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
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THROUGH WHICH "ROMÂNIA MILITARĂ"
BECOMES THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL
OF THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF**



"Art. I – The official journal named "România Militară" is founded at the Great General Staff, starting 1 January 1898, in which all officers within the Armed Forces will find military studies, which interest their training.

Through the agency of this journal, all officers, belonging to all branches, who are in active duty, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces".

*Carol – King of Romania
Issued in Bucureşti on 8 December 1897*



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A LEGACY SINCE 1864

The Romanian Armed Forces road to modernity started in 1859, once the United Principalities General Staff Corps, currently the Defence Staff, was established.

Soon after it, in 1864, a group of nine captains, graduates of the first series of the Officer Cadet School in Bucharest, took the initiative to develop a "military science, art and history journal" named "România Militară/Military Romania".

The initiators of the publication – **G. Slăniceanu** (Captain, Chief of the Engineer Battalion), **A. Gramont** (Staff Captain), **G. Borănescu** (Engineer Captain), **G. Anghelescu** (Staff Captain), **A. Anghelescu** (Artillery Captain), **E. Arion** (Artillery Captain), **E. Boteanu** (Staff Captain), **E. Pencovici** (Staff Captain) and **C. Barozzi** (Engineer Captain) –, educated not only in Romania but also abroad, were inspired by the necessity to develop a substantial theoretical activity in the Romanian Army too.

The journal manifesto¹, included in the first issue, which appeared on 15 February 1864, contained innovative ideas and approaches that were meant to:

– contribute to the organisation of our military system the Legislative Chamber is about to decide upon soon;

– assemble and examine the Country old military institutions that had made for the glory of Romania for several centuries and ensured our existence;

– explore, in the absence of any military study, all the aspects related to the Army training, the most solid basis of the armed forces;

– get the Romanian Troops well-informed about the military events in the world;

– join efforts to work concertedly and whole-heartedly to develop and strengthen the edifice that is meant to ensure the future of our country"².

"România Militară" was an independent publication, under the aegis of the War Ministry, and it ceased to appear in 1866 as there were no sufficient funds and subscribers. The publication was resumed in 1891, about a quarter of a century later, also as the result of the initiative of a group of officers in the Great General Staff who intended to "reproduce the serious studies on the organisation, strategy and art of commanding troops under any circumstances"³. Shortly after it, by the Royal Decree no. 3663 issued on 8 December 1897, "România Militară" became the "Great General Staff official publication".



¹ Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul aniversării a 75 de ani de la apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1939, București, 1939, p. 31.

² Ibidem, p. 32.

³ România Militară, no. 1, 1981, p. 6.

English version by Diana Cristiana LUPU.



C. Barozzi
(Engineer Captain)



E. Pencovici
(Staff Captain)



E. Boteanu
(Staff Captain)



G. Borănescu
(Engineer Captain)



G. Anghelescu
(Staff Captain)



G. Slăniceanu
(Captain, Chief
of the Engineer
Battalion)



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VICTORY IN MODERN WARFARE – ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS –

Air Flotilla General Gabriel RĂDUCANU, PhD

Rector of "Henri Coandă" Air Force Academy, Braşov



In the debates related to the future of warfare, technology seems to represent the centre of gravity as far as arguments are concerned. However, technology is not an independent variable: warfare unequivocally entails a technological dimension but success in warfare is dependent not only on the way in which technology is employed in relation to the enemy but also on other equally important factors such as strategy, tactics or logistics. History provides fairly enough examples of states that have lost battles and even wars against enemies considered inferior in terms of technology. The question arises if future technology will allow for such situations to occur.

For many experts in security studies, humanity is heading to an era when technology plays an increasingly important role in all areas of social relations, from meeting the primary needs of the individuals to ensuring the security and development of society as a whole. The reasoning is based on the unprecedented pace of technological progress. For example, during the last decade of the 20th century, the technological evolution was faster than in all the first 90 years of the same century. The mentioned unprecedented development is best illustrated by the Moore's Law. Gordon Moore, cofounder of INTEL, noticed, in 1965, that the number of transistors in a microchip doubled every two years. This process has got accelerated nowadays, the period of time in which the transistors in a microchip double being 18 months. This rate of change is evident in a wide technological area: for example, the wireless signal transmission distance doubles every 18 months. What is remarkable in terms of this incredible technological progress is not only the qualitative leap but also the really disruptive capacity of the implications generated by the current technological revolution. The most recent developments in domains such as nanotechnology, bioscience, robotics, artificial intelligence, computers and information technology have established directions that will have profound implications for the conduct of war.

Certainly, many states need investing in assets and technology to be able to support a qualitative advantage in a future armed conflict. For example, the US 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasises the significance of military superiority whose advantage depends not only on combat assets but especially on the technology that has helped developing the particular assets so that they could ensure an advantage even under the conditions of numerical inferiority. It is true that the United States of America has a unique capacity to develop military assets



able to ensure superiority in an armed conflict but other competitors have already emerged. China and Russia are the countries that, alongside the USA, have already introduced a new armed forces service, namely the space force, and it seems to represent only the beginning of the process!

The fact that technological revolution has become the cornerstone of military assets development programmes as well as of defence policies worldwide is not surprising at all, and the way in which such aspects influence the military domain should be carefully considered:

- *Increasing human performance:* with the help of new technologies, the military has become faster, more powerful, more resistant and more connected to what the reality of the battlefield means. Bulletproof vests made of liquids or nano-materials weigh less; biological markers help to track, identify and locate friendly or enemy forces; there are contact lenses that project data directly onto the military retina ... these are just a few examples of the level and the way in which technology can influence the tactics of war or even the strategy of waging a war;

- *Directed-energy weapons:* function based on bundles of electromagnetic waves that propagate at the speed of light, directed to a target that is at a very long distance. They use different types of energy, such as radio waves, microwaves, laser, electromagnetic waves, plasma, protons, neutrons or sound and can neutralise very large facilities by the power of electromagnetic impulse or can penetrate buildings, cars etc.;

- *New propulsion systems:* they will generate a true revolution in terms of logistics, mobility and efficiency. Possible developments include portable energy systems, very large capacity batteries, air-based propulsion systems or systems that produce seawater fuel etc.;

- *Robotics:* unmanned air, ground or maritime vehicles are now not new. However, the implementation of nanotechnology and of artificial intelligence in such systems can transform them into weapons having extremely versatile capabilities;

- *Cyber capabilities:* new hardware and software systems enable the development of more secure and efficient networks. Most likely, cyber warfare will represent the blitzkrieg-type war of the 21st century: belligerents will have available capabilities through which the enemy communications and information systems can be neutralised, thus gaining a decisive advantage in the conduct of hostilities. An example in this regard is the attack on Georgia's information systems by Russia, in 2008, in parallel with launching a conventional military operation;

- *New production techniques:* 3-D printing is already a manufacturing technique that transforms the complex logistic effort of production into a one

that is flexible, cheap and adapted to limited resources. This type of production could also be used in manufacturing drones, explosives and even human tissue, for medical purposes.

Although the advantages in military affairs derived from the technological revolution are undeniable, there are also opinions according to which the excessive focus on new technologies for gaining victory in the future war is an erroneous perspective. The critics of this trend mainly appeal to history, to argue that not always the technological advantage ensures the unequivocal victory. Firstly, the combat assets are employed in a certain context defined by ethics, policies, and organisational factors: the use of drones in Pakistan by the United States of America to attack the al-Qaeda terrorist network, for example, generated real political controversy, regardless of the obvious benefits in military terms. Secondly, there are certain technical aspects that still need further development. The use of artificial intelligence in autonomous military systems, for example, could change the nature of war if the levels of friction and uncertainty that they introduce into the equation of armed fight are considered. Apparently simple decisions will become extremely complex under the conditions of a chaotic situation such as war. If we refer to the use of nanotechnology, then the deployment of a large number of autonomous systems could generate a real blockage in the act of command and control. Technology can reduce military flexibility, as it will require a highly specialised human resource for exploitation. Thirdly, war entails scenarios focused on human interaction. In military stabilisation, peace enforcement or peace keeping actions – in any situation in which the aim is to influence and to impose a model, not to destroy – the physical presence of the military remains crucial.

There are thus sufficient topics for reflection when it comes to the limitations of the technology employed in combat assets, generated by the complexity of human nature, on the one hand, and the complexity of the environment, on the other hand. There are questions to which no exact answer has been provided yet, solutions being still sought for.

In his book, *Command of the Air*, published in 1921, Giulio Douhet, an Italian General and air power theorist, argued that the advantage derived from the aircraft speed and manoeuvrability will make it impossible to ensure defence against an air attack strategy. Several years later, J.F.C Fuller, a military strategist, fascinated by the tank technical capabilities, argued that mass branches, such as infantry, will become irrelevant in the future. Both Douhet and Fuller proved wrong, and it is not impossible for the history to repeat in the case of the current technological revolution in military affairs. Therefore, victory in modern warfare is a topic of permanent debate.

METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR STRATEGY

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*Geopolitical Future's Chief Operating Officer, Associate Professor
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The post-Cold War period ended in 2008. Since then, the world started going back to old fears residing in nation states, as trust in globalisation, with all its past promises, diminishes. Old continental powers like Russia, China but also Iran or Turkey have started making their voice heard globally, while the US seeks to diminish its role (and expenditure) in global affairs. All this appears to make the question of nation states' interests more stringent today than several decades ago. In fact, the nation states interests were there while the world was thinking about globalisation as a phenomenon to save the world from all negative effects there are, conflict included. What happens now is that reality became more visible to all: the subject of national interest never went away, as globalisation never went for a dilution of states.

This reality however, because it is now more visible than before – also to the regular citizens, who seek to assure their own security, is driving a renewed discussion on strategy. Grand strategy has been determined mostly by geography. But, considering the socio-economic changes, geography is, in a sense, also changing – and for sure operational strategies need to adapt to the changing environment. Understanding the drivers behind those changes that affect the citizens daily lives get us to consider how strategy, at operational level, is changing – or how it is supposed to change.

This article considers the main elements influencing strategic thinking after World War II, focusing on the challenges highlighted in such evolution. The paper concludes on the challenges the next stage of strategic planning is likely to face, considering current issues, posed by what 'is new' post-2008. More, as strategy depends on analysis, challenges in analytical method point to those for strategic planning. So, methodologically, this paper takes analysis and modelling as the foundational framework for considering strategic planning. It concludes by pointing out several key tendencies that, based on past lessons, may shape strategic processes and analytical method both, in the future.

Keywords: Cold War, readiness, globalisation, relative peace, military conflict.

Motive: *On 18 June, Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that Russia intended to develop "a renewed theory of warfare". He emphasised that "the conflicts of the new generation are the set of the classic and asymmetric means of the warfare, where the combat actions are fleeting and there is no time to correct the mistakes"¹. He also added that "today the main task is the development of the theory of warfare for the medium term". This is no news, even if media has reported as such. It is the confirmation of current affairs. More, it indicates that operationalising grand strategy is not only complex – which has always been, but has gotten increasingly fluid, while challenges grow. Developing theory for the medium term taking into account the tactical manoeuvres of different interested parties (nation states or interest groups) becomes a priority – but how this is actually done, remains problematic as the short term cannot exclusively serve for the medium term. Shoigu's statement, along many other similar political statements serves for the reason of this paper, which attempts answering the question: what are the challenges we face today, when operationalising strategy.*

Introduction

The end of World War II has shaped how the Cold War was played out and, ultimately, how it ended. The lessons learned in the battlefield have been used as focus for strategising to resolve potential problems, arising with the enemy. As the Cold War ended, humanity hoped for long-time peace. Globalisation and the idea of "think globally, act locally" has influenced not only the global socio-economics, but also the security environment and more, the public perception on the security and defence matters. Local, regional conflicts got global coverage and foreign forces got in for their resolution, but globally, we

¹ Interfax article "Russian defense minister says new warfare theory required", published on 18 June, quoted by BBC Monitoring Service and RIA Novosti, available at <https://ria.ru/20190618/1555661861.html>, retrieved on 18 June.



The late 90s and early 2000s are considered the start of the “revolution in military affairs” in what regards strategy.

lived in relative peace. As the winner of the Cold War, the US policing and securing the world was seen not only natural, but also beneficial by most.

The perception of relative peace did not translate into the relaxation of strategic thought. On the contrary, the digitisation and social transformations produced changes into how strategy was taken. The late 90s and early 2000s are considered the start of the “*revolution in military affairs*”² in what regards strategy. September 11, 2001 was the peak event of that phenomenon.

Then, as 2008 confirmed, globalisation also had negative effects for the society, conventional warfare was also reaffirmed. Russian invasion in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea not only brought back memories of the Cold War, but also triggered questions in what regards strategy building. The resurgence of Russia into a regional power, along with China’s growth, while digitisation has exponential effects on society, increases complexity of global affairs and ultimately, strategy.

Modelling for Strategy

For a country, grand strategy comes from geography, which defines the state’s imperatives³. Territorial integrity, *in extenso*⁴, is what strategy is about. Therefore, strategy considers the country’s resources, its potential vulnerabilities and the opportunities for growth in the framework of keeping a secure and stable environment for the population. “*The landscape imprisons their leaders, giving them fewer choices and less room to maneuver*”⁵.

It is the limited choices aimed at securing the state’s borders and its population that make the strategy. While geography defines the basic limitations, all other aspects referring to society and the linkages between and within its members, are shaping particular options leaders can and should take, in specific times. Such options, regarding the medium and long term, refer to operationalising the grand strategy.

² Christian Brose, “*The new revolution in military affairs*”, in *Foreign Policy*, 16 April 2019, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/new-revolution-military-affairs>, retrieved on 10 June 2019.

³ Imperatives – geopolitical imperatives, in the sense of those elements that the nation must hold on in order to keep its territorial integrity and security.

⁴ Latin meaning – *in full length, in all aspects*.

⁵ Tim Marshall, “*Prisoners of Geography*”, pp. ix, CPI Group, 2016.

Strategic modelling, done for operationalising grand strategy, has several characteristics, derived from the decision making process⁶:

- *time*: it addresses medium and long term horizon;
- *frequency*: it emerges from a formalised planning cycle;
- *effort*: it requires significant input from key areas (geography, history, social sciences, technology) as well as specific information input from key functions, referring to key problems to solve;
- *consequences*: it affects the long-term direction of the state (of the state’s security apparatus) and its competitive dynamics.

Without decision, there is no strategy. But fundamentally, decision relates to options (the set of limited choices) and is dependent on analysis. It is therefore the particular context and the interests at play that both transforms strategy into action and changes operational strategy, re-considering the options the political leaders have at a certain moment in time. While aiming at long term goals, the strategic build-up process is dependent on short-term realities: those that refer to recent or current problems and those anticipated, the given(s) in specific scenarios.

Strategic planning is thus dependent on analytical method. Valuable analysis helps decision-makers to understand and predict critical changes. It answers a small number of powerful questions that, in effect, shape strategy:

❖ “*what is our current status?*” – in geopolitics, the answer is given by looking into three dimensions: the politics, the economics and the military dimension of a nation state. All three are interlinked and speak of the state’s power in the global arena. State security depends on the coordination of the three dimensions and therefore knowing the details on what makes the current status, for all of them, is actually knowing the current level of state security.

❖ “*what affects (may affect in the future) our current status?*” – this speaks of the events that are threatening or are beneficial to any and all above mentioned dimensions, both internally and externally. In defining elements that may influence the state’s status, we are actually doing event analysis. For strategic purposes, only events

⁶ Craig S. Fleisher, Babette E. Benssusan, “*Business and Competitive Analysis*”, pp. 1-16, adaptation from business theory on competitive analysis, strategy definition.



Strategic planning is dependent on analytical method. Valuable analysis helps decision-makers to understand and predict critical changes.



For strategic purposes, only events that have medium to long term effects get to be analysed – which means that events are also considered as relevant or irrelevant, timely or not.

that have medium to long term effects get to be analysed – which means that events are also considered as relevant or irrelevant, timely or not.

❖ “*what scenarios?*” – to shape strategy, we look at long-term outcomes of what we expect to happen considering the events affecting current status. Those are scenarios to which strategy must respond with options

❖ “*what options?*” – this is the step where it becomes clear that the directions leaders want to go (or those that they are promoting as such) are rarely those directions they should or could go. It is the scenarios that tell what options leaders can take into sustaining the strategic goal and the country’s objectives. All in all, choices are personal and relate to the tactical level, but they depend on options available.

The driver for such analysis is actually the information available to best understand the elements, the events potentially affecting the status quo. Considering the data-driven (not information-driven) often-confused landscape, one way to understand whether an event or generally, an issue⁷ is relevant for the strategic level of planning, we need to consider the critical commonly asked questions:

1. “*what?*” – really defining the issue in question, in as simple terms as possible;
2. “*so what?*” – establishing relevance, based on the potential effects;
3. “*now what?*” – establishing timeliness, considering relevance. This is the step where an issue is defined as tactical or strategic and taken as such. It is usual that with strategic issues, the “*now what?*” question does not have a clear answer. This is the indicator that a next level of analysis is needed, considering the complexity of the matter.

While the questions guiding the strategic planning and analysis remain unchanged, the answers are dependent on societal evolution and therefore have the effect of potentially changing strategy.

⁷ The term “*issue*” is usually defined in analytical context as a “*problem*” but also as an “*outcome*” that needs to be analysed, considering potential implications for the general environment, as well as for the actors that the analysis refers to. In reference to “*New Technologies and immutable geopolitical constraints*” published in Proceedings of the 21st International Conference Intelligence in the Knowledge Society, pp. 47-59, 2016, Ed. ANIMV.

In essence, it is the changes affecting long-term trends for societal evolution that pose challenges for the analytical framework.

Defining the shapers in strategic modelling

The leadership of a state needs to ensure its security. In doing so, they are in fact working for increasing the state’s power at the global level. At a minimum, their work on increasing state’s security minimises the negative effects of aggressive moves by the state’s competitors.

Keeping the population secure is the grand strategy goal. To reach it, strategic planning is done for achieving objectives that relate to the three dimensions of the state: politics, economics and military, all in sync and interdependent. That basically means that the leadership needs to have identified those challengers and shapers affecting the societal evolution and seek to take advantage of them through planning.

To understand the features of those elements that are potentially shaping the strategic thinking, we need to refer to recent history and identify the questions answered in the analytical process have sparked changes in strategy. This is done with the aim of defining current elements that are or may soon become shapers of strategic planning. Historical context taken into account is that following the end of the World War II.

Battlefield shapers – direction and centrality

In the ’50s, right after the World War II ended and the Cold War was only beginning, the two world powers at the time – the US and the USSR both considered changing their strategic models. The US War Department published in 1955 the “*Global logistics and strategy*” by Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley⁸ pointing out the need for taking into account the interconnected character of defence when it comes to strategy.

The strategic focus of the US after the war was to make sure effective planning techniques are in place so that resources needs

⁸ Richard M. Leighton, Robert W. Coakley, “*Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943*”, Center of Military History, U.S. Army, published in 1995 of the first print of 1955 – a digital copy of the original can be found at https://history.army.mil/html/books/001/1-5/CMH_Pub_1-5.pdf (retrieved on 3 June).

The leadership of a state needs to ensure its security. In doing so, they are in fact working for increasing the state’s power at the global level.



Fundamentally, the shaper for strategy has been the holistic view of operations – the nodes where particular action items met have become central to both the strategic planner and the strategy implementor.

(manpower and material resources) are met and joint operations in various admixtures: land, sea, airpower are carried on in coordination and not in competition (for resources). The text was also pointing out the need for “interagency coordination”⁹ for making sure strategy is carried on successfully at both military and civilian levels.

From an analytical perspective, the text of Leighton and Coakley reminds of the need to establish the centre and the direction you look on an issue of strategic importance. Taking the centre to be the main driver in implementing strategy, then the direction the analyst takes is from the centre to the horizon. If the centre is expected to be affected by strategy implemented, then the direction to analyse is from the horizon (or the environment) to the centre, in an attempt to identify anything and everything that could go wrong in the implementation process of a strategy. In a sense, the analyst, too, is establishing the route(s). This is done to check on potential events that could derail strategic planning but those are elements that may also challenge the process.

Fundamentally, the shaper for strategy has been the holistic view of operations – the nodes where particular action items met have become central to both the strategic planner and the strategy implementor. This view came from analysing the defects of the World War II battlefield operations – with logistics having been key to delivery. As it also alluded at the need to have civilian and military functions in sync, it also anticipated the strategic needs of the Cold War, forecasting a potential shaper for strategic planning for the next decades.

For the USSR, the strategy elaborated by Tukhachevsky¹⁰ before and during the World War II, which regarded the impact of motorisation and airpower in conducting warfare extended into a discussion on the conduct of deep operations in an annihilation war. The question the Soviet Union regarded as key for strategic planning referred to the speed of mass mechanised forces¹¹. This approach also anticipated

⁹ *Ibid*, pp. ix – a digital copy of the original can be found at https://history.army.mil/html/books/001/1-5/CMH_Pub_1-5.pdf (retrieved on 3 June).

¹⁰ Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893 – 1937) was a leading Russian military strategist, shaping the World War II Soviet doctrine and strategy and influenced strategic thinking during the Cold War.

¹¹ Lawrence Freeman, “Strategy – A History”, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, pp. 517, Ebook version.

the Cold War – as the question asked by the Soviet leadership was really how fast the U.S.S.R was able to manoeuvre deep into NATO territory with minimal mobilization of combined forces so that it got in before the American forces were able to get into Europe. During the early years of the Cold War – the ‘50s and the ‘60s, the Soviet Union had such strategy tested when trying to keep its control over the satellite states in Central Europe (the campaigns into Hungary and Czechoslovakia¹²).

From an analytical perspective, the USSR strategical considerations of the time regarded the operational direction, the steps taken for defining those elements threatening stability. Centrality was not a question for the Soviets, nor did they regarded nodes to be important in planning or implementing strategy, considering that their view was maintaining minimum dependency on the outside and maximum control (as opposed to influence) over the interior. The shaper for strategy in this case related to the time and timeliness for operational deployment, which really emphasised the importance of event analysis in the analytical and strategic planning processes.

Dialectic shapers – the permanence of threats

In 1963, the retired French general Andre Beaufre defined strategy “the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute”¹³. He was the first¹⁴ of the thinkers in the West who, at the time, started to think about strategy into a different dialect than just military. For him the Cold War that had just started was not ‘new’, but permanent. In this sense, in his work, he emphasised the concept of “state’s power”, while also underlying that conflict was no longer only on the battlefield, but also in economy, culture and ultimately, in all aspects of society. For strategic planning, this translated, according to him, into a “dialectic of opposing wills”¹⁵ where the state could

¹² In Hungarian revolution of 1956, the USSR Operation Whirlwind – launched by Marshal Ivan Konev and the Warsaw Pact troops occupation of Czechoslovakia, on 21 August 1968, after the implementation of Brezhnev Doctrine.

¹³ Andre Beaufre’s works are “Introduction à la Stratégie” (1963) and “Dissuasion et Stratégie” (1964). The quote comes from Beatrice Heuser, “The Evolution of Strategy”, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 22.

¹⁴ Lawrence Freeman, “Strategy – A History”, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, p. 532, Ebook version.

¹⁵ Andre Beaufre, “Deterrence and Strategy” – translation by Major General R.H. Barry, Frederick A. Praeger Publ. House, 1966, p. 23.

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formulate operational strategies that, while apparently opposites, they were part of the same grand strategy as they focused on the same goal.

For most of his time, his writings were hard to follow as they were more philosophical and therefore appeared to be less practical¹⁶. However, he was not the only one having served who was thinking that deterrence – and conflict in general, was not only about the military and the battlefield. In 1967, on the other side of the Atlantic, James Wylie, in his “*Military Strategy*” pointed out that “*a general theory of strategy was not developed in the US and there was a stringent need to get on with that*”¹⁷. Wylie, too, spoke about the concept of power in seeking a meaning that would drive strategy. In his work, he took Mahan’s¹⁸ idea that control was in fact the objective of strategy. Based on that premises, he saw strategy dependent on the two elements helping the state achieve control: logistics and external relations. He understood strategy being about the “*ends and means*” and had made a distinction between two types of strategy: directive and cumulative¹⁹.

His ideas on strategy, from an analytical methodology perspective, refer to sequences taken and, depending on the events or issues analysed during the strategic planning, result into two options for action. When directive, strategic planning follows a linear sequence, being used for offensive operations. When cumulative, strategic planning relates to critical points – items (results of events or issues investigated) are piling up and action is taken only when it becomes critical to do so. This is used for cases when the state chooses to take a defensive position, aiming to deny enemy’s control.

Both Wylie and Beaufre emphasise the fluidity of strategic planning. As they regard power at the core of strategy, they underline

¹⁶ Bernard Brodie in his paper “*Andre Beaufre on Strategy – A Review of Two Books*” delivers one of the clearest critic, pointing to the heavily philosophic text of Beaufre; available at <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P3157.pdf> retrieved on 29 May 2019.

¹⁷ Roger W. Barnett, J. C. Wylie, “*Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*”, in *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 44, No. 2, Article 14, 1991, p. 134, available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol44/iss2/14>, retrieved on 29 May 2019.

¹⁸ Alfred Thayer Mahan was a United States naval officer and historian, living between 1840 and 1914, his work influencing the US strategy in the World War I, often called the most important American strategist in the 19th century.

¹⁹ Lawrence Freeman, “*Strategy – A History*”, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, p. 578, Ebook.

the complexity that goes into it. In the same time, as they both write during the Cold War, their texts focus on deterrence. The shaper for strategy in their case resides in the good definition for the current status. It is where power resides, where state has to work most, that matters first. In this case, the event analysis that follows is dependent on the priorities set through the current status analysis.

Agile shapers – the adaptive attitude

In the 70s, as the Cold War encompassed conventional warfare in South Asia, the works of Wylie and Beaufre, which were initially taken to be too abstract for military thinking, came back at the forefront of discussions on regular warfare and strategy. As new technology also started to challenge existing doctrine and thinking models, Colonel John Boyd, an American fighter pilot with experience going back to the Korean War, has revived the texts of the two in giving them meaning through a very practical take: the ‘OODA Loop’. Boyd basically pointed to the strategic need of holistically approach the problems at hand. OODA stands for *observation, orientation, decision and action*, all of them set for agility. When elaborating on the strategic planning model he proposed, Boyd has fundamentally referred to the fact that any action changes the environment that it is set into. Therefore, operational strategic planning needs to focus on the short term effects of any and all events or issues at hand.

Boyd pointed to the dangers of preconception – as observation is sure to contain more uncertainty than clarity and therefore interpretation is done subjectively, as it suits the one looking at the environment. In this sense, his work is fundamental for understanding the challenge of disorientation, increasingly present in the last decades of the 20th century (and more), which was caused due to what Beaufre and Wylie pointed out: permanence of systemic cold war, in all aspects of society, with issues piling up and limited clarity on offensive actions. He is also calling on adapting strategic planning to “*chaos theory*”, which he sees evolving in the security environment: disorderly systems are built on micro-causes that may have unexpected effects. The focus for Boyd is to plan strategy so that you are able to disrupt the enemy’s decision-making process.

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Operational strategic planning needs to have one objective: cause confusion and uncertainty in the enemy's mind.

In his work, he challenges the idea of equilibrium, but not that of centrality. Considering that there is more chaos than stability, the laws of physics and econometrics are no longer applicable on the short term and the short term affects the long term more than it did in the past, which means that achieving the equilibrium is no longer a goal for strategy. However, centrality is: the core of things are still those elements defining the grand strategy and taking into consideration national interest. Only that adaptation is key to deliver results – and for that agility, and not only speed, is needed.

From Boyd's perspective, operational strategic planning needs to have one objective: cause confusion and uncertainty in the enemy's mind. This, in exchange, will undermine the enemy's will to fight (moral warfare), as it will create a distorted perception of reality. To win, and implement the grand strategy goal, you would continue with strategic planning in seeking to use advantages gained through moral warfare in order to attack war-making capabilities (physical warfare).

Translating the theory put together by Boyd in contemporary world, we would consider the use of deception, through communication campaigns in trying to distort reality as an operational strategy employed by all major powers today. The "fake news" used by Russia in Eastern Europe are aimed at distorting realities so that the focus of societies in the countries is changed to other goals than those linked with their national grand strategy. Moral warfare is used to seek advantages and support for attacking physical capabilities belonging to the security apparatus of nation states. Attacks on critical infrastructure are examples of physical warfare that are using advantages gained in the moral warfare realm.

Boyd's work points to creating surprise and shock as part of strategy, considering he is emphasizing the importance of mentality and generally, of the mental estate in fighting the enemy. Manoeuvres relating to moral warfare are also comprised in his presentations – they are not tactical, but also relate to operational strategy, considering that their goal is to kill the spirit and will of the fighters. The context of Boyd's work, while alluding to societal challenges that continue to today, is still the Cold War: when the enemy was well known and substantial.

From an analytical perspective, the OODA loop is bringing forth dependencies, as key element to take into account in strategic planning, together with timeliness. In this sense, the current status becomes fluid and essentially defined by known unknowns while event analysis takes on a more important role. In effect, Boyd is posing the question of whether strategy, as we know it before the Cold War is really doomed to failure as he appears to focus on tactical adaptation to challenge strategic process. The strategic shaper, in Boyd's case, is the rapidly changing conditions of the 'current status', which, from a methodological standpoint, adds to analysis the agility dimension. In practice, analysis needs to produce for both the short term and long term, in pointing how details that appear chaotic are actually able to influence the grand strategy.

Cognitive shapers – the non-standardised solutions

John Boyd's writings and his presentations led to the evaluation of strategies based on their ability to cause confusion and uncertainty in the enemy's mind. Boyd's influence grew in the late '70s and early '80s and resulted into the rewriting of the "Field Manual 100-5: Operations". Its first publication in 1976 was revised and the text of the manual in 1982 has replaced "attrition" with "manoeuvre", pointing out that the primary objective is that of "the spirit and will" of opponent and not "killing the enemy's troops and destroying the enemy's equipment" as in the case of attrition²⁰. This gave way for more thinking on what manoeuvre means in strategic planning. Edward Nicolae Luttwak's²¹ work on manoeuvre, in an attempt to give it meaning within the strategic planning process. He sees it opposite to attrition, which makes the whole process less about human power and technology and more about the quality and the state of mind of the military.

Luttwak talks about the authority problems in what regards the strategic planning process, continuing Boyd's work into emphasising the role of operational level. He underlines that, with perception being

²⁰ Lawrence Freeman, "Strategy – A History", Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, pp. 560-565, Ebook.

²¹ Edward Nicolae Luttwak is a political scientist having worked on grand strategy and military history since the early 70s. He worked for the US OSD/Net Assessment and co-developed the current manoeuvre-warfare concept. He also introduced the "operational level of war" concept into US Army doctrine while working for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

From an analytical perspective, the OODA loop is bringing forth dependencies, as key element to take into account in strategic planning, together with timeliness.



the main enemy to really understand the status of any conflict at play, the solution comes from the operational level. The “*political free zone*” works to the benefit of commanders and, in complex engagements with the enemy, they know those details that make for better reality check and better implementation of the OODA loop²². Luttwak also speaks of the need to ‘conduct warfare at all levels’, considering relational manoeuvring. His texts point to the need of avoiding the enemy’s strengths and focusing on attacking the enemy’s weaknesses. This option is successfully and more rapidly implemented especially in the case of limited resources at play for implementing strategy. Which speaks of two cases: when rapid agile action is needed or when the main carrier of strategy is not a resourceful (in terms of human power, technology and finance) nation state.

In his work, the main question posed by Luttwak relates to the definition of “*limited war*”. The alternative to large scale war, while minimal details may have a major impact on grand strategy is, in Luttwak’s view, establishing hierarchical levels for planning and conducting operational strategy. This is one method to keep track and use political goals for military and security objectives. The most important element in the model he proposes is the “*center of gravity*”, a concept of Clausewitz inspiration²³. The centrality Luttwak proposes is the “*brain of the enemy*”²⁴ – that is what strategic planning should aim to tackle, considering all methods that could be used to produce shock and disorder, countering to the paralysis of the enemy’s actions.

