



GENERAL ALEXANDRU IOANIȚIU – FROM THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SERVICE TO THE GENERAL STAFF –

Colonel Liviu CORCIU

Director, National Military Archives of Romania

Young Officer Alexandru Ioanițiu's fate was foreshadowed in exceptional conditions, as it was his entire career during the difficult years of the First World War.

Active participant in the frontline, involved alongside his subunit and regiment in the battles in Dobruja, on the Neajlov and in Mărășești, exceptionally promoted from the rank of lieutenant to that of major in only two years, promoted from battery commander directly to teacher at the School of Artillery and Engineering, and subsequently, within the Historical Service of the General Staff, Professor of Military History and Commander of the Superior War School, to become Chief of the General Staff, to name only some of the landmarks of a "splendid" military career prematurely and tragically ended.


The current article attempts to outline, without the ideological shadow which marked the society back then, the profile of military thinker Alexandru Ioanițiu, his personality asserted through consistent pieces of work and studies in military history and strategy, gravitating around the theory of armed fighting, planning and command of operations within the campaign, reorganisation and equipment of the armed forces, in the context of the major conflict that was foreseen and also of his own experience on the battlefield.

Keywords: military theory, campaign, Great General Staff, Historical Service, conflict.

INTRODUCTION

Over the years, the Historical Service of the General Staff has had in its composition many personalities who made or wrote history. One of them was Alexandru Ioanițiu who, during his six years of activity (1921-1927), made a solid contribution to the knowledge and development of military historiography through his theoretical creation as well as through his didactic vocation manifested from his early years of career.

He was a victim of closeness, because of his professional relations, to Ion Antonescu, against whom he did not say anything when the Romanian Armed Forces were ordered to cross over the Prut. That is why not much was written about Alexandru Ioanițiu in the post-war years, thus some accomplishments of an exceptional military career being “forgotten”.



In 1929 he was holding a position within the Historical Service subordinated to the Great General Staff and was teaching “National War” at the Superior War School commanded by Ion Antonescu. They met again, by force of circumstances, in 1934, when General Ion Antonescu became the Chief of the Great General Staff and Alexandru Ioanițiu, still in the Great General Staff, was responsible for the *staff officer’s course*. His performance during the royal manoeuvres in the autumn of that year, when he filled the

position of chief of Antonescu’s staff, was impressive, acknowledged as such even by Antonescu, who depicted him as it follows: “*He is an elite character. Superior culture. All his work is clear and very accurate. He will have a marvellous career*”¹.

In 1929 he was holding a position within the Historical Service subordinated to the Great General Staff and was teaching “National War” at the Superior War School commanded by Ion Antonescu.

¹ ***, National Military Archives of Romania (*Arhivele Militare Naționale Române – AMNR*), Collection *Memorii bătrâni*, letter I, crt. 59, Original memoire of Colonel Alexandru Ioanițiu, p. 81.



This encomiastic feedback, given by a person tight-fisted when it came to approbation and whose intransigence was known by almost everyone amongst the contemporary, makes us take into account the possibility, unrequited² by some authors, that Alexandru Ioanițiu would have enjoyed a honest appreciation on behalf of Ion Antonescu who saw in him an extremely capable young officer and to whom he assigned the command of the 1st Border Guard Artillery Regiment on 1 October 1934.

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY CONTEXT ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1940

Ever since 1939, when general mobilisation was decreed, it was clear enough that the armed forces were neither prepared nor equipped enough to fulfil their mission, which was the result of the lack of a coherent policy in that regard, within the time elapsed since the end of the First World War.

In order to better understand the way in which the “closeness” to Antonescu occurred, we need to outline the political-military context concerning Romania at the time when General Ioanițiu was appointed as Chief of the Great General Staff.

On 6 September 1940 there was no more balance in Europe and our security guarantees were torn to pieces: France capitulated in a period of six weeks and England was far and consumed by its own issues, assaulted by uneven aircraft battles whilst, closer, Poland had already been divided between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Ever since 1939, when general mobilisation was decreed, it was clear enough that the armed forces were neither prepared nor equipped enough to fulfil their mission, which was the result of the lack of a coherent policy in that regard, within the time elapsed since the end of the First World War.

The difficult situation of Romania at that moment was generated by the territorial ruptures undergone, not only through the application of the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, which established the relinquishment of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union, but also through the Second Vienna Award, which established the relinquishment of North-Western Transylvania to Hungary.

Things were not brighter at the south-eastern Romanian border either, considering that, on 31 July 1940, Gigurtu’s Government was informed by the German Ambassador to Bucharest, Wilhelm Fabricius, that Southern Dobruja had to be ceded to Bulgaria.

² Alex Mihai Stoenescu referring to Ion Antonescu, in Alex Mihai Stoenescu, *Armata, mareașalul și evreii*, Editura RAO, București, 2010, p. 660.



ROMANIAN
MILITARY
THINKING

Included by force within the order³ Germany created in Southeastern Europe, Romania lost 33% of its territory, approximately 7 million inhabitants, and the entire Romanian society turned hopeless⁴.

The events in the summer of 1940 had dire consequences for the economy, natural resources, and agricultural production, as well as a negative influence upon the country demographics, generating spontaneous protest demonstrations in Romania's large cities and also in Bucharest.

A suggestive picture of Romanian society in that turmoil was outlined in a letter⁵, dated 28 July 1940, through which the German military attaché for Land Forces in Bucharest, Colonel Karl Richard Wahle, reported to Berlin: *"The lack of continuity is the Romanian Government's known issue (...) Despite the fact that in two years ten cabinets have come and gone, nothing has changed"*.

Other political and social effects were added to the above-mentioned ones: the Legionary Movement, interested in seizing power, contested, in its turn, the King's performance, the Constitution was suspended, the Parliament was dissolved, and Carol II abdicated *"transferring the difficult regal tasks"* to his son, Michael, and appointing General Ion Antonescu⁶ as President of the Council of Ministers, with full powers for the ruling of the Romanian state.

Antonescu saw, in the cooperation with Germany, Romania's security guarantee⁷ and considered the reorganisation of the armed forces as being a priority, therefore one of the first meetings⁸ after seizing power took place at the German Legation in Bucharest, on 7 September 1940 in the afternoon, where he pinpointed his reform programme for the military institution. In relation to it, the deputy military attaché in Bucharest reported: *"Antonescu aims to restructure and to equip with strong-engine mechanised mobile units (...) The defence centre of gravity must be oriented towards east (...) He shall destitute all officers standing in his way"*.

