to *"Security Center NAVFOR"* through the website of the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (HOA MSC) using a secret identification code. This allowed warships to monitor the vessels that are transiting the region and identify potential vulnerabilities posed by the degree of manoeuvrability, speed, cargo, number of crew members and freeboard height. Vulnerability data were transmitted to NATO and CTF 151 ships, which made it possible for the three naval groups operating in the region to have a common list of ships with high vulnerability. During transition, in accordance with the level of vulnerability, merchant vessels were organised in groups that were monitored during their transit through the *"International Recommended Transit Corridor/IRTC"*. The *"NST ALBATROS"* transit was executed in convoy system, under the protection of allied and partner vessels operating in the area.

To achieve a proper coordination with the forces operating in the Gulf of Aden, the Naval Component Command remained in touch with the Centre for Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), the centre's main aims being to coordinate

the assistance of the sailors in the Gulf of Aden, Somalia and the Horn of Africa region. This proved effective and helped to ensure safe transit of dangerous areas, under the direct monitoring of EU and NATO naval forces deployed in the region.

In addition, during the Naval Component Command planning process for this mission, one important goal is the achievement of a good coordination between the forces designated to maintain security in the region, the conception of action and the self-protective measures taken on board. Normally, the warships in the region implement a concept of operation with fixed position for each ship and directly control a certain area. Outside the areas controlled directly, the ships apply their power against the pirates with different means; the most frequent one is the usage of helicopters. In accordance with this CONOPS, the merchant ships have to coordinate their action to delay pirate actions by using rapid manoeuvres and changing speed and direction, with warships' direct actions mainly with naval helicopters and machine guns. The warship actions in the region are very well represented by the Spanish frigate *"SPS INFANTA CRISTINA"* engagement on 14 November 2010 against pirates while escorting the *"PETRA I"*, a Spanish logistic support vessel. The pirates used, for this action, a boat hijacked on 10 October 2010, the *"MV Izumi"*, under Panama flag. The pirates opened fire first against *"PETRA I"*. The *"INFANTA CRISTINA"* immediately accelerated and manoeuvred to stand in front and protect the craft and then it was also attacked by pirates. The Spanish soldiers responded first with warning shots, and then they were forced to open fire with machine guns at the ship that was attacking them. The crew of the Spanish frigate realised that the ship they were attacking was a hijacked merchant ship and ceased fire and transmitted to the pirates that they were firing at a warship. The pirates then fled and the *"INFANTA CRISTINA"* decided not to pursue them in order not to endanger the lives of the hostages aboard[3]. The Spanish frigate actions exemplify the importance of the warships presence in the region, the way those ships engage the pirates, and that the pirate actions are more dangerous.

At the same time, good relations of cooperation and information exchange initiated by the Romanian Navy Staff and Naval Component Command with CC MAR Naples using the Maritime Safety and Security Information System/MSSIS and with the Italian Navy using Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre/V-RMTC (it has to transform it into a Trans-regional Maritime Network/ T-RMN) have proven useful. By accessing the database of these organisations, it was possible to have permanent information about the situation in the areas of transit.

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[3] EU NAVFOR Warship Attacked by Pirated Vessel Whilst Protecting AMISOM Escort – EU NAVFOR Public Affairs Office, http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/11/eu-warship-attacked-by-pirated-vessel-whilst-protecting-amisom-escort/

The Naval Forces participation in this mission has highlighted a number of issues that should guide future training activities of forces and headquarters. Among these measures, I would like to stress the need to continue the Navy's participation in the exchange of information with the organisations that activate in the maritime environment to deter security risks, such as the V-RMTC programme.

The V-RMTC programme was initiated by the Italian Navy during the fifth meeting of the *Sea Power Symposium*, held in Venice on 12-15 October 2005. The participation in this programme allows the comprehension of the concept of data transfer about maritime situation between different international organisations. At the same time, the programme provides the appropriate training of operators in accordance with international requirements. Such training is organised periodically by the V-RMTC, like the *Trans-Regional Information Sharing Exercise/T-RISE 2010*. The purpose of this exercise was the information sharing between Naval Operational Centres (NOC) of partner countries engaged in Trans-regional Maritime Network by monitoring shipping traffic in the area of responsibility taking into account the challenges to the international security and the need to improve maritime security. Through this exercise, the Italian partner has decided to promote cooperation and improve interoperability between the Mediterranean V-RMTC Community Naval Operational Centres and the Operational Centres of the countries that joined the community in 2008 (Brazil, India and Singapore). National systems for shipping traffic monitoring of these countries were integrated with the V-RMTC and thus the network transformed into Trans-regional Maritime Network. Participation in such programmes that are designated to exchange information on maritime situation and operators' training in such exercises enable wide cross-regional synergies between the actions of countries involved in surveillance and monitoring the naval situation.

Another important element to be considered in the future planning of these kinds of actions must be represented by the preparation of standard operating procedures for action when pirates are arrested during their attack. This is a very sensitive issue and the forces acting in the Gulf of Aden had to face, in many cases, unusual situations on this issue. In preparing such procedures, it should be borne in mind that international maritime law rules provide that a person can be accused of piracy only when they are captured during the attack. On the other hand, a person should be judged in the country to which the vessel that was attacked belongs or whose naval forces arrested the pirates. Given these issues, Rules of Engagement/ROE for ships engaged in actions that may be affected by pirates have to contain ways to handle such issues.

An example can be considered the way in which EUNAVFOR forces operate during the actions taken to prevent bringing pirates in Europe to be put on trial. They have concluded memoranda of understanding with Kenya and the Seychelles to prosecute suspects. To allow the prosecution and punishment of suspects, the warships crew was specially trained in collecting and preparing evidence to be presented in the trials. These measures were taken because legal experts in Europe believe that when the pirates are brought to trial in Europe they may ask for political asylum on the grounds that they cannot be repatriated to Somalia given that human rights are not respected in this country.

In fact, in 2009, one such case was recorded, in which two of the five pirates put on trial for piracy in the Netherlands requested asylum. *"A judge of one of them even said he hoped the government would facilitate receiving asylum for his wife and children. The five were arrested by a vessel owned by the Danish Royal Navy while they were attacking a Dutch-flagged cargo. Law professor Jan Knoops has suggested that the Dutch trail might encourage pirates to surrender just in order to seek a better life in Wester countries"*[4].

The employment of forces in actions against piracy requires some changes in the methods we train the crews that will participate in such operations. Their training in the art of negotiation allows preparation for negotiating with the pirates in order to minimise possible casualties. Moreover, to increase the surprise factor during rescue missions for persons captured by pirates it is necessary to prepare the intervention teams to descend in rappel from helicopter in such action.

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The transport of materials and military equipment from Iraq theatre of operations proved once again that Romania's integration in NATO and the EU overlaps the national actions to solve the crises with the organisational action of the military-political alliances we are part of. In this way, some theatres of operations that used to be of no interest to Romania can now become areas of operations for the Romanian forces. This was particularly put out during the transport mission from Iraq while the ship transit through the dangerous area was monitored by allied forces that were in mission in the region where pirates posed a threat to the ship. This underlines once again that Romania can receive support from its allies and, in some cases, can defend their interests even though, as a state, it does not have forces engaged in the operations area.

In these circumstances, in which Romania is a beneficiary of maritime security, our country must continue to contribute in turn with forces and resources

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[4] *EU Force Seeks "Eyes in the Sky" as Pirates Head East"*, Jane's Navy International, vol. 115, no. 4, 2010, pp. 26-31.

to the joint effort of developing and maintaining maritime security. Such a contribution, appreciated by the allies, is the annual participation in *"Operation Active Endeavour"*.

In conclusion, the Romanian Naval Forces participation in the transport of materials and military equipment from Iraq theatre of operations is an argument that demonstrates the importance of the Navy and the ability of our forces to carry out actions in keeping with national commitments in other theatres of operations far from the country.

Maritime situational awareness and establishment of recognised maritime picture, a process that involves surveillance, intelligence gathering and information sharing with the specialised agencies of the NATO/EU or regional authorities must be one of the core missions of the Naval Component Command. This constant contact and information exchange with international structures has allowed the Naval Component Command to have access to information on maritime security in the areas of interest transited by the transport ship.

Collecting data on the situational awareness in the area of interest of the Naval Component Command allows the planning and coordination of Naval Forces involved in various activities, considering that the database is generated by the same structure that plans military actions. The Naval Component Command must continue to support regional or international initiatives to achieve a global capability, maritime surveillance and information exchange to prevent and combat criminal activities at sea.

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CONCEPTUAL AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE FORCES PARTICIPATING IN COUNTERING THE THREATS IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Colonel (r.) Dr Sorin VEGHEŞ
Colonel (AF) Mihai RADU

In the ever changing and diversifying physiognomy of conflict – characterised mainly by: replacing the interest to occupy a territory with the interest to influence events; renouncing the necessity of being present in favour of the requirement to control in order to influence and possibly to intervene; avoiding, if possible, direct armed confrontations; changing the goal of causing substantial losses with the one of avoiding them –, it may be noted that only the efficient, integrated use of the available military and civilian capabilities represents the key element that makes it possible for the new strategic objectives to be met.

Keywords*: security and defence; asymmetric threats; NATO transformation; Strategic Concept*

The political and military strategic objectives of the new political-military context that will probably deeply change the current political milieu in Europe are about to substantiate in a new theory of warfare, mainly based on the citizens' new perception of the concept of *security*[1]. Thus, we see that the relation between the concepts of *security* and *defence* is more and more determined by the citizen's perception regarding the way the existential normality is affected and by the awareness of the existence of some means and actions meant to protect and defend. We consider that once put in practice, this new theory will cause realignments and chain reactions at both national and global level, having in view the fact that it covers the entire spectrum of current threats, the whole range of possible protagonists in confrontation, from states

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Colonel (AF) Mihai Radu – Military Representation of Romania to NATO and the EU.
[1] We consider necessary to correctly and differently use the terms *security* and *defence*, as security refers to the situation in which a community lives and its institutions function normally in the absence of any threat, while defence represents the action taken against hostile manifestations and its results.

to non-state actors and transnational ethnic groups, the whole range of threats, from the symmetrical to the completely asymmetrical ones, as well as the entire spectrum of combat forms, from the traditional and conventional ones to those in which there are no restrictions, including the struggle to correctly perceive the way the conflict develops. In essence, it takes shape the idea according to which flexible and agile structures and mechanisms are necessary, mainly to rapidly tailor the tactics to the decision-making cycle, which is very short, and to use some flexible and deployable structures able to conduct actions in crowded urban areas and against the multiple methods of action – terrorist, criminal, conventional, and even against the portable weapons of mass destruction.

Nevertheless, the new threats cannot be effectively responded in the short term. That is why, NATO and the European Union make important efforts to reform themselves, in order to adapt to the new political and security context.

We consider we can speak about a new political and security context or, better to say, about the perfection of change in the current multipolar system, having in view the profound modifications at the centre of the system. We consider here the redefinition of the two organisations – NATO and the European Union –, of the role the important powers in the developed Western world play (France, Germany – whose leaders have a common vision regarding the new system – and Great Britain), as well as the desire to connect more regional security complexes, in the context of the redistribution of the spheres of influence (Eurasia – through coopting Russia and Turkey).

In this respect, we appreciate that the recent signing of the *France-UK Defence Treaty*[2] regarding the establishment of some common military capabilities and some common investments in military research could open a new page in security and defence management. Moreover, through coopting Russia and Turkey in resolving some security issues in Europe, without involving NATO and the United States[3], the European Union could change from an organisation that has a *"Euro-Atlantic orientation"* into one having a *"Euro-Eurasian orientation"*[4].

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[2] During the summit in London on 2 November 2010, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and UK Prime Minister David Cameron signed the *Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty*, having a military component and one related to the nuclear arsenal. Article available at http://romaniapress.ro/mapamond-7-zile/1383-marea-britanie–frana-tratat-de-cooperare-nuclear-i-in-domeniul-aprrii.html

[3] See the study *The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe* published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 15 October 2010, http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/the_spectre_of_a_multipolar_europe_publication

[4] The press release related to the Trilateral Summit France, Germany, Russia, 18-19 October 2010, Deauville, France: *"The trilateral summit will give the three leaders the chance to have an in-depth exchange of views on ways to develop their partnership for forming a common European security and cooperation space, responding to the common challenges in this area and enhancing response mechanisms"*.

These statements are grounded in the conclusions of the report *The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe*, which has as starting point the fact the *"order established in Europe after the end of the Cold War is outdated"*[5] and it has to be redesigned taking into account the current realities on the continent and the relevant powers that have to take part in the construction of a new security arrangement in Europe. The basics of the report, through which the current state of play in Europe is defined, are the following: the security system in Europe is not functional anymore, fact proved by the impossibility to prevent the wars in the Balkans and Georgia, to provide solutions for the frozen conflicts in Europe and to address the disruptions in gas supplies in Europe; Russia, after the USSR dissolution, has become again *"a great power with interests in Europe"*, and *"Turkey is an essential participant in any discussion regarding security in Europe"*[6].

Concurrently, the study introduces a new concept, that of a *"concert of projects"*, which will be, in the authors opinion, the mechanism that will lie at the basis of a necessary future *trialogue* between the EU – Russia – Turkey.

The need for cooperation with the Russian Federation is currently a requirement both within NATO and the European Union. Thus, NATO would like to agree with Moscow in an effort to redefine the threats to common security in the 21st century as well as the ways to combat them, even by involving Russia in developing the missile defence capability project in Europe. Moreover, the allies wish to enhance cooperation with Russia in solving important problems in Afghanistan through its involvement in combating drug trafficking, expanding cargo transit for allied forces through Russia, training the Afghan pilots who operate Mi-17 transport helicopters. As far as the European Union is concerned, France and Germany encourage the Russian Federation to take important steps towards Europe, which is, in fact, a legitimate goal, given the fact that Russia is currently the main supplier of gas to the countries in the European Union.

As for Turkey and its integration in this *trialogue*, the necessity derives from the fear that Turkish nationalists, disappointed with the attitude and the lack of consideration on the part of NATO partners, could re-examine their strategic options, detach from the Western powers and establish strategic partnerships with the emerging countries in Asia (China, India, Iran). Moreover, the deterioration of the relations between Turkey and the United States has affected Turkey's pro-West orientation.

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[5] At http://stiri.netul.ro/luni-marti-deauville-noua-ialta-cum-ar-functiona-lumea-multipolara-a-frantei-germaniei-si-rusiei_730, Mircea Marin, *Luni-Marţi. Deauville – "Noua Ialtă" ? Cum ar funcţiona lumea multipolară a lui Sarkozy, Merkel şi Medvedev ?*
[6] *Ibidem.*

Taking into account the profound changes and modifications, not only the theorists who are optimistic about the results of conceptual changes in conducting warfare but also their opponents, who have reservations about the radical changes caused by these phenomena, have agreed that the approach to future conflicts should be reassessed, considered in an integrated, global, comprehensive manner, and military systems should be transformed, designed for planning, conducting and managing joint actions, civil and military, regardless of the environment (peace or war) or the stage of development. Thus, themes regarding the systematisation of concepts related to the typology of armed conflicts, the need for doctrinal adjustment, the need for organisational and structural transformation, the reassessment of the defence planning process, the re-prioritisation related to providing the necessary capabilities to conduct such confrontations have become constant in debates, as well as issues concerning training, logistic support, management and preparation of participating forces, all these subjects being consistent with the new physiognomy of conflicts (some of them in progress), other than classical, traditional ones.

During the *Cold War*, the national security goals were defined in terms of defence against some possible attacks of another state or alliance of states, and the *"rules of the game were metaphorically called Yalta"*[7]. The most important rule referred to the division of Europe in two spheres of influence, divided by the *"Iron Curtain"*, as it was named by Winston Churchill. Thus, the two camps – the West and the East –, led by the United States and the Soviet Union, were caught in what seemed to be a perpetual confrontation. This bipolar relation was the framework for the establishment of international policies as well as of national military strategies. It was supposed that if a state was prepared to defend against such a danger, it was easy for it to counter other threats, considered less important.

After the end of the *Cold War* and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the security environment and therefore the way to approach conflicts have undergone major changes. Among them, key change milestones were the following: the greater cooperation among the countries in Western Europe, within the framework of what was known until 1993 as the *European Community* and then the *European Union*; NATO eastward enlargement, with its two phases, first the Central Europe and the Baltic states, as an exception, then the South-Eastern Europe; the hesitant NATO intervention in the Balkans, with direct major implications with regard

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[7] Dr. Ilias Iliopoulos – *Securitatea şi apărarea europeană în contextul geopolitic şi geo-cultural,* article published in *Impact Strategic*, the journal of the *Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies,* no. 35, p. 110, available at http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is35.swf

to the growth, even indirect, of the role and military capabilities of the European Union; the terrorist attack on the United States in September 2001; the beginning of the war on terrorism. Thus, we can state that, starting that moment, a new security and defence architecture has been looked for at European, Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian level, architecture meant to replace the previous bipolar model.

The first major changes concern the *approach to conflict, the strategy used to obtain the desired effect*, and the *source of violence*, which has migrated from the state organisations to the individual. In the new type of conflict it is tried to produce change from within, by the delegitimisation of state institutions and ideologies in order to finally win the population support. Unfortunately, life has shown that states that are militarily well prepared for a confrontation with another state or group of states are not able to protect themselves from the attacks of non-state actors. This requires a long-term military and civilian presence, to develop the necessary capabilities and to extend the operational impact. Thus, we conclude that the new type of conflict focuses on the control or influence on the population and not on the control on an adversary or territory.

A second major change, with direct effect on the type of conflict, is the fact that, overall, what we face today is not a clearly defined enemy, but a series of non-traditional and unpredictable threats that are difficult to manage, generically called *asymmetrical threats*. Success in the new type of conflict depends not only on the military force but also on the understanding of the social dynamics, such as politics, social networks, religious influences and cultural issues.

