

THE ROMANIAN AND SOVIET MILITARY POTENTIAL – AS A MEANS OF SECURITY IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS DEBATED AT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WITHIN THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE OF GENEVA, FROM THE PERIOD 1920-1934 –¹

Museographer Valeria BĂLESCU, PhD

“King Ferdinand I” National Military Museum

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During the period analysed in this research, in order to try to remedy the deficit situation in the Armed Forces, the country's authorities took some legislative measures, including the “Law on the Organization of the Nation and the Territory for Time of War”, promulgated on 23 April 1933, in which it was specified that “the organization of the nation and the territory has as its purpose the capitalization on all the country's forces and resources to ensure national defence”. The act basically stipulated obligations for the conscious engagement of the entire people in the effort to strengthen the national defence, the development of own defence industry, agriculture and communications. In the same context, the importance of the Convention on the Definition of Aggression played a major role for Romania in the subsequent negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations with the USSR, which was accomplished on 9 June 1934.

Keywords: League of Nations; armament limitation; Pact of Paris; Dawes Plan; Young Plan;

¹ The study is a synthesis of the author's work: “Romanian-Soviet Relations, 1917-1934” (Chap. VIII, pt. 1-3, 6), currently being published by the Military Publishing House.

DISARMAMENT – BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

At the end of the First World War, after the capitulation of Germany, on 11 November 1918, given the immense human and material losses, the international world was preoccupied with the idea of organizing peace and security by applying the principle of disarmament. Otherwise, they were not new concerns, the first such efforts to limit armaments on an international scale, both quantitatively and qualitatively, had been undertaken even before the First World War, during the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, but without a real success, on the contrary.

However, the idea was resumed at the end of the great conflagration, with even more conviction. That is why the deterrence of military conflicts by reducing the state of armament of the countries was, with priority, a distinct issue on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference. In its opening meeting, on 18/25 January 1919, it was also decided to create the *Commission for the League of Nations*, based on the proposal of American President Woodrow Wilson², contained in his 14 points, which he had presented in the American Senate since 27 December (old style) 1918.

As Raymond Poincaré, the President of France, emphasized, the mission of the expected Society of Nations – or the League of Nations as it was also called – was *the supreme guarantee against new attacks on the rights of the kinships*.

Organized by the nations that sacrificed themselves for the defence of the right, the League of Nations had as its essential purpose to prevent, as far as possible, the renewal of the war, for this seeking to respect the peace that it will have established (Sofronie, 1936, p. 7).

The definitive text of the *Covenant of the League of Nations* was adopted, after extensive debates, on 28 April 1919, being an integral part, then, of all peace treaties³. Together with the treaties, it was intended to be the broadest general guarantee of the territorial order and politics existing after 1918.

² Woodrow Wilson, (28 December 1856 - 3 February 1924), was the twenty-eighth president of the United States of America (1913 - 1921). About his contribution to the establishment of the Versailles peace system at length in: Kendrick, A.C. (1992). *The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson*. Kansas: Univ. Press of Kansas; Knock, T.J. (1995). *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

³ *The peace treaty with Germany* – 28 June 1919, signed at Versailles; *Peace treaty with Austria* – 10 September 1919, Saint-Germain; *The peace treaty with Hungary* – 4 June 1920, Trianon; *The peace treaty with Bulgaria* – Neuilly sur Seine, 27 November 1919; *The peace treaty with Turkey*, signed in Sèvres on 10 August 1920, supplemented by *The peace treaty with Turkey* – Lausanne, July 1923; we also mention *The Treaty of Paris* – 28 October 1920 – concluded between Romania, on the one hand, and Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, on the other, which recognized Romania's sovereignty over Bessarabia.

The fundamental objectives and principles proposed by the League of Nations (L.N.), to serve as a beacon for the future of the peoples of the world, were formulated in the Preamble of the *Pact* – which also mentioned the establishment of the League of Nations – as follows: *The High Contracting Parties, Considering that, in order to develop cooperation between nations and to guarantee their peace and security, it is important to receive certain obligations not to resort to war, to maintain, to the light of day, international relations based on justice and honour, to observe, rigorously, the prescriptions of international law, recognized on the future as a rule for the effective governments' management, to make justice reign and to honour with sanctity all the obligations of the Treaties, in the mutual relations between the organized peoples* (Titulescu, 1971, p. 26; 1994, p. 375; *Le Pacte de la Société des Nations, 1919*, p. 7; *Société des Nations...*, 1930).

It was the first time when it was expected to replace violence in interstate relations by a system based on the principles of international law, treaty obligations, mutual respect and international cooperation.

Of particular importance, along with other generous articles – through their content, for ensuring the security and peace of the world – was also Article 8 (Titulescu, 1971, pp. 379-380) of the *Pact*, which was to guide the disarmament debates and around which the discussions were held, especially in the period to which we refer.

Its content stated:

The members of the Society recognize that maintaining peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the minimum compatible with national security and with the execution of international obligations imposed by a common action.

The Council, taking into account the geographical situation and the special conditions of each state, prepares the plans for this reduction, with a view to the examination and decision of the various governments.

These plans must be subject to a new examination and, if necessary, for a revision, at least every 10 years.

After their adoption by the various governments, the limit of armaments thus fixed cannot be exceeded without the consent of the Council.

Considering that the private manufacture of munitions and material of war raises serious objections, the Members of the Society instruct the Council to consider what measures are to be taken to avoid its troublesome effects, having regard to the needs of Members of the Society who cannot manufacture their own munitions and material of war necessary for their safety.

The members of the Society undertake to communicate in the most frank and complete manner all information respecting the scale of their armaments, their military, naval, and air programs, and the condition of such of their industries as are liable to be used for war. (Ib.)

But not all states supported the principles enshrined in the *Pact*, so the “victims” of the peace treaties, especially Germany and the USSR, polarized – throughout the interwar period – the revisionist front in Europe. Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy added to them, states that spoke against the peace treaties and for their revision, in the chapters related to borders, disarmament, reparations. Unfortunately, secret diplomacy and the policy of *compensations*, sometimes of *appeasement*, facilitated these guidelines and the violation of peace treaties would neither be prevented nor sanctioned, but accepted as a *fait accompli*, or, sometimes, only with formal protests.

However, in order to discourage revengeful tendencies, a major principle was imposed at the League of Nations – that of disarmament. The topic was discussed at the League Assembly in December 1920, and it continued to be the subject of debate in the following years.

In the desire to resolve the controversial issue between the priority of security or that of disarmament, in the 3rd General Assembly of the League of Nations, in the fall of 1922, the text of the “14th Resolution” was voted, a document drafted by Henry de Jouvenel (France) and Lord Robert Cecil (England) (Matei, 1971, p. 26). The respective text established the connection between the three basic principles of peacekeeping, disarmament and security, with the specification that a state would not disarm until security guarantees were given to it. At the same time, the general principles were fixed for the elaboration of a defensive agreement accessible to all states, which was to be discussed in the session of 1923-1924. But serious obstacles arose in the way of the project, caused by the non-payment of German debts and, on this background, by the accentuation of French-English misunderstandings, followed by the occupation of the Ruhr by the French-Belgian armies.

In this context, the *Dawes Plan*⁴ intervened, adopted in London (16 July - 15 August 1924). This represented the triumph of the Anglo-American vision

⁴ *The Dawes Plan* – after the name of the American economist Charles G. Dawes, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1925, thanks to this solution. Other references in: Felix Gilbert, *The End of the European Era: 1890 to the present*, New York: Norton, 1970; Stephen A. Schuker, *The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976; B.J.C. McKercher, *Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy*, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1990; Eugene V. Rostow, *Breakfast for Bonaparte U.S. national security interests from the Heights of Abraham to the nuclear age*, Washington, DC: National Defense UP, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1993.

of the economic reconstruction of Europe. It was a temporary, five-year plan to help Germany pay off its war debts. In essence, the Dawes Plan represented a first revision of the Treaty of Versailles, reducing the total that had to be paid by Germany and removing the coercive power of the Reparations Commission. When it expired it was replaced by the *Young Plan*⁵, adopted in The Hague, on 31 August 1929. It acquired such a name because its promoter was the American economist Owen D. Young, and through this support Germany regained its financial autonomy, deliveries in goods were gradually reduced, to be eliminated within a period of ten years, and the completion of the due payments was extended until 1988.

When the state of tension eased, the League of Nations concluded the need for a mutual assistance treaty project, which was to be carried out by two means: “the general guarantee involving all states” and “special treaties” – by involving only some states (Matei, p. 26). The general guarantee was to be applied only after a reduction in armaments; and the designation of the aggressor state rested with the Council of the League of Nations. The idea was to be completed by the “15th Resolution”, in which the importance of regional agreements was revealed, and the final result was the mutual assistance treaty project adopted by the League’s General Assembly on 29 September 1923. The analysis of the text indicates the formulation of new ideas regarding the concept of aggression and aggressor, of mutual assistance and security, superior from a theoretical point of view to the existing formulations in the *Pact*, but due to the imperfections in its contents it never materialized (Moisuc, 1991, pp. 220-221).

And, for Romania, “arbitration, security and disarmament formed a whole condition” (Matei, p. 26). In the case of arbitration, in the Romanian governmental spheres a “rigorous specification” of its area of application, but also of decisions for the adoption of “effective sanctions” is considered necessary; and as long as the League of Nations “could not translate them into reality”, the alternative for Romania still remained the regional security agreements, provided, moreover, in the Pact of the Geneva Forum (Ib., p. 26).

⁵ About the Young Plan see also: Gotthard Jasper, “Die große Koalition 1928-1930”, in: *Die Weimarer Republik*, Band III, Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, <http://www.blz.bayern.de/blz/web/100083/01.html>; William K. Klingaman, 1929, *The Year of the Great Crash*, Harper&Row, 1989; Susan Willoughby, Douglas Willoughby, *The USA 1917-45*, Heinemann, 2000; Findley, Carter Vaughn, J.A. Rothney, *World War I reparations, Twentieth Century World*: 6th ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company: 2006; Claire Suddath Monday, “Why Did World War I Just End?”, in *Time World*, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2023140,00.html>, 4 October 2010; Wolfgang Stäbler, “Young-Plan, 1929/30-1932”, in *Historisches Lexikon Bayerns*, http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/artikel/artikel_44651, 2010 etc.

On 2 October 1924, during the 5th General Assembly of the League of Nations, based on the project formulated by Édouard Herriot and Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister of France and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, adopted the principle of the direct connection between arbitration-security-disarmament.

Based on this, the Assembly recommended, among other things, to take “in very serious consideration the draft protocol, for all members of the international organization” (point “1” of the resolution) (Ib., p. 29).

Through the recommended Protocol, actually called the *Protocol for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes* or the *Geneva Protocol*, an attempt was made for the first time to repair the cracks in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Thus, “war was completely prohibited and arbitration was mandatory as a means of peaceful settlement of disputes, declaring as the aggressor the state that would not have accepted the proposed solution”.

The abstentions of some great powers, especially Great Britain, for fear of being drawn into the problems of Europe, but also of Italy and the USA, meant that in October 1924 the document was not adopted, and the debates were postponed until 1925.

At the same time, in the resolution of the 5th General Assembly of the League of Nations, at point “4”, the Council called for an “international conference for the reduction of armaments”, in Geneva. If that forum did not reach a consensus, then the Geneva Protocol would become obsolete; hence the indissoluble link between: arbitration, security, disarmament.

This fact leads the Romanian diplomat, Nicolae Titulescu, to state: *The necessary corollary of this feeling of mistrust is the need to revise the treaties in a friendly way, as the only means to prevent war [...]. The idea*



Image taken between Montreux and Geneva, with members of the Romanian delegation to the Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations: N. Titulescu (centre), Commander Roșca (left), Major C. Teodorini (right)

(Source: MMN Archive, “Original Photographs” Collection, inventory number 19569)

of the possibility of revising the treaties creates insecurity, [...] it incites the desire for revenge. This is the surest road to war (Titulescu, 1967-1, p. 168).

The issue of the Protocol mentioned above was resumed in the debate of the General Assembly in Geneva, at the session of March 1925. However, being “a clearly unfavourable moment”, at the proposal of Eduard Beneš, it was postponed until the 6th session of the General Assembly of the League of Nations, from September 1925.