Included by force within the order Germany created in Southeastern Europe, Romania lost 33% of its territory, approximately 7 million inhabitants, and the entire Romanian society turned hopeless. The events in the summer of 1940 had dire consequences for the economy, natural resources, and agricultural production, as well as a negative influence upon the country demographics, generating spontaneous protest demonstrations in Romania's large cities and also in Bucharest.

³ *** , AMNR, *Relațiile militare româno-germane 1939-1944. Documente*, Editura Europa Nova, București, 2000, p. 27.

⁴ Florin Constantiniu, *O istorie sinceră a poporului român*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2002, p. 359.

⁵ *** , AMNR, *Relațiile militare...*, op. cit., p. 27.

⁶ See https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ion_Antonescu, retrieved on 12.10.2019.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ *** , AMNR, *Relațiile ...*, op. cit., p. 32.



According to the Decree-Law no. 3 094, several generals suspected “to have been affiliated to the king” were discharged, into the reserve forces, being accused that, as high military commanders, they had acted inadequately in the dramatic circumstances during the summer of 1940.

Two days later, according to the Decree-Law no. 3 094, several generals suspected “to have been affiliated to the king” were discharged, into the reserve forces, being accused that, as high military commanders, they had acted inadequately in the dramatic circumstances during the summer of 1940. “Considering that our Nation has to embrace the example of duty and liability by sanctioning those who were guilty of this deflection”, sounded Antonescu’s motivation⁹ addressed to the public opinion, whilst the explanation¹⁰ provided for Lieutenant General von Tippelskirch¹¹ referred to the very low morale of the armed forces, which “did not trust the rulers of the state, including the generals who have installed this leadership. Through the changes that we have made, the army morale has been restored. From now on I guarantee for the power and discipline of this army”.

At the beginning of September 1940, Romania was relying on a demoralised army, poorly equipped and trained, greatly criticised by the society for relinquishing territories too easily, an army which, according to German officials¹² nobody could ever count on: “Unless we establish and broaden up a profound army reform, there is nothing to be done”.

Seen from this perspective, Antonescu’s decision, installed in office with the resilient mental equipment of a general who placed discipline in front of his priorities¹³, to appoint as Chief of the Great General Staff a professional, in the person of General Alexandru Ioanițiu, in order to implement, first of all, a moral reform in a demoralised army, becomes perfectly explicable, according to some renowned historians¹⁴.

⁹ He discharged 80 high-rank officers, considered loyal to the former regime or inappropriate, and, soon after it, other 84, accused of “committing serious acts of incapacity, thus demoralising the prestige of the army and the basic commandments of the military service”, https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gheorghe_Arge%C8%99anu, retrieved on 12.10.2019.

¹⁰ ***, AMNR, *Relațiile militare ...*, op. cit., p. 33. Report on 15 September 1940, to the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), following the meeting between von Tippelskirch and Antonescu.

¹¹ Kurt Oskar Heinrich Ludwig Wilhelm von Tippelskirch (9 October 1891 – 10 May 1957), German Armed Forces General in the Second World War. He commanded the 30th Infantry Division at the beginning of the Operation “Barbarossa”. Subsequently, he became the Commander of the Vistula Group, a large German unit established in order to defend Berlin against the Soviet offensive. He surrendered to the US Army on 2 May 1945.

¹² ***, AMNR, *Relațiile militare...*, op. cit., p. 27.

¹³ Dennis Deletant, *Aliatul uitat al lui Hitler. Ion Antonescu și regimul său*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2008, p. 65.

¹⁴ Florin Constantiniu, op.cit., p. 359.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE ARMED FORCES RESTRUCTURING AND REORGANISATION

He made the most of his entire experience, as well as of his organisational talent here by restructuring and reorganising the armed forces. On 15 June 1940, Romania had mobilised, only for the infantry, 35 divisions and 4 mixed brigades comprising infantry and march (training) battalions, without having at least the basic equipment meant for that type of action¹⁵ in the armed forces warehouses.

One of General Alexandru Ioanițiu's main missions was to reorganise the armed forces and to provide the required military equipment as *"none of the existing divisions had all the materials provided in the inventory table"*¹⁶.

His term of office began under the shadows of tension not only on the western border, where the Hungarian armed forces had entered the Romanian territory of Transylvania, relinquished on 5 September 1940, but also on the eastern border that was constantly violated, the Red Army concentrating material and equipment in order to cross the Prut river bank and setting up campaign airfields¹⁷ in southern Bessarabia. Thus, after only three weeks from appointment, on 25 September 1940, the reorganisation¹⁸ of the armed forces began by disbanding the units, services and territorial formations that were not mentioned in the new mobilisation plan.

The *Armed Forces Reorganisation Project*, which was developed under his coordination, stipulated the principles of the new military organisation. Among them the following can be mentioned: the reduction of the general mobilisation framework that was to be established so that large homogenous units would be created, completely equipped and provided, the acquisition of modern warfare and training assets, the preservation of a weaponry reserve, the enhancement of staff with active duty commissioned and non-commissioned officers.



One of General Alexandru Ioanițiu's main missions was to reorganise the armed forces and to provide the required military equipment as "none of the existing divisions had all the materials provided in the inventory table".

¹⁵ ***, *Istoria Infanteriei Române*, p. 231, Reserve troops were called up with their own shirts, socks and shoes.

¹⁶ ***, AMNR, *Relațiile militare ...*, op. cit., p. 36.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

¹⁸ ***, *Istoria Statului Major General Român. Documente 1859-1947*, Editura Militară, București, 1994, pp. 293 and the following.



The real situation of the Romanian armed forces in the autumn of 1940, a couple of months prior to the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, can be also inferred from the request made by Antonescu during the meeting with General von Tippelskirch on 15 September 1940. The sole purpose of the meeting was to clarify in detail the Romanian conception regarding the presence of a German military mission on the Romanian territory, which Antonescu wanted in order to technically and tactically train the Romanian forces.

The same document contains also a description of the condition in which General Alexandru Ioanițiu found the armed forces when he was appointed: slow divisions, with a lot of infantry (12 battalions), no artillery and no modern warfare assets, hypo services only, based on requisitions, which represented a great mass of horses and poor quality chariots, hardly movable and vulnerable, an inappropriate staffing with commissioned and non-commissioned officers, not only in terms of quality, but also in terms of number, and last but not least, the lack of equipment and material reserves.