Another key change is that, *organisationally and structurally, military forces are no longer able to deal with a significant part of the assigned missions by themselves*. During the *Cold War* period, nations were mainly concerned with ensuring the number of troops, combat assets and firepower necessary to conduct a war of attrition – in which each unit would help to deter the enemy.

We can say that this continuous change and diversification of the conflict physiognomy is mainly characterised by replacing the interest to occupy a territory with the interest to influence events, by renouncing the idea that it is necessary to be present in favour of the exigency to control, in order to influence and, possibly, to intervene.

The nature of future wars is difficult to predict. However, generically, we see two more and more obviously manifested trends. The first one is that all the states in the world are armed with increasingly sophisticated weapons and equipment, which opens the possibility for the outbreak of conflicts or wars between well-prepared forces and assets, this being the *traditional, symmetrical warfare* variant. The second trend is that of the regular forces confrontation with irregular forces, put under the command of some centres of economic, religious, ethnic, ideological etc. power,

this being the variant of asymmetrical, irregular, hybrid warfare, integrated within the concept of *irregular warfare*.

Thus, this new approach to conflict has moved the centre of gravity from a fixed position, grounded in exclusively military planning, based on threats, to a comprehensive planning, flexible and reactive, civilian-military, based on the capabilities required to meet the specific objectives of each stage of the conflict. This type of planning is equally based on real time information and predicted information, including elements of doctrine, organisation, training, equipment, management, development, personnel, infrastructure, as well as elements of interoperability and standardisation *(figure 1)*.


Figure 1

In *figure 1*, there are highlighted the key priority objectives in relation to the stages of conflict and the effort level to achieve goals. Thus, we can notice both the contribution of the main actors participating in crisis management and the decrease in the importance of the military component concomitantly with the increase in the importance of civilian components role in the approach and management of the situation.

Acknowledging the existence of the new threats, international terrorism and transnational criminal networks, the Alliance leaders have agreed to implement fundamental changes in the way NATO works.

NATO transformation process is based on a new vision regarding its fundamental objective, that of collective defence, namely to manifest interest in guaranteeing the security of the populations of its member states against all threats, regardless of their nature. However, since the nature of threats has changed, it has become necessary to restructure the Alliance forces and to train them to face the current

unconventional threats. Concurrently, recent events demonstrate that NATO transformation from a military perspective only is not sufficient. Thus, the Alliance reform becomes manifest at the level of the new strategic concept, considering the review of the command structure, the force structure, as well as the reorganisation of NATO Response Force, the reform of NATO Headquarters, the reform of NATO agencies, the reform of defence planning, NATO's involvement in stabilisation and reconstruction operations and, last but not least, the Alliance new decision on the integrated, comprehensive approach to conflict, through involving civilian components in the operations planning and conduct.

All these conceptual and structural changes contribute to the enhancement of military effectiveness, as well as to the development of a political identity of the Alliance, a much stronger and more distinct one.

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
– Conceptual Delimitations
and Theoretical Considerations – (I)

Lieutenant Colonel Dr Ionel STOICA

In the author's opinion, the objectives of terrorism can be classified in many categories: achieving a specific purpose – ousting a government from power, forcing an army to leave the country; obtaining financial funds; releasing prisoners; causing widespread feelings of fear, in the hope of changing the social order in a state; challenging a government so that it could react and impose harsh counterterrorist measures that would attract hostile feelings on the part of the population; using terrorist methods by governments in order to determine the population to be subject to unpopular measures (state terrorism).

State terrorism occurs when the following actions are implemented by states: political opponents are eliminated and the state apparatus uses repressive means for intimidation and in order to get information that might not be obtained otherwise.

***Keywords**: globalisation; Middle East; religious differences; tribal conflicts; religious terrorism*

Terrorism has become a usual term in our vocabulary. However, how can we define it ? There are more than 100 definitions of terrorism worldwide. This paper is not aimed at doing a comparative and exhaustive analysis of these definitions, but we consider it necessary to make some clarifications regarding this aspect that is otherwise very controversial at international level. In this context, we will reproduce a few of these definitions below, some of the most important ones.

Terrorism represents the *calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological*[1].

Another definition, provided by Arnold E. Terrell, refers to the methods employed by terrorists. Thus, terrorism consists in the *use or threatened use of force for a political purpose to create a state of fear that will aid in coercing, intimidating or convincing individuals and groups to alter their behaviour. Its methods are hostage taking,*

piracy or sabotage, assassination, threats, hoaxes, and indiscriminate bombings and shootings[2].

Other definitions highlight the real targets of terrorism, such as: terrorism represents the use of violence when its most important result is not the physical and mental damage of the direct victims, but the psychological effect produced on someone else[3] or: terrorism involves the intentional use of violence or the threat of violence against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a primary target a threat of future violence[4].

There is another definition that we appreciate as more appropriate for the contemporary realities: *terrorism represents the use of violence by sub-states actors to instil fear, through attacking civilians and/or symbolic targets, in order to attract the attention of the international public opinion regarding their dissatisfaction, generating a severe response or the annihilation of the moral resolve of their opponents to make political changes*[5].

Therefore, terrorism is an act, not an ideology, and terrorist acts are aimed at non-combatants only. Terrorists seek to produce psychological effects beyond the immediate victims or the victims of terrorist attacks, to gain strategic advantages, influence and/or power or to determine the target governments to change their behaviour.

The definitions of terrorism are different but they all have a common feature: the use of violence or the threat of violence. Violence presupposes the execution of some actions in which different categories of armament are used (heavy armament and missiles included) against the civilians (more recently, without discriminating between civilians and militaries) or the national and international symbols.

The absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism has important consequences on the phenomenon understanding and combat. Moreover, the need for a coherent and consensual definition is considered by some researchers fundamental for a better understanding of the phenomenon. In addition, the problem of definition has also important consequences from the perspective of formulating security policies. On the other hand, the problem of terrorism definition drags on also because of the fact that the efforts have been focused

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[2] Arnold E. Terrell, *The Violence Formula: Why People Lend Sympathy and Support to Terrorism*, New Britain, CT: Lexington Books, 1988, pp. 3-4.

[3] Lawrence Z. Freedman, Yonah Alexander, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1983, p. 3.

[4] Shireen M. Mazari, *Analysis on Future of Terrorism*, paper presented at *Global Terrorism and International Cooperation*, COE-DAT, Ankara, Turkey, 23-24 March 2006.

[5] James D. Kiras, *Terrorism and Globalisation*, in John Baylis, Steve Smith, *Globalisation of World Politics*, 3rd edition, OUP, London, 2005, pp. 480-496.

more on combating the phenomenon and less on understanding it. Under these circumstances, it is easy to understand the increasing interest the subject benefits from on the part of the academic and political environment.

The disagreement regarding terrorism emerges when it comes to the aim and motivation for violence. Thus, what some states call terrorist groups, others call resistance organisations, or fighters for freedom and national identity. It is interesting that the same state may adopt different positions, at different times, towards a terrorist group, according to the momentary interests of the political elite of the particular state. For example, at first, the USA considered Nelson Mandela and the members of the African National Congress terrorists. When the African leader became the President of South Africa, the US position changed radically, accepting him as a dialogue partner. It was the same with Osama bin Laden, who received support from the USA when he fought against the former Soviet Union; the USA does not have the same attitude towards the same character, although he does not seem to have changed (he fights as before against a great world power).

The difficulty in reaching consensus on the definition of terrorism is due to divergent political interests of states, to the multiple and heterogeneous motivations of terrorist groups and, more recently, to the mutations occurring in the character of international terrorism. Ali Laidi, for example, asserts that terrorism is not the business of theologians (an allusion to the religious substrate of the phenomenon attributed by some Western scholars) but the one of political leaders who have divergent ambitions and interests[6]. The ethnically heterogeneous states are tempted to consider that the groups that fight for autonomy employing methods specific to terrorist groups are also terrorist groups. On the other hand, terrorist groups often have multiple complaints. Chechen terrorists, for example, claim independence from the Russian Federation, but the group is also motivated by religious imperatives.

Another point to be considered is represented by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the attacks of the insurgent, terrorist and extremist groups are aimed not only at the civilians but also at the militaries belonging to international coalitions, which has determined some states to reconsider the way they understand terrorism.

Regardless of the given or accepted definition, we retain that terrorism is not an end in itself but a means of achieving political goals.

In close connection to the problem of defining terrorism is the aspect of its legitimacy. This is, in fact, a criterion based on which terrorism is treated differently from the acts of organised crime. It is important because it brings

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[6] Ali Laidi, *Efectul de bumerang. Cum a determinat globalizarea apariția terorismului*, Editura House of Guides, București, 2009.

into question the morality, which has a major impact not only on the evolution of terrorism but also on the public support for governments committed to combating terrorism. This is why the moral aspect should be treated objectively and honestly by the critics of the phenomenon. From the perspective of terrorists, legitimacy is related to the morality of the goals and the employed methods[7]. The morality of goals refers to the terrorists' final objective – for example, if terrorists, through their actions seek to perpetuate a regime based on privileges and inequities or if they contravene the principles of justice, liberty and equality in society. As for the morality of means, there are limited possibilities available to terrorists to promote it, taking into account the fact that they do not have real chances to win democratic elections, because, among other reasons, the method employed by them to generate change is based on radical ideas that are not accepted by a large majority. Terrorists, as well as their supporters and sympathisers consider that violence promoted through these methods is the only way to attract attention on the discontent of a group and this is why they see terrorism as an acceptable method to correct an inequity.

On the other hand, the opponents of terrorism consider that terrorists violate the international principles based on dialogue and the political negotiations over the issues in dispute and, consequently, they categorically reject this mode of action. An important moment as far as the legitimacy of counterterrorism measures is concerned was represented by the international military intervention in Iraq, in 2003. The legitimacy of the intervention is contested as it was not approved by the UN Security Council. After failing in proving the connection between the regime led by Saddam Hussein and the terrorist network al-Qaeda, as well as the production of the weapons of mass destruction by the Iraqi regime, the American President and the British Prime Minister, George W. Bush and Tony Blair respectively, the artisans of the military intervention in Iraq, argued that the regime led by Hussein represented a danger for the Iraqi people and the entire Middle East region. Although the atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein are not contested by anybody, a great part of theorists argue that through classifying any political violence, terrorist acts included, as illegitimate, in international forums they control, Western states preserve their monopoly on the legitimacy of violence in the international system. These theorists suggest that Western states cannot claim moral superiority, associated with legitimacy, based on their desire to contravene international norms as if they observed them.

The current literature in the field treats terrorism as an aspect of the asymmetrical warfare, namely a conflict between two opposing parties that are not equal

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[7] Lee Jarvis, *The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies*, in *"Security Dialogue"*, Vol. 40, 2009.

from the military point of view in which the party that has less available resources appeals to terrorist actions.

Terrorism goals fall into four main categories:

- to achieve a specific aim: to topple a government; to force an army to leave a country; to get funds; to free prisoners;
- to instil fear at large scale, in the hope of changing the social order in a state;
- to provoke a government into reacting and imposing severe counterterrorist measures, able to attract the population hostile feelings;
- to employ terrorist methods, as a government, to determine the population to embrace unpopular measures (state terrorism). We can speak about state terrorism when the particular acts are put in practice by states: political opponents are eliminated, and the state apparatus uses repressive methods to intimidate and obtain information that cannot be obtained otherwise. Sometimes, states are indirectly engaged in terrorism, as they shelter terrorists or allow them to use their territory and infrastructure in order to organise terrorist actions in other states.

Terrorism causes/explanations

The causes of international terrorism are rooted in:

➢ *globalisation* – Globalisation has resulted in the increase in economic disparity and inequality between the states of the world and within the states, which has led to a global process of marginalisation and social exclusion. A consequence of this process is that globalisation has divided humanity into winners and losers.

To quote Benjamin Barber, expert in terrorism, *"capitalism fails miserably at wealth distribution and, hence, at safety and justice … Internationally, there is only a raging asymmetry that is the first and last cause of an anarchism in which terror flourishes and terrorists make their perverse arguments about death to young men and women who have lost hope in the possibilities of life. The feeling of frustration thus becomes an important factor that lies at the basis of the increase in terrorist threat"*[8].

Those who failed to take a seat at the power table are losers in the new international context. They see in globalisation a new form of economic imperialism. According to them, in the new international context, the USA and the Western European countries that dominate the international political and financial institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organisation etc.)

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[8] Benjamin Barber, *Jihad versus McWorld. Modul în care globalizarea şi tribalismul remodelează lumea*, Editura Incitatus, Bucureşti, 2002.

manipulate the exchange rates and promote fiscal policies that disfavour developing countries, as a way to increase their own wealth.

On the other hand, rapid communications have made people everywhere in the world become increasingly aware of the differences as far as the living standard is concerned, which has changed their aspirations and expectations. When the individual possibilities do not allow for these aspirations to be met, it generates frustrations, and the particular individuals may resort to violence, either for reasons related to their personal financial advantages or for political reasons (the intention to change the existent political system, through insurgency or terrorism). Paradoxically, the rise in the living standard and the greater access to opportunities in the field of education, associated with globalisation, may lead to greater expectations that, if not fulfilled, may determine extreme political opinions and attitudes, and to actions against the political system that has thwarted the fulfilment of these aspirations. It is the explanation for the fact that some important terrorist leaders have graduated from prestigious universities worldwide in different fields of activity and they do not belong to the marginalised social strata. Referring to the Salafi mujaheddin, Marc Sageman, psychiatrist and expert in terrorism, former CIA agent, argues that they *"come from relatively affluent families and have received a higher education than the average in their countries of origin and the West … They can speak many foreign languages and, in general, they are married and fathers of families"*.

Terrorists are not alienated people, as some researchers assert. Sageman also states that terrorists are *"surprisingly balanced"* people.

➢ *geopolitical rivalries* – Ali Laidi states that *"globalisation has not provoked the shock of civilisations but the one of great powers. In this super confrontation, mainly economic in peacetime, but also political, military and even cultural, the Arab world is the loser. Because there is no Arab power"*. The same author asserts that terrorism is not the business of theologians but of the political leaders who have divergent ambitions and interests[9]. This opinion was expressed many years before, even by Western politicians. Paul Kennedy states, in 1994, that *"a large part of its aggressive and combative attitude (of the Islam) against the current world order is explained, in fact, by the old fear to be absorbed by the West"*[10].

Current research indicates political claims as the main cause of terrorism; terrorists view of the world and the perception of the injustice done to them represent their main motivation. *"Terrorists (Islamists) seek less to conquer the world (except*

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[9] Ali Laidi, *op. cit*.
[10] Paul Kennedy, *Preparér le XX siècle*, Paris, Editions Odile Jacob, 1994.

some ultra-radicals), imposing the Islam, and more to regain the natural Arab-Muslim area of influence, by completely removing the Western influence from those areas"[11], argues Ali Laidi.

Modern terrorism has emerged and intensified in the context of the existence of some corrupt regimes (*apostate*, according to terrorists' terminology) in the Muslim world, and as a reaction to the USA foreign policy and its global hegemony. Al-Qaeda ideologist, Abu Musab al-Suri, argues that the USA profited from the dissolution of the USSR to establish a new world order and to dominate the life of the Muslim peoples in all aspects. He considers that the USA is responsible for the accession to power of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and of King Abdullah to the throne of Jordan, as well as for toppling the regime of Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. He labels all these events as American political aggressions.

The promotion of democracy in the Middle East by the USA is seen by some terrorists as an US aggression towards the states in the region. Under these circumstances, anti-American terrorism has spread in the world as a desire to change the US policy towards the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, as well as to stir the opposition to the forces of globalisation. In this context, Burke highlights the fact that Osama bin Laden's agenda is political in essence, even if it is presented and disseminated using religious language and imagery. *"Even if God had not given us the Islam, our pagan ancestors would have rejected the coming of these red mules"*[12], states bin Laden in one of his interventions.

Another expert in terrorism, Peter Bergen, also draws attention to the risk of reducing bin Laden's political claims to the cultural and religious gaps between the Muslim world and the Western one: *"He (Osama bin Laden) does not shout against the subversive effects of Hollywood movies, against Madonna naked body or against the pornography protected by the US Constitution. He does not rise against the culture of drugs and alcohol specific to the Western world or against its tolerance for homosexuals. He lets the American Christian fundamentalist, Jerry Falwell, to care for these aspects"*.

Terrorism is also an economic fight, motivated by what is considered by terrorists the West aggression towards the oil in the Middle East, whose price is limited on the Western markets. In an audio recording, posted on an extremist site, Osama bin Laden argues: *"Striking America in terms of economy and human lives represents a unique and huge opportunity …, be active and prevent them from reaching to oil and direct your actions accordingly, especially in Iraq and the countries*

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[11] Ali Laidi, *op. cit.*
[12] Red mules is the pejorative name for the American and the Coalition troops in Saudi Arabia.

in the Persian Gulf". Ayman al-Zawahiri also summoned the extremist militants to such attacks. A letter dated 7 December 2005, attributed to him, summoned the mujaheddins to concentrate their attacks on the oil stolen from the Muslim world, as the revenues reach, in the largest majority, to countries that are the Islam enemies, while the greatest part of the oil left in the Muslim countries comes in the hand of the corrupt governments in these countries[13].

Terrorism, as a reaction to globalisation and anti-Americanism, is reflected in the increase in the terrorist incidents against the US interests worldwide, after 1990.

➢ *religious differences* – in the latest years, the explanations related to the religious factor have gained ground, some authors even trying to subsume the political claims of the terrorist organisations under the theological ones. Authors such as Daniel Philpott suggests, discussing about radical Islam, that *"We should understand that these groups are defined, established and motivated by religious beliefs, beliefs about the foundation of existence. Beyond these beliefs, they build a political theology and a social criticism that measure the distance between theology and the current social conditions and prescribe according actions"*[14].