The works of Luttwak on strategy speak of cognitive processes, keeping Boyd’s principles alive. In analytical methodology, his work gets translated into the emphasis on situational awareness, which embodies knowledge about existing vulnerabilities. Luttwak supports however the idea of hierarchies in addressing event analysis that builds on situational awareness. Methodologically, the strategic shaper, in Luttwak’s case, is the fact that strategic fluidity comes from the brain and cognitive processes are the dominant in planning

²² Lawrence Freeman, “*Strategy – A History*”, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, pp. 535-540, Ebook.

²³ Antulio J. Echevarria II, “*Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought*”, Naval War College Review LVI, no. 1, Winter 2003, pp. 108-123.

²⁴ Lawrence Freeman, “*Strategy – A History*”, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, pp. 547-548, Ebook.

and implementing strategies, which allows for both non-standardised solutions and problems to arise.

The evolution of strategic thinking follows the evolution of society. Technological progress also defines the way strategy is taken and warfare considered. While steps taken for defining grand strategy and operational strategy are the same ever since antiquity, as populations and communities are defined by similar, basic features, the emphasis on particulars differs from one period to another, depending on the existing societal context.

Thinking ahead

We live in a global world, in the sense of unlimited communicational interconnect-ness. This is viewed mostly as an advantage, as it provides the opportunity of “*knowing more*”. However, in 2008, we realised the downsides of globalisation, when being interconnected meant that we are also more vulnerable. For the security dimension of the state and the military, in particular, interconnect-ness means increased dependencies on the external, which, by default, are equal with increased security risks. With nationalism and distrust in globalisation visibly growing, security risks are not diminishing.

From reading the literature on strategic thinking, as it evolved in time since the end of the World War II, we could conclude that strategy goes in sync with society. While true, that is not necessarily useful, considering the world is no longer bipolar, as it was during the Cold War and the spectrum of “*chaos theory*” is not only valid for state players, but also for the non-state actors, that are growing in importance. The concept of power and internal stability are similar in the sense of dependencies on external forces, and the notion of manoeuvring coordinates with that of vulnerabilities. That calls for considering current challenges in analytical methodology as triggers for improving strategic planning process, in a multipolar world with multiple variables.

The cognitive approach that Boyd and Luttwak developed since the ’70s and until today needs to be addressed in the context of increased digitisation and social polarisation. That means that as Russia has learned from the operational strategic planning of the US and is currently applying concepts like moral warfare in our region, so we should learn



The operational strategic planning processes are already affected by digitization: sequences contract to the minimum and political (which includes juridical) elements are not synced to fight back enemies that become harder to spot.

to be adaptive and agile in fighting back influencers on our strategies. And be aware that others will similarly take on the route of agility, in developing cognitive methods for strategic planning.

Largely, there are several tendencies that we can observe and will likely influence these processes. First, the divisions and differences between the urban and the rural are likely to grow. Globalisation helped the development of urbanisation but rural life remained more or less static. This forces a double approach for operational strategic planning – one that is meant to balance between the two and ensure balanced development and another one that is meant to fight back the negatives coming from the specific disparities existing between the two.

Second, digitisation poses a question of whether digital/cyber power can attributed to nation states, in an attempt to redefine the state's security functions or whether it is just another characteristic of the three dimensions that define the state's power. The answer depends on how digitisation evolves into technological progress and whether it will affect cognitive processes that currently belong only to human beings. However, the operational strategic planning processes are already affected by digitization: sequences contract to the minimum and political (which includes juridical) elements are not synced to fight back enemies that become harder to spot. Which, in essence, complicates the attributes (and the analysis) of the current status quo.

The two tendencies mentioned above do not impact grand strategy planning directly, but indirectly, as they influence both processes and method for analysing and, ultimately, for defining operational strategy supporting the grand strategy. Their evolution is dependent on large social changes that ultimately refer to the evolution of the human beings and the way they socialise, the way networks and webs of knowledge are being formed. This phenomena offers an unique opportunity for states to work with the most creative resource there is: its population. Which in turn, would make strategy dependent on two key functions: education and health.

Therefore, the challenges for strategic planning reside into the definition of long term vulnerabilities for the state's population, which is less and less constrained by the borders, but increasingly active

(as a client and provider both) in the state's security function, with trust in globalisation diminishing. In essence, syncing operational strategic goals with grand strategy becomes increasingly difficult, considering the technological effects on the development of human beings and their morale and spirit.

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THE DIALECTICS OF DECISION-MAKING TYPOLOGIES: RATIONALITY VS INTUITION

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Decision is something that cannot be seen, but can be evaluated by the effects it causes. Numerous attempts made to decipher the secrets of the decision-making mechanism have led to numerous theories, but not to a priori winning solution whatsoever. Closely related to various factors, such as cognitive, emotional, social ones etc., decision-making reflects the entropic status of the organisation, represented by the decision-maker, with all their implicit or explicit culture. The emulation of an intellectual process, decision has many times been at the border of rationality, and that is not at all paradoxical, we believe.

Intuition is not luck or hazard; it is the reflection, beyond rationality, of the vision of a genius, difficult to explain, and even harder to learn. War, in its irrationality, entails rational rules as well as moments of intuition. We do not think that one decision is better than the other, depending on the chosen method. However, we believe that, in the absence of patterns, intuition is what makes the difference.

Keywords: military decision, intuition, education system, rationality, courses of action.

INTRODUCTION

The complexity of the decision-making process and its importance to mission accomplishment for the military, related to *third party* interferences in combat, require us to look at and analyse the related cognitive activities in the overall accepted bipolarity: **rational and intuitive**. People sought to show the limit of human reason in almost all fields of the social life, through all (pseudo)scientific means, accepted by some, rejected by others. The dilemma of the human brain's maximum potential biological functionality, the various cognitive experiments with different subjects have somewhat amplified the tendency to debunk the human being's capacity to reason in all of their actions. In these situations, the logical question arises for us: *Was Descartes completely right?* If a human being thinks, they do so for a certain purpose, and not for the sake of *stating reasons!* Therefore, we think in order to make a decision. But what if the *statement of reasons*, which means the tacit transcendental experience, is what helps us think much faster, freeing us from thinking patterns that have been developed in an educational but limited, non-visionary way?

Each decision, each solution to a problem, each new invention has occurred only as a result of a certain thinking process. The ability to think rationally is what places humans above the rest of the animal kingdom. And yet, this powerful feature of ours sometimes becomes our biggest weakness. Instead of finding solutions based on concrete realities, humans seem to be naturally prone to changing reality by giving pre-defined answers. Eliminating rationality from our thinking processes sometimes leads to defective effects. History is full of examples: Japan's defeat in the Second World War, its incapacity to critically evaluate its position, while war turned against it¹; the Vietnam War, "*an example of collective stupidity perpetuated by very intelligent*

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¹ Richard Pelvin, *Japanese Air Power 1919 – 1945: A Case Study in Military Dysfunction*, Air Power Studies Centre, Royal Australian Air Force, 1995, p. 5.



*individuals*²; Iraq invading Kuwait in 1991, a dramatic case of over estimating its military potential, in an obvious fog of reason.

Contextually speaking, we are the prisoners of certain thinking patterns, continuously developed under the action of the educational factors in the environments we have coexisted in: family, school, community, workplace, church, etc. All these impose *box rules*, transformed into well-defined, but limited thinking patterns. Thus, religion can create, in many situations, real social, economic or even political barriers for its followers. Religious teachings become an absolute pattern, offered by the **initiated**. Mentally escaping from it means a profound changing process many can no longer achieve, especially after a certain age.

The macro-social institutionalised educational system plays an essential role in shaping the future adults' way of thinking. Shaping the thinking typologies is the result of the values promoted in conjunction with the liberalisation of the critical thinking. In socialism, the way of thinking was focused upon submission, envy, discouragement of the initiative, centralising decision-making power and, more important, upon promoting non-values and collective mediocrity. The transition from one system to another is even more dramatic: we have become passive in our thinking, subordinated to immediate and petty reasons, chaotic and messy. These are just two examples through which we generically wished to emphasise the existence of certain thinking patterns, within which we are under the impression that logic/reason rules. Later on, becoming aware of the limits, dimensions and parameters of the cognitive space, we must try to enhance our thinking patterns to the highest level, so that specific decision-making can give rise to performance.

The military system is no different from the others, from the previously presented point of view. The pattern makes things easier, but routine ruins them. Up to a certain point, the decision-making hierarchy **can** be traced out, waiting for a potential result in favour of the one who traces it out. But this is possible under *laboratory conditions*, in an ideal environment, with the enemy's actions

² M.R. Feinberg, J.J. Tarrant, *Why Smart People Do Dumb Things*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995, p. 36.

and reactions played by us, without the quantifiable pressure of stress and not being able to take into consideration the element of hazard (in the shape of chance or unpredicted disadvantage). In an environment characterised by uncertainty, volatility and ambiguity, reason must be perfected through practical training and through learning some enhancement methods. This ability, which is not much different from the others, can be perfected, under the essential condition to possess the necessary will to do it³.

The act of making a decision is an attribute of the manager, because decision-making involves consciously choosing one of the many possible variables, even though this is at the antipode of instinct and reflex, many times being dictated by intuition, but especially by rational intervention, rigorously substantiated on human thinking.

In this respect, maybe a decision-making science should be useful in the military field as well, a science to tackle decision-making in an axiological manner, which is situated on the borderline between mathematically (logically) determined relations and emotional (intuitive) relations. Sound professional knowledge, lessons learnt on management and leadership, logical ordering of certain forecast events in many cases cannot be enough. **Decision-making** is not only a technique derived from science, it is real art, which requires ability and competence, command and choice, perception and vision.

RATIONAL THINKING IN THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

In almost all literatures there are slightly different viewpoints regarding the definition of decision. The complexity of this notion is too high, but we shall present some considerations, to understand that the central role of management/leadership is precisely the process associated with these cognitive activities. Therefore, decision is:

- *The deliberate act by which a person or a group sets in motion an entire psychic or psycho-social equipment, in order to achieve certain goals, to redirect certain actions, to put into practice certain solutions or ideas*⁴;

³ E. De Bono, *Cursul de gândire al lui Edward de Bono. Instrumente eficiente pentru a transforma modul de gândire*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2007, p. 5.

⁴ P. Gheorghiu, *Sistem informațional decizie-conducere*, in *Revista de Statistică*, nr. 8, 1979, pp. 65-66 apud A. Trifu, *Universul multidimensional al deciziei*, Editura Economică, București, 2008, p. 72.

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In the military field, decision can be defined as an adequate means to counteract uncertainty, pushing the mental act to standard formula status.

- *The direction to act consciously chosen out of a given number of possibilities, in order to get certain results⁵;*
- *The decision to opt for a certain alternative to act out of several possibilities, associated with the process or phenomenon taken into consideration⁶;*
- *The rational process to choose and use a direction to act, based on the analysis of several possibilities or solutions⁷.*

In the military field, decision can be defined as an adequate means to counteract uncertainty, pushing the mental act to standard formula status, being characteristic to the most critical and implicitly the most difficult situations. Maybe this is the reason why they have tried, since the first great war of Europe⁸, to eliminate execution errors by implementing firm leadership, based on centralised, closely evaluated and extensively practiced decision-making. Although it retains structural (natural) imperfections of the general decision-making process, through the way in which it is designed and adopted, decision offers the highest degree of absorption in an uncertain environment.

Decision-making is the first step in implementing the human will and, thus, it is a human first factor in wartime. Military education, training and exercises are all centred on the aspects of decision-making. The British military doctrine, for example, states that “*command is first of all preoccupied with decision-making*”⁹. Most factors which influence decision-making are reflected in the way military forces train and exercise their influence, prior to making a decision: time, stress, fatigue, the demand for information, data overloading, noise and sleep deprivation are just some of the aspects that shape the behavioural aspect of the decision-makers. The final aim is to have leaders with good judgment and initiative, who can apply logical decision-making algorithms, based on optional quantitative comparisons, without personal, individual or group interferences.

Military decision is the consequence of a long analysis and documenting activity related to parameters specific to the situation

⁵ I. Căineap, A. Mureșan, *Considerații privind unele procedee de estimare comparativă cu aplicații în analiza economic teritorială*, in *Revista de Statistică*, nr. 8, 1978, p. 152.

⁶ M. Andriașiu, *Metode de decizie multicriteriale*, Editura Tehnică, București, 1986 apud A. Trifu, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁷ I. Verzea, G. Luca, *Management general*, Editura Performantica, Iași, 2005, p. 21.

⁸ ***, *Războiul persan, 500-448 B.C.*, available at <http://istorie-edu.ro/istoria-universala/grecia-antica/razboaiele-medice.html>, retrieved on 12 March 2019.

⁹ *British Military Doctrine (Army Code 71451)*, 4–1.

in which it is shaped. This complicated process which sometimes fails constitutes decision-making. It involves, first of all, the levels that have access to overall situations in the military system and which, naturally, are in permanent contact with the elements that lead to the accomplishment of the decisions that have been made. Even more so, in the complex current situation, when the missions of Romania’s armed forces have enormously diversified, decision-making has got to be operational, efficient, and its result – decision – has got to be put into practice quickly, flexibility and, at the same time, adapted to the very difficult conditions of war.

The investigations carried out have outlined several requirements for rationality¹⁰, which must be met by decision in order to efficiently fulfil its multiple functions. These imply the fact that rational decision must be:

- **scientifically substantiated**, meaning it must be made in accordance with the realities within the organisation based upon scientific instruments, eliminating amateurism, improvisation, routine and voluntarism. The personnel must have the necessary decision-making knowledge and skills, namely they must know the methods and techniques to make decision-making an efficient process; set up in a teleological and axiological manner;
- **integrated and harmonised** in the entirety of decisions that have been made or projected taking into account the strategy and the policies of the organisation. Integrating decisions must take place both vertically, and horizontally, thus guaranteeing the principle of unity between decision and action. Vertical integration refers to correlating the decisions made by each manager with the decisions adopted at superior hierarchic levels. Horizontal integration pertains to correlating with the decisions regarding the other activities involved they are interdependent with;
- **clear, concise and consistent**, which means that by expressing the decision there should be mentioned, without any possibility of interpretation, the content of the decision-making situation (alternatives, criteria, objectives, consequences),

¹⁰ C. Teleșpan, L. Stanciu, *Bazele managementului – curs*, Editura Academiei Forțelor Terestre, Sibiu, 2005, p. 92.

Decision-making involves, first of all, the levels that have access to overall situations in the military system.



Rational decision must be scientifically substantiated, integrated and harmonised in the entirety of decision made or projected, clear, concise and consistent, opportune, efficient and realist.

so that all structures involved in putting it into practice should understand the same thing (unity in thinking);

- **opportune**, meaning fitting the optimum period for drawing it up and for making it operational. This requirement is based on the idea that a good decision made at the right moment is preferable to a very good decision made too late. The requirement of opportunity is met only if the decision is presented to those who put it into practice in due time, so that they can find the necessary resources to prepare the actions to be taken later;
- **efficient**, in order to get an increased effect with a given effort. The criterion to assess the management is efficiency, and the decision (which is its essence) is only normal to be evaluated through its effects, which are obtained after its implementing;
- **realist**, implying correlating the purpose with the available resources (tangible and intangible).

The issue of the validity and assessment of the military decision brings under theoretical scrutiny a series of questions. By whom and on what criteria can its value and quality be measured? In the process of assessing value, is the rationality criterion alone sufficient or is the military decision subjected to the imperative of necessity as well? In military practice, up to what point can we operate with the established dimensions and the indicators in the theory of decision? Can we evaluate abnormality (war, combat) using the means of normality? Of course, the military decision-maker cannot be exonerated of the responsibility of his actions nor can we tolerate their incompetence, free will, voluntarism, abusive behaviour and inefficiency. We cannot set aside the fact that combat induces the highest risk degree to the military decision. The very concept of rationality gets a new meaning. Generally seen, from a humanist perspective, a decision that causes human casualties, regardless of the motivations invoked, is profoundly irrational, just as war in general. But from a technical perspective, that of the algorithm of the operations meant to ensure efficiency to the action taken on the battlefield, military decision has its own logic, its own rationality, and there are firm, rigorous criteria to assess its finality. Thus we can speak about an intrinsic rationality of the decision-making process in combat, to which an exterior social and human rationality does not always correspond. The decision of the military leader

in combat must be considered as a risk option, adopted out of necessity¹¹.

To meet all the above-mentioned requirements, the military decision must be as simple and concise as possible, easy to receive by all structures, easy to execute, easy to modify, if this might be imposed by the concrete conditions and easy to transmit to those involved in carrying out the order coming out of the decisional process. To this purpose, there have been and there still are numerous methods to draw up the military decision, resulting from a more or less complicated, but standardised decision-making process, along with prescriptive taxonomies and typologies. Some of them are:

- MDMP (Military Decision-Making Process);
- MCDM (Multi Criteria Decision-Making);
- Risk Management;
- Scenario Method;
- Cost-Benefit Method.

“From Plato to NATO, the history of decision-making at war has been an endless search for certainty, has been about the enemy’s status and intention, about the environment and about one’s own forces”¹². Rational decision-making analysis is, in general, the preferred pattern in most military organisations to solve complex, multi-level problems. According to Van Creveld, two factors are essential in searching certainty: the amount of information available for making decisions and the nature of the tasks to be fulfilled¹³. On a more and more complex and dynamic battlefield, the tasks of the forces will acquire, and not only in a mimetic way, the same features. The result is a higher degree of uncertainty. The advantage of getting a higher amount of data is diminished by the increased difficulty of its exploitation. To be truly logical, all information relevant to the decision-maker must be obtained to eliminate probability. This leads to a paradox: lots of information, long processing time. **Primary resources dilemma!** The result is a more confused situation, in which separating important, relevant and trustworthy information from unimportant, irrelevant and parasite information becomes very difficult¹⁴.

¹¹ I. Gădiuță, D. Sava, *Decizia militară – raționalitate și legitimitate*, Colecția Bibliotecii Statului Major General, București, 1998, p. 119.

¹² Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985, p. 274.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*



In the military field, descriptive theory can lie upon eight basic concepts: the goals of the parties; the level of the human aspiration; perspective; action courses; partial solving of a conflict between final goals of the adversaries; avoiding uncertainty; analysing/assessing tasks; experience.

To make a decision, a commanding officer must answer the following questions: what the mission is; how complex it is; who and to what extent must take part in drawing it up; who must be informed; the nature of the decision, etc. In this respect, there are two main ways to approach the process itself: descriptive and normative¹⁵.

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- the level of the human aspiration;
- perspective;
- action courses;
- partial solving of a conflict between final goals of the adversaries;
- avoiding uncertainty;
- analysing/assessing tasks;
- experience¹⁶.

The basic idea is to describe decision-making, substantiated on rationality and integrating all stages and resources in a logical scheme, easy to understand and apply.

The feature of the normative theory is the rational approach to decision-making, starting at the superior levels of leadership. An overall assessment points out the fact that setting the fundamental objectives of the military structure and implementing the strategy has a central position, involving scientific, integrating and defining elements.

War is a human activity in which powerful, independent wills are in a decision-making dialectic; this fact, alongside powerful emotions, increases the level of uncertainty. Classical decision-making patterns require that all relevant information obtained is fully aware of the situation. Studies so far have presented two types of decision-making patterns: analytical and naturalist.

Rational analytical patterns interpret the entire system from a holistic point of view, comparing potential, estimated results, to identify the best option. One advantage of this method is the fact the relatively inexperienced personnel, following a procedure, can reach the same decision just as the experienced one; the essential condition is to eliminate uncertainty. Rationality can exist only under conditions of absolute certainty. An example is the Cuban missile crisis

¹⁵ A. Trifu, *Universul multidimensional al deciziei*, Editura Economică, București, 2008, p. 90.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

(1962). Political confrontation escalated and humankind was on the brink of a nuclear war but then the decisions of those involved led to disengagement and to avoiding *Armageddon*. In researching the case, after almost half a century, it has been demonstrated that the positive outcome for humankind was rather obtained as a result of a rational behaviour of some of those in charge with executing the decisions, rather than as a result of *good* decisions made at the governmental level.

Technically speaking, it is possible for the result to justify itself. The documenting process, though laborious, offers the certainty of getting relevant, secure and opportune information. In a military environment, the justification requirement is necessary in most cases, time permitting. It is difficult to imagine a program that can develop a decision-making architecture and, at the same time, that can justify a set of conclusions, without following a rational pattern of making analytical decisions. But, such a pattern implies **adaptability to the state of facts**, in the sense that what is right in times of peace is not adapted in times of war.

Rational analysis is a source of power, specialised and potent. It represents a pertinent means when the decision-maker faces new, multiple problems, and which needs contingency in plans, in order to take into account each option. It has best expressed its efficiency in the field of science and technological development¹⁷. Making rational decisions implies assimilated processes, carried out regularly, systematically and comparatively. The optimal solution to the problem represents the theoretical basis of the estimation process within the entire process of operational planning, being at the same time part of the military decision-making instruments in the Romanian Armed Forces.

Military decision-makers are as free in decision-making as the theory of planning and carrying out military actions allows them to be. Well-known supporters of the rational, analytical style, they prefer similar situations full of historical lessons, *ante bellum* accepted, but somehow lacking in substance, because of the different circumstances. This tacit acceptance generates a paradigm of typical, routine but elementary thinking, just the opposite of the profound, reflective

¹⁷ G. Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998, p. 260.

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The concept of design allows critical and creative thinking to take into account the problems that do not fit the assumed context of the military operational parameters.

and multiple-perspective thinking. It is not the blame of any of the parties; the flawed use of certain leadership concepts, the misunderstanding of the tempo of combat, of the particularities of each of its stages, of the singularity of the action in itself, have derived towards a rationalist passivity in thinking. Clausewitz' mathematical relations, associated with combat, were mere scientific attempts to shape war, and implicitly the decisions associated with it. Later research has shown that this is not possible. Paraphrasing Henry Mintzberg, planning war is like a dance full of ritual. It has no effect on the weather, but those who engage in it believe they will have¹⁸. Later decisions must be aimed at improving the dance, and not its effects on meteorological factors.

The answer to the 19th century Prussian strategist's desire resides nowadays in the concept of design, which allows critical and creative thinking to take into account the problems that do not fit the assumed context of the military operational parameters. The effort to transform has belonged (and still does) to educational institutions, through theoretical training programs, but also to the repetition/simulation practice, through exercises. Nevertheless, the question regarding the *solving of the problem* in a complex, ambiguous, uncertain or volatile environment is whether the previous condition has been met. If under laboratory conditions linearity can be induced, in real, military context (on the battlefield), approaching actions (from a decision-making perspective) must be regarded in a maneuvered style, step by step, in a deductive and evaluative way. Even so, we consider that rationality is limited by complexity, and getting positive effects is possible only in relatively simple tactical situations, and only for the static, estimative part. Alongside the intervention of the dynamic, the decision-makers will be facing more and more alternatives of action, with factors that are hard to quantify and compare, so that, many times, the only solution is to give up patterns and to adopt the intuitive conduct.

INTUITIVE THINKING

Analysing the military conflicts throughout history does not make it clear how commanding officers use intuition in decision-making. One plausible reason might be their fear to explain their failure or even

¹⁸ Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, Prentice Hall, New York, 1994 apud Rolf I. Roth, *The Rational Analytical Approach to Decision-Making: An Adequate Strategy for Military Commanders?* Connections, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 2004, p. 72.

their desire not to reveal their military genius. From our point of view, this is also very hard to quantify, being beyond the logic of the actions' unfolding, outside the patterns of the tactics of those times.

Saint Thomas Aquinas noticed, in the 13th century already, that *"there are processes in the soul that we are not aware of right away"*¹⁹. Guy Claxton accused Descartes of misunderstanding losing the link between the conscious and the unconscious mind²⁰. In time, other authors have dealt with this truth. Among them there are military authors as well, such as Major General J. F. C. Fuller, who talked about that special, undefined something, which can produce surprising and often incomprehensible results, because of a *"power"* at the commanding officer's disposal. He wrote: *"There is an explanation which cannot be doubted, but so far science has not revealed it yet, although psychology is heading towards it"*²¹.

In Clausewitz' opinion, a commanding officer who wants victory will get it only if he casts *"un coup d'œil"*. Understood from the context as a decisive blow, this is in fact the rapid understanding of the circumstances of the fight, possible only after a long study or deep thought. And since time is one of the determining variables in combat, the evaluation must be done using intuition.

Sun Tzu and Jomini also saw intuition as one of the essential qualities of a military decision-maker. The Chinese strategist emphasised the fact that not all good soldiers can be as successful as commanders. In other words, education and experience are not enough to obtain victory. Other superior qualities, such as intuition, are needed. Many times associated with *"military genius"*, it did not reflect an irrational behavior, but another type of rationality, in which his decisions were explained *post factum*. It is accepted that success does not mean carrying out the plan of operations *ad literam*, but rather intuitively *"reading"* the chaos on the battlefield, in order to exploit all opportunities, in spite of the lack of time and information.

Napoleon talked about *"a superior understanding"* and, many times, he seemed to be lucky on his own: *"If I always seem prepared, that is because, before beginning an action, I meditate for long and foresee what might appear ahead. There is no genie who reveals*

¹⁹ Guy Claxton, *Hare Brain Tortoise Mind*, Fourth Estate, London, 1998, p. 204.

²⁰ *Idem*, p. 205.

²¹ J.F.C. Fuller, *The Foundation of the Science of War*, Hutchinson, London, 1926, pp. 98–99.

It is accepted that success does not mean carrying out the plan of operations *ad literam*, but rather intuitively *"reading"* the chaos on the battlefield, in order to exploit all opportunities, in spite of the lack of time and information.



Creativity, imagination, genetic inheritance and emotional intelligence, together with the uncertainty of the situation, provide the decision maker with the general framework to express his own intuition. It is an answer to the subtle signals of the unconscious, which generate unique ideas, out of the conceptualisation area.

to me all of a sudden and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others, it is thinking and meditating"²². Fuller noticed that: "the great artist, the general, should be a genius and, if not, then no effort should be spared to develop his natural skills instead of suppressing them"²³.

Decision-making aims at choosing alternatives, in a process with several approaches, implying objective and subjective factors, in various proportions. These can determine prejudices, thus causing lack of coherence and, *post factum*, thinking errors. The way we let intuition and creativity influence decision-making is, in fact, the essence of decision-making. People count on their perception on reality, and not on its objectivity. Sensorial impressions make sense of the environment we live in.

Intuition is described as being "the ability of reason to discover directly and immediately the truth based on the experience and knowledge previously acquired, without preliminary logical arguments"²⁴. In other words, it is a way of understanding or knowing directly and immediately, which takes place without conscious thought or judgment. It is an answer to the subtle signals and relations retained implicitly and unconsciously. This points to a series of difficult, but fascinating problems in the study of the human behaviour when faced with complex situations. Creativity, imagination, genetic inheritance and emotional intelligence, together with the uncertainty of the situation, provide the decision maker with the general framework to express his own intuition. It is an answer to the subtle signals of the unconscious, which generate unique ideas, out of the conceptualisation area.

The human being has a biological limit in data acquisition and processing. Research shows the fact that, on the average, when a person works with more than seven pieces of information at the same time, the result will be to overload the cognitive process and, implicitly, to give its logic up²⁵. In order to avoid the danger of data overloading, decision makers uses (often involuntarily) rapid thinking

²² Napoleon Bonaparte apud Robert Heintz, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1966.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Available at <https://dexonline.net/definitie-intui%C8%9Bie>, retrieved on 19 March 2019.

²⁵ G.A. Miller, "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information", in *Psychological Review*, March 1956, pp. 81–97.

commands or heuristics in decision-making²⁶. The natural result is to lose essential information and to refer to disponibility, representativity, engagement, prejudice etc., thus resulting in biases, or thinking errors. A conclusive example is the aviation incident of 1988, when an Airbus A 300 belonging to Iran Air was shot down by the cruiser USS Vincennes, when the commanding officer of the ship gave the order, convinced that it was an Iranian F-4! The real cause was the lack of essential IFF equipment, that is critical information, plus the fact that he referred back to previous experience. Another example, of global importance this time, is the fact that, despite previous information, Stalin's mentality did not let him recognise his allies' warnings that Hitler was planning a surprise attack on Russia in 1941.

In December 1995, the US Marine Corps magazine published a captivating article. The author of the article, researcher at the psychology faculty of a great American university, presented some interesting considerations on intuitive decision-making methodologies.

The starting point of these considerations was the results of a scientific study carried out on a large number of people; these people were faced with some complex decision-making problems to which, at first, they had to give an answer in a very short time, like a couple of minutes. After that, for the same test, they were given more time to reflect, so as to be able to come up with a "*mature and balanced*", logical and deductive decision.

The gradual analysis of the results came to a conclusion which seemed surprising at first sight: in most cases, the "*intuitive*" decision solved the problem in a more efficient way than the "*rational*" one, and the percentage went up as the complexity of the problem increased.

"*Culture is what is left after you forgot everything you learnt*". Out of the interviewees, more were unable to explain in a logical deductive way the reason for an intuitive decision, but this did not influence the efficiency of the decision they had taken. All these may seem paradoxical, but in reality there is no contradiction: a logical deductive process can develop itself correctly and completely when the terms of the problems have been defined very clearly and when the complex problem can be deconstructed into smaller elements, in a reasonable number, to be kept under control. And these smaller

²⁶ A. Tversky and K. Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", in *Science*, September 1974, pp. 1124.



On the other hand, even in the scientific world, the all might of logic and deduction paradoxically makes each new discovery first be "guessed" by researchers, then checked through extensive experiments and, only then, demonstrated in a deductive, rigorous manner.

elements, in order to be separately analysed, in a series of steps, must have a low degree of interaction and interdependence. In other words, to be fully approached in a logical deductive way, a problem needs not be too complex, nor multidimensional, nor with many constraints and references to things already mentioned, because in this way the number of the unknown quantities to solve in a unitary framework becomes too large – an aspect well-known to mathematicians.

On the other hand, even in the scientific world, the all might of logic and deduction paradoxically makes each new discovery first be "guessed" by researchers, then checked through extensive experiments and, only then, demonstrated in a deductive, rigorous manner. To fully exemplify this, we will say that Pythagoras himself first guessed the relation between the sides of a right-angled triangle, then checked it several times on various models of triangle and finally rigorously searched for the theoretical demonstration that was named after him.

To sum up, when variables become too numerous, when unknown quantities are too many and related, when the problem cannot be divided in smaller elements, because this could complicate even more the solving of the problem, then the efficiency of the solution, found in a logic and rigorous way, simply decreases because the maximum level necessary to have a unitary and detailed vision of the problem has been surpassed.

Given these facts, the only guideline on decision-making *can* well be intuition, in the sense of a free and automated processing of the existing information, past experiences and acquired knowledge, done by our brain with an extremely high speed little below the level of full conscience.

Based on these considerations, going towards the military operations field, the author of the above mentioned article stated that it is rather difficult to reach an efficient operative solution, at the end of a logical reasoning process, without it being first guessed, right at the beginning; and this for two categories of reasons.

The first is the fact that in a real situation, one's possibilities to act are numerous, just as the enemies' are, if not even more numerous. Therefore, confronting each action course with all the possible enemy actions produces a number of alternatives, in reality hard to take into account because of the chronic lack of de time, which is a characteristic

of any real operative situation. This problem acutely limits the number of alternatives, drastically reducing them to a number no higher than three or four on each side, based on some considerations such as: adherence to doctrine, plausibility, balance, efficiency, acceptability and, finally, common sense.

Furthermore – and this is the second category of reasons – the three main aspects of the problem (characteristics of the mission, situation and forces ratio), together with their numerous components, do not generate derived problems, logically separated one from the other, so that they could be examined one by one. These are, on the contrary, extremely tightly related, so that there is the risk of losing that unitary vision which is indispensable for success.

