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Romanian Military Thinking

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
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Vibrations at the Centenary

I have recently revisited Iași. While there I tried to grasp the life in the city 100 years ago when, in a Romania torn by war, almost wiped off the map, a dramatic page in the national history was written and the Romanian people had renewed hope.

Entering the war after long and judicious consideration, with great enthusiasm and optimism, with promises as well as with illusions and shortcomings, generated not only by politicians, Romania revived in Iași, in the winter of 1917, the city becoming, for two years, the vital centre of the Romanian nation. Here, the heart of a Romania knelt down because of the unpredictable course of events continued to beat.

While our armed forces, turned out their victorious way to Transylvania, and undeservedly defeated at the Danube and the Neajlov, endured the invasion at the bottom gate of Moldavia, in Iași it was rekindled from the ashes of despair a candle light to wake up to the national idea or, in today's terms, a new country project, to which, surprisingly or not, the entire nation adhered. Nicolae Iorga, in one of his conferences held in the Hall of the University in Iași, said: *"We are convinced that our war is based on justice; that is why we do not regret that we are where we are. The awareness of our righteousness makes us confident about the tomorrow victory regardless of the today suffering"*. Octavian Goga wrote in *România*, a newspaper that appeared in Iași at that time: *"As a healthy body, regaining its senses following the enemy blow, our nation bent for a moment to rise again to vigour, anchored in the Country of Moldavia as in a stone fortress, our army, fronted by the Siret and backed by the Carpathians, being revived and, under the shelter of today bayonets, preparing tomorrow thunderbolt"*.

The resistance in Iași was the Romanians everywhere historical achievement, and the *reserve capital* rose to the challenge.

The Palace in Lăpușneanu Street – a historic symbol of Iași, where Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, who brought the 1859 Unification to fulfilment,

lived – became the new royal residence and the place where important decisions to save the national being were made. The agrarian reform and the universal suffrage, promised the Romanian soldiers by King Ferdinand and the country government, kept at distance the Bolshevik scourge that began to haunt Europe and led, among others, to the problems in the Russian army, when we were in dire need of a strong ally near us. From the palace balcony, the King saw the Transylvanian volunteers who joined the country armed forces, swearing the oath of allegiance, on parade. It was at the same palace where the King welcomed the unionists from Bessarabia and Bukovina.

Today, the city, as cosmopolitan as all our great university centres, breathes both the air conditioning of modernity and the flavour of bygone eras. Not only connoisseurs but also onlookers can acknowledge, without much effort, the layers of history on which the city is founded. Near the famous Palace of Culture, a recently restored architectural symbol, the fantasies in metal and glass of a modern shopping centre, an expression of our connection to the values of contemporary culture, dare to claim their celebrity. In other places, other architectural features cohabitate, in harmony or contrast, providing uniqueness to a city that has never lost its identity and, without being arrogant, is aware of its aristocratic status.

On the way to the Copou, the University Palace in Iași remains an undeniable temple of Romanian culture and a precious architectural jewel. The University Library, justly considered one of the most beautiful libraries in Europe, elegantly invites to rediscover the charm of reading and the benefits of thorough study. On the opposite side, an impressive monument is the expression of the people in Iași gratitude for the 2nd Cavalry Division heroism, troops that demonstrated their glory in Prunaru, in the fall of 1916. Down the road, the premises of the former School for the sons of the military men, now a military hospital.


In the Copou Park, Eminescu's lime tree, prisoner in a necessary metal corset, still yearns for the Poet's verse. Up the road, the Army Palace, another building having an emblematic architecture, dominates the landscape with distinction and sobriety. Outside it, there is the imposing monument of Stephen the Great, the voivode. On the left and the right side of the entrance, there are the statues of the two marshals of Romania, Alexandru Averescu and Constantin Prezan, artisans of the revival of the Romanian armed forces that guaranteed the fulfilment of the national ideal. A little bit up, the bust of King Ferdinand seems to be ready to intervene in the dispute, still unsettled, between the two illustrious military

commanders. The large unit located here contributes to the definition of the sense of security and national pride.

The bright green has invaded the city. In the Botanical Garden the magnolia and tulip overture announces a beautiful spring. People are preparing to receive the Lord's Resurrection Light in their houses, the avenues and streets are impatiently waiting for the waves of lime fragrance.

In the distance, on the Galata Hill, in the shadow of the famous monastery spire, the Heroes Monument – designed by Henri Coandă – stubbornly rises over the trees inviting us to owe a debt of gratitude to those who sacrificed for our Homeland.

In the context of the actions dedicated to the First World War Centenary, those who toil today at preserving the memory and pride of the city can already boast some good achievements in culture, and their example should be copied nationwide. The historic destiny of Iași is not unique. In each and every place in the country bearing an imprint of the fight for national reunification should vibrate the emotion of paying homage to this historical fact.

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*
English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU



Vibrations au Centenaire

A cette fin de Mars, j'ai revu le Iassy et j'ai essayé de comprendre un peu de l'existence de cette ville il y a 100 ans, quand, dans une Roumanie hachée par la guerre, presque rayée de la carte mondiale, ici il était écrite une page dramatique de l'histoire nationale et avait renouvelé l'espoir du peuple roumain.

La Roumanie, entrée dans la guerre après une longue et judicieuse attente, avec beaucoup d'enthousiasme et d'optimisme, et aussi avec des promesses et des illusions et de nombreuses défaillances doués non seulement aux politiciens, elle a ravivée, chez Iassy, dans l'hiver de 1917, et la ville est devenue, pour deux ans, le centre vital de la nation roumaine. C'est ici qu'il a continué à battre le cœur d'une Roumanie agenouillée par un cours imprévisible d'événements.

Alors que notre armée, tournée de son route victorieuse vers Transylvanie et immérité vaincue au Danube et sur Neajlov, résistait à l'invasion de l'ennemi à la Porte de la bas de la Moldavie, à Iassy a été ravivée une lumière, de la cendre de désespoir, une lumière qui a soutenu la reconstruction de l'idée nationale ou, comme on dit prétentieusement aujourd'hui, un nouveau projet de pays. D'une façon surprenante ou non, toute la nation a souscrit à ce projet-là. Dans une de ses conférences tenues dans l'Université de Iassy, Nicolae Iorga déclarait: „*Nous sommes convaincus que notre guerre est fondée sur la justice; c'est la raison pour laquelle nous ne sommes pas désolés que nous sommes arrivés ici où nous sommes. La conscience de notre justice nous donne confiance en victoire pour demain, quelles que soient les souffrances d'aujourd'hui*”. Et le poète Octavian Goga écrivait dans le journal *La Roumanie*, qui était édité pendant cette période à Iassy: „*Notre peuple, comme un corps sain, réveillé par le poing de l'ennemi, il a plié son talie un moment, ainsi qu'augmenter à nouveau avec la force consolidée, coïncé en Moldavie comme dans une forteresse de pierre, et notre armée, qui avait devant soi Siret, les pics des Carpathes derrière, elle ravive aujourd'hui après le mur des baïonnettes, en aiguisant les éclairs de demain*”.

La résistance de Iassy était une œuvre historique des Roumains de partout, et la capitale *de réserve* se trouvait dans la hauteur de sa mission historique.

Le Palais de la rue Lăpușneanu – un symbole historique de Iassy, où il a vécu le prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, le prince de l'Union de 1859 – il est devenu la nouvelle résidence royale et il y avait des décisions importantes pour sauver l'entité nationale. La réforme agraire et le suffrage universel, promises aux soldats roumains par le roi Ferdinand et le gouvernement du pays, ont gardé au distance le flagelle bolchevique qui commençait à hanter par l'Europe et qui a conduit, entre autres, à *l'échec* de l'armée russe, alors quand un allié solide était si nécessaire chez nous. Du balcon de ce palais, le Roi a reçu la parade des volontaires transylvaines qui s'étaient réunis, par un serment d'allégeance, à leur armée et ici lui, le Roi, a reçu les messages d'unionistes de Bessarabie et Bucovine.

Aujourd'hui, la ville, aussi cosmopolite que toutes nos grandes centre universitaires, respire à la fois l'air conditionné de la modernité et le parfum des époques depuis longtemps révolues. Sans beaucoup de grands efforts, les couches de l'histoire sur lesquels la ville se révèle se déploient généreusement non seulement au spectateur avisé, mais aussi au tout passant ordinaire. À proximité du célèbre Palais de la Culture, un symbole architectural récemment restauré, les fantaisies en métal et en verre d'un moderne centre commercial osent vers le ciel et vers une déjà supposée célébrité, une expression de notre lien avec les valeurs de la culture contemporaine. Par ailleurs, d'autres coexistences architecturales, en harmonie ou en contraste, offrent unicité à une ville qui n'a jamais perdu son identité et, sans être arrogante, elle est consciente de son statut aristocratique.

Sur le chemin vers le Copou, bien sûr, le Palais de l'Université de Iassy reste un repère unique, un temple de la culture roumaine et un précieux joyau architectural. La Bibliothèque universitaire, considérée, à juste titre, l'une de plus belles en Europe, invite, par son élégance, à redécouvrir le charme de la lecture et les avantages de l'étude approfondie. Du côté opposé, un impressionnant monument exprime la reconnaissance des habitants de Iassy pour l'héroïsme des soldats de la 2^{ème} Division de Cavalerie, qui étaient couvres de la gloire en charge de Prunaru, dans l'automne de 1916. Un peu en dessous, le local de l'ancienne Ecole des fils des militaires est devenu, aujourd'hui, un hôpital militaire.

Dans le Parc Copou, le citron vert d'Eminescu, prisonnier dans un nécessaire corset métallique, attend encore le vers du Poète. Au-dessus, le Palais de l'armée, à son tour, un bâtiment avec une architecture emblématique, domine le paysage

avec distinction et sobriété. Avant lui, il y a le monument imposant du Grand Etienne voïvode. A la gauche et à la droite de la porte, les bustes des les deux maréchaux de la Roumanie, Alexandru Averescu et Constantin Prezan, les artisans de la récupération et de regagner de la confiance en soi de l'armée roumaine, le garant de l'accomplissement de notre idéal. Un peu au-dessus c'est le buste du roi Ferdinand, il paraît prêt à intervenir dans un conflit, encore inachevé, des les deux illustres commandants de l'armée. La grande unité qui a son siège ici contribue à définir le sentiment de sécurité et de fierté nationale.

Le vert frais a envahi la ville, dans le Jardin botanique l'ouverture des magnolias et des tulipes annonce un beau printemps, les gens se préparent à recevoir chez eux la Lumière de la résurrection du Seigneur, les boulevards et les rues en attendant avec impatience les vagues de l'effusion du parfum du citron vert.

Au loin, sur la colline de Galata, à l'ombre des tours de célèbre monastère, le Monument des héros – conçu par Henri Coandă – il est digne de monter parmi les arbres d'autour et d'inciter les passants à la pieuse reconnaissance à ceux qui se sont sacrifié pour leur Patrie.

Dans le contexte des actions dédiées au Centenaire de la Première Guerre mondiale, ceux qui travaillent aujourd'hui pour préserver la mémoire et la fierté de la ville ils peuvent déjà se vanter avec de quelques bonnes réalisations dans le domaine culturel et leur exemple doit être suivi dans tout le pays. Le destin historique du Iassy n'est pas unique. Dans chaque lieu de notre pays qui porte une empreinte de la lutte pour la réunification nationale devrait vibrer l'émotion de rendre hommage ce fait historique.

*Version française par
Alina PAPOI*



THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PERSPECTIVE ON COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS

*Brigadier General (r.) Dr Viorel BUȚA
Colonel Valentin VASILE*

Subject of intense debate, often marked with polemical accents, the different understandings of hybrid threats accept only one unanimous conclusion, namely that they share a lot of similarities and wide divergences.

In this article the authors continue the series of their investigations conducted on the way hybrid threats are defined in various bibliographies – American, British, Russian, Chinese, Swedish, with particular attention to their transformative impact on the strategies and doctrines developed by NATO and the EU, and subsequently by the allied and member states.

This article mainly describes the efforts made by the EU top level institutions to develop appropriate strategies, plans and procedures aimed at effectively countering hybrid threats through the integrated crisis management.

Keywords: *EU Common Security and Defence Policy; hybrid threats; power resources; countering hybrid threats*

of member states, hybrid threats are now mentioned in the declarations of the NATO Summits in Wales and Warsaw, as well as in EU policy documents regarding the *common security and defence* (CSDP).

Brigadier General (r.) Professor Dr Viorel Buța – “Carol I” National Defence University, București.
Colonel Valentin Vasile – Deputy Chief of the Information and Public Relations Directorate, Ministry of National Defence.

The different meanings of the hybridity of contemporary conflicts, which is a subject of intense debate, often marked with polemical accents, share a lot of similarities and wide divergences. Despite the lack of a unitary outlook on the concept of *hybrid warfare*, it nevertheless has a modelling impact on NATO and EU response strategies and options as well as on member states' national security strategies, prompting the exploration of new integrated crisis and war situations management formulas through the complementary use of all power resources – political, diplomatic, economic, information, legal, military ones. In recognition of the interest in the theorisation of the particularities of current conflicts, hybrid threats have become a favourite subject of analysis, reflection and action for the NATO/EU forums. As a consequence of the efforts to investigate the hybridity of conflicts, stimulated by the intensification of threats to international order, stability and integrity

NATO and the EU are engaged in a strategic partnership relationship, defined as such in 2002 in the *EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy*, which lies at the basis of the multidimensional cooperation between the two organisations. The *EU-NATO Declaration* states that the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU is founded on strategic interests and shared values, reinforced by the dual membership of most member states (22) of both organisations.

In the context of the regional and global security situation becoming more tense, ensuring access to energy resources, developing military capabilities and increasing interoperability between them, combating terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strengthening cyber defence and maritime security and countering hybrid threats represent the priorities of multi-dimensional NATO-EU cooperation. This is reflected in common or complementary approaches that are subordinated to improving the tools and procedures needed to discourage potential enemies and defend member states. NATO-EU Strategic Partnership is thus part of the comprehensive approach to crisis management and differential treatment of threats to member states' security by complementary use of political, diplomatic, economic, information, legal and military resources of power.

At NATO level, identifying the circumstances and conditions under which the exposure of an allied country to threats that are specific to the *hybrid warfare* falls under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is of immediate concern for tailoring national and allied responses to the nature of those threats.

Similar to the approaches and response options envisaged by NATO, the EU considers activating the *solidarity and mutual defence clauses*, on which the *Common Security and Defence Policy* is based, if the territorial integrity of the member states is affected by exposure to a wide range of threats, including hybrid ones.

Countering Hybrid Threats: European Options

Under the influence of NATO's approaches to delimitating the area of occurrence and identifying the hybrid features of current conflicts, the EU too tries to define hybrid threats and identify optimal ways to counter them.

In July 2014, in the context of the crisis caused by Russia's more or less dissimulated intervention in Ukraine, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, noticed the need for EU member states to better coordinate their national policies so that we can have "*a stronger Europe when it comes to security and defence matters*".¹

¹ Jean-Claude Juncker, *A New Start for Europe*, opening statement in the European Parliament plenary session, Strasbourg, 15 July 2014, at <http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/jean-claude-juncker-political-guidelines.pdf>

To meet the requirements for developing the conceptual framework, adapting the institutions, capabilities and procedures for implementing the CSDP objectives, the European Commission adopted the *European Agenda on Security*, on 28 April 2015. This programmatic document defined the main areas of action of the EU between 2015 and 2020 for improving information sharing, preventing radicalisation and countering terrorism, organised and cyber crime, protecting citizens and critical infrastructure. Based on these political guidelines, the Foreign Affairs Council on 18 May 2015 called for the development of a *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats* document to help increase the resilience of the EU, member states and partners in the event of such threats.

The *European Agenda on Security* warned that “*threats such as those posed by cyber terrorism and hybrid threats could increase in the years to come*”². It also outlined the main EU action lines, which were included in the *Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy*, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 16 June 2015, and in the *Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy* adopted on 28 June 2016 by the European Council. Mention should be made that the decisions regarding the implementation of the CSDP are usually taken by unanimity by the two European institutions – the European Council and the Council of the European Union – in accordance with Article 42 para (4) of the *Treaty on European Union (TEU)*.

One can also find more references and recommendations for strengthening European security in other documents subsequent to the *Joint Framework – the EU Operational Protocol on Countering Hybrid Threats*, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 14 November 2016, and the *European Defence Action Plan*, proposed by the European Commission on 30 November 2016, as well as the EU sectoral strategies – *Cyber Security Strategy* (published in February 2013 and enhanced in December 2015 with the *Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems*), the *Maritime Security Strategy* (2014) and the *Energy Security Strategy* (2014).

Through the *European Defence Action Plan*, the European Commission calls for the establishment of a European defence fund and provides a set of measures to coordinate and streamline the use of resources the member states allocate in order to develop joint defence capabilities to ensure EU security, simultaneously with the development of the military industry in the member states on a strong and efficient defence platform, contributing to the achievement of the strategic autonomy of the European Union.

² *The European Agenda on Security*, the European Commission, Strasbourg, 28 April 2015, p. 13.

The Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats

The steps taken by Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the support of the European Commission and the European Defence Agency, and based on the proposals made by member states have led to the implementation of the *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – A European Union Response*. Adopted in Brussels, on 6 April 2016, by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the *Joint Framework* represents a significant contribution to defining hybrid threats and finding ways to counter them, including by intensifying cooperation with NATO.

On the occasion of the adoption of the *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats*, its aims were outlined in the statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini: *“In recent years, the security environment has changed dramatically. We have seen the rise of hybrid threats on EU’s borders. There has been a strong call for the EU to adapt and increase its capacities as a security provider. The relationship between internal and external security needs to be further strengthened. With these new proposals, we want to enhance our capacity to counter threats of hybrid nature. In this effort, we will also step up cooperation and coordination with NATO”*³.

The *Joint Framework* adopts the main features of the definitions of conflict hybridisation in NATO’s literature. At the same time, the document accepts as a positive element the diversity of opinions and controversies over the nature and description of hybrid threats. The definitions given to them *“vary and need to remain flexible to respond to their evolving nature, the concept aims to capture the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare”*⁴.

The adoption of the *Joint Framework* helps to develop ways in which member states could better coordinate their work on identifying and countering hybrid threats, based on EU sectoral policies and strategies aimed at strengthening European security. Circumscribed to the Common Security and Defence Policy, the *Joint Framework* advises the member states to implement **22 operational actions** to counter hybrid threats. In keeping with the pursued objectives, these operational

³ *UE Strengthens Response to Hybrid Threats*, the European Commission – press release, Brussels, 6 April 2016, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1227_en.htm

⁴ *Joint Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats – A European Union Response*, the European Commission, Brussels, 6 April 2016, p. 2.

actions are grouped into *four elements* – *improving awareness, building resilience, preventing, responding to crisis and recovering, increasing cooperation with NATO and other partners.*

Operational actions for *improving awareness* stipulate the development and enhancement of the performance of EU specialised mechanisms to facilitate the information exchange between member states by setting up a hybrid fusion cell within the European External Action Service’s Intelligence and Situation Centre. Efforts to streamline strategic communication are considered, as well as the establishment of a centre of excellence for countering hybrid threats.

Operational actions for *building resilience* focus on measures that need to be adopted in a coordinated manner by member states to protect critical infrastructures (energy networks, transport, space activities), financial systems and public health, food security, cybersecurity, industry and economic resources. At the same time, measures are taken to build resilience against the radicalisation of vulnerable members of society in European countries, as well as to counter violent extremism, negative social phenomena that often lead to serious interethnic incidents and even terrorist attacks.

Operational actions for *preventing, responding to crisis and recovering* are intended to help define and practice the procedures to be followed in the case of the last resort applicability of the *solidarity clause* and/or the *mutual defence clause* given the situation in which a member state is exposed to a wide-ranging hybrid attack.

The ***solidarity clause*** is laid down in Article 222 of the *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)* and is the basis for the actions of the Union and its constituent states if a member state has to face the consequences of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster. In such a situation, the EU can mobilise resources, including military ones, to prevent terrorist threats within the territory of the member states, to protect democratic institutions and the population from possible terrorist attacks and to assist the state that was attacked, on its territory, at the request of its political authorities.

The ***mutual defence clause***, the basis of the Common Security and Defence Policy, covers any type of attack or war directed against an EU member state, as provided for in Article 42 (7) TEU: “*If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states*”⁵.

⁵ *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, year 59, 7 June 2016.*

Operational actions to increase EU cooperation with NATO and other partner organisations, the UN and the OSCE, seek to identify the most appropriate ways to counter hybrid threats through dialogue and cooperation at political and operational level, based on common values, respecting the principle of inclusiveness and the principle of decision-making autonomy specific to each organisation. The *Joint Framework* attaches great importance to cooperation with NATO in identifying the most appropriate response options for hybrid threats to member states. The implementation of the measures stipulated the *Joint Framework* provide member states with a powerful tool to counter hybrid threats by coordinated actions at EU level, in cooperation with NATO and other security international organisations, based on the treaties they are part of based on international law. Thus, a common goal is formulated, which must be reached through the cooperation of the EU and NATO in order to timely identify and counter the hybrid and asymmetric threats to the interests and security of the member states.

Following this requirement and the steps taken to synchronise the efforts of the two organisations, the *Warsaw Summit Communiqué* states that, in the long run, the adaptation measures included in the Readiness Action Plan of the Alliance require the development of a “*strategy on NATO’s role in countering the hybrid warfare, which is being implemented in coordination with the EU*”⁶.

The implementation of the NATO-EU strategy, also mentioned in the *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats*, could be facilitated by the establishment of an *EU centre of excellence* in Finland, to deal with the issue of the hybridity of the current conflicts. Its work will focus on procedures to counter hybrid threats, cyber attacks, and misinformation, which are more and more frequent, lately, including by spreading fake news on social networks.

The initiation of the project was announced on 21 November 2016 by the State Under-Secretary Jori Arvonen, Deputy Director General of the European Affairs Department of the Government of Finland. Jori Arvonen said that the project is supported by the EU, NATO, the US and ten other EU member states – Germany, Sweden, France, Spain, Italy, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the United Kingdom (engaged in debates on ways to trigger the exit procedure from the European Union, based on Article 50 of the *Treaty of Lisbon*). On this occasion, Arvonen mentioned that hybrid attacks could be “*diplomatic, military, technological or financial in their nature*”⁷. They are implemented

⁶ *NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué*, issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the NATO Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016, art. 37, para i.