Some authors connect radical Islam and terrorism, arguing that, wherever in the world where Muslim populations neighbour non-Muslim populations, there has been a form of conflict between them lately. An analysis of wars, civil wars and other contemporary conflicts shows a greater incidence of violence and aggression in the Muslim societies than in other societies. If we ignore the tribal conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan), the Islamic factor is highly present. Almost 90% of these conflicts affect the Muslim countries and societies;

➢ *cultural differences* – in an international system dominated by the West politically, economically and culturally, culture is many times the only means of fight that remains to the globalisation losers. Therefore, the Western materialistic cultural values are more and more rejected by those who seek to preserve or regain the own cultural identity. The preservation of traditions and cultural values represents a means of resistance against the flow of Western commercial as well as cultural products (media products, filmography etc.) that currently dominate the world.

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[13] Paul Marriott, *Oil Back above $60*, Reuters, 7 December 2005.
[14] Daniel Philpott, *The Challenge of September 11th to Secularism in International Relations*, in *"World Politics"*, Vol. 55, no. 1, October, 2002, pp. 92-93.

When the individuals perceive their culture and civilisation as vulnerable and not secured, conflict becomes inevitable, against the background of the increasing current interactions between their civilisation and other, more powerful, civilisations. Huntington, for instance, states that there is a clear delineation between the Western liberal society and the Islamic one, *"humiliated and full of resentments generated by the Western military presence in the Persian Gulf, the overwhelming domination of the West as far as the military aspect is concerned, and incapable of shaping its own destiny"*. Huntington's theory considers the Islamic world as being highly homogenous, which is false in reality.

In the next issue, the author will highlight the different types of terrorist groups and their historical and geopolitical importance.

English version by
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

CAN NATO CONTRIBUTE TO PREVENTING STATE FAILURE ?

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Weak states are those that have poor governance structures and lack performance in their ability to meet essential responsibilities, but may however recover their ability to act.

Failed states, understood in this sense, with a reduced governance ability and a poor or weak national authority of state structures, are increasingly common.

Recent studies have identified 136 failed states, starting from the commonly accepted cases such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen to the ones that were put in this situation by ethnic wars (Bosnia-Herzegovina – in the '90s or Congo-Kinshasa – in the '80s) and up to the genocide in Rwanda.

In many cases, they cause internal instability, civil war and armed violence.

Keywords: *economic decline; ISAF mission; international security; operational challenges*

Successful states look pretty much the same. Those that succeed provide their citizens – more or less – with peace, personal security, access to public services, to education and to health care, non-discrimination, participation in making decisions that affect communities[1].

The international community has lately dealt with many issues caused by state failure. The international response to the issues of weak or failed states has been different from case to case and consisted both in ad hoc measures and in humanitarian intervention or post-conflict intervention measures.

The issues of weak or failed states require us to rethink the way in which this situation must be approached ever since its early stages. Interventions are of course a political response, yet, not the only possible one. While the intervention of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) troops in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan

through peacekeeping missions was a means to react to such a situation, it would have been much better if these conflicts had been prevented or sufficiently diminished ever since their beginning.

Weak or Failed States – A Threat to NATO

Failed states are already a danger posed to NATO member states. The collapse of the rule of law and of state institutions brings about anarchy and chaos. Where anarchy, drug trafficking, terrorism, human trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organised crime dominate, the dangers to NATO also appear or, in the case of the Taliban, we can even speak of starting points for terrorist attacks against certain NATO member states[2]. Despite the public acknowledgement of its importance, the Alliance is not properly prepared to deal with situations in which the control over governance is lost. In this respect, NATO Secretary General mentioned that NATO faces: *"common security challenges and threats – challenges and threats, such as failed states, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy and energy security"*[3].

State failure is often seen in a limited sense, as the collapse of state institutions and the disappearance of states. The cases of state collapse are rare phenomena today and less than 20 cases were reported during 1955-1998[4]. While for centuries, the collapse of the state and its disappearance represented a feature of international relations, very few states have disappeared since the nineteenth century. A distinction must be made between legal statehood (as recognised by international law) and empirical statehood (effective control). When NATO refers to failed states, it means the empirical statehood and not state dissolution or division under the action of international law, which constitutes a global or regional threat to security.

State failure is not the same thing with state collapse. State collapse means non-functional institutions, which triggers an emergency situation similar to a war of everyone against everyone. This means anarchy, disrespect for the law, widespread violence, which all threaten neighbouring states and adjacent regions[5].

A *failed state* can be defined as *"a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental tasks of the nation-state in a modern world despite maintaining*

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[2] The list of these phenomena is considered to be the cause of the conflicts, as well as a series of symptoms for fragile or failed states.

[3] Anders Fogh Rasmussen, on the occasion of his visit to Bahrain, 7 March 2010, www.nato.org.

[4] J. Goldstone, *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings* in R. Schwarz, *Preventing State Failure: A Proposed Agenda for NATO*, p. 180.

[5] W. Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, in R. Schwarz, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

its international legal recognition"[6]. Politically, it means, in fact, the failure of good governance; in the field of security, it means the failure of equally and indiscriminately providing citizens protection and stability, and economically it means the failure of the state's ability to provide general welfare, which is the most important thing.

Weak states are those states with inefficient government structure, lacking performance in their ability to carry out essential responsibilities, but which can recover their ability to act. Failed states, understood in this sense, with reduced governance ability and an improper or fragile national authority of state structures, are more and more present.

Recent studies have identified 136 failed states[7], starting from the commonly accepted cases such as: Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen to those brought in this situation by ethnic wars (as, in the '90s, in Bosnia Herzegovina or Congo-Kinshasa in the '80s) and to the genocide in Rwanda. In many cases, these trigger internal instability, civil war and armed violence. In fact, since 1945, more than 90% of all wars have been fought in developing countries[8], with a weak state institution.

With the purpose of anticipating where and when a state will fail, NATO can observe the way in which the governments of developing countries deal with the challenges resulted from the decrease in the welfare level and the economic decline.

Why Should NATO Be Interested in the Problem of Failed States ?

There are three obvious reasons for which NATO should attach more importance to weak or failed states.

First of all, NATO is already operationally engaged in the failed state Afghanistan, and Alliance key members are engaged in the vicinity of the weak state Pakistan. This has implications beyond the classic military aspects of counterinsurgency. NATO's mission in Afghanistan is not just a military one; it also includes state reconstruction and building tasks. The declared mission of NATO and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan) under the mandate of the UN is to assist the Afghan government in exerting and expanding its state authority and influence over the entire country, thus creating the possibility of reconstruction and effective governance. Thus, NATO's role, from this moment, is much more than that of merely a military security provider.

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[6] R. Rotberg, *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences*, in R. Schwarz, *op. cit.*

[7] J. Goldstone, *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Finding*, in R. Schwarz, *op. cit.*

[8] C. Kegley, *World Politics. Trend and Transformation*, in R. Schwarz, *op. cit.*

Second, NATO is already confronted with the increasing insecurity of weak and failed states. These threats are relatively small and indirect, however, it seems that they will occur more and more in the future. Piracy and illegal emigration are the products of these fragile and failed states. These aspects have implications for international security and they are threats that directly or indirectly affects Alliance member states.

Third, NATO will have to pay more attention to weak and failed states, because it will lead the future peacekeeping missions in these states. This is the future operational challenge for the Alliance, meaning that it will have to actually carry out these missions. NATO strategy should be focused on conflict prevention, but, at the same time, it cannot be neglected the need for an intervention through peacekeeping and stability operations. At the same time, it is possible for NATO to assume these peacekeeping missions depending on each case. The Alliance has already recognised that conflict prevention is critical, that is why a step forward is needed and state failure must be prevented.

The beginning of the cooperation between NATO and the African Union (AU) in Sudan and Somalia or the dialogue initiated with the League of Arab States (LAS) are examples for what a *"partnership of partners"* may represent for NATO in the future. A functional form of the cooperation between regional groups (and not only states) that is aimed at expanding the capabilities meant for insecurity and instability will make it possible, in the future, for NATO not to get involved in expensive interventions anymore.

To more effectively provide security within the territorial boundaries of its member states, the Alliance needs to look at security beyond the Euro-Atlantic area[9].

As many weak and failed states are certainly located outside Europe, mainly in Africa and the Middle East, NATO must monitor the development of security in these countries and reach to them through dialogue. In practical terms, NATO should focus on preventing state failure and not on intervening and fighting against the symptoms of a failed state.

Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty

We have so far pointed out that weak and failed states are threats both to NATO and to the international community, on the whole. These states are seen not just as a threat to the security of own peoples, they are rather a problem for a more and more liberal world order, as well as for international peace and security.

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[9] R. Schwarz, *Preventing State Failure: A Proposed Agenda for NATO, op. cit.,* p. 185, in C. Schaubelt, *Complex Operations: NATO at War and the Margins of War*, NATO College, Forum Paper, no. 14, July 2010, http://www.ndc.nato.int

The developments in the '90s in Rwanda, Somalia and Kosovo moved the centre of attention on the humanitarian dimension, to allow acts of intervention in another state with the purpose of protecting the people against major human rights violations, such as slavery or genocide.

Humanitarian interventions have begun to be seen as a legitimate political option for the international community, but with respecting the general norms of non-intervention, as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations.

Even if humanitarian in nature, interventions do cause disruptions in state-building processes. They are traumatic even for countries that have already failed. Preventing state failure would certainly have less adverse effects on its capacity.

The analysis of humanitarian intervention has generated a new discussion regarding the concept of *sovereignty*. The Kosovo Report maintained the concept of sovereignty as the cornerstone of the current international system and sought to strengthen state sovereignty. This proposed moving the focus from undeniable sovereignty to sovereignty seen as a responsibility: *"These approaches all see the basis for sovereignty shifting from the absolute rights of state leaders to respect for the popular will and internal forms of governance based on international standards of democracy and human rights ... On a scale of values, the sovereignty of a state does not stand higher than the human rights of its inhabitants"*[10].

These responsibilities in the field of sovereignty are connected, first of all, with the nation-state, but, when the state is not capable of managing them, they can fall under the international community. That is why some authors have maintained that sovereignty should not be related to the nation-state. Stephen Krasner, who detailed the multiple faces of sovereignty (international legal, domestic and Westphalian)[11], argued that in weak and failed states, to which humanitarian interventions are aimed, a focus of attention on domestic and legal sovereignty seems more important than Westphalian sovereignty[12].

Moreover, interventions in post-conflict situations remain fair political options, with the purpose of addressing threats emanating from insecurity, the massive human rights violations and genocide. This understanding of sovereignty, as a criterion for reflecting performance, can be seen as a twofold track; the target state retain its sovereignty as long as these criteria are met, otherwise, international actors take over this role for a transitional period.

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[10] R. Schwarz, O. Jütersönke, *Divisible Sovereignty and the Reconstruction of Iraq* in *Third World Quarterly*, 2005, Vol. 26, pp. 649-665.

[11] S. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, NJ: Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999.

[12] The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) affirms the principles of the sovereignty of states and of the non-intervention inside the borders recognised by all nations.

NATO may be one of these players that perform tasks in the field of sovereignty for a limited period of time, as the United Nations Organisation does in East Timor and Kosovo. A *"redistribution of sovereignty"* to non-state actors[13] is also possible, and the discussion about engaging the moderate Taliban in Afghanistan or Sunni tribes in Iraq in the political peace process seems to be moving in this direction.

The fact that it is urgent and extremely important to rethink sovereignty is highlighted by the existing tensions inherent in the current international system between goals and results, such as the promotion of human rights and social progress beyond national borders and the principle of equality of states sovereignty.

Building the Post-conflict State. What to Rebuild ?

Once a state has failed, the top priority is restoring the order and the state's ability to function and perform normally. As we have seen, weak and failed states are not characterised only by lack of performance and governance failure but especially by the widespread violence and conflict. When such a conflict situation is stabilised, either through foreign intervention or through a peace treaty and when the armed violence is over, new challenges occur. In post-conflict situations, there are three elements that represent the basic challenges for rebuilding state functionality and recovering the society. These are: security, welfare and representation. They are well interconnected, in some cases supporting one another, in other cases confusing one another *(table 1)*.

NATO Can Avoid State Failure

The complexity of post-conflict situations brings about a good understanding of historical, social and political evolutions.

The responsibility for protection requires, on the part of NATO and the international community, the task of taking care of weak states and, in some cases, even the task of intervening. Moreover, it is necessary for the structures of weak states to be monitored and enhanced and for regional stability to be increased.

If NATO wishes to contribute to expanding the area of peace that characterises the member states, then the issue of the weak states in its close vicinity should be considered, and it should contribute to making peace in the areas dominated by poverty, violence and totalitarianism, which are characteristics of a part

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[13] Z. Laïdi, *Adieu, Bodin ? Souveraineté et mondialisation. Leçons inaugurales de la séance d'ouverture de l'année académique*, 2002-2003, in R. Schwarz, *Preventing State Failure: A Proposed Agenda for NATO*, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

Interdependence of security, welfare and representation

Impact / Condition	Security	Welfare	Representation
Security		Security (peace, forces monopoly, security of property rights) is a prerequisite for welfare.	Security (peace, forces monopoly) is a prerequisite for democratic representation.
Welfare	Welfare reduces conflicts and produces resources necessary for providing security.		Welfare increases the capability and understanding for political participation and prolongs life expectancy of democracies.
Representation	Representation allows for peaceful foreign relations and non-violent resolutions of domestic conflicts. Representation provides optimal solutions for redistribution and contributes to stability.	Representation promotes economic growth and social justice. Representation draws more foreign direct investments and makes assistance more effective.	

Source: R. Schwarz, *Preventing State Failure: A Proposed Agenda for NATO*, p. 185.

of the developing world. As a consequence, we believe NATO, as an institution, should monitor security developments in this part of the world and contribute to the enhancement of weak states rather than wait and take action after the state has failed. Of course, this will be a more efficient attitude as far as the costs and rational use of resources are concerned, and it will raise the interest of many member states in terms of the operational engagement in such areas. A relatively recent NATO study was quite specific in this respect, mentioning that, *"in the world of 2030, the inability to react with expediency and purpose to events both expected or unexpected will be costly"*[14]. At the same time, the Lisbon NATO Summit, which focused on adopting and launching a new strategic concept, expresses the idea that *"the Alliance must do more with less"*[15], which supports the statement according to which the organisation must be focused on conflict prevention

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[14] *NATO/ACT Multiple Futures Project*, April 2009, http://www.ndc.nato.int/content.asp?pageid= 994727583

[15] M. Georgescu, *Un summit istoric*, in *Observatorul militar*, 2010, no. 47, p. 2.

and state construction rather than on intervention when the state has failed or it is about to fail. This can be achieved through the contribution of the following: a monitoring and warning centre, such as the World Bank's crisis prevention unit or a centre of excellence led by NATO, which can study, analyse and identify possible cases of failed states or international or internal evolutions that can contribute to weakening the states in the vicinity of the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Not only should NATO become involved in such activities, but it can also make a collective effort together with other organisations, such as: OSCE, the EU, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

In this context, the Alliance should develop a wider regional policy, which should observe security beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. This already takes place in a certain way through the partnerships with certain countries in North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf area, through the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The complementarity of approaches points out the comprehensive nature of the issue of state stability and governance. NATO has admitted the need for involvement in this respect, but there is more to be done. The states that are failed or have a lower standard of living or are in decline are sources of migration towards the Euro-Atlantic area. Migration is more and more perceived as a security issue connected to drug and human trafficking – new challenges to NATO. These challenges can be combated through institutional construction, reforms in the field of defence or direct support and assistance in planning defence in partner countries.

Of course, there are other areas that determine the insecurity of weak states, such as: lack of economic growth, inequity of resources distribution inside the country, but NATO cannot make an important contribution to them. In these areas, there are other international institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the EU, that can efficiently contribute to strengthening weak states.

Moreover, NATO could enlarge and expand cooperation with other countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as with countries such as Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan in specific domains outside the already existing programmes in the field of developing state capacities or *"soft"* security (maritime security, critical infrastructure, energy).

The reform of the defence sector is a field in which NATO can become involved. It has a remarkable experience in this respect, considering the cooperation with the Eastern European countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact. Security is a very important function of the state, which makes it possible, as shown above, for two other essential functions to be developed: welfare and representation.

In this area, NATO can bring the *"know-how"* for the weak states. The most convincing example is the transformation of the national authority structures of some former members of the Warsaw Pact, so that they could meet the democratic standards and become NATO and EU members. The cost of reforms was evidently counterbalanced by the benefit of enhancing state capabilities and joining Euro-Atlantic structures.

At the same time, it is important for NATO to know what needs to be *"fixed"* in the case of failed states. In this field, one can give the example of some states that managed to avoid total decline, such as Pakistan, the Ivory Coast (saved by the French intervention), the Solomon Islands (saved by the intervention of Australia), Indonesia and Tajikistan and the list may continue with some states in Northern Africa, exposed to domestic violence and terrorism (Algeria and, recently, Yemen).

Avoiding state failure is not an impossible mission, it is a prevention issue rather than an intervention one. When an intervention in a state has already taken place, the reconstruction process is difficult, as it is today the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. It becomes obvious that NATO should focus more on prevention than on intervention, but this does not mean that it must become the world gendarme of weak or failed states reconstruction, but concentrate its intervention policies on the most strategically critical regions: the Middle East, Northern Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

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State failure reflects the consequences of the governance decline process at the level of the nation-state. This is usually associated with the collapse of the social contract that connects the citizens of a state. The state loses its capacity to function and provide the equal distribution of public goods for the entire population. Citizens may lose confidence in state governance and return to communal identities that can provide security and economic opportunities and even representation. In such situations, insecurity and violence escalate and trigger the total collapse of state institutions. Both failure and collapse can possibly be an incubator of direct threats to NATO.