The real situation of the Romanian armed forces in the autumn of 1940, a couple of months prior to the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, can be also inferred from the request made by Antonescu during the meeting with General von Tippelskirch on 15 September 1940. The sole purpose of the meeting was to clarify in detail the Romanian conception regarding the presence of a German military mission on the Romanian territory, which Antonescu wanted in order to technically and tactically train the Romanian forces. He said: *“We have neither planes, nor pilots. (...) We have neither motorised nor mechanised units. We need here, as well as in the case of the aircraft, a special help on behalf of the Germans. We have no air defence, what we have is incomplete, absolutely ineffective. An industry of war has been created, but even here the work has been shallow. There are no raw materials, therefore production will stop soon and unemployment is just behind the corner”.*

Modern warfare assets, which lack almost completely, were going to be part of the great units' inventory as they were acquired, units belonging to the 3rd and 4th Armies being on the top of the priority list.

Once the armed forces reorganisation plan was implemented, in order to maintain great units' operational capacity and to survive unexpected situations that could appear any moment, infantry divisions were gradually organised in nine battalions, following that in the spring of 1941 to be organised as light infantry divisions, on seven battalions or less. Cavalry, mountain brigades and border guard units were also reorganised following a conception based on defensive missions undertaken on wide fronts, which required especially infantry units.



In order to train the army, *the Romanian-German Mixed Training Centre*¹⁹ was established in Făgăraș to replace the Infantry Training Centre. There, it was established the course in educating and training group, platoon, company and battalion level commanders, where they received proper training, attending a 6-week course, the training ground of infantry ammunition and anti-tank shootings being conducted in Cincu Mare Camp²⁰.

Mention should be made that the Romanian armed forces reorganisation endeavours were seriously impeded even by the Germans, through their attitude towards Romania, being manifested by their lack of trust regarding the intention to attack the Soviet Union, although that fact became increasingly predictable.

This sceptical attitude went on even on 23 May 1941, a month prior to launching the attack, when Hitler requested the German 11th Army Commander, who was about to meet Ion Antonescu, to “*avoid any kind of question regarding Germany’s intent to conduct a war against Russia or in the case Germany, given the facts, would attack Russia*”²¹.

The secret about the topic was kept, at least officially, until 18 June 1941, when Hitler informed Antonescu, by mail, about his intent of attacking the Soviet Union, but even at the subsequent meeting Antonescu had with General Eugen von Schobert, the idea of a “*presumable*”²² offensive was in the air.

This German attitude towards the Romanian ally undermined the endeavours of the Great General Staff, implicitly the struggle of General Ioanițiu, who established the initial battle disposition based on the **defence** against an imminent Soviet aggression, so that on 22 June 1941, when the general offensive started, the Romanian armed forces “*were only to a lower extent prepared to intervene*”²³.

Mention should be made that the Romanian armed forces reorganisation endeavours were seriously impeded even by the Germans, through their attitude towards Romania, being manifested by their lack of trust regarding the intention to attack the Soviet Union, although that fact became increasingly predictable.

¹⁹ ***, *Istoria Infanteriei Române...*, op. cit., p. 236.

²⁰ See <http://www.cnij.ro/istoric>, retrieved on 12.10.2019.

²¹ Alesandru Duțu, *Între Wehrmacht și Armata Roșie. Relații de comandament româno-germane și româno-sovietice (1941-1945)*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2000, pp. 25 and the following.

²² Alesandru Duțu, op.cit., p. 27.

²³ Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu. Relațiile germano-române. 1938-1944*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1994, p. 149.



The young artillery Lieutenant, Alexandru Ioanițiu, impressed each and every hierarchical superior, regardless of the position or rank. "He has no tenure in order to be proposed for promotion" wrote in his 1915 rating sheet, Colonel Petcuș, his Regiment Commander, "but he has traits that will help him to be exceptionally promoted", and in the same context "the staggering knowledge of this officer is being confirmed in the winter-term papers, as well as in the articles concerning shootings that he has published in the Artillery Magazine".

THE CHARACTERISATIONS OF FORMER COMMANDERS

Exceptional is the term that could define the career and personality of General Alexandru Ioanițiu, the valedictorian of the 1910 promotion of the Military, Artillery, Engineering and Navy School, who managed even back then to impress his superiors: *"he seems to have a very resilient military education"*, were the words used in the characterisation²⁴ of the young officer, *"very intelligent, thinks clearly and calmly. Conceives easily (...) commands authoritatively"*.

The young artillery Lieutenant, Alexandru Ioanițiu, impressed each and every hierarchical superior, regardless of the position or rank. *"He has no tenure in order to be proposed for promotion"* wrote in his 1915 rating sheet²⁵, Colonel Petcuș, his Regiment Commander, *"but he has traits that will help him to be exceptionally promoted"*, and in the same context *"the staggering knowledge of this officer is being confirmed in the winter-term papers, as well as in the articles concerning shootings that he has published in the Artillery Magazine"*.

Promoted to the rank of Major on 1 September 1917, after on 1 November 1916, he had been promoted to the rank of Captain, the far too young Major Alexandru Ioanițiu was transferred to the Ministry of War, the Artillery Establishment Directorate, being deployed on 1 April 1918 at the Requisitions Service, in order to manage this service after the demobilisation of the reserve officers. Proving his exceptional qualities, he worked there until 1920, he got familiar with the army's administrative issues and undertook serious endeavours in order to solve the issues regarding the requisitions made by the army during the war.

And even there, his superior qualities and abilities were appreciated by his superiors: *"a living intelligence"*, *"outstanding patience and work capacity"*, *"a remarkable competence"* or *"as days go by, Major Ioanițiu clearly draws his future, which will be nothing more than his encomiastic past"*.

In order not to uselessly insist over this aspect, I would like to mention that, with no exception, since 1918 when he was exceptionally promoted for two years in a row, to the rank of Major that time,

²⁴ ***, AMNR, *Memorii bătrâni*, letter I, crt. 59, Colonel Alexandru Ioanițiu original memoir, p. 07v.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 55.

each year, the hierarchical superiors of the officer, regardless of rank, echelon or field of activity, suggested to the decision-makers that the officer should be promoted ahead of schedule or had encomiastic feedback about him, impressed by his professional performance and given some remarkable accomplishments.

However, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on 7 July 1927, the reasons why the mentioned proposals did not come to fruition not being included in the purpose of the current article.

