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in the service of Romania*

2014

Romanian Military Thinking

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Issued in Bucharest on 8 December 1897



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
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Strategic Coherence Artisans

Military command requires, as a prerequisite for success, a process of continuous adaptation to the realities of modern battlefield, an appropriate combination of general theoretical foundations and new concepts and developments in an increasingly complex and unpredictable military environment.

The maintenance of a high level of readiness across the entire military force structure and the possibility to increase the operational capacity in line with the developments in internal and international security environment require proper situational awareness as far as the dynamics is concerned, the readiness process simplification and its correlation with the type of forces and the specifics of missions.

The proper management of the force structure command and control, the fundamental responsibility of the *Operations Directorate* in the General Staff, ensures consistency as far as strategic decisions are concerned. A robust and flexible planning process, able not only to demonstrate the viability of the operations concepts and plans prepared in advance but also to quickly and efficiently adapt to new situations, will promptly address the need to command the Romanian Armed Forces in peacetime, crisis situations, and in wartime.

Component of the General Staff Corps of the United Principalities, established on 12/24 November 1859, and sanctioned by the *High Order of the Day no. 123* on 14/26 December 1859 as *Section 2 – Topographic and Geodetic Works, Tactical and Strategic Operations* – the operations structure has been part of the General Staff functional mechanism throughout its history that began 155 years ago, affirming its role of a vital body having a decisive decisional-operational impact on conducting all military operations and actions of the Romanian Armed Forces. By the quality and timeliness of the specific documents developed, the guidelines for concrete action, and the original solutions to solve strategic and operational situations often difficult and complex, the Operations Directorate has achieved and maintained recognition as a key element in the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff highly effective functioning.

The structure has reconfirmed its role of main pillar by assuming certain exclusively pragmatic tasks and by developing an integrating concept of Romania's defence management. The coordination of training, through complex exercises and drills, as well as the assessment of the commands ability to solve highly complex situations, provides it with the opportunity to materialise the constant concern for maintaining the force structure operational capacity at the optimal level required by an adequate response. The increase in the operational capacity and in the forces capability certainly contributes to strengthening the position of Romania as a reliable partner of NATO, with operational and image benefits that Romania still needs to ensure its own security and assert itself as a factor of regional stability.

The development of studies, hypotheses, and options relating to the Romanian Armed Forces engagement in possible military confrontations provides the personnel of the structure with the opportunity to significantly contribute to the development of Romanian military science. *România Militară* and subsequently *Gândirea militară românească* Journal have in their patrimony the incontestable evidence of the high professionalism of the officers who have manned this structure over time. The ability to properly assess the political and military situations and to provide appropriate solutions has resulted in the acknowledgement of many of them as military leaders with indisputable merits in achieving success on the battlefield. Many of the key figures of the Romanian military elite have had the coveted and envied yet difficult to confirm honour of being operations officers.

Today the Operations Directorate celebrates its 155th anniversary. Throughout this period it has been in service of the Romanian Armed Forces as a structure that considers the Romanian Armed Forces readiness a top priority, preoccupied with providing military decision-makers with the opportunity to appropriately respond to the evolution of the security environment to meet the country political-military interests.

Many Happy Returns!

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

Les artisans de la cohérence stratégique

Le commandement militaire présuppose, comme une condition préalable au succès, un processus de son adaptation incessante aux réalités du champ actuel de bataille, une construction aplanie de fondements théoriques généraux et de nouveaux concepts et évolutions dans un monde militaire de plus en plus complexe et imprédictible.

Le maintien d'un haut niveau d'opérativité de toute la structure des forces militaires et la possibilité du relèvement de la capacité de combat en rapport par les évolutions de l'environnement de sécurité nationale et internationale exigent une perception correcte de la situation opérationnelle et de sa dynamique, la simplification de ce processus de relèvement de la capacité de combat et son corrélation avec le type des forces et par la caractéristique des missions.

Un management approprié du commandement et contrôle de la structure de force, une tâche fondamentale de la *Direction des opérations* de l'Etat-major général, assure l'impératif de la cohérence des décisions au niveau stratégique. Un processus de planification fort et, tout aussi, flexible, en mesure de démontrer la viabilité des conceptions et plans d'opération élaborés en avance, mais aussi de s'adapter rapidement et efficacement à de nouvelles situations, va répondre promptement à la besoin de commandement des forces armées à la paix, en crise ou dans un état de guerre.

La structure d'opérations, composante du Corps d'état major du Principautés unies, créée au 12/24 novembre 1859 et nommée, par le Haut ordre de jour no. 123 de 14/26 décembre 1859, comme la *Section 2 – travaux topographiques et géodésiques, ainsi que les opérations tactiques et stratégiques* –, elle a été partie de l'engin fonctionnelle de l'Etat-major général tout au long de son voyage entrepris il y a 155 ans, en affirmant son rôle d'organe vitale, avec un impact décisionnel-actionnel efficient à mener toutes les opérations et actions militaires de l'Armée Roumaine. Par la qualité et l'opportunité des documents spécifiques élaborées, par les lignes

d'actions concrètes-y tracées et par l'indication des solutions originales pour résoudre de certaines situations stratégiques et opérationnels souvent difficiles et complexes, la *Direction des opérations* a gagné et affirmé son statut d'élément-clé dans le fonctionnement de l'Etat-major général de l'Armée Roumaine à une capacité maximale.

La structure a reconfirmé son rôle de pilier principal par assumer des attributions exclusivement pragmatiques, par élaborer une conception intégratrice à l'égard du commandement de défense de la Roumanie. La coordination de la formation, par des exercices et applications complexes, ainsi que l'évaluation des commandements pour résoudre des situations très complexes, tout lui confère la possibilité de concrétiser la préoccupation permanente de maintenir la capacité opérationnelle de la structure optimale des forces nécessaires pour une réponse adéquate. Elever cette capacité opérationnelle et renforcer les capacités des forces contribuent, sans aucune doute, à consolider le statut de partenaire fiable de l'OTAN, avec d'avantages opérationnels et de l'image que la Roumanie nécessite encore pour assurer sa propre sécurité et son affirmation en tant que facteur de stabilité régionale.

Elaborer des études, des hypothèses et des alternatives d'emploi des forces armées de la Roumanie dans de possibles confrontations militaires fournit au personnel de la structure la potentialité de contribuer d'une manière significative au développement de la science militaire roumaine. La revue *România Militară (La Roumanie Militaire)* et, par la suite, *Gândirea militară românească (La Pensée militaire roumaine)*, détiennent à leur patrimoine les preuves incontestables du grand professionnalisme d'officiers qui ont fait parti, au fil de temps, de cette structure. La capacité d'évaluation pertinente des situations politiques et militaires et le fait d'offrir des solutions adéquates ont forcé beaucoup d'entre eux comme chefs militaires avec des mérites incontestables pour obtenir du succès sur les champs de bataille. De nombreuses personnalités d'élite militaire roumaine sont ennoblis avec ce désirée et enviée, mais en même temps dur à confirmer la noblesse d'officier des opérations.

Aujourd'hui, à la fête de 155 années au service de l'armée roumaine, la *Direction des opérations* est présentée ci-dessous en tant qu'une structure pour laquelle l'état d'efficacité de l'Armée Roumaine demeure la primauté, préoccupée de fournir aux décideurs militaires la possibilité d'une réponse juste à l'évolution de l'environnement courant de sécurité, afin d'accomplir les intérêts politiques et militaires du pays.

Joyeux anniversaire!

***Version française par
Alina PAPOI***

WE, THOSE IN THE FRONT LINE!

Lieutenant General (r.) Alexandru RUS

I start by explaining that the title is not selected at random and it has no connotation or default connection with the organisation of any combat disposition, but it is fully justified by an unbeatable reality, namely that operations structures have always been in the forefront of those who have assumed the major events that have marked the evolution of modern Romanian Armed Forces. Therefore, it is not lack of modesty, a pompous or gratuitous label, but it refers to the origins of the central operations structure, on the one hand, and its place and role in supporting military decisions at strategic level, on the other hand.

Contextually speaking, the motivation of this message is very clear as, on *14 December*, we celebrate *155 years since the establishment of the first operations structure in the Romanian Armed Forces*, 155 years since Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza signed the Order of the Day no. 123 to establish the 2nd Section in the General Staff – a structure highly specialised in the armed forces planning, organisation and management.

Since its establishment, regardless of the name and size of the structure, the Operations Directorate has unconditionally ensured the recognition of its status and importance as a foundation and catalyst for the Great General Staff/Great General Headquarters or the General Staff. In this regard, the Romanian Armed Forces central operations structure has obviously impacted on the most significant moments in the modern military history of Romania, assuming major responsibilities and responding to critical challenges in key moments. To exemplify, we can mention the decisive role played in both planning and conducting military campaigns during the War of Independence and the two World Wars, as well as in the completion of the process of reorganising, modernising and ensuring interoperability of the Romanian Armed Forces, inherent in the context of Romania's NATO and the EU membership.

Lieutenant General (r.) Alexandru Rus – Chief of Operations Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence, between 2009 and 2014.

Apparently, it is rather difficult to explain how it is possible that, in a relatively short period of time, a military structure can literally write history and invariably hold an honourable place in the first echelon. The answer to this dilemma, if indeed one might label a recipe for success as a dilemma, is simple and constant – the human factor –, because only through the devotion, dedication, consistency, professionalism, experience, integrity, sobriety, patience, flexibility in thinking, abnegation and loyalty to the Armed Forces, to the nation and the country, demonstrated by operations officers, the Operations Directorate has had an uninterrupted path and exceptional evolution. On this anniversary occasion, I would like to thank, once again, including this way, my subordinates and collaborators, those who have made things happen, ideas and intentions crystallise and materialise in actions, who have made possible the functioning within parameters of all the operations structures in the Romanian Armed Forces, who, through effort and understanding have supported me to meet the set objectives, to shape and complete the great projects initiated not only by the Directorate but also by other structures belonging to the General Staff or other central structures.

In order to ensure natural continuity and maintain its reputation, based on the traditions set in time, throughout its entire existence, the high standards of training and expertise have been clearly promoted and proliferated in the last five years during which I have had the high honour and great responsibility to lead the Operations Directorate. This anniversary provides the opportunity to review the achievements and accomplishments that have marked a period full of dynamism and challenges.

As it is well known, the centre of gravity of recent years has been the continuation of the active engagement and the affirmation of a credible contribution to the missions and operations, while continuing the transformation and reorganisation of the Romanian Armed Forces. These primary goals, implicit in the context of Romania's participation in the collective defence effort within NATO and in the construction of the European Union military dimension, have been reconfirmed, and the commitments have been invariably translated into deeds, I might even say deeds of arms, considering the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces, sometimes for the first time, in the full spectrum of missions and operations outside the national territory, a good reason for the Romanian military appreciation and recognition among allies and partners.

In consequence, the planning and conduct of joint national exercises – *DACIA 2010*, *BICAZ 2011*, *EFORT ÎNTRUNIT 2012* –, as well as the coordination of the responsible structures and of the forces participating in missions and operations outside the Romanian territory – *IRAQI FREEDOM*, *ISAF*, *ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR*,

KFOR, ALTHEA, UNIFIED PROTECTOR, ATALANTA – have been fundamental missions of the Operations Directorate.

In the past 5 years, since the last anniversary, the Operations Directorate has demonstrated, once again, the status of essential structure, “*crucible*” of the Romanian Armed Forces, through the initiated actions with effect in making strategic decisions, and with major impact on carrying out the Romanian Armed Forces missions.

In this regard, we can briefly review some achievements that are specific to the Operations Directorate areas of responsibility, which have had a real impact at all levels of military art – strategic, operational and tactical – and ensured a comprehensive approach in complex and varied sub-domains:

- two concepts regarding the force structure command and control, consistent with the needs generated by the evolution of the security environment and the accomplishment of the Romanian Armed Forces missions;
- the new Concept of strategic command points disposition, being aimed at ensuring the necessary flexibility for the command-control system reconfiguration at strategic level, in relation to the situation evolution;
- operational plans and assumptions regarding the employment of the Romanian Armed Forces, in allied context, according to the schedule;
- the conceptual review, harmonisation and compliance with the legislative changes in the instructions regarding the Romanian Armed Forces *rules of engagement (ROE)* during the participation in missions and operations;
- manuals and doctrines specific to the operations domain, which have kept pace with and accurately reflected the dynamics of the changes occurred in NATO and the EU;
- the decisive contribution to the development of the “*Multiannual Programme to Restore the Romanian Armed Forces Combat Capability for the Period 2013-2016 and beyond, up to 2022*”;
- inter-ministry cooperation protocols and plans to ensure the joint fulfilment of tasks and responsibilities established by law.

In conclusion, in relation to the recipients of those documents, we can firmly state that thus important political-military decisions have been substantiated and supported at the level of the Ministry of Defence and the Supreme Council of National Defence with major impact on the force structure of the Romanian Armed Forces.

Furthermore, reflecting on my military career, in the light of the experience gained including at the helm of the Operations Directorate, looking to the future, I have synthesised some constants that are absolutely necessary for the military structure

proper functioning, which are valid for the entire military body, of which I wish to emphasise three:

- **institutional and organisational memory**, which is extremely important and can be achieved only by experienced officers transferring knowledge to young officers; it requires a sufficient period of time so the transmission and reception of knowledge can be performed naturally, by overlapping generations in common actions; simply appealing to final documents, electronic equipment or archives is never sufficient as the necessary transfer cannot be achieved; in other words, it is the only way one can avoid repeating past mistakes;
- **teamwork**, which is essential in the development of any project, regardless of complexity, content and targeted effects, workload, time, knowledge and expertise of those having responsibilities and being directly involved in this type of activity; the main effort will be focused on cohesion, increase in morale, improvement in labour and human relations, enhancement of professional and human quality, thus promoting and boosting the sense of initiative.
- **firm command**, which is a basic quality of a good commander, implicitly leaving its mark on the way any structure functions, establishing an appropriate path, irreproachable evolution, without interruptions and without compromising quality, effectiveness, discipline, standards. By commanding firmly, by appreciating and promoting competences, by cultivating mutual respect, a real commander does not represent himself but the structure he commands.

Finally, this anniversary provides me with the opportunity to thank the officers, non-commissioned officers, public servants in the Operations Directorate, and, equally, the personnel in the operations structures in the Romanian Armed Forces for their dedication, professionalism, sacrifices made, sometimes to the detriment of their families, and for the models they are in the military system!

I confess I am proud I have represented, during the past five years, such remarkable people. I wish them good health, happiness and success!

Happy Anniversary to the Operations Directorate!

Happy Anniversary to all the operations structures in the Romanian Armed Forces!

English version by
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE – History and Continuity –

Colonel Dr Sorin PANAIT

In the aftermath of the 1989 revolution, especially in the recent years, the Operations Directorate placed itself on the track of improving and raising the quality of all its activities, in keeping with the reform objectives and the requirements of maintaining itself among the elite structures of the General Staff. The arguments in support of such a conclusion are offered by the positive assessments of certain political and military personalities from Romania and NATO regarding the Operations Directorate staff participating in various refresher courses in the country or abroad, exercises of the Alliance, regarding the planning documents and the implementation tools of Romanian military detachments in foreign missions and the content and quality of the documents of interoperability with NATO member states armed forces.

Keywords: *signalling; modern warfare; manoeuvre; national defence*

The wars as they existed since the beginning of humankind have been the object of planning, in one way or another, by the operations structures, which have developed works and studies regarding the war phenomenon.

The operations structures have represented the central element of a military staff, playing a major role in supporting the leadership of this body in making decisions.

The history of the central military operations structure, from the first organisational entity in the field (the 2nd Section) to its current configuration (Operations Directorate), is one of the most significant chapters of the Romanian Armed Forces history of the last century and a half.

Considering its essential role in preparing the military for war and in leading the operations in campaign, the central operations structure has been given special attention and substantial

support from the part of the superior military leadership, becoming, in time, a benchmark for the Romanian Armed Forces, an elite, professional corps, having the most competent and upright staff officers.

Obviously, the real military value of the central operations body of the Romanian military was shown in the most dramatic events the Romanian nation has gone through in the last 155 years. It is worth mentioning the role of this organisational

Colonel Dr Sorin Panait – the Operations Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

entity in planning and leading the military operations in six campaigns (1877-1878; 1913; 1916; 1917; 1919; 1941), in coordinating at least ten operations, at strategic and strategic-operational level, conducted with tens and hundreds of thousands of people both on the national territory and far from own operational bases.

155 years ago, on 14 December 1859, through the Order of the Day no. 123 (issued on the basis of the High Order of the Day no. 83), signed by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, the first central operations structure (the 2nd Section) of the Romanian military was created, as a component of the General Staff. The creation and functioning of this highly specialised body only one month after the creation of the General Staff, on 12 November 1859, represented a milestone in the process of crystallisation and modernisation of the national military system, a mandatory requirement of the readiness of the young reunited army of the United Principalities.

The missions of the 2nd Section, established by the High Order of the Day no. 83, were:

- conducting topographic-geodesic works for the bearing of the country's map and the other cartography materials, as their absence was hindering a proper training of the officers and the accomplishment of the specific tasks;
- preparing tactic and strategic works (plans) for the troops and the superior military leadership, needed for the training, in order to counter any external aggression;
- conducting specific military training activities: leading marches of the military echelons, organising and conducting manoeuvres;
- establishing and preparing military positions (deployments).

A moment of reference in the organisational evolution of the operations structure was the functioning, starting with 27 April 1877, of a specialised body, for the first time from its establishment, under the name "*Operations Section*". The Operations Section was functioning, together with five other sections, under the General Headquarters.

Romania's military participation in the war, the military successes and failures cannot be understood and appreciated without a reference to the activity of the superior design and leadership body – the Great General Staff, respectively General Headquarters (the wartime organisation form of the Supreme Command). According to the document "*Instructions on the Mobilisation of the Army General Headquarters*", the 6th Operations Bureau was tasked with mobilising the General Headquarters in the night of 14/15 August 1914, except for the General Stage Command and the 4th Echelon.

According to the Order of the Day no. 1 of 15 August 1914, the General Headquarters was created, in two parts: active and sedentary. The active part was structured on four echelons, and the first echelon comprised, along with two other sections, the 1st Operations Section, which consisted of the 1st Operations Bureau and the 2nd Intelligence Bureau.

The stage of the army reorganisation after the end of the 1916 campaign was accompanied by the adoption, on 15 January 1917, of a new organisation of the General Headquarters, which was organised in three echelons. The 1st echelon was divided into three sections as well, but the 1st Operations Section had an increased importance, as it was composed of: the 1st Operations Bureau, the 2nd Intelligence Bureau, the 3rd Organisation Bureau, the Aviation Service (1st) and the TFF (wireless telegraphy) service. Due to the increased volume and complexity of the preparation activities for the military operations to be conducted in the 1917 campaign, the Operations Bureau changed rapidly in terms of personnel, organisation and functions (extension and diversification of competencies). This way it transformed into the most important central body of the General Headquarters, a real laboratory for design, experimentation and application of the principles and rules of the modern warfare, no less than the similar structures of the powerful enemies that the Romanian Army had at the time. According to the commitments assumed with the powers of the Entente, Romania entered the war against the Central Powers at the imperative request of the allies – “*now or never*” – at the moment they imposed, respectively the night 14/27-5/28 August 1916, starting with 21.00 hours. During the next three years of war, Romania’s destiny was mostly identified with the “*uniform*” of the country’s army, going together on a road marked with victories, defeats and heavy sacrifice, but in the end the cornerstone of a historical goal was put to place – the fulfilment of the state unity.

The Operations Section, the fundamental structure of the General Headquarters, directly influenced, through its accomplishments and errors, this road of our military, thus setting a specific print on the physiognomy of the most significant moments of the War for the Country’s Reunification.

In the first years after the end of the First World War, the Operations Section actively engaged, together with the other sections of the Great General Staff, to create a new national military system according to the country’s changed realities (highly varied and lengthy frontiers – 3 400 km), the dynamics of the forces balance in the world and the tendencies of some developed countries’ armies.

The status of the operations structure within the Great General Staff was radically changed after the military adopted the peacetime organisation, in 1920, the “*bureau*” being changed into “*section*”, which was bigger. Therefore, the subdivision “*Operations Section*” that was only present within the General Headquarters, functioning only in war time, would be from then on permanent, as a distinct operations structure in peacetime.

The organisation of the Operations Section between the two wars was dimensioned according to the responsibilities assigned through the internal regulations of the Great General Staff that essentially referred to the development of the campaign plans (own ones and those used within military alliances) together with all the related work and documents. According to the duties and missions assigned, the Operations Section established a “*standard*” organisational structure, which lasted the longest. It comprised four bureaus: 1st Operations Eastern Front Bureau, 2nd Operations Western Front Bureau, 3rd Operations Southern Front Bureau and 4th Defensive Organisation Bureau (Internal Guard/Internal Area).

The number of military personnel in the Operations Section was also relatively constant.

Following the changes occurred, the eastern frontier became again, after September 1939, the most exposed frontier, as the Soviet units moved on to Poland and occupied part of this state, thus increasing the possibility of an imminent aggression of the USSR in Moldova and especially in Basarabia. In the fall of 1940, the Operations Section designed three new plans for the defence of the area.

These plans, materialised in four operational directives, stipulated that the objective of the eastern operations was to defend Moldova and ensure the concentration of our main forces for the counter-offensive.

The operational plans designed by the Operations Section in the spring 1941 also had a defensive character, with the eastern front still considered the most important.

The switch to wartime status was on 21 June 1941. The Great General Staff enacted the General Headquarters, structured on two echelons. The General Headquarters – 1st Echelon, comprising 7 sections, including the 3rd Operations Section, would command the operational troops. The 2nd Echelon would be named, after 2 August 1941, the Great General Staff – the Sedentary Part, with a structure similar to that of the 1st Echelon, but with a doubled number of personnel, dealing with the interior troops.

At the same time with the measures taken by the Great General Staff to diminish the participation of the Romanian troops in the eastern campaign, the 3rd Operations Section created, between 1941 and 1943, plans and action hypotheses to counter a possible aggression from Horthy's Hungary and, at the same time, to be able to start, at the right moment, the liberation of the part of the national territory taken by the Vienna Award. In a study conducted in October 1941 by the specialists of the Operations Section, it was mentioned that the urgency order for the defensive organisation of the country *“will have to give absolute priority to the western front, next to the south and finally to the east”*.

Together with the other sections of the Great General Staff, the Operations Section managed to ensure the unitary and efficient leadership of all the conducted military operations, solving high difficulty and complexity issues, many of which went beyond the classic framework of the military strategy and tactics of the time. Among the solutions adopted by the Operations Section, materialised in strategic leadership documents (the Operational Directive of 23 August 1944 and the Operational Directive of 30 August 1944), we can mention: correctly establishing the priorities (missions); combining the strategic coverage (classic war form) and the *“foyer”* combat (in the localities and on the communications lines); interior directions manoeuvre; maintaining strategic initiative by preceding the actions of the enemy and so on.

Between 12 May 1945 and 1947, the Operations Section from the Great General Staff, despite the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission, which was actively seeking to dismantle and eliminate the Romanian Army and its national specifics, placed in the centre of its concerns the realisation of the new peacetime framework of the military, the edification of a strong, modern military body, capable of defending the country's frontiers and independence. Enlightening in this respect were the steps taken by the Operations Section's officers to draw up a Romanian military doctrine and strategy, right after the end of the war. In a document for the substantiation of the new doctrine project, on 2 August 1945, it was mentioned that the purpose of such a doctrine was to create *“a new army, based on the basic virtues of the Romanian people, representing a real military force, as a result of the lessons learned from the war and the necessities of the future”*.

On 20 October 1946, the Operations Section developed a document named *“Repertory regarding the Issues Concerning the Army in all Areas and our National Defence in the Present and in the Future”*.

At the beginning of 1948, the 3rd Operations Section comprised five bureaus – 1st Operations and Studies; 2nd Internal Order; 3rd Engineering and Communications; 4th Protection of National Defence Interests; 5th Operations Journal. Based on the Ministry Decision no. 1386 of 21 November 1947, the 3rd Operations Section, as the “*body for studies, concepts, doctrines and planning for the Great General Staff*”, had as main mission solving the operational issues in three distinct areas: defending local frontiers, guarding the territory and fighting calamities. Starting with 1949, the 3rd Operations Section transformed into Operations Directorate. Between 1969 and 1999, the Operations Directorate was structured in 4-6 sections (2-3 sections for operations and 2-3 sections for related domains – special operations; guarding special locations; electronic warfare; regulations; psychological operations etc.) and 1-3 independent bureaus (informatics; special; frontier troops etc.), comprising on the average of 120 officers, warrant officers and civilians.

In 1968, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Operations Directorate drew up and submitted for approval a plan with special measures – from 21 August 1968 – to increase readiness and preparations to achieve operational deployment. That applicable operational deployment was conceived and accomplished by the specialists of the Operations Directorate, considering that 16-20 Soviet, Bulgarian and Hungarian Divisions were concentrated or about to be concentrated at the Romanian borders.

After the beginning of the December 1989 Revolution, the Operations Directorate initiated and applied a series of measures that proved to be efficient by considerably reducing the number of victims, despite of a powerful information, psychological and radio-electronic warfare carried out by unknown “*adversaries*”. Out of these measures, we can stress out: establishing an operational group, formed of operations officers, and making it functional in order to coordinate and lead the military actions; properly distributing the missions and forces; accomplishing cooperation among different military services; continuously monitoring the events’ development etc.

Starting from 1990, a series of quality transformations occurred, imposed by the new strategic context. Out of them it is worth mentioning the establishment of the Partnership and Peacekeeping Missions Section – in 1994 and Psychological Actions Section – in 1997. These central subdivisions are compatible with the similar structures of the NATO countries. By their subordination to the Operations Directorate, its structure combined tradition and modernity.

–*Operations Directorate ~ The Military Doctrine an Strategy Melling Pot*–

Being made in charge of dealing, from an operational point of view, with all aspects regarding the defence of Romania's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Operations Directorate prepared and conducted multiple specific actions every training year (studies, programmes, alerts, inspections, regular controls, reconnaissance, training and exercises etc.) in order to increase the readiness of the commands, large military units and units.

After the 1989 Revolution, especially in the latest years, the Operations Directorate has irreversibly followed the road towards perfecting and improving the quality level of its entire activity, in accordance with the objectives of the reform and the requirements for maintaining itself among the elite structure of the General Staff. The arguments to support such a conclusion are given by the positive appreciations from political-military personalities from Romania and NATO towards the Operations Directorate's personnel, during the participation in different courses in the country or abroad, NATO exercises, towards the planning documents and instruments for the implementation of the Romanian military presence in missions abroad, as well as the contents and quality of the documents regarding the interoperability with the NATO member countries armed forces.

Today we are proud of and grateful for the comrades before us who contributed to the accomplishments of this structure, raising the reputation of the operations structure at the level of a real "*pilot-centre*" for designing, experimenting and applying the most modern concepts and ideas in the area of military doctrine and strategy!



CONSIDERATIONS ON SOME TENDENCIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE WAR PHENOMENON

Colonel Dr Gheorghe BADEA

Romania must adapt to the future and build a security system that is suitable to the realities of the new millennium, in a European area of security represented by an environment favourable to protecting and promoting its interests. The multitude of risks and threats to national security and the features of the future war, which becomes increasingly costly, combined with the economic situation of the country, make it difficult for one country to ensure its security by its own means, according to the author.

Romania's security depends on the revival of economic development, including technological advances. The level of production and the diversification of economic branches enable the development of the armed forces procurement and represent a first factor in the increase in the military potential.

Keywords: *Cold War; national interests; military aggressions; economic crisis*

The contemporary society offers us the image of fluid systems, characterised by deep, sometimes surprising changes, which, in order to survive, are restructuring, redefining their interests, reconsidering their laws/relations and principles, creating the image of a global chaos, which in reality operate in an organised manner.

The era of relative stability is now history, and “a new world order is not a fact: it is an aspiration and an opportunity (...) to build a new international system according to the new values and ideals, while old things, considered safe, collapse around us”¹.

The closer we are to a correct analysis of the international environment, the more we notice that it becomes non-linear and “non-linearity means that the act of playing the game has a way of changing the rules”². This “Brownian” motion, inside the global social system, leads to the resettlement of interests and, implicitly, of the forms and means of meeting them, correlated with the changes/mutations

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¹ George Bush, *Foreword, the US National Security Strategy*, see www.cia.org., retrieved on 19.09.2014.

² J. Gleick, *Chaos*, Penguin Books, New York, 1987.

in the technological, social, economic, political and mental fields, because “...the world is open. The one you thought to be thousand kilometres away is now near you meddling in your business... Globalisation... An euphoric gas”³.

The war of the future, being more related to thinking, intelligence and technology, goes beyond its “visible” instrument – the military. Therefore, “in its military, bloody version, classical war has reached its climax”⁴. The future approach presumes taking measures to lower the gap between “soft” and “hard”.

The view on the war of the future entails the development of some daring models in approaching it, the design of new force structures, tailored, trained and equipped to face the new risks and threats. Recent conflicts have shown that the initial military actions are carried out with the forces and assets existing in peacetime.

Because of the mosaic of civilisations and the different perceptions, by international actors, of own interest⁵, in declaration, *the world develops in a relative peace – the “democratic peace” – while vectors/means for carrying out the war are developed*, the scenarios, conceptions and physiognomy of the armed conflict are changed. However, war still remains the single way of solving contradictions and imposing the will, and the supreme force, considering the level of social integration of some systems.

The war of the future will continue to affect collective existence with all derived risks. Its purpose will be reached gradually, military actions following cease-fire stages. It may be carried out in a single stage, intending to trigger the intervention mechanisms of international bodies and to win victory or to impose the will by negotiation.

A global war involving “the core states of the world’s major civilisations is highly improbable but not impossible”⁶. The attitude towards the adversary is based on the political option/attitude of the state and it is materialised in strategic scenarios and strategic/operational hypotheses developed both in peacetime and while conducting the war/armed conflict.

The new technologies, extremely costly, used by military organisations at every level, from the training to the operational and logistic one, cause deep changes in the approach of the future war and produce mutations in the physiognomy of the battlefield and military actions, regarding the organisation of the armed

³ Philippe Labarde, Bernard Maris, *Doamne, ce frumos e războiul economic !*, Editura Antet, București, 2001, p. 42.

⁴ Dumitru Sava, *Războiul celui de-“al treilea val”*, *Gândirea militară românească* no. 2/1999, p. 69.

⁵ The psyche, by each individual’s unique genetic code, allows being misinformed. When we address someone, the assessment errors of the interlocutor add to our own errors and so on. If there are intermediaries between the transmitter and receiver, the original message is substantially modified, with each intermediary.

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor*, Editura Antet, București, 2001, p. 461.

forces, the nature of the missions they have to carry out, and the political objectives that can be reached by the use of the armed force.

The space of future military actions will no longer offer the reality of some well-defined contact lines between the own the adversary forces. Instead we will have the image of a “porous front”⁷ where the combatant forces will be “mixed” and the enemy will be blocked by manoeuvre warfare. The physiognomy of the battlefield will influence not only the engagement but also the command, which will establish the objective and general framework of the conception/decision to execute the mission, the commanders choosing the necessary means.

Time and information will increase in importance, due to technological advances. The battle for and with information will gain more and more ground. The one that wins the battle with time, the one that gets the information in advance will be the one able to dominate the enemy and seize the initiative.

Lately, there are more and more frequent mentions of psychological warfare, electronic warfare, geo-physical warfare, ecological warfare, and more recently, of hybrid war and total war, but, at the same time, of classical war, which, generally, “represents the armed combat between two or more states, between political groups or social classes, in order to meet, by the force of weapons, their political, economic or other goals”⁸.

As it is known, war as a socio-human phenomenon is perceived as destructive and requires the presence of at least two adversaries. By analysing the types of wars above mentioned, it can be considered they do not rely on destructive methods only in order to reach their objectives and they do not even require the existence of two adversaries (e.g. psychological warfare presumes an aggressor and an aggressed, but it is not compulsory for the latter to be the adversary of the first, as it may only seek to determine the other to support certain causes).

The war of the future can be defined as the set of actions conducted in the visible or invisible, perceivable or unperceivable spectrum, between the component elements of the international or internal system (states, social, economical/financial, cultural, religious groups), by employing various forms and means, violent or non-violent, to meet own interests.

The war of the future is supposed to be a conglomerate that changes the balance of the military actions of the armed forces vs. armed forces type in the favour of information, psychological, electronic warfare actions and so on.

⁷ Leliana Niță, *Războiul viitorului și unele tendințe de restructurare a armatelor*, in *Gândirea militară românească* no.1/1999, p.75.

⁸ *Dicționar diplomatic*, Editura Politică, București, 1988, p. 723.

That is why, in order to strictly control the phenomenon, we consider a unitary system has to be created to evaluate and counter the effects and to educate/train the military force, as a specialised body that can intervene more efficiently to face the high number of actions that are possible in the future battlefield.

The war of the future and Romania's security

Romania has to adapt to the future and build an appropriate security system to meet the realities of the beginning of the millennium, in a European security space represented by an environment that favours the promotion and protection of its interests. The high number of risks and threats to the national security and the features of the war of the future, which gets more and more costly, together with the country's economic situation, make difficult to provide security by own means.

Romania's security depends primarily on re-launching the economic development, technological advances included. The level of production and the diversification of the economic branches allow the development of equipment and the procurement in the military, being primary factors to consider related to the increase in the military potential. The economic development determines the level of the military combat capacity by providing the necessary resources for the optimal value and by reducing/eliminating the technological gaps.

In order to assure own security, as the "*rules of the game*" change and a potential war will have a totally different physiognomy and requirements, it is necessary to bring the military to the superior level/state able to discourage through presence or defeat a certain adversary with an equivalent military potential. Also, in peacetime, in order to test our capabilities, certain forces will be required to participate in multinational military exercises, common training, as well as in settling or managing certain crisis situations. These implications suggest two major coordinates: regional accent on the traditional role of our military and a mixed, balanced force, able to accomplish its missions that, at the beginning of the millennium, are bound to be more from the area of crisis situations and low intensity armed conflicts.

For our own security, the future will require more from us and we will have to consider that agility will be very important for our ability to adapt to an extremely dynamic geopolitical and geostrategic environment.

Aggression against national interests – epistemological approach

A new paradigm, the essence of the end of the *Cold War*, came to the fore of nations at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, as well as the hope for a relatively harmonious world, having as main goal to develop economically

and re-launch generous international relationships. The people, at least from this part of Europe, hoped that *“the future would not be dedicated to numerous battles of ideas, but rather to solving modern economical and technical issues”*⁹.

This illusion of harmony caught the states wishing to step on the path of liberalism and open democracy off guard. By practicing for 50 years the responses to military type aggressions, they were surprised and unprepared in the face of the new aggression procedures. The defence against these new procedures did not require an over-sized and heavy armed structure, one trained for a destructive war. The measures for the defence of national interests required a certain type, structure, size and equipment of the force, something that could be attained only in time. The planners and leaders of the new aggression knew it and that is why the offensive was launched in order to seize the initiative and to impose own will, models and standards.

Aggression is based on the will to act, to modify the normal course of events, by remodelling the adversary psychology, especially when the military ways have become excessively costly.

The aggressor considers the aggressed as an enemy and its goal is to destroy the adversary’s will by any means and meet the objectives. It is not a simple threat but a military punishing action. This policy in service of power is more damaging than the one of cannons.

Aggression, as form, is disseminated in the social life, economic, cultural, religious and military domains, acting as a promoter of future and changes, and these sudden changes occurring in people’s lives are overwhelming. In this context, we agree to the idea that *“if we extract a man from his cultural environment and suddenly transpose him in an environment completely different from his, with a different set of rules that he has to respond – different conceptions on time, space, work, love, religion, sex and all the others, if then we take away any hope of returning to a more familiar landscape, his uprooting will be twice heavier”*¹⁰.

Military aggression, in the context of the domains of manifestation of general aggression, can be direct or indirect. Romania can be the target of any of them and, considering the prefigured magnitude and consequences, we will be able to plan the level and force of responses.

The types of aggression, direct or indirect, are usually not distinctly manifested, being expected a complex combination of their use both in the tension period and in the initial period of the open armed conflict. Armed aggression consists in *“the use of the armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial*

⁹ Philippe Labarde, Bernard Maris, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

¹⁰ Alvin Toffler, *Șocul viitorului*, Editura Politică, București, 1973, p. 24.

*integrity or political independence of another state or in any way incompatible with the United Nations Charter*¹¹.

Aggression as a form of manifestation of war is produced, primarily, in the following domains: information, economic-financial – imposing simulated models; cultural – accepting the universal culture and civilisation, in the context of globalisation, to the detriment of national-traditional one; religious – offensive of one denomination over the other; social – promoting the life standard lowering principle, in order to accomplish the transition from a producing society to a consuming society; values – the value fluctuation is rapid, with a focus on universal values over the national ones.

The crisis of the contemporary society is more than a simple economic crisis. Citizens are daily aggressed by presenting negative information, economic-financial tricks that transfer public goods to private persons and by subjecting people to a perpetual “reform” process that has not yet resulted in the increase in life expectancy and life standard.

The aggression phenomenon has a layered development, in line with the structures of manifestation in the society, as follows:

- level I – blocking the rise of the national “*personality*” in a framework of relative prosperity;
- level II – blocking the development of the nation in harmony, within and amongst its different structures;
- level III – the development mechanisms are conditioned and modelled;
- level IV – within the international division of labour it is attempted the transformation of a country’s economy into an agrarian one;
- level V – blocking the access to the course of ideas ordering the global system, through different manipulation strategies, contempt for national values and limitation of the subsistence capacity;
- level VI – blocking or influencing the manifestation of the social ideal only at the subsistence level, the work for survival.

The aggression phenomenon is possible because “*the terms have changed, negotiation and resignation replacing conflict and anger*”¹².

Aggressors have the monopoly on force, based on the legitimacy given by some achievements and the choice of weapons, but the most efficient weapon against aggression is lucidity, since modern war tends to become a set replacing, according to a pre-established finality, the military actions with non-military ones.

¹¹ *Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention on 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts*, see www.crucearosie.ro.

¹² Philippe Labarde, Bernard Maris, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

It is the period of transition, when the disputes in the political-diplomatic, economic-financial, technical-scientific, cultural-spiritual, ecological domains become determinant, bringing to the fore new ways, apparently non-violent, but with deep effects and affecting the whole – blockages, malfunctions, de-structuring, dissolution, even the state failure. The threat of force is no longer the main means; it becomes the reserve, since there are other more alluring means – cultural prestige, life standard, commerce, ideological adhesion etc.

The defence of national interests against any form of aggression can be achieved through measures and actions conducted by political-diplomatic instruments, information and media offensive, promotion of national values, as a sum of individual values, national competition, efficiency of the national economy, citizens' biological safety, accomplishment of the national prosperity, social harmony and social reproduction circle.

The statistics of the last conflicts proves that the outbreak of a military aggression will happen against a background of a quasi-normal state. It is expected that the pre-aggression period will not suspiciously differ from the state of normality. Defence, in this case, will have the character of a *“military response, at a survival level, in the confrontation with a superior adversary and its generalisation only in favourable external political-military circumstances”*¹³.

The defence of the national interests against aggression will be accomplished through the use of a force structure sized according to the predictable and prospective aggression level, prepared to also provide other than military types of response. Success can be achieved only in the context of prosperity of the nation, able to support its own defence effort, including by the use of armed forces.

The context of the contemporary world and the evolution of the war phenomenon require that Romania should take the necessary measures to restructure and modernise its armed forces and, in correlation with this process, to redefine the missions and reconsider the conception of armed forces employment in different stages and levels of the armed combat.

The current priority is to look into the future and stop living in the past and, maybe, even in the present. History has proved harsh to the weak and undecided. The geostrategic and geopolitical context of the future will be the one of power through dynamism, force and intelligence. Only those prepared meet the challenges, while the hesitating and undecided ones lose. Precaution and anticipation represent two factors of the contemporary world reality.

¹³ Constantin Onișor *et al*, *Elemente de artă strategică românească*, Editura Fundația Colegiului Național de Apărare, București, 2001, p. 167.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY THREATS FOR DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS

Colonel Dr Gheorghe BĂJAN

“All the forces in the world are not as powerful as an idea whose time has come”

Victor Hugo

Military implications, in the author's opinion, should be defined based on respecting the requirements specific to the assumed objectives. They provide visibility into what is required in order to change the military vision regarding the Alliance assuming the risks associated with security threats in the next two decades and to establish the operational requirements that must be met by future capabilities in order to counter them. Thus, in the operational planning process, one should consider that the military forces missions will be materialised both by conventional and by unconventional actions, and the objectives sought will be associated with those of actors that are other than the military.

Keywords: *logistic support; C4 network; escalation prevention; the UN; critical infrastructure*

circumstances, once the threats and associated risks are identified, the implications will primarily focus on the operational aspect of planning. The issues related

An overview of the implications of security threats in the early decades of this century requires highlighting the role and purpose of national defence planning process in close correlation, synchronisation and harmonisation with collective defence planning process.