"Healing" failed states is not an impossible task. The weaknesses of the state have often been the key determinant in guiding states to failure and, in some cases, they have been exacerbated by poor economic performance, dependence on a single natural resource and political decisions, all representing challenges for state governance. This is the problem for which NATO has a possible plan. It would be a plan for strengthening fragile states that have strategic importance for NATO by using political dialogue, military support and, most importantly,

by building capabilities and reforming the security sector. Through this, the Alliance can effectively contribute to regional security and stability in its close vicinity and thus it can expand the peace area that characterises NATO member states.

State failure is, indeed, a threat (although, so far, indirect in nature) for NATO member states, because the violence spread in failed states threatens neighbour states and the surrounding regions. Until now, it has been a rare phenomenon, but nothing indicates that such cases of failed states will diminish with time or that they always occur in regions far from the North Atlantic area. In the future, to prevent the effects of failed states from becoming a direct threat to NATO, we suggest a change in orientation. Instead of managing the results of state failure, as in the case of Afghanistan and Somalia, NATO should focus on conflict prevention and state-building rather than wait and act only after states have already failed. It is just a suggestion.

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English version by
✍ Iulia NĂSTASIE

CASE STUDY: Athens' Strategy at the Onset of the Peloponnesian War – Perfect in Theory, Flawed by Design –

Colonel Daniel PETRESCU

The author takes an approach to Athens' strategy at the onset of the Peloponnesian War, starting from Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War.

First, he writes about certain flawed assumptions on which Pericles based his strategy, also mentioning that its ends, ways and means were not clearly articulated. Then, he points out a series of features a successful strategy should have, features that were not particularly considered by Pericles, who also failed to take into account the importance and role of interaction among armed forces, government and people in waging war.

The author also underlines the valuable elements of this strategy, concluding that one should refrain from assessing that Pericles' strategy caused the final defeat of Athens, the purpose of the article being to show that this strategy was unbalanced, inflexible and based on some flawed assumptions.

***Keywords**: Athens; Peloponnesian War; Thucydides; Pericles; strategy; triad people-government-armed forces*

Providing insights on major issues of war and strategy, Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* continues to influence contemporary thinking. His opinions and arguments are rarely contested, as the author's aim is primarily at describing and documenting events, avoiding personal interpretations and views.

The case of Pericles is among the very few occasions where Thucydides abandons this detached perspective. Thus, his positive assessment about the Athenian strategy at the onset of the conflict, and the placing of Pericles among the most positive and complete characters is one of the most striking parts of the book:

(5) For as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged the power of his country. (6) He outlived its commencement two years and six months, and the correctness of his foresight concerning the war became better known after his death. (7) He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt

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no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favourable result[1].

In spite of Thucydides' assessment, this essay considers that Pericles equipped Athens with a strategy which, although it seemed logical and innovative at the onset of the Peloponnesian conflict, was based on some flawed assumptions, was unbalanced, and inflexible, and thus did not provide enough ways and means to achieve victory.

To develop the argument, we will go beyond the pure military viewpoint and will examine the *Grand Strategy of Athens*. The main tools for analysis will be history and theory, while the two speeches of Pericles will be the main source of information. In doing so, we will address the following issues: What was the initial Athenian strategy ? Why do we assess this strategy as unable to bring victory ? Why was this strategy adopted in spite of its flaws ?

To start with, we give the name to Athens' strategy at the onset on the conflict from its author, Pericles. His first speech[2] describes the strategic direction for the war and Thucydides summarises it in the fragment already cited[3]. In the second speech, as appears in the *History*, when contested by the People, Pericles defends his strategy emphasising again the importance of sea power. However, he also admits faults – *"the plague has come upon us – the only point at which our calculation has been at fault"*[4].

Using the historical perspective as a tool, an analysis of Pericles' arguments is as follows. First, his strategy is based on the following flawed assumptions[5]: Sparta would never have the power to challenge Athens on sea; Athens does not need to consult her allies; Athens will always have the power to subdue any revolt in her camp; Persia will remain outside the conflict. Pericles also assumed that he would live to carry out this strategy. Had he thought strategically, he would have considered how internal discord and fight for power would have weakened Athens in the event of his death.

Second, Pericles' strategy did not articulate clearly the *ends, ways* and *means*, and was thus unbalanced. In its *ends*, the strategy aims at defeating Sparta, without properly addressing her allies. Ultimately, it is not conceived to win the war,

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[1] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.65.5 (For consistency, we are going to use the conventional way of citing Thucydides. Numbers refer to the book, chapter and section number in Thucydides' text).

[2] *Ibid*, 1.140 – 1.145.

[3] *"If they march against our country we will sail against theirs"*, […] *"We must cry not over the loss of houses and land but of men's lives"*, […] *"not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of the war, and will abstain from wilfully involving ourselves in other dangers"* (1.143.4 – 1.144.2).

[4] Thucydides, *op. cit.*, 2.64.1.

[5] We found some mentioned in Pericles' speeches, while we inferred others from Athens' actions at the onset of the conflict.

but to avoid defeat[6]. As a result, the strategy was incomplete and unable to achieve victory. Pericles' application of the *"principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians"*[7] introduces inflexibility in the attainment of his political goals.

In its *ways*, the strategy does not attack the cohesion of the Peloponnesian League, does not exploit enemy's weak points (the potential revolt of helots) and makes no use of Spartan bigotism[8]. It underestimates the Spartan will to fight[9]. Moreover, contrary to the assumption that *"innovative and murderous responses were required for absolute victory"*[10], the strategy does not make full use of modern day jointness, there were no operations designed that employed common army-navy actions[11].

Considering the *means*, Pericles' strategy made good use of the financial and naval resources, but lacked any consideration for the role of certain fortified points on land (Decelea). The strategy completely underestimated the possible consequence on people's morale, as well as health hazards, when the entire population had to take shelter inside the Athens' walls. Here, his strategy did not properly consider *"the imponderables"* – the plague, possible treason, intimidation, and dangers confronting democracies in time of war[12].

This leads to the second part of my argument. Prescribing what a strategy should be, theoretical perspective provides another useful tool for judgment. First, a strategy should be desirable, feasible, acceptable, sustainable, suitable and adaptable. Pericles' strategy poorly matched the Athenians' feelings and image of war, and it was thus unsustainable in the long run. Moreover, the lack of direct intervention to stop Spartan plundering caused anger on the part of the people who then questioned the desirability of such a strategy. When challenged, Pericles showed no desire to adapt.

Second, a strategy should consider the importance and role of interaction among *armed forces*, the *government*, and *people* in waging war[13]. Pericles did not address the traditional lack of discipline of the Athenian navy[14] (the *Armed Forces* part of trinity). He eluded the dangers democracy could face during a long

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[6] As none of Pericles' speeches describe victory, we can think that he considered the maintenance of the status quo would serve Athens' interests.

[7] Pericles' speech (1.1.140).

[8] Threatening Delphi would have provided some advantage to Athens.

[9] Spartans proved extraordinarily stubborn during the war.

[10] Victor Davis Hanson, *Introduction* to Robert B. Strassler, editor, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War,* (Free Press, New-York, 1996), p. xix.

[11] There are events that proved that Sparta's will to fight had been broken by a successful operation at land – see Pylos. In fact, Pylos was a joint naval-land operation.

[12] As later Alcibiades' machinations and democracy overthrown proved possible.

[13] The apparent Clausewitzian trinity.

[14] Described by Nicias in the case of Syracuse (7.13.2; 7.14.2).

war and provided no continuity for the Athenians realistic approach in foreign affairs (the *Government* part of trinity)[15]. His direction hurt the *People's* interests as well as their honour, when forced them to remain unresponsive to Spartan actions on land, raising the question of sustainability for the whole strategy.

However, there are some forgotten dimensions of strategy in Thucydides' descriptions. We know today the role of the operational, logistic, social and technological factors[16]. Applying this model, we see Pericles had little regard for the financial (logistic), social and technological dimensions of the incoming war. His speeches make no mention about the fact that war taxes needed to be imposed both on the Athenians and their allies. Also, *"Thucydides does not give an economic and social history of the Peloponnesian War [...] The drain, both psychologically and emotionally, on the people who provided the wherewithal to wage war is omitted"*[17].

Why was this strategy adopted, why did it seem sound in spite of its flaws ? We think the main reason was the influence of Pericles. Both Thucydides – a contemporary, and professor Kagan[18] – a historian of that époque, describe Athens – *"what was nominally a democracy was becoming in his (Pericles') hands government by the first citizen"*[19]. Pericle's strategy seemed sound because his speeches emphasised Athens' advantage and the assembly could not avoid the fallacies of group thinking. Nobody provided a better counter-argument. Moreover, it is equally true that his strategy really had valuable elements: reinforced success (sea power); provided for a good land defence (emphasising the role of the walls and the avoidance of a decisive battle); aimed at destroying Spartan will to fight (a good grasp of the enemy's centre of gravity).

Not only did this strategy convince the assembly, but it also convinced Thucydides. We have already cited his arguments. However, we cannot give him full credit in addressing the issue. Thucydides is biased towards Pericles – a General and an Athenian like himself, and angry at the followers who condemned him[20]. *"Thucydides very limited angle of vision"*[21] is underlined by some scholars, primarily because he *"[...] is writing a strictly military chronicle of the Peloponnesian War"*[22]. In many cases he does not provide reasoning

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[15] Athens always wanted more and was able to go for more, which makes an indirect strategy difficult to pursue by such a daring government.

[16] Michael Howard, *The Causes of War*, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy", 2nd edition Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1983, pp. 101-115.

[17] Victor Davis Hanson, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

[18] Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War*, lectures available online http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nMlkvfFJYPo (accessed 28 September 2010).

[19] Thucydides, *op. cit.,* 2.65.9.

[20] Through analogy, Thucydides suggests that Pericles' successors were wrong in their strategy the way they were wrong when condemned him.

[21] Victor Davis Hanson, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

[22] *Ibid.*

for certain actions[23] and he is influenced by the narrow definition of strategy in his time (the meaning of the term *"strategos"*).

Nevertheless, there are indeed some claims which might seem to contradict our views. The mention that *"the preparations of both the combatants were in every department in the last state of perfection"*[24] comes to suggest that Pericles' speeches do not reveal Athens' strategy in full. Had he lived, Pericles could have pursued a more sophisticated strategy. To address the *"imponderables"* only, Athens did set aside a reserve of money.

Also, we apply a post-factum Clausewitzian analysis to develop and support our argument, while we give little credit to Thucydides in his assessment. As a direct participant in the war, he might have a better sense of what could have worked or not.

This criticism can be countered. Indeed, the strategy was not fully revealed by the two speeches, but there are facts that prove the strategy was incomplete[25]. In the end, what defeated Athens was a combination of internal discord and revolt, development of the naval power of Spartans and the overt support of Persia[26]. None of these potential threats were properly addressed by Pericles' strategy[27].

We have already described Thucydides bias towards Pericles and we have mentioned above some fallacies in his reasoning. His beliefs and assumptions affect the argument. He barely seems to be inclined to describe the triad people-government-armed forces. In this particular case, his understanding of strategy is shallow[28], while his narrative is incomplete: *"[B]oth Plutarch and Diodotus, and extant official documents written on stone, all suggest that more went on than we are told by Thucydides"*[29].

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[23] I.e. no explanation of what was the purpose of attacking some ports in the Peloponnesian Peninsula and why the Athenian navy did go in certain places, which proves that justifying actions was not the main point of Thucydides work. Looking for an explanation of the defeat in the aftermath of the conflict, in spite of the enormous power Athens had displayed, Thucydides chooses the easiest path – followers were unable to rise at the level of Pericles and disregarded his advice.

[24] Thucydides, *op. cit.,* 1.1.1-2.

[25] During Pericles' life, there had been no attempt to get new allies, to separate Sparta's allies, or to approach Persia; there is no evidence of Athens trying to reconsider her attitude towards her allies and to avoid further revolts. Pericles displays no intent to change or adapt strategy. In fact, he does the opposite – delays to appear in front of the People when they are furious and provides no new ideas in the second speech.

[26] Robert B. Strassler, *Epilogue* to *The Landmark Thucydides* …, pp. 549-552.

[27] Even the money reserve set aside lately is not an argument that Pericles took into account the *"imponderables"*. Reserve was not envisioned in the first speech. Also, the use of money was limited only to re-craft the fleet and not to address all kind of contingencies.

[28] He does not explain people's anger against Pericles at the very beginning. Was that because of the lack of reaction when the crops were plundered by Spartans, or was there a deeper sense that the strategy was flawed ?

[29] The "Peace of Callias" (449), the transference of the Delian Treasury to Athens (454), the reassessment of the Athenian tribute, the Megarian Decree (432), the treaties between Athens and Sicilian Egesta (418-417). Victor Davis Hanson, in *Introduction* to *The Landmark Thucydides…*, p. xxii.

The unchanging nature of war gives us the right to use contemporary models in judging ancient events. The Peloponnesian war was a *"total war"* as defined by modern standards and thus allows us to apply a Clausewitzian mode of analysis. Contemporary definitions of strategy influence the argument. But it is equally valuable to bring Thucydides forward to explain modern issues, as it is to send Clausewitz backward to analyse and judge ancient circumstances.

All in all, we need to refrain from assessing that Pericles' strategy caused the final defeat of Athens. Things are more complex, because strategy implementation is equally important. We cannot disagree with Thucydides that Athens had the strength and resources to win the war. We claim instead that the initial strategy, as designed by Pericles, was based on some flawed assumptions, was unbalanced and inflexible. It could not have brought victory unless carefully tuned and decisively implemented. We have provided reasoning for that, focusing on the strategy alone and addressing its flaws, taking advantage of the modern theory of strategy and the historical perspective.

No matter how ancient or contemporary, strategy should be approached as a whole, which is more than the sum of its parts. This is why we resisted the temptation to differentiate and indicate *"ways"*, *"means"* or *"ends"* as a source of potential failure for Pericles' strategy. Placing the emphasis on comprehensiveness and integration gives all elements an acknowledgement of their relative consequences and provides the bases for our final assessment of Athens' strategy at the onset of the Peloponnesian War – perfect in theory, flawed by design.

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PERSPECTIVES REGARDING THE DYNAMICS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REFORMS IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC AREA

Dr Tiberiu TĂNASE

The 21st century is influenced by major reforms which have a great impact over the security context in all its dimensions.

In these circumstances, the reform of the intelligence field represents a permanent concern of both the specialists and the citizens worried by the challenges to national and international security. Therefore, the activity and management of intelligence agencies have to be organised more efficiently.

Intelligence agencies have as main goal searching and providing data, analysing and obtaining the intelligence necessary for political, economic and military decision-making process. Thus, they have intensified the reform of their own structures, which should represent a priority for every agency in order to meet the national security goal.

Keywords*: security context, intelligence, agencies management, analysis and reform in intelligence, intelligence process.*

Motto:
"Intelligence agencies must strengthen their forces in order to assess the global risks which threaten national security".

Vision 2015[1]

States have been more concerned with a more efficient organisation of the structures and management of intelligence agencies/services, especially after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, by adopting some organisational forms that have proved to be more flexible, more efficient in achieving these objectives, obviously increasing their usefulness and performances.

Essentially, the main goal of intelligence agencies/services is to search and provide data, to analyse them and to transform them into intelligence necessary for the political, economic and military management of a state, in the information cycle process. The specific manner in which

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[1] *Vision 2015* concerning the Intelligence Community in the USA is a programmatic document comprised in the series of medium- and long-term strategic level planning, www.dni.gov/reports/vision_2015.pdf.

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this process is organised and developed determines the structure and way of functioning of an intelligence agency/service. Thus, a general structure of an intelligence agency/service could have the following (main) components: management component, data collection component, operation component, technical component, protection component, administrative component.

An organisation represents the basis of a collective activity serving a specific purpose. Some specialists claim that the term *organisation* may be applied to *any complex system of human interaction no matter whether there are or there are not any collective purposes*[2].

Organisations, as complex social systems, are made of elements which have to operate in a concerted way with a view to achieving efficiency by performing some long-term planned changes that are aimed at the whole organisation and especially the human resources.

The efficiency, performances and flexibility of an organisation are essential desiderata for its optimisation and may represent objectives to be achieved within the framework of society's programmes and strategies. This implies the fact that organisations should be analysed not only from the perspective of their capacities to integrate organisational variables and human factors but also from the one of reacting adequately to the influences coming from the external environment.

Intelligence organisation

Intelligence organisation may be that type of organisation circumscribing those structures, units, agencies/services that apply the intelligence process[3] and develop the final product (that of the intelligence)[4].

The intelligence activity (information regarding security) implies the instruments necessary for its progress, which are the intelligence agencies/services that can be classified according to several criteria such as: goal, objectives and area/place of action, way of relating to authority, subordination, structure etc.

The intelligence agency/service represents that type of organisation (public or private institution), legally established, which makes use of methods, means,

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[2] Jack C. Plano, Robert E. Riggs, Helenan S. Robin, *Dicționar de analiză politică*, Editura Ecce Homo, București, 1993, p. 106.

[3] *"The ensemble of operations regarding the collection, filtration and analysis of information and data and the dissemination of the intelligence products that have an operational value to meet the requirements of a specific consumer",* apud Tiberiu Tănase, *Intelligence-ul modern* in *Intelligence* no. 6/16, July-September 2009, p. 26.

[4] Apud Dan Plăvițu, *Revoluția informațiilor în epoca postmodernă*, in *Informațiile militare în contextul de securitate actual*, coordinator Sergiu T. Medar, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2006. p. 46.

procedures and techniques specific to intelligence activity with a view to searching, collecting, checking, processing, documenting, storing or communicating specific information to beneficiaries/authorised users or to some entities (institutions, economic agents, private persons) who have an interest for it, using means that are institutionalised according to the law and internal regulations.