In other words, we come to the conclusion that military operative problems have a degree of complexity that does not allow a very rigorous, unitary and detailed exam, just like the one we described.

Given the restrictive criteria, chosen individually and subjectively, as well as the division of the problem in smaller elements, distinct and possibly "distant", it becomes obvious that such a methodology cannot call itself "logical deductive" or it can do so only if it identifies logic with intuition.

To complicate things even more, there are two more factors that make military phenomena and derived decision-making processes almost impossible to decipher at a logical deductive level, only *a posteriori*, through the historic method.

The first of these factors is what we may call "attrition", that is what prevents all moving mechanisms from working at a certain moment in time. Clausewitz is the one who speaks about wear in "On War": "In wartime everything is very simple: but what is very simple is not easy as well. Difficulties accumulate and produce, overall, attrition that cannot be exactly understood unless you have gone to war"²⁷. Attrition is a basic condition for any strategic action, it is war's most faithful companion. But, when decision is made, can we rationally determine the attrition that can act on the planned manoeuvre?

The second factor is a bit more complex. Let us suppose that we understood the logic of a war, that we planned and carried out operations that took the enemy by surprise and defeated him,

²⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Penguin Books Ltd, London, 1982.

Military operative problems have a degree of complexity that does not allow a very rigorous, unitary and detailed exam.



that we drew up a flawless strategy or a tactic: the enemy – who thinks, just as we do – will sooner or later learn from his mistakes and experiences, will correct his errors, will come up with countermeasures for our decisional style; it will not be so only if we have such an overwhelming superiority, that any of the enemy's counteractions becomes useless. Without such superiority, we will be forced to change our decisional style before going beyond what Clausewitz calls *"the culminating point of victory"*; beyond this moment, the enemy's reaction will be more efficient than our action, because the enemy *"has learned how we make decisions"*.

A contemporary example can be the following: the Israeli defence forces, being continuously at war, skilfully accepted both their own weakness, and the possible organising risks of manoeuvre, only to get the element of surprise. The constant preference of the Israeli for non-conventional and unusual actions eventually led to failure. In time, the opponents began to reconsider their own evaluations. They learned out of experience that, with the Israeli actions, the principle of the *"natural"* or of the *"better option"* does not work. So that, during the war in Lebanon, in June 1982, the Syrians were not completely surprised by the Israeli attempt to move forward at the back of the front, on the worst possible mountain roads, and therefore reacted in due time, succeeding in blocking that mountain pass. But they did not succeed in foreseeing, and thus reacting to the Israeli's following action: direct frontal offensive, by the armoured divisions gathered in the valley of Lebanon. Since they had no time to lose, given an imminent ceasefire, the Israeli decided to give up any hope for surprise and attacked frontally and in broad daylight, thus getting the desired element of surprise upon the Syrians. Obviously, in 1982, after they had proved so many times their strange style of war in the previous confrontations, the only less predictable conduct for the Israeli was to engage frontally.

All these observations lead to one clear conclusion: there is no universal logical deductive decisional method, just as there are no univocal criteria in decision-making. On the other hand, even if these criteria existed, it would be only a question of time before being replaced with their opposites (*"the reversal of opposites"*, that Luttwak speaks about), because of the very adaptable character of the war events.

The science of decision-making is in search of certainty, rationality and logic. The analytical instruments allow for this, reducing the influence of the human factor to the minimum, generating responsible, fair decisions. Nevertheless, in decision-making we must encourage the use of intuition, to develop action courses that break the patterns, but can still be applied, both for us and for the enemy. Reflecting art rather than science in the act of command materialised in decisions, intuition will produce risky, unpredictable and incomprehensible decisions. Without official assessment instruments, it is difficult to decide whether these are the result of genius or of intellectual negligence, materialised in biases²⁸.

SUBJECTIVITY DILEMMA – WAR INTUITION

In a confused situation, a commanding officer needs what Clausewitz described as being *"the rapid discovery of a truth which, to the ordinary mind, is either invisible, or becomes very clear"*²⁹. At first sight, someone can be tempted to reject the role of the intuition in the process of estimation, as being contradictory. After taking into account the factors of combat, there come the options as well. Taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative, the commanding officer is expected to make a decision. But since the advantages and disadvantages of a military plan are not on objective, these cannot be precisely quantified in a mathematic logic. Misinterpreting the factors multiplies the danger of subjectivism and abstractisation of the situation, just as it is hard to say the outcome of the fight just by analysing the enemy's forces. Using intuition (based on knowledge, obviously, and not on hazard!), a commanding officer will be able to choose a course of action appropriate for the circumstances, surprising the enemy and getting the decisive advantage.

Intuition also has an important role in fighting informational inflation. Clausewitz claimed that *"a great part of the information obtained in wartime is contradictory, an even greater part is false and by far the greatest part is to be doubted"*³⁰. The unconscious part of the mind where intuition comes from is infinite and has the ability to process information alongside the conscience. The advantage

²⁸ C.T. Rogers, *"Intuition: An Imperative of Command"*, in *Military Review*, March 1994, p. 48.

²⁹ Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

³⁰ *Idem.*

The advantage of the intuitive commanding officer will be the fact that his mind will continue to process information even when his conscience is busy with other problems.

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Reducing alternatives and using functional patterns, decisions can be made quickly. By comparison, analytical and intuitive decision-making have the same chances. It is essential to find a balance between the two and to use them in appropriate time circumstances.

of the intuitive commanding officer will be the fact that his mind will continue to process information even when his conscience is *busy* with other problems³¹. Despite technological progress, the image of the battlefield, in real time, will never be complete and exact. It will remain unpredictable, chaotic and nonlinear, thus emphasizing the role of intuition in determining options. The dynamics of war is also the dynamics of information, exponentially amplified, from certain to uncertain. Thus, commanding officers will have to make decisions based on incomplete information (or even without it), and the only way is Napoleon's "superior understanding", based on intuitive judgment at the expense of rational calculation.

Reducing the time for decision-making is essential at war. Reiterating Boyd's loop (OODA), advancing in decision gets inside the enemy's mind, forcing him to improvise. Intuitive commanding officers, using their knowledge, can rapidly exclude some options. Reducing alternatives and using functional patterns, decisions can be made quickly. By comparison, analytical and intuitive decision-making have the same chances. It is essential to find a balance between the two and to use them in appropriate time circumstances.

We can speculate that intuitive decision is subjective, so it has got a great deal of hazard. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Scientists have identified the fact that intuitive people share one characteristic – they are experts in a certain field of knowledge. Therefore, the vision on intuition or on the battlefield becomes possible because of the warfare expertise or of war knowledge. Research in cognitive psychology has established that experts possess a wide, but detailed knowledge base, which is organised in easily accessible categories, which matter to intuitive thinking³². Accessing this information is not a conscious one. Psychologists consider there are four essential characteristics of experts: able to quickly express the meaning of a complex model; extraordinary speed in accomplishing mental skills; rapid interpretation of information; superior attention and memory³³.

Regardless of the nature of future military conflicts (classical, asymmetrical, hybrid, proxy etc.), these will be characterized by non-linearity, fluidity, multi-dimensionality and simultaneity. In relation

³¹ W.G.S. Doughty, *Intuition and Decision Making*, in *British Army Review*, December 1989, p. 23.

³² B.L. Benderly, *Everyday Intuition*, in *Psychology Today*, September 1989, p. 36.

³³ J.A. Picart, *Expert War Fighters and Battlefield Vision*, in *Military Review*, May 1991, p. 36.

with time and space, speed will be essential in carrying out operations. Mobility of the forces and omni-directionality will increase even further the degree of uncertainty, making the role of the commanding officers difficult in decision-making. Advancing in decision will require a vision to foresee events and rapid action. Intuitive abilities will be able to provide a military decision-maker with complete perspective on the whole, speedy decision-making and no subjectivism. Therefore, it is imperative to offer an institutionalised framework to understand the role of intuition, meaning logical deductive multi-disciplinary training. Modern philosophy must be readapted and reconsidered, getting out of the rigidity of execution patterns and emphasizing the role of the critic in assessing a plan of operation.

Taking cognitive science further can contribute to understanding the human mind and its abilities. The Cartesian premises of intelligent and controllable conscience, inferring an emotional, irrational and uncontrollable unconscious, must be removed. The power of unconscious intelligence, of emotional thinking and of tacit knowledge must have a more prominent position among the resources of the military commander in his strategies in decision-making. The patterns of thinking must cross the border of industrial formalism, to increase the chances of taking more appropriate decisions. History has repeatedly shown that battle have been lost more often because one leader was not able to make a decision, rather because a decision was bad!

CONCLUSIONS

History teaches us that the great military leaders, such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Pompeii, Charlemagne, to mention just a few, before assuming the command of an army, had already had numerous fighting experiences behind other commanders, from whom they acquired the necessary knowledge to mentally develop victor's decisional mechanisms. Without going too down in history, Erwin Rommel used his experience from the Italian front in WWI as foundation to later develop and organise whipping offensives in the north of Africa.

Most military decisions have been and will be taken under conditions of uncertainty and under time pressure, so that the intuitive decision should become the rule rather than the exception. Assessing the effect of intuitive decisions vs the analytical approach, we conclude



We conclude that the uncertainty of war can be managed through flexibility and tireless rhythm. Nevertheless, when time is not a critical factor, the military leader must adopt a decision as a result of an analytic process, to consolidate the intuitive one.

that the uncertainty of war can be managed through flexibility and tireless rhythm. Nevertheless, when time is not a critical factor, the military leader must adopt a decision as a result of an analytic process, to consolidate the intuitive one. We say that, to be successful in battle, it is essential to have a decisional style that supports calculated audacity, causal originality and risk-taking. Moreover, advance in decision must be supported by an intuitive approach of decision-making, as a pattern to best meet the needs of the modern military commander. Napoleon's meditation and intuition must not be regarded as a gift, but as a requirement for the modern commander. Trusting the unique abilities of the two qualities will provide the leader with the appropriate mental instruments for the complex tasks on the battlefield. This might lift the fog of war, offering vision, understanding and victory.

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THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS (INFO OPS) AND INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)

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This paper aims at highlighting the role of communication within the architecture of information operations (INFO OPS) and of the information resources management (IRM) in the military, taking into account the quantitative and qualitative changes regarding the contemporary battlefield, the new structures of forces, and the new technologies, i.e., in sum, the physiognomy of the current type of war. From this perspective, we intend to identify the role of communication in military operations, considering examples of well known conflicts, from ancient times to the present day. Moreover, we intend to analyse the mutations produced after the Vietnam War and especially after two key moments in conducting military confrontations: the Gulf War (1990-1991) and the Iraq War (2003). These consistent changes radically redesign the role of communicational/informational architecture of the contemporary conflict within the doctrines of the last two decades.

Keywords: communication; information; information warfare; Information Operations (INFO OPS); Information Resources Management (IRM); Network Centric Warfare (NCW).

1. Introduction

The problem of studying the role of communication within the architecture of information operations (INFO OPS) and of information resources management (IRM) in the military, implicitly within the command-control (C2) systems of military structures, is of utmost actuality and interest. The doctrinal and actional mutations produced in the physiognomy of the armed conflict of the last two or three decades led to dramatic changes. The most important changes are represented by the emphasis of the informational (-actional) dimension instead of the previous mainly actional one, of the hybrid form of military operations (both lethal and non-lethal tactical actions) instead of the previous lethal ones, of the understanding the role of communicational/informational flows as fundamental element and final purpose in conflict instead of as a simple successful condition. Communication, meaning flows, physical infrastructure and, especially, human resource to use it, radically changed its position in the contemporary conflict architecture, moving itself from the periphery to the centre of military operations.

To support these views, we analysed the role of communication in military actions related to two key moments in recent history: the Gulf War (1990-1991) and the Iraq War (2003). The first chapter, *The Role of Communication in Military Operations*, deals with the changes regarding the doctrinal redesign in relation to the Zero Point, the Gulf War, based on lessons from history (from ancient times to the present days) that cannot be neglected. The second chapter focuses on the role of communication within the architecture and functions of information operations (INFO OPS) and highlights the qualitative mutations in the so-called *Information-Related Capabilities (IRC)* or joint functions necessary in achieving the synergic effect through joint operations. Moreover, the second chapter considers the scientific fundamentals (coming from the area of economic sciences) and the policies and doctrines necessary for the judicious design of the information resources management. The Iraq War (2003) as a key moment actually produced the qualitative shift from the actional functions to the informational (-actional) ones. The conclusions

Communication, meaning flows, physical infrastructure and, especially, human resource to use it, radically changed its position in the contemporary conflict architecture, moving itself from the periphery to the centre of military operations.



In the USA, the newly established public relations department designed actions to communicate with the public in order to compensate, after the American troops' withdrawal from Vietnam (1973), the lack of interest in enrolling in the US Armed Forces.

of this article are based on the real effects of implementing the new doctrinal concept with communicational/ informational infrastructure: *Network Centric Warfare (NCW)*.

2. The Role of Communication in Military Operations

2.1 *The Gulf War: The Zero Point of (re)designing communication on the battlefield*

After the Gulf War (1990-1991), most of the Western states altered their communication architecture in military structures as a result of awareness of the strategic mutation consisting of primacy of information as a war resource. Aware of the role of communication in the acute social crisis generated by the Vietnam War (1961-1975), the United States of America had already regulated communication issues at least in the relations with the civil society. The newly established public relations department designed actions to communicate with the public in order to compensate, after the American troops' withdrawal from Vietnam (1973), the lack of interest in enrolling in the US Armed Forces. A set of movies were "requested" to Hollywood studios, included in the series "Return from Vietnam": *Rambo* (1982; 1985; 1988; 2008), or *Missing in Action* (1984-1986)¹. These movies, with stupid heroes in an aggressive and primitive display of self force, were the natural answer to the defeat in war at the communicational (media) level. Subsequently, in order to compensate the lack of interest for the Air Force, the Hollywood studios were "requested" for *Top Gun* (1986), with an extraordinary success, easily fit into the broadcast productions, addressed to not a very educated audience, offering immediate satisfaction by placing each individual of the audience in the middle of the action and by "promising" to each one the success at any price, which is binding on the anti-intellectual ethos². Even though the elitist public was offered in counterpoint to those movies, but in accordance with the American society's anti-war attitude of the period, important movies as *The Deer Hunter* (1978), *Apocalypse Now* (1979) or *Platoon* (1986), the effects of "Return from Vietnam" movies were consistent with a theory of communication designed at least a decade ago, the *Uses and Gratifications Theory*³.

¹ Douglas Kellner, *Cultura media*, Institutul European, Iași, [1995] 2001, p. 86.

² *Ibidem*, p. 94.

³ W. Schramm, J. Lyle, E. Parker, *Television in the Life of Our Children*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA, 1961. Later, since 2007, the *Uses and Gratifications Theory*, according to which the "activism" of the public is influenced by the selection of programs/movies according to the needs of entertainment, information (or infotainment) and social utility, and by the level of satisfying these needs by the media, was directly related to cinematographic production. See also Ralph E. Hanson, *Mass Communication: Living in a Media World*, 2nd edition, CQ Press, Washington, DC, [2007] 2008.

Therefore, in a context where the most important military actor in the Gulf War, the United States of America had already understood at that time the role of communication at least in the relationship with the civil society, other states have become aware of this role and have begun to redesign the communicational architecture according to a set of practical requirements of the battlefield. For example, *the lessons of the 1991 war and the decision to end conscription (1996) led France to reorganise communication across four reference areas: institutional, operational, recruitment and crisis communication lines*⁴. The United Kingdom changed its strategic projection on communication over the same period, but as a set of lessons from Kosovo Conflict (1996-1999). Having played the role of leading the multinational operations, the British Armed Forces were confronted with the necessity to establish, from a communicative point of view, the link between the political perspective and the military one, that always needed public support. Basically, at lower costs than those of the American Armed Forces in Vietnam, the British Armed Forces understood that "sophisticated Media Operations were crucial to maintaining public support"⁵ and designed Media Operations (MEDIA OPS) in accordance with the obsolete principle of telling the truth to get the nation's support in the war effort: "Kosovo has taught us some new lessons, and confirmed some old ones. Among the new ones, perhaps the most important is the need to invest people, resources, training, doctrine and coordination in Media Operations, to help to achieve freedom of action at all levels. As for the old lessons confirmed: above all, <Tell the Truth!>"⁶.

The Gulf War, the first media conflict, gave the Americans the most important lesson of reorganising the communicative flows and structures by discussing and setting up the future Information Operations (INFO OPS), simultaneously with the communicative reorganisation of the French and British armed forces, but this aspect will be analysed within Chapter 3. The Gulf War can be seen as a "double hyperwar"⁷, in both major action lines: military operations

The lessons of the 1991 war and the decision to end conscription (1996) led France to reorganise communication across four reference areas: institutional, operational, recruitment and crisis communication lines.

⁴ Saïd Haddad, *Managing the Media during the War in Mali: Between Restriction and Pragmatism*, in Irina Goldenberg, Joseph Soeters and Waylon H. Dean (eds.), *Information Sharing in Military Operations*, New York, Springer, 2017, pp.221-234, p. 223.

⁵ S.J.L. Roberts, *Media Operations: Lessons from Kosovo*, in Stephen Badsey & Paul Latawski (eds.), *Britain, NATO and the Lessons from Balkan Conflicts 1991-1999*, Introduction by Geoffroy Hoon, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2004, pp.67-78, p.70.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 77.

⁷ Łukasz Kamiński, *Gulf War (1990-1991)*, in Christopher H. Sterling (ed.), *Military Communication. From the Ancient Times to the 21st Century*, ABC-CLIO, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA, 2008, pp.201-204, p. 77.



and media coverage of them, lines that made possible the appearance of “CNN effect”⁸ and, implicitly, the interconnection between these two lines, explained as follows: “The reciprocal relationship can be summed up in a series of cycles: war leads to media coverage, which creates public opinion, which places politicians under pressure, who then pressure military commanders, who initiate changes in the conduct of war and/or military censorship. The Gulf War set a new standard for both military communication and media war coverage”⁹.




Figure 1: Key moments

Practically, the Gulf War (1990-1991) created a new standard for contemporary conflicts, at least in terms of their communicational/informational dimension. But, if this conflict can be considered the Zero Point of redesigning communication in military operations, which are the communication lessons of history?

2.2 Lessons of history

The easiest way to identify the lessons from history regarding the role of communication in military operations is to analyse decisive factors in obtaining victory on the battlefield or the sources of errors and failure.

⁸ CNN effect is actually a theory stating that televisions (initially, CNN) use the shocking images of wars or humanitarian crises in order to influence the political decisions for interventions.
⁹ Łukasz Kamieński, *op. cit.*, p.77.



The lesson of military history could be, as the British military thinker B.H. Liddell Hart stated, that one which may be the source of designing the principles of armed struggle in a non-causal, post-Clausewitzian and anti-deterministic manner. The result of identifying the lessons of history is a set of principles, generally valid, that do not necessarily imply a divergence in lower-order principles applicable in military operations for certain military structures, branches and specialities. These principles propose an axiomatic approach in understanding the military art over the millennia: they are basic principles that come from experience, “a few truths of experience which seem so universal and so fundamental, as to be termed axioms”¹⁰. Starting from such a perspective that was the fundamental of the term “indirect approach”, we chose to analyse, within a book published in 2014, *Introducere în arta militară*, the possibility of drawing a main direction of military operations from the communication perspective, i.e. to focus on the role of communicative flows, fundamental in leading the operations over time¹¹. In this respect, we analysed the causes of success/failure of the great battles/operations in the history of humankind, starting with those from ancient time and ending with the contemporary conflicts.

For a brief overview, we chose some expressive examples. In the Trojan War (1194-1184 BC), the Achaean coalition set around the Mycenaean armed forces led by Agamemnon was victorious because of the misinformation of troop withdrawal and of the deception (framed in current military terms in the concept of MILDEC) consisting of the introduction of fighters into the fortress inside the wooden horse. The victory of Greeks led by Themistocles in the Battle of Salamina (480 BC) was due to Xerxes’s misinformation of the fleeing of a part of his enemy’s fleet towards north, which resulted in the lure of the Persian ships in the narrow bay, where they lost their manoeuvrability and where the Greek fleet, weaker and less numerous than the Persian one, could have won. The victory of Macedonian troops led by Alexander the Great at Gaugamela (331 BC), with the size about 1/6 of the total enemy’s forces, against the troops of Darius III of Persia, was due to the interruption of communicative command flow by “extracting” the Bactrian cavalry troops from the military formation, disposed in the right flank of the “immortals” that provided the emperor’s guard, and by disrupting the visual contact and coordination of troops

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¹⁰ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategia. Acțiunile indirecte*, translated by L. Cojoc and S. Pitea, Introduction by I. Cușă, Editura Militară, București, [1954] 1973, p. 346.

¹¹ Adrian Lesenciuc, *Războiul informațional*, Editura Academiei Forțelor Aeriene “Henri Coandă”, Brașov, 2014, pp. 133-138.



The 20th century is the most representative regarding the role of communication flows on the battlefield, and the illustration can be made mainly by building the communicative architecture in the Battle for England (1940), namely a communication flow of command and control (C2), well implemented, which prevented the German armed forces from achieving their aims.

by the use of fighting cars on the dry and powdered plain from current Iraq. The fate of the Battle of Manzikert (1071 AD), more precisely the victory of Arp Arslan's Turkish troops, was decided by the fake rumour about the dead of the Byzantine Emperor Roman IV Diogenes, which led to the desertion of mercenaries. The Battle of Liegnitz in 1241 between the Silesian troops led by Henry II and the Mongolian ones led by Subotai, that coordinated the military operations led in the battlefield by Bautar and Kadan, had unfavourable consequences for Europeans as a result of misleading information about the quantity of Mongolian troops and as a result of the use of smoke by the Asians in order to deceit the enemy. Similar to the deployment of Gaugamela, the Battle of Bosworth (1485) ended with the defeat of Richard III's York armed forces in front of a half numerous army led by Henry Tudor, Duke of Richmond. The Yorkist army, divided into three groups, had the disadvantage of missing communication and coordination and gave way to the future first king of the Tudor dynasty. Also, the Battle of Tenochtitlan (1521) took place after a similar scenario: the Spanish conquistadors led by Hernan Cortés managed, thanks to the superior weapons, to break the enemy lines and thus to fragment the communicational flow of Aztecs led by Moteuczoma Xocoyotl. The Battle of Nördlingen (1634) is another example of the victory gained by the imperial army of Ferdinand and Prince Fernando, led by Count Matteo Gallas and Marquis of Leganes against the Swedish troops led by Gustav Horn and those of the Heilbronn League, led by Bernhard von Weimar, by breaking the Swedish armed forces into two parts and implicitly by fragmenting communication flows. The Battle of Rossbach (1757) between the Prussian troops of Frederick the Great and the Franco-Imperial forces led by Prince Charles de Soubise and by Prince Josef Maria Friedrich von Saxa-Hildburghausen ended by the victory of the Prussian army's as a result of poor communication between Brigade commanders of the Franco-Imperial army. The Battle of Sadova (1866) could have a similar result against the Prussian army led by General Helmuth von Moltke, but the Austrian and Saxon troops, led by General Ludwig von Benedek, could not benefit from the communication "fracture". The 20th century is the most representative regarding the role of communication flows on the battlefield, and the illustration can be made mainly by building the communicative architecture in the Battle for England (1940), namely a communication flow of command and control (C2), well implemented, which prevented the German armed forces from achieving their aims. Also, during the Second World

War, the American *Tidal Wave* Operation on the Romanian territory is a good example: the failure of the US aviation occurred as a result of communication failures (because of the ban on radio communications during the flight).

Taking into account all these examples provided by the history of military art, but also the examples after the Gulf War, mainly those provided by building the communication architecture in network, in the so-called *Network Centric Warfare (NCW)*, we concluded that we can formulate a principle in Liddell Hart's manner of expressing the well known axioms (positive and negative principles), centred on the concept of "indirect approach": "a principle based on the study of history of military art (the above – mentioned examples constituting only several of the many operations that led to victories thanks to communication and informational superiority) should be summarised as follows: do not allow the interruption of communication flows among own troops during operations"¹².

The aim of formulating this principle is not the principle itself, but pointing out that the nomological determination of military operations does not require a nomological hierarchy, but a scientific repositioning outside the Clausewitzian deterministic limits, within a paradigm of openness.

3. The Role of Communication within the Architecture and Management of Information Operations (INFO OPS)

3.1 The emergence of Information Operations (INFO OPS) as a communication function

The Gulf War was the Zero Point in redesigning the communication dimension of the battlefield. In the United States, the interest on communication not only concerned the armed forces interaction with the external publics and the communication with them based on the basic principle of public relations: *Tell the Truth!* – the problem was solved immediately after the Vietnam War – but also the communication with the purpose of influencing external and internal publics. Straight away after the quantitative and qualitative changes in the information environment, especially in relation to the increasing role of cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, in the context of the unprecedented development of the media dimension

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 138.



of the battlefield, during the Gulf War, the first aspects of the unitary management of information/communication flows, regardless of the purpose of communication (information or influence), brought to the forefront the attempt of emphasizing the *soft power* to the detriment of the *hard power*. In this regard, the issue of effective information management on the battlefield has raised among American researchers the issue of defining a new concept. This concept was initially called *information warfare*.




Figure 2. Communication architecture of the battlefield

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Four years after the end of conflict, Martin C. Libicki published a book in which *information warfare* was defined or summed up as a series of conflicting manifestations, as follows:

- a) command-and-control warfare (C2W), against the enemy's C2 structures;
- b) intelligence-based warfare (IBW), then becoming information-based warfare, directed against the information systems of the adversary;
- c) electronic warfare (EW), used for obtaining the supremacy in electromagnetic spectrum;
- d) psychological warfare (PSYWAR or ΨW), aiming at attitudinal and behavioural changes over the different categories of troops (adverse, neutral, allied, even own troops);
- e) "hacker" warfare (HW), pursuing supremacy in the area subsequently called Cyber Network Operation (CNO) in doctrines;
- f) economic information warfare (EIW), aiming at informational control for obtaining economic effects;

g) cyberwarfare, then becoming cybernetic warfare (CW or CybW), comprising all virtual military actions with physical results¹³.

Against the backdrop of the growing debate on the communication/information dimension of the battlefield, a range of studies dedicated to the information warfare were published with the support of various military institutions, for example *Information Warfare/Information Operations Study* (1995). In 1998, the United States of America already had a first doctrine of the information operations, JP 3-13, and eight years after Romania also had its first doctrine of information operations, S.M.G./F.O.P. 3-15, entered into use on 31 July 2006. Information operations were variously defined in different doctrines, as those belonging to the USA, NATO and Romania, all of them of interest for our study.

American definition	NATO definition	Romanian definition
"(...) integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs* in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own".	"0107. a. Info Ops is a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capabilities of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC approved parties** in support of Alliance mission objectives".	"Information Operations stand for a General Staff function for the analysis, planning, evaluation and integration of all information activities in order to obtain the desired effects on the willingness, understanding capacity, perception and capability of the adversaries, potential adversaries and target audiences approved by CSAT***, for supporting the achievement of military objectives".
JP 3-13, 2014:vii	AJP-3.10, 2009:1-3	D.O.I., 2017:13, art. 0109

Table 1. Information Operations (INFO OPS) definition in different doctrines

¹³ Martin C. Libicki, *What Is Information Warfare?*, Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology Institute for National Strategic Studies/National Defense University, Washington, DC, 1995, p. X.

* Information-related capabilities.

** NAC approved parties are those identified in top-level political guidance on Alliance information activities. These may include adversaries, potential adversaries, decision makers, cultural groups, elements of the international community and others who may be informed by Alliance information activities.

*** The Supreme Council of National Defence.



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The physical domain is the place where the situation the military seeks to influence exists. It is the domain where strike, protection, and manoeuvre take place across the environments of ground, sea, air, and space. It is the domain where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. (...) The information domain is where information lives.

The three definitions are convergent; the differences refer to the nature of target approval. It is no coincidence in the fact that the definitions are convergent, because in the projection of these three doctrines, starting from the same source, the US doctrine of Information Operations JP 3-13 from 1998, the information environment is similarly defined and the principles and elements of INFO OPS are, in all three doctrines, almost identical. For example, the information environment, which contains the three domains of reference: physical – consisting of the actual communicational platforms and networks; informational – consisting of the actual communicational flows, and cognitive – representing the users of the information, is almost identically defined in all three doctrines (for a consistent and neutral approach, we have reported to a comprehensive reference description provided by David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, Richard E. Hayes and David A. Signori): *“The physical domain is the place where the situation the military seeks to influence exists. It is the domain where strike, protection, and manoeuvre take place across the environments of ground, sea, air, and space. It is the domain where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. (...) The information domain is where information lives. It is the domain where information is created, manipulated, and shared. It is the domain that facilitates the communication of information among war fighters. It is the domain where the command and control of modern military forces is communicated, where commander’s intent is conveyed. (...) The cognitive domain is in the minds of the participants. This is the place where perceptions, awareness, understanding, beliefs, and values reside and where, as a result of sense making, decisions are made”*¹⁴.

Regarding the constituent elements, the defined information operations are similar at least in the Romanian and NATO doctrines. The American doctrine is less rigorous in the delimitation of those operations that consists of communication based on real information (public relations and civil-military operations) and of influential information¹⁵. Even so,

¹⁴ David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, Richard E. Hayes & David A. Signori, *Understanding Information Age Warfare*, CCRP Publication Series, Washington, DC, 2001, pp. 11-14.

¹⁵ In *Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations* the following elements of information operations are discussed: Strategic Communication (SC); Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG); Public Affairs (PA), the former Public Relations (PR); Civil-Military Operations (CMO); Cyberspace Operations (CO); Information Assurance (IA); Space Operations (SO); Military Information Support Operations (MISO); Intelligence (INTEL), by using information operations intelligence integration (IOII); Military Deception (MILDEC); Operations Security (OPSEC); Special Technical Operations (STO); Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO), consisting of Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electromagnetic Spectrum Management (EMS) and Key Leader Engagement (KLE), see *JP 3-13, 2014, II-5 – II-13*.

the differences in the American design, in relation with NATO design and with the Romanian one, are not consistent. In a comparative perspective, NATO and Romanian doctrines include:



NATO doctrine		Romanian doctrine
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)		Psychological Operations
Presence, Posture & Profile (PPP)		Presence, Posture & Profile
Operations Security (OPSEC)		Operations Security
Information Security (INFOSEC)	Communications Security (COMSEC) Computer Security (COMPUSEC)	Information Security
Computer Network Operations (CNO)	Computer Network Defence (CND) Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) Computer Network Attack (CNA)	Computer Network Operations
Military Deception (MILDEC)		Military Deception/Masking
Electronic Warfare (EW)		Electronic Warfare
Physical destruction		Physical destruction
Key Leader Engagement (KLE)		Key Leader Engagement
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)		Civil-Military Cooperation
AJP-3.10, 2009: I-8 – I-10, art.0121-0128		D.O.I., 2017:27, art. 0210

Table 2. Information Operations (INFO OPS) structure in different doctrines

Information operations provided the first doctrinal consistent construct that assigns an immediate pragmatic meaning to the communicative dimension of the battlefield, establishing this meaning in operational area.

Information operations (INFO OPS) have become the non-lethal field of operations in supporting joint operations, with the aim of influencing the (political-) military decision-making process of the adversary and of protecting the own decisional processes and structures; that was possible because some of information operations (PSYOPS, MILDEC etc.) existed before the doctrines related to those areas have effects. In other words, information operations provided the first doctrinal consistent construct that assigns an immediate pragmatic meaning to the communicative dimension of the battlefield, establishing this meaning in operational area. By focusing on this communicational dimension, the predictability in information environment becomes much higher and the synthetic effect of the joint operations is not disturbed.