The role of NATO collective defence planning is to provide the Alliance with the forces, assets and capabilities agreed by member states, through individual or joint efforts, to meet the security environment requirements and to ensure stability in NATO area of interest. With regard to its aim, it is to harmonise the specific areas to best meet the agreed requirements, to incorporate the Alliance-led operations forces availability, and to ensure the interface between *force planning* and *operational planning*. Under these

to new types of capabilities and their projection in time and space will be the subject of the forces planning process, which should not be considered as a secondary priority, because many of the associated actions are not only interrelated but also interdependent. The determining aspects that are conditions to be taken into account in establishing the evolutionary trends in the security environment are economic strengthening, imbalance, divergent decisions, ability to govern, access to resources, environment, technology, demographic control and clash of civilisations. Briefly, they are defined as follows:

a. Economic strengthening

The economic aspects integration is the predominant component of globalisation, having direct effects on the political and information areas and presenting the degree to which national and regional economies interact and integrate, although apparently, from the functional point of view, they seem independent.

b. Imbalance

A defining characteristic of international relations is the relative gap between states in terms of living standards and power factors, this situation affecting both economic development and approaches to security issues.

c. Divergent decisions

The decision-making process at international level will be influenced by the power of the state and, consequently, decisions will oscillate between the extreme limits of cooperation and confrontation.

d. Ability to govern

It refers to the ability and skill of state governments to get involved in the power management at international level, which results in well-ordered governments, in states that are effective in establishing global policy, as well as in present or future ungoverned or “*failed*” states.

e. Access to resources

It describes the resource availability and access as well as the degree to which a state can manage own resources, including energy, water and food.

f. Environment

The long-term effects of climate change and natural/man-made disasters on international relations should be taken into account.

g. Technology

The development of technology in all areas of society is possible to result, by 2030, in events with a high degree of uncertainty as far as effects are concerned. They refer not only to the outcomes of the revolution in information technology, biology,

materials, equipment and nanotechnology but also to the diffusion and access to new technology (including weapons of mass destruction).

h. Demographic control

It refers to the trends in the population evolution, considering age, income, ethnicity, migration, urbanisation etc.

i. Clash of civilisations

This determining element presents competition and confrontation based on different values, religions and historical geopolitical perspectives.

Possible scenarios

To establish the military implications, the above-mentioned trends should be associated with *specific scenarios*, which should meet the needs of nations, regardless of geographical position, level of socio-economic development and internal problems faced.

The first scenario, *the most pessimistic one*, is exclusively associated with the way globalisation, economic integration, resource scarcity, climate change, and global values and views significantly affect the state defence capabilities. In this respect, it may be considered that climate change and scarce resources significantly affect the ability of the states that are not included in the “*global world*” to function effectively and provide for the population. Weak and ungoverned states generate instability in their areas and global states choose how to respond. As risk factors the following have been considered: ungoverned states, proliferation of radical ideologies, possible resurgence of ethnic, religious and ideological conflicts, vulnerability of points of strategic interest and of infrastructure in ungoverned areas, potential disputes concerning resource-rich territories that have not been inhabited before, consequences of recurrent environmental disasters, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and uncontrolled migration.

The second scenario assumes a *state of relative stability*, which may include the misleading aspects of stability management related to economic development, population ageing process, low birth rates and migration of young people, aspects that may easily be outside domestic concerns, the state being thus unable to respond to geopolitical risks. Here, it is envisaged that states are interested in the demographic change management, strictly referring to the local population, which is aged or migrating, as well as the fact that the main concerns are social cohesion and transnational issues related to the diaspora. It is also considered that the relative stability will result in mainly directing attention to domestic concerns, and thus states will have a low level of response to geopolitical risks. As risk factors the following may be considered: inability to anticipate the external security environment

and the effects of transnational crime, insufficient attention paid to strategic issues, possible resurgence of ethnic, religious and ideological conflicts, and systematic inability to fast respond to external influences.

The third scenario entails the *disappearance of the desire for progress*, and the impact of modernisation will generate a confrontation between global values and views on culture, urbanisation and technology. It is considered that faith firmly anchored in rationalism, coupled with technological innovation, belonging to a developed society, connected to a global horizontal network may be “*provoked*” from outside by authoritarian, very poor regimes or from neighbouring areas, by states where the balance between civil liberties and oversight capacity of the state system is inefficient. The risk factors that can be considered are: complex computer networks, internal tensions between technological efficiency and civil liberties, increased dependence on constant vital resources, territorial disputes, vulnerability of complex interdependent systems, clash between incompatible belief systems, changing loyalty, alliance of authoritarian states, and possible resurgence of inter-ethnic conflicts.

The fourth scenario envisages the *outcomes of power centres policies*, and it is associated with misunderstandings during decision-making process at international level, regarding the acceptance or rejection of global values and views, nationalism, scarcity of resources, and the low level of integration into the international community. The aspects considered are the general increase in living standards, which has simultaneously resulted in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the development of powerful political actors, among whom deterrent relationships have been established, and the fact that globalisation (through the commercial activities integration and the use of mutually accepted international standards) is undermined by the competition for access to resources and spheres of influence. The risk factors include: competition for ideological supremacy and resources, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ungoverned areas, interstate rivalry, possible alteration of spheres of influence, the international system inability to keep power fluctuations under control.

Even if none of these scenarios are confirmed in the future, they can provide a basis for well-structured discussions regarding the risks and vulnerabilities that could endanger human existence, territorial integrity, or cultural and ideological values.

The following security implications specific to these scenarios and their potential impact on the Alliance may be considered:

- the evolving nature of the threats to the vital interests will be new challenges for the Alliance solidarity and strategic unity, as well as for a common understanding of Article 5 attacks;

- the increasing interaction with non-NATO structures (entities) and other international actors will create opportunities for the Alliance to expand its role in strengthening security and stability outside the traditional areas of engagement;
- potential adversaries will attack the Alliance vulnerabilities in unexpected ways using available technologies, which requires that the Alliance should consider the changes to be imposed in the character of military operations and war;
- the increased interaction with other international actors will enable the Alliance to shape and positively influence the ideas and values that are characteristic to the events in a world that is committed to globalisation;
- the Alliance, having available an agreed process for defence planning and capability development, and the military recommendations generated through analysis, will be able to support strategic decision-makers in the process of assessing policy options and will provide clear guidance for defence planning and capability development processes.

Military implications of threats for defence planning process

Military implications should be defined in compliance with the *intended purpose and specific objectives*. They provide visibility on what is required to change the military vision of the Alliance in assuming the risks associated with security threats in the next two decades and to establish the operational requirements that must be met by future capabilities to counter them. Based on the specified requirements, in the operational planning process should be taken into account the fact that the forces military missions will be materialised *in both conventional and unconventional actions, and their objectives will be associated with those of other than military actors*.

Some of the *most plausible scenarios, threats and associated risks, and types of missions* that will have a high frequency in the foreseeable future, as well as some of the *measures* to be taken to respond effectively to eliminate risks or reduce threat levels are discussed as follows.

a. Support for the efforts to counter proliferation

The state or non-state actors that have demonstrated their ability to create, sell, purchase and use tools and equipment of mass destruction will continue to do so in the future. To these are added the risks that may be posed by a nuclear state unable to secure and protect its equipment.

In order to prevent accidental proliferation of nuclear technology, military action is needed to support the protection and extraction of nuclear elements, inactive equipment included. Also, military action may be necessary to support the provisions of existing international treaties on proliferation and the implementation of resolutions prohibiting proliferation. The Alliance posture towards defence against potential nuclear, biological and chemical threats should be strengthened, including through missile defence capability. To make sense and build synergy in disseminating information, the Alliance should also consider the capabilities of other nations and other international organisations. Moreover, the Alliance should notify the United Nations when there are gaps (maintaining technological advantage and providing technological security are essential) in addressing vulnerabilities (both civilian and military) related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The ability to mitigate the effects of a mass destruction attack should be included in future planning, which should be a combination of prevention and effect management capabilities. The Alliance should support incentive programmes for non-proliferation and combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction by having a permanent strategic dialogue with the public, who should understand the importance of this threat.

b. Opponent deterrence

The events in Ukraine require the revision of the concept of *deterrence* (the trust in the classical form of deterrence is likely to become less effective in an asymmetric security environment, where an author is difficult to identify) to send a single message lacking in ambiguity for all opponents, namely that NATO is capable and proactive and will not allow creating uncertainty in the minds of those that could threaten the Alliance population. In this regard, the purpose of the Alliance is to show that it can maintain its commitment to support international peace and that it can conduct deterrent actions in all areas. The Alliance should establish a clear idea of who and what actions/activities should be deterred. Deterrence at the state level will not be sufficient to prevent the action of the threat source (individuals/groups, non-extremist state actors, organised crime, conflicting powers), which may or may not be affiliated to a state or government. The deployment of NATO troops should be regularly highlighted through exercises and demonstrations, carried out in cooperation with international governmental organisations, whose message should also promote non-kinetic deterrence. It also requires the conduct of real deterrent operations by maintaining credible nuclear and conventional capabilities and enabling a show of force when possible or necessary. Therefore, deterrent capabilities should be maintained and adapted (technologies cannot stagnate) through a coherent defence planning process.

c. Logistical support for humanitarian activities

The state weaknesses become evident in humanitarian situations such as famine, epidemics and massive refugee movement from one area to another, especially in providing food, clothing, shelter and medical care. These conditions may be exacerbated in areas with poor infrastructure and governance, generating violent civil unrest. Military action may be necessary to provide support, including personnel and equipment, and to provide forces control and ensure coordination with other agencies and organisations that are involved. NATO will play an important role in supporting the actors involved in humanitarian management that also interact in the cultural and social field, in this respect the political environment having to provide the technological basis to facilitate the multiple coordination of the different elements involved in the operation.

d. Escalation prevention

Military intervention may be required and conducted to intervene in conflict areas, both domestic and international, in order to prevent the escalation of an armed conflict that is under way, to eliminate or control a humanitarian crisis, an armed conflict and/or genocide. It requires the development of techniques for identifying, planning and execution, to intervene in conflicts moderation in a more robust way. The Alliance, in cooperation with other international organisations (UN, EU etc.) should discern when and how to intervene to prevent the conflict escalation. However, it is very important to assess escalation prevention in terms of ending the conflict. Along with other international organisations, the Alliance will need to have clear criteria (for cases of lack or failure of governments, human rights violations, protection of civilians), which not only justify intervention but also define a clear strategy regarding success. More attention should be paid to defining conflict thresholds and early warning indicators, the success of an intervention being determined by the way they are considered.

e. Training of local “*partisan*” forces

The ability to influence indigenous forces in ensuring the state stability and in providing its security and reconstruction is one of the critical elements for the success of the mission. The ability of the military force to train, equip and cooperate with local forces will provide these operations with increased capacity and legitimacy. Therefore, it is necessary to develop common standards on doctrine, concepts and training indigenous forces. The success of stabilisation will be largely determined by the ability of the “*leader*” to effectively get the support of the “*discontented population*”. The local force training, capability and management will take long to achieve success and, therefore, the Alliance, nations and/or other partners involved, agencies and international organisations,

should develop a common set of standards to ensure a common understanding of what is expected from local forces. It is also necessary a consensus on how to recruit, train and organise local partisan forces for contingencies in order to allow the Alliance to provide local expertise to further reduce the military alliance footprint.

f. Prevention of disturbance in the flow of vital resources

It is well known that the world depends on resources such as oil, water, food and minerals, and that the flow of these materials between point A and point B is vital. Therefore, military presence (air, land or naval) will be necessary in areas where the flow of these vital resources may be compromised as a result of a natural disaster, social instability or sabotage. The Alliance should develop a concept and a legal framework to ensure its ability to respond to threats, to prevent the interruption of the flow of vital resources. The flow interruption could have a devastating effect on the Alliance populations and it is therefore imperative to clearly identify the resources considered to be vital for member nations. The communication and coordination with civil authorities will be essential to maintain/defend the resources and specific infrastructure. Locations and types of resources (including infrastructure) will be key factors in defining those military capabilities that will be required for this purpose.

g. Protection of C4 systems and networks

The significant advances in technology have facilitated not only the increase in the Alliance capabilities but also the enemy ability to attack computer systems and networks worldwide. Military resources (space, air, land and naval) may be necessary to neutralise and/or destroy the communications nodes of the enemy that attempts to disrupt, degrade or damage the related computer systems and communication networks. The Alliance should be able to conduct attacks, when necessary, to paralyse the opponents' communication systems. It should be also able to identify and locate the sources of cyber attacks to build and maintain a database/operational situation awareness on current cyber threats. The Alliance should develop offensive cyber capabilities, real "*cornerstones of NATO cyber deterrence capability*" to prevent an imminent attack or to act effectively to reduce their impact.

h. Protection of critical infrastructure

The threats or actions of state or non-state actors to critical infrastructure could have a devastating effect on the state territorial integrity, government, economy and morale. Military forces will be required to have the ability to lead or support the state efforts to prevent or counteract a physical and non-physical attack on critical infrastructure (e.g. oil or gas pipelines, national financial institutions, religious symbols, health and humanitarian services). The Alliance should develop

a concept and a legal framework for the protection of critical infrastructure (CI) using NATO military forces for its protection. The Alliance should also identify the infrastructure within member states and ensure situational awareness regarding the impact on NATO if one or more of them degrade. Therefore, intelligence services should identify such a threat, protection being successful only through the harmonious cooperation of existing security structures. Given the multidimensional emerging threats in the 21st century, it is unlikely that one nation can respond to an attack on pre-designated NATO infrastructure and, therefore, planning mutual cross-border support becomes a necessity. The protection of the infrastructure deployed on the territory of member states remains a national responsibility. However, a framework for critical infrastructure protection should be developed considering the exchange of information and the mutual support in due time, at the request of a member state. The forces training will play an important role in achieving success in the critical infrastructure maintenance and defence by the Alliance.

i. Support for civil authorities

The Alliance should cooperate with civil authorities (local government and law enforcement agencies) to enable consultation and collaboration planning before and/or during a crisis. Providing adequate support to civil authorities requires that the military should have the ability and capability to go through all three operational phases of an international crisis, from a possible military offensive to creating a safe and secure environment and the transfer of authority to civil authorities. It entails setting up a structure, especially in the diplomatic mission area, or of a centre of excellence to establish the doctrine and the training methods, to be able to conduct/assist future crisis response missions in support of civil society actors. Nations and the Alliance should strengthen and/or cultivate new relationships for a comprehensive approach to the resolutions in crisis management by the government agencies engaged in law enforcement, border protection, and coordination of legal proceedings and public health care in the areas of operation. Moreover, the civilian and humanitarian aspects specific to reconstruction operations should be also considered by military authorities during their planning, which constitutes the *cornerstone of CIMIC concept*. Therefore, we find it necessary to establish regular forums to ensure consultation between military specialists and their civilian counterparts in planning future crisis management actions.

j. Support for humanitarian assistance missions

In response to contingency plans in case of humanitarian assistance, NATO forces could be employed to carry out direct actions at various distances from peace deployment locations. They will be composed of military capabilities

that are mobile, interoperable, sustainable and capable of performing a wide range of missions, and their employment requires strategic air and sea transport capabilities, deployable and interoperable communications and information systems. NATO will have to adapt/develop a doctrine to define military roles (to avoid/reduce national restrictions) in the multinational efforts to respond to humanitarian crises and to implement and understand a global concept to address expeditionary operations. In addition to providing support, military structures should be equipped for fast escalation of conflict situations, being able to ensure both the armed and non-armed protection to maintain a safe environment for the conduct of humanitarian actions.

k. Support for disaster relief

In general, in case of disasters, the main responsibilities lie with civilian actors such as local, regional or national authorities, international and non-governmental organisations. Depending on the situation, when the disaster effects exceed the local response capability, the Alliance may be required to support operations. In this respect, NATO will have to adapt/develop a doctrine to support national efforts in response to natural disasters. The Alliance should be able to support and cooperate with other governments, international and non-governmental organisations during the multinational efforts in response to natural or man-made disasters, and the combination, integration and interaction of military efforts with the diplomatic ones are fundamental to the success of the mission.

l. Protection of communication routes

The military may require the development of expeditionary operations in all areas to ensure free trade, transfer of information, safe transport of goods, and supervision of critical communications routes. The request may include counter-piracy missions or missions to combat the denial of free access to international waters. The command of expeditionary operations should be at the lowest possible level to allow making the necessary decisions to protect communications. The military activity should be concerted with that of the civil authorities and agencies with responsibilities in the field. To anticipate potential threats (in space, cyberspace and traditional fields) exchange of information is essential. Expeditionary operations will require military forces prepared to interact with civil authorities and to understand the interests of local populations. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly identify and define critical communications networks and nodes, adequate policies and public expectations to allow NATO to act when necessary. In the operations preparation should be established the military resources that are necessary to provide essential services (military police, CIMIC, engineering support, medical personnel etc.) as part of military operations.

m. State stabilisation and reconstruction

Military interventions and unconventional military actions in countries with low defence capability will be justified with “moral” arguments that promote universal human values and peace and stability, but they actually address the access to natural resources, protection of trade routes, establishment of military bases or expansion of national influence.

The ultimate goal of stabilisation activities and reconstruction efforts is to create a stable and secure socio-economic environment, which will provide extensive benefits and create prerequisites for applying a determined and consistent policy in combating terrorism, ensuring regional stability and optimal living conditions for the local population.

Stabilisation operations are sometimes more expensive than typical short military campaigns today. Stabilisation operations require well-trained forces and often entail higher risks for the military. Stabilisation and reconstruction costs will far exceed those of conventional military missions. Stabilisation activities materialise in the actions taken by mandated authorities or other civil agencies to maintain the security environment or to return to it, in cooperation with the national local authorities or not. Reconstruction efforts include the provisions on emergency infrastructure, essential government services, reconstruction and aid to prevent or improve the humanitarian emergencies and aim to support the efforts of local people and institutions to establish and resume normal activities, including political, economic, social, technical, legal and environmental activities.

The developments in recent years show that the Alliance has a particular focus on the military activities to support stabilisation activities and reconstruction efforts as part of operations, such as: security sector reform support, including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration; humanitarian aid support operations.

The primary military role in the stabilisation activities and reconstruction efforts is to ensure, together with other actors, the security environment necessary for non-military activities. The forces ability to support stabilisation activities and reconstruction efforts is a capability of any highly trained combat force so no dedicated capabilities are required for this type of activity.

The early engagement of non-military and military capabilities in the activities is an important element in stabilising or maintaining stability in the region and it may prevent worsening or development of a crisis situation. The success of any strategy in this field depends on the ability to establish an effective local security force to be developed through appropriate education and training programmes.

Conclusions

At the beginning of the millennium, the world has entered a new phase of evolution, marked by the coexistence and confrontation of major positive trends with others that generate risks and threats. The old world order based on bipolar logic, characterised by rivalry and mutual annihilation capacity of some states and military-political blocs disappeared, and post-bipolar transition has been completed, while the germs of building a new global security architecture play an increasingly important role in the international community concerns.

Globally, the world continues to be strongly conflicting. Conflict engines operate not only in the field of access to resources, their distribution mechanisms and markets, but also in that of the differences related to civic, ethnic, religious, cultural or ideological identity.

The probability of a large-scale military conflict is reduced, while regional and domestic conflicts may be more common, and their direct or cumulative effects tend to become increasingly difficult to control.

The international security environment is rapidly changing. Some changes are linear and predictable as they stem from the objective development of the security environment or they are the result of strategies and programmes. Others have a surprising, seismic character being marked by strategic discontinuity and accompanied by a significant degree of uncertainty regarding their nature, magnitude and duration.

The proliferation of new risks and threats augments the insecurity of the global environment so that, in the next 10-15 years, the world order will look significantly different, and the new dynamics of international relations favour the Euro-Atlantic community efforts, aimed at building a new international equilibrium, able to ensure the expansion and consolidation of freedom and democracy.

The security environment is characterised mainly by the acceleration of globalisation and regional integration, as well as by the persistence of actions aiming at: state fragmentation, reasonable convergence of efforts to structure a new, stable and predictable, security architecture, accompanied by anarchic tendencies in some regions; renewed efforts by states to preserve their influence in the dynamics of international relations, in parallel with the multiplication of forms and the increased non-state actors involvement in the development of these relations.

In this world, defined as complex, dynamic and conflicting, the main confrontation occurs between fundamentally different values, beliefs and perceptions, between democracy and totalitarianism, being generated by the increasing aggression of international terrorism, stemming from religious extremism, structured in transnational networks, against democratic states and rational political

forces in the states committed to democratisation. The major trends that govern global developments in the foreseeable future generate new risks and challenges to national interests and common values and create legitimate concerns while also provide real opportunities.

Globalisation is the main phenomenon that influences the contemporary security environment, in terms of both new risks and threats genesis and opportunities. In this context, no state can isolate itself or stay neutral, no state is protected and none should remain outside the global processes. International security increasingly tends to manifest its indivisibility and the international community is increasingly aware of the responsibilities incumbent. In principle, globalisation is a real opportunity for economic development able to create prosperity and protect the environment, but this path is not a guaranteed certainty for each country. It depends on the ability of states to constantly exploit such opportunities. Otherwise, countries that do not meet these requirements risk missing the chance to benefit from the positive effects of globalisation.

In the present configuration of global stage, whole regions are affected by tension, instability and conflict, poverty and frustration, which generate or facilitate the proliferation of new risks and threats. They may have a different impact on the security of Romania, due to the fact that in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe persist or increase in intensity various tensions and conflicts caused by old dispute having an ethnic or religious, territorial or separatist character, challenging the existing borders, as well as by transnational crime.

The collapse of communism as a political system and the establishment of democracy, NATO and EU enlargement, open borders, increasing flows of people, goods, services and capital as well as technological development have created favourable conditions for the new democracies to connect to the Euro-Atlantic area of prosperity and security. For Romania, these phenomena, in conjunction with its geopolitical situation, represent important strategic opportunities. They are augmented by: NATO membership, integration in the economic, political, cultural, justice and security area of the EU, the strategic partnership with the US, and the increasing role of the Black Sea Region in Europe's concerns related to energy and security, the high interoperability of security and defence institutions in Romania with similar structures in the member states of NATO and the EU.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE TRANSITION TO AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Major General Dr Dumitru SCARLAT

The International Conference in Tokyo on 21-22 January 2002, dedicated to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, affirms that the international community is willing to participate in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and thus supports the Interim Authority under the leadership of Hamid Karzai. At the conference, the author points out, some donor countries made long- and short-term commitments, so that the aggregate amount was more than \$ 4,5 billion. Moreover, some countries offered support in kind, without specifying a certain monetary value.

Keywords: *human rights; Security Council; UNAMA priorities; capabilities*

1. The role and contribution of the UN in the evolution of the situation in Afghanistan

The United Nations showed increased interest in the fate of Afghanistan even before the events on 11 September 2001. The UN has monitored the situation in Afghanistan and made persistent efforts, using the full range of specific actions, to normalise the domestic situation. Given the gravity of the situation in Afghanistan and emphasising the importance of the UN special representative meeting with the “6 plus 2” Group delegations, on 2 November 2001, the Security Council expressed, two days later¹, the strong support for stabilisation, starting with the establishment of a transitional administration in Afghanistan, consisting of representatives of all ethnic groups, to lead the country following human rights principles. The following priorities were considered: to implement emergency humanitarian assistance, to provide support for refugees, to protect civilian population, to conduct

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¹ Under S.C. *Resolution 1378* (2001).

demining activities, and to develop a long-term programme for social assistance and economic reconstruction.

On 12 November 2001, the “6 plus 2” Group² met in New York under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General, agreeing on basic understanding in choosing the Afghan Government and on continuing the UN humanitarian support for the Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries. On 27 November a conference was held in Islamabad, which was aimed at the reconstruction of Afghanistan, sponsored by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, conference attended by over 300 participants, including from Afghanistan.

Under the aegis of the United Nations and in the presence of the UN Special representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, and other UN and the international community representatives, a meeting of all the Afghan factions’ delegates was held in Bonn, in late November 2001. Following the meeting, on 5 December, an Interim Agreement was adopted, up to the restoration of permanent government institutions, namely the organisation of free elections to appoint a representative government in Afghanistan.

The Bonn Agreement, in whose negotiation the Afghan factions hostile to the Taliban were also present, established some urgent measures to be taken related to the situation in Afghanistan as follows: the formation of an interim administration headed by Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai, the presence of an international peacekeeping mission (ISAF) in and around the capital Kabul, the North Atlantic Alliance withdrawal from the capital, the cooperation with the international community to eliminate drug trafficking and terrorism, the application of the Constitution in 1964, pending the adoption of a new fundamental law³.

In the report presented to the UN General Assembly on 6 December 2001⁴, the Secretary-General reviewed all the actions taken by the UN in 2001 to support Afghanistan in all areas, presented the domestic situation at that particular moment, and appreciated the Bonn Agreement as a great historic moment, establishing exactly what the previous UN resolution required for Afghanistan, namely: the establishment of a transitional administration to provide the legal framework, to ensure the respect for human rights, and, then, to organise presidential and parliamentary elections; the implementation of emergency humanitarian assistance in support of refugees, demining actions, security situation stabilisation; the development of a long-term programme for social protection and economic reconstruction.

² The “6 plus 2” Group consisted of the states in the proximity of Afghanistan: China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, on the one hand, and the USA and Russia, on the other hand.

³ Text of the Bonn Agreement, December 2001.

⁴ The Bonn Agreement, December 2001, Annex II.

The first month of 2002 finds the UN equally concerned about the situation in Afghanistan, so that on 15 January the Security Council lifted the sanctions against Ariana Afghan Airlines, and on 28 January established new sanctions against the Taliban and al Qaeda⁵.

The International Conference held in Tokyo on 21-22 January 2002, dedicated to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, affirms that the international community is willing to participate in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and thus supports the Interim Authority under the leadership of Hamid Karzai. At the conference were announced contributions of over \$ 1,8 billion for 2002. Some donor countries made multiannual commitments for different time intervals, so that the aggregate amount was more than \$ 4,5 billion. Moreover, some countries offered support in kind, without specifying a specific monetary value.

Moreover, on 28 March 2002, the Security Council decided the establishment of the *United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan – UNAMA*⁶ for a period of one year. Initially, *UNAMA* was intended to support the implementation of the measures stipulated by the Bonn Agreement in December 2001. Subsequently, *UNAMA* mandate was extended and revised annually.

UNAMA mandate was focused on two main domains: political affairs and the reconstruction of the country, opening offices throughout the country. Currently, there are 26 UN agencies⁷, which work together with the local government authorities as well as with other international organisations. All UN programmes are intended to support the stability and reconstruction process in Afghanistan, to help the Afghan administration in the exercise of specific functions. The UN Secretary-General Special Representative, who leads *UNAMA*, has responsibility for all UN agencies in the country. *UNAMA* mandate included: national reconciliation; human rights and laws respect; humanitarian activities management; reconstruction, restoration and rehabilitation activities coordination and management, together with the Afghan administration. *UNAMA* priorities include Afghan institutions strengthening and Afghan institutions capability building at all levels, as well as the development of some institutions able to ensure good governance, security and respect for law and order.

The Security Council reiterated its support for the Bonn Agreement and the right of the Afghan people to determine their own political future, also stressing the importance of combating drug trafficking, arms trafficking,

⁵ S.C. Resolution 1388 (2002); S.C. Resolution 1390 (2002).

⁶ S.C. Resolution 1401 (2002).

⁷***, United_Nations_Assistance_Mission_in_Afghanistan, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/>, retrieved on 15.01.2014.

and the danger of minefields in Afghanistan. An important aspect of *UNAMA* political mandate was to support the implementation of the Bonn Agreement political objectives, including traditional Afghan customs and constitutional provisions so that, in 2014, to ensure free elections, which already happened. Other political tasks are peace-building actions, conflict prevention and resolution, national reconciliation, monitoring the political situation and human rights, investigation of situations when human rights are violated, recommending corrective actions, maintenance of a dialogue with Afghan leaders, political parties, civil society groups, central government institutions and representatives, as well as support for good offices when required by the future peace process.

UNAMA contributed greatly to support the electoral process, having nearly 2 000 international observers involved in the process between 2003 and 2004. Moreover, support in transportation, air transportation included, was provided. The mandate of the security forces was extended for the following years, the UN bodies monitoring Afghanistan, the Security Council adopting two resolutions almost every year, to support reconstruction and development in Afghanistan⁸. The UN Security Council Resolution 2096 on 19 March 2013 extended *UNAMA* mandate for another year to continue the transition process in Afghanistan. The mission is mainly focused on supporting, at the request of the Afghan authorities, the organisation of future elections, including the presidential elections in 2014 and provincial elections. Moreover, in the resolution, the Security Council reaffirmed the support for the transition process in Afghanistan, which entails assuming full responsibility by the Afghan institutions in the security sector, in accordance with the decisions made at the international meetings that have taken place in recent years.

Following the Conference in Berlin, in March 2004, the international community made new contribution of billion of dollars in reconstruction and anti-drug campaign. On the last day of the international conference in Berlin, the representatives of seven states – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan signed an agreement that provided for enhancing cooperation between police, intelligence services and customs services to combat drug production and trafficking. Statistical data show that Afghanistan ranks first in the world in terms of the poppy culture, with an area of approximately 80 000 hectares, and the opium production, in 2001 a record of 3 600 tons of opium being reported. The United States showed themselves willing to contribute an amount of \$ 2,2 billion, followed by Japan, with one billion Euros.

⁸ *S.C. Resolutions: 1419 and 1453 (2002); 1471 and 1510 (2003); 1536 and 1563 (2004); 1589 and 1623 (2005).*

Following the Conference in London, in 2006, a new agreement was reached to develop Afghanistan, agreement legalised by the UN Security Council on 15 February 2006⁹, monitored and updated by other two resolutions up to May 2007¹⁰. The Conference in London, on 31 January 2006, intended, practically, to mark the end of the transition period, and to establish future directions for peace building and reconstruction, which was actually expected. However, the subsequent events and the actions of the anti-international community and anti-government elements demonstrated that the basic condition for the conclusion of stabilisation period, namely the country security, had not been fulfilled yet. The London Conference on Afghanistan, the "*Afghanistan Compact*", thus established important measures in the following areas¹¹: security, governance, rule of law, human rights, economic and social development.

In turn, the Security Council twice sent commissions to analyse the situation on the spot, in 2003 and 2006. The results of their actions can be studied in reports S/2003/1074 on 11 November 2003 and S/2006/935 on 4 December 2006.

The evolution of the situation in Afghanistan and the necessity to supplement the international community aid got materialised through the declaration adopted at the International Conference in Paris, on 12 June 2008, co-chaired by Afghanistan, the UN and France, bringing together delegations from 67 countries and regions as well as 17 international organisations. At the conference were reviewed the objectives and modes of action of the donor countries in the Afghanistan Compact adopted at the London Conference in 2006. The Afghan Government presented Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to identify the country development priorities between 2008 and 2013 so that contributing countries could better coordinate and enhance the international aid effectiveness. The key priorities identified at the conference included a broad range of activities aimed at strengthening democracy and governance, investing in infrastructure and private sector, improving the effective measures to reduce corruption, strengthening the measures to counter drug trafficking, observing human rights. Before the conference, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, promised that the United States would provide \$ 10 billion over the next two years, and the World Bank envoy took into account that the institution he represented would provide \$ 1,1 billion in the next five years. Japan also offered \$ 550 million, and the United Kingdom pledged support in Afghanistan reconstruction until 2012-2013, amounting to \$ 1,17 billion.

⁹ S.C. Resolution 1662 (2006).

¹⁰ S.C. Resolution 1707 (2006); S.C. Resolution 1746/23 March 2007.

¹¹ ***, Afghanistan Compact, *Annex I-Benchmarks and Timelines*, 2006.

2010 brings again to the fore the debate on the present and future situation in Afghanistan. In an interview with the British Foreign Secretary on the London Conference in 2010¹², he said that the discussions would focus on three fundamental aspects of such strategy: security, good governance and development, as well as on regional relations.

The participants in the international meeting on Afghanistan held in London¹³ approved President Karzai's objectives related to the reconciliation with the Taliban, the transfer of responsibility in the field of security in the next five years, and the fight against corruption. Following the conference, it was agreed on the following strategies to be implemented and developed¹⁴:

- increase in the number of NATO US troops in Afghanistan;
- it is expected that the number of Afghan military and police forces trained by the allied forces to deal with conflict situations can reach 300 000;
- NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan to ensure the growth and training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF);
- Afghanistan to assume the responsibility for local administration, to take military responsibility in three to five years, and to make efforts to promote the rights of women who, up to the fall of the Taliban regime, were totally deprived of human rights;
- EUPOL (EU Police Mission) committed to monitoring, training and advising the Ministry of Interior and to supporting, financially and logistically, at provincial and national level, the Afghan reform led by the police;
- the Afghan Government committed to developing and implementing a national security strategy with the International Community Support;
- Afghanistan has to implement a reconciliation and reintegration programme for the insurgents who want to give up arms and earn a living respecting the Afghan Constitution, named "*Peace and Reintegration Programme*";
- creation of jobs, of which 12 000 in local administration, so that state services can be available and reintegration can be possible. Hillary Clinton declared that the USA and NATO would monitor the economic development and especially the integration of women in all the areas of economic development;

¹² ***, Interview with the British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, 27.01.2010, in Gândul.Info., <http://www.gandul.info/international/conferinta-la-londra-astazi-pentru-afganistanul-de-maine-5451358>, retrieved on 16.01.2014.

¹³ The London Conference on Afghanistan, 2010.

¹⁴ The text of the *London Conference*, January 2010, see Hotnews.ro, 29 January 2010, retrieved on 20.01.2014.

- the international community aid through the *Reintegration Trust Fund* to fund the “*Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme*”;
- alignment of the laws in Afghanistan, including the Criminal Code, up the UN Convention against corruption.

The international conference in Kabul, in July 2010, was attended by over 60 foreign ministers and heads of international organisations, including the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, and the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. In the conference final declaration, it is stated that the Afghan security forces should be able to provide their own the security in some areas of the country in 2010, and to coordinate security in all the provinces of the country by the end of 2014. The conference intended to give the signal for the recovery of Afghanistan. In his inaugural address, President Hamid Karzai referred to the enormous mineral resources of the country, estimated at trillion dollars, which could fund the recovery, as well as to the strategic position of the country in the centre of the so-called *New Silk Road*. The Kabul Declaration Conference stated the Afghan authorities commitment to undertaking a series of reforms regarding: combating corruption; establishing a national judicial system to replace the tribal justice system; protecting women rights in a patriarchal society; extending road and energy infrastructure. The advisor to President Karzai¹⁵ said that: *there is no better solution than trying to democratise the state, under Afghan leadership, though recognising that Afghanistan would not succeed without the financial aid it receives from the international community.*

The participants in the conference stated that NATO and the US troops intended to continue their mission in Afghanistan for another ten-fifteen years, hoping to be less engaged in combat and more engaged in training, logistics and intelligence. However, until the post-conflict state, the allied forces decided to reduce insurgence from province to province, ensuring that, once control obtained, no region can fall into the hands of terrorists. The most important point of the document referred to the Afghan authorities intention to initiate peace talks with the Taliban. Since the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan has met many of the criteria that characterise a “*failed state*”. Barack Obama, the President of the USA, stated that: “... *the conference is a major progress for the future of Afghanistan*”, insisting on the fact that the US strategy in Afghanistan was “*the good one*”, while David Cameron, the Prime Minister of the UK, stated that “...*real progress has been made in Afghanistan*”¹⁶.

¹⁵ Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Advisor to President Hamid Karzai, 2010, see <http://www.afghan-web.com/bios/spanta.html>, retrieved on 30 March 2014.

¹⁶ David Cameron, Prime Minister of the UK, cited by AFP Agerpress, 20 July 2010, retrieved on 19.02.2014.

2. The International Security Assistance Force

The Afghan opposition leaders who attended the Bonn Conference (December 2001) started the country reconstruction process by establishing a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional Authority. Also in Bonn was launched the concept according to which a UN force having an international mandate could support the newly established Transitional Authority led by Hamid Karzai, to provide a safe environment in and around Kabul and to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. These agreements opened the path to the establishment of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, *UNAMA* and *ISAF*.

Under the UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001, in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, thus ratifying the Bonn Agreement on 5 December 2001, which called for the UN to mandate a security force to act in Kabul and its vicinity, the *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)* was established.

On 11 August 2003, NATO¹⁷ took the command of *ISAF* operation, thus marking the conclusion of *ISAF* mission national command 6-month rotations. NATO thus became responsible for the force command, coordination and planning, including the appointment of a field commander in Afghanistan. This new organisation resolved the problem of continuous search for a new nation to take the mission command and the difficulties related to the establishment of a new headquarters every six months, in a difficult and complex environment. The new organisation of the forces command from NATO headquarters thus allowed for the small countries to play an important part in the operation.

ISAF mandate was initially¹⁸ limited to ensuring security in and around the capital Kabul. In October 2003, the United Nations Organisation extended *ISAF* mandate¹⁹ paving the way for the mission expansion throughout the country. *ISAF* mission expansion throughout the country was achieved gradually, in four stages, based on well-designed plans, being closely related to the development of *Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)* acting throughout Afghanistan.

On 31 December 2003, the military component of Kunduz PRT was placed under *ISAF* command, in a pilot project, being the first step in expanding the mission. This process was completed on 1 October 2004, marking the end of the first phase of *ISAF* expansion. *ISAF* area of operations thus covered 3 600 km² in the North, having the mission to influence security in nine Northern provinces.

¹⁷ ***, www.isaf.nato.int/history.htm, retrieved on 17.01.2014.

¹⁸ The Bonn Conference, December 2001.

¹⁹ *S.C. Resolution 1510*.

On 10 February 2005, NATO announced that *ISAF* would expand in Western Afghanistan, marking the start of the second phase of the mission expansion. This process began on 31 May 2006, the moment when *ISAF* took the command of two PRTs in Herat and Farah provinces, as well as of a forward support base (a logistic base) in Herat. In early September, two further *ISAF*-led PRTs in the West became operational, one in Chaghcharan (the capital of Ghor province) and one in Qala-e-NAW (the capital of Baghdis province), marking the completion of *ISAF* expansion westward. After the *ISAF* mission expansion, it was a total of nine PRTs in the North and the West, providing security assistance in 50% of Afghanistan's territory. The Alliance continued to make preparations to further expand in Southern Afghanistan.

On 8 December 2005, at the meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels, the Allied foreign ministers approved a plan that paved the way for an expanded role of *ISAF* presence in Afghanistan. The first element of this plan was the expansion of *ISAF* southward in 2006, known as *Stage 3*. It was implemented on 31 July 2006 when the *ISAF* took the command in the southern region of Afghanistan from the US-led coalition forces, the area of operations thus covering other six provinces – Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan and Zabul – and four additional PRTs. *ISAF*, thus extended, led a total of 13 PRTs, in the North, West and South, covering three quarters of the territory of Afghanistan. The number of *ISAF* forces present in Afghanistan increased significantly, reaching about 20 000 troops.

On 5 October 2006, *ISAF* implemented the final stage of its expansion, taking the command of the international military forces in Eastern Afghanistan from the US-led coalition. In addition to expanding the Alliance's area of operations, the "*Revised Operational Plan*" opened the path to a greater role of *ISAF* throughout the country.

In accordance with the *ISAF* mandate, the Afghan authorities have the primary responsibility for ensuring security, and the *ISAF* role is to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to ensure and maintain a safe environment in order to facilitate the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the development of democratic structures as well as to help the extension of government influence throughout the country. In concrete terms, the *ISAF* actions are aimed at: involving in achieving stability and maintaining security operations, in coordination with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); providing assistance in training the new Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP); identifying the reconstruction needs such as the rehabilitation of schools and medical facilities, the restoration of water reserves and the support

for civil-military projects; supporting the Afghan Government to disarm illegal armed groups (DIAG); supporting anti-drug actions, through the information exchange efforts and the development of an effective campaign meant to inform the public and to support ANA in the actions to combat drugs; supporting humanitarian assistance operations.

On 27 October 2006, *ISAF* reported the following achievements²⁰:

- completion of 1 113 projects;
- the Afghan National Army had over 35 000 troops, and the National Police had 42 000 employees;
- the national road network in Afghanistan had 3 256 km, of which 1 743 km or 52% were paved, and 2 743 km or 82% of the roads were open to traffic;
- 88 138 anti-personnel and 11 254 anti-tank mines were destroyed;
- *ISAF* provided the Afghan Government with technical and planning assistance to complete the development of 7 regional airports and 3 national airports. It also completed a local hospital, three emergency health centre and a health centre, allowing 200 000 more people to benefit from health services so that 83% of the population can have access to health care;
- as for education, about 1 000 schools were opened in 2006 and 43 000-45 000 teachers were trained in Afghanistan.