THE BEHAVIOUR DURING THE CAMPAIGN

In the Second Balkan War, 2nd Lieutenant Alexandru Ioanițiu was mobilised²⁶ to the logistics of the 3rd Artillery Regiment, although he had insisted to the regiment commander to actively take part in the campaign. The Regiment Commander, Colonel Petcuș, explained his decision in the ranking sheet as a necessity, not as lack of confidence in the young officer's abilities.

During the entire period, from 23 June to 31 August 1931, the 3rd Artillery Regiment Commander characterised him along these lines: *“very intelligent and quick-witted and whole-hearted, he knows the regulations too well and implements them calmly and methodically. I was asked to leave him to the sedentary service, based on the intelligent and ordinate services that were required in order to train and to discipline the deposit battery. He fully paid for the praise of his assignment”*.

The 10th Artillery Brigade Commander, Colonel Manolescu, appreciated the fact that the young officer made repeated requests to the regiment commander in order to be actively involved in the campaign. This attitude, he wrote, *“proves his high military senses and that he has a solid conscience regarding the duty”*.

The traits and noble character features of the young officer were also to be subsequently confirmed in 1916 in the Dobruja campaign, when he impressed again through his courage and expertise in commanding the 6th Battery of the 3rd Artillery Regiment. Therefore, in the battle of Tatlageac (today named 23 August) on October 1916 he: *“remained with his battery into position supporting the infantry*



In the Second Balkan War, 2nd Lieutenant Alexandru Ioanițiu was mobilised to the logistics of the 3rd Artillery Regiment, although he had insisted to the regiment commander to actively take part in the campaign. The Regiment Commander, Colonel Petcuș, explained his decision in the ranking sheet as a necessity, not as lack of confidence in the young officer's abilities.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 9.



In an area marked by revisionist tensions, generated by the implementation of the Vienna Award, Brigadier General Alexandru Ioanițiu's performance on the country's western border was providential, stirring his commander's enthusiasm: "In the changes triggered upon the operational projects (...) he contributed his enlightened judgement in order to create for the army a plan of action which would allow it to withstand the best it could to its mission on the western border.

withdrawal, with great courage, without taking into account the bullets falling over the battery and killing the horses. He withdrew only when all infantry had already withdrawn, and after he had saved the material which was very closely threatened by the enemy infantry".

The same scenario, seemingly meant to bolster the courage of his comrades and subordinates, demonstrating in front of the enemy the strength of character and self-control, qualities crucial for every commander, occurred again a few months later in the battle for Bucharest.

Colonel Manolescu who was in command of the 3rd Artillery Regiment for a brief period, between 1 November 1916 and 15 January 1917, wrote in the rating sheet of the newly appointed Captain Ioanițiu²⁷: *"In the battles of Neajlov, between 16 and 20 November 1916, he proved real technical expertise in commanding his battery, which had shot with high accuracy and efficiency in the battles of Videle, Cartojani, Balaria and Stâlpu, thus facilitating the advancement of our infantry. In the battles of Epuresti, he held the line against the enemy by shooting with his battery long enough so our infantry was able to withdraw safely over the Neajlov. Finally, he managed with his battery to avoid the enemy shooting and surveillance".*

This calm and safe attitude was also subsequently maintained, at the dawn of the second global conflagration. Until 15 June 1940, Brigadier General Alexandru Ioanițiu was the Chief of Staff of the 1st Army, made up of all the forces concentrated on the western border, in circumstances in which the military measures were closely related and similar to those from war²⁸, according to the notes made in the rating sheet by his commander, Army Corps General Gheorghe Florescu.

In an area marked by revisionist tensions, generated by the implementation of the Vienna Award, Brigadier General Alexandru Ioanițiu's performance on the country's western border was providential, stirring his commander's enthusiasm: *"In the changes triggered upon the operational projects (...) he contributed his enlightened judgement in order to create for the army a plan of action which would allow it to withstand the best it could to its mission on the western border.*

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 88.

*With his unmatched qualities (...) and **with a calm and a sense of reality I had not seen until that moment**, he also asserted himself at that time. It is my pleasant duty to state now, at my retirement, that he [is] one of the **most outstanding valuable officers** of our army and that he deserves and must be promoted as soon as possible to the highest trustworthy and liability command positions”.*

Mention should be made that the 1st Army, in Sibiu garrison, comprising units belonging to the 6th and 7th Army Corps, was the first one to be mobilised in order to withstand a presumable aggression, determined by the concentration of important Hungarian forces on the western border.

THE DIDACTIC CAREER

His vocation for the didactic career got manifested early, more exactly, in the winter of 1916-1917, when he was with the unit in recovery in Vulturești, Vaslui county, and taught Artillery Tactics and General Tactics in the Officer Candidate Schools established in Iași and Botoșani.

One year later, in 1918, when he was 28 years of age and recently promoted to the rank of major, he was the commander of a student battery within the Artillery and Engineering Training School and taught several artillery classes.

Colonel Bottez, the school Commander of that time wrote about him, somehow premonitory: *“Although he stood very little in school, he brought real services. The solid knowledge that he possesses in all fields, especially the technical ones, makes him a precious element for the school at this moment and in the future.*

Although a very young major, due to the exceptional promotion during the war, he imposed himself to his comrades and subordinates through his knowledge, patience, distinguished education and fair judgement. He is an elite officer, the pride of the officer corps. I am convinced that he will be an excellent chief of corps”.

In 1920 he was admitted to the Superior War School, from which he graduated²⁹ as the 8th out of 76 officer-trainees, and after graduation he was appointed to the 8th Historical Section of the Great General

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 22.



The didactic career within the two military schools went on, although from 1924 he also started teaching the History of the National War class in the Superior War School. His activity, as usual, highly appreciated by hierarchical superiors: "capable, with perfect military competences and with a select military education. Excellent general staff officer", wrote Colonel Emil Gabrielescu, Chief of the 7th Historical Section of the Great General Staff.

Staff (15 October 1921). He continued to teach Ammunition Course within the Artillery Tactics class in the Engineering Military School, and the Ammunition Course in the Engineering Special School.

His direct superior, Colonel Bârzotescu, Chief of the 8th Historical Section of the Great General Staff characterised him at the end of 1922: *"Sane thought, clear and logic. Good memory. Updated with military matters as well as with the non-professional ones. Irreproachable military education"*.