Organisation, structures and reform within an intelligence organisation

The intelligence activity implies searching, collecting data, analysing and processing them in the intelligence necessary for the political, economic and military strategy of a state. This process, known as the concept of *"intelligence cycle/flow"*, determines the structure and operation of an intelligence agency. Thus, the general structure of an intelligence agency/service could have the following components (departments):

- *data collection* – the interface between the intelligence service and sources, having as main tasks the management of existing sources (transmitting the need for information, obtaining it and transmitting it to the centre, remuneration of sources and other activities), finding new sources, running the department of data collecting in order to carry out the assigned missions;

- *operation* – generally divided in countries or areas of interest, as well as according to various topics (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction etc.)[5]. In order to perform some special operations (given the fact that most of the intelligence services in powerful countries and even in other countries possess this kind of special structures), technicians are need, whose main tasks are to put at the disposal of data collection and operating departments all the technical means necessary to carry out the given assignments[6]. In many cases, these are the departments that manage the various connections within the intelligence agency as well as with the beneficiaries, including the ones related to data transmitting and the databases, without which an intelligence service cannot be conceived;

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[5] Corneliu Pivariu, *Lumea secretelor, o modalitate de a înțelege informațiile strategice*, Editura Pastel, Brașov, 2005, p. 231.

[6] *Special Operations* (Special Activity/Covert Action), the complexity of such actions/operations makes it difficult to tell them apart, and the official terminology in the USA calls them special activities defined by the Presidential Executive Order no. 12333 from 4 December 1981, Jacques Baud, *Enciclopedie du Renseignement et des Services Secrets*, Charles-Lavauzelle, Paris, 1998.

- *protection* – generally responsible for the physical protection of the personnel, in cooperation with other departments, having a close connection to the technical department, a cooperation which witnesses a special development, given the current conditions and the perspective of the impact of the new technologies upon the whole activity within the intelligence services;
- *administrative* – which plays an important role in ensuring a proper operation of the service/agency and provides the conditions necessary for an appropriate progress of the whole intelligence structure[7].

It must be added here that administrative structures play a significant part in ensuring a proper operation and in creating the conditions for an appropriate evolution of the whole intelligence agency.

Courses of action regarding the reform of intelligence services

One of the reasons related to the existence of intelligence and security services all over the world is the need to put at the disposal of political decision-makers objective, proper and anticipative assessments, which are supposed to be a tool meant to clarify and optimise the political decision with a view to defending and promoting national interests.

The reformation of intelligence agencies, which are well-known for their conservative tendencies also determined by the need to ensure stability in the operation of the systems, has been imposed by several reasons such as: the transnational nature of the new threats[8], pressures coming from some political factors that have brought into discussion the status quo of the intelligence services in the light of the new conditions of the political environment and the development of the new information technologies[9], aspect that has determined and prompted the diversification and specialisation of intelligence services.

The amplification of threats calls for some preventative measures, which is the reason why a statal entity needs intelligence that may enable it to reach some well-documented decisions. Thus, the existence of constant intelligence

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[7] As a general rule, they are responsible for both the financial management and the infrastructure of the intelligence service. See Jacques Baud, *Enciclopedie du Renseignement et des Services Secrets*, *op. cit.*

[8] *Report* delivered by the *CIA* Director, on 28 January 1998, before the Intelligence Committee of the Senate.

[9] European Parliament, *Assessment of Scientific and Technological Options,* April, 1999, pp. 18-20.

activity is vital for the security of the state, especially under the circumstances of the decrease in the armed forces, in the classical sense. Some military analysts consider the intelligence structures to be the fourth category of armed services, together with the land, air and naval forces[10].

Intelligence is necessary in order to discover the aggressive intentions of an enemy and to define them, such as an indirect aggression or the preparation of the next step in intensifying the threat. In other words, efficient intelligence is needed in order to prevent threats.

Under these circumstances, *one of the courses of action in reforming intelligence services is materialised in the efforts made by states in order to improve and enlarge the legal framework of organisation and operation of the intelligence services and to provide them whith the financial support necessary for a more efficient operation.*

For that purpose, some states have taken prompt action and drafted some normative regulations meant to ensure a better coordination of the national security-related institutions and, at the same time, to grant them enhanced authority.

At the same time, the new configuration of threats has determined the states in the Euro-Atlantic and EU area to carry out significant reforms, materialised through *strategies, security policies, courses of action and regulations.*

The important dimension regarding the reform of intelligence activity is best represented by the trinomial *cooperation – team work – collaboration*[11], which express actual means by which intelligence and security services operate with a view to accomplishing some common goals by signing bilateral and multilateral agreements, by developing regional and international tools that should stipulate some efficient, immediate and long-term measures to combat global threats.

The need for cooperation in the field of intelligence services has been emphasised once more by becoming aware that no intelligence agency can handle alone terrorist activity and the worldwide information boom, since the information flow in all fields of activity has determined the creation of an impressive list of needs in the field of data collection. Thus, the establishment of some *efficient mechanisms for intelligence management and assessment*[12] has become all the more necessary.

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[10] Ionel Bucuroiu, *Serviciile de informaţii în secolul XXI şi problemele de securitate* in *Pulsul geostrategic,* no. 30, June 2008, Braşov.
[11] See *National Information Security Doctrine,* adopted in the Supreme Council of National Defence on 23 June 2004, p. 19.
[12] *Ibidem.*

Cooperation in the field of intelligence calls for a new stage in the collaboration among intelligence services: shifting the centre of gravity from the exchange of general intelligence towards the cooperation for specific cases and actions, as a means of optimal use of the potential of the parties involved. Under these circumstances, it is imperative to identify the best ways to use and direct the logistic, financial and human resources of the intelligence community in order to prevent unwanted side-slips.

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The international security environment is extremely fluid and dynamic, characterised by complexity, representing the overall progress of the political and economic environment resulted from the international evolution in the last decades of this century. The forces that are involved, being complex and strongly interrelated, will transform societies and will redefine the intelligence-related priorities, strategies and methods necessary to meet the unique requirements of the 21st century dynamics.

The current as well as potential challenges within the security field all over the world will change the geopolitical landscape that is regularly analysed by specialists in the intelligence field.

This unprecedented acceleration of the changes and the accentuation of the difference between the first and the last can threaten the fragile institution management. Faced with this asymmetric and dynamic framework, specialists in the intelligence field will be asked to assess the security environment, characterised by regional, economic, resource-related as well as ideological competition.

In this respect, more radical measures will have to be taken in order to reform some essential aspects of intelligence services:

- faster adjustment of the legal framework – not post factum;
- study of intelligence concepts, strategies, policies and technologies with a view to meeting the requirements of the beneficiaries and the concerted threats;
- integrated systems including adequate strategies for each type of threat;
- acceleration of cooperation forms;
- improvement of the activity of all services and of their capabilities made available through and by the intelligence community with a view to meeting the *"changing"* needs of the security intelligence users. This will imply a planned approach to the knowledge transfer, *guaranteeing a continuity* of the formal and informal data collections, which will not be lost in the process of the employees coming and going.

These actions are necessary in order to prepare a *strategic change* to face the predictable challenges, and – equally important – to prepare new *strategies for new challenges* that cannot be predicted.

The experience acquired at the beginning of the 21st century has shown that the success of intelligence services has been determined, in most of the cases, by their top management anticipatory skills related to the changes that are to take place in the security environment as well as by their ability to react properly to the challenges/changes determined by the vulnerabilities, risks and threats that exist in the security environment.

According to specialists, the optimisation of the performances of an intelligence structure belonging to the future will depend more and more upon this capacity to anticipate and react to changes, which has to be attributed to the increasing professionalism of intelligence organisations.

THE SENSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE MILITARY

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In the complex environment of military operations and missions, the role of activities regarding dialogue, information and communication is highlighted by NATO in a complex action developed from the concept of strategic communication (StratCom).

In its theoretical and operational dimension, StratCom is a process meant to counter hostile information flows, it is a fair, timely and proactive way of projecting military operations and actions in front of local, regional and international audiences and an analysis and planning tool within the comprehensive approach to security.

Within the Alliance, as well as in the United States, the development of the concept has its own history, beginning in 2007, when NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, under the pressure of events in Afghanistan, discussed the need for improving the capabilities that come in support of communication and called for the development of an action plan regarding NATO's strategic communication.

***Keywords**: action planning; decision-making factors; StratCom; information strategy; terrorism*

The analysis of military conflicts at the beginning of the 21st century, generically known as *lessons learned*, makes aware military leaders as well as political personalities of the fact that beyond the clear mathematical success of recent military campaigns, in which the power of modern technologies, superior logistics and mobility have proved decisive factors when confronting an adversary, the military victory does not necessarily offer security guarantees. In an age of asymmetric threats and new types of confrontation, of the fight against terrorism, insurgency, secessions, cyber-attacks or modern piracy, it is more and more acknowledged the fact that military structures represent the spearhead or the kinetic force with deterrence role, and they can provide only tactical victories, limited in time and space, if not supported by the majority population. Perceived as a sine qua non condition for enduring social peace, the population role is now carefully considered in any military campaign, and communication and building relationships with the locals become top priority. The military solution, although still actual as a form of coercion against anarchic forces and threats to social peace, order and stability, is tailored today by combining

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lethal and non-lethal effects to be more meaningful to a new political-military understanding of approaching crises and conflicts.

In the context of military evolution and transformation in the second decade of the 21st century when the military are developing new *doctrines and structures*[1] to better meet the new security challenges in the age of information, the aim of this study is to present the dynamics and characteristics of military actions within the strategic vision of a new concept.

Developed in the light of the *Effects-Based Approach to Operations* theory[2], *strategic communication* is an evolving discipline in the military domain, a *relatively new*[3] field of action, which is going to coordinate multiple functions and military branches designed to take action within the *information environment*[4].

The history and teleological value
of the concept of strategic communication within the military

The concept of *strategic communication* and its projection within the military evolved from a research programme developed by the US Department of Defense, in 2001, which underscored the importance and the necessity for the US to enhance its information dissemination capabilities that *"are powerful assets vital to national security"*[5]. In that context, it was stressed the fact that an appropriate management of information dissemination capabilities could create *"strategic communication strategies that … over time, may shape the foreign perception in ways that support America's interests"*[6].

The concept of *strategic communication*, initially seen through the perspective of the *management of information dissemination*, proposes an active posture within the information environment to counter and unveil manipulation, disinformation and instigation, which are harmful to the image of a nation or military operation. In the spectrum of asymmetric threats, US military analysts considered there were *"foes who may resent US power and seek strategic balancing through rhetorical, political*

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[1] In reference to the adoption by NATO of the *New Strategic Concept* (Lisbon, 2010) and to the process of the Alliance military transformation started in 2009.

[2] See Edward R. Smith, *Effects Based Operation*, Command and Control Research Program, 2002.

[3] *NATO Doctrine on Strategic Communication* was issued in 2009, see *NATO Strategic Communication Policy*, 29 September 2009, PO (2009) 0141.

[4] Information environment is defined as the virtual and physical environment in which information is stored, processed and transmitted. It consists of the information per se and information systems. *(MC 422/3 – NATO Military Policy on Information Operations)*.

[5] *Report of the Defense Science Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination*, October 2001, pp. 1 and 9.

[6] *Ibidem.*

and cultural means"[7], and, in this context, emphasised the idea that *"understanding and influencing the opinions of the right audiences at the right time can create diplomatic opportunities, reduce tensions that might lead to war, help contain conflicts, and address non-traditional threats to US security"*[8].

The vision upon this emerging concept was definitely formulated, in August 2004, when, in a follow-up study specifically dedicated to this subject, it was shown explicitly that *"strategic communication is vital for the US security interests and foreign policy"*[9]. The new construct was substantiated and defined through the evaluation of the conditions and the scope under which it was going to be further developed; Strategic communication was defined as *"a sophisticated method that maps perceptions and influence networks, identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on 'double tasks', develops themes and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success"*[10].

With an important geopolitical and military profile, Great Britain gave its own interpretation of the *strategic communication* concept which was going to be integrated within the general strategy of fighting against terrorism. The result was the establishment, in 2007, of the governmental structure *Research Information and Communication Unit (RICU)*, a specialised unit for strategic communication. Its mission is *"to ensure that the UK Government communicates effectively to reduce the risks of terrorism …"*[11]. The *strategic communication* concept is described by the UK through the synergic and coordinated action of the three structures *(Delivery Teams, Analysis Team, Research and Knowledge Team)* that functionally act to *"disseminate messages to the target audiences, exploit information which may condemn terrorism in front of public opinion, develop long term influence campaigns by projecting messages and ideas towards those groups that are sympathetic to or that generate terrorism, continuously assess the implications of technological progress and especially of communication means to identify the way they can be used against terrorism, develop analyses, data bases and monitor the information flows"*[12].

In a pragmatic approach, Germany established, in 2009, the *Cultural Advisor* position at the strategic and operational level of military commands. This new capability is to support military commanders and troops in respect to appropriately communicate and act in different social-cultural contexts as prerequisite for successful end state

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[7] *Ibidem.*

[8] *Ibidem.*

[9] Vincent Vitto, *Memorandum for the Chairman*, Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, Washington, 2004.

[10] *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, Washington, 2004, p. 2.

[11] See http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk./about-us/about-the directorat/RICU/index.html

[12] *Ibidem.*

of their mission. The justification of this newly created position represents the German military analysts' vision on strategic communication. The Cultural Advisor role is to raise cultural awareness and reduce the risks associated with miscommunication.

Denmark, as part of the national strategy to sustain the military engagement in Afghanistan, at the level of its embassy in Kabul, established a *Media Information Centre (MIC)*. MIC sustains the information effort of Denmark towards its citizens and helps to *"enhance the Afghan media's coverage of the Danish political, military and civilian efforts"*[13]. Through this approach, Denmark is promoting its national interests having at the core a concept close to what we see as *strategic communication*.

If, at the level of various nations, *strategic communication* is viewed in different ways and particular forms based on different cultural contexts and geopolitical interests, NATO offers a standardisation model of this concept agreed by its 28 member states.

The concept of strategic communication in NATO

In the complex environment of military operations and missions at the beginning of the 21st century, the role of dialogue, information and communication is emphasised today by NATO within the complex and comprehensive concept of *strategic communication (StratCom)*.

StratCom is defined by NATO as *"the coordinated an appropriate use of NATO communication activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (InfoOps) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) – in support of the Alliance policies, operations and activities, in order to advance NATO's aims"*[14].

Within its theoretical and practical dimensions, *StratCom* defines a process to counter hostile information, a way to project correctly, pro-actively and appropriately NATO's actions and operations in front of local, regional and international audiences, an instrument of analysis and planning within the *comprehensive approach*[15] to security.

As in the USA, the evolution of the *strategic communication* concept in NATO has its own history that begins in 2007, when NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, under the pressure of events in Afghanistan, asked for an *Action Plan on Strategic Communication*[16]. At NATO Bucharest Summit

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[13] *Denmark's Engagement in Afghanistan 2008-2012*, Version 1.0., 06-10-2008, chapters 8 and 9.

[14] *NATO Strategic Communication Policy*, PO (2009) 0141, pp.1-2.

[15] At NATO Bucharest Summit, in April 2008, NATO adopted an Action Plan regarding comprehensive approach to security (see NATO, PR (2008)049, and regarding strengthening communication and cooperation with other states and international organisations, with all relevant actors for the action in common, especially in Afghanistan, with a view to preventing conflicts and enhancing peace and security.

[16] *Action Plan on NATO's Strategic Communication*, SG (2007) 0464.

(April, 2008) it was emphasised the Alliance determination to *"enhance its capabilities on strategic communication"*[17], and, one year later, in the NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration (2009), it was clearly said that *"strategic communication is an integral part of our efforts to achieve the Alliance's political and military objectives"*[18].

In September 2008, through the Allied Command Operation Directive, *ACO AD 95-2*, NATO established the principles and courses of action to plan and conduct strategic communication within NATO operations[19] and consequently, in 2009, the concept was implemented in the theatres of operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo[20]. NATO policy on strategic communication – *NATO Strategic Communication Policy*, as the basic and fundamental paper that set the doctrinal, strategic and operational framework of the concept within the Alliance was issued in September 2009[21].

The Alliance strategic leadership implements strategic communication following the need to project and lead the organisation within the complex architecture of international relations, to strengthen NATO cohesion and to achieve cohesion with international actors, partners, states and organisations with respect to its security interests.

Between NATO strategic leadership and strategic communication there is an inherent bond and, in this respect, within the Alliance, *StratCom* represents a responsibility of all levels of command and a staff function.

Viewed as a process and, at the same time, as a way of thinking, directed from the level of the North Atlantic Council, *StratCom* is integrated at all echelons, the communication dimension being now part of any operational planning process. If not long ago the mission was planned first and the messages and communication strategy were adjusted after, now, under the *StratCom* paradigm, the values and ideas are to be planned first. They orient and sustain the planning of military actions.

In NATO, *StratCom* is aimed at harmonising the Alliance's objectives with other relevant actors, with the general population within a common cultural space or in a different one which may represent a priority area in line with security interests. The process is going to happen by performing political and military actions that have to determine complementary effects over different audiences following the political interests and operational requirements.

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[17] *NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration*, 3 April 2008, Press Release: (2008) 049, point 10.

[18] *NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration*, 4 April 2009, Press Release: (2009) 044, point 16.

[19] *ACO Directive no. 95-2, ACO Strategic Communications*, 5 March 2008, revised and republished on 15 September 2008 (TT 204863) and on 19 November 2009 (TT 207892).