At the NATO Summit in București (2008) a special document dedicated to Afghanistan was adopted, namely *“International Security Assistance Force Strategic Vision”*²¹. In fact, as it is stated in the final declaration, this strategic project is the result of the common work of the leaders of the states participating in the mission, the president of Afghanistan, and the UN Secretary-General. In the pages of the document, the heads of state and government of the 40 countries participating in the international mission in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan stated, in line with the complex dimension of the Alliance involvement in the security, reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, a series of principles, measures and complex actions *“to support this country population and elected government to build an enduring, stable, secure, prosperous and democratic state, in respect of human rights, and free from the threat of terrorism”*.

The Summit in București adopted, in the new vision, the four basic principles of the Alliance contribution to the next stage of reconstruction of Afghanistan: a long-term commitment, the support for the Afghan authorities more and more and more important involvement and responsibility, the need for the international community increasing cooperation and involvement – combining military

²⁰ ***, www.globalsecurity.org., retrieved on 16.12.2013.

²¹ *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, 2008, see <http://www.summitbucharest.ro>., retrieved on 20.11.2013.

and civilian efforts – and, last but not least, the support for regional stability, focusing on Pakistan. General David Petraeus²², analysing the situation in Afghanistan, stated, in *Foreign Policy*, that: “Afghanistan will be the longest campaign in the long war against Islamist terrorism”²³.

Afghanistan has been a hot topic for NATO. That is why the Alliance pays special attention to it, taking into account the importance of meeting NATO’s mandate in this country, the key to success being to stop the terrorist actions promoted and executed by members of the Taliban groups against the free world.

Based on NATO sources²⁴, 48 states, both member and non-member ones, contributed forces within *ISAF*, totalling about 140 000 troops – 90 000 American, 9 800 British, 5 210 German, 3 880 Italian, 2 922 Canadian, 3 935 French etc. At that time, Romania contributed over 1 900 troops. The course of events in Afghanistan showed the need for additional forces to put an end to the wave of terrorist attacks and to prevent the resettlement of the Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

According to the plan, *ISAF* was desired to succeed in creating the necessary environment for the Afghan security structures to gradually take control over the entire country, allowing NATO to leave Afghanistan. However, it was found that the Afghan Government did not have the necessary capability to assume the full range of responsibilities to ensure the security of own citizens, the functioning of the Afghan state institutions and security agencies, and the rule of law. The Taliban actions increased in intensity in the South and the East, with the financial support obtained from the opium production. In 2007, terrorism also extended in the Northern and Western parts of the country, over 400 terrorist attacks taking place in Afghanistan in 2006. Thus, the success of the international coalition mission in this part of the country was threatened. The Taliban had to be prevented from regaining influence. The strategy employed by the US in the regions near the frontier with Pakistan failed. Under those circumstances, NATO was obliged to find a way out of the crisis. It was found and approved at the Bucharest Summit in April.

Nearly a decade after the start of the campaign in Afghanistan, the strategy intended to put an end to the war did not work as expected. It was considered

²² Generalul David Petraeus was Commander of International Security Assistance Force – *ISAF* and Commander of the US Forces Afghanistan – *USFOR-A*, between 4 July 2010 and 18 July 2011.

²³ David Petraeus, *Report on CENTCOM Activity to the US Senate Armed Services Committee*, 1 April 2009, see http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/03/senate_report_says_national_intelligence_fusion_centers_have_been_useless, retrieved on 20.12.2013.

²⁴ ***, <http://www.nato.int/htm>, Year 2010, retrieved on 14 December 2013.

therefore that by the appointment of the new US National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon²⁵, an opponent of the idea of militarily completing the international coalition troops in Afghanistan, the US became aware that the current strategy in Afghanistan was not working. Although the Allied military presence was maximum, approximately 150 000 troops, there was no visible military success.

In January 2010, the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, considered that the fighting lasted for quite a long period in this part of the world and that it was time for a political settlement of the conflict with the Taliban insurgents. The General stated: *“As a soldier, my personal feeling is that there’s been enough fighting”*²⁶. As NATO Commander had anticipated, the discussions that followed during the Kabul Conference in July 2010 paved the way for implementing a transition process in Afghanistan, which was agreed during the NATO Summit in Lisbon, in November 2010.

At the summit it was adopted a list of principles that guided the gradual transition of *ISAF* forces from a combat role to a role increasingly focused on support. Those principles, which were subsequently incorporated in full in the transition process included: better alignment of NATO/*ISAF* forces with the Afghan national priority programmes; cooperation with the increasingly capable Afghan institutions; *ISAF* missions adjustment; more active participation in training and mentoring missions; further ANSF strengthening and supporting the efforts of international civil organisations, *ISAF* and the PRTs to allow increased leadership capability of the Afghan Government. *“Transition will further NATO’s efforts to help the Afghan people build a durable and just peace and the start of the transition process provides an appropriate opportunity for NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to renew and build a robust, enduring partnership which complements the ISAF security mission and continues beyond it”*²⁷, was stated in the summit declaration adopted in Lisbon. Another important concept adopted in Lisbon was that of *“comprehensive approach”*, which entails extending cooperation between NATO, the UE and others, better collaboration and cooperation between military and civilian institutions in the joint peace effort in Afghanistan.

The Lisbon NATO Summit²⁸ brings to the fore the acknowledgement of the strategic importance of the stability of Afghanistan, arguing the close connection with the stability and security of the whole world, and establishing

²⁵ 8 October 2010.

²⁶ Interview with General Stanley McChrystal for *Financial Times*, cited by BBC on 25 January 2010, see <http://www.ziare.com/articole/stanley+mcchrystal>, retrieved on 12.12.2013.

²⁷ Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 2010, see www.presidency.ro, retrieved on 28.11.2013.

²⁸ Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 2010, see www.presidency.ro, retrieved on 28.11.2013.

the continuation of the long-term partnership with the Afghan Government. NATO reaffirmed its long-term commitment in Afghanistan to actively contribute to the achievement of a sovereign, independent, democratic, safe and stable state. Moreover, the UN efforts were appreciated, as, through *UNAMA* mission, it had a major contribution to the progress made in Afghanistan as well as to the reconstruction of the country and its democratically elected institutions.

The Afghan Government reaffirmed its commitments²⁹ to actively contribute to security, governance, and development of responsibilities in a consistent manner, as well as to combat terrorism, strengthen economy, combat corruption, ensure regional security and economic cooperation, observe human rights, especially women rights, being a reliable partner for NATO and acknowledging the importance and relevance of regional cross-border cooperation, coordination and development of trust between Afghanistan and its regional partners, as it is exemplified in the Istanbul Declaration. *“The agreed long-term partnership is not only a sign that our involvement will last beyond our combat mission. It is also a sign in the region that we will not leave behind a security vacuum that will create instability”*³⁰, stated NATO Secretary General, Rasmussen, during the press conference also attended by President Hamid Karzai.

The President of the USA stated in Lisbon that: *“there is now, finally, a strategy and the necessary resources to disrupt the Taliban inertia, to deprive insurgents of fortifications, to train more Afghan security forces and to support the Afghan people”*³¹. Following the discussions at the Summit in Lisbon, *ISAF* leaders and President Hamid Karzai agreed on initiating and implementing a transition process. The schedule established there stipulated that the Afghan security forces should assume full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

President Obama new strategy on Afghanistan, which was published in December 2010, was prepared considering the withdrawal of troops, stated Vladimir Evseev, Director of the Centre for Political Studies³²: *“I think that Barack Obama will have to correct the policy in Afghanistan. Especially because it will not be implemented by the former commander Stanley McChrystal – the initiator of the old strategy, but by the new commander, General David Petraeus. If we need to refer to the US willingness to conduct a comprehensive withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan, I consider the current situation extremely unfavourable. Moreover, the announcement*

²⁹ Commitments made during the London Conference in January 2010 and the Kabul Conference in July 2010.

³⁰ NATO Secretary General, cited by voanews.ro, retrieved on 24.01.2014.

³¹ Declaration of the US President, in *Observatorul militar* in November 2010, see www.presamile.ro/OM/2010/47/zia47, retrieved on 18.12.2013.

³² Declaration of Vladimir Evseev, see <http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2010/10/20/>, retrieved on 11.01.2014.

of this aspect in the new strategy will amplify the Taliban opposition”, also stated Vladimir Evseev.

The transition process officially began on 22 March 2011, with the announcement of the first group of provinces, districts and cities that were to be handed over to the Afghan security forces.

An important step for the future of security in Afghanistan was the document adopted at the Istanbul Regional Conference “*Security and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia*” on 2 November 2011. At the end of the conference it was particularly stated that the cooperation with Afghanistan would be strengthened not only regionally but also by attracting the attention of the entire global community.

The Afghan President Hamid Karzai declared³³ that the main task of his leadership was national reconciliation, urging the Taliban to cease military actions, inviting the leaders of the movement to join the process peacefully, provided breaking the ties with al-Qaeda and returning to peaceful life, recognising the Afghan state Constitution. The Afghan leader stressed that the peaceful process could not be successful unless contacts were established with the Taliban leadership that was in Pakistan. It was also acknowledged and noted the role China, Russia, India and Turkey should play to stabilise the situation in the region. At the Istanbul Conference it was also evoked the role played by Afghanistan neighbouring countries and the international community in the fight against drug trafficking, highlighting the fact that, during the long period when foreign troops were present in Afghanistan, drug production increased 40 times, fact that led to a humanitarian catastrophe. The huge rate of unemployment in this country is in close connection to drug production.

On 5 December 2011, exactly 10 years after the Istanbul Conference, a new conference was held in Bonn, organised on the situation in Afghanistan, thus marking a decade since the Taliban totalitarian regime was toppled and highlighting the role and efforts of the international community to achieve a lasting peace in Afghanistan. The conference, chaired by the Afghan President, welcomed the decision of the international community to achieve a historic partnership for the transition and transformation of Afghanistan extended for a period of 10 years, from 2015 to 2024, this renewed partnership between Afghanistan and the international community entailing firm mutual commitments in the areas of governance, security, peace process, economic

³³ Declaration of the Istanbul Conference, 2 November 2011, see <http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2011/11/03/59817106>, retrieved on 17.01.2014.

and social development, and regional cooperation. Moreover, Afghanistan and the international community recognised their joint responsibility and determination to counter drug trafficking and consumption, the problem of narcotics being a global challenge that caused immense damage and suffering.

The peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan should be based on the following principles: *“the reconciliation process must be led by the Afghans and represent the legitimate interests of all Afghans, regardless of gender or social status; reconciliation must consider the reaffirmation of a sovereign Afghan state, stable and united; the breaking of ties with international terrorism; the renunciation of violence; respect for the Afghan Constitution, human rights and especially the rights of women”*³⁴. It was also highlighted the necessity to continue the international support for ANSF building and strengthening even after 2014. In this regard, the international community strongly committed to supporting the Afghan National Security Forces to train and equip, to finance and develop their capabilities beyond the transition period, taking into account that this contribution will be gradually reduced due to the increasing domestic revenue generation capacity in Afghanistan.

In this context, a clear vision was to be adopted at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012. At the summit some very important decisions about the future of ISAF in Afghanistan were adopted as follows:

- the irreversible transition of the responsibility for security from ISAF to the Afghan security forces (ANSF) is in progress up to the process completion at the end of 2014, as agreed at the Lisbon Summit³⁵;
- by mid-2013, when the fifth and final part of the provinces begin the transition, NATO will have met the objective and the ANSF will be responsible for the security of the entire Afghan nation. At that time, ISAF missions will turn from combat missions to training, advice and support to ANSF missions and ISAF will be able to ensure that the Afghans have the necessary support to cope with the new responsibility. *“We withdraw our forces gradually and responsibly and we will complete the ISAF mission by 31 December 2014”*, it is stated in the declaration³⁶;

³⁴ The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, 5 December 2011, see http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/docs/2011_11_conclusions_bonn_en.pdf, retrieved on 11.12.2013.

³⁵ NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 2010, see www.presidency.ro, retrieved on 28.11.2013.

³⁶ Anne-Marie Blajan, *NATO Summit Declaration – Continuation of the Alliance Mission in Afghanistan after 2014*, 21 May 2012, see www.HotNews.ro, retrieved on 26.11.2013.

- by the end of 2014, when the Afghan authorities have complete responsibility for security, NATO combat mission will be completed. The Alliance will continue to provide political and practical, strong and long-term support, through the partnership with Afghanistan;
- NATO is prepared, if requested by the Afghan Government, to have a post-2014 mission of a different nature, to train, advise and assist the ANSF;
- NATO will fulfil its role, together with other actors, in the development of sufficient and sustainable Afghan forces, capable of ensuring the security of their country. To this end, the Allies welcome contributions and reaffirm their strong commitment to financially support the Afghan security forces.

At this summit, the newly elected president of France, François Hollande, affirmed the decision to withdraw nearly all 3 400 French troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2012, action contrary to the NATO planned deadline – the end of 2014. At a press conference, also attended by the Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, declared that the Alliance would not abandon Afghanistan or the region, even after the troops left the area.

At the Tokyo Conference, *“From Transition to Transformation”* on 8 July 2012, Afghanistan and the international community established the framework hereinafter the *“Tokyo Framework”*, which underpinned the partnership for transformation. It was thus highlighted the progress made in taking over, since May 2012, 75% of the territory by the ANSF, by mid-2013, the ANSF having to achieve the full transition complete to take control over the entire territory of Afghanistan, allowing *ISAF* to complete the mandate by the end of 2014. The Afghan Government committed to conducting free, fair and transparent elections in 2014 (presidential) and 2015 (parliamentary), the entire population of Afghanistan being allowed to participate freely without internal or external interference.

Following the conference, the international community pledged \$ 16 billion aid, which would be operational by 2015, continuing funding, at least until 2017. At the same time, conference participants conditioned the aid by the development of a new plan to combat corruption in the country. The concern of the international community is given by the fears that the situation in Afghanistan will get worse after the withdrawal of NATO troops, scheduled to be completed this year. In this regard, President Hamid Karzai pledged to continue the fight against corruption in return for the aid received for the country’s economic recovery.

On 18 June 2013, the Afghan National Security Forces formally assumed the conduct of combat operations across the country, and NATO-led *ISAF* continued to support the ANSF operations. President Karzai announced the group of Afghan provinces, cities and districts that would be subject to transition in the coming months, as the last part of the transition process. It would support the objective of full transition regarding the ANSF responsibility assumption by the end of 2014.

On 1 December 2013, the international coalition forces numbered 84 271 troops, according to NATO sources.

3. The EU role and contribution to the evolution of the situation in Afghanistan

The European Union has been present in Afghanistan since the mid 80s, but a more active policy in the country was adopted after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. At that time, the European Council appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR) and the Union established a Delegation in Afghanistan. The initial military action was complemented by political, civil and judicial efforts to consolidate democracy, strengthen the country capabilities, create stability and economic development, improve living conditions and ensure respect for human rights. The European Union (the European community and member states together) was one of the major donors from the beginning. In the aggregate, it allocated more than 10 billion Euros for reconstruction in 2001-2010. The European Commission donated, in 2002-2006, 1 million Euros for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and together with Member States assumed the responsibility for 1/3 of the total international humanitarian aid pledged at donors conferences in Tokyo, in January 2002, and Berlin, in April 2004.

Given that political instability is a fertile ground for the development of political extremism and transnational crime, the EU's interest is better illustrated by the fact that 90% of the drugs sold on the European black market come from Afghanistan. Therefore, the reconstruction of Afghanistan is a political project, and the EU cannot be excluded from the project. The Union's aim is to achieve the reconstruction of Afghanistan through diplomatic, military and economic channels, so that this country can no longer be a threat to global security. The European Union role is even more important because it is the only international organisation that can influence the US policy on Afghanistan.

After the Bonn Conference in 2001, the European Commission donated 4,93 million Euros to be used in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Its objectives include the support for the new Afghan Government and the confidence

of the population. RRM, a relatively new tool to prevent conflict, deals with the start of quick impact projects aimed at prevention and stability. In the case of Afghanistan, the aim is that of helping the political transition legitimacy.

The European Commission opened an office in Kabul, in February 2002, for the CSP (Country Strategy Paper), which was operational between 2003 and 2006. The activity of the office was focused on four key areas: the Afghan Transitional Authority capacity building; rural development and food security; economic infrastructure and health. Moreover, other important objectives were focused on supporting the activities related to mine clearance, support for the civilian population, regional cooperation, support for the return of refugees and decrease in drug production. At least 2% of the funds were allocated to projects relating to women.

Since the first phase of post-Taliban reconstruction in 2002, the EU continued to channel 40% of the funds donated through NGOs. Since 2004, the percentage dropped to 20%, half of the funds being allocated to the new Afghan Government, responsible for the implementation of government programmes. The European Commission allocated 22,5 million Euros for the presidential elections in 2004 and 17,5 million Euros in 2005 for parliamentary elections. Overall, Europe paid 40% of the 300 million dollars paid by contributing states for the two election periods and the creation of the electoral register. Following the Berlin Conference in 2004³⁷, Germany, as host country, promised to provide the sum of 320 million Euros over the next four years.

President Hamid Karzai pointed out, in turn, how much he appreciated the support: *“The aid provided by Germany, as the host of the conference, will boost the peace process in Afghanistan. The results will be reflected in increasing stability and legality in the country, which will allow the conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections in only a few months”*. Moreover, the Afghan President appreciated³⁸: *“Our goal is to increase per capita income in the next ten years, to increase stability and to create a democratic framework. We intend to transform Afghanistan in a country able to stand on its own feet, one that is not a burden for the world and for its friends”*.

In November 2005 the first joint declaration between the EU and Afghanistan was signed to establish a comprehensive framework for the relationship between the two parties. The European Commission also allocated a financial aid

³⁷ The Berlin Conference Declaration, see www.dw.de, March 2004, retrieved on 02.02.2014.

³⁸ President Hamid Karzai declaration, the Berlin Conference, 2004, see www.dw.de, retrieved on 03.03.2014.

of 600 million Euros to Afghanistan between 2007 and 2010, less support compared to that between 2002 and 2006. The European Commission spokesperson, Emma Udwin, appreciated that funding governance reforms, health system and rural development was a priority. Between 2002 and 2006, approximately one billion of the 3,7 billion Euros allocated to this country was for projects of this kind³⁹.

Another significant domain having important consequences for the development of Afghan society was represented by the European Commission involvement in the project to conduct the first census in Afghanistan. For this project, a sum amounting to 15 million Euros was allocated in 2006, thereby contributing to the UN Population Fund, to help conduct the census that could provide basic information about the number and characteristics of the country population. The census results can provide the Afghan Government with essential information on the population settlement and composition, helping the authorities to decide on the most appropriate approaches to the problems related to the development of the country, such as: poverty eradication, education and health, unemployment, ensuring energy and living space. The census can also provide the foundation for better governance and useful information to establish the necessary government institutions. The preliminary results of the census were to be published prior to 2009 for preparing the presidential elections planned to take place.

In October 2009 the EU adopted an Action Plan for Afghanistan, which addressed the security problem by defining a series of objectives, including: effective state institutions, better governance, rule of law, promoting human rights and combating corruption. In November 2011, the European Council approved the mandate to negotiate a Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD) with Afghanistan.

The EU is one of the major donors for development and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan and supports the efforts of the Afghan Government to provide basic services to the population in the three areas of interest: governance and rule of law, agriculture and rural development, as well as health and social protection.

On 17 June 2007, the EU launched a police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) as part of an international effort to help the country to take responsibility for maintaining law and order. The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan commenced as a result of the Bonn Conference in December 2001, the London Conference on 31 January 2006 as well as of the invitation to the European Union by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government to start a civilian police mission in the country.

³⁹ Mediafax Press Agency, 26 January 2007, cited by www.zf.ro, retrieved on 16.01.2014.

The EUPOL mission provides support for the reform process within the framework of local laws and universal human rights. EUPOL monitors, guides, advises and prepares the staff of the Ministry of Interior, as well as that of other law enforcement institutions at central, regional and provincial levels. The complexity of the security situation, the nature and size of existing professional challenges in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan represent the major coordinates for all participants in the mission in this area of conflict, the Romanian Police representatives included.

In 2009, the European Parliament set up a full-fledged delegation for the relations with Afghanistan, so that the third (and last) Interparliamentary Meeting with the Afghan *Wolesi Jirga* (Lower House) was organised in February 2009 in Brussels. Since then, because of the delicate situation in Kabul, videoconferencing has been mainly used for interparliamentary meetings.

According to the European Parliament resolution on 16 December 2010 regarding “*A New Strategy for Afghanistan*”, the common EU budget (European community and member states) for aid to Afghanistan in the period 2002-2010 amounted to 8 billion Euros. In the same document, it was stated that the EU strategy for Afghanistan would have to start from two premises: the first related to the acknowledgement that socio-economic and security indicators in Afghanistan had continually deteriorated in spite of nearly ten years of international involvement and investment, and the second related to the need to encourage a shift in the thinking of the international community that, in the past, especially before the establishment of counterinsurgency strategy, had developed plans and made decisions without considering too much the involvement of the Afghan party so that, in the future, its plans and decisions should consider involving the host nation. An important step in this direction was made in London and Kabul conferences. The resolution called for a new EU strategy in order to improve the international aid coordination, to adjust the role of the EU and that of the Afghan parties participating in the peace process, to improve police training and eliminate opium cultivation.

On 15 December 2011 the European Parliament adopted a resolution expressing its concern about the budgetary control of the EU financial assistance to Afghanistan⁴⁰. Despite its concerns, the European Parliament sought to establish closer ties with the Afghan National Assembly. In this respect, the Office for Promotion

⁴⁰ The European Parliament Resolution on 15 December 2011 on the budgetary control of the EU financial assistance to Afghanistan, see <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?RO:PDF>, retrieved on 13.11.2013.

of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD) in the European Parliament hosted a senior official of the *Wolesi Jirga* in 2011, and in 2012, the European Parliament organised a study visit to Brussels for six members of the Afghan Parliament.

The European Union Council, at its meeting on 24 June 2013⁴¹, reaffirmed the EU growing interest in the issue of Afghanistan, also announcing the extension of the EUPOL mandate in Afghanistan until the end of 2014. The EU continued to support the preparations for presidential and provincial elections that also took place in 2014, as well as for the parliamentary elections in 2015, considering that they should be transparent and credible so that the result could be acknowledged as legitimate by the entire population of Afghanistan.

Thus, any long-term solution to the Afghan crisis should start from the Afghan citizens interest in their national security, civil protection, economic and social development, and should include concrete measures to eradicate poverty, underdevelopment and discrimination against women, to observe human rights and the rule of law, to strengthen reconciliation mechanisms, to eliminate opium production, to engage in a solid process of state building and of Afghanistan integration into the international community, and to remove al-Qaeda from the country.

English version by
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⁴¹ The European Council Decision no. 11535/2013.

CHALLENGES FOR THE FIELD ARTILLERY SYSTEM FOR THE YEARS 2030-2040 (II)

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According to the authors, in 2030, the use of the Internet will become a commonplace, which will result in interconnectivity. It can be a benefit for the Allied countries in terms of the opportunities for online education/training, exercises, as well as of the switch from one network to another in a secure manner and the transmission of classified information. On the other hand, it can also be a threat, as the opponent has the opportunity to influence public opinion, to recruit people or to exploit them in order to serve own interests.

***Keywords:** operations; economic stagnation; information; security interests*

societies will become more fractured by individuals and groups that will have a different perception of the globalisation process, their individual and collective identity, religion and acceptable level of culture, a phenomenon that will accelerate the erosion of the concept of the nation state¹⁶.

B. Human theme¹⁴

From the human point of view, changes caused by various trends are expected, such as: global population growth, ageing – with different age profile for Western and developing countries, differences in terms of social standards at global level, growing urban areas and fracturing of national identities¹⁵.

The development in a different direction comparing with what traditional/current institutions and communities mean, the significant increase in single living and the decrease in presence and role of the traditional family in the developed countries will be accelerated by the current development and the future trends in the technological, economic and cultural areas. Difficulties related to emigrants' integration will increase and Western

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¹⁴ The term “social” was used in the Romanian version of this article for a better understanding.

¹⁵ SFA, Chapter 3, pct. 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid* note 15, point 2.

1. Demographic changes

It is estimated that the world population will increase and reach over 8 billion inhabitants by 2030 but the growth will be unbalanced and will have various regional effects. Taking into account the level of immigration, the USA will remain the “*youngest*” state among the global powers, while in China, if the same approach is maintained, the ageing process will significantly increase because of the low birth rate and increasing life expectancy. Ageing will also be a characteristic of Japan, Russia and European states. Russia’s population will decrease and Brazil’s population will increase while India will be the country with the highest number of inhabitants on the globe. By 2030, the African countries will have the fastest growing population¹⁷.

The primary consequence of these changes will be a major immigration phenomenon which, directly influenced by some regional or state policy will generate instability at Alliance borders or even inside some of its member states.

Another phenomena which will intensify is the “*youth bulge*”¹⁸ (“*frustrated and bored youngsters*”, with a medium level of education but without the possibility to work in an appropriate environment, according to their expectations) defined as an excess in the young population, especially male, which can lead to social unrest, war and terrorism.

Identification and monitoring of the physical movements on the field specific to the immigration will sometimes lead to the use of the *FAS* data acquisition system.

This fact imposes the existence, through doctrine, TTPs and structure, of a field artillery data acquisition system, which is independent and flexible, deployable and interoperable with similar structures from other systems of armed forces, border police or other structures of the security system.

Concerning the riots, *FAS* will provide, by high precision fires, special ammunition for riots control, the necessary support for the forces intervening for group dispersion and isolation. Generally, these situations require units/subunits equipped with mortars, which might be a secondary capability reported to the basic one.

The decrease in the human resources and the ageing of the population will limit the recruitment framework for the armed forces, including *FAS*. This way, the competition on the labour market will impose a review of the “*professional*

¹⁷ *Ibid*, point 3.

¹⁸ More details available in “*A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence*” by Henrik Urdal, published by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, in *Expert Paper*, nr. 1/2012.

and financial offer” at Alliance/state level to meet a certain social status, which should remain within the limits of the nationality of the individual state or the member states and generate the necessary fidelity and attachment.

Concerning the *FAS* structures from the reserve forces, they might face serious difficulties in the force generation process with impact on the Alliance/state ability to engage new operations.

2. Urbanisation

Cities will contain 65% of the world population by 2040, while 95% of the urban population growth will be within mega-cities with over 10 million inhabitants¹⁹. These metropolises will expand in littoral areas with a lot of benefits concerning the trade, education, social services etc. However, urbanisation will go together with the growth of slums and outskirts, estimated at 1,5-2 billion inhabitants²⁰ at global level.

These situations will affect the level of resources, the need for infrastructure, public health, and public safety and will increase the possibility of NATO involvement in urban areas.

From the *FAS* perspective, it is required a better adjustment of doctrine, TTPs and rules of engagement in the urban area, taking into account, on the one hand, the desired effects, accomplished during the fire support process and, on the other hand, the asymmetric threats to personnel and equipment/infrastructure.

Moreover, the *FAS* structures may be used in classic operations, PSO, stability operations, humanitarian assistance or relief operations. From this point of view, as mentioned before, while establishing the SOR for the *FAS* structures, in fact, for all land forces units, the “*customer oriented*” principle must be taken into account.

In this way, the civil society will want to benefit fully, in terms of both security and support provided to own population in different situations. The *FAS* structures should have parallel organisation and equipment, to provide them with a capability that could be used as the main fire support component for manoeuvre forces and in emergency situations (earthquakes, floods, snow etc.). In the assigned area of responsibility/deployment, they must be capable of providing appropriate fire support (data/information and lethal/non-lethal effects) in accordance with the mission, as well as shelter, food resources, of intervening in the search for victims, identifying sources of physical danger (explosion of gas, chemical

¹⁹ SFA, Chapter 3, point 5.

²⁰ *Ibid* note 19.

and biological contamination etc.), intervening in the unblocking/clearing of roads etc. This reality involves double training – specific training for accomplishing fire support tasks, in accordance with the mission, and emergency support training.

Moreover, a coordination of efforts, training and interoperability with other bodies involved in emergency relief/intervention will be required.

3. Human network/transparency

As we will see also in the technological theme, human networks of different sizes will be developed, with local, regional or global influence. Global access to information and transparency in decision-making will have a positive impact on social stability. By 2030, the standard of living is estimated to rise in all regions²¹. However, the discrepancy in the standard of living among various regions will generate friction between different groups or even within them.

Another effect of human networks will be that the traditional means of access to information (newspapers, TV, radio) will be replaced by social networks or internal means of communication of different groups (social networks on the internet, blogs, direct interaction between members etc.). Consequently, the means of influence will be more accessible to the potential opponents and the complexity of these networks will continue to provide a platform for organised crime/corruption and for collecting and distributing information to the detriment of the Alliance/state/group of states.

Increased transparency will facilitate the understanding, closer to reality, of the gaps between societies/groups that will generate reactions and social instability at previously unanticipated levels. A possible contribution of the *FAS* in such situations is either through using the capability of effects coordination/Joint Effect Centre, as will be detailed below in the technological theme, or through the support of forces intervening/engaging, as we have detailed above.

The understanding, acceptance and promotion of the “*responsibility to protect*”²² will cause the interference of non-governmental/international (NGOs/IOs) organisations and civil society in decision-making process concerning the initiation, continuation or ending of some operations, where the armed forces of a state/union of states or the Alliance are involved. This will be coupled with the perception, already stated above, that the armed forces, and therefore *FAS* structures, should be used only in response to aggression and as “*service provider*” for the benefit of the nation/Alliance.

²¹ SFA, Chapter 3, point 9.

²² Principle promoted at the UN, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/2626-un-resolution-on-the-responsibility-to-protect> and subsequent links.

4. Fractures concerning identity

Migration, human networks globalisation, decision-making transparency and access to global information, religion, culture can redefine the perception of individuals or certain groups of membership of a particular nation/community. Attraction and identification of individuals in sub-national or supra-national groups, geographically or religiously, ethnically related or not etc. will generate multiple views at social level, which, affiliated to extremist/terrorist or anti-government groups, will generate instability either at the border or within the Alliance/state/union of states.

In addition, declining national identity, indecision about the assumed religion together with the increase in inter-individual or inter-generational tensions can lead to the same kind of instability that will require the presence of an allied/international stability force. All these types of missions generated by “*asymmetric*” causes will become *the rule* and the classic approach of war/armed conflict will become *the exception*. However, certain groups or state entities, on the basis of the access to information and advanced technology, benefiting from all the facilities of the internet and human networks, can initiate or respond to Alliance/state/union of states or international community with actions that will be limited or not to the classic features of warfare. In this way, the FAS will have to carry out that classic mission of fire support of manoeuvre forces or will have to adapt and be flexible enough to “*make itself useful*”, including during the asymmetric conflicts.

C. Technological theme

The domains of innovation and technological advances are necessary features that represent a scientific response to the current and future problems and crises.

1. Technological accelerated changes

Possession of know-how and control of innovation technology are real challenges for all states/union of states, given their relatively slow reform. On the other hand, different states or non-state actors, without being responsible for any development of legal and political structures, will be very interested and, at the same time, able to gain access to classified information or advanced technology, including from the military area. This will lead to global instability by expanding the number of state and non-state entities that will convey high technology as an argument for any negotiation. Advances in biotechnology, micro-technology and space technology will impact on business models, medicine, education and other domains, as well as on the development of a conflict²³.

²³ SFA, Chapter 4, point 3.

One of the implications of these technological changes is the divergent use of disruptive technologies and their related countermeasures²⁴.

In the future, disruptive technologies can be used for positive purposes, such as solving global problems like optimisation of energy and natural resources consumption. Equally, they can be used for negative purposes such as degradation of the political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure Alliance systems' capabilities²⁵. The proliferation of conventional and unconventional capabilities will strengthen the ability of Alliance/state/union of states opponents to oppose it, especially by Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) weapons²⁶. Although, today, the capability to meet such a threat is perceived as a Naval-Air component, in the future, land forces will play an equally important role. Obviously, within the land forces, the FAS capabilities will be those that will ensure the main platforms for A2/AD employment, contributing to the achievement of the planned/desired effects on different categories/types of targets²⁷, especially on the coast areas, along the canals and near the straits.

The accelerated technological changes and the access of the opponents to the latest technology will force NATO and individual countries to invest more in research to maintain the initiative and leadership in the domain. Regarding the FAS, the Alliance/state/union of states will adopt new standards that will generate research and procurement programmes at every entity level.

The technological advance will also bring new products to the military industry, for use in classic operations and also in crowd control and street actions/riots. FAS, together with other systems, will provide the use of these products at long distance according to incidents physiognomy²⁸.

Applying the research results, by using high-tech in all FAS will entail a reconsideration of the number and size of field artillery structures²⁹. The concept

²⁴ *Ibid*, point 3a, presents the definition from *RTO Technical Report TR-SAS-062 Assessment of Possible Disruptive Technologies for Defence and Security*, February 2010 – “focusing on defence and security, a disruptive technology stands for technological development which changes the conduct of conflict or the rules of engagement significantly within one or two generations and forces the planning process to adapt and to change the long term goals, strategies, concepts and plans”.

²⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁶ The subject is developed, from US Army perspective, in the article *A Role for Land Warfare Forces in Overcoming A2/AD*, Colonel V. Alcazar, Colonel T.M. Lafleur, published in *Military Review*, November-December 2013.

²⁷ The Data Acquisition System of SAT may plan as targets – key points in the terrain, A2/AD systems, mandatory passing points on the mobility corridors, logistic facilities, antimissile facilities, C4ISR nodes and communication centres, points for electromagnetic fields generation etc.

²⁸ I have detailed the subject in the *Romanian Field Artillery (Artileria Modernă Română)* Magazine, no. 23/November 2011, in the article “*Non-Lethal Artillery – Oxymoron or Necessity?*”.

²⁹ Most probably, part of the soldiers will be replaced by robots, as a general trend within the Land Forces. The trend is also confirmed by the recent statements of US Army officials related to their commitment

of *objectives/effects-based operations* will be maintained and, from *FAS* perspective, the effects that must be provided can be achieved with a few precision fires, with the contribution of a high precision data acquisition system, with the necessary sustainment, achieved through an appropriate logistic system. This will lead to a reconsideration of the report quantity/quality in terms of fire and/or data support provided by the *FAS*.

The advanced technology will help expand, at the land forces level, the *IFF* system³⁰, which will lead to changes in planning and execution of artillery fires, and in evaluating/assessing these actions. Thus, in the case of operations specific to the armed combat, the *FAS* will provide data and fire support as close as possible to the *forward line of own troops – FLOT* and will be capable of delivering fires during ambushes, raids, incursions or at contact. In asymmetric conflicts, the action in a digitised and *IFF* marked battle space will allow the successful achievement of missions/tasks that result in either lethal or non-lethal effects, as well as in an expected commitment on targets, ensuring own troops safety.

2. Increasing access to technologies

It is already known that certain private companies are already ahead of government agencies regarding the development of new technologies, especially related to nuclear energy, medicine, biochemistry, communications, satellites and other associated technologies. In the future, they will be produced on the open market, their freedom of movement allowing the access of potential adversaries of the Alliance/state to the products or the know-how. The weapons of mass destruction or cyber weapons may be placed at the borders of the Alliance/state/union of states. The targets acquisition (TA) system of the *FAS* can always be used to detect and track (monitor) such threats. Field Artillery ammunition with CBRN charge or for dissemination of printed materials can be developed again, and many countries will re-enter the rearmament competition. Its storage and operation can cause restrictions in the system of access to information, which can be reflected in the inapplicability of many *FAS* standards. The process of harmonisation and even interoperability of *FAS* structures, as the first phase of this process, could be affected and cause trends of some national armed forces to assume training and individual action.

to replace the soldiers with robots. More details are available at <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140120/DEFREG02/301200035/US-Army-Studying-Replacing-Thousands-Grunts-Robots>

³⁰ Identification Friend or Foe, a system that ensures the separate identification of the friend forces and of the enemy forces.

3. Connectivity of computer networks

In the years to come, connectivity will increase and the world will become a large network that will provide universal availability of information. However, the presence of the multitude of interconnected networks will create the vulnerability of infiltrations or cyber-attacks. They will be aimed at both the espionage and the attack of NATO or EU networks. From the Alliance/state/union of states' perspective, a period will follow for political and doctrinal reconsideration of the definition of the *attack* and its association to a level beyond which a cyber-attack can be considered a generator for reactions within the framework stipulated by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Cutting-edge technology will also allow for the intrusion in the electromagnetic spectrum. Therefore, the *FAS* must be provided with autonomous navigation resources, independent from satellites or central coordinating nodes. In addition, missile systems will require a closed communication system that is not affected by any interference/jamming. For this, data transfer between similar artillery/rocket units should be done only relatively local, with common standards and protocols. In a sense, it will be a return to traditional procedures, which will allow *FAS* to operate without being dependent on various existing networks and without being exposed to their vulnerability.

In 2030, the use of the Internet will be a common issue, with a lot of addiction and interconnectivity. For allied countries, this could be a benefit in terms of the possibility of online education/training, online exercises, switching from one network to another in a secured manner, sending information by protected means etc. On the other hand, this can also be a threat because the opponents have the opportunity to exert influence on the public opinion, recruit persons or exploit them for their own interest.

The Alliance will continue to conduct information operations by non-kinetic actions in order to obtain the necessary non-lethal/lethal effects, necessary for achieving the desired "*end state*".

Regardless of the way information operations are conducted, in principle, the *FAS* structures will need to provide a part of this capability. The need for the optimal use of all available capabilities will determine the strategic and operational level commanders to evaluate their own resources and opt for permanent use of the *FAS*. The balance between kinetic and non-kinetic actions will face alternative developments and the fire support coordinator will become the coordinator of the effects. Under current conditions, this coordination is accomplished by the "*double heads*" status of the *FAS* commander (eg: Field Artillery Brigade/FA Regiment Commander within a division must also be the effects coordinator in the respective division, as detailed in *Fire Support of the Joint Task*

Manual – FT-6/2012). This will be reflected in the constitution, on a permanent basis, at *FAS* level, of new teams able to understand, plan and exploit the complementarity of the effects achieved by engaging with fire or by means of information operations. “*The competition*” between InfoOps, as a capability integrative structure, and PSYOPS, MediaOps, CIMIC and STRATCOM, as structures generating specific effects, will result in a reconsideration of the physiognomy of a *Joint Effect Centre/Branch*, articulated and coordinated on the basic architecture provided by the special team within the *FAS*.

D. Economic theme

The access to technology, mobility of people and goods, financial transfers and direct investments are prerequisites of an unprecedented interdependence and interconnectivity of global economies. This situation will place producers and consumers in direct contact in a global network that will facilitate easy access to services, capital and goods. On the other hand, a crisis in an emerging economy can cause cascading effects resulting in a global crisis.

By 2030, the developed countries will have relatively the same consumption rate while the developing countries will increase their consumption³¹. The increasing demand for resources and their tendency to become scarce will lead to new restrictions in the way there are accessed, while alternative sources for energy, food etc. may possibly appear. The last international financial crisis, economic stagnation and rising national debt have put additional pressure on policymakers to reduce defence budgets. However, there are states that make different budget allocations and create gaps at regional or global level³². The continuation of these gaps can lead to the threat of regional instability and jeopardise the security interests of the Alliance.

1. Globalisation of financial resources

Global interconnection of different institutions creates the opportunity for better global resources management but increases the vulnerability of the exploitation of these resources by non-state actors, usually multinational companies involved in organised crime and terrorism. Thus, banks and financial institutions or public communications systems can be targeted.

This kind of insecurity will increase uncertainty among investors who can move massively their investments in other regions, leaving room for regional crises

³¹ *SFA*, Chapter 5, point 3.

³² The example presented in *SFA* is taken from Klaus Olshausen, *High Tide – Low Tide – Defence Budgets: Increase in Asia, Decrease in Europe and America. Reasons and Consequences*, December 2011. According to the author, between 2000 and 2010, the defence budget allocation has increased by 252% in China, 70% in Russia, 53% in India, 28% in South Korea and 4% in Japan.

and even a possible collapse³³. NATO intervention will require a coordinated response that will test its political cohesion and determination.

The consequences for *FAS* are many, but not direct, they will be subsequent to other consequences already discussed above (e.g. participation in stability operations and support).

2. Increased resource scarcity

The states will need a larger amount of energy and raw materials to support the growth and maintain an advantage in the global economy³⁴. Even if new sources of renewable energy and the new exploitation ways will try to compensate for the acute need for resources, the countries with access to such resources will reposition themselves in the international decision-making architecture. The imbalance caused by this reality will create tensions between different states which will have historical or geopolitical disputes on the areas with resources. These disputes will be a source of insecurity at the borders or within the Alliance. In terms of *FAS*, in addition to the various ways of participation in various types of operations, the diminishing of resources will have a direct impact. Those resources necessary for the military industry to make ammunitions and artillery equipment will most likely be redirected towards the civil industry when the two industries are in "*competition*". The specific research and procurement programmes will mainly focus on the solutions based on the resources widely available yet.