From the Romania side, Nicolae Titulescu, appreciating the document as “the technical instrument of peace organization”, supported the maintenance of the protocol “as it was designed, based on the obligation of legal and not only moral assistance”. In addition, he advocated “the introduction of an optional clause” that would allow states that had not wish to go beyond the pact’s obligations “to limit the additional obligations of assistance to what they wished to be just and possible at the time of an aggression” (Titulescu, 1967-2, p. 266).

But the chances of debating the Protocol were no greater at the autumn session, all that could be done was the adoption of a resolution that “sought to save the ideas of the document, through private arbitration conventions” (Moisuc, pp. 220-221). It was the period of negotiations for what would become the *Locarno Pact*, which strengthened the so-called “*pactomania*”, characteristic especially of the third decade of the 20th century.

The atmosphere of relaxation that followed in Franco-German relations, after 1924, allowed for the *Locarno Conference* (5-16 October 1925) to take place and the conclusion of the *Rhenish Pact*, an attempt to solve the security problem at the Franco-German-Belgian borders, as well as the Eastern European equation, especially after the failure of France following the occupation of the Ruhr, on 11 January 1923 (Titulescu, 1996, pp. 495-517).

Through the documents initiated at the end of the meeting in *Locarno*, it was aimed to replace the Versailles system with “freely consented agreements” regarding the “recognition of the territorial status quo in Western Europe, as the basis of the collective security” (Ib., p. 516)⁶ of the European continent.

In fact, the *Locarno* system led to the division of European states into: countries with guaranteed borders, the signatories guaranteed the maintenance of borders between France and Belgium on the one hand, and Germany on the other;

and countries with unguaranteed borders, because Germany, with the support of Great Britain, refused to grant Czechoslovakia and Poland the same guarantees that it granted to its western neighbours, signing only arbitration treaties with them.

Anyway, from this arrangement Germany came out with “a consolidated international position”, which offered it a new possibility to approach foreign policy, which allowed Romania to hope for German mediation in Romanian-Soviet relations (Chiper, 2000, p. 33). But the fear “that it could be drawn into anti-Russian combinations” made Germany refrain then, and later, from such involvement. Moreover, it was feared that the decrease in the Soviet Union’s pressure on Romania would have brought Germany the “disadvantage of a Soviet dissatisfaction”, which would not have been covered by the “advantages of a friendly Romanian attitude”; as, a Romanian-Soviet rapprochement would also have meant “a consolidation of the Romanian political situation, which was undesirable from the point of view of Germany’s economic policy” (Ib., p. 34) – a position from which it will benefit to the fullest, especially during the world economic crisis. At the same time, the clearing up of Romanian-Soviet tensions, apart from the fact that the revisionist potential of Hungary and Bulgaria would be decreased, it would bring, to the detriment of Germany, advantages to Poland and France. The first, because it released itself from the responsibilities towards Romania in the Bessarabia problem, and could focus its attention towards the west, and the second, it could profit by a rapprochement with Soviet Russia, at the expense of Germany.

Thus, the *Locarno* agreements gave Germany the opportunity, later, to manifest its revisionist tendencies towards the east, even though its entry into the League of Nations, in September 1926, seemed to offer a reasonable guarantee against this revisionism (Titulescu, 1996, p. 516). The Englishman Austen Chamberlain, known for his rather anti-German attitude, drew attention to such a diplomatic mistake in 1925. Considering the policy of appeasement towards Germany inappropriate, he declared in the House of Commons: “I consider that [the agreements concluded with Germany] at *Locarno* are not the end of the work of pacification and reconciliation, but only the beginning” (Rudman, 2011, p. 3).

The policy of Gustav Stresemann (the German foreign minister), wrapped in a “pacifist” cover, did not change the reality of the revenge goals of the German ruling circles (de Launay, 1965, pp. 201-202, apud Matei, p. 40).

⁶ About the League of Nations also in: Constantin D. Cutcutache, *Revizuirea tratatelor sub regimul Societății Națiunilor*, București, Institutul de Arte Grafice “Cultura Poporului”, 1929; *Dix ans de coopération internationale*, Secrétariat de la Soci des Nations, Genève, 1930.

THE PACT OF PARIS (27 AUGUST 1928) AND THE MOSCOW PROTOCOL (9 FEBRUARY 1929), THE RESULT OF THE DEBATES WITHIN THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

In the presented international political climate, the “victims” of the Versailles system, skilfully speculating on the differences between the victorious states, tried, therefore, to get rid of the oppressive burden of war reparations in order to restore their economic and military potential, in the idea of changing the *status quo* of the territory established by the peace treaties. Thus, in order to prevent these retaliatory tendencies and out of the need to organize peace, the responsible politicians of the time realized that in order to “prevent war as a social phenomenon” they must, first, “prevent war as a legal institution” (Titulescu, 1996, p. 363). That is why, in the same year 1925, during the 6th Assembly of the League of Nations, through extensive project proposals, debates and various opinions, an attempt was made to save, at least in part, the *Geneva Protocol*, by finding some new, generally accepted formulas for viable disarmament. The solution seemed to be a *World Conference on Disarmament* (CD), a fact for which the Council of the League of Nations established, on 12 December 1925, a *Preparatory Commission for the Conference on Disarmament* (PCD).

The debates in the working committees of the PCD reaffirmed, in general terms, the theses and concepts of disarmament formulated previously, but maintaining the controversy regarding the priority of disarmament or security, which in fact represented the difference of opinion of the two major orientations: French and English.

The preparatory commission, unlike the other commissions, between 1920-1925, created a broad framework for debate, with the participation of all member, or not, states of the Society, including the United States of America and the USSR.

In the period 1926-1930, six sessions took place, and the circled took place around the two theses⁷:

1.) The French concept aimed as an objective, in accordance with art. 8, from the Covenant of the League of Nations, subordinated the reduction of armaments in favour of ensuring the security of the states, a fact for which it had foreseen a rigorous international control of armaments; it supported the limitation of armaments to the extent that acts of surprise aggression could no longer be committed, establishing a corresponding relationship between land, naval and air disarmament.

⁷ The six sessions took place as follows: 2 – in 1926; 2 – in 1927; 1 – 1928; 1 (and the last) – in 1929-1930, with a long interruption caused by the naval conference in London (1930).

Along with other states, Romania supported this French position, along with its allies from the Little Entente and Poland.

Also, regarding the “*limitation of land armaments*”, France claimed that “*only peacetime armaments, usable before mobilization, with which acts of aggression could be committed by surprise, should be limited*” (Sofronie, p. 12; Matei, p. 42), which was also supported by Romania, along with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Argentina, Japan etc.

2.) The English concept – considered that the notion of “*military potential*” was too complex to be taken into account, rejecting international control, and the limitation of armaments that it envisaged did not remove the danger of aggression, which explained the support of the English thesis by Germany and other revisionist states.

In the first year of the debates within the PCD among other interventions, Romania stood out with the proposal of 20 November 1926, regarding “*the elaboration of an international convention for the universalization of the repression of terrorism*” (Pella, 1933, p. 13; Matei, p. 44). It was the first country that proposed the development of such a convention for the suppression of terrorism, fuelled by the revanchist circles.

The Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference highlighted the divergence of interests and opinions, of conception and method of the various delegations, materialized in some projects (Matei, p. 46)⁸.

Related to the topic presented, we mention that the Soviet delegation also submitted its own project, in November 1927, on which occasion M. Litvinov (Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissioner) declared that it was “*the only proposal capable of satisfactorily solving the problem of security and peace*” (Sofronie, p. 14; Matei, p. 47). The Soviet project was debated in the fourth (3 November - 3 December 1927) and fifth (15 - 24 March 1928) sessions of the PCD, and, in short, provided: “*immediate, complete and general disarmament*” (Matei, p. 47).

⁸ The differences of interests and opinions during the debates in the technical committees of the PCD led in the following sessions to the elaboration of new projects. Thus, during the third session of the Preparatory Commission (21 March-26 April 1927), two projects were submitted: a British one, developed by Robert Cecil; and another French project, developed by Paul-Boncour. But the difference in conception and method in terms of disarmament only created a wave of disputes and controversies. Their effect was the meeting of the first Naval Conference in Geneva, from 20 June to 4 August 1927. But, through the call of American President Coolidge to the signatories of the naval treaty in Washington, on 6 February 1922 (USA, England, France, Italy), to negotiate an agreement on limiting the classes of ships not covered by the respective treaty, attracted the resistance of France. Already, from this period it was noted that the Germans made “*a lot of noise about the need for disarmament*”, opposing any measure aimed at strengthening international security. Gustav Stresemann (the German foreign minister) was active in this regard, for the strengthening of Germany’s role in the League of Nations, striving to annihilate an oriental Locarno.

In extenso, the Soviet resolution stated: “Considering that the existence of armaments and the evident tendencies to increase them must inevitably lead states to armed conflicts, that the armed forces are a means used by the great powers to stop small peoples and colonial countries, recognizing that only the complete destruction of all armaments is the most effective guarantee of peace, a guarantee for the prevention of wars, the fourth session of the PCD to decide to immediately start the elaboration of a draft convention relative to general disarmament”. “The basis of the project was to be <the complete abolition of all land, naval and air armed forces, the destruction of all armaments, ammunition and all means of war, the cessation of recruitment for the military industry, abolition of the legislation for military service, the suppression of patents for inventions for the means of destruction, the passing of laws declaring the violation of the above conditions as crimes against the state>” (Textes et documents, 1932, p. 29, apud Matei, p. 47).

With the exception of Germany, the Soviet project had no support, so the Soviet delegation returned with it to the PCD again in February 1928, but this time too without any chance of success.

Without giving up definitively, the Soviet delegation then presented another project, this time providing, in essence, “partial, progressive and proportional disarmament”, by which it proposed that the large countries reduce their armaments by half, the medium ones by a third, and the small ones by a quarter (Matei, p. 48). The debate on this proposal was initially postponed, and later, like the other proposal, it was without any chance of success.

In September 1927, the Assembly of the League of Nations appreciated that the separation of the security-disarmament issue could end the impasse in which the Geneva debates were. Therefore, disarmament was left to the *Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference*, and security came under the competence of the *Arbitration and Security Committee*, a newly created body, under the presidency of the Czechoslovak Eduard Beneš (it worked until June 1928). In this context, the Polish delegation presented a project to suppress the war, through a universal non-aggression pact, which condemned any kind of war (Moisuc, 2003 and 2007, p. 139).

But earlier, in 1927, on the tenth anniversary of America’s entry into the First World War, the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, had been on a visit to Washington and proposed to Frank Kellogg, the US Secretary of State the idea of a draft of a treaty through which to denounce the war and promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. Even if Kellogg, effectively, “did not know what reaction to adopt in front of a document by which he renounced something that no one feared

and offered something implied by everyone” (Turliuc, 2008), he accepted the idea. Then the US advanced the project of a general security pact, which became for history the *Pact of Paris* or the *Briand-Kellogg Pact* (AMAE, collection 71/1920-1944, URSS, vol. 132, pp. 261-263).

The two promoters of the Pact, in the desire to maintain a general peace, went even further, promoting the need for a call for accession to all states. Following the steps taken, on 27 August 1928, the *Pact of Paris* was signed by 15 states and became the law on 24 July 1929 (Moisuc, 2003; 2007, p. 139; *Monitorul Oficial/Official Gezette*, no. 22/7 March 1929, p. 619)⁹. After that date, the document remained open to accession by other states, regardless of whether they were members of the League of Nations or not. Being a general treaty of non-aggression, “whose formula was without limit in time and space”, in only a few years it obtained the impressive adhesion of 63 states, which gave the treaty a “moral and political authority that no similar pact had known in the history of world diplomacy” (Oprea, 1967, p. 24).

Romania also joined the Briand-Kellogg Pact on 4 September 1928 (AMAE, collection 71/1920-1944, ib., pp. 264-265)¹⁰, and the country’s Parliament ratified the affiliation on 27 January 1929 (Georgescu, 2004, p. 76; Oprea, pp. 24-25; *L’agrésion*, p. 37)¹¹.

The fundamental idea of the Pact was that of non-aggression, being concentrated in art. I, where it was specified: “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, on behalf of the respective peoples, that they condemn the use of war for the regulation of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations” (Oprea, p. 26).