[20] See *Higher Military Headquarters' Strategic Communications Plan for NATO's Engagement in Afghanistan*, 2030/SHCGCSC/EC/09-205304, 29 January 2009 and *KOSOVO – DETERENT PRESENCE – STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATING FRAMEWORK*, 24 August 2009.

[21] *NATO Strategic Communication Policy*, 29 September 2009, PO (2009) 0141.

The synergy of communication's effect at the three levels of military action (strategic, operational and tactical) is the result of a coordinated effort developed under the *StratCom* dimension, necessarily and actively conducted through the active involvement of the political and military leadership.

The strategic communication system within NATO may be seen as an engine to create a corporate culture of communication aiming to conduct and disseminate organisational excellence for planning, and conduct military operations and to promote the Alliance's values and shape its image on media flows.

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Strategic communication did not appear in isolation but as a result of the broader effort of military transformation, the emergence of the new social media (Face Book, Twitter etc.) and the increasing role of the public opinion in all social aspects including the military one.

Strategic communication is an instrument meant to inform large audiences (NATO) and to shape perceptions and influence (US).

The Alliance is now in a new process of transformation, reviewing its functions and command structure. In this endeavour, NATO presents today new concepts, new ideas and activates new *functions and military structures*[22] that have a major influence on the way of thinking and conducting future operations. The effort of understanding the sense and significance of *StratCom* should be closely linked with the effort of understanding how it interferes and functions in relation to other conceptual approaches that presently reform, sustain theoretically and practically the military capacity of the most powerful politico-military organisation nowadays.

If, from a certain point of view, cynically, the emergence of the concept of *StratCom* may suggest the failure of previous dialogue and communication attempts, it is more necessary now to study this process and to implement it in the contemporary military structures.

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[22] In reference to *Joint Effect Management Branch, Joint Synchronisation and Execution Branch, Theatre Engagement Centre*, structures made operational in 2010, at the level of operational headquarters and DJSE (Deployable Joint Staff Element), which replaced the old DJTF concept.

YEMEN'S PROBLEMS ARE THE REGION'S PROBLEMS

David HUGHES

The author argues whether Yemen's multiple challenges could spill over into neighbouring countries. First, he writes about the domestic situation of the country, which is riddled with regional tensions that have led to an ongoing civil war in the north and secessionist movements in the south. Then, he mentions the most important issues with which the country is confronted, regarding resources and demography, pointing out the fact that the country is rapidly running out of water and oil, while it has to deal with the high population growth rate. In the author's opinion, these issues pose serious problems for the neighbouring countries, which must adopt a proactive approach and help Yemen not to slip into the failed state category, thus deterring the threat of a domino effect in the region.

Keywords*: al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula; water shortage; Gulf Cooperation Council; proactive approach; regional repercussions*

Unlike the problems faced in the past, Yemen's contemporary challenges are numerous and interconnected, potentially overwhelming the state's limited capacities.

Yemen suffers from a confluence of near-crises: in times of leadership transition, it finds itself in economic, demographic and domestic security turmoil. Its oil reserves are set to disappear within the next 5 – 10 years along with government resources. Without any post-oil plans, the government will face greater challenges in managing a country with such worrying demographic prospects.

The country's geographic dispersion and the difficult terrain heavily impair the government's outreach – with a rapidly expanding poor population, the pressure on already thin resources and on the provision of goods and services are bound to become untenable.

The same could be said for water: uncontrolled extractions, imperfect legal regimes and unequal decentralisation plans mean that Sanaa could potentially be the first capital city to run out of water.

For domestic security, the country is riddled with regional tensions that have led to an ongoing civil war in the north and secessionist movements in the south. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants have also established their headquarters there and are creating a comfortable nest in the under-governed areas. Soon enough, one of these challenges could effectively become a crisis, which might spark a domino effect with regard to the other challenges.

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K. Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi

The main reason why Yemen is such a difficult case to deal with is because most of its problems have considerable regional repercussions. Regional actors should increase their involvement, helping Yemen tackle these challenges and de-escalate regional tensions.

Soft Security Issues

In terms of resources, Yemen could become a burden for neighbouring countries. Yemen is already very rapidly running out of water and oil but if it were to go on artificial life support, the strains on *Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)* countries might become too large to stomach, considering the increase in energy demands from emerging powers.

© REUTERS/Reuters TV
Video grab of Saudi Army vehicles
burning during clashes
with Houthi rebels in the border area
between Saudi Arabia and Yemen

As oil represents 75% of government income, this means that Saudi Arabia will not just bail out the Yemeni budget year-in, year-out as it currently does. It might have to fund increasing portions of it. With few other credible alternatives explored, the GCC countries will surely also have to chip in to keep Yemen afloat lest its problems become the region's problems. Neighbours will not want a failed state on its borders where terrorist groups may breed in harmony, as this would increase regional insecurity and instability.

Water shortages might also spark tensions and resource wars in an already unstable area. The fact that 80% of conflicts in Yemen come down to water is troubling. Looking to the African continent, water wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea or strong tensions between Egypt and Sudan could replicate across the Red Sea on the Arabian Peninsula.

On demographics, Yemen's population growth rate hovers around 3,4% and 2/3rds of the population is under 24. In the next 20 years, the country's population will double to more than 40 million. In 30 years, it will reach 60 million.

The consequences of Yemen collapsing are dire: a failing Yemen would entail half of the 23 million population seeking asylum in Saudi Arabia. This becomes a significant problem for neighbouring countries because of the state of Yemen's labour market. As it is incapable of accommodating for these numbers, the unemployed Yemenis look to neighbouring countries for opportunities.

> ***The Al Houthi conflict taking place***
> ***in the northern province***
> ***has been raging for approximately 6 years***

Further, the country benefits from exporting its workers as it alleviates the economic and social burdens in Yemen: one migrant worker can support six or seven Yemenis at home. After oil, remittances are the number one source of hard currency for Yemen. The problem though is that foreign labourers in the six GCC countries represent 51% of the total GCC population.

Despite the benefits that they bring, an influx of new workers from a booming, poor and unskilled Yemeni workforce would not be the most welcome. Apprehension surrounds new influxes as they are seen as security threats and obstacles hampering the GCC countries' efforts to foster inclusive and harmonious development.

Hard Security Dilemmas

Yemen is a country with very similar numbers of Sunni and Shia Muslims. From a religious point of view, a key consideration is the increasing risk of regional escalation with the involvement of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Saada civil war. The Al Houthi conflict taking place in its northern province has been raging for approximately 6 years. A truce was agreed in February 2010. It remains fragile in part because clashes between Shia rebels and local religious rivals weaken the ceasefire.

© REUTERS/Reuters TV
Video grab shows Houthi rebels driving a seized Saudi border patrol pick-up in the border area between Saudi Arabia and Yemen

Throughout the conflict, President Saleh has accused the Iranian government of militarily, financially and politically supporting the Shia uprising in Saada.

Although the latter might be a possibility, no concrete and verifiable evidence supports the first two allegations. For its own political purpose, Iran has played this game allowing others to exaggerate its regional power and military reach. When Saudi Arabia started to echo Yemeni complaints of Iranian intervention, it condemned joint Yemeni – Saudi action.

Although it is true that the Al Houthi movement cannot fund the insurgency with pomegranates and grapes, many argue that the Yemeni government is accusing Iran to extract precious resources from the US and Saudi Arabia to fund its military repression in Saada. Saleh knows how sensitive these two countries are to Iran's growing regional power and may have been playing on these fears to help secure his regime.

While Iran's involvement remains a matter of speculation, Saudi Arabia's is much more real. Indeed, it has numerous reasons for concern: Iran's growing clout in the region; the development of a Shia movement in Yemen; the import of a Shia – Sunni civil war into Saudi Arabia; and wider border instabilities.

Yemen allegedly received $10 million per month in 2007 from Saudi Arabia during the war. The Saudis also intervened physically in November 2009 with extensive air and naval power. Saudi Arabia has even lost over 100 troops and border forces, with five being held by rebel forces. With Saudi military operations failing to defeat the insurgents on the Yemeni border, this might encourage Iran to be more proactive in Saada to pressurise the Saudis. Consequently, while this affair is originally local, many experts accept a regional narrative.

In addition, al-Qaeda is regrouping into a regional franchise, *AQAP*, with a durable organisational infrastructure that can survive the loss of key commanders. This reflects the group's growing ambitions in terms of the scope of their activities. The under-governed areas of Yemen are becoming a springboard for attacks in Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa and even in the US.

For example, in April 2008, Saudi Arabia intercepted 35 suicide vests coming into the country; hideouts along the border were discovered; in August 2009, the Saudi assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed was nearly killed; in October 2009, two Saudi nationals coming from Yemen and going to Saudi Arabia were killed after a shootout at the border crossing (one was an ex-Guantanamo detainee); or in December 2009, there was the failed Christmas Day Northwest Airlines flight 253 to Detroit bombing.

In 2010, terrorist activities have been sustained at levels similar to those in 2009. The reintegration of Guantanamo returnees poses here important questions: *How do we gauge this risk ?* Not all detainees pose the same threat and predicting

which ones will return and take up arms is an impossible task. Can we reintegrate them into society ? The *2002 Committee for Religious Dialogue* was criticised by the US for the lack of follow-up, external social support and reintegration assistance. Can the Saudi model be effectively imported ? Can these detainees follow the Saudi programme to make sure they do not re-engage in activities that will threaten the country, the region and other continents ? This is a big issue as, in 2009, one third of the remaining Guantanamo 255 detainees were from Yemen.

The return of fighters from Iraq may have the same effect as the transfer of Guantanamo detainees: it may give AQAP an influx of new, experienced and dedicated members with a profound antipathy toward Shi'as and Muslim governments cooperating with the US. Outside Yemen, the return of fighters might also induce sectarian tensions in the region with Iran.

Violence against the Shi'as and Iraqi security forces may well push Iran to increase its protection of its religious brothers in the area. It already supports Hezbollah in Lebanon and has extended its influence to Iraq through its military support to local militias. This involvement could encourage GCC countries like Saudi Arabia to sponsor in return Sunni insurgents in their proxy war with Iran. The Saudis fear Iranian support to aggrieved Shi'as in Saudi Arabia's eastern province. Returnees from Iraq will therefore very likely spark anti-Shi'a rhetoric.

> **The region has also become a transit point**
> **for guns, drugs and other illegal**
> **products from East Africa to the Gulf region**

In terms of maritime security, porous borders and the lack of government capacities have left the coasts of Yemen vulnerable to piracy and smuggling. The waters around Yemen have become infested with pirates that threaten the vital international shipping lanes of the Bab Al Mandab Strait.

Despite international aid to build up the Yemeni coast guard after the 2000 USS Cole bombing, huge oil tankers and other merchant ships are still vulnerable. The immensity of the shoreline combined with the limited number of patrol officers and vessels means that many of the attacks cannot be prevented. Although recorded attacks decreased recently, they are still costly.

The robust anti-piracy measures adopted by merchant navy fleets and the 1 600 specially trained soldiers pledged by Saleh are still not enough. The Yemeni government alone lost $150 million in security expenses, experienced increased insurance premiums and incurred about $200 million in lost fishing

and other revenue. The losses for other regional and international actors are also considerable.

The region has also become a transit point for guns, drugs and other illegal products from East Africa to the Gulf region. Saudi authorities report a continual influx of drugs and illegal workers. Weapons are even more problematic as they are used in attacks within these neighbouring countries: explosive devices were used in the 2003 Riyadh bombings and assault rifles were imported for the 2004 attack on the US Consulate in Jiddah.

A regional approach to solve regional problems

Knowing that Yemen's problems are not confined to its borders, a regional approach should be employed.

NATO should only monitor the situation from a distance but encourage, through various consultation mechanisms, its partners in the Middle East to adopt a proactive approach.

The GCC and Saudi Arabia in particular should be the natural leaders of efforts in Yemen due to its geographic proximity, its strong financial situation and cultural and historical ties. As attempts so far have been below par, NATO countries could use their ties with these countries to act on Yemen and wave the integration or closer association carrot.

Traditionally, GCC members have opposed accession to additional states. Kuwait in particular still resents Saleh's support for Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War. At present, Yemen has an observer status in several committees but many doubt that full membership will ever be granted to Yemen. Yet, the GCC needs to assist Yemen and help it to not slip into the failed state category, lest its instability contaminates GCC members.

NEW CHALLENGES
– New NATO –

Gábor IKLÓDY

The author writes about the creation of the "Emerging Security Challenges Division" (ESCD), which intends to systematically address a broad range of challenges that will increasingly affect the security of the allies on both sides of the Atlantic: terrorism, cyber attacks, threats to energy supply, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. First, he presents a list of the common characteristics of these challenges. Then, he points out the need for the Alliance to become a team player in order to remain an effective security provider, while developing a culture of political discussion which is not confined to issues that directly involve NATO militarily, but which also includes issues that may have "only" political relevance.

He concludes by mentioning the elements that will shape NATO's approach towards emerging security challenges: a new Division in NATO's International Staff, stronger ties with other players, and a more forward-looking debate among allies.

Keywords: Emerging Security Challenges Division; security challenges; culture of debate; transatlantic cooperation

The creation of an *"Emerging Security Challenges Division" (ESCD)* by Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is not just an internal exercise but also a strong political message. For the first time, NATO is systematically bringing together work on the areas that will increasingly affect the security of the allies on both sides of the Atlantic: terrorism, cyber attacks, threats to energy supply, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

At first glance, it may appear as if these challenges have little in common. However, a closer look reveals why they belong together conceptually. These challenges not only share certain common characteristics, but addressing them also requires NATO to change the way it thinks about Alliance solidarity and how it interacts with the broader international community, notably with civilian actors and the private sector.

The *first common characteristic of these challenges* is that they do not necessarily affect all allies in the same way. A terrorist attack on a single ally may generate collective concern, yet it may not automatically be regarded as an attack

A well-orchestrated cyber attack can paralyse a country in ways that in the past could only have been achieved by a foreign invasion.

against the Alliance as a whole. The same holds true for a cyber attack on the banking system or an attack on the energy supply of an individual ally. The decision about if and how to respond lies first and foremost with the country that has been hit.

In contrast to the *Cold War*, when a Warsaw Pact attack on one NATO ally would have triggered a collective response by the other allies, today's challenges do not necessarily lend themselves to such a quasi-automatic response. Consequently, NATO allies need to redefine the way in which Alliance solidarity will be expressed in a range of entirely new scenarios.

A **second common characteristic of the new challenges** is the fact that they do not necessarily require a military response. A well-orchestrated cyber attack can paralyse a country in ways that in the past could only have been achieved by a foreign invasion; yet, if the attackers were an NGO, for example, NATO would hardly be able to threaten military retaliation.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in turn, may well require new military means of protection, such as missile defences. However, dampening proliferation incentives by resolving regional security problems and applying diplomatic and economic *"sticks"* and *"carrots"* will remain the preferred approach. In short, while transatlantic cooperation remains indispensable to cope with the new security challenges, NATO's military *"toolbox"* no longer suffices.

If the Alliance wants to remain an effective security provider for its members, it must become a team player. NATO has only just begun to embark on this journey – and it is going to be a difficult one.

This leads to the **third common characteristic of the new challenges**: since they are both foreign and domestic, as well as military and economic, they require a holistic approach. In concrete terms, they require NATO to build structured relations with a range of civilian actors.

This applies not only to the other major international organisations, such as the United Nations and the European Union, but also to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as the private sector, for example the energy

and information technology sectors. All these actors become partners in the attempt to cope with the security challenges that are thrown up by globalisation. Given the vast differences in their goals, mandates and working methods, building trusting and effective relationships between them will be an arduous process. Yet, NATO must not shy away from this challenge.

If the Alliance wants to remain an effective security provider for its members, it must become a team player. NATO has only just begun to embark on this journey – and it is going to be a difficult one.

Some allies may hesitate to grant NATO a stronger role in areas such as energy security or addressing nuclear proliferation, arguing against unduly militarising a range of issues that for good reasons should remain political. Others might be concerned that dealing with these new security challenges will divert NATO's attention away from its core task of collective defence. Such concerns can only be addressed – and, hopefully, dispelled – if allies devote more time to discussing emerging challenges. Over the past years, managing NATO's operations, such as those in Afghanistan and Kosovo, has taken up most of the allies' time and focus, at the expense of discussing future challenges.

> **As long as every debate in NATO is viewed as preparing military operations, a forward-looking, enlightened debate about emerging 21st century challenges will remain elusive**

What is therefore needed is a new balance between the present and the future: NATO must develop a culture of political discussion which is not confined to issues that directly involve NATO militarily, but which also includes issues that may have *"only"* political relevance. As long as every debate in NATO is viewed as preparing military operations, a forward-looking, enlightened debate about emerging 21st century challenges will remain elusive. The *Emerging Security Challenges Division* will play its part in contributing to such a new culture of debate. Its Strategic Analysis Capability will scan the strategic horizon for challenges that may affect allied security. This will help stimulate the debate among allies and reinforce NATO's unique value as a key forum for security consultation between Europe and North America, the world's strongest community of like-minded nations.

A new Division in NATO's International Staff, stronger ties with other actors, and a more forward-looking debate among allies: these are the elements that will shape NATO's approach towards emerging security challenges. To make this approach truly effective requires profound changes in NATO's structure and policy.

But NATO is ready to embrace these changes. Because allies have understood that only by embracing change will the Atlantic Alliance be able to live up to its role as an anchor of security in a globalised world.