3.2 The need for an integrated management of information in joint operations

At the time of the emergence of the national armed forces interest in planning the communication function of joint operations, the management of information issue, coming from the economy area of study, already had three decades of debate. From the awareness of the role of information as a resource of organisation, more specifically from the pioneering work of Fritz Machlup (1962), *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States*, the focus has changed from production and distribution to information¹⁶ and knowledge, as datum in economic analyses, respectively as a product, a function of resource allocation, the management of information from economic perspective on resources had already come after more than thirty years of study at the paradigmatic level of knowledge. Prior to the Gulf War, the major issues of information resources management (IRM) primarily concerned the physical dimension of the information environment¹⁷ and, in a summative perspective, they were: retention, storage, and access; automation; communications; standards and applications backlogs¹⁸. Beyond the consistent and complex evolution of knowledge, information resources management (IRM) benefited, at least in the United States, from an important public policy interest. In parallel with the reform of the communicational/informational dimension of the battlefield, the reform of information resources management was implemented in the United States through the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, also known as the Information Technology Management Reform Act. At that time, it had the role of considering

¹⁶ Machlup also discussed the issue of the physical dimension of the information environment, through Chapter VII, which analyses "Information Machines", i.e. those "apparatuses, instruments, or gadgets of any size (...) as long as they are <produced> and are devised to provide information", see Fritz Machlup, *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1962, p. 295.

¹⁷ "Information resource management (IRM) is the management of data and information – an umbrella term that includes the management of such information resources as computer hardware, software, communications, internet and external data bases, planning and review, as well as the integration of these resources for the support of managing information for the organisation as a whole", see Boulton B. Miller, *Managing Information as a Resource*, in Jack Rabin & Edward M. Jackowski (eds.), *Handbook of Information Resource Management*, Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York & Basel, 1997, pp. 3-33, p. 3.

¹⁸ Boulton B. Miller, *Managing Information as a Resource*, in Jack Rabin & Edward M. Jackowski (eds.), *Handbook of Information Resource Management*, Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York & Basel, 1997, pp. 3-33, pp. 8-16.

the good practices in IT management private sector in order to turn them into directions of action in federal agencies: "The Clinger-Cohen Act was based upon proven, practical IT best practices used by leading organisations to improve performance and meet strategic goals. It is designed to help ensure that investments in IT provide measurable improvements in mission performance. The Act defines an integrated set of acquisition and management practices needed to build an effective infrastructure and refocuses IT management toward directly supporting missions"¹⁹.

The legislative document provided, among other things, the creation of a position of Chief Information Officer (CIO), including into the Department of Defense (DoD) and into military departments, providing guidance in communication, command, control, and intelligence (C3I) area, that subsequently became C4I (by taking into account the computer networks).





Figure 3. Information Resources Management (IRM)

In the two decades since the first doctrines of information operations (INFO OPS) were established and the major directions in information resources management (IRM) were designed, the current global security environment, characterised by complexity and dynamism, has highlighted the efficiency of information management during military operations. The national security and defence documents, starting with the American ones, take into account the effectiveness of information management. *Since 2007, the Romanian Armed Forces*

¹⁹ Dan Porter, Alex Bennet, Ron Turner & Dave Wennergren, *The Power of Team: The Making of a CIO*, Department of the Navy, The Pentagon, Arlington County, Virginia, 2002, p. 17.



Doctrine (DAR) has also considered this requirement. It stated that planning and conduct of joint information needed a set of elements that, if properly prepared, would provide maximisation of the actional capacity. Given the complexity and diversification of the dynamic modalities of action from the external environment, due to state and non-state actors, using the information resources in a complex and effective way, the Romanian doctrines aligned with the North Atlantic standards. It also considered a number of functions whose purpose was to reduce the effects of external environment dynamics, for a maximisation of effects through military actions. Under the name “joint functions”, conducted before, during and after joint operations, in order to create the necessary conditions for achieving their synergistic effect, the current Romanian Armed Force Doctrine of 2012 includes²⁰: “0506. – (1) To carry out the joint operations, the commander at the operational level must consider a set of joint functions that enable him to determine the specific capabilities required. The main joint functions are:



It can be seen that the joint functions, as they are planned in the Romanian doctrine, contain a set of tools, techniques and activities that within the American doctrine are called “information-related capabilities” (IRC), such as: command-control (C2), information support, information operations (INFO OPS), including, as presented in the previous chapter, PSYOPS, PPP, OPSEC, INFOSEC, CNO, MILDEC, EW, physical destruction, KLE and CIMIC (the last one being included, redundantly, in the set of joint functions), to which the previous

²⁰ Within the previous edition, the “joint functions” were called “support capabilities” and included media operations (MEDIA OPS).
²¹ *Doctrina Armatei României (DAR)*, the General Staff, Bucureşti, 2012, p. 79.

doctrine also included the mass-media operations (MEDIA OPS). To be more rigorous, this set of IRCs included in joint functions comprises those functions based on a consistent communicational architecture, gravitating around INFO OPS and around the other operations coordinated by INFO OPS or in cooperation with INFO OPS. For a proper understanding of the INFO OPS role within the communicational design of the battlefield and for achieving the synergistic effect of joint operations, in 2016 we summarised within a book entitled *Războiul informațional* the following: “Information operations play an important role in all phases of the operations, but also before and after they are carried out, assuming a logical approach of each phase in the transition from the main effort to the supporting effort²². Information operations are not planned and carried out similarly in all armed forces. In multinational operations, their action framework, procedures and tools are aligned and carried out in accordance with the multinational joint coordination of the Multinational Force Commander (MNFC). Taking into account the design of information operations, in accordance with the other joint functions, in order to obtain the cumulated effect, as well as the unitary planning and execution, in accordance with the principle of the single command, and with the other war principles, the operation information can be defined as a joint function²³.

The integrated management of information resources in the battlefield means putting under the same conceptual umbrella all IRC functions, including the command-control (C2) function, developed by the management of information resources (IRM) within the American Armed Forces as structure of command, control, communications, computers & information (C4I), adding intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance (ISR) concept and architecture, in C4I2SR or Dominant Battlespace Knowledge (DBK) design, plus, in conjunction with so-called “surgical munition” or precision guided munition (PGM). This integrated management provides the possibility of building

²² *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, Joint Pub 3-13 (PP 3-13), Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 9 October 1998, p. XI, retrieved on 20 November 2014.
²³ Adrian Lesenciuc, *Războiul informațional*, Editura Academiei Forțelor Aeriene “Henri Coandă”, Braşov, 2014, p. 40.



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a C4I – ISR – PGM structure as a system-of-systems²⁴. This combat architecture (designed on communication/ information structures), supplemented with effect-based operations (EBO) and with the ongoing assessment by Command and Control Measures of Effectiveness (C2MOE), was the fundamental of the emergence of the meta-system called *Network Centric Warfare (NCW)*.




Figure 4. Communication architecture of the warfare

This concept, for the first time used during the Iraq War (2003), consists in operating the information environment with the purpose of creating an informational-actional network, made up of sensors, decision makers, and fire systems. This architecture allows the configuration of a unitary image of the battlefield, the gathering of information and the transmission to the decision centres, the quasi-instant decision act and the immediate action in the physical dimension, by applying the fire power, no matter how geographically dispersed the elements of the network are. Practically, through integrated information management, based on a communicational/informational architecture, the physiognomy of the contemporary

²⁴ "The system-of-systems concept focused on two elements: information and jointness. It envisioned integrating existing (and in some ways overlapping) inter-service platforms and components – particularly, advanced C4I systems with ISR systems into a coherent, interoperable joint framework. Connecting diverse C4I architectures and ISR information systems would enable unprecedented situational awareness capabilities – so-called <Dominant Battlespace Knowledge (DBK)> – envisioned by Owens across a large area of operations (200-by-200-mile boxes). In conjugation with PGMs and their platforms, the system-of systems approach would exploit DBK that would accelerate decision-making processes and result in a <precision force in action and results>, see William Owens, *The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems*, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 63 (February), 1996, pp. 36-39, and essentially enable the U.S. military to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces with virtual impunity", see Michael Raska, *Military Innovation in Small States. Creating a Reverse Asymmetry*, Routledge, Abingdon, OX & New York, NY, 2016, pp. 36-39.

conflict has dramatically changed. The last two decades represent the period when the communication dimension of the battlefield came to light, transforming it radically and, hopefully, irreversibly.

4. Conclusions

For the first time in history, a doctrinal concept with communicative/informational functions was the central concept of organising a theatre of operations. *The war in Iraq (2003) can be summed up by a multinational coalition with forces deployed in the bases of Kuwait, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates and the Indian Ocean aircraft carriers, an Iraqi army small and poorly equipped.* The asymmetry of forces and technology is less important in our analysis than the doctrinal aspect. In this conflict, beyond the implementation of the doctrinal concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW), the structure of air forces involved in the *Iraqi Freedom* operation was characterised by focusing on the information dimension, not on the action (attack) of the war. For example, the 863 US Air Force units that ensured the undeniable air supremacy had the following destination: 293 fighter jets and electronic warfare/surveillance (using the J-8 JSTARS system for hitting armour), 51 for bombing, 22 for C-2 and 60 for IS & R (ensuring the functionality of the RBR concept), 58 for search and rescue operations, 73 for special forces, 182 for air refuelling, 111 for transport, and 13 for other missions, to which 113 British Air Force aircraft were added: 66 fighter jets, 4 for C-2 and 9 for IS&R, 14 for rescue operations, 12 for air refuelling and 4 for transport²⁵. What really happened was that, for the first time in history, through the very projection of the combat functions of the aircraft used, the ultimate goal of joint operations was not to conquer and maintain air supremacy: "*starting with this conflict, conquering and maintaining air supremacy became a means of conquering and maintaining informational supremacy*"²⁶.

In these conditions, as in the lessons of history, according to which the maintenance of the communicative flows is the condition of success in war, the present physiognomy of the conflict brings to the fore

²⁵ An identical distribution can be seen in the case of the British Air Force used in the Iraq War (2003).

²⁶ Adrian Lesenciuc, *Războiul informațional*, Editura Academiei Forțelor Aeriene "Henri Coandă", Brașov, 2014, p. 111.

The war in Iraq (2003) can be summed up by a multinational coalition with forces deployed in the bases of Kuwait, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates and the Indian Ocean aircraft carriers, an Iraqi army small and poorly equipped.

a compulsory communication architecture and aims at informational supremacy. The communicative/informational dimension of war is not limited to the conditions of success, but it represents the end of the confrontation itself.

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THE ISSUE OF AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE DELIMITATION AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON GLOBAL SECURITY

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Although there is currently a fundamental difference in the International Law applicable to airspace and outer space, paradoxically, a border between the two environments has not yet been traced and agreed at international level by the instrumentality of treaties, conventions or agreements. Such delimitation represents an indispensable condition for applying and enforcing the principles that make up the legislative bodies specific for the two environments, but also for a better management of the security issues that concern the operation in the two environments.

In the context of the accelerated technological development and the emergence of private actors in the area of space activities, this gap in international law can generate a number of negative consequences on global security, which we will try to identify in this paper.

Keywords: airspace, outer space, criteria, delimitation, security, the spatial theory.

1. INTRODUCTION

Although the space era was inaugurated on 4 October 1957, with the launch of the first artificial satellite on Earth's orbit, and the flight era began in the early twentieth century with the Wright Brothers' flight in December 1903, it is at least intriguing that until now there has not been established a vertical limit between airspace and outer space. In a more in-depth analysis, this is even more paradoxical, since the two Corpus Juris applicable to each environment are substantially different.

In the case of airspace, the *Paris Convention*, signed on 13 October 1919, and subsequently the *Chicago Convention*, signed on 07 December 1944, stipulate that *"The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory"*¹, while the *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies* (or simply *Outer Space Treaty*) of 27 January 1967 states that *"Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means"*².

Given this irreconcilable difference between International Air Law and International Space Law, we believe that in order to preserve airspace security in the medium and long term, it is in the interest of the international community to agree on a border between airspace and outer space. In addition, Space Law is the only branch of International Law without a legally defined scope, and it is well known that the scope is vital for any type of law to be effective.

¹ *** *Convention on International Civil Aviation*, signed in Chicago, on 7 December 1944, available at https://www.icao.int/publications/documents/7300_orig.pdf, retrieved on 14 May 2018.

² *** *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*, signed in Washington, London, Moscow, 27 January 1967, available at <http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf>, retrieved on 14 May 2018.

In order to preserve airspace security in the medium and long term, it is in the interest of the international community to agree on a border between airspace and outer space.



Given the significant operational impact of vectors developed around rocket technology, it is easy to see the relevance of space technologies for the development of weapons of mass destruction arsenals.

However, this issue has been on the UN agenda for more than 50 years without any solution or any perspective in this regard. To some extent, the persistence of this gap can be explained by the relatively low technological possibilities of most states in space exploration and their inability to exercise effective control over the airspace and the outer space above the national territories. As Julian Verplaetse wrote in 1960, *“But, once many States would join in that activity, some technical understanding and perhaps some legal agreement would be necessary. When the activity goes beyond its limited scope and becomes a usual practice, the need will be urgent and unabatable”*³.

The state of necessity regarding the delimitation, as little evident as it was in the past, as such problematic may become in the near future given the possibilities created by the technological revolutions. Furthermore, we need to mention the emergence of non-state actors, who are intensively involved in the development of space capabilities and programs, often superior to those owned by most states. Space interests of the private sector actors can influence, in a positive way for humanity, the long-term evolution of space exploration, especially from the perspective of mining space resources. For example, several private companies, including *Planetary Resources Inc.*, *Shackleton Energy Company*, *Deep Space Industries*, *Moon Express*, etc. have declared their intention to explore and exploit the mineral resources embedded in asteroids or other celestial bodies. At the same time, the proliferation of space technologies can also facilitate the access of terrorist groups or failed states to this type of technology. Given the significant operational impact of vectors developed around rocket technology, it is easy to see the relevance of space technologies for the development of weapons of mass destruction arsenals.

2. THE MAIN TRENDS AND DEMARCATION CRITERIA RELATED TO THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE

A first step towards regulating the activities in the outer space and in the airspace, so that states and international organisations can control possible skirmishes from international law, must begin

³ Julian Verplaetse, *International Law in Vertical Space*, Rothman, 1960, p. 153.



by unequivocally defining the boundary between the two environments. As mentioned above, the core of the problem lies in the fact that international law of air domain, as the older legal body, has never come up with a precise definition of the term *“airspace”*, leaving the question of the exact location of the upper limit in relation to space unanswered.

Given the regularity of human space flights and the possibility of space tourism in the near future, the definition and delimitation of outer space, the oldest objective of the *United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)*, is a crucial legal issue. However, COPUOS has failed to reach a consensus and, moreover, has failed to adopt any convention or treaty regarding this matter in the last decades. At this point, it can be seen that the *Corpus Juris Spatialis* is the only branch of international law whose scope of application is not well defined from a legal point of view. However, the literature on the subject of delimitation abounds in criteria and principles, many of which concern scientific and political issues.

From all this mixture of ideas, concepts, principles and criteria, international space law specialists must choose those that best meet the international desires, the development needs of the states, the current economic and technological realities. At the same time, to ensure that once the line between air and outer space has been established, it retains some viability, it is necessary for international/space law specialists to take into account technological, demographic, social, economic, military developments. That is why the issue of delimitation/demarcation becomes very complex.

Another very important aspect that hinders this approach is the interest of space faring nations to maintain the *“uncertain”* status of the aerospace. In the following, we will support this argument by the example of the United States.

The most important space-related thinking schools address the issue of demarcation in different ways. A taxonomy of theories and approaches on this issue might be summarized as follows:

- The spatial theory;
- The functional theory;
- The supporters/advocates of the International Customary Law doctrine
- The supporters/advocates of the approach that no demarcation is currently required;

The core of the problem lies in the fact that international law of air domain, as the older legal body, has never come up with a precise definition of the term “airspace”, leaving the question of the exact location of the upper limit in relation to space unanswered.



Many of the views on the issue of delimitation, however, rely on the notion that there is currently no need for a precise boundary between the two environments. At the beginning of COPUOS law-making processes under the auspices of the UN, representatives of Canada, the United Kingdom, the US, and other Western European countries have expressed such an opinion. Even the representatives of the Soviet Union considered that it was not possible at that time to identify the technical-scientific criteria necessary for defining the cosmic space.

- The supporters/advocates of the expansion of state sovereignty *ad infinitum* (“*Usque Ad Infinitum*” theory).

Many of the views on the issue of delimitation, however, rely on the notion that there is currently no need for a precise boundary between the two environments. At the beginning of COPUOS law-making processes under the auspices of the UN, representatives of Canada, the United Kingdom, the US, and other Western European countries have expressed such an opinion. Even the representatives of the Soviet Union considered that it was not possible at that time to identify the technical-scientific criteria necessary for defining the cosmic space⁴.

The arguments of supporters of this theory are based on the following considerations:

1. The absence of an explicit agreement to delimit the cosmos from airspace has so far not led to international tensions and there is no premise that this will happen in the future;
2. The steps towards the establishment of a border altitude will invite many states to claim their sovereignty in a litigious manner, as there are already examples of the right of the free seas (see China’s claims on islands in the South China Sea);
3. Wherever the border will be established, it is very likely that it will be set too high, because the fear of the unknown will cause them to claim as much of the airspace over the national territory;
4. Future aerospace activities at low altitudes will be tolerated in the absence of an express agreement;
5. It is very likely that any later agreement will involve the lowering of the upper airspace relative to a decision currently taken;
6. Once an international altitude is agreed on a limit altitude, it will later be difficult to reduce it⁵;
7. An arbitrary limit, once it is fixed, will easily become a cause for discord among states. This can be caused primarily by border violations, as space objects are difficult to track and identify⁶.

⁴ Gbenga Oduntan, *The Never Ending Dispute: Legal Theories on the Spatial Demarcation Boundary Plane between Airspace and Outer Space*, in *Hertfordshire Law Journal*, 1(2), 2003, available at <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d81b/b88753eaced1ec97cc56baed8cc25ffdc9d6.pdf>, retrieved on 12 July 2018.

⁵ Houston Lay, H. Taubenfeld, *The Law Relating to Activities of Man in Space*, University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 46.

⁶ Gbenga Oduntan, *op. cit.*



Before the 1970s, the states’ demands for demarcation were not very popular, and this was also reflected in the United Nations General Assembly resolutions or in the 1967 *Outer Space Treaty (OST)*. Following the *Bogotá Declaration* of 3 December 1976, when eight equatorial states invoked full and exclusive sovereignty over segments of geostationary orbit corresponding to the underlying territories, other states including France, Belgium, Italy, the Soviet Union, Poland, Egypt militated for demarcation. The current claims of the signatory states of the *Bogotá Declaration* have been limited to the establishment of a *sui generis* regime which guarantees in practice for all countries equitable access to the geostationary orbit and to the frequencies assigned for space services. It should be recalled that, although the claims of the equatorial states were not recognised at the international community level, throughout the Resolution 48/80 of 15 December 1983, the UN General Assembly declared the geostationary orbit a “*limited natural reserve*” and its use must be rational and balanced⁷.

Parallel to the trend that sees no need for present delimitation lies the *spatial theory*. Essentially, the proponents of this theory support the establishment of a fixed boundary at a well-defined altitude that allows a clear separation of air space from the cosmic space. Under these circumstances, the legal status of an object would be determined by its location in relation to the line.

Despite all the efforts made so far, the difficulties in this direction have not yet been overcome at the international level. Although there are various criteria on the basis of which the boundary between air space and outer space could be established, the states did not agree on any of them. It should be noted, however, that certain physical and “*natural*” boundaries have gained some prevalence in international usage. The most representative in this respect are the following:

- The *von Kármán line*, which lies at about 100 km (62.5 miles) above sea level, is used by the International Aeronautical Federation (IAF) to validate records and establish aeronautical and astronautical standards. This line corresponds to the maximum altitude at which the atmosphere is dense enough to support aeronautical flights. Although the calculated altitude does not have the exact value of 100 km, scientists involved

Following the Bogotá Declaration of 3 December 1976, when eight equatorial states invoked full and exclusive sovereignty over segments of geostationary orbit corresponding to the underlying territories, other states including France, Belgium, Italy, the Soviet Union, Poland, Egypt, militated for demarcation.

⁷ Adrian Enăchescu, *Aspecte juridice ale folosirii spațiului aerian și cosmic. Cooperarea între agențiile militare și civile pe timpul utilizării în comun a celor două medii*, graduation study, Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2015, p. 32.



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in the determination of this value have agreed that this value should be considered the boundary between air and cosmic space, because the number is easy to remember, and the altitude thus calculated varies a little in relation to the variation of certain parameters⁸.

- Altitude at which aerodynamic control surfaces become unusable. At approximately 80 km (50 miles), this border has been established by testing the X-15 hybrid aircraft, designed for use both in the air and in the outer space, and is used by the US military and NASA to award the astronaut title.
- The midpoint of gradual transition from the relatively gentle winds of Earth's atmosphere to the violent flows of charged particles from space. This "milestone" is about 118 km ± 0.3 km (73 miles), but it is not used by any international organization at present.
- The re-entry point into the atmosphere at which the atmospheric drag becomes perceptible. It is located at 122 km (76 miles) and it is used by the Mission Control Centre (NASA).
- The lowest perigee attainable by a space vehicle in orbital motion around the Earth. It appears in the US Army's training documents and has a value of between 129-150 km (80-93 miles), depending on the type of orbit, elliptical or circular⁹.

Figure no. 1 depicts a visual representation of the arrangement of these boundaries with respect to the Earth (the representation is not made on a scale).

Some authors consider that the solution to the problem of delimitation is primarily a political one and that perhaps the answer to it lies in the political realm, the legal field having a secondary role, in the sense of assisting the political decision-makers in formulating a solution. There is no doubt that the political act should prevail in this case, but it must be accompanied by legal codification on the basis of which international sanctions can be applied in case of violation of the legal regime of space activities, under conditions of legality and legitimacy.

⁸ *** Fédération Aéronautique Internationale, available at <https://www.webcitation.org/618QHms8h?url=http://www.fai.org/astronautics/100km.asp>, retrieved on 17 June 2018.

⁹ Bhavya Lal, Emily Nightingale, *Where is Space? And Why Does That Matter?*, Space Traffic Management Conference, 5 November 2014, pp. 4-8, available at <https://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=stm>, retrieved on 16 July 2018.




Figure 1: Unconventional and customary borders used to delimit airspace from outer space¹⁰

Given the above, it can be seen that an important reason for delaying delimitation solutions is the advantages deriving from the absence of a precise limit for spacefaring nations that have the dominant interests in space exploration.

Indeed, on a detailed analysis it can be seen that although the proposed solutions have some disadvantages, these do not make it totally undesirable to materialise in solutions to the problem of delimitation. Rather, the political, economic and military interests

¹⁰ *Ibid.*



From a legal point of view, the OST does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons on Earth's orbit or other celestial bodies, but prohibits any form of national appropriation of outer space or parts thereof.

of some of the most powerful spacefaring states make it impossible to establish a consensus on demarcation. Representative in this regard is the position of the United States, which has placed itself in the camp of states that do not consider it necessary to delimit and define the outer space. In 2001 the US State Department stated the following:

"With respect to the question of the definition and delimitation of outer space ... our position continues to be that defining or delimiting outer space is not necessary. No legal or practical problems have arisen in the absence of such a definition. On the contrary, the differing legal regimes applicable in respect of airspace and outer space have operated well in their respective spheres. The lack of a definition or delimitation of outer space has not impeded the development of activities in either sphere.

[...] Other delegations suggest that a definition or delimitation is somehow necessary to safeguard the sovereignty of states. However, we are aware of no issue of state sovereignty that would be solved by defining outer space"¹¹.

In 2014, this statement was reiterated as follows: *"The US Delegation will continue to oppose any proposals to define or delimit outer space.... The US Delegation may point out that many years of debate have not furthered LSC [Legal Subcommittee] understanding of delimitation issues and that no real-world problems have arisen during the more than 50 years of space use and exploration as a result of the absence of any definition/delimitation of outer space. To the contrary, attempts to establish an arbitrary line between airspace and outer space may create confusion or otherwise hinder the peaceful use and exploration of space. To date, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) licensing and regulation of reusable launch vehicles, including suborbital vehicles, have not been hampered by the absence of any delimitation of outer space"¹².*

Currently, given President Donald J. Trump's statements on the creation of an independent Space Forces within the US Armed Forces¹³, it is expected that the US posture on this subject will remain unchanged. A precise delimitation of outer space could make it difficult for the US to establish an independent Space Force.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *** U.S. President Donald J. Trump Statement, available at <https://www.space.com/39966-trump-space-force-for-us.html>, retrieved on 19 July 2018.



This is because, from a legal point of view, the OST does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons on Earth's orbit or other celestial bodies, but prohibits any form of national appropriation of outer space or parts thereof. Also, the Moon Treaty of 1979 declares cosmic space as *"the common heritage of humanity"* (*Res communis*)¹⁴.

Under these circumstances, US actions aimed at establishing a Space Force might be considered by other competitors as acts challenging the international *status-quo* and would serve as a pretext/precedent for other states to do the same. This kind of competition would ultimately lead to a space-based arms race that will threaten the global security.

Another approach to the demarcation problem, the functionalist one, argues that a delimitation based on scientifically or mutually accepted criteria is unnecessarily or even impossible, and therefore the activities carried out at the boundary between air and outer space should be considered/ranked depending on their objectives. The underlying principle of this school of thought is that that both air and space flights should be subject to the same legal regime.

Among the advantages of this approach lies the possibility of applying a single legal regime for flights. Even suborbital flights can be treated in the following ways:

- The Air Law applies throughout the duration of a suborbital flight, even if the vehicle in question crosses the outer space for a limited period on its way to a destination on Earth;
- The Space law applies throughout a flight made by a vehicle that transits the airspace on its way to a space destination.

The essence of the functional approach lies in the nature of the activities being carried out. Thus, there is no distinction between air and space flights, as it does not exist between aircraft and spacecraft. By virtue of this reasoning, wherever there are spatial objects, the Space Law is applied. According to Gbenga Oduntan, the fundamental flaw in this approach is the *"over enthusiastic attempt to put together in an untidy manner a jumble of considerations best treated alone and to hazard a single criteria from this"*¹⁵.

¹⁴ *** Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 December 1979, Article 11, available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_34_68E.pdf, retrieved on 18 July 2018.

¹⁵ Gbenga Oduntan, *op. cit.*

The essence of the functional approach lies in the nature of the activities being carried out. Thus, there is no distinction between air and space flights, as it does not exist between aircraft and spacecraft. By virtue of this reasoning, wherever there are spatial objects, the Space Law is applied.



Advocates of Customary International Law rely on the fact that certain aspects of the demarcation problem have been resolved through international practice.

Despite its appeal, this approach has a number of gaps. Among the issues that it does not mention is the one regarding the legal status of the activities carried out during the planning phase of a space mission, or those carried out on Earth, but which concern space flight. Anyway, the proposal of the functional advocates to extend the application of the Space Law to the activities on Earth does not solve the issue of the demarcation nor exclude it. The statement that outer space represents a “*focus of activities*” is partly true because outer space is at the same time the “*place*” in which these activities take place. As such, it would be completely erroneous to think that outer space starts at the ground level with all activities that are conducted for a future space mission. This is not a convincing argument that would make us accept such an opinion nor accept the possibility that a single corpus of laws could be applied to the whole range of activities associated with a space mission. In addition, states might perceive such an approach as a threat to their sovereignty, which is still an obstacle to the application of functional principles in their current form.

Advocates of Customary International Law, on the other hand, rely on the fact that certain aspects of the demarcation problem have been resolved through international practice. To this end, they believe that since the lowest altitude at which a satellite can orbit around the Earth is about 100 km and it is not liable to national appropriation, it follows that beyond that limit, the Space Law applies, and below this limit the Air Law comes into force. Although the international public opinion recognizes that the lowest orbit of a satellite, located at an altitude of about 100 km, belongs to the outer space, there is currently no international custom to recognise this altitude as the boundary between air and space.

3. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF DELIMITATION AND THE BENEFITS DERIVED FROM IT

In light of the above, we conclude that a precise delimitation/demarcation of airspace from outer space is required, and it must be reinforced through agreements, conventions or treaties concluded internationally. However, we do not intend to address the boundary issue in the sense of territorial demarcation so often encountered in the design/establishment of inter-state borders. This last way of establishing the aero-space boundary can block a number of activities

already taking place in the two environments or may inhibit the development of others. According to Peter Thiel, co-founder of *PayPal* and other companies, the gap between the development of the “*bits world*” and the “*atom world*” is due to the fact that while the first domain has escaped somehow of “*excessive*” regulation, the other one is overregulated¹⁶.

To meet the above-mentioned desiderata, we believe that a possible solution to the issue of delimitation could involve using the jurisdictional areas established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as a model¹⁷. A new treaty or even one that amends those already in force (The Chicago Convention, The Outer Space Treaty), might establish the following provisions:

- *The Air Domain*, located below the 50 km altitude: subject to the territorial sovereignty of the underlying state.
- *The Transitional Area (Buffer Zone)* located between 50-120 km altitudes: like the high seas, this area is open for peaceful uses and innocent passage by all states, with air safety and navigation rules established by the ICAO and/or another internationally recognised authority. Airspace vehicles transiting this area are subject to the Air Law provisions.
- *The Space Domain*, located at above 120 km altitude: is subject to the Space Law.

Another similar delimitation might use the von Kármán line or the lowest perigee of a satellite as landmarks. One of the advantages of such boundaries include the predictability in managing contentious issues, meaning their classification under one of the two bodies of law. Also, a transparent, stable and predictable legal regime for space activities will facilitate the development of the private sector of space exploration. Uniformity of the law will improve the interest of economic actors in the space investment market. At the same time, this will increase the ability of insurance companies to make far more detailed analyses, assessing the risks and costs of insurance for different activities. Defining the legal regime in the above-mentioned terms will increase the level of safety for aircraft, spacecraft and aerospace vehicles operating in each of the three areas.

¹⁶ *** Peter Thiel conversation with Tyler Cowen at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, available at <https://www.businessinsider.com/peter-thiel-tech-innovation-is-outpacing-everything-else-for-a-simple-reason-2015-4>, retrieved on 12 August 2018.

¹⁷ *** *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, retrieved on 12 August 2018.

A possible solution to the issue of delimitation could involve using the jurisdictional areas established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as a model.



Firstly, spacecraft using nuclear fuels may be subject to prohibitive flight regimes so that they cannot fly below a certain altitude, thereby avoiding contamination of the upper layers of the atmosphere.

Secondly, it can internationally be established an authority responsible for monitoring and control of atmospheric transit between certain altitudes. In this respect, setting up the buffer zone facilitates certain types of activities such as peaceful transit, passenger transport with aerospace vehicles etc.).

States that will adhere to such a project could benefit from the infrastructure network through which such services will be provided. Also, spacecraft returning to Earth or going to space could be subject to a monitoring and control regime at the request of the state whose airspace is to be transited.

In this respect, establishing an upper limit of the right of states to self-defence would be another important issue of the global security equation. Although this limit is primarily dictated by the technical characteristics of the defence capabilities that such a state holds, it is also crucial for security reasons and global stability that the activities which may be the subject of an international dispute to be clearly defined.

CONCLUSIONS

In the near future, as more and more countries will have access to space technologies, given that space activities conducted by private actors will intensify, it is likely that the issue of airspace-outer space delimitation will have to be solved in some way or another.

This is all the more necessary since the bodies of law applicable to the two physical environments differ substantially. In the case of the Air Law, states are supposed to have full sovereignty over the airspace above their national territory. In the case of Space Law, it is stipulated that outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation. Therefore, this antagonistic difference may be the core of future discords among states or for unjustified claims by some of them.

Establishing an aerospace boundary is required as there are signs that some spacefaring states intend to run into the development of space-based independent forces. This could mark the transition from the militarisation of outer space, materialised by the presence of military satellites in circumterrestrial orbit, to the weaponisation of it.

On the other hand, the delimitation of the two physical environments must be designed to facilitate the development of the new business models, to ensure monitoring and control of aerospace activities, and to encourage states to pursue space exploration in a sustainable and peaceful manner.