3. Cuts in defence budgets

The social changes described above, geopolitical challenges and volatility in financial markets will reduce economic growth in developed countries. In addition, unemployment and the need for a progressing standard of living will force governments to allocate less defence resources. Underfunded defence budgets will result not only in short-term effects, such as planning and conduct of operations, but also in medium- and long-term effects in terms of force capability. The *FAS* will be equally affected by the underfunding. Possible financial solutions will have to face the growing interest of the industry in shifting towards civilian markets, safer in terms of funding, to the detriment of military consumers.

However, there will be countries that will continue to earmark significant percentages of their GDP for defence, thus creating an imbalance in capabilities, which will entail insecurity at the Alliance borders and a new redistribution of the influence in the global security architecture.

³³ *SFA*, Chapter 5, point 5.

³⁴ *Ibid*, point 6.

The *FAS* will continue the overall process of transformation specific to the land forces. Concepts such as “*Connected Forces Initiative*” and “*Smart Defence*” will be fully applicable, just like any new concepts that will transform the military structure from “*foreign policy tool*” to the “*security services provider*” and player in emergency interventions.

Even if, in his speech during the Defence Planning Symposium 2014, in Oberammergau, on 15 January 2014, the SACT, General Paloméros said that “*initiatives such as Smart Defence, pooling and sharing or the Framework Nations Concept must be seen as ways to anticipate, to mitigate budget constraints’ long-term impact and certainly not as a pretext for further cuts*”, we believe that budgets will continue to be affected in most NATO member states, which requires the identification of new solutions for building the needed capabilities with minimal costs.

E. Environment theme

Recent studies show that global warming will have the same pace in the long term³⁵. Even if the consequences of global warming are difficult to predict, the climate changes will generate different, adverse, unstable and difficult-to-predict effects on the soil, water and air. Global warming will certainly cause the glaciers’ melting at the North Pole, which will lead to the rising of sea levels. The immediate consequence will be that metropolises will be affected, they will expand on the littoral areas, as mentioned above. The climate changes will facilitate the occurrence of extreme weather events (hurricanes, floods etc.) that will directly affect people and land physiognomy, which will change its shape affecting the human habitat available³⁶.

The impact of these changes will be significant at global level, although in some regions some positive effects can be also identified³⁷.

The melting of glaciers and the opportunities for navigation in the Northern area will influence the environment on this part of the globe creating a domino effect.

All these changes in the environment can cause huge catastrophes for the humanity, whether natural, such as earthquakes in Pakistan and Haiti or tsunamis in the Philippines and Japan, or through human intervention, such as the nuclear explosion at Chernobyl.

The devastating effects, much more significant in crowded urban areas, will require international intervention and assistance in the aftermath of the event.

Moreover, the interest of other actors for the new resources and opportunities arising from the environmental changes can give rise to instability at Alliance borders.

³⁵ *SFA*, Chapter 6, point 1.

³⁶ *Ibid*, point 2.

³⁷ For more details, please see *SFA*, Chapter 6, point 4.

The scarcity of water resources, especially because of the increase in the population in those areas that already experience the effects of the lack of water, can generate another competition for accessing water sources, which will result in regional instability.

From a military perspective, NATO will face many situations that will require the conduct of humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations. The *FAS* will be required to participate in such operations using the capabilities previously described, required for emergency intervention. However, many stability and support operations will take place not far from the borders of the Alliance.

Conclusions

In the next 20-30 years, the international security environment will experience significant changes. The countries that are currently developing will be in a position to exercise global influence. The Alliance will develop a series of new partnerships that will influence global security. The future will be characterised by increasing population, unbalanced demographic changes, migration and urbanisation. Accelerated development in technology is another feature of the future, which, together with globalisation and environmental change, will have a direct impact on the economy and society worldwide.

These changes will be reflected in the size, structure and strategies of the armed forces. The *FAS* (a system that will be composed of: *CAI System, Data Acquisition System, Fire System, Logistic System and Training & Simulation System*), as part of the Land Forces/Joint level, will go through a restructuring process of these forces and will develop/adapt its doctrine, techniques, tactics and procedures, in the operations training, preparation, planning, conduct and evaluation. Depending on these operations, the *FAS* will be specifically equipped, in accordance with certain types of engagement. In the future, nations will accept more difficulty to finance security strategies simultaneously through EU, NATO, UN and OSCE. Consequently, there will be a redefinition of the relationships between the organisations that each includes almost the same countries. A different financing of the *FAS* will be possible, as part of the armed forces, either from the budgets of nations or from the central budget of the respective organisation (EU or NATO). This will cause discrepancies at national level and will generate competition in terms of recruitment. Soldiers recruited from all layers of the population will have to be educated and trained so that they could understand and accept different cultures and religions that allow them to engage contact with the people in conflict areas and make decisions. In terms of doctrine, the field artilleryman/woman profile will be similar in all the armed forces of the Alliance, but, in reality, there will be discrepancies between the almost robotic *FAS* structures and those employing human beings, able to move quickly from the acceptance of death or physical, mental and emotional illness to the messages

of consolation of the affected population, saving an injured person or dealing with the media.

The same discrepancies may occur between active and reserve forces, whose generation will last longer and have an extensive training period.

The *FAS* will participate, in general, in operations that are conducted in an international/multinational framework. The Alliance will continue to promote concepts such as “*Smart Defence*” and “*Connected Forces Initiative*” which will subsequently lead to the review of the concept of *interoperability* for a clearer trace of “*identity*” of the doctrine, techniques, tactics and procedures used, types of missions/tasks accomplished, sensors, weapon system and ammunition that may be used, depending on the planned effects.

However, a certain “*national*” degree will be maintained especially during the periods when the national agendas of some countries will require an “*individual*” approach to part of the training or even some actions.

The field artillery system training will follow the principle “*train as you fight*”. The e-learning will become the main form of training, given the limited resources required by training and the security of computer networks by the opening of *PAN (NATO network – Public Access Network)* and additional networks for documents up to “*NATO Restricted*”. Also, e-learning will be part of the allies training in order to provide a common standard and an equal opportunity for all graduates to be included in the *FAS* structures, depending on their classification.

The limited budgets will determine the national *FAS* commands to provide the “*dual responsibility*” requirement, to invest more in the scientific-applied research, which should ensure efficient procurement programmes at national level, especially given the fact that traditional military industry will turn towards the civilian market, where cash is more available.

Equally, the cyber dimension of future conflicts will require the reconsideration of the level of dependence of *FAS* systems on the satellites.

The *Field Artillery System* will continue to be, in a better-defined way, a system of systems.

The *Command and Control System* will have a unique physiognomy compared to the structure of the other forces. A command structure with dual responsibility will be necessary, as long as the artillery unit/subunit/large unit commander will become the effect coordinator for the superior HQs/Joint Force, which means that the special team led by the commander of the artillery structure can be deployed to coordinate and integrate all kinetic actions – the coordination of the fire support – and the non-kinetic actions – the coordination of INFOOPS in order to obtain the planned/desired, lethal or non-lethal, effects.

The *data/targets acquisition system* will benefit from technological developments and will be able to execute the “*data acquisition*” mission by carrying out the specific tasks during military operations, as well as independent missions, in cooperation with other security forces, such as border police.

The *firing system* will be less independent and will carry out mission/tasks, generally in a “*joint*” environment. The concept of “*joint fires*” will involve the collective and coordinated use of all systems (aircraft, artillery carrying ships, SAT firing – delivery system etc.), able to carry out kinetic and non-kinetic actions. Integration of artillery firing system/engagement system at joint level will be met not only in the area of higher HQs but also in a multinational environment. This will have an impact on the type and number of field artillery standards that must be met by the artillery structures. Technological advances will enable the firing system to execute fires in maximum safety conditions by using the identifying sensors of allied forces, preventing fratricide and limiting collateral damages. Artillery and ground missiles will have increased firing opportunities through weapons system ability to engage the target with simultaneously multiple shots using different trajectories and through extended range smart bombs. They will remain within the manoeuvre possibilities of the supported forces.

The *logistic system* of the field artillery will be very mobile, modular, independent, flexible, adaptable and deployable in operational and strategic depth. In this context, contracting of goods and services, maintenance of equipment and management of logistic manoeuvre will be elements that the logistic system of field artillery will have to manage in an integrated manner, in cooperation with the higher echelon.

The *Training & Simulation System* of the *FAS* should provide personnel training both in the situation of using an automated fire control system or in the classic version of “*pencil and paper*”. This system must be able to be configured in accordance with the mission/operation specifics.

The physiognomy of future threats and conflicts will cause change in the relations between operations specific to armed fight, on the one hand, and deterrence operations, on the other hand.

The *FAS* structures will ensure fire support both to conventional forces and to special forces. The mission/tasks to support special forces will be increasing and will bring about changes in the principles of executing fire manoeuvre, forces and equipment. The *FAS* elements of the active forces will generally have a dual capability – fire support and emergency support, while the reserve forces will require significant time for force generation and training.

The *FAS* structures will have a modular architecture, which, under unique command, adapted to the volume and type of structure, will have the flexibility

and ability to respond to any type of threat. The multitude and variety of organisation charts, articulated by integrating structures with different roles, sizes, equipment and nationalities, will be the main feature of the artillery structures within warfare operations. As part of the mission, the *FAS* structures will execute force protection tasks and will adapt the “*insider threat*” management to the specifics of their own structures.

The *FAS* will provide the main platforms of the land forces for A2/AD engagement. In addition, this system will be the primary means of kinetic engagement of enemy targets in urban area, which will involve, in addition to the alignment of techniques, tactics and procedures to this reality, the procurement of the most suitable weapon system/ammunition for such missions. The “*know how*” from current operations will be improved and the lessons learned system will be used to correct both the training platform and the way to optimise the use of human, financial and material resources.

There will be more and more emergency situations and requirements for restoring the public order and the *FAS* structures will have to play an important part in them.

At society level, the military structure will no longer be perceived as an “*instrument for foreign policy*” but as a security and support provider in emergency situations. From this point of view, the *FAS* structures will need to be able to take action in emergency situations (earthquakes, floods, fires etc.), through adequate training and equipment.

In addition, in an integrated manner or by deploying some capabilities, the *FAS* will support other security forces and public order forces in restoring the public order in a particular state or region.

In conclusion, the *Field Artillery*, as a *system*, will face the direct influence of the evolution of the security environment. As a “*system of systems*”, it will continue to be the main combat support component of the manoeuvre forces, with a much more pronounced and better-defined role in terms of coordination of kinetic and non-kinetic actions, in order to obtain the planned/desired, lethal and non-lethal, effects. Moreover, the *FAS* will develop a parallel capability that enables it to intervene in emergency situations.

Those armed forces that will understand the new role, place and importance of *FAS* for the armed forces and the civil society, by facilitating the necessary doctrinaire and structural adaptations, funding training and procurement programmes, will make it possible for any type of operation or intervention to be successful.

RADIO SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT IN THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES (II)

Colonel Dr Liviu-Viorel BÎRSAN

Between 1920 and 1940, the organisation of the operating mode in signal units in the Romanian military, regarding the use of radio frequencies, was mainly theoretical, through books and articles. These addressed the Communications Plan and the Communications Order, which contained tables with characteristics of radio stations, encryption and decryption tables.

Because it was found that the procurement of communications equipment was not done in a coordinated manner, each branch and service importing the means it considered appropriate, the Communications Commission, as a specialised body, was established in February 1926, in order to provide the electromagnetic compatibility in the Armed forces.

Keywords: *electromagnetic field; Marconi; radio communications; telegraphy*

The next conference took place in Madrid, in 1932. Delegations from 77 countries¹⁸ attended the conference. At the same time and also in Madrid took place a conference on issues of telegraphy. The two conferences, on telegraphy and on radiotelegraphy, merged and the International Telecommunication Union – ITU¹⁹ was established, a body dealing with specific aspects of radio, telegraph and telephone. At the conference, it was decided to create three regulations on radio, telephony and telegraphy. The new regulation on the CW²⁰ incorporated the one from 1927 and improved it. A more detailed table of frequency allocation was established, containing footnotes related to the allocations that were not included in the table. The call letters allotted to Romania were changed, becoming YOA to YRZ.

Before the outbreak of the Second World War, one of the most important and complex ITU Conferences was held in Cairo, in 1938. It was actually the first conference that reunited all known services – radio, telegraph, telephone.

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¹⁸ Romania was represented by Theodore Tănăsescu, an engineer from the Ministry of Communications who was also a Professor at the Polytechnic School in Bucureşti (A. N.)

¹⁹ The term *telecommunication* defined any type of transmission, emission and reception of signals, images and sounds or communications of any kind made by radio cables that passed through any electromagnetic system.

²⁰ Radio Regulation (A. N.).

Delegations from 70 countries²¹ attended the conference. Analysing the Conference Declaration, it can be noted that the significant changes were aimed at the limitation of the use of spark transmitters, the allocation of frequencies for civil aviation intercontinental routes, the introduction of aeronautical public correspondence service, the emergence of the concept of tolerance in the frequency stability of transmitters, the request for emitted carrier harmonics attenuation and the introduction of the concept of *bandwidth*. Moreover, the table of frequency allocations was completed up to 200 Mc/s, frequency bands for space research were designated up to 300 Mc/s, and frequency bands for television²² were assigned. It is established the obligation for those countries that install ground, aviation or radio stations to notify the ITU. It is specified the bandwidth that can be occupied to broadcast a service. For example, telegraphy may use a band equal to twice the modulation frequency, and broadcasting 15-20 Kc/s.



Romania reserves the right to use the national broadcasting station in the band 150-160 Kc/s, more specifically the emission frequency is maintained at 155 Kc/s for the transmitter installed in Bod, and the internationally allotted call letters remain the same, YOA-YRZ.

At national level, in the interwar period, the military and civilian decision-makers made timid attempts to keep up with the development of wireless telegraphy and, later, of radiocommunications. We can mention the fact that, in 1919, at the initiative of the Ministry of War, a meeting was held between military and civilian authorities in order to establish the institution where the department managing wireless telegraphy should operate.

Although, initially, the committee decided that the department should be established, as until then, at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the resolution of the Minister of War²³ requiring that the wireless telegraphy service should be

²¹ The Romanian delegation consisted of 3 members, led by Eng. Theodore Tănăsescu.

²² The first television broadcast was made in Britain, in 1926, followed by the USA (1928), France (1929) and the USSR (1934). In 1936, television was already a reality, because *Deutsche Post* made a live broadcast of some phases of the Berlin Olympics. A flowering period was after 1950, when many countries developed their own television stations, having as basis the television industry (A. N.).

²³ The Resolution of the Minister of War states: *“The project is unilateral and its flaw is that it does not consider the evolution in time. We cannot set up institutions under the control of the Ministry of War ... The world, in general, after this great and bitter war is fed up with militarisation (...) The TFF service should depend on the Ministry of Communications (...) As there is no such ministry, it should depend*

established at the Ministry of Communications was realistic and with great perspective. Thus, the Ministry of Communications was established in 1920, taking over the General Post Office, Telegraphs and Telephones Directorate from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The civil domain started to organise and establish specialised structures, in accordance with the regulations of international conferences and taking into consideration the evolution of radio equipment. Thus, PTT General Directorate was established as a radio-technical directorate (1926). It later became radiocommunications (1929) and the analysed domain was regulated by specific legislation²⁴. To monitor the entire activity of radio and broadcasting, to record and control the equipment in the country, to check the systems in service functioning according to the authorised parameters without causing interference to other stations, within the PTT General Directorate was established the first monitoring structure, actually an office. The activity of control and goniometry related to using all radio resources had to be made in agreement with the General Staff.


An important role in the development of the sector in Romania²⁵ is the introduction of the broadcasting service, which confirms the importance of radio spectrum use in the civilian existing applications area. The first radio broadcasts were made on the wavelength of 401,6 meters, from the studio in the Radio Broadcasting Society, where the station itself was installed. Subsequently, that activity diversified by the installation of new radio stations, with improved parameters, in 1929, in Băneasa, on medium waves (wavelength 364,5 m), in 1936, in Bod, near Braşov, on long waves (wavelength 1875 m), and, in 1940, a station on ultra short waves; the first regional radio station, Radio Moldova, was established in Iaşi, in 1941.

In the armed forces, the number and importance of radio equipment grew, the specialised structures adapting and evolving accordingly. The Specialised Battalion turned, in 1919, into the Specialised Regiment, including a Wireless

on the General Posts and Telegraphs Directorate, where a Special Service should be established, a service where the advisory body stipulated in this paper, should be operational, in which the Ministry of War should be represented by the delegate of land and naval forces. The Armed Forces that now have specialists educated and trained during the war, should collaborate to organise and manage the service, both in general interest and in the interest of military operations ... that will take place in our country in the future ..., so that military interests can be fully met ... – according to the Romanian Military Archives, the General Inspectorate of the Engineer Corps collection, file no. 962, p. 293.

²⁴ *Law on the Installation and Use of Radio Stations*, in 1925, regulates inter alia: the exploitation of radio-electric service, the right to transmit or receive signals, images or sounds, the types of radio stations, the status of military stations, the way to obtain operating permits etc. (A. N.).

²⁵ The National Radio Broadcasting Station was inaugurated on 1 November 1928 at 17.00, with the message “*Hello, Hello, this is Radio Bucureşti*” after three years of testing, formalities, fundraising (in November 1926 it was a public subscription and the National Bank completed the necessary amount of money in January 1928).



Telegraphy Battalion. The Specialised Regiment was called, in 1923, the Signal Regiment and, in 1928, the 1st Signals Regiment, including a Wireless Telegraphy Battalion with a Wireless Telegraphy Company and two Engineering companies. In February 1932, the 2nd and the 3rd Signal Regiments and the Signal Battalion for mountain operations were established, and in April the same year, the Signal Brigade was set up, subordinating the three regiments and the battalion. At that time the brigade was under the General Inspectorate of Engineering. In 1942, in full World War, the Signal Command was established, although the signal units were on the front. An important step in the evolution

and importance of organising radio communications and, implicitly, spectrum management was made in July 1943, when the Signal Command was subordinated to the General Staff in terms of organisation, mobilisation and instruction, for the other aspects being dependent on the State Undersecretariat for the Army. On that occasion, the education and training institutions in the field were subordinated, the structure being responsible for the technical training aspects of the entire army. For the analysed domain it is important to note that, among specific tasks, the Radio Signal Service under the Signal Command was responsible, during peacetime, for the wavelength allocation for various state authorities.

During 1920-1940, in Signal units, the activity related to the use of radio frequencies was organised only theoretically, through papers and articles²⁶. There were discussions about the Signal Plan and the Signal Order, which should have appendices containing tables describing the characteristics of radio stations, encryption and decoding tables etc.

It is worth mentioning that, because it was found that the signal assets acquisition was not coordinated, each branch and service importing the equipment that they considered appropriate for **ensuring electromagnetic compatibility**, at the level of the armed forces was established, in February 1926, as a specialised structure, the Signal Commission²⁷, which “*will study all requests from military units*

²⁶ The following can be mentioned: *Wireless Telegraphy and Telephony* by Commander Bucholtzer (1926) *Interim Guidelines on the Organisation and Operation of the Links and Broadcasts in Wartime* by General Constantin Eliade *et al* (1927), *Radio-Telegraphy* by Lieutenant Colonel N. Tiberiu Petrescu (1928).

²⁷ It consisted of one delegate, preferably a specialist in wireless telegraphy and telephony, from the inspectorates of artillery, aviation, navy, infantry, the 11th Superior Technical Directorate,

and services ... to purchase the type of wireless telegraphy and telephony that complied from the technical point of view, especially in terms of characteristics, with those needed on the battlefield”²⁸ The Ministerial Decision that established the structure stipulated that no type of radio set could be purchased or proposed to be purchased without having been studied and tested by the commission.

An important element in the development of specialised education was the fact that the staff was adequately trained on the equipment they were operating. Is worth mentioning that, in the period 1936-1937, radio networks were built for training purposes, lasting for up to 25 days, real traffic being conducted at considerable distances between different echelons. On this occasion, *finding the unauthorised use of some radio frequencies*, the **Great General Staff Radio Service**, the structure with responsibilities in the field, brought to the attention of the General Engineering Inspectorate that, according to the International Telecommunication Convention in Madrid, the wavelengths reserved for aviation²⁹, to protect aircraft in flight and direct them were banned and “*had to be protected by a band of 9 Kc/s necessary for the aviation receivers*”³⁰.

The procurement of radio equipment for wireless telegraphy companies was difficult and the equipment was insufficient compared to the military needs and size. Thus, in 1924, an auction was organised for 14 Levy type radio stations. They arrived in 1927, and in 1937 they were already scrapped. Starting in 1931, radio stations were imported from Marconi Company, and until 1938 there were about 2 000 stations, covering only 40% of requirements.

The Second World War found the Romanian Armed Forces poorly equipped as far as radio transmissions were concerned. That is why, only the links with the division echelons could be provided. The radio stations in the inventory were operational in long, medium and short wavelengths. During the war, and especially during the campaign in the East, with German support, were purchased import stations for only the troops deployed on the front, covering only the strategic echelons and tank units needs.

As relevant working documents in the analysed field, during military operations, radio stations established a scheme of radio links, mentioning the work frequencies in Kc/s or meters, depending on the station type and control panel.

the 4th Engineering Directorate and the General Staff – according to *Monitorul Oastei*, the Statutory Part, no. 4 on 1 March 1926.

²⁸ *Monitorul Oastei*, the Statutory Part, no. 4 on 1 March 1926.

²⁹ 900bm, 1b071bm, 1b153bm, 1b175bm, 53bm (A. N.).

³⁰ Ministry of National Defence Archive, General Engineering Inspectorate, file no. 705/1936 to 1937, p. 346.

At the armed forces level there were no specialised structures for the management of radio frequencies, the specific activity being carried out by the staff that organised the radio transmissions. During the military actions there were difficulties in ensuring electromagnetic compatibility and interoperability between own radio equipment and that belonging to allies, because the equipment was not homogeneous, the existing radio stations having uneven technical parameters as they came from different vendors³¹.

During the military actions in the campaign in the East, with the establishment, in July 1942, of the Signal Command as part of the Great General Headquarters, the specific issues of radio spectrum management were managed by the personnel from the Radio Operations Office and the Radio Goniometry and Listening Service. The aspects of collaboration with the German partner were solved through special conferences, the results being recorded in documents that, among other issues, contained the coordinating elements for the organisation of radio communications³².




Figure 1: The 11th Infantry Division - Signal Commander - telephone network on 14 November 1944

³¹ Most radio stations in the Army were made in England (Marconi), Germany (Telefunken and Lorentz), and Poland and Serbia. In the Air and the Naval Forces, the radio stations were of Dutch, British and German origin.

³² The *Sommerende* (late summer) Plan, issued on 5 November 1942 by the GGH, Echelon 1, which provided the links between the GGH and the Great General Staff, and the large units and units on the front, was prepared following a bilateral staff conference, as an annex of a more developed German

Before and during the Second World War, the radio spectrum management experienced a great effervescence, with implications for the development of services and applications. Radio communications made an impressive leap with the discovery of vacuum tubes, the so-called emitting diodes, triodes, conventional dual grid tube and three grid tube, then the transistor, culminating in the emergence of integrated circuits. These findings led to new uses of the transmission medium, the electromagnetic field. It should be noted that, in the analysed period, new weapon systems and assets, such as radar, aircraft, submarine, tank, rocket, as well as television, space communications or amateur radio communications emerged and developed³³. Radio frequency bands began to be occupied and exploited intensively, being even crowded. Perhaps, like never before, between the two wars, radio communications deeply penetrated the economic domain, everyday life of the people, and had new applications in the military.

An important aspect in this respect, a consequence of the unprecedented development of military aviation during the war, causing a qualitative and quantitative leap of civil aviation after the war, is the establishment, within the Chicago Convention of December 1944, of the *International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)*. The purpose of this attempt was to achieve a multilateral agreement to govern civil aviation worldwide, including by the harmonised use of the allocated radio frequency bands, a document that should meet the economic and technological challenges of the post-war era, the safety and effectiveness requirements of aviation that developed at fast pace.

Following the Second World War, the global and regional activities regulating the use of radio spectrum were resumed, in close connection with the technological developments in the field. In this context, successive meetings were held. In 1947, at the Conference held in Atlanta, the USA, the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) was established and a new Regulation on Radiocommunications was adopted, which was reviewed successively in 1959, 1968, 1979 and 1982. An important aspect introduced by the Regulation in 1947 is the division of the world in three areas of allocation of frequency bands, something still valid today. Moreover, it was decided that, starting in 1948, the Table of Frequency Allocations developed in 1912 should become mandatory for all member states, and the headquarters of the International Telecommunication Union was established in Geneva.

radio plan – D. Cristea, Al. Oșca, *Transmisiunile – suport pentru conducerea militară (1877-1947)*, Editura AĪSM, București, 2003, p. 224.

³³ In Romania, in 1926, it was established the first radio club, and, in 1936, it was established the Romanian Shortwave Amateur Association (A. N.).

In 1992, the IRAC became part of the ITU, renamed ITU-R. ITU continued to organise World Radiocommunication Conferences – WRCs, the last being held in 2012. Romania has attended most of the conferences, the national delegations including military experts in the field.

After the Second World War, Romania continues to adopt regulations in the field of radiocommunications, IRAC and ITU.

At national level, the spectrum management issues were handled by the Ministry of Communications and Public Works, based on the International Telecommunication Convention (Madrid 1932) and Radiocommunications Regulation (Cairo 1938). Later, in 1951, it is the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications that, among other tasks, performed the *“Government policy on the functioning of (...) Radiocommunications, Broadcasting and on the functioning and development of broadcasting facilities”*³⁴. It included a General Radio Directorate, having direct responsibilities in the analysed domain and directly participating with experts in the global and regional conferences.

During the period March 1957 – December 1965, the domain specific tasks were undertaken by the General Directorate of Telecommunications in the Department of Posts and Telecommunications, structure created within the new Ministry of Transport and Communications. After 1965, following several reorganisations, the specialised structures of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and, starting in 1973, the Frequency Office/the General Directorate of Posts and Telecommunications of the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications being in turn responsible for the radio spectrum management. After 1990, the radio spectrum became the responsibility of the Ministry of Communications, which has changed its name³⁵ over time; the management of this resource was the task of the General Inspectorate of Radiocommunications, a specialised structure of the civilian administration, since 1991³⁶; since 2002, the regulatory duties have been undertaken by the National Regulatory Authority for Communications. Currently, the responsibilities for managing and regulating

³⁴ Art. 1 of the Council of Ministers Decision no. 294 on 10 April 1951.

³⁵ Subsequently, it became the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology; currently, the Ministry for Information Society (A. N.).

³⁶ The institution has also undergone reorganisation, becoming, successively, the General Inspectorate of Communications; since 2002, the General Inspectorate for Communications and Information Technology, an institution subordinated to the ministry in the field; in 2007, it merged with the National Regulatory Authority for Communications and Information Technology; in 2008, it became the National Authority for Communications, institution subordinated to the Government. Since 2009, following reorganisation, it is the National Authority for Management and Regulation in Communications, currently, ANCOM (A. N.).

the entire radio spectrum are fulfilled by the National Authority for Management and Regulation in Communications, an autonomous public authority under the control of the Romanian Parliament.

Regulatory issues are achieved by laws and rules, monitoring the national implementation of the Constitution³⁷ and the Convention developed by ITU³⁸, supplemented by the provisions of administrative regulations that govern the use of telecommunications and establish relationships between all countries namely the international telecommunications and radiocommunications regulations, the final acts of the world radiocommunications conferences and related documents.

In 1998³⁹, the first National Table of Frequency Allocation – NTFA was established, a very important document for the radio spectrum management, which, among other aspects, stipulates how to allocate spectrum, groups of users, types of services and applications admitted, and highlights exceptions; it is the outcome of the joint work of all the institutions responsible for spectrum management in Romania, this document being successively revised in 2003, 2009 and 2010. A contribution to the development of this national document was made by Colonel Eng. Nicolae Spătaru, the representative of the Ministry of National Defence in the Interdepartmental Commission for Radiocommunications, a personality acknowledged in the field⁴⁰.

At interdepartmental level, to assist national authorities in the activity of radio spectrum management and of national coordination of the radio spectrum management so that it can be used rationally and effectively, it continuous⁴¹ the functioning of a commission in which the institutions responsible for the management of this resource are represented. It has had different names

³⁷ In case of discrepancy between a provision of the Constitution and a provision of the Convention or administrative regulations, the Constitution shall prevail, and in the event of a dispute between a provision of the Convention and a provision of administrative regulations, the Convention shall prevail (A. N.).

³⁸ In force in Romania by *Law no. 76 on 8 November 1993, on the Ratification of the Constitution and the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union signed in Geneva on 22 December 1992* (A. N.).

³⁹ Parts of the document were approved, in different stages, through the orders of the Minister of Communications no. 261/1993, no. 43/1994, no. 142/1995 and no. 291/1998, as well as through the Order of the President of the National Agency for Communications and Information no. 104/1999 (N. A.).

⁴⁰ He is the only military man nominated as outstanding personality in the field of communications and information technology in Romania, according to the *WHO'S WHO, IT & C ROMANIA*, Editura RA, Monitorul Oficial, 2011, p. 232. He is the first Chief of the Military Radio Spectrum Management Agency within the General Staff (between 2001 and 2004), having a valuable contribution to meeting the necessary conditions related to the adaptation and implementation of the regulatory framework of the MND in view of Romania's accession to NATO and the EU (A. N.).

⁴¹ Activity initiated in 1914.

in time as follows: the Superior Commission for Radiocommunications, before 1990, today the Interdepartmental Commission for Radiocommunications.

In the Ministry of National Defence, the Signal Command – the nominated structure in charge of radiofrequencies management, was disbanded in 1945, becoming the Signal Brigade, which, in 1949, was the Armed Forces Signal Command. In 1951, the Command was named the Signal Corps Command (SCC), which, after several transformations, became, in 1994, the Signal, Information and Electronics Command, and, in 1997, it was renamed the Communications and IT Command, a name it has today, too.

The signal troops remain in close relationships with their fellow civilians working for the use of the equipment so that it can work without mutual interference in different bands. Ever since its reestablishment, the Signal Command had responsibilities in the field of managing radio frequencies allocated to the Ministry of National Defence. Depending on the evolution and available radio equipment, in the Command organisational chart there were, over time, structures having specific responsibilities, starting with Radio Section, in 1951, the **Department of Radiofrequency, Electromagnetic Compatibility and Military Radiocommunications**, in 1979, with the mission to achieve a fair radio frequency allocation, thus allowing any type of radio transmitter to work.

During the process of the Armed Forces reorganisation, in 1997, the Department of Radiofrequency, Electromagnetic Compatibility and Military Radiocommunications became part of the Communications and Information Directorate in the General Staff, being transformed into Radio Frequency and Electromagnetic Compatibility Office. Later, considering Romania's NATO membership requirements, in 2001, based on the core of Radio Frequency and Electromagnetic Compatibility Office, the Military Radio Spectrum Management Agency was established. The role of the Agency, which is set ever since its foundation, is to provide spectrum resources for military radio-electronic equipment, without mutual interference and while avoiding disruption of civil communication equipment.

The Armed Forces have had very diverse radio equipment and electronic resources as follows: low, medium and high power radio stations, radio relay stations with low and high capacity, and systems for providing air and sea radio navigation, radar stations that are able to discover air and naval targets, missile guidance systems, satellite link stations, satellite navigation stations etc.

In this context, to clarify all aspects of spectrum management, at the Ministry of National Defence level have been issued orders and regulations developed in accordance with existing national and international normative acts, covering all domains. It is worth mentioning Order M-64, in 1966, *regarding the record of radio electronic assets and the radio and radio relay operating characteristics in the armed forces*, which was replaced, in 1982, with General Order no. 40, *regarding the radiocommunication activity in the Romanian Armed Forces*⁴². These documents set out the framework for the status of radio-electrical transmitters in the military, for the application of the provisions of internal normative acts and international agreements on radiocommunications, as well as for ensuring the electromagnetic compatibility of military radio equipment, and between them with those belonging to other institutions.



⁴² It was replaced in 2011 with M-31, order regarding the responsibilities for ensuring electromagnetic capabilities in the Ministry of National Defence (A. N.).

MEANS TO COUNTER PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SPECIFIC ACTIONS

Dr Ioana Valeria ALEXE

In the literature, in addition to defining psychological warfare, an important place is held by analysing its components, sources and forms. Psychological warfare actions stem from the possibility to influence people's minds based on theories and concepts related to psychosociology. Psychological warfare is thus a true war of intelligences employing manipulation of information, misinformation and intoxication with information, leading to the opponent mental destabilisation, mental influence, and deterrence. Psychological warfare takes into consideration all the details related to the enemy target, beliefs, convictions, vulnerabilities, likes and dislikes. Once the target motivations are known, psychological operations can be carried out.

Keywords: *psychological warfare; aggression; counter-operations; security; misinformation*

- it is grafted onto innocent human activities such as: information through mass media, citizens association to achieve common goals etc.;
- it aims to achieve goals that are difficult to imagine by outsiders.

Operation *Desert Storm*, conducted in 1991 (NATO-mandated) against Iraq by an international coalition led by the United States, highlighted the landmarks of future operations taking place in the field of military action. Practically, the military operations that followed 1991 got enhanced by exploiting the new opportunities

In a memo written to then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, on 24 October 1953, former President of the USA, Dwight Eisenhower, defined psychological warfare as anything “*from singing of a beautiful anthem up to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage*”¹.

Psychological aggression seems invisible to most people in a state because of the following causes:

- it is conducted in secret by people who do not seem aggressive at all and who do not draw attention by doing anything unusual;
- it uses “*weapons*” without noise, borrowed from ordinary human life: information, words, images;

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¹ www.psihologiaonline.ro

provided by the development and upgrading of new technologies. Technology changes the physiognomy of warfare, but not the essence. Sooner or later, new technologies get generalised and gaps only provoke the search for other vectors of spreading violence as well as the identification of new vulnerabilities. Regardless of their competitiveness, *“new technologies do not trigger war; the more competitive they are the larger-scale the war is”*². Today’s information explosion, developments in technology and military affairs, growing gap between the actors in the world will change, over time, the nature, physiognomy, scope and duration of war. Political arrangements around the war get further complicated while the formulas of imposing the will among states get increasingly subtle. However, the number of victims and the proportion of destruction will lower. It means that war will always remain an act of resorting to armed violence in changing civilisation and culture contexts. It cannot be isolated from the political context and the culture that generates it.

Even if today war is sometimes understood as the end of policy, it remains, however, an instrument of policy, a continuation of policy or, as some theorists still consider, a result of a political power unable to control the predisposition to confrontation. The military engagement between two entities, even when spontaneous (some armed conflicts were triggered on a whim), is always based on a decision, and the decision is always political. As a possible solution to resolve, through armed struggle, tensions, crises and conflicts, war begins to be less and less accepted by states and especially by their population. Although it is still a practice in resolving disputes, people are more and more convinced that such a solution is not the best. Gerard Chaliand states that *“the Europeans emerged from the First World War with a sense of disgust, tempered for the winners by the often bitter taste of victory, and augmented for losers by a painful sense of frustration”*³.

The great change has crystallised in Europe since the First World War but it has become possible only with the evolution of spectacular combat technology in terms of enhancing precision and effect on target. From now on, war ceases to be perceived from a single perspective: its price is too high and it causes too much suffering. Human life is valued more than before.

We expect that, in the future, given the process of shaping economic and cultural civilisations, war should change its philosophy, becoming more complex, with many branches, better adapted to political, economic and social systems, and to the processes specific to the future society. As far as the violent component of war, armed confrontation, is concerned the nuclear and information age

² Nicolae Dolghin, *Studii de securitate și apărare*, vol. 4, *Spațiul și viitorul războiului*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2007, p. 52.

³ Gerard Chaliand, *Antologie mondiale de la stratégie*, Robert La Font, Paris, 1990, p. 9.

will result in substantial mutations in the military art. However, its essence and spirit will remain the same.

The armed confrontation objectives and goals become more diversified, complementary or opposite, exclusivist or just contradictory, depending on interests, and they will consist of: seizing and maintaining strategic initiative, especially in the field of information and striking systems; cyberspace, virtual space and outer space control; exerting influence to have unlimited access to global reserves of strategic raw materials, especially oil reserves; the rule of law; crisis management and control; stabilisation; keeping and even imposing order in an area of the world, based on democratic values; eradicating the causes of pathogenic conflictuality; protecting the environment and life.

Conversely, there will be the armed confrontations aimed at bringing division, maintaining the state of confusion, creating a continuous and diffuse belligerence, profitable for cross-border, non-state, terrorist, anti-civilisational criminal groups or networks; economic, political and information control over regions, areas and even the whole world, energy resources control.

These are only a few of the facts pertaining to war policy that configure the conflict sphere, the space, environment, and even the type of confrontation. Future war is expected to be far beyond the scope of the armed violence in the theatre or, more precisely, the theatre will get extended and flexible, so that, in the end, it seems that there will be almost nothing from what has been understood for centuries by war phenomenon. Until such a stage, the way seems to be very long, so the phrase *“future war”* seems not to find, at least for now, a very optimistic response. It remains that, taking it even as fatality, people can mitigate the destructive effects, some of which could compromise the existence of civilisation in the long run or for good. *“That is why, when one speaks of the future war, one should not necessarily understand the presence or absence of this phenomenon in the life of human society, but the relation between different types of confrontation, violence level, forces and means employed in the armed confrontation, engagement system, spatial and temporal extent of actions and operations, their characteristics, effects and, of course, consequences”*⁴.

War and its strategy have always been dependent on economic development, technology, information, policy option and international situation. Thus a spiral model has been created in which political, economic, cultural, social, informational, military, domestic and international factors have been ordered in a DNA-type double helix, defining the war type, its nature, predominance of one or the other factors, all types of conditions and determinants.

⁴ M. Mureşan., C. Ţenu, L. Stăncilă, *Operaţiunile întrunite în războiul viitorului*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 11.

Unlike the previous centuries, when the analysis of war was limited to a mere description of events and determinants, according to which there was always a party that won and one that lost, in a limited projection based on *yes-no* logic, the outcome of the future war will have multiple facets, corresponding to a variable, fluid, unstable reality, as it is known between yes and no there are infinite possibilities. The trend has already been confirmed by the reality of the conflicts in the last two decades, and the conclusion that emerges is that no war can fully resolve all the problems it causes. Always, following a military conflict, both parties win and lose not necessarily in complementary proportion (what is lost by one party is won by the other one), but in a nuanced and complex manner. Victory often includes a substantial percentage of loss and defeat is not always devoid of some gain. The loser, especially if it does not trigger the war, being a victim of aggression, enjoys political, economic, diplomatic and even military support on the part of international community and some interested states.

Progress in mathematics, physics, social and political sciences, in psychology and sociology has influenced economic theory and not only. For several decades, strategic zero-sum game theory has been replaced with chaos theory, according to which the evolution of a phenomenon largely depends on baseline variation, environmental conditions and system behaviour. The only certainty in this theory is that nothing can be and is sure in this world. *“Mechanistic determinism, which governed the world from the Renaissance to the end of the 20th century, is replaced or completed with a dynamic, complex determinism, according to which it is not reality that should follow rigid, simplistic, preconceived equations, but the equations should be modelled following the complexity of life and shape its perspective, and the revolution in military affairs proves the validity of this truth in the conduct of armed confrontation, too”*⁵. As far as war is concerned, we can draw a dramatic conclusion: war seems to be permanent, while peace, as the strategic balance between the confronting forces, is transitory, timid and relative. This is the truth, even if it seems neither encouraging nor acceptable, and even less bearable.

War is a violent act, a crisis taken to the extreme, a crossing over a threshold limit, a flow over the edges. War means violence. Conscious, deliberate, developed, conditioned and assumed up to a certain point violence, whose purpose may be to destroy, to impose, to subject but also to live and survive.

The war of the future will be largely dependent on computers and intelligence services. War has always been a complex phenomenon, although its essence, that willingness to use armed violence in power relationships, has remained unchanged. The complexity of current technologies *“has generated new contradictory conflicts”*⁶.

⁵ M. Mureşan, *Pentru ce fel de război ne pregătim?*, in *Impact Strategic*, no. 1/2004, p. 34.

⁶ Nicolae Dolghin, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

After 11 September 2001, the moment that shattered many of the existing ideas of security and defence, a new vision, a revolution in the field of defence and security has been experienced. The three pillars that lie at the basis of this new concept are:

1. deterrence in critical theatres, with the option for a major counter-offensive aimed at conquering the aggressor capital and toppling the regime;
2. capability-based approach, where the focus is on identifying how the USA might be threatened and what should be done against the threat;
3. identification of own vulnerabilities so as not to allow them to be exploited by potential adversaries. (The latter pillar has been poorly estimated and analysed, probably due to the conviction of absolute supremacy).

It is well known that who has information has power. Identifying power with information reflects only half of the equation, the convenient one. The other half, the decisive one, should reflect the ability to turn information into power. *“Power components should be effective and political decision should rely primarily on them”*⁷. The more accurate information will be, the more realistic, more effective and responsible decision will be when getting power elements operational.