The didactic career within the two military schools went on, although from 1924 he also started teaching the History of the National War class in the Superior War School. His activity, as usual, highly appreciated by hierarchical superiors: *"capable, with perfect military competences and with a select military education. Excellent general staff officer"*, wrote Colonel Emil Gabrielescu, Chief of the 7th Historical Section³⁰ of the Great General Staff.

Colonel Ioanițiu's didactic career also continued during the period when he was fulfilling his mandatory traineeship³¹, commanding the 2nd Mountain Artillery Battalion, between 1927-1929, where he was appreciated as being an *"excellent officer in all respects"*.

Returned to the Historical Service, where he was considered *"one of the most precious officers"*, he held several conferences in French for different Czechoslovak and French military delegations, but he stood out in the crowd by participating in the military field exercises during the autumn of that year. *"He was the soul who organised the manoeuvres"*, was written in his rating sheet³² by General Constandache, Chief of the Historical Service, who was dissatisfied with the fact that, by recognising his multilateral value, the hierarchical superiors would send him to different services and assigned him to certain tasks, where they found him equally necessary. Especially to the organisation of manoeuvres, where he was deployed from August until December 1930, and from October 1931 to the Commandment Course, his performance winning him the title of *The Ideal General Staff Officer*³³.

³⁰ Between 01.04.1920 and 30.01.1928, when it was reorganised as the Great General Staff Historical Service, the structure was named, successively, 6th Historical Section (01.04.1920), 8th Historical Section (01.04.1922), 7th Historical Section (01.10.1927).

³¹ ***, AMNR, *Memorii bătrâni...*, op. cit., p.72.

³² *Ibidem*, p.75v.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 76.



As a matter of fact, the assignment of other tasks and deployment into different positions based on the requirements of the Great General Staff became so popular concerning Alexandru Ioanițiu, unanimously acknowledged as an elite element, that in his ranking sheet of 1931/1932, General Grigore Constandache, the Chief of the Historical Service, bitterly wrote³⁴: *“In our human selfishness we do not realise that the implemented procedure is exhausting the officer (...) which I appreciate more since being in the current situation also knows to sacrifice enough time and work for the Historical Service. I also consider Lieutenant Colonel Alexandru Ioanițiu belonging to the service and I strongly suggest to be promoted to the rank of Colonel”*.

He was not about to remain longer at the Historical Service, since 1932 found him as Chief of Staff of the *Staff Officer Course* within the Great General Staff, being directly subordinate to the Course Director, General Sichițiu, who characterised him as follows: *“The better I know him, the more beautiful and diverse the qualities appreciated by me and, with no exception, by all hierarchical superiors. He undoubtedly possesses the qualities of a great commander”*.

On 15 April 1933, Alexandru Ioanițiu was promoted to the rank of Colonel and essentially contributed to organising the royal manoeuvres in the following autumn. Undertaken in Oltenia and Muntenia, on the territory of 11 counties, with the participant forces headquarters in Craiova and Pitesti³⁵, the manoeuvres lasted 12 days and unfolded in two phases, a situation being presented at the end of each.

The mentioned manoeuvres provided the commanders from all echelons with absolute freedom, due to the fact that the *umpire service* intervened only when the decisions and measures disposed by one of the parties were not compatible with the given conception or mission. In the contact area, the opposed forces were halted at a distance of approximately 200 m between them, and the reprising of action was done only when the umpire service would give satisfaction to one of the parties.

On 1 November 1934 Alexandru Ioanițiu took over the command of the newly-founded 1st Border Guard Artillery Regiment, where he demonstrated his administrative and organisational abilities,

On 15 April 1933, Alexandru Ioanițiu was promoted to the rank of Colonel and essentially contributed to organising the royal manoeuvres in the following autumn. Undertaken in Oltenia and Muntenia, on the territory of 11 counties, with the participant forces headquarters in Craiova and Pitesti, the manoeuvres lasted 12 days and unfolded in two phases, a situation being presented at the end of each.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁵ ***, *Istoria Infanteriei Române...*, op. cit., p. 210.



In 1939 while already being Chief of Staff of the 1st Army, Alexandru Ioanițiu was also the Commander of the Superior War School “with the same special eagerness, energy, skilfulness and intelligence”, according to the Chief of the Great General Staff, Adjutant General Florea Țenescu, “managing to have the most beautiful results regarding the teaching staff, as well as the student-officers”.

but without quitting his position as teacher at the Superior War School: *“from nothing and from the little that I could give him, he managed to organise the dorm rooms for the troops, a stable for the horses, two cannon sheds, a kitchen, a small administrative pavilion, although in the first nine months he had only 3 artillery and 6 infantry officers”,* wrote Border Guard Corps Commander, General Grozeanu.

After three years of traineeship with the troops, on 1 January 1937, he was again appointed to the Great General Staff as Chief of Defence Coordination Bureau, but actually working as Chief of Operations Bureau until 31 October 1938, when he was appointed Commander of the 3rd Artillery Brigade, headquartered in Bucharest.

On 27 February 1939 he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and on 24 March, the same year, he was appointed as Chief of Staff of the 1st Army, which was responsible for securing the country’s western border.

In 1939 while already being Chief of Staff of the 1st Army, Alexandru Ioanițiu was also the Commander of the Superior War School *“with the same special eagerness, energy, skilfulness and intelligence”³⁶*, according to the Chief of the Great General Staff, Adjutant General Florea Țenescu, *“managing to have the most beautiful results regarding the teaching staff, as well as the student-officers”*. On 6 December 1939, he participated, alongside King Carol II, members of government, civil and military authorities from the capital city, in the festivities³⁷ of the inauguration of the Superior War School new premises and the institution’s half centennial celebration.

CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY THEORY AND STRATEGY

Alexandru Ioanițiu studied the most representative military conflicts in the world, being convinced that *“the study of war is a rich source of knowledge in all areas of military art and science”³⁸*, but especially the First World War, *our war*, as he liked to call it, a war he taught at the Superior War School.

³⁶ *** , AMNR, *Memorii bătrâni...*, op. cit., p. 90.

³⁷ See <https://www.unap.ro/index.php/ro/istoric-unap>, retrieved on 12.10.2019.

³⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Alexandru Ioanițiu, *Războiul României (1916-1918)*, vol. I, Tipografia Geniului, București, 1929, p. 3.