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PSYOPS, LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE

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The current debates about hybrid wars revolve around identifying and delineating the hard power components from the soft power ingredients of interventions, yet the difficult part seems to be understanding the political objectives envisaged by the political actors and putting them in relation with the methods employed to accomplish those targets. We may say that hybrid wars are like equations with many unknowns, therefore difficult to solve, as well as difficult to establish in time, in terms of the date the war started.

In our article, we investigate the relation between legitimacy, international political culture and psychological operations and demonstrate that the rhetoric strategies employed in different contexts are in fact legitimising discourses aiming at morally disarming the adversaries by presenting their claims or objectives as inadequate, incorrect or unjust and determining them to abandon the fight.

Keywords: legitimacy, PSYOPS, rhetoric strategies, international political culture, hybrid war.

INTRODUCTION

In this article we aim to highlight the relation between PSYOPS, especially between rhetorical strategies used in such operations, legitimacy and the international political culture, our objective being to reveal that the messages used by various actors in their attempt to reach their political-military objectives through psychological operations are composed in such a manner to meet the already accepted norms for an adequate behaviour on the international scene. Keeping in mind that psychological operations are mainly communication campaigns that target firstly the adversary public and secondly the general public, we started from the assumption that, in order to achieve military objectives, it is essential to justify them, in other words *“the war needs to be just”* both in the eyes of combatants and in the eyes of the public opinion. Therefore, based on the *“historic”* context of the moment, the pattern of the rhetorical strategies used will reflect the international political culture that is specific to the context of the analysed actions, understood as the existence of a largely accepted view of the right, legitimate actions.

As PSYOPS soldiers conduct a broad range of political, military, economic and ideological activities by developing, producing and disseminating truthful information to foreign audiences in tactical support of strategic national security objectives, we believe it is important to better be able to grasp the main themes composing the international political culture picture, the principles that construct the international system and the persistent dilemmas reflected for instance within the academic discipline of international relations theory and in the history of international relations.

From an historical perspective, the rhetorical commonplaces used in legitimating strategies revolve around two issues: defending the national interest or defending the common goods of the international security, be that common security perceived as indivisible or human rights, for instance. The international law has been evolving ever since

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inception from privileging the interests of the states to privileging the interests of the individuals, in the same logic the national security concept evolves towards a human security paradigm hermeneutics.

The evolution of the international political culture can be perceived as a struggle to transcend the power politics logic, the security dilemma or the balance of power thinking towards supranational integration and the "rule of law". That implies that since the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, the international society has tried to bring "morality" back in the sphere of foreign policy, a tendency reflected for instance in the relatively new developments concerning humanitarian law, war crimes, international criminal courts, R2P (responsibility to protect) or humanitarian interventions. It seems that the Machiavellian sayings that *politics have no relation to morals* and that *the ends justify the means* were in fact never accepted as such due to their cynical flavour. Therefore, as some international relations scholars uphold, every actor tries to present its actions as correct, legal, moral, or just and suggests that a useful method to understand interests is to reveal the rhetorical commonplaces used as arguments in order to legitimise them. The key process involved is presenting certain actions as acceptable, while those of the opponent as unacceptable in connection to norms that are part of the international political culture of that moment.

In the next chapter, we will discuss the two concepts, *legitimacy* and *international political culture*, as reflected in the works of several international relation scholars, and, in the second chapter, we will analyse some elements of the rhetoric strategy employed by Russia in its hybrid warfare waged against Ukraine and by China in its political narratives in correlation with the main principles that construct the international system.

LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE

What we want to convey in this chapter is similar to the idea promoted by Neta Crawford in "Argument and Change in World Politics. Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Interventions" and the ideas reflected in a previous book¹, i.e. the importance

¹ Neta Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics. Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Interventions*, Cambridge University Press, 2004; I. Leucea, *Constructivism și securitate umană*, Institutul European, Iași, 2012, pp. 40-44.

of the ethical argument for the success of psychological operations. The author illustrates in this book the role of the political argument in maintaining international order, changing the models of international the relations or modifying social practices. Political arguments, persuasion, and practical reasons are all fundamental processes within and in the relations between states. Beliefs and culture represent the content and the context of the political argument; without them, actors cannot understand other people's arguments nor can they have a successful reasoning. Keeping in mind the central importance of the argumentation and rationalisation process in global politics, we can think prescriptively in using the ethical argumentative process to reform international politics². The author explains the end of colonialism in terms of delegitimising this political organisation, i.e. through the idea that military occupation of a country against the will of the people of that country is an act that is internationally condemnable. In a few instances in late 20th century, when several states attempted to annex certain territories, such as the case of Indonesia invading East Timor in 1975, its actions were contested not only by the colonised population, but also by the international public opinion. In Iraq's attempt to annex Kuwait, in 1990, the international community under UN authorisation intervened in order to annul the Iraqi conquest. Colonisers used to be proud and justified in their actions, but nowadays the perception has changed to a 180 degrees³.

The importance of legitimising actors' actions on the international arena is generally evoked in the constructivist approach of international relations. Mlada Bukovansky analyses, in her book entitled *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture*, the major transformation that took place both in the internal politics and international politics through the process of delegitimising the monarchic sovereignty and legitimising national sovereignty. The author analyses the transformation of political legitimisation and the way it affected international order. The best way to explain this transformation and its consequences is to analyse the complex play between the elites' discourse with regard to political legitimisation and the strategic struggle for power

² *Ibid*, p. 2.

³ *Ibid*, p. 3.

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Mlada Bukovanski defines the culture of international system as a set of implicit or explicit sentences shared by major actors of the system with regard to the nature of the legitimate political authority, state identity and political power, as well as with regard to the norms and rules that derived from these sentences that pertain in the interstate relations in the system.

within and among states. The author demonstrates how culture, power and interests matter in international change, highlighting the importance of two concepts that are neglected and poorly understood more often than not: political culture and legitimacy. Political legitimacy is conceptualised and contested via political culture. Keeping in mind that legitimacy has an internal as well as an international dimension, we might as well say that international system has a distinct culture, it is a system-wide political culture.

Mlada Bukovanski defines the culture of international system as a set of implicit or explicit sentences shared by major actors of the system with regard to the nature of the legitimate political authority, state identity and political power, as well as with regard to the norms and rules that derived from these sentences that pertain in the interstate relations in the system. In other words, the term culture needs to be understood as a reference to the shared knowledge of rules and norms that constructivist theorists say have a constitutive role in the structure of the international system. These rules and norms are fundamental in shared opinions regarding political legitimacy, which is a critical component of political power, since a government that is seen as illegitimate by its own citizens will have difficulties in mustering the resources in an international competition⁴.

Democratic governments are legitimate due to the consent of the governed and conceptualise the political community through a number of people who make laws and self-govern via representatives. The will of the people – be it loosely defined – started its ascension in mid XVIII century and has come to be seen as the ultimate source of legitimate authority⁵.

With respect to legitimacy, Ian Clark sees it as a key concept for international relations, an academic discipline and a distinctive characteristic of the practice of international relations⁶. Legitimacy plays a fundamental role in international relations. Actors of the international society are permanently involved in legitimisation strategies with the purpose of presenting certain activities or actions

⁴ M. Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture*, New York, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 1-5.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 3.

⁶ I. Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, Oxford University Press, 2007.

as correct. Ian Clark is interested in studying the legitimisation practices that can be traced at international level in various historic periods. The author's interest follows the way in which the notions of legitimacy were presented, debated and applied in the context of certain particular events in world history and how these practices might evolve in the contemporary international society. He identifies three interacting fields: key legitimisation principles of international society, legitimisation practices and actors' legitimisation strategies. Where legitimacy and legitimating overlap is the political sphere, the space where norms, separation of powers and search for consensus meet. The analyst assesses that the notion of consensus is crucial, but extremely problematic because it raises questions with regard to the link between legitimacy and consensus. It is not very clear why certain ideas reach consensus. A possible explanation might be the fact that they are inherently persuasive and states are convinced that they should agree to them; another would be that the practice of legitimacy is sustained starting from a number of other norms, such as the legal, moral and constitutional ones⁷; another explanation why certain ideas obtain consensus deal less with the normative aspects, though they remain present in the fight for legitimisation, but are produced as part of a process of political calculations and contingencies, as a result of negotiations and diplomatic pressure where material and ideological power differences matter. Thus, dominant concepts of legitimacy, especially those expressed at the end of great wars, tend to reflect the mindset of the victorious, which shows the existence of an important relation between power and legitimacy. From a critical perspective, we may say that what is true or right depends on the game of power and domination. In legitimisation principles, on the one hand, and legitimisation strategies, on the other, we find the legitimisation practice through which these norms are consensually interpreted, developed, reconciled, transcribed and mediated⁸.

A significant number of theorists of international legitimacy consider that the key object of the history of this issue is the notion of moral

⁷ I. Leucea, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁸ *Ibid*.



Legitimacy plays a fundamental role in international relations. Actors of the international society are permanently involved in legitimisation strategies with the purpose of presenting certain activities or actions as correct.



Kissinger thought that an order whose structure is accepted by all great powers is legitimate. Raymond Aron also drew attention on the relation between stability and legitimacy, considering that a homogenous system is a legitimate one.

purpose of the state or state's constitutional order⁹. Contemporary writers tend to follow this logic foreshadowing an increased stability of a legitimate power system. The main theme is that such a stability derives from an order which is not coercive¹⁰ and a legitimate order differs from one obtained by force mainly in the result of stability. The essence of this argument taken from political sciences was imported in the field of international relations also by Henry Kissinger who considered that the stability of the post-Napoleonic system resulted from the fact that it was generally seen as legitimate. Kissinger thought that an order whose structure is accepted by all great powers is legitimate¹¹. The accent falls on the existence of consensus, since an order should not seem oppressive or unacceptable to a great actor, because then the actor will adopt a revolutionary policy.

Raymond Aron also drew attention on the relation between stability and legitimacy¹², considering that a homogenous system is a legitimate one. The author thinks that the European state system remained homogenous up until the First World War, but this quality was lost with the 1917 Russian Revolution. The author characterises this situation through the heterogeneity of the legitimacy principle and reached the conclusion that a homogenous system confers more stability.

More recently, Osiander has argued that stability does not derive from a material balance of power, but from the degree of congruence between the main assumptions based on which the system is built and adherence to a consensual agenda¹³.

Among the main authors who tackle the issue of legitimisation in international relations is Ian Hurd, who considers that legitimacy determines the relation between actor and institution¹⁴. In cases when legitimacy, as a psychological phenomenon based on internalisation,

⁹ C. Reus-Smith, *The Moral Purpose of the State. Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1999.

¹⁰ M. Barnett, 'Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations', in *World Politics*, 49 (4), 1997, p. 548.

¹¹ H. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, London, 1977 apud I. Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 16; I. Leucea, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹² R. Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, New York, 1966, I. Leucea, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

¹³ A. Osiander, *The States System of Europe 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Condition of International Stability*, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 5-10; I. Leucea, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁴ I. Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 44.

is a quality that exists in the mind of individuals, then validity is a quality of a system that exists when general expectations overlap. In a social system validated by people, those who do not believe in it cannot simply ignore the rules and institutions they perceive as legitimate. The fact that many more believe in their legitimacy means that those people who do not believe should take this into account when they assess the effects of certain actions. Therefore, though the internal validity derives from the psychology of the members of society, it is seen by the other actors as an objective element of the system's structure¹⁵.

Stacie Goddard¹⁶ treats the issue of legitimisation policies in relation with territorial disputes, generally actors perceiving territories as indivisible. The author focuses on the radical political rhetoric that promoted the idea of indivisibility. Negotiating territories, politicians use a certain argumentation and they have in mind the inside audience, thus they reach incompatible pretensions; therefore territories are built as 'indivisible'. The significance of Jerusalem as an indivisible territory can hardly be underestimated and it is a quintessential example of the persistent Israeli-Palestinian conflict undermining the possibility for an enduring peace, since the Israelis insist that a united Jerusalem will be the eternal capital of the state of Israel¹⁷. In East Asia, the issue of Taiwan is another example of indivisible territory. The major issue lies in the 'severe' costs that these indivisible territories suppose. Another example is Kashmir – the claims on this territory seem to be irreconcilable, with some seeing this place as the most dangerous in the world.

What the author demonstrates is that the perceived indivisibility of territories determined the failure of negotiations. Indivisibility, regarded as natural, an inevitable result of identities that clash and of strong attachment to the land, is correlated to a specific historical context, yet at the same time Goddard draws attention on the fact that in other historic periods territories were perceived as divisible¹⁸. Therefore, the indivisible character of territory is constructed by an international political culture and the question remains under what

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 46.

¹⁶ S. Goddard, *Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy: Jerusalem and Northern Ireland*, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 1-2.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 3.

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Legitimation strategies used are those that can give leverage compared to the opponent's claims.

conditions actors cannot negotiate compensations or cannot appeal to other negotiation mechanisms. The author's main argument¹⁹ is that the indivisible territory is a social construct and, as such, indivisibility is not inevitable or inherent to territoriality. When politicians negotiate territories, they start a process of legitimisation explaining why the claims of one of the parties are justified. Legitimation strategies used are those that can give leverage compared to the opponent's claims. In most of the cases, politicians do not try to instigate to violence, to intractable conflict, but they use rhetorical strategies that help them promote political interests. Legitimation strategies can lead actors into a trap, putting them in a negotiation position where they cannot accept the legitimacy of the opponent's claims. When this happens, actors come to negotiations with incompatible claims, considering the territory as indivisible and thus triggering sometimes tragic solutions. Depending on the way actors chose to legitimise their interests the possibility of mediating territorial conflict can be maintained or destroyed.

According to Stacie Goddard²⁰, territory is not the only indivisible element. The 30 Years War was waged following indivisibility of religion; neither Protestants, nor Catholics wanted to give up their claims to religious authority, thus destroying the chance to reach a compromise. Territory is an interesting subject, since its negotiability varies in time and space. Actors are more prone to negotiate certain territories and not others, even territories that are comparable from an economic point of view.

3. PSYOPS, RHETORICAL STRATEGIES AND HYBRID WAR

Understanding war in terms of using force, hard power, in order to achieve political objectives, hybrid war supposes the use of "soft" means to reach the desired objectives. In the case of psychological operations, keeping in mind the importance of legitimisation strategies discussed above, we can assume that in the middle of psychological operations there are communication campaigns aiming to send messages that "legitimise" and "normalise" the desired political objectives. If we refer

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 5.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 4.

to Russia's hybrid warfare in the recent annexation of Crimea, from the perspective of psychological operations of extreme importance was the legitimisation of the annexation through a "democratic" organisation of the referendum for the people living in the peninsula to freely express the desire to be reunited with Russia, which represented precisely the ethical argumentation strategy of change.

In this hybrid war, speculating on the inherent contradictions of international law that legitimises states' right to defend territorial integrity, a clear and hard to manipulate principle, but also peoples' right to national self-determination, Russia built its strategic communication on the exploitation in its interest of the conceptual malleability of 'national identity'. In time, the principle of national self-determination has strengthened the state system by offering a morally and politically strong justification to live in a world made up of national states. But, on the other hand, the principle of national self-determination represented a strong challenge for states' society by generating conflict sources, by empowering and legitimising secessionist movements²¹. The process by which self-determination has become an international political norm and then an international legal norm, starting from being a political principle, is a complex and contested one²². This principle confers political and moral rights to national groups, who encourage and legitimise claims for state frontier reconfiguration. Applying the principle of national self-determination as a political norm has always been selective for reasons that belong to the difficulty in identifying the nation or to the importance of other (economic, strategic, geopolitical) criteria in configuring frontiers and, above all, to the imperatives and interests of great powers. Despite ambiguities, national self-determination has been involved in almost all big reconfigurations in the past 150 years – the four big decolonisation waves, unification of Germany, Yugoslavia's dissolution etc. The idea and practice of national self-determination principle have been central in state system expansion in the non-European world and in worldwide expansion of the international



In the middle of psychological operations there are communication campaigns aiming to send messages that "legitimise" and "normalise" the desired political objectives.

²¹ Andrew Hurrell, Andrew, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 122; J. Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 36.

²² *Ibid*, p. 122.



In analysing Crimea's annexation, we can see that Russia's communication strategy was to focus on those elements of international culture that legitimise its actions, while occulting those aspects that were unfavourable. An aspect that not thoroughly discussed was, for instance, the organisation of a fragmented and illegal referendum in a province of a sovereign state.

society²³. From a legal point of view, this organisation principle is a direct challenge to the stability of state-based international order. Accepting the right of any minority to withdraw from the community it belongs to, because it wishes so or other powerful actor conspire at, would mean destroying all order and stability within states and creating anarchy on international arena; it would mean supporting a theory that is incompatible with the idea of the state as territorial and political unity²⁴. The theoretical problem intervenes whenever it is necessary to decide which of the national claims to statehood should be recognised²⁵.

In analysing Crimea's annexation, we can see that Russia's communication strategy was to focus on those elements of international culture that legitimise its actions, while occulting those aspects that were unfavourable. An aspect that not thoroughly discussed was, for instance, the organisation of a fragmented and illegal referendum in a province of a sovereign state. Beyond the discussion regarding a possible manipulation of the 16 March 2014 Crimea referendum results, there is the issue of illegitimacy of the organisation of that referendum without asking the Ukrainians' opinion on the annexation of this part of their country, which led to violation of constitutional norms. Yet, what is important is Russian authorities appeal to democratic principles to legitimate the annexation: the appeal to popular vote as a principle well accommodated in the international culture.

Although the results of the referendum are contestable, since there is information referring to the fact that the presence to vote was under 30%, the vote did not allow the presence of international observers – the OSCE observers being twice removed and the vote was organised by violating Ukraine's Constitution, the Russian Federation insisted on its communication campaign only on those aspects that legitimised the annexation of the peninsula; the elements that delegitimised the referendum were glossed over, for example the Budapest Memorandum that granted Ukraine's integrity signed

²³ R. Higgins, *Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 64.

²⁴ A. Hurrell, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

²⁵ J. Mayall, *Politica mondială. Evoluția și limitele ei*, Filipeștii de Târg, Editura Antet XX Press, 2000, p. 33.

by Russia, the USA and the United Kingdom in 1994. Following the line of legitimacy in organising the Crimean referendum, Vladimir Putin made use of the declaration adopted by the USA regarding Kosovo, i.e. independence declarations may violate the internal legislation of a country, but this does not mean that international law is violated, yet the violation of the Budapest Memorandum means exactly the violation of the international law, be that just an example and not speaking about transparency or human rights.

Despite this, the argument ignores not only the undercover military operation that, in February 2014, preceded and conditioned Crimea's secession. Moreover, several details on the 'referendum' organised by Russia in March 2014 put in the spotlight the myth that there was an overwhelming request for reunification among the inhabitants of the peninsula. One of the first and most criticising reports on the pseudo-referendum came from three representatives of the Council for Civil Society Development and Human Rights, institution that is under the umbrella of Russian presidency. One of the representatives of this Russian state official body visited Crimea in 2014. In his report it was estimated that the vote presence was not 83.1% as authorities in the Kremlin officially reported, but rather 30-50%. The support among voters for Crimea's annexation was not 96.77% as reported by Moscow-controlled authorities, but around 50-60%²⁶.

In this international environment based on contradictory principles, actors appeal to various strategies to legitimize military or non-military actions in order to promote certain political interests. Constructivist researchers are keen on finding those interpretations that legitimize and allow certain behaviours in the international system. The principle of sovereignty allows such behaviours²⁷. For instance, constructivists' analysis referring to America's invasion in Iraq does not aim to reveal the 'real' interests of the intervention that are presupposed: oil, weapons of mass destruction, human rights etc. The hypotheses dealing with Bush's private reasons or what caused the decision

²⁶ Andreas Umland, „De ce nu are Rusia drepturi asupra Crimeii”, available at <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/de-ce-nu-are-rusia-drepturi-asupra-crimeii>, retrieved on 17.06.2019.

²⁷ M. Barnett, *Social Constructivism*, in J. Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 166.

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to invade Iraq actually aim to find the truth. But the truth regarding the interests is hard to establish, constructivists say. For this reason, constructivists' researches head towards highlighting the argument invoked to persuade the American public and soldiers that the invasion was a legitimate act. The motivation was strengthened by the supposed connection between the terrorist 9/11 attacks and the Bagdad regime. The premise that Saddam owned weapons of mass destruction, though based on false data, created a context for finding justifications for the intervention²⁸.

Constructivists' questions such as *"How was it possible?"* examine the way meanings are produced and attached to subjects and social objects, building particular interpretive dispositions that determine certain possibilities and exclude others. International relations are inextricably linked to discursive practices that promote representations considered *"truths"*. The purpose of analysing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been occulted, but to reveal the way certain representations legitimise certain actions.

After all, in the case of military operations the rhetoric used is subscribed to the logic of legitimising actions and is competing with the adversary's *"propaganda"*. Thus, in the case of 2001 Afghanistan intervention, the main objectives of psychological operations were to change the rhetoric used by the Taliban and al-Qaeda, i.e. the intervention aims at Islam, and promote the message that the intervention aims to combat terrorism and annihilate terrorist groups²⁹.

The analysis made by the author of the study *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001 – 2010* proposes several conclusions regarding the fact that the topics and messages used in PSYOPS campaigns need to overlap national security objectives, as well as messages on a national level. It is mentioned³⁰ the opinion that these campaigns are rather reactive instead of being proactive. The study underlines the idea that the communication strategy needs to take into account the public opinion and a popular support for governing, as a prerequisite

²⁸ K. Fierke, *Constructivism*, in T. Dunne, M. Kurki, and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 177.

²⁹ A. Munoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001 – 2010*, RAND Corporation, 2012.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 2.

for victory. Victory cannot be obtained only by killing insurgents, but by getting the support of the people and by limiting the use of military force. As some suggest, the battlefield is not necessarily the classical one, but it is the one inside people's mind³¹.

Therefore, in terms of hybrid warfare, communication strategies of various actors who try to achieve certain political objectives could be identified in time if they assumed the indissoluble relation between the international political culture and the legitimising principles shared at a certain moment. We consider that the communication strategy aiming to legitimise military actions of an actor may start long before the adversary becomes aware that the war – the hybrid war – is in full fling. Before starting actions that are typical of classic military interventions, there is a high probability that the soft power strategy could be under way in the sense of legitimising the desired results.

A heated debate that is taking place nowadays refers to the interpretation and deciphering China's intentions on long term. Is China a benevolent actor as it says it is or is its soft power strategy part of a hybrid war? Following our argumentation, even superficially analysing China's messages, we may suspect that its foreign policy is subscribed to a logic that is similar to the competition between great powers during the Cold War, its purpose being to consolidate a positive image of China in order to win strategic allies and to dethrone the USA from its dominant position on international arena. There is no coincidence that, in its attempt to offer an alternative to the American dream, China proposes the Chinese dream in its foreign policy discourses. Aiming to contain a possible negative interpretation to its economic and military ascension, China presents itself as a new type of superpower (see e.g. Hu Angang, *China, A New Type of Superpower*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2011) who will fight to eradicate poverty and inequality on a global scale, but not to wage warfare³².

Loads of western analyses present China's development as a miraculous solution, an exceptional one, a revelation, although through this rhetoric may legitimise the communist political regime. The message that *"the most amazing economic transformation in the history of humanity was driven by a communist party, exactly*

³¹ *Ibid*, pp. 3-4.

³² A. Marga, *Ascensiunea globală a Chinei*, Editura Niculescu, București, 2015, p. 37.

In terms of hybrid warfare, communication strategies of various actors who try to achieve certain political objectives could be identified in time if they assumed the indissoluble relation between the international political culture and the legitimising principles shared at a certain moment.



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in the same period when the European communism had been removed³³, promoted in a book written by Martin Jacques (*When China Rules the World*, Penguin Books, London, 2012) is relevant in that sense, mainly combined with another book title, *How China's Authoritarian Model will Dominate the 21st Century* (Basic Books, New York, 2010)³³.

Appealing to economic statistics and bringing forward data to prove the fact that this state has identified the right solution for international development (*l'incroyable metamorphose de la Chine, le siècle de Chine*) China insists on the idea of the originality of its economic, social and political reforms. While in the '90s Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the end of history, of course referring to the indubitable success of the democratic regime, liberal ideology and market economy principles, China is coming to demonstrate the communist regime has paradoxically revived "three days" after the fall of communism in East European countries. In these rhetorical strategies we can notice that China is trying to prevent the spread of certain interpretations that should identify its foreign policy objectives as being circumscribed to a power politics logic: China does not aim to follow selfish national interests, but works for the benefit of the whole humanity; it does not aim to reach or to outrun America, but it aims for the global good. China's strategic communication does not put in the spotlight less pleasant aspects of this fulminate development, such as pollution, corruption, human rights infringement, individual liberties infringement, and so on. China wants to promote its ascension as being far from a policy meant to maximise state power, but to promote the fact that the originality of its development serves the common good of humanity. China send the message that is it not involved in a "cold war", but it promotes a new, unprecedented, exceptional policy.

As an example of discourse trying to position an actor at the other end of the spectrum of egoistic power politics logic, the Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his first public address since the commercial war with US started, has called for openness between countries and denounced racial supremacy as 'stupid' amid rising trade tensions with the US. He said "*different civilisations were not destined to clash. Thinking that one's own race and culture are superior, and insisting*

³³ *Ibid.*

on transforming or even replacing other civilisations, is stupid in its understanding and disastrous in practice. There is no clash between different civilisations, [we] just need to have the eye to appreciate the beauty in all civilisations". Mr Xi added that China would only become more open to the world in the future.

"Today's China is not only China's China. It is Asia's China and the world's China. China in the future will take on an even more open stance to embrace the world"³⁴.

CONCLUSIONS

Psychological operations mean almost the same thing as persuasive communication, "*demonstrably any program that supports a long-term effort to achieve a national or regional foreign policy objective through persuasion*"³⁵, we uphold the relevance of the subject discussed in this article, namely the importance of studying the PSYOPS and rhetoric commonplaces used in different contexts in connection with concepts like legitimacy and international political culture, as central concepts analysed in the literature of the international relations academic discipline, be that theory of IR or history of IR.

As we have already mentioned, PSYOPS soldiers conduct a broad range of political, military, economic and ideological activities by developing, producing, and disseminating truthful information to foreign audiences in tactical support of strategic national security objectives. Due to the difficulty of the tasks implied by those type of activities, we believe there is a need to create a larger framework for understanding the international arena, the structure of international systems, the moral imperatives, pattern of thinking foreign policy, and so forth in order to be able to integrate the operational, tactical and strategic level when planning and conducting the communication campaign and create the messages to be employed in that specific activities.

³⁴ *** *China's Xi Jinping urges openness amid US trade war*, 15.05.2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48285993>, retrieved on 17.06.2019.

³⁵ F. Walker, *Strategic Concepts for Military Operations* in F. Goldstein & B.F. Findley (eds.) *Psychological Operations. Principles and Case Studies*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1996, p. 17.

Psychological operations mean almost the same thing as persuasive communication, "*demonstrably any program that supports a long-term effort to achieve a national or regional foreign policy objective through persuasion*".



We believe it is very important to state that “*splitting lines between operation, tactic and strategic level are almost blurred, and what needs to be increased is the credibility of the messages*”³⁶. The international arena was historically characterised by mistrust and fear, therefore it is very difficult to be persuasive and build credibility when most people are inclined to be pessimistic or realistic, yet there is no other way but to strive to be credible.

The theory of international relations brings forward the enduring international politics dilemmas and the main issues in the IR academic discipline concerns how to build trust and how to construct a more just international order. The PSYOPS objectives are quite similar that is why we recommend an interdisciplinary study of the persuasive communication.

“*Splitting lines between operation, tactic and strategic level are almost blurred, and what needs to be increased is the credibility of the messages*”.

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³⁶ A. Munoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001-2010*, RAND Corporation, 2012, pp. 3-4.

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POWER DISTANCE, UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE AND LEVEL OF LINGUISTIC KNOWLEDGE – ESSENTIAL DIMENSIONS OF MILITARY COALITIONS FUNCTIONING –

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The high hierarchy and orientation toward respecting the rules and military regulations (a feature of the Latin Group), the special elitism and respect for the status (a feature of the Anglo-Saxon Group), the excessive orientation towards the fulfillment of the objectives, "avoiding uncertainty" and the exaggeration of rules (a feature of the Americans), different approaches with respect to solving military conflicts (fight or humanitarian approach), national rules related to force protection, the accommodation and payment conditions, personnel policies, and the way to communicate generate different levels of misunderstanding within a coalition.

As a result of the extensive research performed in Afghanistan during 2012-2018, I consider that three cultural dimensions have a major impact over interoperability. The level of linguistic knowledge, power distance and uncertainty avoidance are aspects that should be more studied and harmonised.

Military organisations that function together over extended periods of time develop an experiential isomorphism resulted from the common experiences, through the standardisation of the policies, doctrines, resources and training programmes, determining an increased military interoperability. They learn more about multiculturalism in military environment and offer the opportunity to study the links between cultural differences and interoperability effectiveness.

Keywords: linguistic level, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, military coalition, interoperability.

I. INTRODUCTION

Starting in 1995, R.H. Palin¹ observed that, additional to the political decisions and to the interoperability of military equipment, cultural factors have a role in achieving interoperability in multinational coalitions. Steward Bonner and Arthur Woolgar Verrall (2001), Leung K. and Bond M. H. (2004), William Hardy (2007) and also the researchers of *Task Group 120* have studied the issue of cultural interoperability and the way in which cultural differences influence the efficiency of military international missions.

Cultural differences generate different styles of leadership, possible frictions, both in coalitions and in interaction with local population, with NGOs etc.



Cultural differences generate different styles of leadership, possible frictions, both in coalitions and in interaction with local population, with NGOs etc.

Those involved need a foundation to see their allies level of cultural training, the knowledge and harmonisation of different elements affecting the situational awareness.

This article provides a presentation of the specific cultural issues in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan, from the perspective of three variables: **power distance, uncertainty avoidance and level of linguistic knowledge**. Moreover, it presents the possible effects

¹ R.H. Palin, *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper Number 294, 1995.



According to Geert Hofstede cultural theory, there are six dimensions that explain the way in which different cultures motivate people and organisations. Only two of them are analysed, namely Power Distance (PD) and Uncertainty Avoidance (UA).

of those differences in the interaction process inside military coalitions. It represents a cultural knowledge instrument for every type of multinational organisation and it is useful for the military².

The study related to cultural dimensions provided by Geert Hofstede, even criticised by important sociologists (B. McSweeney, O. Shenkar, S. H. Schwartz, W. Bilsky, Mansour Javidan) who argue that in the analysis of a phenomenon different qualitative techniques should be used and that there have been considered insufficient cultural aspects), remains the dominant model of cross-cultural research. According to his cultural theory³, there are six dimensions that explain the way in which different cultures motivate people and organisations. In the present paper only two of them will be analysed, namely:

a) **Power Distance (PD)** – reflecting the degree to which people from that culture perceive cultural inequity. This item has an increased value in societies or organisations that have a multi-layered social structure and involves an unbalanced distribution of political and economic power among the population.

b) **Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)** – representing the easiness with which the particular culture faces the new, assumes risks and, moreover, the anxiety degree of the particular nation. The societies having high levels of UA tend to be very structured, with extended laws and rules meant to diminish the effects of changes and uncertainties as much as possible. Cultures with a reduced level of UA are tempted to adopt a more relativistic approach in order to allow more points of view to co-exist avoiding the establishment of other rules.

Elron Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari (1999) strengthen the importance of Hofstede’s dimensions in the analysis of multinational operations “...in hierarchic organisations such as the armies, **Power Distance** item can influence many aspects of interrelationship”⁴.