Future war will place armed combat in an extended environment. This environment will include, besides military characteristics, the political, economic, social, environmental, legal, diplomatic ones. Policymakers seek to avoid the firm decisions so necessary for planning, preferring diffuse strategies and actions.

Following the installation of informational relativity, unpredictable differences emerge between perceived and actual reality. Currently, considering the increasing dynamics of information as well as of economic, financial, military values, the apparently state of chaos can be easily managed and maintained by the main state actors in the world. The enhancement of data collection and analysis process so that data can become information is the priority of transformation strategies in the armed forces worldwide today. *“It is considered to have the most powerful impact on war and military operations because it aims to achieve information superiority”*⁸.

Information superiority triggers the emergence of conceptual developments combined with technological systems that will have profound spatial effects as follows:

- multi-sensitive systems – assure battle space availability and eliminate the unknown elements;
- engagement management systems in compliance with the battle space requirements;

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 77.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

- sensor-decision-execution networks, allowing precise instant strikes, cooperation, auto-synchronisation;
- increased opportunities for deception;
- decentralisation of decision-making process, which will reduce some vulnerabilities;
- achievement of command and control effectiveness;
- real-time identification of the places and moments with adverse developments;
- windows of opportunity management in the conduct of war and military actions.

Information supremacy as far as war is concerned will allow its monitoring across all concrete aspects of armed violence. It will provide the necessary conditions to manage the challenges generated by the fluidity and nonlinearity of the battle space as well as by the rapid pace of actions.

The global social system includes the political, economic and military subsystems. The armed forces represent the basic component of the military subsystem, being in a complex set of relationships with the other subsystems.

Society is considered to be a complex aggregate generated by the interaction of different social systems. Civil society is the expression of free forms of association – national, regional, local, professional, associations that are voluntary, democratic, tolerant and uncontrolled or manipulated by the state or political parties.

Civil-military relations are a key component of national security policy. *“The theory of civil-military relations is circumscribed by the civil contract, as military power regulator and national security provider”*⁹. The relationships between power, professionalism and ideology (says S. P. Huntington) make possible five ideal types of civil-military relations:

- anti-military ideology based on the military great political power and low professionalism;
- anti-military ideology based on the military reduced political power and low professionalism;
- anti-military ideology based on the military low power and high professionalism;
- pro-military ideology with great political power and high professionalism;
- pro-military ideology with low political power and high professionalism.

National security is an aggregate of political, economic, cultural and military measures intended to discourage any form of aggression and to safeguard national values and interests both domestically and internationally.

⁹ Nicolae Rotaru, *Criză și dialog*, Editura RAO, București, 2003, pp. 21-22.

Military thinking is defined as “politically conservative, ideologically realistic, patriotically nationalist, and internationally alarmist”¹⁰. Armed forces are neither entirely separate from nor fully integrated into the society. As occupation, “military profession and the armed forces are understood as being increasingly socially integrated and, consequently, they are subject to the pressure of the most dynamic factors of society – market rules”¹¹. Today, the problems of the military can be addressed only in close relation with those of the civil society, the relationship between the armed forces and society being the functional basis for a social system having three main areas of interest: democratic control, civil-military relations, and defence sector reform.

Psychological training is a fundamental dimension in creating the modern fighter, being complementary to general and specialised military training, thus providing the necessary psychological support to maximise the efficiency of the human resources involved in the training and education process. The last armed conflicts have highlighted that their psychological dimension, less known previously, has a great importance and role today. Therefore, the armed forces in the world, the Romanian Armed Forces included, have conceived and provided effective ways to increase combat capacity, which is essential to carry out the assigned missions. The image of modern fighter should not be reduced to the muscular “gorilla” type but it rather represents a strong personality, psychically and physically harmoniously developed, able to effectively demonstrate the information, energy and movement potential in the tactical field.

As the psychological branch has imposed as a distinct branch, and psychological warfare makes many victims among both soldiers and civilians, it is natural to treat the psychological foundations of armed combat.

Nowadays, the role of military psychologists in training combat subunits and units has become indisputable. Psychological weapon and adequate training of fighters to use or counteract its effects are more and more discussed. There are appreciated the “beliefs created by military psychologists, among commanders and trainers in the armed forces of the United States, United Kingdom and France, regarding the need to associate adequate psychological training (designed to create the military “mental strength” and reduce “mental losses”) with strategy and tactics modernisation, and high-precision smart weapons development. Morale is understood differently, the interpretations being dependent on the way many authors try to provide it with more or less psychological load”¹².

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 22.

¹¹ Apud Marian Niță, *Introducere în sociologia militară*, Editura INI, București, 1999, pp. 92-107.

¹² Ionel Stoianovici, *Moralul militarilor*, in *Spirit Militar Modern*, no. 1/2002, pp. 35-38.

The mental preparation for combat programmes include concepts and phrases as “*specific resilience*” or “*fourth branch*” attached to psychological branch, and the outcomes of this type of training became evident in the Persian Gulf War, military psychologists actually participating in it. Historically, the importance of psychological weapon increased when conflicts became ideological or changed into revolutions (the French Revolution, the fighting against colonial empires etc.), and it was especially highlighted in the two wars in the first half of the 20th century. Despite this relevance, over the millennia, the balance of losses on the front mentions human and material losses but none mentions “*mental losses*”.

Lately, psychology has consolidated its status as a science, and its role is increasingly acknowledged in the military studies, training and education. For example, “*American psychologists have completed the military history course with data derived from war documents, and their extensive and systematic work has resulted in studies, essays, other works, where historical investigations go hand in hand with contemporary problems of armed combat psychology*”¹³. “*The general principles of psychological assistance in combat also generate the ways of structuring the methods to control, dominate and treat combat stress and psychological combat trauma*”¹⁴. Among the methods employed to control combat stress, in general, and the effects of fear, panic, fatigue, lack of sleep, etc. the following can be mentioned: realistic assessment of combat situations; timely awareness and information; firm and resolute management; conversations with fighters; awareness of physical and mental stress; intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to remove the sense of fear; the sense of fear verbalisation, explanation, communication; introspection, reasons of fear externalisation; positive psychosocial climate; group cohesion, occupation, permanent activity; methods and techniques of psychotherapy; recreation, optimism, positive thinking. These methods are the most useful and effective ones employed by psychologists to solve and eliminate the dilemmas of the “*psychological trap*” which get manifest, in the form of combat stress, with the highest intensity in the first three to five days after the onset of combat actions.

Psychological assistance in combat is based on significant statistical research that has highlighted that in the first 1-2 days of combat the following losses are recorded: 20-25% represented by the dead, wounded, missing; 15-20% is the loss of mental nature. Of the 20-25% mentally affected, about a half can be included

¹³ Thomas Edward Lawrence (1888-1935), British Colonel. British agent in the Middle East during the First World War, with the task of organising and managing the Arab anti-Ottoman uprising. His journal, published under the title *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (abridged version *Revolt in the Desert*), evokes, using symbolic allusions, his life experience.

¹⁴ Excerpt from *Fundamente psihologice ale luptei armate*, Second Edition, revised and enlarged, Gabriel Dulea, Editura Universităţii de Apărare, Bucureşti, 2007, chapters 1-8.

in a short-term treatment near the theatre of operations, and the other half can be treated in specially designed units.

Medical-psychological groups were tasked with medical and psychotherapeutic care, working 2-5 km from the combat line, consisting of: 1 psychiatrist, 1-2 psychologists and 2-3 social workers.

In conclusion, it can be stated that there is no unitary and coherent theoretical system regarding the fighters psychological assistance in peacetime and in crisis situations.

If there is a military psychologist attached to the battalion command, the expertise and competence should be proper to the military psychologist responsibilities, namely: special expertise related to the military battle group and the warrior psychological problems; expertise in punctually evaluating, in terms of psychology, the missions and the psychological integrity of the group and the individuals mental capacity for the mission; ability to forecast losses in dependence on the personnel psycho-physical state; expertise in managing combat stress; expertise in treating psycho-traumas; *“ability to detect psychological attacks and expertise in countering the psychological problems of the military group in combat and the fighters”*¹⁵.

*“In the stage the organisation of combat and the experience of war are in our country, it is fundamental that military psychologists integrated into the battalions deployed in areas of operations should be able to gather information on psychology in combat and to disseminate this thoroughly structured information, as well as quantitative, qualitative, sociological, psycho-physiological and clinical aspects”*¹⁶. There are at least two situations in which detection and treatment can be performed by psychologists and by commanders having knowledge in combat psychology. They are stress disorder and combat fatigue, which, if not timely detected and treated can degenerate into major mental disorders whose treatment requires specialised medical intervention.

The concept of stress in modern psychophysiology was first formulated by Canadian physician Hans Selve. He had many opportunities to observe the state of stress in his patients being about to undergo surgical interventions. He found metabolism disorders as well as intense emotional stress. It is also evident in cases of *“psychological aggression”*. By language or behaviour, by serious psychological traumas such as those specific to combat conditions, the military psyche is affected. In contemporary military conflicts in the Gulf, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq, it was found that soldiers often tended to be passive during the decisive examination before the fight. In fact, they became anxious to enter the proper clash to release the entire inner mental load accumulated before the decisive battle.

¹⁵ *Ibidem.*

¹⁶ *Ibidem.*

The idea of the upcoming battle with the enemy mentally disturbed them. It is interesting to note that this condition, undermined by nervousness as by an obsessive syndrome, “ended up with the outbreak of fire”¹⁷.

Nowadays, psychological weapon has imposed as a distinct armed forces branch, and psychological warfare makes many victims among not only the military but also the civilians. T. E. Lawrence seems to have offered the most comprehensive image, rendered in writing, of the psychological weapon. “It is necessary – says Lawrence in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* – that, besides the consciousness of our people, who have the lead role, we should address, if possible, the consciousness of our enemies, and that of those who support us behind our combat lines, and that of those behind the enemy lines, waiting for the end of the battle, and, finally, that of neutral spectators. We will achieve victory, or better to say, we will find ways to reach it only by employing the psychological weapon”¹⁸. Starting from such a description, we can say that this weapon has been used, more or less consciously, for centuries. So far, the oldest data on its use in war are found in *The History* of Herodotus (c. 484-425 BC) and Themistocles (526-460 BC) is considered to be the first to use it, winning the resounding victory at Salamis (480 BC) against the Persian fleet.

For the “*the third wave*”, the mental preparation for combat programmes include concepts and phrases such as “*specific resilience*” or “*fourth branch*” attached to the psychological weapon, and the results of training fighters in this field became obvious in the Persian Gulf War, in which military psychologists actually participated.

“*Psychological defence is achieved, among population, by forming some convictions related to the justice of security policy by involving the government in avoiding and discouraging possible psychological aggressions*”¹⁹. Moreover, it is true that “*population is aware of the need for psychological defence but it is not sufficiently informed by those with responsibilities in the field. We can say that there is a psychosocial support for psychological defence but it is not capitalised on*”²⁰. Maybe we should take action in this respect!

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¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Ibidem* see note 13.

¹⁹ Tudora Sima, *Fenomene psihosociale contemporane*, Editura Victor, București, 2004, p. 254.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 255.

FROM THE 19TH CENTURY'S MILITARY MODERNISM TO THE 21ST CENTURY'S SECURITY MODERNITY

Colonel BEng Daniel-Nicolae BĂNICĂ

The security environment of the past, present and future is marked by complex challenges, economic, social, cultural or financial, being thus very unpredictable. Therefore, the configuration and typology of warfare is very often influenced by the developments in the security environment. The accelerated pace of technological progress and the way it disseminates provide indications on the way the future warfare will look like.

Over time there have been important military transformations aiming at modernisation. These developments, combined with the economic, geopolitical and demographic ones, seem to make this world a more dangerous and less stable place than before. In this context, the role and quality of the military factor are decisive in maintaining peace and stability at regional and global level.

Keywords: *modernism; warfare; military conflicts; security*

I. Background and Milestones

The year 2014, marked on 15 August by the commemoration of 300 years since the death of our great patriot and Christian Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu and all his four sons, who chose the supreme sacrifice instead of giving up their Orthodox Christian faith, is full of historical significance, for both the military domain and the Romanian society. Thinking back to certain events that marked the existence of the Romanian society, in general, and of the Romanian Armed Forces, in particular, we cannot ignore the 155 years since the establishment, in 1859, of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, when Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza created the first command structure of Romania's modern army.

A quick review of the events reminds us, in 2014, of a series of events that have greatly influenced these past 155 years: 100 years since the outbreak of the Great War, 75 years since the outbreak of the Second World War, 65 years since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, on 4 April 1949, in Washington, in its first form, by 14 European nations, the USA and Canada, 25 years since the fall

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of the Berlin wall and the December 1989 Romanian Revolution, when Romania regained its freedom and its possibility to reaffirm itself as a democratic and European nation; 10 years since our country joined NATO, marked by the supreme sacrifice of 26 Romanian soldiers who fell in military operations abroad and by the 40 soldiers wounded and, last but not least, 7 years since our country's accession to the European Union.

Throughout time, most military confrontations were conducted according to the third principle of physics, namely the action-reaction principle. However, it took a long time, thousands of years, for the confrontation to shift from the direct contact type to the non-contact war of today¹.

As far as the methods of using the weapons in the armed fight² are concerned, they began to be more and more diversified as the weapons' speed of movement towards the target and of forces to the confrontation point increased, and the armament range and lethality developed.

The evolution of military actions and operations since the War of Independence up to the present has seen rapid development in all three environments, mainly in the air environment, with an emphasis on winning the space component.

Throughout time, military confrontations have been based on generally the same concepts, the differences between them and mainly their intensity being determined in most situations by the degree of science development of that time, the existing technologies and the logistics and financial possibilities support.

The concept of *integrated military operations*, in its modern version, manifested as such only during the First World War, when air operations were added to the combined land and naval operations. Later, during the Second World War, the concept of integrated military operations was developed through a superior coordination of the military services, due to the development and improvement of communications systems. After the end of the *Cold War*, expeditionary warfare and parallel war concepts were re-discovered and updated. After the 1990s, influenced by the revolution in military affairs, new concepts were dealt with such as effect-based operations and network-centric warfare. At the beginning of the 2010s, the concepts of *High Value Targets* and *Time Sensitive Targets* were approached.

In the aftermath of the First World War, the Soviet Union was among the first countries to use the principle of "*my enemy's enemy is my friend*", considered to be a pragmatic one. On 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union chose to sign

¹ Mihail Orzeacă, *Războiul continuu*, Editura Militară, 2011, p. 208.

² *Ibid.*, p. 209.

the Non-aggression Pact with Germany (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) instead of an alliance with France and the United Kingdom against Germany, although Stalin knew, from studying Hitler's *Mein Kampf*³ – that the “vital space” that National-Socialists needed was sought within USSR.

During the *Cold War* (“the war that did not take place”), both actors – USA (in NATO since 1949) and Soviet Union (in the Treaty of Warsaw since 1955) – prepared intensively for a military confrontation that they really did not want. Between 1947 and 1990, the arms race absorbed huge financial, material and other resources just because each side feared that the opponent could acquire supremacy and thus be tempted to trigger aggression in order to eliminate the rival for world supremacy⁴. “Both powers watched for a perfect balance of terror, as the nuclear balance was called, (...) in Geneva, the opponents had become partners in maintaining the stable balance”⁵.

After the Cuban “missile crisis” in 1962 and under some tensed circumstances that could have lead to a total war between the USA and the USSR, the leaders of the two countries decided, on 21 June 1963⁶, to install a quick, clear and direct communication link between Washington and Moscow, known as the “hotline” and undertook negotiations for limiting the number of nuclear missiles and nuclear warheads.

In the context of an increased opposition against the arms race and of the raised awareness of a growing part of international public opinion, in 1978⁷, President Jimmy Carter decided to stop the project of producing ER bomb⁸ as a consequence of the adoption in 1967 of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* and of the *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*, known as *Outer Space Treaty*, which forbade any kind of weapons in outer space⁹. Also, negotiations were started and *START – Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaty*, *SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty* and *ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile*

³ Stalin had a copy of Hitler's book in his library and began to secretly study the German language in order to read the book in original (Tom Ambrose, *Despots and Dictators*, p. 133, Editura Litera, 2010).

⁴ Laurence Freeman, *The Cold War. A Military History*, pp. 204-205.

⁵ Academician Mircea Malița, *Criza rachetelor. ONU, New York, 1962*, apud Ion M. Anghel, Lucian Petrescu, Valeriu Tudor (coord.), *Pagini din diplomația României*, Editura Junimea, Iași, pp. 384-385.

⁶ The telephone, in fact, a fax, was installed via London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, with coding-decoding terminals in Washington and Moscow (*op. cit.*, p. 240).

⁷ Thomas Parish, *Enciclopedia războiului rece*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 2002, p. 47.

⁸ ER – Enhanced Radiation (atomic bomb).

⁹ The United Nations Organization, *The Treaty on Principle Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies* (<http://www.unoosa.org/unvienna.org/osa/en/SpaceLaw/Treaties.html>, accessed on 23.07.2014)

Treaty were signed. The last nuclear weapons limitation agreement was signed by US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on 8 April 2010, in Prague¹⁰.

In 1978, when diplomatic relations were established with Communist China, the US had no intention to make the country an ally, because it would have meant to abandon the Alliance with Taiwan and perhaps even with Japan and South Korea, but it sought to broaden the gap in the relations between the Soviet Union and China¹¹, because a strong alliance between the two great Communist powers could have meant serious threat for the democracies around the world, not just in Asia.

The disbandment of the Warsaw Treaty and the collapse of the USSR modified the balance of power between East and West and the nature of the relationships established among the countries that belonged to opponent military blocks during the *Cold War*.

II. Security Reality and Perspectives in Approaching Future Military Actions

25 years after the end of the *Cold War*, there are at least 23 000 nuclear heads with a power of destruction many times bigger than of those that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Their explosive capacity is 150 000 times more than the one used in Hiroshima and 760 times more than the combined destructive power of all the bombs used by all combatants during the Second World War¹².

The future warfare will enforce critical changes in the military body, as the focus will not be on the number, but on the quality of the forces that, at their maximum of strength, use an optimal combination of knowledge, action, precision and lethal capability applied in a joint context.

Edifying for the mandatory requirements of contemporary and future military organisations is the statement of former American Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who championed for the need for “*rapidly deployable, fully integrated joint forces, capable of reaching distant theatres quickly and working with our air forces and sea forces to strike adversaries swiftly and with devastating effect*”¹³. Indeed, within the allied context, military capabilities are required to cover almost the entire range of missions,

¹⁰ Peter Baker, Dan Bilefsky, *Russia and US Sign Nuclear Arms Reduction Pact*, in *The New York Times*, 8 April 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/20110/04/09/world/europe/prexy.html?_r=1, retrieved on 21.07.2014.

¹¹ The USA did not sign an alliance with Communist China for holding back the Soviet Union (George Friedman, *Următorii 100 de ani. Previziuni pentru secolul XXI*, p. 12).

¹² M. El Baradei, *Seven Steps to Raise World Security*, in *Financial Times*, 2 February 2005.

¹³ Donald Rumsfeld, *Do I Have Any Regrets? Of Course I Do*, interview given to *Der Spiegel*, 4 April 2011, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,754847,00.html>, retrieved on 12 May 2013.

beginning with NATO Article 5 collective defence to stability, crises response, counter-terrorism and humanitarian missions, both within the area of responsibility and beyond.

Recent developments in the contemporary world confirm that today's security environment is going through a period of complex challenges and financial difficulties. At the NATO Summit in Chicago, these phenomena were confirmed in the official declaration¹⁴, in conjunction with NATO's intention to mark the end of NATO's combatant role in Afghanistan, by the end of 2014.

At the moment, both the pace of accelerated technological progress and the way in which it is disseminated provides us with indications about how the future war will look like. Important military transformations marked by modernism have been set in motion. These developments, combined with the economic, geopolitical and demographic ones, could make this world more dangerous and less stable than before.

While the USA has lost its monopoly on the use of high technology war ammunition, China produces on a large scale both cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as other types of Ammo, representing a potential threat to American bases in the Western Pacific, while Iran acquires a technology that allows it to manufacture smart ammunition, although its quality is noticeably lower than the Chinese one.

A serious threat comes from the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the emerging states. Assuming that Iran will become a nuclear power, it is likely that other states would like to proceed in a similar manner.

Nevertheless, the most important looming threat could come from cyberspace. A number of organisations or even isolated individuals have been able to introduce in the information systems the so-called "*logical bombs*" – codes and software programmes that have affected the power grid of the United States in September 2011¹⁵ (the event was discussed in the media as a failure of control devices).

The Romanian Armed Forces NATO integration process was launched based on the "*Joint Force Command Naples Plan for the Accession and Integration of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia/2004*". The process started in 2005 and encompassed the readiness of forces assigned to NATO, according to the objectives foreseen for each organisation of the Armed Forces HQs and Support Commands.

¹⁴ *Chicago Summit Declaration*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease, retrieved on 13 May 2013.

¹⁵ On 9 September 2011, a widespread power outage in the network of the Gas&Electric Company in San Diego occurred; it affected 10 millions of people in the United States and Mexico, for more than 18 hours (according the article *The Great Blackout of 2011*, published in *Coronado Eagle & Journal*, San Diego, USA on 12 September 2011).

During the last 25 years, the Romanian Armed Forces have gone from mass training as a support of the entire people's defence war to an operational capability training, which is expressed by the following statement: *"to individualise the training through standardisation"*.

Romanian military theory and practice have been made compatible with the western ones in order to meet efficiently the tasks enforced by the present nature of conflicts, by the quality standards of the Romanian Armed Forces training, in order to participate in such conflicts, irrespective of the theatre of operations or environment (excessive weather, culture and civilisation etc.) or methods and rules of engagement and be successful.

Military education has known important stages and milestones of modernisation. The military education system is structured on three education levels – higher education, pre-university education and continuous non-university development – integrated in the national education system, adapted to the requirements of national legislation and consistent with the education systems of NATO and EU member countries.

Since the standardisation specific to the Warsaw Treaty, in more than 20 years of consistent NATO and EU oriented standardisation, the activity has sought to achieve the medium term objectives (2008-2015) of the *Romanian Armed Forces Standardisation Strategy*. Current planning tools are described in the *"STANAGs Implementation and Agreement Annual Programme on 2014"* and the *"STANAGs Implementation and Agreement Multiannual Plan between 2014 and 2019"*.

The *Romanian Armed Forces Standardisation Strategy* aims to *"eliminate/fulfil the standardisation gap between Romania and the Alliance"*.

Until 2020-2025, the efforts are focused on achieving the standardisation tasks given the horizon of acceptance and implementation of STANAGs in connection with the *Capability Targets 2013* assumed by Romania within NATO's defence planning process.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to say how the future military confrontations will look like. Some experts and politicians believe that the future does no longer belong to the weapon systems developed for major confrontations, such as F-22 Raptor, a US fighter aircraft, considered to be *"the least suitable for anti-riot military combat actions in Iraq and Afghanistan"*¹⁶, while others consider that *"the next world war could take place in cyberspace, and this could be a catastrophe ... The best way to win is to avoid it..."*¹⁷.

¹⁶ Andrew Taylor, *Senate Passes Pentagon Budget War Funding*, article published by *Associated Press*, 06.10.2009.

¹⁷ Hamadoun Toure, statement made at the International Telecommunications Council in Geneva, October 2009, www.hotnews.ro, 06.10.2009, retrieved on 15.06.2014.

Asymmetric warfare is considered a military confrontation between the two parties with different potential, but, especially with *different military capabilities*. Choosing the type of confrontation belongs to the weaker party, which has no chance of winning in a direct battle. In any fight, each party tries to achieve victory and, in the end, during negotiations, everyone tries to impose its own interests and points of view. Most of the times, the weaker party is acting according to the “*everything is permitted in order to achieve victory*” principle¹⁸.

Regarding the air power in asymmetric warfare, this phenomenon is most visible in the tendency to replace the human crews on board aircraft with flying robots, the sophisticated UAVs – *unmanned aerial vehicles* that more and more undertake the traditional missions of human pilots, air navigators, machine guns operators, air observers etc. Basically, we are witnessing a technical breakthrough of unmanned aerial research means, at all levels, from the strategic to the micro-tactical one.

Another significant aspect of robotics is the progress from UAV to UCAV, from simple unmanned aerial vehicles – with no human pilot, used mainly in air reconnaissance, surveillance, to *unmanned combat aerial vehicles*. This is a radical programme in the field of air strength, which is still at the beginning, and whose final effects cannot be assessed yet. One can conclude, however, that this step from UAV to UCAV will radically change the air force, the way the air power is used and war eventually¹⁹.

The future warfare will witness the confrontation, on the one hand, for maintaining the control over own UAVs and, on the other hand, for blocking and taking the control over enemy UAVs.

III. Instead of Conclusions

We are witnessing a reconfiguration of the world and a transformation of the multi-polar world into an inter-polar area with security influences and implications at Alliance level included.

There is no doubt that the present situation in Ukraine leads to a relocation of the North-Atlantic Alliance capability to South-Eastern Europe, closer to NATO’s Eastern border, Romania included; there is a new focus on NATO Eastern Neighbourhood in order to prevent any subsequent action of Russia.

¹⁸ Paraphrase of Callot D’Herbois’s opinion, who said that “*Everything is permitted to those who act in favour of the revolution* (the 1793 French Revolution)”, quoted by Gheorghe Văduva in *Războiul asimetric și noua fizionomie a conflictualității armate*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2007, p. 11.

¹⁹ Victor Strîmbeanu, *Puterea aeriană în conflictul asimetric – Studiu de caz: Afganistan (II)*, in *Gândirea militară românească* journal, no. 6/2012.

The NATO Summit of 4-5 September 2014, held in Wales, was an opportunity for restating the engagements assumed in the context of the measures to reassure the allies from the Easter Flank.

China takes advantage of the new geopolitical and geostrategic repositioning and signs alliances with powerful actors to gain absolute military advantages in dealing with Japan, Taiwan and Korea.

Iran hopes to enter under the twofold umbrella of Russia and China and to secure another status in the area.

Iraq simmers under the pressure of internal events that contribute to a more substantial involvement of NATO and United States in the area.

For the horizon of 2015-2018, an American shield is foreseen on the Poland-Romania-Turkey line, while the ring of fire around the Black Sea could bring forth a Russian-Iranian-Chinese shield. As Crimea is now Russian, the two shields could be at a distance of less than 800 km from each other, which in referential terms would mean two shields at contact.

As a corollary, the new outbreak of Ebola lurks in just like a cheetah and is ready to unleash a new challenge for the 21st century.

The future will show us if this alternative materialises and, if so, then, we will obviously find out the consequences ...

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF DECEPTION TO PLANNING AND CARRYING OUT THE CAMPAIGN (IV)

Colonel Eugen Anton POPESCU

The issue of deception in relation to military campaigns is treated in the article. In this context, deception in different types of warfare is analysed. Thus, attrition warfare, manoeuvre warfare and moral warfare are discussed.

The author concludes that deception results in the relative advantage that, effectively capitalised on, can determine the operation success. Moreover, deception significantly contributes to the erosion of the adversary morale and will to fight. That is why, it is necessary, in the author's opinion, that deception should be studied, understood and approached systemically, as well as included in the planning process at all levels.

Keywords: *planning process; OODA loop; military campaigns; warfare*

4.4 Integration of deception in the attrition-manoeuve-moral conflict

As shown before, deception contributes greatly to the implementation of strategies of “attrition”, “manoeuvre” and “moral” conflicts. However, historical examples show that no conflict is pure. Such a classification helps in analysing and understanding the essence of the conflict. However, in reality, conflicts take all three forms shown, yet with general characteristics that bring them nearer or closer to one of them. The question is: *What is the essence of conflict and how can deception be integrated in the conflict?* John Boyd believes that the patterns of conflict for a victorious operation are: goal, plan, action, support and command⁵⁰. In his opinion, the aim is to diminish the adversary's freedom of action while improving own freedom of action, so as to neutralise the opponent's ability to deal with events and efforts as they unfold, while maintaining own capacity⁵¹. The plan should cover the following aspects⁵²: test the adversary to unmask

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⁵⁰ John Boyd, *Patterns of Conflicts*, p. 127.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 128.

⁵² *Ibid*.

strengths, weaknesses, manoeuvres and intentions; employ a variety of measures to combine menace, uncertainty and mistrust with ambiguity, deception and novelty as a basis to substantially reduce its moral ties, disorient, thus masking, distort and maximise the presence and activities of their troops; select action or response that is least expected and establish focus of main effort together with other secondary efforts and pursue directions that permit events and branches and threaten alternative objectives; move along “*paths of least resistance*” in order to reinforce and exploit success and exploit during the operation those differences, frictions, obsessions, etc. of the adversary that interfere with their ability to cope with unfolding circumstances; subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload or seize the activities, centres, vulnerable and critical connections that allow the adversary a coherent *OODA* cycle (*OBSERVATION – ORIENTATION – DECISION – ACTION*)⁵³ in order to dismember organism and isolate remnants. In Boyd’s view, the support should be aimed primarily at superior mobile communications, and only essential logistics, made in order to maintain cohesion of overall effort and sustain appropriate pace of operations within available resources⁵⁴.

Command must decentralise execution and encourage lower-level commanders to shape the tactical environment and guide forces in order to take the necessary, quickly and decisive actions to exploit the opportunities that present themselves. Strategic command must be centralised in the sense of establishing aims, matching talent with ambition and with resources available, sketching flexible plans, allocating resources and shaping focus on overall effort⁵⁵.

Testing the opponent in order to expose the strengths, weaknesses, manoeuvres and intentions can be achieved by using diversion attacks and withdrawals, as well as by carrying out demonstrations. In the Second World War, the Soviets discovered the strengths of the Germans by carrying out a diversion attack. The German tactical defence base consisted of machine gun nests. At the beginning of the diversion attack, the Germans responded with machine gun fire, thus exposing their positions. Soviet officers identified and established the exact position of each machine gun nest, which was destroyed afterwards by artillery and snipers. Thus, it was only after the strengths of the German defensive were neutralised that the attack itself began. This technique was very old and suggestively named “*Beat the grass to startle the snake*”, being included in the “*36 strategies of ancient China*”⁵⁶.

⁵³ John Boyd, *Organic Design for Command and Control*, pp. 8-27.

⁵⁴ Idem, *Patterns of Conflicts*, p. 128.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ <http://chinesewarstrategies.blogspot.ro/2008/11/36-strategies-of-ancient-chinaoverview.html>, retrieved on 17.05.2013.

In this context, deception is used to substantially reduce the enemy's moral ties and to ensure the selection of the course of action least expected by the opponent, first by increasing ambiguity and number of alternative targets, which, from the adversary's point of view, translates into alternative expectations, and then by imagining a certain course of action, while own troops set out on an entirely different course.

Selecting a course of action unexpected by the opponent causes them to expose their vulnerabilities and weaknesses, which, operated effectively, on the line of least resistance, ensure success. Thus, the *OODA cycle* must be *"more inconspicuously, more quickly and with more irregularity as basis to keep and gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort; to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other efforts that tie-up, divert or drain away adversary attention and strength elsewhere"*⁵⁷. Deception interferes in the opponent's *OODA cycle* ever since the first *O – Observation*. Through consistent feedback and through providing *"confirmation"* of false information from multiple sources, as well as through continuously adapting the events of the deception depending on the reaction of the target, deception acts on the second *O – Orientation*. The interference of deception in the opponent's *OODA cycle* should not be regarded as a separate action. This interference is part of a set of coordinated methods and actions aimed at *"... influencing the strategic behaviour of the adversary"*⁵⁸. In *figure 6* there are shown the ways to influence the strategic behaviour of the enemy, according to John Boyd⁵⁹.

As one can see, all the elements that the *plan* and the *action* should be aimed at involve deception actions. *"The statements related to the plan and the action suggest that we try to penetrate the enemy system and mask own system against its penetration by the enemy; to create a variety of impressions on what is happening or what is about to happen; to generate mismatches between what seems to be and what it is; to push the opponent beyond its adaptation limits"*⁶⁰. Adapting to the new circumstances that characterise warfare is the central theme of Boyd's philosophy. Adaptation allows interaction with the environment: *"We as human beings cannot exist without the environment ..."*⁶¹. Interaction with the environment allows us to exist, while *"... isolation leads to decay and disintegration"*⁶².

⁵⁷ John Boyd, *Patterns of Conflicts*, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁵⁸ Frans Osinga, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

⁵⁹ John Boyd, *Patterns of Conflicts*, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 129.

⁶¹ John Boyd, *Strategic Game*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁶² *Ibid*.




Figure 6: Ways to influence the strategic behaviour of the enemy, according to John Boyd

Therefore, the strategy should aim at the physical, mental and moral isolation of the opponent and the protection of their critical connections and our centres of power, as a basis for preventing isolation and preserving own physical, mental and moral strength. Therefore, basically, “grand strategy” should ensure “the pursuit of the national interest, not only by enhancing the physical and moral strength (while undermining that of the opponents), but also by influencing the non-engagement of potential adversaries so that they are oriented towards a strategy that ensures our success”⁶³.

Consequently, strategic actions must undermine the power of potential adversaries and influence their decisions in the sense of their own interest. Yet, direct actions are easy to detect and usually easy to counter. Moreover, the understanding by the enemy of own plans allows them to carry out, in their turn, actions meant to deceive us. For this reason, “grand strategy” should ensure, along the strategic engagement lines, “alternative objectives” and influence the creation of “alternative expectations”. The stratagem is represented by the successful use of actions to increase ambiguity, while “denying the enemy’s access to critical information” and subsequently carrying out actions to reduce ambiguity and portray a desirable alternative that favours us. These actions,

⁶³ John Boyd, *Patterns of Conflicts*, op. cit., p. 140.

such as disinformation, but not only, are accompanied by or take place in the context of “*open*”, real actions (political, diplomatic, economic, cultural etc.) that give consistency and truthfulness and ensure the success of deception. Logically, the role of deception is of a framework for strategic actions of any kind, of link between the real and false actions, intentions and pieces of information, as well as of effective way to achieve strategic goals through the interference in the potential or actual opponent’ *OODA cycle*.

Strategic actions cannot be designed and carried out without “... *an appreciation that emphasises national interest, critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions etc. that could be used by a real or potential opponent*”⁶⁴. Obviously, a real or potential adversary exploits every opportunity through which they could promote their own interests and since deception is an effective way in this endeavour, the actions to counter it (counter-deception) and other measures to counter the actions of the opponent to exploit “*critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions etc.*” of the nation are required. In other words, the national interest would be: “*Strengthening the nation’s capacity to act as a whole to model and cope successfully with the frequently changing conditions of the international environment*”⁶⁵ and, for this reason, a strategic behaviour is necessary in order to ensure, on the one hand, the unity of the action and, on the other hand, the interaction with the international environment. Boyd believes that a national strategy would be one that “... *increases the spirit and national strength (while undermining their potential or real opponents’ ones), and affects the opponent’s strategy in order to promote their own interest*”⁶⁶. Therefore, the “*grand strategy*”, by the instruments of national power, should act in a coordinated manner and have a common vision as far as the national interest is concerned, and in a broad framework, of national strategic actions, yet preserving an autonomy in order to ensure flexibility and initiative.

Regarding strategic actions, it is suggested, among other things, that it is necessary for the behaviour and actions of potential or real adversaries to be influenced, in the sense of own interests and to their detriment, which obviously implies deceiving them. In the same note, the strategic goal at military level should be “*Diminish the opponent’s capabilities and, at the same time, improve own adaptation*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 141.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

and action capacities, as an organic entity, so that we can cope with the situation, while our opponent should not be able to deal with the events/efforts as they arise and take place”⁶⁷. Boyd’s philosophy is simple: he who is more adaptable wins. Moreover, he believes that undermining the opponent’s capacity to adapt is absolutely needed. To achieve the strategic military goal, Boyd suggests the following strategy: “*Penetrating the moral-mental-physical being of the opponent in order to dissolve their moral fibre, disorient their mental images, disrupt their operations, overwhelm the adversary system, [...] and neutralise those moral-mental-physical bastions, the connections and activities upon which they depend, in order to destroy internal harmony, paralyse the system and deteriorate their will to resist*”⁶⁸. Clearly, the proposed strategy is based more on the psychological aspect of the war than on the lethal one.

We have shown that deception is the basic ingredient of surprise and has a substantial contribution to security of operations. Moreover, by diversion, camouflage and disinformation and by denying access of the adversary to critical information deception tremendously contributes to attacking and destroying the morale and will to fight of the opponent.

5. Conclusions

Deception has a major contribution to achieving surprise, as a basis for obtaining the relative advantage that, operated efficiently, can ensure the success of the operation. Moreover, deception can contribute greatly to applying other principles of operations, such as security of operations, freedom of action etc. This should not be seen only as a set of measures, actions and activities, but must be understood in the context of the manoeuvre approach to war. From this perspective, deception significantly benefits the application of desiderata of manoeuvre conflict. By deception, one can divert the attention and effort of the enemy from the objectives and course of action of own troops, while designing a different course of action. The ambiguity and state of uncertainty specific to the war atmosphere can be amplified exponentially, to the detriment of the opponent, through disinformation. Through deception, one can create and expose weaknesses and vulnerabilities for the enemy, which, attacked and destroyed, lead to breaking down connections, isolating constituent elements and the collapse of the enemy system. Also, by diversion,

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*


camouflage and disinformation, and by keeping the enemy away from receiving critical information, deception contributes tremendously to attacking and destroying the morale and will to fight of the enemy.

We think that deception is the stratagem itself applied by the joint force commander to defeat the opponent, an integral part of the intent of the commander, a factor that contributes to shaping the strategic and operational environment and an effective means to achieve strategic goals.

We also believe that it is necessary for deception to be studied and understood in a broader framework, that of the systemic approach, and be included in the planning process at all levels.

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THE STATUS OF THE TRAINER AND OF THE MILITARY INSTRUCTOR (II)

Colonel Dr BEng Aurel-Constantin NEAGU

The author analyses the trainer potential roles. Among them, those of counsellor, expert and manager are mentioned. Moreover, the author explains that a trainer can have many roles simultaneously, depending on the situation. It is therefore necessary for trainers to be aware of the roles they play within an organisation so that they can permanently develop their skills and achieve professional goals. In addition, the main advantages and disadvantages of having an electronic trainer are discussed. In this regard, it is shown that, despite advantages, there are many situations when the presence of a “human” trainer is absolutely necessary.

Keywords: education; trainer; instructor; electronic trainer; skills

A

nother approach, very useful for the systematic analysis of the domain, is the one

of the *potential roles in professional development*, belonging to E. Moorby⁵. The following roles are reviewed:

- a) *reception*: first point of contact;
- b) *administration*: organising, planning events;
- c) *technical support*: maintaining/servicing training equipment (video-projector);
- d) *trainer*: instructor, lecturer;
- e) *tutor/mentor*: supporting and facilitating individual learning;
- f) *training counsellor*: establishing the needs, assessing, designing training programmes;
- g) *consultant*: focusing on solutions to organisational issues;
- h) *specialist*: author of distance learning courses, programmes;
- i) *manager/director*: designing/implementing strategies, allocating resources.

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⁵ E. Moorby, *Training and Employee Development*, London, McGraw-Hill, 1996, <http://uzspace.uzulu.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10530/1162/The%20impact%20of%20training%20%26%20development%20on%20production%20at%20Porto%20in%20Richards-Bay.%20MK%20Moyo.pdf?sequence=1>Instructo

Depending on the size of the department, organisational structure, degree of centralisation/decentralisation and sub-divisions (services, offices, training centres etc.), level of individual competence and relations with managers, practitioners adopt one or usually several roles.

Moreover, general functions, such as the instructor, trainer may comprise most of the above-mentioned roles in the job description, while specific functions, such as “coach” or “educational web-designer”, usually play one role.

Somewhat closer to nowadays, Arthur Proud⁶ identifies the main qualities and competences of a trainer. He divides them into seven categories, detailing each one of them:

1. *Education, general training*

- studies according to the legislation and in keeping with the field in which that person wants to be a trainer. Specialised training will be tested.

2. *Professional qualifications and experience*

- professional qualifications for the job of “trainer”, in keeping with the legislation;
- experience as a trainer or managerial experience in the field in which that person will act as a trainer. Experience will cover the following dimensions:
 - ⇒ designing a module from a training programme;
 - ⇒ developing the modules, both the one designed by the author and another one, designed by a colleague;
 - ⇒ assessing the training.

3. *Presence and impact*

- natural authority – the trainer must be credible;
- he/she must be proactive – the trainer must lead;
- the trainer must be calm, determined and composed in order to deal with the resistance of the participants and be able to influence them;
- he/she must change language, repertory depending on the needs of the client;
- excellent abilities of presenter.

4. *Motivation*

- he/she must truly want to be a trainer;
- he/she must prove their ability to pursue goals;
- commitment – he/she must show commitment to the vision of the organisation;
- he/she must be proud of the quality of their work when achieving performance;

⁶ Arthur Proud, *The New Trainer's Toolkit: Tools, Techniques and Tips for the Novice Trainer*, Cambridgeshire, Great Britain, 2002.