Among his representative works we mention “*Războiul României (1916-1918)*”, comprising two volumes, appeared in 1928-1929, as a synthesis of the period he spent working for the Historical Service of the Great General Staff, where he noticed the need for a specialised paper in order to approach the First World War scientifically and objectively, without any bias or polemical tone.

It is worth outlining the fact that, according to the confessions made by the author in the preface, his work’s documentary source for Romanian military operations were exclusively the documents existing in our military archive, aspect which confirms once again the valour of the archival patrimony within our management.

Alexandru Ioanițiu was constantly preoccupied with detailing the commanding action and the staff decisions at different echelons, sources of lessons learned in the field, which could also represent an abundant study material for contemporary generations, unfortunately not included in the university curricula.

Unlike other works with similar characteristics and objectives that had appeared up to that point, “*Războiul României (1916-1918)*” did not contain critical comments, allowing the reader to do this, and did not approach the the political decision, the author being aware that “*the memories of those who contributed to the war preparation and commandment could have played a very significant role for knowing the circumstances within the great political and military decisions that were made*”.

Alexandru Ioanițiu supported the necessity for creating a specific, national military doctrine during a period when the armed forces, influenced by the achieved results due to the French Military Mission trainers, “*had borrowed*” their doctrine and military regulations without taking into account the fact that they had been conceived based on the western front combat experience.

“Now, as well as in the past, the doctrine and tactical regulation have been built based on the war experience. After the war, we immediately borrowed the doctrine and French regulations, conceived based on the western front experience.

Or our conditions and means of combat will be completely different. Therefore, it is necessary for not only the doctrine but also the regulations we adopted to be filtered according to the experience acquired on the eastern front and especially on the Romanian front”.



Alexandru Ioanițiu was constantly preoccupied with detailing the commanding action and the staff decisions at different echelons, sources of lessons learned in the field, which could also represent an abundant study material for contemporary generations, unfortunately not included in the university curricula.



In 1920, there had been translated from French “The provisional manoeuvre regulation of the infantry”, part II in the form of “Guidelines for the infantry combat”. Only in 1925, it was developed “The provisional regulation for infantry training” adapted to the Romanian specific.

In 1920, there had been translated from French³⁹ “*The provisional manoeuvre regulation of the infantry*”, part II in the form of “*Guidelines for the infantry combat*”. Only in 1925, it was developed “*The provisional regulation for infantry training*” adapted to the Romanian specific.

His opinion in that regard, which was not singular in the debates of that time, was part of the post war tendency of societal and military change, amongst other initiatives such as “*The Law on the Armed Forces Organisation*”, developed in 1923 and adopted on 23 June 1924, to replace the old 1908 law.

Another supporter of the idea was also General Radu R. Rosetti⁴⁰, whose opinion was that the number of 23 divisions, in the 1925 Romanian armed forces, was disproportionate to the capacity of sustaining Romanian economy and society, having a population of 17 million inhabitants, giving France’s example – only 20 divisions⁴¹ for 40 million inhabitants.

Another representative work, “*Pentru generațiile de azi și de mâine. Virtuțile neamului în lumina războiului nostru national (For today and tomorrow’s generations. The virtues of the nation in the light of our national war)*”⁴², appeared in 1930, was co-authored by Alexandru Ioanițiu and Petre Vasilescu⁴³, the one who demonstrated such virtues, both in opposition towards Antonescu’s policy⁴⁴, who ordered him to be arrested, and in the communist prisons, where he died.

Somehow premonitory for the responsibilities that he would have to face in a matter of only 10 years, Alexandru Ioanițiu wrote: “*War will unfold depending on, first of all, the way the material preparations have been made and the way the first operations have been conceived and prepared; secondly, on the skilfulness and knowledge of the commanders, as well as the way the professional training of the fighters*

³⁹ ***, *Istoria Infanteriei Române*, op. cit., vol.II, p. 171.

⁴⁰ Radu R. Rosetti, https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radu_R._Rosetti, retrieved on 12.10.2019.

⁴¹ ***, *Istoria Infanteriei Române*, op. cit., p. 205.

⁴² Lieutenant Colonel Alexandru Ioanițiu and Petre I. Vasilescu from the Great General Staff, *Pentru generațiile de azi și de mâine, Virtuțile Neamului în lumina războiului nostru național*, Tipografia Școalei pregătitoare pentru ofițeri de artilerie, “*Regele Carol I*”, Timișoara, 1930.

⁴³ See http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/morminte3/docs/morminte3p_11.htm, retrieved on 12.10.2019.

⁴⁴ See the article 1942. *Generalul Petre Vasilescu protestează*, in *Document. Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Naționale*, no. 1(19)/2003.

has been conducted; finally, thirdly, on the impulse with which professional knowledge – both the commanders’ and the fighters’ – shall be practised against the enemy, under bullet and shell fire”. (...) this impulse, which is only an effect of the moral force of the fighters, crucial for achieving victory. (...) Moral force relies on cultivating the nation’s military virtues”.

The book is divided in two parts. The first one presents the main chronological milestones of the war, whereas the second contains some pages extracted from the Army Monitor or from the Military Bulletin with examples of military heroism grouped and entitled: *“Examples of military endeavours undertaken by the army officers, heroically fallen in the war for the accomplishment of the nation – illustrating the military virtues of the nation”.*

Practically, this is what the book contains: a sum of heroic acts, a sum of sacrifice-for-the-country examples, taken from the orders of the day of the Romanian units participating in the First World War, with no distinction between ranks, positions or ethnicity, see the example of Private Bercu Schwartz⁴⁵ from the 8th Light Infantry (Vânători) Regiment, some people that *“have practised the military virtues up to the highest degree”*, and in the meantime the authors’ moral duty to make their sacrifice for the country as known as possible.

Ultimately, Colonel Alexandru Ioanițiu’s last work to which we will refer here, *“Elemente de strategie (Strategy Elements)”*⁴⁶, was written together with two-star General Ion Sichițiu, a little prior to his appointment as Chief of the Great General Staff (1937). What they have in common is the fact that both were, in turn, valedictorians of the Artillery School, as well as the fact that they both filled the position of Chief of the Great General Staff.

The book appeared out of necessity, also related to the main preoccupations of Alexandru Ioanițiu, to the most meaningful theoretical approaches, amongst which the support for the necessity to develop a national doctrine, to anticipate the traits of ulterior wars and the importance of the volitional factor in the success of military operations would distinguish.