Its importance derives from the fact that it came to correct, in a happy way, the fundamental vice that was imputed to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the fact that it did not contain “a mandatory solution” for international conflicts, for all the conflicts, without exception.

The Covenant of the League of Nations did not excluded war entirely, and from a legal point of view it made war possible in four cases: 1) resorting to war after an arbitration case, by not respecting the Council’s decision, after the expiration of a three-month period; 2) when the Council could not adopt a unanimous resolution to resolve a conflict, nor could the Assembly with the required majority. In such

⁹ The states that initially joined were: France, the United States of America, Japan, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, Poland, Germany, New Zealand, Australia, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Italy, the South African Union and India.

¹⁰ Romania’s declaration to join the Pact (4 September 1928) was signed by C. Argetoianu, the Foreign Affairs Minister.

¹¹ Romania and the USSR further joined the Pact.

a case, the Pact mentions that the members of the League of Nations involved could reserve the right to act as they see fit, *“for the maintenance of law and justice”*; 3) when a dispute between the parties was considered by one of them to be within the domain of the domestic law, and recognized as such by the Council; 4) when there was a dispute between two states, one of which was not a member of the League of Nations, and it had refused to submit the dispute to the latter institution (Titulescu, 1996, p. 156).

Or, the Briand-Kellogg Pact meant precisely giving up war in the four cases. It could be invoked before the League of Nations, as well as before the Hague Court, in order to prevent the exercise of the legal right to war, as it results from the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Therefore, from the point of view of international law, the Pact of Paris stipulates:

“a) the suppression, as regards the members of the League of Nations, of war in the four cases in which the Pact of 1919 failed to curb the legal right to war;

b) extending the renunciation of the legal right to wage war also for states that are not members of the League of Nations;

c) the obligation not to oppose [...] the sanctions that the League of Nations would establish to prevent war [...]” (Ib., p. 158).

However, even in the case of the Paris Pact, war was still possible in three situations: *“legitimate defence; breach of commitments made by one or more signatory states; the need to fulfil the obligations provided for in art. 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations”*. But, in these cases, the war was reducing *“either to the natural right of self-defence [...], or to a punitive action undertaken by the community against those who violating the accepted laws [...]”*. From this point of view, Nicolae Titulescu, like others, also had critical words for the Paris Pact, saying that *“it cannot be considered a progress”* compared to the Geneva Pact, with all its imperfections, underlining that it originated from *“the grandiloquence of Briand”* and the *“concrete political interest”* of Kellogg, to *“collect foreign laurels, which cost nothing for America”* (Titulescu, 1967-2, pp. 322-324; 1967-1, pp. 235-239; Matei, p. 49).

On the other hand, the Greek diplomat N. Politis, who enjoyed a significant reputation at the League of Nations, was expressing that it was *“a deliberate exaggeration, intended to stimulate imaginations, to say that the Pact of Paris outlawed war. In fact, it limits itself to proclaiming a principle. But it does not organize the application of the principle and does not prescribe the sanction”* (Matei, p. 50; Coulon, 1934, p. 235).

For Romania, joining the Briand-Kellogg Pact also meant some advantages: the strengthening of relations with France, which had played an important role in granting the international loan of stability for Romania, considering that it was also the beginning of the period of the world economic crisis; keeping the same policy towards the countries of the Little Entente and Poland; opened a new perspective in economic relations with Germany. In the view of the German minister in Bucharest, von Mutius (Chiper, p. 34), post-war Romania could have taken over the role of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire as a *“leading power in the East”*, otherwise, he considered that an economic and social regression in Romania could have been an opportunity for the *“Bolshevization and Russification”* of the country. It was not desirable, therefore he considered, in the interest of his country, to support Romania *“in its economic and state consolidation”* (Ib., p. 35).

But, especially, the importance of the Briand-Kellogg Pact for Romania was that it paved the way for a reconciliation in Romanian-Soviet relations, constituting the future legislative basis regarding final the documents for the regulation of relations between the two states, knowing that through the decree signed by Vl. Ilyich Lenin, on 13/26 January 1918, Soviet Russia had unilaterally broken diplomatic relations with Romania.

*

In the period following the conclusion of the Pact of Paris, in the spirit of its provisions, the diplomatic efforts dedicated to the defence of peace took on various forms of manifestation, whether they were initiated by specific international forums or by the governments of countries located in the immediate vicinity of possible outbreaks of war.

The Soviet Union had a similar initiative. Eager for affirmation and recognition on an international level, after having joined the Briand-Kellogg Pact, on 4 October 1928, in accordance with Article 1 of the document (which provided for the possibility of the other states joining), the USSR proposed to the Polish and Lithuanian governments, on 29 December 1928, the signing of a *“protocol”* for the early implementation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The stated goal was to consolidate peace in Eastern Europe. Initially, a tripartite agreement was intended: Soviet-Polish-Lithuanian, but, in the end, other countries from the region were also involved, including Romania.

With Romania, Soviet Russia had not held official talks since 1924. Moreover, a press release of the *“TASS”* Agency, dated 18 March 1927, revealed this fact, noting that *“neither open, nor direct negotiations had been held, nor indirectly”*; as *“no negotiations on Soviet-Romanian relations with any other government and gave*

no reason to suppose a possible return of the USSR compared to the position they took in 1924, in Vienna, on the Bessarabia issue” (*Relațiile româno-sovietice. Documente*, vol. I, 1999, p. 266).

The announcement was made at a time when Italy was going to ratify the Convention it had signed on 28 October 1920, recognizing the union of Bessarabia with Romania¹².

Anyway, by the end of the same year (1927), the USSR made attempts for an official contact with Romania (AMAE, collection 71/1920-1944, URSS, vol. 78, pp. 314, 320).

The efforts continued the following year – especially through the representatives of the Little Entente – when the “*tendency of getting closer to Russia*” had been observed, during the meeting of the three in Geneva, in March 1928.

In this context, the representative of Czechoslovakia, Eduard Benes, had been empowered to negotiate with the USSR, including for a Romanian-Soviet understanding, without prejudicing our country’s position on the issue of Bessarabia – the Gordian knot in Romanian-Soviet relations. Negotiations continued until the first part of 1929, through various friendly diplomatic channels, finally finding a text formula for an unanimously acceptable treaty, which was to emphasize the “*maintenance of the existing peace situation*” (Ib., collection 71 URSS/1917-1937, vol. 137, p. 110) between the signatory states. In these conditions was signed, on 9 February 1929, the *Moscow Protocol* or *Litvinov Protocol*, between the governments of Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Ib., collection 71 URSS/1920-1944, vol. 132, pp. 267-269; vol. 189, pp. 126-129).

THE ROMANIAN AND SOVIET MILITARY POTENTIAL – AS A MEANS OF SECURITY, IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS – DEBATED DURING THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

In the same year of the signing of the Litvinov Pact, 1929, the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament from the League of Nations entered its 6th session and had the difficult mission of coagulating the divergent opinions of the representatives of the participating countries, so the *Draft Convention on the reduction*

¹² It had previously been ratified by: Great Britain, on 14 April 1922; France, on 24 April 1924; Italy, on 23 May 1927; Japan never ratified it.

and limitation of armaments (AMR, collection 948, Microfilme, roll P.II. 1.2000, f. 74-79), began to take shape, in order to be subject to the debate of the *General Conference on Disarmament*¹³.

Referring to the contribution of the Romanian military delegation within this international body in Geneva, we can say that it was an important one, in the sense of the concern for ensuring national security. Evidence of such an appreciation is currently offered by an invaluable documentary collection kept especially in the Archives of the Ministry of National Defence, drawn up at that time by the higher fora with attributions in the defence of the country. Being debated in the Superior Council of National Defence and presented at the Geneva *Disarmament Conference*, in order to be able to support the need to ensure the security of the Romanian state, it was a strictly secret material and remained so for a long time.

To the sources cited above, we add another, equally original and useful for the topic under debate, namely the testimony of the former Major, at that time, Corneliu

¹³ The issue of Disarmament in general has been debated in many specialists works, such as: André Gardes, *Le désarmement devant la Société des Nations*, Ed. A. Pedone, Paris, 1929; Davud Daries, *Le problème du XX-e siècle*, Paris, Payot, 1931; *Resolution adoptée de 1843-1931 par les congrès universels de la paix concernant la désarmement*, Geneva, 1932; “*Sociétés des Nations, Conférence pour la réduction et la limitation des armements*”, in *Journal*, no. 5/6 February 1932; Liviu P. Nasta, “*Marea bătaie pentru dezarmare și pace*”, in *Adevărul*, 22 November 1932; Georges Otlilik, *La Sociétés des Nations et le désarmement, Editions de l’Annuaire de la Sociétés des Nations*, Geneva, 1932; Paul Mantoux, Alfred Zimmern, Ernst Jäckh, Henry de Jouvenel, *Le désarmement et l’opinion internationale*, Paris, 1932; Constantin Kirițescu, *Dezarmarea morală. Le Désarmement moral*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1933; A. Soreanu (LTC), *Dezarmarea*, București, 1934; A. Soreanu (LTC), G.J. Ciorogaru (PhD), *Civilizație și potențialul de război*, Imprimeria Națională, București, 1935; Aimé l’Hote, *Renseignements documentaires sur la Conférence pour la Réduction et la Limitation des Armements*, Paris, 1936; Pierre F. Brugière, *La sécurité collective, 1919-1945*, Ed. A. Pedone, Paris, 1946; Eduard Milhaud, “*Le pacte de la Sociétés des Nations et le Pacte de Renonciation à la guerre*”, in *Dictionnaire diplomatique*, vol. I., n.d. I. Lemin, “*Formarea celor două focare de război și lupta Uniunii Sovietice pentru securitatea colectivă (1931-1938)*”, in *Politica externă a URSS și relațiile internaționale contemporane*, Editura A.R.L.U.S., 1952; I.F. Ivașin, *Contribuții la istoria politicii externe a U.R.S.S.*, Editura Politică, București, 1960; Raimond Barraine, *La réglementation des rapports internationaux et l’Organisation des Nations Unies*, Paris, 1964; Gh. Zaharia, D. Tuțu, “*Aspecte ale politicii externe a României în anii 1933-1936*”, in *Anale*, no. 5/1965; N.Z. Lupu, “*Planul de la Geneva și împrejurările eșuării lui*”, in *Anale*, no. 1, 1966; Naoum Sloutzky, *La Société des Nations et le contrôle du commerce international des armes de guerre (1919-1938)*, Centre européen, de la Dotation Carnagie pour la paix internationale, Genève, 1969; Z.S. Șeinin, “*V Ghenuie i Gaaghe (Straniți diplomaticeșkoi deiatelnosti M.M. Litvinova)*”, in *Novaia i noveișia istoria*, Moscow, no. 3, 1968; Sergiu Verona, *Armele și dezarmarea*, Editura Politică, București, 1970 etc.

Teodorini¹⁴, who, from 1930, was part of the Romanian Military Commission in Geneva, therefore, directly participated in both the PCD as well as in the General Conference on Disarmament.