⁷ Jussi Rosendahl, *Finland Plans to Set up Center to Counter ‘Hybrid’ Threats*, Reuters World News, 21 November 2016, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-defence-finland-hybrid-idUSKBN13G1F8>

by state or non-state actors by coordinated use of conventional and unconventional methods to constrain and influence the behaviour of the attacked state without a formal declaration of war. At the same time, Arvonon also states that “*the aim of the centre is to strengthen the involved parties’ resistance and prepare for hybrid threats by training, research and exchanging of best practices*”⁸. In the first part of 2017, new decisions and measures are planned to achieve the *EU’s centre of excellence for the study of hybrid threats*.

The *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats* stipulates that member states have the primary responsibility for maintaining the legality and constitutional order and for countering hybrid threats, based on the sovereign right of decision on national security and defence policies. However, considering that member states may face common threats, they “*can be addressed more effectively with a coordinated response at EU level by using EU policies and instruments to build on European solidarity, mutual assistance and the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty*”⁹.

The implementation of the types of operational actions stipulated in the *Joint Framework* outlines the range of European response options, based on *solidarity and mutual defence clauses*, should the EU member states be confronted with crisis situations generated by military, hybrid or other threats.

A first assessment of the state of implementation of the 22 operational actions mentioned in the *Joint Framework* is included in the *Report of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union* of 17 October 2016. The *Report* stipulates that, after the adoption of the *Joint Framework*, European efforts have focused on four main areas: → *improving situational awareness through an EU Hybrid Fusion Cell*; → *building resilience of member and partner states to hybrid attacks by protecting critical infrastructures*; → *responding to and recovering from crisis*; → *increasing cooperation with NATO*.

The *Report* notes the establishment and realisation of the initial operating capacity of the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and the willingness of a member state to actively contribute to the establishment of the *European Centre of Excellence to conduct research, training and exercises*. The *Report* also mentions the increasing cooperation with NATO in key areas – information exchange, cyber security, crisis prevention and response, and strategic communication.

The *EU Joint Operational Protocol for Countering Hybrid Threats*, adopted to complement the *Joint Framework*, in July 2016, is mentioned in the *Report* as an important achievement for establishing procedures for identifying hybrid

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Joint Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats – A European Union Response, op. cit., p. 2.*

threats, ensuring appropriate alerts and activating crisis response mechanisms. A detailed assessment of the way to implement the operational actions stipulated in the *Joint Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats* will be presented by the European External Action Service and the specialised services of the European Commission in July 2017.

The EU's Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy

Adopted on 28 June 2016 by the European Council, the European Union's Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy brings forward **five priorities for the European foreign policy** focusing on: *the enhancement of member states security, the increasing state and societal resilience to the East and South of the EU, the integrated approach to conflicts, the cooperative regional orders and global governance* to ensure peace and security, prosperity and democracy within the international community. The document identifies hybrid threats, alongside terrorism, organised crime, cyber attacks, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity among the main threats to EU member states.

Combating these threats is considered by the *Global Strategy*, and the EU “*will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronised exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions to build the capacities of our partners, counter hybrid and cyber threats, and promote maritime security*”¹⁰.

The *Global Strategy* mentions the need to improve cooperation and coordination of national efforts to revise EU sectoral, thematic and geographic strategies, together with establishing the level of political-military ambition and developing military capabilities provided by member states to fulfil missions under a European mandate, independently or in cooperation with NATO. The implementation of the *Global Strategy* and its effects on the achievement of the *CSDP* objectives are to be assessed annually at the Council of the European Union, European Commission and European Parliament level.

EU Operational Protocol for Countering Hybrid Threats

Published on 7 July 2016 by the European Commission, the *EU Operational Protocol for Countering Hybrid Threats* aims to contribute to the implementation of the requirements of action 19 of the *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats*. This action stipulates that “*the High Representative and the Commission,*

¹⁰ *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, the European Council, Brussels, June 2016, p. 37.

in coordination with the member states, will establish a common operational protocol and carry out regular exercises to improve strategic decision-making capacity in response to complex hybrid threats building on the crisis management and integrated political crisis response procedures”¹¹. These requirements were the starting point for developing “effective procedures to follow in case of a hybrid threat, from the initial identification phase to the final phase of attack, and mapping the role of each Union institution and actor in the process”¹².

Based on the features identified in previous documents, the *Operational Protocol* also proposes a European definition of hybrid threats, characterised as “mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological, information), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of open organised hostilities. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity with the intention to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats”¹³.

In order to assess correctly the purposes of hybrid threats, one must develop information exchange procedures and intelligence products as a first essential step to any countermeasure plan. This is all the more important as the hybrid threats transgress legal boundaries and national borders, having a wide range of deliberate actions that affect the functionality of critical (IT, financial, energy, transport) infrastructure and decision-making processes at the level of the target state institutions by capitalising on its domestic vulnerabilities and widening the social and political gaps in order to destabilise it and diminish its resistance and reaction capacity.

The common procedures presented in the *Operational Protocol* describe the way in which the EU institutional coordination should be done for intelligence fusion and analysis, necessary capabilities inventory, informing policy recommendations and decision-making for hybrid threats against member states and partners. Also, the *Operational Protocol* sets out the (political-strategic, operational and technical) levels of coordination in hybrid threats management and preparation/training needs of EU and member state armed forces, through exercises included, to tailor the types of responses in order to meet the nature

¹¹ *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats*, Action 19, the European Commission, Brussels, 7 April 2016, p. 17.

¹² *Joint Staff Working Document: EU Operational Protocol for Countering Hybrid Threats – EU Playbook*, the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 7 July 2016, p. 2.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 4.

and intensity of hybrid threats. The *Operational Protocol* builds on and develops existing mechanisms at EU level for crisis management and for cooperating with partner organisations, primarily NATO.

EU Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Security and Defence

The implementation of the provisions of the *Global Strategy* is addressed in detail in the *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence* presented to the Council of the European Union on 14 November 2016 by Federica Mogherini. The *Implementation Plan* adds to the series of European documents on security and defence of member states, in meeting the general and specific *CSDP* objectives included in the *Warsaw NATO-EU Declaration* (2016), underlining the importance of strengthening the defence and response capabilities of the member states in the event of conflict or external crisis management.

The *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence* defines a new level of ambition of the European Union to enhance its relevance to security and defence, setting out the following **three priorities**:

- *responding to external conflicts and crises*, their integrated management based on executive mandates developed in strict compliance with international law to establish the objectives of possible military operations and civilian missions of the EU;
- *capacity building of partners* through security training, advisory and mentoring missions; in this regard, the possibilities of using *CSDP* instruments to “provide expertise and assistance to strengthen partners’ resilience and counter hybrid threats”¹⁴ are considered, including through measures taken in the fields of strategic communication, cyber defence and border security;
- *protecting the Union and its citizens* is a strategic priority and is done both through missions and operations outside the EU and through complex measures, at member state level, to increase resilience and protect critical networks and infrastructure, securing external borders, developing civil protection and disaster response structures, providing access to and use of the global commons, countering the hybrid threats from state and/or non-state actors, preventing and countering terrorism and radicalisation, managing migration flows, combating people, arms trafficking and organised crime.

¹⁴ *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*, the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 14 November 2016, p. 3.

These three priorities of the *Implementation Plan* are complementary and can be found among the objectives of the EU's missions or operations as lines of action of a coherent ensemble – the common security and defence policy.

The *Implementation Plan* reiterates the importance of the **mutual defence clause** and the **solidarity clause**, set out in the *TEU*, Article 42 para (7) and *TFEU*, respectively, Article 222. At the same time, the *Implementation Plan* states that “NATO remains the foundation for the collective defence for those states which are members of it”¹⁵, as well as the fact that “the specific character of the security and defence policy of all EU member states will be fully respected”¹⁶.

In order to enhance the relevance and credibility of the EU in terms of security and defence, the *Implementation Plan* includes a set of 13 actionable proposals, corresponding to the new level of ambition, to enhance military cooperation, to develop partnerships, joint/national capabilities and rapid response force package, to optimise the functionality of warning, planning and command structures, to increase solidarity and financial flexibility, to provide permanent structured cooperation and integrated crisis and conflict management so as to make the best possible use of the potential of European treaties and mechanisms. Here are some of the 13 actions: to strengthen the civilian and military capacity building required for civilian missions and/or military operations, operations regarding logistic support, assessment and monitoring, information analysis and exchange, advisory and training, healthcare, communications, cyber defence and maritime security, strategic communication; to foster strategic coherence by implementing mechanisms to allow coordinated annual analysis of member states' defence spending, to enhance cooperation and complementarity in scientific research, advanced technology and military production; to review procedures and optimise the functionality of structures designed to plan and develop *CSDP* missions and operations; to improve the rapid response toolbox including the EU battlegroups; to develop cooperation with other organisations (UN, NATO, OSCE) and with partner states, respecting the principle of their own decision-making autonomy.

The *Implementation Plan* complements the already undertaken or ongoing documents and activities also described in the *Report of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union* of 17 October 2016 for the implementation of the *Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy*. The review of existing sectoral strategies, the intensification of public diplomacy activities and the integrated approach to crises and conflicts are essential for increasing the resilience of the member

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 4.

¹⁶ *Ibid*.

and partner states and for effectively countering terrorism, hybrid threats and violent extremism.

As outlined in the *Implementation Plan*, a strategic priority for the EU is to develop its capacity to manage situations of instability, to react and to intervene during all phases of external crises or conflicts by using a wide range of means, actions, missions and operations stipulated in Article 43 of the *TEU*: civilian and military means, humanitarian and disarmament operations, advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation included. In fulfilling the *CSDP* objectives, the EU can resort to civilian missions or military operations to ensure security and mediation between the parties involved to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. To that end, the *Implementation Plan* specifies that “civilian or military experts can reinforce the EU Delegation’s capacity of analysis and interaction in a state where there are risks of violence, instability or hybrid threats”¹⁷.

Regarding the relationship with NATO, the *Implementation Plan* reiterates the seven areas of cooperation mentioned in the *NATO-EU Joint Declaration*, adopted in Warsaw on 8 July 2016, as follows: countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation, including at sea and on migration; security and cyber defence; developing defence capabilities; military industry and scientific research; exercise planning; fostering the resilience of Eastern and Southern European partners in their efforts to develop their security and defence capabilities.

The progress made in implementing the measures set out in the *Implementation Plan* will be analysed and included in a first assessment report in June 2017, as an element of the implementation process of the *EU Strategy for Global Foreign and Security Policy*.

The disturbing deterioration of the security environment is being analysed at the level of the European Parliament in light of the complexity, danger and unpredictability of conventional and hybrid threats posed to member states.

In its resolution on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, adopted on 23 November 2016, the European Parliament called on the member states to further develop defence cooperation to fully implement the provisions of the *Treaty of Lisbon* on the security and defence of the EU. On that occasion, the European Parliament recommended the allocation of sufficient funds and the coordination of member states’ security and defence investments.

In its resolution of 23 November 2016, the European Parliament underlined that EU security, often perceived as deeply interconnected, was rather interdependent

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 11.

and vulnerable, because member states “react to common threats and risks in an uncoordinated and fragmented way, thus complicating and often hampering a more common approach”¹⁸. Following on from this, the European Parliament appreciated that the EU “lacks the resilience to effectively tackle hybrid threats, which often have a cross-border dimension”¹⁹. The European Parliament also expressed its support for “enhancing cooperation on security and defence with other institutional partners, including the UN, the African Union and the OSCE, as well as strategic bilateral partners, particularly the US, in areas such as hybrid threats, maritime security, rapid reaction, counterterrorism and cyber security”²⁰.

NATO-EU Partnership and Hybrid Threats

The EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy, adopted on 16 December 2002, states the convergence of NATO and EU strategic interests, stating the main objective of the two organisations – ensuring member states’ security through cooperation, political consultations and mutual support for crisis management and conflict prevention. To this end, designing and deploying military operations under the EU mandate can be supported by NATO by information sharing, planning and resources capabilities based on the strategic partnership and its circumscribed principles – mutually reinforced support in crisis management, timely and effective policy consultations, respect for the equality of the two organisations and their decision-making autonomy, as well as the interests of the member states and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, coherent and transparent development of their military capabilities in order to maximise the possibilities for mutual support.

The framework for NATO-EU cooperation was complemented by the adoption of the “Berlin-Plus” Agreement on 17 March 2003. It specifies how NATO, without becoming directly involved, can support EU-led military operations for crisis management by providing resources, assistance through operational planning processes and access to allied command and control capabilities.

In the past years, amid mounting tensions in the security environment, worries about the difficulty in identifying and countering hybrid threats have been expressed from the highest NATO and EU levels. Thus, in August 2014, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as Secretary General of the Alliance, felt that “it will take more than NATO to counter

¹⁸ *European Parliament Resolution of 23 November on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy* (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy), 2016/2067 (INI), Strasbourg, pct. 2.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pct. 37.

*such hybrid warfare effectively*²¹. In this way, the Secretary General of the Alliance drew attention that the exclusive use of military power was not a complete solution to dealing with hybrid threats whose effective countermeasures exceed the scope of national and allied military command. Understanding the benefits of replacing or completing military actions with actions specific to other resources of power (e.g. political, diplomatic, economic, relational, information ones) outlined the main lines of action of the strategy to counter hybrid threats, based on a comprehensive approach, with the support of all allied and partner states through complementary use of civilian and military means.

The ***NATO-EU Joint Declaration*** was adopted on 8 July 2016, at the Warsaw NATO Summit, being signed by European Council President Donald Tusk, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and Secretary-General of the North- Atlantic Alliance Jens Stoltenberg. The *NATO-EU Joint Declaration* is aware of the value of the cooperation and the results achieved during the 15 years since the establishment of the strategic partnership, the combined efforts of the two organisations contributing to maintaining the peace and security of the member states while continuing to support their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as values and principles of the United Nations Charter.

For the future, the *NATO-EU Joint Declaration* emphasises the urgency of developing and adopting procedures agreed by both organisations to “*boost our ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response*”²².

The *Joint Declaration* restates that NATO and the EU have transformed their cooperation into a strategic priority. Its main dimensions are tackling hybrid threats, managing migrant issues, developing maritime cooperation, mutual support and coordination in the field of cyber security, strengthening defence industry and applied research for the development of cutting-edge military technologies, multilateral projects and advanced, complementary and interoperable military capabilities. Increased joint response capacity is based on improved cooperation during planning and deployment of missions, operations and training, including through parallel and coordinated exercises in 2017 and 2018 to check the response to hybrid threats.

²¹ Ian Traynor, *Ukraine Crisis: NATO Plans East European Bases to Counter Russia. NATO Chief Announces Move in Response to Ukraine Crisis and Says Alliance Is Dealing with a New Russian Military Approach*, in *The Guardian*, 27 August 2014.

²² *Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, Warsaw, 8 July 2016.

As a consequence of the tensions in the security environment, the continuity of efforts arising from the urgency of identifying the most appropriate ways to counter hybrid threats is also illustrated in the *Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government* who participated in the Warsaw NATO summit. Adopted on 9 July 2016, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué recognises that the “*The Alliance faces a range of security challenges and threats that originate both from the east and from the south; from state and non-state actors; from military forces and from terrorist, cyber, or hybrid attacks*”²³.

The Warsaw Summit Communiqué confirms the commitment of NATO member states to support the operationalisation of an *EU centre of excellence* to deal with the issue of the measures to counter hybrid threats. In this regard, in November 2016, the steps taken to establish its location in Finland and to nominate NATO and EU member countries interested in participating in the project were announced publicly.

The European Parliament, in its resolution of 23 November 2016, welcomed the adoption of the *NATO-EU Joint Declaration in Warsaw* and recommended that its provisions were immediately implemented. At the same time, the European Parliament appreciated that, in the areas of cooperation mentioned, the *Joint Declaration* “*describes well-established informal practices rather than bringing EU-NATO cooperation to a new level*”²⁴ and stressed “*the need especially to deepen cooperation and further complement capacity-building with regard to hybrid and cyber threats...*”²⁵.

The partnership between the EU and NATO contributes to the development of member states’ resilience, enables the understanding of the importance of internal cohesion at the level of both organisations and the member states for the successful management of the crises they are faced with, as well as the awareness of the importance of the national contribution and the fulfilment of the assumed responsibilities for providing common security and collective defence.

Hybrid Threats from the Perspective of National Documents

The major themes in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy documents are mirrored in the way in which Romania’s national security is conceptualised. From this perspective, the steps taken in recent years by the national security assurance institutions to strengthen Romania’s strategic profile based on promoting

²³ *NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué, op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁴ *European Parliament Resolution on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, op. cit.*, p. 36.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

the concept of *extended national security* through an integrated and multidimensional approach, converging with the European security principles, are relevant.

The *National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019, A Strong Romania within Europe and the World* stipulates the importance of ensuring national security by enhancing the synergy and complementarity between actions and efforts undertaken in defence, public order, intelligence, counterintelligence and security, diplomacy, crisis management, education, healthcare and demography.

The implementation of the concept of *extended national security* is supported by the *National Political Agreement on the Increase in Defence Financing* and the *Programme for the Transformation, Development and Procurement of the Romanian Armed Forces until 2026*, the steps taken at national level being correlated with NATO's strategic adaptation measures.

The hybridity of contemporary conflicts is taken into consideration in the *National Defence Strategy*, which states that, at the global level, the security environment “*is undertaking an ongoing transformation, which reflects mainly upon highlighting interdependences and unpredictability within international relations system and the difficulty to delimitate classical risks and threats from the asymmetric and hybrid ones*”²⁶.

That is why there is a need to reduce vulnerabilities caused by the insecurity of resources and incoherence in managing various types of crises. Their solution requires, as mentioned in the *National Defence Strategy*, the improvement of the mechanisms that are instrumental in the “*interoperability ability of various state institutions which must take actions should any asymmetric or hybrid threats occur*”²⁷. The integration of the measures taken by the ministries and agencies related to the fields of national defence, public order and national security is provided in the *National Defence Strategy*, which specifies, among the military courses of action, “*developing the capacities required to respond in case of asymmetric and hybrid threats*”²⁸. In order to ensure the security of citizens, the defence of the territory of the country and the fulfilment of the obligations deriving from the international treaties Romania is part of, the intelligence, counterintelligence and security dimension of the national defence integrating and multidimensional approach also includes an explicit requirement regarding “*identifying and counteracting asymmetric and hybrid actions*”²⁹.

²⁶ *National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019*, the Presidential Administration, București, 2015, art. 29, p. 11.

²⁷ *Ibid*, art. 67, p. 16.

²⁸ *Ibid*, art. 73, p. 18.

²⁹ *Ibid*, art. 75, p. 20.

The main features of the hybridity of the threats to the current security environment, described in NATO and EU documents, can also be recognised in the definition of the hybrid threat proposed by the *Guide on the National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019*: “a threat coming from a state or non-state (individuals, groups) enemy that uses conventional and (political, military, diplomatic, economic, cybernetic, information) unconventional methods and means in a conjugated and adaptive manner (rapidly, dynamically) to achieve their objectives”³⁰.

The *White Paper on Defence*, approved by Resolution no. 12 of 11 April 2016 of the joint sitting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, states that the military level of ambition of the Romanian Armed Forces is to be able to carry out with own forces “a set of actions to deter potential aggression against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Romania, to plan and conduct defence operations on the national territory in order to counter conventional, unconventional and/or hybrid aggressions by using all instruments of national power in an integrated manner until the intervention of the main allied forces”³¹. The lines of action set out in the *White Paper* specify the need for the Romanian Armed Forces to focus their efforts on the development of cyber defence capabilities and the “improvement of interagency interoperability”³² for using national resources more efficiently and “ensuring a joint force required to effectively counter specific conventional, unconventional and hybrid warfare actions, alongside other agencies with defence responsibilities”³³.

The Military Strategy of Romania – Modern Armed Forces for a Powerful Romania within Europe and around the World, approved by the Government on 28 September 2016, is based on the provisions of *Law no. 203/2015 on defence planning* and elaborates on the lines of action set out in the *National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019* and the *White Paper on Defence* for the materialisation of the concept of *extended national security* through a complex, multidimensional and interagency approach.

Among the identified military risks and threats, the *Military Strategy of Romania* mentions “hybrid warfare, as a threat from a state or non-state enemy, that is using conventional and unconventional methods and means in a vector oriented and uniform manner, may represent a major risk against the security of Romania”³⁴.

³⁰ *Guide on the National Defence Strategy for 2015-2019*, Presidential Administration, București, 2015, p. 8.

³¹ *White Paper on Defence – Romania*, București, 2015, p. 31.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *The Military Strategy of Romania – Modern Armed Forces for a Powerful Romania within Europe and Around the World*, București, 2016, 2nd Chapter.

To these, one may add unconventional threats that are manifested on a broad range, including information operations meant to destabilise, divide and reduce the cohesion of target states and the organisations they are part of, cyber attacks, organised crime, interethnic tensions and economic imbalances and so on.

The Romanian Armed Forces have a key role to play in securing national defence and participating in NATO and EU collective defence missions. From this perspective, the level of ambition is reflected in the national military objectives for 2016-2019, whose fulfilment is aimed at providing the Romanian Armed Forces with the force structure and the capacity for joint action at the necessary level in order to: “*deter a potential aggression; conduct defensive operations on the national territory to counter conventional, unconventional and/or hybrid aggressive actions until the intervention of the main allied forces; participate in accordance with assumed obligations in a NATO collective defence major joint operation, or in a EU-led high-intensity operation under the mutual assistance clause...*”³⁵.

Among the doctrinal directions of development, the *Military Strategy of Romania* mentions the harmonisation of the legislative and normative framework on which the interagency approach of the national security and defence, the execution and countering of the special, information, psychological and cybernetic operations, as well as “*the participation in the development of the concept of countering hybrid warfare*”³⁶ are based. The fact that these issues are stipulated highlights the continuity of the steps taken to develop the Romanian Armed Forces interoperability, to adapt national capabilities and procedures in relation to NATO and EU doctrinal standards, practices and evolutions, including as far as addressing hybrid threats is concerned.

Conclusions

Countering the threats specific to any type of warfare (classic, hybrid, asymmetric) requires that the force structures are adapted and made flexible, the rapid response capacity is increased and the strengths of all power resources are capitalised on by coordinating the actions of member and partners states at political, diplomatic, information and military level. This is the paramount aim of the set of documents that set out the dimensions and lines of action of the Common Security and Defence Policy – the *European Agenda on Security* and the *EU's Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy*, which are sectoral strategies on cyber, energy and maritime security.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 3rd Chapter.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 4th Chapter.

Identifying the characteristics of contemporary conflicts has led to adding, to the above-mentioned strategies, a set of documents tailored to meet the requirements of prevention and preparation of desirable responses to new types of threats in the security environment – *Joint Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats*, *EU Operational Protocol for Countering Hybrid Threats*, *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence* and, in the future, the *European Defence Action Plan*. All these documents provide theoretical support and enable the use of the main formulae for countering the hybrid threats, characterised by the complementary use of political, diplomatic, economic, information and military instruments.