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
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Rivista Militare, Italy, no. 4, July-August 2010

Nuclear Strategy • The Taliban • NATO-Russia Military Cooperation, a Still Open Challenge • The NATO Defence College • The Italian Army in Emergencies of Public Calamity. A Resource for the Country • Hybrid Warfare. The Israel-Hezbollah War of 2006 • The Terrorist Antiaircraft Threat • A Possible New Selective Procedure for the Admission to the Military Academy • The Italian Army in the Operational Demining and Humanitarian Clearing in Lebanon • Communicating Consent • Legio VII Gemina and Hydraulic Mines

ISAF Joint Command • New Prospects for a World without Nuclear Devices • Interview with the Commander of Serbian Armed Forces • Performance Estimation Process in Military Environment • Cyberwar and Cyber-activity: New Scenarios • Sensors of Observation Satellites: Technical Issues and Future Developments • Amphibious Forces at the Beginning of the New Century • September 1943: Barrage Stations of Salcano and Prevallo • Principles of Military Art: Canne, 216 BC: Encircling Manoeuvre • Embedded and Public Military Information • Legitimate Application of Employment Rules. Legal Considerations

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Signal, USA, vol. 65, no. 3, November 2010
Situational Awareness in Hand • Helping Soldiers Take a Load off • Warfighters May Chat with Confidence • Properly Equipping the Force • Dynamic Spectrum Access Bursts into Airwaves • Waveform Navigates Radio Labyrinth • Army's Private Cloud Goal Is Praiseworthy but Problematic • Bulgarian Military Faces Multitude of Challenges • Bulgaria's High-Technology Industry Emerges from the Cocoon of Communism • Networking Keeps Business Moving in Bulgaria

Truppendienst, Austria, no. 6(318), 2010
Child Soldiers – What to Do with Them ? • Resocialising Child Soldiers • The Invention of the Torpedo • Gottfried Baron of Banfield • The Air Support Wing • Basic Considerations on the International Operations of the Austrian Armed Forces • Information and Communication Technology Security in the AAF • Psychology in Operations: The NATO Workgroup: Morale and Effectiveness of a Unit • UNIFIL and the Blue Line • Mine Clearing Systems • Checking the Operability of Stand-by Forces for First Missions by Way of the Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback Programme

World Policy Journal, USA, vol. 27, no. 4, Winter 2010
Energetic Cities: Energy, Environment and Strategic Thinking • The New Urbanism: In the Future, What Will our Cities Look Like ? • Urbanity, Revised: To Imagine the Future We Must Rethink the Meaning of a City • Endless Road in China: From Country to City and Back • The Architect and the City. A Conversation with Didi Pei • Urbanism on the Steppe: The Insta-City in Inner Mongolia • The Tragedy of Line C: The World's Great Cities Have a Monumental Problem • Playing Host is Hard to Do: The Allure of the World Stage and Shiny New Stadiums • One Out of Every Two Nigerians Now Lives in a City • Young in Tehran • Living in the Shadows: Navigating Austria's Evolving Asylum Policy • The Self-Appointed Superpower: Turkey Goes it Alone • A Deeply Flawed Fuel Bank • Flying a Questionable FlagWhiter Intelligence: Where Espionage Goes Wrong.

Selection and Translation
Delia PETRACHE,
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National Military Library

EDITORIAL EVENTS

✑ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

"No one can grasp the chains of flying ... and that great, undisturbed, untouchable tranquillity (...) that is given by flying; it is something surreal, that cannot be described ... with good reason, I am madly in love with life, with the sky, with the flowers, with flying, with everything". I discovered these words at the beginning of my journey through the biography of honourable Air Flotilla General Ion-Stratulat Dobran, a War Veteran.

His flight through life, with takeoffs and landings that have not always been obstacle-free, with runway realignments in order to return to the skies, was revealed to those passionate about this domain through the effort of an editorial team coordinated by **Aurel Pentelescu, Marius-Adrian Nicoară** and **Dan Antoniu**, leading figures in the contemporary military historiography, prolific researchers in the history of aeronautics.

Born on 5 February 1919 in Vrănești, in the former county of Muscel, graduate of the School of Air Force Officers in Cotroceni, in 1941, first category fighter pilot (war pilot) at the Air Force Flight School in Ghimbav, Brașov, member of the already famous 9th Fighter Group belonging to the 1st Fighter Flotilla in Pipera, Lieutenant aviator Ion-Stratulat Dobran took part in the air combat missions on the Eastern Front (starting 14 August 1943), in the missions meant for defending the city of Bucharest (23-30 August 1944) and in the Western campaign (8 September 1944 – 12 May 1945). He carried out 340 combat missions, engaged in 74 dogfights, had 10 confirmed victories and was shot down 3 times, but survived each time.

He was awarded the highest military decorations, recommended for the *"Mihai Viteazul"* Order, promoted for exceptional merits to Captain, in 1946, and to Major, in 1950, and removed brutally and with no explanation from the armed forces in 1952, being forced to re-qualify as a lathe-operator at the *"Timpuri Noi"*

Metallurgical Plant. He returned as a pilot in the civil aviation in 1966 and retired from TAROM (the Romanian national airlines) in 1973.

In 2000 he was promoted to the rank of Air Flotilla General (ret.).

He turned 90 on 5 February 2009 and, at that venerable age, he accepted the idea of publishing a book meant to pay homage to his deeds – ***Generalul de flotilă aeriană Ion-Stratulat Dobran, veteran de război (Air Flotilla General Ion-Stratulat Dobran, a War Veteran)***, in which his life and activity would be evoked, even though, a long time ago, he decided – just as other people of noble character – to adopt a strict regime of silence, without public appearances and honours.

What followed ? A quite interesting book about the life of this *"living legend"* of the Romanian aviation. A book in which there were gathered the thoughts of some former classmates, people who made history in the Romanian aviation, war veterans, with faces bearing the marks of high winds and heavy rains, extremely high temperatures and sharp frosts, people who were lucky enough to return home after fighting against enemies who were just as fierce in winning air duels. Some titles deserve to be mentioned, in order to illustrate the complex personality of this *"example of conduct and professionalism"* – Colonel (AF) (r.) Alexe Rusen; *"An unequalled, living legend"* – Air Fleet General (r.) BEng Ion Stoian, *"A colleague, a role model"* – Colonel (r.) BEng Mihai Radu Eliat, *"A colleague I am proud of"* – Colonel (r.) BEng Emil Aurel Pasăre, *"A fighter aviation ace"* – Colonel (AF) (r.) aviator Vasile Iuraşcu, *"A man with a great heart, a man of great character"* – Dr BEng Cristian Crăciunoiu.

Some diary pages (1942-1943), which were not included in *"Jurnalul locotenentului Dobran" ("The Diary of Lieutenant Dobran")*, which appeared at Modelism Publishing House, in 1998, give a touch of authentic biographical flavour to the book. The novelty continues in the second part of the volume, in which more than half of the pages comprise Ion Dobran's comments on the photographs of the planned and still awaited album *A Generation in Photos*, as well as a substantial number of documents and iconographic records of his life and work, which are part of his rich archive.

A special place in this book belongs to the historic meeting between General Ion Dobran and American Colonel Barrie Davis, pilots and enemies during the Second World War. An amazing meeting, as General Dobran mentioned, after 65 years from the air confrontation on 6 June 1944, when, in the fierce battle for the oil fields and refineries from Prahova, they *"riddled"* each other with gunfire and were forced to make crash-landings, without knowing what happened to the other. However, the end was fortunate for both of them,

as they each believed to have scored another victory, without blaming themselves for killing the opponent, according to an honour code specific to fighter pilots. *"A glorious meeting for 65 years of oblivion"*, as the authors of this volume point out, a gift of God, as well as an *"achievement"* of the people who made this historic meeting possible (Kogaionon Films, Romanian Embassy in the USA, Air Force Staff, Aviation Museum, historians Dan Turturică and Alexandru Armă, Romanian-born American filmmaker Nicholas Dimăncescu and others).

This is an essential book for those who still believe in the power of the elites as the nation's moral landmarks that we so desperately need in order to redefine and substantiate our options for building a better future.

We want to express our gratitude towards those who worked so hard to make this book possible as well as those who paid for the printing and to congratulate *EDITGRAPH Publishing House* from Buzău for the magnificent graphics !

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⊜ *Alina PAPOI*

"Extreme environmental conditions require extreme responses of the human body. Exposing the human being to different border stresses provides us with important data regarding human physiology and pathophysiology". It is what we can find in the book ***Medicina condiţiilor extreme (Extreme Conditions Medicine)***, published, under the coordination of **Prof. Dr Marian Macri, MD**, at the *Armed Forces Technical-Editorial Centre*.

The authors – **Dr Dragoş Popescu, MD, Adrian Macovei, MD** and **Dragoş Vlad, MD** – approach the main aspects of the environment the aeronautical personnel carry out the activity in, as well as the multitude of aggressions and risks they are subject to. The authors say that, due to the approach taken, the book represents a novelty in the medical disciplines suite.

Going through the history of aerospace medicine, the authors mention the most eloquent experimental studies on the human behaviour in conditions of hypobaric hypoxia as well as of imponderability, studies that have been conducted in our country since the 19th century. The first medical expert commission to examine the Romanian aviators was established in 1914. It set the first medical standards regarding the selection and medical examination of the aeronautical personnel, which were valid during the First World War. Since 1915, medical examination

of the flight personnel has been compulsory. In 1917, the first hospital specialised in aerospace medicine was established in Tecuci. The brief history ends with the presentation of the National Institute for Aeronautical and Space Medicine, a unique institution in our country, which plays *"an important role in the development of aviation and especially in the safety of flights and other aeronautical activities"*.

The book treats, succinctly, in its fifteen chapters, legal issues related to extreme environment medicine, structure of the atmosphere, hypoxia, physical acceleration, noise, vibrations, temperature, biological rhythms and passengers who suffer from chronic diseases – circadian rhythm, flight stress and the human body response to it, sensory impairment in extreme conditions, bioterrorism – survival techniques, hyperbaric medicine – diving physics, conditions for diving in the Black Sea, decompression theory, hyperbaric oxygenotherapy, search-rescue operations, medical-legal aspects related to air-medical evacuation, accidents and incidents specific to extreme conditions – hyperventilation, mountain sickness, hypo- and hyperbaric accidents, neurotoxicity, pulmonary toxicity, narcotic syndrome, nervous syndrome caused by low pressure –, space flight.

In the final chapter, the authors are concerned with the medical assistance provided to passengers, the factors specific to tropical areas and their effects on the human body: heat, humidity, sun, insects, animals, water, food, time zone changes, sexually transmitted diseases etc.

Last but not least, we have to highlight the authors special, innovative and laborious concern that has made possible the appearance of this book that is remarkable and, why not ?, extremely useful !

<div style="text-align:center">*</div>

Starting from the statement according to which military information systems are primordial in gaining decision-making and information superiority in an armed conflict, the book ***Sisteme informaţionale militare. Servicii şi tehnologie (Military Information Systems. Services and Technology)***, published at the *"Carol I" National Defence University*, takes an approach to topics such as data collection in military actions, sensor- and ISTAR-based information networks, information and communication technology, data and information representation. Each of these topics provides a series of scientific data that are necessary in order to outline the physiognomy of modern military information systems and their role in ensuring organisation management.

The authors – **Constantin Alexandrescu, Gelu Alexandrescu** and **Gheorghe Boaru** –, coryphaei of the military information systems domain, make an in-depth presentation of: information and communication technology; modern technologies for data and information collection in the battlefield – sensors and their use in weapon systems; cybernetics and artificial intelligence – military cyber systems; direct communication between pieces of technical equipment of military information systems; cryptography – characterisation and technologies; information, linguistic, technical and software redundancy; information and military information systems security; information representation in classic and modern military information systems.

The reader cannot but benefit from the methodical, analytical and succinct style of the authors, as the book provides additional knowledge to those who are interested in information society, in general, and in modern military information systems, in particular, most of all in artificial intelligence. Here is what the authors have written in relation to this domain: *"It is still believed that human intelligence is unparalleled, yet, one day, computers may ‹laugh› at us and wonder whether biological information processors are really intelligent. In the broad sense of the word, computer intelligence will be based on description, representation, problem solving and other consistent ideas of the kind and definitely not on disorder. It is even considered that, instead of enhancing the intelligence of a system, this study dilutes it through exposing the details and becoming aware of the limits, because, from the moment a process is dissected, studied, analysed and known, its intelligence seems to fade away invariably".*

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Securitatea la începutul mileniului III (Security at the Beginning of the Third Millennium) is, as pointed out by *Prof. Dr Mircea Cosma*, in the *Foreword*, *"a succinct radiography of one of the most present features of the security environment and of the attempt to manage it effectively"*. It deals with some essential aspects of the security issue and the consequences of post-*Cold War* security transformations.

Divided in nine chapters, the book is focused on: description of the impact of globalisation on the security environment; dimensions and strategies of international security; involvement of international organisations in applying international humanitarian law; analysis of the power politics of Putin's Russia;

a possible scenario regarding the future centres of power; generalities regarding the world economic crisis and Romania's security; Gulf crisis – from the war *per se* to diplomatic war.

The author – **Colonel Dr Mircea Vladu** – analyses scrupulously and critically the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, both marked by unipolarity, by a security culture that is represented by state and non-state actors at the same time, as well as a certain *"transatlantic split"*, between the United States and some NATO allies. In this context, a few major tendencies that define the security environment are mentioned: *"acceleration of globalisation and regional integration processes; reasonable convergence of efforts meant for establishing new stable and predictable security architectures, together with the accentuation of anarchical tendencies in some regions; revival of the efforts of states aimed at preserving their influence in the dynamics of international relations, paralleled by the multiplication of forms and the increase in the importance of the intervention of non-state actors in international relations"*.

The book is published at *Editura Adalex* in Sibiu.

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"The Romanian Armed Forces have always been one of the essential pillars of the national edifice, making a significant contribution to the achievement of the great economic and social transformations that have marked the Romanian history and proving, each and every time, that they have the strength and determination to deal with complex challenges". This is a quote from the article of the Minister of National Defence, Gabriel Oprea, in the opening of the first issue of this year of the review of the **Defence Intelligence General Directorate – *Infosfera.***

The publication comprises a number of articles regarding: *the NATO-EU strategic partnership* (Lieutenant General Dr Gheorghe Lungu); *intelligence activity in theatres of operations* (Major General Dr Ilie Botoș); *demographic decline of the Russian Federation* (Dr Adriean Pârlog and Dr Ionel Stoica); *geospatial intelligence in future warfare* (Colonel BEng Marin Alniței); *critical infrastructure protection in the Romanian Armed Forces* (Marian Bacșiș and Viorel Velicu); *Commonwealth of Independent States, as an expression of the Russian Federation's privileged interests* (Marius Diamescu and Ion Cătălin Nițu); *particularities of future conflicts – hybrid*

threats (Gabriel Anghel); *interagency cooperation in counterintelligence activity* (Sorina-Ana Manea); *NATO Lisbon Summit – the Alliance's relations with the Russian Federation* (Dr Iulian Chifu); *energy security at the Black Sea – a dimension of the regional critical infrastructure protection* (Dan-Marcel Bărbuţ); *India – the strategic giant of the beginning of the 21st century* (Filofteia Repez and Gheorghe Deaconu).

We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude towards the editorial staff that had the courtesy to send us the publication !

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Bulletin of the National Military Museum "King Ferdinand I", no. 7-8, printed at *Alpha MDN Publishing House*, concentrates over 30 papers having as a theme medieval, modern and contemporary history and archaeology, on the one hand, and aspects related to museography – patrimony and its conservation, on the other hand.

Among the papers presented, we mention some titles, such as: *"Byzantine-Cuman-Petcheneg Confrontation in Lebunion – the End of Petcheneg Military Supremacy in the South-East of Europe"; "Napoleon III and the Unification of the Principalities"; "Romanian Armed Forces Funding during the Reign of Carol I. 1866-1914"; "Romanian Navy Distinguishing and Command Marks. 1866-1947"; "Romanian Armed Forces. From the Royal Armed Forces to the Popular Armed Forces. 1947-1968"; "Problem of the Romania Armed Forces Procurement in the Context of the Country Economic-Financial Evolution between 1920 and 1935"; "1944-1945: German Resistance in Romania behind the Soviet-Romanian Front"; "Preliminaries regarding the Establishment of the National Military Museum"; "Băleşti – the Place where History Is Intertwined with Literature"; "Cold Steel Weapons in the Romanian Armed Forces"; "Mortars Skoda cal. 30,5 cm"; "Flag of a Town in Transylvania in the Second Half of the 19th Century".*

English version by
✎ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*
✎ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

Résumés

Le capital intellectuel – une remarquable ressource de l'Armée

L'ambition de travailler dans le domaine militaire requête une ouverture sans précédent et une ample disponibilité vers le dialogue avec d'autres institutions ayant des responsabilités dans la défense nationale. L'auteur est convaincu que les auteurs des articles de la publication *Gândirea militară românească/La Pensée militaire roumaine* comprennent qu'ils ont le devoir de présenter clairement leurs idées, d'une manière qui facilite la compréhension de la mise en réseau avec d'autres institutions, et du rôle des structures du niveau opérationnel et tactique.

Rejoindre les idées dans une manière créative peut générer de nouvelles valences de l'instrument militaire, à condition que les solutions offertes présentent un réel caractère pragmatique. Cela nécessite une relation permanente aux réalités du champ de bataille actuel pour aider le processus de développement des capacités militaires.

Une Alliance pour le XXIe siècle

Une Europe entière, libre et en paix reste l'objectif principal de l'Alliance et le contraint de laisser libre la voie d'accès – *la politique des portes ouvertes* – pour toutes les démocraties européennes qui aspirent à l'adhésion et qui accomplissent les normes requises. Dans un environnement sécuritaire difficile d'y prévision à moyen et à long terme, l'OTAN réaffirme son engagement à préserver la liberté et la sécurité de tous ses membres, par des moyens politiques et, pour le cas où s'avèrent insuffisantes, par les dispositions militaires en vigueur. Pendant ce temps, l'Alliance exprime sa disponibilité de contribuer à l'amélioration de l'état de la sécurité à l'échelle internationale, grâce à des partenaires avec les Etats et les organisations internationales en dehors de ses frontières, en reconfirmant donc son statut de source essentielle de stabilité au niveau mondial.