- he/she must set high goals;
- he/she must derive personal satisfaction from applying concepts;
- he/she must be inclined towards the practical side rather than the theoretical one.

5. *Values and ethics*

- he/she believes in the people's natural kindness;
- he/she is honest;
- he/she assumes responsibility for their own behaviour;
- he/she leaves according to a clear set of principles;
- he/she is loyal;
- he/she is confident;
- he/she believe in each person's ability to improve themselves.

6. *Interpersonal abilities*

- he/she is friendly;
- he/she establishes relations with the others rapidly;
- he/she is involved beneficially in settling conflicts;
- he/she seeks for common ground with the clients;
- he/she shows natural, contagious enthusiasm;
- he/she is satisfied when seeing other people's progress;
- he/she is not egocentric;
- he/she gives and receives effective feedback.

7. *Implementation*

- he/she looks for details;
- he/she explains the role of details in the wider vision of the issue that is the subject of the training programme;
- he/she seeks to focus on what is important;
- he/she is disciplined in using processes, structure and time;
- he/she overcomes obstacles;
- he/she prioritises activities;
- he/she works until they meet their goals.

Rosemary Harrison⁷ argued that there is not a unique role that learning and development practitioners must meet, but they combine multiple roles and responsibilities. Moreover, these people are not necessarily experts in training, but they can be line managers, specialists or external consultants. Thus:

- in a medium-sized organisation, they should plan and organise the development process at work, without receiving help from a specialist;

⁷ Rosemary Harrison, *Human Resource Development in a Knowledge Economy: An Organisational View*, Palgrave Macmillan, Great Britain, 2003.

- in large organisations, practitioners with no training and development experience work with managers, reporting, however, to a human resource manager. As line managers responsible for development, they will have to plan and organise learning and development activities at work;
- the experienced ones will advise, organise and assess learning and development strategies and plans (organised by departments or at the level of the entire organisation).

The dimensions of the trainer's personality

In the specialised literature, there are numerous portrayals of the trainer, generally focused on the same dimensions:

- the *cognitive-axiological dimension*, aiming at fundamental biophysical capabilities and intellectual cognitive capacities.
- the *motivational-attitudinal dimension*, focused on the following domains: emotional, motivational, volitional, value-related-attitudinal, orientation regarding the issue, focus on actions;
- the *action-strategic dimension*, aimed at the general normative competences and action-methodological competences.

When speaking of the trainer's personality, one must consider the following components, according to the way they are found in the specialised literature:

- the *knowledge of the trainer*, as a result of gathered training and experience, with its components: general and philosophical knowledge, specialty knowledge and psycho-pedagogical knowledge;
- the *qualities determined by the specifics and complexity of their activity*: attitudinal qualities, skills qualities, awareness of their responsibility and role, pedagogical tact and education (teaching) style.

The roles specific to the trainer in adult training

An *instructor at the workplace* is a trainer who leads the training process at the workplace or at the employee's office, with one person or a small group; he/she is a person who has progressed a lot particularly professionally and shows interest in and commitment to also help the others grow and learn. It is an effective way to train the staff at the workplace and relies on the strategy: "say – show – carry out".

The *trainer – teacher* is the most common category of roles in adult training and development activities. In this role, trainers must be well-trained in relation to the issues addressed, have knowledge about various techniques, methods

and strategies of transmitting knowledge and, last but not least, must prove psycho-pedagogical skills or at least the ability to transmit information effectively.

The *trainer – facilitator* assumes a passive posture, acting as a person who rather guides and advises (in a subtle way), providing the participants with materials and information when required. In addition to the traditional skills of the trainer, the facilitator must prove skills for helping participants indirectly, know when to intervene and when not, have rich content and material resources (videos, case studies, role plays etc.) available sufficient to meet unexpected requirements from participants.

The most difficult part of the role of facilitator is when, while working to solve a situation, the group of participants reaches an impasse or is on the wrong track. In these and in similar situations, the facilitator must be able to take control and intervene to “help” the participants and, at the same time, he/she must allow them to learn the way to finding solutions to the impasse they reached through collaboration.

The *internal consultant/advisor* is generally an expert in training, employed by an institution or organisation and rarely a consultant brought from outside the institution or organisation. The internal consultant may, for instance, follow the needs expressed by the leadership of a company through various methods; he/she may be involved in identifying and analysing certain needs, in individual discussions or playing an advisory role for the senior management. He/she can deal with broader development opportunities for employees and, in this respect, must have solid experience and knowledge and must have been trainer or facilitator previously. Moreover, he/she must have the skills required to work with people who, hierarchically speaking, occupy higher positions.

The *trainer for trainers* entails an activity that involves a wide range of fundamental skills, methods, techniques and specific approaches from the person who wishes to accomplish it, in order to help others in learning and training activities for them to become trainers in their turn. In this sense, the trainer who conducts such a course should be a credible and acceptable professional, able to react to those situations that put him in the position of a model; in addition, he/she is required to have highly developed observation skills and the ability to provide feedback to participants during the event.

The *designer of training programmes* is a relatively new role, specific most of all to large organisations, with special departments for training and development, and training events are not only sporadic cases, but they are focused on programmes/training sessions as complete and complex as possible.

The designer of training programmes identifies and analyses the needs of participants and outlines such a training programme that, in addition to the course, may contain instruction sets, a trainer’s manual and a student’s manual or other support materials, while another trainer specifically applies all these in the activity with the trainees. For this, a trainer – designer of training programmes must have sound knowledge of the domain addressed by the course and of the way a training event takes place; he/she must know sources for obtaining certain materials and how he/she can access the necessary resources and make sure that these will come into the possession of the trainer assigned to realise the detailed programme. The trainer – designer is also responsible for the modification of certain training programmes that can be purchased in order to meet the particular needs of the respective institution or organisation.

Table 1: Comparative analysis of the competences required from the trainer/military instructor

TRAINER	INSTRUCTOR
<p>- leader of a training and improvement process who, thanks to the knowledge and competences acquired and developed, either by special stages of practice or by direct experience, plays a decisive role in the professional development process of the human resource in the education system.</p>	<p>Superior Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - collaborates to develop documents for education organisation, planning and record; - is responsible for his and his subordinates’ professional training; - guides, controls and assesses the activity of the members of the education commission; - approves education projects designed by subordinates. <p>Principal Instructor⁸:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - guides, controls and assesses the activity of the members of the education commission; - approves education projects designed by subordinates.
<p>- designer of training programmes, based on normative acts in force, operational/professional training standards and requirements of a certain sector or field of activity – including the one of training the trainers.</p>	<p>Superior Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - collaborates to develop documents for education organisation, planning and record. <p>Principal Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - participates in developing documents for education organisation, planning and record.

⁸ According to Article 2, par 1, b) of the Order of the Minister of National Defence no. M. 58 of 27 May 2013 to approve the *Guidelines regarding the Military Instructors Body*.

TRAINER	INSTRUCTOR
<p>He/she analyses the training/improvement requirements:</p> <p>a) He/she identifies the training/improvement requirements of the undergraduate education system;</p> <p>b) He/she identifies and assesses the issues regarding the organisation and development of training/improvement activities and finds solutions to them.</p>	<p>Military Instructors:</p> <p>- are required to acquire new professional competences through different learning activities in formal, non-formal and informal learning contexts⁹, so that they could have minimum 90 transferable professional credits every consecutive 5 years (interval determined since the date that certain military trainer filled his position).</p>
<p>- designer of training programmes and activities based on the identification of the training supply and demand in a certain sector or field of activity.</p> <p>He/she plans training/improvement programmes:</p> <p>a) he/she sets the training/improvement objectives in accordance with the national and regional training/improvement policy;</p> <p>b) he/she adopts strategies that makes it possible for training to be accessible and efficient for all students;</p> <p>c) he/she sets performance indicators and evaluation tools.</p>	<p>Superior Instructor:</p> <p>- draws up analytical programmes for the discipline(s) taught and puts forward proposals for updating and improving their content.</p> <p>Principal Instructor:</p> <p>- draws up analytical programmes for the discipline(s) taught and puts forward proposals for updating and modernising their content.</p> <p>Military Instructor, Warrant Officer/ Non-Commissioned Officer Instructor:</p> <p>- draws up analytical programmes for the discipline(s) taught and updates their content.</p>
<p>- he/she designs, develops, evaluates and reviews theoretical/practical activities and/or professional competences training and development programmes, carried out in specialised institutions or in the workplace.</p>	<p>Superior Instructor:</p> <p>- designs operational education objectives for the topics and meetings of the disciplines taught;</p> <p>- draws up the activity plan of the education commission every months and monitors its accomplishment.</p> <p>Principal Instructor:</p> <p>- draws up the activity plan of the education commission every months and monitors its accomplishment.</p> <p>Military Instructor, Warrant Officer/ Non-Commissioned Officer Instructor:</p> <p>- draws up the operational education objectives for the topics and meetings he/she is in charge of.</p>

⁹ *Formal learning contexts* consist of learning programmes and activities assisted by trainers authorised in this regard, organised in accredited training institutions within and outside the Ministry of National Defence. *Informal and formal learning contexts* consist of learning activities carried out individually or in a group, outside formal learning programmes and activities, through self-training or experience exchanges, research activities, participation in scientific, pedagogical, methodological activities or missions in theatres of operations, as well as specific activities carried out at work.

TRAINER	INSTRUCTOR
<p>- organiser of training programmes, providing all the necessary requirements for the optimal development of the training programme. He/she organises the training/improvement sessions:</p> <p>a) he/she decides on the target group (number of participants, studies, interests etc.); b) he/she delivers the support materials (course support, software, sheets, equipment, instruments etc.) accessible and adequate to the topics; c) he/she carefully selects and properly sets the area where the programme is going to take place (hall/halls, seats for students, lights, equipment etc.).</p>	<p>Superior Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - organises professional, psycho-pedagogical and methodical training of instructors and subunit commanders who are part of the education commission; - organises the exams at the disciplines taught and participates in the verifications carried out by the subordinate instructors; - organises the procurement of education material and technical systems for the education activities he/she is in charge of; - collaborates with the head of the courses to meet the demands of subordinate students. <p>Principal Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - organises professional, psycho-pedagogical and methodical training of instructors and subunit commanders who are part of the education commission; - collaborates with the head of the courses to meet the demands of subordinate students. <p>Military Instructor, Warrant Officer/Non-Commissioned Officer Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - takes measures to provide the technical-material support for the sessions he/she carries out with the students; - contributes to the improvement of the forms and methods for organising and developing the education process and for developing and modernising the technical-material support; - guides and controls the professional activity of the students' group whose group leader he/she is; - collaborates with the head of the courses to meet the demands of subordinate students.
<p>- facilitator of the learning and development process, by creating learning situations proper to the development of professional competences that represent training targets. (1) He/she presents the stages of the training/improvement sessions:</p> <p>a) he/she explains the purpose and objectives of training/improvement; a part of the objectives are negotiated with the participants in the training process;</p>	<p>Superior Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - guides and controls the professional activity of the subordinates and the students' group whose group leader he/she is; - guides the drawing up of course papers by students. <p>Principal Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - carries out the education tasks assigned; - guides and controls the professional activity of the subordinates and the students' group whose group leader he/she is;

TRAINER	INSTRUCTOR
<p>b) he/she familiarises the students with the stages to be followed during the programme and the way it will take place.</p> <p>(2) He/she sends pieces of information:</p> <p>a) he/she conducts scientific and methodical research;</p> <p>b) he/she is concerned with respecting the rigours of science;</p> <p>c) he/she shows clarity and correctitude during explanations and debates;</p> <p>d) he/she monitors the way the knowledge is applied in various situations;</p> <p>e) he/she draws students in debates, in solving problems etc.</p> <p>(3) He/she leads the training/improvement activities:</p> <p>a) he/she flexibly approaches the training sequences; the situations created and the unexpected events are used in order to reach the set goals;</p> <p>b) he/she constructively deals with the conflicts occurred;</p> <p>c) he/she communicates (verbally and non-verbally) affectively, without asperities and without being boring;</p> <p>d) he/she encourages and facilitates learning and teamwork;</p> <p>e) he/she creates opportunities for exercises;</p> <p>f) he/she provides the students with feedback on the training/improvement process;</p> <p>g) he/she uses performance indication of monitoring.</p> <p>(4) He/she provides support to the training/development process:</p> <p>a) he/she assigns the students with their role in the training/improvement process;</p> <p>b) he/she creates opportunities for finding options and making decisions regarding the training/improvement process;</p> <p>c) he/she provides the students with the material resources necessary for the training/improvement process;</p> <p>d) he/she gives assistance to those who require help.</p>	<p>- guides the drawing up of course papers by students;</p> <p>Military Instructor, Warrant Officer/ Non-Commissioned Officer Instructor:</p> <p>- carries out the assigned education activities, with competence and professionalism;</p> <p>- guides the drawing up of course/graduation papers by students;</p> <p>- provides individual or collective guidance.</p>

TRAINER	INSTRUCTOR
<p>- evaluator of the competences already formed or developed by the participants in the training process, as well as of his/hers performance as a trainer.</p>	<p>Superior Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - periodically assesses, together with the subordinate instructors, the learning status of the pupils and students and sets measures to improve efficiency of the education process and their school performance; - assesses the activity of the members of the education commission. <p>Principal Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - assesses the activity of the members of the education commission. <p>Military Instructor, Warrant Officer/ Non-Commissioned Officer Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - assess the students' training level and keeps track of their results for the discipline/disciplines he is in charge of.
<p>- evaluator of training programmes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - of own programmes and of the training programmes proposed for evaluation in order to get authorised. 	
<p>- the person who learns throughout the entire professional career, permanently developing own training competences.</p>	<p>Superior Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - deals with his/her professional training; - designs handbooks, courses, lessons, collections of lessons, exercises and evaluation or self-evaluation tests for the disciplines taught and guides the subordinates in this activity; - carries out pedagogical research with the purpose of education modernisation; - publishes studies and articles in specialised journals, in the military and/or civil press. <p>Principal Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - participates in designing handbook and courses and in modernising the material base of the education process; - carries out pedagogical and applicative research with the purpose of modernising military education; - publishes studies and articles in specialised journals, in the military and/or civil press. <p>Military Instructor, Warrant Officer/ Non-Commissioned Officer Instructor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - improves the professional, psycho-pedagogical and methodical training in order to carry out the assigned education tasks;

TRAINER	INSTRUCTOR
	- carries out applicative research activity in a certain military branch or in the field of education sciences; - publishes studies and articles in specialised journals, in the military and/or civil press.

Due to the expansion of the Internet and intranet both in everyday life and in the training activity, the role of trainer is assumed by the *electronic trainer*, which can be used in those situations in which the training seeks to improve participants' knowledge and skills. However, an electronic trainer cannot answer in the case of certain programmes aimed at interpersonal or social skills, social communication skills, where the presence of a "real" trainer is needed.

The roles described above are not independent and a trainer can fulfil several roles simultaneously. It is important to realise, however, that the trainers are aware of the diversity of the roles they can fulfil in an institution/organisation at some point, which will allow the continuous development of capacities and progress at the professional level. Consequently, the skills of a trainer can range from simple skills of reading or lecturing to a whole range of competences.

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English version by
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

SLEEPINESS AND SLEEP APNEA IN AVIATION – SURGICAL APPROACH –

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Everyone knows the cognitive and performance – related effects of fatigue: lack of concentration, forgetfulness, inability to determine priorities or make decisions. Flight crew members are well aware that efficiency of performance under these conditions – sleepiness and sleep apnea – is significantly decreased and presents high threat to flight safety. The determination of “fitness to fly” for military aviators with sleep disorders can be very difficult because we could not obtain coherent information about fatigue from current aeromedical guidelines. The majority of air organisations do not provide any helpful somnological assistance. Evaluation of medical requirements for pilots needs partnership. This paper presents the first step of the author’s efforts to promote the implementation of a fatigue risk management system (FRMS) in Romania – a surgical treatment algorithm in sleep apnea.

Keywords: *fatigue; sleepiness; sleep surgery*

1. Introduction

In a variety of studies, fatigued individuals consistently underreported how tired they really were, as measured by physiologic parameters. A tired individual truly does not realise the extent of actual impairment. When an aviator is diagnosed with a sleep disorder that can result in sleepiness, a discussion of flying aptitude is always in order. If the diagnosis of a sleep related breathing disorder in aviators has been done step by step, in case of necessity a treatment has to follow. This has to be done by a stepwise proceeding as well, dependent on the graduation of the disorder and the collateral diseases.

2. Surgical Treatment

Surgical treatment options can only be discussed in obstructive forms of nighttime breathing disorders. They can be divided into tissue and skeletal surgery. Beside these there is the alternative

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of tracheotomy, simply disconnecting the abnormal upper airways but being largely obsolete today in this indication. In 1969 in Freiburg/Germany this method was the first description of a successful therapy of severe obstructive sleep apnea, which at that time, nine years before the first description of obstructive sleep apnea by Christian Guilleminault, was misinterpreted as pickwickian syndrome by the author Kuhlo. Today, obstructive sleep apnea is next to never treated by tracheotomy. There is one fundamental rule: the younger and less obese the patient, the more he is a candidate for a surgical approach.

2.1. Tissue surgery

Tissue operations are regularly offered by otorhinolaryngologist. Surgical opening of anatomical constricted upper airways is certainly reasonable. In less severe cases, it can solve the problem, in more severe cases, it can be the condition for a successful nCPAP therapy. There is a wide range of possible procedures like resection of nasal conches, adenotomy, tonsillotomy or tonsillectomy, tongue ground resection and resection of uvula or velar tissue. Also an epiglottal reconstruction can be reasonable to avoid the inspiratory closure of the throat in the case of lax epiglottis.

In 1981, a radical surgical method against snoring was imported from Japan to Europe: the Uvulopalatopharyngoplasty (UPPP). Here velum, uvula, tonsils and tongue ground are resected radically to create an open air channel.

This initial scalpel-based operation was later modified using laser technology (LAUPPP, Laser Assisted UPPP). Both methods, at least in the initial radicalness, are obsolete today, as they can lead to the complications of remarkable disorders of voice and swallowing and show a high incidence of relapse. Furthermore, the velum is an important structure, which on the one hand communicates with the breathing centre via baroreceptors, on the other hand is of enormous importance for the sealing of the naso- to the oropharynx in the case of later use of a nasal breathing mask. A radical UPPP can make a later nasal CPAP therapy impossible. More conservative tissue-surgical methods – there are a lot – can have their eligibility, but all of them are only indicated in milder forms of obstructive sleep-related breathing disorders. The indication is similar to that of oral devices. The biggest problem of all tissue surgery methods is the poor database with regard to long term follow up. Most studies have observed patients not longer than 24 months, the one with an observation time of 48 months was done in Sweden and showed a relapse rate of 70%.

2.2. Skeletal surgery

The therapeutic principle of the oral devices, opening of extrathoracic airways by protraction of the jaws, also can be reached by surgery, doing mandibular or maxillo-mandibular osteotomy. This method was generated by Hochban in the early nineties and is well established today. It is able to treat also severe forms of obstructive nighttime breathing problems and anomalies of facial cranium, but is appropriate rather to younger patients and not effective in case of extreme obesity.




Figure 1: Cephalograms and profile pictures of a young female with obstructive sleep apnea before and after a jaw osteotomy. AHI before was 43/hour, afterwards 0/hour.

In contrast to tissue surgery, these procedures are effective in the long run. Jaw osteotomy is not a minor surgical intervention. To be successful, it requires an accurate indication, patient's examination, planning and comprehensive cooperation with orthodontists. But, especially in younger patients, it is a good option to avoid a lifelong necessity of mask usage, and, in contrast to oral devices and mechanical breathing support, it is curative.

2.3. Alternative therapeutic options for sleep-related breathing disorders

During the last twenty years, many therapeutic approaches for nighttime breathing disorders have been tested, but at least without comprehensible results. In the nineties, the treatment of sleep apnea with a pacemaker was evaluated,

which in case of apnea was able to stimulate the laryngeal muscles via the hypoglossal nerve. This highly interesting and primarily successful therapeutic option was cancelled due to financial reasons. Experiments to treat obstructive sleep apnea with cardiac pacemakers failed. In principle, promising for milder forms of upper airways obstruction is the approach of tightening the laryngeal muscles with gymnastics. A study done in Zurich/Switzerland showed positive effects of playing the didgeridoo, a traditional Australian wind instrument. Other gymnastic approaches like face formers or electrical tense devices were not finally successful, but it is known that also passive stretching of laryngeal musculature with oral appliances or nCPAP shows transitory effects, as after a longer use of these therapies in following nights without treatment snoring is reduced markedly. But, this effect disappears after a few nights. Systematical gymnastic training programmes for laryngeal muscles yet do not exist.



Figure 2: Australian aborigine playing the traditional wind instrument, the didgeridoo. Twenty minutes of playing this instrument every day has a positive influence on snoring.

Many other therapeutic options for obstructive sleep apnea have been tested, and in part they were brought to market. There are nose patches, nose clips, anti-snoring-sprays and lotions, glasses or pillows against snoring. Obviously there is no border for the money bringing and puffer-like success promising fantasy of some clever marketing strategists. All this is suspect and dubious and at the most appropriate to harm the image of the still young sleep medicine.

3. Conclusions and Perspective

No one is immune from fatigue. Screening for sleepiness and for sleep apnea among aviators needs to be seriously evaluated with some urgency. Sleep medicine is a young science, which despite the enormous augmentation of knowledge in the last decades still is in its infancy. Nevertheless, today, the spectrum of medical professions is unimaginable without sleep medicine and most fascinating is that it is in touch with every other specialty of medicine and therefore the ideal platform for the view beyond one's own nose. In a time of increasing specialisation, this gets more and more important to keep the sight for the whole. Many clinical pictures only can be researched and treated not only interdisciplinary, but particularly in sleep medicine, and therefore colleagues of all medical disciplines are invited to deal with this highly interesting, forward-looking and satisfying field, for the welfare of our military patients.

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UKRAINE'S ROLE IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S EXPANSIONIST POLICY

Dr Mirela ATANASIU

Recently, events have shown that the Russian Federation is taking increasingly rapid steps towards restoring its control and influence over the former Soviet Union countries, employing the full range of available instruments such as the economic, political, diplomatic, imagogical, and military ones.

The brutal manner in which Russia annexed Crimea, an autonomous republic within Ukraine, triggered the worst crisis in East-West relations after the Cold War.

In this context, the article analyses the situation in Ukraine, the Western states reaction, and the Russian Federation possible courses of action.

Keywords: *conflict; Russia; Crimea; imperialism; hegemony; nationalism*

1. What does Ukraine represent for the Russian Federation?

Russia without Ukraine is a country; Russia with Ukraine is an empire¹. The Russian Federation is aware Ukraine, under its power and influence, can provide many advantages: a control area in front of NATO, EU and USA expansion, a region from where natural resources can be exploited, a mass for military, economic or any other type of manoeuvre represented by the population on the Ukrainian territory and a possible ally on its way to rebuild “*the Russian Empire*”. Also, Russia’s interest in Ukraine comes from the fact that, in 1997, the Black Sea Fleet, operational-strategic echelon of Russian Military Maritime Fleet, settled an agreement with the Ukrainian authorities in order to use the naval base in Sevastopol as operational base in the area.

In 2012, this agreement was extended by President Yanukovich for 25 years more. Thus, while Ukraine tended to come closer and closer to the West, through the European Union, NATO and the US, Russian authorities were showing a major strategic and military interest in maintaining

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¹ *Ukraine Crisis – Russian Military Intervention*, 26 April 2014, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/politics-2014-04.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1097%2eml0ao0696k%2e106m, retrieved on 28 April 2014.

the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea area of naval operation intact, through the naval base in Sevastopol.

Huntington said that “*for a torn country successfully to redefine its civilisational identity, at least three requirements must be met. First, the political and economic elite of the country has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, the public has to be at least willing to acquiesce in the redefinition of identity. Third, the dominant elements in the host civilisation ... must be willing to embrace the convert*”².

Vladimir Putin, former KGB officer, became President of the Russian Federation in 2000, while re-installing the former secret police apparatus. Since then, through the actions undertaken, he shows that he seeks to reconstruct as much of the former Soviet Union. Obviously, the first step in this respect is represented by the reintegration of Ukraine in the Russian Federation’s area of influence.

So, by its policies, the Russian President tries to rebuild the Russian influence in the geopolitical space of the former USSR, restore Russia’s status of great world power and promote this new Russian civilisational identity recreated on the international agenda. To this end, Putin uses all the political, economic, diplomatic and military and imagologic tools available to achieve his goal called by many experts as “*imperialist*”³. Also, it is visible that he adopted a way of thinking similar to his Soviet predecessors, some authors even saying that “*Putin is a mirror reflection of Stalin*”⁴. Now, along Stalinism, the concept of “*Putinism*”⁵ began to be circulated by Western as well as Russian analysts, explaining this ideology.

The first step was taken in order to obtain the political and economic support of his own state. Statistics show that the Russian Federation has started to improve since Putin took office. The Russian political system and the economic system were supported by the construction of a vertical structure of power. The renewed power of the regime is reflected in the foreign policy of the state. Thus, Russia restarted

² Samuel P. Huntington, *Ciocrinea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale*, Editura Antet, Oradea, 1997, p. 201.

³ See Jackson Diehl, in *Putin’s Unchallenged Imperialism Moves to Ukraine*, <http://www.ukemonde.com/putin/imperialism.html>; Kathrin Hille, *Russia: Imperialism Awakes*, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7ef8545c-ab65-11e3-8cae-00144feab7de.html#axzz2zn5enfi4>.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See details in: *Putinism – An Ideology?*, 20 February 2013, a definition given to the concept: “*Putinism is an expression widely used to describe the ruling style of Russia’s current president Vladimir Putin. This ruling style has been described as a guided democracy with a carefully managed economy resembling the rent-seeking oil economies of the Persian Gulf. Moreover, gas and energy have also become Russia’s defining foreign policy features. Media censorship might not comparable to the days of the Soviet Union – however, it is ensured that the life of the few remaining independent and critical journalists is as difficult as possible*”. Details on: <http://crossingthebaltic.com/2013/02/20/putinism-an-ideology/>

to promote its interests on the international scene more actively and this led to direct confrontations with influent powers of the international community⁶. In the context of Russia's economic revival, the political and economic elites began to support President Putin's expansive policy. Especially that, during the President's first mandate, they had a lot to gain from that support, "*the regional elites being offered to powers and unlimited control over the area resources*"⁷.

The statistics compiled by the US International Institute for Strategic Studies show that "*the Russian defence reform continues with the aspiration to field more modern and more deployable and responsive forces. Russia has proved it can design and develop a credible prototype of a fifth-generation fighter*"⁸ and that "*despite shortcomings in defence-industrial capacity, has a long history of complex weapons research and development and can produce – and sell – formidable guided weapons like Onyx/Bastion, Kaliber, and the S-350/S-400, as well as platforms like the Sukhoi T-50 combat aircraft*"⁹. Russia has shown that it does not hesitate to use the military force when it considers that its interests are at stake (it invaded its neighbours in Georgia in 2008 using the military instrument and threatens to repeat the same scenario in 2014 in Ukraine, it already has armed troops in the border territory). Ukrainian officials of the National Council of Defence declared that about 100 000 soldiers of the Russian Federation are located at the northern, southern and eastern borders of Ukraine¹⁰.

Its economic instrument is also widely used. After taking office, V. Putin used the Ukraine and many European countries' energy dependence upon Russia as a political bargaining and blackmail tool. This happened in 2006, as well in the winter of 2008-2009, when, after some misunderstandings, the Russian Federation stopped supplying gas to Ukraine for a period of time, as Russia threatens to do in 2014 also, Russian officials saying "*it is the result of recent conflicts and the debt of \$ 2 billion that have to be paid by Ukraine to Russia*"¹¹. In this context, given the fact that the pro-Russian government in Ukraine was ousted from power,

⁶ Valdai Discussion Club, *Russian Elite – 2020. Valdai Discussion Club Grantees Analytical Report*, Moscow, July 2013, p. 4.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 13.

⁸ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2014, Further Assessments Flyer*, p. 1, <http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20releases/archive/2014-dd03/february-0abc/military-balance-2014-fact-sheet-c7ed>, retrieved on 20 April 2014.

⁹ *Ibid*, *Editor's Introduction*, p. 3, <http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2014-7e2c/mb2014-00b-foreword-2-3161>, retrieved on 20 April 2014.

¹⁰ Globalsecurity.org, *Ukraine Crisis – Russian Military Intervention*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/politics-2014-ext.htm> retrieved on 28 April 2014.

¹¹ Ziare.com, *Ce va face România dacă Rusia taie livrarea de gaze naturale către Ucraina*, 21 March 2014, <http://www.ziare.com/economie/gaz/ce-va-face-romania-daca-rusia-taie-livrarea-de-gaze-naturale-catre-ucraina-1288899>, retrieved on 25 April 2014.

“Moscow announced an 80% increase in the price of gas deliveries to Ukraine”¹². We believe the decision to annex Crimea was the result of several factors, one of them being that, in September 2013, Ukraine signed the concession agreements for exploration and exploitation of gas in the Black Sea, a step that would reduce the energy dependency on Russia. The agreements were on “*exploitation of a gas field in the North-Western Black Sea, estimated at about 10,8 billion cubic meters*”¹³.

Meanwhile, Russia has started an economic project of building an Eurasian economic union to include as many of the former Soviet satellites. Currently, the union likely to be launched in 2015 attracted only Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Bringing Ukraine into the Eurasian economic circle would have followed President Putin’s ambitious plan of restoring Russia to its essential stage as a comprehensive international actor. By signing the economic cooperation agreement with President Viktor Yanukovich, it seemed the former Ukraine renounced its way to the EU. But Yanukovich was ousted from power by the people and, in the immediate future, it is nearly impossible for Russia to regain influence in Ukraine as a whole, which we believe led to the invasion of Crimea, “*to control at least part of the country*”¹⁴.

Jan Techau, director of *Carnegie Europe*, claimed that “*the goal of the Russian policies at the moment is to regain political control over all of Ukraine – either very quickly or over the next one or two years*”¹⁵. Professor Dan Dungaciu declared for the *HotNews* that “*Russia seeks to federalise Ukraine or apply the Transnistria model to the eastern Ukrainian territories if Kiev refuses official federalisation*”¹⁶. Analyst Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in one of his important works that “*... Russia cannot be in Europe without Ukraine also being in Europe, whereas Ukraine can be in Europe without Russia being in Europe*”¹⁷.

¹² Business 24, *Kievul refuză creșterea prețului la gaze naturale. UE reacționează*, 5 April 2014, <http://www.business24.ro/gazprom/stiri-gazprom/kiievul-refuza-cresterea-pretului-la-gaze-naturale-ue-reactioneaza-1543714>, retrieved on 15 April 2014.

¹³ Victor Cozmei, *Peninsula Crimeea, noul punct fierbinte al Europei de Est: locul în care interesele Rusiei și ale Ucrainei intră în coliziune directă*, 25 February 2014, <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-16683935-peninsula-crimeea-noul-punct-fierbinte-europei-est-locul-care-interesele-rusiei-ale-ucrainei-intra-coliziune-directa.htm>, retrieved on 5 May 2014.

¹⁴ Konrad Putzier, *Putin and Stalin: Mirror Reflections*, 14 March 2014, *World Policy* blog, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/03/14/putin-and-stalin-mirror-reflections>, retrieved on 16 March 2014.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Claudiu Zamfir, *De ce vrea Rusia să bage pumnul în Gurile Dunării? Despre pericolul militarizării fluviului și destabilizarea Ucrainei, cu profesorii Dungaciu, Cioroianu și Naumescu*, 6 May 2014, <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-17172634-vrea-rusia-bage-pumnul-gurile-dunarii-despre-pericolul-militarizarii-fluviului-destabilizarea-ucrainei-profesorii-dungaciu-cioroianu-naumescu.htm>, retrieved on 7 May 2014.

¹⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Marea tablă de șah. Supremația americană și imperatiile sale geostrategice*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2000, p. 138.

This brings us to the conclusion that the Russian reactions are also a defensive feedback to the likely situation to be created on the European continent, one in which its former satellites at the Black Sea, Ukraine and Georgia, together with two other former communist borderland states neighbouring its western outpost, Belarus and Kazakhstan, can become the eastern flank of NATO defence, leading to the disappearance of a currently existing buffer zone between the East and the West, to the increase in the strategic importance of Western neighbours and to making permanent an inferior status-quo of the Russian Federation in the region, if not its political isolation.

Thus, when a referendum took place in Crimea according to which “96% of the citizens expressed their will to separate from Ukraine and reunify with Russia”¹⁸, President Putin did not lose the occasion to make a step toward increasing his own influence in the region and annexed the peninsula to his country’s territory, motivating his decision by the people’s will and historical justice. This happened given the circumstances in which, because of the recent deterioration of the internal political situation in Ukraine, divided between the options for East and West, Huntington’s third requirement, “the dominant elements in the host civilisation must be willing to embrace the convert”¹⁹, was already fulfilled in Crimea, where pro-Russian population is majority.

Later, after the annexation of Crimea and in the context of growing provinces with a pro-Russian majority demanding secession from Ukraine, Russian expansionist policy continued by promoting laws that facilitate obtaining Russian citizenship by those “who are fluent in Russian and live or have lived in the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire within the present borders of the Russian Federation”²⁰. Moreover, it is conveyed the idea of Russian involvement in maintaining chaos in South-East Ukraine and of fuelling the conflict between separatists and pro-Westerners. On the other hand, Russian officials declared that “Russia does not know what position should it take concerning the situation in Ukraine. Moscow has lost influence in Ukraine over the Russian-speaking communities and no longer can convince militants to surrender weapons”²¹. Starting from the presumption

¹⁸ Globalsecurity.org, *Autonomous Republic of Crimea*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/arc.htm>, retrieved on 20 April 2014.

¹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Clonirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale*, Editura Antet, Oradea, 1997, p. 201.

²⁰ RIA Novosti, *Putin Signs Law to Ease Russian Citizenship for Former USSR Residents*, 21 April 2014, <http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140421/189284295/Putin-Signs-Law-to-Ease-Russian-Citizenship-for-Former-USSR.html>.

²¹ Alina Mătiș, *Criza din Ucraina. Noi confruntări în estul țării. HARTA mișcărilor de trupe rusești este un duș rece pentru Europa. Premierul Victor Ponta: “Deși ne paște un RĂZBOI”, există “O VESTE BUNĂ”*, 3 May 2014, <http://www.gandul.info/international/criza-din-ucraina-noi-confruntari-in-estul-tarii-harta-miscarilor-de-trupe-rusesti-este-un-dus-rece-pentru-europa-premierul-victor-ponta-desi-ne-paste-un-razboi-exista-o-veste-buna-12576974>

of innocence, the statement is probably true. But, at the same time, in the media it was disseminated the recorded evidence of an intercepted phone call between Vladimir Putin's main ideological consultant, Alexander Dughin, philosopher and political scientist, giving indications to Russian separatists in South-Eastern Ukraine to act *"in a radical way, inciting civil war"*²². This is the same person who said that *"Romania's integration in the Eurasian space can occur under the sign of orthodox cultural identity"*²³. Dughin also said last year, in 2013, before the precipitation of events in Ukraine, that *"Russia and Romania have too much in common! We have been waiting for a reunion and mutual rediscovery in the context of a common civilisation. The first steps in this direction are already taken. I do not overestimate their value, but take them as positive"*²⁴. How can a political specialist of such level take into account this possibility referring to a NATO and EU member country and having at the same time strong historical European roots? And then the logical question comes: *Has Moscow got any plans in this regard in the long term?*

There are some who believe that Russia has been systematically challenged, isolated and vulnerable²⁵ when NATO came far on the southern flank of Russia and also approaching China. Russia's vast borders are under unprecedented pressure. Consequently, for several years, Russia has been making a great effort to prepare for a major military defence, comparable to the period of the Second World War. From this point of view, we believe that in the East European area, where the Russian Federation seeks to impose itself and consolidate in accordance with its close proximity concept, enshrined in its military defence doctrine, we have been experiencing, for about 25 years now, the recoil of history and I personally have a feeling of déjà-vu ...

2. What can we expect?

Russia's annexation of Crimea proved to be the most dangerous geopolitical event in the post-*Cold War* period and even after the Cuban missile crisis. The annexation could cause two types of actions, both harmful to Europe's stability in the long term. The first option was for Russia to regain the influence in the region

²² See in detail in Ziare.Com, *Consilierul lui Putin, înregistrat când le dădea instrucțiuni extremiștilor din Ucraina*, 2 April 2014, <http://www.ziare.com/international/ucraina/consilierul-lui-putin-inregistrat-cand-le-dadea-instructiuni-extremistilor-din-ucraina-1291369>, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

²³ *Cine este Alexandr Dughin, considerat ideologul lui Putin și promotorul neo-urasianismului. Cum vede viitorul României și al Ucrainei*, 12 March 2014, <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-16799499-cine-este-alexandr-dughin-considerat-ideologul-lui-putin-promotorul-neo-urasianismului-cum-vede-viitorul-romaniei-ucrainei.htm>

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Criza din Ucraina – consecința secolelor de arbitraj politic*, 8 May 2014, <http://www.cotidianul.ro/criza-din-ucraina-consecinta-secolelor-de-arbitrariu-geopolitic-233178/>

and the right to redraw borders and exercise veto power over governments of neighbouring countries. The second possibility was for the Ukrainian government to fight back, aided by Westerners, which could lead to a Yugoslavia-style civil war that would ultimately attract Poland, NATO and even the USA²⁶. The Ukrainian government at the time of the annexation accepted somewhat in silence the loss of Crimea, unwilling to provide a pretext for Russian invasion that could thus precipitate into a total civil war. However, internal tensions arose, once the control over Crimea was established, and unrests followed in other Russian-speaking majority areas in South-Eastern Ukraine. An “*antiterrorist*” operation was launched by officials in Kiev in April this year, in order to suppress the pro-Russian armed insurrection in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. Since 1 July²⁷, the operation has resulted in at least 140 soldiers wounded among the Ukrainians and more than 200 deaths (Ukrainian soldiers, civilians and separatists)²⁸. Moreover, at least one quarter of the checkpoints on the border with the Russian Federation are closed²⁹.

Petro Poroshenko became President of Ukraine and even in his inaugural speech he said that he would refuse any “*compromise*” with Russia on his country’s European orientation and on Crimea belonging to Ukraine³⁰. Subsequently, Ukrainian President had a meeting with Vladimir Putin in which he presented a plan to resolve the situation in South-Eastern Ukraine. A key point of Poroshenko’s plan was the creation of humanitarian corridors required by Moscow to allow civilians to leave the conflict areas in the east of the country. Although it seemed that the situation was heading for the better, *Gazprom* stopping gas deliveries to Ukraine showed otherwise. Moreover, after 10 days of unilateral truce offered by Ukrainian forces, the authorities restarted the fight against terrorism³¹.

NATO officials declared they were “*concerned that Russian troops at the border with Ukraine may represent a threat to the southeast of Ukraine*”³². Moreover, after Russian troops were heavily concentrated on the border with Ukraine,

²⁶ Anatole Kaletsky, *Realpolitik in Ukraine*, <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-03-03/realpolitik-ukraine>, accessed on 25 May 2014.

²⁷ The present article is updated with events until 1 July 2014.

²⁸ *Război în estul Ucrainei: Separatiștii proruși dețin controlul în 10 orașe*, See details on: http://www.realitatea.net/razboi-in-estul-ucrainei-separatistii-prorusi-detin-controlul-in-10-orase_1456244.html, retrieved on 1 July 2014.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Petro Porosenko a fost investit în funcția de președinte al Ucrainei. Cine este Porosenko: BIOGRAFIE*, 7 June 2014, http://www.realitatea.net/petro-porosenko-este-investit-in-functia-de-presedinte-al-ucrainei_1457035.html, retrieved on 1 July 2014.

³¹ *Ukraine Begins Military Offensive as Cease-fire Ends*, 1 July 2014, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/01/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/>, retrieved on 1 July 2014.

³² Adrian Kroft, *Russia Could Achieve Ukraine Incursion in 3-5 Days – NATO General*, 2 April 2014, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/02/uk-ukraine-crisis-breedlove-idUKBREA310J820140402>, retrieved on 15 May 2014.

Vladimir Putin said that *“Russia is counting from now on equal relations with Western countries after having defended its geopolitical interests in the Ukrainian crisis and will continue to defend the interests of Russian ethnic groups from other states”*³³. This statement by the Russian President is nothing else but a confirmation of the plan to regain Russian influence in the former Soviet states and of the concern of the Romanian President expressed at a TV broadcast that *“Crimea was target zero, and target one is the returning to the mouths of the Danube, the traditional border of the former Soviet Union, on the Chilia branch, which means from Crimea to Odessa and to the Chilia branch”*³⁴ and that *“the situation in Ukraine, caused by the actions of the Russian Federation, is a risk to Romania’s security”*³⁵.