Towards Montreux – members of the Romanian delegation to the League of Nations Disarmament Conference (from left to right): Major C. Teodorini, General Toma Dumitrescu, N. Titulescu, Savel Rădulescu, Adjutant Colonel Aviator I. Stoicescu (Source: MMN Archive, “Original Photographs” Collection, inventory number 19570)

According to his notes, the composition of the Romanian delegation at CD was: the head of the delegation – Dimitrie Ghica, the Minister of Foreign Affairs;

¹⁴ Archive of the National Military Museum “King Ferdinand I” (hereafter: M.M.N. Archive), in: *Memories from the career of General Corneliu Teodorini* (hereafter: *Memories...*), in: “Manuscript” Collection (in short: mss. no. 306, written in 1965), pp. 1-2. Corneliu Teodorini (1893–1976) participated between September 1930 and December 1933 in the League of Nations Disarmament Conference, respectively in the Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments. At that time, he was working at the Second Intelligence Section, Bureau 4 Treaties and Military Attaches, the structure that dealt with “issues pending with the League of Nations” (M.M.N. Archive, mss. no. 306/1965, p. 6); later he was attached to the military in France and Belgium (November 1938 - May 1941); he witnessed the events of the “war” in France (September 1939-July 1940) and the Regime of Marshal Petain-Vichy (July 1940-May 1941); he was an active participant on the fronts of the Second World War, both in the East and in the West, holding, at the same time, important positions. Thanks to his merits, he was promoted in this confrontation to the rank of general and obtained important military distinctions: the Order “Mihai Viteazul” cl. III, by Royal Decree no. 399/8.02.1943 and cl. II, by Royal Decree no. 3267/20.12.1943 (as brigadier general) etc.

and as members: Nicolae Titulescu, minister plenipotentiary in London; C. Antoniadă, minister plenipotentiary to LN; university professor I. Petrovici; General Nicolae Samsonovici, head of the Great General Staff.; minister Al. Zăuceanu; minister Savel Rădulescu, head of the economic division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; General Toma Dumitrescu, Commander of the Army Corps; deputies: university professor V.V. Pella; technical advisors and experts: Commander E. Roșca, Colonel Aviator royal field aid I. Stoicescu, Lieutenant Colonel Gh. Potopeanu, Lieutenant Colonel B. Alinescu, Major. C. Teodorini, secretary of the military delegation; secretaries: Ed. Ciuntu, first secretary of the Romanian Legation under LN; D. Buzdugan, first secretary of the Legation in London; P. Zănescu, attached to the legation; other private secretaries and typists (MMN, Manuscripts collection, mss. no. 306/1965, p. 21).

By the way, Major Corneliu Teodorini was also the head of the “S.D.N. Military Bureau”, established in 1932, which was subordinated to the Superior Council of National Defence (SCND), reflecting, once again, the importance given to this issue at the management level of the the country. In that Office, Teodorini also had Captain Zadic and Sergeant-Major of Administration Dragomirescu (secretary) as helpers, both from the Second Section of the Great General Staff (AMR, Collection 948, Microfilms, roll P.II.1.2008, f. 198)¹⁵.

General Toma Dumitrescu, the representative of the Romanian military delegation since the establishment of the PCD, following the unfolding of events in the country in the early 1929, informed about the state of mind in Geneva, stating that, from 1925 to the end of 1929 (6th session), “things had settled down and the debates were about to reach a common denominator” (Ib., roll P.II. 1.2000, f. 67-69, Report no. 447/28 May 1929). There was also the possibility of establishing a date for convening the CD, based on a “Draft Convention, on which the great powers and the majority of the states had to agree, except Germany and the rest of the armies defeated in the great war, as well as Soviet Russia” (Ib., f. 67).

At that stage, the great powers tried to impose their principles, summarized as follows:

- 1.) in the issue of “limitation of land armaments – the French point of view prevailed;
- 2.) for naval armaments – the Anglo-American point of view;
- 3.) for aerial armaments – the Franco-English point of view” (Ib., f. 68).

¹⁵ The two had already accompanied Teodorini for two years, at the Disarmament Conference.

The Romanian delegation, in agreement with its allies, supported the French point of view, which stipulated that *“the first step towards disarmament must be carried out taking into account the degree of security enjoyed by each individual state and the assurance of their full sovereignty”*. This *“corresponded to the interests of our national defence, the situation of armaments [...], reserving, at the same time, the possibility and freedom to equip our army with the armaments we needed”*.

It should be noted that in 1929, three conventions related to disarmament had been drawn up at the League of Nations, the implementation of which could have been *“very disadvantageous”* for Romania, as General Dumitrescu expressed it, if the existing situation in the country does not change as quickly as possible. The conventions he was talking about referred to: 1.) Control and publicity of private and state factories, of war materials; 2.) Control and publicity of war material trade; 3.) The limitation and reduction of armaments. By implementing them, Romania would have had *“great inconveniences”*, because, according to the wording in the documentation: *“while other countries that will possess the complete, or almost complete, material will have nothing to publish, we should submit to control and expose the huge material that we lack. We will thus appear to be the most militaristic country in Europe, while the reality is different”*. To the difficult situation, the only solution we can apply is *“hasten for the supply of the army with the materials it needs, for an increase in our military expenditure for equipping the army will be very difficult later, when the limitation and reduction convention are enforced”* (Ib., f. 69).

Later, through a balance report dated 7 October 1929 (Ib., f. 70-73)¹⁶, General Dumitrescu again informed his superiors about the evolution of the disarmament problem at the LN. For a better understanding of what was previously presented and in attempt to highlight as conclusively as possible the concerns of the League of Nations in the thorny issue of disarmament, he came up with new additions.

Invoking the *“Convention on the Control and Publicity of the International Trade in Arms, Munitions and War Material”*, drawn up in 1925 and signed by more than 50 states, he specified that, due to some flaws in the content, it had only been ratified by a very small number of states (4). It could thus be easily deduced the inconvenience it presented to most states, because, if it had been implemented, only non-armament producing countries would have been forced to submit to control, which would have put them in a state of inferiority to the producing

countries. In order to ensure a fair resolution of the situation, it was concluded that in the final part of the aforementioned Convention, the composition of another convention should be specified, which would have as its object the control and publicity of *“private manufactures of weapons etc.”*, in accordance with art. 8 of the LN, which was absolutely necessary to be able to put into force the first arms control convention from 1925.

As a result of the above requirement, it was established at the LN a special Commission that developed, in the 1927/1928 sessions, a *Draft Convention on the private production of weapons etc.*, based on the provisions contained in the 1925 Convention (Ib., f. 70).

Referring to the interest of Romania, vis-à-vis the two documents, General Dumitrescu indicated that *“the application of both the 1925 Convention (traffic) and that of manufacturing (the 1929 project) are not favourable to us as long as we do not have the necessary weapons for our safety. The explanation was that during this time we would be subject to the publicity obligations provided for in both conventions, whether we buy materials from abroad or manufacture them in the country”*, while *“the states that currently possess the armaments they need will not be affected by the provisions of these conventions”* (Ib., f. 71). To complete what has been stated, he added: *“we sought and obtained that in both conventions the application of advertising obligations should be suspended for Romania, Poland and the Baltic countries, as long as Russia does not adhere to these conventions”* (Ib., f. 72). In the same sense, General Dumitrescu showed that also in the session of August 1929, during the discussions on the *Draft Convention on Manufactures*, by common agreement with France, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Romania had supported the restriction of advertising of state manufactures.

At the same time, he had also agreed with the French proposal for postponing the manufacturing convention, until after the work of the Disarmament Preparatory Commission was finished. The Romanian General specified that he had supported it in order *“to gain time and avoid the shortcomings that the application of this convention would bring us in the current situation”*. At the end, the general added that the *Draft Convention* presenting the aforementioned divergences was sent to the General Assembly of the LN, where it was submitted to the 3rd Commission (of disarmament), within which a resolution had also been approved that was presented by the Romanian delegation. Its was done in the sense of a *“new meeting of the Special Commission, for the definitive drafting of the Draft Convention, only after the PCD will decide on the <Publicity> Chapter”*.

¹⁶ Document addressed to the Chief of the General Staff – General N. Samsonovici.

The informative document to which I referred was presented to the Minister of War, General Henri Cihoski¹⁷, on 31 October 1929. Through the resolution he placed on that document, he undertook the mission of informing the Superior Council of National Defence about *“the need for the urgent arming of our army”, “in relation to the changes in the activity of the Military Section of the League of Nations”* (AMR, collection 948, Microfilms, roll P.II.1.2000, f. 70) – as it was expressed.

By the end of 1929, the *Draft Convention on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments* (Ib., c. 74-79) was already foreshadowed at the Geneva forum, on which the Romanian representative had drawn up an extensive Report (Ib., collection M.St.M., file no. 338, pp. 3-42)¹⁸, for the information of the country’s decision-makers. Mainly, it should be noted that in the *Draft Convention*, an extensive analysis was made on the following chapters: I. Military forces; II. Materials; III. Budgetary expenses; IV. Chemical warfare and V. General provisions.

For the preparation of the documentation related to each mentioned chapter, precise instructions were recorded in the *Report*. For example, with regard to the *Troops*, it was stipulated: *“The land, naval and air forces are dealt with, each state commissioning itself to limit its forces in service, fixing certain figures that must be entered in the tables. When establishing these tables, the numbers will be entered as men in service, results from the calculation of average daily effectives, which are obtained by dividing the total number of days of presence by the number of days of the budget year”*¹⁹ (Ib., collection 948, Microfilms, roll P.II.1.2000, f. 97-130).

At Art.-A. of the Chapter *Military forces*, details were given on the figures that had to be entered in the tables or published as information in the Chapter V of the Convention. Article “A” also stated that the number of untrained recruits could be made public, but as *“optional information”*.

¹⁷ General Henri Cihoski (1872-1950) led the Ministry of War in the Iuliu Maniu Government, between 10 November 1928-7 June 1930. Under this government, a series of economic laws were developed, with the intention of protecting the armament and security of the country. In the context of the deterioration of the international situation, as a result of the insufficient equipment of the Romanian Armed Forces, the government decided to take measures to remedy the situation. Appreciating that the Romanian industry cannot manufacture the necessary armaments and ammunition in a very short time, the government concluded a contract with the Czechoslovak company *Skoda*, on 17 March 1930, in the amount of 1,250 million lei, for machine guns, and 5,500 million of lei for cannons, a total of 6.75 billion lei. The conditions under which this contract was concluded would generate lively debates regarding the *“Skoda affair”*. On 8 April 1935, the contract was redefined (Source: Ion Mamina, Ioan Scurtu, *Guverne și guvernanți 196-1938*, Editura Silex, București, 1996, pp. 69-72, 77).

¹⁸ See also collection *Microfilms*, roll P.II.1.2001. *Dare de seamă asupra activității Conferinței Dezarmării, între 25 aprilie-15 iunie 1933*.

¹⁹ *“Instrucțiunile...”* - Work was signed by Major General Henri Cihoski, Minister of War, Major General Samsonovici, Chief of the General Staff, and by the head of the 1st Organization-Mobilization Section, Colonel Dediu.

In Art.-C, it is detailed *“what is meant by militarily organized formations”*: police forces of any nature, whose effective numbers are limited and entered in the tables from Art. A. For this chapter, the First Section of the Great General staff and of the army inspectorates had the mission of compiling tables with the situation of the army as of that date, *“compared to the provisions of the budget for the year 1930, for the Great General Staff to appreciate, for the future, what figures should foresee and which would lead to the change of budget expenditures in the respective chapters”*. Also, it became necessary to find a way *“to camouflage some effectives in the service, admitting that the establishment of some limit figures no longer allowed increases when applying the convention”* (Ib., f. 75).

As an observation, it was added: *“In this chapter, only the limitation or fixation of the effectives in service was provided. It must be taken into account that the possibility is not excluded that some delegations will come back and add – as a requirement – the limitation of the trained reserves”* (Ib., f. 76).

For the same chapter, reference was then made to a bushy and meticulous situation (presented in 14 annexes) (Ib., f. 102-105)²⁰, regarding the effectives of each individual unit, from which I compiled a centralization, for example, in *table 1*.

Table 1: Global effectives by units and periods, for the troops in term (including gradations), for the year 1929 (Ib., f. 102-105)

UNIT NAME	1.01.– 4.02 (48 days) Older	18.02 – 28.06 (131 days)			29.06 – 1.09 (65 days)	2.09 – 22.10. (15 days)	23.10 – 31.12 (70 days)	Remarks
		Recruit	Total					
I. Ministry of War – total	2529	2529	574	3103	2303	3103	2463	
II. Military Commands – total	3114	3537	-	3537	2645	3537	3287	

²⁰ The 12 centralizations were: Appendix no. 1 – *Table of the global effectives by units and periods, for the troop in term (including gradations), for the year 1929*; Appendix no. 2 – *Table of the global effectives of the gradations of troop corps*; Appendix no. 3 – *Table of the combat force of an Infantry Regiment Type “A”*; Appendix no. 4 – *Table of the combat force of a Type “B” Infantry Regiment*; Appendix no. 5 – *Table of the combat force of a Type “C” Infantry Regiment*; Appendix no. 6 – *Table of the combat force of a Battalion of Rifles*; Appendix no. 7 – *Table of the combative force of a Regiment of Hussards*; Appendix no. 8 – *Table of the combat force of an Artillery Regiment (gun, shell) Type “A”*; Appendix no. 9 – *Table of the combat force of an Artillery Regiment (gun, shell) Type “B”*; Appendix no. 10 – *Table of the combative force of a Mounted Artillery and Mountain Gun Division*; Appendix no. 11 – *Table of the combat force of a mountain Howitzer Regiment*; Appendix no. 12 – *Table of the number of days of maintenance, which belong to the commands, troop bodies and services by periods and for the whole year*; Appendix no. 13 – *Table of distribution of animals in army*; Appendix no. 14 – *Table of the number of guards and of civil preventive force remains*.