The multidimensional and integrative approach to security and defence at national and European level is strongly based on the *mutual defence clause*, which results in the security guarantees that EU member states grant to each other based on Article 42 para (7) of the *TEU*. It follows that any harm done to the territorial integrity of any EU member state by armed aggression causes the reaction of all other member states, bound to assist and support the attacked state by all available means. The expression of the inherent right to collective defence of all states, recognised by the United Nations Charter, Article 51, the *mutual defence clause* represents a European equivalence of the *principle of collective defence* (all for one, one for all!) of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, which is defining for NATO's defensive character. The dual membership of the EU and NATO of most states in the two organisations strengthens the system of reciprocal and simultaneous security guarantees, which benefit them as member states and allies.

From the perspective of EU documents regarding *CSDP* implementation, countering hybrid threats requires coordinated response actions that are synchronised at national and EU level, with the main feature being the integration of all retaliation and response undertaken at political, diplomatic, economic, information and military levels.

However, mention should be made that if one or more member/allied states are exposed to a hybrid aggression, where “*a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary and civilian measures are employed in highly integrated design*”³⁷, invoking the *mutual defence clause* from the Treaty of the European Union and the *principle of collective defence* from the North Atlantic Treaty is conditioned by the identification of the aggressor, their acts of aggression and their deliberately hostile nature.

³⁷ *NATO Wales Summit Declaration*, issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5 September 2014, pct. 13.

Yet, in the case of hybrid conflicts, precisely determining the circumstances and elements of the aggression could be difficult, having as a consequence the fact that reaching the consensus of member and allied states on establishing whether the respective actions are armed aggression on the territory of one/some of them could be delayed or even blocked. This potential situation is part of the logic of the hybrid aggression, in which the aggressor denies their involvement, hiding their intentions and real motivations, and covering their hostile actions as far as possible. In an attempt not to exceed the legally binding belligerence, the aggressor declares that their actions are defensive, preventive, legally substantiated and in full keeping with the provisions of international law on humanitarian assistance, protection of own citizens, peacekeeping and crisis management. In order to create ambiguities, confusions and differences of perception as to their status, the aggressor builds up and invokes an apparent legitimacy, supported by preferentially selected historical, custom-related, legal, ethnic, cultural and religious arguments, as well as by campaigns to influence and model the perception of internal and international public opinion.

The internal cohesion of the target state, as well as the cohesion of the coalition and/or the organisation it is part of become the most important targets for hybrid aggression planners and can be harmed by the exploitation of the vulnerabilities it/they is/are showing – economic development gaps, interethnic and inter-confessional disagreements, social, political and cultural gaps, political class delegitimization, widespread corruption, large-scale financial frauds and so on. Against the backdrop of political, diplomatic, economic and information pressures, attempts are made to limit, as far as possible, the use of armed force and to freeze the conflict in the conditions of maintaining positions and of the *status quo* obtained through resorting to hybrid means and mediation provided by international organisations, allied and partner countries.

At the basis for the development of effective procedures for countering hybrid threats lies the reduction and elimination of internal vulnerabilities, the protection of critical (IT, financial, energy, transport) infrastructure, the strengthening of internal social cohesion and resilience of member states, the increase in the speed of response in the integrated use of political, diplomatic, information, economic, military, humanitarian and cultural instruments. The success of these steps will depend on the political will and the ability of member states to resolve the ongoing crises, which call into question the very viability of the current EU aggregation formula: the crisis of confidence; the increasing BREXIT-type fragmentation tendencies; the public debt crisis; the resurgence of nationalist, protectionist and populist-extremist policies; the unemployment, radicalisation and terrorism;

the intensification of secessionist movements; the immigrant and refugee crisis; the renegotiation of Schengen Area Agreements; the external crises (Ukraine, the Middle East and North Africa) and their impact on the common security and defence policy.

In the preliminaries of the Rome anniversary summit (25 March 2017)³⁸, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker presented the ***White Paper on the Future of Europe*** before the European Parliament on 1 March 2017. The document analyses the ways forward for the continuation of the European Community project, proposing five scenarios for the evolution of the European Union, with 27 members, by 2025 – in the current configuration or with variable geometries and speeds, which should harmonise and reflect as much as possible the interests of member states.

Regardless of the scenario in which the member states will shape their future, the *White Paper* reveals, as being the common element of the European Union's options for evolution, that “*the need to reflect on how to deter, respond and protect against threats, ranging from large-scale cyber-attacks to more traditional forms of aggression, has never been so critical*”³⁹.

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³⁹ *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*, the European Commission, Brussels, 1 March 2017, p. 8.

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English version by
 **Iulia SINGER**

RECONSIDERATION OF ENGINEER SUPPORT IN NATIONAL AND NATO JOINT FORCES OPERATIONS

Brigadier General (r.) Dr Mircea VLADU

The approach taken by the author stems from the experience of the land forces in the theaters of operations as well as from possible scenarios of conflicts in which the engineer support plays an important role.

In the Romanian combat manuals there are provisions related to special engineer detachments. However, they have not been sanctioned in the new doctrine of the engineer support in joint operations. According to the author, such error could be corrected. Therefore, some argued and detailed proposals are presented. Among them, the improvement of engineer forces interoperability within NATO and the enhancement of command and control in the field of engineering.

Keywords: *command points; capabilities; operational disposition; joint operations*

Introduction

Future major ground battles will be conducted mainly by the Land Forces, and, starting from this idea, from the experience of the theatres of military operations, as well as from the decision of NATO authorities related to giving more attention to the engineer support needed by task forces not only prior to their deployment but also during the conflict and even in the post-conflict period¹, any realistic idea that may lead to the engineer support effectiveness can be only beneficial.

As far as doctrine is concerned, NATO member states have the liberty to classify their national forces in different ways under the major armed forces services – land, air and navy, but the experience in the theatres of operations demonstrates the necessity of including engineer forces among them, although their development and capabilities can differ from one nation to the other.

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¹ See Lieutenant Colonel Laurențiu Arin, *Transformarea genistică specifică în domeniul conceptual*, August 2012, p. 4, see www.rft.forter.ro.

This aspect in the doctrine has provided the Romanian military decision-makers with the possibility of maintaining in national combat manuals provisions related to special engineer detachments (mobile obstacle detachment/MOD; obstacle-clearing detachment/OCD; movement support detachment/MSD), but the issues related to them have not been sanctioned in the new doctrine of the engineer support in joint operations.

The efficiency of the mentioned detachments, demonstrated during the exercises conducted on the national territory, intended to train our engineer forces to ensure the engineer support necessary for the joint task forces earmarked for national and collective defence, and the fact that the authors of G.1, Engineer Support in Joint Operations Doctrine, no. S.M.G. 35 on 17.03 2016, omitted to include provisions related to the mentioned detachments or even to suggest that NATO member states armed forces should include such detachments to achieve interoperability have determined me assume the responsibility of making some suggestions in this respect, which can become the starting point in resolving these problems by decision-makers in the field.

Moreover, I consider that the engineer support in joint task forces operations can be more effectively provided if, besides the mentioned special engineer detachments, other types of detachments, such as mobile mixed fortification detachment (MMFD) and mobile mixed water supply detachment (MMWSD), will be established within both Romanian and NATO member states armed forces.

These suggestions are based on the following arguments:

a) the engineer support in joint operations, especially in terms of mobile obstacle detachment and obstacle-clearing detachment to limit the enemy forces mobility, road building and maintenance to ensure the mobility of own troops, maintenance of the operational capacity of the personnel within the task force command points by fortifications capable to resist the destructive effects of weapons, supply of water necessary for the forces engaged in joint operations etc. represent the responsibility of the task force commander, fulfilled through the engineer troops commander;

b) the engineer troops repartition once the operational disposition is achieved and the establishment of MOD, MSD and OCD to execute specific engineer support missions during the joint operation, facilitating the mission of the joint task force command through the engineer troops commander;

c) the enhancement of the detachment troops mobility due to the effective information and fire support provided by the earmarked structures in the composition of the joint task force;

d) the timely logistic support, considering the importance of the specific missions executed by these detachments, which contribute to the joint operation success;

e) the improved organisation of communications, considering that the engineer troops in a detachment regroup in only one area;

f) the camouflage and deception measures, in the areas where the special detachments are established, intervene or regroup following the mission;

These suggestions adoption could be followed by their inclusion not only in NATO joint operations doctrine engineer support but also in NATO Allies specific doctrines.

To better grasp the significance of each and every mentioned detachment, some relevant aspects will be briefly presented.

Mobile Obstacle Detachment

According to combat manuals, this detachment can consist of engineer troops specially trained to lay/clear anti-tank mines in the composition of large combined arms units engaged in joint operations, once the operational disposition is achieved, in an area situated between the Immediate Engagement Forces/IEF and Subsequent Engagement Forces/SEF, on their main effort direction, in compliance with the joint operating concept.

The operational disposition should be established prior to the beginning of the joint operation so that the engineer troops earmarked for the MOD can have the necessary time to achieve their engineer support missions/tasks and move to the area where the detachment is established to prepare the interventions during the operation.

In essence, MOD has to execute the following engineer support missions/tasks during the offensive joint operation²:

a) lay anti-tank mines to counter-attack/strike enemy forces;

b) lay anti-tank mines to ensure the insertion of the joint task force SEF (reserve);

c) consolidate, by laying mines, the lines (areas) conquered by the enemy.

During the defensive joint operation, MOD can be assigned the following engineer support missions/tasks:

a) lay anti-tank mines to limit the enemy penetration in the depth of the joint task force defence area;

b) lay anti-tank mines on the flanks of the counter-attack/strike group in the line of counter-attack/strike;

c) re-lay anti-tank mines where they have been destroyed in the area re-conquered by the enemy, when the own forces counter-attack/strike has been successful.

² Colonel Professor Dr Ion Preda, *Sprrijinul genistic al acțiunilor marilor unități tactice tip brigadă*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2004, pp. 47-49.

Obstacle-Clearing Detachment

This special detachment can consist of engineer troops specially trained to clear obstacles using explosive devices in different environments, in the composition of large combined arms units engaged in defensive joint operations, once the operational disposition is achieved, in an area situated between IEF and SEF, on the important denied direction, in compliance with the joint operating concept.

The Obstacle-Clearing Detachment has the engineer support mission/task of verifying and maintaining operational the pyrotechnic and electrical initiators³ prepared prior to the defensive joint operation by the troops in composition and of operating them following the order of legally responsible person, thus countering the enemy forces movement.

Movement Support Detachment

The detachment can consist of engineer troops specialised in establishing and maintaining the terrestrial communication lines necessary to ensure the movement of the joint task force in its offensive area, to execute manoeuvre, insert SEF (reserve) in operation, achieve logistic transports and ensure the viability of the road network necessary for the operational disposition regeneration⁴.

Mobile Mixed Fortification Detachment

Mention should be made that the organisation of this type of special detachment (MMFD) within engineer troops is stipulated neither in the Romanian Armed Forces nor in NATO member states armed forces. However, as an engineer expert, I consider necessary to establish and use such a detachment, especially during the conduct of defensive joint operation, within the national engineer troops, NATO allied troops, as well as within NATO joint task force, based on the following arguments:

a) in the future integrated and extended battlefield, the joint task force commands need to be protected against the destructive effects of classical and long-range weapons. This type of protection can be effectively achieved by building special spaces in peacetime, resistant buildings, caves, grottos etc., situated on the territory of the host nations, strongholds within mobile command points, classical shelters made of wood, reinforced concrete, glass fibre, reinforced plastic etc.;

³ *Ibid*, p. 50.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 51.

b) inexistence of specialised and performant engineer troops, earmarked for building the joint task force command points, at least at the level of a command point building company level;

c) inexistence, in the inventory of the Romanian and other NATO engineer troops, of mobile command points, the joint task forces commands protection being thus achieved using buried shelters made of wood, reinforced concrete, reinforced plastic etc., their building, decommissioning and transport requiring a longer period of time, more numerous forces and assets, at the pace of operation;

d) abandonment of the idea launched in the theatres of operations in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan, according to which command points protection can be achieved with the help of surface fortifications to the detriment of the buried ones⁵. From this perspective, it has been omitted the fact that, in the future, large-scale ground battles are likely to occur and, in this situation, the command protection in the command points only with surface shelters is insufficient.

The proposed structure can have reduced troops in peacetime, and it can be augmented during the conflict with reserve/mobilised personnel. To augment it, specific technical assets and even civilian personnel in the area of operations can be used. To reduce cost, the civilian personnel having military obligations can be concentrated/mobilised at the workplace, and the specific combat assets can be requisitioned, if the host nation legislation allows it. If the host nation legislation does not allow concentration/mobilisation and requisition, the performed work is paid.

Mobile Mixed Water Supply Detachment

Also in the case of this type of detachment, mention should be made that its organisation within engineer troops is stipulated neither in the Romanian Armed Forces nor in NATO member states armed forces. Taking into account that the structures specialised in water supply and purification are not capable of ensuring the quantity of water necessary during the joint task force operations, I consider necessary to establish a mobile mixed water supply detachment (MMWSD) within the national engineer troops, NATO allied troops, as well as within NATO joint task force. It will consist of engineer troops specialised in purifying water, as well as of specialised civilian personnel and assets in the area of operations, according to the above-mentioned procedure.

⁵ See Engineer, EOD and CBRN Management Training Centre Panait Donici – Rm. Vâlcea, *Necesitatea asigurării capacităților de amenajare genistică a punctelor de comandă la nivelul structurilor de geniu organice ale brigăzii mecanizate*, August 2012, p. 30, see www.rft.forter.ro.

Conclusions

I formulated the above-mentioned suggestions starting from the fact that the Romanian engineer troops were among the first structures that participated in managing the conflicts that occurred more than 20 years ago and the experience acquired imposed as a lesson learned the necessity to operationalise the goal set by the Alliance, namely to provide the NATO forces engaged in all types of operations with the most effective engineer support thus NATO commands enjoying the greatest freedom of action at the best value for nations. In order to meet the goal the following courses of action are necessary in the medium term⁶:

- a) increase the awareness and the capability of engineer troops available for NATO missions;
- b) enhance NATO engineer troops interoperability;
- c) optimise the command and control process related to engineer troops;
- d) support the efforts meant to achieve NATO engineer troops interoperability.

The points of view and the suggestions expressed above are in line with these courses of action, and the incurred costs are not too high. In order for these suggestions to be operationalised the will and expertise of political-military decision-makers, both national and NATO ones, are necessary.

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⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Laurențiu Arin, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

BENCHMARKING – A Future Solution for Quality Assurance in Education –

Colonel Dr Olivian STĂNICĂ

Why benchmarking in Romanian military education system? Starting from this question and based on a documented analysis in the field, the author considers that benchmarking can be an instrument useful for enhancing performance within Romanian military education institutions compared to similar institutions in the country or abroad. One of the significant stages of this process is to measure and compare quality in education. Thus education providers are supported to find the strategies and courses of action that result in enhanced performance. According to the author, the two existing agencies in Romania responsible for quality assurance in education – ARACIS and ARACIP could work in this regard in the absence of other regulatory bodies in Romania.

Keywords: *quality in education; evaluation practices; performance indicators; human capital*

Benchmarking¹ was originally applied in manufacturing industries and business as a way to improve management performance and to identify gaps and formulate suggestions related to effectively bridging them. Subsequently, it was amended and applied in services in sectors such as accounting, hotels, transport. Modern **benchmarking** was set up by Rank Xerox in the '80s and since then it is essentially considered a method of achieving competitive goals, promoting strategic thinking and helping businesses to develop their strengths and reduce their weaknesses.

The main feature of benchmarking process is to establish credible objectives and target the continuous improvement of a product, a process and employees (human capital).

Recently, this approach has been applied in the field of education as a systematic way of measuring/comparing educational institutions

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¹ Source: *Assistance in order to use and develop tools for quality assurance*, EU Project, TVET 6 RO, ed. 2009.




Figure 1: Benchmarking Value Cycle*

or aspects of their activities in accordance with certain rules or requirements as well as with the examples provided by the best practices.

Due to global competition and rapid economic and social change, the environment in which educational institutions operate changes, raising serious challenges for their position on the educational market, their reputation, even their existence. In order to progress, sometimes even to survive, a school or a university must be aware of the new trends, adopt changes and update practices. **Benchmarking** is an effective tool to achieve improved performance through continually monitoring and comparing with similarly successful organisations.

Therefore, it is important for the success of benchmarking process to identify the best practices and determine how such practices can be adopted by other institutions. Thus, **benchmarking** could be defined as *measuring the performance of the best organisation of the same type, determining how the best performing organisations achieve the performance levels and use information as a basis for setting the institution own goals and strategies.*

Why applying **benchmarking** to military education in Romania? **Benchmarking** could be an effective tool that supports mutual learning and institutional performance in education.

* Source: <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/390124386441056832/>.



Figure 2: Benchmarking – complex process of comparing the results and the performance of similar institutions in different fields of activity

Once the Ministry of National Defence accepts that military secondary schools and military universities must comply with national quality standards and that diplomas are recognised on the labour market then it is inevitable that the results and performances of these institutions should be compared with similar institutions in the country or abroad. Some of the comparison methods used may be part of **benchmarking** domain.

Involvement in a benchmarking process will support both military education institutions and national education authorities to obtain data in order to make documented decisions, consolidate the institution identity, formulate and implement new long-term development strategies.

That is why **benchmarking** exercises on internal quality have consistently provided valuable examples of good practices and indicators on: *How do we develop strategies for internal quality assurance and institutional quality culture? How do we link internal processes to external expectations? How do we develop adequate internal mechanisms to enhance the quality of the educational process and how do we demonstrate their effectiveness?*

Benchmarking could enhance the reputation of the institution and help to better position it in the hierarchy of institutions. Measuring performance and comparing with others, education providers find out new ideas, start strategic research, and learn from others to improve themselves.

Benchmarking is a process that allows comparison of inputs, processes or outputs between institutions (or parts of institutions) or within a single institution over time², according to certain points of reference.

² International glossary of quality, see www.qualityresearchinternational.com.

A very important stage of the benchmarking process is measurement and comparison. Benchmarking of educational quality is, in essence, a way to help providers in the field identify strategies and actions that will help improve performance.

To do this, education providers must:

- find a way to describe and define the kind of organisation (for example, their organisational structure), the way it operates (organisational practices) and the way it supports the quality of teaching and learning activities;
- find a way to evaluate the effectiveness of their structure and organisational practices;
- choose a suitable reference element (e.g. a similar organisation) to compare its structure and practices.

Benchmarking indicators are, therefore, tools that help to perform these descriptive activities, based on evaluation and comparison. This is consistent with defining the performance indicator as *an attribute or feature of a practice or outcome of an activity that supports the appreciation of the performance of an implemented process*.

Performance indicators that contribute to the development of benchmarks are often classified as output, process and input indicators³.

Input indicators include, for example, the resources available for education and training: number of employees, staff qualifications, number of books in the library, available computers, internet access etc. Input indicators are important for management, as they indicate the resources available to achieve strategic goals and objectives, but before using them for benchmarking, some standards need to be set, for example, the number of computers with internet access/student or the number of students/qualified teacher etc. The resources provided for education cannot ensure its quality, because its effectiveness may vary (maybe computers are not used by students, maybe some of the qualified teachers are not very good at teaching etc.).

Process indicators describe the most important characteristics of the educational process that may affect its quality: for example, the number of hours of contact with students; average scores of students/discipline or module; the number



Figure 3: Benchmarking logo

³ See Annex no 1 of the document: *Fundamentals of a 'Common quality assurance framework' (QCAF) for VET in Europe*, European Commission, 29.09.2005.

of hours spent in the IT lab per week etc. Such data can provide a picture of the effectiveness of the process and, in particular, the learning activity of the student, if there are established standards of achievement. However, process indicators cannot serve as direct evidence of the level of achievement in accordance with established objectives, although they can explain why a particular achievement is good or insufficient. Since educational institutions tend to use process indicators rather than output ones to measure their progress and achievements, it is worth mentioning that applying the benchmarking method to compare their processes should be the primary concern only when it is not possible (or not yet possible) to directly measure results, or when such benchmarks provide indications of improvement.

Output/result indicators provide information on the effectiveness of the activities. Such indicators include, for example, the percentage of students who graduate on time, the average students graduating, the percentage of students continuing their studies after graduation or getting a job, the level of employers' satisfaction with the skills and competencies of graduates.

This classification of performance indicators as input, process and output indicators is not accurate, but it is useful. Often, educational institutions prefer to focus on evaluation processes, not on results. Classification helps to keep the importance of result indicators and thus to adopt the attitude that the *results* matter.

It should be noted that the same indicator can be classified differently according to the activity being evaluated. For example, the average student score for a given discipline is a performance indicator as the *output* of that discipline, but it is a *process* indicator for the entire learning programme.

In order to optimise the process of collecting information from different institutions and then to compare the results, two working tools can be used: an on-line survey (*Annex 1*) and a profile sheet of the school/college proposed for evaluation (*Annex 2*)

Conclusions

➤ **Benchmarking** can be a useful tool for the heads of the military educational institutions to increase their competitiveness with similar institutions in the country or abroad by diversifying educational offerings and attracting a large number of candidates to different study programmes.

➤ Measurement of student satisfaction has become a widespread practice in Romanian pre-university and university education in recent years. A large number of institutions (universities, academies, colleges, schools) regularly collect feedback from students on the quality of the learning process. From the point of view

of students, as consumers, it is advisable to measure the quality of their learning experience, both directly and indirectly. That is why the most direct way is to measure their perceptions about their own learning experience.

➤ A benchmark for **student satisfaction** can monitor their assessment of teaching, goals and standards, appraisal practices, workload, general skills, and overall satisfaction. However, collecting such data requires uniformity in the content and structure of the information collection tools (e.g. a centralised questionnaire for all institutions) and the existence of a practice of sufficient duration to provide intra- and inter-institutional data. It is most useful at the level of discipline, in comparisons.

➤ **Benchmarking** should be also used to collect feedback from graduates precisely to regulate quality processes and develop new standards for teaching-learning (introduction of new information technologies, eLearning, eBooks etc.).

➤ Currently, there is no single structure in the educational system in Romania, responsible for organising, managing and analysing the results of **benchmarking** process. In my opinion, the two quality assurance agencies in education (Quality Assurance Agency for Secondary School and Quality Assurance Agency for University) could support this role in **benchmarking** process and in analysing its results. Both agencies have valid and credible information on the performance of educational institutions in making decisions, presenting their educational offerings, their professional competencies and thus they can support and contribute to **benchmarking** initiative.