Westerners’ reactions proved ineffective. So far, the EU has established visa bans and assets freezes of 48 Russian and pro-Russian Ukrainian officials. EU member states have been hesitant about imposing economic sanctions against Russia because they feared the reprisals of the latter, especially in terms of gas supply.

Western democracies, just emerging from a long crisis, with a level of growing dissatisfaction of the medium class, populist movements that threatened parties, criticised Russia in unison, without apparent effect. Political and diplomatic relations are strained between the West and the Russian Federation, serious statements are made on both sides, military manoeuvres in bordering areas of influence take place every day, symbolic gestures are made, such as that of President Obama’s *“withdrawal of Russia’s designation as a beneficiary developing country under the GSP”*³⁶, however, declaring that this decision was not related to the situation in Ukraine, but with the fact that *“Russia is sufficiently advanced in economic development and improved in trade competitiveness that continued preferential treatment under the GSP is not warranted”*³⁷. From these actions and statements we can deduce that the United States and the European Union will not intervene militarily to stop the actions of revisionist Russia. The West is aware that damage will be greater than the benefits, which is why even today it is not seriously set for a direct economic or political confrontation with Russia.

³³ NATO: *Rusia a concentrat masiv trupe la granița cu Ucraina. Putin cere tratament egal*, 2 July 2014, <http://www.capital.ro/nato-rusia-a-concentrat-masiv-trupe-la-granita-cu-ucraina-putin-cere-tratament-egal.html>, retrieved on 2 July 2014.

³⁴ Iulia Marin, *Traian Băsescu: Moscova poate face conflictele înghețate să explodeze. Pe rând sau toate deodată*, 14 April 2014, http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/presedintele-traian-basescu-sustine-declaratie-presa-ora-1500-1_534bc5fb0d133766a8c5f00c/index.html, retrieved on 8 May 2014.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Andra Costea, *Barack Obama privează Rusia de beneficiile comerciale*, 8 May 2014, <http://www.ziuanews.ro/externe/barack-obama-priveaza-rusia-de-beneficiile-comerciale-120997>, retrieved on 22 May 2014.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

Russia-West tension seems to have entered into a new kind of warfare, manifested by displaying military exercises and troop movements on both sides of the civilisational barrier. These events rather show a mutual deterrence and the presence of certain US capabilities, mainly from the air force, in the region highlights the US interest for a peaceful solution and not for an escalation of the conflict.

The future stakes for action seem to lean more towards the economy, as the main systemic vulnerability coming from Ukraine can be an economic crisis that could engulf the country, which may strengthen Russia's position at the expense of the Western world. Furthermore, Russia has responded to the economic sanctions imposed by Europe with similar measures applied on Ukraine, by stopping the gas. So if this action of *Gazprom* is extended to the West as well, this could complicate things greatly for the Western world and especially for southeast Europe³⁸. Then what will be the ways remaining for the West to tackle Russia? It is possible that a new type of war would somewhat satisfy Moscow's aspirations, from the perspective that any tension in the relations with the West is believed to restore Russia's political, symbolic and superpower status lost with the dissolution of the USSR, giving it the possibility to discuss with US in peer. All these will last until the establishment of a new balance of power. History will show if it is unipolar, bipolar or multipolar.

Conclusions

As shown by the still ongoing facts, Russia will not give Ukraine to the West and, if it is however forced to do it, in any case it will not be willing to leave Crimea and Sevastopol, where it has recently extended the Black Sea Fleet Stationary Agreement for the next 30 years.

Ukraine, in its current territorial size, has no chance of joining the EU or NATO, regardless of the enthusiasm of the discourse of the new leaders in Kiev or even the will of the majority population in the west of the country. A territory wherein there is one Russian soldier is a territory blocked in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration and the Russian Federation is aware of this fact. The same situation applies to Transnistria and Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the prospect of the countries that formally include them to join the Euro-Atlantic structures is limited.

The overall conclusion on the situation in Ukraine is that diplomats can issue sanctions and sign treaties and maps can be redrawn whenever it is wanted,

³⁸ *Sud-Estul European în 2014: instabilitate și insecuritate*, 19 March 2014, <http://geopolitics.ro/sud-estul-european-in-2014-instabilitate-si-insecuritate/>, retrieved on 1 July 2014.

but geography remains the silent witness directing nations' behaviour. We believe this is a golden rule of history. He who does not learn the lesson the first time will suffer every time he breaks this rule. Although, after 1990, there has been a historical ebb tide of the Russian Empire and an advance of the West towards Russia's frontiers, there seems to be a strategic alignment beyond which the Russian Federation will not allow Western influence. Moreover, the diplomatic and military reactions of Ukraine and the Western world do not seem to prevent President Putin from pursuing his "*Russian Empire*" reunification plan, not only in words, but also in action. So far, it seems that Moscow has outlined a solid agenda that includes bringing Russian speakers in the Russian Federation (even if they live in neighbouring sovereign states), restoring a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, in the former Soviet states, using the ethnic Russians present in those territories, redrawing international borders where possible and maintaining a conflict situation with the West, which he believes strengthens his internal position.

All major confrontations in history (including the *Cold War* and the fall of Communism) were completed in terms of the power relations between the parties. The succession – war balance of power – war – the new balance of power is virtually endless and has written the history of this world, namely the rise and fall of empires. The fact is that the stake of the current moment is the very future of Europe, because the situation in Ukraine will change regional geopolitics.

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The Secretary General's




Annual Report **2013** (IV)

Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Source: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20140123_SG_AnnualReport_2013_en.pdf
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1110 Brussels – Belgium
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The negative trend is particularly visible in the two scatter graphs where the defence expenditures of all Allies, except those of the United States, feature in relation to the 2% guideline on defence expenditures and the 20% guideline on major equipment expenditures for 2007 and 2013.


Nevertheless, recent efforts by a number of Allies serve as an important example. Several have effectively increased their major equipment expenditures over the last six years, investing in future requirements despite the pressures of the economic crisis.




Source: NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2013-14. 2005 prices and exchange rates. Estimates for 2013.

Moreover, sharing responsibilities is not only a matter of the percentage of any country's GDP spent on defence. The provision of forces and capabilities to NATO-led operations and missions is a meaningful demonstration of Alliance solidarity. Despite budget cuts, contributions to NATO operations remain strong. European Allies in particular have taken the lead in a number of operations and missions, including in Kosovo and Libya. European Allies have also consistently contributed the bulk of forces to the NATO Response Force and to Baltic air policing, as well as to a majority of air surveillance and interception rotations in Iceland.

**Air policing rotations, Baltic States
2004-2013**



**Air surveillance and interception rotations, Iceland
2008-2013**



Source: NATO

Note: Figures have been rounded off.

Reforming the Alliance

NATO has continually evolved over the last two decades, building on operational experience, expanding partnership networks and innovating to develop capabilities for modern defence. In 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed on a new Strategic Concept to guide this current phase of NATO's evolution and tasked the Secretary General and the North Atlantic Council with reforming NATO's structures. Since then, NATO has been hard at work to ensure that this transformation results in an Alliance that is fit for purpose in addressing 21st century security challenges.

In the years since 2010 there has been significant progress toward these goals. As agreed by Allies in 2011, the number of operational entities comprising the NATO Command Structure has been reduced from thirteen to seven; fourteen NATO Agencies have been consolidated into four. Resulting cost savings are already apparent in 2013 and are expected to increase in the years to come. In addition to more streamlined structures, a focus on key priorities has helped a smaller workforce to meet the changing needs of the Alliance. NATO is on track to deliver an Alliance that is efficient and effective in its operations and prepared for the future.

Defence planning

Addressing the challenge of orienting national and Alliance resources to address new threats has been central to NATO's defence policy efforts in recent years. NATO cannot dictate how Allies allocate their resources, and it is the Allies (individually or in groups) that ultimately provide defence capabilities. However, NATO can facilitate national and multinational efforts in ways that build on the strengths of the Alliance to ensure these efforts are harmonised through NATO's defence planning process.

The 2010 Strategic Concept laid down the parameters for the next ten years of planning. Further political guidance as well as the comprehensive Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012 provide the framework for the ongoing work of improving the defence planning process. In 2013, NATO developed tools to clearly illustrate the current performance of individual Allies across a number

of areas, as well as wider trends in capability development over time. NATO forces need to be flexible, agile and deployable, with all the supporting infrastructure and logistics this entails so that they can respond to a variety of threats.

NATO Command Structure

The NATO Command Structure enables NATO to implement political decisions through the coordination of military means and is part of what makes the Alliance unique. These military command and control bodies which make up the command structure coordinate contributions from member and partner countries during operations and exercises. They are permanently manned and ready to react at very short notice to any contingency.

“NATO forces need to be flexible, agile and deployable, with all the supporting infrastructure and logistics this entails

In 2010, Allies agreed to reform this command structure. The aim was a leaner, more affordable structure that would be flexible and more deployable. 2013 was a year of steady progress toward this goal, with the new command structure attaining its initial operational capability in December. The number of operational entities has been reduced from thirteen to seven. In November 2013, Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (The Netherlands) provided the headquarters component for the major NATO Response Force exercise Steadfast Jazz. This was an important demonstration of the Command's ability to support a diverse, deployable force, the exercise having taken place at sea, in the air, and on land, with participants from Allied and partner countries.

At the end of 2015 when the implementation of the command structure reform is complete, the manning and footprint of the overall structure will have been reduced by one third, resulting in savings of €123 million to the military budget.

NATO Agencies

NATO Agencies are responsible for a range of services necessary to support the work NATO does, including procurement of goods and services as well as logistical support for current operations. Because of the complex links

between the functions of the NATO Command Structure and the services provided by NATO Agencies, planning for and implementation of agency reform has been coordinated to ensure continuous provision of support.

The aims of the agency reform process agreed in 2011 are improved governance and enhanced efficiency. When the process began, there were fourteen entities; these have now been consolidated into four bodies, focused on support, procurement, communications and information, and science and technology. This consolidation provides a better coordinated, more effective structure.

In 2013, agency reform efforts focused on consolidating services and programmes while preserving the ability to provide for ongoing operations. Cost-saving programmes have delivered a five per cent reduction in 2013 and remain on track for a 20 per cent reduction in coming years.

During 2013, 88 per cent of all agency personnel were transferred into the new organisations for support, communication and information, and science and technology. Work also progressed on the development of a new procurement body to better integrate existing acquisition programmes, provide a flexible framework for future projects and improve cost-effectiveness.

Also in 2013, as part of agency reform, NATO established the Office of Shared Services, which is working to rationalise service delivery across NATO bodies. It is focused on three areas: finance and accounting, general procurement, and human resources.

NATO Headquarters

NATO's International Staff numbers just over 1 000, making up a relatively small but important element of the Alliance's overall structure. As part of the broader reform, and in preparation for the move to a new headquarters, NATO has been working to streamline the workforce and modernise the working practices of the International Staff. By 2018, the size of the International Staff will have been reduced by nearly 20 per cent. More importantly, dozens of staff positions have been reassigned to higher priorities. These efforts to craft a more adaptable civilian workforce are part of a new human resources policy, implementation of which began in 2013.

NATO's International Military Staff, numbering around 500, is also under review. An extensive report was completed in 2013 that will guide the efforts to refine

that structure so that it, too, is properly equipped to serve the goals of a 21st century Alliance.

NATO's committee structure is also part of the Headquarters reform. NATO members come together in committee meetings to discuss and decide. Since 2010, there has been a 65 per cent reduction in the number of committees – this leaner, more coherent structure allows for swifter, better integrated responses to tasks delegated by the North Atlantic Council.

The new NATO headquarters, which is currently under construction, will provide the Alliance with a modern base. The current headquarters was designed and built in the 1960s as a temporary structure for 15 countries. NATO now has 28 member countries and requires a facility able to flexibly adapt to shifting priorities.



AND THE FUTURE STARTS NOW: BETTER STRATEGIC AWARENESS, IMPROVED OPERATIONAL AGILITY, ROBUST RESILIENCE

Visiting Romania at the invitation of the Chief of General Staff, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Jean-Paul Paloméros, was present Friday, 31 October 2014, at the National Defence University “Carol I” to deliver a keynote address to approximately 350 people, teachers and students from the institution as well as students invited from the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration.

The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation was welcomed at the National Defence University “Carol I” by the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Ștefan Dănilă, and the Commandant (Rector) of the National Defence University “Carol I”, Air Flotilla General Professor Dr Gabriel-Florin Moisescu.

General Paloméros delivered an address about the allied transformation process, the Romanian Armed Forces participation in allied projects and initiatives, as well as the security situation in the region.

At the end of the visit, General Jean Paul Paloméros signed the Guestbook of the National Defence University “Carol I”.



REMARKS to the
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
CAROL I of ROMANIA
General Jean-Paul PALOMÉROS
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
BUCUREȘTI, 31 October 2014

General Ștefan Dănilă,

General Moisescu,

Ladies and gentlemen, generals, admirals, officers,

I am really delighted to have the great opportunity to meet with officers representing the future of NATO. You are one of the most important investments Romania can make in the education and teaching of an emerging generation of military and civilian leaders. In fact, I know that it is a standing tradition of this school, which was founded in 1889 and became the sixth staff school in Europe, successfully providing high quality officers, able to perfectly collaborate with other Allies.

It is also a great honour to intervene in a school founded by General Ștefan Fălcoianu, who had very strong ties with France, having studied both in the Imperial Military School of Saint-Cyr and the Polytechnic School of Paris, between 1860 and 1864. The ties between Romania and France are long enduring and friendly.

It is above all a real opportunity for a Strategic commander to reaffirm the Alliance's resolve to support its Eastern Allies, to support Romania and many other Allies, in a time when ambiguity and development of hybrid threats is increasing on the flanks of the Alliance, and certainly in the East and South-East. I acknowledge the full commitment of your Nation to address these emerging challenges, with a particular effort, as stated in your White Paper, to enhance Romanian Forces at appropriate readiness levels and the development of Romanian Air Defence with a great modernisation. In a Transformational effort, I know you are integrating the lessons identified of your important and successful contributions to NATO-led operations, in particular in Afghanistan and in the Balkans.



For us, it is truly invigorating to see that Romania continues to invest in you, to invest in its people, to invest in the Alliance to prepare its future. This is of crucial importance not only for your country, but also for NATO, for its cohesion, for its efficiency, for its credibility.

Thus, I will take a few minutes with you, before we come to the questions and answers period, to describe NATO Transformation and advocate three simple messages. First, you are members of an Alliance which has just celebrated its 65th anniversary, which can be proud of its past, and which is ready to defend the sovereignty and security of its 28 members, the sovereignty and security of 900 million of people. Second, NATO is taking on its responsibilities to cope with emerging threats and third the transformation efforts, that my command is leading, are indispensable to adapt our Alliance and prepare its future.

1- A successful past based on shared values

In one poem of 19th century, Mihai Eminescu stated that *“Every nation and every age is standing on the shoulders of the past”*. And this is particularly relevant for the Alliance that Romania joined a decade ago, and which is probably the most powerful, the most relevant and successful military organisation of the modern age. It has contributed in deterring a major conflict in Europe for the past 65 years, and has brought peace, security and freedom to today’s 28 Nations.

During the last twenty-five years, the Alliance demonstrated a very high level of adaptation and flexibility, adapting its structure from the Cold War to cope with crisis management requirements, in the Balkans, Afghanistan or Libya. Our Alliance's forces have been stretched from one crisis to the other and the best testimony is that many of you have been deployed in these operations. I praise you for your courage and commitment. Our forces have learned to cope with asymmetry, with counter-insurgency, and with short notice, long range, enduring deployments. But let's be clear on the roots of this enduring success. Our Alliance is in no way a coalition of circumstances, it is the result, the combination of Political will and credible military capabilities tied together by a solid bond, our shared values for freedom, democracy, rule of law.

From its inception, and as reaffirmed again during the last NATO Summit of Heads of States and Governments in Wales, the strength of NATO has been to bring together diverse national and regional security concerns and strategic interests. NATO has been able to cope with the diversity of national interests and of threat perceptions, with different regional perspectives – which is very understandable for 28 countries, from the North to the South and from the East to the West – and with the many political and social culture changes. Today, I can tell you, based on my two years of experience, as it was the case ten years ago when Romania joined it, our Alliance retains a great power of attraction and, as part of NATO's cooperative security effort, our Heads of States and Governments have decided to enhance cooperation with our many Partners in particular through an interoperability platform.

2- NATO is maintaining its relevance and credibility

In line with our Strategic Concept, NATO is filling today a spectrum of missions and operations larger than ever, first and foremost Collective Defence – which remains the core of NATO missions, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security – which has been a great success with Partners and partner Organisations willing to work with NATO. The main challenge for the Organisation is to find the right balance and coherence of effort, to deal with the volatility of a complex security environment. We have to maintain a commitment to solve previous crises – the one that are still there, while answering to current crisis and preparing ourselves for future security challenges which is important for Allied Command Transformation. And the future starts now.

The reality of our security environment is that we are still present in Kosovo, in the Mediterranean Sea, in the shore of the Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan, and in other places as well. As planned, we are going to end ISAF mission in Afghanistan in December 2014 and transition to training, assisting and advising the Afghan authorities and Afghan National Security Forces. Thanks to the recent agreement between Afghan political leaders, the planning of the Resolute Support Mission is moving forward and we are working hard to prepare this very demanding mission. I want to praise Romania for its commitment, with 1 800 soldiers deployed in 2013, the 7th troop contributing Nation to ISAF. They outstandingly supported our Afghan counterparts, the Afghan people, with a large portion of the troops in the Zabul province, one of the most contested by the insurgents, and you have done very well. Having ended its combat operations in June 2014, we are – I am – glad that your country is committed to take its responsibility in the Resolute Support Mission to keep on supporting our Afghan Partners. We must learn the lessons from Iraq, we can't afford to give up. It is important and crucial for Afghanistan and for peace and security.



Along with these long-standing crises response operations, you know better than anybody else the degradation of the security environment that has been occurring in your close neighbourhood. Unfortunately, it brought back the reality and necessity of our Collective Defence, for those who had a doubt, task as well as the support we owe to Ukraine, a reliable and very close partner.

It is on Collective Defence that the alliance has built its credibility.

Just after the beginning of the events in Crimea, the first sign of Alliance's solidarity was the instant commitment of the Allies to implement tangible and credible reassurance measures for our eastern nations. NATO was able to improve its prevention and deterrence posture, while avoiding any kind of military escalation with Russia, or any potential exploitation by an aggressive and effective Russian strategic communication campaign. We have a lot to learn about STRATCOM today.

The first phase of the reassurance measures was built around a reinforcement of our Air Baltic policing missions, a significant increase of our NATO AWACS deployment, to enhance our situational awareness and the deployment as well of Maritime assets.

As far as Allied Command Transformation is concerned, our enhanced program of exercises gave us the ability to maintain, and even improve dramatically Allies contribution to assurance measures. Combining all these exercises, the Alliance conducts today one training event every two days, increasing visibly its presence on NATO's flanks. We must take advantage of this to improve interoperability.

I would just remind you that these reassurance measures are complementary to the core of deterrence, based upon our nuclear component, and our credible conventional forces.

Turning now to our very short-term expectations, the Alliance military authorities, SACEUR and I, were tasked to implement the Readiness Action Plan, by which we should sustain these assurance measures, and improve the overall readiness and responsiveness of the Alliance, to improve the readiness that we have lost under the pressure of decreasing defence budgets and to cope with threats emerging on the Alliance borders, in particular in the East.

Concerning the first point, to sustain the assurance measures, we will capitalise, as it was stated by General Dănilă, on our Connected Forces Initiative, which focuses on enhancing Education, Training and exercises as well as new technologies. This is a very flexible transformation tool, which levers two decades of lessons learned, and enables NATO to maintain the high level of interoperability between the Allies, with Partners as well. It is a way to invest in our key resources, our men and women. Today, our renewed exercises policy is allowing us to improve our flexibility and as well provide a dynamic presence on the eastern flanks of Europe.

To enhance the quality of our exercises we are building high intensity scenarios and use the full expertise of ACT's subordinate commands: the Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway, the Joint Force Training Center in Bydgoszcz, Poland, which focuses on the tactical preparation of NATO forces and is instrumental in preparing the deployment of our people to Afghanistan, and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal, led by General Mîndrescu, a wonderful leader.



NATO can also fully benefit from Nations initiatives to create Centers of Excellence through which they share their expertise, in domains of interests for the Allies. I would specially thank Romania for the improvement of NATO Human intelligence capabilities, through your Center of Excellence of Oradea that I visited yesterday, and I have been deeply impressed by the expertise and commitment of your people. Only men and women can transform information in intelligence.

In order to improve the responsiveness of our forces, we are also closely working with our sister command Allied Command Operations to build what is referred now as a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force that must take benefit on what was already created and implemented in our NATO Response Force a few years ago. This force will need to be military relevant, with a reasonable and sustainable notice to move, include key enablers and be able to connect rapidly with the supported Host Nation. It must be well trained, through short-notice and high intensity exercises. It will be as well a transformation vehicle for the overall enhancement

of NATO responsiveness. I must stress that to achieve a better readiness it will require a real effort and investments from the nations in infrastructure, communication and information systems or command and control.

In summary, NATO is doing its job in deterring and preventing a further extension of the crisis within its borders, and it is doing so in both a responsible and resolute manner.

3- ...while preparing the future

To define our preparation of the future, I would say that ACT is working accordingly with the French philosopher Auguste Comte' statement saying that we should "*Know to anticipate in order to act*".

It means that preparing the Future starts now and it depends on four main lines of effort:

- Imagining what are the main trends that would define our future military environment, and then its military implications.
- Developing the capabilities and technologies enabling the Alliance to shape its future.
- Encouraging Nations to continue to invest in their Defence and to answer the requirements of our NATO Defence Planning Process.
- Enhancing our Partnerships as part of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach within the international community.

First and foremost, ACT has begun last year a very ambitious Framework for Future Alliance Operations to define the main trends of our security environment. To be clear, this Framework is not designed to provide an assertive view of the future – unfortunately we have no magic crystal ball in Allied Command Transformation – but we strive to enhance our ability to understand the key tenets of tomorrow. Let me share with you some of our first conclusions. In light of our present experience, we must take the assumption that there is a clear enduring trend for our adversaries to overturn the key components of our military power.

We must assume they will not accept internationally established borders, treaties rules of law, or norms of behaviour. They will increase their use of asymmetric or irregular forms of warfare, in order to counter our military superiority. Some states or non-state actors should seek more often to combine

these different forms of warfare – conventional, irregular and cyber warfare – and possibly, large scale terrorism, including hostage taking. They will try to deny us clear, legitimate, Course of action and clearly identified targets and will seek to increase the ambiguity on the battlefield, posing in certain cases the same problem of indubitable attribution that we currently experience in the cyberspace for instance. This hybrid and ambiguous model will represent a complicating element for developing our strategy and our defence planning, as it blurs the boundaries between conventional approaches of power. Moreover, our opponents could seek to strike the Alliance within its own borders, in such a way to limit the possibility to adequately use our forces, and even sometimes the legitimacy to employ them.



Second, our opponents will keep on increasing their capabilities, and they will, more and more, aim to impede our actions. They will also challenge our technology based superiority model.

As we can observe today, non-state combat experienced fighters can move easily from one theatre to another as it is the case in the entire arc of crisis from the Sahel to Caucasus, including Middle East – North Africa. In addition, they are able to exchange and share lessons learned and techniques, using modern information technology and extensive strategic communication tools. They will be more and more empowered by access to technologically advanced weapons. So, we must assume that there will be less, and perhaps no more so called, “*permissive environments*”. Going further down our considerations, this raises

a real question of NATO's ability for the future to ensure a first entry in a high intensity operational area. Anti-access and area denial capabilities will continue to be spread through the dissemination of very highly effective systems by some major Powers. Our adversaries will seek to increase the lethality and diversity of threats in the area of operations in order to step up our dependency on force protection and affect our Nations' perceptions of risk and therefore, our public opinion and political will to intervene, and our society's resilience.

Third, our readiness will be more and more stressed.

Crisis could develop so swiftly that the decision-making process would leave us very little space to respond in a very timely manner. To compensate this fact, our forces will need to be more agile, more mobile, able to adapt in real time to a very versatile combat and security environment. Not only they will have to be trained and exercised on the whole scope of possible missions, but they will need as well to be able to interact with an increasing number of actors and to better integrate the military component, within a wider global approach.

So, from these three main trends, we have tried to define key strategic military perspectives on which we need to focus for the future, that I will summarise in three priorities: better strategic awareness, improved operational agility and robust resilience.

But, as Romanian sculptor Constantin Brâncuși said, *"to see far is one thing, going there is another"*. It brings me to the implications for the Alliance.

First and foremost, Allies need to bolster their Defence budget. In Wales, NATO's Heads of States and Governments recognised that we live in a dangerous world where many big nations have been investing to modernise their defence capabilities, such as China, India or Russia. Therefore, they have made a pledge to increase their defence expenditure to meet the 2% guideline of Gross Domestic Product, and a minimum annual investment of 20% of the total defence expenditures. But, even with improved defence budgets, we have to spend better, and we have to prioritise our efforts, we have to innovate and I can tell you that I am confident that our countries can face this challenge. We can do that together.

After the results from our last cycle of our NATO Defence Planning Process, our political authorities have recognised a list of 16 priority shortfalls, which should be addressed in priority in the near future such as JISR, Training, BMD, Cyber.

To achieve our capability goals, I strongly advocate maximising our multinational collaboration through Smart Defence and the Framework Nation Concept.

And I praise Romania as a strong supporter of multinational initiatives because you are participating in 42 Smart Defence projects.



To develop our capabilities, I would stress to leverage technology and innovation considering the exponential pace of technological progress. The spirit of innovation is well-known in Romania, as the inventor and aerodynamics pioneer, Henri Coandă designed and built in 1910 the world's first jet powered aircraft. Indeed, in our modern environment we must be able to rapidly and smartly exploit existing and emerging technologies such as autonomous systems, nanotechnologies, distributed IT solutions – cloud computing –, new energy production and storage (and many others). On this crucial need to exploit, to tap the best of technology, let's be sure that our potential adversaries will not miss the opportunity, in fact they are already using new technologies to their benefit. I must also mention standardisation as one of the most powerful enabling factors of a smarter capability development and for improved interoperability. I think then that we must learn to work much closer, more effectively with industry, with University, and with Think Tanks to anticipate the impact of new models, of new sociology and of new technologies on military capabilities.

As a summary of these considerations on equipment perspectives, I would say that we need to better master the trinity of cost, time, and effectiveness

of our major equipment projects. We must do this, through a balanced and innovative approach and keeping interoperability in mind. I do think also that effective, pragmatic, efficient innovation offers us solutions to tackle the capability modernisation challenges I have just depicted. This is why I put so much emphasis on innovation as a key engine for Transformation.

Turning to my last point, I must emphasise the key place of our Partners in our Alliance strands of effort. As shortly presented in our future works, our Nations will continue to face global challenges, which require comprehensive solutions. Therefore, NATO has to capitalise on its partnerships both with partner nations and partner organisations.

First and foremost, the Alliance should maximise its collaboration with the most important Strategic Partner: the European Union. Today 22 European nations are members of the two organisations and many Non-NATO EU countries enjoy a very close partnership with NATO (Sweden, Finland, Austria). There is a clear interdependency between NATO and EU that we strive to capitalise on, in developing more coherent capabilities and multinational projects, as well as interconnected training through our Connected Forces Initiative. EU and NATO are part of the same peace and security equation and they must complement, reinforce each other. That will in turn strengthen our Transatlantic relationship.

Closing

To conclude, ladies and gentlemen, I would stress that the last Summit in Wales underlined the necessity to sustain our efforts, in order to train and exercise NATO forces, develop its capabilities, enhance its readiness and responsiveness and strengthen the links with Partners. This is a great challenge of NATO's Transformation, a challenge for the future, a challenge for your future, a challenge for future generations.

And I have no doubt that, thanks to the outstanding education you are receiving here in this great defence university, you will be able to meet this challenge. You will be able to build on your operational experience, on your understanding of the new world, to take any opportunity to transform your forces, to transform our Alliance, to keep on the pace of a world which evolves at light speed.

In a couple of months, you will inspire your men and women with innovation, agility, creative and critical thinking. By having been selected to this course, you will now share the responsibility on keeping our Alliance fit for the future.



And your motto "*LABOR IMPROBUS OMNIA VINCIT*" – "*Great labour overcomes everything*" is enlightening the path to your future successes. Keep faith, keep confidence in yourself, in your Nation, keep confidence in our Alliance.

Fight, never give up. You cannot afford not to try and you will succeed.

The world belongs to those who are courageous enough to change it.

Thank you.

* Photographs supplied courtesy of <http://www.unap.ro/index.php/ro/evenimente?id=322>

WHAT'S REALLY HOLDING LIBYA BACK

Barak BARFI

The author writes about Libya after the death of Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi and the dilemmas the country has been confronted with.

First, he addresses the need for security reform, focused on building a strong army and police force in the context of the inability to rein in hundreds of autonomous militias.

Then, he mentions the political and administrative gridlock the country has been facing, with a dysfunctional parliament, state institutions destroyed by Qadhafi and lack of proper investment in higher education.

To conclude, he identifies a series of other changes the country must face, such as: a federalist movement in the East, tribes shutting down oil pipelines, stressing out the need for fostering efficient governance, building state institutions and encouraging respect for the state of law.

Keywords: *security reform; political and administrative gridlock; unbridled militias; oil stoppages; political isolation law*

After Libyan rebels killed former Libyan leader Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi in October 2011, the country rejoiced with hopes that a new generation of politicians would be able to address the grievances that gave rise to the revolution. But three years later, the failures of these elected leaders have spawned new frustrations that seem almost as insurmountable as those Qadhafi was never able to resolve.


These problems stem in part from the growing pains of unseasoned politicians. But the real dilemma Libya faces is that its citizens' expectations are misplaced. The country has structural challenges that could take a generation to resolve. From a lack of technical capacity to a division of formal and informal authority pitting revolutionaries against state institutions, Libya is coping with the same dilemmas that plagued the Qadhafi years.

SECURITY REFORM

Western nations have focused their efforts on security reform, believing that this is the elixir for most of Libya's problems. They are particularly concerned about eliminating jihadists, who have killed both Libyans and Westerners, including the American ambassador in September 2012.

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To do so, Western nations are working to build a strong army and police force. But this will anger the country's hundreds of autonomous militias, who do not take their orders from the central government. Some units, such as those from the Western towns of Misrata and Zintan, are grouped according to region. Others, in the east, such as the Islamist February 17th Brigade, are ideological in nature. All, however, march to their own drum with impunity. In November 2013, Misrati forces opened fire on civilians in the capital, killing forty-three. Militias from the city of Zawiya have consistently clashed with their Warshfana neighbours. And, in the eastern city of Benghazi, Islamists have assassinated more than 50 security officials.

The parliament, known as the General National Congress (GNC), has proved unable to rein in the militias. Its plans to build an army and police force have been consistently thwarted by the brigades. Instead, the GNC has exacerbated the problem by enlisting and thus emboldening them. The largest political party, the National Forces Alliance (NFA), has aligned itself with Zintani units while its chief rival, the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), has co-opted Misrati forces. In 2011, the prime minister created the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) from militia groups to act as a parallel police force. Other ministries contract brigades to provide security.

The United States believes that the lawlessness plaguing the country is impeding the development of a strong central government. To combat it, Washington has announced plans to train between 5-7 000 fighters and has earmarked \$8 million to do so.



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But what America overlooks is that the security challenges Libya faces today are no different from those that hamstrung the Qadhafi regime. After a disastrous defeat by Chad in 1987 put an end to a nine year war against his southern neighbour, Qadhafi neglected his army. In the years following a failed military coup in 1992 – the last in a long string of military rebellions – Qadhafi changed tack, repeatedly announcing his intention to disband the country’s armed forces and replace them with the popular militias. Qadhafi selected the best officers and put them in special brigades. There, they received training and weapons that the military units were not afforded. Qadhafi doled out weapons to groups such as the Committee to Combat Heresy and Drugs, and the General Authority of Youth and Sport. He also invested revolutionary committees with wide sweeping powers.

Today, there is not much difference between the GNC’s inability to stand one up to cut the militias down to size and Qadhafi’s neglected army. Under both governments, revolutionary power trumps institutional legitimacy. Blurred lines of authority hinder the establishment of an efficient chain of command.

Until the GNC addresses these dilemmas, there is little chance that it will be able to restore order.

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE GRIDLOCK

One of the biggest challenges Libya faces is its dysfunctional parliament. Originally envisioned to serve as an interim body with a term of 18 months to write a constitution, the GNC has extended its mandate. Infighting between the NFA and JPC has resulted in political gridlock that has left many Libyans frustrated with the democratic process. The GNC's unfamiliarity with electoral politics in the aftermath of 42 years of authoritarian rule is partially responsible for this predicament.



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But the real culprit is the country's political culture. Qadhafi atomised society, destroying state institutions and neglecting investment in higher education. He viewed the static bureaucracy as his principal adversary, preventing the masses from embracing his revolutionary ideology. To neutralise it, he occasionally dismantled ministries, moved government offices outside the capital and suggested that citizens receive the country's oil wealth directly rather than entrusting state institutions to manage it.

Years of sanctions also prevented a generation of Libyans from studying in Western universities. Instead of moving younger cadres up the ladder, Qadhafi merely shuffled the same troglodytes between ministries.

Qadhafi's childhood friend Muhammad Abu'l-Qasim al-Zway epitomises this. During a 34 year political career, he held cabinet portfolios ranging from Information to Justice to Public Security, in addition to serving as ambassador to several countries. He finished his career as Qadhafi's last speaker of parliament.

The lack of technical capacity equally hampers the bureaucracy from functioning. Few have the skills necessary to rebuild ministries. Most are incapable of independent decision making, and are limited instead to rubber stamping their superiors' decisions. And in a country where Qadhafi personally signed every contract over \$200 million, there were – are – few competent bureaucrats.

But rather than removing obstacles to development, the GNC has merely created more. In May 2013 it passed a political isolation law, barring anyone who served under Qadhafi from holding public office for ten years. In doing so, it has embraced Qadhafi's exclusionary tactics that prevented all but a few from reaching the upper echelons of government.

OTHER CHALLENGES

Libya is plagued by other problems as well. A federalist movement in the East is chipping away at the central government's authority. In October 2013 its leaders announced the formation of an autonomous region and selected a cabinet. Brigades associated with the movement took control of three



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of the country's five oil export terminals, preventing fuel shipments. In Libya's hinterlands, tribes shut down oil pipelines to protest everything from lack

of citizenship to lack of investment in their areas. These stoppages slowed oil production from a pre-revolution level of 1.6 million barrels per day to 600 000, in a country where oil exports account for 95% of foreign currency earnings.

But like many of the country's problems that make international headlines, the oil slowdown poses very little threat to Libya. It has approximately \$119 billion of foreign currency reserves and a sovereign wealth fund with at least \$50 billion more that can cover any budgetary shortfall. But with the government unable to even allocate half of the budget, it is unlikely that it will ever have to dip into its coffers.

Problems such as unbridled militias and oil stoppages highlight the erosion of state authority. The best way to tackle these issues is to foster efficient governance, build state institutions, and encourage respect for the rule of law. By focusing on the core problems that have historically plagued Libya rather than their current byproducts, Western nations can help put Libya on the path to stabilisation. And that will make everyone in the region more secure.



TRANSATLANTIC ENERGY SECURITY AND THE UKRAINE CRISIS: A BLESSING IN DISGUISE?

David KORANYI

The author addresses the issue of a possible cut-off of gas supplies from Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crises, pointing out that EU member states' reliance on and exposure to Russia on energy supplies has critical national security implications.

First, he writes that Moscow's resort to force implies to consumers that they may be wise to take active steps to further diversify their gas supplies and drastically reduce their exposure to Russia.

Then, he mentions the expected consequences of a hypothetical complete cut-off of gas supplies to Europe in 2015.

Moreover, he mentions the critical vulnerabilities that are particularly worrying from Moscow's perspective in the event that such a cut-off did happen.

He concludes by adding that the Ukraine crisis may herald a new chapter in transatlantic energy strategies and prove to be a reverse "Arab Oil Embargo" moment in the energy history of the transatlantic alliance.

Keywords: Russia; oil; gas; energy security; emerging security challenges; USA; EU-NATO

In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, Europe may face yet another cut-off of gas supplies from Russia. Gazprom still meets more than half of Ukraine's gas demand and supplies close to a third of Europe's imports, roughly half of which 82 billion cubic meters (bcm) went through Ukraine in 2013. In March, Gazprom drastically increased prices for Ukraine and threatened to shut down supplies in case of non-payment in a letter addressed to 18 European leaders, while Ukraine is facing a serious liquidity crisis that cripples its ability to pay its gas bills.



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David Koranyi – the Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council's Patriciu Eurasia Centre.

Ukraine crises

Preparations within the European Union (EU) and in the context of the G7 have begun in earnest to get ready for various contingencies especially in the winter of 2014/15 and – by the words of UK energy secretary Ed Davey – to start “*a process of disarmament to prevent energy being used as a weapon in the future*”.



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Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and its actions in Ukraine question the sustainability and indeed the very concept of mutual energy security – the foundations of which go back to the *Cold War*. EU member states’ reliance on and exposure to Russia on energy supplies has critical national security implications. The renewed disputes over gas pricing and transit recalled the spectre of the 2006 and 2009 Russo-Ukrainian gas crises, yet again showcasing Russia as an unreliable supplier and as a state that is ready and willing to use energy as a weapon.

Consequently, there is an increasing realisation among European Union and NATO member states that “*business as usual*” cannot continue. Moscow’s resort to force implies to consumers that they may be wise to take active steps to further diversify their gas supplies and drastically reduce their exposure to Russia.

Indeed, at its meeting in late March 2014, the European Council concluded that efforts to reduce Europe’s high gas energy dependency rates should be intensified and asked the European Commission to conduct an in-depth study of EU energy security and a comprehensive plan for the reduction of EU energy dependence to be presented by June 2014.

A short-term shock

Who stands to lose most if energy again becomes a weapon that is used in the ongoing standoff over Ukraine? In the short term, it is clearly the European Union and especially its vulnerable member states in Central and Southeast Europe and the Baltics. Despite major progress in integrating these countries into the EU's emerging single energy market and interconnect them with each other, their dependence on Russia on gas supplies is still substantial.



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According to the *Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research*, in case of a hypothetical complete cut-off to Europe in January 2015 for a month – that includes not only the Ukrainian transit route but also the Yamal pipeline through Belorussia and *Nord Stream*, the direct gas link to Germany – only 77% of the average demand would be served in Central and Eastern European countries and average gas prices will go up by 37%.

In case of a hypothetical 12-month embargo up to March 2015, during which Russia reduces its supplies by 30%, a 31% price increase would result, with roughly half of the gas demand unmet, with clearly catastrophic economic consequences. Western European countries are much less exposed, at least in terms of physical security of supply, as they have a diversified, liquid natural gas market with the ability of bringing in additional supplies from Norway, North Africa and via liquefied natural gas through the numerous regasification terminals with spare capacities. Still, the price increase would be substantial even in Western Europe,

adding to the existing concerns over the yawning gap between gas prices either side of the Atlantic.

Russian weaknesses

Despite the EU's renewed zeal to address its dependency on imported gas from Russia, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where Russia will not remain Europe's gas supplier for the foreseeable future. Europe cannot completely replace 150-160 billion cubic meters of Russian gas in the coming years. Yet, in the medium- to long-term, it is Russia that is more vulnerable.



Despite Europe's short-term exigencies described above, it is striking how Russia's ability of applying political and commercial pressure has already diminished since the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis. Gazprom has to compete with other suppliers on an increasingly liquid and integrated European gas market that applies competition rules vigorously. Some 53% of Russia's budget revenues come from fossil fuel exports, especially oil. Fossil fuel accounts for 72% of its exports. Gas exports to OECD Europe account for about 5% of the Russian GDP. Gazprom generates around 55% of its revenues from gas sales to the European Union.

There are three critical vulnerabilities that are particularly worrying from Moscow's perspective:

1. The Ukraine crisis could prompt a general re-evaluation of the role of natural gas in Europe's energy mix in general and will very likely generate a reserved if not outright hostile approach towards Russian natural gas. The combination of these two developments may in the medium-term result in a diminished demand for Russian gas that will deliver a blow to Gazprom's and the Russian state's finances, including key figures within President Putin's inner circle.

2. As an answer to Europe's declared intention to diversify away from Russian gas, Moscow is banging the drums on its own diversification strategy towards the rapidly growing Asian markets. Indeed, a long elusive but recently concluded deal between Chinese CNPC and Gazprom proves that point.

Yet, one should not discount the detrimental effects to Russia's image as a reliable supplier in Asia if there is a third cut-off in supplies to Europe. China in particular is very sensitive to reliable energy supplies and their economic and national security implications and will certainly limit its gas partnership with Russia should it deem Moscow too unpredictable. Furthermore, despite Russian posturing, Moscow's increasing focus on Asia is unlikely to become a primary concern for European gas-supply security. Russia will not be in a position to play Asia against Europe.