UNIT NAME	1.01.– 4.02 (48 days) Older	18.02 – 28.06 (131 days)			29.06 – 1.09 (65 days)	2.09 – 22.10. (15 days)	23.10 – 31.12 (70 days)	Remarks	
		Recruit	Total						
III. The infantry – total	48184	47320	59355	106675	59540	106675	52790		
Reg.	Type “A”*	1090	1078	1022	2100	1380	2100	1100	
	Type “B”	600	788	912	1500	650	1500	630	
	Type “C”	460	448	452	900	400	900	400	
IV. Cavalry – total	8859	8855	8778	17633	9510	17633	8170		
V. Artillery – total	17013	17599	19924	36893	20144	36893	17789		
VI. Engineering – total	5292	5221	7620	12841	5685	12841	5550		
VII. Military firefighters	684	684	276	960	500	960	490		
VIII. Military high schools	667	667	240	907	520	907	655		
IX. Justice, camps, orders (garrison commands)	656	704	-	704	629	704	619		
X. Recruitment / Circles	2677	3124	-	3124	2190	3124	2411		
XI. Deposits of Remount	570	570	260	830	555	830	490		
XII. Armament establishments, ammunition	4500	4510	2140	6650	4080	6650	4140		
XIII. Sanitary establishments	3074	3075	978	4053	2265	4053	2505		
XIV. Administrative establishments	2194	2194	1485	3679	1963	3679	1960		
XV. Guards with enlisted troop	811	811	-	811	811	811	811		
GENERAL TOTAL	101424	101400	101000	202400	113340	202400	104130		

*) It differs, since 1930 their numbers will be supplemented, reaching 2,100 (maximum).

Increased attention was also paid to the “industries that worked for the needs of defence”, and for which a draft law had been drawn up, only after a thorough study on the way in which the neighbour states presented themselves, especially those with revenge orientations, but also for the friends, the conclusion being disarming for the state of supply of the Romanian armed forces.

At the end of the study, Lieutenant Colonel Velescu, head of the 4th Section from the Great General Staff, concluded: “For us, the issue must be studied in advance by Section I and IV of the Great General Staff, and by the XII Technical Directorate (from the Ministry of Defence), as bodies directly interested, and by Section III and II as consultative bodies, to see [...] what can be proposed for the future. The general views of Section IV are directed towards the Polish system (highly developed), which have to be added a part of the ideas of the French system, of course, applied to our political, economic, industrial situation” (Ib., f. 294) etc.

The responsible factors of the Romanian armed forces had such concerns in the following period as well, all the more so since our neighbours from the east, as we reported in the previous section, had waved the spectre of war, remaining followers of disarmament only at the declarative level, as we will ascertain.

Extensive studies were devoted to Armaments of the USSR, from which it follows that their military potential was not in agreement with the statements.

It is necessary to recall that during the 4th session of the PCD, from November-December 1927²¹, the USSR had officially expressed its point of view on disarmament, through the resolution proposed by Maxim Litvinov. The Soviet commissar then demanded: “the complete abolition of the land, naval and air armed forces, the destruction of all armaments, ammunition and all means of war, the cessation of recruitment for military service, the abolition of military service, voting of laws which to declared the violation of the above conditions as crimes against the state” (Moisuc, 2003; 2007, p. 135).

The proposal was supported at the time only by Germany and Turkey, but it had fundamental flaws: 1.) the security of the borders was not ensured by anything; 2.) it did not exclude the policy of force and the threat of force; 3.) it did not recognize in advance the territorial *status quo* of the states; 4.) it did not exclude invasion through different forms and means. Regarding the last point, we must remember the Comintern, through which the USSR was organizing actions to undermine the sovereignty of neighbouring national states. The “Tatar-Bunar” case, from 1924, was instructive in this regard. On the other hand, based on the programmatic documents issued by the Communist International, a program had been developed to “destruct the armed forces” of the non-communist states, because their defence depended precisely on the degree of “solidity” of the respective countries’ armed forces. In this vision, in the program entitled: *The Work of the Communist Party*

²¹ The Soviet project, although rejected by most states, was taken up with insistence by the Soviet and German foreign ministers, Maxim Litvinov and Gustav Stresemann, in 1928 and 1929.

for the Disintegration of the Armed Forces of the Dominant Classes, it was clearly stated, along with many other considerations, that “the possibility of the proletariat to overthrow the bourgeoisie will largely depend on the degree of disintegration of a bourgeois army and the crush of the bourgeois state”, when there is “an immediate revolutionary situation” (ANIC, collection C.C. al P.C.R., Foreign Relations, file no. 32/1933, pp. 415-431).

So, the Soviets campaigned for formal, official disarmament, instead through the well-known subversive methods, they made the prologue of the world revolution that did not exclude war. But for them it was “excusable”, because they preached the “noble” cause of the Bolshevization of the world!

Such a reality was also exposed by the Soviets in “Pravda”, in 1929, saying: “The issue of the fight against the war must be raised in the future enlarged session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and detailed resolutions must be adopted, explaining that only the revolutionary party, tried and prepared in advance, with a good illegal apparatus, will be able to successfully carry out the campaign against the war; that the means of fighting the war is not the strike, but the organization of revolutionary cells in all the belligerent armies and their preparation for making the revolution” (Pravda, 20 January 1929).

And what was the revolution, if not a state of anarchic, militaristic confrontation?

We must also remember that the USSR was in friendly and collaborative relations with the other “victim” of the Versailles treaty system, Germany, since the first years after the war. It is appropriate to invoke the date of 16 April 1922, when, in Rappallo, Walter Rathenau and Gheorghe Cicerin signed the German-Soviet Cooperation Treaty, with several secret annexes, supplementing the secret military agreements of 17 April 1919 and 25 March 1921. Thus, they flagrantly violated the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations²². The German-Soviet dream was big and bold, envisioning an Eastern Europe allied with Central Europe to swallow up Western Europe (Jitianu, Cd. C.II. A.T., ib., p. 9).

²² General Ion Jitianu, Commander of the II (A.T.) Corps, *A few words on disarmament* (hereinafter: *A few words...*), 1923. (Bucharest: the Great Staff), p. 9. *La France Militaire*, of 16 December 1922, recorded that the German-Russian alliance treaty, on the basis of which there was such cooperation, had been signed on the Russian side by Novitzky and Stefans, and on the German side by General von Seeck and Admiral Behne. Following these agreements, it was no longer a secret that in 1923 the Russian armed forces had benefited from major German support: over 500 officers had been sent to Moscow; a large number of engineers from the “Krupp” factory had worked for the assembly of the plants in Petrograd and Samara, in Kronstadt they had rebuilt the fleet. Germany had also sent Russia 500 airplanes, and in the Monsk-Petrograd-Moscow region they had rebuilt the railways.

In this sense, the Soviets wasted no time, as it is known. Since the Moscow Disarmament Conference (December 1922), half of the budget of that year had been allocated to war material. This fact determined the USSR, through its delegation from the PCD, that on 8 December 1930, when the *Draft Convention* was accepted, to adopt a position of total rejection (Sofronie, p, 21; Matei, p. 65). The document, being largely inspired by the French theses, maintained the provisions of a military nature from the peace treaties, therefore, it did not give “equality of treatment” as Germany wanted. And because the document avoided an effective solution to the disarmament problem, providing only a reduction and limitation indirect, budgetary, of the armaments (quite imprecise), it was refused by the Soviets.

It is also interesting to note that in the discussions on the report of the PCD (the Cobian-Bourquin report) to the Council of the League of Nations, there was a “live confrontation” between the representative of the Soviets, A.V. Lunacerski, and the Polish delegate, General Kaperzinschi, in connection with the “reservations” expressed by some states bordering Soviet Russia: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Romania. All these states conditioned the signing of the Disarmament Convention on its signing by the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegate considered the reservation as an affront, demanding the withdrawal of the relevant paragraph, as well as the final provisions of the Draft Convention. He had declared that it was “unacceptable”, because it put his country in an “exceptional situation”, because: “Nothing gives the right to say that the Soviet Government will not sign the convention” (Matei, p. 66; Dimineața, 11 December 1930). After the incident, a “transactional text” was then adopted, with the following content: “In the text of the convention adopted in the first reading, there was an article by which Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland and Romania specified certain conditions for their accession to this convention.

The Commission decided to reserve consideration of this proposal for the Conference on Disarmament. This provision was taken for two reasons; the first, because the text raised an eminently political issue; and the second, because it was a complete problem, that of the game of the reservations which the contracting parties will possibly afford, to formulate at the time of signing”.

The text was also accepted by Romania, being then voted with a majority of votes.

Considering such facts, Romania followed with attention and concern the evolution of the state of armament of the neighbouring state, especially since the warnings of an expected war against us, coming from everywhere. From a detailed study of 1930, which we will refer to for exemplification, without pretending

to exhaust it, it was found that *“Russia was intensively preparing for war”*, that *“it was making extraordinary efforts to train the troops and officers, for the creation and improvement of its own military industry, for increasing the number of technical means and for the preparation of the entire economy of the country, in view of the war”* (AMR, collection 948, S.C.S.A.T., file no. 4/1930, p. 62)..

The policy of *“peace”* that Soviet Russia preached at the League of Nations was *“diametrically opposed to the military preparations”* it was making, having at its disposal an *“enormous”* budget for equipment and training (Ib., p. 58). So, the military forces of the USSR knew a great increase, and especially aviation, whose achievements *“exceeded all expectations”*, being rated as the best. In this field, Stalin himself had publicly committed that in the future, not to make any material sacrifices so that the aviation would be ready to *“destroy in a few hours, enemy cities within a radius of 500 km”*; in the same sense developing an industry of *“combat gases”*, through the German company *“Stolzenberg”* (Ib., p. 59).

The USSR had also taken important measures to fortify the border and build strategic roads, and to check the military knowledge of the troops and officers, manoeuvres were held every year. In this way, the Soviet armed forces were *“maintained in an atmosphere of immediate danger and hatred against neighbours, by all possible means”*.

Regarding the armaments and the war industry in Soviet Russia, it could be said that, in the period 1927-1929, it had taken care to equip its entire army with armaments and war material, especially for the border divisions. Then, during 1929-1930, the Soviets pursued the development of technical and motorized weapons, especially for heavy artillery. Regarding to the infantry, it should be specified that since 1928 they had equipped it with a machine gun of their own construction, much superior to the previous one; and in 1929 they had built in their own factories two models of light battle chariots, as well as a new type of armoured car.

The information also showed that starting from 1927, the Soviets made great efforts *“to increase the war industry and prepare the industrial mobilization”*, and *“thanks to the German technical aid”*, they could fuel *“a long-lasting war, with their own means”*. For it they had own: cannon foundries, weapons factories, arsenals for artillery material, 15-20 factories of airplanes and aviation materials, numerous factories and factories of tractors, tanks and armoured vehicles of their own models.

Apart from its own industrial effort, Soviet Russia armed itself also through orders in Germany, Italy, the USA and Czechoslovakia, countries whose industries *“removing all political considerations”* thought *“only of material advantages”* (Ib.,

p. 60), as stated in the mentioned study. For example, in 1928 they had bought from:

- 1.) Germany – aircraft engines, armoured motorcycles, anti-aircraft artillery optics;
 - 2.) Italy – 300 *“Savoya”* seaplanes, 2 counter-torpedoes, 3 cargo boats, 3 coastal defence vessels, *“Fiat”* light battle chariots; and following an agreement, until 1932 it was to buy also other materials for aviation, the fleet and the metallurgical industry, worth 200 million lire.
- To the mentioned equipment, others were added from:
- 3.) America – about 5,000 tractors;
 - 4.) Sweden – from *“Cassa Bofors”* – torpedoes and airplane bombs;
 - 5.) Czechoslovakia – *“Avia B.H.3”* fighter planes and *“Walter”* engines for airplanes;
 - 6.) England – 60 battle chariots;
 - 7.) Paris – 400 planes.