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Annex 1

ON-LINE QUESTIONNAIRE⁴ (A variant proposed by the author)


Creating an on-line questionnaire to survey the target audience’s opinion involves: designing the questionnaire, collecting data, and analysing/interpreting the data. There are several sites on the Internet that offer different models for designing a questionnaire/survey. We propose a variant that is easily accessible and can be used in the educational process. The online questionnaire is, in our opinion, a valuable tool for improving the quality of education in an education institution. It makes easy the collection of the views/perceptions of different categories of beneficiaries of learning outcomes, in an acceptable time, being at everyone’s reach.

The proposed model involves several steps, as follows:

Step no. 1: The web page will be accessed at the following address: <http://www.surveymonkey/>

Step no. 2: Look at menus related to designing a questionnaire type, choosing questions, answers, and then collecting/interpreting data.

Step no. 3: Question types are set and selected.



Creating questions for the questionnaire/survey

With different types of questions, including rating ranges and multiple variants, it is easy to create multiple choice online surveys, according to the templates indicated and found in the database.

Step no. 4: The questionnaire will be personalised using different elements.

Personalisation of the questionnaire/survey

It is possible to customise the questionnaire/survey by adding the company/institution logo, name, colours and different images. Your own URL (Uniform Resource Locator – a uniform way around the world to locate a file or document on the internet) will be created. A URL specifies

⁴ Source: <http://www.surveymonkey/>.



the address of a file on the web, an address that is unique to each file. It will be sent to the correspondents as a landing page for promoting and establishing the contact details until the survey/opinion poll is completed.

Step no. 5: The questionnaire will be completed with different advanced features.



Advanced features

The data we need with the various questions and the quick validation of the answer will be obtained. Open and hard-to-test questions will be eliminated. Surveys must be interactive, with skip logic and fluent questions, easy to interpret.

The audience that you will benefit from through **SurveyMonkey** is the order of tens of millions of correspondents ready to provide the answers you need to make critical decisions.

Step no. 6: The answers will be collected and the data will be interpreted.



Collecting answers

If your questions are written, the answer selections are formulated, then you have to be ready to receive answers. How should the survey be sent?

The solutions are multiple: it can be sent in an email, it can be placed on a web page or the link (where the questionnaire is located) can be made known via *Facebook*, *Twitter* or another page of a social network.

We have a lot of ways to send the survey. Here are the basic variants:

- **Link.** You can create a custom URL for your investigation, then you can get answers by email to your link to your e-mail or by posting the link on your site. You can also open a study invitation for different segments of visitors on your site.

- **Email.** After uploading your contacts to the **SurveyMonkey Address Book**, you can create your own email lists and personalised email invitations, then send surveys to email addresses. You will be able to track the correspondents who complete/reply to the survey and send reminders to those who have not responded.

- **The site.** You will post the survey on your site or it will appear in a pop-up window when visitors arrive at your site.

- **Social media/social networks.** If you have a *Twitter* account, you can make the link that contains your survey/questionnaire public. Also, on your *Facebook* account, on your personal *Facebook* page.

- **Buy a target audience.** With **SurveyMonkey Audience**, you can acquire access to a target audience that meets the specific demographic criteria for your survey. (Currently available only to loyal US customers). It is a great way to get specific answers from a specific group.

Interpretation of data: statistical analysis tools are employed to interpret data and use it as the necessary information for decision-makers/beneficiaries.

Note: Rewards can be given: coupons, gift cards (with **SurveyMonkey Survey Rewards**) for those who respond in a timely manner to your survey.

Annex 2

Profile file of the school/college proposed for evaluation

(A variant adapted – proposed by author⁵)

DOMAINS	INDICATORS
THE SCHOOL PORTFOLIO	<p>Percentage of titular teachers; seniority in the profession and on the job of the teachers; main improvement initiatives of the student performance; seniority of the school/college leadership, results of the school/college in standardised national tests (the share of students with scoring below 5 and 6 etc.)</p> <p>- at school level; but also for subgroups of students having different social profile. For example: a school can show that, although its overall results are weaker than another, it has similar or better results among students having a certain social profile (middle-class, low-income, disadvantaged families); such data may represent a veritable guidebook for parents.</p>

⁵ Source: SAR Policy Brief, Academic Society from Romania, *Sistemul românesc de asigurare a calității educației preuniversitare. Putem reforma formele fără fond?*, no. 62, January, 2013.

DOMAINS	INDICATORS
SATISFACTION OF THE BENEFICIARIES	Data collected from all parents or based on a representative sample regarding: the degree of satisfaction of the beneficiaries (General Staff/Human Resource Management Directorate/other institutions etc.) regarding the quality of teaching basic subjects (mathematics, Romanian language, foreign language, physical education, military training); degree of satisfaction with student counselling/professional orientation; the degree of satisfaction with the student's relationship with colleagues; the relationship with teaching staff/auxiliary teaching staff, platoon commander in college; degree of satisfaction with the objectivity of classifying grades; satisfaction with the objectivity of rewarding/punishing students; satisfaction with learning conditions (winter heating, furniture, healthcare, size of classrooms, laboratories, access to the library etc.).
SOCIAL PROFILE OF THE STUDENTS	Percentage of disadvantaged students in school; percentage of students from families with different educational status (low, medium, high), share of Roma students etc., identified on the basis of individual responses of the students' families. The data could be collected from the students in the first year through the standard sheet developed by the Armed Forces Services.



THE THIRD ROME

– Permanent Myth of Pan-Slavism –

Dr Florian BICHIR

Three great metropolises have marked the life of the Christian Church whose political, cultural and spiritual importance is recognised up to these days. All three are put together by a concept – “Rome – eternal city, Rome – the City of God” –, which had different nuances depending on the historical period. Although having different names, the latter, Constantinople and Moscow, have appropriated a surname related to that of Rome, namely “New Rome” and the “Third Rome” respectively.

Russia, from Peter the Great, fervently desired to become a European Russia and a powerful state in the world arena, thus its political, social and especially economic policy.

Russian messianism appears as the myth of the Third Rome, the Russian Orthodox Church being a vital supporter of the state in its actions meant to protect all Russians, a veritable divine mission, in essence, the Church and the State being ontologically united. Around this myth there were born subsequent ideals of Russia – the populist movement, Slavophilism, nationalism, socialism and the tsarist and Soviet imperialism.

Keywords: *Third Rome; Russia; Byzantine Empire; Russian messianism; nationalism*

Feudal Russia had its particular and special relations with Byzantium, especially considering the influence it exercised on the majority of the fields of activity in the new state, mainly within the Orthodox Church, the most efficient *weapon* of the Byzantine historical expression. What is the significance of the influence as far as the church is concerned? In concrete terms, the Byzantine influence got manifested in Byzantine liturgy and in the lifestyle and monastic organisation proper to Eastern Christianity as well as in the entire Byzantine administrative structure. Adrian Ignat says: *“Byzantine culture was, starting in the second half of the 15th century and through the 16th century, recreated and replaced, in Tsarist Russia with the hiliast and messianic state and national religion,*

with the *sui genesis* Russian Orthodox Christianity, at the same time ritualist-triumphalist, sentimentalist-pietistic and populist-national¹. Ionuț Constantin writes in *Rusia, paradigma euroasiatică/Russia, the Eurasian Paradigm*, that Russian princes gradually sought to approach Byzantium, perceived correctly as a neighbouring power that emanated prestige, power and abundance. Practically, they replaced a conflicting situation with a cooperation one, meant to adopt civilizational values not only in politics but also in religion, considering the advantages of copying such a prestigious model.

As Rome was the Christian centre for Western Europe, Constantinople was the Christian centre for Eastern Europe, and the majority of the peoples in the region became Orthodox. These peoples were under the authority of Byzantine Patriarch, and their rulers accepted the suzerainty of the Emperor in Constantinople over all Orthodox subjects. Moreover, during that time, the suzerainty of the Byzantine Emperor was accepted not only by those nations but also by the popes in Rome. Thus, they acted in the West as the Emperor representatives and as advocates of the *oikoumene* unity.

The political-military cooperation between Russia and Byzantium was initiated when Emperor Basil II, the Basileus in Constantinople, confronted with the threats in Bulgaria as well as with other challenges in Asia Minor, requested the support of Knyaz Vladimir, reinforcing the cooperation by the marriage of his sister, Ana, to the Russian *barbarian*, certainly a desperate situation for the Greeks. Ana, an Orthodox Christian, conditioned the marriage by Vladimir conversion and renunciation of pagan customs².

The Russian Knyaz accepted, thus Byzantine Orthodoxy becoming the official religion. The hagiographic tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church consecrated Vladimir to the state of holiness, *isapostolos* (equal to apostles), considering the conversion a miracle³. The historical fact shows that, besides any miraculous components, interwoven with Russian folk traditions, Vladimir converted owing not only to his grandmother Olga⁴, who was a Christian, but also to his about 600 wives and concubines, to whom the influences of the Christian community in Kiev were added. The Byzantine missionaries who came to Russia also significantly contributed to Vladimir's decision. The translation of the Bible

¹ Adrian Ignat, *Cele trei Rome*, Editura Universitară, 2012.

² Ionuț Constantin, *Rusia, paradigma euroasiatică*, Editura TopForum, 2014, pp. 32-33.

³ An important aspect in the analysis of the Third Rome is the reproduction in the Russian space of the Byzantium founding fathers models in the next centuries. We mention that, like Constantine the Great, Knyaz Vladimir was considered equal to apostles, and Olga, his grandmother, compared to Saint Elena, Constantine's mother.

⁴ Saint Olga, Prince Vladimir grandmother, was baptised in 955.

and liturgical books into glory by Saints Cyril and Methodius together with their disciples constituted the premise of a much faster conversion of the Russian people to Christianity.

However, Vladimir's conversion was also politically motivated: the strategic advantage provided by marrying the Byzantine Emperor sister born in the purple and the increase in his personal and his country prestige, plus the opportunity of having privileged diplomatic relations with the Greeks. Last but not least, there were the practical advantages related to the development of trade and cultural relations with Byzantium⁵. Internally, the confessional connection with Byzantine Orthodox Christianity also led to the consolidation of the political authority of the Knyaz on the Slav-Varegian territory, which was unified by the Church, in turn, under the protection of the Knyaz⁶.

Vladimir was baptised in 988, in "Saint Basil" Church in Kerson, a Byzantine city, which demonstrates that Byzantium did not easily renounced the role it played in religiously subordinating the other states. Practically, his baptism united the State and the Church in Russia, having thus long-term political consequences. Therefore, it was a religious conversion motivated by a political goal, especially considering that Vladimir preferred Orthodoxy to Catholicism or Judaism. The geostrategic position of Byzantium related to the East and the West, seen as the *World* itself (in political, economic, cultural and spiritual terms) also weighed in the decision made by Vladimir. Following his conversion and marriage to a princess born in the purple, Russia became more important in its relations with Byzantium.

It seems that Vladimir, the Great Knyaz, was awarded the title of *Basileus* by his Byzantine protector, as mentioned in a Synodal letter sent in 1561 to the Russian ruler John IV (1533-1584) by the Ecumenical Patriarchy, to award him the title of *Basileus (Tsar)*, "justified by the fact that Vladimir I was crowned with the emperor crown brought from Byzantium by the Metropolitan of Ephesus", according to Adrian Ignat⁷.

By accepting Byzantine culture and Christian-orthodox religion, organic connections developed between all the countries in the Byzantine *commonwealth*, as Dimitri Obolensky⁸ put it. Following conversion, churches were built, culminating with *Saint Sofia* Cathedral in Kiev, during Tsar Yaroslav,

⁵ Kiev was called "Byzantium on the Dnieper", sign of Russo-Byzantine relations.

⁶ Adrian Ignat, *op. cit.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Dimitri Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth. Eastern Europe 500-1453*, Praeger Publishers, New York, Washington, 1971. In Romanian, Dimitri Obolensky, *Un commonwealth medieval: Bizanțul*, Editura Corint, București, 2003.

between 1025 and 1037, copying the symbol of Orthodoxy, *Saint Sofia* Cathedral in Constantinople. Similarly, *Lavra Pecerska* Monastery in Kiev was organised following the model of *Studion* Monastery in Constantinople. It was followed by another cathedral having the same name, in Novgorod, between 1045 and 1052. Some of the cities in Russia, especially Vladimir or Rostov, hosted Greek studies and libraries having books in Greek. The colonial character of Byzantine political and spiritual suzerainty was evident in the fact that the Church bishops were usually Greeks, and the Greek language was used in the church service along with the Slavonic one.

Vladimir's decision to get baptised together with the people had not only a religious dimension but also a political one, as well as a great historical impact in time. Adrian Ignat, presenting the historical perspective of Vladimir conversion, reproduces the suggestive text of the panegyric of Metropolitan Ilarion, held in honor of the Russian Knyaz: *"the country of Romans praises Peter and Paul, as due to them it believes in Jesus Christ, the son of God, Asia – John Theologian, India – Thomas, Egypt – Mark. All countries and all peoples worship and glorify their teachers in Orthodoxy. Let us give praise – modest praise limited to our power – unto the One who has performed great and admirable deeds, unto our doctor and teacher, the great Khagan of our country, Vladimir, grandson of Igor the Elder, son of glorious Svyatoslav!"*⁹.

However, the links between the two worlds, Byzantine and Russian, had to be maintained. Thus the Russian colony in Constantinople had to maintain the contact between the Russian space and Byzantium. An important contribution to that relationship was made by Greek metropolitans in Kiev, as well as by the architects, painters and traders who came from Byzantium to Russia. Mount Athos, the centre of Orthodox monachism and pilgrimage, played an extremely important role in the spiritual cohesion of the two entities, but trades represented the most consistent part of Russo-Byzantine relations.

Naturally, metropolitans from Constantinople were followed by a significant number of Greeks, who became political and administrative decision-makers in church as well as in other domains, especially economic ones. *"Among the twenty-three metropolitans mentioned in chronicles up to the Mongol invasion, according to Adrian Ignat, seventeen were Greek, while only two were Russian (the other four nationalities are not known). Together with those metropolitans, Greek teachers came to Russia. They brought with them Greek books to educate*

⁹ Adrian Ignat, *Cea de-a Treia Romă – între utopie și realitate*, Revista Teologica, no. 3, 2010, pp. 81-102.

the clergy". Even when Russia became ecclesiastically independent, the conservative instinct consistent with the *Greek books* continued to play an important part in the Russian medieval civilisation.

Besides the Orthodox Church servants who came from Constantinople, Greek diplomats, traders, craftsmen and artists came to Russia, while some Russians, in turn, served in the Byzantine army. Russian princes occasionally visited Constantinople and they got married to Greeks¹⁰. Russian monks settled in Mount Athos as well as in other monasteries in the Middle East, generating a true pilgrimage to the sacred places through the capital of Byzantium. There are so many elements that strengthened the relations between the two parties! The Byzantine Emperor was perceived by the Russians as God's representative on earth and supreme legislator for Christians, the supreme authority on Earth each and every Christian had to be subject to regardless the issue.

An important event during the mentioned historical period was Knyaz Igor failed attempt to conquer Constantinople. Following his death, Kievan Russia lost its political unity and got divided in many principalities that paid tribute to the Great Prince of Kiev. The lack of political unity as well as the geographical factors made Russia vulnerable to the Pecheneg and Cuman incursions and weakened, in the region of Kiev, the economic prosperity based, initially, on the fact that the trade route through Kiev and Novgorod was secure. Following the mentioned events, three political centres were established: the Great Principality of Kiev, the Principality of Suzdal and the Principality of Galicia. In absence of any important political centre, the nation unity was maintained by the Church. Russia's national unity was actually inseparable from the nation's links with Christian universalism, represented by the metropolitan appointed by Byzantium¹¹.

What was concretely the significance of the New Russian Rome myth? Firstly, it is the existence of a heraldry, a prestige that had to be exploited and defended in the context of the Middle Ages turmoil. How could be such a mission accomplished? The first "*goal*" was that Russia had to save the world by imposing Orthodoxy, even by force, if necessary. The Saviour himself became a venerable national, *Russified*, Christ, without exaggeration¹².

¹⁰ Several marriages were concluded between Byzantine and Russian royal houses; the majority of them took place in the 12th century, when the Empire was ruled by the Komnenos dynasty.

¹¹ The Byzantine civilisation penetrated Central Europe as a Christian mission from Russia. Thus, in 867, Patriarch Photius made the announcement that the Russians, who just attacked Constantinople, accepted a Christian bishop from Byzantium. The relations between Photius and the Russians should be subsumed under the great missionary work performed by Patriarchy among the Slavic peoples.

¹² Ionuț Constantin, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

The Russian Orthodox Church was a vital supporter of the state in its expansionist actions as well as in the actions meant to protect *all Russians*, a true *divine mission*, in essence. Thus, it can be talked about caesaropapism, in which the Church and the State got fundamentally united in ontological terms following the Byzantine model, and the conquest of Constantinople to free it from pagans became a goal for Russian tsars for centuries. Actually, throughout history, many actions meant to conquer territories were performed by Russia in the name of Orthodoxy. Following the fall of Kievan Russia, the Orthodox Church Metropolitan Headquarters moved to Vladimir, then to Moscow and, two centuries later, it was promoted to the rank of Patriarchy, becoming the heir of Byzantine tradition. After the religious events around the unionist Synod in Ferrara-Florence (1439-1440), the Metropolitan of Moscow, the Greek Istodor, accepted the unification of the Russian Orthodox Church with Rome, which was not accepted by the Great Prince Basil. Thus, the Greeks were perceived by the Russians as traitors, because they accepted the pact with Catholicism, and the fall of Constantinople, in 1453, was seen in the Russian world as the punishment of God. Following this event, Moscow adopted the Byzantine power symbols, the Byzantine imperialist mentality and especially the Orthodoxy symbols. It was not by accident that the Russian great princes adopted the title of tsar, the Slavic version of Caesar.

Constantinople *Apostasy*, by accepting the Unification in Florence (1439) with the Catholic Church, resulted in the Russian Church self-acknowledging as the only powerful and legitimate defender of the Orthodox Church. The fall of Constantinople was considered by Metropolitan Iona as well as by his contemporaries a divine punishment for the *apostasy*, convincing the Russians that their attitude towards the unification with the *heretical* was divinely approved. Basil II was thus offered the opportunity to proclaim himself the only protector of Orthodox faith, and he assumed, in a way, the role of the Emperor in Constantinople, while the political animosity between Poland-Lithuania and Moscow backed up the anti-Latin feelings. Thus, it was prepared the final stage in the political and religious rule of Moscow, reached under Ivan III, Basil III and Ivan IV. All these aspects led to the emergence of the *New Rome* doctrine, which became so influential in Russian thought: the first was Rome itself, which was confronted with lechery, the second was represented by Byzantium, which betrayed Orthodoxy, the third was Moscow, and it was impossible for the fourth to exist. Later, in 1492, Metropolitan Zosima called the Great Knyaz "*the sovereign and autocrat of entire Russia, the new Emperor Constantine of the new city Constantinople-Moscow*", in a Byzantine manner. Moscow adopted the final measure to support its hegemonic principles in religious terms.

In 1589, the Patriarchs in the East promoted the Metropolitan of Moscow to the rank of Patriarch, which thus became one among the most respectable Orthodox jurisdictions. Of all the peoples in Eastern Europe that were subject to the Church in Constantinople, the people in Moscow were by far the most hostile to the Latin Christianity. They could never approve the diplomatic coquetry with Rome to which the Bulgarian and Serbian rulers periodically resorted. For them, the Greeks, by signing the Unification in Florence, betrayed the Orthodoxy. The contrast between the Byzantine tragic unreliability and the Russian faithful fidelity allowed for the *historical myth* to take a step forward; it was because it was enticing to state that, from that moment on, Moscow and not Constantinople was the providential centre of the true Christian faith¹³.

After the fall of Constantinople, Ivan III married the heir of the Paleologues, the last Greek emperors of Constantinople, gaining an important asset in support of the idea that Moscow would be the *Third Rome*, the eternal city, the true successor to Rome and Constantinople. Following some legends, the myth of the “*Third Rome*” spread among the Russians, becoming an axiom, according to Ionuț Constantin¹⁴.

The first attempt to promote Orthodoxy to the rank of Leading Church was made in the time of Patriarch Nikon (he had such rank in 1652). His dreams of glory were generated by the fact that he became one of the trusted friends of Tsar Aleksei Mihailovich. In virtue of this fact, he proclaimed himself *Great Sovereign*, exercising the laic and spiritual authority on behalf of the Tsar. The Russian Patriarch maintained his relations with the Patriarch in the East, and wanted the Russian Church to play a key role in Orthodoxy, a role they could not play anymore, being under the Ottoman yoke. In this respect can also be interpreted the radical changes made to correct the religious books and the ritual, meant to meet the highly sought ecumenical role (the Russian Church Council in 1655 approved the liturgical reforms)¹⁵.

Legends, Philotheus Letter and the Faith Guardians

In *Miturile Rusiei clasice (Russian Classical Myths)*, Antoaneta Olteanu briefly presents the Russian legends related to the socio-political laboratory where the idea of the *Third Rome* was born. Unfortunately, the author wrongly considers that “*a legend says that a monk, namely Philotheus, dreamt about the glory*”

¹³ Antoaneta Olteanu, *Miturile Rusiei clasice*, Editura Paideia, pp. 207-215.

¹⁴ Ionuț Constantin, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

¹⁵ Antoaneta Olteanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-215.

of the Third Rome that was nothing else than Moscow". In reality, Philotheus did not exist!

The conquest of Constantinople was described, in the Russian space, by Nestor Iskander, in the Story of the Conquest of Tzarigrad. His prophecy that, one day, the city would be liberated by Christians, can be seen as a signal of the idea that the ascension of the power in Moscow was a new hope for the Orthodox Christians. The stories of the Babylonian Empire were invented or adapted to establish Russia's right to the Byzantine heritage. The imperial symbols worn by Byzantine emperors were described as brought from Babylon, and it was claimed that a Russian contributed to their discovery¹⁶. Similar prophecies date back in the Kievan Russia period. It is true that people received them as such, more as an oddity than as a curiosity. It was said that a magus came in Kiev in 1070 prophesying that the 'Greek Land' (Byzantium, A.N., A.O.) would be where Russia used to be, and Russia would be where the Greek land was"¹⁷. The vision of prophet Daniil related to the four empires was also an important element in the construction of the religious myths: "during those empires, the Heavenly Emperor would build an empire that would be never destroyed, dominating and defeating the others, and existing forever" (Daniil, 11, 44). For Byzantine writers the idea of eternal empire (understood, according to first interpreters, as the Roman Empire), referring to Byzantium, used to play a key role, although during the last centuries of the Byzantine Empire it became weaker¹⁸. The theory is part of the eschatological expectations of the time (according to which the end of the world was expected in 1492). The end of the world also meant the end of history, therefore the advent of the Kingdom of God. Against the mentioned background it should also be mentioned the special mission assigned to the Russian people or state. The Russian Church adopted the idea of the Tsar sacred mission and power from Byzantium, and in the 17th century Eastern Patriarchs stated that Tsars directly inherited the power of Byzantine Emperors¹⁹. The most ardent supporter of the Tsar sacred mission was Iosif Volokolarnsky (late 15th century – early 16th century)²⁰.