Social changes, technological evolution, massive migrations are only few elements that generate changes in the value of PD

² The issue of cultural differences has been analysed extensively in my PhD thesis “The Effects of Cultural Differences over the Military Mission from the Theatre of Operations Afghanistan”.
³ Geert Hofstede, *National Cultures Revisited*, Behavior Science Research, 18(4), 285-305, 1983. *Idem*, *A Case Study for Comparing Apples and Oranges: International Differences in Values*, in M. Sasaki (ed.), *Values and Attitudes across Nations and Time*, Brill, Leiden, 1998.
⁴ Keith Stewart, Mark Bonner and Neil Verrall, *Cultural Factors in Future Multinational Military Operations*, presented at the meeting of the RTO HFM experts “Human Factors in the 21st Century”, 2008, pp. 16-20.



and UA dimensions. For example, the PD value for Romania, according to Hofstede’s study is 90. The researches of the Romanian sociological institutions are positioning it around 60.

It is thus demonstrated the link between the style of leadership and the type of culture, namely the PD and UA values. GLOBE study stresses the dimensions that determine the leadership style and behavioural models inside multinational organisations, those two having a major role in determining styles and models.

In *figure no. 1*, there are presented six styles of leadership and the position, on the intensity scale, of the comprised countries, in ten groups. The importance of the style is special, making easier the interaction in the multinational military organisation.

GLOBE study stresses the dimensions that determine the leadership style and behavioural models inside multinational organisations, those two having a major role in determining styles and models.

Orientation towards performance	Orientation towards the team	Participative	Human	Autonomous	Auto or protective group
High	High	High	High	High	High
Anglo Germanic Nordic Asia SE L. European L. American	Asia SE Confucian L. American E. European African L. European	Germanic Anglo Nordic	Asia SE Anglo African Confucian	Germanic E. European Confucian Nordic Asia SE Anglo	Middle East Confucian Asia SE L. American E. European
Confucian African E. European	Nordic Anglo Middle East Germanic	L. European L. American African	Germanic Middle East L. American E. European	African Middle East L. European L. American	African L. European
Middle East		E. European SE Asian Confucian Middle East	L. European Nordic		Anglo Germanic Nordic
Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Orientation towards performance	Orientation towards the team	Participative	Human	Autonomous	Auto or protective group

Figure no. 1: “Societal Groups and Style of Leadership”, Robert J. House, 2004

As a result of the research performed in the theatre of operations in Bosnia over a 12-month period, E.K. Bowman published a valid model of the relationship between the cultural dimensions and the



elements supporting the performance of the teams/groups⁵. Bowman concludes that if the members of a team come from societies whose *Power Distance* dimension is high, the probability of distributing the information is very limited and the members' expectation is that the leader should take all the decisions. If the leader comes from a society whose *Power Distance* dimension is high, the leader is used to take decisions on his own and the members of the team will feel they have no value, which results in low coordination and knowledge of the skills of the team, including a reduced situational awareness.

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The understanding framework of cultural diversity and knowledge in teamwork					
National Cultural Dimensions	Elements that support group performance				
	Degree (scale)	Situational analysis	Coordination	Establishing roles/ responsibilities	Basic behaviour
Power Distance	High	Vertical	Centralised	Rank	Leader
	Low	Horizontal	Decentralised	Expertise	Team/group
Uncertainty Avoidance	The need for high certainty	Detailed information	Well defined	Very specialised	Formal
	The need for low certainty	General information	Ad-hoc	Multifunctional	Informal
Orientation towards activity	Independent	Direct implication	To do	Skills and abilities	Mission
	Interdependent	Indirect implication	To be	Connexions	Relationships

Figure no. 2: Knowledge framework of cultural diversity and knowledge in teamwork (Bowman, 2002)

Important negative consequences are present in the case of *Uncertainty Avoidance* extreme dimensions. Thus, if the team members come from societies with a high level of UA, they will need more coordination information and they will not prove creativity in interaction and operational planning. If this item is increased at the leader's level then he will be lost in details and the opposite is the lack of details, both with negative consequences over the efficiency of the coalition.

If the members of the team have an independent style of accomplishing the objectives, they will accomplish them one by one,

⁵ E.K. Bowman, *Cultural Factors Affecting MNT Communications in the SFOR Environment*, Unpublished Manuscript, 2002.



without developing teamwork or a complex situational awareness. If the team leader has an independent style, he will not appreciate the activity of the members of the team that are working creatively, in a complex way and outside the clear established objective.

In respect to Hofstede's research on dimensions, a new aspect of the research performed by E. K. Bowman is given by the fact that it has been tested and validated in military organisations and in real operational environment.

Moving from the cultural dimensions to the *language*, the third element discussed in this article, it is considered important to mention Boene's contribution⁶, related to the sources of problematic intercultural relations, in which the level of linguistic knowledge comes first (46.1%) in the top of problematic intercultural relations. The language in a multinational context is an instrument of individual power for those who are experts in English, because they have the opportunity to dominate interaction and decisions⁷. To communicate in a secondary language, even for fluent speakers, may be a problem, because of the speaking pace, technical terms and abbreviations. Communication problems can be increased by the stress and the lack of rest that are inherent in a theatre of operations.

Moving from the cultural dimensions to the language, the third element discussed in this article, it is considered important to mention Boene's contribution, related to the sources of problematic intercultural relations.

II. MULTINATIONAL MILITARY COALITION IN AFGHANISTAN – RESTRICTED CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (PD, UA and the official language)

In 2006, the *Allied Rapid Reaction Corps – ARRC* (NATO, Rheindalen) took over the ISAF command. It was a complex mission that represented a close collaboration between 37 NATO and non-NATO countries, the Afghan Government and the ministries subordinated to it, the "War Lords" allied to NATO, numerous NGOs, international organisations, the UN and international media.

ARRC, being a British HQs predominantly, had cultural specificities. General Richards, when taking over the command of ARRC, came

⁶ B. Boene, *Relations with Officers from Other Nations in Military Operations Other than War and in the Impact of Comparisons on Professional Self-perceptions*. In G. Caforio (ed.), *The Flexible Officer*, Artistic & Publishing Company, Rome, Italy, 2002, pp. 89-105.

⁷ S. D. N. Cook & D. Yanow, *Culture and Organisational Learning*. *Journal of Management Inquiry* 2, 1993, pp. 373-390.



with his own experience, professional training and culture. The fact that ARRC was the General HQs of the mission comprising British officers, speaking the same language and having the same training and culture, created all the premises for the operational planning to adapt the existing military doctrine to the reasons, practices and concepts used in this process. In missions in which forming experience and expertise are different, it is difficult for the military to be united inside the same style of planning and execution of military operations. Improvisation, in time, leads to the fragmentation of an operation and to the decrease in the efficiency of the mission. This is only an example of the major impact of the leader that comes from an old culture and that is helped by the expertise of his military personnel, speaking the same language and having a common professional experience, can have over the mission. It is a mechanism functioning in a coherent, efficient and coordinated manner.

In February 2019, NATO states and partners participating and contributing to the mission in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan were as follows⁸:

	Albania	135		Germany	1.300		Portugal	193
	Armenia	121		Greece	12		Romania	733
	Australia	300		Hungary	93		Slovakia	36
	Austria	17		Iceland	3		Slovenia	8
	Azerbaijan	120		Italy	895		Spain	67
	Belgium	82		Latvia	42		Sweden	29
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	63		Lithuania	50		North Macedonia	47
	Bulgaria	159		Luxembourg	2		Turkey	593
	Croatia	106		Mongolia	233		Ukraine	16
	Czech Republic	357		Montenegro	29		United Kingdom	1.100
	Denmark	155		Netherlands	160		United States	8.475
	Estonia	39		New Zealand	13			
	Finland	24		Norway	54			
	Georgia	870		Poland	303			
							Total	17.034

Figure no. 3: NATO countries and partners in February 2019

⁸ See https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/20190215_2019-02-RSM-Placemat.pdf, retrieved on 18 March 2019.



From the beginning of the intervention and up to 2019, the participation and contribution varied every year. To the military personnel mentioned above we can add NATO civilian personnel, those belonging to US DoD, civilian employees belonging to different local companies, international organisations and NGOs. It gives the perspective of the human resources that interact every day.

In order to have a view of possible frictions inside the coalition, in the table below I present the PD and UA values, extracted from Hofstede's study over cultural dimensions for NATO members and coalition partners in Afghanistan.

COUNTRY	PD	UA	COUNTRY	PD	UA	COUNTRY	PD	UA
Albania	56	14	Georgia	31	55	Poland	68	93
Armenia			Germany	35	65	Portugal	63	104
Australia	36	51	Greece	60	112	Romania	90	90
Austria	11	70	Hungary	46	82	Slovakia	104	51
Azerbaijan			Island			Slovenia	71	88
Belgium	65	94	Italy	50	75	Spain	57	86
Bosnia-Herzegovina			Latvia			Sweden	31	29
Bulgaria	70	85	Lithuania			Northern Macedonia		
Croatia	73	80	Luxembourg	40	70	Turkey	66	85
Czech Republic	57	74	Mongolia			Ukraine		
Denmark	18	23	Montenegro			Great Britain	35	35
Estonia	40	60	Netherlands	38	53	USA	40	46
Finland	33	59	New Zealand	22	49	Canada	39	48
France	68	86	Norway	31	50			

The *world's average values*, according to Geert Hofstede's studies⁹ for the two dimensions are: **55** for **PD** and **65** for **UA**. We can see that 40% of the countries from the coalition have a value of the PD >55, which generates effects to be solved at the level of the leader-subordinate relationship and in the participation to the decision process. Moreover, the differences related to UA can cause problems in operational planning because of the need for information of the personnel with the UA item >65. The US, the Framework Nation has the biggest contribution and ensures the mission command.

⁹ Geert H. Hofstede, *Cultural Dimensions Resources*, see http://www.geerthofstede.com:80/geert_hofstede_resources.shtml, retrieved on 15 June 2019.



The cultural differences become visible in the common planning process even for the native English-speaking nations (the British and the Americans), when the conception is developed in common. A plausible explanation may be related to the different mental learning models.

Another explanation may be related to the working style and/or the way the military conceptualise the “quality” of the plan. According to Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, the difference between the UK and the USA related to PD is small, leading to the conclusion that in the case of a coalition operation comprising the two countries friction is not a problem. *“The planning mental model comprises the concepts and their relationships, the background and the consequences of those plans. They influence individual expectations over the way the process has to be conducted and provides the selection framework for the behaviour and the objectives in the planning process”*¹⁰. Reality demonstrates that linguistic nuances and the UA value influence operational planning.

The *Resolute Support (RS)* leadership is provided by ABCA (USA, UK, Canada and Australia) officers. Of course, the other NATO member states are represented at the top level, but there are less officers belonging to those states.

In this context, the USA rating is below average for the PD item, showing a less formal culture inside social relationships, in which power is distributed in a balanced way, it thus being a society that is oriented on short term, and that tolerates *uncertainty* very well. American planners pay a lot of attention to details, while British ones consider that too many details conduct to a rigid structure that limits the reaction to unexpected situations.

In the same context, Romania has a high rate of the item *Power Distance* (90), Romanians preferring not to interact with the leaders, executing orders and not having decisions to make. Even the general behaviour is still the above mentioned one, because of the totalitarian regime legacy, the generations under 40 years old wanting a participative and cooperative leadership. The *Uncertainty Avoidance* item for Romania has also a value of 90, demonstrating a high degree

¹⁰ Louise J. Rassmusen, R. Sieck Winston, Paul Smart, *US/UK Mental Models of Planning: The Relationship between Plan Detail and Plan Quality*, Applied Research Associates, RTO-MP-HFM-142, to 9-10, 2008, pp. 9-11.

of anxiety related to decisions and the future, the population preferring the certainty of “today”. There is a difficulty in managing ambiguous situations and many other options. The availability is to agree with the common opinion, rejecting the minority opinions. Uncertainty and situational nervousness generate a degree of anxiety that has no foundation and an unjustified level of emotions and impulsive actions. In conclusion, the values of the two dimensions affect both Romanian leaders and subordinates in multinational organisations. Creative ideas will be very frequent but they will be materialised only if the decision is taken by the leader. The Romanian leaders expect to be informed over all aspects, and have the tendency to control the power, the information, the career evolution and the decisions.

The linguistic knowledge level is a requirement in the *Job Description*, in accordance with the responsibilities and the participation of everyone into the mission. The competencies are established by a STANAG, being obligatorily tested periodically or/and before the pre-mission training, in the case the military has not been tested. The situation inside the coalition is **good** related to the linguistic level, being helped by the fact that most of the leaders and planners are native English speakers and at the operational level the knowledge level is appropriate.

Previous Research Performed in Multinational Coalitions

1. Research performed outside the theatre of operations

*“Cultural Interoperability. Ten Years of Research into Co-operation in the First German-Netherlands Corps”*¹¹ is the only research conducted in the modern times with the participation of two NATO countries between 1995-2005. René Moelker, Joseph Soeters and Ulrich von Hagen wanted to determine if cultural interoperability was feasible, what conditions could support that and in what directions it would be developed. They focused on two well known hypotheses of Intercultural Theory, presenting that the frequency of the contacts and *mutual trust* are prone to sustaining sympathy feelings between different cultures. It is a case study on collaboration in peacetime.

¹¹ Ulrich von Hagen, René Moelker, Joseph Soeters, *Cultural Interoperability. Ten Years of Research into Co-operation in the First German-Netherlands Corps*. Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr. International Forum, Volume 27, pp. 15–51, 131-161, Protzeller Chausse 20, 15344 Breda & Strausberg, May, 2006.

The linguistic knowledge level is a requirement in the Job Description, in accordance with the responsibilities and the participation of everyone into the mission. The competencies are established by a STANAG, being obligatorily tested periodically or/and before the pre-mission training, in the case the military has not been tested.



The leadership style is different in Germany and in the Netherlands. The authoritarian style is frequent in the German Armed Forces, while the participative one is characteristic for the Dutch. The majority of the German troops showed the preference for the Dutch style of leadership. Maybe the mentioned styles of leadership are also influenced by cultural differences, such as the difference between a volunteer army and an army comprising recruits.

According to Hofstede's PD and UA values, the *Power Distance* items of the two studied cultures are very closed (35/38), differences being seen for the item *Uncertainty Avoidance* (65/53).

The conclusions of the study demonstrate that those differences do not generate major effects in military interaction at peacetime.

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Interoperability in peacetime, in reduced stress conditions was not a problem, because the data collecting, analysis and decision-making processes took longer time than in a normal theatre of operations, aspects that could have been dramatically influenced by the different value of the UA item.

2. Research conducted in the theatres of operations

a. Dutch-German cooperation in Kabul

In 2003, the common HQs took over the command of the mission in Kabul for a six-month period. The Dutch-German cooperation proved to be less successful in the theatre of operations, although the opposite situation was expected, considering the previous positive evolution of the cooperation during the peacetime. From the beginning of the bilateral collaboration in 2002, especially the Dutch did not feel comfortable in relation to the German domination concerning the personnel, logistics and command. The contribution in terms of personnel of the two countries was unbalanced¹³. The problems at Camp Warehouse reached the Corp's HQs in Münster and ISAF HQs in Kabul. The German-Dutch operational cooperation in Camp Warehouse ended in the fall of 2003.

The pre-mission long term common training proved to be an important issue, even not sufficient in stressful situations, marked by time and logistical constraints.

¹² M. van den Berg Dechesne, J.C. Soeters, *International Collaboration under Threat: a Field Study in Kabul* (submitted for publication), 2005.

¹³ U. VonHagen, P. Klein, R. Moelker, J. Soeters, *True Love. A Study in Integrated Multinationality within 1 (GE/NL) Corps*. SOWI, International Forum, no. 25, Strausberg, 2003.

b. Military international cooperation on KAIA Airport (Kabul)

From the beginning of the ISAF Mission in 2001, a command and staff Air Force unit comprising officers and staff sergeants from NATO was tasked to maintain Kabul Airport functional. There was a six-month rotation of personnel representing different nations. Romania ensured, through a detachment belonging to the Romanian Air Force, the command of Kabul International Airport in two rotations, the first for a six-month period (2006), and the second for one-year period (2011-2012). In the aggregate, 25 nations contributed troops, and no country numerically dominated the other countries.

There were problems related to language, norms, national regulations, causing discipline problems. The decision cycle was criticised, the problems being related to the complex multinational chain of command and control. The military in KAIA were in general contented with the mission and considered their activity in Afghanistan as a "normal working place". The success of the operations in KAIA can be related to the norms based on technology and professional isomorphism (Dimaggio/Powell – 1991).

I consider this case a good example of international military cooperation.

c. Canadian-Norwegian-Hungarian-Belgian cooperation in Camp Julien

The third case study, conducted by Joseph Soeters and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch¹⁴, refers to a multinational combat group formed of approximately 230 airborne Belgian troops, a Norwegian reconnaissance battalion and a Hungarian infantry company being in a Canadian Base in Camp Julien. The Belgians reported that they did not feel comfortable in the working environment and in the day to day relationship with the Canadians. The survey conducted by Joseph Soeters and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch among Belgian troops showed that they indicated the relationship with the Canadians as being "very bad", because they were treated in a "condescending" way. All those frictions

¹⁴ Joseph Soeters, Tibor Tresch Szvircsev, *Towards Cultural Integration in Multinational Peace Operations*, Volume 10, 2010, no. 1-2, *The Janus Face of War Counter Insurgency in the Post Modern Era*, Defence Studies, May, 2010, pp. 272-287.

The military in KAIA were in general contented with the mission and considered their activity in Afghanistan as a "normal working place". The success of the operations in KAIA can be related to the norms based on technology and professional isomorphism (Dimaggio/Powell – 1991).



None of the analysed cases does show a perfect cooperation. Even in the second one, that seems to illustrate the most efficient way to interact because of the standardised procedures, there are frictions. These are the consequences of isolation and frictions caused by stereotypes generated by the interaction of different armies and the differences in the PD and UA values.

and misunderstandings were based on a clear difference in “*traditions and military regulations*” and on different values of PD and UA. In comparison with the interaction with the Canadians, the contacts with the Norwegians and the Hungarians did not create many problems for the Belgians.

The analysis of the three Case Studies

Those three case studies presented previously illustrate three different facets of the international military cooperation. None of them does show a perfect cooperation. Even in the second one, that seems to illustrate the most efficient way to interact because of the standardised procedures, there are frictions. These are the consequences of isolation and frictions caused by stereotypes generated by the interaction of different armies and the differences in the PD and UA values.

In all the three cases, different operational tasks are distributed between national participating units. Each of them, in case studies a) and c), has its own Area of Responsibility having the task to control the situation, to protect the area against the hostilities and to develop projects together with the civilians and local population. Despite all these aspects, national contingents did not have the same accommodation conditions while the command of the base was mainly performed by a single nation (Case Study A – Germany; Case Study C – Canada). At the military airport in KAIA (Case Study B), each national unit was given a certain functional task. Such a kind of structure is based on the cumulated interdependence, meaning that each unit contributes directly, complementary to the whole. The ways in which those processes are managed differ for each case study. The management entails reciprocal interdependence and adjustment. Only in the “*KAIA case*” there are reciprocal adjustments at the personnel level, in a real international environment, creating thus what can be named a collective esprit de corps. In each of the two operational camps (Warehouse and Camp Julien), only a single country has the command, the personnel problems being thus managed in the national way.

IV. PD, UA and Level of Linguistic Knowledge – Variables Studied in the Theatre of Operations in Afghanistan between 2012 and 2018



The recent research was conducted by the author of the paper in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan between 2012 and 2018. I used the qualitative research method, conducting two case studies in which participative and non-participative observation was employed. In this type of observation, I did not use a grid reference, limiting myself to noting the personnel’s behaviour being in interaction in different situations and registering the results in the observation sheet created for this purpose. I tracked the frequency of the factors determining effects and I developed an instrument for cultural knowledge and harmonisation. In the present paper, only the effects of the variables mentioned in the title are presented. Related to the declaration or non-declaration of the observer status I used both variants, depending on the studied variable and the context of observation.

Case Study No. 1 – Romanian Staff

The observation of the two contingents was conducted over 11 months (July 2016 – May 2017) and started with the identification of the personnel at the beginning of each rotation in the Resolute Support HQs in Kabul, Afghanistan. I collected data about the corps to which they belonged (officers or NCOs), their expertise in multinational missions, the period for which they worked in the Armed Forces, their courses and training, pieces of information that were included in the “*Observation Sheet*” created for this purpose. The subjects had previous military expertise for more than five years, 84% of them having experience in theatres of operations or military international environment (long term courses, missions abroad, multinational exercises etc.), 73% of them being graduates of long-term higher education courses.

The results were presented in a narrative realistic form, grouped in relation to the items observed as follows:

Observation no. 1: the level of expertise and professional competencies as well as the linguistic level is variable between the nations. The most problematic issue of the collaboration inside



The most problematic issue of the collaboration inside the coalition is the unbalanced level of linguistic communication between the military of different nations. Even in the case of the interaction between native English speakers there is the risk of misunderstanding some nuances, risk that is increased proportionally with the percentage of the non-native English-speaking personnel appointed within the chain of command and inside the decision-making process.

the coalition is the unbalanced level of linguistic communication between the military of different nations. Even in the case of the interaction between native English speakers there is the risk of misunderstanding some nuances, risk that is increased proportionally with the percentage of the non-native English-speaking personnel appointed within the chain of command and inside the decision-making process.

To verify the conclusion, we use the following construction: if the level of knowledge in English is not good, then there is a possibility that the information distribution or understanding to be fragmented, resulting in superficially elaborated documents and compromised efficiency of the mission. This type of construction is verified through comparison, achieved as a result of the study of the groups in which the Romanian military take part, interacting with multinational personnel. There is a great difference related to the concepts, a step in which appear variables in linguistic knowledge and professional competence, between the Romanian personnel and the experienced NATO native English speakers, difference generated by the level of knowledge of NATO procedures and the degree of expertise. In exchange, inside the structures in which the same nation is in the majority, those who are in the minority have the tendency to be separated, feeling thus excluded, not used at their own capacity and finally frustrated.

There are two facets of the way non-native speakers are perceived. The first is represented by the fact that expressing themselves less clear and concise, they are perceived as being incapable to fulfil the highest operational tasks. The second facet is represented by the supplementary volume of work the natives will have by taking over the responsibilities of non-native ones. Also, the commander of the structure is in the situation to manage this with diplomacy, being in the position to act urgently, because the decisions in the theatre need a high degree of clarity and they have to be formulated and disseminated efficiently.

Observation no. 2: Power Distance and communication. The individuals that come from cultures with a high value of this item are tempted to use a formal hierarchical way to communicate, in which subordinates will consider that it will be inappropriate to ask questions

and to question the decisions of the leader. The individuals that come from cultures with a low value of the item are tempted to use an informal communication model; they think individually, feeling comfortable to confront the leader's decisions when necessary and fighting for the individual rights. The Turkish military, the Italians, the Albanians avoid, in general terms, the participation in the meetings or have a passive participation because of the difficulties in communicating in English. Informal meetings represent the framework for knowledge and the foundation for communication. The developed subjects are general ones and the basic language enables a primary interaction.

Observation no. 3: Uncertainty Avoidance and communication. This dimension has the following significance: *“When a society feels threatened and unsafe because of uncertain ambiguous situations, it tries to avoid them by ensuring a stable career, establishing formal rules, showing intolerance towards deviant behaviours believing in absolute truth and the supremacy of the expertise”*¹⁵.

A low value of this cultural item is an acceptance of a conflict status, appreciated as being natural and useful. The norms are confused and flexible, the adaptation process to the change being easy. The stress level is low and there is a tendency to assume a certain degree of risk.

The leaders that come from cultures with a high value of this item have the tendency to become very attentive to details and too structured so the creativity of the teams will be cancelled. Leaders will control the situations and will limit the dialogue.

Observation no. 4: the false consensus in communication. In multinational groups there is usually a tendency for the English native speakers to consider that the whole auditorium can understand the message they want to transmit, which is a communication mistake.

Observation no. 5: Power Distance has implications over the interaction between **technology** and multinational operations in a way that the countries in which the value of this item is low have the tendency to offer access to their own technology much easier than those with a higher value of the item. They associate technology to the economic advantage and military authority.

¹⁵ Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work/Related Values*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1980.

Observation no. 6: The membership of different political, social and military systems generates differences in terms of procedures, equipment, and different values for the *Power Distance* dimension, differences that reduce interoperability. The consequence of educating and training the personnel of different nationalities in totalitarian systems (especially in the Eastern European Bloc) or in protracted war zones (Afghanistan) generate the development of a certain type of behaviour called “*adaptive/survival behaviour*”. The consequences of such type of behaviour are: lack of trust between the partners, respect only for the persons and leaders with strong skills, precautions in what is said, functioning in groups that are already “*verified*” or known, wish to fulfil the job description at the minimum level, without initiative, and without making an effort or standing out. This attitude generates frustration at the coalition partners’ level that expect an active and involved participation.

Observation no. 7: The concept of “*Lead Nation*” is the most efficient approach for the aim of the mission in the opinion of the participants in the case study. The validity of this concept is confirmed by both case studies, the one conducted in Kaia Base and that conducted in Mazar al Sharif, Herat. The clear definition of the areas of responsibilities, the single leadership and the set of procedures are the ways to diminish the effects of the cultural differences inside the coalition.

Case Study No. 2¹⁶ - Multinational Structure

Aiming to primarily verify the instrument (“*The Linear Model of knowledge and harmonisation of cultural interaction*”) proposed in the PhD thesis, I decided to conduct, over a 24-month period, the mentioned case study in a multinational structure comprising military and civilian personnel.

This article presents only the observations related to the subject, as follows:

Observation no. 1: The level of linguistic knowledge (English or local)

The national educational system has a great importance in the process of learning the English language. The participation in common

¹⁶ Details are in the Annex to the PhD Thesis, Case Study no. 2, pages 1-236.

multinational missions, courses, the experience in theatres of operations etc. are elements that contribute to enhancing the level of English language knowledge; native English-speaking nations understand and appreciate the non-native efforts in communicating in English and are conscious of the importance of pace and simple speaking in communication. The personal interest stimulates the progress in faster learning foreign languages and increases the level of inter-personal interaction.

Observation no.2: Power Distance—the USA, Great Britain, Germany and Canada are societies in which this item has a low value, individuals coming from those societies being very open to a constructive dialogue, looking for innovative solutions for the problems and agreeing on informal communication channels. They provide information straight to the top, without disdain for somebody else status. The idea about hierarchy is very clear “*everyone is accomplishing a role, temporarily, being paid for it, with the goal of accomplishing the mission of the organisation*”. Romania, Poland, Turkey and Afghanistan have a high level of the value of this item, preferring a strict hierarchy, with a tight control. Individuals coming from this type of societies, inside the groups, avoid asking questions, even if they do not understand the content of the discussed subject. They consider that it is impolite to intervene and “*disturb*”. Information is offered in a formal way and it is considered that it is the responsibility of the leaders in taking decisions, even minor ones. The differences in the *Power Distance* item affect the exchange of information in multinational groups;

There is the probability that a certain type of behaviour or speech of the leader coming from a society with a low value of this item (for example the USA) to be perceived as very arrogant, disrespectful and very critic towards individuals coming from societies with an increased level value of this item (Afghanistan);

Observation no. 3: Tolerance/Intolerance, Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) – In the societies with a high level of this item (Germany, Romania, Turkey, Poland, Afghanistan) the norms are flexible, dissensions and conflicts being accepted as a natural part of life. The differences in this item have effects over operational planning and work in general. Individuals with a low level of UA item (the USA, Great Britain



The significant difference in the value of the Power Distance dimension seriously affects the leader-subordinates relationship, and the difference in the value of the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension has an effect over the whole concept of planning and execution.

and Canada) focus on details in order to avoid, to the possible extent, uncertain situations. A leader that comes from a society with a low level of the UA item is in general one that is innovative; the other is the one that respects the rules. The individuals with a high level of UA item can perceive the others as being slow, obstructive and inefficient. They prefer group cooperation and clear instructions. The risk inside the group in which individuals come from societies with a reduced or an increased value of the *Uncertainty Avoidance* item resides in the different pace at which the planning process and the work are carried out, creating thus different frictions and frustrations.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The main problems encountered in a multinational coalition are represented by the deficit in linguistic knowledge and in NATO procedures knowledge, the trust deficit between the coalition partners as well as the diminished determination and motivation for the mission.

The significant difference in the value of the *Power Distance* dimension seriously affects the leader-subordinates relationship, and the difference in the value of the *Uncertainty Avoidance* dimension has an effect over the whole concept of planning and execution.

Cultural knowledge, common training and availability to efficiently work and interact inside the coalition represent elements that have to be taught during the professional formation process.

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CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE ABILITY OF THE CURRENT FORMAL TRAINING SYSTEM TO DEVELOP THE FUTURE MULTIROLE AIRCRAFT PILOTS NECESSARY COMPETENCIES

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Starting from the experience of the partners in the North Atlantic Alliance related to the impact of the new combat aircraft on the training systems, the present article focuses on the importance for the Romanian Air Force to meet the conditions that are necessary for formal training, so that pilot candidates can rapidly and efficiently adapt to the context created by the procurement of the fifth generation combat aircraft, expected in 2030.

The adaptation to the new requirements related to the students training for the future combat operations entails a documented analysis of the training requirements that are specific to the new aircraft, the identification of the competencies required for the students that will exploit the future combat aircraft, as well as the assessment of the way in which the current system trains students and develops the necessary competencies.

Keywords: skills, formal training, operations, education and training programmes.

INTRODUCTION

The entry into operation of the fifth-generation¹ combat aircraft has produced a major change in institutionalised training and has prompted the Air Forces from NATO member states to reassess the current training system and adapt it to the new requirements. In this context, the *United States Air Force – USAF*, NATO's most important air force and, at the same time, the first entity to have felt the effects of launching the F-22 Raptor, requested the RAND Corporation to assess the capability of the own current training system, consisting of the binomial aircraft-training programmes, to ensure the education and training of pilots to meet the new requirements². The study was finalised after two years of research, and its findings in the final report highlighted the fact that future air operations will lead to a change in the combat pilots training system, but without specifying what performance and capabilities are expected from the school aircraft to support new training requirements. The study proved to be extremely necessary and helped the responsible entity in making well-documented decisions about keeping or replacing institutionalised training programmes or current school aircraft³.

Future air operations will lead to a change in the combat pilots training system.

¹ According to Air Force Magazine, combat aircraft are classified as such:

- 1st Gen : Jet propulsion (F-80, Me 262)
- 2nd Gen : Swept wings; range radar; infrared missiles (F-86, MiG-15)
- 3rd Gen : Supersonic, pulse radar, Beyond-visual-range missiles (Century Series, F-105, F-4, MiG-17, MiG-21)
- 4th Gen: Pulse-doppler radar; high maneuverability; look-down/shoot-down missiles (F-15, F-16, Mirage 2000, MiG-29).
- 4th Gen. +: High agility; sensor fusion; reduced radar signature (Eurofighter Typhoon, Su-30, F/A-18E/F, Rafale)
- 4th Gen. ++: Active electronically scanned arrays; continued reduced signatures or "active" (waveform canceling) stealth technology, supercruise (Su-35, F-15SE)
- 5th Gen.: All-aspect stealth with internal weapons bays, extreme agility, full-sensor fusion, integrated avionics, some or full supercruise (F-22, F-35), see <http://www.capfalcon.net/2012/01/10/us-air-force-the-quest-for-a-sixth-generation-fighter/>, retrieved on 2 June 2019.

² John A. Ausink, Richard S. Marken, Laura Miller, Thomas Manacapilli, William W. Taylor, Michael R. Thirtle, *Assessing the Impact of Future Operations on Trainer Aircraft Requirements*, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, MG-348-AF, 2005, see http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG348.pdf, retrieved on 2 June 2019.

³ *Ibidem*.



Taking into account the experience of NATO partners related to the impact of the new combat aircraft over their training systems, the Romanian Air Force needs to adapt its own institutionalised training system

In response to RAND Corporation’s research, the *Air Education and Training Command – AETC* began its own research study on the functionality of the institutionalised training system, a study later supplemented by an analysis of the present and future requirements it has to meet. The purpose of the analysis was to identify the performance requirements, the training tasks, and the standards pilots should meet to be admitted in the initial qualification programmes for the 4th and 5th generation aircraft.