For all this, primarily the USSR had a budget for the military that *“exceeded all other countries in Europe”*. From 1924 until the date in question it had increased year after year, as the statistic in table 2 below also reflect (Ib., p. 61).

Budget year	The General Budget (million rubles)	Army budget (million rubles)	The proportion in which the military budget increased compared to the previous year %	The proportion in which the military budget increased compared to the budget of 1924/1925 %
1924/25	403,5	35,1	-	-
1925/26	678,7	59,0	68	68
1926/27	780,8	67,9	15	93
1927/28	923,0	80,3	18	128
1928/29	1061,0	92,3	14	162
1929/30	1115,6	97,0	5	176

*) The data entered in the table were officially communicated by Soviet Russia

In conclusion, according to the budget intended for the military, 217,500 lei were intended annually per one Soviet soldier.

Second, Soviet Russia had benefited from the *“intellectual support”* of the *German Reichswehr* (Ib., pp. 61-62). In the same vein, it is interesting to note that during the manoeuvres of 1929, the Soviet fleet visited the German ports in East Prussia, exchanging *“courtesy”* with the German officers in Swinemünde.

Also, German General Hammerstein, commander of the *Reichswehr*, participated in the Soviet manoeuvres in 1929; and to German manoeuvres on the Elbe, participated a delegation of Soviet officers, headed by General Kork, Army Commander. Then, numerous officers and engineers from the German armed forces worked in factories in Soviet Russia, and Russian officers, in turn, participated in the command trips of the German General Staff.

Regarding the aforementioned collaboration, the *Daily Mail*, from 6 September 1930, headlined: *“It is obvious that former German officers are currently leading the construction of airplanes and airships in Soviet factories. Numerous German experts, mostly former officers of the German armed forces, work in the 64 toxic plants of Soviet Russia”* (Ib., p. 132).

For its part, the German newspaper *Tempo* recorded: *“Soviet officers can participate in the command trips of German General Staff officers and are informed about the tactical and armament matters of this military. Red Army officers have free access to German infantry schools, where Uborevich, former commander of the Moscow Military District, also did a long internship. They can enter everywhere and learn about all the secret dispositions of the German military”* (Ib., p. 133).

Over all visible forces, the USSR was also preparing numerous camouflaged military forces. Apart from the pre-military activities, they also had paramilitary ones, so that one could speak of an *“armed nation”* (Ib., p. 123). The education of the masses for the war was entrusted to militarized societies, the most important of which was *“Osoaviachim”*, which had over 5,000,000 members, and was led by *“the most outstanding military, technical and scientific personalities”*. Its purpose was to *“prepare the elements of the armed forces before incorporation, to maintain and extend the military service and to equip the Soviet armed forces with the most modern means of combat (aircraft, chemical means, tanks etc.)”* (Ib., p. 58). And according to a law that was to enter into force (in 1933), *“all elements of the nation, of both sexes and of any age”* were *“obliged to render productive military service in case of war”* (Ib., p. 124); service that extended to all branches of activity: industry, agriculture, schools and universities, state or private establishments. Both students and workers of any category were required to complete a military course and take part in manoeuvres or exercises with the troops, and those who for certain reasons were exempted from military service were required to perform other works of public utility, such as: field work, in forests, road construction, fortifications etc., both in peacetime and in wartime.

The Soviet leadership went so far with this field of total military education that it was expected that *“the education of fighters should start from the school benches, not only to the troops but also in the concentration camps”*. Voroshilov himself, the military commissar of War and Navy (Ministry of War) publicly appreciated, in 1930, that in the last five years the Red Army had made progress, moving to new forms of organization, based on new regulations; the active training of the commanders was improved and the individual training of the shooter and specialists etc.

On this aspect and, especially, on the value of the Soviet command staff, Romanian military analysts appreciated:

- *“The command staff, intended for the Great Commandments, are generally young and without military training and special culture;*
- *They all have the experience of the civil war, where they distinguished themselves as men of energy and with the intuition of leading the masses;*
- *Lately, some of them, even the older ones, have started attending the War Academy and other training courses;*
- *The superior officers are of the same quality;*
- *Lower command personnel are well trained. The majority consists of convinced communists;*
- *Where the party does not have absolute confidence in the commander of the Great Unit, it is doubled by a military commissar”* (Ib., p. 122).

Following what was presented, the Romanian military specialists concluded that *“Russia is intensively preparing for war”*, making, therefore, *“extraordinary efforts for the training of troops and officers, for the creation and improvement of its own military industry, for the increasing number of the technical means and for the preparation of the entire economy in view of the war”* (Ib., p. 62). The Soviets had the same preoccupation even later, predicting amounts even higher for the 1934 budget exercise, as the following figures demonstrate:

1.) The General Budget for the year 1934 had been fixed, by the decree of 4 January 1934, at the amount of 48,879 million rubles (3,910,353,000,000 lei = 3 trillion, 910 billion, 353 million lei), which represented an increase of almost 40% compared to the 1933 budget;

2.) The armed forces budget – totals 2,873,295,000 rubles (229,863,600,000 lei), with an increase of 27% compared to the 1933 budget.

Therefore, the proportion of the army budget to the general budget was 5.88%. Under these conditions, it was distributed as follows:

- a) for a soldier – 5,113.00 rubles (409,040.00 lei);
- b) for one inhabitant – 17.41 rubles (1,392.80 lei).

It was thus appreciated that the Soviet budget had known a continuous ascendancy, so that in six years it had grown six times, the largest amounts being allocated to the industrial branches that were related to the war potential.

Having also a share of 6.5% intended for the reserve fund, it also offered great flexibility in the secret distributions of the funds, towards the general interest of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The situation was the same with regard to the Budget of the *War and Navy Commissariat* (Ib., f. 451).

And if the troops of the Red Army, *“at the same time, were the same”*, it appeared that *“the majority, if not the totality of the budget above was intended for the Army, for the war materials”* (Ib., f. 452-453). The distribution of the funds of the Soviet military budget by chapter was secret, each year only the global distribution was published, which in the case of the 1934 budget was:

- 58% for the Army and Navy – 1,665,000,000 rubles (133,200,000,000 lei);
- 5% Special Forces – 130,000,000 rubles (10,400,000,000 lei);
- The general administration and management of socio-cultural activities represented 37%, i.e. 1,078,295,000 rubles (86,263,600,600 lei); which meant a General Total of 2,873,295,000 rubles (229,863,600,000 lei).

In the study I referred to, it was also specified that the figures presented did not fully illustrate the reality of the funds intended for the Soviet Armed Forces. In fact, they were much higher, because part of the maintenance expenses had been directed, since 1926, to be supported by the *“budgets of the Republics, Regions and local Administrations”* (Ib., f. 453). To these were added the private contributions, *“more forced than voluntary”*, through a *“skilful propaganda of the Communist Party and militarized civil societies”* – *“Osoaviakhim”, “Autodor”, “Red Cross”* etc.

To show, comparatively, the level of procurement and the capacity of the Romanian Armed Forces at that time, we could continue with similar assessments for Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland (Ib., collection 948, S.C.S.A.T., file no. 4/1930, pp. 68-77).

In any case, following the analyses carried out, a conclusion was clearly imposing, namely that *“a political tension ruled over Europe”*, being reflected in the *“armament over fever”* and in the financial effort that all countries were making *“to ensure their political goals, through armed support as strong as possible”* (Ib., p. 58).

In such an atmosphere, Romania’s military situation was assessed as *“becoming exceptionally serious”*, the results of the analysis of its own military situation being *“more than worrying”* (Ib., p. 77).

Following such an analysis, punctually, it was concluded:

“1.) Our enemies have far superior forces to attack us. The enemy’s armament, especially that of the Russian and Hungarian armies, is being improved every year; heavy and motorized artillery, tanks, and above all, aviation, which will have hundreds, maybe even thousands of planes. Behind their armed forces, our enemies have a powerful war industry capable of supplying by itself the entire consumption of war materials. Romania does not have a war industry.

2.) In front of these perspectives, the military situation of our country becomes exceptionally serious.

Indeed: The enemy is much superior to us numerically and can attack us simultaneously on three frontiers. We are therefore forced to wage a war on internal lines against numerically much superior forces; The experience of all wars proves that, in such a case, the one attacked cannot escape destruction unless it achieves essential conditions: a) to strike decisively and completely beat one of the opponents; b) to manoeuvre quickly between them (see Germany and Austria in the Great War, Romania 1916). However, the material shortages of our army (heavy artillery, aviation, tanks) do not allow us to completely defeat one enemy at a time, and the current state of communications does not allow us to manoeuvre quickly. In such conditions, the problem that the war will pose cannot be solved properly, and the country remains under the threat of a great danger” (Ib., pp. 77-78).

Taking into account these realities and for the recovery of the military system, the Romanian General Staff, starting in 1930, made a series of proposals, which aimed primarily at increasing the mobilization forces, by 1/3 of the total existing at that time, because the morale factor *“had an overwhelming importance”*. Also, it was necessary that *“the material of the army be at the height of modern warfare”*, because otherwise the situation was *“disastrous”* and *“the damages much greater than the expenses”* that would have been made *“to eliminate the shortages”*. It was thus *“imperatively necessary”* that *“the armed forces, in a possible conflict, from the beginning of the operations have strong material support”*, so as not to repeat a 1916.

In the documentation of the General Staff speaking of the *“lack of armaments and materials”* it was mentioned that they are so great that they require a very large expenditure, therefore, in order to be covered, in the *Plan for the material procurement for the Armed Forces*, two implementation stages were proposed:

I. The first stage would have required 49,436,000,000 lei, over a period of 5 (five years), and would have included the provision of the forces with *“the material and armament required by the needs of the war”*, in accordance with the ones mentioned in the *Plan*;

II. The second stage, expected the amount of 27,678,000,000 lei, also for 5 years, and it had referred to *“increasing the number of large units”* (Ib., p. 81).

The periodization was necessary, because *“since the war, the sums necessary for this purpose were not allocated, and a very precious time was lost, so that today (1930- A.N.) we find ourselves in a very difficult situation”*. Added to this was the fact that the country’s industry was not yet organized for the manufacture of war material. It was necessary, therefore, to be encouraged, giving it the opportunity to manufacture war material in peacetime; as, other materials had to be procured from abroad, and in wartime it should not be forgotten that this supply was conditioned by the safety of the communication routes, the experience of the first war showing how easily it could be isolated from this point of view.

Despite all the good thoughts and plans made, in 1930, the first year when the *Plan for the material procurement for the Armed Forces* was applied, from the General Budget of the country, in the amount of 69,480,198,723 lei, only 13.8% was made available to the Armed Forces, i.e. 9,092,700,000 lei, of which 1 billion for the payment of materials from the country and only ½ billion lei for the payment of annuities abroad. To these amounts, the Armed Forces had added 1 billion lei, from its normal budget, which meant a total of 2 million and a half lei, compared to approximately 10 billion lei as it should have been, so that, if things went at that rate, the *Plan* was expected to be achieved in 25 years.

Table 3: General budget of the various states, of which the armed forces budget (Ib., p. 102)*

	Hungary	Poland	Czecho-Slovakia	Bulgaria	France	Yugoslavia	Italy	Romania	Remarks
General Budget	42,8	55,3	46,8	8,3	321,1	41,5	157,8	70	*) note
Army Budget	12,6	15,6	13,1	2,2	83,9	10,5	39,9	9,06	
The proport. between G.B. and A.B., %.	30%	30%	30%	27,54%	26%	25,27%	25,27%	13%	

*) Russia is not included in the table, because with a population of 154,000,000 inhabitants – the general budget being very high, a comparison with the military budget does not show a real picture of the effort made to maintain it.

Making a simple calculation like this, it meant that only in 1955 the Romanian Armed Forces would have carried out its plan of organization and modernization, or the neighbours from the East, as it is known, did not give us the necessary respite (!),

which makes us better understand now, in a historical perspective, the phenomena that generated the territorial seizures of the Second World War.