¹⁶ The desire to free from the Tatar yoke probably urge the Russians to adapt another legend circulating in northern Russia in the 13th century, a Serbian translation from Latin. The legend described the existence of a legendary Christian kingdom in India, capable of helping the other Christians in their fight against non-Christian people. The despair characterising all the Russians at that time seemed to explain the popularity of the *Legend of the 12 Dreams of King Mamer*, with its apocalyptic tendencies. The legend has an Oriental origin as many other legends such as Stefanit and Ihnilat, also extremely popular (see Francis Dvornik, *Slavii în istoria și civilizația europeană*, Editura All, București, 2001, p. 274).

¹⁷ Philip Longworth, *Crearea Europei de Est. De la preistorie la postcomunism*, Editura Curtea-Veche, București, 2002, p. 241.

¹⁸ Zenkovski, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

¹⁹ Antoaneta Olteanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-215.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 47.

One of the most serious researchers, Adrian Ignat, reviews the idea of the *Third Rome* beyond Russian messianism, having as the starting point *Nestor's Chronicle*.

In 1050, the Metropolitan of Kiev, Ilarion, in his famous homily over the *Law and Grace*, uttered in the great church of the *City of Glory, Kiev*, evoked the image of the Holy City, Jerusalem²¹. He considers the Russian people an Orthodox people whose calling is to take active part in the universal history of saving²². The people acknowledged it and reunited the Christians and peasants in only one word (*Christian – peasant, Christian*). Although in the West, in Latin, *paganos* (*peasant*) and *pagan* are synonymous, in Russian, the baptised citizens are called Christians, to oppose the impure foreign elements. Related to this aspect, M. Lotman and B. A. Uspensky say *it is characteristic that the idea of Moscow, the Third Rome, could be soon changed into the idea of Moscow, the New Jerusalem, which did not contradict the first idea but could be considered its substantiation*²³.

The New Jerusalem – Moscow – was the symbol of Holy Russia. The Russians would prove to be the prophets of this new world. Such prophetic conscience can be seen in the works of many Russian writers, especially Dostoyevsky. Russian prophets reached the same apocalyptic paroxysm as the great prophets of Israel. Many of their positive prophecies, which considered Pan-Slavism or universal theocracy, failed to fulfil. However, the negative prophecies made by Dostoyevsky, Solovyov, or by Rozanov or Leontiev related to the certain phenomena such as socialism, Marxism, militant atheism, which would transform Russia from a blessed land to a cursed one got fulfilled. Instead of Christ, Russia would give birth to Antichrist and the voice of the Great Inquisitor would become known. It is certain that the curse of the chosen people also turned against Russia²⁴.

For a long time, in the publications related to geopolitics, the formula the "Third Rome" (in Slavonian, Treții Rîm) lay at the basis of all mysterious and subversive aspects in Moscow policy: anarchy and tyranny, universalism and eschatology, power and religion.

The concept was related to the historical context of transforming the Great Knyaz Kingdom of Russia in the Russian Empire (Basil III and Ivan the Terrible),

²¹ See Dimitri Stremoukhoff, *Moscow the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine*, in *Speculum*, XXVIII, no. 1, January 1953, p. 85.

²² Paul Evdokimov, *Hristos în gândirea rusă*, translated by Pr. Ion Buga, Editura Symbol, București, 2001, p. 52.

²³ Iu.M. Lotman and B.A. Uspensky, *Otvuki kontseptsii, Moskva-tretii Rim v ideologii Petra Pervogo (K probleme srednevekovoi traditsii v kul'ture barokko)*, in *Khudozhestvennyi iazyk srednevekov'ia*, Editura V. A. Karpushchin, Moscow, 1982, p. 238.

²⁴ Adrian Ignat, *op. cit.*

of centralising power in the hands of the imperial administrative apparatus. The political legitimacy of those transformations was sought in the field of religion²⁵.

To start from the beginning, we present the paragraph – too seldom or never cited – in the letter of Philotheus, the *old* (the abbot of the Monastery Yeleazarov in Pskov), written in 1511 and intended to the Tsar: *The Old Church of Rome fell because Appolinarian inequity and heresy; The Church of the Second Rome, Constantinople, was hit in battle..., and currently there is the Church of the Third Rome, the New Rome, your sovereign empire: The Holy Apostolic Catholic Church ... shines in the entire Universe brighter than the Sun. Your Highness can acknowledge that all orthodox empires converged in only one Empire. You are the Emperor of all Christians in the entire Universe... Two Romes fell and the Third is currently here, and the Fourth will never exist as your Empire will never fall*²⁶. Antoaneta Olteanu, citing Obolensky, states approximately the same: *In a letter intended for his sovereign, the Great Knyaz of Moscow, Basil III (1505-1533), Philotheus wrote: Your Highness, all the kingdoms having Orthodox religion will get together in your kingdom. You are the only one Tsar of all the Christians worldwide (...). All Christian kingdoms were gathered in your kingdom. After that we expect the never ending kingdom. (...). Two Romes fell, the Third is currently here, and the Fourth will never exist*²⁷.

Petre Guran states that the “Third Rome” is a *corrupted phrase from a letter sent by a monk in Pskov to the government agent in Moscow, Munehin, extending over Moscow the analogy made between Rome and Constantinople in late Antiquity, thus Moscow being symbolically called the Third Rome, namely the new capital of the Empire and the entire world.*

Briefly, the theory suggests a succession of universal empires that fade, because of their political and military decline, being replaced with new imperial structures intending to legitimate their power by assuming the symbolic function of Rome – the capital of the entire world. Read like this, the formula is either a rhetorical exaggeration or a barbarous triviality.

The Third Rome, in the text of Philotheus in Pskov, is a more complex and subtle idea²⁸. Rome is the expression of not only the political universality incarnated by the Roman Empire but also of the religious one, incarnated by the heir of Peter the Apostle. The coincidence between political and religious

²⁵ Petre Guran, *A treia Romă: un mit medieval și extensiile lui contemporane*, in *Revista 22*, see <http://www.revista22.ro/a-treia-roma-un-mit-medieval-si-extensiile-lui-contemporane-29680.html>

²⁶ Cyril Toumanoff, *Moscow the Third Rome: Genesis and Significance of a Politico-Religious Idea*, *Catholic Historical Review*, XL, (1954–5), p. 438.

²⁷ Dmitri Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth, op. cit.*, p. 395.

²⁸ Nina Sinitsyna, *Tretii Rim: Istoki i evoliutsiia russkoi srednevekovoi kontseptsii*, Moscow, 1998.

universality made Rome really different from other capitals. The juxtaposition of the two authorities in the same centre creates a relation between them, which may be obedience of the religious authority to the political one, neutrality and tolerance, or obedience of the political authority to the religious one. The religious dimension of the idea of Rome empowers the theological-political speculation. From this perspective, the New Rome (Constantinople) incarnated the first circumstance, religion subject to policy, at least during the first half of its millennial existence. After that the ratio gradually reversed (such opinion is at least questionable; it cannot be said that in the first millennium religion was systematically subject to policy – A.N.). Thus, in the late political existence of the New Rome, it remained as a mere symbol of the religious idea, namely the capital of the Eastern Church Patriarch, a religious power, capable of legitimising the *political power, growing even greater*.

The idea of Rome thus acquires, in Philotheus thought, the second valence, that of the guardian of religion and, by extension, of the true religion – Orthodoxy.

Saint Sylvester and his successors to the throne of Rome were the guardians of faith until they lost such dignity because of their heresy – *philioque* (and the subsequent Latin ones). The New Rome, through Photius (858-867; 877-886) and his successors to the ecumenical patriarchal throne, assumed the role of guardian of true faith until, in turn, lost such dignity because of the betrayal at the Council in Florence (1439). We can see that in the expression “*two Romes fell*”, Philotheus does not refer to the military conquest of the two imperial capitals but to the heresy of the two religious institutions, the papacy and the ecumenical patriarchy, which also resulted in their military defeat.

Therefore, the Third Rome is the new defender of Orthodoxy (*Guardian of the Church* is one of the sacred titles of the Byzantine Emperor). Here is the ambiguity in the text of Philotheus. Is this Third Rome the ecclesiastical or the political institution in Moscow, the prince or the metropolitan/patriarch? The disambiguation depends on the age, of the four centuries in the existence of the Russian Empire, two being marked by an ecclesiastical institution, which was highly autonomous, having even the right to spiritually subject the political power (Metropolitan Macarie in relation to young Ivan the Terrible, Patriarch Philaret in relation with his son, Tsar Mihail, Patriarch Nikon in relation to Tsar Alexei) and two by the Church total obedience to the Emperor (from Peter the Great who disbanded Patriarchy to its restauration in the year of the revolution, 1917). All these considered, the idea that the Orthodoxy needed

a guardian, embodied by the Emperor, the state as an institution, or the Russian people, because of the pious attitude, and in the 20th century because of the great number of martyrs, remained prevalent. Thus, a corollary of the idea of the Third Rome is that of Holy Russia, when the pious people defend the Church in its fight with the evil tsar (consider the letters of Prince Andrei Kurbski to Ivan the Terrible). Emerged from the idea of the Third Rome, *Holy Russia* changed in an opponent to counterweight the political power²⁹.

Kerstin Rebecca Bouveng states, in her excellent book *“The Role of Messianism in Contemporary Russian Identity and State Craft”*, that Philotheus continued to advocate the idea that the Russian people was the new Israel, a people chosen by God, the first among the Christian peoples, and the Russians were called to recreate the Kingdom of Christ here on Earth³⁰.

As it can be noted, all the three extremely important geopolitical areas – Europe (as Rome), Byzantium (or Constantinople) and Israel – are presented in the same text. In Russian speech, the transition from Greece to Rome and Byzantium played an important part in justifying the Empire, and the transition from Israel to Byzantium helped *transferring* the religious truth in Russia.

Constantinople was the Christian centre of the entire Eastern Europe, as the majority of the peoples in those regions had a Christian-Orthodox mission being under the authority of the Patriarch there. Dmitri Obolensky thus concludes that peripheral leaders often accepted the Emperor suzerainty over all Orthodox Christians: for practical reasons, in their desire to unify their command, as well as for idealist reasons, in their devotion to the Basileus³¹. Byzantine world is *an ordered system of states and satellite nations bound by their common subjection to the Orthodox Church and to the Emperor in Constantinople, their rank and position being defined by the titles given to their leaders, borrowed from the hierarchy of the Sacred Palace in Constantinople*³². Even the Muslims considered the Emperor in Constantinople sovereign over many nations including: Macedonians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Halans, Russians, Iberians (Georgians) and Turks (Ugrians).

Citing Keenan³³, Kerstin Rebecca Bouveng states that the letter of Philotheus was probable not conceived as *a call to greatness* but rather as an advertisement

²⁹ Michael Cherniavsky, *Holy Russia: A Study in the History of an Idea*, in *The American Historical Review*, no. 63/3, 1958, pp. 617-637.

³⁰ Kerstin Rebecca Bouveng, *The Role of Messianism in Contemporary Russian Identity and State Craft*, Durham University, 2010.

³¹ Dmitri Obolensky, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ E.L. Keenan, *On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors*, 1994, pp. 26-27 in S.F. Starr (ed.), *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

for the Tsar in the political-religious context, and it was not in relation to the foreign or Muscovite policy, being only a manifest. [...] Simply, the Muscovite policy and politicians were influenced by bookish clergy up to modern times, more exactly up to the late 17th century.

Besides the messianic romanticism, the close connection between the Church and the state from the beginning of Russia up to the secularisation should not be neglected. Baehr³⁴, from example, calls those *developers of doctrines bookish clergy, ecclesiastical propagandists of the state*.

Messianic claims in the Church emerged once the Russian Orthodox Church got independent from Byzantium, as well as following the attempt to the unification between the East and the West in 1439. The Russian Church vehemently rejected the unification performed by the Orthodox Patriarch and the Pope.

An important impetus for Russian messianism and accreditation of the idea that Moscow is the Third Rome was represented by the fall of Constantinople, in 1453: *Following the conquest of Constantinople, in 1453, there was a single nation capable of assuming the leading role in Western Christianity. A great part in Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania were already conquered by the Turks, and the rest was soon absorbed. Kiev was under the sceptre of the Roman Catholic Kings of Poland and Lithuania. Only Moscow remained. Muscovites did not see as a coincidence the fact that it was free from the last vestiges of Tatar sovereignty exactly when the Byzantine Empire fell prey to the Turks. It was as if God had given them liberty because they were chosen to be the successors to Byzantium*³⁵.

It was suggested by some historians that the doctrine *Moscow – the Third Rome* was not seriously considered by Muscovite Tsars as a guideline for their policy or that it was modified or even abandoned following the movement to Petersburg. *The popular version of Russian messianism emphasises the holiness and uniqueness of the Russian people and land than the holiness of the Tsar*³⁶. We note thus – according to Kartashev – *a special aspect: a people or at least some of its representatives convinced that they have a special religious vocation*³⁷.

³⁴ S.L. Baehr, *The Paradise Myth in Eighteenth-Century Russia*, Stanford University Press, 1991, p. 21.

³⁵ Thierry Camous, *Orienturi și occidenturi. 25 de secole de războaie*, translated by Mira-Maria Cucinschi, Editura Cartier, București, 2009, p. 174.

³⁶ See J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, London, 1993, and also S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 3 vol., Cambridge, 1951-1954; K.M. Setton, *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd ed., 6 vol., Madison, Wisc., 1969-1989; A.S. Atiya, *The Crusade: Historiography and Bibliography*, Bloomington, 1962; H.E. Mayer, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*, Hannover, 1960. Related to crusades, see *Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East: Bulletin*, 1981-1997.

³⁷ George T. Dennis, *Defenders of the Christian People: Holy War in Byzantium*, in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (eds.), Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Washington D.C., 2001, p. 32.

According to Byzantine tradition, the Emperor in Constantinople was *ruler over all the people*, and in his prerogatives it was written: *In his body, the Emperor is like any other fellow being but in his office, he is God, ruler over all the people; that is why there is no one more powerful than the Emperor on Earth*³⁸.

Despite the desire of Russian Knyazs to be like the Emperor in Constantinople, hence the idea of the Third Rome, between Russia and Constantinople there were armed conflicts only before the Russians officially became Christians. Russian rulers always had full respect for Byzantium. The Byzantine Emperor was considered the ruler of all Orthodox Christians³⁹.

After the fall of Constantinople, that prerogative of the Byzantine Emperor was claimed by Russian Tsars: *By his nature, the Tsar is like all the other fellow beings but, by his dignity, he is equal to God Almighty. He is not only the servant of God but also his representative, keeping watch and ward over the purity of faith and the security of the Church. To this end, God has given him the sword*, according to Joseph Sanin, Abbot of Volokolamsk⁴⁰.

Peter J. S. Duncan, senior lecturer in Russian Politics and Society at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, College University, London, states, in his remarkable book – *Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After*⁴¹, that the letter of Philotheus for Basil III was the climax in a long chain of ideas. Macarie, the Metropolitan of Moscow (1542-1563) under Ivan IV, published religious texts from Russia and printed them (at the first printing press in Russia) in two huge volumes. They included the epistle of Philotheus and established

³⁸ Agapetus, *Expositio capitul admonitoriorum*, XXI, PG 86 (I), col. 1172, apud Dmitri Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth*, p. 224.

³⁹ In turn, the Emperor in Byzantium had respect for those who recognised his authority. An example in this regard is the one in 1140, when three Knyazs fought for hegemony in Russia. Iziaslav from Kiev (a grandson of Vladimir Monomakh), his uncle, Iuri Dolgoruki, from Suzdal', and his cousin, Vladimiro, from Galici. The former was an ally of Hungary and an adversary of Byzantium, while the latter two were supporters of the Empire. The Byzantine historian during that period wrote about the Prince from Suzdal' that he was an ally (symmonachos) of the Emperor, and about the Knyaz in Galici that he was his vassal (hypospondos) and therefore the Empire had to support the ally, in that case, Iuri Dolgoruki. On the other hand, Byzantium also supported the Knyazs that financially contributed to the "issues" of the Empire. In 1346, a part of the structure of *Saint Sophia* Cathedral, weakened by the recent earthquakes, crashed. The ruler in Moscow sent a large sum of money for the cathedral to be repaired. Another sum of money was sent, in 1398, to help Constantinople, which was, at that time, under Turkish blockade. According to Dmitri Obolensky, *Un commonwealth medieval*, *op. cit.*, pp. 254, 287.

⁴⁰ Antoaneta Olteanu, *Miturile Rusiei clasice*, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁴¹ Peter J.S. Duncan, *Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After*, Routledge, London and New York, 2000.

and developed a clear ideology that linked the Church and the dynasty evoking a Christian Empire⁴².

The theory of the Third Rome was intended, from the very beginning, to justify the autocratic position of Muscovite rulers by portraying them as God representatives on earth. However, it goes beyond the Western concept of the *Divine Right of Kings*.

Moreover, it provides them with the messianic duty of extending the Orthodox jurisdiction wherever they are, of liberating those having the same faith, and of re-conquering Constantinople for Christianity. It does not mean that the state actions were exclusively or mainly dictated by religious reasons, notes Peter J. S. Duncan. On the contrary, since the 16th-17th centuries, the Russian Orthodox Church has been gradually reduced to being a state department. Raising the Metropolitan of Moscow to the status of Patriarch, in 1589, removed the last token of subordination of Moscow to Constantinople.

Moreover, under the weak rule of the Tsars, the Church inaugurated a short period of ecclesiastical supremacy. In the period called the *Time of Troubles* (1604-1613), when Catholic Poles ruled in Moscow, the Orthodox Church led the Russian Resistance, having its centre in *Serghei of Holy Trinity* Monastery, located 60 kilometres far from Moscow, in Serghiev Posad (during the Soviet period, Zagorsk). Following the expulsion of the Poles, Zemskii Sobor elected Mikhail Romanov as Tsar. The real power was however in the hands of his father, Patriarch Philaret, who was awarded the title of *Great Sovereign* by his son. Tsar Aleksei Mihailovici (1645-1676) awarded Patriarch Nikon the same title.

The latter accepted Patriarchy on condition the Tsar and all nobles obeyed him. Nikon managed to establish an order resembling theocracy. He made a series of changes to the Russian religious ritual in order to comply with the practice in Ukraine and the Balkans, in case the "*Christian Empire*" could extend its influence. But the Tsar, supported by the nobles, thwarted the Church political ambitions. The Church Council in 1666-1667 adopted the changes proposed by Nikon, but dismissed the Patriarch.

The Council declared: *The Tsar had the power to pronounce over the Patriarch and over all the other priests*. It marked the end of the attempts to create a theocracy,

⁴² David B. Miller, *The Velikie Minei Chetii and the Stepennaia Kniga of Metropolitan Makarii and the Origins of Russian National Consciousness*, Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte, XXVI (1979), pp. 263-382.

representing the Church subordination to the State. Moreover, the Council rejected the theory according to which the fall of Byzantium was the punishment for the betrayal in Florence.

The reign of Peter I, *the Great* (1696-1725), decisively changed the relations between the Church and the State. Many of those within the Church who opposed to extending the state control were expelled (adhering to Old-Christians). For that palpable reason, Peter's mission was easier in his desire to subordinate the Church. By completely rejecting Byzantine tradition, he disbanded the Patriarchy in Moscow, in 1700. He replaced it with a Holy Synod, directly responsible in front of him. Peter followed the Lutheran model, and that personal ideal was one of his political ideas regarding the modernisation of Russia by selectively copying the models in the West. That policy was – undoubtedly – a direct negation of Russian messianism.

The idea of *Moscow, the Third Rome* thus received another devastating shock by the construction of the new capital, Sankt-Petersburg, symbolising the abandonment of Moscow traditions. Peter also expressed the rejection of Orthodox messianism by rejecting the title of *Eastern Christian Emperor* and adopting the Latin title of *Imperator*⁴³.

In foreign policy, the *Third Rome* theory exercised a considerable influence by injecting the sense of religious mission in expansion against the Catholic Poles and Lithuanians in the West and the Muslims in the East⁴⁴.

Emanuel Sarkisyanz suggests that religious enthusiasm could have a decisive influence over expansion only in 1552, when Ivan IV conquered Kazan. However, he agrees that Muscovite expansion was pragmatically motivated and suggests that the *Third Rome* had less influence over Russian imperialism than the Holy Roman Empire, concept based on German imperialism⁴⁵.

Last but not least conclusion is drawn with the help of Kerstin Rebecca Bouveng, who notes a dichotomy easy to be assimilated: the well-known East-West dichotomy⁴⁶.

The *Third Rome* narrative entails Byzantium – the Eastern Church and the *Second Rome* – played a central role in shaping Russian identity.

⁴³ Stephen L. Baehr, *From History to National Myth: Translatio Imperii in Eighteenth-century Russia*, RR, XXXVII, no. 1, January 1978, pp. 1-13.

⁴⁴ Henry R. Huttenbach, *The Origins of Russian Imperialism*, in Tomas Hunczak (ed.), *Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution*, New Brunswick, N.J., 1974, pp. 26-30.

⁴⁵ Emanuel Sarkisyanz, *Russian Imperialism Reconsidered*, in Hunczak (ed.), *Russian Imperialism*, pp. 51-52.

⁴⁶ Kerstin Rebecca Bouveng, *The Role of Messinianism in Contemporary Russian Identity and State Craft*, op. cit., 2010, pp. 17-19.

Byzantium was the first superior model for Russia, and Russia continued to copy the *original* Byzantine model, while, by repeated discourses, a turning point was triggered, presenting Byzantium as an inferior enemy. Finally, Moscow declared itself the true Byzantium as well as the centre of Orthodoxy.

Similar to *old* Europe, the Russian state, having previously the European model, started to declare that Europe was decadent while Russia was true Europe. The ambiguity towards others was included in the concept *Moscow – the Third Rome*. Storchak uses the above-discussed concepts, messianism and missionism⁴⁷.

Neumann highlights the doctrine as having two contradictory dimensions, one internal-temporal and another spatial-external. The internal significance of the doctrine is to equal the ruler to the divine history on earth. The external dimension refers to the relation with the Other, for the areas formerly belonging to the Roman Empire. This aspect is certainly asymmetrical, to the extent to which the Other was abandoned by God in favour of Moscow⁴⁸.