ROMANIAN
MILITARY
THINKING

Colonel Alexandru Ioanițiu’s last work to which we will refer here, “Elemente de strategie (Strategy Elements)”, was written together with two-star General Ion Sichițiu, a little prior to his appointment as Chief of the Great General Staff (1937). What they have in common is the fact that both were, in turn, valedictorians of the Artillery School, as well as the fact that they both filled the position of Chief of the Great General Staff.

⁴⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Alexandru Ioanițiu and Petre I. Vasilescu, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁴⁶ Division General Ioan Sichițiu, Colonel Alexandru Ioanițiu, *Elemente de strategie*, Atelierele “Cartea Românească”, București, 1936.



In the foreword, the authors confessed: *“In the field of strategy, the few works that have appeared looked upon war under the specific aspect the operations from the western theatres of war had.*

In this current paper, we seek to fulfil this gap and to analyse the question of leading the war, the strategic manoeuvres and the battle within the modern war between armed nations, paying due attention to the special conditions in which the nations with modest war potential and small armed forces will be summoned to fight, operating on extended fronts and theatres of operations poorly equipped in terms of resources and communications”.

At that time, education in the Superior War School was influenced by the French doctrinarian concept, characterised for a long time by the priority given to defence⁴⁷, at the expense of the manoeuvrable approaches to mobile war.

In 11 chapters, written on 425 pages and supported by 12 sketches of the most important battles in history, new ideas for that period were developed, illustrated by examples from the universal military history and decisions of famous commanders.

Among the most interesting ones, chapter 10 develops the forms of the strategic manoeuvre and speaks about the common use of combat vehicles, in order to crush the enemy resistance and therefore to open a breach which subsequently was to be rapidly exploited.

This procedure, known later as *blitzkrieg*⁴⁸, was not foreign to the Romanian area, the techniques based on mobile operations, used on a large scale by the German armed forces between 1939 and 1941, according to some authors⁴⁹, being tested even in the theatre of operations in Romania during the 1916 campaign.

Only in the curricula of the 1936-1937 academic year, following some directives establishing that the military education should inspire itself from the experience of the mobile war⁵⁰, and why not, as a consequence of the mentioned work, it was introduced in the Superior War School the orientation towards mobile operation with motorised troops and tanks supported by aviation, category that was under development, but strongly impelled by technological progress.

⁴⁷ *** , *Istoria Infanteriei Române...*, op. cit., p. 194.

⁴⁸ Blitzkrieg , <https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blitzkrieg>, retrieved on 12.10.2019.

⁴⁹ Michael B. Barrett, *Preludiu la Blitzkrieg. Campania austro-germană în România – 1916*, Editura Militară, 2016.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 195.

THE TRAGIC DEMISE

On 17 November 1941, after an aerial accident which took place on the Baden airfield (today Kuchurhan, Rozdilniansky region, Odessa district, Ukraine) General Alexandru Ioanițiu died hit by a plane propeller while he was inspecting the front. Mention should be made that Marshal Antonescu was in the special commandment train at Tighina, where it was also the General HQ deployed in order to coordinate the military operations against Odessa.

According to what one can see on the map, the distance between Tighina (nowadays Bender, Republic of Moldova), where the General HQ were, and Baden, the 4th Army command post, is about 50 km, approximately 1hr-1hr½ car drive whilst by plane the distance could be covered in 15-20 minutes.

The decision to choose the plane that day was probably influenced by the fact that it rained heavily, resulting in the overflow of the Dniester river, which destroyed more bridges and did severe damage. To that, a time crisis could be added, a pressure generated by the situation on the front; Odessa could not have been conquered “*on the move*”, the Soviets opposing a serious resistance, whereas the conception dissension regarding the way offensive should be undertaken determined General Ciupercă, the 4th Army Commander, to resign exactly a day earlier the offensive should have been initiated.

On the fateful day, 17 September 1941, after having lunch with Marshal Antonescu accompanied by several Romanian and German Generals, von Korten⁵¹ and Hauffe, as well as Colonel Bassenge⁵², General Ioanițiu left at 15:30 for Baden, joining Marshal Antonescu at the 4th Army HQ.

The tragic incident was described by General Constantin Pantazi⁵³ in his memoirs⁵⁴ written during his detention in prison in Văcărești: “*One morning, the Marshal took off, together with General Ioanițiu,*



ROMANIAN
MILITARY
THINKING

On 17 November 1941, after an aerial accident which took place on the Baden airfield (today Kuchurhan, Rozdilniansky region, Odessa district, Ukraine) General Alexandru Ioanițiu died hit by a plane propeller while he was inspecting the front. Mention should be made that Marshal Antonescu was in the special commandment train at Tighina, where it was also the General HQ deployed in order to coordinate the military operations against Odessa.

⁵¹ The German 4th Air Fleet Chief of Staff.

⁵² Chief of Staff of the German Aeronautical Mission in Romania.

⁵³ Constantin Pantazi, Romanian General and Minister of War, one of the faithful adepts of General Ion Antonescu, https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constantin_Pantazi, retrieved on 12.10.2019.

⁵⁴ Constantin Pantazi, *Cu Mareșalul până la moarte. Memorii*, Editura Publiferom, București, 1999, p. 140.



in two Fiesler⁵⁵ airplanes and both landed in Baden, the location of the 4th Army command post which was leading the operations against Odessa. They both disembarked the planes, and Ioanițiu, going towards the Marshal on the shortest route, passed under his plane's propeller, which was completely still. But when he arrived under the propeller, the remaining gases acted as an impetus and the propeller, which started instantaneously to spin violently, hit forcefully in the head Ioanițiu, who fell and deceased after a short amount of time".

Other sources⁵⁶ tell about the instantaneous demise of General Ioanițiu. However, we need to outline as a strange coincidence the fact that, on 12 September 1941, five days prior to the tragic event, General von Schobert⁵⁷, the Commander of the 11th German Army, died in an accident involving the same type of airplane, in Nikolaev, Ukraine, when landing on a Soviet minefield. At his funerals, held on 15 September, alongside Antonescu, participated also General Ioanițiu, he who would die two days later within somehow similar circumstances.



General Ioanițiu (left), Marshal Antonescu (centre) and General Hauffe (right) while inspecting the eastern front. In the framework it can be noticed a part of a Fieseler Fi 156 „Storch” fuselage.

⁵⁵ Fieseler Fi 156 *Storch* – aircraft meant for air reconnaissance, liaison, and evacuation, (STOL – *Short Take Off and Landing*), <https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fieseler>, retrieved on 12.10.2019.