Moscow's pursuit of an "*Eastern export policy*" is hampered by a whole range of factors, including the lack of physical interconnection between the Western Siberian gas fields supplying Europe and the Asian markets, China's resistance to Russian attempts to utilise these fields instead of under-developed East Siberian fields and different price levels.

China also has access to gas from other sources, including Central Asia, Myanmar (Burma) and LNG (liquid natural gas) shipments primarily from the Middle East and prospectively from Australia, East Africa, Canada and even the United States. Russia is being squeezed between two buyers in improving positions: an increasingly integrated European gas market on one side and a fast-growing Chinese and Asian market on the other, both with multiple supply options, in terms of forms and sources of energy.

3. While gas is in the spotlight for most of the time, oil plays a much more important role in Russia's economy and Moscow is vulnerable on that front too. Russia badly needs Western technology to maintain its oil production by tapping into its own conventional and unconventional reserves, tight oil (or shale oil)

in particular. As Moscow is actively looking into its own tight oil formations to maintain oil production and control increasing costs in partnership with Western international oil companies (IOCs), a tighter sanctions regime against Russian companies and Rosneft in particular could be a serious blow in the medium-term.

How this triangular relationship will play out between IOCs with investments in Russia pushing back on sanctions, Western governments contemplating further sanctions and key Russian players (Rosneft in particular) in need of Western know-how is critical to the sustainability of Russia's petro-economy in the medium- and long-term.

Transatlantic dilemmas

The Ukraine crisis will help Europe confront its energy security challenges and may bring closer the transatlantic alliance on energy security. But there are three strategic dilemmas that the transatlantic partners will need to respond to in the coming years.

1. It is worth recalling that the Ukraine crisis occurs at a time when the European Union – similar to other major global consumers with the notable exception of the United States – is struggling with increasing fossil fuel import dependence and huge import bills. Parallel to a push for increased usage of renewables and energy efficiency, Europe will need to consider its own indigenous unconventional gas potential. While it is unlikely that Europe will be able to replicate the American unconventional revolution, unconventional gas production may potentially offset the declining conventional production on the continent.

2. Diversifying away from Russia is within grasp but will come at a security premium. The EU is in a good position to access external gas supplies, as it is surrounded by major producing regions. At the same time, virtually all existing and prospective external gas supply sources and routes are fraught with political and hard security risks the EU and NATO will have to be acutely aware of and grapple with for decades to come. This will require a strategic rethinking of cooperation and burden sharing on issues such as energy intelligence gathering and analysis, critical energy infrastructure protection inside and outside EU and Alliance territory, cybersecurity and strategic energy relations with partner countries.

3. The United States cannot directly help Europe with gas supplies in the short term. First shipments of US LNG will not come online until 2016 with larger quantities to follow only after 2018. But in the medium-term, allowing unrestricted US LNG exports to Europe would be a great contribution to overall efforts to increase the energy security of European allies, even if the EU should be conservative about how much actual US gas will end up in Europe. The price points

in Asian markets are currently far more attractive and will likely remain the preferred destination for US gas exports. But by increasing liquidity on the global LNG markets, the United States could further improve the negotiating power of European buyers, especially those in Central Europe and the Baltics. And this would also have the symbolic value of promoting open and transparent global energy markets versus resource nationalism and protectionism.

A new chapter

The Ukraine crisis may herald a new chapter in transatlantic energy strategies and prove to be a reverse “*Arab Oil Embargo*” moment in the energy history of the transatlantic alliance. The 1973 embargo was to a large degree responsible for turning the EU towards Russia as an external energy supplier despite the *Cold War* and for prompting the United States to promote restrictive energy trade policies.



There are strong indications that there is a fundamental shift within the European Union and in the United States in terms of their assessment on their energy relationship with Russia going forward, parallel to a rethinking of energy strategies on both sides of the Atlantic as well as energy’s role within the transatlantic relationship. The Allies are in a good position to come out on top of the current crisis, provided that they persist in standing up to Russian belligerence and commit political will and resources to build a reinforced transatlantic energy alliance. The implications will go beyond the Allies and Russia. And they will help to promote an open and transparent global energy governance and trade system.

IN THE *TRIPLEX CONFINIUM* OF GREAT POWERS. OUTLOOK ON ROMANIA'S GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION IN THE MAELSTROM BETWEEN 1938 AND 1940 (II)

Colonel Dr Dan PRISĂCARU

Located in the Ponto-Baltic isthmus, in a "buffer zone", Romania was to be, between 1938 and 1940, along with twelve other nations (Finnish, Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Croatian, Greek), a "buffer" of the agreements and disputes between geopolitical centres of power in Europe, especially Germany and the Soviet Union.

According to certain Romanian politicians and diplomats, one of the causes of the fall of Greater Romania in the tragic year 1940 is the fact that, after 7 March 1936, Romania did not have a "foreign policy of geography", but a policy of "misunderstood sentimentalisms".

Keywords: buffer zone; balanced foreign policy; dismemberment of Greater Romania

Adaptation and survival in the German-Soviet geopolitical "claws"

The new neighbourhood configuration of Unified Romania, a major element in defining the geopolitical position of a state, was radically changed by the major transformations that took place at the end of the First World War. Thus, on the eastern border, there was Soviet Russia (1922, USSR), which was formed after the Bolshevik coup d'état from 25 October/7 November 1917. The new Soviet state continued the Tsarist Empire's expansionist objectives with the same consistency, did not recognise the act of 27 March/9 April 1917, which acknowledged the union of Basarabia with Romania nor the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919-1920 and adopted a revisionist policy.

Except for a short period (1934-1936), when Nicolae Titulescu, who tried to bring Romania into a security arrangement formed by the triangle Paris-Moscow-Prague, headed the Foreign Ministry, the Soviet-Romanian relations were particularly tense¹. The Soviet Union refused any Romanian settlement offer

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¹ Some of the works dealing with the Romanian-Soviet relations during the interwar period are: Florin Valeriu Dobrinescu, *Bătălia diplomatică pentru Basarabia*, Editura Junimea, Iași, 1991;

on the Basarabia issue (Romania was the only neighbour with which the Soviet Union did not sign a bilateral agreement of a political nature) and used a variety of ways and means, including the Romanian Communist Party, a section of the Comintern, in order to dismember the territory of the Romanian national state. So, Romania was directly threatened from the east. The policy pursued by the USSR throughout the interwar period, the historical antecedents, the military potential, the expansionist ideology, the pressure constantly maintained on the Nistru River line are only a few elements that anticipated the greatest dangers to Romania's security and vital interests coming from this direction.

Hungary, Romania's western neighbour, was a very tough opponent. Although the country signed the Treaty of Trianon, which established the legality of the unification act from Alba Iulia on 1 December 1918 at international level, the Hungarian political circles held an intense and continuing revisionist policy against the Romanian state throughout the interwar period.

Bulgaria, Romania's southern neighbour, also showed clear revisionist intentions. Although the Bulgarian revisionism did not have the intensity of the Hungarian one, it was aimed at the annexation of Dobrogea and, as a minimum objective, at reoccupying the *Cadrilater* (Southern Dobrogea).

Romania had good relations with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia throughout the interwar period; between 1920 and 1921, the three countries formed a regional defence alliance, *Little Entente*², which was intended mainly to counter Hungarian revisionism.

The imperative to maintain the status quo in the Balkans led to the creation, in 1934, of the *Balkan Entente*, a regional defence alliance, joined by Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey³.

With the northern neighbour, Poland, the relations were overall positive, reflected in a political-military alliance, defensive in nature, signed in 1921

Marin C. Stănescu, *Moscova, Cominternul, filiera comunistă balcanică și România (1919-1947)*, Editura Silex, București, 1994; Nicolae Titulescu, *Politica externă a României – 1937*, edition by George G. Potra, Constantin I. Turcu, Ion M. Oprea, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1994; *Relațiile româno-sovietice. Documente, vol. I, 1917-1934*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1999, *volumul II, 1935-1941*, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 2003; Emilian Bold, Răzvan Locovei Ovidiu, *Relațiile româno-sovietice (1918-1941)*, Casa Editorială Demiurg, Iași, 2008 etc.

² Eliza Campus, *Înțelegere*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1968, Milan Vanku, *Mica Înțelegere și politica externă a Iugoslaviei, 1920-1938. Momente și semnificații*, Editura Politică, București, 1979.

³ Eliza Campus, *Înțelegerea Balcanică*, Editura Academiei R.S.R., București, 1972; Cristian Popișteanu, *Înțelegerea Balcanică. Momente și semnificații*, Editura Științifică, București, 1977; Alexandru Oșca, Gheorghe Nicolescu, *Tratate, convenții militare și protocoale secrete (1934-1939)*, Editura Vlasie, Pitești, 1994.




Figure 1: Little Entente (1921 – 1938) – Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia

and renewed in 1926 and 1931⁴. The Treaty ensured support for each party in case of an unprovoked attack from the East and was particularly important, as it was the only support facing the Soviet expansion, the greatest danger to Romania. The bilateral relations deteriorated when the Foreign Ministry was run by Nicolae Titulescu, because of his belief in improving relations with the Soviet Union, something which was entirely unacceptable for the Polish side.

In turn, Poland had tense relations with Czechoslovakia, one of Romania's main allies, because of a dispute over Teschen province. Instead, Warsaw maintained cordial relations with Hungary, Polish diplomacy refusing to ratify the Treaty of Trianon, which legally consecrated the Great Union of 1 December 1918. Also, Józef Beck, Polish Foreign Minister, actively supported the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian border by dividing the territory called Carpathian Ruthenia, located in Czechoslovakia until 14 March 1939, which affected the security interests of Romania, especially in Transilvania.

Following this brief presentation of Romania's neighbours and the relationships with them in the interwar period, it appeared that 53% of the national borders were vulnerable, being threatened from three directions: east, west and south.

⁴ Dumitru Tuțu, *Alianțele militare ale României*, in *Probleme de politică externă a României 1918-1940*, vol. II, Editura Militară, București, 1977, pp. 108-162; Nicolae Dascălu, *Relații româno-polone în perioada interbelică (1919-1939)*, Editura Academiei Române, București, 1991; Daniel Hrenciuc, *România și Polonia. 1918-1931. Relații politice, diplomatice și militare*, Suceava University Press, 2005.




Figure 2: The Balkans Entente (1934 – 1940) – Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey

The Romanian military analysts had correctly perceived this reality. In 1927, Major Ion Cernăianu wrote: *“Our neighbours, Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary, from which we took back the territories that we deserved, have been accustomed to regard these territories as an absolute and permanent ownership, and tearing them from their body has been seen by them as a blatant injustice. As a result, their enmity finds the essential resort in territorial claims, joining them in a community of interests. Therefore, we must look at the Russian-Hungarian-Bulgarian friendship as a true aggressive alliance, which will strike us without mercy when it is able to do so”*⁵. These are fair and realistic observations that will unfortunately come true in the fateful year of 1940.

Given the geographical and territorial configuration of the country and the development of the external risk factors, the General Staff had to design a defensive model by dividing the territory into “fronts”, hypothetical theatres, in order to counter the threats on the mentioned directions. Thus, there were formed: *“the Eastern Front”* between the Eastern Carpathians and Nistru River, the *“Southern Front”* between the Southern Carpathians and the Danube River, including Dobrogea, and *“the Western Front”* between the Western Carpathians and the western border.

⁵ Maior Ion Cernăianu, *Adoptarea doctrinei franceze în armata noastră*, Tipografia Adolf Auspitz, Lugoj, 1927, p. 15.

Transilvanian Highlands, called “*the strategic redoubt of the country*”, usually represented the place of concentration of the General Staff reserve⁶. The political and military developments from the regions that interested the Romanian state could have led to military operations conducted on one, two or three directions. The assumption of a simultaneous attack launched from the three strategic directions would have created a very difficult situation, described by military experts of the interwar period as “*the Romanian strategic issue*”.

Romania had the military capability and the necessary force to repel only one offensive, launched by either the Hungarian or the Bulgarian armed forces or even a combined attack from both countries. The situation could become difficult in case of a Soviet military attack, given the obvious difference of the two armies’ potential. In case of an aggression from the three strategic directions, “*the Romanian strategic issues*” would have become unsolvable⁷.

The campaign plans of the Romanian Armed Forces in the interwar period scheduled the manoeuvre on inner lines, in response to external lines manoeuvre of potential adversaries. In case of an aggression from one or more lines, the most exposed “*front*” would have been activated and the general strategic reserve was to be employed on the threatened theatre. Since the Carpathian chain hindered the manoeuvre from one direction to another, the General Staff proposed to the policymakers the development of the rail and road infrastructure in the mountainous region. The option of resistance in the intra-Carpathian plateau, considered “*the orographic centre of the national defence*”, although it was one of the last solutions available to the Romanian state for preserving its existence, was also taken into account by the strategic planning structures⁸.

The Romanian defence pattern was relying largely on the political and military alliances concluded between the two world wars. The Romanian political and military decision-makers were persuaded that, in case of an USSR attack against Romania, the alliance with Poland would have become operational, the Little Entente would have countered Hungary’s aggression and the Balkan Entente would have blocked a possible attack from Bulgaria. In addition, the political elite in Bucureşti relied on the support of France and England as great guarantor powers of the political

⁶ Pamfil C. Georgian, *Considerațiuni generale asupra geografiei militare*, Bucureşti, 1939; Arhivele Militare Române (A.M.R.), Fund 948, file no. 552, p. 64.

⁷ Locotenent-colonel Ioan Cernăianu, *Defensiva în lumina noilor idei doctrinare românești*, Bucureşti, Tipografia Marelui Stat Major, 1933, pp. 23-37; Petre Otu, *Îmbrățișarea anacondei. Politica militară a României în perioada 1 septembrie 1939-22 iunie 1941*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 27.

⁸ General de divizie (r.) prof. univ. dr. Valentin Arsenie, general de brigadă dr. Petre Botezatu (coord.), *Strategia militară românească în epoca modernă (1859-1999)*, Editura Nummus, Bucureşti, 1999, pp. 83-131.

system created in Versailles. At a primary assessment, the Romanian alliance system seemed a well-articulated building, capable of providing Romania with adequate protection. However, a closer approach would have shown much structural vulnerability. Although the major threat to Romania came from the East, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente could provide small relief to Romania from this direction. For example, Czechoslovakia had very good relations with the USSR and the operations plans of the three states of the Little Entente did not foresee the participation of Czechoslovak and Yugoslavian military forces to a response operation against a Soviet aggression. Turkey, in turn, introduced a clause to avoid being engaged in a military conflict with the Soviet Union.

Moreover, Romania's presence in the two regional alliances worsened the relations with Germany and Italy because they had disputes with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The events during 1937-1938 would show that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, for different reasons, were vulnerable entities of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, which eventually caused the failure of the political project of the two regional security structures⁹.

The fact that Romania had not signed military agreements with France and Great Britain that would represent credible guarantees for the independence and territorial integrity of our country was also aggravating. The Treaty with France from 10 June 1926 had a general character, more of a moral value, while the one with the United Kingdom was not even a security arrangement. There was also a big issue in providing military help to Romania in case of a military conflict on the Eastern front, unless Bulgaria was favourable to an Anglo-French policy in the region. Nevertheless, this meant territorial concessions to Bulgaria, especially from Romania and Greece, which was an unpopular fact for București and Athens.

Another European centre of power that tremendously influenced the geopolitical position of Romania in the second half of the fourth decade of the twentieth century was Germany. The Third Reich was interested in reoccupying the positions held until 1914 in Central and Southeastern Europe, and Romania, with its oil and agricultural resources, became an important matter in German expansion plans. The political and economic subordination strategy adopted by the Berlin authorities included economic pressures, encouraging Hungarian-Bulgarian revisionist claims, conducting skilful propaganda, disruption of the regional alliance system that included Romania, supporting some of the internal political forces etc.¹⁰.

⁹ Martin Wight, *Politica de putere*, Editura Arc, 1998, pp. 138-143.

¹⁰ Regarding Berlin actions, see the work of Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu. Relațiile româno-germane 1938-1944*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1994, pp. 43-124.

Given the changes in the European balance of power in favour of Germany, after 7 March 1936¹¹, the decreasing Franco-British influence in Central and Southeastern Europe and the appeasement of London and Paris towards the breach of the peace treaties by revisionist states, some Romanian politicians argued that a possible solution for preserving the territorial integrity of Unified Romania was to get closer to Germany. Thus, George Brătianu, Octavian Goga, Mihai Manoilescu, Lecca etc. advocated for strengthening the economic and political ties with Berlin, being opposed to Nicolae Titulescu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who advocated for a closer relation with the Soviet Union and the inclusion of Romania in the triangle Paris-Prague-Moscow¹².

In the parliamentary debate from October 1935, George Brătianu argued that concluding a non-aggression pact with the USSR was “*a deadly threat to the existence of the Romanian state*”, since, according to the great historian, “*without any intention of defending us against the threats coming from the West, the Soviet troops entering our territory would lead to a clash between foreign armies and make this country, as it was two centuries ago, the battlefield of hostile imperialisms in Central and Eastern Europe*”¹³.

In the same vein, in November 1936, during the debates in the Parliament, Octavian Goga drew attention to this issue, saying that “*a war alongside Russia, regardless of whether we will be winners or losers, would create a hopeless situation: if we were to be defeated we will suffer the consequences of the *Vae victis dictum!* A victorious Bolshevik Russia ... would be a penetration to the West, the trampling of our land, a continental, even global Bolshevisation, I would say...*”¹⁴. Octavian Goga was a supporter of the idea that “*Greater Romania was possible only after fighting against Vienna, but it shall not be maintained unless Berlin’s help is involved*”¹⁵. In fact, he continued the political axiom formulated by Titu Maiorescu, who said, in 1881, that “*the state that owns the Danube Delta is forced to become an ally of Germany*”¹⁶.

¹¹ A.J.P. Taylor, *Originile celui de-Al Doilea Război Mondial*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 1999, p. 88; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomația*, second edition, Editura ALL, București, 2002, p. 267.

¹² Details in Rebecca Haynes, *Politica României față de Germania între 1936-1940*, Editura Polirom, 2003, pp. 105-124; Petre Otu, Aurel Pentelescu, *Gheorghe I. Brătianu, Istorie și politică*, Editura Corint, București, 2003, pp. 16-47; Ioan Chiper, *România și Germania nazistă. Relațiile româno-germane între comandamentele politice și interese economice (ianuarie 1933-martie 1938)*, Editura Elion, București, 2000, pp. 201-249.

¹³ Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (Central Historical National Archives) (A.N.I.C.), Fund Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri (Presidency of the Council of Ministers) (P.C.M.), file no. 26/1935, p. 12.

¹⁴ *La politique étrangère de la Roumanie* par Octavian Goga, București, 1937, pp. 49-50.

¹⁵ ANIC, PCM Fund, Ion Antonescu Military Cabinet, file no. 137/1940, pp. 49-50.

¹⁶ Apud Petre Otu, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

With the new European geopolitical realities in mind, after 7 March 1936, the decision-makers in București opted for a prudent policy of navigating between the established continental blocks of power. The traditional orientation towards France and Great Britain was kept, but there were also sought ways to improve the relations with Germany and to avoid excessive closeness to the Soviet Union. Armand Călinescu, synthesised this political orientation on 24 May 1938, in his diary: *“Geographical Location. Rich country. Located on the avenue of invasions. On the traffic routes – the Danube. Where ideologies are intersecting / ... / which should the political approach be? No sentimentality, just interests. There can be neither the Russians nor the Germans. If we stand by the Germans, their victory means economic and then political subjugation. We have seen this before, the country and the crown. And then it was a Hohenzollern, a relative and a knight. Humiliations, nevertheless. What would it be with an adventurer of low origin? Therefore, armed support must be sought away. I recognise that France is in crisis. At the point of recovery although. But we have Great Britain. Here we must anchor our policy”*¹⁷.

A big anglophile, the Romanian Prime Minister did not accept that Britain would not support the countries of southeastern Europe, including Romania, against the German and Soviet expansion. Subsequent events showed that Britain followed only its own interests in this area. On 27 September 1939, London notified the Government in București that, in the case of a Soviet aggression, Romania would not receive military support from it, a decision strengthened by the secret provision of the treaty between France, Britain and Turkey, signed in Ankara on 19 October 1939. Later, the *“Churchill-Stalin Percentage Sgreement”*¹⁸ signed in Moscow in October 1944 sealed the placement of 90% of Romania under the Soviet Union influence in exchange of a similar share for Great Britain in Greece.

The annexation of Austria in 13 March 1938 and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia by the *“Munich Agreement”* disaggregated the Little Entente and worsened Romania’s geopolitical situation¹⁹.

In an internal document, dated 27 October 1938, the General Staff drew attention to this worrying fact, stating that: *“The events of recent years have shaken much of the value of these alliances / ... / Great Britain and France were not able to oppose and the Little Entente had a passive attitude. Since the amputation of Czechoslovakia, the Little Entente, although not formally dissolved, is in fact*

¹⁷ Armand Călinescu, *Însemnări politice*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1990, pp. 391-392.

¹⁸ Albert Resis, *The Churchill-Stalin Secret “Percentages” Agreement on Balkans*, Moscow, October 1944, in *“The American Historical Review”*, vol. 83 (1978), no. 2, pp. 368 et seq.

¹⁹ Milică Moldoveanu, *Dezmembrarea Cehoslovaciei (1938-1939) și implicațiile politico-militare asupra centrului și sud-estului Europei în Probleme de politică externă ale României (1918-1940)*, vol. III, Editura Militară, București, 1988.



Figure 3: The four “artisans” of Czechoslovakia’s split, from left to right: Neville Chamberlain, Edouard Daladier, Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini

*non-existent/ ... /, a lesson learnt from the recent events is that the value of the alliances and political-military commitments signed in peacetime is relative*²⁰. Also, in another document, the General Staff pointed out: *“Through the partial annexation of the Bohemian Quadrilateral and the control over Vienna, the most important communication centre in Central Europe, Germany implicitly controlled the entire Danube basin and its expansion in the three directions, south, east and south-east, was far more easier*”²¹.

Through the total dissolution of the Czechoslovak state on 15 March 1939, Romania’s geopolitical and military situation became far more complicated. The General Staff had to organise a new defence line in the Maramureş area in order to cut off a potential attack threatening the right flank and the rear guard of the Transilvanian front. Under the pressure of new events, on 14 March 1939, Romania declared the partial mobilisation and signed the economic treaty with Germany on 23 March.

In 13 April 1939, Great Britain and France, concerned by the German rapid expansion in Central and Southeastern Europe, granted unilateral security guarantees to Romania and Greece. The Berlin leaders reacted with hostility, considering this as part of the “encirclement” policy against the Reich. Besides, during Grigore Gafencu’s visit in Germany, from 18 to 20 April 1939, Hermann Göring pointed out to him that *“if Romania takes part in the encirclement policy, we (the Germans) will abandon it to the Bulgarian and Hungarian neighbours*”²². Moreover, the Nazi leader showed his dissatisfaction, saying that *“after Munich, in a region we hoped to be undisputed leaders, that is Eastern, Danubian and Balkan*

²⁰ AMR, Fund 948, file no. 493, pp. 113-114.

²¹ *Ibid*, file no. 323, p. 224.

²² Grigore Gafencu, *Ultimele zile ale Europei*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1992, pp. 69-70.

Europe, Great Britain and France showed again their presence”²³. In the discussion with Göring, Gafencu proposed that Germany should give Romania a guarantee like the Franco-British one, but the proposal remained unanswered²⁴.

In the context of the deterioration of the European political and military situation, the authorities in București regarded with hope the tripartite Russian-Franco-British negotiations, in the summer of 1939. At the same time, they were aware of the fact that Romania situation was damaging. Armand Călinescu wrote down in his “Notes” that we had “weaknesses in the West, East and South alike” and that “we won’t escape the broil (the war)”²⁵. It is well-known that the authorities in București were not consulted in any way by the Western allies regarding the Soviet request for the Red Army to transit the Romanian territory, in the event of any action against Germany; the responsibility for the failure of the tripartite negotiations was cynically and hypocritically discarded by Moscow on Poland. In this regard, on 25 August 1939, in the Soviet capital, V. Molotov declared to Emille Naggiar, the French ambassador, that “Poland’s stubborn refusal (to allow the Soviet troops to transit the Polish territory) makes a tripartite pact support impossible”, and therefore, “the Soviet government had to solve the problem... by signing the non-aggression pact with Germany”²⁶.

At that moment, Carol II tried, through Turkey, to explore the Moscow position towards the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Romania. Therefore, on 11 August 1939, during the discussions with Turkish President Ismet İnönü, the Romanian sovereign said that “Romania, especially given its grains and oil, would provide, in case of defeat, an enormous benefit to the offenders. Therefore, as events will allow, Romania wants to take action as late as possible, being convinced that preventing the aggressors from getting their resources and throwing their forces into the war in the crucial moments will bring services to the common cause”²⁷.

The King’s remarks showed up his intention to keep Romania away from a European war as long as possible and also the warned that, in case of defeat, the offenders could benefit from the country’s resources, harming “the common cause”. The Moscow tripartite negotiations failure and Ribbentrop-Molotov pact gave the coup de grace to the alliance system built by Romania in the interwar period and led to an almost complete political and military isolation of the country. After 23 August 1939, the Franco-British support as well as the German-Soviet rivalry did not present advantages for Romania’s security anymore. The German-Soviet agreement swept out the France and Great Britain presence in Southeastern Europe,

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Armand Călinescu, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

²⁶ Grigore Gafencu, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

²⁷ A.N.I.C., Collection Vasile Stoica, file no. I/70, p. 70.

the European equilibrium was destroyed and the rebuilt Romania was in an almost intricate geopolitical and geostrategic situation. It was again in a buffer state position, between two centres of power that were sharing their areas of influence from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Although they did not know the details of the Ribbentrop/Molotov Agreement, the Romanian leaders were aware of the new geopolitical situation of the country. In this respect, on 22 August 1939, Armand Călinescu observed in his journal: *“Coup de grace of the German-Soviet Agreement. I consider it a very serious situation; did they have a deal to divide Poland and Romania?”*²⁸. In turn, Grigore Gafencu observed with high precision: *“Romania was not surrounded as before anymore, by two rival empires that demanded only its neutrality, but by two partners who wanted nothing else but for our country to obey with docility to the new order they agreed upon”*²⁹.



Figure 4: Signatories of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
– Joachim von Ribbentrop (left), Vyacheslav M. Molotov (right),
and Iosif V. Stalin (centre)

Also, Constantin Argetoianu was realistically analysing the German-Soviet Agreement effects: *“Russia has pursued – wrote the cynical politician – only a single matter, to start a war in Europe, to maintain it at least 2-3 years, to watch and then to collect the benefits. The benefits, regardless of the winner, will be the ruin, the anarchy and the communism imposed to all belligerent countries. What the Third International and propaganda couldn’t do, the war would do”*³⁰.

Trapped between the Soviet Union, whose minimal requirement was the annexation of Basarabia and Bucovina, and Germany, highly interested in the Romanian oil

²⁸ Armand Călinescu, *op. cit.*, p. 425.

²⁹ Grigore Gafencu, *Preliminarii*, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

³⁰ Constantin Argetoianu, *Însemnări zilnice, vol. VII, 1 iulie-22 noiembrie 1939*, Editura Machiavelli, București, 2003, pp. 78-79.



Figure 5: German soldiers destroying the Polish border checkpoint from Sopot in September 1939. The invasion of Poland marks the onset of the Second World War in Europe. This image does not represent the actual moment of the border crossing but a staging of German propaganda, a few days later.

and grains, as well as the political control of the rest of the national territory, Romania declared its neutrality on 6 September 1939. It was a temporary solution, suited to the geopolitical realities of the moment. Between 6 September 1939 and 28 May 1940, the day of Belgium's surrender, Romania led a balanced external policy, or a "right turn", as Grigore Gafencu observed, between the two totalitarian powers in the East and West. It was a specific conduct of a buffer state and was part of the Romanian tradition of diplomacy, originated from the middle ages³¹.

The political and military leading factors from București were still hoping that the Franco-British side would maintain the balance of power in the West, but also in the Southeastern part of the continent. Belgium's surrender and France's military collapse dissipated definitely their illusions.

Radu Lecca claimed in his memoirs that Carol II and his collaborators' sympathies and pro-allies beliefs during the neutrality represented one of the factors that allowed the surviving of Unified Romania until June 1940. Therefore, Radu Lecca said: "In București, I found a German journalist named Klaus Schikert, whom I have known since 1933, from «Völkischer Beobachter», and now has been appointed here as a representative of the D.N.B. official press agency. Schikert was well informed and in Germany he had relations with the administration. In that period (1939-1940), I was expecting every day that Romania be dismantled. So was Ritgen (another German diplomat). But Schikert told us that Romania's dismantling cannot happen unless

³¹ Sorin Alexandrescu, *Paradoxul român*, Editura Univers, București, 1998, pp. 124-129.

*France is occupied, because King Carol, as long as France is not defeated, would be able to resist militarily against the territorial cession. In that case, Russia, as a neighbour, would be the first to occupy the oil regions, which would not suit Germany at all. This is the reason why it could remain whole until the summer of 1940*³². Without enhancing the role of this factor, we consider that it must be taken into account when analysing the period September 1939-June 1940.

After Wehrmacht's victories on the Western Front and the prospect of being alone in front of the Soviet colossus, Carol II and the people near him changed the external political orientation in order to save what they could in terms of Unified Romania independency and borders. It was already late. After Basarabia, Northern Bucovina and the Hertza Land were seized, the German "card" remained the only solution or "the smallest evil" to ensure the survival of the Romanian state. However, "the price" imposed by Germany was much bigger than the one asked in 1936. The Reich demanded imperatively that Romania reached an agreement with Hungary and Bulgaria regarding the two countries' territorial claims. Totally isolated politically and militarily, with weakened internal cohesion and an army poorly equipped and ready for war, the regime of King Carol gave away the North-West of Transylvania to Hungary and the Quadrilater to Bulgaria.

Romania's geopolitical and geostrategic situation became critical and there was a real risk of total territorial dismantling of the state, because the Soviets were supporting Bulgaria and Hungary's territorial claims and were maintaining a permanent tension at the borders imposed by the ultimatums from 26 and 27 June 1940. There are indicators outlining the hypothesis that the Soviets were interested in triggering armed hostilities between Hungary and Romania, which would have provided favourable conditions for crossing the Prut River, occupying the Eastern Carpathians, the oil region and Dobrogea in order to expand their influence in the Balkan Peninsula³³.

Understanding the Soviet intentions, Hitler imposed the Vienna "arbitration" from 30 August 1940 on Romania, established a strategic border on Eastern Carpathians at approximately 90 km from Prahova Valley, to have under control the oil region of Prahova, in case of necessity. To cut off the Soviet access in the Southeastern Europe, the Reich guaranteed the new borders of mutilated Romania, producing the second rupture in the Soviet-German relations after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.

³² Radu Lecca, *Eu i-am salvat pe evreii din România*, Editura Roza Vânturilor, București, 1994, p. 137.

³³ MOL, G 63-253 csomó-1940-27, Encrypted telegram no. 123 of 23.08.1940 to the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow, signed Csáky, DIMK, document no. 314, pp. 508-509, apud Ottmar Trașcă, *U.R.S.S. și diferendul româno-maghiar în vara anului 1940*, in "România și relațiile internaționale în secolul XX", Cluj-Napoca, 2000, pp. 188-203.




Figure 6: Romania, October 1940

Source: *Spațiul istoric și etnic românesc*, vol. 1, second edition, Editura Militară, București, 1992.

The dramatic events from the summer of 1940 outlined once again Romania's difficult situation as a buffer state between the two poles of geopolitical power. Located in the Ponto-Baltic isthmus, Romania, together with other 12 nations (Finnish, Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Croatian, and Greek) had to be a "buffer" to the shocks caused by the geopolitical centres from East and West. The warnings coming from some Romanian politicians and diplomats who stated that Romania must follow "a geographical foreign policy" and not one of "badly understood sentimentalities" were unfortunately confirmed³⁴.

In the perspective of the subsequent course of events, we consider that this kind of politics, if it did not save Basarabia and Northern Bucovina, because the Soviet Union was among the winners of the Second World War, would have imposed another course of events that could have saved the honour of the country and of the armed forces in 1940 and, perhaps, would have limited the human and material losses generated by the participation in the Eastern and Western war for recovering the territories lost without a fight.



³⁴ In this regard, see the manuscript of diplomat Nicolae Henric Lahovary entitled "Contribuție la problema RĂSPUNDERILOR. Cum am fi putut păstra ROMÂNIA MARE", an essay on Romanian foreign policy failures in the interwar period and its effects on the Great Unification of 1918, published by George Nicolescu in *Diplomație și diplomați români*, Editura DMPress, Focșani, 2001, pp. 311-339.

THE 2013 GÂNDIREA MILITARĂ ROMÂNEASCĂ JOURNAL AWARDS

THE 16TH EDITION – 12 November 2014

On 12 November 2014, two events very significant for the life of our editorial staff took place in the *Marble Hall* of the National Military Circle: the 150th anniversary of the *România Militară* Journal, the precursor of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal, and the 16th edition of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal Awards, once again part of the events dedicated to the General Staff Day (12 November). Academician Dan Berindei, member of the Editorial Board of the *Gândirea militară românească* Journal, Lieutenant General Dr Nicolae Ciucă, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and Lieutenant General Dr Niculae Tabarcia, Chairman of the *Journal Awards Selection, Evaluation and Nomination Commission*, were among those present at the ceremony.



As a corollary of the history of our journal, in its century and a half of existence, the *Romania Militară – Promoter of the Gândirea militară românească* almanac was launched, together with a CD comprising the most important moments from the 15 editions of the *Journal Awards*.


At the same time, *anniversary diplomas* were presented, as a token of appreciation, to the authors of articles and the collaborators of our journal who have helped build the journal's prestige and national and international acknowledgement.



At the beginning of the ceremony, the Chairman of the Commission pointed out the hard-working, productive, but extremely difficult activity of the Commission members – Air Flotilla General Dr Liviu Marilen Lungulescu, Colonel Dr Anton Stan, Brigadier General (r.) Dr Costică Țenu and Colonel (r.) Dr Petre Otu – thanking them for their objectivity and meticulousness in deciding the winners. The awards, for five different domains, were presented by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff.


Here are the laureates of the *Journal Awards* for this year:

- The Award “*Marshal Alexandru Averescu*”, for the *Military History* domain, was presented to **Teodor FRUNZETI** – coordinator, co-authors **Corneliu ANDONIE**, **Ion GIURCĂ**, **Marian MOȘNEAGU**, **Vasile POPA** and **Florian TUCĂ** for “*Mareșali ai României*”/“*Romania’s Marshals*”.




- The Award “*Division General Ștefan Fălcoianu*”, for the *Military Policy, Security and Collective and National Defence* domain, was presented to **Mihail ORZEATĂ** for “*Între război și pace. Lumea dominată de conflicte în care trăim*”/“*Between War and Peace. The World Dominated by Conflicts We Live In*”.

- The Award “*Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu*”, for the *Military Art* domain, was presented to **Victor STRÎMBEANU**, **Marius-Adrian NICOARĂ**, **Mircea BARAC**, **Daniel STAN**, **Sorin TURTURICĂ** and **Adrian SULTĂNOIU** for “*Aeronautica militară română*”/ “*Romanian Military Aeronautics*”.



- The Award “*Army Corps General Ioan Sichițiu*”, for the *Troops Organisation, Training, Command and Logistics* domain, was presented to **Ion CERĂCEANU** and **Vasile POPA** for “*Transmisiunile Armatei Române în Campania din Est (1941-1944)*”/ “*Romanian Armed Force Communications in the Eastern Campaign (1941-1944)*”.


- The Award “*Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu*”, for the *Geopolitics and Geostrategy* domain, was presented to **Eugen LUNGU** for “*Zece ani de turbulențe în securitatea lumii. 2001-2011*”/ “*Ten Years of Turmoil in World Security. 2001-2011*”.



Other nominees for the Gândirea militară românească Journal Awards were:



For the Award “Marshal Alexandru Averescu”: “*Campania militară a României din 1913. O istorie în imagini, documente și mărturii de epocă*”/
“*Romania’s 1913 Military Campaign. A History in Pictures, Documents and Memoirs of an Epoch*”, coordinator **Virgil COMAN**, co-authors **Stoica LASCU**, **Constantin CHERAMIDOGLU**, **Marian MOȘNEAGU**, **Vasile REGHINTOVSCI**, **Angela POP**, **Radu CORNESCU**,
and “*Blindatele cerului. Grupul 8 Asalt în Est și în Vest (1943-1945)*”/
“*Armoured Vehicles in the Sky. The 8th Assault Group in the East and the West (1943-1945)*”,
co-authors **Valeriu AVRAM** and **Alexandru ARMĂ**.



For the Award “Division General Ștefan Fălcoianu”: “*Veteranii Marinei. Căpitan-comandor Alexandru Dumbravă*”/
“*Marine Veterans. Admirals’ Guild Căpitan-comandor Alexandru Dumbravă*”,
coordinators **Mariana PĂVĂLOIU**, **Bogdan DINU**,
and “*Smerș în Basarabia. 1944-1954*”/“*Smerș in Basarabia. 1944-1954*”, author **Pavel MORARU**.



For the Award “Brigadier General Constantin Hîrjeu”: “Spațiul cosmic – dimensiune a acțiunilor militare”/“Cosmic Space – Dimension of Military Actions”, author **Laurențiu Răducu POPESCU**, and “Aviatoarele României. Din înaltul cerului în beciurile Securității”/ “Romania’s Female Aviators. From High Above the Sky to the Securitate Prison Cells”, author **Sorin TURTURICĂ**.



For the Award “Army Corps General Ioan Sichițiu”: “Managementul cunoștințelor în organizațiile mari”/“Knowledge Management in Large Organisations”, co-authors **Ion ROCEANU, Ciprian LUNGU**, and “Cunoașterea integrativă a personalității. Un model teoretico-metodologic”/ “Integrative Knowledge of the Personality. A Theoretical-Methodological Pattern”, author **Adrian PRISĂCARU**.



For the Award “Lieutenant Colonel Mircea Tomescu”: “Sub povara a 90 000 de tone de diplomație? Statele Unite ale Americii, strategia hegemonică și declinul relativ de putere”/“Under the Load of 90 000 Tons of Diplomacy? The United States, the Hegemonic Strategy and the Relative Decline of Power”,
author **Simona R. SOARE**,
and “Spionajul american în România. 1944-1948”/
“American Espionage in Romania. 1944-1948”,
author **Sorin APARASCHIVEI**.




The *Certificate of Excellence of the Gândirea militară românească Journal* for 2013 was given to:

➤ **The Armed Forces Technical-Editorial Centre**, for its outstanding contribution to the enrichment of the heritage of military science.



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Foreign Affairs, USA, vol. 93, no. 5,
September-October 2014

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Jane's IDR, UK, vol. 47, July 2014

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***Military Technology*, vol. 38, no. 7, 2014**

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***Military Technology*, vol. 38, no. 8, 2014**

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***Signal, USA*, vol. 68, no. 11, July 2014**

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***World Policy Journal*, vol. 31, no. 2,**

Summer 2014

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*Dr Mihai POPESCU, Delia PETRACHE,
Cătălina ROJIȘTEANU
National Military Library*

2014 / 2015

Thank you, dear collaborators, for the word materialised in the pages of the journal of the General Staff!

Thank you for the fact that, together, we have written a page in the history of the Romanian Military Thinking!

Therefore, it is to each of You we express our gratitude and appreciation:

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“GMR” Editorial Staff

*We thank you all – the collaborators and readers
of our journal alike, and we wish you happy holidays.
May you be healthy and loved!*

Happy New Year!

FOR THE ATTENTION OF THOSE INTERESTED IN SUBMITTING ARTICLES TO “RMT”

Manuscripts submitted to the editorial staff should be sent by mail or email, edited in *Microsoft Word, Times New Roman, size 14, justify*, and they should have no more than 8 pages. The **graphic illustration** – schemes, figures, tables should be designed using *CorelDraw*, and maps and images – in *JPEG* format.

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To optimise our collaboration, submissions should be accompanied by the following: name, phone/fax number, email, address of the institution and other relevant information.

RMT Editorial Staff reserves the right to make editorial changes regarding the style, grammar and length of the manuscripts. Authors will be consulted, in case the changes could affect the form or the content of the manuscript.

We expect You, with interest and hope, to submit your articles for publication, mentioning that manuscripts and relating materials are not given back to authors. Thank you for your understanding!

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The editorial and layout process
was completed on 16 December 2014.



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Cover 3: Jens Stoltenberg takes up office as NATO Secretary General - Press Conference and Press Reception.
Left to Right: Oana Lungescu (NATO Spokesperson) with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Carmen Romero (Deputy NATO Spokesperson).
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_113445.htm
Cover 4: Torchlight Procession – 1 December 2014. Photo: Eugen Mihai.



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