The evaluations of the state of the Romanian Armed Forces were not only made by the specialists of our country, but also by those from abroad. They came both from Romania’s enemies and from the Allies, which were all the more serious, *“because they were beginning to no longer trust us”* (Ib., p. 82). Such a message emerged from a briefing received from Yugoslavia, in which it was specified that *“the majority of the Yugoslav staff officers declare that the Romanian military has made almost no progress and has lagged far behind in terms of the provision of war material”*; while, in comparison, the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak armed forces made *“remarkable progress in all respects, so that they could say they have <truly modern military>”*; therefore, Romania was warned that by ignoring its military *“it does not respect the obligations of the alliance treaties”* (Ib., p. 92).

However, as far as the USSR assessments on the Romanian Armed Forces were concerned, they were even more worrying, numerous publications reflecting the precarious state of our military. We recall the *“Krasnaia Armia”* (Red Army, dated March 24, 1930), which wrote: *“The military industry in Romania is much weaker than in Poland. The equipment of the Romanian Armed Forces relies on the reserve of armaments and materials acquired following the World War. From the point of view of quantity and especially quality, there are many shortcomings, namely: they have 3 (three) models of weapons: Russian, Austrian and French; The cannons are old, worn out and almost impossible to replace without other supplies from abroad; Artillery material is even more varied than that of infantry”* (Ib., p. 137).

The reviews from *“Krasnaya Zvezda”* (Red Star, from 30.V.1930) were no less harsh (Ib., pp. 90-91). Through the article *The character of the future war*, it was highlighted that *“compared to the other neighbours”*, the Romanian divisions are *“the weakest”*, in terms of their combative force (Ib., p. 137).

Similar assessments were also made in other Soviet writings. For example, the Soviet work: *Foreign Armies and Fleets*, officially published in Moscow, under the auspices of the Soviet Army Printing Office, specified about the Romanian Army: *“Compared to the other armies of our neighbours to the West, the Romanian Army has the weakest preparation for war, and the combat its capacity is reduced”* (Ib., f. 90). Among the causes of this situation, the authors had stated: *“The material condition of the Romanian soldier is miserable: poorly fed, in the barracks he sleeps on bare boards, desertions (are) very frequent, discipline leaves much to be desired. Although the Romanian High Command recently pays special attention to raising*

the army combat capacity and organizing it on a more modern basis, however, the current shortcomings of the army cannot be corrected due to the following causes:

- Lack of a soul connection between the officers and the troop;
- The officers have a bad material situation, they are often moved and, in addition, the good ones are not encouraged and rewarded at all” (Ib., p. 92).

Referring to the “mobilization stock”, the same paper reinforced the claims in *Krasnaia Armia*, on 24 March 1930 (Ib., c. 91).

Regarding the Romanian aviation, the Soviet opinion was that “it does not represent a combat weapon because it has old material, few and primitively arranged airfields”; and concluded that “in a possible war it does not even matter”, and that all these shortcomings “put the Romanian armed forces on the lowest step of war preparation”.

Regarding the Soviet assessments, the Romanian specialists said that they were “quite precise”, which indicates that they were well informed.

Table 4: Annual expenditure for a soldier, from the budget of the armed forces of different states (1930) (Ib., p. 103)

The State	Russia	Germany	Hungary	France	Yugoslavia	Italy	Poland	Czecho-Slovakia	Bulgaria	Romania
Military budget (billions - lei)	174,000	29, 241	12,682	83,984	10,500	39,946	15,655	13,110	2,286	9,090
Personnel at peace (of people)	800,000	135,000	60,000	577,882	90,000	400,000	210,000	127,012	33,000	240,000
Expenses for a soldier per year, in “lei”	217,500	216,593	211,366	145,500	116,666	99,866	74,550	71,178	69,272	38,200

Given the precarious situation of the general state of the Romanian Armed Forces and following the news provided by the Military Commission within the PCD from Geneva, at the Romanian General Staff, a Supreme Council was held 19 December 1930, under the presidency of King Carol II. Following the debates, it was concluded that changes had to be made to the “armed forces procurement plan”; “analyses and studies” undertaken on the “armament of the Romanian armed forces compared to other countries”, from which conclusions and future solutions were derived, both for the conference and for the country; a greater care for the military budget (Ib., f. 91).

After the establishment of the “organic framework of the armed forces”, during of the Disarmament Conference, the Romanian representatives contacted the representatives of the Little Entente, France and Poland, deciding that their general staffs should prepare for the Secretariat of the League of Nations the answers drawn up on an identical basis, regarding the situation of armaments, based on a common principle, that of “ensuring the most complete military security conditions” (Matei, p. 87). Apart from that, Teodorini has said that, during the mentioned period, he had a close connection and consultation with the partners from the Little Entente and Poland, managing, under the umbrella of France, to have better support within the Disarmament Conference. Despite all the efforts, in the period of the following years, the results were not different. It was proved by a vast documentation made by Section IV of the Romanian General Staff, later included in *Study no. 2196/1934*, which was sent to the Superior Council of National Defence, through the *Information Note* of 20 June 1934.

The respective study, in accordance with the mobilization plan, reflected the armament required for the equipment of the Romanian Armed Forces, in order to meet the appropriate defence capacity. As will be seen from the tables below, compared to what was needed, this armament was missing “almost entirely” (Collection 948, Microfilms, roll P1.II.1.2000, f. 467).

I. A. Artillery fire power (Ib., f. 469).

Current number	Weapon name	Necessary	Existing	Surplus	Deficit	Remarks
	Field gun – 75 mm	1852	-	-	1852	-
	Field howitzer – 100	1070	-	-	1070	-
	Mountain cannon – 75 mm	510	-	-	510	-
	Howitzer of mountain – 100 mm	54	20	-	34	-
	Long cannon – 105 mm	831	-	-	831	-
	Howitzer hard – 150 mm	631	-	-	631	-
	High power cannon – 150 mm	432	-	-	432	-
	High power howitzer – 220 mm	144	-	-	144	-
	High Power Cannon on Rail – 240 mm	24	-	-	24	-
	Trench mortar – 150/170 mm	96	-	-	96	-
	Trench mortar – 200/240 mm	48	-	-	48	-
	Guns (a.c.a.) – 75 mm	948	-	-	948	-

I. B. Portable automatic weaponry and infantry and cavalry accompanying weapons (lb., f. 470)

Current number	TYPE OF WEAPON	CALIBRE	NUMBER OF PIECES				Re-remarks
			Necessary	Existing	Surplus	Deficit	
1.	Rifle and carbine	7.92	51,4951	-	-	51,4951	-
2.	Semi-automatic rifle and carbine	7.92	100,678	-	-	100,678	-
3.	Rifle Machine gun	7.92	19,566	-	-	19,566	-
4.	Machine gun	7.92	9,270	-	-	9,270	-
5.	Machine gun cannon "Oerlikon"	20	926	-	-	926	-
6.	Heavy machine guns	13.2	882	-	-	882	-
7.	Cannon of accompanying	75	810	-	-	810	-
8.	Bayonets	Pt. 7.92	61,5629	-	-	615,629	-
9.	"Trablons"	Pt. 7.92	4,0146	-	-	40,146	-
10.	Automatic pistol "Steyer"	9	100,843	<u>15,800</u> 14,600	-	85,043	No. - are functional
11.	Daggers	-	377,363	<u>130,486</u> 103,514	-	246,877	<i>Idem</i>
12.	Swords	-	48,875	<u>97,949</u> 37,399	49,074	-	From surplus to repair 11,476
13.	Rifle and carbine	Dif.	545,441	<u>958,000</u> 770,000	412,559	-	For artillery - Weapons restoration service
14.	Pistols	Dif.	39,364	<u>49,700</u> 45,900	10,336	-	<i>Idem</i>
15.	Bayonets	Dif.	407,501	<u>799,943</u> 634,029	392,442	-	<i>Idem</i>

I. C. Ammunition (lb., f. 471)

Current number	TYPE OF AMMUNITION	CALIBER (mm)	Quantities				Remarks
			Necessary	Existing	Surplus	Deficit	
1.	Cartridges – old rifles and carbines	7.92	262,107,500	-	-	262,107,500	-
2.	Semi-Automatic carbine cartridges	7.92	45,707,000	-	-	45,707,000	-
3.	Cartridges – Rifles machines guns	7.92	97,830,000	-	-	97,830,000	-
4.	Cartridges – Machine gun	7.92	208,360,000	-	-	208,360,000	-
5.	Cartridge – Machine gun cannon "Oerlikon"	20	27,780,000	-	-	27,780,000	-
6.	Pistol cartridges – "Steyer"	9	4,033,720	302,027	-	3,730,693	-
7.	Projectiles – machine gun cannon	75	573,600	-	-	573,600	-
8.	Projectiles – accompany mortar	75	729,000	-	-	729,000	-
9.	Cartridges – old rifles and carbines	-	109,088,200	298,023,638	189,135,438		-
10.	Cartridges – different pistols	-	1,574,560	2,371,996	797,436		-
11.	Cartridges – heavy machine guns	13.2	17,640,000	-	-	17,640,000	-
12.	Different grenades	-	3,102,000	Offensive. 76,7,504; Def. 1,117,161; V.B. 58,703			

Note: "Artillery ammunition is completely deficient, the material is non-existent; The old ammunition could be fired with the new material if it is stipulated in the manufacturing conditions".

Table 5: Existing armaments and ammunitions, which have the same calibre as those in the mentioned Study but do not have the same technical and tactical properties (weight, projectile, speed, impact etc.) (lb., f. 472)

Current number	NAME	ARTILLERY FIRE POWER	AMMUNITION	Remarks
1.	Field gun, 75 mm	898	2,654,708	-
2.	Field howitzer, 100 mm	220	239,314	-
3.	Mountain cannon, 75 mm	79	166,887	-
4.	Mountain howitzer, 100 mm	20	-	-
5.	Long cannon, of 105 mm	21	89,669	-
6.	Heavy howitzer, of 150 mm	63	155,107	-
7.	Big cannon for 150 mm	57	51,791	-
8.	Guns (a.c.a.) - 75 mm	12	22,192	-
9.	Accompany mortar - 75 mm	110	74,819	-

Note: "These materials cannot replace their counterparts in the General Staff Study, as they do not have the same technical and tactical properties. Only the ammunition can be used, provided that in the specifications of the new materials ordered this clause should be included".

Table 6: Existing armament and ammunition that would no longer have any use, after the equipment provided for in the General Staff Study (lb., f. 473)

Current number	WEAPON NAME	ARTILLERY FIRE POWER	AMMUNITION	Remarks
1.	Bayonets	39,442	-	-
2.	Swords	49,074	-	-
3.	Rifles and carbines	412,559	189,135,438	-
4.	Rifles machine guns	13,306	28,337,994	-
5.	Machine guns	13,557	118,586,040	-
6.	Revolvers	10,336	797,436	-
7.	Mortars of 58 mm	209	67,839	-
8.	Mortars of 90 mm	149	65,347	-
9.	Cannon, 37 mm	149	156,724	-
10.	Cannon, 53 mm	194	142,092	-
11.	Field gun 76 mm	460	1,007,045	-
12.	Mountain cannon 76 mm	141	290,090	-
13.	Mountain cannon 76.5 mm	36	178,928	-
14.	Field gun, 77 mm	91	157,196	-
15.	Light howitzer, 105 mm	185	45,839	-
16.	Light howitzer, 114.3 mm	85	50,498	-
17.	Light howitzer, 121.9 mm	115	91,290	-
18.	Long cannon, 104 mm	13	53,364	-

Current number	WEAPON NAME	ARTILLERY FIRE POWER	AMMUNITION	Remarks
19.	Long cannon, 106.7 mm	31	33,404	-
20.	Long cannon, 102 mm	79	121,644	-
21.	Heavy howitzer, 152.4 mm	27	57,678	-
22.	Heavy howitzer, 155 mm	27	61,556	-
23.	Heavy howitzer, 210 mm	16	46,450	-
24.	Cannon (a.c.a.) 57 mm	40	91	-
25.	Cannon (a.c.a.) 76.5 mm	36	4,503	-

It should be noted that the materials listed in the above table were "quite numerous" and that required "a rather long time" for replacement. Therefore, in the Study of the General Staff it was stipulated: "All this time we will have to use the ammunition, so as not to have to destroy or throw it away", and recommended:

"1.) Completing the gaps in the current mobilization plan with the new calibres and models;

2.) The introduction into the service of the army of weapons that do not currently exist (semi-automatic weapon, machine gun etc.);

3.) Replacement of old materials, which no longer correspond to the requirements of the battlefield" (lb., f. 468-469).