⁵⁶ See Gh. Buzatu, Stela Chepeta, Marusia Cîrstea, editors, *Pace și Război (1940-1944), Jurnalul Mareșalului Ion Antonescu (commentaries, annexes, chronology)*, Casa Editorială Demiurg, Iași, 2008, p. 267.

⁵⁷ See https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugen_Ritter_von_Schobert, retrieved on 12.10.2019.

*“The sad symbol of work sometimes pushed till sacrifice”*⁵⁸, General Ioanițiu was buried on 19 September in Bucharest, in the “Ghencea Military” Cemetery, the media of the time presenting the premature disappearance of one *“of the most valuable and distinguished commanders of the Romanian armed forces”*.

Being promoted post-mortem to the rank of Division General and decorated with the Order “Mihai Viteazul” in the Rank of Knight, but also with the Iron Cross ranks I and II given by Hitler⁵⁹, he left behind 6 children, four boys and two girls, plenty of works published in books and specialised publications and, according to Constantin Pantazi, a great untapped potential: *“Ioanițiu was a man of great and real valour; very intelligent, instructed, calm, with great work capacity. (...) He was destined by Ion Antonescu, in case of his demise or impossibility to continue the mission to succeed into ruling the state. (...) Apart from his superiority and intellectual distinction, he was of a firm character; he was a true man”*⁶⁰.

CONCLUSION

The acknowledgement of General Ioanițiu’s professional value determined Ion Antonescu to appoint him as Chief of the Great General Staff, by “burning” the hierarchical stages and breaking the legal provisions regarding the armed forces organisation. At the moment of appointment, Alexandru Ioanițiu had not commanded divisional level echelons or army corps and he had been “only” Chief of Staff at the army echelon.

He had neither the necessary studies, because he had not graduated the Command Course for large unity commanders, where he had hardly been accepted for 1940-1941, nor the required rank in order to occupy such a position; being proposed for promotion in 1939, the Adjutant Division General Florea Țenescu, the former Chief of the Great General Staff, considered him as “unpromotable”.

⁵⁸ General Iosif Iacobici letter to Marshal Antonescu, in the CNSAS archive, in *România în arhive. Studii și documente*, Editura Mica Valahie, București, 2011.

⁵⁹ Brigadier General Professor Dr Adrian Stroea, Colonel (r.) Marin Ghinoiu, *File din istoria artileriei. Fapte, întâmplări și oameni*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2015, p. 307.

⁶⁰ Constantin Pantazi, *op. cit.*, pp. 134 and the following.



General Ioanițiu supported the original military doctrine, likely to be found in nations with a modest war potential and small armies, purpose to which he subordinated his entire creation and pedagogical activity and to which end he invested impressive effort, doubled by a remarkable synthesis capacity.

However, Antonescu did not hesitate to appoint him as Chief of the Great General Staff in recognition of his value, intelligence, calm and work capacity, practically subordinating all his former hierarchical superiors up to that moment, as many as were left. An extreme gesture, in a conservational institution such as the military, which, alongside the discharge of the generals labelled as *"loyal to Carol"*, transmitted everyone that, considering the state the army was in back then, there were no half-measures.

General Ioanițiu supported the original military doctrine, likely to be found in nations with a modest war potential and small armies, purpose to which he subordinated his entire creation and pedagogical activity and to which end he invested impressive effort, doubled by a remarkable synthesis capacity. He contributed to the foundation of a school based on the lessons learned from the participation in the First World War, considering that they will remain strictly actual *"since our conditions and means of war today will not be too different compared to those from the war of 1916-1918"*.

We can neither imagine what would have happened if General Ioanițiu had succeeded Antonescu in commanding the Romanian armed forces and state, according to what Constantin Pantazi said, and nor can we imagine if he had ended in the communist prisons, considering what happened after the war with so many other Romanian generals.

But we can certainly assert that, according to his contribution to the development of military science and art, and to the crystallisation of a doctrine based on the national specific, he was an exceptional man, a man *ahead of his time*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ***, Arhivele Militare Naționale Române, *Relațiile militare româno-germane 1939-1944. Documente*, Editura Europa Nova, București, 2000.
2. ***, Institutul de Istorie și Teorie Militară, *Istoria militară a românilor. Culegere de lecții*, Editura Militară, București, 1992.
3. ***, *Istoria Infanteriei Române*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1985.
4. ***, Collective, *Istoria Statului Major General Român. Documente 1859-1947*, Editura Militară, București, 1994.
5. *Revista Artileriei*, monthly magazine printed by Institutul de Arte Grafice "Tipografia Românească".

6. Michael B. Barrett, *Preludiu la Blitzkrieg. Campania austro-germană în România -1916*, Editura Militară, București, 2016.
7. Gheorghe Buzatu, Stela Acatrinei, Gheorghe Acatrinei, *România din arhive. Studii și documente*, Editura Mica Valahie, București, 2011.
8. Florin Constantiniu, *O istorie sinceră a poporului român*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2002.
9. Dennis Deletant, *Aliatul uitat al lui Hitler. Ion Antonescu și regimul său 1940-1944*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2008.
10. Alesandru Dușu, *Între Wehrmacht și Armata Roșie. Relații de comandament româno-germane și româno-sovietice (1941-1945)*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2000.
11. Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu. Relațiile germano-române. 1938-1944*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1994.
12. Alexandru Ioanițiu, *Războiul României (1916-1918)*, Tipografia Geniului (Cotroceni), București, 1929.
13. Alexandru Ioanițiu, Petre I. Vasilescu, *Pentru generațiile de azi și de mâine, Virtuțile Neamului în lumina războiului nostru național*, Tipografia Școlii pregătitoare pentru ofițeri de artilerie, "Regele Carol I", Timișoara, 1930.
14. Constantin Pantazi, *Cu mareșalul până la moarte. Memorii*, Editura Publiferom, București, 1999.
15. Division General Ioan Sichitiu, Colonel Alexandru Ioanițiu, *Elemente de strategie*, Atelierele "Cartea Românească", București, 1936.
16. Alex Mihai Stoenescu, *Armata, mareșalul și evreii*, Editura RAO, București, 2010.
17. Brigadier General Professor Dr Adrian Stroe, Colonel (r.) Marin Ghinoiu, *File din istoria artileriei. Fapte, întâmplări și oameni*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2015.