ASPECTS REGARDING THE COMPETENCIES REQUIRED FOR FUTURE PILOTS OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

Taking into account the experience of NATO partners related to the impact of the new combat aircraft over their training systems, the Romanian Air Force needs to adapt its own institutionalised training system in time so that, with the purchase of the fifth generation fighter aircraft, expected in 2030, pilots will be provided with training appropriate to the actual training requirements, thus facilitating their working on upper generation combat aircraft. In this regard, I consider addressing this issue as necessary for both the present and the future Air Force. Moreover, finding viable solutions prior to the acquisition of new combat aircraft would allow the timely distribution of budget effort, thus avoiding financial pressure greatly exerted on the system in a short period of time. In addition, an early approach to the subject provides the time to identify dysfunctions and to regulate the system effectively.

For example, to complete the annual training requirements for air missions, F-22 pilots must train almost the entire year. However, F-22 pilots do not meet their minimum yearly training requirements for the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and service officials. Moreover, the utilisation of F-22s for exercises and operational missions that do not require the F-22’s unique capabilities interrupt pilot training and lead to reduced proficiency. These restrictions limit the value of the exercises and can result in pilots developing bad habits⁴.

To assess the capacity of the current training system to meet the pilots training needs generated by modern aircraft, it is necessary

⁴ GAO-18-190 Force Structure, F-22 Organization and Utilization Changes Could Improve Aircraft Availability and Pilot Training, Washington, July 2018.



a comparative analysis of the skills that the current system develops in pilots through *Advanced Flight Training – AFT* and *Introduction to Fighting Fundamentals – IFF* and those required for admission to the qualification programme on modern combat aircraft. Lower Teaching Stages, *Selection and Initial Flight Training (Screening and Initial Flight Training – IFT)* and *Basic Flight Training – BFT* are not relevant to this analysis because they are addressed by all pilots and are not influenced by the requirements of combat aircraft. Therefore, the minimum set of skills required to be acquired during the lower stages of training will remain the same for all pilots, and for those who will be oriented to multirole aircraft, the competencies accumulated in the higher stages of training are relevant.

Starting in 2030, the Romanian Air Force intends to acquire the first multirole F-35 combat aircraft and, implicitly, to begin the training of the first series of students who, immediately after completing the introductory phase of the basic tactics (IFF), under the institutionalised training, will access the initial qualification on the F-35A. This first class will be the beginning of the training of Romanian pilots for the fifth-generation combat aircraft, and from that moment on a constant annual increase in the number of pilots will have to be expected on the F-35. These pilots will need some skills to exploit this aircraft, skills that will somehow differ from the skills required for today’s combat pilots. At the same time, the Air Force inventory will move from the fourth generation to the fifth generation of combat aircraft, and budget efforts will be considerable.

Training plans should be designed to determine the skills and competencies a workforce needs to achieve current, emerging, and future missions and to identify gaps – including those that training and development strategies can help address. Periodic reassessments should be part of a continual effort to evaluate and improve the agency’s training and development efforts, and evidence of timely changes should be reflected in those efforts⁵.

Therefore, the current pilots training system, from the selection phase through the institutionalised training stages and to the completion of the IQT initial qualification stage, may need to adapt to the new student preparation requirements for the future air

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⁵ GAO-16-864 Air Force Training, Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve Effectiveness – Accessible Version, Washington, September 2016.



Identifying the minimum set of skills required to complete the course must be done through “inductive logical reasoning”, starting from the minimum skills and competencies required to enter the training course, from the number of flight training missions, from the number of exercises performed using the simulator and the allocated time. To them it is added the combination of new skills necessary for pilots to operate and efficiently use the new equipment and systems introduced on the multirole aircraft.

operations. To this end, it is necessary to have a documented analysis of the training requirements specific to the new aircraft, identifying the type of competencies required for future students to exploit future combat aircraft, and an assessment of how the current system prepares and develops the necessary skills.

As the F-35 specific training programme may be subject to changes according to future aircraft development programmes, we start the research from the existing *F-35 Aircraft Training Programme* and we intend to cover potential future changes. In support of this approach we formulate some hypotheses like the number of flight training missions and their duration will be similar to those for the F-16 aircraft. Based on this hypothesis, there will be a finite number of skills and competencies that a student will have to achieve within the *Initial Qualification Course on the multirole aircraft*. Therefore, identifying the minimum set of skills required to complete the course must be done through “*inductive logical reasoning*”, starting from the minimum skills and competencies required to enter the training course, from the number of flight training missions, from the number of exercises performed using the simulator and the allocated time. To them it is added the combination of new skills necessary for pilots to operate and efficiently use the new equipment and systems introduced on the multirole aircraft.

In order to determine the possible deficiencies in the training system, we compare the minimum set of competencies identified to be required for pilots to be admitted to the Initial Qualification Training course and the set of competencies acquired and certified today, with the completion of the *Introduction to Fighting Fundamentals – IFF* course. To determine how these discrepancies can be eliminated, the present study identified flight safety as the main element of analysis and the effectiveness in conducting combat action as the secondary one. Flight safety has as its primary objective the reduction or avoidance of unacceptable risks as well as the exposure of the pilot student to situations where inherent errors may occur, which may have undesirable major effects.

If a deficiency can be identified as a result of the analysis that could create a flight safety issue, then the way to be solved will be translated into the necessary competency to be acquired before the initial qualification course on the aircraft.

Since the field of development and training of combat pilots is complex and implies a lot of variables, and research work requires good organisation, the basic skills necessary for a pilot to successfully complete the training can be distributed in four major categories, depending on the field addressing them as follows:

- category of skills required for piloting and controlling the aircraft;
- competency category for knowledge, understanding and application of flight principles and regulations;
- the category of competencies required to manage the information on board and make the right decisions;
- competency category specific to combat aircraft pilots.

This systematisation of the database is absolutely necessary, taking into account that the F-35A aircraft Training Development Team has identified over 3,500 individual tasks required to be executed by a pilot along the training programme for obtaining the mission qualification, starting from take-off to the use of night-time weaponry. After simplifying the management of this large amount of data from these four categories of competencies, it is necessary to identify the shortcomings that the current system has in relation to the new training needs.

Knowing the exact number of skills required to obtain each basic skill and the number of repetitions according to the training programme needed to develop a certain skill is not so important, but identifying a certain type of skills and the level of performance required is essential. Therefore, the grouping of competencies in the four categories based on performance standards, corresponding to the areas mentioned above, has proven to be extremely useful and necessary.

To determine the pilots' level of training, the Air Force has standardised the assessment of their performance in techniques of flying, instrument flight, flight performance as an instructor or as an assessor. In all cases, through examinations planned or decided by commanders, the performance of the pilots in the conduct of the missions for which they are qualified is assessed. Also, according to the RAND Corporation study, an important feature of future operations will be the ability of pilots to handle a large amount of information received on board aircraft as well as the ability to interpret them. Competencies in the category dedicated to piloting and controlling the aircraft are the basic skills necessary for any pilot to progress

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in training. For each aircraft, a certain level of training is required for the pilot to exercise control, but the foundation in flight technique is provided by the stages of training on classical school aircraft. In the advanced training phase, the student continues training, but it is focused on the development of other competencies, specific to the combat pilot. Within the IFF, training is polarised on the development of competencies in the “*Competence specific to combat aircraft pilots*” category, as the pilot is already wings awarded and has the competency specific to the category dedicated to piloting and controlling the aircraft, but only to be maintained by training. Finally, we can conclude that the current training system provides the student at the end of the IFF stage with the level of performance needed to address the IQT program for the fourth- and fifth-generation multirole combat aircraft.

Competencies in the category of knowledge, understanding and application of flight principles and regulations, as well as those in the category dedicated to piloting and controlling the aircraft are also well developed by the current training system. The assessment of skills in the knowledge, understanding and enforcement of flight and regulatory principles starts from the first day of the first training phase and continues until the end of the career. Air Force polarises the training provided in each stage or phase on the development of this category of competencies, and aims to the student responsibility in preparing and executing missions as their flight experience will increase. These expectations are much more evident in the case of combat aircraft pilots in solo flight, where the accurate flight execution and situational awareness is the responsibility of only one person, the mission becoming more complex and requiring a high level of performance. To successfully accomplish it, instructors should permanently evaluate and correct pilots’ performance during training, regardless of the phase or stage, thus providing students with the development of basic skills in this category. In conclusion, we can state that, from the point of view of this category of competencies, there is no deficiency in the current training system in relation to the specific requirements of the fourth- and fifth-generation of multirole combat aircraft.

The category of skills required for *Cockpit Resources Management* – CRM and *Decision Making* – DM is one of the those two categories for which students are poorly trained during institutionalised training stages and the assumption of a required level of their performance

after completing basic tactical training and before approaching the initial qualification course on the combat aircraft is little unrealistic in this respect.

Regardless of the aircraft analysed, the pilot, during the flight, is required to receive information and data, process them to make the right decision and to execute the actions accurately. Moreover, the amount of information received on the board of the modern aircraft will be much higher than of any other aircraft in the past, and assessing pilots’ ability to manage this information is very important in training them. CRM includes many more tasks to be performed onboard of combat aircraft and is not limited to information and sensor management, but thanks to the advanced data exchange technology implemented on multirole aircraft, this study focuses on these latest aspects of CRM, in order to highlight the need to develop pilots’ capacity to handle a large amount of information and data onboard during the flight. All these resources provide a wealth of information, and it is imperative that the pilot could manage, interpret and identify their source. Thus, in the case of fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft, the pilot will receive both on-board sensors and data links from terrestrial sources and/or other aircraft in the air. Processing all this information, maintaining aircraft control and monitoring the action environment are complex and difficult tasks that require dedicated training before the aircraft qualifications course begins.

A key component of the management of information and sensors is prioritisation. Prioritisation includes knowing the exact moment of the use of a sensor, weapon, or information that is received at a moment in time. Therefore, this study focuses on the type and amount of information received by a pilot at each stage of training as well as on how well the current training system for modern combat aircraft is prepared from this point of view.

However, the most important deficiency of the training system, prior to commencing training in the combat field, is the level of those specific skills developed for the combat aircraft pilots. First of all, developing these skills, before approaching training, on an airplane with a simple, constructive design is, ultimately, a safety issue. Without an intermediate training programme on a dual command aircraft, students will have to go directly from the school aircraft to a state-of-the-art combat aircraft. The school aircraft has very good



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New combat aircraft benefit from flight control equipment and systems which allow for network flight performance beyond the old aircraft performance and which requires a much less effort from pilots to maintain the aircraft control. Therefore, we appreciate as necessary the analysis of the possibility of eliminating certain training events from the category of competencies dedicated to maintaining the aircraft control as well as the allocation of appropriate resources and time to the categories of competencies for which the deficiencies of the current training system were found.

flight characteristics for the aviation category it belongs to, but the performance and systems on board are far from modern combat aircraft. Obviously, the training system is not able to offer the students the possibility of acclimatising to the manoeuvres performed at high overloads, to provide the training needed to perform refuelling missions in the air or tactical training with new hostile environment survival systems such as the *Distributed Aperture System*⁶, as well as missions for recognition and suppression of enemy ground defence (SEAD). The new fighter aircraft's development programmes are still going on and the new technologies used onboard combat aircraft bring new missions for which students must be trained, leading to a high density of training events to be performed in a time-frame well defined and unmodified in accordance with the new requirements. The consequence of this development is the need to resize the number of events in the training categories already existing in the IQT training programme and to overburden the student by increasing the number of skills that need to be acquired in a short time. That is why the existence of a training system able to provide the necessary preparation for the students from all stages would provide a relaxation of the IQT programme and, implicitly, a resource saving, given the high cost of operating the multirole aircraft.

CONCLUSIONS

As technology advances and its impact on pilots' development and training is becoming more and more enhanced and with immediate effects, I believe that future research studies in this area are absolutely necessary. Taking into account that new combat aircraft benefit from flight control equipment and systems which allow for network flight performance beyond the old aircraft performance and which requires a much less effort from pilots to maintain the aircraft control, we appreciate as necessary the analysis of the possibility of eliminating certain training events from the category of competencies dedicated to maintaining the aircraft control as well as the allocation of appropriate resources and time to the categories of competencies for which the deficiencies of the current training system were found.

⁶ The DAS surrounds the aircraft with a protective sphere of situational awareness. It warns the pilot of incoming aircraft and missile threats as well as providing day/night vision, fire control capability and precision tracking of wingmen/friendly aircraft for tactical maneuvering.



Another solution to mitigate the differences between the institutionalised and the operational training stage is to allocate more solo flight missions as the student gains more confidence in his/her possibilities and manages emotionally better the contact with the combat aircraft.

Moreover, training in the execution of certain tasks, intended to be performed in flight, must be transferred from the aircraft to the simulator. The student must safely execute all manoeuvres in flight, but the introduction of specific CRM elements must be done much earlier in the flight simulator. Simulator training involves a much lower consumption of resources, and the instructor can concentrate, during training, only on the items that are found to be deficient.

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WHY DID THE AXIS LOSE THE SECOND WORLD WAR? A POLITICO-MILITARY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

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Considering the magnitude of forces involved, the expenditures involved and the human and material losses produced, the Second World War has been the largest and most deadly uninterrupted conflagration of human history so far. It was the very first time when a considerable number of new technical breakthroughs including the atomic bomb were widely used against militaries and civilians alike, directly or indirectly, causing the death of over 50 million people, about 3% of the world population of that time¹. War began on 1 September 1939, with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany, and ended six years later with the complete defeat of the Axis Powers – Germany, Japan and Italy – by the Allied Forces – United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union. 'Rivers' of ink have flowed on this subject; a large bibliography has analysed causes and factors that allowed Allies to be victorious in the Second World War but we cannot say the same about the causes that led to the defeat of the Axis powers. 'Vae Victis', as Romans would say, meaning 'Woe to the vanquished ones'.

Keywords: Second World War, Axis Powers, Allied Forces, politico-military perspective, socio-economic perspective.

¹ Martin Gilbert, *Second World War: A Complete History*, p. 1.

INTRODUCTION

In an attempt to answer *why the Axis lost the second world conflagration*, this paper aims to identify some of the possible causes that led to the defeat of Germany, Japan, Italy and their allies. The focus will be on Germany without limiting the research to this country alone. On a summary examination, it appears that Axis powers lost the Second World War due to their politico-military and socio-economic² mistakes; unpardonable strategic errors generated mostly by the arrogance and stubbornness of Axis leaders, poor coordination of military efforts, the effects of the extreme antisocial measures adopted, and lack of proper economic support to war machine led to the defeat of Axis powers. However, these aspects must be thoroughly analysed in conjunction with concepts, theories and analytical tools provided by old and modern scholars, which investigated the "domain" of war.

However, before embarking upon an analysis to identify the reasons that caused the Axis powers to lose the war, it is absolutely necessary to look for the causes that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. At the end of the First World War, no one believed that such a devastating conflict would ever break out again. A very pacifist wind, fuelled by the Wilsonian principles³, was blowing in the diplomatic world: it was believed that a worldwide organisation such as the League of Nations⁴ was enough to impose a well-defined set of international norms meant to preserve peace, and any irrational and aggressive action would of a state would thus be stopped. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Hans J. Morgenthau, when he set out the first principle

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² We have decided to use in our research the associations "politico-military" and "socio-economic" rather than undertaking a distinct politic, military, social and economic analysis given the interdependence and intrinsic relationship considered to exist between the connected terms and the common effects of the actions that involve them.

³ Woodrow Wilson, US President during the First World War. In January 1918 he outlined his own vision regarding the world after the world conflagration, in a 14 points statement, focused on the right to self-determination, democracy and capitalism.

⁴ The League of Nations or the Society of Nations was established on 10 January 1920, after the Paris Peace Conference, that put an end to the First World War.



Animus dominandi, the desire to dominate, dictates the flow of things in human society, according to Morgenthau, and therefore governs international relations, an inherent part of an imperfect world.

of political realism, in his famous work “*Politics among nations*” (1948), namely that “*politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature*”⁵, of course he took into account the conflicting side of the human individual, the permanent inner struggle between his moral impulses and their urge to master, to conquer, and considered that any attempt to impose the rules of inner morality of the individual as international norms was illusory. An advocate for Realpolitik⁶, Morgenthau showed us that war must be read in this key of being aware that there is a permanent struggle between power and peace, and those who do not understand it risk repeating the tragic mistakes of history. *Animus dominandi*, the desire to dominate, dictates the flow of things in human society, according to Morgenthau, and therefore governs international relations, an inherent part of an imperfect world. And considering that the solutions proposed by internationalist liberals, by certain Wilsonian origin – collective security, enforcement of international law –, are seen as utopian, the realists propose the theory of the balance of power as the only successful response to the attempt to preserve peace. Its essence is very simple: when the power of an actor on the international stage increases inadmissibly much, thus threatening the integrity of the other participants of the same “calibre” in the world game, an automatic adjustment system, embodied by alliances, coalitions or any other type of association with the purpose of limiting the aggressor’s influence is set in motion to remove any possibility of global hegemony. Considering that the events of the Second World War unfolded in this exact way, Morgenthau’s territory seems to be confirmed.

Another great international relations theorist, Kenneth Waltz, the father of neo-realism and believer in the theory that the pressure exerted by the structures belonging to the system is what causes chaos and violence, also embraces the theory of the balance of power. “*As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors*

⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni. Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace*, Editura Polirom, 2006, p. 44.

⁶ Realpolitik, political trend according to which it is not morals, ethics and other ideological reasons that govern international politics and diplomacy but given facts and circumstances, as well as pragmatic factors. Key representatives: Carl von Clausewitz, Otto von Bismark, Henry Kissinger.

unbalanced power”⁷, Waltz said. Nothing can be truer. There are countless examples in history when, in the face of an imminent threat, nations that apparently had only conflicting interests agreed to oppose the common aggressor together. This was also the case with the extraordinary mobilisation of forces against Germany, and its allies. Through an extremely aggressive attitude, spread throughout the 12 years of existence of the Third Reich, it resulted in bringing together a coalition of opposing forces that would have been impossible to achieve otherwise. And the moment when Great Britain, the United States and the USSR decided to join forces meant the beginning of the end for the Axis powers.

THE POLITICO-MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

Following the Treaty of Versailles, which regulated the end of World War I, Germany lost a tenth of the population and 13% of the territory, the colonies were confiscated and redistributed by the newly established League of Nations, and the project of unification with Austria was banned⁸. The period of chaos and extreme domestic violence that followed has left deep marks, and on this general background, dominated by a devastating economic crisis, fear, hatred and revenge spirit, it is no wonder that radical nationalism flourished rapidly. On 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany and, in less than two months, he set up a ruthless dictatorship, imposing a law of empowerment⁹ on the Reichstag, by which he captured both the executive and the legislative powers, and the National Socialist Party became the sole leader of the Germany. Hitler’s rise to power resembles somehow to that of Mussolini, which happened 10 years earlier. At first, Hitler’s admiration for the Italian dictator was sincere, which could not be said to work in the opposite direction: Benito Mussolini did not share Hitler’s ideas about the supremacy of the Aryan race, nor did the anti-Semitic politics driven to extreme¹⁰. They would eventually become close only after a series



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⁷ Kenneth Waltz, *The Balance of Power and NATO Expansion*, working paper 5.66, Berkeley University, 1998, p. 2, available at www.u.arizona.edu/~volgy/europe4.

⁸ Richard J. Evans, *Al Treilea Reich*, volumul I, Editura Rao, 2010, pp. 103-104.

⁹ In German, in the abridged version, the law was named *Ermächtigungsgesetz*, the formal title being *Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich*, which means “*Law to remedy the distress of people and Reich*”.

¹⁰ Pavel Moraru, *Relațiile internaționale în anii 1914-1947*, Editura Militară, București, p. 120.

of reciprocal visits. The alliance began to grow with the signing of the collaboration treaty called the Rome-Berlin Axis (25 October 1936)¹¹ and Italy's accession to the Antikomintern¹² Pact, on 6 November 1937. In 1940, the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis was established in Berlin, with a "validity period" of 10 years.



Photo 1: The Signing of the Tripartite Pact¹³

From the politico-military perspective, the Axis lacked common overall objectives ("ends"), viable and affordable strategies ("means") and effective coordination of military efforts ("ways"). The Tripartite Pact signed in Berlin on 27 September 1940 by Adolf Hitler for Germany, Saburō Kurosu for Japan and Galeazzo Ciano for Italy recorded only on paper the establishment of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis.

From the politico-military perspective, the Axis lacked common overall objectives ("ends"), viable and affordable strategies ("means") and effective coordination of military efforts ("ways"). The Tripartite Pact¹⁴ signed in Berlin on 27 September 1940 by Adolf Hitler for Germany, Saburō Kurosu for Japan and Galeazzo Ciano for Italy recorded only on paper the establishment of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. In reality, the alliance concluded among the three countries was separated not only by geographical distances but also by ideological and cultural differences, by divergence of overall objectives and ways to achieve them. Obtaining vital space for the German Aryan race ('Lebensraum') never matched the Italians' desire to restore

¹¹ The document was drafted at the initiative of Italian Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, and was formalised in 1939 through the Pact of Steel (Stahlpakt).

¹² Signed initially between Germany and Japan, on 25 November 1936.

¹³ Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?curid=22411034>

¹⁴ The Tripartite Pact, also the Three-Power Pact, Axis Pact, Three-way Pact or Tripartite Treaty was a pact signed in Berlin, Germany on 27 September 1940, which established the Axis Powers of the Second World War. The pact was signed by representatives of Nazi Germany (Adolf Hitler), Fascist Italy (foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano), and Imperial Japan (Japanese ambassador to Germany Saburō Kurosu). The Tripartite Pact was subsequently joined by Hungary (20 November 1940), Romania (23 November 1940), Slovakia (24 November 1940), Bulgaria (1 March 1941, prior to the arrival of German troops), Yugoslavia (25 March 1941), and Croatia (15 June 1941).

the greatness of the long ago fallen Roman Empire or desperate Japanese rush for resources.

Analysed in terms of war alliances and coalitions, as defined by modern military specialists¹⁵, the Tripartite Pact can be rather considered an agreement for political, military and economic assistance than an alliance or coalition among the three powers, given the fact that each of them acted almost independently for the achievement of their particular goals. Even the "new order" term promoted by the Tripartite Pact did not reflect the idea of commonality, the three powers clearly defining their areas of influence and action – Europe for Germany and Italy and "Greater East Asia" for Japan¹⁶. Furthermore, there was neither consultation in the Axis before triggering hostilities nor real reciprocal assistance during their development. Hitler showed absolutely "no interest in allowing Japan to take part in Barbarossa while Japanese leaders did not even inform him of the impending attack on Pearl Harbour, any more than Mussolini warned Hitler of his attack on Greece, or Hitler told Mussolini of his invasion of Yugoslavia"¹⁷. The Axis powers were disunited not only politically but also militarily, as the strategic errors committed by their Leaders had both political and military impact and eventually rushed the end of the war to their detriment.

None of the three Axis powers possessed a "grand strategy" on the conduct of war, a coherent idea of "distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy", as defined by Liddell Hart and raised to the level of "art"¹⁸. The early victories of the war of each of the three states were individual achievements rather than reflecting a coherent, continuous and uniform vision of war. Germany started the war gloriously and full of promises (for Axis side) but lost it on hand of Hitler and his unforgivable errors. Stalin once considered the Fuhrer as "a very able man" but Hitler was no genius, militarily speaking. He was a "dilettante, interested in small details, and he wanted to hold

¹⁵ Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*, p. 35.

¹⁶ The Tripartite Pact stated that: *Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe* (Article 1) and *Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia* (Article 2).

¹⁷ Andrew Roberts, *The Storm of War: a New History of the Second World War*, p. 588.

¹⁸ Michael Howard, *The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy*, p. 975.

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German military leaders acknowledged that speed was the essence of success, but the idea of rapid war ("blitzkrieg") that worked perfectly in finite and crowded spaces on the Western Front proved ineffective this time in the boundless steppes of Russia. The combination of stubborn resistance of Soviets over an expanded front and extremely bad weather caused Operation Barbarossa to fail.

*everything, stubborn, dour, hold everything to the last*¹⁹. He made impulsive decisions, sometimes with fury or recklessness, sometimes with conceit given by the easy successes achieved in the early war campaigns, which resulted in the loss of millions of lives on both sides. Most probably, anger drove Hitler to order Luftwaffe to attack British cities in response to the bombing of Berlin, but this first mistake "cost" him the chance to put any German boots on English soil. What started as a successful "extensive experiment to test the 'strategic-bombing' theory espoused after World War I by [...] Giulio Douhet"²⁰ ended lamentably by losing the Battle of Britain. While uncalculated decision probably led to the loss of the Battle of Britain, there was definitely conceit when Germany decided to invade Russia and recklessness when it declared war to the United States – two errors which might be considered as crucial for the defeat of the Nazis. Even failing to defeat Great Britain on the Western front, Hitler launched himself in 1941 in a new and dangerous "adventure" against the Soviet Union. Taking into consideration that Germany had suffered devastating consequences because of a two-front war only two decades before, it is inexplicable why Hitler chose to risk the same approach. German military leaders acknowledged that speed was the essence of success, but the idea of rapid war ("blitzkrieg") that worked perfectly in finite and crowded spaces on the Western Front proved ineffective this time in the boundless steppes of Russia. The combination of stubborn resistance of Soviets over an expanded front and extremely bad weather caused Operation Barbarossa to fail. It was not the beginning of the end, but it was definitely the end of the beginning for Germany, its defeat on the Eastern Front terminating the belief that the Nazis were led by a providential and invincible leader. Less than six months later, Germany made another capital mistake, by declaring war against the United States. It is unlikely to consider that President Roosevelt could have got the support of the Congress for starting a war against Germany when he had already asked for a declaration of war against Japan. This would have considerably reduced the US involvement in the European theatre of operations. Although Germany was, at the time, blocked in the war against the British and the Soviets, Hitler did not hesitate to start

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 583.

²⁰ Bevin Alexander: *How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat*, p. 744.

a conflict with a country that was virtually untouchable, especially after the withdrawal of U-boat submarines from the Atlantic Ocean. Either he did not consider the real military potential of the Americans or he believed that a war against Japan would weaken the American power enough not to threaten the European front. The reality proved to be cruel for the Germans and the US involvement in Europe hastened the end of Second World War.

In the first two years of war, the Axis armed forces were able to achieve most of the proposed objectives, especially due to the ingenuity of using strategic surprise and concentration of forces, the aggressiveness showed at tactical level, combining the destructive power of all services in an unprecedented way. In the summer of 1942, however, there was a major deadlock in all theatres of operations, especially in Russia. It can be said, according to most of the researchers who studied the unfolding of the second world conflagration, that due to the wrong strategy implemented at that time at Adolf Hitler's insistence, Germany lost the war beginning with November 1942²¹, with the success of the Red Army's Uranus operation, which disintegrated the Axis forces massed in the Stalingrad area. Concerning the subject of Hitler's involvement in the strategic planning of the German armed forces, French historian Benoit Bihan gives us an unequivocal explanation: "A discussion regarding the German strategy during the Second World War does not make us state that Hitler stayed in the way of the success of a good strategy, but makes us wonder about the resorts that allowed the Fuhrer to attract Germany in a project whose evolution could not have been different from what it was"²².

Beyond the strategic errors of their leaders, the Axis powers lacked cooperation and co-ordination of their military efforts. In the article *Wartime Alliances versus Coalition Warfare*, Patricia A. Wiesman stated that "coalitions and wartime alliances are both subsets of multinational operations" and "any multinational operation requires coordination in command and control and mutual cooperation in ideas and actions". Unbelievably lucky for the Allies, this was not the case in the situation of Axis Powers. The stubbornness and overconfidence

²¹ Benoit Bihan, *Germania a pierdut războiul din cauza lui Hitler*, p. 286, in Jean Lopez, Olivier Wieviorka, *Miturile celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial*, Editura Rao, București, 2017.

²² *Ibid*, p. 287.

In the summer of 1942, however, there was a major deadlock in all theatres of operations, especially in Russia. It can be said, according to most of the researchers who studied the unfolding of the second world conflagration, that due to the wrong strategy implemented at that time at Adolf Hitler's insistence, Germany lost the war beginning with November 1942.



of the Axis leaders determined them to adopt an “individualism” policy for their operations, probably in the idea of not sharing the laurels of their already flawless envisaged victories. A “better military coordination between Berlin, Rome and Tokyo should have ensured the Japanese attacked not the Americans but rather the Russians as soon as Germany was ready”²³. Nevertheless, the socio-economic blunders of the Axis powers “complemented” the politico-military ones.

The socio-economic perspective

Each Axis power lacked a sufficiently strong economy able to support the presumed war effort. Even before the war, in 1938, the Axis powers had, together with the colonies, a GDP lower than that of France, Britain, their colonies, Poland and Czechoslovakia: \$ 750 billion compared to 1024²⁴, without considering China, which was already at war with Japan, and which alone had a GDP higher than the Japanese Empire. Indeed, the gross domestic product does not necessarily represent an indicator of military power, especially in the present case, in which the Axis powers focused their economies on war production years before, but they provide clear indications on the capacity to support the war effort in the long term. After the USSR and the US entered the war (and Finland, Hungary and Romania, on the Axis side), the balance tilted even more towards the Allies, although, at the level of 1942, due to the huge territorial gains of the German and Japanese armed forces, the difference was not huge: the Axis powers (including the occupied territories) had a GDP of 1552 billion dollars, while the Allies had 2069 billion dollars²⁵.

As for war production, the data here are significant. If we consider the production of tanks and self-propelled guns, the difference is huge, 4:1 in favour of the Allies (between 1939 and 1945, they produced over 230,000 units, while the Axis powers only 55,000). As far as combat aircraft are concerned, the situation is similar: the Allies produced over 400,000 aircraft, while the aeronautical industry of the Axis only

²³ Michael Howard, *op. cit.*

²⁴ Mark Harrison, *The economics of World War II: an overview*, p. 21, available at <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.590.924&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 23.

160,000 (the US production alone, of over 190,000 units, exceeded the entire production of the Axis by almost 30%)²⁶.

But perhaps no other indicator could be more relevant to anyone who tried to predict the fate of war, even from the very beginning, than oil: while the Allies had access to 80% of world resources, Germany relied only on the Romanian resources and on the limited capacity to produce synthetic gasoline. As historian Jacques de Launay also noted, after August 1944, when the Romanian armed forces took over the refineries in the Ploiești area, Germany was able to cover only 10-20% of its needs²⁷.

In other words, there was no real correlation between the level of ambition and the available possibilities of the Axis. It was most probably lack of resources in the case of Japan or the undeveloped economy for Italy. Instead, Germany had both economic capacity and resources but it did not know how to use them intelligently. If Germany had not “ad infinitum” delayed the implementation of advanced technologies, it would have been able to counter the attacks of allied forces. Finally, if Germany had used the available human and material resources at their full potential rather than destroying or using them for purposes other than the war, the flow of war would have been probably different. Hitler did not prove to have a sound mind when he “ran” for the Final Solution. Clausewitz’s theory recommends “the use of engagements for the purpose of war”²⁸. Hitler did not do this. The *Final Solution* absorbed most of his attention and used the bulk of resources available to the Third Reich. Beyond the atrocities committed, the extermination of millions of Jews and Gypsies, and the murder of other millions of civilians and prisoners of war, Hitler’s plans “deprived Germany of the labour and mental contributions of potentially valuable workers and took immense amounts of transportation, resources, personnel, and energy badly needed for the war effort”²⁹. Furthermore, the severe economic measures and rationalisations imposed by Nazis on the occupied territories and even on their allies triggered hostile reactions

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 26.

²⁷ Jacques de Launay, *Mari decizii ale celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1988, p. 113.

²⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 177.

²⁹ Michael Howard, *op. cit.*

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from the people of these countries, which subsequently turned against Germany. Nevertheless, the engagement in the war against Soviet Union without adequate logistical support and the declaration of war against the United States – a nation able to produce five times more weapons than Nazi Germany – were not likely to enhance the economic situation of the Axis Powers.