La guerre continue – la confrontation politique-diplomatique (III)

Nations, Etats, collectivités, organisations et groupes d'individus ont leurs propres intérêts, représentés par les biais de politiques adéquates.

Dans les régimes totalitaires, la politique est directement subordonnée à une seule personne. Il n'y a aucun des amies permanentes en politique, mais des intérêts permanents – de nombreux experts et les décideurs à réfléchir et dire ça – et c'est pourquoi les alliances sont si souples.

En considérant les circonstances internes et externes de l'environnement de sécurité, la politique évolue entre la démocratie et la dictature.

La politique et la diplomatie ne peuvent pas être dissociés. Elles agissent ensemble, conformément au droit national ou d'une alliance d'intérêts.

La guerre non conventionnelle – différences/lacunes culturelles et les stratégies d'en contrecarrer

À la fin de la première décennie du 21e siècle, le monde contemporain est à la fois imprévisible et contradictoire, ainsi que plein de contrastes.

Dans ce contexte, l'approche de la guerre non conventionnelle est un sujet important, ce qui a de profondes implications pour les forces classiques. Dans cet article, il est suggéré une nouvelle définition de la guerre irrégulière, à savoir: *"un conflit armé entre les acteurs non-étatiques et pour la légitimité et l'influence sur ces parties de la population pertinente pour le pouvoir dans un espace spécifique"*. Les forces militaires doivent s'adapter aux nouvelles menaces et des risques. Les stratégies doivent aussi combattent les différences et les lacunes liées à l'irrégularité de la guerre, parmi les plus pertinents étant les suivants: une posture militaire plus souple, à haute vitesse et réactive des structures militaires, des forces expéditionnaires, une présence militaire visible.

Exigences prochaines de la formation de l'aviation militaire dans le Ciel unique européen

Le programme SESAR est un programme de gestion de la modernisation du trafic aérien européen. Le projet va combiner les aspects technologiques, économiques et réglementaires et va utiliser la législation du Ciel unique européen pour synchroniser les plans et les actions de différentes parties intéressâtes. Il va lier les ressources pour le développement et la mise en œuvre des améliorations nécessaires dans toute l'Europe, dans les deux systèmes embarqués et au sol. Cet article se propose de fournir au lecteur les connaissances et la compréhension des besoins génériques des activités de formation en aviation militaire dans le futur environnement européen. Il vise à discuter des besoins militaires dans l'espace aérien pour la formation de routine, jour de jour, dans l'air, sur la mer et aux forces terrestres. Enfin, le document présente des recommandations pour renforcer l'utilisation de l'espace aérien par tous les utilisateurs européens, y compris l'aviation militaire.

La nouvelle structure de commandement de l'OTAN

L'actuelle crise économique mondiale et les tentatives répétées de l'OTAN pour concevoir son rôle dans le rapport global de pouvoir ont provoqués de profonds changements dans la manière de préparer et de mener les opérations dirigées par l'OTAN, et donc dans son organisation structurelle, à la fois en termes de commandements alliées militaires et de la structure de force.

La mise en œuvre de nouveaux concepts connexes, comme l'approche fondée sur les effets à l'exploitation et des capacités de l'OTAN, conduit à des changements structurels importants dans l'organisation et des systèmes de commandement et du contrôle allié, du type d'exploitation (structures organisées telles que *"J"*) vers les structures fonctionnelles.

Une approche historique-conceptuelle de l'intégration des capacités d'agression non conventionnelle

Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le processus de transformation de la sécurité politique et des stratégies ont dû s'adapter aux réalités de l'époque. Par conséquent, la direction politico-militaire a dû comprendre que l'information, l'opinion publique, le moral, l'esprit et l'âme de la motivation humaine sont décisifs pour obtenir la victoire. À ce titre, la prochaine étape a été d'intégrer toutes ces réalités dans la science militaire en ce qui concerne la guerre. À cet égard, l'auteur souligne les principales étapes de ces changements: la perception de guerre de l'information et de la nouvelle doctrine révolutionnaire des années 1999-2011. Comme le dit l'auteur, en 2025, des menaces non conventionnelles seront caractérisés par: l'augmentation des informations, l'évolution de la guerre irrégulière, la primauté des capacités, des aspects non militaire de la guerre.

Le Sommet à Lisbonne – point de référence dans l'historie de l'Alliance

Le Sommet de l'OTAN à Lisbonne est considéré comme un moment historique, notamment parce que les Etats membres ont décidé le nouveau concept stratégique de l'Alliance pour les 10 années prochaines. Au-delà de la menace terroriste, le concept considéré comme les nouveaux défis tels que les cyber-attaques et le potentiel menace de missiles balistiques des États comme l'Iran ou la Corée du Nord.

Au cours de la réunion, l'OTAN également débattu de l'avenir de la mission en Afghanistan, et les Etats membres ont décidé, à cet égard, sur un calendrier concernant le retrait de la présence militaire jusqu'en 2014. Les membres également ont abordé le projet concernant la mise en place du bouclier anti-missile et la relance de la coopération des alliés occidentaux avec Moscou, à l'occasion du Sommet du Conseil OTAN-Russie.

Le concept stratégique de l'Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord – 2010

L'évaluation du concept stratégique de l'OTAN, du point de vue des objectifs promues par la Roumanie, souligne quelques prémisses particulières, initiées et soutenus par les autorités nationales décideurs au cours des débats relatifs à ce thème, comme suit: à réaffirmer la défense collective en tant que l'élément central de l'OTAN, ainsi que la nécessité pour répondre aux nouvelles menaces de sécurité; à renforcer le rôle de l'OTAN en tant qu'un forum pour le dialogue transatlantique sur les questions sécuritaires, à accorder une attention croissante à l'évolution de la sécurité dans la zone proximité de l'OTAN, à renforcer les relations de partenariat, à travers l'expansion des activités et l'organisation de leurs fonctions sur les intérêts spécifiques des partenaires; à reconnaître l'importance d'inclure la défense anti-missile parmi les missions de l'OTAN.

La détermination des besoins et des capacités critiques dans l'OTAN et de l'UE

Pour que la Roumanie peut avoir disponible une force militaire crédible, qui est dimensionnée par rapport avec sa population, le territoire et les missions et capable d'assurer la défense de ses intérêts de sécurité nationale et le respect des engagements pris au niveau international, il est nécessaire que les priorités dans le domaine des forces armées roumaines soient les programmes d'approvisionnement des forces de prendre en compte les éléments suivants: fournir les contingents déployés sur le théâtre d'opérations avec les appareils et systèmes d'armes nécessaires pour accroître la protection et le niveau de sécurité des troupes qui participent à des missions; avoir les pièces de l'équipement nécessaire pour compléter la mise en œuvre le concept de commande-contrôle au niveau national; fournir des forces opérationnelles à faible capacité des systèmes d'armes et de pièces de l'équipement, les acquisitions en développement/ les programmes de modernisation en vue pour assurer la protection des minorités nationales en territoire.

L'implémentation du nouveau concept stratégique sur la base de la directive politique de l'OTAN

Les membres de l'Alliance entraînent le partage équitable des rôles, des risques et des responsabilités. Dans ce contexte, le budget destiné à la défense dans le PIB national, ainsi que le pourcentage de ce budget alloué pour les dépenses d'achat sont des indicateurs de l'effort d'un Etat-membre dans le domaine de la défense. En essence, il est recommandé que les membres devraient toujours allouer 2% ou plus de leur PIB à la défense. Il est recommandable que les pays membres qui souvent allouent des ressources en vertu de ce pourcentage de cesser d'en faire et redoubleront le niveau des allocations budgétaires, dans le respect des engagements

pris. Dans le même contexte, ils sont également invités de maintenir les allocations d'achat en termes réels au moins un cinquième du budget destiné à la défense, dans le but de transformer les unités existantes dans unes modernes, avec une logistique durable et qui ont l'interopérabilité des forces.

La nécessité de développer les capacités dans l'Armée Roumaine

L'approche globale du développement des capacités, en général, et celles militaires, en particulier, comprend la modernisation de la technologie et des pièces d'équipement, qui se préparent pour les forces et l'utilisation les résultats de la recherche scientifique qui devrait permettre à l'ensemble de la gamme des missions effectuées.

Dans ce contexte, les principaux domaines du développement des capacités sont les suivantes: le commandement et le contrôle, l'information, l'assurance et la recherche, la mobilité, l'engagement effectif, le soutien logistique, la survie et la protection.

Le développement des capacités militaires est un processus qui se manifeste conjointement dans le fonctionnel aux domaines suivants: doctrine, organisation, formation, approvisionnement, commande, personnel, infrastructure et interopérabilité.

Réaliser les transportations des théâtres d'opérations avec les forces et les moyens subordonnés aux forces navales sous le contrôle opérationnel du component opérationnel naval

L'adhésion de la Roumanie à l'Organisation de l'Atlantique Nord et l'engagement de cette organisation dans les opérations de sécurité en Irak et en Afghanistan ont conduit notre pays à participer à des forces dans ces théâtres d'opérations. La marine participe activement à des engagements militaires roumains

en menant des activités d'un caractère spécial, tel que le transport de matériaux, après avoir réussi la finalisation de la cession, dans un théâtre d'opérations.

Afin de remplir cette importante mission, le navire *"NST ALBATROS"* avait à traverser une zone avec un environnement de sécurité instable, caractérisé par des actions asymétriques de la piraterie. Compte tenu du danger représenté par les pirates, les activités ont été planifiées dans le processus de planification navale de la component du command par deux lignes d'opérations.

Les transformations conceptuelles et structurelles des forces participantes pour combattre des menaces dans le nouvel environnement de sécurité

Dans la perpétuelle évolution et la diversification de la physionomie du conflit – qui se caractérise principalement par: le remplacement de l'intérêt d'occuper un territoire à l'intérêt d'influencer les événements; renoncer la nécessité de présenter en cours en faveur de l'obligation de contrôle en vue d'influencer et éventuellement d'intervenir; en évitant, si possible, directement les confrontations armés –, il convient de noter que l'utilisation efficace et intégrée des militaires à la disposition et les capacités civiles représentent l'élément clé qui permet à atteindre les nouveaux objectifs stratégiques.

Dans cette manière, l'OTAN et l'Union européenne font des efforts majeurs de mettre en œuvre les réformes profondes au sein de ces deux organisations, les réformes que ces organisations doivent s'adapter au nouveau milieu politique de la sécurité.

Le terrorisme international – délimitations conceptuelles et considérations théoriques (I)

De l'avis de l'auteur, les objectifs du terrorisme peuvent être classés en quatre catégories: la réalisation d'un but spécifique

– évincer un gouvernement de l'alimentation, obligeant l'armée à quitter le pays, obtenir de moyens financiers; la libération des prisonniers, d'avoir causé un sentiment très répandu de la peur, dans le espoir de changer l'ordre social dans un Etat; contester un gouvernement afin qu'il puisse réagir et imposer de mesures antiterroristes dures qui pourraient attirer les sentiments hostiles de la part de la population; en utilisant des méthodes terroristes par les gouvernements afin de déterminer la population d'être soumis à des mesures impopulaires (terrorisme d'Etat). Le terrorisme d'État se produit lorsque ces actions sont mises en œuvre par les Etats: les opposants politiques sont éliminés et l'appareil d'Etat utilise des moyens répressifs pour intimider et pour obtenir des informations qui pourraient ne pas être obtenus autrement.

Peut l'OTAN contribuer à prévenir l'échec des Etats ?

Les États fragiles sont ceux qui ont des structures de la mauvaise gouvernance et la performance manque dans leur capacité à s'acquitter de ses responsabilités essentielles, mais ils peuvent toutefois récupérer leur capacité à agir. Les États en déroute, comprises en ce sens, avec une possibilité de réduire la gouvernance et une administration faible ou affaiblie nationale de ses structures étatiques, sont de plus en plus communs. Des études récentes ont identifié les 136 États en déroute, à partir des cas communément acceptés comme l'Afghanistan, la Somalie et le Yémen à ceux qui ont été mis dans cette situation par des guerres ethniques (Bosnie-Herzégovine – dans les années '90 ou au Congo-Kinshasa – dans les '80) et au génocide au Rwanda. Dans de nombreux cas, ils provoquent l'instabilité interne, la guerre civile et la violence armée.

Etude de cas: La stratégie d'Athènes au début de la guerre du Péloponnèse – parfaite en théorie, entachée par le design

L'auteur adopte une approche de la stratégie d'Athènes au début de la guerre du Péloponnèse, de Thucydide à partir de ‹l'Histoire de la guerre du Péloponnèse›.

D'abord, il écrit à propos de certaines des hypothèses erronées sur lesquelles Périclès a fondé sa stratégie, également de mentionner que ses extrémités, les moyens ne sont pas clairement définis. Ensuite, il souligne qu'une série de caractéristiques d'une stratégie réussie doivent avoir des fonctions qui n'étaient pas particulièrement examiné par Périclès, qui a également omis de prendre en compte l'importance et le rôle de l'interaction entre les forces armées, le gouvernement et le peuple dans la guerre.

L'auteur souligne également les éléments de valeur de cette stratégie, la conclusion que l'on doit s'abstenir d'évaluer cette stratégie de Périclès a causé la défaite finale d'Athènes, dans le but de l'article étant de montrer que cette stratégie n'était pas équilibrée, rigide et basée sur des hypothèses erronées.

Perspectives relatif à la dynamique des reformes des agences de renseignement dans la zone euro-atlantique

Le 21e siècle est influencé par les réformes majeures qui ont un grand impact sur le contexte de sécurité dans toutes ses dimensions. Dans ces circonstances, la réforme du domaine de l'intelligence représente une préoccupation permanente à la fois des spécialistes et des citoyens préoccupés par les défis à la sécurité nationale et internationale. Par conséquent, l'activité et la gestion des services de renseignement doivent être organisées de manière plus efficace. Les agences de renseignement ont pour objectif principal la recherche et la fourniture de données, d'analyse et d'obtenir les renseignements nécessaires pour le processus de prise de décision politique, économique et militaire. Ainsi, ils ont intensifié la réforme de leurs propres structures, ce qui devrait représenter une priorité pour toutes les agences afin d'atteindre l'objectif de la sécurité nationale.

La signification et l'importance de la communication stratégique dans le milieu militaire

Dans l'environnement complexe des opérations militaires et des missions, le rôle des activités en matière de dialogue, d'information et de communication est mise en évidence par l'OTAN en une action complexe développée à partir du concept de la communication stratégique (STRATCOM). Dans sa dimension théorique et opérationnel, StratCom est un processus signifié pour lutter contre les flux d'informations hostiles, c'est une façon juste, rapide et proactive de projeter des opérations militaires et actions devant des auditoires locaux, régionaux et internationaux et un outil d'analyse et de planification au sein de l'approche globale de la sécurité. Au sein de l'Alliance, ainsi que dans les États-Unis, le développement du concept a sa propre histoire, à partir de 2007, lorsque le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, sous la pression des événements en Afghanistan, a évoqué la nécessité d'améliorer les capacités qui viennent à l'appui de la communication et a appelé à l'élaboration d'un plan d'action en matière de communication stratégique de l'OTAN.

Problèmes du Yémen sont les problèmes de la région

L'auteur fait valoir que de multiples défis du Yémen pourraient déborder dans les pays voisins. D'abord, il écrit à propos de la situation intérieure du pays, qui est criblée de tensions régionales qui ont conduit à une guerre civile dans le nord et des mouvements sécessionnistes dans le sud. Puis, il mentionne les problèmes les plus importants auxquels le pays est confronté, en matière de ressources et de la démographie, en soulignant le fait que le pays est rapidement manqué d'eau et d'huile, alors qu'il doit composer avec le taux de croissance de la population. De l'avis de l'auteur, ces questions posent de sérieux problèmes pour les pays voisins, qui doivent adopter une approche proactive et aider le Yémen à ne pas glisser dans la catégorie d'un État en déliquescence, dissuadant ainsi la menace d'un effet de domino dans la région.

Des nouvelles menaces – une nouvelle OTAN

L'auteur écrit à propos de la création sur les problèmes *"de sécurité émergentes à la Division"* (ESCD), qui a l'intention d'attaquer systématiquement à une vaste gamme de défis que de plus en plus affecter la sécurité des Alliés des deux rives de l'Atlantique: le terrorisme, les cyber-attaques, les menaces à l'approvisionnement énergétique et la prolifération des armes de destruction massive. Tout d'abord, il présente une liste des caractéristiques communes de ces défis. Ensuite, il souligne la nécessité pour l'Alliance pour devenir un joueur d'équipe afin de rester un fournisseur de sécurité efficace, tout en développant une culture de la politique, une discussion qui ne se limite pas à des questions qui impliquent directement l'OTAN militairement, mais qui comprend également questions qui peuvent avoir *"seulement"* une politique pertinence. Il conclut en citant les éléments qui vont façonner l'OTAN dans son approche vers les pays émergents aux défis de la sécurité: une nouvelle division de l'OTAN du personnel international, des liens plus forts avec d'autres joueurs, et un débat plus prospectif entre les alliés.

Version française par Alina PAPOI

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King Carol II confers the rank of Marshal on Generals Alexandru Averescu and Constantin Prezan

Source: The National Military Museum, by courtesy of Professor Neculai MOGHIOR

Cover 1: *NATO Lisbon Summit, 19-20.11.2010, in The Global Herald,*
at http://theglobalherald.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/lisbon-summit-nato.png.

Cover 4: *The soldiers of "Carpathian's Hawks" 812ⁿᵈ Infantry Battalion returning from the mission*
accomplished in the Afghanistan theatre of operations – February, 2011. Photo: Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE

http://www.mapn.ro/smg/gmr