Regarding the state of Romanian aeronautics, in another situation signed by General Ion Antonescu and submitted to the Supreme Council of Defence of the Country, 30 June 1934, it was specified that, after the consultation with Prince Nicolae, the following conclusion was reached:

– "The current organization of our Aeronautics does not correspond either to the real needs of the armed forces, since attention was paid only to the Covering Aviation, nor to the need of the aviation as a service, par excellence of great mobility and availability, since the organization is cumbersome, lacking in flexibility and unadaptable to the needs of the armed forces;

– Its organization is macrocephalic, it has too many commands;

– The units are too numerous compared to the existing material, so that some of them are equipped, as far as the flying echelon is concerned, with incomplete material, and the rolling echelon is non-existent;

– The current infrastructure does not correspond either to the needs of storage and conservation of materials, nor to the requirements of tomorrow's war, which requires a certain grouping for the best possible defence;

– The production capacity of the indigenous Aeronautics industries must be specialized, in order to satisfy a need of a goal-oriented production and a well-established conception of equipment etc." (lb., f. 474-475).

As a conclusion of the causes that had generated such a state, it was inserted that *“with us there is nothing clarified and decided”*, this fact being perpetuated, *“due to the lack or non-compliance to a basic plan”* (Ib., f. 475); and the units existed *“either on paper”*, or they were *“units of weak fighting capacity or incapable of a sustained effort”*.

CONCLUSIONS

During the analysed period, in order to try to remedy the deficit situation in the Armed Forces, the country's authorities took some legislative measures, including the *“Law on the Organization of the Nation and the Territory for Time of War”* promulgated on 23 April 1933, which stated that *“the organization of the nation and the territory has as its purpose the valuing of all the forces and resources of the country to ensure the national defence”*²³. The act basically stipulates obligations for the conscious engagement of the entire people in the effort to strengthen the national defence, the development of the own defence industry, of the agriculture and communications. In the same context, it was specified that *“all the inhabitants of the country, subject to military obligations, are part of the armed forces”*, and those who do not have such duties *“may be obliged in time of war to render a service in the interest of national defence”*. We can also recall the Law no. 83/8 May 1934, for the *“pre-military training”* of the youth, which stipulated the mandatory pre-military training for all young people between 18-20 years of age. The body created for the training of youth in the field of defence of the country was the *“Oficiul de educație a tineretului român/Office of Education of the Romanian Youth”*, the youth organizations *“Cercetașii României /Scouts of Romania”*, and later *“Straja țării/Country Guard”* (created in 1937).

Regarding the development of a war industry and the training of specialists in the field, with all the concerns, in the situation of the world crisis and the lack of funds, only from the middle of the fourth decade will improvements be felt in this regard. Without abandoning orders for combat equipment from abroad, some measures were also taken to develop a local industry, which would provide, at least in part, the necessary armaments and ammunition that the armed forces needed. Among such measures were: the launch of the loan to equip the country (5 November 1934), the introduction of the *“aviation stamp”*, the establishment of the National Defence Fund (13 November 1934), the promulgation of encouraging laws for the armaments and ammunition industry, the allocation of more important

budget funds for the needs of the armed forces, the conclusion of new conventions, especially with foreign companies producing combat equipment.

It was only in the conditions of the increasing danger of revenge and revisionism, that the Romanian state registered the achievement of a solid defence system as a major concern, creating the Ministry of the Armed Forces procurement, on 1 November 1938.

*

In conclusion, the efforts of the international community made in the issue of disarmament in the year when the *Draft Convention on the reduction and limitation of armaments* was finalized, was expressed by Nicolae Titulescu in October 1930, at the end of the 11th session of the General Assembly of the League of Nations, whose president he was. In summary, he highlighted: *“Almost all the states, members of the League of Nations, have expressed their agreement to art. 36 of the Hague Court Statute [...]. Today, mandatory arbitration is radiating all over the world and yet, let us be honest, the fact seems normal to you. But there is something more much: you have here solemnly signed a convention in which solidarity appears bright. The states came here to undertake, even if the war does not threaten them, to impose taxes to come to the aid of the members of the international community, victims of some aggression”* (Titulescu, 1967-2, pp. 341-343).

The year that followed, 1931, represented for the military delegations from the League of Nations – the year of preparing all the materials that each delegation needed to support its interests during the Disarmament Conference, which would begin on 2 February 1932.

Following the same path, the Romanian Government was able to transmit its response to the League of Nations on 15 September 1931, through the technical instructions sent, accompanied by a memorandum, called *Summary Observations*, through which Romania insisted on its specific situation and, implicitly, on the need for some military forces that corresponded to the requirements of ensuring its security (Matei, p. 87). In the document, three considerations were made, which were to be advanced to the Disarmament Commission, as proposals. Of these, the one concerning the *“anti-Soviet reservation”* should be noted, by which it was desired to introduce a special clause into the text of the Disarmament Convention, which would provide for the entry into force of the convention for the signatory states, members of the League of Nations and neighbours of non-member states, only when the latter states will have signed and ratified the convention, under the same conditions as the member states of the Geneva forum (Ib., p. 87).

As far as the Romanian party was concerned, C.Teodorini testified that the secret documents provided by all the sections of the General Staff, on the segment that interests us and to which we have already referred, were systematized

²³ *Evoluția sistemului național de apărare și a politicii militare a României în perioada interbelică/The evolution of the national defence system and the military policy of Romania in the interwar period* (hereinafter: *Evolution of the system...*), <http://www.armyacademy.ro/e-learning/working/capitol7.html#sistemul/capitol7.html#sistemul>.

by the II Information Section in a succinct material, *“as close to the truth as possible”*, necessary to *“combat the tendentious and inaccurate statements of the opposing delegations”* (AMMN, mss. no. 306, p. 31). In order to reach a consensus in this thorny issue of disarmament, the military committees had taken as the basis of the discussions the *Draft Convention*, concluded by the PCD, and as data on the development and war potentials had been based on the *“so-called Military Yearbook of the League of Nations, which contained the data provided annually by each member state”*, but which, although each state provided them officially, under the signature of the heads of government or their plenipotentiaries at the League, *“very often did not correspond to reality, which gave rise to endless discussions within the committees”*.

For the same reasons, in order to hide the true situation of armament of the states, the military delegations had to take into account, as the basis of the discussions in the military committees, the indications of their political factors, which were for the *“camouflage”* of the real armaments, more precisely, *“the <misleading>, with the aim, obviously, that when it came to fixing the quantitatively (calibres, horsepower etc.), each nation would benefit from the much-desired plus, compared to its dangerous neighbours”*. Starting from this aspect, Major Teodorini testified that, otherwise, all the military delegates were of the opinion that it would have been easy for them to reach a consensus on the issue of disarmament, if the political factor had not intervened, counteracting the technical solution. And yet, in all this there was a logical explanation. Even if the representatives of each nation were aware of the enormous burden that was pressing on all the citizens of their country, as a result of the arms race, and even if they sincerely wanted to reduce the expenditures for armaments and direct them to the other compartments of the state’s needs (social, economic, education etc.), the desire to ensure the security of their country, however, made them affirm their agreement for disarmament, *“but with only one prevailing condition: everyone should remain with a better machine gun, with a superior cannon, with an airplane and tank stronger than the neighbour”* (Ib., p. 29).

Seen from this aspect, *La Conference du Disarmement* became rather *La Conference des armements*, as the disarmament *“actors”* themselves ironically called it. And all this happened during the period when the world economic crisis was in a vertiginous ascent, and with it all the procession of negative consequences, both social and political. That is why, in the plenary session of the same Geneva forum, regarding future expectations, Titulescu expressed his desire, to all the delegations of the participating states, to show a unity of will, as *“he had felt it on all occasions”*, so that *“through a joint action to stop the economic crisis”* that was haunting the world, and for this he professed his confidence, relying on the *“collective soul”*

that he felt, uniting *“all races, all peoples”*, making them understand, despite that, all the differences, all them formed *“an indivisible block”*.

“I have never understood better than from this presidential chair, the Romanian diplomat finally expressed himself, that the League of Nations relies less on the Pact than on the human heart, I have never understood better that bringing amendments to the Pact, that extracting from it all that can lead to hatred; that strengthening everything that can bring the peoples closer together; that by letting it tell us freely what it wants; that by transforming its demands into commandments of international life, the interests of the League of Nations are best served”²⁴.

Relying on this unity, during the 12th Assembly of the League of Nations, also as President, Nicolae Titulescu advanced the idea of a one-year armistice to stop armaments, all the delegates of the Geneva forum being invited on 1 November 1931 to respond to this challenge. On that date the call was crowned with success, the Secretariat of the League of Nations announcing the taking into effect of the armistice for a year (Matei, p. 88)²⁵.

The international community was equally concerned with both disarmament and overcoming the crisis, so that, on 25 July 1931, in Prague, the Council of Politicians and Scientists met, and decided to organize an international conference to discuss the issue of disarmament. The result was that, on 26 and 27 November 1931, not the Conference took place, but the International Disarmament Congress in Paris. Its resolution summarized the basic conclusion: *“disarmament is vital for the organization of peace and the establishment of confidence on which economic prosperity depends”* (Ib., p. 81).

In Geneva, the General Commission of the DC resumed its work on 2 February 1933, and the first debates were devoted to the French disarmament plan. On that occasion, the Soviet representative, M. Litvinov, appreciated the importance of this orientation on security, but previously (January) he had made proposals *“on precise criteria for defining aggression”*, which took the form of a statement entitled *Definition of the aggressor*.

The new concept prevailed over the other opinions, and following the debates it would be an integral part of the text of the future disarmament convention (Ib., p. 180).

²⁴ *“Lucrările Adunării Societății Națiunilor pe anul 1930/Proceedings of the Assembly of the League of Nations for the year 1930”*, 4 October, *Special Supplement*, no. 97. Also published in: *Universul* of 6 October 1930. *“The proceedings of the 11th session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, chaired by Nicolae Titulescu, ended with effective resolutions and decisions for the good development of international relations [...], it should be noted the measures taken by the Assembly regarding the unanimous accession of the state member of League of Nations to the principle of binding arbitration stipulated in the statute of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, as well as the decisions adopted with the aim of improving the world economic situation, decisions which foresee the ignorance of the objective and legal character of the crises of overproduction in capitalism”*.

²⁵ Later it will be extended by four months.

Simultaneously with the events taking place at the Disarmament Conference, its atmosphere was favourable for Romania, in the idea of taking steps to normalize diplomatic relations with the USSR, without constituting an obstacle in the way of the allies. This was due to the fact that “*the Romanian and Soviet points of view were getting closer and closer*” (AMAE, collection 71/1920-1944 URSS, vol. 82, p. 33), as Nicolae Titulescu expressed himself, on 25 May 1933. The respective synonymy of opinions stemmed from the fact that the interest of both states required to remove from the report “*Politis*” the formulation according to which “*acceptance of arbitration could constitute a way of designating the aggressor*”, but also the acceptance of the definition of “*territory*”, which meant “*the territory over which a state exercises its authority*” (ib., pp. 79-84).

And because the Geneva debates were moved to London, in June 1933, for the Economic Conference, the London atmosphere proved to be a favourable one for the materialization of the expressed common points of view, Romanian-Soviets. Thus, on the initiative of M. Litvinov, between 3 and 5 June 1933, at the headquarters of the Soviet Embassy in London, three *Conventions defining aggression* were concluded: the first, was signed by the representatives of the governments from Romania, Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Turkey and the USSR, in the form of a regional non-aggression pact; the second, was signed on 4 July 1933, by the USSR, Turkey and the states of the Little Entente, and the third, initiated on 5 July 1933, between the USSR and Lithuania.

In general, the importance of these conventions resided in the fact that they had no time limit and remained open to accession by other states. Instead, for Romania, the Convention on the Definition of Aggression played a major role in the subsequent negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations with the USSR, which was accomplished on 9 June 1934.

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