Conclusions

There will never be enough available space to allow an extensive meaning to the causes that led to the defeat of the Axis Powers in the Second World War. There are many who believe that the Axis powers were defeated by the tenacity of United States and Great Britain. Others could give this crucial credit to the Soviet Union. Any of these ideas could be considered viable with adequate support. In our opinion, the Axis lost the war because of the indecisions and blunders of their leaders, the poor coordination of military efforts, the effects produced by the extreme antisocial measures adopted, and the impossibility to ensure proper economic support to the war machine. In this regard, Germany gave us the best examples. However, surprisingly or not, in spite of the Fuhrer's bad decisions, the Germans resisted for six years against a coalition of the most powerful countries in the world. It was most probably the merit of the German troops, who showed remarkable discipline throughout the entire war. But no Army in the world could have carried out the diabolical plans of an inhumane leader, who, from the moment he lost contact with reality, took refuge in an ideological reclusion that proved to be so destructive for the entire planet.

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THE IDENTITY MAP OF RADICALISED YOUTH

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The present paper makes a thorough analysis in the spinning universe of terror, which is governed by a different set of rules, under which societal values are seen as flaws and weaknesses that are against the common goals established by the leaders of extremist movements. The youth feel the need to belong to a social group. By doing this, they are confirming their own view of an ideal identity as being real – they are accepted as a whole, they are not judged and, most importantly, their enemy becomes the groups' enemy. Also, in this paper the authors have used a qualitative analysis of data, based on case studies, to identify the factors that make up the portrait of the radicalised youth identity.

Keywords: youth, identity, radicalised, loyalty, ISIS.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of *identity* is hard to be surprised, but, primarily, it refers to self-defining – a firm and coherent reasoning about who you are, where you are heading and what position you have in society¹. The search for identity – that Eric Erikson² was concerned about in his studies – is a process beginning at the age of adolescence, which continues to intensify more and more during the youth. On the way to adulthood, the individual goes through various stages, conflicts and crises more or less important. Adolescence is the age of building an identity. Adolescence is also the age when there is the risk for the youth to feel that they cannot integrate into a collectivity, which could be the first step on the path to radicalisation.

The present scientific approach starts from the hypothesis that the phenomenon of radicalisation triggers the young people that find difficult to shape an identity. The research presented in the present article is a qualitative one.

The employed research method is the qualitative analysis of data, focusing on the deep analysis of the data and their significance, as well as of the relationship between data through the case study technique. There have been analysed the data of some adolescents, found in other articles and social media posts, to outline a map of radicalised youth.

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION – BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND FAILURE

According to Erikson (1968)³, *identity* is a coherent conception of the self made up of the goals, values, and beliefs to which a person is solidly committed. By choosing an occupation, adopting the values to guide, including shaping a satisfactory sexual identity, young people form their identity. Adolescence is the time when young people

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¹ F. Golu, *Manual de psihologia dezvoltării*, Polirom, Iași, 2015.

² Eric Erikson (1902-1994) – psychologist and pshychanalist, creator of the social development theory of the individual and of the “*identity crisis*” concept.

³ D. E. Papalia, S. W. Olds & R. D. Feldman, *Dezvoltarea umană*, Editura Trei, București, 2010.



look for commitments to which they can remain faithful, building a sense of self-esteem.

Adolescents oscillate between being a child and maturing, are concerned about their future, they live intensely sentimental, but they are unstable in their relations with the opposite sex⁴. At this age, even if they are keen to learn, the effort for knowledge is not a constant one, which leads to superficiality, including in shaping self-sentiment. In the context of trying to shape one's own identity, the teenager is in a permanent conflict with adult models, which he or she does not know whether to adopt or not. He views the values, principles, ideas of society in a critical way, trying to build his own values and ideas, according to his own physical and psychological characteristics. That is why this age stage is characterised by denial and refusal of everything that seems official, formal or outdated.

Those who manage to satisfactorily solve the identity crisis develop their virtue of fidelity⁵, expressed by: sustained loyalty, faith or the feeling of belonging to a loved group or person, but also by identifying with a set of values, an ideology, a religion, a political movement, a creative activity or an ethnic group (Erikson, 1982)⁶. Instead, those who do not acquire a firm, comfortable and sustainable identity result in confusion about what they are. Although young people today spend their time constantly connected to information, technology allows them to access a virtual world, which sometimes leads them to use one or more virtual identities. This freedom in exploring identity comes with risks, one of which is even the blurring of their own role. Failure to acquire identity can also be accentuated by strong pressures from parents, other adults or friends. Finally, such adolescents can deviate from normality by adopting a negative identity.

RADICALISATION – ANSWER TO THE PRESENT INCERTITUDES IN IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

The step towards adult life can be difficult. Sometimes overcoming difficulties finds a response to a phenomenon that is more and more present among young people, a phenomenon that appeals to the feelings of uncertainty experienced by them, and offers simpler,

⁴ F. Golu, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵ D.E. Papalia et al., *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

faster solutions – shortcuts to identifying an identity. Each person has different motivations for accepting radicalisation – conscious or less conscious. Throughout radicalisation, young people receive emotional, moral or even financial support (paid airplane tickets, places where they can stay in the country where they will arrive). Among the vulnerabilities we can enumerate⁷: social non-adaptation, behavioural problems not supported by society, family problems, deaths, lack of self-confidence, involvement in criminal activities.

Currently, the ways in which young people are radicalised are diverse, the Internet being the most widely used terrorist channel to attract the vulnerable people. They offer recruits understanding, attention, and the impression that they are listened when the society rejects them.

There are no religious, racial, political criteria for which an individual is radicalised. The process is simple: identifying vulnerabilities and recruiting itself. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that most of the terrorist campaigns were the result of a process of extremism of already existing religious or political movements.

The research also highlights the fact that a religious or political movement cannot appear or last without the continued psychological activation of at least a lasting sense of common identity (if not more of such feelings) among members, agents and supporters⁸.

Besides all this, Bayb shows that martyrdom (community death) is a reference social construction to which the terrorist community resorts and which gives the act of self-sacrifice to individuals the verdict of legality in order to develop the special status of the martyr⁹.

A principle well known in sociopsychology states that whenever the disputes that the aggressors attribute to their victims increase, the level of violence they use increase. As mentioned above, people who name the terrorist organisations they want to join are considered

⁷ ***Department for Education and Home Office. *How Do People Become Radicalized?*, July 2015, see <https://educateagainsthate.com/parents/how-do-people-become-radicalised/>, retrieved on 20 May 2019.

⁸ B. Klandermans, *Politicized Collective Identity. A Social Psychological Analysis*, 56(4):319-31, 2001, see <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/clipboard>, retrieved on 11 March 2019.

⁹ Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2010. 33:9, pp. 797-814, see DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2010.501423, retrieved on 8 March 2019.



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to be members of the group, which is ready to provide support to others. The support is even greater when the terrorist's reference community has large divergences between it and the objectives of the attack. Despite the fact that Bayb's study¹⁰ clearly confirms that these divergences can rely mainly or exclusively on nationalism or religion, yet other divergences are also considered conflict-provoking, such as divergences in political behaviour or in a particular profession (do not forget that suicide attacks against military officers or senior dignitaries have usually received stronger support than those attacks that have been executed against civilians).

In addition, suicide organisations can try to enlist people who have lost certain family members as a result of combating terrorism. Nevertheless, and despite the existence of such examples of the reversal effects of difficult counter-terrorism operations, in terms of increasing the percentage of suicidal terrorism, we can still find situations where suicidal campaigns have occurred during a period of decline in the occurrence of difficult operations to combat rebellion¹¹.

Studies highlight a positive link between the emergence of the threat and the likelihood of resorting to authoritarian patterns of thinking¹² and the need for strong leaders to diminish the concern that the situation exists, including leaders who adopt authoritarian values. Researchers in the field, such as A.W. Kruglanski and S. Fishman considered the "deep issue" behind the many superficial divergences of terrorist motivations, namely: the endeavour to get a sense and personal importance¹³.

¹⁰ Kai Hafez, *The Myth of Media Globalization*. Polity Press. Cambridge, 2007, see https://books.google.ro/books?id=gbFPAQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Hafiz+2007&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewj_9v9xJniAhXBIVAKHXeCCyEQ6AEIMjAC#v=onepage&q=Hafiz%202007&f=false, retrieved on 10 March 2019.

¹¹ Fran Elejabarrieta, *Social Positioning: a Way to Link Social Identity and Social Representations*, *Social Science Information*, 33, 2, pp.241-253, 2016, see DOI: 10.1177/053901894033002006, retrieved on 8 March 2019.

¹² Arie Kruglanski, Shira Fishman, *The Psychology of Terrorism: "Syndrome" Versus "Tool" Perspectives*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18, 2016, pp. 193-215.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Case study data focused around the age of adolescence. An interesting example is Laura, who joined FARC, leaving her home in a rural area of the Arauca Department¹⁴. She has described her childhood as boring. In spite of the dangers, she perceived, in the clearest way, that joining an armed group gave her more opportunities than she could have ever found in her community. The reason why she was attracted was schooling, at home lacking access to education and training. Interestingly, Laura did not know from the beginning what group she was joining, finding that she was a new member of the FARC only when she arrived to prepare for shooting. She has recognised that her enrollment was not accepted or enthusiastically received by her mother.

Another case of a 13-year-old woman who joined the FARC group is the teenager María Clara¹⁵. In this case, the reason was to run away from a family where she was not loved. María Clara joined the movement after she grew up with her grandmother and served as an informant for FARC. She said, when she was asked, she joined because her grandmother did not want her and because her mother was dead. It often happened that her grandmother beat her and locked her into the house.

Adherence to FARC is described by María Clara as a deliberate, calculated decision¹⁶. FARC was identified by the girl as an escape from hostility, the abuse she regularly suffered, and a way to make dreams come true. Thus, she departed from her apparent fate in poverty by simply joining and began an interesting life in FARC.

Tooba Gondal is a 22-year-old Pakistani woman, born in France and raised in eastern London. She explained exactly what ISIS meant to her in an audio recording. In 2013, two years before going to Syria, she shared the record for those interested on Twitter¹⁷.

¹⁴ Keith Stanski, *Terrorism, Gender, and Ideology: a Case Study of Women Who Join the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)*, see https://www.academia.edu/148962/Terrorism_Gender_and_Ideology_A_Case_Study_of_Women_who_Join_the_Revolutionary_Armed_Forces_of_Colombia_FARC_, retrieved on 20 May 2019.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ Simon Cottee, *Tracking the Online Life of a Female British ISIS Recruiter*, 15 January 2016, see https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/jma4wk/umm-muthanna-al-britania-syria-828, retrieved on 20 May 2019.



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The difficulties in shaping identity have been answered by radicalisation. Tooba smoked at school, had secret lovers and worshiped boy troops, even if all that came from a Muslim practitioner. The girl began to post on Twitter verses in the Qur'an and talk about religion in 2014, and a confession about her identity trail is on her Facebook page.

The case of this woman clearly shows how the difficulties in shaping identity have been answered by radicalisation. Tooba smoked at school, had secret lovers and worshiped boy troops, even if all that came from a Muslim practitioner. The girl began to post on Twitter verses in the Qur'an and talk about religion in 2014, and a confession about her identity trail is on her Facebook page. In the 9th grade she began to *"stray from that path. I started to smoke and it entered my structure until it became an addiction. Then I had fun with the wrong boys and I did all sorts of haram (prohibited) things. But it was not so bad until I went to college. That's where I discovered freedom... I dressed as I wanted and the longer it was, the worse: piercings, not even thinking about what I was doing. I had no haya (modesty), I had no limits"*¹⁸. Tooba chose the ISIS path as a result of the harsh judgment of her behaviour by one of her teachers and under the guidance of a Muslim colleague. Accession to ISIS is a blessing in her view: *"How lost I was until I was blessed and now it all makes sense..."*; *"16 November 2012: The day when Allah guided me to Islam, Alhamdulillah"*¹⁹.

She remembers that her first day of college was difficult, as she was dressed in jilbab *"I received so many glances"*²⁰. *At the time of her change, her best friend removed from her. One of the boys in the group told her it would not last for more than two days, as Tooba remembered. She gave up everything that was haram (prohibited) that day. Tooba had completely absorbed the ISIS ideology by the end of 2014, and alienation from the British society was total.*

She was a carefree girlfriend, more interested in the dating scene than dawah or proselytism, so the case reflects a person's repugnance to who she used to be. For Tooba, it appears that ISIS was a way of escaping the unwanted self.

The case studies are focused on a number of analysis criteria to try to clarify the decisions made by such radical youths. The analysis of the case studies has established that the standard of living is one of the vulnerabilities alongside the existing opportunities and the degree of integration into society. Last but not least, the common vulnerability of all cases is the lack of understanding of one's own self.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Ibidem.



Therefore, there is a psycho-social profile of the young person that tends towards radicalisation. It is characterised by very poor living standards and family problems. It is one of a misunderstood, a socially inappropriate individual, with a problem that is not accepted by the society. In general, such an individual does not have many friends, being isolated from society. He is confused about his own identity, naïve, and does not trust himself. The lack of opportunities to shape a professional role is another vulnerability.

In all cases, difficulties in shaping identity, feelings of uncertainty and searching for shortcuts, quick solutions to identifying an identity are the main characteristics of adolescents. It has been found that during the youth period, this search process is intensified, according to Erikson's theory²¹, which talks about identification.

Therefore, *the study hypothesis has been confirmed, namely that the phenomenon of radicalisation provides answers to the young people experiencing difficulties in shaping their identity.*

CONCLUSIONS

At the same time worrying and encouraging is shaping an identity that finds answers in sectarian and religious values that promote suicidal attacks. Poverty and illiteracy could be important vulnerable factors for recruits at the lower levels of radical organisations, as shown by the analysis of the present research data.

The political objectives of the movement may be secondary to the perceived possibilities of joining a terrorist movement for potential recruits. Some women may consider that terrorist movements offer opportunities that otherwise cannot be achieved, according to the analysis. Also, the difficulties and risks faced by women in civil society may overcome those inherent in adhering to a terrorist movement in some cases.

What should be done among adolescents to combat this phenomenon of radicalisation? Based on early understanding and tolerance on the part of society, as well as on the measures to block attempts to engage with terrorist organisations, in later phases,

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²¹ D.E. Papalia et al., *op. cit.*, p. 67.



Achieving the performance to minimise over-90% recidivism, through individual and group discussions with already radicalised people, Germany is another model that fights for deradicalisation.

in search for solutions, we set out some start-up ideas that help young people.

A good example of this phenomenon is Denmark, which has a Prevention Center belonging to the internal secret service. In this programme, those who enter are deradicalised individuals that can be better identified with young people who are at the threshold of the extreme²².

Achieving the performance to minimise over-90% recidivism, through individual and group discussions with already radicalised people²³, Germany is another model that fights for deradicalisation.

In order to prevent possible radicalisation, it would be preferable to develop prevention programmes and deradicalisation programmes, so the ability of the authorities to react quickly and targeted to the individual concerned would be maximised. Modifying the user content and user behavior algorithm might be a relatively early solution, but it also needs to take into account the impact of the fact that YouTube has more control over the content hosted by the platform.

In this regard, a programme to redirect users can be adopted, for example the *Redirect Method*. A smaller number of views would occur if the videos appearing in the Recommended section highlight the dangers of affiliation with terrorist organisations. In conclusion, the phenomenon of radicalisation in adolescents would dramatically decrease.

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²² Claudia Lascateu, Adelina Medeşan, *Youtube și combaterea radicalizării*, January 2018, see <https://intelligence.sri.ro/youtube-si-combaterea-radicalizarii/>, retrieved on 20 May 2019.

²³ *Ibidem*.

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ASPECTS REGARDING PEACEFUL WAYS OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

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In the current stage of international society development and of international interdependencies increase, for the maintenance of international peace and security through conflict prevention and peaceful dispute resolution, it is necessary to develop new concepts such as "structural prevention" and "early warning", while "regulatory diplomacy" should develop those "soft" procedures that are more flexible and can be employed both within a particular framework and within international organisations. Thus, within the political-diplomatic methods, besides the traditional methods, emerged the alternative ones, generically called "diplomacy of the second rank" or "Track One and a Half Diplomacy".

Keywords: disputes, international matters, conflicts, regional stability, conflict prevention.

Introduction

Over 70 years have passed since the adoption of the *Charter of the United Nations*, and the international community still continues to face "differences" and "situations" in interstate relations that are solved either by peaceful means or by resorting to force.

Unsolved issues between states may be regarded as "disputes", differences of opinion or divergences over some aspects of international relations, or related to the interpretation or application of certain international agreements, and everything that goes beyond this framework and jeopardises peace and international security, as it is stipulated by the provisions of the UN Charter, is considered an "international situation".

It should be mentioned that, from the perspective of the terminology used, related to the peaceful settlement of disputes, the UN Charter refers to "disputes or international situations susceptible to threaten or prejudice peace". Thus, a double distinction is made: *disputes – situations; disputes and internal situations – disputes and international situations*. From the analysis of the UN Charter content, it appears that the term "situation" has a broader meaning: "a state of fact that could lead to international friction or could give rise to a dispute" (Article 34). So, the term "situation" refers to several states because it involves more complex interests and may generate a dispute.

From the point of view of applying the principle of peaceful dispute resolution, in the opinion of many specialists in the field, the distinction *dispute – situation* is not relevant because the notion of *dispute* is sufficiently comprehensive to include everything that can be considered as a *situation*. Instead, it is important to distinguish *international disputes* from *internal disputes*, because their nature determines the procedures that can be used to find peacefully a fair solution.

The international characteristic of disputes, according to some authors, does not consist either in the cross-border dimension or in the fact that it refers to relations between states. It is determined

Unsolved issues between states may be regarded as "disputes", differences of opinion or divergences over some aspects of international relations, or related to the interpretation or application of certain international agreements.



by the legal object of the conflict. Thus, international disputes are those in which the opposing positions of the parties considered to be subjects of international law are based on the provisions of international law.

International Dispute – Internal Dispute Distinction

In other authors' opinion, international disputes are those to which international law rules can be applied¹. It is taken into account that international norms cannot be applied to those matters essentially related to the internal jurisdiction of the states, as also stated in the UN Charter in Article 2 (7): *“Nothing in this Charter will authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which essentially fall within the jurisdiction of a State nor shall it oblige its Members to submit such matters for resolution on the basis of the provisions of this Charter; this principle will in no way affect the application of the coercive measures provided for in Chapter VII”*.

To conclude, starting from the study of international law and international practice, it can be considered that the internationality of the dispute is given by:

- the nature of entities in opposing positions (subjects of international law);
- the subject of the conflict (a right, a claim, an interest in relations governed by the rules of international law);
- the means used to solve conflicts have features specific to international relations.

A state's internal dispute may be subject to peaceful solving procedures governed by international law where its scale and dangers justify third parties (states and/or international organisations) to intervene with a view to finding an acceptable solution for the parties to the dispute so that peace and security are not jeopardised.

When the internal crisis gets serious accents, it must be determined when it threatens regional stability and peace of the world, because it is only from this moment that it can act in the spirit of the principle of peaceful resolution without violating another fundamental principle, that of non-interference in internal affairs of the states. The intervention of a third party (state, international organisation,

¹ D. Popescu, A. Năstase, *Drept internațional public*, revised edition, Casa de editură și presă “Șansa” S.R.L., București, 1997, p. 320; R. Miga-Beșteliu, *Drept internațional. Introducere în dreptul internațional public*, Editural ALL Beck, 2003, p. 325.

international personality etc.) in an internal dispute can only be made when it is concluded that *“the prolongation of the dispute or situation could jeopardise the maintenance of international peace and security”* (UN Charter, Art. 34).

The differences between domestic and international conflicts consist of:

- the moment when the third party deems necessary to intervene in an internal conflict is sometimes far behind the conflict trigger, a delay that sometimes makes the situation out of control and much more difficult to find a way to solve it, as it happened, for example, in the case of the former Yugoslav inter-ethnic conflict of the early 90s;
- the parties of the internal conflict (of ethnic, cultural, religious etc. nature) as they are not subjects of international law, the means that can be used exclude the referral of the case to international courts of general jurisdiction such as the International Court of Justice.

In the current stage of international society development and increasing international interdependencies, it can be said that certain internal conflicts can no longer be considered as taking exclusively the competence of states by virtue of their sovereign entities enjoying a right of non-existence. For example, in the conflict in Kosovo, mediation between Serbian authorities and Kosovo representatives on behalf of the international community was made by the Contact Group.

Unlike the *dispute* which represents a disagreement over the negotiable interests of the states and which, most of the time, does not last long, the *conflict* concerns incompatible interests that relate to the fundamental problems of statehood. The conflict has therefore much deeper roots, so the duration is longer and the final solution is to go up to its roots.

Traditionally, the term international conflict refers to collisions of interests between two or more states with diametrically opposed positions to certain values of national interest (state territory, decolonisation, secession, autonomy, national power, ideological system, international power etc.).

Conflicts are characterised by a longer duration and involve violent actions or tendencies to become violent whose goal is to achieve a unilateral victory. It should be stressed that sometimes an unresolved



dispute or one whose right solution has not been found may degenerate, in time, into conflict. Hence, the importance of resolving disputes as soon as possible in order to avoid an aggravation of the situation.

In international conventions, in the theory of international law and practice, the term crisis is also used, which often addresses issues that affect international peace and security. The crisis is a situation where the most important state values are threatened directly. Most often, the crisis is triggered by territorial disputes, economic boycott, the threat of the political regime etc. In most cases, the crisis involves resorting to force. In order to break out, the perception of the threat of war does not have to be very strong, but it is sufficient to be more qualitatively prominent than in ordinary adversarial relations (than in the case of disputes). On the whole, the international crisis causes the destabilisation of relations between the parties involved and tests the structure of the global international system or of the subsystem.

As in the case of dispute or conflict, the crisis involves a process of interaction between the parties involved, but with a high degree of aggressiveness. The conflict can degenerate into armed actions, but it is characterised by a longer period of time and fluctuations in intensity. The crisis is closer to war than dispute, with armed violence likely to erupt anytime, at the beginning or on the road.

Unlike the other cases where, as a rule, peaceful solutions are used, in the case of international crisis, more often than not, besides such means, the use of force is also employed as a means of stopping hostilities and restoring calm.

Ways to Prevent and Resolve Disputes and Conflicts

The means currently available to the International Conflict Prevention and Dispute Resolution Society are embodied in two broad concepts: the *Structural Prevention Concept* and the *Early Warning Concept*.

The *Structural Prevention concept* was presented as the official policy of the United Nations in 1992 by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the document entitled *Peace Agenda*², which shows that the practice of preventing violence requires a shift from

² See the UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111/17 June 1992, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peacekeeping*, <https://digitalibrary.un.org/record/144858>.

short-term intervention of preventive diplomacy, based on a limited set of diplomatic or military initiatives, towards a more comprehensive approach that includes long-term initiatives addressing the origins of the conflict, namely, the intervention should have a more structural character and include, alongside diplomacy, military operations as well as and the institution of economic construction and development.

The UN Secretary-General's report in 2001 entitled "*The Prevention of Armed Conflict*" stated that an effective preventive strategy implies a "*comprehensive approach that includes both short-term and long-term policy, diplomatic, humanitarian, in the field of human rights, development and institutional matters, as well as other measures taken by the international community in cooperation with the states and regional actors*"³.

The *Early Warning concept*, used as a means of conflict prevention and resolution of international disputes, requires the creation of an international framework allowing for early settlement of conflicts and a settlement taking into account the nature of the conflict, the dynamics and the context in which it has arisen.

In the process of conflict prevention and resolution, *intra-regional integration and communication* can be of particular importance, facilitating dialogue by creating a climate based on shared trust and concern, and at the same time can be the basis for sanctions, thus avoiding the use of force. The *Early Warning System* should be included in the broadest international framework, preferably within the UN system. With a view to timely reporting the risk of a conflict, the United Nations created in 1997 a programme within the *United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)*, the *Southeast European Area Early Warning System*, which aims to democratise and support the transition in South-East Europe through early warning, assisting NGOs and government institutions in regional crisis analysis. The programme includes 7 states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Serbia with Montenegro and Kosovo, Macedonia and Romania), monitoring economic, social and policy indicators to analyse the potential risks of instability and potential national crises.


The nature of intervention must take into account the contextual and cultural factors specific to each case. Third parties may intervene

³ UN Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574, *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005902.pdf>

either through *non-coercive actions*: material and logistical support for the initiation and conduct of negotiations, proposals or guarantees to support possible agreements (especially against the weaker side), advancement of concrete solutions to conflict resolution, strong economic supportive promises of either *coercive nature*: diplomatic pressure with political, economic sanctions, or armed intervention that can decisively change the ratio of forces.

From the analysis of what the phrase “*dispute resolution*” means, there are three fundamental factors that influence the process:

- *the interests of the parties* – are those aspects that each party seeks to achieve (financial, economic, political etc.);
- *the power of the parties* at the international level as a result of the combination of external circumstances (economic-financial development, geographical position, international authority etc.);
- *the rights of the parties* – that are given by the external framework (international norms – conventional or customary – or agreements between the parties).



The three spheres interact, in the process of dispute resolution, and some exchanges can be achieved within certain limits. Both rights and power are the basis of certain interests. Rights grant power, but sometimes, in practice, power confers rights. In the process of solving a dispute, some rights or some aspects of power may be left in favour of meeting a certain interest.

It should be noted, however, that a dispute may become more acute and may be very difficult to solve when the parties focus only on

power and rights. The role of the third party in this situation is to remind those involved that the interests that are based on certain rights are a key component in the effort to find a mutually acceptable solution. This means that the power element should be left on the last phase (a situation that, unfortunately, in practice, does not happen too often).

A long-lasting solution to a conflict requires neither only one of the parties involved to be satisfied, nor should “*the winner takes it all*” be encouraged. Also, in the case of conflicts, after the conflict situation has been resolved, there may be a need to remove the elements underlying the trigger and escalation of the conflict. For example, the removal of leaders as it happened in Yugoslavia where President Slobodan Milošević was brought before the International Court for the former Yugoslavia, being accused, among other things, of crimes against humanity and genocide (the trial was not completed as a result of the late death of the accused on 11.03.2006) or Iraq, where President Saddam Hussein was captured by the US Armed Forces, subjected to the trial of the Iraqi Interim Government Tribunal following which he was sentenced to death and executed on 30.12.2006.

The way to resolve a dispute or conflict is not always easy and straightforward. There are situations in which conditions change and resumed stages that have been passed or peace agreements have been violated and conflicts have re-escalated. For example, in the case of conflicts in Cambodia, Angola, Rwanda, Georgia etc.

Through the multilateral negotiations framework that it offers, and through the in-house decision-making bodies, international organisations, even when they do not directly intervene, influence the attitude of states as well as non-judicial procedures of solving disputes. Thus, the states involved in the dispute no longer have discretionary powers to trigger a particular procedure or find themselves in the uncomfortable situation of not being able to reject a solution decided by the organisation without breaching the obligations incumbent on them as a member of the organisation concerned. We are thus witnessing a serious limitation of the sovereign capacity of the state to which it has agreed by assuming the role of member of that organisation.

Presently, the ways in which international society seeks to provide a peaceful solution to international disputes include:

a) political-diplomatic means which in turn are *traditional (official)*, where we have those that do not involve the intervention

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of a third party (consultations and negotiations) or those involving the intervention of a third party (the good offices, mediation and conciliation) and *alternative political-diplomatic means*, second-level non-formal diplomacy that focuses more on the interaction of negotiated positions than on their content in support of official diplomacy and hybrid diplomacy somewhere halfway between formal and informal diplomacy and which also covers the minuses of traditional diplomacy;

b) jurisdiction means that include arbitration and international justice;

c) the means of the institutional framework provided by international organisations, that can be governmental or non-governmental.

The distinction between the peaceful means of solving disputes is based on the applied standards and on the constraining nature of each of them. Political and diplomatic means are characterised by the absence of the requirement to apply the rule of law by seeking to reconcile conflicting interests, and their results are not of a constraining, mandatory character. They offer the possibility of successive or concurrent formulation of several proposals for solutions and recommendations until the acceptance of one by all the parties involved in the dispute.

As far as the political and diplomatic means are concerned, the judicial means presuppose the placement of the third party “above” and the decision-making capacity to resolve the dispute through the impartial application of international law, decisions which, moreover, become mandatory for the parties.

In the contentious procedure under international law, unlike national law, states enjoy the fundamental right that they should not submit their dispute to jurisdiction unless they so wish and only when all parties to the dispute agree that an arbitral tribunal or court can take jurisdiction over the dispute in question.

Political and diplomatic means are often used in an institutional setting to resolve differences of lesser importance (debates in conflict) or involving major interests. As a rule, in this latter situation, states categorically refuse to use an instrument that leads to practical and mandatory solutions, preferring “soft”, flexible procedures that can be carried out both within a particular framework and within international

organisations. The purpose of these means is to bring the points of view of the parties involved closer together, until a mutually acceptable solution is found.

Traditional diplomacy, because it has often been criticised for the tendency to hinder the process of effectively preventing conflict escalation due to its obligation to distinguish between civil wars, where foreign power is not allowed (based on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs), and international conflicts, in which all states are concerned, have left room for unofficial diplomacy (secondary, of second rank) that continues the official mandate, but in a hidden way, through secret channels or the dialogue of lower level officials.


This second level of diplomacy is more subtle and personal, usually involves actors representing non-governmental organisations acting at the root of the conflict, communication channels and less visible action, having greater movement capacity and being more effective in creating bridges between the parties to the dispute, thus providing additional and parallel means for official diplomacy.

The inconvenience of this kind of diplomacy lies in the fact that the discussions take place in the context of personal relationships, which can oscillate and influence the negotiation process in one way or another, and because it is based on the efforts of some people or NGOs.

Through the roles they fulfil, the two levels of diplomacy appear as two partially overlapping circles that have: common characteristics and responsibilities but different efficiency; similar means but which cannot substitute each other.

Therefore, in addition to the two forms of diplomacy, a new hybrid one appeared, known by specialists as *Track One and a Half*, where the official representatives of the states involved in the dispute give authority to non-state entities to represent the parties, to negotiate and act on their behalf. For example, during the Civil War in Mozambique (1975-1992), the Sant’Egidio Christian community carried out humanitarian activities in conflict zones. The organisation was accepted by the parties involved, namely the Mozambican president and the rebels (the National Mozambican Resistance Movement) as a mediator, along with a representative of the Catholic Church and one of the Italian government. The mediation took place under the United

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Nations supervision, and Sant'Egidio's role proved to be key in signing the 1992 General Peace Agreements in Rome.

Conclusions

All organisations, regardless of their profile (universal or regional, political, military, economic or technical), have a hard word to say in maintaining international peace and security, in building the international community based on interstate relations of cooperation and mutual respect.

Applying the provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the Security Council has a peace-making function through its effective contribution to dispute settlement before escalating to open conflicts with the use of the armed force. In fulfilling this function, its prerogatives are discretionary: The Council may invite the parties to resolve their dispute by one of the peaceful means provided in Article 33⁴, may conduct investigations, regardless of the existence or otherwise of the parties consent (Article 34)⁵, may decide, in more serious cases,

⁴ Based on the provisions of Art. 33, the UN Security Council made, in 1988, early efforts to find a solution for the conflict in Cyprus, the Secretary-General being requested to continue the efforts related to good offices, see S/17483/20.07.1985, S/20330/15.12.1988.

⁵ In the case of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct prompt investigations, following the complaints of Iran that Iraq used chemical and bacteriological weapons, see the Report of the UN Secretary-General S/16433/1984.

whether to recommend the procedures and methods that it considers most appropriate (Article 37) and may make recommendations at the request of all parties to the conflict (Article 38).

Through its recommendations, the Security Council performs good office, mediator or conciliator functions. Sometimes the Council instructs a third party (commission or personality) to perform good offices or mediation services. Often, mediation and good offices are entrusted to the UN Secretary-General or to intergovernmental committees.

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