Baehr emphasises that, when the state itself, in the second half of the 17th century, started to narratively implement the idea of *Moscow – the Third Rome*, two tendencies coalesced – religious and political: one underscored messianic blessing and holiness as well as the fact that it latently slipped to isolationism.

English version by
✍️ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

⁴⁷ V.M. Storchak, *Tema Rossiyskogo Messianizma v Obshchestvenno-Politicheskoi i Filosofskoi, Mysli Rossii*, 2003, RAGS.

⁴⁸ I.B. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 8-9.

UNIVERSAL AND NATIONAL MILITARY ART

– Idealism and Pragmatism in the General Staff Publications –

Alina PAPOI

The article briefly presents the history of Gândirea militară românească journal, mentioning that it used to appear under different names: România Militară (1864-1866; 1891-1897; 1898-1916; 1921-1947), Revista militară generală (1947-August 1948), Cultura militară (1948-December 1958), Probleme de artă militară (1959-1989), being, for most of the period, the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff official publication. Although for almost a century and a half military science has not undergone significant conceptual changes, the domain has not stagnated, all the development-related aspects being presented in the pages of the journal, depending on their historical context.

Keywords: *Romanian Armed Forces General Staff; Gândirea militară românească; military journalism; military science; military art*

There are periods in the history of mankind when political, social and economic events result in changes, mutations and even innovations in thought at all levels. In such periods, the military dimension is also affected by the attempts to generate new concepts, new ideas, prolific ones, many of them becoming substantial and perennial doctrines. General Lucien Poirier, a French military thinking theorist, called such events “*épisodes de renaissance intellectuelle*”¹. There have been periods of “*intellectual renaissance*” in the history of *România Militară*, since its foundation in 1864, regardless of its different names and functional subordination depending on the time exigencies: *România Militară* (1864-1866; 1891-1897; 1898-1916; 1921-1947), *Revista militară generală* (1947-August 1948), *Cultura militară*

¹ Christian Malis, *La renaissance de la pensée stratégique française après la deuxième guerre mondiale*, within the Seminar “*La France et ses stratèges*”, 22 March 2010, see http://www.fondation-res-publica.org/La-renaissance-de-la-pensee-strategique-francaise-apres-la-deuxieme-guerre-mondiale_a486.html. Lucien Poirier was a French General (1918-2013) who graduated from the Military School of Saint-Cyr, one of the theoreticians and founders of the French nuclear deterrence strategy. He was the Chair of the Scientific Council of Compared Strategy Institute in Paris.

(1948-December 1958), *Probleme de artă militară* (1959-1989) and *Gândirea militară românească* (1990-present).

During the above-mentioned period, except some intervals, the publication has been subordinated to the General Staff/the Great General Staff, the Romanian Armed Forces management and command body. The functional trajectory of the entity has had reverberations in the way national aspirations have been translated into practice, the General Staff being involved, alongside the Ministry of War Defence, in the complex process of the Romanian armed forces modernisation. Established on 12 November 1859, under the rule of Alexandru Ioan I (Alexandru Ioan Cuza), the General Staff Corps of the United Principalities Army² represented “*a body (...) destined to provide norms related to theoretical and practical training, mobilisation, execution of different military tasks, military operations plans (...), being a priority generated by the young Romanian state realities and military policy objectives*”³. In more than one hundred and a half years since the staff body was established it has had different names, depending on the political-historical exigencies of the stages the Romanian armed forces have had to meet: the General Staff, the General Staff Corps, the Great General Staff. Since 1994, it has had the current name – the General Staff⁴.

Since the reforms made by Alexandru Ioan I up to the time Romania entered the First World War, the Romanian military thinking assimilated the fundamental principles of European military science in a proper way, adopting what was relevant and worth following but taking into account the autochthonous tradition, history and culture. Theoreticians such as C.N. Hârjeu, Al. Averescu, D.I. Cocorăscu, N. Alevra and Al. Iarca contributed their research and studies to the substantiation of the theoretical activity in the military field, trying to provide “*scientific solutions for complex problems*”⁵.

I consider that the *Law in 1864* on the organisation of military power in Romania, introduced by Alexandru Ioan I and discussed in some articles in the first issues of *România Militară* journal, contributed to shaping the Romanian modern military thinking. In this context, mention should be made that the editors focused on the materials related to the main branches in the composition of the permanent

² Major General Dr Mihail Orzeață (coordinator), *Statul Major General. 1859-2004. Istorie și transformare*, Centrul Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2004, p. 22.

³ Ion Giurcă, Maria Georgescu, *Statul Major General român (1859-1950). Organizare și atribuții funcționale*, Editura Militară, București, 2012, p. 39.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁵ *Pagini din gândirea militară românească*, introductory study and text selection by Colonel Dr Corneliu Soare, Colonel Gheorghe Tudor, Colonel Aurică Minei, Lieutenant Colonel Nicolae Țurlete, Editura Militară, București, 1969, p. XLI.

army, to the period of military service, to the superior command of the army, exercised by the ruler and the General Staff. There were also materials presenting the training and assets in the army, starting from the models existing in the military organisation in other European states. In an article in 1865 that was not signed the cannon technique was studied, the author, who was studying in Nantes, emphasising that the cannons used by the French in the war against Italy played a significant part relating not only to the artillery employment but also to “*changing the military art bases*”⁶. Part of the studies, appeared between 1864 and 1900, were appreciated by intellectuals from abroad. In this regard, at the beginning of 1865, the journal editorial staff received a letter from a correspondent in Paris, eulogising the authors in *România Militară* for *their ability and skills in writing about the issues of interest in the military science of the time*⁷.

The attempts made by the authors in *România Militară* may seem frail but, at that time, they had practical value by stimulating military thinking and disseminating knowledge in the army. The measures implemented during the rule of Alexandru Ioan contributed to the development of theoretical activity in the Romanian army materialised in the emergence of certain currents and opinions as well as institutions that supported and transformed the social life in the country.

Military Thinking – “Encyclopaedia of Time”

We can speak about the military phenomenon, about military thinking, only in connection to the historical context, regardless of the period. In this regard, the sociologist Dimitrie Gusti emphasised that “*the true and deep study of warfare would contain a thorough encyclopaedia of time to which all sciences should contribute*”⁸. In the same vein, theoreticians like Colonel Dr Corneliu Soare consider military thinking as “*the aggregate of ideas, concepts and doctrines that address the phenomenon in a particular period*”⁹, and other experts detail the concept as representing “*the aggregate of knowledge, concepts, trends related to the military phenomenon in its dynamics, to the military life domain and issues*”¹⁰.

Some Romanian theoreticians in the 19th and 20th century treated fundamental issues of military science in their works, such as strategy and tactics, employment

⁶ *Artileria ghintuită și întrebuințarea ei*, in *România Militară*, 1865, vol. II, p. 266.

⁷ *Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul comemorării a 75 de ani de la apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1937*, București, 1939, p. 68.

⁸ *Lexicon militar*, Editura Militară, București, 1980, p. 341.

⁹ Colonel Dr Corneliu Soare, *Istoria gândirii militare românești*, Editura Militară, București, 1974, p. 9.

¹⁰ Colonel Dr Simion Pitea, Colonel Dr Gheorghe Tudor, *Pagini din gândirea militară universală*, vol. I, Editura Militară, București, 1984, p. 10.

of different branches in a military conflict, forms of military action, as well as importance of combat assets. To talk about *military science* means to know and understand its emergence, to outline a definition, to fathom the developed processes and the employed methods. Science means knowledge. It is what the Latins taught us. A term debated in philosophy, academia, and in the military as well. “*Science is involved in everything*”, wrote General Gheorghe Văduva in *Gândirea militară românească* journal¹¹, mentioning that everything existing on earth is based on knowledge. And its result is science.

For a long time, *military science* was confused or overlapped with *military art*, resulting in both containing in their definitions notions such as principles, rules, theories and methods to prepare and conduct war. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, *military science* was defined as “*a system of knowledge related to the laws and principles of armed combat, to the norms and forms of organising, training and using the armed forces, to the methods and procedures employed in military actions*”¹². Knowledge has become the sign of social change. In addition to classical armed combat, other forms of military actions appeared, such as psychological, information or imagological warfare, focusing on the human being, on the way individuals think: Alvin Toffler mentions the “*knowledge warriors, intellectuals in or out of uniform*”¹³.

We can speak about *military art* relating to the “*field of military sciences*”¹⁴, against a background of technical processes and doctrinal development that resulted in real and important challenges with regard to studying the warfare, the battlefield, and the laws and principles of armed combat. Eastern Roman Emperor, Maurice defined *military art* as the “*army’s chief craft*”¹⁵, emphasising, by using this metaphor, the extremely important role played by the commander in the event of a conflict, when the combination between his personality, character, training and knowledge becomes evident: “*I would rather fight against an army of lions led by a sheep than against an army of sheep led by a lion*”¹⁶.

¹¹ Brigadier General (r.) Dr Gheorghe Văduva, *Știința militară și impactul ei strategic*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 2, 2006, p. 118.

¹² Dr Liviu Deac, *Știința militară la sfârșitul secolului al XX-lea și începutul secolului al XXI-lea*, in *Tratat de știința militară*, vol. I, Editura Militară, București, 2001, p. 19.

¹³ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Război și antirăzboi. Supraviețuirea în zorii secolului XXI*, Editura Antet, 1995, p. 166.

¹⁴ Lecturer Dr Adrian Lesenciuc, *Introducere în arta militară*, Course, Air Force Academy “Henri Coandă”, Brașov, 2015, p. 27.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁶ Mauricius, *Arta militară*. Critical notes, translation and foreword by H. Mihăescu, Editura Academiei R.S.R., București, 1970, p. 121.

According to Carl von Clausewitz, *military art* referred to the specifics of the means employed in war, it being in turn “a true political instrument”¹⁷. Science, will and skill – the three components of human action – actually defined the war, as the theorist explained. The Clausewitzian triad, the “weird trinity”¹⁸, as he himself called it, is still currently valid.

On Intellectual Revival and Military Spirit

Although initially *România Militară* was an independent publication, it provided, from the first issues, the “space for military thinking to be expressed”¹⁹, an attribute I consider it has preserved so far. The nine captains who had the idea of establishing the journal and suggested its name were officers belonging to the first series of graduates from the Cadet School in Bucharest²⁰. Moreover, they graduated from military schools in Europe: “If we remember that, in 1864, when the journal appeared, Romania was not independent, and it did not enjoy the full liberty to organise a powerful army in both principalities, it is easy to imagine that the decision of the founders in 1864 to give such name to the journal was an act of vivid and patriotic courage. Their decision is worth admiration. These two words, the emblem of the title, suggest as clearly as possible the dawn of the intellectual revival in the army alongside the revival of the military spirit in our national life”²¹.

Military science and military art were among the stringent preoccupations of the editors of the journal. In this regard, in the publication *Programme*²² in 1891 it is mentioned the promotion of the knowledge related to the military art and assets, to the evolution and development of military science at European level. The journal was meant to disseminate military culture and training principles, by adapting European military regulations to the national context, by analysing and interpreting the events on the battlefields, the issues of strategy and tactics in specialised literature, all the aspects that “concerned the spirit of the army and the nation”²³.

In the pages of *România Militară* a lot of studies, articles and opinions related to strategy and tactics were published, written by personalities in military life

¹⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 67.

¹⁸ Marius Căpraru, *Libertate și moderație politică*, Editura Lumen, Iași, 2010, p. 25.

¹⁹ Colonel Dr Mircea Tănase, *De la România Militară la Gândirea militară românească*, in *România Militară – promotorul gândirii militare românești*. Almanac, Centrul Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2014, p. 9.

²⁰ *Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul comemorării a 75 de ani de la apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1937, op. cit.*, p. 32.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²² *Prefață*, in *România Militară*, no. 1, January 1891, p. 1.

²³ *Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul comemorării a 75 de ani de la apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1937, op. cit.*, p. 617.

such as Florea Țenescu, Alexandru Ioanițiu, Ioan Sichitiu, Nicolae Stoenscu, Gheorghe Ionescu-Sinaia, Ioan Cernăianu and others. Aspects regarding the definition of concepts, the relation between them, the principles of war, the forms of manoeuvre, the characteristics of offensive and defensive, the importance of the branches employed in an armed conflict, especially during the First World War were discussed.

In the interwar period, the military theoretical activity focused on the study of the operations conducted on the front. Thus, in several issues of *România Militară* in 1940 and 1941²⁴ there were articles that preponderantly discussed the German armed forces actions and doctrine, the authors focussing on the main characteristics of the military operations during the First World War.

In parallel, special importance was attached to the relevant aspects in the technical field and their repercussions on the military art: the progress of aviation, of tanks, the evolution of chemical weapons and of vehicles resulted in the emergence of other concepts relating to the conduct of warfare, to the forms and procedures of military actions. In Europe of that time, in developed countries such as Germany, England and France, unilateral theories appeared, which highly appreciated the role of technical progress in the evolution of combat assets. In our country, the topic was debated by theorists as C.N. Hîrjeu, Radu Dinulescu, Mircea Tomescu, Octav Vorobchievici, Florea Țenescu, Ioan Sichitiu, Ilie Șteflea, Nicolae Alevra, Radu Rosetti, Alexandru Rizeanu. For example, I have found in *Istoria gândirii militare românești/The History of Romanian Military Thinking* a mention related to the significance of command in wartime: “*The force of troops resides, first and foremost, in the qualities of the commander*”²⁵.

In *Cultura militară*, and subsequently in *Probleme de artă militară*, for a period of almost four decades, both elements related to the military concept “*of the Romanian popular army, and the materialisation of the concept in tactical and operational military art*”²⁶, and aspects of strategy, operations and modern military assets were discussed. The communist era influenced military science that “*enriched*” by adding an adjective that was specific to the time: socialist. In one of the issues of the journal *Probleme de artă militară, socialist military science* was defined exclusively based on ideology, the political component

²⁴ Major N. Bălășescu, *Câteva observații asupra armatei germane și asupra operațiunilor ei pe frontul de vest*, in *România Militară*, no. 7-8, July-August 1940; Captain N. Trandafir and Captain V. Zărnescu, *Studiu comparativ între Regulamentul Marilor Unități și Regulamentul german „Truppenführung”*, in *România Militară*, no. 1, 1941; Lieutenant Colonel I. Rudeanu, *Privire generală asupra doctrinei germane de luptă*, in *România Militară*, no. 2-3, February-March 1941.

²⁵ Octav Vorobchievici, *Arta comandamentelor în război*, București, p. 67, in Colonel Dr Corneliu Soare, *Istoria gândirii militare românești, op. cit.*, p. 260.

²⁶ Colonel Dr Mircea Tănase, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

being very important and the military notions being considered from the scientific socialist perspective: “a unitary system of knowledge regarding the preparation and conduct of military actions in order to defend the socialist homeland, the achievements of socialism; it is a product of the age of transition from capitalism to socialism, of the historical conditions related to the preparation, development and victory of socialist revolutions, which led to the liberation of the working class and the triumph of socialism in a large part of the world”²⁷.

History is history, with its positive and negative aspects. It is our history, the Romanian people’s history, and I consider it should be respected. For no reason can we forget those periods in the existence of the Romanian people. What is important is the impact each and every historical period has had on the physiognomy and organisation of the national armed forces, and the lessons we can learn from those events.

In the ’70s, there were studies and papers dedicated to the military theoretical thinking phenomenon consisting of: “military science, social sciences branches, military history, philosophy of war, military geography, military doctrine, military technical sciences”²⁸. The Great General Staff final report for 1972 emphasised, among other aspects, the concern for the theoretical substantiation of mobilisation and the inclusion of the topic in the operational preparation meetings²⁹. Moreover, the Great General Staff had some important initiatives related to the armed forces organisational structure, their modernisation, the education and training of the command and staff personnel, especially through the Military Academy directly subordinated to the Great General Staff at that time³⁰. The courses in military science and military art contribute to the entire educational and training process in the armed forces. After two decades, the courses in *military science* taught at the Military Academy in Bucharest consisted of “military history, military geography, troop education and training theory etc.”³¹.

Following the events in December 1989, *Gândirea militară românească* focused on the theoretical and scientific aspects in the military, the General Staff, and especially on the intellectual contributions to the national military construction,

²⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Mihai Arsăntescu, Lieutenant Colonel Emil Burbulea, *Știința militară socialistă și unele din problemele ei actuale*, in *Probleme de artă militară*, no. 1, 1966, p. 63.

²⁸ Colonel Dr Corneliu Soare, *Istoria gândirii militare românești*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

²⁹ Brigadier General Dr Vasile Băețelu, Colonel Marin Ghinoiu, *Contribuția Marelui Stat Major la reforma armatei în perioada 1968-1989*, Major General Dr Mihail Orzeață (coordinator), *Statul Major General. 1859-2004. Istorie și transformare*, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

³¹ *Curs de istoria artei militare*, vol. I, Academia Militară, București, 1991, p. 31.

the autochthonous military thinking, in the context of our country integration in the North Atlantic Alliance and then in the European Union.

Our country underwent substantial transformations, starting from the shortcomings of a communist system up to the construction of a democracy able to integrate in the context generated by the two bodies having the role to provide defence and security – NATO and UE. In November 1991, the Minister of National Defence at that time, Lieutenant General Nicolae Spiroiu, visited NATO Headquarters to discuss the engagement of our country in the procedures to join the Alliance. In that period, against a background of the world technological development, military theorists developed the concept of *revolution in military affairs*. The dominant idea of the concept was information as the main power factor: “*The information domain is the real and virtual space in which information is created, partitioned and transmitted. It is the domain that facilitates communication between combatants, command and action*”³².

As it is known, in 1994, Romania was the first country in Central and Eastern Europe that joined the Partnership for Peace. It is also the year when the Great General Staff changed its name in the General Staff³³, acquiring a new structural physiognomy, by changing the names of directorates and reorganising different component entities. Moreover, the Military Academy changed its name becoming the Higher Military Studies Academy, subordinated to the General Staff. A year later, the Supreme Council of National Defence, established in 1990, adopted the concept of military education reform, which had as main goals to educate and train the officer as a leader of an organisation and to integrate military education in the national education system.

Between 1996 and 2000, at conceptual level, numerous normative acts were developed in order to support the reform process in the armed forces. Moreover, the *National Security Strategy of Romania*, the *Government White Paper* and the *Military Strategy of Romania* were developed. The *Military Strategy*, developed by the Ministry of National Defence, had as a goal to ensure national security through “*credible defensive capacity, restructuring and modernisation, intensified operational partnership and gradual integration in NATO*”³⁴.

³² General Dr Mihail Popescu, Lieutenant General (r.) Dr Valentin Arsenie, Brigadier General Dr Gheorghe Văduva, *Arta militară de-a lungul milenilor*, vol. II, Tipografia Ministerului Apărării Naționale, București, 2004, p. 352.

³³ Major General Dr Mihail Orzeață, Colonel Dr Costinel Petrache, *Reforma armatei în perioada 1990-2004*, in Major General Dr Mihail Orzeață (coordinator), *Statul Major General. 1859-2004. Istorie și transformare*, op. cit., p. 285.

³⁴ *Strategia militară a României*, Editura Militară, București, 2000, p. 3.

Numerous related topics were discussed in the General Staff publication – *Gândirea militară românească*.

Following 1999, the fundamental goal in the field of education and training was to increase actional interoperability and technical compatibility in the context of our country institutional alignment to the North Atlantic Alliance requirements and standards. Military education underwent an intensive reorganisation process to adapt to the exigencies of the new model. Thus, in the military education institutions tactics was not studied in the context of a classical conflict but also in that of nonviolent military actions and stability and support operations. Throughout that period, military art was the topic for research and debate among military experts worldwide. The 20th century conceptually clarified military art starting from the knowledge of the manner in which the armed forces prepared and conducted operations in a theatre of war.

In the field of education and training many major tasks were achieved, which led to the enhancement of the staff training in compliance with NATO standards, as well as to the intensification of the military professionalization process. The exigencies of the new modern battlefield required a new philosophy in the armed forces education and training, topics preponderantly debated in the General Staff publication. Moreover, a significant part of the experience acquired by those who participated in international activities was illustrated in the pages of *Gândirea militară românească*, through consistent, novel and well-substantiated articles.

Being a space destined to creative manifestation, the publication hosted articles, case studies, debates and interviews through which the reader receives significant information regarding not only the armed forces activity but also the national and international social and geopolitical environment. To exemplify, I will present some of the titles in 2001, related to the above mentioned aspects: *“Gândirea tehnică militară românească din perspectiva integrării euroatlantice”/“Romanian Technical Thinking from the Perspective of Euro-Atlantic Integration*, *“Realizări și activități de pionierat în cercetarea științifică militară universitară”/“Pioneering Achievements and Activities in Academic Military Scientific Research”*, *“Gânduri despre strategie în contextul globalizării”/“Thoughts on Strategy in the Context of Globalisation”*, *“Sinergia forțelor în acțiunile militare întrunite”/“Synergy of Forces in Joint Military Actions”*, *“Viitorul strategiei și al artei operative navale”/“The Future of Naval Strategy and Military Art”*, *“Procesul de planificare a operației întrunite”/“Joint Operation Planning Process”*.

On 2 April 2004, Romania became a North Atlantic Alliance member country. *Gândirea militară românească* reflected, in that period, aspects from the activities meant to initiate, prepare and include our country among NATO member states, the journal transforming itself under the inherent constraints belonging to the socio-political context, thus becoming “*not only an attentive and informed observer, but also an analyst (...) that transposed the understanding of the complex realities in the European and global geopolitical and geostrategic space into essential, historically inalienable solutions in the Romanian military theoretical patrimony*”³⁵. Romania’s membership of NATO, considered one of the most important political-military achievements of the state since the establishment of Greater Romania, was illustrated in the pages of the armed forces publication through a series of materials dedicated to the moment, reunited under the title “*Realitatea NATO*”/“*NATO Reality*”, as follows: “*Ce este transformarea NATO*”/“*What is NATO Transformation*”, “*Viitorul Alianței Nord-Atlantice*”/“*The Future of the North Atlantic Alliance*”, “*NATO pe drumul spre Istanbul*”/“*NATO on the Road to Istanbul*”, “*Corelația apărare națională – apărare colectivă*”/“*The National Defence – Collective Defence Correlation*”.

Under the heading “*Proiecții conceptuale. Dezvoltări teoretice*”/“*Conceptual Projections. Theoretical Developments*”, the publication manifested its interest in the approaches in the field of defence, one of the articles focusing on the significance of the *Law on Defence Planning* in 2004, which came to outline “*a well-articulated political mechanism to promote the actions in the field of collective defence that are tailored to the new status of a NATO member country*”³⁶. Romania’s membership of NATO generated the obligation to implement a new concept related to training, focused on the principle “*train as you fight*”³⁷, based on training and evaluation in compliance with the standards in the other NATO member countries, able to ensure an adequate capability to respond to the new challenges in the combat space specific to modern warfare. In this context, in the pages of the journal were debated aspects related to the command and control system in modern military operations, information warfare, crisis management, network-centric warfare, logistic support. In this respect, in an article dedicated

³⁵ Colonel Costinel Petrache, *GMR – 140*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 1, 2004, p. 7.

³⁶ Dr George Maior, *Participarea României la Summitul de la Istanbul*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 4, 2004, p. 12.

³⁷ Brigadier General Dr Teodor Frunzeti, *Nivelul tactic de manifestare a asimetriei și idiosincrasiei în acțiunile militare*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 4, 2004, p. 38.

to this subject, significant elements relating to the role each NATO member state should play to ensure the logistic support in multinational missions were presented. Thus the author of the article, Constantin Rusu, stressed the idea that the Alliance logistic support concept referred, at both strategic and operational level, to *“the interpretation of the logistic principles through the interaction of some military organisational structures, either existent or established, to facilitate multinational cooperation”*³⁸.

In the same context, that of illustrating some domains, components or instruments of military art and of their employment in the theatres of operations, I mention the article *“Caracteristicile misiunilor militare în Afganistan”/ “The Characteristics of Military Missions in Afghanistan”*. The author, Lieutenant General Dr Sorin Ioan, made a synthesis of the exigencies proper to the theatre of operations in Afghanistan and, as a direct consequence, of the imperatives related to the responsibility of those who fought there. The measures taken to counter the Taliban had to be focused, in the author’s opinion, on prevention and rapid reaction, in order to mitigate the disastrous effects of the Taliban actions. In this respect, the author suggested a series of measures among which the following can be mentioned: active reconnaissance and destruction of explosive devices; establishment of control networks in unsafe and exposed areas; change of the route to return to the base³⁹.

In the past ten years, the journal has been open to the most visible events in the internal and international military areal. Annually, more than one hundred authors in the military, academia or related domains have had their articles published in the journal. During this period, in the journal have been addressed topics related to military actions planning, international terrorism, logistic support, communication and information training, air traffic management, intelligence, NATO command structure, technological revolution effects on the military. Moreover, the main ideas debated or adopted following NATO summits have been signalled. A permanent title in the publication has been military history. Under this title, aspects from the Romanian and universal military history have been presented as follows: the Balkan Wars, the Romanian Armed Forces campaign in the First World War, the structure and responsibilities of the Great General Staff, Romania’s military potential in the interwar period.

³⁸ Constantin Rusu, *Conceptul NATO privind suportul logistic*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 4, 2004, p. 123.

³⁹ Lieutenant General Dr Sorin Ioan, *Caracteristicile misiunilor militare în Afganistan*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 3, 2010, p. 87.

Although for almost a century and a half military science has not undergone significant conceptual transformations, the field has not stagnated. Technological applications and information novelties have generated certain substantial, revolutionary, mutations in what used to be called classical warfare. We can thus speak about digital military communication systems, virtual space and cyber warfare, asymmetrical confrontations, hybrid warfare, joint operational environment, aspects that have been presented in the pages of the General Staff journal.

Permanently connected to the events in the geostrategic environment, the journal has transmitted to the readers the aspects from the experience of those who have represented the armed forces and the country respectively in Brussels. Thus, one of the issues of the journal was dedicated to Romania's Military Representation to NATO and the EU in the capital of Belgium. The authors presented a series of novelties in the field of global security or aspects considered relevant from the perspective of the hybrid warfare development. In this regard, the more than obligatory cooperation between the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union to prevent and counter hybrid warfare is emphasised, starting from the existence of a set of instruments *"that are not available to the Alliance because of the limitations generated by its role and missions, the cooperation with the EU being thus the best possible solution. Both organisations focus on this aspect, and there has already been good cooperation in the field of cyber defence. This cooperation can be extended to other domains specific to hybrid warfare, as the EU has available a wide array of instruments that can be employed in combatting most of the components that are specific to this type of warfare"*⁴⁰.

The journal has provided information related to the international environment, being connected, through the published articles, to the events in the global geopolitical arena. In the pages of the publication are presented the points of view of the armed forces command representatives as well as the opinions of some personalities in the academic, university or civil environment. Moreover, following the collaboration between the journal and other publications in the field in NATO member countries, translations of some materials considered interesting, suggestive or relevant for the topics to be acknowledged by the Romanian reader have been published.


⁴⁰ Lieutenant General Dr BEng Gheorghe Savu, *Războiul hibrid – forme de manifestare și contracarare din perspectivă euroatlantică*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 4, 2015, p. 124.

In the pages of *Gândirea militară românească* have been presented general and particular aspects, some of them extremely novel, of the experience of those who have participated in the theatres of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Alliance is a powerful and viable construction, in which the scientific architectural element has to be the backbone. In this context, it is indispensable that, in NATO member states military systems, military science and military art should be constantly studied.

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English version by
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NATO Secretary General's Annual Report Shows How the Alliance Is Adapting to Face a More Dangerous World (I)

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg published his annual report today (Monday 13 March), showing how, in 2016, the Alliance *“took further steps to keep our almost one billion citizens safe”*.

The report highlights how NATO is adapting to the new security environment by strengthening its collective defence and projecting stability beyond its borders.



Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_142137.htm, last updated on 13 March 2017.

Four multinational battlegroups are being deployed to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. At least seventeen allied countries will contribute troops.

While enhancing its deterrence measures in the eastern part of the Alliance, NATO has had political dialogue with Russia and held three meetings of the NATO-Russia Council last year.

The Secretary General underlined how the Alliance is doing more to project stability, such as by training local forces in Afghanistan and Iraq to fight terrorism. NATO has also sent training teams to countries including Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.

NATO AWACS planes are supporting the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL and a new Intelligence Division has been created by NATO to deepen its understanding of the threats it faces.

Mr Stoltenberg explained how the Alliance has turned a corner on defence spending. In 2016, twenty-three allies increased their defence expenditure in real terms by 3.8 %, which added up to ten billion US dollars.

The Secretary General confirmed only five allies spent 2% or more of GDP on defence in 2016. He said, *“It is realistic that all allies should reach this goal. All allies have agreed to it at the highest level and it can be done”*.

Mr Stoltenberg pointed out European allies together spent 2% of GDP on defence as recently as the year 2000. He was encouraged that Romania plans to reach 2% this year and both Latvia and Lithuania expect to do the same in 2018.

The Secretary General encouraged allies to redouble their efforts on defence spending and said it would be a key focus at the upcoming meeting of NATO leaders.



The Secretary General's
Annual Report

2016

(I)

Jens Stoltenberg

Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_142237.htm



At no time since the end of the Cold War has the NATO Alliance faced greater challenges to our security than it does today.

But NATO is the most successful alliance in history because it has been able to change as the world has changed. For the first 40 years of its life, the Alliance's focus was collective defence. When the Berlin Wall came down, our focus shifted to crisis management beyond our borders – intervening to stop large-scale bloodshed and keep the peace in the Western Balkans, fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, and tackling piracy off the Horn of Africa.

Since 2014, we have had to adapt again. Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, and destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine, as well as ISIL's seizure of Mosul, marked in very different ways the start of a new era. So today, the Alliance must engage in both collective defence and crisis management at the same time.

Allies have implemented the largest reinforcement of our collective defence since the Cold War. In the last two years, NATO's deterrence and defence posture has changed significantly, and the Warsaw Summit in July 2016 was an important landmark in our adaptation.

We have tripled the size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000; established a 5,000 strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, ready to move within days; and set up eight small headquarters in the eastern part of our Alliance.

We are currently deploying four multinational battlegroups to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, with contributions from 17 different Allied countries – including Canada and the United States. This is clear evidence of the enduring strength of the transatlantic bond. We are increasing our presence in the southeast of the Alliance, centred on a multinational brigade in Romania. We have also stepped up air policing over the Baltic and Black Sea areas.

An important element of the Alliance's ability to deter, and defend against, any threat is our readiness – and here military exercises are essential. In 2016, NATO conducted 107 exercises of its own and was associated with a further 139 national exercises.

In keeping with our international commitments, we also invited Russian observers to attend ten NATO exercises, as far afield as Greece, Norway and the United Kingdom. At the same time, we have continued our political dialogue with Russia, holding three meetings of the NATO-Russia Council to discuss the situation in and around Ukraine, transparency and risk reduction, and Afghanistan.

Another key concern – and an area in which NATO is making good progress – is cybersecurity. In 2016, NATO dealt with an average of 500 cyber incidents per month, a 60% increase on 2015. Experts defend NATO's networks 24/7, the Alliance has created rapid reaction teams, and at the Warsaw Summit we made a cyber defence pledge which commits Allies to developing the fullest range of defensive capabilities.

Our missile defence programme represents a long-term investment against a long-term threat. The Aegis Ashore missile defence site in Romania is now capable of 24/7 operations – significantly increasing the defensive coverage of NATO territory against short- and medium-range missile attacks from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

Defence is not just about what we do at home, but also what we do beyond our borders. So we have agreed to strengthen our contributions to project stability in our neighbourhood – including by training local forces to fight terrorism.

In Afghanistan, we have moved from a large combat operation to a train, advise and assist mission – helping to ensure that country never again becomes a safe haven for international terrorists. Building on our training programme for Iraqi officers in Jordan, we have now established a training and capacity-building programme in Iraq itself. We have opened a regional centre in Kuwait, together with our partners in the Gulf. Our Joint Force Command in Naples has provided mobile training courses to Egypt on countering terrorism and to Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia on countering insurgency.

But, as an Alliance, we recognise that we can and should do more – including expanding our efforts to train local forces and build local capacity – and doing so will be an important focus in the years ahead.

Another key focus will be tightening our ties with international partners such as the European Union. The Joint Declaration I signed with Presidents Tusk and Juncker in Warsaw in July raised our cooperation to a new level. In December, we agreed on 42 different measures to implement that agreement, including on countering hybrid threats, cyber defence, and maritime security.

All of our efforts must be underpinned by adequate resources and fair burden sharing. At the Warsaw Summit, Allies restated their commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence within a decade – and in 2016, we took a step in the right direction.

Defence spending by European Allies and Canada increased by 3.8%, or around USD 10 billion. Twenty-three Allies increased spending in real terms in 2016. At the same time, ten Allies met the NATO-agreed guideline of spending 20% or more of their defence expenditure on major equipment, up from eight in 2015.


But we still do not have fair burden sharing within our Alliance. Only five Allies met the 2% guideline in 2016. So in 2017, we must redouble our efforts to sustain the positive momentum and speed up national efforts to keep our pledge.

This is essential for the continued strength of the transatlantic bond on which our Alliance is founded. For almost 70 years, the unique partnership between Europe and North America has ensured peace, freedom and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. That is an achievement we can never take for granted.

We are a transatlantic alliance of 28 – soon to be 29 – democracies whose strength lies in our shared values – freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Our common endeavour, as stated in our founding treaty, is *“the preservation of peace and security”*.

In a dangerous world, NATO is as essential as ever. At this pivotal time, the Alliance is strong and continues to adapt. That will be at the core of NATO’s next Summit in Brussels in late May.

I want, finally, to acknowledge the huge debt of gratitude we owe to the brave men and women from Allied and partner nations who serve in NATO’s missions and operations. Their day-to-day commitment to our common purpose and our shared values, no matter the challenge or threat, is what keeps us all safe. It is their courage and their resolve, above all, which make me look to the future with confidence.



Jens Stoltenberg
NATO Secretary General



For All Who Serve

NATO's commitment to safeguarding the freedom and security of all its members is made possible by the service of men and women from across its member and partner countries.

In 2016, tens of thousands of Allied service members were deployed on land, in the air, and at sea to provide for NATO's defence and to project stability beyond NATO's borders. Whether engaged in security operations, military exercises, or training missions, the security and stability of the Alliance would not be possible without their contributions.

NATO recognises the dedication of all who serve. The Alliance owes a debt of gratitude to every man and woman in service for the risks they take and the sacrifices they and their families make while serving NATO's common purposes and values.



Preventing conflict means being able to deter and defend against any potential security threat. In recent years, NATO has responded to a series of new challenges with the largest reinforcement of its collective defence in a generation. At the same time, as part of an overall approach to its collective security, the Alliance seeks to improve transparency and reduce the risk of escalation by engaging in meaningful dialogue with Russia.

Protecting our Citizens

For nearly 70 years, NATO has helped to preserve the peace and protect its citizens. Today, NATO is home to almost one billion people, and the Alliance's commitment to their security remains as firm as ever.

NATO began to adapt its defensive posture in 2014 in response to major changes in the security environment – changes that have rendered that environment more complex and demanding. In the face of these changes, Allies agreed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 to further strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture in order to better protect their citizens and to enhance NATO's efforts to project stability in its neighbourhood.

The Warsaw decisions on strengthened deterrence and defence build on the Readiness Action Plan, which was agreed at the Wales Summit in 2014 and has largely been implemented in the years since. The Alliance also agreed to increase its efforts to fight terrorism, including by sharing more information, intelligence, and analysis.

Key Warsaw decisions related to deterrence and defence include:

- agreement to create a rotational forward presence in the eastern and south-eastern parts of Alliance territory
- adoption of a framework for further adaptation in response to growing challenges and threats emanating from the south
- reconfirmation of the role of nuclear deterrence as a core element of the overall Allied deterrence posture
- commitment to increased resilience and civil preparedness
- a pledge to enhance cyber defence
- resolve to improve strategic awareness and enhance maritime posture



NATO's posture is defensive in nature, proportionate, and consistent with the Alliance's international commitments. It demonstrates an enduring respect for the rules-based European and global security architecture. NATO does not seek confrontation, but will defend all Allies against any threat.



The measures agreed in Wales and Warsaw allow NATO to provide assurance to those Allies who feel at risk from new threats. The measures contribute to a credible deterrence and offer flexibility to Allied decision-makers. NATO's posture deliberately avoids any ambiguity or uncertainty that a potential adversary might seek to exploit and demonstrates the determination of all Allies to uphold and defend the common values that underpin the Alliance.

Implementing the Readiness Action Plan

Only two years after its adoption by Allies in Wales, the Readiness Action Plan has largely been implemented. The size of the NATO Response Force has tripled to 40,000, with a Spearhead Force at its core able to move within days. Eight small headquarters have been established in the eastern part of the Alliance to facilitate training and reinforcements, if needed. At the same time, NATO has augmented Turkey's defences, the Ally most directly affected by the turmoil in the south.

The Readiness Action Plan combines a series of measures related to assurance and adaptation. It balances requirements for increased military presence in some geographic areas with the ability to reinforce anywhere on Alliance territory. It marks significant advances in three areas:

- NATO's ability to anticipate and take decisions to respond to potential threats from any direction
- the scale, composition and preparedness of the NATO Response Force, including the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
- a renewed emphasis on the collective preparation of NATO's largest military formations to enable follow-on heavy reinforcement of any Ally, if necessary

The Readiness Action Plan is designed to reassure all Allies in the face of the evolving security environment and to improve readiness and enable the Alliance to rapidly respond to changing demands. Through the design and implementation of this plan, NATO has also improved its 360-degree situational awareness.



Assurance Measures

In 2016, all 28 Allies contributed to assurance measures on a rotational basis. Through a series of land, air and maritime activities, NATO continues to provide assurance and to support deterrence in and around the eastern part of the Alliance. These measures are increased or reduced as necessary, depending on the security situation.

Throughout 2016, NATO also continued its support to Turkey, augmenting Turkish air defence capabilities through the deployment of missile batteries. At the Warsaw Summit, Allies agreed on the importance of implementing further assurance measures for Turkey. These include an increased AWACS presence in the region, a range of maritime activities, and air policing. The aim of the measures is to respond to the growing challenges from the south and contribute to the security of the Alliance as a whole.

Adaptation Measures

Through the adaptation measures of the Readiness Action Plan, NATO has upgraded its high-readiness forces on land, at sea and in the air. The NATO Response Force has been substantially enhanced by tripling its size and increasing its readiness levels, with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) at its core. Several Allies have already committed to taking the rotational lead

of the land component of the VJTF until 2023, with the United Kingdom taking over the lead from Spain in 2017. The VJTF is ready to deploy within days.

To support potential deployment of these forces and to assist in coordinating planning, exercises and reinforcements, the Alliance has established eight NATO Force Integration Units in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. These units operate with the oversight of the Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, Poland and the Headquarters Multinational Division Southeast in Bucharest, Romania.

2016 assurance measures included:

- fighter jets on air policing patrols over the Baltic States and fighter jets deployed to Bulgaria, Poland and Romania
- Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) flights over the territory of NATO's eastern Allies
- maritime patrols in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea with the Standing NATO Maritime Groups and Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Groups
- maritime patrol aircraft flights along NATO's eastern borders
- deployment of ground troops to the eastern areas of the Alliance for training and exercises
- 83 of the 246 exercises conducted in 2016 were in support of NATO's assurance measures

In recent years, NATO has experienced an increase in hybrid threats – those that may draw on conventional and non-conventional means and overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures. A comprehensive strategy on NATO's role in countering hybrid threats emphasises the need to prepare for potential conflict in a hybrid environment where ambiguity may be the norm. A key element of the strategy is enhanced cooperation with the European Union, which plays an important role in relation to non-military activities to counter hybrid attacks. Work in this area is well underway, underpinned by the Joint Declaration issued in Warsaw by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the NATO Secretary General.

Through the Readiness Action Plan, NATO has enhanced its planning for collective defence and has improved its crisis response procedures,

including the creation of an accelerated decision-making process. As part of the Readiness Action Plan, NATO leaders have also established a framework to address the growing challenges and threats emanating from the Alliance's southern neighbourhood. NATO's Framework for the South focuses on improving the Alliance's regional understanding and situational awareness, its capabilities for expeditionary operations and its ability to project stability in its neighbourhood.

NATO's Forward Presence

The Readiness Action Plan was NATO's initial response to a changing security environment in 2014. As the challenges to Allied security continued to evolve, Allied leaders agreed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw that a further shift in NATO's posture was warranted. As part of this shift, Allies agreed to establish a rotational forward presence in the Baltic and Black Sea regions to demonstrate solidarity, determination, and an ability to act in defence of NATO territory.

NATO's forward presence will include multinational battlegroups deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States respectively. It will also include a multinational brigade for training, led by Romania, that will contribute to NATO's deterrence and defence in the Black Sea region. Significant additional contributions by other Allies send the message that NATO stands as one, and that an attack on any single Ally will be considered an attack against all. These troops will be under NATO command and control, which will include a multinational divisional headquarters in Poland.

4 Multinational Battlegroups

ESTONIA:	LATVIA:
United Kingdom	Canada
Denmark (as of 2018)	Albania
France	Italy
LITHUANIA:	Poland
Germany	Slovenia
Belgium	Spain
Croatia (as of 2018)	POLAND:
France (as of 2018)	United States
Luxembourg	Romania
The Netherlands	United Kingdom
Norway	

■ Framework Nation
■ Contributing Nation
Valid as of 31 December 2016



NATO's forward presence will be an integral part of NATO's deterrence and defence posture. During peacetime, the multinational forces in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland will train with national defence forces in those countries to enhance interoperability and improve their ability to operate locally. In case of aggression, these forces will respond in accordance with the right to self-defence, in coordination with the national forces of the host nation.



The forward presence in the Black Sea region will include a multinational framework brigade for integrated training, as well as measures to strengthen NATO's air and maritime presence in the region. Romania is the framework nation for the multinational brigade, which is being developed with contributions at the battalion level from Bulgaria, Poland and Turkey. Other significant contributions have been announced by Canada, Germany and the United States.

NATO's rapid-reinforcement strategy also ensures that these forces can be supported by NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, the broader NATO Response Force, NATO's substantial followon forces, and Allies' additional high-readiness forces, if necessary.

Air Policing

Safeguarding the integrity of Alliance members' sovereign airspace is a long-standing peacetime task contributing to NATO's collective defence. Air Policing involves Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptor) aircraft owned and operated by NATO members. They respond to aircraft that are unidentified or operate in an unusual or unsafe manner. Existing military and civilian agreements ensure coordinated Air Policing operations across NATO members' airspace and guarantee security to Alliance members.

NATO Air Policing reflects the fundamental guiding principle of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states. All NATO members contribute in some form to NATO Air Policing through the use of national air surveillance systems, air traffic management, interceptor aircraft, or other air defence measures. For those that do not have the full range of air policing assets in their own militaries, agreements exist to ensure a single standard of security for all NATO members.

Since 2004, NATO has provided air policing for members that do not have all the necessary means within their own national structures. Allies provide NATO Air Policing support to the Baltic States via rotational deployment of interceptor aircraft through the NATO force generation process. Italian and Hungarian interceptor aircraft provide NATO Air Policing for Albania and Slovenia from bases in Italy and Hungary respectively. By the end of 2016, 43 contingents from 17 countries had contributed to the Baltic Air Policing mission since it began.



In 2014 and 2015, the number of NATO Air Policing flights over the Baltic and Black Sea areas increased significantly due to increased Russian air activities. As a consequence, NATO augmented its air policing presence by deploying additional fighter aircraft in the framework of the assurance measures of the Readiness Action Plan.

Although the number of policing missions in the north decreased in 2016, the overall number increased mainly because of the higher number of NATO Air Policing missions along the Turkish-Syrian border due to changed command and control arrangements and the changed security environment in the area.

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In the second part of the report, the Secretary General highlights some aspects regarding the need for transparency and risk reduction, the relations with Russia, WMD and CRBN, cyber defence and defence expenditure.

WHAT CAN WE LEARN TODAY FROM THE “THREE WISE MEN”?

Jamie SHEA

Sixty years ago this month the report of the “*three wise men*” on promoting non-military cooperation and strengthening unity within the Alliance was issued. What lessons can we draw from this report in the turbulent world of 2016, when many of the fundamentals of transatlantic cooperation and western liberalism are again being questioned?

Our modern age has developed a cult of anniversaries. Each new year brings opportunities to recall events that took place many years previously. 2016 has been no exception. We have recalled titanic events of the First World War, such as the battle of the Somme, but also more distant moments such as the Great Fire of London and the San Francisco earthquake. Yet the present can also be historic. 2016 is turning out to be a momentous year, with the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the unexpected election of Donald Trump as US President – events which historians will analyse for many years to come.

So why – between the invocation of the past and our obsession with an anxious present – should readers of the NATO Review spare a few minutes to reflect on the report of three former foreign ministers that was adopted by the North Atlantic Council 60 years ago this month (December 1956)? Apart from an historical “*fait divers*”, what does this report say about the state of the Alliance today? The definition of a significant event is not only that it had a deep and lasting impact at the time but also that it continues to be a trove of lessons for our own times.

The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, 05.12.2016, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/three-wise-men-nato-military-alliance/EN/index.htm>

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(From left to right) The “three wise men” Halvard Lange, Gaetano Martino and Lester B. Pearson – the foreign ministers of Norway, Italy and Canada, respectively. © NATO

How to strengthen allied unity

In May 1956, Halvard Lange from Norway, Lester B. Pearson from Canada and Gaetano Martino from Italy were tasked to “*advise the (North Atlantic) Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community*”. Their recommendations resulted in new procedures being instituted for political consultation within the Alliance.

This was the heart of the three wise men’s report: the need for NATO to be not only a military pact but also to take on an increasingly important political role beyond the scope of military planning and force generation, and to debate international political developments to better anticipate risks and opportunities for collective Alliance diplomacy.

The impetus for the report came from the medium-sized and smaller nations of the Alliance who, by the early 1950s, felt that their influence was marginalised by the domination of the big “*three*” – the United States, the United Kingdom and France – who tended to dominate discussions and impose their view points. This may have been natural at the time, given their overwhelming military contributions to NATO’s collective defence but the risk was that this imbalance in NATO would progressively disincentivize smaller allies from sharing the military burden or demonstrating political solidarity in crisis situations.

The founding fathers of NATO in the late 1940s had correctly foreseen that, if NATO remained a military structure and failed to develop a real sense



The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington D.C. on 4 April 1949 by twelve founding member states, already foresaw the need for more political consultation and a broader approach to security within the Alliance. © NATO

of common interests and values among its members, it would fade, especially if the imminent threat from the Soviet Union was seen to diminish over time. For that reason, Canada inserted Article 2 into the North Atlantic Treaty to provide for economic cooperation. In 1951 an earlier group of wise men had attempted to link the economic capabilities of allies more to NATO's military needs. Yet, by the mid-1950s, not much had come of these efforts. NATO was more a military upholder of the status quo than a force to shape the future of Euro-Atlantic security. Therefore, the *Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO* – as the three wise men's group was formally called – was a second effort to fix the problem.

More consultation and wider cooperation

No ally should go it alone. Standing together politically is also the best form of military deterrence.

Their report was truly a breakthrough, even if it took time for the recommendations on enhanced consultation to seep into the Alliance's DNA. The allies committed to greater transparency and earlier consultation about their national policies. They agreed to put collective NATO interests above their immediate concerns and to ensure that these did not undermine the Alliance's collective interest. They gave the Secretary General a greater role to set the agenda or intervene in disputes among allies, something which later

Secretaries General made abundant use of, for instance in mediating disputes between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean, or the United Kingdom and Iceland over fishing.

For the first time structures were established, notably a Committee of Political Advisors to better prepare for political consultations among Ambassadors. The Secretary General was even tasked to produce an annual political appraisal on the state of the Alliance, an idea that lapsed but was revived later by Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and his successor, Jens Stoltenberg, in the form of an annual report.

The report of the three wise men did not establish a formal Atlantic community, as its tasking had proposed. Ideas for cultural cooperation among allies or more economic coordination either fell flat or were later taken up by other institutions, particularly after the emergence of the European Economic Community in the late 1950s. But the three wise men did launch a programme to promote scientific and technological cooperation among allies and to transfer technology and know-how from the more advanced to the less advanced allies. This has survived remarkably well and is now known as the Science for Peace and Security programme, endowed with a budget of €12 million and which these days develops cooperation among NATO member states and partner countries on issues as diverse as demining, water management and the destruction of chemical and biological substances.

Winning public support and understanding

A second innovation was the sense that NATO required public support and greater public understanding of its mission, if it was to thrive in the long run. This led to the establishment of national information programmes led by dedicated staff.

Today this continues as “*strategic communications*” – an area of growing priority for NATO as our publics are increasingly exposed to multiple news outlets, propaganda, counter-narratives and deliberate fake news in the social media. In this more contested and even confrontational environment, effective communications are vital if NATO is to persuade its nations to make greater efforts for their defence and to defend democratic values at a time when these are no longer accepted without challenge.

Four elements, which were perhaps less explicitly stated or foreseen by the report’s authors in 1956, have now emerged as its true and lasting legacy.



Currently NATO has 28 member countries¹ with Montenegro on the verge of joining. © NATO

Political unity: the best deterrent

First, that no ally should go it alone. Standing together politically is also the best form of military deterrence. The wise men stressed that Alliance unity was the best guarantee that its individual policies would ultimately succeed. The purpose of consultation was to ensure that through consensus, no ally could be excluded or marginalised and each would more readily join the consensus to the extent that it felt its voice had been heard during the discussion. Consensus-building would therefore not be an automatic or easy process. But ultimately consensus would endure because each ally felt that it could identify with the common position that emerged.

In the 36 years that I have been at NATO, I have seen at first hand that, when NATO decides, it shows staying power: 17 years in Kosovo, 13 years in Afghanistan and nine years in Bosnia. When I was NATO Spokesman in the 1990s and had to handle the Kosovo crisis, I was struck by the fact that NATO's solidarity and unity brought the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to the negotiating table even faster than the impact of its airstrikes. The three wise men's intuition, to paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, that "*We either hang together or we hang separately*" is one that NATO has well digested.

¹ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm (the article was published on 5.12.2016-Ed.).

Balancing interests and responsibilities

The second lesson is that NATO has to balance the interests of the larger and smaller allies and give them all a stake, in terms of responsibilities and benefits,

To survive and thrive, NATO had to become less rigid and more adaptable.

in NATO membership.

When the wise men set out on their work, NATO had 15 members. Today it is on the verge of 29 and the majority of allies that have joined

since the end of the *Cold War* have been relatively small countries; for instance, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia and Montenegro. But they all have their history, regional perspective and particular way of dealing with their neighbours, which can benefit NATO diplomacy. They can make effective military contributions if they are linked to a good NATO planning process or, for instance, the recent concept of Framework Nations, which encourages groups of allies to work together on a multinational basis to develop forces and capabilities required by the Alliance, guided by a framework nation. This gives smaller allies a niche role in providing important military capabilities.

The wise men rightly identified that NATO's key to success would be to balance everyone's interests and priorities while establishing a framework for common action. Never has this principle been more fundamental than it is today, as NATO has to tackle the very different security challenges from the East and the South, without losing its cohesion or its ability to influence events.

Deterrence and dialogue

The third major lesson from 1956 is that military strategies can prevent wars in the short-term but cannot remove the factors that cause tension. It is too risky to rely on military deterrence alone. By adding political cooperation to NATO's core tasks, the wise men recognised that only a political strategy patiently followed would allow the Alliance to escape the *Cold War*.

In 1956, there were hopes for less tension in Europe. Stalin was dead, Khrushchev had recently made his speech to the 20th Party Congress in Moscow denouncing the crimes of Stalin, the Soviet Union seemed to be moving towards détente, West Germany had just joined NATO, thereby stabilising the situation between the two halves of Germany, and Hungary was experimenting with reform. So it was the right moment for NATO to probe and exploit these opportunities, even if they were dashed when the Hungarian uprising was brought to a tragic



At the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, allied leaders sent a clear message that NATO is responding to the changed security environment by enhancing its deterrence and defence posture, while remaining open to political dialogue with Russia. © NATO

end and the Soviet Union launched Sputnik and tried once more to force the allies out of Berlin. Nonetheless, in the mid-1960s, NATO came back to the idea of balancing defence and détente in the form of the Harmel Report. Its core idea has recently been revived in the Alliance, with the NATO Summit in Warsaw agreeing that the Harmel formula of deterrence and dialogue is also the right approach in dealing with a more adventurous and unpredictable Russia in 2016. Of course, the wise men back in the 1950s could not have foreseen the development of partnerships, relations with the United Nations, European Union and other institutions, nor the enlargement of the Alliance to so many of its former adversaries after 1990. But they led the way in stressing the non-military tools of security policy.

Adapting to new challenges

Finally, the three wise men also saw that to survive and thrive, NATO had to become less rigid and more adaptable. West Germany's entry into NATO in 1955 had introduced a new major power into NATO's deliberations, which might initially not have the military clout of France or the United Kingdom but which in time would become a major force in NATO politics. Southern flank members of NATO, such as Italy, Greece or Turkey, also showed that NATO needed to respond to security challenges in the Mediterranean as well as along the central front of the Fulda Gap or the Luneburg Heath in Germany.

The collapse of the European Defence Community in the French National Assembly in August 1954 had underscored that a greater European role

and more equitable transatlantic burden-sharing would need to be taken forward in NATO, rather than separate European structures for at least the foreseeable future. In sum, the three wise men's report recognised that for adaptation to be successful it has to respond to internal challenges as much as to the signals that are being received from the outside world.



The “three wise men” showed the value of taking a longer-term perspective on the evolution of the Alliance. © NATO

In conclusion, to remain relevant, NATO has from time to time to evaluate itself from the outside. It is all too easy to be consumed by the crisis *“du jour”* or the unrelenting agenda of weekly committee meetings. Yet to invest too much in the present is to neglect the future and the need to prepare for it now. The three wise men's report showed the value of taking a longer-term perspective on the evolution of the Alliance. This was not only repeated in the Harmel exercise in the 1960s, but also when NATO tasked the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and a group of experts to make recommendations for its new Strategic Concept in 2010.

In the turbulent world of 2016 when many of the fundamentals of transatlantic cooperation and western liberalism are again being questioned, it may not be such a bad idea for NATO leaders to turn to wise men and women for guidance, to make sure we are not losing sight of the wood for the trees and are charting a sensible course through the maze of contemporary security challenges.

ON DETERRENCE

Dr Kestutis PAULAUSKAS

“Everything in war is very simple. But the simplest thing is difficult.”

Carl Von Clausewitz

Deterrence is a relatively simple idea: one actor persuades another actor – a would-be aggressor – that an aggression would incur a cost, possibly in the form of unacceptable damage, which would far outweigh any potential gain, material or political. The involvement of at least two actors makes deterrence a complicated social interaction. It is very much about human nature, psychology and basic human emotions: fear, courage, trust, lust for power, and revenge.

Elevate all this to the level of state actors, with all the intricacies inherent in statehood and statesmanship, add the stakes of national survival, add nuclear weapons to the mix, and deterrence becomes a highly complex, volatile, intangible, but also combustible concept.

From deterrence by denial to denial of deterrence – and back

During the *Cold War*, NATO pursued deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment was based on the notion of “*unactable damages*”, including through massive nuclear retaliation for any Soviet attack – conventional or nuclear. Deterrence by denial was about making it physically difficult for the aggressor to achieve his objective, which NATO pursued through forward defence at its eastern border with the Soviet Union.

The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, 02.11.2016, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-deterrence-defence-alliance/EN/index.htm>

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After the end of the Cold War, the Alliance dramatically downsized its conventional and nuclear forces.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a long period of denial of deterrence followed. The Alliance dramatically downsized its forces (conventional and nuclear) and persistently reduced defence spending. It also shifted its overall paradigm from territorial defence, including forward defence conducted by large and heavy formations, to out-of-area crisis response, underpinned by expeditionary capability based around more deployable but also smaller and lighter units.

Along the way, the Alliance's know-how of deterrence, including planning, exercises, messaging and decision-making has not been at the centre of NATO's attention. And for good reason: the post-*Cold War* security environment demanded such a change in focus. The Alliance had to focus on crisis management – from conflict prevention, to peace enforcement, peacekeeping and stabilisation – first in the western Balkans and later also in Afghanistan.

Today, deterrence is back. A good indicator is to compare the number of times the word “*deterrence*” occurs in the respective communiqués of the 1999 Washington Summit (precisely once) and the 2016 Warsaw Summit (28 times). It was one of two interrelated themes in Warsaw: first, strengthened deterrence and defence for protection of the Alliance's citizens; second, from this position of strength, projecting stability beyond Alliance borders.

The year 2014 was a turning point due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the change of borders in Europe by force, and the rise of so-called Islamic State (or Daesh) in Syria and Iraq.



*In the post-Cold War security environment,
NATO soon found itself having to focus on crisis management in the Balkans.*

As an initial response, NATO took steps to boost its political and military responsiveness, and to increase the readiness of its forces. As part of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), measures have been taken – on land, at sea, and in the air – to reassure allies in the eastern part of the Alliance.

Moreover, a series of longer-term measures have been launched to adapt NATO's forces and command structure, so that the Alliance will be better able to react swiftly and decisively to sudden crises. Such adaptation includes enhancing and tripling the size of the NATO Response Force, enhancing Standing Naval Forces, developing a more ambitious exercise programme, accelerating decision-making and improving planning processes. While the RAP has been mostly implemented, it is clear that NATO continues to face a new strategic reality: an arc of uncertainty and instability around its periphery, which requires further adaptation.

Two triggers

The decision to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture was triggered by two developments. The first was Russia's military doctrine, the scale and pace of its military modernisation, and above all, its aggressive

rhetoric, aggressive actions against neighbours, and increased military activity and provocations close to NATO's borders.

Russia's seamless employment of all tools and capabilities at its disposal – from hybrid activities, to conventional military threats and nuclear saber-rattling – has been especially disconcerting for Allies, since it appears to lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in Russia's approach to conflict¹. The deployment of Anti-Access/Area Denial² capabilities that reach into NATO territory and international airspace and waters – from the High North, through the Baltic and Black Seas to the eastern Mediterranean – has added further complication, not least in terms of NATO's freedom of movement.



*At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, allies agreed to step up readiness to ensure that NATO can respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges.
© German Army Press Office*

The second development that triggered the strengthening of the Alliance posture has been the rapid degradation of the security situation in the South. Failed states and civil wars, the spread of Daesh and its attacks on the population of allied cities, and the massive refugee flow towards Europe, taken together, have created a significant strategic challenge to the Alliance.

Deterring and defending against a non-state actor with state-like capabilities and aspirations, such as Daesh, has presented a particularly complex conceptual as well as practical challenge to the way deterrence and defence has been traditionally conceived by allies.

¹ <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=797>

² <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=906>

Importantly, while different in nature, both challenges can significantly affect the security of all allies, and each requires a 360-degree approach to security. Russia's propaganda and espionage is targeted against the Alliance as a whole, and Russia pursues military activities and tests of sovereignty in the East, the South, but also in the North Atlantic. Likewise, the massive migration, as well as the propaganda, recruitment and terrorist attacks perpetrated by Daesh affect, directly or indirectly, the security of all allies.

The three C's of Alliance credibility

In light of this changed and evolving security environment, allies agreed at Warsaw to *"ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against potential adversaries and the full spectrum of threats that could confront the Alliance from any direction"*.



Russia's aggressive actions towards its neighbours and the scale and pace of its military modernisation – on display, here, during the Victory Day parade on 9 May 2016 – helped trigger the decision to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture. © REUTERS

As a means to prevent conflict and war, credible deterrence and defence is essential. To this end, allies have developed a broad approach, which draws upon all of the tools at NATO's disposal: from civil preparedness and national forces as first line of defence, to cyber defence, missile defence, conventional forces, and nuclear deterrence as the fundamental guarantee of Alliance security.

Credibility is essential for successful deterrence. Alliance credibility can be pictured as a three-legged stool, comprising cohesion, capability and communication. Take away one leg, and the stool topples over.

➤ **Cohesion**

With the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union gone, the Alliance's unity and solidarity have not been truly tested over the last two decades. Russia's resurgence, however, and the pressure of the southern challenges have brought allies closer together.



Beyond concern over Russia's actions, the spread of so-called Islamic State (or Daesh) and its attacks on the population of allied cities also served to spur efforts to strengthen NATO deterrence and defence.

As a clear signal of solidarity, all allies have contributed to measures to reassure allies in the eastern part of the Alliance and have also agreed a set of tailored measures to assure Turkey in the south.

The round table of the North Atlantic Council is a powerful multiplier of solidarity. Although there are perpetual intra-allied debates and discussions on details and costs, once forged, NATO's consensus is rock solid. Russia's persistent effort to undermine this solidarity has actually reinforced it.

➤ **Capability**

Robust military capability is another indispensable element of credible deterrence. Despite significant military downsizing and defence spending cuts over many years, NATO remains the most powerful military alliance in the world. No country or group of countries could seriously challenge NATO in a direct major conflict.

However, this does not mean that potential adversaries could not be tempted to exploit an apparent time-space advantage, reinforced by Anti-Access/Area Denial

capabilities, on the Alliance's periphery. After all, at least one potential adversary has been actively exercising such scenarios, and tested them in real-time.

This is why NATO decided to enhance its forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and to establish a tailored forward presence for the Black Sea region. The multinational nature of this enhanced forward presence creates a tripwire function necessary to signal to the potential adversary that any aggression against an ally will be met by NATO military forces from across the Alliance, and from both sides of the Atlantic. This is to avoid any ambiguity or misunderstanding and to make it clear that a potential aggressor would be engaging in a conflict not with, for example Estonia or Poland, but with NATO as a whole.

Together with the national home defence forces, the forward deployed battlegroups would also form an important element of defence in these countries. They would be quickly reinforced by the Alliance's NATO Response Force and, if needed, the follow-on reinforcing forces.



At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, allies agreed to “ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against potential adversaries and the full spectrum of threats that could confront the Alliance from any direction”. © NATO

In the case of a major conflict scenario, reinforcement enabled by high readiness, deployability and sustainability of allied forces remains the central element of NATO's defence strategy. From an operational perspective, this is essential to ensure timely availability of allied forces where and when needed, rather than fixing the Alliance's forces in one theatre.

The South represents a different kind of challenge and requires a different approach to deliver a comprehensive effect of assurance and protection of allies and deterrence of potential adversaries. Here, NATO is adapting through a combination of robust intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability for strategic anticipation; an expeditionary capability to respond rapidly to any developing contingency; and enhancing the defence capacity of partners in the region to provide for their own security.

Ultimately, NATO's entire command structure and force structure – as well as allies, individually and collectively – need to be prepared and ready to defend each other from any threat from any direction.

➤ **Communication**

NATO's resolve needs to be clearly and unambiguously communicated to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation by any potential adversary. A good example of such communication is the speech delivered by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference in February 2016.



As a clear signal of solidarity, all allies have contributed to measures to reassure allies in the eastern part of the Alliance and, at Warsaw, allied leaders decided to enhance NATO's forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, as well as in the Black Sea region. © NATO

He underscored that Russia's rhetoric, posture and exercises of its nuclear forces, aimed at intimidating neighbours, is undermining trust and stability in Europe. While reminding the audience that NATO's deterrence *"also has a nuclear component"*, he noted that for NATO, *"the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote"*. But he also emphasised that *"no one should think that nuclear weapons can be used as part of a conventional conflict"*, as *"it would change the nature of any conflict fundamentally"*. In other words, Russia would not be allowed to escalate its way out of a failing regional conventional conflict through a limited use of nuclear weapons.

Allies conveyed the same message in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué by stating that *"if the fundamental security of any of its members were to be threatened however, NATO has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits than an adversary could hope to achieve"*.

The Communiqué as a whole should be read as a clear and comprehensive public statement on NATO's aims and intentions, including with regard to deterrence and defence. It can be safely assumed that it is not only read by allied audiences, but also by potential adversaries.

The challenges of continuous adaptation

The Warsaw Summit is neither the beginning nor the end of the Alliance's adaptation. It is, however, an important waypoint towards a strengthened Alliance deterrence and defence posture. As work progresses, it will need to address a number of challenges.




Joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance is an essential capability required to improve situational awareness and the ability to respond to challenges emanating from the South. © NATO

The price tag: Freedom does not come free. Two per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) should not appear an insurmountable target for the richest club of countries in the world. But NATO still has a long way to go: only five allies currently meet the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of two per cent of their GDP on defence, and only ten allies meet the NATO guideline to spend more than 20 per cent of their defence budgets on major equipment and research and development.

However, NATO may have turned the corner: collectively, allies' defence expenditures have increased in 2016 for the first time since 2009. In two years, a majority of allies have halted or reversed declines in defence spending in real terms.

Dialogue: Allies made clear in Warsaw that deterrence has to be complemented by meaningful dialogue. NATO remains open to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NATO-Russia Council. The aim is to avoid misunderstanding, miscalculation and unintended escalation and to increase transparency and predictability.

These efforts, however, will not come at the expense of ensuring NATO's credible deterrence and defence. Although Russia has yet to stop its aggressive rhetoric, hybrid meddling in neighbouring countries and provocative military activities around NATO borders, let alone reverse its illegal annexation of Crimea, NATO remains ready for dialogue. The recent meetings of the NATO-Russia Council illustrate the importance of such a dialogue.



While progress has been made over the past couple of years, some member states still have a long way to go to meet NATO guidelines on defence spending.

Non-state actors: Deterrence theory assumes the rationality of actors. Reality curtails that rationality in two major ways: first, any interaction between two rational actors often produces sub-optimal and irrational outcomes. Second, different actors adhere to different notions of rationality. A modern, democratic state actor will not be able to judge what a terrorist group, such as Daesh, deems “cost”, “benefit” or “unacceptable damage”.

Deterrence, defence against and, ultimately, defeat of such actors require a broader approach and a concerted effort by the international community. To address the root causes of instability in the Middle East and North Africa, which has spawned groups like Daesh and its affiliates, NATO is enhancing its contribution to the broader efforts of the international community to project stability through crisis management, partnerships and capacity building programmes for the partners in the region. A series of measures have also been agreed to respond to the threat posed by Daesh and similar groups, including ensuring that this threat is appropriately monitored and assessed and that relevant plans are kept up to date.

Overall coherence: Finally, in the longer run, NATO will need to consider the overall coherence of its evolving deterrence and defence posture. This includes capabilities, exercises, and plans, across all domains – air, maritime, land and cyber, missile defence and nuclear. NATO leaders took important decisions in this regard at the summits in Wales as well as Warsaw. Implementation is now underway.

However, while NATO continues to adapt to new threats and challenges, one thing remains constant: the greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend its territory and populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. A strengthened deterrence and defence posture will ensure that it can continue to fulfil that responsibility and no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.



Cover 1: Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 15-16 February 2017
<http://www.nato.int>

Cover 3: The International Woman's Day 2017 at NATO theme was "Be bold for change". This picture was taken at the launch of the "He Runs, She Runs, We Run" solidarity event, 08.03.2017
Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_142105.htm
#BeBoldForChange

Cover 4: Heroes Mausoleum on Galata Hill, designed by Henri Coandă, 1928-1930 (The Iași County Directorate of the National Archives)
Source: Sorin Iftimi, Aurica Ichim, Iași – capitala României, 1916-1918 (Iași – Capital of Romania, 1916-1918), Tipografia Everest 2001 SRL, București, 2017.



<http://www.smg.mapn.ro/gmr>